[Senate Hearing 108-440]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-440, Pt. 1
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2005
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 2400
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 1
MILITARY POSTURE
SERVICE CHIEFS
SERVICE SECRETARIES
UNIFIED AND COMBATANT COMMANDERS
MISSILE DEFENSE
ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
ROLE OF U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
UNIFIED AND REGIONAL COMMANDERS
CONTINGENT RESERVE FUND REQUEST
__________
FEBRUARY 4, 10; MARCH 2, 4, 11, 23, 25; APRIL 1; MAY 13, 2004
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
----------
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Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JACK REED, Rhode Island
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BILL NELSON, Florida
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN CORNYN, Texas MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Military Posture
february 4, 2004
Page
Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald H., Secretary of Defense; Accompanied by
Hon. Dov S. Zakheim, Comptroller, Department of Defense; Gen.
Peter Pace, USMC, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Hon.
Steven Cambone, Under Secretary for Intelligence; and Hon.
David S.C. Chu, Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness.... 10
Service Chiefs
february 10, 2004
Schoomaker, GEN Peter J., USA, Chief of Staff, United States
Army; Accompanied by LTG Steven Blum, USA, Chief, National
Guard Bureau................................................... 143
Clark, ADM Vernon E., USN, Chief of Naval Operations............. 186
Hagee, Gen. Michael W., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps..... 209
Jumper, Gen. John P., USAF, Chief of Staff, United States Air
Force.......................................................... 227
Service Secretaries
march 2, 2004
Brownlee, Hon. Les, Acting Secretary of the Army................. 886
England, Hon. Gordon R., Secretary of the Navy................... 902
Roche, Hon. James G., Secretary of the Air Force................. 917
Unified and Regional Commanders on Their Military Strategy and
Operational Requirements
march 4, 2004
Abizaid, GEN John P., USA, Commander, United States Central
Command........................................................ 990
Jones, Gen. James L., USMC, Commander, United States European
Command, and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.................. 1007
Ballistic Missile Defense
march 11, 2004
Wynne, Hon. Michael W., Acting Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics......................... 1082
Christie, Hon. Thomas P., Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation..................................................... 1086
Ellis, ADM James O., Jr., USN, Commander, United States Strategic
Command........................................................ 1090
Kadish, Lt. Gen. Ronald T., USAF, Director, Missile Defense
Agency......................................................... 1096
Dodgen, LTG Larry J., USA, Commander, Space and Missile Defense
Command........................................................ 1110
Atomic Energy Defense Activities of the Department of Energy
march 23, 2004
Abraham, Hon. Spencer, Secretary of Energy....................... 1178
The Role of U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Special Operations Command
in Defending the Homeland and in the Global War on Terrorism
march 25, 2004
O'Connell, Hon. Thomas W., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.................. 1233
Brown, GEN Bryan D., USA, Commander, United States Special
Operations Command............................................. 1239
McHale, Hon. Paul, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense........................................................ 1247
Eberhart, Gen. Ralph E., USAF, Commander, United States Northern
Command, and Commander, North American Aerospace Defense
Command........................................................ 1256
Unified and Regional Commanders on Their Military Strategy and
Operational Requirements
april 1, 2004
Fargo, ADM Thomas B., USN, Commander, United States Pacific
Command........................................................ 1313
LaPorte, GEN Leon J., USA, Commander, United Nations Command and
Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command, and
Commander, United States Forces Korea; Accompanied by Maj. Gen.
Timothy Donovan, USMC, C-5, United States Forces Korea......... 1338
Hill, GEN James T., USA, Commander, United States Southern
Command........................................................ 1355
Contingent Reserve Fund Request
may 13, 2004
Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul D., Deputy Secretary of Defense............. 1405
Kaplan, Hon. Joel D., Office of Management and Budget............ 1411
Pace, Gen. Peter, USMC, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.......................................................... 1415
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2005
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
MILITARY POSTURE
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room
HR-2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain,
Roberts, Sessions, Collins, Ensign, Talent, Chambliss, Graham,
Dole, Cornyn, Levin, Kennedy, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, Ben
Nelson, Dayton, Bayh, Clinton, and Pryor.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director; Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, chief clerk; Cindy Pearson,
assistant chief clerk and security manager; and Leah C. Brewer,
nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; L. David Cherington, counsel; Regina
A. Dubey, research assistant; Brian R. Green, professional
staff member; William C. Greenwalt, professional staff member;
Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley,
professional staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional
staff member; Elaine A. McCusker, professional staff member;
Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Paula J.
Philbin, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten,
professional staff member; Joseph T. Sixeas, professional staff
member; Scott W. Stucky, general counsel; Diana G. Tabler,
professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional
staff member; Madelyn R. Creedon, minority counsel; Kenneth M.
Crosswait, professional staff member; Gabriella Eisen, research
assistant; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard
W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton Greene,
professional staff member; Jeremy L. Hekhuis, professional
staff member; Bridget W. Higgins, special assistant; Maren R.
Leed, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, minority
counsel; Peter K. Levine, minority counsel; and William G.P.
Monahan, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Andrew W.
Florell, and Sara R. Mareno.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul,
assistant to Senator McCain; Arch Galloway II, assistant to
Senator Sessions; James P. Dohoney, Jr. and Derek J. Maurer,
assistants to Senator Collins; Lindsey R. Neas, assistant to
Senator Talent; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
Chambliss; Aleix Jarvis and Meredith Moseley, assistants to
Senator Graham; Christine O. Hill, assistant to Senator Dole;
Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Sharon L.
Waxman, Mieke Y. Eoyang, and Jarret A. Wright, assistants to
Senator Kennedy; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka; William K.
Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant
to Senator Ben Nelson; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator
Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri
Glaze, assistant to Senator Pryor.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Warner. Good morning, everyone. I am not sure what
the precedents are for the Senate Armed Services Committee
commandeering the other body's chamber, but nevertheless,
sitting up here, I feel somewhat like a bishop. A very
impressive setting. I thank my distinguished friend, the
chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Duncan Hunter;
and the ranking Democrat, another dear friend, Ike Skelton; and
Robert Rangel, the staff director.
The committee meets today to receive annual testimony from
the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff--this
morning represented by the Vice Chairman, General Pace, in the
absence of General Myers, who had the untimely loss of his
brother, Chuck Myers.
Senator McCain. Mr. Chairman, I do not think we have order
here.
Chairman Warner. I think you have a point, and I cannot
judge from the noise up here. We will ask the audience to
refrain from conversation, please. Thank you.
We are to receive the posture of the United States Armed
Forces and President Bush's defense budget request for fiscal
year 2005 and the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).
Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice Chairman Pace, we welcome you again
back before the committee and commend you once again for the
outstanding leadership that you both continue, as a team, to
provide our Nation and to our men and women in uniform and
their families.
There are few precedents for the challenges you face in
this post-September 11 world, but in every way you have met the
challenges.
I start today by recognizing the men and women of the Armed
Forces of the United States who, together with a coalition of
nations, liberated Iraq, a country larger than Germany and
Italy combined, in roughly 3 weeks. This combined force
accomplished this with unprecedented precision and casualties
were far below the estimates. Nevertheless, we grieve each and
every one who was lost or wounded and express our compassion to
their families.
Iraq, a nation that for decades had known only tyranny and
oppression, is now moving forward to a future of freedom and
opportunity for all of its people.
While the mission of the U.S. and the coalition forces
continues in Iraq, much has been accomplished since Operation
Iraqi Freedom began last March. The world is a safer place and
Iraq is a better place because, along with many nations, the
U.S. confronted a brutal dictator who has defied the mandates
of the international community for over a decade.
Disagreements will continue about the process and the
timing of the decision to use force, but on one thing there can
be no disagreement: the professionalism, the performance, and
the sacrifices of the men and women in uniform were, are, and
always will be inspiring. Every American is justifiably proud
of the U.S. Armed Forces. The security of the United States of
America is in good hands today with its military.
As we meet this morning, hundreds of thousands of our
service members are engaged around the world and here at home,
defending our Nation in Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation
Iraqi Freedom, and other military operations in the ongoing
global war on terrorism. These brave men and women and their
families deserve our continued support, and they will get it
from this committee--the equipment, the resources, the support
they need to perform their missions today and tomorrow and into
the future.
We must remember that defense of our homeland begins on the
distant battlefields of the world. Our forward-deployed forces
are and will remain our first line of defense. This committee's
responsibility will continue to be to ensure that these troops
remain the best equipped, the best trained, and the most
capable forces in the world.
I am encouraged by my initial review of the President's
defense budget for the fiscal year 2005. This request of $401.7
billion for the Department represents a 5-percent increase over
the fiscal year 2004 authorized level and the fourth straight
year of growth for the defense budget. This sends a strong
signal to the world of America's commitment to freedom, and the
President and you, Mr. Secretary, deserve special recognition
because we know the competitive forces in our budget today. But
to get this increase was necessary.
As Congress works its will on the budget request, we must
be mindful of potential problems. We are putting increased
demands on our forces around the world, increased demands on
their families, and increased demands on our Reserve and
National Guard. We are blessed with a military that is
responding to these demands with extraordinary commitment, but
even the best military has its limits.
As we proceed with the hearing today--and I am going to ask
unanimous consent that the full balance of my statement be
included in the record--we are learning of the President's
initiative to strengthen America's Intelligence Community. I
commend the President for this leadership, and we await greater
details about the commission envisioned and its membership. In
testimony before this committee last week, Dr. David Kay,
former Special Adviser to Director Tenet, told us that, based
on the findings to date of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG)--that is
the military force in country conducting the survey--prewar
estimates about large stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) may have been incorrect. As Dr. Kay stated, ``We were
almost all wrong, and I certainly include myself there.''
While that is one serious finding to date, he also told us
of positive findings: that the ISG had discovered a quantum of
evidence that includes evidence of Saddam Hussein's intent to
pursue a WMD program on a large scale; evidence of actual and
ongoing chemical and biological research programs; evidence of
an active program to use the deadly chemical ricin as a weapon,
a program that was only interrupted by the start of the war in
March; evidence of ballistic missile programs that clearly
violated terms of the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council
resolution; and there was much more.
The work of the ISG under General Dayton and Mr. Duelfer
continues. Final judgments should in fairness await the outcome
of their work.
Dr. Kay also told us that he had found absolutely no
evidence of any intelligence analyst being pressured to change
or exaggerate any intelligence conclusions. On the contrary, he
reminded us all that the basic assessment of Iraq's WMD
holdings had been consistent since 1998, when U.N. inspectors
left Iraq. Dr. Kay as well as many others have reminded us that
intelligence efforts often differ from what is later actually
found on the ground. The important thing is when they differ to
understand why.
Based on the intelligence available to the President, not
only U.S. intelligence but that of the U.N. and other nations,
Dr. Kay felt that the President could have reached no other
conclusion: Iraq had caches of chemical and biological weapons,
had used them in the past, and was likely to use them in the
future.
As Dr. Kay stated, ``It was reasonable to conclude that
Iraq posed an imminent threat. What we learned during the
inspection made Iraq a more dangerous place potentially than in
fact we thought it was even before the war.''
As I stated earlier, the world is a safer place and Iraq is
a better place because a real and growing threat has been
eliminated. We did the right thing at the right time to rid
Iraq of this brutal regime.
There are currently six ongoing investigations--the
President's contemplated commission would be the seventh--
concerning Iraqi WMD programs, including, most importantly, the
ISG. As I mentioned, it is an ongoing operation, fully funded
by Congress. It is under the direction of General Dayton and
Charles Duelfer. It is important that the work of these
investigations be completed, and I hope that we will receive
from the Secretary some estimates of the timetable in which
that is likely to be done.
An independent panel can build on the good work already
begun and ultimately contribute to the recommendations on how
to make our Intelligence Community stronger and more effective.
The security of our troops in harm's way and of our Nation
will be improved by these reviews. I wish to commend the
distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee. I am
privileged to serve on that committee with him, and I believe
that that committee has done notable work, and perhaps you will
comment on that in the course of the hearing.
Mr. Secretary, I hope you can address your views on these
issues related to the Iraqi WMD and the current situation in
Iraq in your opening testimony. For example, the President's
National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, stated, ``There
are differences between what we knew going in and what we found
on the ground.'' The question to you is, what steps are you
taking to ensure that the ongoing intelligence activities of
defense intelligence agencies, particularly the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National Security Agency
(NSA), are as complete and analytically rigorous as possible?
We must bear in mind that a lot of focus is on the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and George Tenet, but our
distinguished witness today has under his jurisdiction a very
considerable component of the Intelligence Community.
Mr. Secretary, are you beginning to examine your prewar
planning and preparation in light of the findings we know to
date? There have been public accusations of manipulation or
exaggeration of prewar intelligence by policymakers. You are
among the first of the administration witnesses to testify
before Congress on this subject. I say to you most
respectfully, how do you respond?
I have been privileged to have known you and worked with
you for I suspect over 30 years and, speaking for myself, I
have absolutely 100 percent confidence in your integrity. But
you should look us square in the eye and give us your own views
on this subject.
Mr. Secretary, the plan as laid down by Ambassador Bremer
and approved by the Iraqi Governing Council calls for a series
of steps over the next few months culminating in the transfer
of sovereignty to Iraqi authority on June 30 of this year. Are
these milestones and final target dates achievable? What
significant challenges remain? What accommodations are being
made to ensure our troops can continue to operate and the ISG
can continue its important work in a sovereign nation,
presumably, after this transfer on the 30th?
Again, gentlemen, we welcome you. General Pace, we will
have the opportunity to hear your testimony and your views, and
I would certainly invite you to make any comments that you wish
to make about the WMD program.
Senator Levin.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
The committee meets today to receive annual testimony from the
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the posture of
the U.S. Armed Forces and President Bush's defense budget request for
fiscal year 2005 and the Future Years Defense Program.
Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice Chairman Pace, we welcome you back
before the committee and commend you, once again, for the outstanding
leadership you both continue, as a team, to provide our Nation and to
our men and women in uniform and their families. There are few
precedents for the challenges you face in this post-September 11 world,
but you have been equal to the task.
I start today by recognizing the men and women of our Armed Forces
who, together with a coalition of nations, liberated Iraq, a country
larger than Germany and Italy combined, in roughly 3 weeks. This
combined force accomplished this with unprecedented precision and
casualties far below estimates. Iraq, a nation that for decades had
known only tyranny and oppression, is now moving forward to a future of
freedom and opportunity for all of its people.
While the mission of U.S. and coalition forces continues in Iraq,
much has been accomplished since Operation Iraqi Freedom began last
March. The world is a safer place, and Iraq is a better place, because,
along with many nations, the U.S. confronted a brutal dictator who had
defied the mandates of the international community for over a decade.
Disagreements will continue about the process and timing of the
decision to use force, but on one thing there is no disagreement: the
professionalism, performance, and sacrifice of our troops was, is, and
always will be, inspiring. Every American is justifiably proud of the
U.S. Armed Forces. The security of America is in good hands with
today's military.
As we meet this morning, hundreds of thousands of our service
members are engaged around the world and here at home, defending our
Nation in Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and
other military operations in the ongoing global war on terrorism. These
brave men and women, and their families, deserve our continued support.
They will get it from this committee--the equipment, the resources, the
support they need to perform their missions.
As President Bush remarked when he signed last year's Defense
Authorization Act in November:
``Every member of the United States military is now involved in
a great and historic task. The stakes for our country could not
be higher. We face enemies that measure their progress by the
chaos they inflict, the fear they spread, and the innocent
lives they destroy. America's military is standing between our
country and grave danger. You're standing for order and hope
and democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq. You're standing up for
the security of all free nations, and for the advance of
freedom.''
Our President continues to provide the strongest of leadership.
We must remember that defense of our homeland begins on the distant
battlefields of the world. Our forward deployed forces are--and will
remain--our first line of defense. This committee's responsibility will
continue to be to ensure that these troops remain the best equipped,
best trained, most capable forces in the world.
It is critical that we fully honor the service of our men and women
in uniform, and that we keep faith with their dedication to duty
through adequate pay raises, timely modernization of equipment and
facilities, and sustained investment in those programs that enhance the
quality of life of our service personnel and their families.
I am encouraged by my initial review of the President's defense
budget request for fiscal year 2005. This request of $401.7 billion for
the Department represents a 5-percent increase over the fiscal year
2004 authorized level, and the fourth straight year of growth for the
defense budget. This sends a strong signal to the world of America's
commitment to freedom.
As Congress works its will on this budget request, we must be
mindful of potential problems. We are putting increased demands on our
forces around the world, increased demands on their families, and
increased demands on our Reserve and National Guard. We are blessed
with a military that has responded to these demands with extraordinary
commitment, but even the best military has its limits.
As we perform our annual budget review, we must--and we will--
carefully analyze the effects of these challenges on our men and women
in uniform, and their families. Congress will, I am confident, make the
investments needed to ensure we have the people and the capabilities
necessary to meet these challenges.
There will be many questions. To assist Congress, I hope you can
address some of these questions in your testimony this morning,
including:
Do we have enough people, the right mix of people, and
the capabilities in the Armed Forces to meet the threats of the
foreseeable future?
Are we doing all we can to ensure that our forces
deployed overseas--both active and Reserve components (RC)--
have the best possible equipment and support?
Are the lessons learned from recent military
operations being rapidly shared and integrated across the
entire force and with our allies?
What increased role can we realistically expect NATO
and other nations to play in the global war on terrorism?
As we reposition forces to meet new global threats, do
we have the facilities, infrastructure, and mobility assets we
will need?
These are but a few of the complex issues we must work on together
to solve in the months and years ahead.
As we proceed with this hearing today, we are learning of the
President's initiative to strengthen America's intelligence community.
I commend the President for his leadership.
In testimony before this committee, last week, Dr. David Kay,
former Special Advisor to Director Tenet, told us that, based on the
findings of the Iraq Survey Group, to date, prewar estimates about
large WMD stockpiles may have been wrong. As Dr. Kay stated, ``. . . we
were almost all wrong, and I certainly include myself here.'' While
that is one serious finding, to date, he also told us that the ISG had
discovered a quantum of evidence, that includes:
evidence of Saddam Hussein's intent to pursue WMD
program on a large scale;
actual, ongoing chemical and biological research
programs;
an active program to use the deadly chemical ``ricin''
as a weapon a program that was only interrupted by the start of
the war in March; and,
evidence of ballistic missile programs that clearly
violated the terms of U.N. Security Council Resolutions.
Dr. Kay also told us that he had found absolutely no evidence of
any intelligence analyst being pressured to change or exaggerate any
intelligence conclusions. On the contrary, he reminded us all that the
basic assessment of Iraq's WMD holdings had been consistent since 1998,
when U.N. inspectors left Iraq. Dr. Kay, as well as many others, have
reminded us that intelligence efforts often differ from what is
actually found on the ground later. The important thing is when they
differ, to understand why.
Based on the intelligence available to the President not only U.S.
intelligence but that of the U.N. and other nations, Dr. Kay felt that
the President could have reached no other conclusion: Iraq had caches
of chemical and biological weapons, had used them in the past, and was
likely to use them in the future. As he stated, ``. . . it was
reasonable to conclude that Iraq posed an imminent threat. What we
learned during the inspection made Iraq a more dangerous place,
potentially, than, in fact, we thought it was even before the war.''
As I stated earlier, the world is a safer place and Iraq is a
better place because a real and growing threat has been eliminated. We
did the right thing to rid Iraq of this brutal regime.
There are currently six ongoing investigations concerning Iraqi WMD
programs, including the work of the Iraq Survey Group funded by
Congress and under the direction of General Dayton and Charles Duelfer.
It is important that the work of these investigations be completed. An
independent panel can build on the good work already begun and,
ultimately, contribute to the recommendations on how to make our
intelligence community stronger and more effective. The security of our
troops in harm's way and of our Nation will be improved by these
reviews.
I hope you can address your views on these issues related to Iraqi
WMD and the current situation in Iraq in your opening testimony. For
example:
The President's National Security Advisor, Condoleeza
Rice, has stated, ``. . . there are differences between what we
knew going in and what we found on the ground.'' What steps are
you taking to ensure that the ongoing intelligence activities
of Defense intelligence agencies particularly DIA and NSA are
as complete and analytically rigorous as possible?
Are you beginning to examine your pre-war planning and
preparation in light of the findings we know, to date?
There have been public accusations of manipulation or
exaggeration of pre-war intelligence by policy makers. You are
among the first in the administration to testify before
Congress on this subject. How do you respond to these
accusations?
The plan, as laid down by Ambassador Bremer and
approved by the Iraqi Governing Council calls for a series of
steps over the next few months, culminating in a transfer of
sovereignty to Iraqi authority on June 30 of this year. Are
these milestones and final target date achievable? What
significant challenges remain?
What accommodations are being made to ensure our
troops can continue to operate, and the ISG can continue its
important work, in a sovereign nation after this transfer of
sovereignty?
Again, gentlemen, I thank you for your service. Your continued
commitment to our uniformed and civilian personnel and their families,
your leadership during time of war, and your focus on preparing our
Armed Forces to meet the threats of the future have greatly enhanced
our national security.
Senator Levin.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first join you in welcoming Secretary Rumsfeld,
General Pace, and Dr. Zakheim back to the Armed Services
Committee for their annual posture hearing. Much has happened
in the world since our last posture hearing. The rapid advance
of our Armed Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and the
total collapse of the Iraqi regime stand as a testament to the
courage and to the dedication of our men and women in uniform,
who remain by far the best trained, best equipped, and most
capable military force in the world today. They are the
standard against which all other military forces are measured.
Unfortunately, military operations in Iraq did not come to
an end with the President's announcement on May 1. In early
July, General Tommy Franks announced that continued violence
and uncertainty in Iraq would make significant reductions in
U.S. force levels unlikely for the foreseeable future. Six
months later, we still have roughly 125,000 troops in Iraq,
with almost 180,000 more serving in support roles outside of
the country. We are in the process of rotating in fresh units
to ensure that we will be able to sustain this presence for
years to come.
The current rotation of U.S. forces into Iraq will result
in a drawdown to 110,000 troops. The drawdown is based upon the
belief that Iraqi police in the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps
(ICDC) will be able to take the lead in providing security in
Baghdad and other Iraqi cities. I am concerned that this will
set the Iraqi security forces up for failures, as there is a
real question as to whether they are ready to take on and
defeat the insurgents who are targeting Iraqis as well as U.S.
and other coalition forces.
The new Iraqi army, whose mission is limited to external
defense, will not have a role in providing domestic security
for their fellow citizens. I remain convinced, as I have
written to Secretary Rumsfeld, the President, and others in the
administration, that the recall of units of the Iraqi army at
the middle grade and below would have been a better way to help
handle the insurgent threat.
Our troops in Iraq face extremely hazardous conditions,
including improved explosive devices, ambushes, car bombs,
mortar attacks, and shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles.
In addition, roughly 10,000 American troops continue to
engage in military operations against hostile forces in
Afghanistan. Tens of thousands more soldiers, sailors, airmen,
and marines are deployed in Korea and other hot spots around
the world, including numerous countries that had not seen an
American in uniform before September 11, 2001.
Congress and the American people will provide the support
that is needed by our troops in the field. In less than a year,
we have enacted two emergency supplemental appropriation acts,
for $62 billion and $87 billion, to cover the costs of our
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It has been reported that
an additional supplemental appropriation of $50 billion to $55
billion will likely be required to fund continued operations
over the next fiscal year.
I have no doubt that if our troops need the money Congress
will provide it. However, that money should have been part of
the budget before us, not left to a supplemental and therefore
not part of the projected budget deficit. A fair deficit
projection would have included those costs since we are
planning on those costs.
The pace of operations has placed a great strain on our
forces. We have seen the imposition of stop-loss requirements
to prevent troops from leaving the force when their term of
service is finished. Some have been deployed for extended
periods, and some have been deployed repeatedly. Some units
have been told that they would be going home soon, only to have
their tours of duty extended. Others have been denied clear
information about when their deployments would end. In the last
2\1/2\ years, we have seen the largest sustained call-ups of
National Guard and Reserve components since the establishment
of an all-volunteer military force.
A year ago, as our Nation was being prepared to go to war
in Iraq, a number of us expressed the view that our cause would
be strongest and our long-term success would be more certain if
we actively solicited the support of the international
community. While America's Armed Forces have proven and
continue to prove every day that they are ready to take on any
military challenge anywhere in the world, I continue to believe
that we are paying a steep price for the failure to obtain the
political support of the international community, which would
make the occupation one of the world community, to include
Muslim nations, and not just an occupation by Western nations.
It would therefore be less difficult and less dangerous.
The strains on our Armed Forces are very real. Concerns
about morale and potentially about recruitment and retention
are real. The risks posed to our Guard and Reserve system are
real. These are issues that we must do everything in our power
to help address.
Finally, in the wake of the testimony of Chief Weapons
Inspector Dr. David Kay, who concluded that the prewar
intelligence on Iraqi WMD was fundamentally wrong, this
committee has a particular responsibility to look into how
intelligence failures affected planning for and the conduct of
Operation Iraqi Freedom. I am deeply concerned that my request
to the Department of Defense (DOD) for information concerning
the impact that intelligence had on the planning for and the
conduct of Operation Iraqi Freedom has so far been denied by
the Department.
My specific request was for a briefing on the planning
process generally, including how the intelligence affected that
planning, and an overview of the final approved war plan for
Operation Iraqi Freedom to the extent that it can be shared
with Congress.
I am also concerned that it has taken so long for the
Department to respond to my request of November the 25th of
last year for information relating to the Office of Special
Plans, which was established by Under Secretary Feith and which
reportedly involved the review, analysis, and promulgation of
intelligence outside of the U.S. Intelligence Community.
My specific request in the case of the Office of Special
Plans was for documents relating to the establishment,
functions, and responsibilities of that office and the Policy
Counterterrorism Evaluation Group, and for documents produced
by either of those two entities, a list of personnel directly
related to those two offices, and communications from those two
offices to key agencies.
Finally, this morning apparently some of the information
was delivered to us. But after, just at a quick perusal of that
information, we also see that much of what we asked for is
still being denied by the Department, and that is simply
indefensible. We have an obligation and a responsibility to
oversee the operations of this Department. I have been
repeatedly promised that information by Mr. Feith and there
just was no justification for the long delay in forwarding what
information came to us this morning. I do hope, Mr. Secretary,
that you will straighten this out for us.
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses and I
welcome them all back to this committee.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE;
ACCOMPANIED BY HON. DOV S. ZAKHEIM, COMPTROLLER, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE; GEN. PETER PACE, USMC, VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF; HON. STEVEN CAMBONE, UNDER SECRETARY FOR INTELLIGENCE;
AND HON. DAVID S.C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY FOR PERSONNEL AND
READINESS
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
members of the committee. I appreciate this opportunity to
testify on our DOD budget and request that my full statement be
included in the record.
I, too, regret that General Myers could not be with us
today because of the loss of his brother. I have, in addition
to General Pace and Dr. Zakheim, brought two individuals, two
under secretaries, along in the event that there are questions
on the intelligence side or on the force level side. Dr. David
Chu is here and is available, and Dr. Steve Cambone. Dr. Chu of
course is the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, and
Dr. Cambone is the Under Secretary for Intelligence.
I, too, want to commend the courageous men and women in
uniform and also the civilians in the DOD that serve all over
the globe as well. What they have accomplished since our
country was attacked 28 months ago is truly impressive. They
have helped to overthrow 2 terrorist regimes, to capture or
kill 45 of the 55 most wanted in Iraq, including Saddam Hussein
and his sons, to capture or kill close to two-thirds of known
senior al Qaeda operatives, and to disrupt terrorist cells on
several continents. We value their service, their sacrifice,
and the sacrifice of their families as well.
When this administration took office 3 years ago, the
President charged us to change the status quo and prepare the
Department to meet the new threats of the 21st century. To meet
that charge, we have fashioned a new defense strategy, a new
force sizing construct, a new approach to balancing risks. We
have issued a new unified command plan, taken steps to attract
and retain the needed talent in our Armed Forces, including
targeted pay raises and quality of life improvements for the
troops and their families.
We have instituted what we believe to be more realistic
budgeting so that the Department now looks to budget
supplementals for unknown warfighting costs and not to simply
sustain readiness. We have completed a nuclear posture review.
We have transformed the way the Department prepares its war
plans. We have adopted a new lessons-learned approach during
Operation Iraqi Freedom and undertaken a comprehensive review
of our global force posture. With your help, we are
establishing the new National Security Personnel System (NSPS)
that should better enable us to manage our 746,000 civilian
employees.
The scope and scale of what has been done, what has been
accomplished, and what has been initiated is substantial. Our
challenge is to build on these efforts even as we fight the
global war on terror.
One effect of the global war on terror has been a
significant increase in operational tempo and an increased
demand on the force. To manage the demand on the force, we have
to first be very clear about what the problem really is, so
that we can work together to fashion appropriate solutions.
The increased demand on the force we are experiencing today
is, we believe, very likely a spike, driven by the deployment
of 115,000 troops in Iraq. For the moment, the increased demand
is real, and we have taken a number of immediate actions. We
are increasing international military participation in Iraq. We
have accelerated the training of Iraqi security forces, now
more than 200,000 strong. Our forces are hunting down those who
threaten Iraq's stability and transition to self-reliance.
Another way to deal with the increased demand on the force
is to add more people. Well, we have already done so--we might
want to put up a chart there----
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
--a fact that many people seem not to understand. Using the
powers granted by Congress, we have already increased Active-
Duty Force levels by nearly 33,000 above pre-emergency
authorized end strength. We have done this over the past 2
years, as you can see. If the war on terror demands it, we will
not hesitate to increase force levels even more using those
emergency authorities provided by Congress.
But it should give us pause that even a temporary increase
in our force levels was and remains necessary. Think about it.
At this moment we have a pool of about 2.6 million men and
women, active and Reserve. Yet the deployment of 115,000 troops
in Iraq has required that we temporarily increase the size of
the force by 33,000. That suggests strongly that the real
problem is not the size of the force per se, but rather the way
the force has been managed and the mix of capabilities at our
disposal. It suggests that our challenge is considerably more
complex than simply adding more troops.
General Pete Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff, compares
the problem to a rain barrel in which the spigot is near the
top. When you turn the spigot on, it only draws off the water
at the very top. The task--you have two choices: You can either
increase the size of the barrel and leave the spigot where it
is or you can lower the spigot and start drawing on the
contents of the entire barrel.
The answer in my view is most certainly not a bigger rain
barrel. The answer is to move the spigot down so that all the
water is accessible and can be used and so that we can take
full advantage of the skills and talents of everyone who serves
in the Guard and Reserve.
Another chart, please, Commander.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
I do not know if you can see that up there. But I keep
hearing people talk about the stress on the Guard and the
Reserve. The fact is that since September 11, 2001, we have
mobilized only 36 percent of the Selected Reserve, a little
over one-third of the available forces in the Selected Reserve.
But while certain skills are in demand, as the chart shows,
only a very small fraction of the Guard and Reserve, just 7.15
percent, have been involuntarily mobilized more than once since
1990, 13 years ago. Over 13 years we have mobilized only 7.15
percent of the Guard and Reserve involuntarily more than once.
That means that the same people are getting stressed and
they are getting used and used, but the vast majority of the
Guard and Reserve are not being used. Over 60 percent have not
been mobilized to fight the global war on terror. Indeed, I am
told that a full 58 percent of the current selected Reserve, or
about 500,000 troops, have not been involuntarily mobilized in
the past 10 years.
Now, what does that tell us? First, it argues that we have
too few Guard and Reserve Forces with the skill sets that are
in high demand. We obviously, therefore, have too many Guard
and Reserve Forces with skill sets that are in little or no
demand.
Second, it indicates that we need to rebalance the skill
sets within the Reserve components and also between the active
and the Reserve components so that we have enough of the right
kinds of forces available to accomplish the needed missions.
Third, it suggests that we need to focus on transforming
the forces for the future, making sure we continue to increase
the capability of the force, thus our ability to do more with
the forces that we have. We are working to do just that.
In looking at our global force posture review, some
observers had focused on the number of troops, tanks, and ships
that we might add or remove from a given part of the world,
Europe, Asia, or somewhere else. I would submit that that may
well not be the best measure. If you have 10 of something, say
ships, and you reduce the number by 5, you end up with half as
many. But if you replace the remaining half with ships that
have double the capability, then you have really not reduced
your capability even though the numbers have been reduced.
That is true of troops. That is true of aircraft. It is
true of going from dumb bombs to precision bombs. Today the
Navy is reducing force levels. Yet, because of the way they are
arranging themselves, they will have more combat power
available than they did when they had more people. In Operation
Iraqi Freedom, the Navy surged more than half of the fleet to
the Persian Gulf region for the fight. With the end of the
major combat operations, instead of keeping two or three
carrier strike groups forward, they quickly redeployed all
their carrier strike groups to home base. By doing so they
reset the force in a way that will allow them to surge over 50
percent more combat power on short notice to deal with future
contingencies.
The result? Today six aircraft carrier strike groups are
available to respond immediately to any crisis that might
confront us--all while the Navy is moderately reducing the size
of its Active Force.
The Army, by contrast, has put forward a plan that, by
using emergency powers, will increase force levels by about 6
percent. Because of the way he will do it, the Army estimates
that they will be adding, not 6 percent, but up to 30 percent
more combat power. Instead of adding more divisions, Pete
Schoomaker and the acting Secretary of the Army are focusing
instead on creating a 21st century modular army made up of
self-contained, more self-sustaining brigades that are
available to work for any division commander.
As a result, the intention is that 75 percent of the Army's
brigade structure would always be ready in the event of a
crisis. The Army plans will increase the number of active and
Reserve brigades significantly over the next 4 years, but
because we will be using emergency powers we will have the
flexibility to reduce the number of active troops if, as, and
when the security situation permits.
The point is this: The focus needs to be on more than just
numbers. We should be focusing on finding ways to better manage
the forces we have and on increasing the speed, agility,
modularity, capability, and usability of those forces. Today
DOD has several dozen initiatives under way to improve
management of the force and to increase its capability. We are
investing in new information age technologies and less
manpower-intensive platforms and technologies.
We are working to increase the jointness of our forces,
taking civilian tasks currently done by uniformed personnel and
converting them into civilian jobs, freeing military personnel
for military tasks. We have begun consultations with allies and
friends about ways to transform our global force posture to
further increase our capability. We are working to rebalance
the active and Reserve components, taking skills that are found
almost exclusively in the Reserves and moving forces out of
low-demand specialties, such as heavy artillery, and into
higher demand capabilities, such as Military Police, civil
affairs, and Special Operations Forces.
A number of the members of the committee have served in the
Guard and Reserve. Each of us knew when we signed up that it
was not simply to serve 1 weekend and 2 weeks active duty. We
signed up so that if war was visited on our country we would be
ready to become part of the Active Force, and on September 11
war was visited on our country.
If we were not to call up the Guard and Reserves today,
then why would we have them at all? This is the purpose of the
Guard and Reserve. It is what they signed up for, and, God
bless them, the vast majority are eager to serve, a fact borne
out by the large number of those who stepped forward and
volunteered to be mobilized for service in Afghanistan and in
Iraq.
Our responsibility is to do everything we can to see that
they are treated respectfully, managed effectively, and that we
have the tools they need to win today's wars and to deter
future conflicts.
Today, because DOD has the flexibility to adjust troop
levels as the security situation may require, we believe that a
statutory end strength increase will take away our flexibility
to manage the force. First, if the current increased demand
turns out to be a spike, the Department would face a
substantial cost of supporting a larger force when it may no
longer be needed.
Second, if we permanently increase statutory end strength,
we will have to take the cost out of the DOD top line. That
will require cuts in other parts of the defense budget--
crowding out investments and the programs that will allow us to
manage the force better and to make it more capable.
I urge Congress not to lock us into a force size and
structure that may or may not be appropriate in the period
ahead. During the period of the emergency, we have all the
flexibility that is required and we have been using it.
The 2005 budget before you is in a real sense a request for
a second installment on funding for the transformational
priorities set out in the President's 2004 request. In 2005, we
have requested $29 billion for investments in transforming
military capabilities. We have requested additional funds to
strengthen intelligence, including critical funds to increase
DOD human intelligence capabilities, persistent surveillance,
as well as technical analysis and information-sharing.
We have requested $11.1 billion to support procurement of
nine ships in 2005. In all, the President has requested $75
billion for procurement in 2005 and $69 billion for research,
development, testing, and evaluation.
We also need your continuing support for two initiatives
that are critical to the 21st century transformation, the
Global Posture Review and the Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) Commission scheduled for 2005. These are important
initiatives. We need BRAC to rationalize our infrastructure and
the new defense strategy and to eliminate unneeded bases and
facilities that are costing the taxpayers billions of dollars
to support. We need the global posture changes to help us
reposition our forces around the world so that they are
stationed--not where the wars of the 20th century happened to
end, but rather arranged in a way that will allow them to deter
and, as necessary, defeat potential adversaries who might
threaten our security or that of our friends and allies in the
21st century. These two are inextricably linked.
Mr. Chairman, the President has asked Congress for $401.7
billion for fiscal year 2005. It is an enormous amount of
taxpayers' hard-earned money. Such investments will likely be
required for a number of years to come because our Nation is
engaged in a struggle that could well go on for a number of
years. Our objective is to ensure that our Armed Forces remain
the best trained, best equipped fighting force in the world and
that we treat the volunteers who make up the force with the
respect commensurate with their sacrifice and their dedication.
Before turning to questions, let me make some comments in
response to your request on the subject of intelligence and WMD
and the testimony that Dr. Kay presented to this committee.
During my confirmation hearing before this committee, I was
asked what would keep me up at night, and I answered,
``Intelligence.'' I said that because the challenge facing the
Intelligence Community today is truly difficult. Their task is
to penetrate closed societies--and you might want to put that
picture of a closed society up----
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
--and organizations and try and learn things our
adversaries do not want them to know.
That is the Korean Peninsula. The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)
is the line in the middle. South Korea, the same people as in
North Korea, has light. It is a satellite photo. It has light
and energy and opportunity and a vibrant, democratic system.
North Korea is a dark, dark country. The little dot of light to
the left in the center of North Korea is Pyongyang.
So their task is to penetrate these closed societies and
organizations, to try and learn things that our adversaries do
not want them to know, the Intelligence Community, often not
knowing precisely what it is that we need to know, while our
adversaries know precisely what it is that they do not want
them to know. That is a tough assignment.
Intelligence agencies are operating in a era of surprise,
when new threats can emerge suddenly, with little or no
warning, as happened on September 11. It is their task to try
to connect the dots before the fact, not after the fact. It is
hard enough after the fact, but they are trying to connect the
dots before the fact so action can be taken to protect the
American people.
They have to do this in an age when the margin for error is
modest, when terrorist networks and terrorist states are
pursuing weapons of mass destruction and the consequences of
underestimating a threat could be the loss of potentially tens
of thousands of lives. The men and women in the Intelligence
Community have a tough and often thankless job. If they fail
the world knows it, and when they succeed, as they often do, to
our country's great benefit, their accomplishments often have
to remain secret.
Though we cannot discuss those successes always in open
session, it would be worth the committee's time to hear of
them, and I hope and trust that the Director of Central
Intelligence, George Tenet, will be able to make some of those
recent examples of successes--and there have been many--public
so that the impression that has and is being created of broad
intelligence failures can be dispelled.
I can say that the Intelligence Community's support in
Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the global war on terror
overall, have contributed to the speed, the precision, and the
success of those operations and saved countless lives. We are
blessed that so many fine individuals have stepped forward to
serve in the Intelligence Community and are willing to work
under great pressure and in more than a few cases risk their
lives.
They faced a difficult challenge in the case of Iraq. They
knew the history of the Iraqi regime, its use of chemical
weapons on its own people and its neighbors. They knew what had
been discovered during the inspections after the Persian Gulf
War, some of which was far more advanced, particularly the
nuclear program, than the pre-Gulf War intelligence had
indicated. They were keen observers of the reports of the U.N.
Special Commission (UNSCOM) in the 1990s. They and others did
their best to penetrate the secrets of the regime of Saddam
Hussein after the inspectors left in 1998.
It was the consensus of the Intelligence Community and of
successive administrations of political parties and of Congress
that reviewed the same intelligence and much of the
international community, I might add, that Saddam Hussein was
pursuing WMD. Saddam Hussein's behavior throughout that period
reinforced that conclusion. He did not behave like someone who
was disarming and wanted to prove he was doing so. He did not
open up his country to the world, as Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and
South Africa had previously done and as Libya is doing today.
Instead, he continued to give up tens of billions of
dollars in oil revenues under U.N. sanctions when he could have
had the sanctions lifted and received those billions of dollars
simply by demonstrating that he had disarmed if in fact he had.
Why did he do this?
His regime filed with the U.N. what almost everyone agreed
was a fraudulent declaration and ignored the final opportunity
afforded him by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441. Why?
Congress and the national security teams of both the
Clinton and the Bush administrations looked at essentially the
same intelligence. They came to similar conclusions: the Iraqi
regime posed a danger and should be changed. Congress passed
regime change legislation in 1998. In the end, the coalition of
nations decided to enforce the U.N.'s resolutions.
Dr. David Kay served in Iraq for some 6 months directing
the work of the ISG and reporting to Director Tenet. He and the
ISG have worked hard under difficult and dangerous conditions.
They have brought forward important information. Dr. Kay is a
scientist and an extremely well experienced weapons inspector.
He has outlined for the committee his hypothesis on the
difference between prewar estimates of Iraq's WMD and what has
been found thus far on the ground.
While it is too early to come to final conclusions, as he
indicated, given the work that is still to be done, there are
several alternative views that are currently being postulated.
First is the theory that WMD may not have existed at the start
of the war. I suppose that is possible but not likely.
Second is that it is possible that WMD did exist but was
transferred in whole or in part to one or more other countries.
We see that theory put forward.
Third, it is possible that the WMD existed but was
dispersed and hidden throughout Iraq. We see that possibility
proposed by various people.
Next, that it is possible that WMD existed but was
destroyed at some moment prior to the end--the beginning of the
conflict--or that it is possible that Iraq had small quantities
of biological or chemical agents and also a surge capability
for rapid buildup and that we may eventually find it in the
months ahead.
Or, finally, there is the theory that some have put forward
that it could have been a charade by the Iraqis, that Saddam
Hussein fooled his neighbors and fooled the world; or that
Saddam Hussein fooled the members of his own regime; or that
the idea that Saddam Hussein himself might have been fooled by
his own people, who may have tricked him into believing that he
had capabilities that Iraq really did not have.
These are all theories that are being put forward today.
This much has been confirmed: The Intelligence Community got it
essentially right on Iraq's missile programs. Iraq was
exceeding the U.N.-imposed missile range limits and documents
found by the ISG show evidence of high-level negotiations
between Iraq and North Korea for the transfer of still longer-
range missile technology. If we were to accept that Iraq had a
surge capability for biological and chemical weapons, his
missiles could have been armed with WMD and used to threaten
neighboring countries.
It is the job of Dr. Kay's successor, as the chairman
indicated, and the ISG to pursue these issues wherever the
facts may take them. It is a difficult task. Think, it took us
10 months to find Saddam Hussein. The reality is that the hole
he was found hiding in was large enough to hold enough
biological weapons to kill thousands of human beings. Our
people had gone past that farm several times--had no idea he
was there. Unlike Saddam Hussein, such objects, once buried,
can stay buried. In a country the size of California, the
chances of inspectors finding something buried in the ground
without their being led to it by people knowledgeable about
where it was are minimal.
As Dr. Kay has testified, what we have learned thus far has
not proven Saddam Hussein had what intelligence indicated and
what we believed he had. But it also has not proven the
opposite.
The ISG's work is some distance from completion. There are
some 1,300 people in the ISG in Iraq working hard to find
ground truth. When that work is complete, we will know more.
Whatever the final outcome, it is important that we seize the
opportunity to derive lessons learned to inform future
decisions. In the DOD, the Joint Forces Command has done an
extensive review of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Intelligence
Community is also looking at lessons learned. It is doing it
under the leadership of Director Tenet with Dr. Kerr. It is
being done in other elements of the community as well.
It is important also that we step back and take a look at
the bigger picture and see that U.S. intelligence capabilities
are strengthened sufficiently to meet the threats and
challenges of this century. The President has announced that he
will be forming a bipartisan commission on strengthening U.S.
intelligence capabilities. The commission will review the past
successes of the Intelligence Community as well as the cases
that have not been successes, to examine whether the
Intelligence Community has the right skills, the proper
resources, and the appropriate authorities to meet the
challenges and the threats of the 21st century.
Intelligence will never be perfect. We do not, will not,
and cannot know everything that is going on in this world of
ours. If at this important moment we mistake intelligence for
irrefutable evidence, analysts might become hesitant to inform
policymakers of what they think they know and what they know
that they do not know, and even what they think. Policymakers
bereft of intelligence will find themselves much less able to
make prudential judgments, the judgments necessary to protect
our country.
I am convinced that the President of the United States did
the right thing in Iraq, let there be no doubt. I came to my
conclusions based on the intelligence we all saw, just as each
of you made your judgments and cast your votes based on the
same information. The President has sworn to preserve, protect
and defend the Nation. With respect to Iraq, he took the
available evidence into account; he took into account September
11; he took into account Saddam Hussein's behavior of
deception; he took into account Iraq's ongoing defiance of the
U.N. and the fact that he was still shooting at U.S. and U.K.
aircraft and the crews that were enforcing U.N. resolutions in
northern and southern no-fly zones; and he took into account
the fact that this was a vicious regime that had used WMD
against its own people and its neighbors and murdered and
tortured the Iraqi people for decades.
The President went to the U.N. and the Security Council and
passed a seventeenth resolution, and he came here to this
Congress and, based on the same intelligence, you voted to
support military action if the Iraqi regime failed to take that
final opportunity to cooperate with the U.N.
When Saddam Hussein did pass up that final opportunity, the
President nonetheless gave him an ultimatum, a final final
opportunity to leave the country. Only then, when all
alternatives had been fully exhausted, did the coalition act to
liberate Iraq. Ours is a safer world today, and the Iraqi
people are far better off for that action.
Senator Warner asked in his opening statement if I know of
any pressure on intelligence people or manipulation of
intelligence, and the answer is absolutely not. I believe that
Senator Roberts has attested to that from the analysts and
witnesses that he and his committee have interrogated over a
period of many months. I believe that Dr. Kay answered exactly
the same way--that he talked to analyst after analyst and no
manipulation of the data and no indication of anyone expressing
concern about pressure.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would be happy to turn it
over to General Pete Pace.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rumsfeld follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld
introduction
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to be here
today to discuss the progress in the global war on terrorism, our
transformation efforts, and to discuss the President's 2005 budget
request for the Department of Defense.
First, I want to commend the courageous men and women in uniform
and the Department civilians who support them. They are remarkable--and
what they have accomplished since our country was attacked 28 months
ago is truly impressive. In less than 2\1/2\ years, they have:
Overthrown two terrorist regimes, rescued two nations,
and liberated some 50 million people;
Captured or killed 45 of the 55 most wanted in Iraq--
including Iraq's deposed dictator, Saddam Hussein;
Hunted down thousands of terrorists and regime
remnants in Iraq and Afghanistan;
Captured or killed close to two-thirds of known senior
al Qaeda operatives;
Disrupted terrorist cells on most continents; and
Likely prevented a number of planned terrorist
attacks.
Our forces are steadfast and determined. We value their service and
sacrifice, and the sacrifice of their families, who also serve.
We thank the members of this committee for the support you have
shown for the troops during the global war on terror. With your
support, we have the finest Armed Forces on the face of the Earth.
We have a common challenge: to support the troops and to make sure
they have what they will need to defend the Nation in the years ahead.
We are working to do that in a number of ways:
By giving them the tools they need to win the global
war on terror;
By transforming for the 21st century, so they will
have the training and tools they need to prevail in the next
wars our Nation may have to fight--wars which could be notably
different from today's challenges; and
By working to ensure that we manage the force
properly--so we can continue to attract and retain the best and
brightest, and sustain the quality of the All-Volunteer Force.
Each represents a significant challenge in its own right. Yet we
must accomplish all of these critical tasks at once.
When this administration took office 3 years ago, the President
charged us with a mission--to challenge the status quo, and prepare the
Department of Defense to meet the new threats our Nation will face as
the 21st century unfolds.
We have done a good deal to meet that charge. Consider just some of
what has been accomplished:
We have fashioned a new defense strategy, a new force
sizing construct, and a new approach to balancing risks--one
that takes into account not just the risks in immediate war
plans, but also the risks to people and transformation.
We have moved from a ``threat-based'' to a
``capabilities-based'' approach to defense planning, focusing
not only on who might threaten us, or where, or when--but more
on how we might be threatened, and what portfolio of
capabilities we will need to deter and defend against those new
threats.
We have fashioned a new Unified Command Plan, with
A new Northern Command, that became fully
operational last September, to better defend the
homeland;
The Joint Forces Command focused on
transformation; and
A new Strategic Command responsible for early
warning of, and defense against, missile attack and the
conduct of long-range attacks.
We have also transformed the Special Operations
Command, expanding its capabilities and its missions, so that
it can not only support missions directed by the regional
combatant commanders, but also plan and execute its own
missions in the global war on terror, supported by other
combatant commands.
We have taken critical steps to attract and retain
talent in our Armed Forces--including targeted pay raises and
quality of life improvements for the troops and their families.
We have instituted realistic budgeting, so the
Department now looks to emergency supplementals for the unknown
costs of fighting wars, not to sustain readiness.
We have reorganized the Department to better focus our
space activities.
Congress has established a new Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence and an Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense.
We have completed the Nuclear Posture Review, and
adopted a new approach to deterrence that will enhance our
security, while permitting historic deep reductions in
offensive nuclear weapons.
We have pursued a new approach to developing military
capabilities. Instead of developing a picture of the perfect
system and then building the system to meet that vision of
perfection, however long it takes or costs, the new approach is
to start with the basics, roll out early models faster, and
then add capabilities to the basic system as they become
available.
We have reorganized and revitalized the missile
defense research, development, and testing program, and are on
track to begin deployment of our Nation's first rudimentary
ballistic missile defenses later this year.
We have established new strategic relationships, that
would have been unimaginable just a decade ago, with nations in
Central Asia, the Caucasus, and other critical areas of the
world.
We have transformed the way the Department prepares
its war plans--reducing the time it takes to develop those
plans, increasing the frequency with which they are updated,
and structuring our plans to be flexible and adaptable to
changes in the security environment.
We adopted a new ``Lessons Learned'' approach during
Operation Iraqi Freedom, embedding a team with U.S. Central
Command that not only studied lessons for future military
campaigns, but provided real-time feedback that had an
immediate impact on our success in Iraq.
We made a number of key program decisions that are
already having a favorable impact on the capability of the
force. Among others:
We are converting four Trident nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) into conventional
nuclear-powered cruise missile attack submarines (SSGN)
capable of delivering special forces and cruise
missiles into denied areas.
The Army has deployed its first Stryker
brigade to Iraq, is completing conversion of the
second, and is replacing the Crusader with a new family
of precision artillery that is being developed for the
Future Combat System.
We have revitalized the B-1 bomber fleet by
reducing its size and using the savings to modernize
the remaining aircraft with precision weapons and other
critical upgrades.
We have also undertaken a comprehensive review of our
global force posture, so we can transform U.S. global
capabilities from a structure driven by where the wars of the
20th century ended, to one that positions us to deal with the
new threats of the 21st century security environment.
Using authority granted to us last year, we have
established a new Joint National Training Capability, that will
help us push joint operational concepts throughout the
Department, so our forces train and prepare for war the way
they will fight it--jointly.
We have worked with our Allies to bring NATO into the
21st century--standing up a new NATO Response Force that can
deploy in days and weeks instead of months or years, and
transforming the NATO Command Structure--including the creation
of a new NATO command to drive Alliance transformation.
With the help of Congress last year, we are now
establishing a new National Security Personnel System that
should help us better manage our 746,000 civilian employees,
and we are using the new authorities granted us last year to
preserve military training ranges while keeping our commitment
to responsible stewardship of the environment.
The scope and scale of what has been accomplished is remarkable. It
will have an impact on the capability of our Armed Forces for many
years to come.
We will need your continued support as we go into the critical year
ahead.
Our challenge is to build on these successes, and continue the
transformation efforts that are now underway. In 2004, our objectives
are to:
Successfully prosecute the global war on terror;
Further strengthen our combined and joint warfighting
capabilities;
Continue transforming the joint force, making it
lighter, more agile and more easily deployable, and instilling
a culture that rewards innovation and intelligent risk-taking;
Strengthen our intelligence capabilities, and refocus
our intelligence efforts to support the new defense strategy
and our contingency plans;
Reverse the existing WMD capabilities of unfriendly
states and non-state actors, and stop the global spread of WMD;
Improve our management of the force;
Refocus our overseas presence, further strengthen key
alliances, and improve our security cooperation with nations
that are likely partners in future contingencies;
Continue improving and refining DOD's role in homeland
security and homeland defense; and
Further streamline DOD processes, continuing financial
management reform, and shortening acquisition cycle times.
So, we have an ambitious agenda. But none of these tasks can be put
off.
Our task is to prepare now for the tomorrow's challenges, even as
we fight today's war on terror.
managing the force
One effect of the global war on terror has been a significant
increase in operational tempo, which has resulted in an increased
demand on the force. Managing the demand on the force is one of our top
priorities. But to do so, we must be clear about the problem--so we can
work together to fashion the appropriate solutions.
The increased demand on the force we are experiencing today is
likely a ``spike,'' driven by the deployment of nearly 115,000 troops
in Iraq. We hope and anticipate that that spike will be temporary. We
do not expect to have 115,000 troops permanently deployed in any one
campaign.
But for the moment, the increased demand is real--and we are taking
a number of immediate actions. Among other things:
We are increasing international military participation
in Iraq.
As the President noted in his State of the
Union address, 34 countries now have forces deployed in
Iraq with U.S. forces and Iraqi security forces.
Japan began deploying its Self-Defense Forces
to Iraq last month--the first time Japanese forces have
been deployed outside their country since the end of
World War II.
As more international forces deploy, we have
accelerated the training of Iraqi security forces--now more
than 200,000-strong--to hasten the day when the Iraqis
themselves will be able to take responsibility for the security
and stability of their country, and all foreign forces can
leave.
As we increase Iraq's capability to defend itself, our
forces are dealing aggressively with the threat--hunting down
those who threaten Iraq's stability and transition to self-
reliance.
Another way to deal with the increased demand on the force is to
add more people. We have already done so. Using the special powers
granted by Congress, we have increased force levels by nearly 33,000
above the pre-emergency authorized end strength.
The Army is up roughly 7,800 above authorized end
strength;
The Navy is up roughly 6,000;
The Marine Corps is up some 2,000, and
The Air Force is up about 17,000.
If the war on terror demands it, we will not hesitate to increase
force levels even more using our emergency authorities. Because we are
using emergency powers, we have the flexibility to reduce force levels
in the period ahead, as the security situation permits, and as our
transformation efficiencies bear fruit.
But it should give us pause that even a temporary increase in our
force levels was, and remains, necessary. Think about it: At this
moment we have a force of 2.6 million people, both active and Reserve:
1.4 million Active Forces,
876,000 in the Selected Reserve--that is the Guard and
Reserve Forces in units; and
An additional 287,000 in the Individual Ready
Reserves.
Yet, despite these large numbers, the deployment of 115,000 troops
in Iraq has required that we temporarily increase the size of the force
by some 33,000.
That should tell us a great deal about how our forces are
organized.
It suggests strongly that the real problem is not the size of the
force, per se, but rather the way the force has been managed, and the
mix of capabilities at our disposal. It suggests that our challenge is
considerably more complex than simply adding more troops.
General Pete Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff, compares the
problem to a barrel of rainwater, on which the spigot is placed too
high up. When you turn it on, it only draws water off the top, while
the water at the bottom can't be used. The answer to this problem is
most certainly not a bigger rain barrel; the answer is to move the
spigot down, so that more of the water is accessible and can be used.
In other words, our challenge today is not simply one of increasing
the size of the force. Rather, we must better manage the force we
have--to make sure we have enough people in the right skill sets and so
that we take full advantage of the skills and talents of everyone who
steps forward and volunteers to serve.
Consider another example: I keep hearing people talk about the
stress on the Guard and Reserve--that we can't keep calling them up for
repeated mobilizations. Well the fact is, since September 11, 2001, we
have mobilized roughly 36 percent of the Selected Reserve--a little
over one-third of the available forces--and most of those mobilizations
are concentrated in certain skill sets. For example:
We have called up 86 percent of enlisted installation
security forces
69 percent of enlisted law enforcement forces
67 percent of enlisted air crews
65 percent of enlisted special forces
56 percent of civil affairs officers
51 percent of military police officers
48 percent of intelligence officers
But, while certain skills are in demand, only a tiny fraction of
the Guard and Reserve--just 7.15 percent--have been called up more than
once since 1990. The vast majority of our Guard and Reserve Forces--
over 60 percent--have not been mobilized to fight the global war on
terror. Indeed, I am told that a full 58 percent of the current
Selected Reserve--or about 500,000 troops--have not been involuntarily
mobilized in the past 10 years.
What does that tell us?
First, it argues that we have too few Guard and
Reserve Forces with certain skill sets that are high demand and
too many Guard and Reserve with skills that are in little or no
demand.
Second, it indicates that we need to rebalance the
skill sets within the Reserve component, and between the active
and Reserve components, so we have enough of the right kinds of
forces available to accomplish our missions.
Third, it suggests that we need to do a far better job
of managing the force. That requires that we focus not just on
the number of troops available today--though that is
important--but on transforming the forces for the future,
making sure we continue to increase the capability of the
force, and thus our ability to do more with fewer forces.
We are working to do just that.
mass vs. capability
One thing we have learned in the global war on terror is that, in
the 21st century, what is critical to success in military conflict is
not necessarily mass as much as it is capability.
In Operation Iraqi Freedom, coalition forces defeated a larger
adversary. They did it not by bringing more troops to the fight, which
we could have done, but by overmatching the enemy with superior speed,
power, precision and agility.
To win the wars of the 21st century, the task is to make certain
our forces are arranged in a way to ensure we can defeat any adversary,
and conduct all of the operations necessary to achieve our strategic
objectives.
In looking at our global force posture review, some observers have
focused on the number of troops, tanks, or ships that we might add or
remove in a given part of the world. I would submit that that may well
not be the best measure.
If you have 10 of something--say ships, for the sake of argument--
and you reduce the number by 5, you end up with 50 percent fewer of
them. But if you replace the remaining five ships with ships that have
double the capability of those removed, then obviously you have not
reduced capability even though the numbers have been reduced.
The same is true as we look at the overall size of the force. What
is critical is the capability of the Armed Forces to project power
quickly, precisely, and effectively anywhere in the world.
For example, today the Navy is reducing force levels. Yet because
of the way they are arranging themselves, they will have more combat
power available than they did when they had more people.
In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Navy surged more than half the
fleet to the Persian Gulf region for the fight. With the end of major
combat operations, instead of keeping two or three carrier strike
groups forward deployed, as has been traditional Navy practice, they
quickly redeployed all their carrier strike groups to home base. By
doing so, they reset their force in a way that will allow them to surge
over 50 percent more combat power on short notice to deal with future
contingencies.
The result? Today, six aircraft carrier strike groups are available
to respond immediately to any crisis that might confront us. That
capability, coupled with the application of new technologies, gives the
Navy growing combat power and greater flexibility to deal with global
crises--all while the Navy is moderately reducing the size of its
Active Force.
The Army, by contrast, has put forward a plan that, by using
emergency powers, will increase the size of its Active Force by roughly
6 percent or up to 30,000 troops above authorized end strength. But
because of the way they will do it, General Schoomaker estimates the
Army will be adding not 6 percent, but up to 30 percent more combat
power.
This is possible because, instead of adding more divisions, the
Army is moving away from the Napoleonic division structure designed in
the 19th century, focusing instead on creating a 21st century ``Modular
Army'' made up of self-contained, more self-sustaining brigades that
are available to work for any division commander.
So, for example, in the event of a crisis, the 4th Infantry
Division commander could gather two of his own brigades, and combine
them with available brigades from, say, the 1st Armored Division and
the National Guard, and deploy them together. The result of this
approach is jointness within the Service, as well as between the
Services. That jointness--combined with other measures--means that 75
percent of the Army's brigade structure should always be ready in the
event of a crisis.
The Army's plan would increase the number of active and Reserve
brigades significantly over the next 4 years. But because we will be
using emergency powers, we will have the flexibility to reduce the
number of troops if the security situation permits--so the Army would
not be faced with the substantial cost of supporting a larger force as
the security situation and the efficiencies permit.
Yet even if the security situation, and our progress in
transformation, were to permit the Army to draw down the force, the new
way they are arranging their forces will ensure the U.S. still has more
ground combat power--more capability.
So we have two different approaches:
In one case, the Navy is reducing force levels while
increasing capability;
In the other, the Army is increasing troop levels--but
doing so in a way that will significantly increase its
capability.
In both cases, the increase in capability of each
Service will be significant.
The point is: our focus needs to be on more than just numbers of
troops. It should be on finding ways to better manage the forces we
have, and by increasing the speed, agility, modularity, capability, and
usability of those forces.
dod initiatives
Today, using authorities and flexibility Congress has provided, DOD
has several dozen initiatives underway to improve management of the
force, and increase its capability.
Among other things:
We are investing in new information age technologies,
precision weapons, unmanned air and sea vehicles, and other
less manpower-intensive platforms and technologies.
We are working to increase the jointness of our
forces, creating power that exceeds the sum of individual
services.
We are using new flexibility under the Defense
Transformation Act to take civilian tasks currently done by
uniformed personnel and convert them into civilian jobs--
freeing military personnel for military tasks.
This year, we will begin to move 10,000 military
personnel out of civilian tasks and return them to the
operational force--effectively increasing force levels by an
additional 10,000 service members in 2004. An additional 10,000
conversions are planned for 2005.
We have begun consultations with allies and friends
about ways to transform our global force posture to further
increase capability.
We are also working to rebalance the active and Reserve components.
We are taking skills that are now found almost exclusively in Reserve
components and moving them into the Active Force, so that we are not
completely reliant on the Guard and Reserve for those needed skills. In
both the active and Reserve components, we are moving forces out of low
demand specialties, such as heavy artillery, and into high-demand
capabilities such as military police, civil affairs, and Special
Operations Forces.
Already, in 2003, the Services have rebalanced some 10,000
positions within and between the active and Reserve components. For
example, the Army is already transforming 18 Reserve field artillery
batteries into military police. We intend to expand those efforts this
year, with the Services rebalancing an additional 20,000 positions in
2004, and 20,000 more in 2005--for a total of 50,000 rebalanced
positions by the end of next year.
We are also working to establish a new approach to military force
management called ``Continuum of Service.'' The idea is to create a
bridge between the active and Reserve components--allowing both Active
and Reserve Forces greater flexibility to move back and forth between
full-time and part-time status, and facilitating different levels of
participation along that continuum.
Under this approach, a reservist who normally trains 38 days a year
could volunteer to move to full-time service for a period of time--or
some increased level of service between full-time and his normal
Reserve commitment, offering options for expanded service that do not
require abandoning civilian life. Similarly, an active service member
could request transfer into the Reserve component for a period of time,
or some status in between, without jeopardizing his or her career and
opportunity for promotion. It would give military retirees with needed
skills an opportunity to return to the Service on a flexible basis--and
create opportunities for others with specialized skills to serve, so we
can take advantage of their experience when the country needs it.
For example, coalition forces in Iraq need skilled linguists--so
under the Continuum of Service approach we have recruited 164 Iraqi-
Americans into a special Individual Ready Reserve program, and expect
to deploy the first program graduates to Iraq this spring.
The ``Continuum of Service'' would allow the Armed Forces to better
take advantage of the high-tech skills many reservists have developed
by virtue of their private sector experience--while at the same time
creating opportunities for those in the Active Force to acquire those
kinds of skills and experiences. It encourages volunteerism and
improves our capability to manage the military workforce in a flexible
manner with options that currently exist only in the private sector.
We have also been working to fix the mobilization process. We have
worked hard over the past year to add more refined planning tools to
the process, and make it more respectful of the troops, their families,
and their employers. Among other things:
We have tried to provide earlier notifications, giving
troops as much notice as possible before they are mobilized, so
they can prepare and arrange their lives before being called
up;
We have worked to ensure that when they are called up,
it is for something important and needed--and not to replace
someone in a task that could wait until a contingency is over;
We've tried to ensure that the number of people who
have been recently mobilized is as small as possible, and that
as many of the forces as possible that are remobilized or
extended are volunteers;
We have tried to limit tours, and give the troops some
certainty about the maximum length of their mobilization and
when they can expect to resume civilian life. We are doing
better, but in my opinion, the process is still not good
enough.
We are working each day to make the process better, and more
respectful of the brave men and women who make up the Guard and
Reserve.
As you can see, we have a number of initiatives underway that we
are confident will improve the management and treatment of the Guard
and Reserve Forces.
The men and women who make up the Guard and Reserve are all
volunteers. They signed up because they love their country, and want to
serve when the country needs them.
A number of you on this committee have served in the Guard and
Reserve, as have I. Each of us knew when we signed up, it was not to
serve 1 weekend a month and 2 weeks active duty. We signed up so that
if war was visited upon our country, we would be ready to leave our
work and family, and become part of the Active-Duty Force.
Well, on September 11, war was visited on our country. Our nation
was attacked--more than 3,000 innocent men, women, and children were
killed in an instant. At this moment, in caves and underground bunkers
half-a-world away, dangerous adversaries are planning new attacks--
attacks they hope will be even more deadly than the one on September
11.
We are a nation at war. If we were not to call up the Guard and
Reserves today, then why would we want to have them at all? Why were we
asking them to sacrifice time with their families every month to train?
Why are the taxpayers paying for postservice benefits, including
healthcare and retirement pay, that add up to between $250,000 and
$500,000 per reservist?
This is the purpose of the Guard and Reserve. It is what they
signed up for. I know that the vast majority are eager to be in the
fight--a fact born out by the large number of those who stepped forward
and volunteered to be mobilized for service in Iraq.
Our challenge--our responsibility--is to do everything we can to
see that they are treated respectfully, managed effectively, and that
they have the tools they need to win today's war, and to deter future
wars.
We are working to do just that--to better manage the force, and to
transform the force to make it more capable for the 21st century.
Today, with authority granted by Congress, DOD has the flexibility
to adjust troop levels, as the security situation requires.
We have authority to increase or decrease, as need
arises.
We are using that authority; and
We are working on a number of new initiatives that
will allow us to better manage and transform the force.
However, we believe that a statutory end strength increase would
take away our current flexibility to manage the force:
First, if the current increased demand turns out to be
a spike and if we are successful in the transformation and
rebalancing initiatives underway, the Department would face the
substantial cost of supporting a larger force when it may no
longer be needed--pay and benefits, such as lifetime
healthcare, for each service member added, not to mention the
additional costs in equipment, facilities, and force
protection.
Second, if we permanently increase statutory end
strength, instead of using the already available emergency
powers, we will have to take the cost out of our top line. That
will require cuts in other parts of the defense budget--
crowding out investments in the very programs that will allow
us to manage the force and make it more capable.
None of us has a crystal ball to see into the future. You have
given us the authority to adjust the size of the force and the
flexibility to deal with unknowns. We have been using that authority
over the past 2-plus years, even as we work to implement comprehensive
measures to better manage the force. I urge Congress to not lock us
into a force size and structure that may or may not be appropriate in
the period ahead.
Instead, help us to support the Armed Services with the
transformational initiatives they now have underway; help us rebalance
the Active and Reserve Force, and give the troops more options to
contribute along an expanded continuum of service; help us add
capability, and transform the force for the future.
2005 budget
The President's 2005 budget requests the funds to do just that.
The President's first defense budgets were designed while our
defense strategy review was still taking place. It was last year's
budget--the 2004 request--that was the first to fully reflect the new
defense strategies and policies.
One of the key budget reforms we implemented last year is the
establishment of a 2-year budgeting process in the Department of
Defense--so that the hundreds of people who invest time and energy to
rebuild major programs every year can be freed up and not be required
to do so on an annual basis, and can focus more effectively on
implementation.
The 2005 budget before you is, in a real sense, a request for the
second installment of funding for the priorities set out in the
President's 2004 request.
We did not rebuild every program. We made changes to just 5 percent
of the Department's planned 2005 budget, and then only on high-interest
and must-fix issues--and then only when the costs incurred to mitigate
risks could be matched by savings elsewhere in the budget.
The President's 2005 budget requests continued investments to
support the six transformational goals we identified in our 2001
defense review:
First, we must be able to defend the U.S. homeland and
bases of operation overseas;
Second, we must be able to project and sustain forces
in distant theaters;
Third, we must be able to deny enemies sanctuary;
Fourth, we must improve our space capabilities and
maintain unhindered access to space;
Fifth, we must harness our advantages in information
technology to link up different kinds of U.S. forces, so they
can fight jointly; and
Sixth, we must be able to protect U.S. information
networks from attack--and to disable the information networks
of our adversaries.
In all, in 2005, we have requested $29 billion for investments in
transforming military capabilities that will support each of these
critical objectives.
The President's 2005 budget requests $10.3 billion for missile
defense, including:
$9.2 billion for the Missile Defense Agency--an
increase of $1.5 billion above the President's 2004 request;
and
$1 billion for Patriot Advanced Capability-3, the
Medium Extended Air Defense System, and other short and medium
range capabilities;
The budget also includes $239 million in funding for accelerated
development of Cruise Missile Defense, with the goal of fielding an
initial capability in 2008;
The 2005 budget request includes critical funds for Army
Transformation, including:
$3.2 billion to support continued development of the
Future Combat Systems--an increase of $1.5 billion over the
2004 budget; and
$1.0 billion to fund continued deployment of the new
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, such as the one now serving in
Iraq.
We have also requested additional funds to strengthen intelligence,
including critical funds to increase DOD Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
capabilities, persistent surveillance, as well as technical analysis
and information sharing to help us better ``connect the dots.''
To enhance our communications and intelligence activities, we are
requesting:
$408 million to continue development of the Space
Based Radar (SBR)--which will bring potent and transformational
capabilities to joint warfighting--the ability to monitor both
fixed and mobile targets, deep behind enemy lines and over
denied areas, in any kind of weather. SBR is the only system
that can provide such capability.
$775 million for the Transformational Communications
Satellite (TSAT) which will provide the joint warfighter with
unprecedented communication capability. To give you an idea of
the speed and situational awareness the TSAT will provide,
consider that transmitting a Global Hawk image over a current
Milstar II, as we do today, takes over 12 minutes with TSAT it
will take less than a second.
$600 million for the Joint Tactical Radio System, to
provide wireless internet capability to enable information
exchange among joint warfighters.
The budget also requests $700 million for Joint Unmanned Combat Air
Systems (J-UCAS)--a program that consolidates all the various unmanned
combat air vehicle programs, and focuses on developing a common
operating system.
The budget requests $14.1 billion for major tactical aircraft
programs, including:
$4.6 billion for the restructured Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF) program;
$4.7 billion to continue procurement of the F/A-22;
$3.1 billion to continue procurement of the F/A-18E/F;
and
$1.7 billion to support development and procurement of
11 V-22 aircraft.
The budget requests funds for Navy fleet transformation, including
$1 billion to continue funding the new CVN-21 aircraft carrier, and
$1.6 billion to continue development of a family of 21st century
surface combatants including the DDX destroyer, the littoral combat
ship, and the CG(X) cruiser.
We have requested $11.1 billion to support procurement of 9 ships
in 2005. Fiscal year 2005 begins a period of transition and
transformation for shipbuilding as the last DDG 51 destroyers are
built, and the first DD(X) destroyer and Littoral Combat Ship are
procured. This increased commitment is further shown in the average
shipbuilding rate for fiscal years 2005-2009 of 9.6 ships per year.
This will sustain the current force level and significantly add to Navy
capabilities.
In all, the President has requested $75 billion for procurement in
2005 and $69 billion for Research, Development, Testing and
Evaluation--funds that are vital to our transformation efforts.
Another area critical to transformation is joint training. Last
year, Congress approved funding to establish a new Joint National
Training Capability (JNTC), an important initiative that will
fundamentally change the way our Armed Forces train for 21st century
combat.
We saw the power of joint warfighting in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Our challenge is to bring that kind of joint warfighting experience to
the rest of the forces, through both live and virtual joint training
and exercises. Thanks to the funds authorized in the 2004 budget, the
JNTC's initial operating capability is scheduled to come online in
October of this year. We have requested $191 million to continue and
expand the JNTC in 2005.
With your help, we have put a stop to the past practice of raiding
investment accounts to pay for the immediate operation and maintenance
needs. The 2005 request continues that practice. We have requested full
funding for the military's readiness accounts, providing $140.6 billion
for Operation and Maintenance (O&M) including $43 billion for training
and operations. These funds are critical to transformation because they
allow us to pay today's urgent bills without robbing the future to do
so.
We have also requested funds to support pay and quality of life
improvements for the troops--including a 3.5 percent military base pay
raise. We have requested funds in the 2005 budget that will also help
the Department keep its commitment to eliminate 90 percent of
inadequate military family housing units by 2007, with complete
elimination projected for 2009. We have requested funds to complete the
elimination of out-of-pocket housing costs for military personnel
living in private housing. Before 2001, the average service member had
to absorb over 18 percent of these costs. By the end of fiscal year
2005, it will be zero. These investments are important to the troops,
and also to their families, who also serve--and deserve to live in
decent and affordable housing.
I am also appointing a commission to conduct a comprehensive review
of military compensation and benefits, with a view toward simplifying
and improving them. Today, we have too many pay categories that serve
overlapping purposes, or provide incentives where they are most needed.
Before making major changes, I urge you to allow the Department to
first develop a comprehensive and integrated set of compensation
proposals, which we will submit to you next year.
We are also making progress in getting our facilities replacement
and recapitalization rate in proper alignment. When we arrived in 2001,
the Department was replacing its buildings at a totally unacceptable
average of once every 192 years. Today, we have moved the rate down for
the third straight year, though it is still too high--to an average of
107 years. The 2005 budget requests $4.3 billion for facilities
recapitalization, keeping us on track toward reaching our target rate
of 67 years by 2008. We have funded 95 percent of facilities
maintenance requirements--up from 93 percent in fiscal year 2004.
The budget also supports our continuing efforts to transform the
way DOD does business. With the passage of the Defense Transformation
Act last year, we now have the needed authority to establish a new
National Security Personnel System, so we can better manage DOD's
civilian personnel. Initial implementation will begin this year, and
cover roughly 300,000 of DOD's 746,000 civilian employees.
Yet, while progress has been made, the Defense Department still
remains bogged down by bureaucratic processes of the industrial age,
not the information age. We are working to change that. To help us do
so, we have requested funds for a Business Management Modernization
Program that will help us overhaul DOD management processes and the
information technology systems that support them.
We have also requested that Congress nearly double the Department's
General Transfer Authority, from the current limit of $2.1 billion to
$4 billion, or roughly 1 percent of the DOD budget. In an age when
terrorists move information at the speed of an email, money at the
speed of a wire transfer, and people at the speed of a commercial
jetliner, it is critical that we have the ability to shift funds
between priorities.
We also need your continuing support for two initiatives that are
critical to 21st century transformation: the Global Posture Review, and
the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission round scheduled for
2005.
Mr. Chairman, I cannot overemphasize the importance of proceeding
with both of these initiatives.
We need BRAC to rationalize our infrastructure with the new defense
strategy, and to eliminate unneeded bases and facilities that are
costing the taxpayers billions of dollars to support.
We need the Global Posture Review to help us reposition our forces
around the world--so they are stationed not simply where the wars of
the 20th century ended, but rather are arranged in a way that will
allow them to deter, and as necessary, defeat potential adversaries who
might threaten our security, or that of our friends and allies, in the
21st century.
These two efforts are inextricably linked.
It is critical that we move forward with both BRAC and the Global
Posture Review--so we can rationalize our foreign and domestic force
posture. We appreciate Congress' decision to authorize a BRAC round in
2005--and will continue to consult with you as we proceed with the
Global Posture Review.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, the President has asked Congress for a total of
$401.7 billion for fiscal year 2005--an increase over last year's
budget. Let there be no doubt: it is a large amount of the taxpayer's
hard-earned money. Such investments will likely be required for a
number of years to come because our Nation is engaged in a struggle
that could well go on for a number of years to come.
Our objective is to ensure that our Armed Forces remain the best
trained, best equipped fighting force in the world--and that we treat
the volunteers who make up the force with respect commensurate with
their service, their sacrifice, and their dedication.
Their task is not easy: they must fight and win a global war on
terror that is different from any our Nation as fought before. They
must do it, while at the same time preparing to fight the wars of 2010
and beyond--wars which may be as different from today's conflict, as
the global war on terror is from the conflicts of the 20th century.
So much is at stake.
Opportunity and prosperity are not possible without the security
and stability that our Armed Forces provide.
The United States can afford whatever is necessary to provide for
the security of our people and stability in the world. We can continue
to live as free people because the industriousness and ingenuity of the
American people have provided the resources to build the most powerful
and capable Armed Forces in human history--and because we have been
blessed with the finest young men and women in uniform--volunteers
all--that the world has known.
They are courageous; they are selfless; and they are determined.
They stand between this nation and our adversaries, those who wish to
visit still further violence on our cities, our homes and our places of
work. The men and women of the Armed Forces are hunting the enemies of
freedom down--capturing or killing them in the far corners of the
world, so they will not kill still more innocent men, women, and
children here at home.
We are grateful to them and proud of them. We stand ready to work
with you to ensure they are treated with the dignity they deserve, and
the respect they earn every day.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd be pleased to respond to questions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. That was a very
strong, informative, and forthright statement, and I commend
you for it.
General Pace. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: Thank
you very much for this opportunity, and thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for your words of condolence to General Myers and his
family. I know they deeply appreciate that.
General Myers did write a written statement for submission
to this committee, and I would ask that his statement be
accepted.
Chairman Warner. Without objection, the statement of all
witnesses today will be incorporated in entirety in the record.
General Pace. Thank you, sir.
Sir, I will keep my remarks short, but I would be remiss if
I did not say a couple of things. First, thank you to this
committee and to Congress for your strong, sustained,
bipartisan support of the military. I would like to dwell on
that for a second. This is not a pro forma statement. You said
in your statement, Mr. Chairman, that we have the best trained,
best equipped, most capable Armed Forces in the world. We have
that because of the resources that Congress provides, and we
deeply appreciate it.
Second, a thank-you to the service men and women who serve
our country. They are magnificent. They are doing everything we
are asking them to do, and we are very proud of what they are
doing.
Next, their families who serve at home, whose sacrifices at
home are often as equal to or greater than the servicemen and
women that they are providing support to overseas--we owe a
great debt of gratitude as a Nation to their families.
We also should thank the employers of our National Guard
and Reserve. We could not do what we are doing without the
skills of our Guard and Reserve. They are quality people, and
because they are quality people, there is no doubt in my mind
that there are businesses around the United States that have
gaps of quality in them because their reservist or their
guardsman is away from home. We deeply appreciate the
employers' support of those members so they can help protect
our country.
We are a Nation at war, but we are not alone. We have
invaluable coalition partners, and, together with those
coalition partners, we will protect our homelands and we will
defeat terrorism.
This will be a long and difficult fight, but it is a fight
worthy of the extraordinary efforts of your soldiers, sailors,
airmen, marines, and coast guardsmen. When you visit them--and
many of you have and we thank you for that--you look them in
the eye. You know they get it. They understand what is at
stake. They are proud of what they are doing. They know that
their good works do not always make the evening news, but they
also know that the roads, the hospitals, schools, electric
grids, power plants, all the things that they are doing to help
restore the basics of society in both Iraq and Afghanistan, are
in fact critical to success.
Their extraordinary efforts have been and must continue to
be matched here at home by our collective will, patience, and
commitment. Our Nation and those who defend her deserve no
less.
I am proud to sit here before you today representing all
the men and women of our Armed Forces. I am proud to be a part
of this process with you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Myers follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Richard B. Myers, USAF
I am privileged to report to Congress on the state of the United
States Armed Forces.
As they were a year ago, our Nation's soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, and guardsmen are currently operating within our borders and
around the globe with dedication, courage and professionalism,
alongside our coalition partners, to accomplish a variety of very
demanding missions. Global terrorism remains a serious threat, and the
stakes in the global war on terrorism remain high.
Over the past year, I have told you that with the patience, will,
and commitment of our Nation we would win the war on terrorism. The
support we have received from Congress has been superb. From
congressional visits to deployed personnel, to support for
transformational warfighting programs, to funding for security and
stability operations, to improved pay and benefits for our troops, your
support for our service men and women has enabled us to make
significant progress in the war on terrorism.
We are winning. Saddam Hussein no longer terrorizes the Iraqi
people or his neighbors; he is in custody awaiting justice. The Iraqi
people are well on their way to establishing a prosperous and peaceful
future. They have already assumed a significant role in providing for
their own security, and the list of important accomplishments in every
sector--education, medical care, business, agriculture, energy, and
government, to name a few--is long and growing. We have made
substantial progress in Afghanistan as well. The recent Constitutional
Loya Jirga is an encouraging example of democracy in action. In both
countries, as in the Horn of Africa and other areas, U.S. and coalition
personnel work together to capture or kill terrorists, while at the
same time improving infrastructure and economic conditions so that
peace and freedom can take hold.
Despite the operational demands on our forces, we remain ready to
support the President's National Security Strategy to assure our
allies, while we dissuade, deter and defeat any adversary. The draft
National Military Strategy (NMS), developed in consultation with the
service chiefs and combatant commanders describes the ways we will
conduct military operations to protect the United States against
external attack and aggression, and how we will prevent conflict and
surprise attack and prevail against adversaries. The strategy requires
that we possess the forces to defend the U.S. homeland and deter
forward in four critical regions. If required, we will swiftly defeat
the efforts of two adversaries in an overlapping timeframe, while
having the ability to ``win decisively'' in one theater. In addition,
because we live in a world marked by uncertainty, our forces must also
be prepared to conduct a limited number of lesser contingencies while
maintaining sufficient force generation capabilities as a hedge against
future challenges.
We appreciate your continued support giving our dedicated personnel
the warfighting systems and quality of life they deserve. Our challenge
for the coming year and beyond is to stay the course in the war on
terrorism as we continue to transform our Armed Forces to conduct
future joint operations. We cannot afford to let our recent successes
cause us to lose focus or lull us into satisfaction with our current
capabilities. The war is not over, and there is still dangerous work to
do. To meet this challenge, we continue to focus on three priorities:
winning the war on terrorism, enhancing joint warfighting, and
transforming for the future.
war on terrorism
Twenty-eight months after the terrorist attacks on September 11,
defeating global terrorism remains our military's number one priority.
We will continue to fight this war on many different fronts, because
terrorism comes in many different forms. The stakes remain high, but
our resolve remains firm.
The more experience we gain in this fight, the more we recognize
that success is dependent on a well-integrated military, interagency
and coalition effort. This means the coordinated commitment of the
military, diplomatic, informational, economic, financial, law
enforcement, and intelligence resources of our Nation--all instruments
of our national power. On the international level, coalition military
and interagency cooperation has been remarkable. In Iraq, coalition
forces from 34 nations are working hard to bring peace and stability to
a country brutalized for 3 decades. In Afghanistan, 37 nations are
working to secure a democratic government and defeat al Qaeda and
remnants of the Taliban regime, with NATO assuming an increasing role
in stability and reconstruction efforts.
We have made significant strides coordinating U.S. Government
efforts within the interagency and with our coalition partners. One of
the ways we have been successful at coordinating interagency efforts is
through venues such as the Strategy Working Group, the Senior
Leadership Review Board and the Regional Combating Terrorism
Strategies. Continued success in this war will depend largely on our
ability to organize for a sustained effort and coordinate seamlessly
among all government agencies. An even more demanding task is
coordinating the efforts of our coalition partners, now numbering more
than 90 nations. Coalition contributions have been significant, ranging
from combat forces, to intelligence, logistics, and medical units. They
have complemented our existing capabilities and eased the requirement
for current U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Coordinating the
efforts of our coalition partners is critical to combating the
remaining terrorist threat.
The al Qaeda network, though damaged, remains resilient, adaptable
and capable of planning and executing more terrorist acts, such as the
attacks in Saudi Arabia and Turkey toward the end of 2003. Al Qaeda
continues to receive support and recruit operatives from sympathizers
around the world. Al Qaeda will increasingly focus on Iraq as today's
jihad. As the network consolidates its efforts in Iraq, the threats of
attacks will grow. In fact, four al Qaeda audiotapes released in 2003
prominently mentioned Iraq, demonstrating Osama bin Laden's emphasis on
staging attacks there. Ansar al-Islam also remains a formidable threat
in Iraq, despite damage inflicted by coalition forces during Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Its key leadership remains at large and continues
to plot attacks against U.S. and coalition interests.
Other terrorist groups also pose significant threats to U.S.
interests, and we believe that some of these terrorist groups have
developed contingency plans for terrorist attacks against U.S.
interests abroad. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia continue
to conduct terrorist attacks throughout Colombia. They currently hold
three U.S. hostages captured in early 2003, and directly threaten
efforts to bring peace, stability and an end to the drug trade in
Colombia. Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia is another terrorist group
that shares al Qaeda's goals and methods, adding to the transnational
terrorist threat. The intelligence that led to recent heightened alert
levels in the U.S. show that the threat of a major terrorist attack
against the U.S. homeland remains very real.
Disturbingly, terrorist groups continue to show interest in
developing and using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
(CBRN) weapons in terrorist attacks. Terrorists have attempted to
acquire military-grade materials, and interest in CBRN weapons and
materials by several groups is well documented.
The coalition's efforts in the war on terror represent the
significant first step in curtailing WMD proliferation. Our strategy
for combating WMD calls for the combatant commanders to detect, deter,
deny, counter, and if necessary, interdict WMD and its means of
delivery. Combating WMD relies on a continuum of interrelated
activities, employing both defensive and offensive measures, and
confronting the threat through mutually reinforcing approaches of
nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management.
This multi-tiered and integrated effort will greatly reduce the threat
of WMD falling into the hands of terrorists. Following the liberation
of Iraq and the collapse of Saddam Hussein's brutal regime, the
countries of Iran, and most recently, Libya have been more forthcoming
about their illegal WMD programs to the international community. This
should also help to apply international pressure on North Korea and its
nuclear declarations.
To counter the potential threat of the proliferation of WMD, the
President's Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is the most far-
reaching attempt to expand our efforts to impede and interdict the flow
of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery, and related
materials, between state and non-state actors of proliferation concern.
It is part of a larger effort to counter proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and missile-related technology by interdicting
shipments of these materials by air, land, and sea. To date, there are
11 partner nations actively participating in PSI operations and
exercises. Our goal is to expand PSI participation in order to be
postured to respond quickly to assist in the interdiction of the
proliferation trade.
oif and oef operations
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is still center-stage in the war on
terrorism, and doing a magnificent job under difficult circumstances.
Iraq is well on its way to becoming a sovereign country. Our coalition
is strong, with 34 countries directly supporting stability and security
in Iraq. As part of the 15 November 2003 agreement, the U.S., our
coalition partners, and the Iraqi Governing Council are forging plans
and agreements to allow for the transfer of sovereignty to Iraq this
June. Since the end of major combat operations, we have made steady
progress towards meeting our objectives. Essential services are being
restored, and a political transformation is already underway in Iraq.
Security in Iraq is steadily improving, and we are transitioning to a
time when the face of security in Iraq is an Iraqi face, and coalition
forces are in the background.
Today, coalition forces continue to rout out remnants of the former
regime attempting a desperate last stand. Using intelligence provided
by Iraqi citizens, we are conducting thousands of raids and patrols per
week alongside Iraqi security forces. We have seized massive amounts of
ammunition, and captured or killed 45 of the 55 most wanted former
Iraqi leaders, as well as thousands of other Saddam loyalists,
terrorists and criminals. We have captured or killed all of the top
five, most notably Saddam Hussein and his sons, Uday and Qusay.
The Iraq Survey Group is continuing its examination of Saddam's WMD
programs by interviewing Iraqi citizens, examining physical evidence,
and analyzing records of the old regime. We know that this process will
take time and patience, and must be able to stand up to world scrutiny.
Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and guardsmen in Iraq are
now supporting over 203,000 Iraqi security forces. The Iraqi police
continue to expand their training pipelines in Jordan and Iraq,
producing hundreds of trained officers each month. We are well on track
to meet our goal of 71,000 Iraqi police by August 2004. The Facilities
Protective Service has fewer training requirements and has already
reached its goal of 50,000 members. They have taken over security from
coalition forces at most fixed site locations, such as power lines and
parts of the oil infrastructure--key targets for sabotage. Our goal for
the Border Enforcement Force is to have 25,700 members by December
2004. They will relieve coalition forces guarding checkpoints along
Iraq's border. U.S. military forces continue to vet former members of
the Iraqi military and other security services for employment in the
new Iraqi security services, but Iraqis are formally in charge of de-
Baathification efforts and have established guidelines for that
process. The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and
for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan 2004 that Congress
approved last year was instrumental in enabling our planned accelerated
development of these security forces, and we are grateful for that
support.
The New Iraqi Army continues to train additional battalions. Iraq's
Army needs more than just military skills. They must have a deep-rooted
sense of professionalism, focused on protecting all Iraqis while
operating firmly under civilian control. The new army will reflect
Iraq's religious, regional, and ethnic mix, will be apolitical, and
indoctrinated in their role of defense and security. We will spend the
time and resources necessary to ensure the Iraqi Army is a well-trained
and highly capable force.
The linchpin of our security efforts during this transition period
is the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), which is currently planned for
a force of 40,000 by the summer of 2004. The ICDC is a light military
force, created to deal with the current stability issues in Iraq. As we
have done from the beginning, we continue to reassess the security
environment in Iraq. These security assessments could change force
goals for the various components of Iraqi security forces. With the
resources allocated from the supplemental, we have made great headway
in providing them with vehicles, uniforms and other gear, including
communications systems that will enable them to succeed in their
critical tasks. Military commanders in Iraq tell me that the Iraqi
Civil Defense Corps has been highly effective, and as such, we
increased the goal from 18 to 36 Battalions and provided $124 million
extra funding to reinforce the success of this Iraqi Security Force.
These supplemental funds also provided commanders with one of the
most successful tools in winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi and
Afghan people, the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). These
funds provide commanders and the resourceful young troops they lead
with the means to respond to urgent humanitarian and stabilization and
reconstruction needs such as water and sanitation projects, irrigation
and small-scale agriculture assistance, school house repairs, and civic
cleanup projects. This program is an invaluable tool for establishing
relationships with the Iraqi and Afghan people, assisting in economic
development, and creating a safer environment.
The United Nations and the international community are also playing
vital roles in the political and economic transformation of Iraq. Over
70 countries and international organizations including the U.S.,
pledged $33 billion at the Madrid Donors Conference. U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1511 called upon Iraqis, initially through the Iraqi
Governing Council, to determine the course and speed of their political
reformation. In response, the Iraqi Governing Council has submitted its
plan and timetable for selecting a transitional National Assembly and
interim government, drafting a constitution and holding elections. It
is an ambitious schedule, but one that they can accomplish with our
help.
In addition to security and political progress, we continue to help
Iraq rebuild the infrastructure required for economic progress and a
stable democracy. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and Task
Force Restore Iraqi Electricity are managing a comprehensive
maintenance and upgrade program designed to improve power generation,
transmission, efficiency and capacity to meet the future needs of the
Iraqi people. Through the coordinated efforts of the Army Corps of
Engineers and the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity, we met the initial
October 2003 goal of 4,400 mega-watts (MW) of peak power generation.
The next goal is 6,000 MW of power by 1 June 2004. In order to meet
this goal the CPA developed the Power Increase Plan to offset recent
system failures from severe weather and continuing sabotage and
looting. This plan increases electrical power generation through an
increase of generator rehabilitation and maintenance projects, the
increase of new power generators to the national power grid, increasing
electrical power imports from other nations, and improving system-wide
power transmission and distribution. Other progress continues
throughout Iraq in potable drinking water projects, supplying hospitals
with medical supplies, providing school supplies for Iraqi school
children and rebuilding classrooms. Living conditions are improving
everyday in Iraq, as many of you have seen for yourselves on recent
trips to Iraq.
In Afghanistan, our military strategy combines both combat and
stability operations. U.S. and coalition forces are conducting combat
operations to rid Afghanistan of al Qaeda and Taliban remnants, and
stability operations to assist in building Afghan security
institutions, governing bodies, and economic prosperity. A few weeks
ago the interim Afghan government held their first Constitutional Loya
Jirga, approving a new constitution for Afghanistan.
Security and stability operations are being conducted by 11
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) operating throughout
Afghanistan, with 1 more PRT planned for this year. PRT representatives
are making great strides improving the quality of life for the Afghan
people by building schools, clinics, wells, roads, and other community
infrastructure projects. Reopening the Kabul-to-Kandahar road was a
major success. Our efforts have increased security and stability in
Afghanistan.
In August 2003, NATO assumed responsibility for the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. In October 2003 the
United Nations Security Council passed a resolution extending ISAF's
mission in Afghanistan for 1 year, and authorizing ISAF to operate
outside Kabul and its environs. In February 2004, a Canadian officer
will assume command of the NATO ISAF headquarters from the German
commander. NATO's role in Afghanistan is expanding. The first phase of
NATO expansion included transfer of responsibility for the U.S. PRT at
Konduz to NATO, with Germany as lead nation, and temporary NATO
deployments outside Kabul. NATO is planning future ISAF expansion
throughout Afghanistan.
The Afghan National Army (ANA), now numbering 5,785 trained
personnel, is at the forefront of efforts to improve security and
stability and establish a strong national identity among the Afghan
people. They are well on their way to reaching the annual throughput
goal of 10,800 personnel by June 2004. To date the ANA has performed
well, fighting side-by-side with U.S. and coalition forces during
recent successful combat operations to capture or kill Taliban, Hezb-I-
Islami-Gulbiddin, and al Qaeda elements. Most of the funding provided
in the Afghanistan portion of the Fiscal Year 2004 Emergency
Supplemental is being targeted to efforts that strengthen the ANA, such
as new infrastructure and equipment that will also improve recruitment
and retention efforts. These efforts include increased pay, plans to
field 15 new regional recruiting centers by this spring, and
establishing military benefit packages.
Congress has demonstrated its commitment to the future of
Afghanistan, but there is still much more the international community
could and should contribute to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The
Afghan government, with the help of the U.S. Government, is seeking
more donations for several infrastructure projects such as a new
Ministry of Defense headquarters, a hospital in Kabul, and a military
academy, as well as donations of certain equipment, weapons and
ammunition.
In neighboring Pakistan, working closely with President Musharraf,
we have been able to increase coordination among U.S., Coalition,
Afghan, and Pakistani Forces along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The
Pakistani government has taken some initiatives to increase their
military presence on the border, such as manned outposts, regular
patrols and security barriers, including areas of the Pakistan
federally Administered Tribal Areas, an area historically avoided by
Pakistan's military forces. The Tripartite Commission consisting of
U.S., Afghan, and Pakistan representatives concluded its fifth session
in December, and among its accomplishments was the establishment of a
subcommittee to investigate means to prevent cross-border conflict.
U.S./Pakistani military cooperation continues to improve, and we are
helping Pakistan identify equipment requirements for their
counterterrorism efforts.
Operations in the Horn of Africa remain an essential part of the
war on terrorism. The Joint Task Force Horn of Africa at Camp Lemonier,
Djibouti is conducting counterterrorist and civil affairs operations in
Eastern Africa. Although these operations have impacted al Qaeda's
influence in the region, a continued military presence is essential to
stop the movement of transnational terrorists and demonstrating to the
region our resolve to wage the war on terrorism in Africa.
In support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)--Philippines, U.S.
Pacific Command (PACOM) used congressionally-approved funds this past
year to continue counter-terrorism training for the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. A small contingent of U.S. military personnel remains in
the southern Philippines managing these efforts and other humanitarian
assistance projects.
other overseas operations
U.S. European Command (EUCOM), in accordance with Secretary of
Defense (SECDEF) guidance, has developed a concept for the reduction of
U.S. forces supporting U.S. Kosovo Force in the Province of Kosovo, and
U.S. Stability Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Implementation of this
plan is dependent on the North Atlantic Council's Periodic Mission
Review recommendation for the Balkans.
When EUCOM concludes the Georgia Train and Equip Program in May
2004, they will meet their objective of improving Georgia's ability to
confront transnational terrorism operating within Georgia. Training is
being provided for two staffs, four battalions, and one mechanized/
armor company team. To build on this success and momentum, EUCOM is
reviewing a possible follow-on Georgia Capabilities Enhancement Program
to sustain and improve the Georgian military's newly acquired
capabilities, and demonstrate a continued U.S. commitment to the
Georgian Armed Forces' development.
Maritime Interdiction Operations took on a new global focus last
year, beyond the historical CENTCOM and EUCOM missions, when the
President approved Expanded Maritime Interception Operations to
interdict terrorists and their resources globally. Expanded Maritime
Interception Operations are now significant mission areas for every
deployed battle group, especially along maritime transit lanes and
choke points. Results from these maritime operations, such as in the
Mediterranean Sea, have produced lower insurance premiums in the
shipping industry, considerably less illegal immigration in countries
such as Spain, Italy, and Greece, and a reduction in crime at sea.
Maritime Interdiction Operations are a truly international effort.
German and Spanish led multi-national naval forces patrol the CENTCOM
area of responsibility, and this past year coalition naval forces have
been responsible for boarding over 30 ships within EUCOM's area of
responsibility.
U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) continues to support
counternarcotics trafficking and counterterrorism efforts in the
Caribbean and Central and South America. They are assisting the
Colombian military in its fight against designated terrorist
organizations by providing military advice, training, and equipment
with an emphasis on the pursuit of narcoterrorist leadership,
counternarcotics tactics, and security for major infrastructure such as
the Cano Limon pipeline. SOUTHCOM supported the formation of the
Colombian Army Special Operations Command and is continuing its efforts
to train the Commando Battalion, and a Ranger-type unit. Training was
successfully completed for the first Colombian Commando Battalion, and
training has begun for the second battalion. The Colombian military has
been very successful over the past year in their fight against
narcoterrorism. The Tri-Border Area between Argentina, Brazil, and
Paraguay is another focal point for drug and arms trafficking, money
laundering, document fraud and Islamic terrorist-supported activities
in South America. U.S.-sponsored multilateral exercises are promoting
security, improving effective border control, and denying terrorist
groups such as Hizballah, Hamas, and other Middle Eastern terrorist
safe havens, restricting their ability to operate.
SOUTHCOM is also providing nearly 2000 military personnel to manage
detainee operations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. We operate in close
coordination with several U.S. agencies. We are constantly reviewing
the status of each detainee, and to date have transferred 87 of the
detainees who were determined to be of no intelligence or law
enforcement value, or no threat to the U.S. or its interests, back to
their countries of origin for release. Four detainees have been
transferred back to their country of origin, under an agreement for
continued detention by that country. More await similar agreements to
allow for transfer or continued detention. A number of detainees have
been assessed as high intelligence and or law enforcement value, or
pose a significant threat to U.S. interests. These detainees will
remain for further exploitation. Other cases are being considered for
referral to the Military Commission, although no one has been referred
to date. Information gleaned from detainees, many of whom continue to
make threats against Americans, has already helped prevent further
terrorist attacks against the U.S. and our allies. Furthermore,
continued detention of those who pose a threat to U.S. interests
prevents those enemy combatants from returning to the battlefield.
In accordance with the Unified Command Plan 2002 Change 2
implemented last year on 1 January 2004, U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM) reported significant progress in all of their new mission
areas: global strike; missile defense; DOD information operations; and
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. Further, they are on
schedule to achieve full operational capability in each of the newly
assigned mission areas this year. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) has
already approved the Information Operations Roadmap, which has 57 wide-
ranging recommendations that aid combatant commanders in planning and
executing fully integrated information operations.
As we become more reliant upon information to conduct operations,
the defense of our network is paramount. This requires properly trained
people, common operating standards, and a well-stocked arsenal of
information assurance tools. We are working diligently to centralize
network operations and defense, and to formalize information sharing
policy, guidance, and procedures. These steps, along with our
cryptographic modernization plan, will safeguard our vital information.
We are formalizing the role of U.S. Special Operations Command
(SOCOM) in the war on terrorism. In the near future, we will be
recommending a change to the Unified Command Plan assigning SOCOM
specific responsibility to coordinate DOD actions against terrorist
networks. We are also drafting planning guidance that will designate
SOCOM as the supported commander for planning and, when directed,
executing operations against terrorist networks. These changes will
provide SOCOM and all of DOD improved focus in our global effort to
combat terrorism.
current homeland defense operations
Last year, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) reached full
operational capability in their mission to deter, prevent and defeat
threats and aggression aimed at the U.S. and its territories. Upon
SECDEF approval, NORTHCOM can now deploy Quick Response Forces
(company-sized units) and Rapid Response Forces (battalion-sized
forces) to support time-sensitive missions such as defense of critical
infrastructures or consequence management in support of the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS). To improve interagency collaboration, DOD
has been working with DHS to develop and implement the National
Response Plan, a national-level, all-hazards plan that will integrate
the current family of Federal Domestic Emergency Response Plans into a
single plan.
The Joint Staff has developed a contingency plan (CONPLAN) for
consequence management operations, and NORTHCOM and PACOM have
developed supporting plans. NORTHCOM's Joint Task Force Civil Support
maintains strong interagency relationships to integrate command and
control of DOD forces with Federal agencies to manage the mitigation of
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE)
incidents. This past summer, DOD, Nevada National Guard and Reserve
units, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 27 other Federal
agencies, and Nevada State and local agencies participated in a
consequence management exercise in Nevada called Determined Promise
2003. I was thoroughly impressed by the coordination and cooperation
among active and Reserve component forces, Federal, State, and local
authorities. We are conducting similar exercises across the country.
In regards to antiterrorism and force protection measures, the
Joint Staff is working to ensure that combatant commanders at home and
abroad have the resources to mitigate threats and respond to emergent
requirements through the Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives
Fund. My staff is involved in developing and updating antiterrorism
standards and policies to reflect current worldwide operations and
lessons learned so that we can address any vulnerabilities. We
coordinate with various agencies in the areas of training, planning,
operations and intelligence sharing, all essential for developing sound
antiterrorism policies.
In an effort to improve the security of U.S. military installations
and personnel around the world, the Joint Staff has created the
Antiterrorism Enterprise Portal, an evolving web-based portal that
aggregates the resources and programs required to support the DOD
Antiterrorism Program. This portal is fast becoming DOD's one-stop
location for antiterrorism/force protection information.
A program that complements this portal capability is the Joint
Protection Enterprise Network (JPEN). Operated by NORTHCOM, this
network provides the means to share unclassified force protection
information rapidly between military installations in the continental
United States, increasing their situational awareness and security
significantly. Although currently operating only on military
installations, JPEN has the potential to be expanded to share terrorist
information with Federal, State, and local agencies as well.
The war on terrorism requires collecting relevant data and turning
it into knowledge that will enable us to detect and preempt the plans
of an elusive, skilled enemy dispersed across the globe. Although many
obstacles remain, we are making significant progress in the area of
information sharing. The Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating
Terrorism (JITF-CT) at DIA is a prime example of effective intelligence
cooperation in the war on terrorism. In the area of counterterrorism,
we are making significant progress toward transparency and full
information sharing. JITF-CT has experts from 12 intelligence and law
enforcement organizations, and JITF-CT personnel are embedded in 15
other organizations, including some forward deployed personnel.
readiness for future operations
Our Nation's number one military asset remains the brave men and
women serving in our Armed Forces. This past year, they demonstrated to
the world their dedication, perseverance, and compassion as they
liberated the Iraqi people and worked to bring peace and prosperity to
the region. The administration, Congress, and DOD have made raising
their standards of living a top priority. The 2004 budget provided an
average military pay raise of 4.15 percent and targeted increases of up
to 6.5 percent for some enlisted personnel. The 2005 budget's proposed
reduction of out-of-pocket housing expenses from 3.5 percent to 0 is a
sound investment, as are future pay increases based on the Employment
Cost Index plus .5 percent.
DOD has a focus group that continues to look at programs to enhance
the combat effectiveness and morale of service and family members
associated with OIF and OEF. Areas where we have made significant
progress are Rest and Recuperation Leave, danger area benefits to
include incentive options for extended tours of duty in Iraq and
Afghanistan, exchanges, childcare and communications initiatives.
All Services generally met or exceeded active duty and Reserve
component recruiting and retention goals in both fiscal years 2002 and
2003 and entered fiscal year 2004 with healthy Delayed Entry Program
levels. However, recruiting and retention of both active and Reserve
personnel will continue to require attention and continued investment
as we face the challenges of an improving economy and the high
operations tempo associated with the war. I view all of the quality-of-
life issues as inseparable from overall combat readiness, and we
greatly appreciate congressional support for all of these initiatives.
The overall readiness of our Armed Forces--whether forward
deployed, operating in support of contingency operations, or employed
in homeland defense--remains good. Our forces are the world's best
trained and, possess the requisite personnel, equipment, and resources
necessary to accomplish the military objectives outlined in the
Strategic Planning Guidance. Challenges do exist, especially with
regard to ground forces in Iraq. We are currently in the midst of
rotating our combat troops in Iraq--a feat that will rival any in
history. We will continue to examine force levels and size them
appropriately as security dictates.
We continue to rely heavily on our Reserve and Guard personnel, who
are playing critical roles in homeland defense, and serving with
distinction around the world in the war on terrorism. Some missions
like the ones in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are almost exclusively
made up of Reserve and Guard units, and they are doing a magnificent
job. We are well aware of the strains on members, their families, and
their employers, and continuously seek better ways to support them.
There are several initiatives underway, collectively by DOD, the
Services, combatant commands, and the Joint Staff to reform the
mobilization process and to relieve the stress on the force. United
States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), in conjunction with the
Services, is leading the mobilization reform effort by evaluating
policy changes and identifying other solutions to streamline the
mobilization/demobilization process, and preliminary recommendations
are expected in early 2004. Two Operational Availability sub-studies
were conducted last year and identified the active component/Reserve
component mix and low density/high demand assets as two areas of
immediate concern to relieve stress on the Reserve component forces. As
an example, the Army has already begun converting some Reserve
component artillery forces into Military Police forces to meet one of
the expected high demand roles of the foreseeable future. This, and
other ongoing rebalancing efforts will ensure that Active and Reserve
Forces continue to complement each other. The Services are actively
engaged in reviewing how much of a given capability they need for this
new security environment, and which capabilities belong in each
component. Other key DOD areas of concern are reducing the need for
involuntary mobilization of the Reserve component early on in rapid
response operations, establishing a more rigorous process for reviewing
joint force requirements, and ensuring efficient use of mobilized
Reserve component personnel. A comprehensive Rebalancing the Force
Report by Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs (ASD(RA))
will summarize these efforts, while a study by Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Health Affairs (ASD(HD)) will define Reserve component
requirements for homeland defense.
U.S. Armed Forces are capable of achieving all assigned objectives
in the defense strategy. However, current stresses on the force remain
considerable. The increased demands of the war on terrorism, sustaining
post-conflict operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and other global
commitments are unlikely to change significantly in the near-term.
Moreover, while committed globally, our Armed Forces must continue to
defend the homeland, reconstitute forces returning from contingency
operations, transform to meet future challenges, strengthen joint and
combined warfighting capabilities, and maintain readiness. Today, given
these commitments and requirements, we are carefully managing the risk
in executing an additional major combat operation.
When units return home from combat operations, they must undergo a
reconstitution process, which generally means a drop in their
readiness. However, this does not necessarily indicate that a unit is
either unavailable for or incapable of executing part or all of their
assigned wartime missions. We have initiated new measures in the
current readiness reporting system to identify Service and combatant
command requirements, determine the scope of required reset actions,
and develop appropriate solutions to mitigate shortfalls and manage
risk. Our workload remains high, but we remain prepared to accomplish
those missions assigned to us.
Army units returning from OIF I/OEF require focused maintenance
efforts to return them to pre-hostility readiness levels, while
continuing to meet combatant commanders' maintenance requirements. The
Army's goal is to return OIF I/OEF active duty units to pre-deployment
readiness within 6 months and Reserves within 1 year after return to
home station. However, some critical aviation systems may require
additional time in order to complete depot level repairs. Funding was
programmed from the 2004 supplemental for these organizational and
depot level maintenance requirements. Army Materiel Command is the lead
agency for developing a plan to repair major equipment items from OIF
I/OEF. Approximately 1,000 aviation systems, 124,400 communications and
electronics systems, 5,700 combat/tracked vehicles, 45,700 wheeled
vehicles, 1,400 missile systems, 6 patriot battalions, and 232,200
various other systems are included in this repair plan. As OIF II and
beyond maintenance requirements are further defined, DOD will refine
estimates and update costs.
Combatant commanders and the Services identified preferred
munitions as one of their risk areas of concern via periodic readiness
reporting. Supplemental funding, as well as augmented annual budget
requests, have allowed us to meet our requirement for Joint Direct
Attack Munitions and laser-guided bomb kit demands. In the near-term,
we are focused on improving how we determine our munitions
requirements. Over the long-term, we plan to field improved guided
munitions systems that build on our already superb precision-delivery
capabilities.
Our military training areas are facing competition from population
growth, environmental laws, and civilian demands for land, sea, and
airspace. The Services are proud of their success in protecting the
environment, endangered species and cultural resources. We are grateful
to Congress for their assistance in the Fiscal Year 2004 Defense
Authorization Act, which precluded designating certain DOD lands as
critical habitat, and preserved valuable Navy training while ensuring
protection of marine mammal species. Having the world's most
sophisticated weapons systems and simulators cannot substitute for our
most important military training activities, air, land, and sea
maneuver and live-fire training. Some installations, ranges, and
training areas are losing critical military value because encroachment
is impairing their capability to provide useful readiness and
operational support. Such facilities should be reviewed during the next
round of Base Realignment and Closure. We will continue to seek
congressional support that balances environmental concerns and
readiness.
Our Nuclear Readiness continues to evolve. In December 2001, the
Nuclear Posture Review established a New Triad composed of Offensive
Strike capabilities (both nuclear and non-nuclear), Defenses (active
and passive) and Responsive Infrastructure in order to respond to a
wide range of contingencies. DOD is in the midst of a Strategic
Capabilities Assessment to assess the progress in fielding the New
Triad and determine the number and types of forces to meet the
President's goal of 1,700 to 2,200 operationally deployed strategic
nuclear warheads by 2012.
We continue our efforts to ensure we can operate effectively in a
CBRN environment, since our potential adversaries, both nation states
and terrorists, seek to acquire and develop weapons of mass
destruction, including biological warfare agents. Vaccinations
represent an important countermeasure against biological threats and
provide our military personnel with the best available protective
measures. To date, approximately 695,000 military personnel have been
vaccinated against anthrax and more than 520,000 military personnel
have received smallpox vaccinations. The anthrax and smallpox
vaccination programs are very successful, and it is imperative to
develop effective countermeasures against other biological threats to
protect our warfighters.
While our warfighting team has always included contractors, their
involvement is increasing. The Joint Staff is leading a joint group to
develop overarching DOD policy for management of contractor personnel
during contingency operations.
We must also reexamine our ability to get to the fight. The
Mobility Requirements Study 2005, completed in 2000, is the current
baseline mobility requirements document. DOD is actively engaged in
conducting a new full-scale mobility study that reflects our current
defense strategy and incorporates lessons learned from OEF and OIF to
further clarify strategic lift requirements. The goal is to complete a
new Mobility Capabilities Study by June 2005, in time to influence
preparation of Program Objective Memorandum-08 (POM-08).
Sustaining our overseas presence, responding to complex
emergencies, prosecuting the global war on terrorism, and conducting
operations far from our shores are only possible if our ships and
aircraft are able to make unencumbered use of the sea and air lines of
communication. Our naval and air forces must be able to take advantage
of the customary, established navigational rights that the Law of the
Sea Convention codifies. We strongly support U.S. accession to the
convention.
Although C-17 production is not planned to terminate until fiscal
year 2008, production of several C-17 long lead items is planned to
close in fiscal year 2006. The Air Force and DOD are studying the
benefits and risks (including financial and war fighting) of continuing
or terminating the C-17 long lead items production line, and plan to
complete this assessment in time to inform the fiscal year 2006 POM and
the Enhanced Planning Process.
Increasing costs, decreasing reliability and maintainability, and
an increased need for air-refueling capability dictate modernization of
the KC-135 fleet. Congress has authorized the Air Force to lease 20 and
purchase 80 new Boeing 767 tanker aircraft. In early December 2003, DOD
suspended negotiations with Boeing, pending the outcome of ongoing
Inspector General investigations. Based on the results of that
investigation, the Air Force will recommend a cost-effective strategy
for acquiring a suitable replacement for the KC-135 fleet to meet joint
warfighting requirements to support our National Security Strategy.
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) will be a giant leap over
existing attack/fighter capabilities. JSF is in the third year of an
11-year development program, and we have seen some design challenges.
The current design challenge for all three variants is weight, which
impacts performance requirements, particularly for the Short Takeoff
and Vertical Landing variant. Design teams are working diligently to
solve this issue, and we have moved the first planned production
procurement to the right 1 year, and added extra money to the
development. The weight issue is within normal parameters of design
fluctuation, and this issue will be worked out through the development
and design process.
Protection of our troops remains a top priority. Interceptor Body
Armor (IBA) was in the initial fielding phase at the start of OIF. The
Army has been aggressively managing this critical item, and accelerated
fielding and production rates when CENTCOM identified the need due to
the threat situation. The Army has been issuing the IBA directly for
use in the combat theater of operations. IBA consists of an Outer
Tactical Vest (OTV) and a set of Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI).
As of 26 January, 93 percent of the troops and DOD civilians operating
in Iraq had been outfitted with IBAs with SAPI. The OTV and SAPI assets
needed to equip the remainder of the force are in theater being
distributed. During the upcoming force rotation, all OIF II forces will
be outfitted in Kuwait prior to entering Iraq. We will continue to work
diligently to provide the best protective equipment for our servicemen
and women and DOD civilians.
The up armored version of the high mobility multi-purpose wheeled
vehicle (HMMWV) has proven to be effective at protecting our soldiers
against mines, improvised explosive devices (IED) and direct fire
weapons. Currently there is a shortfall in Iraq and worldwide. To fill
this shortfall, in the near term, the Joint Staff, the Services, and
the combatant commanders are conducting an aggressive campaign to
redistribute worldwide inventories of up armored HMMVVs to Iraq. In the
longer-term, Congress' Emergency Supplemental provided funding to
accelerate production of up armored HMMVVs to meet CENTCOM requirements
by January 2005.
OIF reaffirmed how critical the deployment and distribution process
is to joint warfare. The Joint Staff is working with DOD and the
Service logistics experts to develop an integrated end-to-end
deployment and distribution process that is responsive to rapid
projection of forces, the delivery and handoff of joint forces, and
worldwide sustainment in support of the Joint Forces Commander.
During the fiscal year 2004 budget cycle, Congress voiced concern
over the Department's overseas basing plans. Since then, our global
posture strategy has matured. We are now in the process of detailed
consultation with our allies and Members of Congress. The overseas
portion of the fiscal year 2005 military construction budget submission
includes projects at enduring locations. These projects reflect our
combatant commanders' most pressing base and infrastructure needs. I
urge Congress to support our combatant commanders and fund the overseas
military construction projects submitted in the fiscal year 2005 budget
request. These projects contribute directly to our readiness and the
quality of life our personnel deserve.
joint warfighting
Protecting the U.S., preventing future conflicts, and prevailing
against adversaries require our military to sustain and extend its
qualitative advantage against a very diverse set of threats and
adversary capabilities. Maintaining our qualitative advantage begins
with improving education programs across the Services. We must also
adapt and transform organizations and functions to eliminate gaps and
seams within and between combatant commands, agencies at all levels of
government, and potential coalition partners. Information sharing is at
the forefront of this effort.
Recent operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, and Africa
have demonstrated the impact timely sharing of intelligence has on
planning and executing military operations. Since this is a global war
requiring an international effort, we must also improve coalition
command and control capabilities, and consolidate the numerous networks
that exist today. These disparate networks hinder our ability to plan
in a collaborative environment and exercise timely and effective
command and control with our multinational partners.
We must also review policies and implement technology that
safeguard our vital sensitive information while ensuring critical
operational information is shared with all those who fight beside us.
JFCOM has been tasked to take the lead in identifying specific
multinational information sharing requirements and recommending policy
changes. Our goal is to establish a multinational family of systems
with common standards as part of the Global Information Grid enterprise
services. I view this as a top priority and ask for congressional
support--information sharing with our allies is critical to winning the
war on terrorism.
During OIF, our military forces benefited from unprecedented
situational awareness through a common operational picture. In
particular, one new system, Blue Force Tracker, was critical to the
success of our forces as they sped towards Baghdad. Some of the 3rd
Infantry Division, V Corps, and I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)
vehicles were equipped with transponders that automatically reported
their positions as they maneuvered across the battlefield--greatly
improving situational awareness for our battlefield commanders, and
reducing the potential for blue-on-blue engagements. Despite
significant improvements in joint combat identification, challenges
remain to reduce incidents of friendly fire, and maximize the synergy
of combined arms to provide all front-line tactical units with friendly
and threat information during decisive engagements. To address these
challenges, JFCOM has the lead in the comprehensive effort to improve
Joint Battle Management Command and Control, which includes the
integration of Common Operational and Tactical Pictures, Combat
Identification, and Situational Awareness across the force.
We are taking command and control lessons learned from OIF like the
capability to track Blue Forces, and running them through the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System process to help shape
future systems requirements. The objective is to ensure all of the
critical considerations of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material,
Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) are
employed in an approach that synchronizes material and non-material
solutions.
We are also improving our military war planning process. The Joint
Staff has developed an adaptive planning process--whose key concepts
are agility and speed--to reduce the time to develop and update war
plans, while adding flexibility and adaptability to respond to the
rapid changes in the global strategic security environment. The goal is
to provide the President and SECDEF the best options possible. We have
also been developing a collaborative campaign-planning tool for crisis
action planning and execution. These tools should allow commanders the
ability to assess multiple courses of action, rapidly compressing plan
development time while increasing plan flexibility.
Our warfighting effectiveness is also enhanced by our Joint
Exercise Program, which provides combatant commanders with the means to
train battle staffs and forces in joint and combined operations,
evaluate their war plans, and execute security cooperation plans with
our allies and coalition partners. In order to improve joint training
opportunities, JFCOM has established a Joint National Training
Capability (JNTC), which will achieve Initial Operational Capability in
October 2004. JNTC will combine live and virtual play at multiple
locations. The goal is to provide realistic joint combat training
against an adaptive and credible opposing force, with common ground
truths, and high quality exercise feedback.
Strategic airlift is available to exercises only on an as-available
basis, since it is prioritized for operational needs first. Providing
the personnel and assets to accomplish meaningful joint training during
this period of high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) has also been
challenging. To balance these competing requirements, the combatant
commanders are reviewing their fiscal year 2004 exercise programs with
a view to canceling, downsizing, or postponing exercises. We must
continue to balance operational and exercise requirements against
operations/personnel tempo (OPS/PERSTEMPO) and available lift.
Prior to combat operations in Iraq, we established a process for
adapting OIF lessons learned for future operations as rapidly as
possible. JFCOM has the lead role in turning identified operational
level lessons learned into required capabilities through the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System. A consolidated OIF
After Action Review will be presented to Congress in July 2004. The top
three OIF Strategic Lessons Learned, from the Joint Staff perspective,
are the need for an improved deployment process (including Reserve
component mobilization), redistributing specialties between the active
and Reserve components, and improving the Phase IV planning and
transition process.
Phase IV transition and Stability Operations require significant
adjustments in how we plan, train, organize, and equip our forces. We
can expect future adversaries to attempt to offset U.S. military
strengths through asymmetric means, to include terrorist insurgency, as
combat operations transition to post conflict operations. The lessons
learned process continues during stability operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq.
The Joint Staff, in coordination with the Services and the
combatant commanders, is revising the National Military Strategy to
link strategic guidance to operational warfighting and serve as a
military plan to implement the National Defense Strategy and the
National Security Strategy. The National Military Strategy provides the
context for other military documents such as the Joint Operations
Concept, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, and other plans. It will
incorporate lessons learned from Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring
Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom and establish specific military priorities,
objectives, employment concepts, and capabilities for combatant
commands and Services. The 2004 National Defense Authorization Act
requires that the National Military Strategy include the Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) annual risk assessment, which is due 15
February 2004.
considerations and recommendations for goldwater-nichols act
For the past 18 years, joint operations have been improving under
the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The act strengthened
civilian control of the military and facilitated better military advice
to the President, SECDEF, National Security Council (NSC) and Congress.
Now, it is time to consider new ideas for improving the effectiveness
and efficiency of the military instrument of power in today's new
security environment.
The war on terrorism and other recent military operations have
demonstrated the need for improved interagency cooperation, integration
and execution of National Security Council decisions. We also need to
improve how we coordinate the efforts of international, regional and
non-governmental organizations. I fully support initiatives to
formalize a mechanism that creates effective lines of authority and
provides adequate resources to execute interagency operations. For
example, designating the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the
principal military advisor to the Homeland Security Council would
improve homeland defense and prosecution of the war on terrorism beyond
our borders.
Joint Officer Management codified in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols
legislation was based on the threats and force structure evident late
in the Cold War. We are developing a strategic plan to shape joint
officer management based on the type and quantity of officers needed to
perform current and future joint missions, and the education, training,
and experience joint officers require. This strategic approach will
ensure future joint officers meet the needs of joint commanders.
We are already taking some initiatives to improve our Joint
Professional Military Education system, with the goal of educating and
training the right person for the right task at the right time.
Historically, we waited until officers became majors and lieutenant
colonels before we provided them with joint education. We are finding
that the war on terrorism requires noncommissioned officers and junior
officers from all Services to work in the joint environment more often
than they have before. We are developing courses tailored to the needs
of our younger troops that expose them to joint warfighting far earlier
in their careers. To improve joint officer management and education,
and prepare officers for joint duty earlier in their professional
careers, I request consideration to allow the Service War Colleges to
teach Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase Two and the
authority to determine the appropriate length of the Joint Forces Staff
College's JPME Phase II course. We also have pilot programs providing
joint education to Senior Noncommissioned Officers and our Reserve and
Guard component members. Additionally, we are reviewing our joint
general and flag officer training programs to ensure our senior
officers are prepared to command joint task forces and work effectively
with interagency and coalition partners.
Today, the chairman remains well positioned to assist in providing
strategic direction to the Armed Forces, assess impacts on the long-
term readiness of the force, and evaluate current and potential levels
of risk associated with global military activities. Already, we are in
the process of transforming our internal processes make them more
responsive in the current dynamic environment. In a similar vein, I
request we also reevaluate and streamline our current reporting
requirements to Congress, many of which seem of questionable utility. I
propose the formulation of a working group composed of members from the
House Armed Services Committee (HASC), Senate Armed Services Committee
(SASC), House Appropriations Committee (HAC), Senate Appropriations
Committee (SAC), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), and Joint Staff to identify the best means
and frequency of communications to meet congressional oversight needs.
transformation of the u.s. armed forces
We cannot focus solely on the threats we face today and assume
there are not other, perhaps even more challenging threats on the
horizon. Maintaining our unchallenged military superiority requires
investment to ensure the current readiness of deployed forces while
continuing to transform military capabilities for the future. Our
adversaries will learn new lessons, adapt their capabilities, and seek
to exploit perceived vulnerabilities. Therefore our military must
transform, and must remain ready, even while we are engaged in war.
Before the events of September 11, transforming the force was
viewed as DOD's greatest near-term challenge. Since then, we have had
to fight battles in the mountains of Afghanistan, in the cities of
Iraq, and around the world for the security of America. Putting
transformation on the back burner and focusing solely on the fight at
hand is simply not an option. We are fighting a war unlike any we have
fought before--it demands new ways of thinking about military force,
new processes to improve strategic agility, and new technologies to
take the fight to the enemy. DOD continues to invest heavily in
transformation, both intellectually and materially. Given that
transformation begins with innovative thought, we have developed a
suite of concepts that will define how the joint commander will fight
in 2015 and beyond.
We recently published an overarching concept document titled Joint
Operations Concepts to provide a framework for developing capabilities
and defining concepts. Using this document as a foundation, the Joint
Staff completed development of five joint functional concepts to define
how joint warfighting will be conducted across the range of military
operations. These functions include force application, protection,
command and control, battlespace awareness, and logistics. Meanwhile,
the combatant commands have been working on four high-level operating
concepts that include strategic deterrence, stability operations,
homeland defense, and major combat operations.
Collectively, functional and operating concepts define how we want
to fight in the future, and will help us transform from the threat-
based force of the Cold War to a capabilities-based force postured to
respond to a wide variety of threats, some of which we cannot
confidently predict today. To aid the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council in determining warfighting needs with a capabilities-based
approach, we are developing joint integrating concepts. These concepts
are far more focused than functional and operating concepts, and define
specific tasks to be conducted. They are designed to bridge the gap
between how we want to fight and the capabilities we need. Examples
include urban operations, global strike operations, and forcible entry
operations. The functional, operating, and integrating concepts will
continue to evolve over time. The first round of this very important
concept work should be done within the year.
For each functional concept area we have established a Functional
Capability Board to integrate the views of the combatant commands,
Services, defense agencies, Joint Staff, and OSD. These boards comprise
functional experts from across DOD who will provide the best advice
possible for our planning, programming, and acquisition processes.
Functional Capability Boards also support a new process called the
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, which replaces
the previous Cold War-era Requirements Generation System. The new
system recognizes that less expensive programs can have a significant
impact on joint operations. Virtually all programs are reviewed through
the JROC process for potential joint impact before they get a green
light, ensuring all Service future systems are born joint.
Based on the recommendations of the Joint Defense Capabilities
Study--the Aldridge Study--we established the Strategic Planning
Council chaired by SECDEF, and composed of the Service Secretaries, the
Joint Chiefs, principal under secretaries, and the combatant
commanders. The first meeting was held 28 January 2004. To capture and
disseminate this top-down strategic direction, we will produce a new
Strategic Planning Guidance document as the mechanism to provide
subordinates with this strategic guidance. The first Strategic Planning
Guidance document should be complete by February 2004.
We are also developing an Enhanced Planning Process that integrates
DOD-wide lessons learned, experimentation, concept development, study
results, capability gap analysis, and technology development into a
collaborative capabilities planning function. The goal is to offer
distinct and viable alternatives to senior leadership rather than a
consensus driven, single point solution, and implement their decisions
into the Joint Programming Guidance document, the first of which will
be issued in May 2004.
These three transformational process initiatives--Functional
Capability Boards, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System, and the Enhanced Planning Process--work together improving our
planning and programming agility for future joint capabilities. JFCOM
is working with the Functional Capability Boards to incorporate lessons
learned from OEF and OIF into a list of materiel and non-materiel
recommendations to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to turn
lessons learned into identified capabilities needs as quickly as
possible.
JFCOM is also coordinating with the Services, combatant commands,
other U.S. agencies, and coalition partners to ensure experimentation
efforts support the warfighter. One of JFCOM's key experimentation
initiatives is the Standing Joint Force Headquarters, which will
provide combatant commanders a rapidly deployable command and control
team, along with supporting information systems and reachback
capabilities, that will enable us to respond to regional conflicts with
smaller and more effective joint operational headquarters. JFCOM is
establishing the prototype Standing Joint Force Headquarters this year,
and in fiscal year 2005 we will field the communications portion known
as the Deployable Joint Command and Control System to CENTCOM and
PACOM. EUCOM and SOUTHCOM receive follow on systems in fiscal year 2006
and fiscal year 2007. The Deployable Joint Command and Control System
will use state-of-the-art information technology to enhance Joint Force
command and control.
Communications systems are a prime target for transformational
ideas. The Joint Tactical Radio System is a software programmable radio
that will provide seamless, real-time, voice, data and video networked
communications for joint forces. It will be scalable allowing
additional capacity (bandwidth and channels) to be added, backwards-
compatible to communicate with legacy systems, able to communicate with
multiple networks, and able to accommodate airborne, maritime and land
based systems. It provides the tactical warfighter with netcentric
capabilities and connectivity to the Global Information Grid, and is
essential to meeting our 21st century joint communications warfighting
requirements.
Transformation also means developing multiple, persistent
surveillance capabilities that will let us ``watch'' situations and
targets by looking, smelling, feeling, and hearing with a variety of
long-dwell sensors from space, air, ground, sea and underwater and
integrating these capabilities into a ``system of systems.'' The
exploitation of Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), holds
great promise. MASINT collects information from many diverse sources to
detect, characterize and track a target or activity by its distinctive
properties, or ``signatures'' that are very difficult to conceal or
suppress. Last year, DIA created its Directorate for MASINT and
Technical Collection to develop new forms of technical collection and
integrate MASINT into collection strategies and operations.
Another example of the transformational technologies we have just
fielded is the Army's Stryker Brigade, which is centered on a new,
fast, and quiet vehicle that can deliver 11 troops to the fight. This
effort is far more than simply fielding a new vehicle; it is also a new
way to organize a brigade, and link that brigade to a networked command
and control system that shares intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance information. Our Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) are
organized and trained to take advantage of this new technology. The
first Stryker BCT is already proving its worth in Iraq.
To reduce our vulnerability to weapons of mass destruction, we have
made progress on providing missile defenses for our homeland, our
deployed forces, and our friends and allies. In the coming year, we
plan to deploy six ground-based interceptors in Alaska and four in
California to provide an initial capability to defend the U.S. from
ballistic missile attack. The Patriot missile defense system and the
emerging AEGIS-based SM-3 system will provide short and medium range
missile defenses, as well as critical surveillance and tracking
essential to our Ballistic Missile Defense System. Coupled with an
upgraded launch detection capability provided by the Space-Based
Infrared System, our ballistic missile defenses will continue to
improve significantly over the next few years.
The Global Positioning System (GPS) offers an excellent example of
a system that transformed modern warfare. GPS delivers worldwide
positioning, navigation and timing data that provide U.S. and allied
forces an all-weather, precision engagement capability. Over the last
decade, the success of combat operations was largely due to GPS-aided
precision-guided munitions. We must continue to modernize GPS, improve
capabilities, protect U.S. and allied access to reliable military
positioning, navigation and timing information, and deny this
information to our adversaries, while minimizing impacts to peaceful
civil users. We are engaged with NATO and the European Union to resolve
our concerns with the proposed Galileo system, a civil satellite system
that puts at risk our programmed military enhancements to GPS. A U.S.
interagency team has made significant headway with some tough technical
issues over the past year, but continued negotiations are essential to
address the remaining technical, and more importantly, the political
issues. Once these issues are resolved, we can confidently move forward
with our vision of space superiority to support future joint and
coalition operations.
As recent military operations have demonstrated, space is a
critical dimension of the battlespace. Lessons learned from OEF and OIF
highlight our increasing reliance on space communication assets and our
demand for bandwidth. Our challenge is meeting future warfighter
requirements in the face of an aging satellite constellation. Despite a
planned 10-fold increase in capability through Advanced Extremely High
Frequency (EHF) and Wideband Gapfiller Systems, projected capacity may
not meet the growing demand. This shortfall will potentially impact our
ability to maintain a technological advantage over our adversaries.
Work on Transformational Satellite Communications continues, which is
designed to improve communications for mobile systems, particularly
those that provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Our
unmanned aerial vehicles and the Army's Future Combat System place
heavy demands on bandwidth, particularly when real-time video feeds are
required. The frequency spectrum is critical not only to joint
warfighting, but to all Federal, State, and local agencies to ensure
national security and public safety. Military and civilian technology
is rapidly moving to a wireless medium. As pressures from commercial
sources to free up more Federal spectrum mount, we must ensure our
long-term spectrum accessibility for our military forces.
These are just a few examples of our ongoing transformation
efforts. We are working hard to integrate old systems with new, in
innovative ways. Interoperating between our own legacy and
transformational systems is a challenge for us, but it is an even
greater challenge to our coalition partners, who must participate in
key decisions on how transformation will enhance combined operations in
the future.
Over the past year, NATO has achieved great success in progressing
toward a transformed military organization. The alliance has developed,
approved, and begun implementing a new, more streamlined command
structure, which will make it viable in the 21st century global
security environment. The catalyst for modernization will be the new
Allied Command Transformation, which will maintain a close partnership
with JFCOM. Also, on the forefront of transformation, NATO has created
the NATO Response Force, a key enabler of NATO's new operational
concept. It is designed to be a combined, deployable, sustainable, and
lethal force intended to be NATO's first responders, able to respond
quickly to a crisis anywhere in the world. In a display of NATO's new
focus, on August 11, 2003, NATO assumed command of International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, the first out of area
mission in the history of the Alliance. To be an effective joint force
in the future, we must ensure that our allies keep pace with our
transformation efforts.
conclusion
Responding to today's dynamic threat environment requires our Armed
Forces to be innovative, agile, and flexible. With Congress' strong
support, our military has made significant progress combating
terrorism, improving our joint warfighting capabilities, and
transforming our military into a 21st century fighting force. We
appreciate your efforts to help us be responsive to a changing world,
and make that world a safer and better place.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General.
Members of the committee, we have a quorum present, and it
is the desire of the chair and the ranking member to address to
the committee promotions of three flag officers and general
officers who are in combat commands today. I propose that we
briefly go into executive session to consider and act upon
several important nominations.
[Whereupon, at 10:27 a.m., the hearing was recessed, the
committee proceeded to other business in executive session,
then reconvened the hearing at 10:29 a.m.]
Chairman Warner. Colleagues, the Secretary will be
addressing the House in the posture statement beginning at 1
o'clock. We will therefore have to conclude our work by the
hour of 12:00, so we will hold to 5-minute rounds for each
member. I will proceed at this point in time.
Mr. Secretary, I thought your comprehensive statement on
transformation is one that this committee will try and support
in every way. Do you know of any special legislation that you
will further require for the implementation of this package?
The legislative package is in the normal sequence of events to
come to the committee here in a week or so, but perhaps you
could tell us at this time. An example is the important
institution of reform in the civil service that you proposed
last year and which I think in large measure was adopted. Any
other legislative proposals you could alert us to at this time?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, there is nothing of the
magnitude of the new national security personnel system that we
will be proposing. But there will be a number of smaller items,
lesser items, that we will be recommending for approval,
consideration of the committee.
Chairman Warner. Do you feel that the budget provides the
needed dollars to implement the transformation that you have
undertaken and continue to undertake?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do.
Chairman Warner. That involves not only pay and benefits
for the military, but also the acquisition of new equipment?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do.
Chairman Warner. The plan of the United States Army under
the direction of a very able Chief of Staff and a very able
Acting Secretary requires sort of fracturing the existing force
into another series of units. Are they going to be fully
equipped?
Secretary Rumsfeld. They will be. Pete Schoomaker and I
briefed the President on the Army's proposal. The President
approved it. General Schoomaker will be presenting it to this
committee at a time of your choosing. It is important that it
be considered carefully.
It has multiple dimensions. Not only does he intend to go
from 33 to 48 brigades over a period of 4 or 5 years--5?
General Pace. Four years to 43, sir, and then an additional
4 to the 48.
Secretary Rumsfeld. So it is 4 years to the 43 brigades and
then an additional period for the remaining 5 brigades, with an
off ramp in the event they are not needed.
But, in addition, he intends to more fully equip these
brigades with division capabilities that currently are only at
the division level and to make them more modular, so that they
can be mixed and matched and deployed. There is no doubt in my
mind but that if this plan is completed in the time frame
indicated then we will have a much improved tooth-to-tail
ratio.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Returning to the question of the WMD, the ISG, the military
force augmented by a number of civilians from the Agency and
other departments of the government, is one that is under the
command of General Dayton, and now Mr. Duelfer will join. Is
the funding adequate for them to continue and fulfil their
mission? Because you and I both stressed that this mission must
be completed.
You described in your statement a number of, as you call
it, ``theories'' of things that could have happened. Now, we
wish to develop all the facts that we can possibly find to
determine the answers to the various theories that you have
represented.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The ISG has somewhere between 1,200 and
1,300 people currently assigned.
Chairman Warner. That is correct.
Secretary Rumsfeld. General Dayton is the individual who is
responsible for those people. He had reported to Dr. Kay, and
Dr. Kay had the responsibility for the judgment calls as to the
pace at which people should be interviewed and interrogated,
the pace at which various documentation should be translated,
and all of those judgment things that are more appropriate to
the CIA than the DOD.
General Dayton has done a superb job of managing that task.
There is a natural tension. You never have enough Arabic
speakers or enough people to go over all the documentation that
exists. They do not exist in our country or even through
contractors. On the other hand, they have a good cadre of these
folks. As you said, they come from all departments and
agencies. It is fully budgeted for in this budget, and they are
doing a terrific job under very difficult circumstances.
The tension that exists is our people are not currently
being killed by WMD; they are being killed by terrorists. The
same individual that one might interrogate or the same document
that one might translate could produce information, for
example, on the location of Saddam Hussein; it could produce
information on counterterrorism, and it could produce
information on the location of WMD. You do not know that as you
go through that process.
So we are continuing to focus on WMD, but we are also
focusing on counterterrorism.
Chairman Warner. The mission basically remains the same?
Secretary Rumsfeld. It does.
Chairman Warner. The structure of leadership remains the
same?
Secretary Rumsfeld. It is identical.
Chairman Warner. You will keep this committee informed if
at any time you feel those resources of a significant amount
have to be diverted away from that mission?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Dr. Cambone, am I correct when I said
that the mission has not been altered?
Dr. Cambone. Yes, sir.
Secretary Rumsfeld. It has not.
Chairman Warner. Fine. Thank you very much.
I was pleased that you directly answered my question with
regard to the WMD. You also added your personal dimension to
it, which is important because you have served under a number
of presidents for a very long time in many challenging tasks,
and you understand government service and the importance of
being honest and forthright, as you are.
General Pace, on the question of the transfer of
sovereignty, you have looked at the various steps that have to
be performed. One of them General Abizaid addressed, and in our
preliminary discussions in preparation for this hearing you
felt that he might have been misquoted with regard to the
appropriate protections of the coalition forces and the ability
of them to continue their work, not only the ISG, but the
hunting down of the insurgents and the terrorists.
Are you satisfied, one, that the schedule can be kept; and,
two, that the basic military missions of the coalition forces
can continue after June 30?
General Pace. Sir, your Armed Forces right now are
currently protected by the provisions of U.N. Resolution 1511,
which gives us the protections of an agreement like the Status
of Forces Agreement (SOFA) as we do what we do right now in
Iraq. Our State Department, working with the U.N., working with
the Iraqi Governing Council, knows exactly the kinds of
protections that our Armed Forces will continue to need after
the turnover of sovereignty, and they are working that.
General Abizaid has had his input to that. We are watching
that very carefully. We will ensure that our soldiers, sailors,
airmen, marines, and coast guardsmen continue to have the
requisite protection of their own individual rights as they do
the mission that we have asked them to do.
Chairman Warner. Lastly, Mr. Secretary, the forces under
your supervision in the military are dependent on intelligence
daily, I mean today, tomorrow, and in the future. While there
are six and possibly seven investigations of the questions
associated with WMD, we cannot wait until the final outcome to
make some corrective measures. Are you personally looking at
the DIA, the NSA, and other organizations, and contributing
also your views to the greater Intelligence Community, about
such corrections that have to be made today to see that the men
and women of the Armed Forces and indeed others engaged in
intelligence work that are on the front lines are receiving
accurate, to the best we can, intelligence?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. The things that are under way
with respect to the DOD: number one, we are participating with
the Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI), review of lessons
learned that is led by Mr. Kerr. The DIA has its own lessons
learned activity under way, as do the Services.
In addition, we, needless to say, have been cooperating
with the 9/11 Commission. We have been cooperating and will be
cooperating with the commission to be appointed.
I should add, however, that the intensive lessons learned
activity that took place looking from the U.S. perspective
after the Iraq war and also from the Iraqi perspective,
interrogating Iraqi military people, has provided information
as well with respect to intelligence. So there have been a
whole series of things that the people have been proceeding on
in an orderly way.
Chairman Warner. Corrective measures are taken as you and
others deem they are appropriate?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Absolutely.
Chairman Warner. In a timely way to protect our people?
Secretary Rumsfeld. As the lessons are learned, they are
implemented and have been. That process has been under way and
ongoing.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
There was an article about a week ago in the press that
said that in two rounds of talks at the U.N. and Washington the
United States told U.N. representatives that everything is on
the table except the June 30 deadline for handing over power to
a new Iraqi Government. Is that an accurate description of the
President's position, that there will be no extension of that
deadline regardless of the situation on the ground or
regardless of whether or not that deadline has the support of
the U.N.?
Secretary Rumsfeld. First, let me come right back to that,
but let me clarify some confusion. I have been reading things
where critics and people have been saying that the Iraqi
security situation is not sufficiently good that we could turn
over sovereignty and then leave on June 30. There was never any
intention to do that.
Senator Levin. I just wonder, though, if you could answer
my question----
Secretary Rumsfeld. I will.
Senator Levin.--because of the time problem.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Okay.
Senator Levin. Is that the position of the administration,
that there will be no extension despite whatever happens on the
ground and even if the U.N. does not support the turnover of
sovereignty on that date?
Secretary Rumsfeld. A decision on changing the date or
changing whatever are really decisions for the President and
not for me. These issues involving the governance pass-over are
things that are basically in the hands of the President and the
NSC, not the DOD.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
On the WMD issue, in September 2002, DIA produced a
classified study called ``Iraq--Key WMD Facilities: An
Operational Support Study.'' Part of that study has now been
declassified. It included the following statement: ``There is
no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and
stockpiling chemical weapons or where Iraq has or will
establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities.''
That is from a September DIA study, which was classified until
recently.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Now, on September 19, 2002, the same month of that
classified DIA assessment, you publicly stated that Saddam has,
``amassed large clandestine stockpiles of chemical weapons''
and ``we know he continues to hide biological and chemical
weapons, moving them to different locations as often as every
12 to 24 hours and placing them in residential neighborhoods.''
How do you explain the contrast between the DIA-reported
intelligence that said there was no reliable information about
production or stockpiling of chemical weapons and your public
statements that you knew that Saddam has such weapons? What
explains the discrepancy there?
Secretary Rumsfeld. First, let me say that, on your prior
question, I would never say never on the deadline myself.
Clearly the goal is to pass sovereignty as soon as possible,
but what judgments the President might or might not make depend
on the way the world evolves.
Needless to say, I am sure I never saw that piece of
intelligence and whether or not it was the DIA's view overall
or an analyst's view I cannot tell from the way you have
presented it. I have relied not on any one single intelligence
entity, like the DIA or the CIA. I have relied on the
Intelligence Community's assessments, and the Intelligence
Community's assessments were what they were, and they were as I
stated them.
Senator Levin. Do you see a difference between saying with
certainty that we know something and saying that there is some
evidence of something?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do.
Senator Levin. That was not the way in which the public
statements of the administration were made. It was not that
there is evidence or that there is belief. It was the
statements of great certainty, that we know that there are
amassed stockpiles of weapons, we know where they are.
Everything was stated with certainty. What is not part of any
of those investigations, those six that you have mentioned, is
a review of the policymakers' certainty in their statements and
what was the basis in intelligence for those statements of
certainty.
That is one of the issues here, as to whether or not those
statements, made with certainty by many members of the
administration, should be reviewed in terms of what the
intelligence was that did or did not back up such certain
statements. I am not asking the question. I just want to let
you know that that is not being looked at by any of the
investigations that you refer to. The investigation or inquiry
that I am attempting to make at the Armed Services Committee
with my staff is to look at that issue as well as all the other
issues.
But here is my question for you. It relates to the
operation of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Doug Feith.
He made an analysis of the links between al Qaeda and Iraq and
apparently presented a briefing to you on that analysis of the
intelligence. Apparently the briefing that he made to you was
then made to the DCI, the Intelligence Community staff, the
NSC, and then to the Office of the Vice President.
Was the Feith operation supposed to look at intelligence
through a different prism from the rest of the Intelligence
Community? Why was it formed other than for that? Why did it
bypass the usual channels with the product of his analysis? It
is kind of a two-part question.
Secretary Rumsfeld. There was something that the press has
characterized as an intelligence cell in the Office of Policy,
Mr. Feith's office. It had two people in it at any given time.
The people changed, and there may be two more. Maybe there were
four or five at some point.
All they did was to try to, as I understand it--and I
talked to Mr. Feith about this. Their task was simply to read
the intelligence, not to gather intelligence, but to read the
intelligence that existed and to assist him in developing
policy recommendations in his role as Under Secretary for
Policy.
At one moment, you are quite right, two people who had been
looking at this thought they had an interesting approach to it.
He asked me to be briefed. I sat there and listened to them. I
said, ``Gee, that is interesting; why do you not brief the
people at CIA?'' They did.
Senator Levin. And the Vice President.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I did not say that. I said exactly what
I said. I asked them to brief the people at the CIA, and they
did that. I do not know if they briefed anyone else besides
that, but they did do what I asked.
The implication that this two-person activity, or four or
five over time, was gathering intelligence or doing something
unusual is just not correct, as I understand it.
Senator Levin. My question, though, was it intended that
they look at intelligence through a different prism?
Secretary Rumsfeld. No. As I understand it, just what I
said. Their task was to take the intelligence that existed,
look at it and see what they could figure out about it, just as
I do when I read it and you do when you read it. In this case,
Doug Feith asked a couple of people--there are mountains of
this stuff and it is a big task to integrate it in your mind.
He had this small group doing that, and they looked at
terrorist networks, which seems to me to be a perfectly logical
thing to do after September 11.
Senator Levin. Thank you. My time is up.
Chairman Warner. Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, I am certainly glad to hear of the increase
of 30,000 members in the United States Army, although it was
done in a rather bizarre fashion by the Chief of Staff of the
Army, as I understand. It is usually an announcement made by
the Secretary of Defense, but it is not important.
But a year and a half ago a number of us on this committee
recognized the need for additional Marine Corps and Army
troops, and I am sorry it took you so long to reach that
conclusion. The reason I say that is because 40 percent of the
troops in Iraq now will be Guard, National Guard, and Reserves
and, despite your testimony, from my conversations with Guard
and reservists around the country, you are going to see a very
large exodus of members of the Guard and Reserve because of the
incredible deployment burden that has been laid upon them. I
hope that I am wrong, but that is what I am hearing from
National Guardsmen and reservists throughout the Nation.
Mr. Secretary, is it your intention still not to provide
this committee with the communications concerning the Boeing
decision, despite the fact that there is an Inspector General
(IG) investigation and a Department of Justice investigation,
and this is an issue of very serious consequence? I only have 5
minutes, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me comment. First of all, it seems
to me that your suggestion that it took us a long time to
increase the size of the Army is not correct. The Army has been
being increased over a 2-year period, under the emergency
authorities authorized by Congress. General Schoomaker has only
been in for a short period of months and he has fashioned a
plan, presented it, and it seems to me a perfectly proper
approach for the Chief of Staff of the Army to be the one
discussing the way the Army is going to be organized and
arranged. I do not consider it strange or unusual.
In terms of the exodus issue from the Army, we certainly
hope not. Pete Pace, do you want to comment on the retention
and recruiting in the Army?
General Pace. Sir, I can, sir. It is a snapshot in time,
and we all need to be attentive to how we use our folks and
what the downstream effects are. But, currently, all our
retention goals, all of our recruiting goals, are being met. In
fact, those Army and Guard units that are notified of going
overseas, they have had an increase in those whose window was
coming up for retention or getting out. They have increased
that number by about 130 percent across the board.
So the immediate snapshot is one of heroes--not victims--
stepping forward to support their country. But you are correct,
Senator, we do need to keep an eye on it that we have them
doing missions that are viable, missions that they should be
conducting, that we treat them with respect, that they know
ahead of time when they can be called up, that they know how
long they are going to be called up for, and that they know
when they are going to be demobilized--all things we need to do
better.
Senator McCain. We will see. I hope I am wrong. That is not
what I am hearing from the people that actually are being
deployed and are returning, including in my own State.
But please answer the question about whether you intend to
turn over the documents to this committee or not, particularly
in light of actual criminal investigations that are going on.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The first thing I would say is that you
have not received a definitive answer in a long period and for
that, I regret that. The complexity of it, as I understand it,
is that it is not a DOD issue in total. It is a matter of a
longstanding practice of the DOD and other executive branch
departments of not turning over internal documents that reflect
advice and opinions of employees as they advise senior
decisionmakers. You are aware of this. E-mails are considered
that type.
With respect to the tanker issue, because of the concerns
that a great many people have raised and the criminal
investigation--the investigation, I should say, that you
mentioned----
Senator McCain. You answered my question, Mr. Secretary. I
would like your long answer to be made part of the record,
okay?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Fair enough.
[The information referred to follows:]
There is a longstanding practice in the Department of not turning
over internal documents that reflect the opinions of our employees as
they advise senior decisionmakers. Electronic mail, like any other
document, is subject to this principle. Generally, electronic mail
messages that have been disclosed outside the executive branch or that
do not reflect communications of Federal employees in advising on
decisions will be turned over. Those internal electronic mail messages
that do reflect advice to decisionmakers will not be turned over. It is
important that officials of this Department receive open and candid
advice and assessments from its employees. Turning over documents
containing the frank opinions and candid advice of employees at many
levels in the Department could discourage them from providing the
crucial communications that our officials need to make the important
decisions they are charged to make. On the proposed tanker program, we
have provided, in addition to documents, comprehensive explanations of
this program in testimony, briefings, and interviews. We stand willing
to provide briefings and interviews on this and other important issues
as we have in the past.
Senator McCain. Does it bother you when there are e-mails
that have already been disclosed that say things, for example
from Boeing, ``Boeing doing good stuff, Rudy and Andy met with
Bill Schneider, Bill Schneider very supportive, will work issue
in OSD''? Understand, Mr. Schneider is Chairman of the Defense
Science Board (DSB), which will be, according to what you are
about to tell me, reexamining the requirement. So you have the
fox guarding the henhouse.
Does it bother you, ``We have ghostwritten several op-eds,
including former Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet
(CINCPAC) Archie Clemins, we will have one in Navy Times and
maybe in Air Force Times, and get an early bird when
published''?
Does it bother you when the Secretary of the Air Force
calls in the Boeing lobbyist--these are according to the e-
mails that we got from Boeing and why we need your e-mails, Mr.
Secretary--and says, ``You have to put pressure on Mike
Wynne.'' He chastises the Boeing lobbyist for not putting
pressure on Mike Wynne?
Does it bother you when, even after you had put a pause on
the Boeing tanker deal, that Mr. Sambur sends out an e-mail
that says the ``lease should be published today because all
concerns concerning Ms. Druyun have been resolved''?
Does it bother you when there are many members of the
Defense Policy and Science Board who were lobbying DOD and Air
Force officials to approve the lease of 100 Boeing 767s? Some
of them are mentioned in the Boeing e-mails: Richard Perle,
Bill Schneider, General Fogleman, Admiral Jeremiah, and Admiral
Clemins.
Does not all of this bother you, Mr. Secretary, that this
incestuous relationship went on between Boeing, the United
States Air Force, the Secretary of the Air Force in particular,
and Mr. Sambur, and none of these people have been called to
account for this kind of behavior?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator McCain, I personally and we the
Department take seriously any and every allegation of
wrongdoing.
Senator McCain. These are facts, Mr. Secretary. These are
facts on paper, of e-mails that were sent within the DOD and by
Boeing.
Secretary Rumsfeld. As you are well aware, there is a DOD
Inspector General's investigation of the entire aspect of this,
and we are proceeding in an orderly and systematic way to try
to come to the truth as to what took place. I assure you that
if there has been wrongdoing, as there appears to have been, we
will take appropriate action.
I would say one other thing. When I left the DOD in 1977, I
made it a point not to be connected with anything related to
the Defense Department that was for profit. I did it so that I
could always feel I could say whatever I wanted on a defense
issue and not have someone do what you just did and suggest
that, simply because I was connected to a defense company,
therefore what I said----
Senator McCain. I am not suggesting----
Secretary Rumsfeld. Just a minute.
Senator McCain. I am not suggesting, Mr. Secretary. I am
telling you that Admiral Clemins, who is on your board, had
ghostwritten by Boeing an article praising the tanker lease.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I understand what you said, and I say
we are looking into those things. But I do not think that
simply reading off all of those names of people who happen to
serve the government in a nonprofit way, on the Defense Science
Board or the Defense Policy Board or some other advisory board
of the DOD, that they are suddenly supposed to be in a
cellophane package and not have any other thoughts or any other
role in life. We understand----
Senator McCain. I am talking about their actions. I am
talking about their actions, not their position, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, we are looking into it. If we
find any wrongdoing, I can assure you we will take appropriate
action, as we have in the past.
Senator McCain. Well, the Senate Armed Services Committee
has the responsibility of oversight of the activities of your
Department, and I do not see how we are going to be informed as
to exactly what happened unless we see the communications and
what went on in this decisionmaking process.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. I listened to you in your response to
Senator McCain and you acknowledged that your Department was
tardy in the response to some of the material which can be
forthcoming, because, as the Senator said, this committee has
oversight responsibilities, and we must continue to perform
those and not just await IG reports and the like.
I thank you.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The IG reports, well, I will not get
into the details, but the reason for the delay is because it is
not totally a DOD decision. It is a decision for the executive
branch, and we have to coordinate with the White House and the
Office of Management and Budget.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr.
Secretary, General Pace. Thank you for representing the
servicemen and speaking about their continued service to the
country, which all of us are grateful for.
Mr. Secretary, the U.S. Iraqi weapons inspector David Kay
made it clear in recent days that his exhaustive postwar
inspections leave little doubt that Saddam Hussein had no WMD
at the time the war began. His conclusion is a devastating
refutation of the Bush administration's case for war in Iraq
and seriously undermines our credibility in the world.
Until now, the administration has resisted the independent
investigation of the issue, but now it is proposing
investigation by a committee handpicked by the administration,
with findings to be made only after the 2004 election. The
White House agenda is clear--to blame the failure, the
administration's case for war, on the Intelligence Community
rather than the administration's manipulations and
misrepresentations on the available intelligence.
The debacle cannot all be blamed on the Intelligence
Community. Key policymakers made crystal-clear the results they
wanted from the Intelligence Community. Mr. Kay said, ``We were
all wrong.'' He is wrong. Many in the Intelligence Community
were right. There were clear warnings from the Intelligence
Community. The dissents within the Intelligence Community to
many of the positions taken by the administration were not
noted or glossed over.
As Senator Levin pointed out, your own DIA in September
2002 said: ``There is no reliable information''--``no reliable
information,'' Mr. Secretary--``whether Iraq is producing,
stockpiling, chemical weapons or where Iraq has or will
establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities.''
The State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(INR) concluded: ``The activities we have detected do not add
up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what
INR would consider to be an integrated, comprehensive approach
to acquire nuclear weapons. INR considers the available
evidence inadequate to support such a judgment.''
Department of Energy intelligence disagreed that the famous
tubes were a nuclear weapons program. The INR also concluded
that the tubes were not intended for use in Iraq's nuclear
weapons.
Greg Thielmann, a retired career State Department official
who had served as Director of the Office of Strategic
Proliferation and Military Affairs at the INR, said it all last
July: ``Some of the fault lies with the performance of the
Intelligence Community. Most of it lies with the way senior
officials misused the information they were provided.'' He
said: ``They surveyed the data, picked out what they liked. The
whole thing was bizarre. The Secretary of Defense had this huge
Defense Intelligence Agency and he went around it.''
Lieutenant Colonel Karen Kwiatkowski, a recently retired
Air Force intelligence officer who served in the Pentagon
during the buildup to the war, said: ``It was not intelligence;
it was propaganda. They take a little bit of intelligence,
cherry-pick it, make it sound much more exciting, usually by
taking it out of context, usually by juxtaposition of two
pieces of information that do not belong together.''
We have seen in the examples that were mentioned this
morning, for example just on the issues of stockpiling on
chemical weapons, as mentioned by Senator Levin, in 2002 DIA
said no reliable information on whether producing and
stockpiling. You said in 2002 before this committee, ``We do
know that.'' ``We do know that.'' I understand the Intelligence
Community never says ``We know.'' But you said in September,
``We do know that.''
In October the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) said we
have 100 metric tons, 500 metric tons of chemical weapons. We
found that out in the last year. Secretary Powell says in
February, ``That is a conservative estimate.'' The stockpile of
100 tons to 500 tons--``That is a conservative estimate.''
Then you say in March 2003, ``We know where they are.''
``We know where they are.'' That is an extraordinary leap, and
that extraordinary leap was wrong.
Do you not think that that independent commission ought to
be really reflective of men and women that can look hard and
fast, at not just what the intelligence was, but how it was
manipulated, and interrogate career individuals in the
Intelligence Community that believe that to be the case?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Kennedy, you might not have
been here for my opening statement on the intelligence piece,
but there was not a single thing in there that blamed the
Intelligence Community or put any cast on it even slightly like
you suggested.
Second, I never have gone around the Intelligence
Community. The Intelligence Community does not always agree.
You have hundreds of people, and they have footnotes and they
have different opinions. You develop a consensus. I have stuck
with the consensus----
Senator Kennedy. Are we not entitled to hear what the
dissent was as well?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Absolutely.
Senator Kennedy. Did we ever? Was that provided----
Secretary Rumsfeld. Absolutely.
Senator Kennedy. Will you provide where these dissent
positions were provided us prior to the time that we voted?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I am not in the Intelligence Community.
I do not deal with the Intelligence Community committees in
Congress. I am saying that within the executive branch, when
intelligence is circulated it includes footnotes, it includes
differing opinions, as it always has for the last 30 years to
my certain knowledge.
Next, you have twice or thrice mentioned manipulation. I
have not heard of it. I have not seen any of it, except in the
comments you have made.
Third, I am told by Dr. Cambone sitting behind me that the
document you read from and possibly the same document that
Senator Levin read from also has a paragraph in it that says
the following: ``Although we lack any direct information, Iraq
probably possesses chemical warfare agent in chemical
munitions, possibly including artillery rockets, artillery
shells, aerial bombs and ballistic missile warheads. Baghdad
also probably possesses bulk chemical stockpiles primarily
containing precursors, but that also could consist of some
mustard agent and stabilized VX.'' That is in the same
document, I am told.
Last----
Senator Kennedy. You said ``probable'' and ``possible,''
``probable'' and ``possible'' rather than ``we know.'' It is a
big difference.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I am coming to ``we know.''
I could be wrong. I am asked a lot of questions. I use a
lot of words, and I am sure from time to time I say something
that in retrospect I wish I had not. However, I remember the
moment I said ``we know'' something, and it was this: The
forces had gone in, out of Kuwait into Iraq, and they were
moving up and they had gotten in a day or two possibly, and
they were a long way from Baghdad.
As everyone on this committee will remember, the suspect
sites, which is what they generally call them, for WMD that the
Intelligence Community produced, the suspect sites tended to be
north. They tended to be in the Baghdad and north area. Our
troops were a long way from even Baghdad. I was asked, ``Where
are the WMD?'' I think I said: ``We know where they are. They
are up north; they are not down here.'' I was referring to the
suspect sites.
You are quite right. Shorthand ``we know where they are''
probably turned out not to be exactly what one would have
preferred in retrospect.
But let me say one other thing. General Pace, would you
please describe what the United States Armed Forces did every
day by putting on chemical gear? They believed, we believed,
everyone believed, they had chemical weapons. These people did
not get into these----
General Pace. Yes, sir. What we did, sir, was, as you would
expect, prepare for the potential capabilities of the enemy.
Even if you disregard all of the intelligence that was current
at that time, if you simply looked at the fact that he had used
chemicals against his own people, had used chemicals against
Iran, it was prudent for military planners to believe that he
might use chemicals against us when we attacked.
So as we went across the line of departure, as we crossed
from Kuwait into Iraq, all of our troops were in mission
protective chemical gear, and they stayed in that, either just
the suits themselves, sometimes the boots and the gloves, and
on occasion the mask as well, as the tactical intelligence
changed. They put that gear on and stayed in that well past the
line at which we thought, which was about 60 miles south of
Baghdad--well north of that line, they stayed in chemical
protective gear.
It was reinforced by discoveries on the battlefield, like
3,000 brand new sets of chemical protective suits and atropine
injectors that were found on the Iraqi side when they uncovered
them in a school. Those kinds of discoveries led us to believe
that if the Iraqis themselves had that kind of equipment and we
knew we did not have chemical weapons, that they were preparing
to use it.
That is the kind of environment inside of which we wore the
chemical protective gear. It was not only for the troops who
were on the ground, but everyone in theater. The Navy guys at
sea, the Air Force folks where they were, all had the chemical
equipment right there with them and practiced daily getting
into it in case they were attacked.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
I just say that in your September 19, 2002, testimony to
the committee you said five times that Iraq has or we know they
have WMD.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I am not going to go back and quote the
comments from the previous administration and President Clinton
and Vice President Gore and Secretary Cohen and all of that the
way you have. I can just say that the stream of intelligence
over a period of a long time in both administrations led the
same people in similar jobs to the same conclusions.
Chairman Warner. Mr. Secretary, that is an important point.
You must recognize, we are slightly handicapped, that our
offices are locked. We cannot get to a lot of the information
we had intended to bring with us this morning. I will see that
our record will remain open for an indefinite period of time
until our offices are once again opened and material is
available to members to put in the record and ask such further
questions as may be appropriate.
But you are quite correct on that, Mr. Secretary, and there
is a continuity between the manner in which these facts were
brought to the attention of the American public by the
succession of the Clinton and the Bush administrations. I think
in time we will get the answers to it.
But I would like to note one thing. In the mystery of where
these weapons may be, perhaps it will be solved, but we should
thank God that they were not there to be used against our
troops, bottom line.
Yes, Senator.
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, I just want to make it clear
that the record will be kept open and not just for whatever
submission you referred to, but for other submissions and for
additional questions, given the short period of time that we
have to question the Secretary.
I wonder, just how long would that record be kept open? A
couple of days?
Chairman Warner. You and I will consult. We have to know
when our offices are opened, and that is an undetermined period
of time.
We will now proceed to Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kennedy has indicated that we need somebody to take
a hard look at the intelligence that is hard and fast. Senator
Kennedy, if I could have your attention.
Senator Kennedy. Excuse me.
Senator Roberts. I am hard; I am fast; I am from Dodge
City; and I am chairman of the Select Committee on
Intelligence. We have under Senate Resolution 400 marching
orders to investigate or to make an inquiry in regards to the
timeliness and the credibility of the prewar intelligence in
reference to WMD and any terrorist activity, the atrocities
that were committed in Iraq, which are obvious, and also
regional stability.
I want people to know that in this committee, with this
hard and fast and tough chairman from Dodge City, we have had a
7-month, 24-7, 10 staff members, work just tremendous overtime
effort. We have a working draft over 300 pages long that will
be presented to the members of the Intelligence Committee as of
tomorrow.
We have interviewed over 200 analysts, including critics,
including people mentioned by Senator Kennedy. I must say that,
after repeated interviews by our staff, to date we still have
yet to find any coercion or intimidation on the part of any
analyst to change their analytical product. It is the most
comprehensive inquiry in intelligence in at least a decade.
After this Thursday, we will meet again after a week, after
members of the Intelligence Committee are able to digest and
educate themselves to what is in this report. We hope to agree
on a report. That may be a little tough, but we are going to
get that job done. We will be making some recommendations, as
opposed to simply pointing fingers of blame.
We will redact the classified material. We will work with
the Agency to get that done. We will have deadlines. We will
make a public report. I hope we can do it in March.
If there are any egregious policy decisions that we find in
this report, we will look into it. Under Secretary Feith will
again appear before the Intelligence Committee, along with his
subordinates. CIA Director Tenet will also appear, and I cannot
emphasize enough how aggressive, how strongly I feel that we
will let the chips simply fall where they may.
Over the course of the inquiry that we hope to complete
soon in the Intelligence Committee, we have found a large and
consistent body of analysis, as you have indicated, Mr.
Secretary, over 10 years in regards to Saddam Hussein in
reference to his WMD capability. This intelligence was used,
the famous word ``used,'' by the executive, by President
Clinton, by President Bush, and also by those of us in
Congress. It was used on the no-fly zones, on the sanctions, on
the targeted bombing attacks, and, finally, in regards to
military action.
I would just like to quote the President when he indicated
that ``We simply cannot allow our adversaries to build arsenals
of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missiles to
deliver them. There is no more clear example of this threat
than Saddam Hussein. The UNSCOM inspectors believe that Iraq
still has stockpiles of chemical and biological munitions, a
small force of Scud-type missiles, and the capacity to restart
quickly its production program and build many more weapons. Let
me be clear: A military operation cannot destroy all the
weapons of mass destruction, but it can and will leave him
significantly worse off than he is now in terms of the ability
to threaten the world with these weapons or to attack his
neighbors. He will know that the international community
continues to have the will to act when he threatens again.''
That statement was made by President Clinton, and I am not
trying to point out President Clinton or President Bush. The
key question is, did you find this intelligence to be true and
consistent prior to the military action? I think your answer is
going to be ``yes.'' I think that is going to be stressed all
the way through this hearing and your answer. So I will leave
that to you to answer that question, after I have answered it
for you.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree. It has become developed and
adjusted as one goes along, but the threads have been
consistent.
Senator Roberts. All right. Now, as everybody knows, there
has been a global Intelligence Community failure, on the other
hand, in regard to whether or not they had WMD stockpiles and a
challenge really to recommend systemic reform. You have gone
over some action steps that the military is taking. If I can
find my list, you said the DCI is having a review with the Kerr
report. The DIA is conducting their review. All the Services
are conducting their reviews. You are working with the 9/11
Commission.
We have the House Intelligence Committee investigation, the
Senate Intelligence Committee investigation, and now this
outside Warren Commission type of investigation. There are at
least six or seven panels now doing investigation on the
systemic reform that must take place because of the mistake in
regard to the stockpiles. I hope the hell there is somebody
left down at the CIA to actually conduct the global war on
terrorism, with all of these activities.
But I guess my question to you is, we will have Mr. Tenet
up again. We will have Secretary Feith up again. We will get
our work done. I trust that you are committed to really trying
to find out how we can do this better because, as the Senator
has indicated--I am talking about Senator Kennedy now--many
strong statements were made. I believed that we would find the
WMD. Dr. Kay believed that. Dr. Duelfer even still believes
that. Still there was a failure in regard to intelligence.
Would you have any comment?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, Dr. Kay is probably correct when
he said that we are not completed; we are 85 percent down the
road, and there is more to be looked at. We will know ground
truth before it is over, and the ISG and Dr. Duelfer have a big
task to finish it up.
I agree completely; the country, the President of the
United States, is determined to get to the bottom of this
question. Your committee is determined; Congress is determined;
and I am sure we will as a country get the answers as to what
took place. I personally believe that the independent
commission that the President has proposed is a good thing to
do. I agree with you that there are a great many people looking
at this, but it is a big subject. It is an important subject.
As we go into the 21st century and look at the challenges
and threats we face, we have to have a high degree of
confidence that we understand them and we understand what we
know about them and what we do not know about them.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. As we say as individual Senators, I know
my time has expired, but I do want to quote Dr. Kay in regards
to: The world is far safer with the disappearance and removal
of Saddam Hussein. When we have the complete record, you are
going to discover that after 1998 it became a regime that was
totally corrupt. Individuals were out for their own protection.
In a world where we know others were seeking the WMD, the
likelihood at some point in the future of a seller and a buyer
meeting up would have made that a far more dangerous country
than even we anticipated with what may turn out to be not fully
accurate estimating.
I thank the chairman for his leniency.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr.
Secretary.
I do not think I am the only one who is alarmed at the
significant costs associated with Afghanistan and Iraq that are
not included in this budget, and alarmed that these off-book
transactions are potentially dangerous and misleading.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Pardon me, I am having trouble. What
was misleading?
Senator Reed. Well, I think there is a number of costs that
we assume----
Secretary Rumsfeld. A number of what?
Senator Reed. Costs.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Costs?
Senator Reed. Costs associated with Iraq and Afghanistan:
the ongoing commitment of over 100,000 troops, the
recapitalization of equipment, the bonuses that we will have to
use to maintain troop strength. All these costs do not seem to
be properly included within the budget going forward. There
seems to be a prospective reliance upon a supplemental sometime
down the road.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, Senator----
Senator Reed. May I complete?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Sure.
Senator Reed. It seems that the operative logic here is
that if it cannot be properly or accurately estimated, then it
is assumed to be zero or it is excluded from the budget. In
fact, what I find alarming is that seemed to be the logic that
applied to post-combat operations in Iraq last year, when many
people on this committee asked for estimates about the cost of
ongoing operations, the costs of occupation, and we were told
essentially, ``Well, we cannot estimate them, so we will not
include them in our specific budget request.''
That led to a $79 billion--a huge supplemental last year. I
feel we could be on the same track.
I just want your view, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, Senator, I am confused by your
comment. Last year we came before Congress and had a plug
number to propose--or 2 years ago, I guess it was--for
Afghanistan. We were told by Congress: ``Do not do that.
Supplementals are for wartime operations; we will not consider
any proposals for the wartime operation in Afghanistan or
Iraq.''
The reason the budget is cast the way it is cast is because
Congress insisted that it be cast the way it is currently cast.
Senator Reed. Well, Mr. Secretary, I do not believe I
insisted on that; did I?
Secretary Rumsfeld. You are a Member of Congress.
Senator Reed. I know, but I am not going to accept an
argument saying that we forced you to disregard costs, not to
include proper estimates, not to include in your proposal to
Congress what you think you need.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, we were zeroed out. We
proposed it, and it was zeroed out. We were told, ``Do not do
it this way.''
Senator Reed. Do you think that is the right approach, Mr.
Secretary?
Secretary Rumsfeld. No. Obviously, we wanted----
Senator Reed. Then why do you not propose a budget that
reflects accurately all the costs that you anticipate over the
next year for Afghanistan and Iraq?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The decision was made, after Congress
rejected that approach, that the executive branch would try to
use supplementals for the purpose of wartime operations, but
not for various things that just were not included in the
budget.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, as I recall the debate about
the $10 billion, it was not the fact that we were telling you
do not put the money in. We wanted to know what you were going
to spend it for. You wanted $10 billion unconditional, to be
spent anyway you wanted. That is a usurpation of our
responsibility to appropriate money for specific items.
You have the obligation to come before us with a detailed
estimate of the cost and what you propose to do in the way of
covering those costs. I cannot understand how you can argue
that we are forcing you to disregard costs.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I did not suggest that at all. That was
your statement, not mine, Senator. What we are doing is we will
come before Congress with the proposal for what should be spent
in a supplemental. There will be the details; there will be the
justification, just as there would have been in the budget.
Senator Reed. Why can you not include those costs today in
your budget, so that we can make appropriate decisions about
offsets, about priorities? This is to me extraordinarily
ineffective and misleading budgeting, and it is not because
Congress has ordered you. I would suspect that the law requires
you to send up a budget here that covers all your anticipated
costs.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, Senator, if you go back over the
years you will find that every war has been funded by
supplementals. That is what has been done throughout my adult
lifetime. I do not know a single situation where there has been
a war that has been funded by a budget----
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary----
Secretary Rumsfeld.--that is developed a year and a half
before and then submitted to Congress for a war that is
ongoing.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, we both understand that
supplementals are used to cover unanticipated costs that arise
after the budget documents are presented and because of other
exigencies that take place. You know fully well, as we all do,
that we will be committing over 100,000 troops to Iraq, other
troops to Afghanistan. These troops have costs. Their costs are
numerous, myriad costs. Yet you are telling us now that,
because we have told you you have to operate with a
supplemental, you are not putting those costs in the budget?
Chairman Warner. Senator, your time is up.
I would like to observe that the Appropriations Committee
has a lot to do with the supplementals and the policy governing
those supplementals. I believe if you will consult with Senator
Inouye and Senator Stevens that this is their domain and they
made that decision. If I am incorrect, Mr. Secretary----
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, the Secretary basically said
that he has not included all the costs that he anticipates this
year for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in this budget,
and, therefore, we are not getting a full picture in the budget
of the anticipated, the known, the most likely military
operations of this Government for the next year.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I would phrase it quite close to that,
but not exactly--that it is not possible to predict costs a
year in advance in a war. Wars are uncertain things. It is
possible to say, you are correct, Senator, that the funds for
the ongoing conflict in the global war on terror and
Afghanistan and Iraq are not in the budget. That was specified
in the budget when it was presented. That is the pattern that
has developed during the 3 years I have been back in this post,
as I understand it, as a result of an interaction between the
executive and the legislative branches at a level far above me.
Chairman Warner. Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary and General Pace, let me make sure that we
remind you, as you do every opportunity you have and every
opportunity we have, to convey to our men and women in uniform
how much we appreciate the great job they are doing. As we go
through this budget process, we want to make sure that we pass
a budget that is reflective of the great work that they are
doing and the great appreciation that all Americans have for
that terrific work that all of our men and women are doing.
I want to talk about a couple of specific issues, Mr.
Secretary, relative to the budget. The two issues are first of
all tactical air (TACAIR) and second air mobility. I know this
is probably General Myers' specialty, but again you and I have
talked about each of these in enough detail that I know you are
prepared on this.
First of all with respect to TACAIR, we have been talking
about this train wreck that may be forthcoming down the road
relative to Joint Strike Fighter, F/A-18, F-15, and the F-22. I
note with very much approval that you have 24 F-22s funded in
this authorization proposal. Last year during the Senate
deliberations on the budget we had an issue relative to the F-
22 and we worked through it. I am assuming because of your
proposal that you are satisfied that procurement of F-22 is on
time, on schedule, and continues to be on budget.
Second, with respect to the TACAIR issue, I note that we
are having some problems with the Joint Strike Fighter. It is
the same kind of problems we always have with every aircraft--I
do not care what it is. We experienced it with the F-22, and
our critics were quick to jump on us with respect to the F-22.
But I want to make sure that you are satisfied that this weight
issue on the Joint Strike Fighter is not something that is
going to delay that, that both of these programs are on
schedule, and that this train wreck that we have all feared may
be forthcoming is going to be able to be avoided.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, I certainly hope you are right.
The F-22 has a cost cap on it. It had some troubles with the
software, and the costs have gone up. The Joint Strike Fighter
has a weight problem, and that is being worked on. As you
properly indicate, that is not unusual in programs of this
type. It is in its very early stages.
If one talks to the experts in the Air Force, they seem
reasonably confident that they have noted the problems, have
addressed them, and have people proceeding on them in an
orderly way.
Do you want to add anything to that, Dov?
Dr. Zakheim. Yes. Senator, as you well know, this is not a
problem that is unique to the United States. This is an issue
that always arises when you go from computer-aided design to
actual engineering. It affects every country that builds an
airplane.
The decision that was taken, which was very prudent, was to
deal with the issue now and to have cost control and
essentially to get our arms around the problem now instead of
taking some systems out and then having to reintegrate them
later on at a much higher cost to the taxpayer. Of course, the
Joint Strike Fighter is an international program and all our
partners have agreed to this approach.
Senator Chambliss. I am taking the response from both of
you that you are very comfortable with the schedule of both of
those programs at this point?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I am never comfortable. They are always
complicated; they are always difficult; they always seem to
take a little longer than you wish; and they always seem to
cost a little more than you would hope. But the folks that are
working on them believe they have their arms around the
problems, and they are working on them hard.
Senator Chambliss. Mr. Chairman, I note my time has
expired.
Senator Sessions [presiding]. I believe Senator Warner
asked that Senator Akaka be recognized. Senator Akaka, you are
next.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to begin by permitting Senator Levin 30
seconds.
Senator Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Akaka.
The issue of whether or not an intelligence investigation
by an outside commission should be a truly outside commission
or one just appointed by the President we can save for another
place. If it is going to be independent, it has to be
independent of the President, and that means Congress has to be
involved in the selection of that commission and the rules.
That is number one.
Another issue, which we are not going to resolve here, is
we believe on the Democratic side that the Intelligence
Committee should look at the use of intelligence by the
policymakers, not just at the production and creation by the
Intelligence Committee. That is another issue for another place
and another day.
I want to put in the record something relative to the
alleged continuity of intelligence between the Clinton
administration and the Bush administration. I am going to put
in the record three tables that were produced by the Carnegie
Endowment. Table 3 compares pre-2002 intelligence assessments
with October NIE assessment in 2002. So I am going to go down
the list and put these tables in the record comparing pre-
October intelligence with post-October 2002 intelligence.
``Iraq reconstituted its nuclear program after
1998'': pre-2002, probably not; October 2002, yes.
``Iraq attempted to enrich uranium for use in nuclear
weapons'': pre-2002, maybe; October 2002, yes.
``Iraq attempted to purchase uranium from abroad'':
pre-2002, no; October 2002 NIE assessment, yes.
Now, on the chemical weapons programs: ``Iraq had large
stockpiles of chemical weapons:'' pre-2002, maybe; October 2002
NIE, yes.
``Iraq had covert chemical weapon production
facilities'': before 2002, not sure; October 2002, yes.
On and on, the significant differences in the intelligence
between before and after October 2002, laid out in this
Carnegie Endowment study. I would ask that these be made part
of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Chairman Warner. Without objection. The Secretary should be
given the opportunity to put in the record a rebuttal.
Senator Levin. That was on Senator Akaka's time, so I
appreciate it----
Chairman Warner. I understand that.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I would be happy to. I will say this;
George Tenet was the DCI in the last administration and this
administration, and he has indicated repeatedly that there are,
as I said, threads of the intelligence that are consistent and
provide continuity over a sustained period of time. He is the
DCI.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Levin. No, no. Senator Akaka still has the rest of
his time.
Senator Akaka. General Pace, various lessons learned
reports have highlighted the problems associated with theater
logistics during Operation Iraqi Freedom. My understanding of
the problem is that there were two major drivers: first,
shipments. Shipments were not well-configured for in-theater
distribution when they left the United States, which shifted a
major burden onto the deployed units there. Second, this
problem was exacerbated by the lack of timely deployment of
distribution units and equipment.
My first question to you is, what is your assessment of
these problems. Has DOD taken steps to ensure that these
problems will not arise again as new units are deployed into
Iraq?
General Pace. Thank you, Senator. As I think you know,
Senator, we had, as part of our prewar workup with the team
that was going to be leading it in Central Command, folks who
were focused on lessons learned. They went down to Tampa. They
worked with the leadership in Tampa. They went with the forces
overseas and they have worked with the forces since they have
come back to collect just the kind of data you are talking
about.
When we looked at deploying the force, we knew that we did
not need to repeat what we did last time, to move so much gear
to theater. Literally last time, I am told, although I do not
know the exact figures, about 90 percent of the logistics that
were taken to the theater and Operations Desert Shield-Desert
Storm had to be put back aboard ships and brought home. We
wanted to avoid that problem.
We wanted to make sure that we had the tooth forward and
the tail sufficient, but coming up behind to support. In the
process of doing that, the number of ships that were available,
the numbers of planes that were available, were allocated by
the Transportation Command commander in support of the troops
on the ground.
In doing so, there were certainly lessons about how to load
ships and the kinds of things that, had they been there a
little sooner, would have helped. But we have absorbed those
lessons and we are taking those and redesigning our logistics
system to make a joint logistics system. What we were able to
do in this last one was coordinate and de-conflict each
Service's logistics push forward. What we need, as we had with
the joint fighting force, we need a joint logistics system that
allows us to better coordinate and get the right gear to the
battle at the right time.
Were there problems? Certainly, sir. We have identified the
problems and we are working on them.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Mr. Secretary, the London Financial Times
reports February 4, 2004, that the ``U.S. is preparing to cut
its troop levels in Europe by up to a third.''
[The information referred to follows:]
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My question is, with the ongoing Global Defense Posture
Review and the likely decision to bring home troops from
overseas bases, whatever that number may be--and perhaps you
could comment on that--not to mention the decision to
temporarily increase Army end strength levels, how will these
be factored into the BRAC process?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The BRAC process is just getting under
way, and, of course, one would hope that the answer to your
question would be that the BRAC Commission would do it
skillfully. But at the moment we do not have a good solid
number as to the number of forces that would be coming out of
Europe, although there certainly will be forces coming out of
Europe and also some out of Asia as well as elsewhere.
The BRAC process task will be to look at that and see that,
if the theory is right that there is something like 20 percent
base capacity, facility capacity, excess at the present time.
If that is true and then one brings forces home from overseas,
one would think that the excess capacity here at home would be
somewhat less than that and the BRAC Commission would have to
take those things into account.
Senator Cornyn. My next question has to do with the fiscal
year 2003 creation of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense, the purpose of which was to better coordinate
and provide policy oversight for DOD homeland defense
activities. Could you please explain how you see DOD's role in
homeland defense evolving and how that will be factored into
the BRAC process as well?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, I do not know that it will have a
relationship with the BRAC process. The forces we have, of
course, around the world are available for homeland defense.
The ones that are here are closest. The ones that are elsewhere
are available. The principal responsibility for homeland
defense, as we know, is the first responders, depending on the
nature of the problem.
But very quickly the DOD gets engaged. For example, at the
Olympics last year in Salt Lake City we had a lot of forces
there. In fact, we had a lot more forces there than we did in
Afghanistan at that time. When there is a difficulty like at
the Senate Office Building today, we have a chem-bio unit that
is coming up to assist in that.
But the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense task is to
keep us in the Department sensitive to the responsibilities of
the Department with respect to supporting the first responders
here in the United States and to working closely with the
Homeland Security Department and in the interagency process to
see that there are the kinds of exercises and testing of
systems to see that we are prepared and able to respond and
coordinate properly with the people who have the principal
responsibility.
Senator Cornyn. Well, I know, for example, in my State the
military bases frequently have memoranda of understanding with
local communities so that if there is an emergency of some
nature on base that the fire department, the first responders,
off base can augment the resources available on base and vice
versa. That is the thrust of my question.
But to that extent, do you deem that relevant to the
process? I mean, is that going to be factored in somehow or
another?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, certainly the statute lists a
whole series of things that need to be taken into
consideration, and I would think that those kinds of
considerations would be included.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. In the instance of the last question and
other questions, you might amplify for the record your
responses, so that we can move along here expeditiously. I
thank the witnesses and the questioners.
[The information referred to follows:]
Homeland defense mission requirements will be factored into the
military value evaluation of DOD's installations within the Base
Realignment and Closure process 2005 analytical effort.
The criterion to be used in the Base Realignment and Closure
process is as follows (as published in the Federal Register on February
12, 004):
Military Value
1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on
operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force,
including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities and
associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by
ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and
terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in
homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving
locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and
future total force requirements at both existing and potential
receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.
Other Considerations
5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including
the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the
closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.
6. The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of
military installations.
7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving
communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions, and personnel.
8. The environmental impact, including the impact of costs related
to potential environmental restoration, waste management, and
environmental compliance activities.
Homeland defense mission requirements will be factored into the
military value evaluation of DOD's installations within the BRAC 2005
analytical effort.
The security of our Nation, whether expressed as homeland defense,
domestic preparedness, or the global war on terrorism, is the primary
DOD mission. Both the Base Realignment and Closure legislation and
DOD's implementation of it ensures that homeland defense and security
are considered in the BRAC process. Specifically, criterion two
requires DOD components to consider ``the availability and condition of
land, facilities, and associated airspace . . . as staging areas for
the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions.''
Additionally, as a mission of DOD, all of these issues (homeland
defense, domestic preparedness, and the global war on terrorism) are
captured by the requirements of criteria one and three.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General, it is a pleasure to be able to
recognize the men and women in the military and the wonderful
job that they do. It is also a sobering experience for my
colleagues and I to call the parents, the spouses of those who
have been lost in Iraq or anywhere around the world.
My question today is going to be a basic question. General
Pace, last November I asked Acting Secretary of the Army Les
Brownlee when every soldier in Iraq would be equipped with the
most advanced body armor. I asked this question after a
constituent called my office to complain that his son was
conducting house to house searches in Iraq and still wearing
kevlar. Secretary Brownlee said that all troops in Iraq would
have the advanced body armor by December.
My question, of course, is, do you know if this is now the
case?
General Pace. Sir, it is the case. In fact, it was January,
last month, that 100 percent of DOD military and civilians in
Iraq had been issued to them individually the advanced body
armor. As we rotate the force, before they go into Iraq the new
troops will have issued to them the new body armor. Thanks to
the funding of Congress, we have been able to take the initial
capacity of industry--when this war began, it was still in the
technology environment. We were able to take that 1,600 set per
month capacity, and we have built it up now, thanks to your
funding, to 25,000 sets per month. We have met the objective
and we will be able to ensure that everyone continues to have
it as they enter the country.
Senator Ben Nelson. I now hear that the 1057th
Transportation Company, part of the 37th Theater Supply
Command, is not outfitted with advanced body armor. They have
some newer vests, but not the insert of the body armor. Their
mission, as you may know, is the transportation of supplies and
personnel into southern Iraq, which then also takes them into
harm's way on a very regular basis.
Do you know whether they have or can you look into that if
you do not know whether they have it by now?
General Pace. Sir, I will find out specifically whether or
not every soldier in that unit currently has that. I can tell
you for a fact that there are sufficient sets in Kuwait and in
Iraq to have every single service member and DOD civilian with
their own personal set. It is the plan as they rotate to ensure
that each gets a set before they go in. But I will find out on
that unit.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you. I know that all of you are
committed to the best protection for our men and women in
uniform. You can appreciate the fact that when a call comes in
from a parent concerned about the safety of his son or
daughter, that is a matter of critical interest, as well it
should be. I will communicate that information back to that
very concerned parent.
General Pace. Thank you, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much.
Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. That is a very
important series of questions.
Senator Ben Nelson. And my time is up.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Collins----
Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, could I just make a quick
comment?
Chairman Warner. Yes, sir.
Secretary Rumsfeld. On reflection, Senator Levin mentioned
a Carnegie report. I do not know. I have never seen it, but I
suspect it is unclassified. If it came from open sources, one
ought not to be surprised that there might be a difference
between an open source document and what the DCI told me.
Chairman Warner. We note that for the record. Thank you.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, in your testimony today you have a whole
section entitled ``Mass Versus Capability,'' and you state,
``Critical to success in military conflict in the 21st century
is not necessarily mass as much as it is capability.'' But the
fact is, whether we are talking about troops or weapons systems
or body armor or ships, numbers still matter.
For that reason, I want to talk to you about the
shipbuilding budget. Our naval fleet now consists of only 294
ships, and there are some projections that say that as cruisers
and destroyers are decommissioned, the number may drop to as
low as 180 ships. The Chief of Naval Operations has testified
many times that a more appropriate fleet size would be
approximately 375 ships. I realize that these ships of the
future are going to be far more capable ships, but nevertheless
the Chief of Naval Operations is still saying that our fleet
size is considerably too small.
There are also reports that the Navy is slipping
construction of a second DDX destroyer by 1 year, from fiscal
year 2006 to 2007. If that occurs, it will be the first year in
more than 20 years that our military will not be procuring a
major surface combatant. That threatens to exacerbate what is
already a shortfall in the number of ships that would ideally
be maintained in our fleet. But it also raises serious
questions about the impact on our industrial base.
I would like you to discuss the shipbuilding budget in
light of the Chief of Naval Operations' belief that we are
significantly underfunding shipbuilding and also with regard to
the possibility of the DDX destroyer construction slipping.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, Senator Collins. This is the Chief
of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy's proposed
budget for shipbuilding. This is their recommended budget. You
are right: the ships at the end of fiscal year 2003 have
dropped below 300 to 296. You are also correct that in the case
of ships, capability is important, to be sure, but numbers do
also matter because of presence. I agree completely with that.
The DDX situation as I understand it, they provided a gap
year, a delay of a year, to allow lessons learned from the
first ship to be applied to the following ships. That was the
judgment that was made in the Department of the Navy.
With respect to the total shipbuilding program over the
forward year defense plan, the numbers go from 7 to 9 to 6 to 8
to 8 to 17, the 17 being because the ships nature, the littoral
ships, and that you can do more of them.
But we agree that, with the program that the Department of
the Navy has put forward, it is a less manpower-intensive Navy.
It is important that what they have arranged is a surge
capability so that they are going to be able to provide greater
seapower in more places, at more times, than had been the case
in the past.
General Pace, do you want to comment on it?
General Pace. I can. Let me just take for example, ma'am,
aircraft carriers, which in the past have been one-third on
deployment--about four on deployment, one-third coming back and
reconstituting and changing out ship's crews, and one-third
getting ready for the next deployment. You have had generically
about four that you could get to a battle right away.
What Admiral Clark has done in his transformation of the
Navy has made it so that he is going to be able to provide to
any combatant commander anywhere in the world six of these
carrier battle groups on demand. He is doing that by things
like integrating Marine Corps and Navy aviation, so he has the
wings that fly off the carriers working together as a unit and
trained up.
I will not take more of your time.
Senator Collins. We are going to have to have further
discussions on that.
In closing, let me just say very quickly that I am also
very concerned about reports that I am hearing from Federal
employees' representatives and from the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) on the progress with the new personnel system.
I will be following up in writing with some of those concerns.
Chairman Warner. Senator, you keep a very watchful eye on
this man's Navy. Thank you very much.
Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you again for being here and doing
what you do. Let me commend you on one thing in your budget, if
I may, and that is your treatment of housing for our men and
women in uniform. Basically the way you have it structured now
the housing is now a tax-free benefit that they receive, and
that is a very positive thing. It is good for morale and good
for the quality of life.
There is one thing that I would love to work with you on
this year, though, Mr. Secretary, and that is that, given the
structure of the earned income tax credit and also the child
tax credit, our men and women in uniform, even in a combat
zone, could be penalized under the Federal tax system for
serving in the military, and they could lose up to $4,000 a
year.
I do want to work with you on that this year. I was not
aware if you were aware of that problem and if it is something
that you perceive as a problem that we can solve in your
budget.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I am not aware of what you are
referring to, but we would be happy to look into it and work
with you.
Senator Pryor. I look forward to working with you on that.
I also want to look at Halliburton. I know there has been a
recent spate of news stories about Halliburton. One said it
overbilled about $28 million for food service over in the
region in and around Iraq. I believe that was five different
facilities if I have my facts straight. Then there was the
story that we have all read and seen about overbilling for
gasoline.
There is another story about $6.3 million in overbilling
for sort of unspecified services. I am not quite sure what that
is, but I was reading some of the press clips on that.
As I see these stories, I am sensing a pattern with
Halliburton's billing practices. Mr. Secretary, I was wondering
if you had that same concern that I do about Halliburton's
billing practices?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I will just make a brief comment and
then Dov can comment on it, Dr. Zakheim.
A prime contractor ends up with subcontractors. The
subcontractor ends up then billing the prime, and the prime
bills the person letting the contract. We have hundreds and
thousands--not hundreds of thousands, but hundreds and probably
thousands--of auditors. They are constantly looking at all of
these things.
In these things, they frequently come up with differences
of opinion. They are all making the press, and that is fair
enough. Those are all also things that we are concerned about,
and the auditors are crawling all over them.
Dov?
Dr. Zakheim. Yes, Mr. Secretary.
Senator, let me first tell you that in April of this year,
with the Secretary's approval, I sent a team of auditors to
Iraq. With the exception of the one press report about the $6.3
million, and I will get back to that, every single report, in
fact every single revelation, came from our auditors in our
Department. Those auditors are also working with our inspector
general and with the General Accounting Office (GAO), because
they are on top of not just the issues you just raised, but of
every single contract in Iraq, are every single contractor.
You are right about the $28 million. That reflects what our
auditors found relative to 5 of 58 facilities, and they are
still working their way through the other 53. Kellogg Brown and
Root (KBR) has agreed that there will be a withhold on that
charge simply because there is a disagreement over how to
estimate the number of people being served.
With respect to the gasoline, again $61 million was
identified. That has gone to the Inspector General, so I really
cannot say very much more about that.
With respect to the $6.3 million, that was something that
KBR found themselves and they reported it. That gives you an
indication, and it goes back to what the Secretary said: The
prime contractor is doing its best to do the right thing when
it has literally billions of dollars in contracts not that such
funds have necessarily already been received and spent, but in
terms of the size of the undertaking. A good part of that, the
logistics, or ``logcap'' as it is called, was something they
were awarded several years before the Iraq war and was for
worldwide support.
The basic issue that our auditors are finding is that of
relationships with subcontractors, and we are working our way
through that.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Pryor. Mr. Chairman, I am out of time. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Ensign.
Senator Ensign. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I want to try to protect you from something
you said today that hopefully nobody will hold against you in
the future. You said that we will know before it is over. In
other words, ``we will know''--and I just want to make sure
that you had a chance to correct that.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you. I'll correct it right now.
We will know what we know, but we may not know all we would
like to know when it is over. I thank you very much for that.
You have saved me a tough question from Senator Levin a year
from now. [Laughter.]
Senator Levin. No, he has not. [Laughter.]
Senator Ensign. I actually do want to go along that line of
questioning, though, simply because I want to point out
something that everybody is saying. That is that we basically
know we have an intelligence failure, we think we know we have
an intelligence failure, but yet members of the panel are
saying it like it is fact.
The reason that I am bringing that out is because to their
best guess, they are saying it like it is fact, just like when
you were before this committee, just like you said today, we
know because in all probability we should know whether or not
there were WMD and things like that.
We should be a little more careful, but it certainly was
not the intent of anybody on this committee to mislead the
American public, hopefully it was not, just like I do not
believe it was your intent on the ``we know'' comments.
Secretary Rumsfeld. No indeed.
Senator Ensign. So that is really important.
But when we are doing these intelligence investigations--
the most important part for all of us to keep in mind is that
this should not be a witch hunt to find somebody, to find a
scapegoat. It is important, if people did something wrong or if
they purposely did something and misled people, then they
should be held accountable. But the purpose it seems to me for
the investigation, just like we did an intelligence
investigation after the missiles of October, was so that we
could improve our intelligence-gathering capabilities.
We know right now that we have some problems. We have known
that, actually, maybe for quite some time, and some people have
been arguing that we need to improve the human intelligence
instead of relying so much on our high-tech stuff.
I guess I would just like maybe your comment on the focus,
where the focus should be into the future. You have put up that
satellite photo of North Korea. Okay, we identify, but how do
we get into the future? How do we really improve our
intelligence capabilities into the future?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, my impression is that Director
Tenet has done a lot to improve intelligence over these past
years. The funding has been increased. Improving human
intelligence--there has been a good deal of effort on that. It
takes a long time, years, 4, 5, 6, 7 years, to actually
strengthen that aspect of it.
I am hopeful that the Senate Intelligence and the House
Intelligence Committees, when they complete their report, will
have thoughts on this subject, and certainly the commission
will have thoughts on this subject.
Senator Ensign. I guess one of the other comments that I
want to make of us leaning forward, because of the media
attention that has been focused on intelligence and possible
intelligence failures, is that it will stop us from doing the
right thing in the future. Some people might use this as we
cannot trust our Intelligence Community.
What Dr. Kay said has to be emphasized more than we can
possibly emphasize it, in that, yes, there were probably some
intelligence failures, but it does not take away from the fact
that it may have been a more dangerous world than we thought. I
am hoping that it does not change the administration's policy
on forward-leaning, the idea of preemption, the idea of, ``If
we could have prevented September 11, would we not have done
everything we possibly could?''
What we did in Iraq was prevent more September 11s, and I
am hoping that this recent revelation does not change
administration policy.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, you are on a very important
point. We have to know that there are always going to be
intelligence failures, and there also are going to be
intelligence successes and they have saved people's lives.
Second, there is a risk that policymakers would hesitate to
make decisions or that analysts would hesitate to explain what
they thought. One thing that is important that worries me about
the discussion here this morning: it is critically important
that there be interaction between users of intelligence and
suppliers of intelligence. Each informs the other.
The implication that if there is an interaction between a
policymaker and a supplier of intelligence that somehow or
other that is pressure or that is manipulation or that is not
right or fair to them is wrong, because we each learn from each
other. Inattentive users of intelligence have a responsibility
to interact with suppliers, and the suppliers learn from that--
of intelligence--and the user of intelligence learns, because
they end up talking to each other in a very open way. That is a
healthy thing, not a worrisome thing.
Senator Ensign. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired and for
the record I would like to ask the Secretary and your people to
give us an idea of when you will have a plan on transforming
the Guard and the Reserve, the idea of that spigot, when,
approximate timetable you will have a plan for us.
Secretary Rumsfeld. We have the plan, and we can brief you
at your desire, whenever, particularly the Army. General
Schoomaker is well along in it, and the Navy and the Air Force
have some Reserve Forces, and they have some plans also.
Senator Ensign. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I share the concern of Senator Reed about
the fact that there is no money in the budget you submitted for
fighting the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In your
testimony you refer to the unknown costs of fighting wars. I
guess I am incredulous that that is not something that DOD and
the service branches can quantify fairly accurately. That is
what you do. With all your experience and success in the
private sector as well as the public sector, I just cannot
believe that that is an unknowable figure for fiscal year 2005.
Can we just, given that it is not in there, try to identify
what we, for the purposes of our discussion and our
decisionmaking, or it is already a factor in the transportation
bill that we are considering now? I have seen numbers that said
$4 billion a month is the cost of the current operation in
Iraq--these are published reports--and $800 million in
Afghanistan. Is it for estimation purposes reasonable to
extrapolate that for fiscal year 2005?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, fiscal year 2005 starts
October 1, 2004. It is what, 10 months from now? The budget for
2005 that was submitted by the President this week was prepared
starting in January 2003 and completed in November 2003, and
given to the OMB, sent up to Congress in January 2004 for the
year that starts in October 2005 and goes to September 2006.
Now, if one thinks about it, that is anywhere from at the
minimum 12 and at the maximum 24 months in advance. We do not
know, we cannot know, how many troops we are going to want in
Iraq in the period----
Senator Dayton. Mr. Secretary, you must for planning
purposes be making some assumptions. I am just asking you, can
we reasonably assume on an estimated basis that the numbers I
just read--$4 billion a month for the current operation in
Iraq, $800 million a month for the current operation in
Afghanistan, multiplied by 12 are an approximation for what it,
under a best guess, will cost?
Secretary Rumsfeld. You get into best guesses and you
misinform people.
Senator Dayton. I consulted last night an oracle. I said,
who is best qualified to shed some light on this, and I went
looking for Rumsfeld's Rules. I discovered it is not that easy
to find them now. You are off the Web site. You are probably
one of the few in the administration who practices them,
especially as it relates to budget matters.
But a couple of them that come to mind are: ``Be precise.
Lack of precision is dangerous when the margin of error is
small.'' This is Stephen Friedman. I do not know if he is
quoting you precisely. He references a couple of them. ``If you
cannot measure it, you cannot manage it. That which require to
be reported on you will improve if you are selective.''
It seems to me if we are going to manage--our role is to
manage and we are making decisions first now in the next couple
weeks about overall Federal budget and then as an authorizing
committee about levels for the--this is the lineup we have and
the timetable we are on. If you will not give us numbers, how
can we manage and fulfil our responsibilities?
Secretary Rumsfeld. My first choice would have been to do
it. I tried to do it 2 years ago, and I was told by Congress,
``Do not do it.'' Now, that is a fact.
Senator Dayton. But ``Congress'' covers a multitude of
sins. I am only one.
Secretary Rumsfeld. You said that. I did not.
Senator Dayton. I did not have a role in that. I do not
agree with Congress all the time, but I guess I am trying just
to go back again because we are going to have to deal with
this. Is this a state secret, what this estimate is for 2005?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Of course not. What one can do and what
we tried to do--in fact, what we proposed and were rejected on
2 years ago--was to say: ``Look, you have alternative futures.
You could end up with 115,000 troops in Iraq, or it could go up
because the security situation could deteriorate and you might
have to do something else, or it could go down because the
Iraqi security forces exceed 200,000 and are capable of taking
over a number of those responsibilities. It could be any one of
those.''
We came in with a budget that said that and said here is a
midpoint; we do not know whether it will have to go up or stay
the same or go down. We were told: ``Listen, wars are funded
with supplementals; do it that way.''
Senator Dayton. My time is up.
Chairman Warner. Senator Sessions.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Sessions. It may be in terms of spending money and
Congress, ``Congress'' means Senator Ted Stevens. I do not
know, but if I recall it was his belief that we should do it by
supplemental. It certainly gives those few in Congress who
oppose the war a readily available number to claim how much we
are spending as justification for their opposition from the
beginning.
The intelligence issue will roll along. I do know that the
truth always generally comes out. It was interesting that Dr.
Kay, in his testimony the other day before us, indicated that
the Republican Guard commanders in Iraq thought they had WMD.
Only they would say: ``No, I did not have it, but my fellow
commander had it. They would interview him and he would say: I
do not have it, but commander such-and-such has it.'' They all
thought they had it, but apparently it has not been found yet.
Mr. Secretary, I commend you on continuing a steady train
of transformation of the defense of America. I remember one of
the first hearings I asked Mr. Wolfowitz that he had not broken
enough glass, not enough people were hollering about the
changes; maybe you were not making enough changes. He said:
``We have a plan and a thought to move steadily forward to make
our Defense Department more relevant to the threats facing
America, and I think you will see us accomplish that.''
Do you feel that, even with this war that fell upon us, you
are on track to make us, as Coach Eddie Robinson said, ``more
hostile, agile, and mobile.''
Secretary Rumsfeld. Indeed I do. There was a lot of
discussion after September 11 as to whether the global war on
terror should take precedence and we should try to forget
transforming and not try to do two things at once. But, in
reality, the transformation supports the global war on terror,
and it is critically important.
It not only supports it, but it informs it. It gives us the
impetus to achieve the kinds of transformation and changes that
are so necessary.
Senator Sessions. Well, I thank you for having a historical
vision of where we are today and where we need to go and moving
steadily and effectively in that direction.
I am so proud of our Guard and Reserve. I have visited a
number of their ceremonies where they were activated and left
their home communities, like Foley, Alabama, and Mobile, and
the crowds were enthusiastic. They feel a sense of service.
They do not feel, General Pace, they are victims. They feel
like they are serving America. They want to be used well. They
want to be used wisely.
I have had personal interviews, Mr. Secretary, with the
head of Guard and Reserve Forces, the commanders, and they tell
me you are pushing them; you not only support them, but you are
encouraging them to study how we activate people, to make it
less burdensome on families. Would you share your personal view
of how we can do better about handling Guard and Reserve?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I will indeed. We have all three
Services working to rebalance the active and Reserve components
so that we do not have to overuse those Guard and Reserve units
that have special skills that are in short supply in the Active
Force. That rebalance is going forward, and it is going forward
apace.
Second, we have looked at the deployment and redeployment
process, and we recognize the importance of certainty on the
part of people. We are taking steps to improve the tools, the
planning tools that will enable us to do a vastly more nuanced
job. I am impressed with the effort that Transportation Command
is engaged in. I am impressed with the effort the Joint Forces
and the Joint Staff are engaged in. We have simply got to do a
better job to make sure it is respectful of them and their
families and their employers.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator, for discussing that
Guard issue.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, could I make one comment?
Chairman Warner. One other thing. When you and I talked you
told me a very important fact about the quantum of the Guard
and Reserve which you felt, although they would serve and serve
willingly, simply their skills did not match to the needs. Do
you remember that discussion we had?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Exactly, and that is what General
Schoomaker particularly in the Army is in the process of
working very hard to do. He knows what to do; he has it
calculated; he knows the units--I believe he knows the units--
and he is well along in that task.
Could I make a quick comment?
Chairman Warner. Yes.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I hate to have the meeting end without
making a statement that should have been made at the time
Senator McCain was asking questions. I am advised that in
selecting the DSB for the tanker recapitalization evaluation,
the DOD took significant measures to ensure that individuals on
the task force leading the evaluation--Admiral Don Pilling, USN
retired, and Dr. Ted Gold as co-chairmen--had no relationship
with Boeing or the tanker lease program, and the committee can
be assured that no member of the task force will have any
association with Boeing or the tanker lease program.
I can further assure the committee that the chairman of the
DSB, Dr. Bill Schneider, will recuse himself from any
association with the evaluation or the task force efforts.
Furthermore, the process and results will be entirely open
since the evaluation task force will be operated in accordance
with the provisions of P.L. 92-463, the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, and DOD Directive 5105.4, the DOD Federal
Advisory Committee Management Program.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Could we get a
copy of that document such that we can give it to Senator
McCain?
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Warner. Now we will turn to Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, when Senator Reed and I were in Afghanistan
over Thanksgiving we learned that the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) had not yet met its obligations or its
commitment to provide additional troops for the provisional
reconstruction teams (PRTs) and other purposes. So far as I am
aware, they still have not done so. Could you please advise us
as to what, if any, progress is being made to persuade NATO
countries to contribute additional troops, as they had
obligated to do so?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I know that Lord Robertson, before he
left at the end of December, had worked very hard on it, and
the U.S. had been involved in assisting. The new Secretary
General has been working on it as well. The last time I looked,
there were still, out of the totality of the requirements, a
few pieces that had not been filled.
I suspect that what is happening is that the U.S., which
has been under a memorandum of understanding first with the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and now with
NATO ISAF, has worked together with them to fill in gaps as
they occur from time to time. But to my knowledge, they have
not fully completed everything, although they must be in the
high 90 percent.
Do you know?
Dr. Zakheim. There is that. Also, with respect to the PRTs
that you mentioned, the British are in fact in Mazar-e-Sharif.
The Germans have one up and running as well. One of the issues
has been where they go. We have eight of those now up and
running, and the idea is to have new ones stood up. We are
talking, to my knowledge, to at least five different NATO
countries that have given preliminary indications that they do
want to go in and set up PRTs. The question is, how do you do
that in an organized fashion?
Senator Clinton. You will keep this committee informed as
it goes forward?
Dr. Zakheim. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Clinton. Is Turkey one of those five countries?
Dr. Zakheim. They are one of them, but there are several
others, as I say.
Senator Clinton. With respect to the budget, it is my
understanding that, at least during the Vietnam War, the costs
of the war were in the budget. Supplementals were used for
additional costs. In September of this past year, I asked
Ambassador Bremer when he appeared before our committee whether
the administration would request an additional supplemental for
Iraq and Afghanistan. He replied, ``If there is any further
need, I would anticipate any further request will be done
through the normal appropriations process. In other words, it
will come forward as part of the regular appropriations
process, the 2005 budget, presumably early next year.''
With respect to the comments that Congress instructed----
Secretary Rumsfeld. Excuse me. Were you referring to Iraq
or Afghanistan in that last comment?
Senator Clinton. Iraq and Afghanistan.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Both?
Senator Clinton. Both.
With respect to the comments that you have made, Mr.
Secretary, that Congress essentially told you not to do it a
certain way, would you provide this committee with the names of
those Members of Congress or the staff and with whom they
communicated that demand in the Secretary's office at some very
early date, please?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, it was Congress overall. They
just simply took it all out. They zeroed out the $10 billion we
had requested.
Senator Clinton. But Mr. Secretary, that was for a
discretionary pool of $10 billion to be used as presumably you
saw fit. We are talking about a budget that connects costs to
missions and functions. As late as September 2003, Ambassador
Bremer, who I believe reports to you, assured this committee
that there would be requests done through the normal
appropriations process. Now, if there is someone in Congress--
not just Congress as a large undifferentiated mass--that is
saying, ``Do not do that,'' we would like to know it.
What the response from Congress was: We are not about to
give you a blank check of $10 billion to be used with no
oversight. We need to clarify that, because it goes right to
the heart of the authority of this body and the kind of
oversight that we are expected to provide.
Indeed, it raises some questions because at least the press
reports that there will be a supplemental after the election,
which seems to me to be inappropriate. I would hope that we
could get to a meeting of the minds as to exactly what is
expected from the budget to these ongoing expenses in both Iraq
and Afghanistan.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Clinton, I am told that you are
right, that there have been some portions of wars that have
been funded through the normal process. It appears that from
1967 to 1970 in the Vietnam War they included some estimates.
After 1970, I am told, they stopped putting cost estimates in
because they did not prove to be very accurate and thereafter
the Vietnam War was not, nor have, I believe, subsequent wars.
Second, I suppose you could say $10 billion; it would not
be fair to say what you said, ``Ten billion dollars to be spent
any way you want, without any oversight.'' No department of
Government does that. They always report; they always say what
they are doing. They have to get it cleared, if it is major
changes at all, from eight different committees. So there is
plenty of oversight.
The answer to your question about what Bremer said is also
correct, and that is that if you take the supplemental, a
portion of it was for the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA), $18.6 billion as I recall. He said, and I believe Mitch
Daniels and later Josh Bolten said, that that was for that
period and that funds for non-military purposes, the $18.6
billion, would, in fact, be put into normal appropriation
process, and that is what is planned to be done.
Senator Clinton. Planned to be done. It is not in the 2005
budget?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Anything--as I understand it--maybe you
ought to say it in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
language, Dov.
Dr. Zakheim. Essentially the money was for reconstruction,
and, as you recall, Senator, when that money was asked for, it
was meant to extend beyond just 1 year. Then the idea was, and
I believe Director Bolten has reiterated that, that once we get
past that amount of money laid out, everything that is
requested will become part of the normal budget and such
requests are normally outside the Defense Department budget. So
I do not think there is an inconsistency there.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your generosity of time. I am
just going to throw out some concepts to follow up with you
later. Number one, my big fear after listening to this debate
and discussion is that we are going to rush to get out of Iraq
before the job is done. I know you will not do that. I want to
let you understand that some of us up here know that predicting
the future is a very hard thing to do. What it costs is what it
costs, and what good have we done if we leave before the job is
done?
I am very hopeful that in the long term Iraq will become
more stable. There is one less dictator to give money to
suicide bombers in the Mideast. I think we are better off, and
if we want to have that discussion politically, as Senator
Kerry says, bring it on.
But, bottom line, that is my political statement. Here is
something that a lot of us agree on, and it may be I find
myself on the outs with the Pentagon, the Guard, and the
Reserve. You have tunnel vision about the role of the Guard and
Reserve. The Guard and Reserve do not just answer the Nation's
call; it also answers its State's call. There are 500,000
people you say that are being underutilized. I would like some
information about how many times those citizen soldiers are
called up to deal with disasters in Alabama, South Carolina,
Virginia, California, wherever.
Second, I believe our homeland security needs are not being
adequately met, that the Guard and Reserve has an additional
role there that could supplement our homeland security needs.
When you look at restructuring your force to meet the needs of
the 21st-century war model, Iraq and other places like Iraq,
let us not forget that the Guard has more missions than just
that one mission.
I want to leave with you a couple thoughts. Number one, I
believe that 40 percent of the force in Iraq will be Guard and
Reserve in the immediate future. I believe that it is going to
get worse before it gets better, and it is time to start
upgrading the benefits of those who are doing a good job for
this country.
Specifically, would you support reducing the retirement age
from 60 to 55 for those who serve 30 years as a member of the
Guard and Reserves?
[The information referred to follows:]
I do not support retirement reform that is solely for the purpose
of reducing the age of eligibility. Simply reducing the eligibility age
would provide an immediate benefit only to individuals who are already
retired or eligible for retirement, and provides no immediate benefit
to the vast majority of members who are bearing the burden of
activation and deployment today. I view the Reserve retirement system
as part of a total Reserve compensation package that should enable the
Department to shape the force and achieve strategic human resource
management objectives. It should enhance retention, particularly among
members bearing increased burdens of mobilization; attract members to
the force, both prior service and non-prior service personnel; and
enhance personnel management flexibility. We need to make a careful
examination of this issue in the context of total compensation. I will
be forming an advisory committee to look at the total compensation
program, including Reserve retirement.
Secretary Rumsfeld. First, Senator, I agree completely. The
President has said that we should stay in Iraq as long as is
necessary and not a day longer. There is no suggestion of a
premature departure.
Second, I am not sure I agree completely with what you said
about the Guard and Reserve. The implication of what you said
was that they necessarily were the only forces available for
U.S. needs, home needs, and domestic needs, and I do not agree
with that. The Active Force also does a lot with respect to
fighting fires or hurricanes or various other things that may
happen. We look at it as a total force concept.
Senator Graham. Right. But the primary mission of the Guard
in its day-to-day training is title 32, not title 10.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I understand, but I would not want to
leave the impression that the Active Force is disinterested in
homeland defense or in the domestic needs that they get called
up to assist on.
Senator Graham. No, sir, and I do not want to give you the
impression that the Active-Duty Forces are somehow not doing
everything. They are doing everything and then some. So I have
some problems with you on end strength, too.
But I do not want to get tunnel vision about the role of
the Guard. Unlike the Active-Duty Forces, which have done a
marvelous job, that are stretched too thin, are being asked to
do too much in my opinion. You cannot rearrange the pie until
you grow the pie. That is just my opinion about this. The Guard
has a specific function, unlike the Active Forces, under title
32.
Chairman Warner. Ladies and gentlemen, we have to move
right along.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. That is an important question, and I would
hope you would provide your response for the record, because
this distinguished member of our committee is an active member
of the National Guard.
Senator Graham. I am not part of the solution. I am
probably part of the problem. I am not up here tooting my horn.
Chairman Warner. If we do not stop, he is going to call you
to active duty and send you overseas.
Senator Graham. If that happens, you know we are really in
trouble.
But I do want to work with you, Mr. Secretary, to address
the Guard and Reserve role in its entirety, to look at end
strength, not just from an army like Iraq but maybe an army
like North Korea, and see if this makes sense. But stay the
course. The investigation will be done by an independent group.
You have done a great job. You helped bring people out that
were hurt during September 11. You are the right guy at the
right time. So hang in there, and any differences I have with
you will be honest differences, openly displayed. I am proud of
what you have done for our country, so hang in there.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. Well stated. Thank you very much.
Now, gentlemen, the two of you will wrap up.
Senator Bayh, you lead off.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. We are obligated to yield these chambers
back to the other body here.
Senator Bayh. I will move quickly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to touch upon just a couple of things I hear
frequently from the public, the first dealing with the adequacy
and the quality of the intelligence we receive. I am interested
in your opinion as a consumer of intelligence. I agree with all
the things you said at the beginning. It is a tough and
thankless assignment. We have a lot of good men and women
trying to deal with circumstantial evidence, gaps in the
evidence, contradictory evidence, denial and deception,
etcetera, etcetera, etcetera. It is possible that good people
get a lot of things right but occasionally make some mistakes.
With that as a preface, many Americans would be interested
in your opinion as a consumer of intelligence. On a scale of 1
to 100, 100 being omniscience, 1 being clueless, how would you
characterize the quality and the adequacy of the intelligence?
Secretary Rumsfeld. In between. [Laughter.]
Senator Bayh. Can you try and quantify it a little better?
Many Americans right now look at perhaps the failure that we
have experienced in Iraq, they look at the fact that we maybe
underassessed Libya and Iran, and they wonder: ``Gee, just we
are having to make decisions of great import. Just how adequate
and reliable is this information?''
Secretary Rumsfeld. You want to put that chart back up?
See previously inserted chart.
This is the problem. We are dealing with closed societies,
dictatorial regimes. There is North Korea, not a light there.
It is enormously difficult. The reality is we have had some
wonderful successes, and some of them are not public. I hope
George Tenet will make some of them public this week or next
week because I think he ought to. The failures are very
visible, and that is always the case.
I cannot give it a grade. It would vary depending on the
collection source. It would vary depending on the target. One
has to live with that in this world of ours. You end up making
the best policy judgments you can off of that.
Senator Bayh. Perhaps this is a job for this commission,
because when we make decisions about going to war or other
things based upon understandably imperfect information, many
people wonder just how imperfect is it. Is this an aberration
or is this more the normal course of events?
My second question just very briefly has to do with
priorities, Mr. Secretary. I hear from a number of people, not
a man or woman on the street, but from people more who follow
these things more regularly. They look at the situation in
North Korea, with their capabilities, their experimentations
with longer range missiles, and the belligerent and erratic
nature of that regime. They look at Iran with their well-known
connections to terrorists and the fact that their program is
further advanced than we thought. They now look at what we do
know about Iraq, and they say that perhaps Iran and North Korea
constitute even greater threats, yet we are spending over $100
billion to address Iraq. We obviously have used force to
liberate that country and trying to introduce democracy in that
part of the world, and they wonder, ``Is this an appropriate
ordering of priorities? Should we not be devoting more to
trying to address the problems of Iran and North Korea, given
now what we know?''
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, they are each being addressed in
a different way. North Korea is being addressed in a diplomatic
way in the relatively early stages since they made the
announcements of their capabilities. Iraq had been addressed in
a diplomatic manner through 17 resolutions of the U.N. over a
period of a decade and a half. Iran has just been revealed to
have more advanced nuclear activities than they had indicated.
On the other hand, if you look at North Korea, they have
lowered the height requirement to go into the Army to under 5
feet, to 4 feet 10, because so many people were starved. There
is abuse of the food distribution system at the present time.
It is hard to know what is actually going on in there. We do
know there are concentration camps. We do know that there are a
lot of people that are trying to flee the country.
We have imperfect knowledge in this world of ours. We do
today and we will into the future. I personally believe that
the President made the right decision with respect to Iraq. He
is making the right decision to try diplomacy with respect to
North Korea and to work those problems with the neighbors in
China, Russia, and South Korea and Japan.
With respect to Iran, there is obviously ferment and
turmoil going on with the young people and the women and the
people who want reform in that country, going on as we meet
today. Each is going to play out in a way that I suppose is
different.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. They are very
clear responses to an important question.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Good afternoon, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Rumsfeld. It is suddenly afternoon.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Secretary, I spoke to you about my
meeting with President Asad in Syria. When I confronted him
with why he did not stop the jihadists from going from Syria
into Iraq, where they are killing our men and women, he
answered without an answer, saying, ``Well, I cannot control my
borders; you cannot control your borders.''
Then he talked of the historical smuggling that goes on
across that border, but then said, ``I would like to cooperate
with the Americans.''
I have reported that conversation to many people in our
government, including you, and you seemed to dismiss that that
was worth following up. Can you tell me why?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, my portfolio is not Syria and
foreign policy. I do not believe I dismissed it, and I try not
to be dismissive of anything. On the other hand, we know he has
been notably unhelpful on his border. We know that he is
working with Iran in funding Hezbollah and bringing them down
through Damascus into Lebanon, into Israel.
Senator Bill Nelson. I confronted him with all of those,
and he was not cooperative.
Secretary Rumsfeld. We know he is testing chemical weapons.
Senator Bill Nelson. I confronted him with that.
Secretary Rumsfeld. We know he has taken the Iraqi funds
that are in Syria and refused to give us access to those funds,
and they belong to the Iraqi people. That is a regime that has
been almost consistently unhelpful.
Senator Bill Nelson. I confronted him about the withholding
of those funds. But if he were sincere, I do not see that there
is any down side for us to explore that----
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not either.
Senator Bill Nelson.--because it would lessen the people
going in trying to harm Americans.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, we explored it with Libya, and
Libya said, ``Here it is, let us come in and take it out.'' We
sent airplanes in and took it out, and it is in the United
States being examined--the documentation and the materials. He
is opening up his country to inspectors. That is a very good
thing. There is a model there.
Saddam Hussein did not follow it. Qaddafi is following it.
Asad is not.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, General Myers was interested in
that, but General Myers works for you. It might be something
worth exploring, and I would respectfully suggest that that is
in the interests of the United States.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree.
Chairman Warner. Senator----
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I have been waiting this
whole time. I have one more thing.
Chairman Warner. I was not going to cut you off. Go ahead,
take 1 more minute.
Senator Bill Nelson. Good, thank you.
Chairman Warner. I just commented I thought your question
was well taken.
Senator Bill Nelson. Oh, well, you are very kind. I thought
you were asking me to stop.
I have reported to you and Senator Levin on this very same
thing.
Now, the other thing that----
Secretary Rumsfeld. I am going to have to ask it to end
quite soon. I have the House hearing at 1:00.
Chairman Warner. We are going to end in about a minute.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I have to make a phone call in between
and get prepared for that.
Chairman Warner. Right.
Senator Bill Nelson. Respectfully, Mr. Secretary, I was
told not only about the WMD prior to the vote in the Senate,
but I was specifically told what has now been made public by
the President and the Secretary of State: that there were
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that could be put on ships off
the eastern seaboard and flown over eastern seaboard cities
with the WMD. You can understand that I thought that was an
imminent threat to the interests of the United States.
However, what I was not told was that there was a dispute
in the Intelligence Community over the veracity of that
information, specifically, as reported by The Washington Post,
that it was Air Force intelligence that specifically discounted
that, that it was not true.
My question to you is, why was I not told that there was
this disagreement in the Intelligence Community, instead of
being told that it was gospel truth that those UAVs could be
flown over eastern seaboard cities?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not know who told you that, and I
would not use the word ``veracity.'' I would use the word
``accuracy.'' There was a discussion in the internals, in the
Intelligence Community, and I have forgotten exactly how it
worked. But one agency believed that the--I am trying to--is
this unclassified or classified now?
Chairman Warner. Mr. Secretary, I suggest you answer that
for the record. It is an important question, and it will give
you adequate time.
Secretary Rumsfeld. It is, and there is a classified answer
and an unclassified answer. I can give you an unclassified
answer here and we would be happy to--Dr. Cambone can give you
a classified answer in 1 minute.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Secretary, everything that I have
said has been unclassified.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Right. I am talking about my answer,
not your question. Your question clearly is unclassified.
My understanding is there was a discussion and some people,
as is usual in intelligence, believed that the equipment
associated with the Iraqi UAVs--which we saw and watched
tested, they flew considerable distances, they were not big,
but they did have the ability to carry something, and they had
some vehicles in close proximity to them during some tests.
There was a debate as to whether those vehicles had a role in
connection with the UAVs or whether the vehicles had a role in
connection with hydrogen balloons or weather balloons or
something else.
Dr. Cambone. Well, that is two different things.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Is that two different things? Steve
Cambone, come up and answer it for me.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, if you want to receive a
classified answer I would be happy.
Chairman Warner. Fine. At this point, Mr. Secretary, time
has expired for everybody. You have been most patient.
I thank you, Senator, and thank you, General. We have had
an excellent hearing----
Secretary Rumsfeld. Steve can give a 2-minute unclassified
answer.
Chairman Warner. All right, if you wish. Then we will
proceed as you desire.
Dr. Cambone. Yes, sir. There was, Senator, a dispute on the
role of the UAVs. The Air Force had a different view than
others in the community, and I think that you have two parts of
the story combined that I would like to separate for you, if I
may, in a closed session.
But there was a dispute by the Air Force. It was resolved
as part of the ordinary process of doing the NIEs and the
estimates that are done. The Air Force maintained its dissent.
What you are reporting on is an after-the-fact report of the
Air Force's dissent.
But let me clean up the parts for you in a different
setting.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Levin. His question is why he was not informed of
the dissent.
Dr. Cambone. That I cannot answer, sir.
Chairman Warner. Okay, gentlemen----
Senator Bill Nelson. That is the question.
Chairman Warner. We thank you very much, Mr. Secretary,
General. We have had an excellent hearing.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
end strength
1. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, there seems to be some
confusion relating to increasing Army end strength. The press has
recently reported that you will increase Army end strength by 30,000
over 4 years. Last week, my staff was briefed by the DOD Comptroller
Dr. Zakheim that those reports were false and you still oppose
increasing end strength. Where do you stand on increasing Army end
strength?
Secretary Rumsfeld. While I oppose a permanent increase in the
Army's end strength, I strongly support a temporary increase of 30,000
that allows the necessary flexibility for the Army, while fighting the
global war on terrorism, to increase the number of Active Force brigade
combat teams (BCT) from 33 to 43 between now and fiscal year 2007. A
determination for an additional 5 BCTs (for a total of 48) will be made
at a later date. This temporary measure will enable the Army to field
standardized unit designs and transition to a unit-based personnel
management system. Our intent is to make the Army more ready and
relevant for the unpredictable nature of the emerging strategic
environment. Once this restructuring is complete, the Army will return
to their authorized strength by fiscal year 2009.
2. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, paying for the 30,000
increase in troops is not included in the budget. Do you plan on
relying on supplemental spending bills for the next 4 years to pay for
this increase?
Secretary Rumsfeld. No decision has been made on how to pay for
this increase. Since the increase is not reflected in the fiscal year
2005 request, we likely would need to fund it as part of a fiscal year
2005 supplemental.
3. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, supplemental bills are
submitted by the administration for emergency spending requests. Why is
future end strength considered an emergency spending request? These are
the same accounting gimmicks we accused the previous administration of
committing.
Secretary Rumsfeld. For fiscal year 2005, including this end
strength increase in a fiscal year 2005 supplemental would be
consistent with the administration position because it is directly
related to the global war on terrorism, whose incremental costs are
being funded in supplementals. Beyond fiscal year 2005, no decision has
been made on how to fund the end strength increase.
4. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, every independent expert has
called for increasing Army end strength. The demands of the global war
on terror have stretched our military thin. Will the administration
continue to oppose legislative efforts by Congress to increase end
strength?
Secretary Rumsfeld. While reducing stress on the Active and Reserve
Forces continues to be a top priority within the Department, the
addition of permanent end strength is not the most effective or
efficient means to relieve stress on our forces. The Department is
already using existing legislation that allows for temporary increases
in end strength to meet mission requirements. Furthermore, the Army is
aggressively reworking its division structure to create additional
combat brigades from within existing end strength.
In addition to the Army initiatives, there are several dozen other
initiatives across the Department that will reduce stress on the force
while increasing our capabilities. For example, actions are underway to
realign units and specialties within the active and Reserve components
to reduce mobilization and deployment imbalances. Also, the Services
are taking actions over the next 2 years to convert as many as 20,000
military positions that are civilian in nature to civilian status, so
that more military billets will be available to support current
operations.
national call to service
5. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, you are pursuing a temporary
increase in manpower levels for the Army which will need to be phased
out in a short time and could well reside in the Reserves. Does it not
make sense to employ the Call to Service Act's 18-18-18 plan to augment
the required end strength you are pursuing?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Army has implemented the National Call to
Service Plan (NCSP) and established a 1-year test to quantify the
impacts of this program. We want to allow NCSP to mature and to
complete the 1-year test to help us make better decisions on the
program and its place in the Army. Currently, our force stabilization
and modularity efforts are key elements of our transformation. Some of
the increase will be covered with the 15-month variable enlistment
(VEL), although it does not mesh with the Army's stabilization plan.
Furthermore, the structure the Army is creating during the increase is
primarily infantry and armor. If we were to fill the ranks of the new
Units of Action (UAs) with 15-month VEL soldiers, we would not have a
sufficient population of infantry and armor noncommissioned officers to
fill the ranks of these UAs later. Considering the historical loss
rates of 3-year and 4-year term soldiers, and the propensity of the 15-
month VEL soldiers to not reenlist, relying on the 15-month VEL to
create temporary strength would create a critical shortage of junior
leaders in our future UAs.
6. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, I would like you to discuss
the implementation of the 18-18-18 plan that Senator Bayh and I
included in the Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act. If
the Army is envisioning only a temporary increase in end strength, it
may be well-suited for the Call to Service Act's 18-18-18 plan. What
percentage of your total force will be made up of personnel under this
type of contract?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Army has implemented the NCSP and
established a 1-year test to quantify the impacts of this program. We
want to allow NCSP to mature and to complete the 1-year test to help us
make better decisions on the program and its place in the Army.
Currently, our force stabilization and modularity efforts are key
elements of our transformation. The 15-month VEL cannot realistically
be used, except on a marginal basis, as it does not mesh with the
Army's stabilization plan. The temporary strength increase of the Army
will need to occur across all parts of the military structure, not just
the initial entry soldier. Our solution is focused on long-term results
for shaping the Army as a whole. The Army is keeping the number of 15-
month VEL accessions at approximately 2 percent of the annual accession
mission. Assuming minimal reenlistment rates for these soldiers, less
than half a percentage of the total force will be made up of personnel
under this type of contract at any one time.
7. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, do you envision expansion of
this program?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The DOD initiated the National Call to Service
(NCS) enlistment option on October 1, 2003, with all four Services
participating. Although the program is new, we are pleased with its
start and are enthusiastic about the future of the program. We are
currently evaluating the program.
8. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, what is the role of the 18-
18-18 plan playing in each of the Services?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The NCS program plays a role in each of the
Services as they implement the program in accordance with overall
departmental guidance.
The Air Force goal for fiscal year 2004 is 370 NCS
participants. They started the program on October 1, 2003, with
the first NCS enlistee on that day. To date, the Air Force has
enlisted 295 NCS participants.
The Army's goal for fiscal year 2004 is 2 percent of
non-prior Service accessions, or about 1,450 participants.
Unique among the Services, the Army is offering NCS program
participation in 10 of its 41 recruiting battalions. The RAND
Corporation will analyze the NCS program to determine its
effects on other enlistment options and the degree to which NCS
is a market expander in the high quality recruit market.
Through February 20, the Army has enlisted 213 participants.
The Marine Corps' goal for fiscal year 2004 is 175 NCS
participants. The Marine Corps has enlisted 39 NCS participants
to date, but expects no difficulty meeting the 175 participant
goal.
The Navy's goal for fiscal year 2004 is 1,000 NCS
participants. Due to initial challenges with their recruit
reservation system, the Navy did not start enlistments under
NCS until January 2004. To date, they have enlisted 55
participants, but see no problem in meeting the 1,000
participant goal.
bases
9. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, I applaud your leadership in
reassessing our force structure in Europe and around the globe. Bases
in the Central Asian nations of Uzbekistan and Kyrgystan have been
invaluable in the Afghan theater. Reports indicate Romania, Poland, and
Bulgaria as sites for future bases. Can you comment on this? What other
countries are being considered?
Secretary Rumsfeld.
Global posture is really more than bases and
facilities. It encompasses several factors--facilities,
activities, relationships, usability of forces, surge and
personnel management.
As part of our process each combatant commander
provided proposals for realigning the posture in their
respective Area of Responsibility (AOR). A key theme in the
realignment effort has been to strengthen and transform
existing alliances, as well as build new partnerships.
We are currently compiling a report on the overall
Global Posture effort. It will contain a classified annex that
will enumerate countries, by region, where we intend to
position forces and capabilities.
10. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, I applaud your leadership
in determining our future force structure, global basing strategy, and
efforts to more fully integrate Active and Reserve Forces. What
deadlines have you established to ensure these initiatives are folded
into the upcoming BRAC process?
Secretary Rumsfeld.
We will use the Global Posture Review to inform the
BRAC process. The review enables us to provide specific input
on overseas changes for the BRAC 2005 process.
This input will allow domestic implications of the
review--with forces and personnel either returning to or moving
forward within U.S. territory--to be effectively accounted for
within the BRAC decisionmaking process.
BRAC decisions in will be critical in preparing
appropriate domestic infrastructure for those U.S. forces that
will be returning to the U.S. and its territories.
Rather than sub-optimizing through individual moves,
BRAC looks at the whole picture, thus yielding more efficient
and effective placement of forces.
BRAC is the best way to determine the
placement of forces relocating to the U.S. Both efforts
are necessary for a true capabilities-based
infrastructure prioritization.
guantanamo
11. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, we commend our service
members for treating the detainees at Guantanamo humanely and in a
manner consistent with the principles of the Third World Geneva
Convention of 1949. That said, many of the detainees in Guantanamo have
been in captivity for 2 years. As you are aware, as time elapses, the
quality of intelligence you can gather decreases. In December, Senator
Lindsey Graham, Senator Cantwell, and I wrote you to inquire about your
plans for the detainees in Guantanamo. Since I have not heard a
response, can you please update me on your plans for prosecuting the
detainees?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I am likewise proud of our service members and
the tremendous job they have been doing and continue to do in the
operations at Guantanamo.
It is important to note that the intelligence-gathering mission at
Guantanamo continues to provide vital intelligence in the current
conflict. The individuals being held at Guantanamo are providing us
with important information that continues to help us in our efforts to
undermine the al Qaeda network and defend the Nation against that
network. For example, intelligence gained from Guantanamo has provided
U.S. and coalition forces with information for use in planning and
executing counterterrorism missions. It has enhanced and continues to
expand our understanding of jihadist motivation, selection, and
training process.
As I mentioned in my February 18 letter, the President has
designated six detainees as eligible for military commissions, and we
are working through each case systematically. In February, Guantanamo
detainees Ali Hamza Ahmed Sulayman al Bahlul of Yemen and Ibrahim Ahmed
Mahmoud al Qosi of Sudan were charged with conspiracy to commit war
crimes. Prior to being charged, these detainees were assigned military
defense counsel. Their trial dates and commission panel members will be
selected at a later time. In addition to the assignment of counsel to
and the charging of al Bahlul and al Qosi, military defense counsel
have been assigned to Salim Ahmed Hamdan of Yemen and David Hicks of
Australia.
In addition to the above progress in the cases of those currently
designated as eligible for commissions, we have also finalized a number
of decisions that we believe are essential to moving forward and
ensuring that the proceedings are full and fair. On December 30, the
Department of Defense announced the selection of John D. Altenburg, Jr.
to serve as the Appointing Authority. On March 17, 2004, I issued
Military Commission Order No. 5 officially delegating the appointing
authority responsibility to Mr. Altenburg. Mr. Altenburg brings with
him a wealth of legal and military experience that will serve our
Nation well in his performance of the Appointing Authority's duties.
The progress made in the military commission process requires day-to-
day management by an individual, like Mr. Altenburg, who can devote his
entire attention to the process.
The Department also announced the selection of Air Force Brigadier
General Thomas L. Hemingway as legal advisor to the appointing
authority. As legal advisor, Brigadier General Hemingway will aid Mr.
Altenburg in the day-to-day management of the process by overseeing
Appointing Authority personnel and advising him on legal matters
concerning the military commissions.
The Department of Defense also announced four individuals who will
be designated to serve on the Military Commission Review Panel
established by Military Commission Order No. 1 (Mar. 21, 2002). Those
individuals are: Griffin B. Bell, who served as Attorney General under
President Carter and as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit; Edward G. Biester, a Pennsylvania state court judge,
former Pennsylvania Attorney General and former member of the U.S.
House of Representatives; William T. Coleman, an attorney currently in
private practice who has served as Secretary of Transportation and as
an adviser to several administrations; and Frank Williams, chief
justice of the Rhode Island Supreme Court. As you may know, the Review
Panel is responsible for hearing appeals from the decisions of the
military commission. In that capacity, the panel plays an integral part
in ensuring the fullness and fairness of the military commission
process.
The General Counsel of the Department of Defense also issued a
military commission instruction that provides specific details on the
Review Panel's responsibilities and operation. Among other things, this
instruction establishes term limits and permits removal of review panel
members only for good cause and protects them against undue influence.
As we continue to move forward with the military commission
process, it is important to bear in mind that in past conflicts we
generally prosecuted war criminals after we had been victorious. In so
doing, we greatly diminished the need to protect information. In
today's war on terrorism, we are prosecuting our enemies even while the
war clearly remains ongoing. In this current conflict, perhaps more so
than any other conflict before it, information is the critical weapon
for defeating our enemies and the need for the protection of vital
information continues.
12. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, on December 12, 2003,
following a visit to the facilities in Guantanamo, Senator Graham,
Senator Cantwell, and I expressed our serious concern over issues
regarding the disposition of the detainees--some of which have been
detained for over 2 years. Since we are waiting for your written reply
to this matter, when will you make a determination on the final
disposition of the detainees' status?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I very much appreciate the time that you and
Senators Graham and Cantwell took to see for yourselves the operations
at Guantanamo as well as your thoughtful concerns and questions about
the detention of enemy combatants at Guantanamo.
As I noted in my February 18, 2004 response, at the time of capture
and based on available information, the detaining combatant commanders
determined that those detained were part of, or otherwise supporting,
forces hostile to the United States. Under the law of war, enemy
combatants such as those detained at Guantanamo may be detained until
the end of hostilities. Our Nation continues to be in an armed
conflict. As with any armed conflict, no one can predict when its end
will occur. Regarding detainee disposition and status, there is an
interagency process in place to review the status of detainees
regularly, to asses their intelligence value, if any, and evaluate
whether they remain potential threats. Although a stark departure from
U.S. Government practice in past conflicts, we have already released
some detainees and are currently engaged with a number of countries to
seek arrangements to return detainees to their home countries.
13. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, when and how will you begin
the process outlined in the Order of the Military Commissions that the
President signed in November 2001, and will you have outside observers?
Secretary Rumsfeld. That process is already well underway. In July
2003, the President determined that six individuals were subject to his
November 13, 2001 Military Order. In February 2004, Guantanamo
detainees Ali Hamza Ahmed Sulayman al Bahlul of Yemen and Ibrahim Ahmed
Mahmoud al Qosi of Sudan were charged with conspiracy to commit war
crimes. Prior to being charged, al Qosi and al Bahlul were assigned
military defense counsel. Their trial dates and commission panel
members will be selected at a later time. In addition to the assignment
of counsel to and the charging of al Bahlul and al Qosi, military
defense counsel have assigned to Salim Ahmed Hamdan of Yemen and David
Hicks of Australia.
Approximately 80 members of the media will be permitted to attend
and an offer has been extended to the International Committee of the
Red Cross to have a representative observe military commission
proceedings. We are currently examining whether it is logistically
possible for additional groups or individuals to attend.
budget
14. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, I notice in the new budget
there are large increases in funding for already existing programs. How
does this year's budget proposal figure into your long-term
transformation plans?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The fiscal year 2005 budget sustains our
ongoing transformation plans. Transformation is a large undertaking,
but it does not consume the entire acquisition budget. Many ongoing
programs remain vital to the short-term and long-term superiority of
our military--for example new ships, transport aircraft, trucks,
communications gear. These ongoing programs will continue to consume
large portions of our acquisition budget.
15. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, during your first
appearance in front of this committee you questioned the need for three
tactical aviation programs. Can we still afford three new tactical
aviation programs: F/A-18E/F, F/A-22, and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The fiscal year 2005 budget continues the
multiyear plan we formulated in preparing the fiscal year 2004 request.
This plan made adjustments in our tactical aviation programs to ensure
that they were realistically funded and executable, i.e. affordable.
These and all other major programs will again be subject to new
scrutiny as we prepare our fiscal year 2006-fiscal year 2011 multiyear
plan.
missile defense
16. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, under the fiscal year 2005
DOD budget, top-line funding for missile defense is going up to $9.2
billion, an increase of $1.5 billion over the previous year. In fiscal
year 2005, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) will start to ``initiate
technology development and testing of advanced, lightweight space-based
interceptor components'' with the goal of incorporating them into its
Block 2012 capability. Arguably, these space-based interceptors cross
the line from militarizing space to weaponizing space. Yet, this move
is being done without any real debate on U.S. security needs. Is the
U.S. space policy being updated to include the option to weaponize
space?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The MDA continues to study space-based
interceptors along with many other technology programs and future
capabilities. Building on prior technology assessment studies of space-
based missile defenses, MDA will conduct an analytical effort in 2004
to assess the potential benefits of these capabilities to support a
layered missile defense system. MDA's current five year budget calls
for continuing research and development in this area, with the option
of developing a space-based test bed in Block 2012. Ultimately, any
future decision to deploy interceptors in space would require
additional Department and congressional decisions and funding.
17. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, MDA states that the Initial
Defensive Operations system will not be considered to have achieved
Initial Defensive Capability until after an assessment from the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E). Will this be
DOT&E's report on the missile defense system that is expected in summer
2004?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Initial Defensive Capability will be achieved
when a militarily useful increment of missile defense capability is
available to place on alert. DOT&E will include appropriate comments on
the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) the February 2005 report to
Congress.
18. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, as you likely know, the
DOT&E, Mr. Christie, has publicly expressed serious concern about the
lack of operational test data for his office to evaluate. Given these
concerns, how much can DOT&E really analyze this system?
Secretary Rumsfeld. DOT&E will have access to all the testing data
available on the BMDS deployable test bed. I expect that DOT&E will use
the available data to provide the Department its fair and objective
assessment of the defensive capabilities of the system.
19. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, the designation of a
program as undergoing spiral development is crucial because, according
to section 803 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2003, once a program is designated to be undergoing spiral
development, it must show its development strategy, test plans,
performance parameters, exit criteria, and operational assessment.
Furthermore, from 2003 to 2008, the Secretary of Defense must give an
annual report to Congress by September 30 on the status of each program
undergoing spiral development.
In the MDA budget request, this phrase is used to explain its
development process (``Spiral development enables the execution of an
iterative process for developing the BMDS. . . .'' p. 2), yet according
to the GAO, there are no programs that are officially undergoing spiral
development. Is the BMDS ever going to be officially designated a
program undergoing spiral development?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The BMDS was identified as undergoing spiral
development after September 30, 2003 and, therefore, will be included
in the Department status report due by September 30, 2004.
20. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, is it still reasonable to
believe that the BMDS will be capability operational by the end of
2004? Will the missiles be fully operationally tested by then?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We still expect the BMDS to have operational
capability by the end of 2004. As we have stated previously, this will
be a limited capability with improvements to follow.
The Ground-based Interceptors (GBIs) that are a part of the Ground-
based Midcourse (GMD) element will not be fully operationally tested by
the end of 2004; however, they will be proven in developmental tests
against threat-representative targets. Operational testing of this
initial and evolving capability will proceed as the test bed is
complete and continue as part of the development program and as part of
our validation and verification effort.
joint requirements oversight council decision on joint standoff weapon
21. Senator McCain. General Pace, in General Myer's posture
statement he states that you are ``establishing a more rigorous process
for reviewing joint requirements.'' He also affirms that ``in the near
term, [you] are focused on improving how [you] determine our munitions
requirements. Over the long-term, [you] plan to field improved
munitions systems that build on our already superb precision-delivery
capabilities.''
It appears to me that the cancellation of the United States Air
Force's (USAF) joint participation in the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW)
program in favor of the USAF's Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser
Extended Range (WCMD-ER) is totally counter to the direction Secretary
Rumsfeld is setting for the department.
With respect to requirements, WCMD-ER has half the range, increases
the signature for the delivery platform, and offers no plan to
accommodate for the unexploded hazard of aging explosives.
With respect to the business case, the decision ignores the sunk
costs that have already been spent on integrating the JSOW into five
USAF aircraft in favor of future integration of the WCMD-ER into two
USAF platforms at the time when the USAF is about to realize their
return on investment. How do you explain this decision?
General Pace. The Joint Staff has absolutely increased its rigor in
reviewing service as well as joint munitions requirements. We are
currently coordinating between combatant commanders (COCOM), individual
Services, and the Joint Staff to accurately depict warfighter needs
through the Munitions Requirement Process. This effort will enable
Services to better define the capability and funding requirements
needed to support the combatant commander's operations plan (OPLAN)
requirements and threat assessment.
Addressing the USAF decision to terminate the JSOW program in
fiscal year 2005, Director, J-8 directed a review of several munitions
programs. Over a 3-month period, the Force Application Functional
Capabilities Board (FCB) conducted an assessment of standoff weapons
capabilities and the impact of the USAF termination initiative on the
overall JSOW program. The Joint Staff assessment did not focus on a
pure comparison between JSOW-A and WCMD-ER. The tasking sought to
identify gaps, seams, and redundancies in comparing JSOW with other
joint and Service munitions. The unique attributes of JSOW were
recognized and these capabilities weighed against their cost/benefits
to the warfighter. JSOW is a standoff outside point defense weapon
(SOPD). WCMD-ER is also a SOPD weapon. While it does not have the same
range as JSOW, WCMD-ER does have the ability to be launched outside the
range of most tactical threat systems. We recognize the issue with the
unexploded ordnance hazard, but this is a challenge for our entire
inventory of area target munitions. A final theme in the assessment
included Strategic Planning Guidance direction to accept risk when
existing capabilities sustain our advantage.
The USAF based its decision to end JSOW-A procurement on
requirements analysis that concluded JSOW-A provided a capability that
would be served by other weapons. The USAF, even considering the
funding for JSOW to date, projected a cost savings of $398 million in
the FYDP.
The Joint Staff recommended canceling the JSOW program, stating
that advancements in precision capability of other current and funded
munitions could effectively serve the JSOW target set. Current standoff
munitions, together with direct attack munitions delivered by stealthy
platforms, provide the necessary capabilities to meet COCOM
requirements. The Joint Staff concluded that cancellation of the JSOW
program would present limited risk in joint warfighting capabilities
and offer substantial offsets for other critical requirements.
The Joint Staff concluded that DOD should accept limited risk and
capture substantial offsets for future programs.
air force tankers
22. Senator McCain. General Pace, regarding tanker aircraft, the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 calls for an
``Analysis of Alternatives,'' a long-term maintenance and training
requirements study, and a corrosion study to be completed by March,
April, and May 2004, respectively. Where are we with regard to each
project? Specifically, who is conducting them? When will each be
completed?
General Pace. Independent Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Public Law
108-136 Section 134 directs the Secretary of the Air Force to submit an
AoA by a federally-funded research and development center or another
independent agency no later than March 1, 2004. The AoA Guidance was
approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) outlining the conduct of an AoA using a
federally-funded research and development center or other entity
independent of the DOD. This effort is expected to take 18 months to
complete.
Maintenance and Training Public Law 108-136 Section 135 requires
the Secretary of Defense to submit a report, no later than April 1,
2004, regarding long-term tanker aircraft maintenance and training
requirements. The Air Force, more specifically the KC-767 and Trainer
System Program Offices, are preparing the report, with Logistics and
Materiel Readiness as the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
lead. The report is expected to be submitted to Congress by USD(AT&L)
no later than April 1, 2004.
Aircraft Material Condition Public Law 108-136 Section 345 requires
the Secretary of Defense to submit a report, no later than May 1, 2004,
on the material condition of the KC-135 fleet. The statement of work
has been prepared and the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) is under
contract. CNA is reviewing the available data and beginning their
assessment.
23. Senator McCain. General Pace, on December 1, 2003, the Deputy
Secretary ordered a ``pause'' in the execution of the tanker contracts
until the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) completes an
independent assessment of allegations related to the tanker proposal.
As you likely know, the Justice Department is also investigating
matters related to the tanker program. It seems to me that the need for
a ``pause'' prompted by the OIG's assessment applies with equal if not
greater force to the Justice Department's investigation. In other
words, the tanker contracts should not be executed until the Justice
Department has completed its investigation. Do you agree? If not, why
not?
General Pace. I'm not in a position to comment about ongoing
investigations. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
approved the Air Refueling Aircraft Program Operational Requirements
Document, thus validating the need for air refueling capability. This
capability is essential to COCOMs, and we should take every appropriate
action to satisfy it as soon as possible.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
targeted pay increases
24. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Rumsfeld, I am concerned as I know
you are about retention and morale among our troops, particularly those
who continue to be deployed overseas for long periods of time.
Apparently as DOD was putting together its fiscal year 2005 budget
recommendation, the OMB took out DOD's proposals for targeted pay
raises, primarily for career enlisted members. I realize that resources
are tight and that we can't always fund every pay and benefit program
on the table. Having said that, I would appreciate your thoughts on how
we can continue to retain high quality personnel, most of whom have
other options outside the military, and what you believe is the proper
mix of pay increases and quality of life enhancements that will ensure
we create an environment that will retain the necessary amount of
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in our Armed Forces.
Secretary Rumsfeld. We've made great strides in reaching our goal
of improving military compensation so that it is equal to or greater
than the 70th percentile of private sector incomes for military members
with comparable education and years of service. We've closed the gap
for officers and will have closed nearly 80 percent of the gap for mid-
grade non-commissioned officers (NCOs) with this year's 3.5 percent
(Employment Cost Index (ECI) plus \1/2\ percent) across-the-board pay
raise. We remain committed to achieving this goal. Our service members
have seen this commitment over the past few years in increases to pay
and housing allowances. This year's budget provides the resources to
eliminate the remaining 3.5 percent out-of-pocket housing expenses for
the average member on the first of January.
Further, I am appointing a Defense Advisory Committee on Military
Compensation to conduct a comprehensive review of military compensation
for Active and Reserve Forces with a view toward simplifying and
improving our compensation program to ensure we retain the right mix of
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in our Armed Forces.
temporary increase in end strength/guard-reserve missions
25. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Rumsfeld, I applaud your recent
decision to float up the Army end strength over the next several years
in order to better meet the demands being placed on our Armed Forces.
As I interact with my constituents who are military members it
continues to become clear to me that they are, overwhelmingly, proud to
serve their country and willing to do so when called. At the same time,
they want predictability in their lifestyle and a sustainable
deployment schedule. The temporary increase you are instituting will
help spread mobilizations and deployments over more people, and I
believe that will help relieve some of the strain on our military
members. Part of your plan for creating a more operational, deployable
Army is to move people into skill sets that have high demand from those
that are not in high demand. Regarding how this rebalancing may affect
the Reserve components, can you explain in more detail which skill sets
you are talking about and how this shift in skill sets will affect the
way the Guard and Reserve look and how they are used in the future?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Specialties such as Civil Affairs, Security/
Police Forces, Intelligence, and Special Operations Forces are examples
of the most highly stressed career fields that need rebalancing.
Converting skills from lower demand areas such as Field Artillery, Air
Defense Artillery, and Combat Heavy Engineers to these higher stressed
career fields increases the number of these units. Expanding the
rotational base allows the Services to achieve mobilization rates that
are both reasonable and sustainable.
guard/reserve retention
26. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Rumsfeld, our Guard and Reserve
members have done a great job over the last several years and have
played a major role in military operations overseas and at home. Based
on the planned ratio of Reserve to Active Forces in Iraq during OIF 2,
they will be playing an even larger role in the future. Indications I
get from Guard and Reserve personnel I've talked to are that we have a
possible retention crisis brewing. People I've talked to who have been
deployed or are currently deployed claim that as many as 70 percent of
the people in their units plan to get out when they are demobilized.
It's unclear if they actually will, however the fact they say they are
going to is troubling. The additional feedback I get that I think is
important to mention is that predictability in lifestyle is more
important to retaining these people than any kind of pay and benefit. I
know you and your staff are working right now to revamp the
mobilization process and develop new standards for how Guard and
Reserve personnel will be used. But I want you to know that this issue
is in the forefront of my concern as well and I look forward to seeing
how DOD will address this issue which I believe is absolutely central
to the future of our Armed Forces. On that note, I would appreciate any
preliminary thoughts you have on the standards the Department intends
to put in place for using and retaining our Guard and Reserve Forces.
Secretary Rumsfeld. We are acutely aware that the Reserve
components are being called upon now more than they have in the past,
and we are concerned about the impact of this increased use on our
ability to meet our future human resource requirements. It is unclear
at this point what current and long-term effects this increased use may
have. While we are currently achieving our strength objectives, we
remain vigilant about future enlistment and reenlistment behavior and
trends. In our efforts to strengthen Reserve recruiting and retention,
the Department is examining proposals for enhanced bonus programs and
exploring opportunities to improve the quality of life for our members.
We have stepped up our family and employer support programs, and we
monitor employer- and family-related issues and concerns for potential
serious problems. In addition, we are considering a number of
initiatives that are focused on limiting the personal turbulence for
our Reserve component members.
To promote judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components and
to reduce the strain on Reserve component members, we are focusing much
of our effort on developing new standards for their use. We are
exploring policies that will provide more predictable periods of
mobilization and more advanced planning time for overseas tours. For
example, a member could plan for not more than 1 year of mobilization
in every 6 years of Reserve service and arrange his personal and family
affairs accordingly. We are examining ways to enhance our use of
volunteers in an effort to minimize the need for involuntary activation
orders. Additionally, our efforts to prepare proposed legislation and
revise our policies to support the continuum of service are ongoing.
These efforts are focused on removing barriers to optimal use of
Reserve component members across the spectrum of military operations in
both peacetime and in times of national emergency.
Although there are no immediate indications that the current
mobilization has negatively impacted recruiting and retention, we are
working to identify early warning indicators that will assist us in
targeting enlistment and reenlistment incentives before problems become
serious.
The Secretaries of the military departments are individually
responsible for determining their strength requirements and skill mix
and applying available resources to ensure manning requirements are
achieved. We will continue to work with them to ensure that our
programs are sufficient to provide a strong force with the requisite
numbers and skills.
strategic airlift
27. Senator Chambliss. General Pace, strategic airlift has been
absolutely central to our success in Afghanistan and Iraq over the past
3 years, and central to the success of the Expeditionary Air Force for
much longer than that. You are currently in the process of revising the
Mobility Requirements Study to incorporate lessons learned from
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and OIF, and I understand that this
study will be complete by June 2005. However, I don't think it takes a
complex, time-consuming study to determine that we simply don't have
enough airlift. We can't build C-17s fast enough and we can't modify C-
5s fast enough to produce the amount of airlift capability that we
need. One illustration of this which I find a little troubling is that
over the last few years DOD has contracted with the Russians to use AN-
124 aircraft for strategic airlift because we simply don't have enough
of our own. At the same time, DOD and the Air Force in particular are
dragging their feet in funding C-5 modernization programs which could
help alleviate our need to contract with the Russians. I would
appreciate your comments on this situation as well as your comments on
how you will fund the C-5 modernization effort in order to increase the
United States' strategic airlift capacity.
General Pace. The AN-124 is only used on a limited basis as the
last option for airlifting outsized cargo. Our preferred method of
cargo shipment is sealift. Only when the material is needed at
destination before sealift can get it there, do we resort to airlift.
Certain large shipments, known as outsized cargo, can only fit on a C-5
or C-17. The Fly America Act mandates that when the appropriate
aircraft are not available, we must first offer a contract to U.S./
Civil Reserve Fleet carriers. However, no U.S. carriers have the
capability to move outsized cargo. In the past 5 years we have
contracted the AN-124 125 times, with the vast majority of those
instances being in fiscal year 2002-2003 as we were building up and
executing OIF. In fiscal year 2003, the AN-124 flew less than one-half
of 1 percent of the total strategic airlift missions flown (79 out of
180,000).
As part of the C-5 modernization effort, we have funded the
Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) for 55 aircraft. In fiscal year
2005, $103 million is included in the President's budget request,
including funds for procurement of kits for 18 additional aircraft. We
have also requested $322 million in the fiscal year 2005 budget for the
Reliability Enhancement and Re-Engining Program (RERP). Three test kits
(two C-5Bs and one C-5A) were procured in fiscal year 2004 with
operational test and evaluation scheduled to be complete in fiscal year
2008. The Air Force has programmed funds for procurement of 12
additional kits through fiscal year 2009, scheduled to begin as the
Operational Test and Evaluation ends. Although budgetary constraints
have delayed this program, we plan to AMP all remaining C-5s in the
fleet and RERP the required amount to meet mobility requirements.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Lindsey O. Graham
tricare funding
28. Senator Graham. Secretary Rumsfeld, last year, Congress
appropriated $400 million to the Defense Health Program for an expanded
TRICARE benefit for reservists and their families. Recognizing your
reluctance to rely on unnamed sources, I have received information that
a significant amount of these funds have been expended without program
implementation. How much of that $400 million remains, and for what
purpose has the money been used?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you for your support of our reservists. I
share your respect and appreciation for their contribution to our
Nation. Implementing the enhanced access to TRICARE provided to
reservists by the Fiscal Year 2004 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) presents the Department with both fiscal and administrative
challenges.
As no additional funds were appropriated to support the new
requirement, a prior approval reprogramming from within the
Department's current appropriated funds is required. That reprogramming
action is currently being staffed within the Department and should be
forwarded to Congress shortly. As an interim measure, costs associated
with the benefit are being absorbed within funds appropriated to the
Defense Health Program appropriation as part of the Fiscal Year 2004
Appropriations Act. Given that the ability to absorb these costs is
limited, I request your support expediting congressional approval of
the reprogramming request.
The enhanced benefit also introduces a number of administrative
challenges. As sections 703 and 704 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2004
represent the extension of current periods of eligibility, the benefit
became active and the Department began to incur costs on November 6,
2003. At that time, the system capability to capture and report actual
program expenditures did not exist. The Department is aggressively
pursuing the necessary systems changes and contract modifications to
properly administer these benefits, but those efforts are not yet
finalized. As such, actual benefit expenditures are currently not
available. However, current analysis indicates expenditures through
March 2004 will be approximately $244 million. This estimate includes
the provision of health care benefits under section 703 and 704, as
well as associated system changes and contract modifications.
Section 702 requires regulatory action which is currently under
development within the Department. The Department is developing the
program to ensure administrative and health care costs do not exceed
the $400 million limit specified by Congress in fiscal year 2004.
29. Senator Graham. Secretary Rumsfeld, could you please comment on
the status of the implementation of this vital readiness and retention
program?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act
and the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2004 temporarily revise statutes governing
healthcare services for Reserve component (RC) sponsors and their
family members. We are committed to making these changes as quickly as
possible to ensure eligible members have access to TRICARE health
benefits.
The Department has begun a series of steps to
implement these new temporary benefits such as changing systems
and contracts, and developing marketing and educational
materials to get information out to the RC members and their
families.
The law limits the fiscal year 2004 outlays to $400
million for authorized benefits. The Department is setting up
systems to accurately track and account for all administrative
and healthcare costs to stay within this limit.
Looking to the future, we need to proceed cautiously
in considering costly new entitlements for reservists who have
not been activated. A key issue would be the effect of a new
entitlement on recruitment and retention of both active duty
and Reserve component members.
air national guard
30. Senator Graham. Secretary Rumsfeld, since the 1950s, the Air
National Guard has followed a policy of maintaining at least one flying
mission in every state. This policy is no doubt due to the invaluable
contributions that the Guard provides not only to the national defense
but also in recognition of the positive role Guard members play in
their communities offering most individuals their only exposure to the
military. Do you intend to continue that longstanding policy?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I appreciate your long-standing support for our
Nation's men and women in uniform as well as your concern for the
continued relevance of our citizen airmen of the Air National Guard.
The support of Congress will be critical as we transform the DOD to
meet the national security requirements of the 21st century.
The Department anticipates an overall reduction in the number of
manned aircraft as we transform. This is due not only to constrained
resources, but also the capabilities the Nation will require from the
Department in the future. Information age warfare requires a different
portfolio of capabilities than industrial age warfare, and we are
transforming the joint force to meet that challenge. Also, the aircraft
the Department is planning on procuring will be vastly more capable
than our current legacy systems, which will result in a lower number of
aircraft being procured. The Department is also very interested in the
potential of unmanned systems.
The USAF is committed to ensuring the Air National Guard is a full
and equal partner in the Air Force of the future. I strongly support
their efforts to ensure the future relevancy of the Air National Guard
in their transformation plans. Our shift to capabilities based planning
and the resulting shift in focus away from legacy systems require a
commensurate change of focus by the Air National Guard. Lieutenant
General James has developed a strong transformation vision, and I am
confident that his approach will help to ensure a relevant Air National
Guard.
The Air Force and Air National Guard assure me their intent is to
maintain a Guard flying unit in every state; however, first and
foremost, they are committed to providing a relevant and more capable
Air National Guard presence in every state, to provide required
capabilities to the joint force. While it has always been a goal, there
is no stated policy to keep a flying unit in each State. The Department
believes such a policy would not be in the best interests of the
Nation. The Air Force and Air National Guard leadership require the
flexibility to transform the Air National Guard to ensure it has the
required capabilities needed for the future.
rebalancing forces
31. Senator Graham. Secretary Rumsfeld, you mention in your brief
prepared for Congress the need to manage/reduce the need for Reserve
mobilization but at the same time you want to ``restructure'' the
Reserves to serve in more ``high demand'' units such as military
police. Please comment on your plan to achieve both of these goals.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The rebalancing strategy has as its objectives:
to enhance early responsiveness by structuring forces to reduce the
need for involuntary mobilization during the early stages of a rapid
response operation; to resolve stressed career fields by structuring
forces to limit involuntary mobilization to reasonable and sustainable
rates; and to employ innovative management practices such as the
continuum of service, reachback, enhanced volunteerism, mobilization
process improvements, and predictable rotational overseas presence.
Through this comprehensive rebalancing strategy the Department will
gain added efficiencies from its existing force structure that may
preclude any necessity to increase force end strength. For example, the
Army's rebalancing plans will convert lower priority, less stressed
field artillery force structure to higher priority and higher demand
military police. This will increase the number of both active and
Reserve component military police units. Expanding the rotational base
allows the Services to achieve mobilization rates that are both
reasonable and sustainable.
32. Senator Graham. Secretary Rumsfeld, it was mentioned in the
budget brief that, contrary to what has been reported, Army end
strength numbers are not going to be temporarily increased; instead,
active duty personnel are going to be ``restructured.'' Who will
replace those active duty positions that are being restructured?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The President has authorized the Army to
temporarily increase active component strength by 30,000, using
emergency powers provided in statute, for the purpose of resetting the
force and creating 10 additional brigade UAs to address demands on the
force based on current global war on terrorism emergency operations.
The Army will increase its strength by up to 30,000 over the next 4
years and then return to statutory limits provided in the NDAA. It will
employ a number of methods to return to the prescribed statutory
limits. These methods include restructuring of ``Cold War''
capabilities deemed unnecessary or excessive for the emerging strategic
environment, converting selected military spaces to civilian spaces in
the institutional force, and headquarters delayering to provide more
soldiers in deployable units. The exact number of spaces to be
restructured is still under review. The spaces for ``Cold War''
capabilities that are no longer needed are being reinvested to create
brigade UAs and associated support elements. Spaces in the
institutional force that can be converted to civilian positions will be
filled through the hiring of general schedule civilians or contractors.
military retention/recruiting
33. Senator Graham. Secretary Rumsfeld, in your opinion, what
effect will the lack of targeted pay raises have on military retention
in light of an improving economy and the current strain on military
forces?
Secretary Rumsfeld. In my opinion, the lack of targeted pay raises
will not adversely affect retention. The proposed 3.5 percent pay raise
is one-half percent greater than the average pay raise in the private
sector. When we also consider that the Basic Allowance for Housing, for
some members about one-third of their regular military compensation,
increased 6.9 percent and the Basic Allowance for Subsistence rose 4.8
percent, military compensation growth was significantly higher than for
the average civilian.
34. Senator Graham. Secretary Rumsfeld, what effect do you believe
the current stop losses will have for long term recruiting and
retention goals?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I believe the current Stop Loss program will
have minimal effect on long-term recruiting goals. The current Stop
Loss program is small in scale, impacting approximately 45,000 (as of
the end of January 2004) out of the 2,000,000 active and Reserve
Service members. As of today, the Army is the only Service currently
executing stop loss. Army Stop Loss programs are expected to remain in
effect until their unit stabilization system and increased manning
initiatives are fully realized in 3 to 4 years. We are closely
monitoring retention rates. When we ask the force about their
intentions to stay in uniform, the signals remain positive.
stockpile report
35. Senator Graham. Secretary Rumsfeld, over the last several
years, the Senate has supported a number of Department of Energy (DOE)
programs essential to the Nation's nuclear deterrent force. Many of
those programs support DOD as the end ``customer.'' When do you intend
to finalize the Stockpile Report?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We are currently conducting a periodic review
of our plans for implementing the Nuclear Posture Review. The updated
plans will serve, among other things, as the means to change the
projection of our specific stockpile requirements. We will make a two-
thirds reduction in number of our operationally deployed nuclear
weapons that President Bush has announced. The plan must also protect
against a number of unknowns in the 2012 timeframe and beyond,
including the international environment, the limited progress we have
made toward restoring our nuclear infrastructure, and the condition of
the aging stockpile. Infrastructure is of particular concern, since the
U.S. cannot build complete replacement warheads or build new ones from
scratch if it were required to do so. Because of this and other
infrastructure shortfalls, we must rely on those warheads we have in
secure storage to respond to new threats by incorporating new
technology into these existing warheads when required.
Nearly all of the weapons in the stockpile were designed and built
during the Cold War. For now, our plan is to retain some, explore
modifications of others to give them improved capabilities, and to
prudently reduce the overall inventory of warheads. Predicting specific
stockpile requirements that will meet our deterrence needs for the next
decade and beyond, is a very complex problem. This initial stockpile
plan for 2012, now in development, will involve significant reductions.
We will continue to refine our requirements in the future taking into
account progress made in restoring the nuclear infrastructure and the
condition of the stockpile.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Dole
transformation
36. Senator Dole. General Pace, in a recent article in the National
Journal, the operational linking of individual Service training ranges
at Nellis, the National Training Center, Twentynine Palms, and San
Diego was hailed as one of the greatest transformation achievements
stemming from operations in Iraq. Where do you see further
``transformational'' opportunities emerging in joint training and
operations?
General Pace. While the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC)
has demonstrated initial success in providing a capability to conduct
joint training at a collective level, we are also making strides to
develop an enhanced capability to provide distance learning and
training at an individual level. This capability is referred to as the
Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability (JKDDC).
JKDDC will transform the way our joint military forces receive
joint individual training. Through this capability we will develop and
distribute joint knowledge via a dynamic, global-knowledge network that
provides immediate access to joint education and training resources.
This capability facilitates a transformed culture by preparing future
decisionmakers and leaders (officers, enlisted, and DOD civilians
across the joint community) to employ joint operational art, understand
joint doctrine, and respond innovatively to adversaries.
rebalancing the forces
37. Senator Dole. General Pace, while end strength is certainly an
area of concern, I am more concerned about force mix particularly, the
total force of active, Reserve and Guard. How are you addressing the
short-term issue of manning high demand career fields?
General Pace. The Services are taking a number of actions to reduce
stress on high demand career fields beginning in fiscal year 2004-2005.
Generally, they will move force structure from high-density, low-demand
capabilities (air defense and artillery) into high-demand capabilities
(military police and civil affairs).
The Army will begin the restructuring of 40,000 billets in fiscal
year 2004-fiscal year 2005. This includes beginning realignment of
30,000 billets in fiscal year 2004--affected career fields include
Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Chemical Defense, Special
Operations Forces, Intelligence, and Military Police. Realignment of
the remaining 10,000 billets will begin in fiscal year 2005 affected
career fields include Military Police, Transportation, and
Quartermaster.
The Navy will complete realignment of over 14,600 billets by fiscal
year 2005 in its Antiterrorism/Force Protection, Intelligence, and
Medical career fields. Additionally, the predominantly RC Naval Coastal
I Warfare capability will gain active component structure: (1) four
active component Maritime Security Force Squadrons will be commissioned
by end fiscal year 2004; and (2) two of eight RC Naval Coastal Warfare
Squadrons transfer to AC in fiscal year 2005.
The Air Force will realign 3,800 billets in fiscal year 2004-fiscal
year 2005. This includes 2,700 billets in the highly stressed Special
Operations career field and 1,100 across 16 other stressed AC career
fields.
The U.S. Marine Corps will realign billets in Air/Naval Gunfire
Liaison Companies and examine further rebalancing efforts for Law
Enforcement, Civil Affairs, and Intelligence. In fact, three Air/Naval
Gunfire Liaison Companies will be established resulting in a 54/46 AC/
RC mix of forces in a capability that was previously 100 percent in the
RC.
38. Senator Dole. General Pace, in your proposal to reassign some
units (namely air defense and artillery) to units such as military
police and civil affairs, are we sacrificing a capability of a core
mission in order to meet a short-term requirement?
General Pace. We are not sacrificing a capability of a core mission
in order to meet short-term requirements. The rebalancing efforts by
the Services are the result of detailed analysis. In general, the
Services will move force structure from high-density, low-demand
capabilities (air defense and artillery) into high-demand capabilities
(military police and civil affairs).
39. Senator Dole. General Pace, could you discuss in further detail
how you plan to rebalance the forces between the active, Guard, and
Reserve components?
General Pace. The Services are taking a number of actions, in
addition to those already mentioned for the near-term, to rebalance
forces between the AC and RC to better match the force structure to the
Defense Strategy.
The Army will realign up to an additional 85,000 billets beginning
in fiscal year 2006 upon the completion of the Total Army Analysis 06-
11. This is in addition to the 40,000 billets that will begin
realignment in fiscal year 2004. The primary capabilities affected will
be: (1) significant decreases in Field Artillery, Air Defense,
Engineers, and Armor; and (2) significant increases in Military Police,
Transportation, Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants/Water Distribution,
Civil Affairs, Psychological Operation, and Chemical Defense.
Other actions by the Services that will affect the AC/RC include:
-- All Services will increase the use of ``reach-back''
capabilities, particularly in the Medical and Intelligence
career fields, in order to reduce the deployment requirements
for high-stressed RC career fields;
-- The U.S. Navy (USN) and USMC will integrate AC/RC F/A-18
units to improve overall carrier air wing availability and
reduce reliance on one component or the other, exclusively;
-- The Air Force will reduce reliance on the RC by 24 percent
over the FYDP through AC/RC realignment in the highly stressed
career fields of Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) helicopters
and the C-130s that refuel the CSAR helicopters.
mobilization of the national guard
40. Senator Dole. General Pace, with this month's deployment of
North Carolina's 30th Heavy Enhanced Separate Brigade, I have been made
painfully aware of some of the problems faced by our National Guard
(NG) units as they mobilize. What are you doing to guarantee that these
service members are expediently transitioned to active duty payrolls
and that their lodging and subsistence are of the same quality as the
active units training on the same bases?
General Pace. For pay and lodging and subsistence, we are doing the
following:
Pay. Since the mid-1990s, mobilized Army National Guard
(ARNG) soldiers remain on the Defense Joint Military Pay System
(DJMPS) and are not rolled over to the active component (AC)
pay system. When an ARNG soldier is mobilized, the NG United
States Property and Fiscal Officer (USPFO) issues a pay order
which establishes entitlements using an AC accounting
classification; thereby, transitioning the soldier to active
duty.
Problems arise when an ARNG soldier reports to an AC Finance-
Office with a pay concern, as the AC is not familiar with the
DJMPS-RC system. However, the U.S. Army Finance Command in
conjunction with the Defense Finance and Accounting System
established RC training teams to conduct training at various AC
installations on the DJMPS-RC. In addition, the ARNG has
implemented a toll-free number and set up an email address for
ARNG soldiers to use when they have questions or concerns
regarding their pay. Also, three ARNG Mobilization Pay Teams
(MPTs) are being organized to identify and make necessary pay
adjustments and corrections. The toll-free number and email
address were operational March 1, 2004, and the MPTs should be
operational April 1, 2004.
Lodging and Subsistence. The Army has experienced significant
challenges in billeting mobilized soldiers. In response, the
Installation Management Agency (IMA) has created a standard
policy for all installations to use when accommodating
mobilized soldiers regardless of component affiliation. This
standard is based on the fundamental principle that AC and RC
soldiers are on one team and are to be treated equally within
the installation's capabilities.
41. Senator Dole. General Pace, the budget request news release
sent out by your office proposes the use of innovative management to
improve the mobilization process. Could you go into some specifics
about that objective?
General Pace. In order to relieve stress to the RC force, we are
evaluating several innovative management practices to improve the
flexibility of the total force. We also want to reduce the impact on
critical career fields in the RC and the need for involuntary
mobilization. Our four approaches include: establish the paradigm of
the continuum of service, increase use of reachback, improve
predictability of rotational overseas presence, and improve the
mobilization process.
The paradigm of the continuum of service is a new practice that
provides individual service members greater opportunities to serve in
support of the Department's mission. Currently, the RC force is made up
of either full-time or traditional reservists. With the new approach,
RC individuals will be able to perform military service in a variety of
ways, at varying levels of service, moving between full-time and part-
time status, as circumstances in their lives and needs of the
Department evolve.
Increased use of reachback refers to the ability to connect
electronically to information sources and resources at home base or
other locations around the world to accomplish essential tasks and
missions. By employing reachback, the in-theater force can be smaller
and more agile, with corresponding reductions in combat support and
physical security requirements. Additionally, by using computer
connectivity, RC units and individuals can provide mission support
during drill periods as well as short-rotation active duty tours, thus,
further lessening the requirements for RC mobilizations.
Improving the predictability of rotational overseas presence allows
longer lead-time to plan for overseas deployment. RC members benefit
from additional time to prepare their families, employers, and train
with their units. Incorporating RC forces into a more predictable
rotational overseas presence plan also allows the Department to free up
active component units to support rapid-response requirements that may
arise, and the Services are able to better manage the operational tempo
of the total force.
Improvements to the mobilization process include: establishing
standards to ensure judicious and prudent use of the RC, gaining better
access to the Individual Ready Reserve pool (for greater source of
military manpower and depth of capabilities), and continuing Service
refinements to automation systems, thus, enhancing visibility of
activated RC members and improving the ability to meet mobilization
requirements.
42. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld, since September 11, 2001, 21
North Carolina NG units have been mobilized. Of those, only one unit
was given anywhere close to a 30-day notice. With the announcement of
the OIF 2 rotation, the 30th Heavy Enhanced Separate Brigade received
their orders 4 days prior to their mobilization date. While I
understand the urgent requirements immediately following September 11,
this holding of notice orders for an anticipated rotation is
unacceptable, especially given the additional preparations required for
our citizen soldiers. What is being done to address this ongoing
problem?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The 30th Enhanced Separate Brigade alert order
was released by Headquarters, Department of the Army on July 25, 2003.
The 30th Enhanced Separate Brigade mobilization order was released by
Headquarters, Department of the Army, on September 27, 2003, with a
mobilization date of October 1, 2003. While it is the Army's policy to
issue mobilization orders 30 days prior, operational requirements
sometime dictate otherwise. While it was unfortunate that it was only 4
days from mobilization order receipt to report for duty, it did allow
for the soldiers families to become eligible for the benefits and
entitlements that come with activation, such as medical care, dental
care, and lower interest rates for loans. It is the Department's policy
to ensure the predictable use of Reserve Forces shall be extended to
the maximum amount possible by notifying Reserve members early that
they are being considered for activation and by issuing orders as soon
as it is operationally feasible to do so with the goal of providing
them to the activating member at least 30 days prior to the report
date.
brac/guard and reserve training
43. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld, with the proposed 25 percent
reduction in domestic facilities with BRAC and movement away from
large, forward-operating bases, how are you planning to accommodate
Guard and Reserve training, basing, and quality-of-life needs when
worldwide operations require a manpower ``spike''?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Department of Defense is committed to
meeting the quality-of-life needs of our service members and their
families as we transform our military for the 21st century. Just as our
forces are dealing with the global war on terrorism, so too, are our
military families. We have the honor and the obligation to assist them
in meeting the stresses and challenges of military life. Because of the
unique challenges of our times, we formed a Joint Family Readiness
Working Group in October 2002. The working group is critical in the
Department's efforts to monitor deployment and family readiness and
serves as an advisor to DOD leadership on emerging policy and
operations issues.
Each of the military services has comprehensive deployment support
programs. These programs educate families and help them cope with the
demands of military life and separations. Outreach efforts include
personal contact with families on a regular basis. Through technology
(toll-free numbers, Military OneSource, and Web sites), families can
access information or link to services virtually around the clock.
Personal services include emergency assistance, respite care for
children, financial assistance, and help in navigating military
systems.
The military family lives with a high level of stress not only
because of frequent deployments that place the service member/parent/
spouse in harm's way, but also because of frequent moves, disruptions
in the military spouse's employment, and the challenges created by
children changing schools. The OneSource program is a primary means of
support to families dealing with these challenges, especially the two-
thirds who live off-base and the 60 percent with family
responsibilities. Through the Military OneSource programs, service
members and their families can also access prepaid nonmedical family
assistance counseling to help them deal with deployment separations,
parent-child communication, financial issues, and reunion/reintegration
issues.
Our service members have strong family values and high aspirations
and expectations for their quality of life. To that end, the
Department, in its new social compact, has entered into a written
commitment to improve life in the military, underwrite family support
programs, and work in partnership with families to accomplish the
military mission. Family support is a continuous effort, and there is
no finish line for readiness.
As we continue to support our Active and Reserve Forces and their
families, we are closely monitoring our programs so that resources are
available and accessible to all affected by mobilization and
deployment. We are being particularly vigilant and supportive of our
family readiness volunteers. They do a superb job and are an incredible
group of dedicated and effective volunteers.
44. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld, while I understand the
temporary nature of many of the facilities now housing our Guard and
Reserves units training for deployment, the deplorable state of those
facilities is not understandable. How will remedying this situation be
factored into the considerations for the 2005 BRAC round?
Secretary Rumsfeld. As the Department rationalizes its base
infrastructure with defense strategy through the BRAC process, excess
base capacity can be eliminated. This will release scarce resources
that would otherwise not be available for other higher-priority
requirements, such as modernizing weapons, improving quality of life
for military members, and improving the readiness of our forces by
upgrading the facilities that support them. To the extent funding can
be diverted from unnecessary facilities through BRAC, the facilities
you mention could be improved.
transformation and postwar stability
45. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld, while our latest military
innovations have been significant in ``winning the war,'' we seem to
have a ways to go in ``keeping the peace.'' How does your
transformation vision address the need to maintain a postwar stability
operation or peacekeeping capability?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Our vision of transformation encompasses
developing new concepts for the employment of military force across the
range of military operations, from major force-on-force combat to
stability operations. To support this vision, the Joint Staff,
combatant commands, and the military services are developing future
joint concepts that will support our operational goals as laid out in
the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. For example, the April 2003
Transformation Planning Guidance included specific guidance on
developing a joint operating concept (JOC) for stability operations,
with particular emphasis on peace enforcement. That JOC is now under
development and is expected to be completed soon. To make the concept a
reality, the military will conduct experiments and wargames to ensure
the force adopts the new concept. Such transformational capabilities
are critical to adapting our forces' combat capabilities into useful
tools for resolving crisis situations. In addition, we continue to work
with our friends and Allies to increase global capacity to conduct
stability operations and to develop policies, concepts, and doctrines
that ensure we can operate together effectively during stability
operations.
welfare of the military family
46. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld, the welfare of the military
family is undoubtedly a key to the success of our All-Volunteer Force.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank the countless volunteers
and military family advocacy employees for their dedicated work during
OEF and OIF. How is DOD formalizing the family advocacy mission, and
how is this mission included in you transformation vision?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Department of Defense is committed to
meeting the quality of life needs of our service members and their
families as we transform our military for the 21st century. Just as our
forces are dealing with the global war on terror, so too, are our
military families. We have the honor and the obligation to assist them
in meeting the stresses and challenges of military life. Because of the
unique challenges of our times, we formed a Joint Family Readiness
Working Group in October 2002. The working group is critical in the
Department's efforts to monitor deployment and family readiness and
serves as an advisor to DOD leadership on emerging policy and
operations issues.
Each of the military services has comprehensive deployment support
programs. These programs educate families and help them cope with the
demands of military life and separations. Outreach efforts include
personal contact with families on a regular basis. Through technology
(toll-free numbers, Military OneSource and Web sites), families can
access information or link to services virtually around the clock.
Personal services include emergency assistance, respite care for
children, financial assistance, and help in navigating military
systems.
The military family lives with a high level of stress not only
because of frequent deployments that place the service member/parent/
spouse in harm's way, but also because of frequent moves, disruptions
in the military spouse's employment, and the challenges created by
children changing schools. The OneSource program is a primary means of
support to families dealing with these challenges, especially the two-
thirds who live off-base and the 60 percent with family
responsibilities. Through the Military OneSource programs, service
members and their families can also access pre-paid non-medical family
assistance counseling to help them deal with deployment separations,
parent-child communication, financial issues and reunion/reintegration
issues.
Our service members have strong family values and high aspirations
and expectations for their quality of life. To that end, the
Department, in its new social compact, has entered into a written
commitment to improve life in the military, underwrite family support
programs, and work in partnership with families to accomplish the
military mission. Family support is a continuous effort and there is no
finish line for readiness.
As we continue to support our Active and Reserve Forces and their
families, we are closely monitoring our programs so that resources are
available and accessible to all affected by mobilization and
deployment. We are being particularly vigilant and supportive of our
family readiness volunteers. They do a superb job and are an incredible
group of dedicated and effective volunteers.
47. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld, given that our current
deployments are drawing heavily on Guard and Reserve Forces, what is
the Department doing to ensure necessary and appropriate support for
all families, especially those from rural communities who live long
distances from military installations?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We have been working with the Services and the
RCs to create more of a joint service, total force family readiness and
support perspective, so that any member or family can go to any
installation or family support group and receive the assistance they
need, regardless of the Service or component affiliation of the member.
Family readiness is a command function that must start at the
battalion/squadron level. The unit commander is in the best possible
position to determine what is needed to support his or her unit members
and their families. Thanks to the National Guard Bureau, over 400
family assistance centers have been brought online to augment the
family support system in America's hometowns in support of mission
readiness. These joint centers provide an outreach capability not only
to Guard and Reserve families that are not located near an
installation, but they also support the large number of active service
and family members who reside off the installation. Combined with the
active duty family centers, there are over 700 family assistance
centers around the world.
Through technology (toll-free numbers, Military OneSource, and Web
sites), families can access information or link to services around the
clock. We have been extremely pleased with the success of the OneSource
program. This program offers service members and their families, from
any location in the world, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, access to a
professional counselor via a toll-free telephone line, the Internet,
and e-mail. The program offers the service in more than 130 languages.
Personal services include emergency assistance, respite care for
children, counseling, financial assistance, or help in navigating
military systems. In addition, military members and their families can
access prepaid family assistance counseling services on issues ranging
from parent-child communications to reunion/reintegration of the family
following deployments. A licensed provider provides this counseling
within 30 minutes of the military family's home.
The military family lives with a high level of stress not only
because of frequent deployments that place the service member/parent/
spouse in harm's way, but also because of frequent moves, disruptions
in the military spouse's employment, and the challenges created by
children changing schools. The OneSource program is a primary means of
support to families dealing with these challenges, especially the two-
thirds who live off-base and the 60 percent with family
responsibilities.
Our service members have strong family values and high aspirations
and expectations for their quality of life. To that end, the
Department, in its new social compact, has entered into a written
commitment to improve life in the military, underwrite family support
programs, and work in partnership with families to accomplish the
military mission. The OneSource program leverages the power of public-
private partnerships and technology to deliver services.
48. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld, what is the Department doing
to facilitate coordinated, targeted support for these troops and their
families from local community resources, like schools, churches, and
public agencies?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The National Guard Family Assistance Centers,
located at over 400 sites in communities throughout the country, work
with local agencies to ensure support is made available to military
families. Moreover, the Family Centers at the installation have always
worked with the local public agencies to ensure military families
receive the appropriate support for which they are eligible. A number
of veteran service organizations have also stepped up to the plate and
are assisting families whose loved ones are deployed with home repairs,
cars, lawn mowing, and other tasks that the deployed service member did
while at home. The community response to our military families has been
and continues to be very inspiring.
The family support systems at the installation level work with the
schools to ensure that their staffs are aware of the unique needs of
military children and, in particular, students with a parent deployed.
Family Center staff and School Liaison Officers work regularly with the
local schools providing training and other resources to help them
assist military children.
Military OneSource, our recently implemented toll-free telephonic
information and referral service links military families directly to
local civilian community services. Military OneSource verifies
referrals and frequently conducts a three-way call to introduce the
military family to community service providers. In addition, families
can access prepaid nonmedical family assistance counseling, provided by
local civilian counselors, through the Military OneSource program.
I am pleased to recount a number of initiatives: for example, DOD
sponsors www.MilitaryStudent.org, a Web site designed for children and
parents of military families on deployment, their teachers, military
installation leaders and families of special needs. The Web site is an
extensive collection of information, skills, and strategies to help
students and their families address deployment challenges as well as
information and suggestions for those in support roles.
We help educators become aware of the challenges of the military
child. To foster national awareness and highlight best practices for
public school and military leaders, the DOD and the Military Impacted
Schools Association (MISA) sponsored the National Conference for the
Military Child. An outgrowth of the conference was the Promising
Practices Program, which promotes worldwide replication of school
programs and policies that schools can emulate for the benefit of
military children and is located on the DOD Web site,
www.MilitaryStudent.org.
The Department has initiated several partnerships. A partnership
with the Department of Education's Safe and Drug Free Schools has
expanded to include work with the National Child Traumatic Stress
Network (sponsored by the University of California, Los Angeles, Duke
University, and the Department of Health and Human Services) and world-
renowned trauma experts to develop publications such as: ``Educator's
Guide to the Military Child During Deployment'' and ``Educator's Guide
to the Military Child During Post Deployment: Challenges of Family
Reunion.'' In addition, Parent's Guide to the Military Child in
Deployment has been written in collaboration with the same agencies. A
partnership with child psychologists and the Child Study Center of New
York University School of Medicine has made their outstanding
guidebook, Caring for Kids After Trauma and Death: A Guide for Parents
and Professionals, available on our www.MilitaryStudent.org Web site
where the DOD publications mentioned above also reside.
A partnership with Generations United is allowing the DOD to work
with a nonprofit organization to develop a literacy tutoring program
for children of deployed military families by training retired military
members to offer educational and emotional support on a one-to-one
basis. It will be piloted in six heavily impacted public school
districts. In addition, the National Child Traumatic Stress Network and
DOD are working with Walter Reed Army Medical Center and the Veterans
Administration to develop a program to work with children of severely
wounded military members returning from Iraq and Afghanistan to help
children comprehend the life-altering changes of the military member
and the impact on the family.
To give national prominence to military child education issues and
to encourage states to work together to solve many of the challenges of
military children in transition and deployment, DOD is sponsoring the
National Education Consortium of Highly-Impacted States. It will be
held in Washington, DC, in 2004 and attended by Chief State Schools
Officers of the most heavily impacted military states. The agenda
includes discussion regarding reciprocity and legislative initiatives,
establishment of partnerships, and future consortium plans.
49. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld, does the Department play a
direct role in helping these types of organizations help our troops and
families, or are we merely assuming that they are all doing their part
to support military families? What type of feedback are you receiving?
Secretary Rumsfeld. In October 2002, we established a Joint Service
Family Readiness Working Group. This working group has family program
representatives from all active and Reserve components, nonprofit
organizations such as the Red Cross, the National Military Family
Association, and relevant Federal agencies such as, the Department of
Veterans Affairs. This group casts a wide net of information gathering
from their field programs and offices. Through this we get a great deal
of feedback. I am pleased that the feedback indicates a great deal of
community support for our military families.
Family support leaders conduct site visits to highly impacted
areas. The visits are intended to get a pulse of family and community
support operations. During these visits, they meet with families,
family readiness group leaders, and family support staff. Leaders come
back from these trips impressed with the strength of our family support
infrastructure but also with the incredible amount of community support
for our troops and their families.
We work closely with the President's USA Freedom Corps to provide a
means of channeling public service to military communities and
individuals in need. Industries, not-for-profit organizations, schools,
and individuals have rallied to support our troops and their families
in countless ways from repairing cars to providing respite care.
The DOD plays an active role in partnerships with many
organizations. We are not only the beneficiaries of the efforts of not-
for-profit organizations, we are also active participants. With the
MISA, for example, we contribute publications, Web site information,
and programs that can benefit schools highly impacted by our children
of military families. We have hired outstanding educators, researchers
and child psychologists to develop an on-line course that educators
anywhere in the world can access for free. The course contains cutting
edge strategies, research, and teaching and counseling techniques that
will help to support our military children.
Military OneSource is a success story for us. We constantly receive
feedback from our service members that our 24/7/365 information and
referral service for our military families is providing a much needed
support function, everything from locating a dentist for their autistic
child to providing school district information for family relocation.
In addition, military members and their families can access prepaid
family assistance counseling services on issues ranging from parent-
child communications to reunion/reintegration of the family following
deployments. A licensed provider provides this counseling within 30
minutes of the military family's home. Military OneSource tracks the
requests from military members and gives us constant feedback regarding
concerns and needs of our families. This invaluable information is used
to guide our decisions regarding new programs, policies, and procedures
necessary to improve military family quality of life.
guard and reserve activations/separation from businesses
50. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld, many of our Guard and Reserve
personnel either work for a small business or actually run their own
small business. Given the historic magnitude of current Guard and
Reserve activations and the substantial economic implications
associated with these activations, could you outline for the committee
how the Department is preparing these business owners and employees for
separations that could last 12 to 18 months, both before they leave and
after they return?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Employer support is an important part of an
individual's decision to remain in the Reserves under normal conditions
and is even more important in a time of mobilization when employees are
absent from their employers for more extended periods. Absences by
reservist-employees may create work problems and increased costs for
civilian employers and may significantly affect the operations of a
self-employed reservist's business. Employers of America's NG and
Reserve members have become inextricably linked to a strong national
defense.
The Department chartered the National Committee for Employer
Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR), an agency within the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, in 1972 to
promote cooperation and understanding between Reserve component members
and their civilian employers and to assist in the resolution of
conflicts arising from an employee's military commitment. Today, ESGR
operates through a network of more than 4,500 volunteers throughout 55
committees located in each State, the District of Columbia, Guam,
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Europe. The Department tasks ESGR
to ``. . . promote both public and private understanding of the
National Guard and Reserve in order to gain U.S. employer and community
support through programs and personnel policies and practices that
shall encourage employee and citizen participation in National Guard
and Reserve programs.''
ESGR uses the military chain of command to promote better
understanding of the importance of maintaining positive working
relations between employers and their RC employees, in order to sustain
NG and Reserve participation. ESGR also solicits the assistance of
military agencies, military training schools, and military and civilian
associations in educating the Reserve Forces about their rights and
responsibilities regarding terms and conditions of civilian employment,
as stipulated in the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act (USERRA).
Congress also provided clear protection for all members of the
uniformed services (including noncareer NG and Reserve members, as well
as active duty personnel) in October 1994, with passage of the USERRA
chapter 43 of title 38, U.S. Code. The Department of Labor is the
enforcement authority for USERRA, and it processes all formal
complaints of violations of the law. The Act seeks to ensure that
members of the uniformed Services are entitled to return to their
civilian employment upon completion of their service. They should be
reinstated with the seniority, status, and rate of pay they would have
obtained had they remained continuously employed by their civilian
employer. The law also protects individuals from discrimination in
hiring, promotion, and retention on the basis of present and future
membership in the armed services.
There is a difference between the reservist who is self-employed
and chooses to also pursue a military career in the Guard or Reserve,
and the small business owner who employs a reservist who is called up
for an extended period of time. About 15 percent of employed reservists
are either small business owners, manage or work in a family owned
business, or have their own professional practice. About 18 percent are
employed by small businesses (firms with fewer than 100 employees). The
Small Business Administration (SBA) advises small business owners, and
small businesses with essential employees who are members of the
Reserve or NG to have a plan in place to work through any potential
disruption that may result from a broad call-up to active duty. The SBA
Office of Veterans Business Development has created a new Web site
where small business owners or small businesses with key employees who
are members of the Reserve or NG can find relevant information. The Web
site is part of a comprehensive plan to provide members of the NG and
Reserve who own or are an essential employee of a small business with
timely information on all SBA programs and services available to them
if and when they are called to active duty.
Through a vast array of programs and services, the U.S. SBA
provides tools to assemble and enact a plan designed to prevent or
reduce the potential disruption caused a business by the sudden absence
of a key player. The SBA and its resource partners offer managerial,
technical, and financial assistance, counseling, and training to assist
small businesses with any conceivable business-related issue, from how
to market their products and services, to financial assistance, to what
to do if called to active duty.
Additionally, the SBA has implemented the Military Reservist
Economic Injury Disaster Loans (MREIDL) program. Small Businesses may
qualify for MREIDL, the purpose of which is to provide funds to
eligible small businesses to meet its ordinary and necessary operating
expenses that it could have met, but are unable to meet, because an
essential employee was ``called-up'' to active duty in their role as a
military reservist. These loans are intended only to provide the amount
of working capital needed by a small business to pay its necessary
obligations as they mature until operations return to normal after the
essential employee is released from active military duty. Interest
rates are determined by formulas set by law and recalculated quarterly
but the maximum interest rate for this program is 4 percent. Loan terms
up to a maximum of 30 years are available, and SBA determines the term
of each loan in accordance with the borrower's ability to repay. The
actual amount of each loan is limited to the actual economic injury as
calculated by SBA, not compensated by business interruption insurance
or otherwise, and beyond the ability of the business and/or its owners
to provide. If a business is a major source of employment, SBA has
authority to waive the $1,500,000 statutory loan limit.
Little data is available on the actual or specific employer costs
associated with Reserve employees. To address this lack of information,
the Department is conducting a study to determine if and when
significant problems with employer support of the Guard and Reserve
arise due to RC call-ups or other reasons. The Department is also
collecting information about the costs that mobilizations impose on
employers of RC personnel and to evaluate various approaches of
offsetting those costs. Also, last July the Secretaries of Defense and
Labor signed a Memorandum of Understanding that provides the framework
for a broad range of continuing and new partnership efforts between the
two departments to ease reentry into the civilian workforce and ensure
military skills are translated into civilian employment.
military intelligence
51. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld, in recent interviews, Dr.
David Kay, the former head of the ISG, stated that the CIA became far
too dependent on spy satellites and intercepted communications. This
statement concerns me, especially as we move to ``transform'' the
military aspects of the intelligence community. I was, however,
encouraged to see the DOD's initiative to improve human intelligence
collection mentioned as part of the budget request. Could you discuss
in more detail how you plan on balancing technology-based intelligence
data with the necessary elements of human intelligence and data
analysis?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Our efforts to balance technology-based
intelligence data with human intelligence (HUMINT) reform began in 2003
with a broad-based, 4-month study entitled ``Taking Stock of Defense
Intelligence'' and a simultaneous initiative to reform HUMINT. Based on
on-site research and discussion with every COCOM, Service, and Combat
Support Agency, the ``Taking Stock'' study yielded a comprehensive
account of intelligence issues and shortfalls, including the need for
more and better HUMINT. Concurrently, as we strove to reform our HUMINT
activities, we also uncovered numerous unaddressed problems in other
areas: analysis, horizontal integration, dissemination, training, and
professional development--to name a few. Thus, it became clear to us
that broad-based changes are needed in the way we conduct defense
intelligence activities. We are now engaged in a comprehensive
remodeling effort for all of defense intelligence, which will address
many, if not most of these problems, balance HUMINT and technical
collection, provide robust support to the warfighter, and serve the
greater needs of the DCI and the National Intelligence Community.
reserve mobilization
52. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld, one of your proposals to
manage demand placed on our military forces is rebalancing the forces
to reduce the need for Reserve mobilization. Within the context of
today's extended rotations, this appears to be a prudent measure;
however, there may be a long-term implication to address. Having a
military less reliant on Reserve mobilization places less of a
requirement on the executive branch to seek congressional approval when
deploying the United States Military. Could you elaborate on how you
envision the end state of the military after restructuring the Active
and Reserve Forces?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Use of RCs is an integral part of the
Department's total force policy in support of our Nation's challenges
and interests, and will continue to be so as we meet the emerging
challenges of the 21st century and the myriad of requirements
associated with the global war on terrorism. Our focus is to have a
force with the right amount of capabilities in the right place, able to
use them at the right time. Access to the RC without reliance on
mobilization, especially in the early phases of rapid response
operations, is both prudent and necessary. In the end, our goal is to
rebalance the RC to ensure reasonable and sustainable mobilization
rates.
53. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld, more specifically, will the
transformed military still depend on mobilizing the Reserve Forces to
execute significant military operations?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The transformed military will still depend on
mobilizing the Reserve Forces to execute significant military
operations. The forces that will be most readily available in the early
stages of a rapid response operation will be those in the AC. At the
same time, unique capabilities resident within the RC can still be used
through enhanced volunteerism without the need for early mobilization.
The Reserves remain a critical part of our total force, and as such
will always be essential to major combat operations.
54. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld, partial mobilization, by law,
authorizes the mobilization of Ready Reserve members, without their
consent, for a period not to exceed 24 consecutive months. Yet a policy
has been instituted within the Department that requires our Ready
Reserve Forces, who have been previously mobilized (but still have not
met the 24 month cap), to sign statements declaring that they volunteer
to be mobilized for a second tour. In most cases, if the service member
refuses to volunteer for a second tour, they will not be mobilized with
the rest of their unit. In one specific case in my State, service
members were reluctant to volunteer, not for lack of motivation or an
unwillingness to deploy, but because they feared long-term
consequences, both financially and socially. Service members are
concerned that by volunteering (via a signed document retrievable
through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)) for active duty they may
give up protections afforded them under the Servicemembers Civil Relief
Act. They fear employers will be less likely to hold their jobs because
their return to active duty was voluntary. Additionally, some service
members fear societal repercussions; their spouse, for example, may not
share the service member's enthusiasm as they consider another year
apart. In this situation the service members fear that a signed
volunteer form, if made public, may come back to haunt them. Thus, the
requirement for a signed volunteer statement has the unintended
consequence of forcing mobilized units to find individual replacements
for soldiers electing not to volunteer. I fear this policy may also
contribute to more force turbulence in the long run.
Can you explain why a policy has been instituted that seems
contrary to the edicts of an executive order directing the partial
mobilization of the Ready Reserve? Why does the Department feel this
documentation is necessary?
Secretary Rumsfeld. There is no Department-wide policy to that
effect. The Department's policy is to encourage and maximize the use of
volunteers to reduce the need for involuntary mobilizations.
Volunteerism is a cornerstone of the current mobilization, and it has
served the Nation well.
It is important to note that whether service is voluntary or
involuntary, the service member enjoys and retains the same rights,
benefits, and protections under both the service members Civil Relief
Act and the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act.
However, to best employ its total force, the Department of Army
established a set of guidelines or priorities regarding how they select
units and individuals for deployment, both active duty and Reserve
component members. These involve readiness, time at home station, and
length and number of times mobilized. One of these guidelines with
respect to Guard and Reserve units and individuals is that they will
only be mobilized for a second time as a last resort. However, if there
are soldiers who wish to volunteer for a second mobilization, the Army
has informally asked them to acknowledge that they are volunteering for
a second mobilization to insure the guidelines are being followed.
Though the intent of this practice is valid, it may, as you pointed
out, be counterproductive. Accordingly, I have initiated a Department-
wide review of individual call up documentation to ensure that
volunteerism is not hampered, that unintended consequences are not
generated, and that we properly account for our service members.
55. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld, on a related issue, please
provide me the actual numbers of Guard and Reserve members who have
been mobilized since 1991, the number mobilized more than once, more
than twice, and the number mobilized more than three times. Of those
mobilized multiple times, how many signed volunteer statements?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The best available data reflects the number of
Reserve component (RC) members mobilized (fiscal year 1991 (1 October
1990)--first quarter fiscal year 2004 (31 December 2003)):
Total Mobilized from fiscal year 1991 (1 October 1990) first
quarter fiscal year 2004 (31 December 2003): 575,057 (Desert Shield/
Desert Storm; Haiti; Bosnia; SouthWest Asia; Kosovo, Noble Eagle/
Enduring Freedom/lraqi Freedom)
Mobilized once (for one contingency only): 517,942
Total mobilized two times: 53,060
(Mobilized two times--for current contingency only): (15,982)
(Mobilized two times--for two contingencies only): (37,078)
Mobilized three times (for three contingencies only): 3,520
Mobilized more than three times (for more than three
contingencies): 535
Data includes all members who served in the Reserve components over
this time period, including those who are no longer in the force.
The total number of individuals who have served in the Selected
Reserve during this time period is about 2,549,855.
Most of the members mobilized were Selected Reserve members.
About 45,000 of those mobilized were Individual Ready Reserve
members.
Some of the Army RC members mobilized did volunteer for
mobilization under involuntary orders. Army information reveals that
the policy of having volunteers sign forms, indicating that they are
true volunteers, began in late 2003.
From January 1, 2004 through March 31, 2004, 1,883 Army RC members
signed such forms. This is 6.9 percent of the total Army RC members
mobilized (27,428) in the first quarter of 2004.
It is important to note that a member's military obligation to
serve in the Ready Reserve as part of the All-Volunteer Force is with
the understanding that the member is liable for active duty in times of
war or national emergency. Therefore, if these members did not
volunteer for duty, others, or possibly even these members themselves,
would have been called-up.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
iraq and wmd
56. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, on September 26, 2002, you
stated ``We know they have weapons of mass destruction. We know they
have active programs. There isn't any debate about it.'' On January 7,
2003, you said: ``There is no doubt in my mind but that they currently
have chemical and biological weapon.'' What was the basis for your
statements that you knew that Iraq possessed WMD, and that there
``isn't any debate about it''?
Secretary Rumsfeld. [Deleted.]
57. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, on March 11, 2003, you said
that Saddam Hussein ``claims to have no chemical or biological weapons,
yet we know he continues to hide biological and chemical weapons,
moving them to different locations as often as every 12 to 24 hours,
and placing them in residential neighborhoods.'' What was the basis for
your statement that you knew that Iraq continued to hide biological and
chemical weapons and move them every 12 to 24 hours?
Secretary Rumsfeld. [Deleted.]
intelligence/al qaeda and iraq
58. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, in the summer of 2002, the
staff of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Doug Feith,
presented a briefing to you on analysis of the intelligence concerning
the links between Iraq and al Qaeda. That same briefing was later
provided, reportedly at your suggestion, to the DCI, then to
Intelligence Community staff, then to the National Security Council
(NSC), and then to the Office of the Vice President. What was the
purpose of this intelligence analysis product that was prepared outside
of the Intelligence Community?
Secretary Rumsfeld. There is no ``intelligence analysis product
that was prepared outside the intelligence community'' as you state. A
briefing was prepared, as you note, to point out information obtained
from a CIA report published during the Clinton administration. The
information in this CIA product led to information contained in several
other CIA publications, and this data was immediately brought to the
attention of the DIA, the Joint Staff J-2, and the Defense Intelligence
Officer (DIO) for the Middle East in April 2002--the Intelligence
Community, in other words. This information was subsequently briefed,
as you noted, to the DCI, to Intelligence Community staff, and to the
NSC--hardly the hallmark of preparing an intelligence product ``outside
the Intelligence Community.''
The purpose of the briefing was to help to clarify the various
kinds of support and relationships that existed between terrorist
groups and various state sponsors based on existing intelligence.
postwar planning
59. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, in the current edition of
the Atlantic Monthly magazine, James Fallows has an article describing
problems with the postwar planning effort for Iraq. One of his
recurring points is that the Defense Department, specifically your
office, told military personnel they could not participate in the
various planning studies and exercises that were being conducted by the
CIA, the State Department, the Army War College, and the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID). Did you or your office ever tell
any military personnel not to participate in any such planning effort
and, if so, why?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Fallows' article says Pentagon personnel
``were forbidden by OSD to attend'' numerous interagency meetings,
including a January 2003 National Intelligence Council exercise. This
is not the case. As just one example, Dr. Joseph J. Collins, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity
Conflict, certainly an important part of OSD, participated not only in
this particular National Intelligence Council meeting, but from early
fall of 2002 and through March 2003, also participated in countless
interagency meetings and conferences, working hand in glove with our
colleagues at the Department of State, USAID, the CIA, and the NSC,
acting as the Pentagon's ``point man'' for postwar planning.
60. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, according to James Fallows'
article in this month's Atlantic Monthly, you called retired General
Jay Garner and told him to fire Tom Warrick, the head of the State
Department's ``Future of Iraq'' study team, from General Garner's
reconstruction planning staff. According to Fallows, your direction to
fire Warrick came from higher authority, believed to be Vice President
Cheney. Did you tell General Garner to fire Tom Warrick, and did Vice
President Cheney have any involvement in this issue?
Secretary Rumsfeld. This is not true. I did not direct Jay Garner
on matters related to junior staff. As I did not call him, questions
regarding the Vice President's ``direction'' in this matter are moot.
61. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, why did the administration
not want Tom Warrick to serve on General Garner's staff, especially
given that General Garner reportedly indicated that Tom Warrick was a
highly valued member of his team?
Secretary Rumsfeld. State Department officials, including Mr.
Warrick, participated in daily interagency planning meetings on post-
Saddam Iraq from their beginning in the summer of 2002. When it came
time to staff the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
(January 2003), State Department experts were a significant percentage
of the interagency team assigned.
iraq and biological weapons
62. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, on September 19, 2002, you
told this committee of the ``need to focus on the immediate threat from
biological weapons. . . . Iraq has these weapons. They are much simpler
to deliver than nuclear weapons and even more readily transferred to
terrorist networks who could allow Iraq to deliver them without Iraq's
fingerprints on the attack.''
Dr. David Kay testified last Wednesday that the ISG had found no
evidence that Iraq had any stockpiles of biological weapons before the
war. What was the basis for your comment that Iraq's biological weapons
posed an ``immediate threat''?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The last NIE of the previous administration had
this to say in December 2000:
[Deleted.]
In October 2002, the CIA stated that, ``there are compelling
reasons to be concerned about BW activity at other sites and in mobile
production units and laboratories. Baghdad has pursued a mobile BW
research and production capability to better conceal its program.''
(Emphasis in original: (U) CIA, ``Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction
Programs,'' p. 17.)
The basis for my comment, then, was (a) intelligence from the
experts at the UN, operating in Iraq from 1991 through 1998; (b)
contemporary intelligence from the CIA; and (c) the intelligence
presented during the previous administration.
63. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, on September 19, 2002, in
testimony to this committee about Saddam Hussein's WMD programs, you
said ``Many of his WMD capabilities are mobile and can be hidden to
evade inspectors.''
The administration has said that the two trailers found in Iraq
were intended to produce biological warfare (BW) agents. Last week Dr.
Kay told this committee ``I think the consensus opinion is that when
you look at those two trailers . . . their actual intended use was not
for the production of biological weapons.''
Were you referring to mobile biological trailers in your testimony?
If so, what is your current view on whether those trailers were
intended to produce biological agents? If not, what were you referring
to?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The consensus opinion of the entire
Intelligence Community in October 2002, was that there were compelling
reasons to be concerned about BW activity in mobile production units
and laboratories. ``Iraq has now established large-scale, redundant,
and concealed BW agent production capabilities based on mobile BW
facilities.'' (U) CIA, ``Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs,''
p. 17.
64. Senator Levin. General Pace, in the current edition of the
Atlantic Monthly magazine, James Fallows wrote a long article about the
problems with the planning for the postwar situation in Iraq. He
described numerous studies and planning efforts conducted outside of
the Defense Department and military, including by the CIA, USAID, State
Department, Army War College, and others. His article says that the
military and the Defense Department ignored these studies. Is that
true? If so, why were they ignored?
General Pace. DOD Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD)
Joseph J. Collins has already formally provided a rebuttal to that
article. The rebuttal was printed in the April 2004 issue of the
Atlantic (copy included). I concur with DASD Collins' assessment, that
Mr. Fallows' article overemphasized bureaucratic conflict in the
executive branch and distorted the nature of the contingency planning.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
All components of the executive branch involved in national
security, Defense, State (to include USAID), the CIA, and the NSC, were
involved in the contingency planning for postwar Iraq. The fact that
different agencies did not completely agree during the planning process
is well-known and requires no further explanation, but when the time
came for national-level decisions in an NSC meeting, all points of view
were vetted and resolved.
Planning by interagency representatives occurred for OIF and its
possible contingencies every single day. The level of coordination for
the planning for Iraq was unprecedented. Our planners did not work in a
vacuum; they participated in the ``Future of Iraq'' project; they went
to the war colleges for seminars, and they interacted through the
policy and academic communities at periodic events.
Planners do not have a perfect crystal ball. Some of our
assumptions were correct; some were incorrect. Regardless, we have
adjusted for current circumstances, modified our path where required,
and continued to move forward. Not surprisingly, there are disputes. In
our open system of government, combined with a free media, these
disputes sometimes play themselves out in our newspapers and magazines
and television. But that does not mean we are blind about the realities
of the situation in Iraq or lacking in energy and thought about
crafting a way forward.
The positive results are often overlooked. One of the most heinous
dictators of the 20th century is permanently vanquished, and over 25
million people liberated from his tyrannical regime of oppression and
death. Over 80 percent of Saddam's senior leadership have been killed
or captured, while rebuilding in Iraq proceeds at a pace unknown in
other examples of postwar contingencies. Furthermore, Iraq was
liberated while protecting most of its infrastructure and natural
resources, providing key enablers to allow Iraq to rapidly return to
the world's family of peaceful nations, and soon the family of
democratic nations as well. The Iraqi Governing Council signed into
being Iraq's first ever--in a society many millenniums old--interim
constitution establishing the elements of a democratic government with
guarantees of basic human rights--another first for the Middle East.
This would never have happened under Saddam or his sons.
missile defense
65. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, the Department has announced
plans to ``field'' a national missile defense in September, despite the
fact that the system has not yet been operationally tested. Your budget
request also asks for hundreds of millions of dollars to continue
production of missiles for this system, which have yet to be
realistically tested.
DOD officials testified last year that the Department had no intent
to waive operational testing for missile defense. For example, then-
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Pete Aldridge testified
that: ``the reason we have the [national missile defense] test bed. . .
is to enable operational testing.'' However, in a recent article the
Pentagon's chief tester, Tom Christie, said: ``I don't know when we're
going to run operational tests, to be brutally frank. That's off in the
future.''
When do you plan to have the Pentagon's chief tester conduct formal
operational testing for the National missile defense system, in
accordance with the law, so that we will all know whether the system
will actually work against a real threat?
Secretary Rumsfeld. At Initial Defensive Operations (IDO) the BMDS
will provide a modest operational capability to defend the Nation
against a limited ballistic missile attack. The test bed will enable
testing to improve system maturity and, through the next year,
incorporation of operational testing objectives for developmental
testing. These tests will incorporate increasing levels of operational
realism using alert-configured hardware and software, operational
tactics, techniques and procedures, threat-representative targets, and
trained warfighters. They will facilitate assessment by the tri-Service
Operational Test Agency team in support of the DOT&E's annual reporting
requirements. Title 10 operational testing of the integrated system
will be planned and executed as appropriate.
66. Senator Levin. General Pace, General Myers' written testimony
says that we will achieve ``full operational capability'' for missile
defense this year. According to Defense Department documents, full
operational capability means, ``the full attainment of the capability
to employ effectively a weapon, item of equipment, or system.''
Yet, according to a report recently sent to Congress by the
Pentagon's chief tester, the national missile defense the Department
intends to deploy in September of this year has not yet had end-to-end
operational testing. This report also says that ``at this point in
time, it is not clear what mission capability will be demonstrated
prior to [deployment].'' Furthermore, Secretary Rumsfeld has said that
the missile defense to be deployed this year will only be
``rudimentary,'' and that any ``capability'' will be with a small
``c.''
How can you assert that missile defense will be ``fully
operational'', when the Pentagon's chief tester says we have no idea
how well the system will work, because we haven't realistically tested
it yet?
General Pace. The missile defense capability to be delivered this
year is an initial capability intended to provide a rudimentary means
to defend against a limited, long-range ballistic missile attack
against the United States. The chairman and I are confident that we are
on track to field and operate this capability.
Admiral Ellis at U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is conducting
a Military Utility Assessment (MUA) providing the COCOMs assessment of
the missile defense operational capabilities and limitations. His
initial increment of the assessment is based on data available in the
September-December 2003 timeframe. The additional test events,
exercises, and war games to be executed in 2004 will allow for a more
in-depth assessment, and confidence in the assessed capabilities will
grow as more system performance data is collected.
The MUA and the assessment by the DOT&E are closely related. They
share a common database of observations derived from testing and
simulation at the system, element, component and subcomponent level.
The warfighter and Operational Test Agencies are working
collaboratively to develop test objectives, quantify system
performance, and assess mission execution.
Unlike a traditional operational test and evaluation, the MUA is
not assessing performance against a fixed performance level; instead it
is determining the extent to which a developmental system contributes
to mission accomplishment. The missile defense system to be fielded
this year will make us safer than we are now and serve as the
foundation for increasingly effective capabilities in the future.
jsf program
67. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, the DOD press release on the
budget states that the development cost for the JSF program has
increased more than $7 billion from $33.0 billion to $40.5 billion in
the last year, and that ``schedule delays on this very complex aircraft
are prudent and necessary.'' Is this 22 percent cost growth in the JSF
program a reflection of unrealistic cost estimates or poor program
management?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Acting USD(AT&L) directed a restructuring
of the program to improve the performance of the aircraft through
additional design work. The focus is on reducing the weight of each
variant, since weight control is always a challenge for aircraft, and
is particularly critical for the short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing
(STOVL) variant. This additional work and schedule extension contribute
to the increased cost of the System Development and Demonstration (SDD)
phase of the JSF program. Developing three JSF variants for the
Services is an aggressive undertaking. I view these budget changes as
cost and schedule realism, inherent in a program unmatched in scope,
complexity, and importance, rather than as the product of unrealistic
estimates or poor management.
We are replanning JSF SDD to make sure that we succeed.
Specifically, our SDD plan recognizes that: (1) STOVL performance is
absolutely vital; (2) we must focus on STOVL performance upfront to
ensure the viability of that variant for our warfighters; (3) we must
aggressively pursue trade studies to improve performance by reducing
weight; (4) we must aggressively pursue propulsion enhancements to
improve performance; and (5) fiscal year 2007 is the right time to
begin low-rate initial production. We also are reviewing the program,
with the assistance of an independent team, to establish that we are
doing all we can to succeed.
I want to point out that the development of propulsion, subsystems,
avionics, and autonomic logistics has gone well. The extensions in the
schedule and increases in cost will allow us to improve the design of
the airframe, but do not reflect difficulties in all aspects of
development.
68. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, in your view, is a 1-year,
22 percent cost growth in a major program like this acceptable?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Cost growth in any program is a reason for
concern and should be examined to identify its causes. The 22-percent
cost increase spans fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2013. In the
President's budget for 2005, the Department extended the design phase
and reprogrammed procurement funds to account for the additional work.
The increase in cost also reflects the development of anti-tamper
capability, technical risks, and adjustments to the cost estimate to
reflect those risks with a greater degree of confidence. The increase
in cost, over the full course of development, is reasonable for a
program of this magnitude and complexity.
nonproliferation
69. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, the President's budget
request would reduce funding for the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) program by $40 million--from $449 million to $409
million. At a time when we are all deeply concerned about the danger
that WMD--and especially nuclear weapons--could end up in the wrong
hands, why would we want to cut back on the one program that has proven
most successful in preventing the proliferation of such weapons?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The decrease you are questioning is largely due
to the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility having completed the
capital-intense phase of construction. The question implies that the
annual budget request is the single measure of progress and the single
indicator of commitment. It is an important metric. But there are three
others: actual threat reduction, value for US investments, and
increasing recipients' stake in the success of specific projects.
Measured against the aggregate of all four metrics, the CTR program
continues to be a vital component of the U.S. Government's national
security strategy. The President and his administration remain firmly
committed to his 2002 pledge of $10 billion over 10 years for
nonproliferation and threat reduction programs in the former Soviet
Union, including--but not limited to--CTR. Yearly programmatic
requirements mean that some annual requests, as for fiscal year 2005,
will slightly below the $1 billion average; others will be slightly
above.
It is important to acknowledge that, of the 62 CTR program areas
Congress has funded since the program's inception, 51 of those areas
are now complete. This reflects the large amount of former Soviet
nuclear weapons inventory and infrastructure that CTR has helped
eliminate or secure. Many of CTR's original array of projects is
reaching completion. These include projects that were capital-intense
in their early construction phases. CTR's fiscal year 2005 program plan
includes only two ``infrastructure-heavy'' projects: the Shchuch'ye
chemical weapons destruction project already under way, and
infrastructure supporting Nuclear Weapons Site Security enhancement
projects. Newer areas of CTR focus--Biological Weapons Proliferation
Prevention and Weapons of Mass Destruction-Proliferation Prevention
Initiative--do not require capital-intense construction projects to
achieve their threat reduction goals.
development of nuclear weapons
70. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, the President's budget
request would increase the funding for new or modified nuclear weapons
and include funds intended to cut in half the time needed to resume
nuclear weapons testing. What is the military requirement for new
nuclear weapons?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Military requirements stem from a lack of
capability to perform a mission. If existing nuclear weapons cannot
perform a mission or meet only a portion of our deterrence objectives,
we are obligated to pursue ways to correct these deficiencies in order
to maintain the U.S. deterrent. Our current situation is that our
forces are equipped with nuclear systems whose average age is 20 years
and that were designed for a Cold War deterrence posture. We have
requested a few programs to examine the potential to adapt existing
weapons to give them improved capabilities. We also need to explore new
technologies and processes that will keep our scientists and engineers
at the forefront of nuclear weapon science.
The main thrust of test readiness is aimed at reducing the amount
of time we required in order to address a potentially serious problem
in the stockpile using an underground nuclear test. We believe that 36
months is too long; the U.S. needs a more responsive test readiness
posture, which is reflected in the President's fiscal year 2005
request.
71. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, what are the target types
for these new nuclear weapons?
Secretary Rumsfeld. First, there are no current programs to produce
any new nuclear weapons. We made that point clear in the Nuclear
Posture Review, which was submitted to Congress in December 2001.
However, the Nuclear Posture Review did identify limitations in
capabilities of the existing nuclear arsenal. We are examining both
nuclear and non-nuclear options that could correct the existing
limitations. For example, hard and deeply-buried targets, which are
often associated with adversary weapons of mass destruction facilities,
are one area where it would be very useful to improve our current
capabilities. We are studying an option to repackage an existing weapon
to do so.
72. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, are these new nuclear
weapons intended to be used in a preemptive fashion?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The United States is not developing any new
nuclear weapons for any purpose. The President of the United States is
the sole authority for employing nuclear weapons to protect U.S.
territory, troops, allies, or friends against aggression. Today, the
United States and our friends and allies are threatened by rogue states
that possess weapons of mass destruction. As a matter of policy, no
President forecloses options that can be used to deter and defeat
aggression. It is my job to ensure the President has the flexibility
and the options to address the variety of risks that our Nation may
face today and in the foreseeable future.
73. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, will we have to resume
nuclear weapons testing to support new and modified nuclear weapons?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The administration is currently observing as
matter of policy a test moratorium, although we continue to oppose
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Annually, the
Secretary of Energy and I review an assessment of the safety and
reliability of the stockpile. At this time, the Secretary of Energy and
I have not recommended that the U.S. resume nuclear testing to resolve
technical issues affecting the safety and reliability of the nuclear
stockpile.
detainees at guantanamo bay
74. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, the President has determined
that six detainees being held in Guantanamo are eligible to be tried by
military commissions, though the actual decision whether to charge
someone will be made by the Appointing Authority, Major General John D.
Altenburg, Jr. My understanding is that no date has been set yet to
start commission proceedings. In the meantime, five detainees have been
assigned defense counsel, and these military attorneys have filed a
friend-of-the-court brief to the U.S. Supreme Court. They argue that
prisoners convicted by military commissions should have the right to
appeal to civilian courts. This is an issue that I raised when we held
a hearing in December 2001 on military commissions. In addition, my
staff has been told that even if a detainee is tried and acquitted of
all charges, the DOD may continue to detain that individual
indefinitely. When will you begin military commission proceedings, and
how long do you expect it to take for the government to either release
or charge and try all 650 or so detainees?
Secretary Rumsfeld. In February, Guantanamo detainees Ali Hamza
Ahmed Sulayman al Bahlul of Yemen and Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud al Qosi of
Sudan were charged with conspiracy to commit war crimes. Prior to being
charged, these detainees were assigned military defense counsel. Their
trial dates and commission panel members will be selected at a later
time. In addition to the assignment of counsel to and the charging of
al Bahlul and al Qosi, military defense counsel have been assigned to
Salim Ahmed Hamdan of Yemen and David Hicks of Australia.
As you point out, military defense counsel have filed a friend-of-
the-court brief to the U.S. Supreme Court. I have no doubt that
military defense counsel will mount a vigorous defense for any
individual they are assigned to represent and that the efforts of the
prosecution will be no less vigorous. Those involved in the military
commission proceedings must take the time to do things properly so that
every accused receives a full and fair trial. It would be inappropriate
and impossible for me to predict a date certain for a conclusion to all
of the cases in which charges will be brought.
Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that the war with al
Qaeda is real and ongoing. Since the massive attacks of September 11,
al Qaeda has continued to launch attacks as well as to attempt attacks.
In December 2001, Richard Reid, who has been linked to al Qaeda
attempted to bomb a transatlantic commercial flight. In April 2002, al
Qaeda firebombed a synagogue in Djera, Tunisia. Last spring, al Qaeda
suicide bombers attacked three residential compounds for foreign
workers in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, killing 34 people including 10 U.S.
citizens. In August 2003, Jemaah Islamiyah, an al Qaeda affiliated
group, set off a car bomb outside the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta,
Indonesia, killing 12 and wounding 150. This past fall, the Taliban
stepped up its insurgency in Afghanistan. U.S. troops and coalition
forces remain on the ground in Afghanistan. Between August 2003 and
January 2004, 11 U.S. soldiers have been killed in Afghanistan. Just
recently, several Army Rangers were killed in an ambush in Afghanistan.
It is clear that the war is far from over.
Those detained at Guantanamo have been captured in a real war. They
include not only rank and file soldiers who took up arms against the
coalition in Afghanistan but also senior al Qaeda and Taliban
operatives, some who have been linked to potential attacks against the
United States, and others who continue to express their commitment to
kill Americans if released.
We detain them to prevent them from returning to the conflict--to
prevent them from hijacking a plane and using it as a weapon of mass
destruction, returning to the battlefields of Afghanistan, or rejoining
the armed conflict against the United States elsewhere. We detain these
individuals for the security of our citizens and our soldiers. When we
believe that these individuals can be either transferred to the control
of another government or released without impairing the security of our
service men and women as well as our citizens we have done so. To date,
146 detainees have been released or transferred from Guantanamo. We
have done so despite the fact that the law of war does not require it.
Moreover, we have done so through a multi-layered and interagency
process that likewise is not required by the law of war.
We are not limited to either charging or releasing these detainees.
The law of war does not require the release of enemy combatants prior
to the cessation of hostilities. It does not require it because to do
so would be to undermine the very purpose of the law of war itself:
minimizing the loss of life and damage inflicted by war. Releasing
individuals who would return to the fight could only serve to inflict
more damage on U.S. citizens and their sons and daughters who bravely
serve this country. This reasoning would also lead to the unacceptable
conclusion that the only means to remove the enemy from the battlefield
is to kill him. Nor does the law of war require that we charge the
detainees held at Guantanamo. Enemy combatants are held at Guantanamo
not as punishment but to prevent them from continuing the fight.
During the course of any war, the end of the war remains uncertain.
It could have very easily been said during the middle of World War II
or Vietnam that prisoners of war captured during those wars were going
to be held indefinitely. No one could predict with certainty the end to
either of those conflicts. Nor can we predict today with certainty the
conclusion of al Qaeda's war against the United States.
In a very real sense, the release of detainees not suspected of
violations of the law of war lies in the hands of al Qaeda and its
affiliates and supporters. Only al Qaeda and its affiliates and
supporters can stop waging war against the United States. Until they
stop, we will not rest and we will not increase their strength by
permitting their fighters to return to the battlefield anywhere in the
world. This war will not last forever. It is a war that I am confident
we will win.
north korea's nuclear capabilities
75. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, North Korea has taken some
alarming actions and made some alarming announcements over the last 2
years. Last October, Pyongyang declared that they had reprocessed all
8,000 plutonium fuel rods that had been canned and frozen for 7 years
under the Agreed Framework--from 1994 to 2003. This came after North
Korea had expelled the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
inspectors, withdrawn from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and
stated that it had restarted its five-megawatt nuclear reactor.
According to a new report, North Korea may already have as many as
seven nuclear weapons. How solid is our intelligence regarding North
Korea's nuclear capabilities and intentions, and specifically regarding
the reprocessing of the spent plutonium?
Secretary Rumsfeld. As you are aware, North Korea presents an
extremely difficult intelligence target. Its extreme isolation and
Stalinist society present daunting obstacles to fully understanding and
ascertaining events within its borders. Nevertheless, we have
concluded, as have North Korea's neighbors (China, Japan, South Korea
and Russia), that North Korea does have an ongoing and active nuclear
weapons program. We have all come to this conclusion independently, and
are actively engaged in the Six Party Talks with North Korea aimed at
ending this program and its threat to regional peace and stability.
As reported in the press, a recent, non-official U.S. delegation to
North Korea, containing former nuclear weapons experts, was allowed to
tour North Korea's primary nuclear facility at Yongbyon. They were
shown an empty area where the 8,000 spent fuel rods containing
plutonium had been stored and material they adjudged to be reprocessed
plutonium from this fuel. It is possible that North Korea has
fabricated several nuclear weapons from this plutonium, but we cannot
confirm this.
Dr. David Kay states unequivocally in his ``Interim Progress Report
on the activities of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG)'' that there were
prohibited weapons programs in Iraq and that Saddam was in violation of
the U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding weapons of mass
destruction. In addition, by expelling UNSCOM he clearly showed his
contempt for the U.N. and international norms. It is also a fact that
Saddam's regime sheltered and met with terrorists over the course of
the 1990s and into the new century.
As the President has said, he ``will not wait on events while
dangers gather.'' The Saddam regime was dangerous, in clear violation
of U.N. Security Council Resolutions regarding WMD, and was a state
sponsor of terrorism. In light of these facts, there does not seem to
be a need to reexamine the decisions that led to the liberation of the
people of Iraq.
76. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, how willing is the rest of
the world likely to rely upon this intelligence, in light of concerns
that have been raised about the intelligence that we relied upon in
Iraq?
Secretary Rumsfeld. China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia, have all
independently concluded that North Korea has an ongoing and active
nuclear weapons program. In light of the number of disparate
intelligence agencies that have all independently come to this
conclusion, including three of the most powerful countries on Earth--
Russian, China, and Japan--I think it very likely the rest of the world
will consider this intelligence to be reliable.
preemption doctrine
77. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, press reports have quoted
David Kay as saying ``If you cannot rely on good, accurate intelligence
that is credible to the American people and others abroad, you
certainly can't have a policy of preemption.'' In light of the
intelligence failures which clearly undercut the prime rationale for
the war in Iraq, do you continue to espouse a doctrine of preemption
for the future?
Secretary Rumsfeld. America's future depends on our willingness to
lead in the world. One of the important lessons from September 11 is
that we must take threats seriously before they fully materialize. The
United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to
counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the
threat, the greater is the risk of inaction--and the more compelling
the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To
forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United
States will, if necessary, act preemptively.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
office of special plans
78. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, it has been suggested that
the Pentagon established the Office of Special Plans (OSP) to sift for
yourself the information on Iraq. Many believe that by establishing OSP
you were signaling your lack of confidence in the Intelligence
Community and its assessment of the threat posed by Iraq. What was your
goal in establishing OSP? Was it to develop intelligence to contradict
that produced by the CIA, as some have suggested?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Directorate of Special Plans (often
referred to as the OSP) was an expansion of that part of the Bureau of
Near East and South Asian Affairs (NESA) that dealt with Iraq and Iran.
It was renamed ``Special Plans'' because we did not want to undercut
the President's diplomatic efforts in the United Nations and elsewhere
with respect to Iraq by attracting attention to the fact that the part
of NESA that dealt with Iraq was being expanded.
This directorate was an expansion of the Northern Gulf Directorate
within NESA in September 2002. It was established due to the increased
workload related to the war on terrorism and to what was then a
possible Iraq contingency. It was a policy planning group and was a
consumer, rather than a producer, of intelligence. It helped develop
policy with respect to subjects such as deployment planning, coalition
building, media in a putative postwar Iraq, potential war crimes
investigations, possible oil issues in a postwar Iraq, and
implementation of the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act (Public Law 105-338,
passed unanimously by the Senate).
79. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, did it, indeed, reflect a
lack of confidence in the analysis you were receiving from the
Intelligence Community? If so, what was your principal complaint with
the community's analysis?
Secretary Rumsfeld. As stated earlier, the organization that was
then known as the Directorate of Special Plans (often referred to as
the OSP) did not provide ``competitive analysis'' of intelligence.
80. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, did OSP ever go beyond
analysis and collect any intelligence of its own, at any time?
Secretary Rumsfeld. No. It was a policy planning group and was a
consumer, rather than a producer, of intelligence.
81. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, did OSP ever task the
Iraqi National Congress (INC) to collect intelligence? If so, how were
tasking priorities established?
Secretary Rumsfeld. No.
82. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, what was your assessment
of the intelligence the INC collected?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Any assessment of the intelligence the INC
collected was provided to me by the professionals of the Intelligence
Community, having been processed in accordance with long-established
vetting procedures used throughout the Intelligence Community.
83. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, was this intelligence
subsequently vetted for accuracy?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The professionals of the DIA treated the data
obtained in exactly the same way it treated any other intelligence
source information, processing it in accordance with long-established
vetting procedures used throughout the Intelligence Community.
84. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, how accurate was it
determined to be at the time? How accurate is it now determined to be?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The professionals of the DIA treated the data
obtained in exactly the same way it treated any other intelligence
source information, processing it in accordance with long-established
vetting procedures used throughout the Intelligence Community.
There are many examples of excellent information provided by the
INC Information Collection Program. Here are a few categories:
[Deleted.]
85. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, was this information sent
directly to the White House, circumventing regular Intelligence
Community channels?
Secretary Rumsfeld. No.
86. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, was it used in White House
speeches and statements?
Secretary Rumsfeld. You'll have to ask the White House how speeches
and statements were researched.
questionable sources
87. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, according to critics like
Ken Pollack, a former analyst and supporter of the war in Iraq, OSP
chose to believe reports that trained intelligence officers considered
unreliable or downright false. Pollack further states that OSP gave
great credence to reports from INC and its administration-backed
leader, Ahmed Chalabi, because the INC was telling the administration
what it wanted to hear. Do you agree with that assessment? As a long-
time and practiced intelligence consumer, isn't one of the cardinal
rules of the business to abstain from wishful thinking?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not agree with that assessment. The DIA
considered the INC's Information Collection Program a reliable source
of intelligence. That intelligence went through the normal Intelligence
Community review. Another cardinal rule of intelligence is to never
rely on a single source of analysis.
88. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, did OSP pass raw
intelligence to the White House, and, specifically to the Vice
President's office, or did OSP pass only finished all-source evaluated
intelligence that contained an assessment of the reliability of the
sources upon which it was based?
Secretary Rumsfeld. No, to neither. OSP was a consumer, not a
provider of intelligence.
89. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, did DCI George Tenet, who
oversees the Intelligence Community, ever express concern to you, or
that you became aware of, regarding OSP's role? If so, what were his
concerns?
Secretary Rumsfeld. No.
90. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, why did you close OSP last
summer?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The office is not closed. It has simply
returned to its original name.
The Directorate of Special Plans (often referred to as the OSP) was
an expansion of that part of the NESA that dealt with Iraq and Iran. It
was called ``Special Plans'' because we did not want to undercut the
President's diplomatic efforts in the United Nations and elsewhere with
respect to Iraq by attracting attention to the fact that the part of
NESA that dealt with Iraq was being expanded.
This Directorate was an expansion of the Northern Gulf Directorate
within NESA in September 2002. It was established due to the increased
workload related to the war on terrorism and to what was then a
possible Iraq contingency. Once the administration decided to proceed
with the liberation of Iraq, it was decided to change the designation
of this Directorate back to its previous name of the NESA Northern Gulf
Affairs Directorate.
91. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, you're a great fan of
lessons learned exercises. Given the OSP's controversial role, have you
asked that the OSP concept be the subject of a lessons learned
exercise? If so, what have you learned? If not, why not?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not consider controversy (or the lack
thereof) as an indicator of the effectiveness of an office. Such
controversies seldom have anything to do with the facts involved in a
matter and are not a sufficient reason for in-depth reexamination of
every decision.
iraqi national congress
92. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, did the Pentagon oversee
the INC's own intelligence collection program?
Secretary Rumsfeld. [Deleted.]
93. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, did the U.S. fund INC's
collection effort?
Secretary Rumsfeld. [Deleted.]
94. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, what did the Pentagon's
oversight consist of, and what was the purpose of the INC's collection
program?
Secretary Rumsfeld. [Deleted.]
95. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, how many Iraqi defectors
did the INC produce?
Secretary Rumsfeld. [Deleted.]
96. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, who at the Pentagon was in
charge of the defectors program and responsible for vetting each
defector for reliability?
Secretary Rumsfeld. [Deleted.]
97. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, how many INC-produced
defectors did you judge to be reliable?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The DIA Defense HUMINT Service made those
judgments--as they do with all foreign intelligence programs.
98. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, how was reliability
determined? For example, did you polygraph them? If so, how many of
those polygraphed showed deception?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The reliability of any intelligence data
presented to me or to other policy makers is determined by the
professionals of Intelligence Community. The DIA treated the data
obtained from the INC Information Collection Program in exactly the
same way it treated any other intelligence source information,
processing it in accordance with long-established vetting procedures
used throughout the Intelligence Community.
99. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, did the Intelligence
Community share your views on INC defector reliability? If not, why
not?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Assessing defector reliability is something
which the Intelligence Community has decades of extensive experience.
The reliability of any intelligence data, of the reliability of what a
putative defector's information might be, is presented to me after
having been determined by the professionals of the Intelligence
Community. The DIA treated the data obtained from the INC Information
Collection Program in exactly the same way it treated any other
intelligence source information, processing it in accordance with long-
established vetting procedures used throughout the Intelligence
Community.
[Deleted.]
100. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, given the apparent
inaccuracy of much of the information the INC-produced defectors
provided, have you initiated a lessons learned exercise to determine
how this inaccurate intelligence was not detected and how, in some
cases, it found its way to policymakers?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Your premise that ``much of the information the
INC-produced defectors provided'' is inaccurate, is itself not correct.
[Deleted.]
There are many other examples of good information that the INC
Information Collection Program has provided. Here are a few categories:
[Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
service readiness
101. Senator Akaka. General Pace, the Army is planning to go to a
unit manning system, which will result in a cycle of very ready units
for a period of time and will then ``stand down'' for a period of time
before reconstituting themselves with new personnel. The Navy has begun
to implement the Fleet Response Plan (FRP) that attempts to raise the
average level of readiness over time, but will minimize the readiness
``peaks and valleys'' of the previous inter deployment training cycle.
It seems that the Navy is moving to a system that will produce Army-
like readiness cycles at the same time that the Army is moving to a
readiness cycle that is more like the Navy's. Also, these proposals
seem to be ``bottom up'' and have come from Service initiatives
designed for various purposes. Has the Joint Staff looked at the impact
of these changes and whether it is sound to have the Services heading
in opposite directions on this issue?
General Pace. Although seemingly divergent, both Services are
actually converging on concepts to transform from Cold War paradigms to
more continental U.S. (CONUS)-based, highly mobile and rapidly
deloyable constructs. This would support anticipated continued high
tempo of operations (OPTEMPO), while increasing overall force readiness
and reducing unit stress. Already a core capability of the Marine
Corps, the Air Force's Air Expeditionary Force concept supports this as
well.
Navy forces currently deploy under the Global Naval Force Presence
(GNFPP), which is a Secretary of Defense-approved rotational schedule.
The Navy's FRP would provided sustained rotational forward deployed
forces ``on demand,'' while affording a significant surge response for
contingencies (six Carrier Strike Groups within 30 days, plus two
additional as follow-on forces). This would enable the Navy to maintain
more forces at a higher level of readiness.
The Army has traditionally worked from a ``steady-state'' concept
where it deployed forces when needed for emerging crises/missions,
while maintaining a large forward-based presence. The Army concept,
still very early in development, would use scheduled unit rotations
into and out of forward-based locations, so it would be similar to
GNFPP in that regard. The intent of the Army's concept would be to
provide a predictable deployment schedule, preserve a ready surge-
capability for contingencies, and reduce the overall footprint of
permanently forward-based forces.
102. Senator Akaka. General Pace, what will the impact be on the
Services' ability to provide ready units to combatant commanders?
General Pace. Both initiatives are being developed in close
coordination with the Joint Staff and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) with
readiness, sustainment, Global Force Management, and, most importantly,
warfighting effectiveness issues in the forefront.
103. Senator Akaka. General Pace, your statement says, ``When units
return home from combat operations, they must undergo a reconstitution
process, which generally means a drop in their readiness. However, this
does not necessarily indicate that a unit is either unavailable for, or
incapable of, executing part or all of their assigned wartime
missions.'' My understanding of the term ``readiness'' is that it is
generally used as shorthand for ``readiness to execute wartime
missions.'' Are you using the term in some other way? If not, how does
a drop in readiness not equate to a reduced ability to execute assigned
missions, either in whole or in part?
General Pace. A reduction in readiness does mean a unit has a
reduced ability to execute its wartime mission, as was stated. But that
does not mean the unit is necessarily unavailable for tasking, or that
a unit is not capable of executing all or portions of its wartime
mission. A unit could be tasked to execute only the portions of its
wartime mission for which it is ready. Or it could be augmented with
equipment and/or manning, termed ``cross-leveling,'' to quickly
increase its readiness status for deployment/employment. Or a unit
could simply be tasked to execute its wartime mission at a reduced
readiness level, but with a commensurate higher risk to mission
accomplishment.
104. Senator Akaka. General Pace, if drops in readiness do not
necessarily mean that units can't perform their missions, what system
are you using to evaluate what their true capabilities are?
General Pace. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI)
3401.02, Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS),
governs the readiness system used by DOD. GSORTS provides a monthly
assessment of selected unit status indicators (personnel, equipment/
supplies, equipment condition, training) and includes a commander's
subjective assessment on the unit's ability to execute the mission(s)
for which it was organized or designed.
Unit readiness status is reported as C-1 through C-5:
C-1--Unit possesses required resources and is trained to
undertake its wartime mission(s).
C-2--Unit can undertake portions of its wartime mission(s), but
may have reduced flexibility and could require some
compensation for deficiencies.
C-3--Unit can undertake many, but not all, portions of its
wartime mission(s), with significantly reduced flexibility and
required compensation.
C-4--Unit requires additional resources/training to undertake
its wartime mission(s), but may be directed to undertake
portions of its wartime mission(s).
C-5--Unit is undergoing Service-directed resource action and is
prepared to undertake wartime mission(s).
improving overseas training ranges
105. Senator Akaka. Secretary Rumsfeld, I know that the budget
request assumes that most of the changes in overseas presence will
occur in concert with BRAC, and, therefore, that most of the associated
funding will not be required until fiscal year 2006. However, it
appears that a decision has been made to make greater use of overseas
training ranges, and I understand that many of these ranges are fairly
primitive and undeveloped. How much do you anticipate will be required
to expand and improve overseas ranges to support the new presence
policy?
Secretary Rumsfeld. There have been no decisions yet on any aspect
of the proposed global posture changes, so it is premature to speculate
where we may use overseas training ranges in the future. We will indeed
seek the use of overseas ranges where such use provides us unique
training opportunities, supports our security cooperation priorities,
and helps with the transformation process of our allies and partners.
However, we are still analyzing the advantages and cost implications of
combatant commander proposals and therefore cannot speculate on exact
requirements for such ranges.
106. Senator Akaka. Secretary Rumsfeld, are any funds for this
purpose included in the fiscal year 2005 budget request, and, if not,
when do you expect they will be required?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Any fiscal year 2005 budget proposals related
to overseas training ranges are connected to ongoing service
initiatives, and separate from the broader Global Posture Review. An
example is the Army's Efficient Basing Graffenwoer initiative. Because
we are still conducting our posture review, we cannot speculate on when
any new funding requests related to future use of overseas training
ranges will be forthcoming.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Pryor
tax-free treatment of military personnel in combat zones
107. Senator Pryor. Secretary Rumsfeld, I would like to again
commend you for addressing family housing in the DOD's fiscal year 2005
budget. This is an issue which I believe is close to the hearts of our
military personnel. I want to work with you to ensure that our military
is fairly compensated. I understand that under the tax code, military
pay is given tax-free treatment while the soldier, sailor, airman, or
marine is serving our Nation in a combat zone. Congress provided this
tax-free treatment because of the sacrifice these men and women are
making to their country. However, the exclusion of combat pay has
penalized some military personnel with families by limiting the
benefits of the earned income and child tax credits. In some cases, our
military personnel with families lose as much as $4,000 in these tax
credits because they are serving our Nation. Do you see this as a
problem, and is this something that should be addressed this year?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, the DOD agrees that this is a problem. In
the summer of 2003, my staff began working with representatives from
the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service on a solution
that will prevent service in a combat zone from interfering with a
service member's eligibility for tax credits. The solution requires
legislation. The DOD would like to see this issue addressed this year
and is working with the Treasury Department to alleviate this
unintended tax consequence to the Service members serving in combat
zones.
halliburton
108. Senator Pryor. Secretary Rumsfeld, I have heard from many
constituents concerned about defense contracts to Halliburton. Three
recent news stories indicate that Halliburton over-billed $28 million
for food services at five different food service facilities, that
Halliburton overbilled for gasoline, and that Halliburton overbilled
$6.3 million for unspecific services. Which, if any, of these contracts
were competitively bid?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Two prime contracts are represented here. The
first contract is known as the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
(LOGCAP III) contract. It covers the referenced ``food services'' and
``unspecific services.'' This contract was awarded on the basis of
competitive procedures. The second contract is a sole source contract
for fuel. It covers the referenced ``gasoline.'' This contract has
since been replaced with contracts awarded using competitive
procedures. The $6.3 million represents a voluntary disclosure and
refund from a subsidiary of Halliburton: Kellogg, Brown, and Root on
the original fuel contract. This apparent overbilling and the others
are presently being investigated.
109. Senator Pryor. Secretary Rumsfeld, how many noncompetitive DOD
contracts have been awarded to Halliburton in the last 3 years?
Secretary Rumsfeld. In the last 3 years, DOD awarded Halliburton 80
contract actions on a noncompetitive basis and 1,732 contract actions
on the basis of competitive procedures.
110. Senator Pryor. Secretary Rumsfeld, what penalty does
Halliburton face for overbilling the DOD?
Secretary Rumsfeld. When an overbilling is identified, the
government auditor immediately notifies the contractor, the
government's disbursing officer, and the government's contracting
officer. The overbilled amount is deducted from subsequent contract
payments. Other possible remedies (criminal, civil, contractual, or
other) for overbilling will depend upon the reasons for the
overbilling, as determined by various investigations.
business management modernization program
111. Senator Pryor. Secretary Rumsfeld, you have proposed in your
budget an effort to implement the Business Management Modernization
Program (BMMP). I understand that the program would overhaul the DOD
management processes, consolidate and integrate information systems,
and facilitate auditable financial statements. Will BMMP help to
prevent the billing problems we have seen with Halliburton in the
future?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The BMMP is transforming business processes to
implement common processes, data, and controls. BMMP will improve the
business of the Department as a whole.
112. Senator Pryor. Secretary Rumsfeld, do we have to wait for the
passage of the fiscal year 2005 bills to implement the BMMP?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The answer to your question is no. We don't
have to wait for the fiscal year 2005 bill to implement BMMP.
iraqi wmd/recommendation to go to war
113. Senator Pryor. Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin
Powell stated in an interview with The Washington Post that he might
have made a different recommendation on war with Iraq, if he had known
that Iraq had no prohibited weapons. If you knew Iraq had no, or
little, WMD, would you still have recommended military action? If yes,
please articulate the threat. If no, please elaborate.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Dr. David Kay states unequivocally in his
``Interim Progress Report on the activities of the Iraq Survey Group
(ISG)'' that there were prohibited weapons programs in Iraq and that
Saddam was in violation of the U.N. Security Council resolutions
regarding weapons of mass destruction. In addition, by expelling UNSCOM
he clearly showed his contempt for the U.N. and international norms. It
is also a fact that Saddam's regime sheltered and met with terrorists
over the course of the 1990s and into the new century.
As the President has said, he ``will not wait on events while
dangers gather.'' The Saddam regime was dangerous, in clear violation
of U.N. Security Council Resolutions regarding WMD, and was a state
sponsor of terrorism. In light of these facts, there does not seem to
be a need to reexamine the decisions that led to the liberation of the
people of Iraq.
[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2005
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
SERVICE CHIEFS
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room
SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Allard,
Sessions, Collins, Talent, Chambliss, Dole, Levin, Kennedy,
Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson,
Clinton, and Pryor.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; L. David Cherington, counsel; Regina
A. Dubey, research assistant; Brian R. Green, professional
staff member; William C. Greenwalt, professional staff member;
Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley,
professional staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional
staff member; Elaine A. McCusker, professional staff member;
Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten,
professional staff member; Joseph T. Sixeas, professional staff
member; Scott W. Stucky, general counsel; Diana G. Tabler,
professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional
staff member; Madelyn R. Creedon, minority counsel; Richard W.
Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton Greene,
professional staff member; Maren R. Leed, professional staff
member; Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel; and William G.P.
Monahan, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Sara R. Mareno, Nicholas W. West,
and Pendred K. Wilson.
Committee members' assistants present: Cord Sterling,
assistant to Senator Warner; Christopher J. Paul and Dan
Twining, assistants to Senator McCain; Jayson Roehl, assistant
to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator
Sessions; Derek J. Maurer, assistant to Senator Collins;
Lindsey R. Neas, assistant to Senator Talent; Clyde A. Taylor
IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Meredith Moseley, assistant
to Senator Graham; Christine O. Hill, assistant to Senator
Dole; Mieke Y. Eoyang and Jarret A. Wright, assistants to
Senator Kennedy; Terrence E. Sauvain, assistant to Senator
Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman;
Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; William K. Sutey,
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to
Senator Ben Nelson; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator
Clinton; and Terri Glaze, assistant to Senator Pryor.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Warner. Good morning, everyone.
We start today's hearing by first welcoming back one of the
members who has been absent without leave (AWOL), the
distinguished Senator from Connecticut. If you would like to
take a moment to explain your absence, we would be glad to have
your views.
Senator Lieberman. Well, Mr. Chairman, thanks for welcoming
me back. It was quite a journey. I feel as if I was actively
deployed and now I am returning to my home base. I appreciate
very much the opportunity to return.
I do want to say very briefly that along the way in this
journey I met a number of families who have service members on
active duty in Iraq, and I met some of the service members
themselves who had returned. The level of pride and morale is
extremely high. Cutting through all the natural debate that
goes on about the war, it was very reassuring.
If you will allow me, I carry this around with me because
we lost Anthony De Agostino from Waterbury, Connecticut, and I
was in touch with his folks and they sent me a mass card after
the funeral. The father sent me this note: ``Dear Senator
Lieberman: Please continue to support all our men and women in
uniform. Please keep America the true leader of peace in the
world. Tony was our only son, our only legacy. Although this
was a great loss to our family, we wish you godspeed in making
the world a safer place.''
I had the honor to go on my own journey across America, but
these are the real heroes. I wanted to say this in front of you
and the Service Chiefs, with great honor and admiration. I
return to work with you and Senator Levin with a sense of
purpose to work on the critically important work of this
committee, to make sure that we complete the mission we started
with success, and to return our service men and women home as
soon as possible in peace, and in what I would describe as
victory.
I thank you for your welcome. I promise not to give
extended remarks any other time you call on me.
Chairman Warner. No, that is all right. We are very
appreciative of your sentiments. I recall vividly when you
first joined this committee and you were one of the principal
co-sponsors of the resolution in 1991 to authorize the use of
force against Iraq. You were a member of the four of us who
were co-sponsors in the recent resolution. You have always been
a very strong voice on behalf of the men and women of the Armed
Forces, and I appreciate your sentiments that we should
complete this mission with a measure of unquestioned success.
Your statement is so powerful that I am thinking about
waiving mine, but I think I will go ahead.
We meet today to receive the annual testimony of the
Service Chiefs on the posture of each of our military services
and on their respective portions of President Bush's defense
budget request for fiscal year 2005 and the Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP). We have a great team before us today,
military men of great distinction and humility, men who have
served this Nation well during previous conflicts, in most
instances combat conflicts. Equally important, if not of
greater importance, today in this global war on terrorism you
bring to bear that vast experience that each of you have.
Thank you for what you do every day for our men and women
in uniform and their families. It has been a challenging year
for our military. You have provided the leadership they need to
successfully accomplish their mission and to understand just
how important their service is to the security of the United
States and indeed to the whole free world.
I start by recognizing the extraordinary professionalism
and courage of the men and women of our Armed Forces. In this
past year, together with a coalition of nations, they freed
Iraq from the tyrannical rule of Saddam Hussein. They are
valiantly fighting today in Afghanistan and other far-flung
points on the globe.
In Iraq they did this mission quickly, with precision, and
with casualties well below the estimates. This is proof of the
training, equipment, readiness, and inspiration that you
individually and collectively have provided your forces. Their
sacrifices and the sacrifices of their families are deeply
appreciated by every citizen in this Nation, most particularly
the sacrifices of those families who lost their loved ones, and
those families who welcomed home those who bear the wounds of
war. I ask you to communicate one message to the uniformed
service members and their families that you represent: America
is proud of you.
We need not let the critics of the moment diminish the
importance of what our military has accomplished. In my
opinion, there is no doubt that a very dangerous threat has
been removed. The United States and indeed the world is a safer
place because of the efforts of our military and coalition
partners in Iraq.
The Nation will continue, as it should, the debate over
whether or not Saddam Hussein had large stockpiles of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD), and the debate on other issues
relative to the WMD program. However, not all the facts are in
on the specific issue of stockpiles and on the other issues. We
cannot reach final judgments and conclusions. We have upwards
of 1,300 men and women in uniform together with many other
civilians still as a part of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) who
are continuing that mission.
What we do know at this point is as follows: We know that
Saddam Hussein was indeed a threat. He has used WMD on his
neighbors and on his own people, and he was maintaining his
capability to quickly produce these weapons. Clearly he had
breakout capability on a range of weapons, some of mass
destruction.
We know that Dr. Kay testified that Saddam Hussein had
restarted Iraq's nuclear weapons program. Although there are no
estimates, it was a matter of time until he acquired some
measure of capability with those awesome, ultimate weapons of
mass destruction.
We know that Iraq was continuing research and development
(R&D) on chemical and biological weapons, and had an active
program to use the deadly chemical ricin as a weapon. We know
that Iraq was developing and producing ballistic missiles that
clearly violated United Nations (U.N.) Security Council
mandates that were imposed following the first Gulf War.
As Dr. Kay told this committee 2 weeks ago, and I quote
him: ``It was reasonable to conclude that Iraq posed an
imminent threat. What we learned during the inspection made
Iraq a more dangerous place potentially than in fact we thought
it was even before the war.'' Our military men and women in
uniform under your leadership, have removed this threat.
There have been allegations that the President and his
senior advisers manipulated and exaggerated the prewar
intelligence on Iraq. I personally have seen no clear and
convincing evidence of this. In fact, many of the basic
conclusions reached by President Bush, Vice President Cheney,
and others, are entirely consistent with the basic conclusions
of officials in the previous administration. I have with me
today a whole series of those quotes.
An examination of United States intelligence, intelligence
of other nations, and reports in the U.N., combined with Iraq's
past history, led 77 members of this body, the United States
Senate, to basically reach the same conclusions that two
administrations' senior officials had reached: Saddam Hussein
represented a great threat that had to be confronted with
military force.
Diplomatic efforts were tried repeatedly and failed. The
last of 18 U.N. Security Council Resolutions, 1441, passed
unanimously by 15 members of the Security Council on November
8, 2002, found Iraq to be ``in material breach of its
obligations'' that the U.N. Security Council had set down. The
council then specifically said ``the final opportunity to
comply with its disarmament obligations is before Iraq'' and
warned of serious consequences if Saddam Hussein failed to
comply. He did not comply.
Before us today are the leaders of our four military
Services, three of whom were at their current positions at the
start of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Now, the Goldwater-
Nichols Act, which I brought with me today, fundamentally
reshaped the duties and responsibilities of the Chiefs and then
the body of the Joint Chiefs, including special provisions to
ensure that any dissenting opinions from the members of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff could reach the President. I direct you
to section 151, title 10, subsection D, ``Advice and Opinions
of Members Other than Chairman.''
I think it is appropriate, since this is your first
appearance as a group before this committee since the
commencement of hostilities, that each of you in your opening
statements, with your exception, General Schoomaker,
specifically advise this committee. There is a presumption
raised by Goldwater-Nichols that you had the opportunity to
approach the President and indeed the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs and others if you had any doubts concerning the
advisability of the use of force at the time it was used
against Iraq, and this is that opportunity today.
I think it is very important for America to understand how
their professional military leaders felt about the decision to
go to war before the use of force, and also how they feel today
in light of revelations about certain portions of our
intelligence. This is that opportunity.
Operations continue in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in
the global war on terrorism. The circumstances of our times
demand, however, that we not rest on the laurels of our recent
successes. We must prepare now for the future, a future fraught
with new challenges and new dangers.
The President's budget request anticipates this uncertain
future. The fiscal year 2005 budget request for the Department
of Defense (DOD) of $401.7 billion represents a 5-percent
increase over the fiscal year 2004 authorized level and the
fourth consecutive year of growth in the defense budget.
Much is being asked of each military Service. You have all
been looking for better and more efficient ways to use each
taxpayer dollar, from developing new capabilities to changing
concepts of operations to better integrating the very valuable
National Guard and Reserve Forces that we have in this Nation.
We look forward to hearing about your initiatives and welcome
your insights on the challenges that you face.
Senator Levin.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First let me join you in welcoming back our friend Joe
Lieberman. He in his own way has been serving the Nation, both
in the campaign that he just waged and also in his
extraordinarily fine service here in the United States Senate,
the civility, the thoughtfulness which he brings to his every
task that he undertakes. I just want to join you, Mr. Chairman,
I know speaking for every member of this committee, in
welcoming Joe home.
As we meet today, America's Armed Forces are heavily
engaged in trying to bring stability to Iraq. Additionally,
almost 40,000 more stand on the front lines in Korea, within
range of North Korean artillery and rockets. Thousands of
American troops are risking their lives every day in continued
operations in the global war on terrorism in Afghanistan and
other hot spots around the world. Of course, many more continue
to work to keep the peace and to build a more stable future in
the Balkans and elsewhere.
To support these efforts, the President has already called
up nearly 190,000 members of the Reserve components to active
duty. Given the presence of all of our Service Chiefs, we all
want to extend to those men and women serving us and through
our Service Chiefs our thanks to both active duty and Reserve
Forces for the work that they are doing with bravery and
dedication on behalf of all Americans.
I also want to note that they and their families are making
sacrifices for all of us and that there are stresses and
strains on all of them, and that the military is stretched
thin.
Mr. Chairman, you have made reference to the inquiry into
intelligence failures prior to the war. It is essential that
there be an inquiry into massive intelligence failures relative
to the presence of WMD in Iraq. It was the presence of those
weapons which was given as the reason for urgency in proceeding
to attacking Iraq. It is essential that there be an inquiry
made into the way in which our intelligence was projected and
represented by our policymakers, and it is essential that there
be an inquiry made into the planning which either existed or
did not exist relative to the post-Saddam period as to what we
could expect in that period and how we would address it.
Whatever we determine about those issues, let nobody doubt
that those who ask those questions, all of us, stand four-
square behind our men and women who serve our Nation around the
world. We will provide our men and women in uniform with
everything that they need to ensure that they succeed in their
mission. People who are asking the questions about intelligence
so that our future intelligence and decisions are better are
just as determined to help us succeed in our mission and to
give our men and women in uniform everything they need to
achieve that success as persons who are taking different
positions relative to those inquiries.
The budget before us represents a peacetime budget. It
fails to include funding to pay for the incremental costs of
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. So while the exact costs of
those operations in fiscal year 2005 are not presently known,
many of the costs can be readily estimated.
I want to just emphasize this so that everyone understands
what I have said. The budget before us does not include items
that we know have to be paid for, and should be paid for and
will be paid for, in terms of supporting our men and women and
giving them all the resources that they need. Now, some of
those costs, although they are not included in this budget, can
be readily estimated and should be estimated at this time.
For instance, we know that forces are going to be rotating
into and out of Iraq in the October time frame, just after the
beginning of fiscal year 2005. It is my understanding again
that these costs are not in the budget. But this, coupled with
the announced policy of the administration of not asking for a
supplemental appropriation for the DOD this calendar year, is
going to result in forcing the Services to plan on supporting
deployed operations from within the normal budget, at least for
several months.
That puts the Services, it seems to me, in a very difficult
position. I would be interested in hearing from our witnesses
this morning about the measures that they may have to take if
they are to live within these constraints until a supplemental
appropriation is requested next January.
The U.S. military is by far the best trained, best
equipped, most capable fighting force in the world today. Its
readiness can be attributed in large measure to the hard work
that the Service Chiefs and their staffs have put forward in
support of their responsibilities mandated by title 10, U.S.
Code, to organize, train, and equip their respective Services.
We are going to do everything we can to ensure that our
military remains the best, and it is to that end that we are
going to be exploring some critical issues with the witnesses
before us today and other witnesses who will be called before
this committee.
So, Mr. Chairman, I want to join you in welcoming our
witnesses today. I want to thank them for their service, for
their leadership. It has made a critical difference during
these very difficult times. I want to give a special welcome to
General Schoomaker, who is making his first appearance as our
Army Chief of Staff before the committee at a posture hearing.
Welcome, all of you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Levin.
General Schoomaker, as the senior Service, the Army, you
may lead off.
STATEMENT OF GEN PETER J. SCHOOMAKER, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF,
UNITED STATES ARMY; ACCOMPANIED BY LTG STEVEN BLUM, USA, CHIEF,
NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
General Schoomaker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good
morning. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee.
It is a pleasure to appear before you today. With your
permission, I would like to submit the 2004 Army Posture
Statement for the record.
Chairman Warner. Without objection, it will be admitted to
today's record in its entirety, together with the statements of
the other members of the panel.
General Schoomaker. Thank you, sir.
I would like to begin by thanking each of you for the
tremendous support you continue to show for our men and women
in uniform, as witnessed by your statements this morning
already.
The fiscal year 2004 defense legislation and supplemental
appropriation have provided our soldiers the tools they need to
carry on their important, often dangerous work. The fiscal year
2005 President's budget request provides our Army with the
resources we need to meet the noncontingency requirements of
the national security strategy. It fully funds our statutory
end strength of 482,400 soldiers. It supports training
requirements in accordance with our joint and combined arms
training strategy.
The budget request funds depot maintenance for the 15
critical systems in our recapitalization program. It provides
funds to upgrade barracks, family housing, and funds facilities
sustainment at 95 percent.
The budget request also provides for future readiness by
funding upgrades for Stryker Brigade Combat Team 5 and our
continuous investment in the Future Combat System (FCS).
As with any budget, it reflects a balance. We have accepted
risk in some lower priority depot maintenance, base operations,
and other areas. The budget request does not fund our
contingency requirements for OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF). We do not know with certainty what these requirements
will be, but we will need a supplemental to fund them once they
are known.
All of this has been carefully weighed and I ask for your
support of the fiscal year 2005 budget request.
There is no question that the pace of our Nation at war
challenges our Army. It is hard to recall a time in history,
with the exception of World War II, when we have been busier,
as we deploy and redeploy nearly a quarter of a million
soldiers over the next 4 months. We continue to meet these
challenges with the seamless commitment of active, Reserve, and
National Guard soldiers who continue to give so selflessly to
our great Nation. Accompanying me today are Lieutenant General
Steve Blum, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and
Brigadier General Gary Profit from the Office of the Chief of
the Army Reserve. I appreciate their presence here today.
Chairman Warner. Gentlemen, we welcome you to the hearing.
Thank you.
General Schoomaker. This is not easy and we cannot approach
it as if it is business as usual. This state of war requires us
to challenge old paradigms, to be flexible and adaptable. Using
the authority provided by Congress and the flexibility you have
built into our law, the Secretary of Defense and the President
of the United States supported my request to temporarily grow
the Army by up to 30,000 soldiers above its statutory end
strength. I asked for your support as well.
I appreciate the concern that many of you have shown over
this issue. This temporary end strength increase is the right
choice. A permanent increase in statutory end strength before
the Army has implemented our ongoing force structure reforms
would be inefficient and could jeopardize the future readiness
of our Army.
I have asked to temporarily grow the force under the
authorities provided in title 10, section 123[a] because the
real issue we must address is improving Army capabilities, by
tailoring our structure to better meet the requirements of our
national security strategy. Capability is the issue, not the
number of soldiers. With the flexibility I have requested, we
can grow the active component from 33 to 43 combat brigades
while increasing the number of National Guard combat brigades
that are identical to the Active Force.
In the future we will make a decision on adding an
additional five active component combat brigades to further
enhance our capability. Combined with other initiatives, such
as adjusting the balance between the active component and the
Reserve component, increasing the pool of soldiers in high-
demand specialties, and the implementation of unit modularity
and stabilization, this restructure will provide the Nation and
the Joint Forces Commanders with an Army better suited to meet
rotational or readiness requirements such as we face today,
while remaining ready to meet the challenges of the future.
We must never lose sight of the fact that it is our
soldiers who put it all on the line. We will do everything in
our power to prepare them for the challenges they face. I could
not be more proud of them and the professionalism, courage, and
competence that they demonstrate every day. I would include our
family members in that who have already been recognized. They
pay a tremendous price and they are with us.
In closing, I would like to thank this committee for the
opportunity to appear before you today and for your continued
support for the men and women in our Army, deployed in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and throughout the world.
I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you, sir.
[The 2004 Army Posture Statement follows:]
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Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General.
Admiral Clark.
STATEMENT OF ADM VERNON E. CLARK, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS
Admiral Clark. Thank you.
Chairman Warner and Senator Levin, distinguished members of
the committee: Good morning to each of you. I very much
appreciate the opportunity to be here this morning and to talk
to you about your great Navy, the Nation's great Navy.
It is also my privilege, like my friend General Schoomaker,
to thank you, on behalf of the men and women of the United
States Navy--the uniformed members, the civilian members,
active and Reserve--for the support provided by Congress to
make our Navy ready to respond to the issues that face us in
the world today, and for helping us create the Navy of the
future.
The support of Congress in the face of difficult choices,
choices that each of you must make each year, has made a
difference to our people and to our Nation's defense. All of us
in the Navy are very grateful for what you do.
Of course, your Navy is just one part of an unparalleled
joint warfighting team. I am also very grateful for these great
partners that I am sitting here with today at this table. It
has been my privilege to serve with these great professionals
and I consider them the best of the best. We spend quite a bit
of time together, oftentimes just the Joint Chiefs and
sometimes with the Secretary. But I can tell you that this
group of individuals is dedicated and committed to delivering
the kind of joint operating concepts and transformational
capabilities that this Nation needs for the future.
We recognize that it will take all of us working together
to bring the kind of joint capabilities that the Nation needs
now and in the future.
I have outlined, Mr. Chairman, in some detail our Navy's
accomplishments over the last year in my written statement. So,
in the interest of time, I will not dwell on them here, except
to say that this has been an incredible year for our Navy. Your
Navy was built to take credible, persistent, combat power to
the far corners of the Earth, anywhere, any time the Nation
needs us to take it there. Our operations this past year have
proved again the value of being truly ready to meet combat and
ready to perform combat operations.
At the height of OIF, 7 of our carriers were deployed, 7 of
our 10 air wings, and 75 percent of our amphibious structure.
In total, 55 percent of our fleet was deployed overseas.
This last year proved again the importance and the need to
exploit the vast maneuver space provided to us and the
independence to operate from the seas. Most importantly, it
proved once again that our Navy's actions this year highlighted
the asymmetric advantages that we possess in this country. That
is the ability to deploy unparalleled technology and the genius
of our people. The things that you have said about our young
men and women are greatly appreciated.
With this year's budget request, we seek to accelerate our
advantages into the future, to deliver the right readiness for
this Nation at the right cost, to respond to the Nation's
warfighting needs, to shape the 21st century workforce, to
deepen our investment in the growth and development of our
people, our number one asset, to accelerate our investment in
our Seapower 21 vision, to recapitalize and transform our Navy,
and to improve its ability to operate as part of the joint
warfighting team.
As General Schoomaker pointed out, this is not an easy
task. Our budget request this year assesses the capabilities we
need for today and tomorrow, and it balances the investment,
and the key word here is ``balance.'' It balances the
investments that we need so that we can take on the challenges
and deal with acceptable risks.
As I indicated to this committee last year, we seek to make
improvements in our investments for the future. This year we
are requesting procurement dollars for 9 new ships and 104
aircraft. As a point of reference, that's 30 percent more than
we projected in last year's budget. The key thing that I have
spoken with this committee a number of times about is
investment streams and the requirement to get the shipbuilding
investment stream to the level that it needs to be.
As a point of reference, the year I arrived in this post
the account for the Navy shipbuilding and conversion (SCN) was
$4.7 billion. We invest this year a little over $11 billion in
new construction and in modernization of our force. I am proud
of those improvements.
Our investment in aircraft programs is significantly higher
than it was 4 years ago as well. We have invested nearly $6
billion in our 2005 budget request and this is almost double
our investment in 2001. This does not include the investment of
over $6.3 billion in aviation R&D. This number is triple what
it was 3 years ago.
We have focused these investments on important new
capabilities. The heart of our future family of ships is the
DD(X), the 21st century destroyer, a ship that will absolutely
revolutionize naval fire support and almost everything that we
know about shipbuilding. The DD(X) has a new, stealthy hull
form; integrated electric drive and power generation system;
modularity and enhanced human systems engineering will reduce
manning, and it is estimated that that alone will save the
taxpayers over $18 billion in the life of this program;
leveraging the platform for future growth and spiral
development. It will change the way we develop and construct
ships and it will change the way we fight for the next half
century. DD(X) starts this year.
The EA-18G was brand new in the budget last year. This
year's budget will greatly accelerate the recapitalization of
the just plain old EA-6B, the Nation's only joint electronic
attack capability. OIF and congressional action last year
accelerated the aging process on this airplane. With your
support this year means that relief is on the way, and it
cannot happen too soon.
We will commission the first Virginia class submarine later
this year. Virginia will incorporate unmanned vehicles and the
ability to plug into joint networks like no other submarine
ever has in history. Congress' authorization for multi-year
procurement of five of these submarines in last year's budget
has helped make these important, complex platforms more
affordable for the future.
Of course there are others, like the Littoral Combatant
Ship (LCS). We will award it with this year's budget. Our first
new aircraft carrier in 3 decades, CVN-21, continues to be
funded as well as a sea-based missile defense and a nuclear-
powered cruise missile attack submarine (SSGN) and F-18E and
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), and the Advanced Hawkeye program.
We accelerate our request for the LPD-17 class.
We have other initiatives in this budget, like our Fleet
Response Plan (FRP), mentioned the other day in front of this
committee, that will deliver the right readiness and the
ability to surge 50 percent more combat power than we have ever
been able to do routinely in the past.
General Pace described to you this transformational
approach. It is a change in the way we organize, train, and
equip our force. It means that we can surge this morning, if
the President needs us, to six carrier strike groups anywhere
we need to in the world.
It is all about maximizing the investment that the
taxpayers make in the Nation's defense. The bottom line is that
we have framed in this budget the right current readiness at
the right cost to the Nation, and for that I seek your support.
Of course, at the heart of everything good that is
happening in the Navy today is this: We are winning the battle
for people. The momentum here is fantastic. The Navy has seen
higher quality recruits, and the best retention that I have
ever seen in my life. In fact, for the third straight year, it
is the highest retention in the history of the United States
Navy. This was made possible with innovative incentive pay
pilot programs. We have experienced dramatically reduced
attrition, competitive reenlistments in detailing and
outstanding deckplate leadership. In short, this is the highest
quality Navy this Nation has ever seen, and it is all about the
people.
The authorities you have granted us in this regard are
incredibly important and in my view, have made the difference.
I ask you to continue to give us the tools to be successful.
These tools have been critical in our ability to attract,
retain, and shape the kind of workforce we need for the future.
I will say this, as I said last year: Manpower is never
free. So in this budget I am suggesting and requesting that we
reduce our end strength by some 7,900 people from the 2004
levels. Our strategy for doing this is simple. We are capturing
the work on our ships and stations, improving our training
processes, leveraging technology advances, decommissioning our
older, most manpower-intensive platforms where the risks allow
us to do so, and rebalancing our Reserve and Active Forces in a
way that delivers the right skills when we need them and
reduces the personnel strain.
I am committed, Mr. Chairman and members of this committee,
to building a Navy that can maximize the capability of our
people and minimize the total number on the payroll. We will
continue to invest in our sailors' growth and development, and
our ability to provide them meaningful and challenging careers
that lets them make a difference. This is part of our covenant
with them.
As our Navy delivers the more high-tech systems that I
mentioned, it is my intent for us to also develop a smaller yet
smarter workforce. We will spend whatever it takes to equip and
enable our sailors. We do not want to spend one extra penny for
manpower that we do not need.
There is a lot more to talk about, and we will in the
closed hearing that follows.
Mr. Chairman, in response to your question about my
position and understanding and beliefs prior to OIF, I say
this: As I watched the hearing the other day with the Secretary
and General Pace, I watched the kind of questions that you were
asking, and I thought about where we were at that point in time
in our history. I asked the Secretary of Defense if I could
read just part of a private correspondence that I sent to him
on the morning we commenced combat operations.
It is a private correspondence, I will not read the whole
thing, but this part he said would be appropriate for me to
share with you, and this was at my request. I started by
telling him that we were ready. I said that the leadership in
the fleet was confident. I said that our readiness was higher
than I had ever seen it.
Then I said this: ``For some this is about weapons of mass
destruction, for others it is about al Qaeda. For us it is
about all of that and more. Iraq has been shooting at our
aircraft for over 5 years.'' I went on to say to him that it
was my belief that this cause was just and our people believed
in it. Mr. Chairman, that was my position then and that is what
I believe today.
I look forward to your questions and I thank you again for
the opportunity to be here.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Clark follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM Vernon E. Clark, USN
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate this
opportunity to appear before you. I want to express my gratitude for
the substantial investment you have made in making this Navy the best
Navy the Nation has ever seen.
Your Navy is built to take credible combat power to the far corners
of this Earth, taking the sovereignty of the United States of America
anywhere we need to take it and at anytime we choose to do so. It is
capable of delivering the options this Nation needs to meet the
challenges of today and it is committed to the future capabilities the
joint force will need to win throughout the 21st century.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
It is a wonderful time to be a part of this Navy and a great
privilege to be associated with so many men and women--active and
Reserve, uniformed and civilian--committed to the service and defense
of this Nation. I speak for all of our men and women in thanking you
for your exceptional and continuous support.
i: your navy today--projecting decisive joint power across the globe
Your Navy's performance in Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and
Iraqi Freedom (OIF) last year proved--more than anything else--the
value of the combat readiness in which you have invested. It
demonstrated the importance of the latest technology in surveillance,
command and control, and persistent attack. It highlighted our ability
to exploit the vast maneuver space provided by the sea. Most
importantly, it reaffirmed the single greatest advantage we hold over
every potential adversary: the genius of young Americans contributing
their utmost in their service to this Nation.
This past year, the fleet produced the best readiness levels I have
seen in my career. We have invested billions of dollars to training,
maintenance, spare parts, ordnance, flying hours and steaming days
accounts these last few years, and that investment resulted in the
combat ready response of more than half the Navy to operations
worldwide.
Seven aircraft carriers and 9 big deck amphibious ships were among
the 164 U.S. Navy ships forward deployed last spring in support of OEF
and OIF and contingencies worldwide. The Military Sealift Command
sailed and chartered more than 210 ships and moved 94 percent of the
Nation's joint and combined capability to the fight. We also deployed 3
fleet hospitals, a hospital ship, 22 P-3 aircraft, 25 naval coastal
warfare detachments and we mobilized more than 12,000 reservists.
OIF and OEF were the most joint operations in our history and they
have provided the best possible opportunity to dissect, study, and
analyze some of the limiting factors and effects of how we fight.
Beyond the mere numbers, these operations confirmed that we should
continue to pursue the capabilities that enhance our power projection,
our defensive protection and the operational independence afforded by
the sea.
While we recognize that we must continue to challenge all of our
assumptions in a variety of scenarios, our lessons learned indicate
that the capabilities-based investment strategies, new warfighting
concepts and enabling technologies we are pursuing in our Sea Power 21
vision are on the right vector. Let me give you some examples.
The reach, precision, and persistence of our Sea Strike
capability added lethality to ground combat engagements in Afghanistan
and Iraq. The joint surveillance and attack technologies and processes
that we have already put in place forced enemy combat formations to
either disband and desert or be destroyed in place by precision
weapons. Navy aviation generated more than 7,000 combat sorties in
support of OIF, sometimes flying joint missions with land-based Air
Force tankers more than 900 miles from their carriers. Surface
combatants and submarines struck targets throughout Iraq with more than
800 Tomahawk missiles. The initial deployments of new F/A-18E/F Super
Hornet squadrons greatly extended our range, payload, and refueling
options. We will realize more of these capabilities in the future
through the conversion of the first of four Trident nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) into the nuclear-powered cruise
missile attack submarine (SSGN) conventional strike and Special
Operations Forces (SOF) platform.
U.S.S. Higgins (DDG 76) provided early warning and
tracking to joint forces in Kuwait and southern Iraq to help warn
forces and defend against the threat of theater ballistic missiles.
This tracking-only capability demonstrated the initial potential of
extending Sea Shield defenses to the joint force. In a sign of things
to come, we advanced our missile defense capability with another
successful flight test of our developmental sea-based defense against
short-to-medium range ballistic missiles. U.S.S. Lake Erie (CG 70) and
U.S.S. Russell (DDG 59) combined to acquire, track, and hit a ballistic
test target in space with an SM-3 missile in support of the ballistic
missile defense program. This was the fifth success in six tests.
Our OIF mine warfare efforts cleared 913 nautical miles of water in
the Khor Abd Allah and Umm Qasr waterways, opening 21 berths in the Umm
Qasr port and clearing the way for operations in the littoral areas of
the Northern Persian Gulf and for humanitarian aid shipments into Iraq.
These operations included the use of the High Speed Vessel X1 (Joint
Venture), Navy patrol craft and six unmanned, autonomous underwater
vehicles (AUVs) directly from our science and technology (S&T) program
in the littoral for special operations and mine clearance operations,
and gave us important insights into our vision for both future littoral
and mine warfare concepts and capabilities.
We projected joint combat forces across the globe with
greater speed and agility than we have ever done in the past. Along
with our number one joint partner, the United States Marine Corps, we
put more than 60,000 combat-ready marines ashore in Kuwait in 30 days.
The Navy's Military Sealift Command delivered more than 32 million
square feet of combat cargo and more than 1 billion gallons of fuel to
the Nation's warfighters in OEF and OIF. We were able to sustain the
strategic and operational flexibility afforded by Sea Basing to
generate a three-axis attack on Iraq from our dispersed aircraft
carriers, surface combatants, and submarines in the Red Sea, the
Mediterranean Sea, and the Persian Gulf.
We forged ahead in our shipbuilding investments. We awarded three
preliminary design contracts for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS),
leading to the construction of the first LCS in fiscal year 2005. We
selected the baseline design for the DD(X) 21st century multi-mission
destroyer, launched San Antonio (LPD 17), christened Virginia (SSN 774)
and began fabrication of Makin Island (LHD 8) and Lewis and Clark (T-
AKE 1).
In OIF, we were able to know more, decide faster, and act
more decisively than ever before. Our three-axis, multi-platform attack
from the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and Mediterranean Sea--as well as the
geometric increases in striking power, defensive protection and speed
of maneuver generated by our joint forces--is made possible by the
power of joint command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR). Fully 80
percent of targets struck with precision ordnance were unknown at
aircraft launch. We developed and installed CENTRIX and COWAN networks
to enhance joint and coalition interoperability on all of our deploying
ships, and we also promulgated the FORCEnet campaign plan, defining the
architecture and standards that will help us further integrate
warriors, sensors, weapons, and platforms.
These accomplishments this past year have taught us more about who
we are and where we are headed. We know that the combat power of the
truly joint force is much more than the sum of the Services'
contributions. We understand the value of readiness and the importance
we must place on improving the fleet's ability to respond and surge
with decisive combat power. We relearned the lesson that over flight
and basing is not guaranteed; our dominance of the maritime domain and
our consequent ability to quickly deliver an agile combat force is a
priceless advantage for our Nation. We reaffirmed that our people are
now, and always will be, the root of our success.
ii: your navy tomorrow--accelerating our advantages
Readiness, advanced technology, dominance of the maritime domain,
and the genius of our people--these are our asymmetric advantages. They
are the core of our Sea Power 21 Navy and we intend to accelerate these
advantages over the coming year. We are in a position to continue to
build upon and recapitalize these strengths, to innovate and
experiment, and to push the envelope of operational art and
technological progress. Our ability to project persistent, sovereign
combat power to the far corners of the Earth now and in the future
depends on it.
In last year's statement, I discussed principally the advantages
brought by advanced technology and the vast maneuver area of the sea in
our Sea Power 21 vision.
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This year, I would like to spend a few moments on the efforts we
have taken to improve our other advantages: our readiness to respond to
the Nation's defense needs and the tools we will need to ensure the
right people for our Sea Power 21 Navy.
Today's naval forces and personnel are superbly trained and well
provisioned with ordnance, repair parts and supplies. They are ready
earlier--for a longer period of time--and they are deploying at a
higher state of readiness than ever before. In short, the Navy this
Nation has paid for is truly ready to accomplish its missions and it is
more ready to do so than I have ever seen it in my career.
I mentioned the results; in OIF, we surged more than half the fleet
to fight half a world away. The combined power of our forward presence
forces and those that we were able to surge overseas helped keep our
enemies on the run. This conflict and our analysis of future campaign
scenarios make it apparent that the readiness of both our forward
forces and the forces that must surge forward will be critically
important to our future. It is no longer good enough to be able to
surge just once every 10 years or so.
The war on terrorism and the unpredictability of the global
security environment make this an immediate imperative. The Nation
needs a Navy that can provide homeland defense and be both forward and
ready to surge forward to deliver overmatching and decisive combat
power whenever and wherever needed. We are committed to do so.
With this in mind, we launched the Fleet Response Plan (FRP) this
past year. The FRP resets the force in a way that will allow us to
surge about 50 percent more combat power on short notice and at the
same time, potentially reduce some of the personnel strain of forward
rotations.
In simplest terms, rather than having only two or three Carrier
Strike Groups (CSGs) forward-deployed and properly equipped at any one
time--and an ability to surge only a maximum of two more--the FRP
enables us to now consistently deliver six forward deployed or ready to
surge CSGs almost immediately, plus two additional CSGs in the basic
training phase in 90 days or less. This FRP capability is commonly
known as six plus two.
To do this, we have fundamentally reconfigured our employment
policy, fleet maintenance, deployment preparations and fleet manning
policies to expand the operational availability of non-deployed fleet
units. We have shifted the readiness cycle from one centered solely on
the next-scheduled-deployment to one focused on returning ships to the
right level of readiness for both surge and deployed operations. The
net result is a fleet that is more ready, with more combat power--more
quickly--than was possible in the past.
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Our forward rotations remain critically important to our security,
to strengthening alliances and coalitions, and to the global war on
terrorism. But it is clear we must make these rotations with purpose,
not just to fill the calendar.
For example, implementing the new Proliferation Security Initiative
to counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a tool for terrorists
and their sponsors is likely to involve the use of forward naval forces
in maritime interdiction. Additionally, we plan to be ready to
establish initial missile defense operations using forward-deployed
Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyers and their Aegis systems
in Long-Range Tracking and Surveillance roles. Of course, we will
continue to provide combatant commanders with the combat-credible,
rapidly employable forward forces required for the Nation's defense.
But at the same time, we recognize that our ability to rapidly
surge significant additional combat power and provide a range of joint
employment options is critically important to the swift and decisive
combat operations that must be our future. The FRP allows us to do just
that.
We have an obligation to accurately assess the readiness needs and
create the resources necessary to support this FRP capability. This has
also been a major focus this past year.
Readiness is a complex process. It is much more than a count of our
end strength, our ordnance and spares, and the number of hours and days
spent training. It is the product of our ability to deliver the
required effects needed to accomplish the mission. We know too that
readiness at any cost is unacceptable; as leaders we must achieve and
deliver the right readiness at the right cost.
The Integrated Readiness Capability Assessment (IRCA) was developed
for the fiscal year 2005 budget to more carefully examine our readiness
processes. Starting with our new FRP operating construct, we took a
hard look at everything that we needed to have on hand and what we
needed to do to deliver the required combat readiness for the Nation's
needs.
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The IRCA assessment helped us understand the collective
contributions of all the components of readiness, accurately define the
requirements, align the proper funding, and provide a balanced
investment to the right accounts. It improved our visibility into the
true requirements and it gave us a methodology to assess and understand
both acceptable and unacceptable risks to our current readiness
investments.
The end result is this: we have carefully defined the readiness
requirement. We have identified areas where we can streamline or cease
activities that do not add to readiness. We have requested the funds
our commanders need to create the right readiness for fiscal year 2005.
I ask for your support of this year's current readiness request as
we've redefined these processes and already taken acceptable risks. We
will deliver the right readiness at the right cost to the Nation.
These improvements to our operational availability of forces and
the associated readiness elements will not be made on the backs of our
people.
We have a smart, talented cadre of professionals who have chosen a
lifestyle of service. Our ability to challenge them with meaningful,
satisfying work that lets them make a difference is part of our
covenant with them as leaders.
A new operating concept like the FRP could not be made if we still
had the kind of manpower-intensive mindset to problem solving we had
even 5 years ago. But today, thanks to your sustained investment in S&T
among others, we have already realized some of the advancements in
information technology, simulators, human system integration,
enterprise resource planning, Web-enabled technical assistance and ship
and aircraft maintenance practices that can reduce the amount of labor
intensive functions, the training, and the technical work required to
ensure our readiness.
These advances speak to our larger vision for our Sea Power 21 Navy
and its Sea Warrior initiative. Our people are today's capital assets.
Without them, all the advanced weaponry in the world would sit dormant.
But at the same time, it is the effects they deliver that are the true
measure of their contribution to readiness and capability.
We have long had a force stove-piped into active and Reserves,
uniformed and civilian, sea and shore, and enlisted and officer
components, all with work driven largely by the limits of industrial
age military capabilities, personnel practices, technology, and the
organizational models of the day.
In today's era, when we have whole corporations bought or sold just
to capture the intellectual capital of an organization, we recognize
that our human resource strategy must capture the talents and efforts
of our capital as well. Our vision for the future is a more truly
integrated workforce wholly committed to mission accomplishment. This
must include a total force approach that can functionally assess
missions, manpower, technology, and training and produce an enterprise-
wide resource strategy.
The principles of this strategy are clear. We will capture the work
that contributes to mission accomplishment. We will define enterprise-
wide standards. We will leverage technology to both enhance and
capitalize on the growth and development of our people. We will
streamline organizational layers. We will instill competition. We will
incentivize the talents and behaviors needed to accomplish the mission.
There is still much to study and discuss as we develop our total
force approach in the months and years ahead, but we can already see
that the application of these principles will help us more accurately
define our manpower requirement and lead us to a smaller workforce in
the future.
The benefits are enormous. Our people will be powerfully motivated
and better educated and more experienced in the coming years. They will
be properly equipped to maintain, operate and manage the higher
technology equipments that are our future. Our combat capabilities will
continue to grow.
We must be committed to building a Navy that maximizes the
capability of its people while minimizing the total number in the
manpower account. Manpower is never free; in fact, manpower we do not
truly need limits both the true potential of our people and the
investments needed to transform our combat capability for the future.
Our developing human resource strategy will likely require changes
in the way we recruit, assess, train and manage the workforce. Sea
Warrior of course, is crucial here. Last year's authorization of the
National Security Personnel System (NSPS) is very important to such an
effort as well. The NSPS Act authorized a more flexible civilian
personnel management system that allows the Department of Defense (DOD)
to be a more competitive and progressive employer at a time when our
national security demands a highly responsive system of civilian
personnel management. The legislation also ensures that merit systems
principles govern changes in personnel management, whistleblowers are
protected, discrimination and nepotism remain illegal, and veterans'
preference is protected. This will facilitate the kind of competition
and performance we need for the future. The Navy has volunteered to be
in the first wave of conversions to NSPS in 2004.
Most importantly, I believe we will also need these kinds of
flexible authorities and incentive tools to shape the career paths and
our skills mix in a way that lets us compete for the right talent in
uniform, not just within the Navy, but with all the Nation's employers
as well.
In the months ahead, I will continue to discuss with you our
developing human resource strategy and the kinds of authorities we'll
need to deliver on it.
We are beginning to realize the powerful warfighting capabilities
of Sea Power 21. Our culture of readiness and our commitment to
developing a 21st century workforce will help us employ those
transformational capabilities to achieve unprecedented maritime power.
iii. our fiscal year 2005 budget request
This past year our Navy's budget request continued our effort to
sustain our current readiness gains, deepen the growth and development
of our people and invest in our transformational Sea Power 21 vision
while harvesting the efficiencies needed to fund and support these
three critical priorities.
This year we intend to:
Deliver the right readiness at the right cost to
support the war on terror and the Nation's warfighting needs,
Shape the 21st century workforce and deepen the growth
and development of our people, and
Accelerate our investment in Sea Power 21 to
recapitalize and transform our force and improve its ability to
operate as an effective component of our joint warfighting
team.
At the same time, we will continue to pursue the Sea Enterprise
improvements that make us a more effective Navy in both fiscal year
2005 and beyond. Our Navy budget request for fiscal year 2005 and the
future supports this intent and includes:
Nine new construction ships in fiscal year 2005, including
construction of the first transformational destroyer (DD(X)) and the
LCS, the acceleration of a San Antonio Class Amphibious Transport Dock
Class ship from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2005, and one SSBN
conversion and refueling. Our request this year includes the following
ships:
Three Arleigh Burke Class Guided Missile Destroyers
(DDG)
One Virginia class submarine (SSN)
One San Antonio Class Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD)
Two Lewis and Clark Class Dry Cargo and Ammunition
ships (T-AKE)
One 21st century Destroyer (DD(X))
One LCS, and
One SSBN conversion/refueling
The investment plan across the Future Year's Defense Plan (FYDP)
also includes three Maritime Prepositioned Force (Future) (MPF (F))
ships and advanced procurement for an MPF (F) aviation variant. While
our build rate dips to six ships in fiscal year 2006, this is a
reflection of a shift in focus to the next generation surface
combatants and sea basing capabilities. We have also assessed the risks
and divested several assets that have high operating costs and limited
technological growth capacity for our transformational future; this
includes decommissioning two coastal mine hunter ships, and the
accelerated decommissioning of the remaining Spruance-class destroyers,
Sacramento Class Fast Combat Store Ships and the first five
Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruisers in the FYDP.
Procurement of 104 new aircraft in fiscal year 2005,
including the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, the MH-60 R/S Seahawk and
Knighthawk Multi-mission Combat Helicopter, the T-45 Goshawk training
aircraft, and the Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey among others. We continue
to maximize the return on procurement dollars through the use of multi-
year procurement (MYP) contracts for established aircraft programs like
the Super Hornet and we have increased our research and development
investment this year in the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), the EA-18G
Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) aircraft and the broad area anti-
submarine, anti-surface, maritime and littoral intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capable Multi-mission Maritime
Aircraft (MMA).
Investment in transformational unmanned underwater
vehicles (UUVs) like the Long-Term Mine Reconnaissance System, and
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) such as the Broad Area Maritime
Surveillance UAV and the Joint-Unmanned Combat Air System. The budget
also requests funding for experimental hull forms like the X-Craft, and
other advanced technologies including the Joint Aerial Common Sensor
(JACS).
A 3.5 percent basic pay raise, and a reduction in average
out-of-pocket housing costs from 3.5 percent to 0, allowing sailors and
their families more of an opportunity to own their own homes and have
more of a stake in their communities;
Investment in housing and public-private ventures that
will help eliminate inadequate barracks and family housing by fiscal
year 2007 and enable us to house shipboard sailors ashore when their
vessel is in homeport by fiscal year 2008;
Readiness investment that supports the FRP, including
sustained funding for ship and aircraft operations, aviation depot
maintenance, and precision-guided munitions. This includes improvements
in ship maintenance and training scheduling to maximize surge
capabilities.
A. Delivering the Right Readiness at the Right Cost
To me, the ``right readiness'' is the return on your investment in
the Navy. Readiness is the catalyst that brings combat power to bear
whenever it is needed. Achieving readiness at any cost however is not
good for the Nation. This year's request accurately defines our
readiness needs, assesses the risks to our investment and--as
requested--will deliver the resources necessary for leaders in the Navy
to create the required readiness.
Ship Operations and Flying Hours requests funds for ship
operations operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of 51.0 days per quarter for our
deployed forces and 24 days per quarter for our non-deployed forces. We
have properly funded the flying hour account to support the appropriate
levels of readiness and longer employability requirements of the FRP.
This level of steaming and flying hours will enable our ships and air
wings to achieve the required readiness over the longer periods defined
by the FRP, and as a result, it will improve our ability to surge in
crisis and sustain readiness during deployment.
Ship and Aviation Maintenance. We have made significant
improvements these last few years by reducing major ship depot
maintenance backlogs and aircraft depot-level repair back orders;
improving aircraft engine spares; adding ship depot availabilities;
ramping up ordnance and spare parts production; maintaining steady
``mission capable'' rates in deployed aircraft; fully funding aviation
initial outfitting; and investing in reliability improvements.
Our fiscal year 2005 request continues to improve the availability
of non-deployed aircraft and meets our 100 percent deployed airframe
goals. Our ship maintenance request continues to ``buy-down'' the
annual deferred maintenance backlog and sustains our overall ship
maintenance requirement. We are making great strides in improving the
visibility and cost effectiveness of our ship depot maintenance
program, reducing the number of changes in work package planning and
using our continuous maintenance practices when changes must be made.
Shore Installations. Our Facilities Sustainment,
Restoration, and Modernization (SRM) program remains focused on
improving readiness and quality of service for our sailors. While our
fiscal year 2005 Military Construction and Sustainment program reflects
difficult but necessary trade-offs between shore infrastructure and
fleet recapitalization, the majority of the SRM trends are very good.
Facilities sustainment has increased in fiscal year 2005. Our budget
request keeps us on a course to achieve the DOD goal of a 67-year
recapitalization rate by fiscal year 2008, achieve Navy goals to
eliminate inadequate family and bachelor housing by fiscal year 2007
and provides Homeport Ashore Bachelor Housing by fiscal year 2008. We
are exploring innovative solutions to provide safe, efficient
installations for our service members, including design-build
improvements, and base realignment and closure (BRAC) land sales via
the General Services Administration (GSA) Internet. Additionally, with
the establishment of Navy Installations Command, we have improved our
capability to manage our dispersed facility operations, conserve
valuable resources, establish enterprise-wide standards and continue to
improve our facility infrastructure.
Precision-guided munitions receive continued investment in
our fiscal year 2005 request with emphasis on increasing the Joint
Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW) baseline variant, Joint Direct Attack Munition
(JDAM), Tactical Tomahawk (TACTOM), and Laser-Guided Bomb (LGB)
inventory levels, while the JSOW penetrator variant enters full-rate
production. We have also entered into a common missile program with the
U.S. Army to replace the aging inventory of TOW, Maverick, and Hellfire
missiles. Joint partnerships with the Air Force and Army in several of
our munitions programs continue to help us optimize both our
inventories and precious research and development investments and will
remain a focus for us in the future.
Training Readiness. We continue to make significant
strides in this critical area. In fiscal year 2004, Congress supported
two important programs to advance our training readiness. First, you
endorsed the Training Resource Strategy (TRS), to provide more complex
threat scenarios and to improve the overall realism and value of our
training. Additionally, you funded the Tactical Training Theater
Assessment and Planning Program to provide for a comprehensive training
range sustainment plan. Our fiscal year 2005 budget continues this
work. We are working to make the Joint National Training Capability a
reality. We have established a single office to direct policy and
management oversight for all Navy ranges as well as serve as the
resource sponsor for all training ranges, target development and
procurement, and the Navy portion of the Major Range Test Facility Base
(MRTFB).
Environmental Readiness. In the last 2 years, Congress has
provided significant legislative relief from encroachment and
environmental requirements by amending the Endangered Species Act, the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and the Marine Mammal Protection Act. These
amendments help to balance environmental stewardships and realistic
military training. We will continue to focus the use of our ranges on
military training, and remain committed to our environmental
obligations through integrated natural resource management plans. We
will make every effort to protect marine mammals while ensuring our
sailors are properly trained and our transformational systems are
properly tested. We look forward to demonstrating our ongoing
commitment to environmental stewardship.
B. Shaping the 21st Century Workforce
At the heart of everything good in our Navy today is this: We are
winning the battle for people. Higher quality recruits, historic
retention rates, innovative incentive pay pilots, reduced attrition,
competitive reenlistments and detailing, and outstanding leadership in
the ranks has made this the highest quality workforce the Navy has ever
seen.
In 2003 specifically, we exceeded all of our aggregate retention
goals for the third straight year; our recruiters reached their quotas
for the 28th consecutive month; we reduced attrition another 10 percent
from fiscal year 2002 levels; and, through decommissioning older,
manpower-intensive platforms, improving training and employment
processes, and more efficient infrastructure organization, we have
reduced gaps at sea to less than 1,000, down from 18,000 gaps just 6
years ago.
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These accomplishments will help us develop the 21st century
workforce we will need for our Sea Power 21 Navy. As our Navy becomes
more high tech, so must our workforce. Our people will be a more
educated and experienced group of professionals in the coming years,
and we must properly employ their talents. We will spend whatever it
takes to equip and enable these outstanding Americans, but we do not
want to spend one extra penny for manpower we do not need.
As part of that effort, we continue to pursue the kind of new
technologies and competitive personnel policies that will streamline
both combat and non-combat personnel positions, improve the two-way
integration of active and Reserve missions, and reduce the Navy's total
manpower structure. To that end, we are proposing a fiscal year 2005
Navy end strength reduction of 7,900 personnel.
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We will use existing authorities and our Perform To Serve (PTS)
program to preserve the specialties, skill sets and expertise needed to
continue the proper balancing of the force.
We intend to build on the growth and development momentum of the
last 3 recordbreaking years. We are fully committed to ensuring every
sailor has the opportunity and resources to successfully compete. Our
goal remains attracting, developing, and retaining the most highly
skilled and educated workforce of warriors we have ever had, to lead
the 21st century Navy.
As I testified last year, Sea Warrior is designed to enhance the
assessment, assignment, training, and education of our sailors.
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Our fiscal year 2005 budget request includes the following tools we
need to enhance mission accomplishment and professional growth:
Innovative personnel employment practices are being
implemented throughout the fleet. Optimal manning experiments in U.S.S.
Boxer (LHD-4), U.S.S. Milius (DDG 69) and U.S.S. Mobile Bay (CG 53)
produced revolutionary shipboard watch standing practices, while
reducing overall manning requirements and allowing sailors to focus on
their core responsibilities. The fleet is implementing best practices
from these experiments to change Ship Manning Documents in their
respective classes. Optimal manning means optimal employment for our
sailors.
We have our fourth crew aboard U.S.S. Fletcher (DD 992) and our
third crew aboard U.S.S. Higgins (DDG 76) in our ongoing Sea Swap
initiative. This has saved millions of dollars in transit fuel costs
and increased our forward presence without lengthening deployment times
for our sailors. Fletcher and Higgins will return to San Diego this
year after a period of forward deployed operations of 22 months and 17
months respectively. We will continue to assess their condition and
deep maintenance needs to develop and apply lessons learned to future
Sea Swap initiatives.
Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB). Targeted bonuses such
as SRB are critical to our ability to compete for our highly trained
and talented workforce both within the Navy and with employers across
the Nation as well. Proper funding, adequate room for growth, and the
flexible authorities needed to target the right skills against the
right market forces are important to the shape of the workforce. This
program specifically targets retention bonuses against the most
critical skills we need for our future. We ask for your continued
support and full funding of this program.
Perform to Serve. Last year, we introduced PTS to align
our Navy personnel inventory and skill sets through a centrally managed
reenlistment program and instill competition in the retention process.
The pilot program has proven so successful in steering sailors in
overmanned ratings into skill areas where they are most needed that the
program has been expanded. More than 2,400 sailors have been steered to
undermanned ratings and approved for reenlistment since the program
began last February and we will continue this effort in 2005.
Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) is a financial incentive
designed to attract qualified sailors to a select group of difficult to
fill duty stations. AIP allows sailors to bid for additional monetary
compensation in return for service in these locations. An integral part
of our Sea Warrior effort, AIP will enhance combat readiness by
permitting market forces to efficiently distribute sailors where they
are most needed. Since the pilot program began last June, more than
1,100 AIP bids have been processed resulting in 238 sailors receiving
bonuses for duty in these demanding billets. We ask for continued
support of this initiative.
Professional Military Education (PME). We are taking a
more comprehensive approach to the education of our people than we have
done in the past. We are in the process of developing a PME continuum
that integrates general education, traditional Navy-specific PME, and
Joint PME (JPME) curricula. This will allow us to develop a program
that fully incorporates all aspects of our professional and personal
growth and development training needs. Improvements so far include
establishing networks with civilian educational institutions,
developing new degree programs, and establishing partnerships with
other services' institutions. We are also expanding opportunity through
distance learning and the Internet. We are committed to broadening the
professional and intellectual horizons of both our officers and our
enlisted men and women to prepare them to operate tomorrow's fleet and
assume key naval and joint leadership roles.
The Human Performance Center (HPC) has been established to
apply Human Performance and Human System Integration principles in the
research, development and acquisition processes. In short, the HPS will
help us understand the science of learning. They will ensure training
is driven by fleet requirements and they will focus requirements on the
performance needed to carry out our missions. This will eliminate
potential performance and training deficiencies, save money and help us
improve our readiness.
The Integrated Learning Environment (ILE) is the heart of
our revolution in training. ILE is a family of systems that, when
linked, will provide our sailors with the ability to develop their own
learning plans, diagnose their strengths and weaknesses, and tailor
their education to support both personal and professional growth. They
will manage their career requirements, training and education records.
It will match content to career requirements so training is delivered
at the right time. Most importantly, these services will be provided
anytime, anywhere via the Internet and the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet
(NMCI).
We are taking advantage of every opportunity to accelerate the
tools we need to develop our 21st century workforce. The improvements
and pilots that Congress has supported--including bonuses, pay table
adjustments, retirement reforms, better medical benefits, and our Sea
Warrior initiatives--are having the desired impact.
Your support of our fiscal year 2005 request for a 3.5 percent
basic pay raise, for our efforts to transform our manpower structure in
some fundamental ways, and for a reduction in average out-of-pocket
housing costs from 3.5 percent to 0 will have a direct effect on our
ability to properly size and shape the 21st century workforce that is
our future.
C. Accelerate Our Investment in Sea Power 21
As I testified last year, Sea Power 21 defines the capabilities and
processes that the 21st century Navy will deliver. We now have an
opportunity to accelerate the advantages that our vision for a joint,
netted, and sea-based force provides this Nation, thanks to the
tremendous investments that you have made in our battle for people, in
the quality of service for each of our sailors, and in readiness.
This year, we will pursue distributed and networked solutions that
could revolutionize our capability. We will focus on the power of sea
basing and our complementary capability and alignment with our number
one joint partner, the U.S. Marine Corps. We will sustain a robust
science and technology program, and we will exploit investments made in
joint research and development (R&D) wherever possible.
For example, we are urgently pursuing technical advances to support
our sailors, soldiers, airmen, and marines in Iraq. The Naval Sea
Systems Command and the Office of Naval Research are working closely
with all Services, government agencies, industry, and academic and
government laboratories to identify, test, and deploy promising
technologies that can counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs),
snipers, suicide bombers, and other force protection threats. We are
also pursuing other quick-reaction technology initiatives such as
persistent wide-area surveillance using small UAVs, blue force tracking
technology, body armor, and extremity protection. We are committed to
ensuring that the joint force on the ground is as equipped as they
possibly can be to accomplish their mission.
Our highest priority programs within each of the core capability
sets that define our Sea Power 21 vision.
Sea basing is the projection of operational independence. Our
future investments will exploit the largest maneuver areas on the face
of the Earth: the sea. Sea basing serves as the foundation from which
offensive and defensive fires are projected--making Sea Strike and Sea
Shield a reality. Sea basing capabilities include, Joint Command and
Control, Afloat Power Projection and Integrated Joint Logistics.
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Our intent is to maximize our sea basing capability and minimize as
much as possible our reliance on shore-based support nodes. To do this,
we will make doctrinal, organizational and operational changes mandated
by this concept and by the underlying technology that makes it
possible. We have an opportunity here, along with the U.S. Marine Corps
and the U.S. Army, to reexamine some of the fundamentals of not only
how we move and stage ground forces, but how we fight ashore as well.
Our highest priority sea basing investments include:
Surface Combatant Family of Ships. As I have already
testified, the power of joint forces in OIF was in the synergy of
individual Service strengths. The same concept holds true within the
Navy itself. We seek the synergy of networks, sensors, weapons, and
platforms that will make the joint force greater in combat power than
the sum of the individual parts. Development of the next generation of
surface combatants as ``sea frames''--analogous to ``air frames''--that
are part of a modular system is just such an endeavor.
The surface combatant family of ships allows us to dramatically
expand the growth potential of our surface combatants with less
technical and fiscal risk. To bring these concepts to life and to take
them--and the fight--to the enemy, we have decided upon three entirely
new ship classes. The first to premier will be the LCS in 2007. The
DD(X) will follow in about 2011. Just a few years after the first
DD(X), the keel will be laid on the first CG(X), the next class of
cruiser designed from the keel up for theater air and ballistic missile
defense.
Our R&D efforts and experimentation with high speed and theater
support vessels like Swift, and the X-Craft later this year, are
helping us reduce our technical risk and apply important lessons in
hull design and mission modularity to the development of the surface
combatant family of ships. DD(X)is the heart of the family and will
spiral promising technologies to both CG(X) and LCS in the future. I
will discuss each one of these ships in more detail below.
CVN 21 is the centerpiece of the Navy CSG of the future.
It will bring transformational capabilities to the fleet, including a
new electrical generation and distribution system, the electromagnetic
aircraft launching system (EMALS), a new/enlarged flight deck, weapons
and material handling improvements, and a crew reduction of at least
800 personnel. It will be able to generate higher daily and sustained
sortie rates than our Nimitz-class aircraft carriers. Our fiscal year
2005 request of $979 million in R&D and procurement funding continues
the development of CVN 21 and several critical technologies in the lead
ship, including the EMALS prototype and testing already ongoing in
Lakehurst, New Jersey. Construction of the CVN 21 remains on track to
start in fiscal year 2007.
CVN 70 RCOH. The fiscal year 2005 budget provides advanced
procurement funds for the U.S.S. Carl Vinson (CVN 70) RCOH, now
scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2006. CVN 70 has sufficient reactor
fuel for one additional deployment. This action makes the best possible
use of Carl Vinson's remaining fuel capacity and improves shipyard work
loading.
MPF(F). These future Maritime Prepositioning Ships will
serve a broader operational function than current prepositioned ships,
creating greatly expanded operational flexibility and effectiveness. We
envision a force that will enhance the responsiveness of the joint team
by the at-sea assembly of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade that arrives
by high-speed airlift or sealift from the United States or forward
operating locations or bases. These ships will off-load forces, weapons
and supplies selectively while remaining far over the horizon, and they
will reconstitute ground maneuver forces aboard ship after completing
assaults deep inland. They will sustain in-theater logistics,
communications and medical capabilities for the joint force for
extended periods as well. Our fiscal year 2005 request accelerates the
lead MPF(F) from fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2007 to reflect our
emphasis on Sea Basing capabilities.
Sea Strike is the projection of precise and persistent offensive
power. The core capabilities include Time Sensitive Strike; ISR; Ship
to Objective Maneuver; and Electronic Warfare and Information
Operations.
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We are already investing in impressive programs that will provide
the capabilities necessary to support Sea Strike; these include the
following fiscal year 2005 priorities:
DD(X). The technology engine for the fleet, DD(X) is the
centerpiece of a surface combatant family of ships and will deliver a
broad range of capabilities. This advanced multi-mission destroyer will
bring revolutionary improvements to precise, time-critical strike and
joint fires and our Expeditionary Strike Groups of the future.
Transformational and leap ahead technologies include an electric
drive and integrated power system; an advanced gun system (AGS) with
the high rate of fire and precision to reach almost 8 times farther and
command more than 110 times the area of our current five inch
capability; the new Multi-Function Radar/Volume Search Radar suite;
optimal manning through advanced system automation, stealth through
reduced acoustic, magnetic, infrared, and radar cross-section
signature; and enhanced survivability through automated damage control
and fire protection systems. DD(X) is an enabler both technically and
operationally. This seaframe will also reduce our seagoing manpower
requirements and will lower total ownership costs.
This program will provide a baseline for spiral development of
technology and engineering to support a range of future seaframes such
as CG(X). It will also enable the transformation of our operations
ashore. Imagine an Army or Marine rifleman on the ground and Navy petty
officer at sea looking at the same real-time picture of enemy troops
encamped at a municipal airport. With the push of a button, the
rifleman sends targeting coordinates to the petty officer in a DD(X)
more than 50 miles offshore. Within a few minutes, rounds from the AGS
start falling on the airport with incredible accuracy. That kind of on-
demand, persistent time-critical strike will revolutionize our joint
fire support and ground maneuver concepts of operation and it will free
our strike fighter aircraft for more difficult targets at much greater
ranges.
DD(X)'s all-electric drive, called the Integrated Power System
(IPS), will not only drive the ship through the water, but will also
generate the kind of power capacity that will enable eventual
replacement of the AGS. When combined with the physical capacity and
volume of the hull form, DD(X) could lead us to revolutionary
technologies from the naval research enterprise like the
electromagnetic rail gun and directed energy weapons. The fact that
rail guns do not require any explosives will free up magazine space for
other mission areas. This capability is projected to be a reality in
the 2015 to 2018 timeframe. DD(X) will be in service for decades after
that; having the kind of growth potential to install those kinds of
technologies dramatically lowers our future development costs.
The funding profile for DD(X) supports the 14,000-ton design and
the S-Band Volume Search Radar (VSR). Lead ship detail design and
construction are planned to start in fiscal year 2005.
JSF. The JSF will enhance our Navy precision with
unprecedented stealth and range as part of the family of tri-Service,
next-generation strike aircraft. It will maximize commonality and
technological superiority while minimizing life cycle cost. The JSF has
just completed the second year of a 10-11 year development program, and
is experiencing a variety of typical challenges that affect System
Development and Demonstration (SDD) program schedule and cost.
Additional design work is required to address technical issues,
primarily weight projections. The budget therefore realigns $5 billion
from procurement appropriations in fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year
2009, and Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) was deferred 1 year to
fiscal year 2007. The JSF remains vital to our future. It will give us
the range, persistence and survivability needed to keep our strike
fighters viable for years to come.
SSGN. Funding is included in fiscal year 2005 to continue
the SSGN conversion program. Our future SSGN capability will provide
covert conventional strike platforms capable of carrying 150 Tomahawk
missiles. The SSGN will also have the capacity and capability to
support SOF for an extended period, providing clandestine insertion and
retrieval by lockout chamber, dry deck shelters or the Advanced Seal
Delivery System (ASDS), and they will be arrayed with a variety of
unmanned vehicles to enhance the Joint Forces Commander's knowledge of
the battlespace. The inherently large capacity of these hulls will
enable us to leverage future payloads and sensors for years to come. We
still expect our first SSGN to be operational in 2007.
EA-18G. Last year, you initiated funding at our request to
replace the aging EA-6B Prowler with the EA-18G AEA aircraft. Increased
EA-6B usage in 2003 has resulted in wing center section or outer wing
panel fatigue for some 43 EA-6B aircraft, making your support last year
critical to our ability to dramatically accelerate the recapitalization
of the Nation's only joint electronic attack capability. Using the
demonstrated growth capacity of the F/A-18E/F, the EA-18G will quickly
recapitalize our electronic attack capability at lower procurement
cost, with significant savings in operating and support costs; all
while providing the growth potential for future electronic warfare
system improvements. It will use the Improved Capability Three (ICAP
III) receiver suite and provide selective reactive jamming capability
to the warfighter. This will both improve the lethality of the air wing
and enhance the commonality of aircraft on the carrier deck. We begin
purchasing airframes in fiscal year 2006 and will achieve initial
operating capability in 2009.
Sea Shield is the projection of layered, global defensive power.
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Sea Shield will enhance deterrence and warfighting power by way of
real-time integration with joint and coalition forces, high speed
littoral attack platforms setting and exploiting widely distributed
sensors, and the direct projection of defensive power in the littoral
and deep inland. Sea Shield capabilities include: homeland defense, sea
and littoral control, and theater air and missile defense. Our highest
priority Sea Shield programs this year include:
Mine Warfare Programs. We intend to field a set of
unmanned, modular mine countermeasure (MCM) systems employable from a
variety of host platforms or shore sites to minimize our risk from
mines and sustain our national economic and military access to every
corner of the globe. Our future MCM capability will be faster, more
precise and organic to both Expeditionary and Carrier Strike Groups and
will ultimately remove both the man and our mammals from the minefield.
Within the FYDP, we expect to reduce the time that it takes to render
sea mining ineffective by at least half of the time that it takes us
today.
Our fiscal year 2005 budget request includes funding to realize
organic mine warfare capabilities in one Strike Group this year, while
maintaining the funding necessary for a potent and dedicated MCM force.
We have also requested an increase of $167 million across the FYDP for
mine warfare programs, to include unmanned vehicles such as the Long-
Term Mine Reconnaissance System (LMRS) to provide a clandestine mine
reconnaissance capability from our Los Angeles-class submarines, and
the Remote Minehunting System on Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (DDGs
91-96). Both of these programs are scheduled to reach initial operating
capability (IOC) milestones this year. Future introduction of the LCS
with mine warfare mission modules will improve the ability of Strike
Groups to neutralize mine threats in parallel with--not in sequence
before--other operations.
Littoral Combat Ship. The role of LCS is to provide access
to joint forces in the littorals; a capability gap we identified as a
result of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. During the past year and
a half, considerable campaign analysis and fleet battle experiments
have demonstrated that naval forces need better ways to fight mines;
small, fast, highly armed boats; and quiet diesel and advanced air-
independent propulsion submarines operating in shallow waters. The
performance of U.S. Navy Patrol Craft and the experimental HSV-X1 Joint
Venture in the Iraqi littoral was critical to the early detection and
destruction of the Iraqi mine threat. The same kind of capability needs
to be delivered in a fast, maneuverable, shallow-draft platform that
has the survivability to operate independently. LCS will have these
characteristics, along with self-defense, navigation, and command-and-
control systems.
LCS will be built from the keel up to be a part of a netted and
distributed force, and will be the first ship designed with FORCEnet as
a requirement. The main battery of LCS will be its off-board systems:
manned helicopters and unmanned aerial, surface and underwater
vehicles. It is the off-board vehicles--with both sensors and weapons--
that will enter the highest threat areas. Its modular design, built to
open-systems architecture standards, provides flexibility and a means
to rapidly reconfigure mission modules and payloads. As technology
matures, the Navy will not have to buy a new LCS platform, but will
upgrade the mission modules or the unmanned systems.
LCS also will have an advanced hull design and be significantly
different from any warship that has been built for the U.S. Navy.
Detail design and construction of the first LCS Flight 0 ship is
planned in fiscal year 2005. The LCS requirements process is tailored
to support the rapid delivery of two flights (Flight 0 and 1) of ships,
using an evolutionary, ``spiral'' acquisition approach. The spiral
development process allows time-phased capability improvement for ship
and mission systems. This incremental development and delivery strategy
supports the ship's accelerated acquisition schedule, diverse threat
and capability requirements, and dynamic levels of technology push/
pull. The ship's modular, open design will also enable lifecycle
adaptability and affordability. Four LCSs have been added since last
year's budget plan was submitted.
Missile Defense. Our Navy is poised to contribute
significantly in fielding initial sea based missile defense
capabilities to meet the near-term ballistic missile threat to our
homeland, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies. We are
working closely under the authority of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
to deliver this much-needed capability to the Nation's combatant
commanders. Our sea-based missile defense programs experienced
tremendous success on the test range this year, scoring two of three
intercepts. Continued development and testing will support initial
defensive operations beginning in the fall of 2004, with select Arleigh
Burke-class destroyers providing long range surveillance and tracking
to the Nation's capability late this year.
MMA--Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS). We
significantly increased this year's R&D funding for the MMA to
recapitalize our 1950s-era Lockheed ``Electra'' based P-3 force. Our
acquisition plan was further refined this past year with the
integration of the BAMS-UAV program into the overarching Maritime
Patrol and Armed Reconnaissance requirement. This lethal combination of
manned and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft will recapitalize our
maritime patrol anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare and armed
ISR capability. We also developed a robust sustainment plan for the
current P-3 fleet that includes special structural inspections (SSI)
and kits that extend P-3 service lives by a minimum of 5,000 hours.
This SSI program will replace, correct or modify our current P-3 force
to ensure that they do not prematurely reach the end of their fatigue
life before we achieve IOC of the MMA in 2013.
Virginia-class submarine (SSN-774). The first ship of this
class was christened this year and will commission in 2004. This class
will replace Los Angeles-class (SSN-688) attack submarines and will
incorporate new capabilities, including unmanned vehicles, and the
ability to support SOF. It will be an integral part of the joint,
networked, dispersed 21st century fleet. Our fiscal year 2004 budget
funded the first of five submarines under the MYP contract authorized
by Congress last year. The second submarine of the MYP contract is
funded in fiscal year 2005. Approximately $240 million in economic
order quantity advance procurement is funded in fiscal year 2005 in
support of this contract.
CG Modernization. Funding for the Ticonderoga-class
cruiser modernization continues in fiscal year 2005. The Cruiser
Modernization Program is a mid-life upgrade for our existing Aegis
cruisers that will ensure modern, relevant combat capability well into
this century and against evolving threats. These warships will provide
enhanced area air defense to the Joint Forces Commander. These
modifications include installations of the Cooperative Engagement
Capability, which enhances and leverages the air defense capability of
these ships, and an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) improvement package.
These converted cruisers could also be available for integration into
ballistic missile defense missions when that capability matures. Our
first cruiser modernization begins in fiscal year 2006.
FORCEnet is the operational construct and architectural framework
for naval warfare in the joint, information age. It will allow systems,
functions, and missions to be aligned in a way that will transform our
situational awareness, accelerate speed of decisions and allow naval
forces to greatly distribute its combat power in a unified, joint
battlespace. FORCEnet provides the world-class information and
technology (IT) tools that we need to continue to be the world-class
Navy.
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Programs that will enable the future force to be more networked,
highly adaptive, human-centric, integrated, and enhance speed of
command include:
Navy Marine Corps Intranet. NMCI is operational and
providing commercial IT services for more than 300,000 Navy employees
and two combatant commanders. This initiative, as part of our FORCEnet
strategy, is providing a single, secure shore-based network and will
link with our tactical networks to provide end-to-end collaboration
within the Navy and across the joint community. fiscal year 2005
funding of $1.6 billion provides for NMCI operations and, at the same
time, continues transition of the remaining legacy IT networks to NMCI
enterprise network services. This past year, with the help of the
authorizing language you provided, the NMCI program finalized a full
partnership agreement with the Defense Information Systems Agency
(DISA) for operations and provisioning.
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS). The new MUOS
Satellite Communications (SATCOM) program will increase DOD narrowband
ultra-high frequency (UHF) SATCOM capacity by roughly 1,300 percent
over current capabilities. MUOS is a $6.4 billion joint interest
program, and it supports a particularly important ``Comms-on-the-Move''
capability for handheld terminals, aircraft, missiles, and UAVs in
urban and heavily wooded terrain. We plan to reach the initial
operational capability (IOC) milestone in 2009, with full operational
capability in 2013.
Joint Aerial Common Sensor (JACS). We have partnered with
the Army in the JACS development program in our pursuit of a
replacement for the aging EP-3 airborne information warfare and
tactical signals intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft. JACS will provide
multi-intelligence strike targeting data and Signals Intelligence
capabilities, and will include a Synthetic Aperture Radar, Ground
Moving Target Indicator, electro-optical and infrared sights, and
measurements and signature capabilities. These will be coupled with
automatic/manual data fusion. Our fiscal year 2005 request includes $25
million for this program.
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS). JTRS will be the
wireless ``last tactical mile'' component of the Global Information
Grid (GIG) and will transform Navy's tactical communications systems by
incorporating Internet Protocol (IP) communications over multi-spectral
radio frequency (RF) media. JTRS is a software programmable, multi-
band, multi-mode family of net-workable radios, capable of simultaneous
voice, data, video communications and mobile ad hoc networking. Our
fiscal year 2005 request includes $56 million for JTRS.
Deployable Joint Command Control System (DJC2). DJC2 is
the priority command and control (C2) transformation initiative. DJC2
will provide a standing, fully deployable, scaleable, and standardized
C2 capability to the regional combatant commanders (RCC) and Joint
Force Commanders. DJC2 responds to the need for joint, deployable C2
capability, with first RCC delivery to Pacific Command (PACOM) in
fiscal year 2005. DJC2 is an enabler for the Standing Joint Force
Headquarters concept being developed by Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).
The Navy is lead component for the acquisition program, and we ask your
support for the $81 million we've requested in fiscal year 2005.
D. Improving Effectiveness
As I have testified, your Navy today is the most capable and most
ready Navy in our history, thanks in large part to the support of
Congress and of the American people. But, I believe that we can do
better--that, in fact, we must do better--as stewards of the public
trust in determining not just how much we should spend on programs, but
how those defense dollars are spent. This is especially true today
because of the strategic challenges posed by the ongoing global war on
terrorism, because of our need to recapitalize aging, Cold War-era
infrastructure and capability, and because of the burgeoning
technological and operational changes that will dramatically alter the
way we fight. Revolutionizing the way in which our defense dollars are
spent presents opportunities to increase our effectiveness, both now
and in the future.
Sea Enterprise is focusing headquarters leadership on outputs and
execution, and is creating ideas that will improve our productivity and
reduce our overhead costs. Its key objectives are to:
Leverage technology to improve performance and
minimize manpower costs;
Promote competition and reward innovation and
efficiency;
Challenge institutional encumbrances that impede
creativity and boldness in innovation;
Aggressively divest non-core, underperforming or
unnecessary products, services and production capacity;
Merge redundant efforts;
Minimize acquisition and life-cycle costs;
Maximize in-service capital equipment utilization; and
Challenge every assumption, cost, and requirement.
Department of the Navy senior leadership is actively engaged in
tracking the execution of ongoing Sea Enterprise initiatives totaling
approximately $40 billion, and identifying $12.4 billion in cost
savings and requirements mitigation across the FYDP. We are committed
to efficiency and productivity improvements that will generate the
savings necessary to augment our investment stream and implement our
Sea Power 21 vision--delivering the right force, with the right
readiness, at the right cost. Specific highlights of these fiscal
transformation initiatives include:
Right Readiness. Along with the FRP, we have also
initiated processes ashore that will generate a more effective force.
As just one example, we have established a single shore installation
management organization, Commander, Navy Installations (CNI), to
globally manage all shore installations, promote ``best practices''
development, and provide economies of scale, increased efficiency,
standardization of polices, and improved budgeting and funding
execution. This initiative is anticipated to save approximately $1.2
billion across the FYDP.
Right Cost. We have taken a hard look at our ``level of
effort'' programs to maximize return on taxpayer investment. This
year's effort generated $2 billion in future savings in programs not
supported by specific performance metrics in force structure, readiness
or cost benefit. In addition, we focused on streamlining our
organizations and processes as a means to harvest efficiencies and
control costs. Innovative programs like Shipmain and the Naval Aviation
Readiness Integrated Improvement Program are aiding in developing and
sharing best practices, streamlining maintenance planning and improving
performance goals in shipyards, aviation depots, and intermediate
maintenance activities. We also reorganized the Navy Supply Systems
Command, including the establishment of the Naval Operational Logistics
Support Center to consolidate transportation, ammunition and petroleum
management. We will continue to look for additional opportunities in
this area while leveraging the gains already made.
Right Force. We believe transformation to our future force
must include improving our buying power. To improve upon our force
structure, we are divesting non-core, redundant, underperforming, and
outdated products and services. We are using multi-year procurement
contracts and focusing where possible on economic order quantity
purchase practices to optimize our investments. An excellent example
lies in the F/A-18E/F multi-year procurement contract that anticipates
procurement of 210 aircraft while saving us in excess of $1.1 billion
across the FYDP. We also recognize the need to transform our single
greatest asymmetric advantage, our people. The upcoming year will focus
on ensuring we not only have the right number, but the right mix of
military, civilian, and contractor personnel to accomplish the mission
at the lowest possible cost. You have given us a tremendous tool to
enhance our flexibility in this area, the NSPS, and we plan to take
full advantage of it.
Building on prior efforts, I am dedicating a significant amount of
personal time to conducting execution reviews with leadership at the
major commands across the Navy because, as I see it, leadership
engagement in execution is an essential step to achieving our Sea
Enterprise objectives. These reviews have provided me the opportunity
to focus on the intricate details of the organizations while ensuring
commanders are aligned with the vision and direction in which we are
steaming. We focus on ways to swiftly move from strategy to
implementation, as well as innovative ways to reduce costs and return
resources to the enterprise for reinvestment.
In 2005, the Navy will continue to pursue product and process
efficiencies and the opportunities to be more effective while improving
our warfighting capability. Harvesting the savings for recapitalization
is a vital part of that effort, and we will continue to balance the
benefits of new productivity initiatives against operational risks. Our
intent is to foster a culture of continuous process improvement, reduce
overhead, and deliver the right force structure both now and in the
future.
iv. conclusion
For us, winning the global war on terrorism remains our number one
objective--and victory is the only acceptable outcome. To achieve this,
we are accelerating the advantages we bring to the Nation.
The FRP will improve upon the operational availability of fleet
units, providing forward deployed forces for enhanced regional
deterrence and contingency response, while at the same time, retaining
the ability to rapidly surge in times of crisis.
We are investing in enhanced warfighting capability for the joint
force, using the extended reach of naval weapons and sensors to reach
farther and more precisely with striking power, and deliver broader
defensive protection for joint forces ashore and fully leverage our
command of the sea.
We are creating a personnel environment that attracts, retains, and
relies upon creative, effective, and competitive people. We are
investing in the tools, the information technology, and the training
that delivers more meaningful job content to them because it is they
who offer us our greatest advantage.
The support of Congress is vital to our readiness today and to
building the Navy of tomorrow--I thank you for your dedicated efforts
and support.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Admiral. I felt it
important to pose that question at this particular time because
we are very proud in this Nation of civilian control of the
military. Nevertheless, those in the ranks look up and they see
you as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and they repose in you
and the other chiefs a very special trust and confidence. That
statement that you just made will resonate throughout the Armed
Forces of the United States.
Thank you.
General Hagee.
STATEMENT OF GEN. MICHAEL W. HAGEE, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE
MARINE CORPS
General Hagee. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin,
distinguished members of the committee: It is my privilege to
report to you that your marines, active and Reserve, are well
trained, well equipped, highly motivated, and they are ready.
As Senator Lieberman so beautifully articulated, their families
are behind them.
Your support, and that of the American people, is critical
and deeply appreciated. Your sustained commitment to improving
our Nation's Armed Forces to meet the challenges of today as
well as those of the future is vital to our Nation's security.
Mr. Chairman, in answer to your question, I was in sort of
a unique position over the last couple of years, two positions
actually. Before becoming Commandant of the Marine Corps, I was
the Commanding General of the First Marine Expeditionary Force
(MEF). That, of course, was the force that fought up on the
right flank in Iraq. In that role I was very involved in the
planning of that particular operation. I can tell you, sir,
that based on the intelligence that I had received from
throughout the Intelligence Community and the analysis of our
own internal intelligence individuals, I was absolutely
convinced that Saddam Hussein had chemical weapons, if not
biological weapons, and that he would use them when we crossed
the line of departure.
We prepared those marines for that contingency. We went to
great lengths to secure the Saratoga suits. We went to great
lengths to ensure they all had protective masks and the
appropriate number of filters. We had both chemical and
biological detection devices, devices that we did not normally
have in the Marine Corps, brought in for that contingency.
I took over as Commandant of the Marine Corps on January 13
of last year. The intelligence that I saw once I came back here
to Washington convinced me that I was correct in my analysis.
When we crossed the line of departure last March, I was still
convinced that he was going to use chemical weapons on our
marines and our soldiers. In that particular stance, I am happy
that I was wrong on that.
But looking back on the intelligence that we had at that
particular time, there is nothing different that I would do,
even having perfect vision looking back.
Sir, the Marine Corps' first priority is and will continue
to be warfighting readiness and excellence in support of our
Nation. In the near term, the Marine Corps is focused on
readiness to provide expeditionary forces that meet our
Nation's demanding needs. For the long term, the Marine Corps
and the Navy are committed to developing a sea basing
capability that will provide a critical joint competency for
assuring access and projecting power from the sea worldwide.
During this past year, your marines, both active and
Reserve, were engaged in operations in support of the global
war on terrorism from Afghanistan to the Horn of Africa to
Liberia. Highlighting the value of our expeditionary
capability, in OIF we deployed a combat-ready sustainable force
of almost 70,000 marines and sailors in less than 60 days.
We are now preparing to deploy forces to relieve Army units
in western Iraq in support of OIF 2. Beginning this month, we
will deploy approximately 25,000 marines into Iraq. In our
preparations we are working closely with Army forces in and
outside concerning equipment, tactics, techniques, and
procedures. We are also drawing on analysis of our experiences
last year in southern Iraq, the tactics of the British, and our
own extensive small wars experience.
Before we deploy, we are conducting rigorous urban
operations training and language and cultural education. We are
paying particular attention to individual and vehicle
protective equipment enhancements and procedures. We are also
continuing to improve our warfighting capabilities by
leveraging advancements in technology, developing innovative
organizations, and improving our joint training. Currently the
First Expeditionary Strike Group, which combines the
capabilities of essentially a surface action group, submarine
and maritime patrol aircraft, with those of an amphibious ready
group and a Marine expeditionary unit, special operations
capable, is returning from its deployment to the U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR).
We are combining our analysis of OEF and OIF with the
lessons from this initial deployment in order to enhance our
adaptability, flexibility, and lethality. In addition, naval
tactical air (TACAIR) integration continues to be implemented
and we are aggressively improving our interoperability with
special operations forces.
Our top ground and aviation programs are adequately funded.
The introduction of new systems such as the MV-22 Osprey, the
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, the JSF, the Lightweight 155
Howitzer, the Four-Bladed Cobra and Huey Upgrade Helicopters,
and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System into our force
structure will significantly increase our speed, flexibility,
and our overall expeditionary and amphibious warfighting
capabilities.
In planning for the future uncertainties, the Secretary of
the Navy, the CNO, and I are committed to developing a sea
basing capability that will provide a critical joint competency
for assuring access and projecting power that will greatly
improve the Nation's security. Sea basing in the future will
assure joint access by capitalizing on the dilemma created by
the operational maneuver of forces from the sea. The
replacement ships for the amphibious assault ships (LHA) class
are an essential part of our concept of joint sea basing.
Mr. Chairman, lastly I would like to emphasize the
magnificent performance of your individual marines, the most
agile and lethal weapon system we possess.
On behalf of all marines, I thank this committee for your
steadfast support and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Hagee follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Michael W. Hagee, USMC
Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, distinguished members of the
committee; it is my honor to report to you on the state of readiness of
your United States Marine Corps. Your marines are firmly committed to
warfighting excellence, and the support of Congress and the American
people has been indispensable to our success in the global war on
terrorism. Your sustained commitment to improving our Nation's Armed
Forces to meet the challenges of today as well as those of the future
is vital to the security of our Nation. On behalf of all marines and
their families, I thank this committee for your continued support.
i. introduction
In the near-term, the Marine Corps' top priorities are to maintain
our high state of readiness and to provide capable forces that meet the
demanding needs of the unified combatant commanders in order to
prosecute the global war on terrorism in support of the Nation. For the
long-term, the Marine Corps and Navy are committed to developing a sea
basing capability that will provide a critical joint competency for
assuring access and projecting power that will greatly improve the
security of the United States. The marked increase in our warfighting
capability will be apparent as we introduce new systems such as the MV-
22 Osprey, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), the Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF), and the Lightweight 155mm Howitzer into our force
structure, using them to enhance the already potent combat power of our
Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) as integral elements of our
Nation's joint force.
The Navy-Marine Corps team continues to play a critical role in the
global war on terrorism and in the establishment of stability and
security throughout the world. During this past year, the Marine Corps,
both active and Reserve, was engaged in operations from Afghanistan to
the Arabian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, Liberia, the Georgian Republic,
Colombia, Guantanamo Bay, and the Philippines. Most prominent in
highlighting the value and power of the Nation's naval expeditionary
capability was the Marine Corps' participation in Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF). Success in this operation underscored the unique
contributions of our multi-dimensional naval dominance, our
expeditionary nature, our flexibility to deal with complex situations
and challenges, and the adaptability of our forces and individuals in
order to defeat the challenges posed by adaptive, asymmetric enemies,
and long-term threats.
Early last year, the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) deployed a
combat ready force of almost 70,000 marines and sailors in less than 60
days using the full array of our complementary power projection
capabilities. Forward deployed Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs)
(Special Operations Capable) again demonstrated their proven value for
immediate response. Eleven strategically located Maritime Prepositioned
Force ships were unloaded in 16 days to provide the equipment and
sustainment for two Marine Expeditionary Brigades. A 7 ship amphibious
force from each coast embarked a total of 11,500 marines, sailors, and
their equipment and within 30 days these 14 ships began to arrive and
offload in Kuwait. Strategic sea and air lift was also vital to our
success in this effort. Exploiting the operational speed, reach, and
inherent flexibility of seapower, the Navy-Marine Corps team achieved a
rapid buildup of sustained warfighting power that was combat ready to
support U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) on March 1, 2003.
Closely integrated with our joint and coalition partners, as well
as Special Operations Forces (SOF), the I MEF provided the combatant
commander with a potent combined arms force comprising a balance of
ground, aviation, and combat service support elements all coordinated
by a dynamic command element. This teamwork--the product of demanding
and realistic Service and joint training--presented a multi-dimensional
dilemma for the Iraqi regime's forces and loyalists. It also greatly
increased the range of options available to our leadership as they
addressed each unique and complex situation. The integration of the 1st
United Kingdom Division within the I MEF provides outstanding lessons
for achieving merged coalition capabilities and consistent goals in the
future.
The combat power of I MEF generated an operational tempo that our
enemy could not match. With short notice that operations would commence
early, the marines and their joint and coalition partners rapidly
secured key strategic objectives. The I MEF then engaged in 26 days of
sustained combat operations. Using the tenets of maneuver warfare, they
executed four major river crossings, fought 10 major engagements, and
destroyed 8 Iraqi divisions before stopping in Tikrit--almost 500 miles
inland. In support of Joint Special Operations Forces Northern Iraq,
the 26th MEU inserted a MAGTF from the Eastern Mediterranean into
Northern Iraq--almost 1,200 miles distance. The sustained resources of
the Marine Force, which were derived primarily from our seaborne
logistics, provided us unrivaled advantages. While our logistics were
stretched by the operational commanders, our combat service support
units demonstrated flexibility and resourcefulness.
Highlighting the expeditionary mindset of marines, our combined
arms force successfully operated in desert, urban, swamp, and rural
environments while effectively conducting combat, peacekeeping, and
humanitarian operations--at times simultaneously. Marines also
demonstrated the ability to re-task and reorganize to conduct
unanticipated missions like the taking of the city of Tikrit. Following
major combat operations, I MEF assumed responsibility for security and
stability in five Central Iraq provinces until they were relieved of
the last province by coalition forces this past September. Flexibility
and adaptability are key characteristics of an expeditionary force, and
they are critical advantages that we must seek to optimize for the
future, particularly in this era of global uncertainty.
Recent operations also emphasize the increased importance of access
to key regions for projecting our Nation's power. With global
interests, the United States must retain the capability to secure
access as needed. Power projection from the sea greatly increases the
range of options available to avert or resolve conflicts. A credible
naval forcible-entry capability is critical to ensure that we are never
barred from a vital national objective or limited to suboptimal
alternatives.
Since the end of major combat operations, the Marine Corps has been
setting the force in order to enhance warfighting readiness for future
contingencies. We are reloading combat equipment and materiel on the
ships of the Maritime Prepositioned Squadrons while also ensuring that
the requirements for OIF 2 are fulfilled. We are using provided funding
to repair, refurbish, and where necessary, replace equipment. During
this period, marines have continued to forward deploy. Marine Corps
units are supporting Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan,
operations in the Horn of Africa, exercises critical to supporting the
Combatant Commanders' Theater Security Cooperation Plans, and
counterdrug operations in support of joint and joint-interagency task
forces. In addition, we have conducted a major program to identify and
analyze lessons learned from the Iraqi campaign. We have also begun to
assimilate these lessons and determine where and how our force should
be rebalanced.
As the last few years have demonstrated, the Marine Corps Reserve
is a full partner in our total force. Reserve units participated in all
aspects of the war in Iraq, providing air, ground, and combat service
support as well as a large number of individual augmentees to marine
and joint staffs. Mobilized Marine Reserve infantry battalions have
also served as ready reaction forces, ``on call'' to support the
Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) role in homeland security.
ii. building on success for immediate operations
We continue to execute global operations and exercises with our
joint and coalition partners. The Marine Corps is preparing to deploy
forces to relieve the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 82d Airborne
Division in Western Iraq in support of OIF 2. These forces will be
deployed in two rotations of 7 months each. This rotation policy will
result in the least disruption for the long-term health of the Marine
Corps, precluding stop-loss/stop-move and unnecessary interruptions in
recruit training, career progression and development, professional
military education, and other deployment requirements. The first
rotation, from March until September 2004, will include 25,000 marines
and their equipment and includes almost 3,000 Reserve component
marines. A second rotation--of like size and composition--will overlap
the first and ensure a smooth and stable transition.
In preparation for OIF 2, I MEF has analyzed lessons learned from
their experiences in conducting security and stability operations from
March to September 2003, and recent Army lessons learned. As they did
last year, I MEF is working closely with the Army Forces in Iraq; they
have conducted a number of liaison visits with the Army units they will
relieve. They have drawn from procedures used by the Los Angeles Police
Department for neighborhood patrolling in gang dominated areas, the
tactics of the British in Iraq--which reflect years of experience in
low intensity conflicts and peacekeeping operations, as well as the
Marine Corps' own extensive ``Small Wars'' experience. We have
assimilated these lessons through a comprehensive training package that
includes tactics, techniques, procedures for stability and counter-
insurgency operations. We have conducted rigorous urban operations
training and exercises. Over 400 marines are receiving Arabic language
immersion training, and all deploying marines and sailors are receiving
extensive cultural education. Our supporting establishment is focused
on the equipment, logistics, and training requirements of this force--
paying particular attention to individual protective equipment,
enhanced vehicle and aircraft hardening, and aviation survival
equipment and procedures. This training and support are critically
important as we send marines back to war in a volatile, dangerous, and
changing situation.
During this next year MEUs will still deploy as part of Naval
Expeditionary Strike Groups in support of combatant commander
requirements. Units will continue to rotate to Okinawa and Iwakuni
Japan, and some of those forces will further deploy in support of OIF
2. While the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) remains high, recruiting and
retention continue to exceed our goals. We are monitoring the health of
our Service, and we are focused on ensuring that the Marine Corps
remains ready for all current and future responsibilities.
iii. taking care of our own
Events of the past year continue to highlight the value of the
individual marine over all other weapon ``systems.'' While we always
strive to provide our marines with the best equipment and weapons, we
never forget that people and leadership are the foundations of the
Marine Corps' readiness and warfighting capabilities. OIF demonstrated
that the Marine Corps' recruiting, training, and education of the force
are extremely successful in maintaining the high standards of military
readiness our Nation requires. The Marine Corps remains committed to
taking care of our marines, their families, and our civilian marines.
Marines
End Strength
The Marine Corps is assimilating the congressionally authorized
increase in Marine Corps end strength to 175,000. The increase of 2,400
marines previously authorized by Congress addressed an urgent need to
train and maintain enough marines for the long-term requirements
associated with the global war on terrorism. It has been particularly
important in enabling us to provide the Nation with a robust, scalable
force option specifically dedicated to antiterrorism--the 4th Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (Antiterrorism).
The Marine Corps is expeditionary by nature and therefore
accustomed to deploying in support of contingency and forward presence
missions. We are structured in such a way as to satisfy our enduring
requirements and meet operational contingencies as long as the
contingencies are temporary in nature. While the force is stretched, we
are meeting our current challenging operational commitments. Our high
operational and personnel tempos have not negatively impacted
accessions or retention efforts; however, we continue to monitor both
very closely.
Recruiting
Sustaining our ranks with the highest quality young men and women
is the mission of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command. Recruiting
Command has consistently accomplished this mission for more than 8
years for enlisted recruiting and 13 years for officer recruiting. This
past year the Marine Corps recruited over 100 percent of its goal with
over 97 percent Tier I High School graduates. In order to continue
attracting America's finest youth, Recruiting Command provides its
recruiters the best tools available to accomplish their mission.
The Marine Corps Reserve achieved its fiscal year 2003 recruiting
goals with the accession of 6,174 non-prior service marines and 2,663
prior service marines. With regard to our Reserve component, officer
recruiting and retention to fill out the requirements of our Selected
Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) units remains our most challenging concern.
This is primarily due to the fact that we recruit Reserve officers
almost exclusively from the ranks of those who have first served a tour
as an active duty marine officer and currently the Corps is
experiencing a low attrition rate for company grade officers in our
Active Force. We are attempting to alleviate this challenge. Two
successful methods include increasing awareness of the benefits of
service in the Reserves to the company grade officers who are leaving
the active ranks and Reserve officer programs for qualified enlisted
marines.
Retention
Retaining the best and the brightest marines is a constant goal;
history has proven that superb leadership in the staff noncommissioned
officer ranks is a major contributor to the Corps' combat
effectiveness. The ranks of this elite group of leaders can only be
filled by retaining our best enlisted marines. The Marine Corps has two
retention measures and both clearly indicate healthy service
continuation rates. Our First Term Alignment Plan (first tour) has
consistently achieved its reenlistment requirements over the past 9
years. With just over one-third of the current fiscal year completed,
we have achieved 76 percent of our first-term retention goal.
Furthermore, our Subsequent Term Alignment Plan (second tour and
beyond) reveals that we have already retained 47 percent of our goal
for this fiscal year.
Current officer retention is at a 19-year high, continuing a 4-year
trend of increasing retention. Despite the increased retention overall,
certain military occupational specialties perennially suffer high
attrition. We are attempting to overcome this challenge by offering
continuation pay for those marines with military occupational
specialties that include special qualifications and skills. Military
compensation that is competitive with the private sector provides the
flexibility required to meet the challenge of maintaining stability in
manpower planning.
Marine Corps Reserve
In 2003, the Marine Corps Reserve rapidly mobilized combat ready
marines to augment and reinforce the active component. Marine Corps
Reserve activations in support of OIF began in January 2003, and peaked
at 21,316 Reserve marines on active duty in May 2003. This represented
52 percent of the SMCR. Of the approximately 6,000 reservists currently
on active duty, over 1,300 individual mobilization augmentees,
individual ready reserves, and retirees fill critical joint and
internal billets. As of January 2004, the Marine Corps Reserve began
activating approximately 7,000 SMCR marines in support of OIF 2.
Judicious employment of Reserve marines remains a top priority of the
Marine Corps to ensure the Marine Corps Reserve maintains the
capability to augment and reinforce the active component. Marine Corps
Reserve units and individuals are combat ready and have rapidly
integrated into Active Forces commands demonstrating the effectiveness
of the Total Force Marine Corps.
A strong inspector-instructor system and a demanding Mobilization
and Operational Readiness Deployment Test program ensured Marine Corps
Reserve units achieved a high level of premobilization readiness.
Marine Reserve Units continuously train to a C1/C2 readiness standard,
eliminating the need for post-mobilization certification. Ninety-eight
percent of SMCR marines called up for duty reported for mobilization
and less than 1 percent requested a deferment, delay, or exemption. The
Marine Corps Reserve executed a rapid and efficient mobilization with
units averaging 6 days from notification to being deployment-ready, and
32 days after receiving a deployment order they arrived in theater.
Many activated Marine Reserve units were ready to deploy faster than
strategic lift could be provided.
Building on the important lessons of the last year, the Marine
Corps is pursuing several transformational initiatives to enhance the
Reserves' capabilities as a ready and able partner with our active
component. These pending initiatives include: increasing the number of
Military Police (MP) units in the Reserve component; establishing a
Reserve Intelligence Support Battalion to include placing Reserve
Marine Intelligence Detachments at the Joint Reserve Intelligence
Centers; returning some of our civil affairs structure to the active
component to provide enhanced planning capabilities to the operational
and Service headquarters; and, introducing an improved Individual
Augmentee Management Program to meet the growing joint and internal
requirements.
When called, the Marine Corps Reserve is ready to augment and
reinforce. Our Reserve marines are a vital and critical element of our
total force. The training, leadership, and quality of life of our
Reserve component remain significant Marine Corps priorities.
Marine For Life
The commitment to take care of our own includes a marine's
transition from active service back to civilian life. The Marine For
Life Program's mission is to provide sponsorship for our more than
27,000 marines who honorably leave active service each year. The
program was created to nurture and sustain the positive, mutually
beneficial relationships inherent in our ethos, ``Once a Marine, Always
a Marine.'' In cities across the United States, Reserve marines help
transitioning marines and their families get settled in their new
communities. Sponsorship includes assistance with employment,
education, housing, childcare, veterans' benefits, and other support
services needed to make a smooth transition. To provide this support,
Marine For Life taps into the network of former marines and marine-
friendly businesses, organizations, and individuals willing to lend a
hand to a marine who has served honorably.
Initiated in fiscal year 2002, the program will reach full
operational capability in fiscal year 2004. In addition to 110 Reserve
marines serving as ``Hometown Links,'' an enhanced web-based electronic
network, easily accessed by marines worldwide, will support the
program. The end state of the Marine For Life Program is a nationwide
marine and marine-friendly network available to all marines honorably
leaving active service, that will improve their transition to civilian
life.
Civilian Marines
Civilian Workforce Campaign Plan
Recognizing that our civilian marines are integral to the success
of military operations, General James L. Jones, the 32nd Commandant of
the Marine Corps, charged our senior Marine Corps officials with the
development and implementation of a strategic 5-year plan for the
recruitment, development, and retention of our civilian marines. The
Civilian Workforce Campaign Plan (CWCP) consists of six strategic
goals: (1) nurture, build, and grow civilian marines; (2) provide
flexible career opportunities; (3) create leaders at all levels; (4)
improve the performance evaluation system; (5) strengthen workforce
management expertise; and (6) establish an integrated total force
management approach. As commandant, I have provided the following
additional implementing guidance.
Our vision is to make the Marine Corps the employer of choice for a
select group of civilians imbued with the Marine Corps values of honor,
courage, and commitment. Through implementation of the CWCP, we will
not only define what the Marine Corps will offer its civilian marines,
but what the Corps expects from them. We will attract, nurture, build,
and grow civilian marines by providing innovative recruitment,
development, retention, reward, and acculturation programs throughout
the work-life cycle.
National Security Personnel System
We want to take this occasion to thank again the committee and
Congress for enacting the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) in
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. The act
authorized a more flexible civilian personnel management system for the
Department of Defense (DOD) that allowed DOD to be a more competitive
and progressive employer at a time when our national security demands a
highly responsive system of civilian personnel management. The
legislation ensures that merit system principles govern any changes in
personnel management, whistleblowers are protected, discrimination
remains illegal, and veterans' preference is protected. The Department
will collaborate with employee representatives, invest time to try and
work out our differences, and notify Congress of any differences before
implementation. In January, DOD officials met with union
representatives to begin the development of a new system of labor-
management relations. Later this year, following an intensive training
program for supervisors, managers, human resources specialists,
employees, as well as commanders and senior management, the DOD plans
to begin implementing NSPS. The Marine Corps, along with the entire
Department of the Navy, expects to be in the first wave of
implementation.
Military-Civilian Conversions
The Marine Corps will continue to actively pursue a review of all
functional areas within the Marine Corps in an effort to return more
marines to the operating forces. Through fiscal year 2003, we have
returned over 2,000 manned structure spaces to the operating forces,
and we will return approximately 650 more marines in fiscal year 2004.
The fiscal year 2005 President's budget converts roughly an additional
1,400 more billets from marines to civilian marines, which will provide
us more options to increase manning in the operating forces.
Education
Amid today's uncertain, volatile security environment, our most
effective weapon remains the individual marine who out-learns, out-
thinks, and out-fights any adversary. Such warfighting competence is
secured only through intellectual development. Recent events
demonstrated how quality education instills confidence in marines. Our
educational standards and programs produce innovative leaders who take
initiative and excel during challenging situations involving
uncertainty and risk. These high educational standards are inculcated
by the Marine Corps University and are designed to target every rank in
both our Active and Reserve Forces. Each year the Marine Corps
University student population includes members of the other Services,
various government agencies as well as dozens of international military
officers from over 30 different countries.
The Marine Corps endeavors to provide its marines with `lifelong
learning' opportunities through a variety of educational programs,
college courses, and library services on our bases and stations.
Furthermore, distance learning programs through the Marine Corps
University make continuing education available to marines regardless of
their location. In addition, the Marine Corps will continue to fully
fund the Tuition Assistance Program in accordance with DOD guideline--
funding for 100 percent of tuition cost up to $250 per semester hour
with a maximum of $4,500 per year. In fiscal year 2003, there were
25,662 marines enrolled in almost 80,000 courses with the help of the
Tuition Assistance Program.
Joint Initiatives
The Marine Corps synchronizes its educational objectives with those
of the other armed services in order to provide regional combatant
commanders with the most capable joint force. We support the proposal
for a Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) and for broadening Joint
Professional Military Education (JPME) opportunities for the Total
Force. By working closely with Joint Forces Staff College and our
sister services, JAWS has the potential to empower future combatant
commanders with talented officers who are experienced in campaign
planning. Intent on broadening our joint experience base, the Marine
Corps is pursuing an accredited advanced joint curriculum (JPME Phase
II) at the Marine Corps War College and will continue to work to
provide JPME opportunities for both active and Reserve components.
Senior Leader Development Program
The Senior Leader Development Program was developed last year to
address General Officer and Senior Executive Service career development
and to link education opportunities to career progression. A study was
commissioned to identify the competencies required in each of our
general officer billets in an effort to link core and complimentary
curriculum with the assignment process. Within the core curriculum,
senior leaders will attend the Joint Warfare series of courses as
prerequisites by rank and billet while they study innovation, business
transformation, and resource management through complementary courses.
Quality of Life/Quality of Service
The Marine Corps works to improve the quality of life for marines
and their families in order to continue the success of the all
volunteer force. We provide excellent quality of life programs and
services, while also helping new marines to better understand what to
expect in the military lifestyle. We continuously assess, through a
variety of means, the attitudes and concerns of marines and their
families regarding their quality of life expectations. With 67 percent
of our marines deployed away from their home installations at the
height of OIF, we carefully captured lessons learned to ensure quality
of life programs meet the needs of deployed marines and families who
remain at home. Community and family assistance centers were
established at Camp Lejeune, Camp Pendleton, Marine Corps Air Station
Miramar, and Marine Corps Base Twentynine Palms to provide marine
family members and loved ones access to relevant information and
referral services.
To further help marines and their families before, during, and
after deployments, the Marine Corps implemented Marine Corps Community
Services (MCCS) One Source, a Marine Corps-conducted, DOD funded pilot
program providing around-the-clock information and referral services.
MCCS One Source is especially useful to our activated Marine Reserves
and their families as they negotiate the requirements and procedures
associated with utilization of military programs such as TRICARE and
other benefit services. In recognition of the importance of the
transition home after deployments for both marines and their families,
the Marine Corps developed a standardized return and reunion program
consisting of a mandatory warrior transition brief for returning
marines, a return and reunion guidebook for marines and family members,
a caregiver brief, and briefs designed for spouses.
We greatly appreciate the supplemental appropriations bills during
2003, that contained additional help for deployed marines and their
families. In 2004, quality of life efforts will continue to focus on
issues related to supporting deployed forces and their families.
Safety
Safety programs are vital to force protection and operational
readiness. Marine leaders understand the importance of leadership,
persistence, and accountability in the effort to reduce mishaps and
accidents. The fiscal year 2003 off-duty and operational mishap rates
were driven upward by the mishaps that occurred during and post OIF,
while the aviation mishap rate decreased. To meet the Secretary of
Defense's challenge to all Services to reduce mishaps by 50 percent in
2 years, the Marine Corps is focusing on initiatives that deal
particularly with the development of strategies and specific
interventions to reduce all mishaps. Our leadership at every level
understand the challenge, and we are actively involved in the effort to
safeguard our most precious assets--marines and sailors.
iv. building on success for the future
The Marine Corps, in partnership with our Navy brethren, provides
our Nation with unrivaled maritime power to help secure peace and
promote our national interests. The President's fiscal year 2005
budget, together with your support, will provide a strong foundation
for our continued success. The fiscal year 2005 budget--predicated on a
peacetime OPTEMPO--sustains a high level of readiness and ensures our
ability to rapidly respond to emerging situations. It also allows us to
assimilate new technologies and explore new concepts that will help
realize the full potential of our people and their equipment. We will
continue to seek improved means to increase the efficiency of our
investments and increase the combat effectiveness of our forces.
Technology and Experimentation
The Marine Corps has a long history of innovation and adaptation.
Experimentation is our principle means to explore new ideas and
technologies in order to develop new capabilities to overcome emerging
challenges. The Marine Corps Combat Development Command has realigned
its experimentation program around the Sea Viking campaign. This
campaign will explore both concept and prototype technology development
pathways leading to the sea-based expeditionary capabilities envisioned
for the future, to include forcible entry from the sea. The Sea Viking
campaign is complementary to the joint concept development and
experimentation campaign of Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and the Navy's
Sea Trial experimentation process. As an integral part of this effort,
the Marine Corps is refining the expeditionary combat capabilities best
suited to participate in future Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) and
Expeditionary Strike Force operations. It is also exploring the
potential for an expanded Seabasing capability in support of future
joint operations.
The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory has experimented with
several new pieces of equipment to enhance individual and small unit
effectiveness. Based on successful experimentation, limited numbers of
the M16A4 Modular Weapons System, Rifle Combat Optic, and the
Integrated Intra Squad Radio were fielded for use during OIF. The
Marine Corps continues to seek enhanced capabilities for the future as
we continue to improve and transform the force. In addition, we have
procured sufficient quantities of the Outer Tactical Vest and its Small
Arms Protective Insert plates to ensure all marines participating in
OIF 2 are equipped with enhanced ballistic protection.
New Concepts and Organizations
The Expeditionary Force Development System implemented this past
year is a methodological process that is designed to facilitate the
development and realization of military operational concepts. It is a
streamlined and integrated system that covers all phases of concept
development to the acquisition of necessary equipment and weapons
systems. The Expeditionary Force Development System proved to be of
great value to our forces engaged in combat operations and is proving
to be a helpful means of ensuring that the Marine Corps quickly profits
from recent operational experiences. The system is compatible with and
supports naval and joint transformation efforts as it integrates
transformational, modernization, and legacy capabilities and processes.
Several emerging concepts and organizational structures are maturing
that will benefit the Marine Corps and ensure we can meet the future
demanding requirements of the combatant commanders.
The Sea Basing Concept
Sea basing, envisioned as a national capability, is our overarching
transformational operating concept for projecting and sustaining multi-
dimensional naval power and selected joint forces at sea. As stated by
the Defense Science Board in its August 2003 Task Force report: ``Sea
basing represents a critical future joint military capability for the
United States.'' It assures joint access by leveraging the operational
maneuver of forces globally from the sea, and reduces joint force
operational dependence upon fixed and vulnerable land bases. Sea basing
unites our capabilities for projecting offensive power, defensive
power, command and control, mobility and sustainment around the world.
This will provide our regional combatant commanders with unprecedented
versatility to generate operational maneuver. Sea basing will allow
Marine Forces to strike, commence sustainable operations, enable the
flow of follow-on forces into theater, and expedite the reconstitution
and redeployment of Marine Forces for follow-on missions. As the core
of naval transformation, sea basing will provide the operational and
logistical foundation to enable the other pillars of naval
transformation (Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Base, and FORCEnet).
This year, the Marine Corps has continued to refine plans for the
Marine Expeditionary Brigade of 2015, in concert with our concept for
sea-based operations. Similarly, the analysis of alternatives for our
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F)), a critical component
of Seabasing, will provide valid choices for achieving Seabasing
capabilities. These initiatives will complement, rather than replace,
the amphibious lift and forcible entry capacity of the LHA(R), LPD-17,
and LHD, and will provide the Nation a deployment and employment
capability unmatched in the modern world.
Expeditionary Strike Groups
The Marine Corps and Navy continue the series of experiments that
will refine the ESG concept. This concept will combine the capabilities
of surface action groups, submarines, and maritime patrol aircraft with
those of Amphibious Ready Groups and enhanced MEUs (Special Operations
Capable) to provide greater combat capabilities to regional combatant
commanders. Navy combatants are incorporated within the existing
training and deployment cycle of the Amphibious Ready Group. Further
experimentation will also allow us to test command-and-control
arrangements for the ESG. We will soon complete the pilot deployment in
this series, ESG-1, composed of West Coast Navy and Marine Forces. The
ESG-2, composed of East Coast Navy and Marine Forces, will deploy later
this year. Currently, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command is
working with Navy and Marine operating forces to capture critical
information from these experimental deployments to ensure that the ESG
capability thoroughly integrates doctrine, organization, training,
materiel, leadership, education, personnel, and facilities. Also, the
Marine Corps Combat Development Command is working with the Navy to
develop the concept for the employment of the additional capabilities
that the ESG provides regional combatant commanders. Finally, the
Center for Naval Analyses is evaluating the series of experiments
through embedded analysts deployed with both ESGs and will submit their
consolidated reports to the Navy and Marine Corps in October 2004.
Marine Corps--U.S. Special Operations Command Initiatives
The Marine Corps continues to aggressively improve interoperability
with SOF. The U.S. Special Operations Command-Marine Corps Board has
developed over 30 initiatives to support our interoperability goals.
The Marine Corps and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) are
working to leverage existing pre-deployment and deployment training as
a means to ``operationalize'' our relationship. Our deploying MEUs
(Special Operations Capable) exchange liaison officers with the Theater
Special Operations Commands as the MEUs deploy within the various
theaters. On June 20, 2003, a Marine Corps ``proof of concept''
detachment that is task organized to complement SOCOM mission areas in
Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, Coalition Support and Foreign
Internal Defense formally stood up at Camp Pendleton, California. The
Detachment transferred to the operational control of SOCOM last
December, to facilitate joint pre-deployment training and is scheduled
to deploy in April 2004, with a Naval Special Warfare Squadron
supporting CENTCOM. Finally, we are conducting joint training with
SOCOM in the areas of fixed and rotary wing air support of special
operation missions.
Reestablishment of Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies
During this past summer the Marine Corps reestablished an Air-Naval
Gunfire Liaison Company in I MEF and another in the II MEF. These
companies provide teams that specialize in all aspects of fire
support--from terminal control to support of division fire support
coordination centers. They greatly enhance the MAGTF Commanders'
liaison capability--with foreign area expertise--to plan, coordinate,
employ, and conduct terminal control of fires in support of joint,
allied, and coalition forces. Each company will be fully stood up by
this summer, and a separate platoon will be stood up in III MEF in
October 2004.
Tactical Aircraft Integration
Naval Tactical Aircraft (TACAIR) Integration makes all naval
strike-fighter aircraft available to meet both Services' warfighting
and training requirements. As part of the TACAIR Integration plan, a
Marine fighter-attack squadron will eventually be attached to each of
the 10 active carrier air wings and will deploy aboard aircraft
carriers. In addition, three Navy strike-fighter squadrons will be
assigned into the Marine Corps' Unit Deployment Program for land-based
deployments. Force structure reductions associated with this plan
should result in a total cost savings and cost avoidance of over $30
billion. The integration of the fifth marine squadron into a Carrier
Air Wing and the first Navy squadron into the Unit Deployment Program
are scheduled for later this year.
TACAIR Integration retains our warfighting potential and brings the
naval services a step closer to the flexible sea based force we
envision for the future. A leaner, more efficient naval strike-fighter
force is possible because of three underlying factors. The first factor
is ``Global Sourcing''--the ability to task any non-deployed Department
of Navy squadron to either Service's missions, allowing for a reduction
in force structure. Second, `Level Readiness'--applying the proper
resources to training, maintenance, and modernization, will ensure the
smaller force is always capable of responding to the Services' and
Nation's needs. Third, the development of an operational concept that
will efficiently manage the employment of this integrated strike-
fighter force within the naval and joint context. Support of readiness
accounts, modernization programs, and our replacement of the F/A-18 and
AV-8B with the short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) JSF will
ensure the potential promised by this integration.
Better Business Practices
The Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy have emphasized,
and the Marine Corps is committed to, business transformation in order
to optimize resource allocation. The Marine Corps is employing a
variety of business transformation initiatives including: competitive
sourcing of over 3,500 commercial billets to save $57 million annually;
outsourcing garrison food service in our mess halls in the continental
United States in to free up 594 marines for other duties; using public-
private ventures to fund new family housing and to increase the
quantity of safe, comfortable, and affordable homes; consolidation of
equipment maintenance from five to three echelons in order to improve
maintenance effectiveness and efficiency; and, regionalizing garrison
mobile equipment to realign marines and dollars with higher priorities.
The Marine Corps continues to develop its activity based costing
capability in order to support fact based decision making.
In March 2003, the Marine Corps began participation in the Navy
Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI)--a network outsourcing initiative that
will provide a common end-to-end Department of the Navy information
system capability for voice, video, and data communications. By
outsourcing information technology services not considered to be core
competencies, the Marine Corps has been able to return 355 supporting
establishment personnel structure spaces to the operating forces. As a
result of this improved business practice, the NMCI operating
environment will promote greater naval interoperability. The Marine
Corps will continue to refine our business practices and increase the
effectiveness of warfighting potential.
v. our main effort--excellence in warfighting
Training
Training at Eglin Air Force Base
In anticipation of the cessation of naval expeditionary forces
training in Vieques, Puerto Rico, efforts began in September 2002 to
establish a new training capability at Eglin Air Force Base (AFB).
Training at Eglin AFB is envisioned to provide a near-term pre-
deployment training capability for East Coast Navy Amphibious Ready
Groups/ESGs and MEUs (Special Operations Capable), with the potential
to be part of the long-term solution. The training concept was designed
for up to two 10-day training periods per year. The long-term objective
is that during each 10-day event, the ESGs will be able to conduct the
full spectrum of training required. The Marine Corps has invested
approximately $4.2 million in environmental assessment/mitigation and
infrastructure development required to establish an initial training
capability at Eglin AFB.
In December 2003, the Marine Corps completed its first 10-day
training period at Eglin AFB, at an additional cost of approximately $1
million. The Marine Corps is assessing the quality the training offered
at Eglin AFB while continuing to explore and develop other options,
both within the United States and abroad. While Eglin AFB has the
potential for enhanced live fire and maneuver training, developing this
capability will require a significant investment by the Department of
the Navy and DOD to upgrade existing facilities.
Joint National Training Capability
As described by the Deputy Secretary of Defense: ``The centerpiece
of our Training Transformation effort will be a Joint National Training
Capability.'' The Joint National Training Capability is one of the
three pillars of Training Transformation, and will improve joint
interoperability by adding certified `joint context' to existing
Service training events. The Joint National Training Capability is a
cooperative collection of interoperable training sites, nodes, and
events that synthesizes combatant commander and Service training
requirements with the appropriate level of joint context.
The first in a series of pre-Initial Operational Capability (IOC)
Joint National Training Capability exercises was held in January 2004,
linking a Marine Corps Combined Arms Exercise with live close air
support sorties, a Navy Stand-off Land Attack Missile Exercise, an Army
rotation at the National Training Center, and an Air Force Air Warrior
Exercise. The Marine Corps will be actively involved in future Joint
National Training Capability exercises including Combined Arms
Exercises and Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1 evolutions
scheduled for fiscal year 2005. The Marine Corps is fully engaged in
the Joint National Training Capability program development, and is on
track to enhance Service core-competency training with the appropriate
level of joint context. In concert with the other Services, the Marine
Corps is working with JFCOM to refine the phrase ``joint context,''
certify ranges, and accredit exercises to ensure the force is training
properly.
Infrastructure
Blount Island Facility
The acquisition of the Blount Island facility in Jacksonville,
Florida, is critical to our Nation and to our Corps' warfighting
capabilities. Blount Island's peacetime mission is to support the
Maritime Prepositioning Force. Its wartime capability and capacity to
support massive logistics sustainment from the continental United
States gives it strategic significance. The Blount Island facility has
a vital role in the National Military Strategy as the site for
maintenance operations of the Maritime Prepositioning Force. The Marine
Corps thanks Congress for your role in supporting this acquisition
project. Phase II, funded by the $115.7 million appropriated in the
Defense Authorization Act of 2004, gives the Marine Corps ownership of
the leased maintenance area and supporting dredge disposal site
consisting of 1,089 acres.
Encroachment
We are grateful to Congress for providing a tool to facilitate the
management of incompatible developments adjacent to or in close
proximity to military lands. We are working with state and local
governments and with non-governmental organizations such as the Trust
for Public Lands, The Nature Conservancy, the Sierra Club, and the
Endangered Species Coalition to acquire lands buffering or near our
bases including Camp Lejeune, Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, and
Camp Pendleton. In return for our investment, the Marine Corps is
receiving restrictive easements that ensure lands acquired remain
undeveloped and serve as buffer zones against future encroachment on
our bases.
We are also grateful to Congress for codifying legislation that
gives us the opportunity to partner with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service and State fish and game agencies in order to manage endangered
species present on military lands. Management via our Integrated
Natural Resources Management Plans, which we prepare in partnerships
with these agencies, allows us to protect and enhance populations of
these species on our lands while allowing marines to train. Finally, we
support the Secretary of Defense's efforts to provide flexibility under
the Clean Air Act and to clarify the governing authorities under which
the DOD would manage operational ranges. The Marine Corps strives to be
a good environmental steward and the growing number of endangered
species on our lands and their increasing populations are examples of
our successes. We remain committed to protecting the resources
entrusted to us by the American people.
Base Realignment and Closures
A successful Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, resulting
in recommendations in 2005, is critically important to the Nation, the
DOD, and the Department of Navy. By eliminating excesses and improving
efficiencies, the armed services will achieve a transformation of our
infrastructure in the same way we are achieving a transformation of our
forces. Recommendations will be developed only after a thorough and in-
depth review.
Command and Control
Naval expeditionary warfare will depend heavily on the ability of
the forces to share linked and fused information from a common source
which will, in turn, ensure command and control of widely dispersed
forces. Exploiting the use of space, ground and aerial platforms
requires a networked, protected, and assured global grid of
information. Leveraging command and control technology to improve our
interoperability continues to be our focus of effort.
Advances in technology and a need to leverage existing
infrastructure requires us to establish a new information technology
(IT) framework--one that is more reliable, efficient, secure, and
responsive. This new IT framework must provide enhanced information
access and improved information services to the operating forces. By
streamlining the deployment of IT tools and realigning our IT
resources, the Marine Corps Enterprise IT Services will shift the
burden away from the operating forces by establishing a new IT
environment. This IT environment will fuse and integrate Department
wide, net-centric enterprise services to provide a common set of
sharable IT services to the entire Marine Corps. By eliminating
individual organizations providing duplicative and redundant services,
we will reduce the IT burden on the operating forces through enterprise
provided IT services, and improve our ability to process information
and enhance the speed of decisionmaking.
Intelligence
Our fiscal year 1996 through fiscal year 2004 enhancements to
Marine Corps intelligence improved the intelligence capability within
Marine Corps units and established a ``reach-back'' intelligence
production capability between forward deployed units and our Marine
Corps Intelligence Activity in Quantico, Virginia. These improvements
are proving to be remarkably beneficial to our efforts in OIF and OEF.
Marine intelligence is concurrently supporting ongoing operations,
preparing for near term operations, and transforming our intelligence
systems to meet future warfighting requirements. Marine Intelligence
Specialists have provided significant contributions to ongoing
operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Djibouti and will play a crucial
intelligence role as Marine Forces return to Iraq in larger numbers
this year. Before again deploying to Iraq, we will train over 400
marines in basic Arabic to aid in our efforts to work with the Iraqis
at the patrol level, and we will provide enhanced language training for
some of our Arabic heritage speakers and others trained linguists to
increase our operational influence and effectiveness. Meanwhile, we
prepare for future conflicts by ensuring that our intelligence training
and systems funded in the fiscal year 2005-2009 program incorporate the
latest technological advances and become more capable of seamless
interoperability with the systems used by other Services and national
agencies.
Mobility
As preliminary assessments of operations in Iraq highlight,
operational and tactical mobility are essential to overcome the current
range of threats. The ability to rapidly respond and then flexibly
adapt to a changing situation is critical to address future challenges.
Increasing the speed, range, and flexibility of maneuver units that are
enhanced by logistical power generated from the sea, will increase
naval power projection. The following initiatives are vital to achieve
greater operational mobility:
MV-22 Osprey
The MV-22 remains the Marine Corps' number one aviation acquisition
priority. While fulfilling the critical Marine Corps medium lift
requirement, the MV-22's increased range, speed, payload, and
survivability will generate truly transformational tactical and
operational capabilities. With the Osprey, Marine Forces operating from
a sea base will be able to take the best of long-range maneuver and
strategic surprise, and join it with the best of the sustainable
forcible-entry capability. Ospreys will replace our aging fleets of CH-
46E Sea Knight and CH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters.
KC-130J
Continued replacement of our aging KC-130 fleet with KC-130J
aircraft is necessary to ensure the viability and deployability of
Marine Corps Tactical Air and Assault Support well into the 21st
century. Acquisition of the KC-130J represents a significant increase
in operational efficiency and enhanced refueling and assault support
capabilities for the Marine Corps. The KC-130J provides the aerial
refueling and assault support airlift resources needed to support the
Osprey, the JSF, and the MAGTF and Joint Force Commanders.
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle
The EFV, formerly known as the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle
(AAAV), will provide Marine Corp surface assault elements the requisite
operational and tactical mobility to exploit fleeting opportunities in
the fluid operational environment of the future. Designed to be
launched from naval amphibious shipping from over the horizon, the EFV
will be capable of carrying a reinforced Marine Corp rifle squad at
speeds in excess of 20 nautical miles per hour in sea state three. This
capability will reduce the vulnerability of our naval forces to enemy
threats by keeping them well out to sea while providing our surface
assault forces mounted in EFVs the mobility to react to and exploit
gaps in enemy defenses ashore. Once ashore, EFV will provide Marine
Corp maneuver units with an armored personnel carrier designed to meet
the threats of the future. EFV will replace the aging Assault
Amphibious Vehicle (AAV). With its high speed land and water
maneuverability, highly lethal day/night fighting ability, and advanced
armor and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) protection, the EFV
will significantly enhance the lethality and survivability of Marine
Corp maneuver units and provide the MAGTF and ESG with increased
operational tempo across the spectrum of operations.
Power Projection Platforms
Combined with embarked marines, amphibious warships provide our
Nation with both a forward presence and a flexible crisis response
force. These power projection platforms give decisionmakers immediately
responsive combat options. As the sea basing concept matures, enhanced
naval expeditionary forces will be optimized to provide a full spectrum
of capabilities.
Inherent in the Sea Strike pillar of the sea basing concept is the
ability to both strike with fires from the sea base and from units
maneuvering within the littoral region. The dilemma that these two
offensive capabilities impose on an enemy and the multitude of options
they create for our leadership increase our ability to achieve success
effectively and efficiently. The built-in flexibility and survivability
of amphibious ships coupled with their combat sustainment capability
ensure the rapid achievement of a full range of offensive operations
that either allow us to accomplish operational objectives directly or
enable us to set the conditions for major joint operations. The ability
to defeat an anti-access strategy--before it is completed or even once
it is developed--is vital to our national security objectives.
The LPD 17 class amphibious ships, currently planned or under
construction, represent the Department of the Navy's commitment to a
modern expeditionary power projection fleet. These ships will assist
our naval forces in meeting the fiscally-constrained programming goal
of lifting 2.5 Marine Expeditionary Brigade Assault Echelons (AEs). The
lead ship detail design has been completed and the construction process
is over 80 percent, complete with a successful launch in July 2003.
Production effort is focused on meeting test milestones for a November
2004 delivery. Construction of LPD 23 has been accelerated from fiscal
year 2006 to fiscal year 2005, leveraging Fiscal Year 2004 Advance
Procurement resources provided by Congress. LPD 17 replaces four
classes of older ships--the LKA, LST, LSD, and the LPD--and is being
built with a 40-year expected service life.
LHAs 1-5 reach their 35-year service life at a rate of one per year
in 2011-2015. LHD-8 will replace one LHA when it delivers in fiscal
year 2007. In order to meet future warfighting requirements, the Navy
and Marine Corps leadership is evaluating LHA (Replacement)--LHA(R)--
requirements in the larger context of joint sea basing, power
projection, the global war on terrorism, and lessons learned from OEF
and OIF. The resulting platform will provide a transformational
capability that is interoperable with future amphibious and Maritime
Preposition Force ships, high-speed connectors, advanced rotorcraft
like the MV-22, JSF, and EFVs.
Maritime Prepositioning Force
The leases on the current Maritime Prepositioning Ships begin to
expire in 2009. The MPF(F) will be a key enabler to sea-based
operations. It will allow us to better exploit the maneuver space
provided by the sea to conduct joint operations at a time and place of
our choosing. When the MPF(F) becomes operational, the maritime
prepositioning role will expand far beyond its current capability to
provide the combat equipment for a fly-in force. MPF(F) will serve four
functions that the current MPF cannot: (1) at-sea arrival and assembly
of units; (2) direct support of the assault echelon of the Amphibious
Task Force; (3) long-term, sea-based sustainment of the landing force;
and (4) at-sea reconstitution and redeployment of the force. The
enhanced capabilities of these ships will significantly increase the
capability of the Sea Base--in the sea basing concept--to provide
unimpeded mobility and persistent sustainment. This enhanced sea base
will minimize limitations imposed by reliance on overseas shore-based
support, maximize the ability of the naval elements of the joint force
to conduct combat operations from the maritime domain, and enable the
transformed joint force to exploit our Nation's asymmetric advantage of
our seapower dominance. The ability to rapidly generate maneuver forces
from this sea base will augment our forward presence and forcible entry
forces, increasing the overall power and effect of the joint campaign.
Acceleration of the lead MPF(F) from fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year
2007 in the fiscal year 2005 budget reflects an emphasis on sea basing
capabilities. The fiscal years 2005-2009 plan procures three MPF(F)
ships and advanced construction for an MPF(F) aviation variant.
High Speed Connectors
High Speed Connectors (HSCs) possess characteristics that make them
uniquely suited to support the sea base and sea-based operations. HSCs
are unique in combining shallow draft, high speed, and large lift
capacity into a single platform. HSCs will help create an enhanced
operational capability by providing commanders with a flexible platform
to deliver tailored, scalable forces in response to a wide range of
mission requirements. The range and payload capacity of HSCs, combined
with their ability to interface with current and future MPF shipping
and access austere ports greatly enhances the operational reach,
tactical mobility, and flexibility of sea-based forces.
Mine Countermeasure Capabilities
There is a great need to continue the development of our mine
countermeasure capabilities. A major challenge for the Navy-Marine
Corps team is ensuring the effective delivery of ground forces ashore
when mines and other anti-access measures are employed in the surf zone
or ashore beyond the high water mark. We are currently exploring with
the Navy how the technology of Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM)
promises a short-term solution and may lead to a better long-term
solution to the challenge of mines in the surf zone. Using unitary
bombs, fuses, and JDAM tail kits, we have designed a mine
countermeasure known as the JDAM Assault Breaching System (JABS).
Preliminary test results are showing promise as an interim solution for
breaching surface laid minefields and light obstacles in the beach
zones. Further testing and characterization of the JABS system is
proceeding throughout fiscal year 2004 with tests against Surf Zone
Mines and obstacles.
Some aspects of JABS development may lead to a long-term solution
to the mine threat. One possible solution that is envisioned includes
developing bomb-delivered darts that physically destroy buried mines in
the Beach Zone and Surf Zone region. In addition, the Navy has adopted
the Marine Corp Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis (COBRA)
mine sensor system for the beach zone with a planned product
improvement enhancement for COBRA called the Rapid Overt Airborne
Reconnaissance (ROAR) that extends detection to the very shallow water
and the surf zone regions by 2015. In addition, the Marine Corps seeks
to improve breaching capability beyond the high water mark by
developing both deliberate and in-stride breaching systems. These
include the Advanced Mine Detector program and the Assault Breacher
Vehicle program.
Fires and Effects
As events over the past year have demonstrated--and suggest for the
future--the increased range and speed of expeditionary forces and the
depth of their influence landward has and will continue to increase. To
fully realize these capabilities the Nation requires a range of
complementary, expeditionary lethal and non-lethal fire support
capabilities. During OIF, 60 AV-8B Harrier aircraft were based at-sea
aboard amphibious shipping--minimizing the challenge of airfield
shortages ashore. This prelude to future sea-based operations was
extremely successful with over 2,200 sorties generated--mostly in
support of I MEF ground units. A key factor to this success was the
employment of forward operating bases close to the ground forces which
allowed the AV-8B to refuel and rearm multiple times before returning
to their ships. In addition, the complementary capabilities of surface
and air delivered fires were highlighted in this campaign. Further, the
importance of both precision and volume fires was critical to success.
Precision fires assisted in reducing both collateral damage and the
demands on tactical logistics. I MEF also validated the requirement for
volume fires in support of maneuver warfare tactics. These fires allow
maneuver forces to take advantage of maneuver warfare opportunities
before precision intelligence can be developed and precision fires can
be employed against fleeting targets or rapidly developing enemy
defensive postures.
Short Take Off Vertical Landing Joint Strike Fighter
The STOVL JSF will be a single engine, stealth, supersonic, strike-
fighter capable of short take-offs and vertical landings. The aircraft
is designed to replace the AV-8B and FA-18 aircraft in the Marine Corps
inventory. The operational reliability, stealth, and payload capability
designed into the STOVL JSF represents a great improvement in combat
capability over existing legacy platforms. The aircraft is in the
second year of a 10-12 year development program. The STOVL JSF force is
integral to our future warfighting capabilities. Its design and
capabilities will fulfill all Marine Corps strike-fighter requirements
and better support the combined arms requirements in expeditionary
operations. Continued support of the STOVL JSF is vital to the Marine
Corps.
Indirect Fires Support
In response to identified gaps in our indirect fires capability,
the Marine Corps undertook an effort to replace the aging M198 155mm
towed howitzers and provide a full spectrum all-weather system of
systems fires capability. Operations in Iraq confirmed this requirement
and the direction that the Marine Corps has undertaken. This system of
systems will be capable of employing both precision and volume
munitions.
The Lightweight 155mm Howitzer (LW 155) is optimized for
versatility, pro-active counter fire and offensive operations in
support of light and medium forces. It supports Operational Maneuver
from the Sea and replaces all M198s in the Marine Corps, as well as the
M198s in Army Airborne, Light Units, and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams.
Compared to the current system, the LW 155 is more mobile, capable of
more rapid deployment, more survivable, and more accurate. IOC is
expected during fiscal year 2005, and a full operational capability
will be reached 3 years later.
The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) fulfills a
critical range and volume gap in Marine Corps fire support assets by
providing 24 hour, all weather, ground-based, responsive, General
Support, General Support-Reinforcing, and Reinforcing indirect fires
throughout all phases of combat operations ashore. HIMARS will be
fielded in one artillery battalion of the active component and one
battalion of the Reserve component. An IOC is planned for fiscal year
2007 with a full capability expected during fiscal year 2008. An
interim capability of one battery during fiscal years 2005-2006 is also
currently planned.
The Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS) is the third element
of the triad of ground firing systems, and it will be the principal
indirect fire support system for the vertical assault element. EFSS-
equipped units will be especially well suited for missions requiring
speed, tactical agility, and vertical transportability. The estimated
Approved Acquisition Objective is 88 systems. Initially, this provides
eleven batteries to support our MEUs (Special Operations Capable). IOC
is planned for fiscal year 2006 and full operational capability is
planned for fiscal year 2008.
Naval Surface Fire Support
An important element of our fires and effects capability will
continue to be surface ships that provide direct delivery of fires from
the sea base. Critical deficiencies currently exist in the capability
of the Navy to provide all-weather, accurate, lethal and responsive
fire support throughout the depth of the littoral in support of
expeditionary operations. In the critical period of the early phases of
the forcible entry operations when organic Marine Corps ground indirect
fires are not yet or just beginning to be established, the landing
force will be even more dependent on the complementary capability
required of naval surface fire support assets. To date, no systems have
been introduced or are being developed which meet near- or mid-term
Naval Surface Fire Support requirements. The DD(X) destroyer--armed
with two 155mm Advanced Gun Systems--continues to be the best long-term
solution to satisfy the Marine Corps' Naval Surface Fire Support
requirements. Our Nation's forcible entry, expeditionary forces will
remain at considerable risk for want of suitable sea-based fire support
until DD(X) joins the fleet in considerable numbers in 2020. Currently,
the lead ship of this class will not be operational until fiscal year
2013. In addition, the Marine Corps is closely monitoring research into
the development of electromagnetic gun technology to support future
range and velocity requirements. Electromagnetic guns could potentially
provide naval surface fire support at ranges on the order of 220
nautical miles, and could eventually be incorporated into ground mobile
weapon systems like the future EFVs as size, weight, and power
technology hurdles are overcome.
H-1 (UH-1Y/AH-1Z)
The current fleet of UH-1N utility helicopters and AH-1W attack
helicopters is reaching the end of their planned service life and face
a number of deficiencies in crew and passenger survivability, payload,
power availability, endurance, range, airspeed, maneuverability, and
supportability. The Department of the Navy has determined that the H-1
Upgrade Program is the most cost effective alternative that meets the
Marine Corps' attack and utility helicopter requirements until the
introduction of a new technology advanced rotorcraft aircraft. The H-1
Upgrade Program is a key modernization effort designed to resolve
existing safety deficiencies, enhance operational effectiveness of both
the UH-1N and the AH-1W, and extend the service life of both aircraft.
Additionally, the commonality gained between the UH-1Y and AH-1Z
(projected to be 84 percent) will significantly reduce life-cycle costs
and logistical footprint, while increasing the maintainability and
deployability of both aircraft. On October 22, 2003, the program to
enter Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP), and on December 29, 2003, the
LRIP Lot 1 aircraft contract was awarded to Bell Helicopter.
Information Operations
The Marine Corps is exploring ways to ensure marines will be
capable of conducting full spectrum information operations, pursuing
the development of information capabilities through initiatives in
policy and doctrine, career force, structure, training and education,
and programs and resources. Marine Forces will use information
operations to deny, degrade, disrupt, destroy or influence an adversary
commander's methods, means or ability to command and control his
forces.
New Weapons Technologies
The Marine Corps is particularly interested in adapting truly
transformational weapon technologies. We have forged partnerships
throughout DOD, other agencies, and with industry over the past several
years in an effort to develop and adapt the most hopeful areas of
science and technology. Several notable programs with promising
technologies include: (1) Advanced Tactical Lasers to potentially
support a tactical gunship high energy laser weapon, (2) Active Denial
System--a high-power millimeter-wave, non-lethal weapon, (3) Free
Electron Lasers for multi-mission shipboard weapons application, and
(4) various promising Counter Improvised Explosive Device technologies.
Logistics and Combat Service Support
Logistics Modernization
Since 1999, the Marine Corps has undertaken several logistics
modernization efforts to improve the overall effectiveness of our
MAGTFs as agile, expeditionary forces in readiness. Some of these
initiatives have reached full operational capability or are on track
for complete implementation. Applying the lessons learned from OIF
resulted in new initiatives concerning naval logistics integration,
naval distribution, and the integration of the Combat Service Support
Element with Marine Corps Bases.
The Marine Corps' number one logistics priority is the re-
engineering of logistics information technology and the retirement of
our legacy systems, which is described in the next section. The Marine
Corps is working to enhance the integration of its distribution
processes across the tactical through strategic levels of warfare,
providing the warfighter a ``snap shot'' view of his needed supplies in
the distribution chain to instantly locate specific items that are en
route. This capability, described in the following section, will result
in increased confidence in the distribution chain and will reduce both
the quantity of reorders and the amount of inventory carried to support
the warfighter.
Logistics Command and Control
The Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps is the Marine Corps'
portion of the overarching Global Combat Support System Family of
Systems as designated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(JROC) and the Global Combat Support System General Officer Steering
Committee. It is a Marine Corps acquisition program with the
responsibility to acquire and integrate commercial off the shelf
software in order to satisfy the information requirements of
commanders, as well as support the Marine Corps Logistics Operational
Architecture. The Global Combat Support System--Marine Corps program
will provide modern, deployable information technology tools for all
elements of the MAGTF. Existing Logistics Information Systems used
today in direct support of our MAGTFs are either not deployable
(mainframe based) or are deployable with such limited capability
(tethered client server) that our commanders lack in-transit and asset
visibility. Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps requirements
include a single point of entry, Web-based portal capability to
generate simple requests for products and services, logistics command
and control capability to support the MAGTF, and back office tools to
assist in the management of the logistics chain. These capabilities
will improve warfighting excellence by providing commanders with the
logistics information they need to make timely command and control
decisions. The key to improving the accuracy and visibility of materiel
in the logistics chain is to establish a shared data environment.
End-to-End Distribution
The Marine Corps is aggressively pursuing standardization of the
materiel distribution within the Marine Corps to include interfacing
with commercial and operational-level DOD distribution organizations.
Furthermore, distribution processes and resources used in a deployed
theater of operations need to be the same as those used in garrison. We
strongly support United States Transportation Command's designation as
the DOD's Distribution Process Owner. In this capacity, United States
Transportation Command can more easily integrate distribution processes
and systems at the strategic and operational levels and provide the DOD
a standard, joint solution for distribution management. Materiel End-
To-End Distribution provides Marine Corp commanders the means to
seamlessly execute inbound and outbound movements for all classes of
supply while maintaining Total Asset and In-transit Visibility
throughout the distribution pipeline.
vi. conclusion
The Marine Corps remains focused on organizing, training, and
equipping our forces to best support combatant commanders throughout
the spectrum of combat. Incorporating recent experiences, increasing
our forces' integration with joint capabilities, exploiting the
flexibility and rapid response capabilities of our units, and
preserving the adaptability of our marines, will collectively lead to
more options for the combatant commanders. The Marine Corps' commitment
to warfighting excellence and the steadfast support we receive from
this committee will lead to success in the global war on terrorism
while helping to ensure America's security and prosperity.
Chairman Warner. We thank you for your service, General,
and I thank you for your very clear and forthright statement,
which again will be listened to very carefully by your forces
and their families for your actions and judgment concerning the
conflict in Iraq. I share your view, as we all do. WMD were not
there readily available to be used.
General Jumper.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN P. JUMPER, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED
STATES AIR FORCE
General Jumper. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the
committee: It is a pleasure for me to be here today and to
represent more than 700,000 active duty, Air National Guard,
Air Force Reserve, and Air Force civilians who serve in our
United States Air Force.
I would like to thank this committee for their continued
support of all that we do around the world to deal with this
global war on terrorism and the other contingencies that we
support globally. Senator Lieberman, I am particularly taken by
your acknowledgment of our families that are out there, that we
hear from every single day. I am encouraged every day at the
courage and the bravery of those families, and I would also
include in that the commitment of the employers who support our
mobilized Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve members that
have served throughout this crisis.
I would also like to take this time, Mr. Chairman, to make
the point that during Operation Desert Shield and Operation
Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991 I was put in charge of preparing
for biological and chemical warfare defense by then Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell when I worked for him on
the Joint Staff. The evidence then was compelling, and
continued to be throughout the years of our no-fly zone
operations, of stored chemical and biological weapons, even
weaponizing on warheads. We did not know the disposition of
their Scud missiles, but we knew that there were missiles left
over after the Operation Desert Storm and Operation Desert
Shield crisis.
We watched for years as the Iraqis made attempts to evade
the inspectors that were on the ground finding these weapons,
and then we watched, as was pointed out earlier, the attempts
to shoot at our airplanes that were patrolling the no-fly
zones. I was, as Admiral Clark said, convinced then and I was
convinced as we went into the war that they were there, and I
stand by my position at that time.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, General.
General Jumper. Sir, as Admiral Clark pointed out, the
group at this table spend a lot of time together, and we talk
about our capabilities jointly and the ability to go to war
jointly. We have decided among ourselves that we will never be
going alone to any confrontation that this Nation undertakes.
We have embarked on a series of joint concepts of operations so
that we can be together when we do deploy at the Nation's
bidding.
As the Army undertakes its new concept of operations
(CONOP) for a brigade combat team and as the sea basing CONOP
unfolds, we are configuring our Air Force to be able to
maintain the superiority in air and space and to join in on
these concepts of operations as required to make them
successful. We are also undertaking dedicated efforts to
improve our close air support for the United States Army. You
will see in this budget efforts that will assure that we have
dedicated and improved close air support on into the future.
We in the United States Air Force have completed our
configuration to the Air Expeditionary Force, an effort that
has taken us since 1994 and in a more dedicated way since 1997
to complete this configuration into 10 equally capable
expeditionary force packages. Today I can report to you that 75
percent of our people in the Air Force are on tap to be
mobilized if required.
OIF required us to deploy 8 of our 10 Air Expeditionary
Forces. We pulled them forward. We deployed into 32 bases and
locations around the world. I can tell you that at the height
of OIF I do not think we had one tent left in the United States
Air Force. We continue today with 14 bases open throughout the
AOR to conduct operations.
Like the Army, the Air Force helped us with our security
needs. They provided us with their National Guard security
forces when we experienced increased threat conditions after
September 11. We now have almost 100 percent of our combat
engineers deployed to help the transition in and out between
the United States Army and the United States Marine Corps.
We have invested, and will continue to invest, a great deal
in the technology of air and space. We will see continued
development of the space-based radar (SBR), and of the
transformational communications system. We will see the F/A-22
in the budget as it continues to go through its operational
testing. This is a system that will be able to deal with the
surface-to-air missiles that we see being developed and
deployed right now around the world, and will also be able to
deal with anything that comes up to challenge us in the air.
We are developing a new series of joint weapons, to include
standoff munitions. We are developing a 250-pound small
diameter bomb that will be able to glide with internal wings
out many miles, allowing it to deal with targets far away. When
we are able to incorporate this on an F/A-22 we will be able to
support the brigade combat team concept deep behind enemy lines
to support people on the ground.
As for mobility, you will see that we continue to acquire
additional C-17s, airplanes that have been renownedly
successful. We saw in OIF the drop of over 1,000 members of the
173rd Brigade in northern Iraq, which proved to be a very
successful operation. Jumping with the Army were 22 airmen who
got to the ground and made sure that the air field was able to
be used to land aircraft as quickly as possible.
In concert with the United States Navy, we continue to
develop unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and to put these UAVs
out there in the hands of the people who need them: the
Predator unmanned vehicle, the Global Hawk, and the Predator B.
These are armed Predators: The two versions of the Predator are
both armed and can deal with targets, as we saw them do in Iraq
when we took out a satellite TV station being used by Baghdad
Bob that was parked right near the Grand Mosque. We were able
to do that with great precision, with only a very small warhead
used from the Predator UAV.
We continue to ask that we be able to recapitalize our
tanker force in a way that is appropriate and is approved by
this committee and by Members of Congress.
We ask for continued improvement of our bomber force, to
include standoff capability on our B-1s. We ask that we may
develop a bomb rack from which we can drop 80 individually
guided, Global Positioning System (GPS)-guided munitions from a
single B-2. This has been tested and proven to be successful.
Of course, as the other Service Chiefs have testified, none
of this is made possible without absolutely magnificent people.
More than 20 percent of each of our Air Expeditionary Force
packages are made up of members of the Air National Guard and
the Air Force Reserve. We cannot go to war without them. They
volunteer in normal times to go on these rotations, and then we
have innovative concepts that are working. Take, for example,
the blended unit in Senator Chambliss' State of Georgia that
has the Air National Guard and the Active-Duty Force in the
same unit. In this case, it is commanded by a guardsman, but
the command can transfer back and forth, and it provides us a
terrific way to have ready forces that Air National Guard
members can fall in on in times of surge. We are going to look
at this concept also in the future with our fighter forces, to
include the F/A-22.
We are happy to report, as are the other Services, great
progress and success in retention and in recruiting. Before
this fiscal year started, we had 43 percent of this year's
recruiting already in the bank and ready to go. Retention again
for several years in a row now is at 100 percent in all
categories. We expected some drop after stop-loss was dropped
last summer. We saw no dropoff in retention. I am proud to
report, sir, that in my travels overseas where I have visited
with soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in the AOR, the
highest morale I have ever seen and a pride that I can tell you
I have never felt before.
Sir, it is a pleasure to be here today and I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Jumper follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. John P. Jumper, USAF
Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and distinguished members of the
committee, the Air Force has an unlimited horizon for air and space
capabilities. Our Service was borne of innovation, and we remain
focused on identifying and developing the concepts of operations
(CONOPs), advanced technologies, and integrated operations required to
provide the joint force with unprecedented capabilities and to remain
the world's dominant air and space force.
Throughout our distinguished history, America's Air Force has
remained the world's premier air and space power because of our
professional airmen, our investment in warfighting technology, and our
ability to integrate our people and systems together to produce
decisive effects. These Air Force competencies are the foundation that
will ensure we are prepared for the unknown threats of an uncertain
future. They will ensure that our combatant commanders have the tools
they need to maintain a broad and sustained advantage over any emerging
adversaries.
In this strategic environment of the 21st century, and along with
our sister Services, our Air Force will continue to fulfill our
obligation to protect America, deter aggression, assure our allies, and
defeat our enemies. As we adapt the Air Force to the demands of this
era, we remain committed to fulfilling our global commitments as part
of the joint warfighting team. In partnership, and with the continuing
assistance of Congress, we will shape the force to meet the needs of
this century, fight the global war on terrorism, and defend our Nation.
The 2004 Posture Statement is our vision for the upcoming year and
is the blueprint we will follow to sustain our air and space dominance
in the future. We are America's Air Force--disciplined airmen, dominant
in warfighting, decisive in conflict.
introduction
In 2003, U.S. and coalition military operations produced
unprecedented mission successes--across the spectrum of conflict and
around the globe. The joint warfighting team demonstrated combat
capability never previously witnessed in the history of conflict.
Integrating capabilities from air, land, sea, and space, the U.S. and
coalition allies achieved considerable progress in the ongoing global
war on terrorism. In our most recent engagements, our Armed Forces
fulfilled our immediate obligations to defend America, deter
aggression, assure our allies, and defeat our enemies.
The foundation of these achievements can be found in the Department
of Defense's (DOD) commitment to teamwork and excellence. Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was a joint and coalition warfighting effort from
planning to execution. Air, ground, maritime, and space forces worked
together at the same time for the same objectives, not merely staying
out of each other's way, but orchestrated to achieve wartime
objectives. Our air and space forces achieved dominance throughout the
entire theater, enabling maritime and ground forces to operate without
fear of enemy air attack. Our airmen demonstrated the flexibility,
speed, precision, and compelling effects of air and space power,
successfully engaging the full range of enemy targets, from the
regime's leadership to fielded forces. When our ground and maritime
components engaged the enemy, they were confident our airmen would be
there--either in advance of their attacks, or in support of their
operations. America's Air Force was there, disciplined, dominant, and
decisive.
These operational accomplishments illustrate the growing maturation
of air and space power. Leveraging the expertise of our airmen, the
technologies present in our 21st century force, and the strategies,
CONOPs, and organizations in use today, the U.S. Air Force continues to
adapt to meet the demands of this new era, while pursuing the war on
terrorism and defending the homeland.
On September 11, 2001, the dangers of the 21st century became
apparent to the world. Today, the U.S. faces an array of asymmetric
threats from terrorists and rogue states, including a threat that poses
the gravest danger to our Nation, the growing nexus of radicalism and
technology. As we continue our work in Afghanistan and Iraq, we stand
ready to respond to flashpoints around the world, prepared to counter
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to unfriendly
states and non-state entities.
We are adapting to new and enduring challenges. As we do, we are
exploiting the inherent sources of strength that give us the advantages
we enjoy today. It is a strategy predicated on the idea that, if we
accurately assess our own advantages and strengths, we can invest in
them to yield high rates of military return. This approach helps us
create a portfolio of advantages allowing us to produce and continue to
exploit our capabilities. Our goal is to create a capability mix
consistent with CONOPs and effects-driven methodology, relevant to the
joint character and increasingly asymmetric conduct of warfare.
Since 1945, when General Henry ``Hap'' Arnold and Dr. Theodore von
Karman published Toward New Horizons, the Air Force has evolved to meet
the changing needs of the Nation--with the sole objective of improving
our ability to generate overwhelming and strategically compelling
effects from air and now, space. It is our heritage to adapt and we
will continue to do so. During this comparatively short history, we
became the best air and space force in the world through our focus on
the development of professional airmen, our investment in warfighting
technology, and our ability to integrate people and systems to produce
decisive joint warfighting effects.
The Air Force is making a conscious investment in education,
training, and leader development to foster critical thinking,
innovation, and encourage risk taking. We deliberately prepare our
airmen--officer, enlisted, and civilian--with experience, assignments,
and broadening that will allow them to succeed. When our airmen act in
the combined or joint arena, whether as an Air Liaison Officer to a
ground maneuver element, or as the space advisor to the Joint Force
Commander (JFC), this focused professional development will guide their
success.
We are also investing in technologies that will enable us to create
a fully integrated force of intelligence capabilities, manned, unmanned
and space assets that communicate at the machine-to-machine level, and
real-time global command and control (C2) of joint, allied, and
coalition forces. Collectively, these assets will enable compression of
the targeting cycle and near-instantaneous global precision-strike.
As we cultivate new concepts of global engagement, we will move
from analog to digital processes and adopt more agile, non-linear ways
of integrating to achieve mission success. This change in thinking
leads to capabilities including: networked communications; multi-
mission platforms which fuse multi-spectral sensors; integrated global
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); robust, all-
weather weapons delivery with increased standoff; small smart weapons;
remotely-piloted and unattended aircraft systems; advanced air
operations centers; more secure position, navigation, and timing; and a
new generation of satellites with more operationally responsive launch
systems.
Investment in our core competencies is the foundation of our
preparation for future threats. They ensure we have the tools we need
to maintain strategic deterrence as well as a sustained advantage over
our potential adversaries. Ultimately, they ensure we can deliver the
dominant warfighting capability our Nation needs.
Potential adversaries, however, continue to pursue capabilities
that threaten the dominance we enjoy today. Double-digit surface-to-air
missile systems (SAMs) are proliferating. China has purchased
significant numbers of these advanced SAMs, and there is a risk of
wider future proliferation to potential threat nations. Fifth-
generation advanced aircraft with capabilities superior to our present
fleet of frontline fighter/attack aircraft are in production. China has
also purchased, and is developing, advanced fighter aircraft that are
broadly comparable to the best of our current frontline fighters.
Advanced cruise missile technology is expanding, and information
technology is spreading. Access to satellite communications, imagery,
and use of the Global Positioning System (GPS) signal for navigation
are now available for anyone willing to purchase the necessary
equipment or services. With this relentless technological progress and
the potential parity of foreign nations, as well as their potential
application in future threats, the mere maintenance of our aging
aircraft and space systems will not suffice. Simply stated, our current
fleet of legacy systems cannot always ensure air and space dominance in
future engagements.
To counter these trends, we are pursuing a range of strategies that
will guide our modernization and recapitalization efforts. We are using
a capabilities-based planning and budgeting process, an integrated and
systematic risk assessment system, a commitment to shorter acquisition
cycle times, and improved program oversight. Our goal is to integrate
our combat, information warfare, and support systems to create a
portfolio of air and space advantages for the joint warfighter and the
Nation. Thus, we continue to advocate for program stability in our
modernization and investment accounts.
The principal mechanisms that facilitate this process are our Air
Force CONOPs. Through the CONOPs, we analyze problems we will be asked
to solve for the JFCs, identify the capabilities our expeditionary
forces need to accomplish their missions, and define the operational
effects we expect to produce. Through this approach, we can make
smarter decisions about future investment, articulate the link between
systems and employment concepts, and identify our capability gaps and
risks.
The priorities that emerge from the CONOPs will guide a reformed
acquisition process that includes more active, continuous, and creative
partnerships among the requirement, development, operational test, and
industry communities who work side-by-side at the program level. In our
science and technology (S&T) planning, we are also working to
demonstrate and integrate promising technologies quickly by providing
an operational ``pull'' that conveys a clear vision of the capabilities
we need for the future.
We are applying this approach to our space systems as well. As the
DOD's executive agent for space, we are producing innovative solutions
for the most challenging national security problems. We have defined a
series of priorities essential to delivering space-based capabilities
to the joint warfighter and the Intelligence Community. Achieving
mission success--in operations and acquisition--is our principal
priority. This requires us to concentrate on designing and building
quality into our systems. To achieve these exacting standards, we will
concentrate on the technical aspects of our space programs early on--
relying on strong systems engineering design, discipline, and robust
test programs. We also have many areas that require a sustained
investment. We need to replace aging satellites, improve outmoded
ground control stations, achieve space control capabilities to ensure
freedom of action, sustain operationally responsive assured access to
space, address bandwidth limitations, and focus space S&T investment
programs. This effort will require reinvigorating the space industrial
base and funding smaller technology incubators to generate creative
``over the horizon'' ideas.
As we address the problem of aging systems through renewed
investment, we will continue to find innovative means to keep current
systems operationally effective. In OIF, the spirit of innovation
flourished. We achieved a number of air and space power firsts:
employment of the B-1 bomber's synthetic aperture radar and ground
moving target indicator for ISR; incorporation of the Litening II
targeting pod on the F-15, F-16, A-10, and the B-52; and use of a
Global Hawk for strike coordination and reconnaissance while flown as a
remotely piloted aircraft. With these integrated air and space
capabilities, we were able to precisely find, fix, track, target, and
rapidly engage our adversaries. These examples illustrate how we are
approaching adaptation in the U.S. Air Force.
Ultimately, the success of our Air Force in accomplishing our
mission and adapting to the exigencies of combat stems from the more
than 700,000 active, Guard, Reserve, and civilian professionals who
proudly call themselves ``airmen.'' In the past 5 years, they have
displayed their competence and bravery in three major conflicts: the
Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. They are a formidable warfighting
force, imbued with an expeditionary culture, and ready for the
challenges of a dangerous world.
Poised to defend America's interests, we continue to satisfy an
unprecedented demand for air and space warfighting capabilities--
projecting American power globally while providing effective homeland
defense. This is the U.S. Air Force in 2004--we foster ingenuity in the
world's most professional airmen, thrive on transitioning new
technologies into joint warfighting systems, and drive relentlessly
toward integration to realize the potential of our air and space
capabilities. We are America's airmen--confident in our capability to
provide our Nation with dominance in air and space.
air and space dominance in a new environment
The U.S. Air Force ensures a flexible, responsive, and dominant
force by providing a spectrum of operational capabilities that
integrate with joint and coalition forces. To sustain and improve upon
the dominance we enjoy today, the Air Force will remain engaged with
the other Services, our coalition partners, interagency teams, and the
aerospace industry. As we do, we will incorporate the lessons learned
from rigorous evaluation of past operations, detailed analyses of
ongoing combat operations, and thoughtful prediction of the
capabilities required of a future force.
The pace of operations over the past year enabled us to validate
the function and structure of our Air and Space Expeditionary Forces
(AEFs). Operations in 2003 demanded more capability from our AEFs than
at any time since their inception in 1998. However, for the first time
we relied exclusively on our AEFs to present the full range of our
capabilities to the combatant commanders. Through our 10 AEFs, our AEF
prime capabilities (space, national ISR, long range strike, nuclear,
and other assets), and our AEF mobility assets, we demonstrated our
ability to package forces, selecting the most appropriate combat ready
forces from our Total Force, built and presented expeditionary units,
and flowed them to the theaters of operation in a timely and logical
sequence. We rapidly delivered them to the warfighters, while
preserving a highly capable residual force to satisfy our global
commitments.
More than three-fourths of our 359,300 active duty airmen are
eligible to deploy and are assigned to an AEF. Through much of the past
year, Total Force capabilities from 8 of the 10 AEFs were engaged
simultaneously in worldwide operations. The remaining elements were
returning from operations, training, or preparing to relieve those
currently engaged. By the end of 2003, more than 26,000 airmen were
deployed, supporting operations around the world.
In 2004, we will continue to use the AEFs to meet our global
requirements while concurrently reconstituting the force. Our number
one reconstitution priority is returning our forces to a sustainable
AEF battle rhythm while conducting combat operations. Attaining this
goal is about revitalizing capabilities. For most airmen, that will
include a renewed emphasis on joint composite force training and
preparation for rotations in the AEF. Through the AEF, the Air Force
presents right-sized, highly trained expeditionary units to JFCs for
employment across the spectrum of conflict.
Global War on Terrorism
The year 2003 marked another historic milestone for the U.S. and
the Air Force in the global war on terrorism. Since September 11, 2001,
air and space power has proven indispensable to securing American
skies, defeating the Taliban, denying sanctuary to al Qaeda and other
terrorist organizations, and most recently, removing a brutal and
oppressive dictator in Iraq. This global war on terrorism imposes on
airmen a new steady state of accelerated operations and personnel tempo
(PERSTEMPO), as well as a demand for unprecedented speed, agility, and
innovation in defeating unconventional and unexpected threats, all
while bringing stability and freedom to Afghanistan and Iraq. The Air
Force and its airmen will meet these demands.
Operation Noble Eagle
High above our Nation, airmen protect our skies and cities through
air defense operations known as Operation Noble Eagle (ONE). The Total
Force team, comprised of active duty, Air National Guard, and Air Force
Reserve airmen, conducts airborne early warning, air refueling, and
combat air patrol operations in order to protect sensitive sites,
metropolitan areas, and critical infrastructure.
This constant ``top cover'' demands significant Air Force assets,
thus raising the baseline of requirements above the pre-September 11
tempo. Since 2001, this baseline has meant over 34,000 fighter, tanker,
and airborne early warning sorties were added to Air Force
requirements.
This year the Air Force scrambled nearly 1,000 aircraft, responding
to 800 incidents. Eight active duty, 8 Air Force Reserve, and 18 Air
National Guard units provided 1,300 tanker sorties offloading more than
32 million pounds of fuel for these missions. Last year, over 2,400
airmen stood vigilant at air defense sector operations centers and
other radar sites. Additionally, in 2003, we continued to
institutionalize changes to our homeland defense mission through joint,
combined, and interagency training and planning. Participating in the
initial validation exercise Determined Promise-03, the Air Force
illustrated how its air defense, air mobility, and command and control
capabilities work seamlessly with other agencies supporting U.S.
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
objectives. The integration and readiness that comes from careful
planning and rigorous training will ensure the continued security of
America's skies.
Operation Enduring Freedom--Afghanistan
Operation Enduring Freedom--Afghanistan (OEF) is ongoing. Remnants
of Taliban forces continue to attack U.S., North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), coalition troops, humanitarian aid workers, and
others involved in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. To defeat this
threat, aid coalition stability, and support operations, the Air Force
has maintained a presence of nearly 24,000 airmen in and around the
region. Having already flown more than 90,000 sorties (over 72 percent
of all OEF missions flown), the Air Force team of active, Guard, and
Reserve airmen continue to perform ISR, close air support (CAS), aerial
refueling, and tactical and strategic airlift.
While fully engaged in ONE and OIF, the men and women of the Air
Force provided full spectrum air and space support, orchestrating
assets from every Service and 10 different nations. Of these, Air Force
strike aircraft flying from nine bases flew more than two-thirds of the
combat missions, dropped more than 66,000 munitions (9,650 tons) and
damaged or destroyed approximately three-quarters of planned targets.
In 2003 alone, Air Force assets provided more than 3,000 sorties of on-
call CAS, responding to calls from joint and/or coalition forces on the
ground.
Last year, the Air Force brought personnel and materiel into this
distant, land-locked nation via 7,410 sorties. Over 4,100 passengers
and 487 tons of cargo were moved by airmen operating at various Tanker
Airlift Control Elements in and around Afghanistan. To support these
airlift and combat sorties and the numerous air assets of the coalition
with aerial refueling, the Air Force deployed over 50 tankers. In their
primary role, these late 1950s-era and early 1960s-era KC-135 tankers
flew more than 3,900 refueling missions. In their secondary airlift
role, they delivered 3,620 passengers and 405 tons of cargo. Without
versatile tankers, our Armed Forces would need greater access to
foreign bases, more aircraft to accomplish the same mission, more
airlift assets, and generate more sorties to maintain the required
duration on-station.
Operations in Afghanistan also highlight U.S. and coalition
reliance on U.S. space capabilities. This spanned accurate global
weather, precise navigation, communications, as well as persistent
worldwide missile warning and surveillance. For example, OEF relied on
precision navigation provided by the Air Force's GPS constellation,
over-the-horizon satellite communications (SATCOM), and timely
observations of weather, geodesy, and enemy activity. To accomplish
this, space professionals performed thousands of precise satellite
contacts and hundreds of station keeping adjustments to provide
transparent space capability to the warfighter. These vital space
capabilities and joint enablers directly leveraged our ability to
pursue U.S. objectives in OEF.
Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch
During the past 12 years, the Air Force flew over 391,000 sorties
enforcing the northern and southern no-fly zones over Iraq. With the
preponderance of forces, the Air Force, along with the Navy and Marine
Corps, worked alongside the Royal Air Force in Operations Northern
Watch (ONW) and Southern Watch (OSW). Manning radar outposts and
established C2 centers, conducting ISR along Iraq's borders, responding
to almost daily acts of Iraqi aggression, and maintaining the required
airlift and air refueling missions taxed Air Force assets since the end
of Operation Desert Storm. Yet, these successful air operations had
three main effects: they halted air attacks on the ethnic minority
populations under the no-fly zones; they deterred a repeat of Iraqi
aggression against its neighbors; and they leveraged enforcement of
United Nations (U.N.) Security Council Resolutions. Throughout this
period, our airmen honed their warfighting skills, gained familiarity
with the region, and were able to establish favorable conditions for
OIF. For more than a decade, American airmen rose to one of our
Nation's most important challenges, containing Saddam Hussein.
Operation Iraqi Freedom
On March 19, 2003, our airmen, alongside fellow soldiers, sailors,
marines, and coalition teammates, were called upon to remove the
dangerous and oppressive Iraqi regime--this date marked the end of ONW/
OSW and the beginning of OIF. OIF crystallized the meaning of jointness
and the synergies of combined arms and persistent battlefield
awareness.
In the first minutes of OIF, airmen of our Combat Air Forces (USAF,
USN, USMC, and coalition) were flying over Baghdad. As major land
forces crossed the line of departure, Air Force assets pounded Iraqi
C\2\ facilities and key leadership targets, decapitating the
decisionmakers from their fielded forces. Remaining Iraqi leaders
operated with outdated information about ground forces that had already
moved miles beyond their reach. As the land component raced toward
Baghdad, coalition strike aircraft were simultaneously attacking Iraqi
fielded forces, communications and command and control centers,
surface-to-surface missile launch sites, and were supporting Special
Operations Forces, and ensuring complete air and space dominance in the
skies over Iraq. Due to these actions and those during the previous 12
years, none of the 19 Iraqi missile launches were successful in
disrupting coalition operations, and not a single Iraqi combat sortie
flew during this conflict. Twenty-one days after major combat
operations began, the first U.S. land forces reached Baghdad. Five days
later, the last major city in Iraq capitulated.
The Air Force provided over 7,000 CAS sorties to aid land forces in
the quickest ground force movement in history. Lieutenant General
William S. Wallace, Commander of the U.S. Army V Corps said, ``none of
my commanders complained about the availability, responsiveness, or
effectiveness of CAS--it was unprecedented!'' As Iraqi forces attempted
to stand against the integrated air and ground offensive, they found a
joint and coalition team that was better equipped, better trained, and
better led than ever brought to the field of battle.
Training, leadership, and innovation coupled with the Air Force's
recent investment in air mobility allowed U.S. forces to open a second
major front in the Iraqi campaign. Constrained from access by land, Air
Force C-17s airdropped over 1,000 paratroopers from the 173rd Airborne
Brigade into northern Iraq. This successful mission opened Bashur
airfield and ensured U.S. forces could be resupplied.
Before 2003, the Air Force invested heavily in the lessons learned
from OEF. Shortening the ``kill chain,'' or the time it took to find,
fix, track, target, engage, and assess was one of our top priorities.
This investment was worthwhile, as 156 time-sensitive targets were
engaged within minutes, most with precision weapons. The flexibility of
centralized control and decentralized execution of air and space power
enabled direct support to JFC objectives throughout Iraq. Coalition and
joint airpower shaped the battlefield ahead of ground forces, provided
intelligence and security to the flanks and rear of the rapidly
advancing coalition, and served as a force multiplier for Special
Operations Forces (SOF). This synergy between SOF and the Air Force
allowed small specialized teams to have a major effect throughout the
northern and western portions of Iraq by magnifying their inherent
lethality, guaranteeing rapid tactical mobility, reducing their
footprint through aerial resupply, and providing them the advantage of
``knowing what was over the next hill'' through air and space-borne
ISR.
The Air Force's C\2\ISR assets enabled the joint force in
Afghanistan as well. This invaluable fleet includes the RC-135 Rivet
Joint, E-8 JSTARS, and the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS). This ``Iron Triad'' of intelligence sensors and C\2\
capabilities illustrates the Air Force vision of horizontal integration
in terms of persistent battlefield awareness. Combined with the Global
Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and Predator remotely piloted
aircraft, spaced-based systems, U-2, and Compass Call, these invaluable
system provided all-weather, multi-source intelligence to commanders
from all services throughout the area of responsibility.
OIF was the Predator's first ``networked'' operation. Four
simultaneous Predator orbits were flown over Iraq and an additional
orbit operated over Afghanistan, with three of those orbits controlled
via remote operations in the U.S. This combined reachback enabled
dynamic support to numerous OIF missions. Predator also contributed to
our operational flexibility, accomplishing hunter-killer missions,
tactical ballistic missile search, force protection, focused
intelligence collection, air strike control, and special operations
support. A Hellfire equipped Predator also conducted numerous precision
strikes against Iraqi targets, and flew armed escort missions with U.S.
Army helicopters.
Space power provided precise, all-weather navigation, global
communications, missile warning, and surveillance. The ability to adapt
to adverse weather conditions, including sandstorms, allowed air, land,
and maritime forces to confound the Iraqi military and denied safe
haven anywhere in their own country. As the Iraqis attempted to use
ground-based GPS jammers, Air Force strike assets destroyed them, in
some cases, using the very munitions the jammers attempted to defeat.
As Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld noted, this new era was
illustrated by the coalition's ``unprecedented combination of power,
precision, speed, and flexibility.''
During the height of OIF, the Air Force deployed 54,955 airmen.
Ambassador Paul Bremer, Chief of the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA), pronounced, ``In roughly 3 weeks [we] liberated a country larger
than Germany and Italy combined, and [we] did so with forces smaller
than the Army of the Potomac.'' Led by the finest officers and non-
commissioned officers, our airmen flew more than 79,000 sorties since
March 2003. Ten thousand strike sorties dropped 37,065 munitions. The
coalition flew over 55,000 airlift sorties moved 469,093 passengers and
more than 165,060 tons of cargo. In addition, over 10,000 aerial
refueling missions supported aircraft from all services, and 1,600 ISR
missions provided battlespace awareness regardless of uniform, Service,
or coalition nationality. This was a blistering campaign that demanded
a joint and combined effort to maximize effects in the battlespace.
Today, Air Force airmen continue to contribute to the joint and
coalition team engaged in Iraq. At the end of the year, 6,723 airmen
from the active duty, Reserve, and Air National Guard conducted a wide
range of missions from locations overseas, flying approximately 150
sorties per day including CAS for ground forces tracking down regime
loyalists, foreign fighters, and terrorists. On a daily basis, U-2 and
RC-135 aircraft flew ISR sorties monitoring the porous borders of Iraq
and providing situational awareness and route planning for Army patrols
in stability and support operations. Providing everything from base
security for 27 new bases opened by the coalition to the lifeline of
supplies that air mobility and air refueling assets bring to all joint
forces, Air Force airmen are committed to the successful accomplishment
of the U.S. mission in Iraq.
Other Contingency Operations
In 2003, the Air Force remained engaged in America's war on drugs
and provided support to NATO ground forces in the Balkans. Since
December 1989, Air Force airmen have been an irreplaceable part of the
interagency fight against illegal drug and narcotics trafficking.
Deployed along the southern U.S., in the Caribbean, and Central and
South America, airmen perform this round-the-clock mission, manning
nine ground-based radar sites, operating 10 aerostats, and flying
counter drug surveillance missions. The Air Force detected, monitored,
and provided intercepts on over 275 targets attempting to infiltrate
our airspace without clearance. Along with our interagency partners,
these operations resulted in 221 arrests and stopped hundreds of tons
of contraband from being smuggled into our country.
In the Balkans, airmen are fully committed to completing the
mission that they started in the 1990s. Today, Air Force airmen have
flown over 26,000 sorties supporting Operations Joint Guardian and
Joint Forge. These NATO-led operations combine joint and allied forces
to implement the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia-Herzegovina and enforce
the Military Technical Agreement in Kosovo. At the end of 2003,
approximately 800 airmen were supporting NATO's goal of achieving a
secure environment and promoting stability in the region.
Additionally, the Air Force engaged in deterrence and humanitarian
relief in other regions. While the world's attention was focused on the
Middle East in the spring of 2003, our Nation remained vigilant against
potential adversaries in Asia. The Air Force deployed a bomber wing--24
B-52s and B-1s--to the American territory of Guam to deter North Korea.
At the height of OIF, our Air Force demonstrated our country's resolve
and ability to defend the Republic of Korea and Japan by surging bomber
operations to over 100 sorties in less than 3 days. This deterrent
operation complemented our permanent engagement in Northeast Asia. The
8,300 airmen who are stationed alongside the soldiers, sailors,
marines, and our Korean allies maintained the U.N. armistice, marking
50 years of peace on the peninsula.
Our strength in deterring aggression was matched by our strength in
humanitarian action. In response to President Bush's directive to help
stop the worsening crisis in Liberia, we deployed a non-combat medical
and logistics force to create a lifeline to the American Embassy and
provide hope to the Liberian people. An AEF of airmen provided airlift
support, aeromedical evacuation, force protection, and theater of
communications support. Flying more than 200 sorties, we transported
and evacuated civilians and members of the Joint Task Force (JTF) from
bases in Sierra Leone and Senegal. The 300 airmen deployed in support
of JTF-Liberia reopened the main airport in Monrovia, and ensured the
security for U.S. military and civilian aircraft providing relief aid.
Strategic Deterrence
The ability of U.S. conventional forces to operate and project
decisive force is built on the foundation of our strategic deterrent
force; one that consists of our nuclear-capable aircraft and
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) forces, working with the U.S.
Navy's Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines. In 2003, these forces as
well as, persistent overhead missile warning sensors and supporting
ground-based radars, provided uninterrupted global vigilance deterring
a nuclear missile strike against the U.S. or our allies. The dedicated
airmen who operate these systems provide the force capability that
yields our deterrent umbrella. Should that deterrence fail, they stand
ready to provide a prompt, scalable response.
Exercises
The Air Force's success can be attributed to the training,
education, and equipment of our airmen. Future readiness of our
operations, maintenance, mission support, and medical units will depend
on rigorous and innovative joint and coalition training and exercising.
This year we are planning 140 exercises with other Services and
agencies and we anticipate being involved with 103 allied nations. We
will conduct these exercises in as many as 45 foreign countries.
Participation ranges from the joint/combined command post exercise
Ulchi Focus Lens with our South Korean partners to the tailored
international participation in our FLAG exercises and Mission
Employment Phases of USAF Weapons School. From joint search-and-rescue
forces in Arctic Sarex to Partnership for Peace (PFP) initiatives, our
airmen must continue to take advantage of all opportunities that help
us train the way we intend to fight.
In addition to previously designed exercises, recent operations
highlighted the need for combat support training. During OEF and OIF,
the Air Force opened or improved 38 bases used by joint or coalition
forces during combat. Our Expeditionary Combat Support teams
established secure, operable airfields in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan,
Pakistan, and in Iraq. They also built housing, established
communications, and erected dining facilities that are still used by
other Services and follow-on forces today. To prepare our airmen for
these missions, we have created Eagle Flag, an Expeditionary Combat
Support Field Training Exercise. During this exercise, combat support
personnel apply the integrated skills needed to organize and create an
operating location ready to receive fully mission capable forces within
72 hours. From security forces and civil engineers to air traffic
controllers and logisticians, each airman required to open a new base
or improve an austere location will eventually participate in this
valuable exercise.
Our ranges and air space are critical joint enablers and vital
national assets that allow the Air Force to develop and test new
weapons, train forces, and conduct joint exercises. The ability of the
Air Force to effectively operate requires a finite set of natural and
fabricated resources. Encroachment of surrounding communities onto Air
Force resources results in our limited or denied access to, or use of,
these resources. We have made it a priority to define and quantify the
resources needed to support mission requirements, and to measure and
communicate the effects of encroachment on our installations, radio
frequency spectrum, ranges, and air space. We will continue to work
with outside agencies and the public to address these issues. The Air
Force strongly endorses the Readiness Range and Preservation
Initiative. It would make focused legislative changes, protecting the
Air Force's operational resources while continuing to preserve our
Nation's environment.
Lessons for the Future
As we continue combat operations and prepare for an uncertain
future, we are examining lessons from our recent experiences. Although
we are currently engaged with each of the other Services to refine the
lessons from OIF, many of the priorities listed in the fiscal year 2005
Presidential budget submission reflect our preliminary conclusions. The
Air Force has established a team committed to turning validated lessons
into new equipment, new operating concepts, and possibly new
organizational structures. Working closely with our joint and coalition
partners, we intend to continue our momentum toward an even more
effective fighting force.
One of the most important lessons we can draw was envisioned by the
authors of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. ONE, OEF, and OIF all validated
jointness as the only acceptable method of fighting and winning this
Nation's wars. In OIF, the mature relationship between the Combined
Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) and the Combined Forces Air
Component Commander (CFACC) led to unprecedented synergies. The CFACC
capitalized on these opportunities by establishing coordination
entities led by an Air Force general officer in the supported land
component headquarters and by maintaining internal Army, Navy, Marine
Corps, and coalition officers in his own headquarters. Both of these
organizational innovations enabled commanders to maximize the
advantages of mass, lethality, and flexibility of airpower in the area
of responsibility.
Another lesson is the Air Force's dependence on the Total Force
concept. As stated above, September 11 brought with it a new tempo of
operations, one that required both the active duty and Air Reserve
component (ARC) to work in concert to achieve our national security
objectives. The synergy of our fully integrated active duty, Air
National Guard, and Air Force Reserve team provides warfighters with
capabilities that these components could not provide alone.
Our Reserve component accounts for over one-third of our strike
fighters, more than 72 percent of our tactical airlift, 42 percent of
our strategic airlift, and 52 percent of our air refueling capability.
The ARC also makes significant contributions to our rescue and support
missions, and has an increasing presence in space, intelligence, and
information operations. In all, the ARC provides a ready force
requiring minimum preparation for mobilization. Whether that
mobilization is supporting flight or alert missions for ONE, commanding
expeditionary wings in combat, or orchestrating the Air Force Special
Operations roles in the western Iraqi desert, the ARC will remain
critical to achieving the full potential of our air and space power.
A third lesson was validation of the need for air and space
superiority. Through recent combat operations, the Air Force maintained
its almost 50-year-old record of ``no U.S. ground troops killed by
enemy air attack.'' Without having to defend against Iraqi airpower,
coalition commanders could focus their combat power more effectively.
In addition, air and space superiority allowed airmen to dedicate more
sorties in support of the ground scheme of maneuver, substantially
reducing enemy capability in advance of the land component.
We also need to continue to advance integration and planning--
integration of Service capabilities to achieve JFC objectives,
interagency integration to fight the war on terrorism, and information
integration. Integration of manned, unmanned, and space sensors,
advanced command and control, and the ability to disseminate and act on
this information in near-real time will drive our combat effectiveness
in the future. Shared through interoperable machine-to-machine
interfaces, this data can paint a picture of the battlespace where the
sum of the wisdom of all sensors will end up with a cursor over the
target for the operator who can save the target, study the target, or
destroy the target.
Finally, there are three general areas for improvement we consider
imperative: battle damage assessment, fratricide prevention/combat
identification, and equipping our battlefield airmen. First, battle
damage assessment shapes the commander's ability for efficient
employment of military power. Restriking targets that have already been
destroyed, damaged, or made irrelevant by rapid ground force advances
wastes sorties that could be devoted to other coalition and joint force
objectives. Advances in delivery capabilities of our modern fighter/
attack aircraft and bombers mean that ISR assets must assess more
targets per strike than ever before. Precision engagement requires
precision location, identification, and precision assessment. Although
assets like the Global Hawk, Predator, U-2, Senior Scout, and Rivet
Joint are equipped with the latest collection technology, the Air
Force, joint team, and Intelligence Community must work to ensure that
combat assessments produce timely, accurate, and relevant products for
the warfighters.
We are also improving operational procedures and technology to
minimize incidents of fratricide or ``friendly fire.'' In OIF, major
steps toward this goal resulted from technological solutions. Blue
Force Tracker and other combat identification systems on many ground
force vehicles allowed commanders situational awareness of their forces
and enemy forces via a common operational picture. Still, not all joint
or coalition forces are equipped with these technological advances. We
are pursuing Fire Support Coordination Measures that capitalize on the
speed and situational awareness digital communications offer rather
than analog voice communications and grease pencils.
A third area we are actively improving is the effectiveness of the
airmen who are embedded with conventional land forces or SOF. With
assured access to Air Force datalinks and satellites, these
``Battlefield Airmen'' can put data directly into air-land-sea weapon
systems and enable joint force command and control. We have made great
progress in producing a Battlefield Air Operations Kit that is 70
percent lighter, with leading-edge power sources; one that will
increase the combat capability of our controllers. This battle
management system will reduce engagement times, increase lethality and
accuracy, and reduce the risk of fratricide. This capability is based
upon the good ideas of our airmen who have been in combat and
understand how much a single individual on the battlefield can
contribute with the right kit.
Summary
The airmen of America's Air Force have demonstrated their expertise
and the value of their contributions to the joint and coalition fight.
These combat operations are made possible by Air Force investments in
realistic training and education, superior organization, advanced
technology, and innovative tactics, techniques, and procedures. In the
future, our professional airmen will continue to focus advances in
these and other areas guided by the Air Force CONOPs. Their charter is
to determine the appropriate capabilities required for joint
warfighting and to provide maximum effects from, through, and in air
and space. This structure and associated capabilities-based planning
will help airmen on their transformational journey, ensuring continued
operational successes such as those demonstrated in 2003.
ensuring america's future air and space dominance
Air Force lethality, mobility, speed, precision, and the ability to
project U.S. military power around the globe provide combatant
commanders the capabilities required to meet the Nation's military
requirements and dominate our enemies. Consistent with the DOD's focus
on Joint Operating Concepts, we will continue to transform our force--
meeting the challenges of this era, adapting our forces and people to
them, and operating our service efficiently. We will adopt service
concepts and capabilities that support the joint construct and
capitalize on our core competencies. To sustain our dominance, we
develop professional airmen, invest in warfighting technology, and
integrate our people and systems together to produce decisive joint
warfighting capabilities.
developing airmen--right people, right place, right time
At the heart of our combat capability are the professional airmen
who voluntarily serve the Air Force and our Nation. Our airmen turn
ideas, tools, tactics, techniques, and procedures into global mobility,
power projection, and battlespace effects. Our focus for the ongoing
management and development of Air Force personnel will be to: define,
renew, develop, and sustain the force.
Defining our Requirements
To meet current and future requirements, we need the right people
in the right specialties. The post-September 11 environment has taxed
our equipment and our people, particularly those associated with force
protection, ISR, and the buildup and sustainment of expeditionary
operations. Our analysis shows that we need to shift manpower to
stressed career fields to meet the demands of this new steady state,
and we are in the process of doing this. We have realigned personnel
into our most stressed specialties and hired additional civilians and
contractors to free military members to focus on military specific
duties. We have also made multi-million dollar investments in
technology to reduce certain manpower requirements. We have redirected
our training and accession systems and have cross-trained personnel
from specialties where we are over strength to alleviate stressed
career fields, supporting the Secretary of Defense's vision of moving
forces ``from the bureaucracy to the battlefield.''
Since 2001, we have exceeded our congressionally mandated end
strength by more than 16,000 personnel. In light of the global war on
terrorism and OIF, DOD allowed this overage, but now we need to get
back to our mandated end strength. We are addressing this issue in two
ways: first, by reducing personnel overages in most skills; and second,
by shaping the remaining force to meet mission requirements. To reduce
personnel, we will employ a number of voluntary tools to restructure
manning levels in Air Force specialties, while adjusting our Active
Force size to the end strength requirement. As we progress, we will
evaluate the need to implement additional force shaping steps.
We are also reviewing our ARC manpower to minimize involuntary
mobilization of ARC forces for day-to-day, steady state operations
while ensuring they are prepared to respond in times of crisis. Since
September 11, 2001, we have mobilized more than 62,000 people in over
100 units, and many more individual mobilization augmentees. Today, 20
percent of our AEF packages are comprised of citizen airmen, and
members of the Guard or Reserve conduct 89 percent of ONE missions. We
recognize this is a challenge and are taking steps to relieve the
pressure on the Guard and Reserve.
In fiscal year 2005, we plan to redistribute forces in a number of
mission areas among the Reserve and active components to balance the
burden on the Reserves. These missions include our Air and Space
Operations Centers, remotely piloted aircraft systems, Combat Search
and Rescue, Security Forces, and a number of high demand global
mobility systems. We are working to increase ARC volunteerism by
addressing equity of benefits and tour-length flexibility, while
addressing civilian employer issues. We are also looking at creating
more full-time positions to reduce our dependency on involuntary
mobilization.
We are entering the second year of our agreement to employ Army
National Guard soldiers for force protection at Air Force
installations, temporarily mitigating our 8,000 personnel shortfall in
security forces. As we do this, we are executing an aggressive plan to
rapidly burn down the need for Army augmentation and working to
redesign manpower requirements. Our reduction plan maximizes the use of
Army volunteers in the second year, and allows for demobilization of
about one third of the soldiers employed in the first year.
Future Total Force
Just as in combat overseas, we are continuing to pursue seamless
ARC and active duty integration at home, leveraging the capabilities
and characteristics of each component, while allowing each to retain
their cultural identity. We continue to explore a variety of
organizational initiatives to integrate our Active, Guard, and Reserve
Forces. These efforts are intended to expand mission flexibility,
create efficiencies in our Total Force, and prepare for the future.
Today's Future Total Force team includes a number of blended or
associate units that are programmed or are in use. The creation of the
``blended'' unit, the 116th Air Control Wing at Robins Air Force Base,
Georgia, elevated integration to the next level. With an initial
deployment of over 730 personnel, and significant operational
achievements in OIF, we are now examining opportunities to integrate
active, Guard, and Reserve units elsewhere in order to produce even
more measurable benefits, savings, and efficiencies.
The reasons for this type of integration are compelling. We can
maximize our warfighting capabilities by integrating Active, Guard, and
Reserve Forces to optimize the contributions of each component.
Reservists and guardsmen bring with them capabilities they have
acquired in civilian jobs, leveraging the experience of ARC personnel.
Integration relieves PERSTEMPO on the Active-Duty Force. Because ARC
members do not move as often, they provide corporate knowledge,
stability, and continuity. Finally, integration enhances the retention
of airmen who decide to leave active service. Because the Guard and
Reserve are involved in many Air Force missions, we recapture the
investment we've made by retaining separating active duty members as
members of the ARC.
Renewing the Force
To renew our force, we target our recruitment to ensure a diverse
force with the talent and drive to be the best airmen in the world's
greatest Air Force. We will recruit those with the skills most critical
for our continued success. In fiscal year 2003, our goal was 5,226
officers and 37,000 enlisted; we exceeded our goal in both categories,
accessing 5,419 officers and 37,144 enlisted. For fiscal year 2004, we
plan to access 5,795 officers and 37,000 enlisted.
In the Air Force, the capabilities we derive from diversity are
vital to mission excellence and at the core of our strategy to maximize
our combat capabilities. In this new era, successful military
operations demand much greater agility, adaptability, and versatility
to achieve and sustain success. This requires a force comprised of the
best our Nation has to offer, from every segment of society, trained
and ready to go. Our focus is building a force that consists of men and
women who possess keener international insight, foreign language
proficiency, and wide-ranging cultural acumen. Diversity of life
experiences, education, culture, and background are essential to help
us achieve the asymmetric advantage we need to defend America's
interests wherever threatened. Our strength comes from the collective
application of our diverse talents, and is a critical component of the
air and space dominance we enjoy today. We must enthusiastically reach
out to all segments of society to ensure the Air Force offers a
welcoming career to the best and brightest of American society,
regardless of their background. By doing so, we attract people from all
segments of society and tap into the limitless talents resident in our
diverse population.
In addition to a diverse force, we also need the correct talent
mix. We remain concerned about recruiting health care professionals and
individuals with technical degrees. To meet our needs, we continue to
focus our efforts to ensure we attract and retain the right people. We
will also closely monitor ARC recruitment. Historically, the Air
National Guard and Air Force Reserve Command access close to 25 percent
of eligible, separating active duty Air Force members with no break in
service between their active duty and ARC service.
Developing the Force
Over the past year, we implemented a new force development
construct in order to get the right people in the right job at the
right time with the right skills, knowledge, and experience. Force
development combines focused assignments and education and training
opportunities to prepare our people to meet the mission needs of our
Air Force. Rather than allowing chance and happenstance to guide an
airman's experience, we will take a deliberate approach to develop
officers, enlisted, and civilians throughout our Total Force. Through
targeted education, training, and mission-related experience, we will
develop professional airmen into joint force warriors with the skills
needed across the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of
conflict. Their mission will be to accomplish the joint mission,
motivate teams, mentor subordinates, and train their successors.
A segment of warriors requiring special attention is our cadre of
space professionals, those that design, build, and operate our space
systems. As military dependence on space grows, the Air Force continues
to develop this cadre to meet our Nation's needs. Our Space
Professional Strategy is the roadmap for developing that cadre. Air
Force space professionals will develop more in-depth expertise in
operational and technical space specialties through tailored
assignments, education, and training. This roadmap will result in a
team of scientists, engineers, program managers, and operators skilled
and knowledgeable in developing, acquiring, applying, sustaining, and
integrating space capabilities.
Sustaining the Force
The Air Force is a retention-based force. Because the skill sets of
our airmen are not easily replaced, we expend considerable effort to
retain our people, especially those in high-technology fields and those
in whom we have invested significant education and training. In 2003,
we reaped the benefits of an aggressive retention program, aided by a
renewed focus and investment on education and individual development,
enlistment and retention bonuses, targeted military pay raises, and
quality of life improvements. Our fiscal year 2003 enlisted retention
statistics tell the story. Retention for first term airmen stood at 61
percent, exceeding our goal by 6 percent. Retention for our second term
and career airmen was also impressive, achieving 73 percent and 95
percent respectively. Continued investment in people rewards their
service, provides a suitable standard of living, and enables us to
attract and retain the professionals we need.
One of the highlights of our quality of life focus is housing
investment. Through military construction and housing privatization, we
are providing quality homes faster than ever before. Over the next 3
years, the Air Force will renovate or replace more than 40,000 homes
through privatization. At the same time, we will renovate or replace an
additional 20,000 homes through military construction. With the
elimination of out-of-pocket housing expenses, our Air Force members
and their families now have three great options--local community
housing, traditional military family housing, and privatized housing.
Focus On Fitness
We recognize that without motivated and combat-ready expeditionary
airmen throughout our Total Force, our strategies, advanced
technologies, and integrated capabilities would be much less effective.
That is why we have renewed our focus on fitness and first-class
fitness centers. We must be fit to fight. That demands that we reorient
our culture to make physical and mental fitness part of our daily life
as airmen. In January 2004, our new fitness program returned to the
basics of running, sit-ups, and pushups. The program combines our
fitness guidelines and weight/body fat standards into one program that
encompasses the total health of an airman.
technology-to-warfighting
The Air Force has established a capabilities-based approach to war
planning, allowing us to focus investments on those capabilities we
need to support the joint warfighter. This type of planning focuses on
capabilities required to accomplish a variety of missions and to
achieve desired effects against any potential threats. Our
capabilities-based approach requires us to think in new ways and
consider combinations of systems that create distinctive capabilities.
Effects Focus: Capabilities-Based CONOPs
The Air Force has written six CONOPs that support capabilities-
based planning and the joint vision of combat operations. The CONOPs
help analyze the span of joint tasks we may be asked to perform and
define the effects we can produce. Most importantly, they help us
identify the capabilities an expeditionary force will need to
accomplish its mission, creating a framework that enables us to shape
our portfolio.
Homeland Security CONOPs leverage Air Force
capabilities with joint and interagency efforts to prevent,
protect, and respond to threats against our homeland--within or
beyond U.S. territories.
Space and Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) CONOPs
harness the integration of manned, unmanned, and space systems
to provide persistent situation awareness and executable
decision-quality information to the JFC.
Global Mobility CONOPs provide combatant commanders
with the planning, command and control, and operations
capabilities to enable timely and effective projection,
employment, and sustainment of U.S. power in support of U.S.
global interests--precision delivery for operational effect.
Global Strike CONOPs employ joint power-projection
capabilities to engage anti-access and high-value targets, gain
access to denied battlespace, and maintain battlespace access
for required joint/coalition follow-on operations.
Global Persistent Attack CONOPs provide a spectrum of
capabilities from major combat to peacekeeping and sustainment
operations. Global Persistent Attack assumes that once access
conditions are established (i.e. through Global Strike), there
will be a need for persistent and sustained operations to
maintain air, space, and information dominance.
Nuclear Response CONOPs provide the deterrent
``umbrella'' under which conventional forces operate, and, if
deterrence fails, avails a scalable response.
This CONOPs approach has resulted in numerous benefits, providing:
Articulation of operational capabilities that will
prevail in conflicts and avert technological surprises;
An operational risk and capabilities-based
programmatic decisionmaking focus;
Budgeting guidance to the Air Force Major Commands for
fulfilling capabilities-based solutions to satisfy warfighter
requirements;
Warfighter risk management insights for long-range
planning.
Modernization and Recapitalization
Through capabilities-based planning, the Air Force will continue to
invest in our core competency of bringing technology to the warfighter
that will maintain our technical advantage and update our air and space
capabilities. The Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment (CRRA)
process guides these efforts. Replacing an outdated threat-based review
process that focused on platforms versus current and future warfighting
effects and capabilities, our extensive 2-year assessment identified
and prioritized critical operational shortfalls we will use to guide
our investment strategy. These priorities present the most significant
and immediate Air Force-wide capability objectives.
We need to field capabilities that allow us to reduce the time
required to find, fix, track and target fleeting and mobile targets and
other hostile forces. One system that addresses this operational
shortfall is the F/A-22 Raptor. In addition to its contributions to
obtaining and sustaining air dominance, the F/A-22 will allow all
weather, stealthy, precision strike 24 hours a day, and will counter
existing and emerging threats, such as advanced surface-to-air
missiles, cruise missiles, and time sensitive and emerging targets,
including mobile targets, that our legacy systems cannot. The F/A-22 is
in low rate initial production and has begun Phase I of its operational
testing. It is on track for initial operational capability in 2005. A
complementary capability is provided by the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter,
providing sustainable, focused CAS and interservice and coalition
commonality.
We also recognize that operational shortfalls exist early in the
kill chain and are applying technologies to fill those gaps. A robust
command, control, and sensor portfolio combining both space and
airborne systems, along with seamless real-time communications, will
provide additional critical capabilities that address this shortfall
while supporting the Joint Operational Concept of full spectrum
dominance. Program definition and risk reduction efforts are moving us
towards C\4\ISR and Battle Management capabilities with shorter cycle
times. The JFC will be able to respond to fleeting opportunities with
near-real time information and will be able to bring to bear kill-chain
assets against the enemy. Additionally, in this world of proliferating
cruise missile technology, our work on improving our C\4\ISR
capabilities--including airborne Active Electronically Scanned Array
(AESA) radar technology--could pay large dividends, playing a
significant role in America's defense against these and other threats.
To create this robust command and control network, we will need a
flexible and digital multi-service communications capability. We are
well on our way in defining the architecture to make it a reality. The
capabilities we are pursuing directly support the Department's
transformational system of interoperable joint C\4\ISR.
There is a need for a globally interconnected capability that
collects, processes, stores, disseminates, and manages information on
demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support people. The C2
Constellation, our capstone concept for achieving the integration of
air and space operations, includes these concepts and the future
capabilities of the Global Information Grid (GIG), Net Centric
Enterprise Services, Transformational Communications, the Joint
Tactical Radio System, and airborne command, control, and communication
assets, among others.
One of the elements of a sensible strategy to maintain U.S. power
projection capabilities derives from a global aerial refueling fleet
that serves Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and coalition aircraft. Our
current fleet of aging tankers met the challenges of OEF and OIF but is
increasingly expensive to maintain. The fleet averages more then 40
years of age, and the oldest model, the KC-135E, goes back to the
Eisenhower administration. Recapitalization for this fleet of over 540
aerial refueling aircraft will clearly take decades to complete and is
vital to the foundation and global reach of our Air Force, sister
Services, and coalition partners. The Air Force is committed to an
acquisition approach for this program that will recapitalize the fleet
in the most affordable manner possible.
Capabilities-driven modernization and recapitalization efforts are
also taking place on our space systems, as we replace constellations of
satellites and ground systems with next generation capabilities. The
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) has completed six successful
launches. Using two launch designs, we will continue to seek
responsive, assured access to space for government systems. Space-based
radar (SBR) will provide a complementary capability to our portfolio of
radar and remote sensing systems. We will employ internet protocol
networks and high-bandwidth lasers in space to transform communications
with the Transformational Satellite, dramatically increasing
connectivity to the warfighter. Modernization of GPS and development of
the next-generation GPS III will enhance navigation capability and
increase our resistance to jamming. In partnership with the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of
Commerce, we are developing the National Polar-orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellite System, which offers next-generation
meteorological capability. Each of these systems supports critical
C\4\ISR capabilities that give the JFC increased technological and
asymmetric advantages.
Space control efforts, enabled by robust space situation awareness,
will ensure unhampered access to space-based services. Enhanced space
situation awareness assets will provide the information necessary to
execute an effective space control strategy. However, we must be
prepared to deprive an adversary of the benefits of space capabilities
when American interests and lives are at stake.
Additional capability does not stem solely from new weapon system
acquisitions. It results from innovative modernization of our existing
systems. One example is incorporating a Smart Bomb Rack Assembly and
the 500-lb. version of the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) into the
weapons bay of the B-2. In September 2003, we demonstrated that the B-2
bomber is now able to release up to 80 separately targeted, GPS-guided
weapons in a single mission. This kind of innovation reduces the number
of platforms that must penetrate enemy airspace while holding numerous
enemy targets at risk. The second order consequences run the gamut from
maintenance to support aircraft.
We will also address the deficiencies in our infrastructure through
modernization and recapitalization. Improvements to our air and space
systems will be limited without improvements in our foundational
support systems. Deteriorated airfields, hangars, waterlines,
electrical networks, and air traffic control approach and landing
systems are just some of the infrastructure elements needing immediate
attention. Our investment strategy focuses on three simultaneous steps:
disposing of excess facilities; sustaining our facilities and
infrastructure; and establishing a sustainable investment program for
future modernization of our facilities and infrastructure.
Finally, we need to continue to modernize and recapitalize our
information technology infrastructure. To leverage our information
superiority, the Air Force is pursuing a modernization strategy and
information technology investments, which target a common network
infrastructure and employ enterprise services and shared capabilities.
Science and Technology
Our investment in S&T has and continues to underpin our
modernization and recapitalization program. Similar to our applied-
technology acquisition efforts, the Air Force's capability-based focus
produces an S&T vision that supports the warfighter.
The Air Force S&T program fosters development of joint warfighting
capabilities and integrated technologies, consistent with DOD and
national priorities. We will provide a long-term, stable investment in
S&T in areas that will immediately benefit existing systems and in
transformational technologies that will improve tomorrow's Air Force.
Many Air Force S&T programs, such as directed energy, hypersonics,
laser-based communications, and the emerging field of nanotechnology,
show promise for joint warfighting capabilities. Other technology
areas, such as miniaturization of space platforms and space proximity
operations, also show promise in the future. Through developments like
these, the Air Force S&T program will advance joint warfighting
capabilities and the Air Force vision of an integrated air and space
force capable of responsive and decisive global engagement.
Capabilities-Based Acquisition/Transforming Business Practices
To achieve our vision of a flexible, responsive, and capabilities-
based expeditionary force, we are transforming how we conceive, plan,
develop, acquire, and sustain weapons systems. Our Agile Acquisition
initiative emphasizes speed and credibility; we must deliver what we
promise--on time and on budget. Our goal is to deliver affordable,
sustainable capabilities that meet joint warfighters' operational
needs.
We continue to improve our acquisition system--breaking down
organizational barriers, changing work culture through aggressive
training, and reforming processes with policies that encourage
innovation and collaboration. Already, we are:
Realigning our Program Executive Officers (PEOs). By
moving our PEOs out of Washington and making them commanders of
our product centers, we have aligned both acquisition
accountability and resources under our most experienced general
officers and acquisition professionals.
Creating a culture of innovation. Because people drive
the success of our Agile Acquisition initiatives, we will focus
on enhanced training. Laying the foundation for change, this
past year 16,500 Air Force acquisition professionals, and
hundreds of personnel from other disciplines, attended training
sessions underscoring the need for collaboration, innovation,
reasonable risk management, and a sense of urgency in our
approach.
Reducing Total Ownership Costs. With strong support
from the Secretary of Defense, we will expand the Reduction in
Total Ownership Cost program with a standard model ensuring
that we have accurate metrics.
Moving technology from the lab to the warfighter
quickly. Laboratories must focus on warfighter requirements and
researchers need to ensure technologies are mature, producible,
and supportable. Warfighters will work with scientists,
acquisition experts, and major commands to identify gaps in
capabilities. With help from Congress, we have matured our
combat capability document process to fill those gaps. During
OIF, we approved 37 requests for critically needed systems,
usually in a matter of days.
Tailoring acquisition methods for space systems. In
October 2003, we issued a new acquisition policy for space
systems that will improve acquisitions by tailoring acquisition
procedures to the unique demands of space systems.
Transformation of our business processes is not limited to
acquisition activities. Our Depot Maintenance Strategy and Master Plan
calls for financial and infrastructure capitalization to ensure Air
Force hardware is safe and ready to operate across the threat spectrum.
Our increased funding for depot facilities and equipment modernization
in fiscal year 2004-2009, along with public-private partnerships, will
result in more responsive support to the JFC. We expect to maximize
production and throughput of weapon systems and commodities that will
improve mission capability.
Our logistics transformation initiative will revolutionize
logistics processes to improve warfighter support and reduce costs. The
goal of the Air Force's logistics transformation program, Expeditionary
Logistics for the 21st century, is to increase weapon system
availability by 20 percent with zero cost growth. Our current
initiatives--depot maintenance transformation, purchasing and supply
chain management, regionalized intermediate repair, and improved
logistics command and control--will transform the entire logistics
enterprise.
Our depots have put some of these initiatives into place with
exceptional results. In fiscal year 2003, our depot maintenance teams
were more productive than planned, exceeding aircraft, engine, and
commodity production goals and reducing flow days in nearly all areas.
Implementation of ``lean'' production processes, optimized use of the
existing workforce, and appropriate funding, all contributed to this
good news story. In addition, our spares support to the warfighter is
at record high numbers. In 2003, supply rates and cannibalization rates
achieved their best performance since fiscal years 1994 and 1995,
respectively. Fourteen of 20 aircraft design systems improved their
mission capable rates over the previous year, with Predator UAVs
improving by 11 percent, and B-1 bombers achieving the best mission
capable and supply rates in its history. Thanks to proper funding,
fleet consolidation, and transformation initiatives, spare parts
shortages were reduced to the lowest levels recorded across the entire
fleet.
Financing the Fight
An operating strategy is only as good as its financing strategy.
Similar to acquisition, logistics, and other support processes, our
finance capabilities are strong. We are taking deliberate and
aggressive steps to upgrade our financial decision support capability
and reduce the cost of delivering financial services. Our focus is on
support to our airmen, strategic resourcing and cost management, and
information reliability and integration. The initiatives that will get
us there include self-service web-based pay and personnel customer
service, seamless e-commerce for our vendor payment environment,
budgets that link planning, programming, and execution to capabilities
and performance, financial statements that produce clean audit opinions
while providing reliable financial and management information, and
innovative financing strategies.
integrating operations
The Air Force excels at providing communications, intelligence, air
mobility, precision strike, and space capabilities that enable joint
operations. Our airmen integrate these and other capabilities into a
cohesive system that creates war-winning effects. Integration takes
place at three levels. At the joint strategic level, integration occurs
between interagencies and the coalition. Integration also takes place
within the Air Force at an organizational level. At its most basic
level, integration takes place at the machine-to-machine level to
achieve universal information sharing which facilitates true
integration at every level.
Integrating Joint, Coalition, and Interagency Operations
The ever-changing dynamics of global events will drive the need to
integrate DOD and interagency capabilities and, in most cases, those of
our coalition partners. Joint solutions are required to produce
warfighting effects with the speed that the global war on terrorism
demands. Fully integrated operations employ only the right forces and
capabilities necessary to achieve an objective in the most efficient
manner. We must also integrate space capabilities for national
intelligence and warfighting.
We are pursuing adaptations of our C2 organizations and
capabilities to support this vision. While the Air Force's global C2
structure has remained relatively constant, throughout our 57-year
history, the demands of a changing geopolitical environment have
stressed current C2 elements beyond their design limits.
We have conducted an extensive review of our C2 structures to
support the National Security Strategy objectives of assure, dissuade,
deter, and defeat as well as the Secretary of Defense's Unified Command
Plan (UCP). We will enhance our support for the JFC and our
expeditionary posture through a new Warfighting Headquarters Construct.
This will enable the Numbered Air Forces to support Unified Combatant
Commanders in a habitual supported-supporting relationship. Working
with their strategy and planning cells on a daily basis will ensure
that Air Force capabilities are available to the JFC's warfighting
staff. This new headquarters will provide the Combined Air Operations
Center (CAOC) with sufficient staff to focus on planning and employment
of air, space, and information operations throughout the theater.
We are also adapting the capabilities of our CAOCs. The CAOCs of
each headquarters will be interconnected with the theater CAOCs, all
operating 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. They will be operated as a
weapons system, certified and standardized, and have cognizance of the
entire air and space picture. This reorganization will increase our
ability to support our combatant commanders, reduce redundancies, and
deliver precise effects to the warfighters. As we near completion of
the concept development, we will work with the Secretary of Defense and
Congress to implement a more streamlined and responsive C2 component
for the combatant commanders and national leadership.
Integrated operations also depend on integrated training. We
continue to advance joint and combined interoperability training with
our sister Services and the nations with which we participate in global
operations. The Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) will improve
our opportunities for joint training. The aim of the JNTC is to improve
each Service's ability to work with other Services at the tactical
level and to improve joint planning and execution at the operational
and strategic levels. The Air Force has integrated live, virtual, and
constructive training environments into a single training realm using a
distributed mission operations (DMO) capability. JNTC will use this DMO
capability to tie live training events with virtual (man-in-the-loop)
play and constructive simulations. Live training in 2004--on our ranges
during four Service-conducted major training events--will benefit from
improved instrumentation and links to other ranges as well as the
ability to supplement live training with virtual or constructive
options. These types of integrated training operations reduce overall
costs to the services while providing us yet another avenue to train
like we fight.
Integrating Within the Air Force
The Air Force is continuing to strengthen and refine our AEF. The
AEF enables rapid build-up and redeployment of air and space power
without a lapse in the Air Force's ability to support a combatant
commander's operations. The Air Force provides forces to combatant
commanders according the AEF Presence Policy (AEFPP), the Air Force
portion of DOD's Joint Presence Policy. There are 10 AEFs, and each AEF
provides a portfolio of capabilities and force modules. At any given
time, two AEFs are postured to immediately provide these capabilities.
The other eight are in various stages of rest, training, spin-up, or
standby. The AEF is how the Air Force organizes, trains, equips, and
sustains responsive air and space forces to meet defense strategy
requirements outlined in the Strategic Planning Guidance.
Within the AEF, Air Force forces are organized and presented to
combatant commanders as Air and Space Expeditionary Task Forces
(AETFs). They are sized to meet the combatant commander's requirements
and may be provided in one of three forms: as an Air Expeditionary Wing
(AEW), Group (AEG), and/or Squadron (AES). An AETF may consist of a
single AEW or AEG, or may consist of multiple AEWs or AEGs and/or as a
Numbered Expeditionary Air Force. AETFs provide the functional
capabilities (weapon systems, expeditionary combat support and command
and control) to achieve desired effects in an integrated joint
operational environment.
One of our distinctive Air Force capabilities is Agile Combat
Support (ACS.) To provide this capability, our expeditionary combat
support forces--medics, logisticians, engineers, communicators,
security forces, services, and contracting, among several others--
provide a base support system that is highly mobile, flexible, and
fully integrated with air and space operations. ACS ensures responsive
expeditionary support to joint operations is achievable within resource
constraints--from creation of operating locations to provision of
right-sized forces. An example of this capability is the 86th
Contingency Response Group (CRG) at Ramstein Air Base, organized,
trained, and equipped to provide an initial ``Open the Base'' force
module to meet combatant commander requirements. The CRG provides a
rapid response team to assess operating location suitability and
defines combat support capabilities needed to establish Air
Expeditionary Force operating locations.
Another example of ACS capability is the light and lean
Expeditionary Medical System (EMEDS) that provides the U.S. military's
farthest forward care and surgical capability. Air Force medics jump
into the fight alongside the very first combatants. Whether supporting
the opening of an air base or performing life saving surgeries, these
medics bring an extraordinary capability. They carry backpacks with
reinforced medical equipment, permitting them to perform medical
operations within minutes of their boots hitting the ground.
Complementing this expeditionary medical capability is our air
evacuation system that provides the lifeline for those injured
personnel not able to return to duty. The other Services and our allies
benefited greatly from this capability in OEF and OIF. The Army and
Navy are now developing a similar light and lean capability. The
success of EMEDS is also apparent in the reduction of disease and non-
battle injuries--the lowest ever in combat.
Horizontal Machine-to-Machine Integration
We also strive to increasingly integrate operations at the most
basic level--electron to electron. Victory belongs to those who can
collect intelligence, communicate information, and bring capabilities
to bear first. Executing these complex tasks with accuracy, speed, and
power requires assured access and the seamless, horizontal integration
of systems, activities and expertise across all manned, unmanned, and
space capabilities. Such integration will dramatically shorten the kill
chain.
Machine-to-machine integration means giving the warfighter the
right information at the right time. It facilitates the exchange of
large amounts of information, providing every machine the information
it needs about the battlespace and an ability to share that
information. In the future, we will significantly reduce the persistent
challenges of having different perspectives or pictures of the
battlefield. Examples would be to ensure that the A-10 could see the
same target as the Predator or to guarantee that the F-15 has the same
intelligence about enemy radars as the Rivet Joint.
We want a system where information is made available and delivered
without regard to the source of the information, who analyzed the
information, or who disseminated the information. It is the end product
that is important, not the fingers that touch it. The culmination of
the effort is the cursor over the target. It is an effect we seek, and
what we will provide.
The warfighters' future success will depend on Predictive
Battlespace Awareness (PBA). PBA relies on in-depth study of an
adversary before hostilities begin in order to anticipate his actions
to the maximum extent possible. We can then analyze information to
assess current conditions, exploit opportunities, anticipate future
actions, and act with a degree of speed and certainty unmatched by our
adversaries. PBA also relies on the ability of air and space systems to
integrate information at the machine-to-machine level and produce high-
fidelity intelligence that results in a cursor over the target. The
result--integrated operations--is our unique ability to conduct PBA and
impact the target at the time and place of our choosing. This machine-
to-machine integration will include a constellation of sensors that
create a network of information providing joint warfighters the
information and continuity to see first, understand first, and act
first.
The C2 Constellation is the Air Force capstone concept for
achieving the integration of air and space operations. Our vision of
the C2 Constellation is a robust, protected network infrastructure, a
globally based command and control system to encompass all levels of
the battle and allow machines to do the integration and fusion. It uses
Battle Management Command and Control and Connectivity and consists of
command centers, sensors, and systems like the U-2, SBR, the
Distributed Common Ground System, and our CAOCs. Given the C2
Constellation's complexity, the Air Force recognizes the need for an
architecture to address myriad integration issues--methodically--so all
elements work in concert.
securing america's next horizon
Armed with the heritage of air and space power in combat, the
lessons learned from our most recent conflicts, and the powerful
advances in technology in the 21st century, we stand ready to deliver
decisive air and space power in support of our Nation. Whether called
to execute a commanding show of force, to enable the joint fight, to
deliver humanitarian assistance, or to protect our Nation from the
scourge of terrorism, we will deliver the effects required. Our ability
to consistently answer the call is our dividend to the Nation, a result
of our sustained investment in people, technology, and integration.
Our portfolio of advantages provides dividends on the battlefield.
We bring to bear a diversified collection of capabilities, which answer
the needs of a spectrum of combat and humanitarian operations. As one
would with any investment, we will monitor, maintain, and adjust our
investments as needed to reflect the demands of a dynamic environment.
Transformational initiatives in the way we organize, train, and equip
reflect such adjustments, changes that will result in significant gains
for our force, for the joint team, and for our Nation. Yet, we will not
shift our focus from the core competencies that have provided the
foundation for our success and continue to do so. The success of the
Air Force resides in the airmen who employ the technology of
warfighting through integrated operations with our joint and coalition
partners. This is our heritage and our future. This is America's Air
Force.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, General, for that statement. I
think the committee as a whole is very appreciative of the good
strong reports from each of you that we have received this
morning.
We will now proceed to a first round of 6 minutes each and
I will lead off. General Schoomaker, we are preparing to have
one of the largest rotations of forces in Iraq in contemporary
military history. That not only involves the training to have
those men and women ready when they arrive, but also the
equipment. You and I have spent some time here recently in
consultation on how at this very moment further adaptations are
being made to the equipment, particularly the high-mobility
multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), to meet the ever-changing
type of threat and weaponry being used. General Hagee, you are
about to oversee your forces once again returning to Iraq.
So I will ask each of you to discuss the ramifications of
this very significant turnover of forces and equipment, whether
it is the HMMWV, personal vests, or body armor. What is the
status as they go into this face of harm's way?
General Schoomaker. Sir, as you correctly stated, this is
one of the largest movements we have had since World War II. It
is very complex. We have approached it in a very deliberative
fashion, we have extended the period of time in which this
rotation will take place to provide for the adequate
preparation time, training, coordination, reconnaissance, and
all of the things we have to do to ensure an appropriate
seamless turnover of forces for this very complicated theater.
Included in this is the extensive management of the
equipment that will remain behind. Any equipment that we have
designed, especially for force protection, including the up-
armored vehicles, not just the up-armored HMMWVs but the
extensive efforts we have been making on other larger vehicles
that are there--supply trucks, the body armor, these kinds of
things. We have, I am happy to say, met the goal--which I
testified to previously--in both Iraq and Kuwait to have the
Interceptor Body Armor now over there in sufficient numbers for
everybody to have. All of that will remain in place and it is
being managed in a very detailed way that will ensure that
nobody is not protected with the very best equipment that we
can acquire.
We have tripled the number of up-armored HMMWVs that are in
the theater and are moving toward a requirement of 4,100. This
is a constantly moving target. We have included the Marine
Corps' requirements in that number and we are working very
closely with General Hagee's people to ensure that adequate
distribution of vehicles for their sector takes place.
We have significantly increased production of this
equipment. You and I have had extensive conversations about not
only the up-armored HMMWV situation but also the add-on armor
kits that are being produced. So unless you want to go into
more detail, sir, I will stop there.
Chairman Warner. That is fine.
General Hagee.
General Hagee. I will not repeat what General Schoomaker
said, but we are ready. We have about 3,000 vehicles--which
includes both large vehicles and the smaller HMMWVs--that we
are hardening right now in conjunction with the Army. The Army
is also leaving behind some of their so-called up-armored
HMMWVs. When the transfer of authority takes place we believe
that we will have all of our vehicles hardened and ready to go.
We have enough body armor for every single marine to
produce sufficient protection, not only in Iraq but in
Afghanistan. Working with the Army, we have also developed
technical means against these improvised explosive devices
(IEDs), but I cannot go any further here in open session.
In addition, we have spent the last few months working with
the Army doing extensive training, taking their lessons learned
from Iraq. We have sent every single maneuver battalion through
an extensive 1-week course out in southern California. We have
taken all of our pilots and put them through a 2-week course
down at Yuma, Arizona. We have also taken our combat support
and combat service support marines, reminded them that every
marine is a rifleman, and sent them through an extensive
training course.
Sir, as we deploy this month we believe we are ready.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
The Commandant mentioned Afghanistan. Obviously, the
theaters are in some competition for equipment. It would be my
expectation that you find that your forces in Afghanistan are
equally well equipped as those in Iraq. Am I correct on that,
General?
General Schoomaker. That is correct, sir.
Chairman Warner. You mentioned in your opening statement
the tremendous value the Guard and Reserve have held throughout
this and indeed other conflicts. Yet when the Secretary of
Defense came, he very forthrightly said that there had been
some analytical studies made of the Guard and Reserve and their
training, and workup for such operations should be changed.
Can you elaborate on how you are working with the Guard and
Reserve community to begin to make them into units that are
more readily able to integrate with the Active Forces?
General Schoomaker. Sir, I would be happy to. At the
highest level, our initiative of modularity that allows us to
plug and play Reserve component units with active component
units in a seamless fashion is, of course, our objective. Take
a look at the way that we have been and are currently preparing
and have been preparing the three guard brigades that are part
of this current rotation going in for OIF 2. We have put the
very best equipment on these soldiers, about $3,000 a set,
including Interceptor Body Armor, the very best of weaponry,
and all of the other equipment that is out there. They have
been going through one of the most extensive training regimens,
both at the National Training Center and at the Joint Readiness
Training Center, which replicates very closely the environment
in which they will operate, with extensive civilians on the
battlefield, etcetera.
Chairman Warner. Thank you for that, General.
Lastly, General Jumper. The brunt of the transportation has
fallen in many ways on your Transportation Command. What is the
status of those aircraft and their ability to really handle
this enormous transfer of forces that it is beginning to
undertake?
General Jumper. Mr. Chairman, a great deal of planning has
gone on, not only for the airborne portion of this, but also
for the portion that we send on ships. I have talked to General
Handy, the commander of the U.S. Transportation Command, about
this and he has a flow plan that is going to get this done in a
timely fashion.
I am confident that the planning for this has been good and
that the flow will be normal.
Chairman Warner. The Navy's role, Admiral, is up and ready
on this?
Admiral Clark. That is correct, sir. As we speak, we have a
ship full of General Hagee's helicopters in the Red Sea en
route, and all of the other shipping that is required is under
control and ready to go.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, gentlemen.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I indicated in my opening remarks, the budget that is
before us does not include funding to pay for the incremental
costs of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. How are we going
to pay for the costs that we know are going to be incurred
before a supplemental budget is presented to us in next
January?
Let me ask General Schoomaker specifically. Do you have an
estimate of the incremental costs that are going to be required
to continue those ongoing operations at the same level in Iraq
and in Afghanistan?
General Schoomaker. Sir, I do not have an estimate, other
than to look at the level at which we are currently operating.
This year our share of that supplemental approached around $38
billion, in the fiscal year 2004 budget.
Senator Levin. Do you have an estimate as to what the
approximate monthly incremental cost would be to maintain those
operations at the current level?
General Schoomaker. At the current level, sir, I believe we
are expending around $3.7 billion in Iraq.
Senator Levin. Per month?
General Schoomaker. Per month, yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Those are incremental costs?
General Schoomaker. This is what I understand right now to
be the total cost of operating in Iraq. In Afghanistan it is
about $900 million a month.
Senator Levin. Do you have the costs for the other
Services? General Hagee, do you have a cost?
General Hagee. Sir, right now, within the Marine Corps, we
are projecting for this fiscal year expending about $800
million to $900 million. Discussing this with the Secretary of
the Navy, we believe that for this year it is about $1.5
billion. We have captured those costs. We have submitted them
to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and we expect
for them to be paid out of the supplemental.
Senator Levin. General Schoomaker, General Hagee, press
reports indicate that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is
concerned that a civil war could erupt in Iraq within the next
6 months. How prepared are your forces, given the large
rotation, to address that potential turn of events if this
occurred, General Schoomaker?
General Schoomaker. Sir, we are going to have a peak of
almost 200,000 people in there at the peak of the rotation. We
certainly are not intending to hold those people in there. That
is part of the rotation base.
I have heard of the discussions about the possibility of
civil war and that is clearly a possibility, but I have not
heard anybody predicting that in fact that is the case. We are
prepared to deal with whatever comes our way. We are very well
prepared to fight. We are very well prepared to do our duty
there in the manner that we are doing it now.
Senator Levin. General Hagee, do you have any comment on
that?
General Hagee. Sir, I would align myself with the Chief of
Staff of the Army.
Senator Levin. There were a number of expectations and
assumptions that were based on prewar intelligence that did not
pan out. For example, the expectation that many Iraqi army
units would defect. That did not happen. There was an
expectation that Iraqi police would stay at their stations.
That did not happen.
The fact that these did not happen led to subsequent
events, such as the looting and the destruction of government
files and buildings. These events probably led to what I and
others consider to be a major error; the decision of Ambassador
Bremer to disestablish the Iraqi army. As a result the various
Iraqi security units had to be rebuilt from the ground up.
There are certain other predictions, assumptions, and
assessments, made by the Intelligence Community which did not
take place. Obviously, the first is the presence of WMD.
General Hagee gave us one example of how our actions were
affected by those assessments and predictions. The same thing
could be said relative to a CIA assessment that Iraq had UAVs
that were intended for delivering WMD, but apparently they did
not.
There were more than 500 sites where WMD or WMD-related
activities were possibly located. This means that there may
have been targets that we did not strike because we were
concerned about collateral damage from the potential release of
chemical and biological weapons. Those are just some of the
assessments and predictions that did not pan out.
This is my question to each of you: Have you been
interviewed by either the Senate or House Intelligence
Committees or by any other congressional committee to determine
the impact of prewar intelligence on the planning for or the
conduct of OIF? General Schoomaker?
General Schoomaker. No, sir, I have not.
Senator Levin. Admiral Clark?
Admiral Clark. No, sir.
Senator Levin. General Hagee?
General Hagee. No, sir.
Senator Levin. General Jumper?
General Jumper. No, sir.
Senator Levin. Do we have contingency plans in the event
that Iraq, after sovereignty is transferred to them, does not
agree to provide the status that we want for our U.S. forces in
Iraq? Once sovereignty is transferred, we are going to have to
deal then with whoever that sovereign is relative to the
operation of our forces and presumably reach an agreement with
that entity that represents the government of Iraq relative to
the status of our forces and the ability of our forces to
operate.
Do we have contingency plans in the event that Iraq does
not agree to provide the status that we want or allow the U.S.
forces to operate freely there? General, let me again start
with you. Do you know of any contingency plan?
General Schoomaker. Sir, I am not aware of what is going on
in that regard. I think it is appropriate for General Abizaid
to address that.
Senator Levin. Do any of you have any comment on that? [No
response.]
My time is up. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
the witnesses for being here today.
General Schoomaker, this transition that was just discussed
of troops being rotated in Iraq will result in about 40 percent
of those troops being Guard and Reserve units. Is that correct?
General Schoomaker. Sir, I believe the last figure I was
given is about 37 percent.
Senator McCain. This is probably the largest percentage of
guardsmen and reservists in a combat situation in history.
Would you agree with that?
General Schoomaker. Sir, I would not be able to agree with
that. I do not know. I am not sure.
Senator McCain. I do not have the facts, but I continue to
disagree with the assertion made by the Secretary of Defense
and all of you again today that we will not have significant
impact on retention of guardsmen and reservists. Many of these
guardsmen and reservists will be there for their second tour,
is that correct?
General Schoomaker. Sir, I do not have the figures before
me, but if I recall the testimony the Secretary gave the other
day, something like 7 percent of the Guard and Reserve has been
called up more than once.
Senator McCain. Well, we will find out, I guess. As I have
said before, I hope that I am wrong.
You intend to expand, General Schoomaker, the size of the
Army by 30,000 individuals over 4 years. Is that correct?
General Schoomaker. Sir, I have asked to grow some headroom
in the Army so that we have the ability to do the modularity,
movements, and transformation that we want to do, while we find
the offsets for them within our current end strength
authorization.
Senator McCain. I guess I had better repeat the question,
General Schoomaker: Is there going to be an increase of 30,000
troops over a 4-year period?
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Do you intend to ask for that to be paid
for each year in an emergency supplemental? It is not reflected
in any budget request by the DOD.
General Schoomaker. No, sir, it is not. That is what I
asked for; it is under the supplemental funding under the
current level of operations that we have. As I said before, we
have 11,000 people right now above our statutory end strength
that are being paid for through the supplemental because of the
level of operations. What I have asked for is to be able to
target who we keep so we can form more units while we fund the
offsets in personnel within our current authorization through
our restructuring and other initiatives.
Senator McCain. Which again, in all due respect, ends up
with an increase of 30,000 personnel. Is that correct?
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir. I asked to be able to grow to
that level. We cannot achieve that level overnight. This is
going to be incremental growth over that period.
Senator McCain. But each year is it the intention to ask
for the funding for this out of emergency supplemental funding?
General Schoomaker. Sir, as long as we have this emergency,
yes, in conjunction with what we have in our program. Obviously
if the emergency terminates then we will have to terminate
this, but this is why we built the off-ramps during the period
of growth.
Senator McCain. I guess my point is, Mr. Chairman, I have
not known of personnel increases being paid for in the name of
emergency supplementals to pay for a conflict. I think what it
does is it increases the size of the deficit and again deceives
the American people about the size of the deficit and the debt
that we are incurring per household.
General Jumper, are you aware that members of the Senate
Armed Services Committee staff were given falsified information
by the people at Tinker Air Force Base?
General Jumper. No, sir, I am not.
Senator McCain. You were not aware of this issue being
discussed in an open hearing? Your liaison people did not
inform you of our concern about that?
General Jumper. No, sir, not about false statements. I have
heard nothing about false statements.
Senator McCain. I showed before the committee doctored
documents that were given to the staff of this committee. You
know nothing about that?
General Jumper. I am sorry, sir; I do not.
Senator McCain. General Hagee, do you need additional
members of the Marine Corps to carry out your responsibilities?
General Hagee. As I see the situation right now, no, sir.
Senator McCain. You do not?
General Hagee. I do not, sir.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. I would like to have several questions
submitted for the record.
Chairman Warner. Without objection, all members are given
that opportunity.
You raised very important questions relative to the budget
and the supplemental, as did Senator Levin. I wish to make it
clear that, having been in the building myself for many years,
these witnesses before us received guidance from the Secretary
of Defense as to what to do. They did not make the decision not
to include in their own budget process the cost for those
personnel. I think we all agree on that. It is a level above
them where that decision was made as to the allocation of the
budget costs.
Are we agreed on that, gentlemen?
Senator Levin. I think that is usually true.
Chairman Warner. Yes. They are responding to the actual
facts, but the decision on the budget was made, frankly, by the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and promulgated through
the Secretary of Defense.
Senator Levin. They could appeal it to the President, I
guess, under Goldwater-Nichols.
Chairman Warner. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Levin. Good old Goldwater-Nichols.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and again
thanks to the chiefs for being here.
Mr. Chairman, there have been some references made and
questions asked regarding the ongoing debate about the quality
of our intelligence about WMD and the way in which the
administration used that intelligence. Those are important
questions. I think it is even more important that we focus, as
I believe all of us want to do, and as Senator Levin mentioned
in his opening statement, on how we support you and our forces
to successfully complete the mission in Iraq. While the inquiry
regarding WMD and the intelligence is significant certainly as
we go forward, what is really important is to go forward.
We are there now. We have successfully carried out what I
have for more than a decade believed was a just and necessary
mission, which was to overthrow Saddam Hussein. I have no
doubt, thanks to the skill and bravery of your forces, that
America and the world are safer as a result.
Now the question is how to complete the next phase, which
in some sense is a different mission. So my questions will
focus on that. I, like everyone else, have been reading lately
and hearing about Mr. Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian
thought to have links to al Qaeda. We now link him to a number
of bombings in Iraq and now have found this disk with what
looks like a request by him to the leadership of al Qaeda for
support for what he called ``a secular war against the Shias.''
I must say, parenthetically, I have always been struck by
the conclusion that there was no link between al Qaeda and
Saddam Hussein. How could there be a link, they say, because al
Qaeda is theological and Saddam was very secular? I am not
reaching a conclusion here, but I am just urging others not to
reach a conclusion. Unfortunately, they had something that tied
them together, which was their hatred of us.
I now return to my question. The news about Zarqawi leads
me to ask, how would you describe the insurgency we are facing
now? Am I right in concluding it is a mix of Baathist
loyalists, Saddam loyalists, and terrorists? Is that the
conclusion you reach about the enemy we are facing in this
phase of the conflict in Iraq? I will start with you, General
Schoomaker, and then General Hagee.
General Schoomaker. Sir, I think it has been best described
as being a combination of former regime loyalists and dead-
enders. There are certainly some criminal elements that are
being paid to perform certain things by them, and obviously you
have seen intelligence that there are other entities that are
there.
It appears from what has been in the open press today that
there is a direction towards trying to work the seams between
the different entities within the country to their advantage. I
will pass the question to General Hagee.
Senator Lieberman. As you advise the Secretary and equip
and staff General Abizaid, I take it that you have no doubt
that part of the element we are fighting in Iraq is terrorists.
They are not just the Baathist loyalists, is that right,
General?
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir, I think that that is clear.
The evidence is there. But terror is a tactic as well as a
philosophy.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Schoomaker. I think that we nevertheless,
regardless of what the source of it is, are seeing terror
tactics used against us in this insurgency. The source of it
from my perspective matters less from my area of
responsibility, which is to protect and prepare our soldiers to
perform over there. I would agree in that regard.
Senator Lieberman. That is an important point and I accept
it. There may be terrorist groups that have come in from
outside, but the point is that from the point of view of your
forces terrorism is terrorism. It could be the Baathists using
terrorist means.
General Hagee.
General Hagee. Sir, I agree with that assessment.
Senator Lieberman. Let me ask a more general question,
which builds a little bit on questions that have been asked
before. I will ask each of you this. Does the budget submitted
by the administration give you the resources you need to fight
the ongoing war against the insurgents in Iraq and conduct
those essential military activities to win the peace as well as
to be prepared to fight and win if necessary elsewhere in the
world?
Understanding that you can never have everything you want
in a world of limited resources, what would be your top
unfunded requirement if in fact you feel that you received as
much of your priority list as you need in the administration's
budget?
General Schoomaker. Sir, I would have to submit that for
the record. I would not like to guess at that at this stage. I
would like to say that the 2004 budget with supplemental is
sufficient to prepare us and to conduct the operations that we
are doing today. What we have in the 2005 Army budget is
sufficient to prepare and equip the Army to do the day-to-day
things to support our preparation for the war. It does not
include the contingency costs of actually operating over in
that theater.
Senator Lieberman. What you would like to submit in writing
is what your top unfunded requirement would be. Did I
understand that correctly?
General Schoomaker. If you are asking me that question,
that is the way I would prefer to answer it, yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The fiscal year 2005 budget supports our highest Army base program
priorities. Should additional funds become available, we would apply
them first to accelerate our force protection efforts, including
ballistic armor protection and individual soldier equipment.
Senator Lieberman. Fine.
Admiral Clark.
Admiral Clark. The demand on the Navy is certainly not the
same as it is on the Army and the Marine Corps with regard to
this specific fight. The requirement for us to be represented
globally certainly is there. Thirty-two percent of my force is
forward-deployed today. I have sufficient resources to execute
that.
Over the course of our discussion, I have talked on a
consistent pattern about the requirement to make sure this
force is ready. In my opening testimony I spoke to the value of
readiness. I assure you that this budget has the resources in
it to make sure that it is ready and I can respond this
afternoon if I have to.
With regard to my most pressing requirement--and you are
exactly right, in a perfect world I could dream up some things
that we could go faster. I fundamentally believe that one of
the things that is costing us in the acquisition side of the
house is that many of our programs--because of resources, we
are not able to move fast enough, so we have them on a program
on minimum sustain rate or do not invest as rapidly as we could
which ends up costing the Nation more.
But I will tell you that for me, the focus is now on how to
create the Navy of the future. For too many years we did not
buy enough ships and airplanes. That would be my most pressing
need and that is where I would put additional resources: to
recapitalize ships, aircraft, and submarines, in a more rapid
manner.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Admiral.
I know I am over my time, Mr. Chairman. I wonder if we
could just ask General Hagee and General Jumper to respond,
please?
Chairman Warner. Yes, of course.
General Hagee. Sir, with the combination of the budget and
the supplemental we can handle day-to-day operations and any
other contingencies that come up. As far as the number one item
on my list, it would be resetting the force, ensuring as we use
the equipment either in Iraq or Afghanistan or wherever that we
have sufficient funds to either purchase new equipment or to
refurbish the equipment that is coming back.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
General Jumper.
General Jumper. Sir, we also have the resources to do our
job, and resetting the force quickly and being able to
recapitalize, as Admiral Clark says, are the two priorities on
the Air Force's list.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you all for your testimony. Thanks
for what you do for us and our country every day.
Chairman Warner. We thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly want to
thank the Service Chiefs for being here today, but I also want
to thank you for the great work that you are doing in leading
our young men and women in the military as they fight and
battle terrorism both here at home and abroad. Thousands of
young men and women in my home State of North Carolina are
currently fighting the war on terror in Iraq. We are forging a
process of peace and in doing so we are moving toward turning
control of the government and society back to the Iraqi people.
In Iraq and Afghanistan, our Nation is helping to rebuild
schools and hospitals, water supply systems and roadways. We
have made great progress, thanks to our diverse and skilled
workforce, which is meeting the challenges with a courage that
makes us all very proud indeed.
With this month's deployment of North Carolina's 30th Heavy
Enhanced Separate Brigade, I have been made painfully aware of
some of the problems faced by the National Guard units as they
mobilize. General Schoomaker, what are you doing to guarantee
that the service members are expeditiously transitioned to
active duty payrolls and that their lodging and subsistence are
of the same quality as the active units that are training on
the same bases?
Would you respond to that, and then also to the budget
request news release sent out by DOD which proposes, ``the use
of innovative management to improve the mobilization process.''
Could each of you go into more specifics about how your Service
intends to meet that objective?
General Schoomaker. Senator Dole, thank you very much. As I
think you might know, I spent considerable time with the 30th
Brigade, Old Hickory, all the way from its pre-mobilization
through the mobilization process and through its most recent
training at the Joint Readiness Training Center. We have pulled
out all stops to ensure that they are absolutely prepared,
equipped, trained, have all of the benefits, and to ensure that
they have mission success.
To answer the second part of your question, we are going to
school on ourselves in preparation for mobilization. We are
learning very much about what we are doing now and have been
doing in mobilization. Both the Chief of the Army National
Guard and the Chief of the Army Reserve are working with us to
achieve the initiatives through modularity and a transition
from what we used to call an ``alert, train, deploy'' mentality
to a ``train, alert, deploy'' capability within our Reserve
components.
Senator Dole. Would others answer briefly, please.
Admiral Clark. Very briefly, we have now only 1,900
Reserves mobilized. Our problem and challenge is significantly
different than the other Services. Suffice it to say that the
main way we are taking this on, Senator, is this: We are
rebalancing the active-Reserve mix so that we do not get caught
in a position where if we have to go accomplish some mission,
we are forced to have a lot of Reserves on day one. We have
restructured our fast response force so that Reserves will not
be required for at least the first 60 days of any operation we
might be required to be involved in.
General Schoomaker's comment about learning from ourselves
is absolutely true. We continue to do that. The biggest area
for us has been in pay. We have made great progress with the
computer systems to support that.
General Hagee. Senator, we are an expeditionary ready
force. We have active duty personnel located with our Reserve
units to ensure that their training meets the same standards as
our Active-Duty Forces. We are ready to activate those
individuals within an extremely short period of time to respond
to any contingency.
General Jumper. Senator, in the Air Force we train our Air
National Guard and Air Force Reserve to the same standards as
the active and they share the same equipment. We have a very
high volunteer rate for our normal rotations in the Air Force,
but we are configured with our Air Expeditionary Forces so that
we can call forward the active portions of those forces as
force packages as we need them if we want to avoid
mobilization.
Still, with our high volunteer rates we do not think that
that is necessary in normal times.
Senator Dole. General Jumper, I have an interest in the A-
10 aircraft. This year's budget shows a significant procurement
funding increase for the A-10. The A-10 certainly has shown its
continued capabilities in Iraq, despite its status as an aging
aircraft. Does the budget investment support your goal of
extending the service life of this aircraft to 2028? Have
recent operations further validated the use of other platforms,
like the F-16 and the B-1, for the close air support mission?
General Jumper. Well, Senator, especially since Kosovo and
particularly into Afghanistan, we have worked close air support
with every kind of airframe that we have. The most significant
addition has been our bomber force. In many cases we have been
able to provide close air support with greater accuracy with
our GPS-guided bombs than we have actually being closer to the
ground with some of our fighter aircraft.
But our F-16s, our A-10s, and our bomber aircraft are all
committed to that mission. We will continue to have, in the Air
Force, dedicated airplanes whose sole mission is close air
support like the A-10. As you say, we have a significant
upgrade program. How this will play out into the future and how
we work this with the aging aircraft problems with the A-10 is
yet to be determined, but we will continue with dedicated close
air support capability in our Air Force.
Senator Dole. Thank you.
My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator, for your
contributions on these questions.
Now, Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service to the Nation and
your individual branches of the Service. My theme will be
reminiscent of many that are here today. The most remarkable
thing about this budget is what it leaves out, not what it
includes. It leaves out the cost of operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and the deliberate increases as a result of 30,000
additional Army troops that were committed to.
I think it is a deceptive way to finance the operations of
the military and I think it also has practical ramifications.
It impacts the Army most specifically and the Marine Corps to a
similar degree.
General Schoomaker, as I understand, the way we are
financing operations today is that this budget proposal will
cover the routine operations of the Army through the 2005 year,
but operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and other contingencies
are being funded out of the 2004 supplemental?
General Schoomaker. That is correct, sir.
Senator Reed. At the current burn rate, when do you run out
of 2004 supplemental money? What day or month?
General Schoomaker. Sir, we are funded through the end of
this year. At the burn rate, we are funded through the end of
the fiscal year.
Senator Reed. You are funded until September 30?
General Schoomaker. Until 30 September, yes, sir.
Senator Reed. The 30th. If this supplemental is delayed
past September 30, say the end of November, or even delayed
until the following year, which is customary nowadays, you will
burn out all the money that is appropriated?
General Schoomaker. That is correct, sir.
Senator Reed. In trying to balance the commitments and the
demands, do you anticipate cutting down base support operations
as a way to cover shortfalls?
General Schoomaker. Sir, quite frankly I only have
visibility of what the Army has. I do not know what OSD has
available. I am concerned, and I think this is what you are
getting to, on how we bridge the gap between the end of this
fiscal year and whenever we can get a supplemental in the next
year. I do not have an answer for you exactly how we would do
that.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General.
Admiral Clark, do you have similar concerns?
Admiral Clark. I do not, because I do not have that kind of
surge requirement at this time. If I had to increase the pace
of aviation operations, then I would need additional resources.
I will end up being the party that pays for the Marine Corps
transportation and that is a small amount that we will have to
deal with. We expect to be covered out of the 2004 supplemental
for this movement and then next year we will have to deal with
when they would be coming home.
Senator Reed. General Hagee, your comments?
General Hagee. Sir, I share the Chief of Staff of the
Army's concerns about this.
Senator Reed. General Jumper?
General Jumper. Sir, so do I. We are funded through the end
of fiscal year 2004 and then we will have to either cash flow
or find a way to bridge until any potential supplement in 2005.
Senator Reed. So if we do not see a supplemental up here in
the middle of the summer, given the way we work, you gentlemen
in varying degrees are facing a funding problem beginning
September, or beginning October 1. Is that a fair assumption?
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Admiral Clark, except for the Navy?
Admiral Clark. Based on what I said last time, I do not
have any requirements that I know of at this time, but I might
have a small transportation requirement.
Senator Reed. General Hagee.
General Hagee. Yes, sir, we will have a challenge during
that first quarter. We would take actions like General Jumper
mentioned: forward flowing or cash flowing until the
supplemental became available.
Senator Reed. Let me ask another related question. This
goes against the Army because they are bearing so much of this
burden and bearing it extremely well, General. The Secretary of
Defense had a chart at the last hearing which he is going to
use to talk about the end strength increases. What I find
remarkable is that from September 2003 to December 2003 the
Army lost 10,000 soldiers at a time that stop-losses were in
place, and at a time that we were contemplating at least
increasing the number of soldiers.
I am concerned that this trend, if it continues, will be
serious in terms of manning the forces, regardless of whatever
end strength and by whatever means we achieve, coupled together
with the anticipation in July when OIF 1 finishes of
significant recruitment problems and retention problems. Could
you comment upon that, General Schoomaker?
General Schoomaker. I am not familiar with the chart you
just held up and I do not know about losing 10,000 soldiers.
Senator Reed. This is the Secretary of Defense's chart,
with the end strength of the actual Army. They show in
September 2003 499,301, and in December, 490,174. This is a
loss of about 10,000 personnel in end strength. That is his
chart.
General Schoomaker. Sir, our statutory end strength at the
end of last year was 480,000.
Senator Reed. I am probably being confusing. The numbers I
refer to is the actual end strength, not the statutory.
General Schoomaker. That is temporary end strength, that
has grown within their authority, and within the authority of
the Secretary of Defense.
Senator Reed. I am not questioning the legality. It appears
to me that we lost 10,000 soldiers, real boots on the ground,
at a time we had stop-loss orders in effect, and at a time in
which we were trying to begin our recruitment for these
additional soldiers.
General Schoomaker. Sir, they are not related. That is what
I am trying to tell you. We have met our retention and
recruiting goals at 100 percent of the force. The force waxes
and wanes based upon who we are mobilizing, and who we are
moving, and it has been as high as twice that number during
part of the year.
Senator Reed. If you could provide me a more specific
written response----
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir, I will.
[The information referred to follows:]
The drop in end strength is directly attributable to traditionally
low enlisted accessions in December and the end of the active
component, 12-month skill-based stop loss/stop move program.
Historically, the active Army does not bring many new soldiers onto
active duty during the holiday season. Thus, each year, strength dips a
few thousand in December and recovers in January. In the summer of
fiscal year 2003, the Army terminated the skill-based stop loss/stop
move program. The termination plan provided for most solders who were
subject to stop loss to depart the active Army between October 31, 2003
and December 20, 2003. Approximately 8,000 soldiers chose to depart
during that time. A new stop loss policy began in January 2004, and
only affects soldiers in deploying units. It will not be based on a
soldier's military occupational specialty. With the implementation of
unit stop loss and a return to accessing new soldiers in January, all
factors indicate a steady increase in strength into the summer months.
Senator Reed. I will provide more specific questions
perhaps.
If you just look at the lines here, we are increasing
actual end strength month by month though last year. We hit a
peak in December of last year and we started going down. If the
next report for January, February, and March shows continued
deterioration in actual end strength, I think it undercuts your
ability to conduct your mission and it raises a serious
problem. I will just stop there.
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a brief
statement I would like to have included in the record just
prior to my questioning.
Chairman Warner. The statement will be put into the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Allard follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Wayne Allard
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to express my appreciation to each
of you for your leadership and dedication. A year ago, our Nation was
demanding much of our military. Our forces were fighting in
Afghanistan, assisting local forces in Yemen, Djibouti, and Georgia,
and defending our homeland. Since then, they have taken on a new
mission: the securing and stabilization of Iraq. The mobilization of
thousands of men and women in the Reserves and National Guard are
indicative of the size and scope of our current military operations.
Despite many hardships, our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
coast guardsmen have stepped forward and embraced their country's call
to arms. We thank them for their service. We thank each of you for
providing them with the leadership they need to defend our Nation.
Even as we confront our foes around the world today, we must
prepare to meet the threats of tomorrow. The ongoing transformation of
the military is vital to the future safety and security of this great
Nation. We must not avoid making difficult choices about legacy
systems. Nor should we turn away from the cost of investing in new
technologies. We must remain committed to this effort. The superiority
of American arms in the decades to come is at stake.
I want to thank our witnesses for taking the time to appear before
us today. I know each of you have many responsibilities, particularly
during this time of conflict. Yet, it is important for us to hear from
you the needs of the men and women under your command. So, I again
thank you for being here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to our time of questions.
Senator Allard. Just recently, I went to a Board of
Visitors meeting, which is advisory to the Superintendent of
the Air Force Academy (AFA), and I want to take this
opportunity to thank General Jumper as well as Secretary of the
Air Force Roche for attending the last two Board of Visitors
meetings. I know they are very busy individuals and their
commitment to the future leaders of the Air Force is very much
appreciated.
I would also add that this last meeting was probably the
best Board of Visitors meeting I have had the chance to attend
in the 6 years that I have been on the Board. We are under new
leadership with Jim Gilmore, who is our chairman, and both the
Superintendent of the AFA, General Rosa, as well as the
Commandant, General Weida. They gave good reports and I think
most generally, in talking with the members of the Board, they
felt that considerable progress had been made at the AFA as far
as addressing this problem with sexual assaults that they have
just been dealing with for the last year or so.
I would ask General Jumper, who was there and listened, if
he might share with this committee his assessment of where we
are with sexual assault issues there at the AFA and how the
plan is moving forward.
General Jumper. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate your
efforts, sir, to reinvigorate the Board of Visitors and to get
the members interested in what is going on out there. You and
Chairman Gilmore have done a superb job of that and I think
that is what made the meeting such a success.
Senator, there is a great deal that has gone on as we
implement the provisions of the Fowler Commission report. We
have about 80 percent of those recommendations implemented at
the AFA. The actions that you and the Board of Visitors took at
the last meeting went a long way in implementing many of the
rest of those provisions. As we have looked at the agenda for
change at the AFA, I think we have seen an excellent response,
especially with regard to the use of alcohol among the cadets.
The number of incidents have gone down dramatically. We do not
declare success on that. We just take it as a trend.
The number of sexual assault incidents that have been
reported since the new leadership has been in place is 10.
Those are being dealt with. The issue that we are consumed with
right now, that I know Senator Collins is worried about, is the
issue of confidentiality and actually how we implement
something that allows some element of confidentiality. We are
working on that right now with the DOD Inspector General to try
and find a way to accommodate all the concerns surrounding
that.
I think from the alcohol uses, to the reporting, to the
response team measures that we have put in at the AFA, I think
that the attitude that I see when I go out there is positive.
Senator, I visit often and I randomly go around and talk to the
cadets, as does Secretary Roche. I see a recognition of the
problem. I see less and less denial and a determination to get
on with fixing the elements of this problem.
We will continue to press forward with all energy, Senator,
to get through this thing.
Senator Allard. Thank you, General Jumper.
General Schoomaker, the President's fiscal year 2005 budget
request provides over $1.4 billion for the DOD's chemical
demilitarization program. You have a major role in that, or the
Army has a major role in it. I was looking at the budget
request and how the Government Performance and Results Act
(GPRA), which is a provision that has been put in place by
Congress for agencies to measure the progress and results of
their programs, received the lowest rating as far as measuring
results.
It does not necessarily reflect funding, but there are also
some problems with cost overruns and some other problems. I
wonder if you would just share with me about the funding and
some of the evaluations of that program. The bottom line
question is are we going to be able to meet the 2012 treaty
deadline for the Army's chemical demilitarization program?
General Schoomaker. Sir, I know that Acting Secretary of
the Army Brownlee is personally involved in running this issue.
I am not as familiar with it and I would be glad to provide for
the record the information.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Army remains committed to safely and efficiently meeting treaty
deadlines.
Senator Allard. Yes, I wish you would do that, because the
GPRA measurement on that means that you are setting goals and
objectives and you are not meeting them. I am concerned about
that. Could you give this to me and perhaps maybe the rest of
the members of the committee who are interested in knowing what
is happening?
General Schoomaker. I would be glad to.
Senator Allard. I am particularly concerned about the cost
overruns and everything that we are hearing about in that
particular program. I think that is an area of concern and
something that we need to watch.
I have another question for you. The Denver Post reported 3
weeks ago that as many as 40 women have been sexually assaulted
while serving our country in Iraq. Then The Washington Post
wrote an article and then USA Today wrote an editorial on that.
As a result, Secretary Rumsfeld ordered a comprehensive
investigation into the matter.
Is the Army addressing the problem of sexual misconduct
when soldiers are deployed?
General Schoomaker. Would you say the last part of your
question again?
Senator Allard. Are you addressing this problem in the
Army?
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir, we are. We are addressing it
very aggressively. This has been a subject that has received
leadership attention. It is a chain of command issue. It is a
leadership issue. It is a discipline issue. We have significant
resources available to us to handle it and we are reviewing
those in regard to much of what General Jumper just spoke to.
Senator Allard. Back to you, General Jumper. Last November
the Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, which I
chair, held a hearing on the current status of many of our
military space programs. It was noted that many of these
programs had fallen behind schedule, experienced enormous cost
overruns, and they may not be appropriately managed.
I believe that we cannot allow our military space programs
to continue down this path, which could eventually threaten our
space dominance. I believe that we need to seriously examine
the size and type of satellites that we are building and I
believe our launch capabilities need to be much more responsive
and much more affordable.
General Jumper, given that the cost of building a few
large, highly capable satellites is becoming prohibitively
expensive, do you believe it is time for us to begin examining
the possibility of building large quantities of smaller, less
capable satellites that together provide the same overall
capability?
General Jumper. Senator, I can tell you that Pete Teets,
who is the Space Executive for OSD and the Under Secretary of
the Air Force, is focused on the ability of our space industry
to perform. It has to do with a number of things, not the least
of which is getting our arms around the requirements.
It has long been a practice in the space industry that
requirements can come from all directions and that they are
perhaps not properly constrained. We are taking aggressive
action to get hold of the requirements.
Certainly one of the things that has to be looked at is the
size and complexity of the satellites. There is a large effort
going on with the development of microsat technology and what
it might be able to do for us, especially as we look at being
able to focus on specific areas. I take your point, sir, and I
know that Mr. Teets is looking at that and I think that is
probably one of the alternatives to the way we are going now.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator. We are past
the time.
Senator Allard. Thank you. Sorry, I did not realize.
Chairman Warner. Not at all.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. It is a very important question.
Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Clark, I was interested in a comment you made about
moving the Navy to more technically advanced ships.
We are moving toward much more technically advanced ships.
I am curious about that. In a sense, are you saying that we are
going to have fewer and fewer tasks that, say, an E-1 can
perform on those ships and more and more tasks on those ships
that E-6s will perform? How will that work?
Admiral Clark. You have it exactly. The technology that we
are inserting in our new platforms is going to require a more
experienced, call it a richer experienced, force. I said in my
opening testimony that our asymmetric advantages are technology
and the genius of our people, and I want all of it I can get.
DD(X) starts construction in 2005. DD(X) will be an all-
electric ship. It will have the ability to project fires 100
miles. It will revolutionize naval fires. Today we can do it at
around 10. This will change the way we fight with the Marine
Corps, and it will change the way we support Army units on the
ground.
A typical ship today that size maybe would have 500 or 600
people on it. This one is going to have between 100 and 150
people on it. No, I do not anticipate that there are going to
be many E-1s there. It is going to require a very experienced
group of people to operate this ship.
This is why I need all of the incentive tools to shape the
force, and it is why I am one chief that is talking about a
force that is much more capable but with fewer people in it.
Senator Pryor. Right. I assume for budgetary reasons there
will be fewer people with a higher pay scale, is that right?
But does that wash out in the end in terms of----
Admiral Clark. Well, it absolutely is shaped differently.
For 4 years, I have been coming up here talking about making my
force richer and experienced. When I got here, the top six,
that is E-4 through 9, were 69.9 percent of my force. In 2004
it goes to 73.3, and in this budget it goes to 74 percent of my
force.
You cannot change this overnight and we have been
progressively growing the experience in the force. It provides
more opportunity for our people, but also sends them the
message: We need you, we need your skill set, and this is what
the Navy is going to be like in the future.
Senator Pryor. Let me ask this in light of that, and I
follow what you are saying completely. I recently received a
letter from a constituent from my State of Arkansas and I
believe he is stationed in Japan. Under the high-tenure system,
it sounds like he is about to be forced to retire. He is an E-
6. I do not know all of his background, and do not know a lot
about him, but I do have his letter right here.
I wonder if we should reevaluate our high-tenure system in
light of what you just said, that there may be some people that
maybe do not go up their promotion chain, but are awfully good
at what they do. We should keep those people for a longer
period of time. Does that make sense?
Admiral Clark. That absolutely makes sense. As CNO, one of
the things I get to do is put policies in place. In order to
shape the manpower force, I put policies in place that put a
limit on an individual that has served for a number of years
and has not been promoted, in order to then make room for a
hard charger that has the potential to serve much longer in the
future. I put rules in on how long they can serve without being
promoted.
Having said that, every individual is an individual, and I
have waiver clauses on every one of those policies. That option
is always open and we assess each case as required to meet the
needs of the current and future naval service.
Senator Pryor. Yes, because, based on what you said a few
moments ago, it seems like you want preferably more tenured
people, more experienced people, and fewer of them per ship. I
understand that. I did not want to point out an inconsistency,
but I just did not know how that worked.
General Schoomaker, let me ask you a question about this
huge rotation that you are undergoing right now in Iraq. I
think you are moving out 125,000, and moving in 110,000, if I
understand the numbers correctly. Could you just give us a
status report on that rotation?
General Schoomaker. Sir, the rotation is on schedule and
moving very well in every aspect, from the transportation plan
to the transfers authority in the theaters.
Senator Pryor. We are right on the timetable?
General Schoomaker. We are doing very well, yes, sir.
Senator Pryor. Are there any hidden or maybe unexpected
costs that you had not anticipated? Are the costs of the
rotation tracking your schedule?
General Schoomaker. I am aware of nothing that is different
in that regard.
Senator Pryor. Let me also ask this, General Schoomaker.
Since I have been on this committee, which has been just over a
year now, we have heard a lot about transformation. What is the
most significant development or developments in transformation
in this budget that we are talking about today? What should we
see in the Army over this fiscal year, that we as a committee
can look to and track and follow the transformation process?
General Schoomaker. Sir, it would take the rest of the
hearing for me to lay it all out. We are going to come over and
provide exquisite detail to every member and every staff member
that would like to see what we are doing. In short,
modularizing the force, increasing the number of modules, and
putting enablers in that cause these modules to be much more
powerful than they are today. This changes the doctrine to look
much more like the doctrine of the future, not the doctrine of
the past. Using this momentum, as a result of the war and the
focus and the level of funding, we have to reset for tomorrow,
not reset for yesterday.
You will see three new brigades this year, at least three
new brigades next year, and four brigades the following year.
We will increase the Active Force by 30 percent with a minimal
cost to our program.
If you take a look at the National Guard, Lieutenant
General Blum is building towards 34 brigades that look exactly
like the kinds of brigades that we have. If we go all the way
to the end of what we can do, we could end up potentially with
82 brigades in the United States Army. That means that the
dwell time issues, the kinds of pressures that are on the Guard
and Reserve and the Active Force, can be reduced. The force is
also stabilized so that people stay longer in one place, kids
go to the same schools, spouses work, and people can invest in
homes and develop equity like other people do. All of these
kinds of things are all part of this transformation.
Transformation is not just equipment. It is about the full
dimension of the doctrine.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator, General.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Schoomaker, last Saturday I had the great privilege
of participating in a welcome back ceremony for 24 soldiers
from the Maine National Guard who were returning from
Afghanistan. I would note that Maine has the third highest
percentage of guardsmen and women being deployed right now in
the entire Nation.
Last week Secretary Rumsfeld suggested to us that the Guard
is not overstressed and he provided us with a chart that showed
that only 7 percent of our Guard have been mobilized more than
once during the past 10 years. That does not reflect the
experience of my Guard units in Maine at all. Many of them have
been deployed three times in the last 10 years. Some were
mobilized with only 5 days notice. Many of them had no idea how
long they were going to be gone nor when they would return.
I want to emphasize that the members of the Maine Guard are
very proud of their service and they do a fabulous job, but
repeated deployment over a 10-year period, 3 times in 10 years,
has imposed a tremendous strain on their families. I am
reminded of the old saying that you recruit the soldier, but
you retain the family. I think, as Senator McCain and others
have suggested, that we are going to see an exodus from the
Guard and Reserves that is going to be very harmful because of
these repeated deployments.
I have two questions for you. First, how are you going to
restructure the Guard units so that you spread the burden more
evenly? My units are clearly in this 7 percent. Second, will
the additional 30,000 active duty troops that you are
requesting help relieve some of the excessive pressure on these
overused Guard units?
General Schoomaker. Senator, thank you very much for your
question and thank you for the service of your constituents. We
are very proud of them. While you were meeting them I was down
in Senator Pryor's State with 400 Guard commanders and command
sergeant majors from across the whole United States working on
exactly what you are talking about.
This is not an issue of how many people as much as it is
what capabilities and how many units of capability we have
available to us. The overstressed people that we have in the
Guard and Reserve and the Active Force are in specialties that
have high demand of which we have too few of them. So much of
our transformational activity is balancing lesser used
capability within our force into the more highly used
capabilities within our force, so we can reduce that stress.
I would like to refer to the rain barrel analogy that the
Secretary of Defense used the other day. I used it with him but
he beat me up a little bit when I first used it. Apparently he
liked it because he used it with you. The problem is we are
paying for a full barrel of rain water here. I would prefer to
call it maybe whiskey, but we had to go with rain water. The
spigot is too high up on the side of the barrel and we are not
able to assess all of that liquid that is in the bottom of that
barrel.
What we want to do is move that spigot down by creating
more of the low-density units and take the units we have too
many of that we do not use enough and convert them and balance
them across the Active, Guard, and Reserve Force structure. It
is essential. To do this we have to have some room, and thus
the temporary bump. That buys us the ability to start doing it
now, because the faster we can create more of these brigades
that look like each other in other capabilities the faster we
will be able to relieve the stress on the force. That kind of
pulls it together.
Because of this rebalancing that we do, that temporary
strength goes away and the units remain when it is over.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Admiral Clark, you did not think you were going to get off
scot-free today when I am here. I am going to submit several
questions to you about shipbuilding, but I want to bring up a
different issue today with you. A few months ago I also
welcomed back to Brunswick Naval Air Station a squadron of P-3
pilots and crews who had been assigned overseas to provide
support in both our operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq.
Could you comment on the role of the P-3 aircraft in OEF
and OIF and what you see as the future for our marine patrol
aircraft?
Admiral Clark. Absolutely, and thank you for asking the
question. This is a group of people who everybody really needs
to know about for what they have been doing for America. This
airplane, which was designed over 30 years ago, actually
probably 40 years ago, was designed to go hunt submarines.
It is a classic example of what happens in America when you
apply the genius of our people and you keep introducing new
systems. Over time we have put better and better sensors on
this airplane, which was designed to do reconnaissance, and
sometimes even underwater reconnaissance. In OIF, I will tell
you that they operated principally in support of the land
forces. We operated them at an extraordinary rate.
These airplanes are wearing out. In fact, I took a proposal
to the Secretary of Defense recently and said that I cannot
keep flying them at this rate. The rate that we are flying them
at today will not meet the transition for the new airplane that
we have in this year's budget, the R&D for, the multimission
maritime aircraft (MMA). We cannot get to the transition
without limiting the flight hours on this airframe.
These people have done a fabulous job and it is our task to
husband this resource, use it where the Nation must use it in
order to deal with the global war on terrorism and the
challenges that we face. The men and women flying in these old
airplanes are doing a magnificent job.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator, very much.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to express how proud I am of our troops and the
efforts they are making in keeping our Nation secure, and also
of the great military leadership that we have had.
General Schoomaker, I understand that the Army is
attempting to reset your prepositioned stocks. General Hagee,
your statement suggests that this task is already largely
accomplished for the Marine Corps. However, I believe both of
your Services are also continuing to use at least some portion
of those stocks in support of ongoing operations in Iraq. I
have two questions.
First, what is the current status of your prepositioned
stocks, and how much do you plan to continue to draw on them
during OIF 2? Second, based on those answers, how long will it
take you to reset your prepositioned equipment, how much
supplemental funding will it require, and what is the impact on
your ability to respond to other missions in the meantime?
Thank you.
General Schoomaker. Senator, thank you for the question.
The most heavily used prepositioned stocks are those that are
actually in Kuwait right now, the ones that we used for the
war. The 3rd Infantry Division, for instance, deployed from
Fort Stewart and Fort Benning, fell in on those prepositioned
stocks and that is what they used to fight the war.
We have something like 9,000 pieces of equipment in those
prepositioned stocks that require resetting. This will take us
a couple years to do. Most of this equipment is the equipment
that was used for the phase one-two operations, or the battle
operations. We are not using them today, so we are starting to
reset the equipment.
The equipment that we have sent into theater for current
operations, primarily HMMWV and other wheeled vehicle forces,
is different. I think the one that is most used right now is
the one that is in Kuwait. We are resetting it. Others are
intact and available to us for worldwide commitment.
Senator Akaka. General Hagee.
General Hagee. Yes, sir. I may have not been quite clear.
We are resetting the force right now. We are in the midst of
accomplishing that. We have not completed the refurbishment of
our three maritime prepositioning squadrons. We have one that
is essentially complete and ready to respond to any
contingency. We have several ships in the two other squadrons
that are complete.
The remaining ships are either providing equipment to our
forces in Iraq, the forces that are getting ready to flow in,
or are in the process of being refurbished right now. How long
it will take until we have all three squadrons back up will be
a function of how long we will have to use the equipment there
in Iraq. We are going to be working on this for a couple more
years to come.
Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, your statement makes
clear the need for all soldiers, regardless of their specialty,
to be able to engage in combat missions. This guidance, the
wisdom of which continues to be made abundantly clear in Iraq,
seems to imply the need for additional training, especially on
small arms. I know that the Army has for some time had a
shortfall in ammunition. The direction you are heading in would
indicate that shortages are likely to increase. If it is not
classified, what is the current size and cost of your
ammunition shortfall and what are your plans to address it?
General Schoomaker. Sir, let me start with the last part of
your question first and if it does not answer your question I
will provide the rest for the record. I have asked them to take
a look at opening another facility for small arms production
this year. We are in the process of doing that right now.
You are correct, we are stressed in the small arms area,
have been for quite a while, and I am concerned about it. The
need to train all soldiers to a higher level, especially the
combat support and combat service support soldiers, to do live
fire convoy protection against ambushes, and to improve their
proficiency in individual arms, puts additional strain on our
small arms ammunition budget. We are doing that training right
now. We are proceeding and I am told that we are okay in terms
of having the ammunition available today to do that.
But I know if we fire at this rate that we are going to
have to produce ammunition more in the future, so now is the
time to facilitize in order to enable that.
I think it will cost between $30 and $40 million to create
another facility to do this. Right now the Army has one small
arms ammunition manufacturing facility.
Senator Akaka. General Schoomaker, your statement
emphasizes the Army's need to continue its efforts in leader
development and states that you will ensure that leaders get
``the right mix of operational assignments and training and
education opportunities for now and in the future.''
I am wondering how your initiative to extend the length of
time that soldiers stay at a given post to up to 6 or 7 years
interacts with your leader development goals, especially at
posts that have a small number of units or that have very
similar type units. Can you explain how soldiers at small or
homogeneous posts will get multiple assignments that will
advance their leadership skills over a 7-year period?
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir. Obviously we have to look at
the larger posts as being the ones that are the easiest at
which to do this. Take Fort Hood, Texas, for example. With two
divisions there, you have the ability to professionally develop
in an operational setting much easier than you do on some of
the outlying ones.
In some cases we are going to have to look regionally to be
able to do the things that we want to do with some of the
smaller places. Our commitment to the professional military
education piece, however, remains the same and we are working
the whole process right now. I quite frankly do not see that we
will have a problem maintaining the institutional training side
such as schools and education.
We need to ask ourselves the opposite question than we have
always asked. The question ought to be, ``Why are we moving
this soldier?'' If the answer is good then we will move that
soldier. If the answer is, ``well, because he or she has been
here 2 or 3 years and it is time to move,'' I do not think that
cuts the mustard. As long as we can continue to develop the
soldier and provide cohesion in the unit that soldier and his
or her family should stay.
I think we are going to find an overwhelming number of
cases in which we do not have to move soldiers. Every soldier
we do not move is a soldier in the force. We have an average of
63,000 soldiers every day in motion that are not in units. By
stabilizing this Army, I can certainly get 8 to 10,000 soldiers
manning brigades. That is part of what we have to do. That is
part of what we are doing inside of this temporary 30,000 that
we are talking about. We are finding those people and getting
them to the units so that we can bring down that temporary
piece of it.
I am sorry for such a long answer, but it is an extremely
complicated process that will make this Army better in the
future than it was before we went into this.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator, for your
questions.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Hagee, I was pleased to see your comments in your
written statement relative to the purchase of Blount Island and
what an asset that has been to the Marine Corps. I think that
the peacetime mission as well as the wartime mission at Blount
Island is going to be an even greater asset to the Marine Corps
in the future.
I was going to ask you about the armor plating of the
HMMWVs and the tactical trucks, but you responded to Senator
Warner's question and mentioned that. I am very proud of the
work that the folks at the Marine Corps Logistics Base (MCLB)
in Albany have done there and I am glad to hear that the
leadership as well as the men and women in theater have a great
appreciation for the improvement of those systems.
General Schoomaker, I want to go back to Senator Allard's
question to you relative to these allegations of sexual assault
in Iraq and Kuwait. I know this is not isolated to Iraq and
Kuwait. It is not isolated to the Army. These are the latest
allegations that have come forth. You mentioned that this is a
chain of command issue. I want to make sure that you are
comfortable with the fact that the chain of command is
operating to the extent that you as Chief of Staff of the Army
are getting information directly from the ground on what is
happening with respect to these allegations. I want to make
sure that you have a procedure in place that is not just
adequate, but a procedure in place that is working to allow the
allegations of this nature to be brought forth in the proper
and sensitive respect that it should be brought forth, and that
these allegations are being handled in a very professional
manner and that justice is being meted out.
Are you comfortable that that is being done?
General Schoomaker. Sir, I am comfortable that we have the
resources and the procedures and the regulations and the
training and everything else that is required. You are hitting
on the most important part and that is compliance with all of
this. That is why the Acting Secretary of the Army and I are
personally involved and we are energized to make sure that we
are complying. We have a task force that the Acting Secretary
set up to look into this, to make sure that we are in
compliance, and to find out why in each case that we find
ourselves not in compliance, why we are not.
I will tell you, this goes back to the chain of command and
discipline. It goes back to things that are fundamental, and we
need that to address that and fix it. Unfortunately, we are not
aware of all of these allegations, what Senator Allard was
talking about there regarding those numbers. We are not aware
of each and every one of those, so I do not know what the
magnitude of what his figures are. We are on top of this and
will continue to do it. This extends into our military academy.
Senator Chambliss. That is an issue that the Personnel
Subcommittee, if not the full committee, Mr. Chairman, is going
to be following very closely because it is critically important
to you, I know, and certainly to us and to all members of each
branch of the service.
General Schoomaker. Sir, I would add that, since I have a
daughter going into the Army, that I have a personal interest
in making sure.
Senator Chambliss. Well, I know you are concerned, but I
just want to make sure it gets the profile that it needs to be
attended to.
General Jumper, I appreciate your comment about the work
that the blended wing is doing at Robins. Now Brigadier General
Lynn is commanding the first blended wing that I think is going
to be the precedent for every branch of the Service in the
future relative to the integration of the Guard and Reserve
into the Active Force. Those men and women down there continue
to do a terrific job and I am just as proud of them as you are.
I want to talk with you for a minute about strategic
airlift. You talked about the C-17 and the great work that it
is doing, has done, and continues to do in theater. I agree
with that, and strategic airlift has been absolutely central to
our success in both Afghanistan and Iraq over the past 3 years.
It has also been central to the success of the expeditionary
Air Force for much longer than that.
Now, you are currently in the process of revising the
mobility requirements study to incorporate lessons learned in
OIF and OEF, and I understand this study is going to be
complete by June 2005. However, I do not think it takes a
complex, time-consuming study to determine that we simply do
not have enough airlift. We cannot build enough C-17s, or
modify enough C-5s fast enough to produce the amount of airlift
capability that we need.
One illustration of this, which I find a little troubling,
is that 125 times over the last 3 years DOD has contracted with
the Russians to use An-124 aircraft for strategic airlift
because we simply did not have enough of our own. At the same
time, DOD and the Air Force seem to be dragging their feet on
funding C-5 modernization programs which could help alleviate
our need to contract with the Russians.
I would appreciate your comments on this situation as well
as your comments on how you will fund the C-5 modernization
effort in order to increase our strategic airlift capacity.
General Jumper. Yes, sir, Senator, and thank you for that
question. The global mobility forces that are out there working
every day are indeed the key to our ability to reach out around
the world. The current mobility study has put the requirement
at 54.5 million ton-miles per day. That is the number that we
are challenging and we are looking and looking again to see if
that is the right measure or if we need to rethink it
completely in this contingency world that we live in.
In order to get to that number, we were on the track that
got us to some number of C-17s plus a re-engined and re-
engineered C-5. Part of our work with the C-5s is to see how
many of the C-5s that are currently in the inventory are
capable of being modified. Do they have service life left? Have
they been overworked? That work is ongoing and as part of the
study that is due in the summer of 2005 we will then be able to
put those together and come up with an answer on the right
combination of C-17s and C-5s modified to be able to meet the
requirement.
That work is ongoing. It is on the front burner. We have
made some adjustments in the funding of the C-5 to move from
the Reliability and Enhancement and Re-engining Program (RERP)
to the avionics modernization program in the C-5 so we can keep
more of those compatible with the current Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and international regulations. But I can
assure you, Senator, this is an area of concern for us and we
are going to keep pushing this.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General, and thank
you for raising the questions about the sexual assault. Sexual
assault is a primary concern to this full committee.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all
of you for the work you do every day and for once again coming
to appear before this committee.
General Schoomaker, I am equally concerned along with
Senators Chambliss and Allard on the investigation into the
allegations of sexual assault and misconduct. Will you be
sharing the results of the investigation with this committee at
some future date?
General Schoomaker. Senator, I would be glad to. We are
taking a look at our internal processes and making sure that
they are being complied with and find out if there are things
that we have to tailor. We would be glad to share that.
Senator Clinton. I would appreciate that. Does the internal
processes review also include looking at these individual cases
that have come to the attention of the press? Obviously that
concerns us as well.
General Schoomaker. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, General.
General, with respect to the news that yesterday the Army
Corps of Engineers admitted it had falsely stated that the Air
Force and the Small Business Administration were involved in
the awarding of the contract to Halliburton for the rebuilding
of Iraq's oil industry, will you direct the Corps to provide
this committee with information on how it decided to award that
contract to Halliburton?
General Schoomaker. I will ask them to do that, Senator.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, General.
General, I am deeply impressed by the work that the Army is
doing under the rubric of transformation. The report that you
have provided us in this posture review is very reassuring and
persuasive as you make these significant changes. I am also
concerned about some very old problems, and the recent
unclassified study by the Army's Combined Arms Center at Fort
Leavenworth, a 504-page internal Army history of the Iraqi war,
which pointed out considerable problems in logistics.
In reading the press reports of this report, we are struck
by all of the old-fashioned problems we had. People could not
communicate. They always were outracing their supply lines.
They did not have the information as well as the resources that
they thought. The fact that the strategy of starting the war
before all support groups were in place, in order to achieve an
element of surprise, taxed the resources of local commanders.
How are you addressing that issue? Is that an issue that is
reflected in this budget or are there additional resources and
changes that need to be taken into account?
General Schoomaker. Those issues are reflected in the
budget. The logistician for the combined force land component
commander, General Christianson, is now the G-4 of the Army. He
suffered the problem on that end. He is now part of the
solution, and we are aggressively looking at it.
You are exactly right, we have not made the best use of our
information technologies. We have not done things that we can
do to fix this. But in all fairness, I also have to say that
the distances and the speed at which all of this occurred
seriously exposed these issues. These are far greater distances
than were anticipated doctrinally. I have heard it said that
the distance from Kuwait to Mosul, up where the 101st was, is
like going from Omaha Beach to Berlin. That is a pretty good
distance. That is a lot further than Patton tried to do in his
Redball Express.
I think this is a serious issue because it has everything
to do with our strategic and operational level agility, and our
ability to do the logistics. There is also a lot of money tied
up in this. Believe me, we are going to school on this piece.
Senator Clinton. General, I know that many of us on this
committee want to be very helpful to you in confronting this
set of challenges, and it does strike me that there is an
opportunity here to think a little bit outside the box. I have
long thought that we ought to be pushing much harder on
alternative energy and clean energy. We use fuel cells, for
example, to lift off our space shuttles, but we are not yet
figuring out how to use them in our military on a day-to-day
basis.
There are some opportunities not just in the immediate
arena about how we should solve this problem the best we can
right now, but also opportunities to think outside the horizon
about what could we be working on at this moment that would
help us. We would appreciate any suggestions or ideas that you
or any of the other Services have that would enable us to help
on this.
I was particularly struck in the report about the failure
of communication, which was so reminiscent of what happened in
New York on September 11. Police were not able to talk to
firefighters, people in one part of the building could not
communicate with someone in another part; and then to read that
again the radios were out of range, and people were improvising
with cell phones. We just have to get a better grip on what we
need to do with technology.
Just as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) and the space program were the source of new technology
that had tremendous effects both for the military and civilian
side, we need to be making some of those investments today as
well.
General Schoomaker. I do not disagree with you.
Senator Clinton. The final point I would make to all the
Services, General, is that I appreciated what you said about
train, alert, and deploy, and I continue to be concerned about
the medical and dental readiness of our Guard and Reserve. I
asked this question for all of our Service Chiefs at last
year's posture hearings, but since then a General Accounting
Office (GAO) study released in 2003 found that the Army had not
been able to consistently carry out the statutory requirements
for monitoring the health and dental status. The result was
that many reservists called up could not be deployed because of
health, and particularly, dental problems.
I would like to get some additional information about what
we are doing to try to deal with that. Of course, the fact that
we do not have universal health care insurance so Guard and
Reserves are on the civilian economy, and do not necessarily
have the health care that they need, is an issue far beyond
this hearing. I would appreciate knowing about whatever the
Army or other Services are doing to try to make sure that we
have the health status as good as possible.
General Schoomaker. Senator, I am happy to report that we
are tracking this very well. For those we have mobilized, we
have a baseline of their medical status as they went in. As
they come back out, we are doing a very good job in comparing
the baseline to make sure they are corrected.
But you are exactly right. We were previously funded to
have one physical every 5 years for our Guard members and no
dental. This means that they arrive with only what they have
been doing with themselves. It is one of the reasons why we
changed the mobilization criteria. Now we mobilize for the
first 25 days, and do a medical check. If we have problems, we
demobilize. We only keep those that pass it as it goes forward.
We have to fix this systemically in the future, and part of
that is being better prepared before an alert so that we can
deploy more rapidly with a more ready force.
Senator Clinton. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to congratulate all of you on the continuing superb
performance of our men and women in uniform. I could not be
prouder. They have been stressed in a number of different
situations. They have consistently shown discipline and courage
on the battlefield or in the streets of the cities in Iraq.
Many of them had to have felt threatened, but they have held
their fire, they maintained their discipline in the face of
hostility, and have won friends as a result. I am just very
proud of them.
Also I am proud and hope we can continue to improve our
jointness idea, where air, ground, naval, and marine forces all
work together as one force for America. As we do that, I think
we will utilize our existing resources better. We get more bang
for the buck that we have invested. I could not be prouder of
what you are doing. We are transforming in the middle of a war.
It is a very stressful time to have to do that. Maybe it is a
good time in the sense that we are learning exactly what we
need to be effective.
As you noted on logistics, General Schoomaker, you learn
from stress. We are learning from stressing our Guard and
Reserve how we can do it better.
General Schoomaker, is it fair to say that since you have
been in your position, one of your top priorities has been this
personnel issue; how to confront it, how to use our Guard and
Reserve better and more effectively, and how to configure our
Active-Duty Forces effectively?
General Schoomaker. That is correct. We are funding almost
2.6 million people in uniform, and we need to figure out how to
get the most out of each and every one of them, not just them
individually, but how to configure them in a way that is most
useful for not only the current operating environment but what
the future one is going to be. We cannot transform without
transforming the personnel system.
Senator Sessions. I think you are correct. We are looking
forward to your report on this intensive analysis you have done
about troop strength, configuration, and the brigades idea that
you have. I do think that it is time for us to think anew, out
of the box, as Senator Clinton said, and really develop a force
that is appropriate, perfect if possible, for the future we
might be facing.
I thought I understood you to say that you could maybe even
increase the effective force by 30 percent with this
rearrangement. Did I understand that?
General Schoomaker. Sir, there is no question we can.
Senator Sessions. Well, that is a tremendous thing. I know
you have increased our manpower and our end strength by
utilizing the flexibility that has been given you. But also to
be able to increase the effectiveness of our force by 30
percent, Mr. Chairman, that is tremendous.
General Schoomaker. Sir, I have to reemphasize, the
increase in manpower is temporary. I do not intend to retain
that manpower. I want it long enough to get the pump primed and
to get these capabilities developed, so that I can have that 30
percent increase within the level of end strength that I have
today.
Senator Sessions. Well, General Schoomaker, you are a
combat veteran. You have been a special forces guy all your
life. You understand warfare, and if you say you can do that I
think we ought to give you the chance to do it. I will be
supportive for sure.
General Schoomaker. I appreciate it.
Senator Sessions. General Schoomaker and General Hagee, we
are going to have a lot of equipment that has also taken some
hits and wear and tear in the deserts of Iraq and Afghanistan,
and we have to reset that equipment so it will be available for
you. I am pleased to see this budget does have a 7-percent
defense budget increase but I am concerned. It is good that the
President has done this. But do we have enough, and do we have
a plan to reset that equipment, tracked vehicles, wheeled
vehicles, and other equipment that maybe suffered substantial
wear and tear? General Schoomaker and General Hagee?
General Schoomaker. Sir, this year we are resetting the
equipment that we can with the additional funding we have
through the supplemental. We do not have the funds to reset
this equipment within the program beyond this year. I will say
it one more time: I think we have to have 2 years of
supplemental beyond this emergency to reset this force. It is
just going to take us that long to do it. War and the level of
operation that we have conducted over there consumes equipment.
It consumes engines, transmissions, and even metal on aircraft.
This is a huge task. I said that approximately 9,000 pieces of
equipment need to be reset alone for the prepositioned stocks.
Senator Sessions. I have heard that a figure of $3 billion
may be necessary. Is $3 billion a figure that you could vouch
for?
General Schoomaker. Senator, that figure does not resonate
with me. I think that the supplemental that will be required
will be considerable if we continue this level of operation and
reset the force.
Senator Sessions. General Hagee.
General Hagee. Yes, sir. We are using the 2004 supplemental
to reset the force during this fiscal year. We are also
capturing those costs of equipment expenditure both in
Afghanistan and in Iraq and would expect that those costs would
be covered by a supplemental in 2005 or in the out years.
Senator Sessions. I think we are going to have to confront
that. After the last Gulf War I think we learned we did not set
aside enough money to refurbish our equipment and it cost us in
the long run. It is better to invest that early rather than
later.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator. Thank you
very much.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. Let me add my
appreciation to the families of the military because, like many
of my colleagues, I have made calls to those who have lost
loved ones. I have spoken to wives, I have spoken to parents.
They are all resolute in their pride of the service of their
loved one. We all recognize how important that service is and
how important it is to do everything that we can to have
adequate end strength for security of the forces as well as for
the importance of the mission.
Perhaps in the long term restructuring makes sense and a
temporary effort to try to make certain that we have end
strength sufficient to take care of security of the troops and
the mission makes sense. What I hope is that the process of
restructuring is being based on that need rather than on the
budget process. The budget process is in my judgment the
equivalent of making a pie a piece at a time. That way, we
never really know what is coming and we cannot see a
comprehensive budget at any one particular point in time
because of one nuance or another. We cannot do it in this
budget, but it will be in a supplemental, or rather in two
supplementals.
I hope in the next 3 years there are no more than two
supplementals, but I suspect it will not be limited to the DOD
budget. There will be supplementals for other things as well.
I hope that the process here of reorganization, which
cannot ignore budgetary constraints and budgetary concerns,
will not be driven simply by a budget. I think there may be a
feeling among some of my colleagues that the budget may have
more to do with it than it should.
I only want to say that as a prelude to asking, General
Schoomaker, in your judgment is this being done, not simply for
budgetary purposes, but for the end strength requirements that
you see today and tomorrow?
General Schoomaker. Sir, I am not sure I exactly followed
your question, but I will tell you why we are doing this. We
have an enormous amount of momentum as a result of this
conflict and we ought to take advantage of this momentum that
we are paying for, because we are conducting operations, and we
ought to reset ourselves the way we want to be tomorrow, not
set ourselves the way we were.
It is kind of a silver lining in a black cloud--if we had
to pay for this level of motion to get this whole thing moving,
it would take us decades to do the kind of transformation that
we can do now within this window of opportunity. It is as
simple as that in my mind. It may not be complex enough to
answer your question, but I think that this is a window of
opportunity.
Senator Ben Nelson. At the end of the day, it is not being
done primarily for budgetary purposes? It is being done to
transform the military and to protect troops and mission?
General Schoomaker. That is correct.
Senator Ben Nelson. Present and future missions.
General Schoomaker. In the end, we end up with the same
size force configured differently, with better capability for
the future.
Senator Ben Nelson. In the interim, is that end strength
sufficient to protect the security of the troops and the
mission? I know in the long term transformation may get us to
where we need to be, but what about the immediate term? To use
another analogy, if you want to cut asparagus in your garden
you have to plant it 2 years early. What I am concerned about
is making sure that in the current situation we will have
protection of our troops.
General Schoomaker. Sir, in the current situation, what we
know today, we are fine. This is working for what we know
today. I cannot predict what is going to happen in the future.
If we end up with a huge conflict in the future, all bets will
be off.
Senator Ben Nelson. I understand that.
One more question. I appreciate your response to my letter
regarding the Army's aviation review. Do you have any idea when
this might conclude so that we would know what is going to
happen with regard to any potential changes that might develop?
General Schoomaker. I expect that no later than the end of
this month I will be back-briefed on the final results, and we
will share that here. We will gladly open it up and let
everybody look at it.
Again, we are looking at modularity.
Senator Ben Nelson. Yes.
General Schoomaker. Right now all these brigades are
different, from the number of helicopters in them, to the
number of units, to sub-units within these brigades. The way
they are organized is extraordinarily inefficient.
Senator Ben Nelson. I appreciate the fact that you are
doing that. I think it is important to continue to make those
reviews.
General Jumper, I would like to commend you first for
continuing your vision to maintain what has been referred to as
a Total Force, blending together active Air Force, Air Force
Reserve, and the Air National Guard. It has been successful in
Nebraska, we believe. We have watched it very carefully.
As part of balancing your forces, are you planning to move
current KC-135s from Reserve units to the active? If so, do you
know what would happen to the missions for those that would be
losing their KC-135s?
General Jumper. Sir, there is a flow plan that has been
shown around and I will make sure you get that flow plan. I
would not want to try to articulate any piece of it because it
is a total plan. It is out there, and I will be glad to get
that to you.
Senator Ben Nelson. If you get it to me personally, that
will satisfy my questions.
General Jumper. Yes, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. I appreciate it.
Thank you very much, gentlemen. Thank you for your service.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Gentlemen, thank you for your service
to our country.
General Jumper, in the course of the intelligence that was
given to us prior to us voting on the resolution regarding
Iraq, we were told not only about the WMD, but we were also
told about the UAVs. All of this information has since been
unclassified by statements that were made by the President as
well as the Secretary of State. The information includes the
UAVs as a threat to the interests of the United States and
being put on ships off the Atlantic coast that could threaten
United States eastern seaboard cities with WMD.
What we were not told was, as reported by The Washington
Post a week ago, that Air Force intelligence totally discounted
the story of the UAVs. The Air Force intelligence that should
know more about UAVs than anybody else in the country. Did you
know about that Air Force intelligence report?
General Jumper. No, sir, I did not at the time. The
Intelligence Community gets together all elements of its
intelligence sources and they come together, as the Air Force
does, and each contributes their knowledge to the effort. That
goes into an overall assessment that is put out by the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) that has privy to everything.
I did not know. At the time this was not an Air Force
position that was contrary to another position. This was our
input at the time to the overall effort as part of the
Intelligence Community.
Senator Bill Nelson. Were you the Chief of Staff of the Air
Force at the time?
General Jumper. I was, sir, yes.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, there is another example
as we get into this question of how were we so faulty on the
intelligence, and how we were not told that there was a
disagreement, a dispute as to the accuracy of that
intelligence. Instead, it was presented to us as, in this case
with UAVs, as if it was the gospel truth. Here the Air Force
Chief of Staff did not even know about the disagreement in Air
Force intelligence, and that it had no truth to it.
Chairman Warner. Would you allow me to read into the
record.
Senator Bill Nelson. Please, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. ``The classified version showed there was
a major disagreement on the issue from the agency with the
greatest expertise on such aircraft, the Air Force. The Air
Force does not agree that Iraq is developing UAVs primarily
intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological
warfare (CBW) agents. It said `The small size of Iraq's new
UAVs strongly suggests a primary role of reconnaissance,
although CBW delivery is an inherent capability.' ''
I think you will find that much of the material that came
before the Senate did have the caveats and so forth set forth
in them.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, according to what you just read,
it clearly states the Air Force's opinion that they did not
have the capability of delivering the WMD. We find out that
General Jumper, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, does not
even know about that dispute. That concerns me and it concerns
the obvious question that we have to answer in the future of
having accurate and timely intelligence in order to protect
ourselves.
Thank you for sharing that, Mr. Chairman.
General Schoomaker, you have stated here that we should
train, alert, and deploy the Reserves instead of alert, train,
and deploy the Reserves. Yet the budget just submitted has a
$600 million shortfall in the training for the Reserves. Why?
General Schoomaker. Sir, I cannot answer that. I will get
back to you on it. I was unaware of it.
Senator Bill Nelson. It is there. What I do not know is
that it might not just be the Reserves. It may be the National
Guard as well. But whether it is $600 million just for the Army
Reserves or $600 million for the Reserves and the National
Guard, the question is obviously begged, what you are trying to
do in remolding the Army? I congratulate you. You have had a
lot of accolades around this table today, and we want to see
you succeed. It is a changing world and we have to succeed. Yet
we have a budget in front of us with a $600 million shortfall.
General Schoomaker. Sir, I will look at that. I do not
understand it that way. But, taking your word for it that is
where it is, I will look at it and I will get back to you and
let you know.
[The information referred to follows:]
Based on projected Reserve component mobilizations in fiscal year
2005, $606 million for drills and annual training was realigned from
the Reserve component pay accounts to support other priorities,
including the extension of TRICARE to the Reserve components. At the
projected mobilization levels, the Reserve component training budget
provides the funds necessary to conduct military occupational specialty
training (individual training at 95 percent), professional military
education training (leader training), and the necessary operational
tempo to support collective training for those units preparing for
mobilization and deployment while in a Reserve status, as well as
enabling recently demobilized units to maintain their readiness edge.
Senator Bill Nelson. Perhaps at some time, Mr. Chairman, we
might want to get General Helmly, the head of the Reserves, to
come up and let us specifically get at this. This budget is not
reflecting where the Chief of Staff of the Army wants to go.
General Schoomaker. Sir, General Profit is here from the
Office of the Chief of the Army Reserves and also General Blum,
who is the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
Chairman Warner. Does the Senator wish to have the General
approach the microphone and give a response to your question?
Senator Bill Nelson. Absolutely.
Chairman Warner. Fine. General Schoomaker, will you invite
your colleague up, please.
General Blum. I thank you for the opportunity to respond on
this. We are working very closely with the Army on this. It is
one Army with three components, for the first time in the
history of this Nation. General Schoomaker is using Army fiscal
assets against all three components to assure that all three
components are ready to do what this Nation requires or asks of
them.
I am not aware of the $600 million shortfall that you are
talking about, but I will be happy to look at what you see and
I would be glad to discuss it. If the goal for us is to have
all the money we need and want to achieve the level of
readiness that we would like, that goal does not exist in any
budget with any supplemental. There will be some risk, and
General Schoomaker and General Helmly, the Chief of the Army
Reserve, and I are working in a very collaborative effort to
make sure, as we move to this modularity piece, which is a big
piece to solving the problem, that the units get what they need
in time to be ready so they can make the train, alert, and
deploy model.
It is not intended that everybody in the Army, all three
components, will be equally and adequately resourced, to be
completely combat-ready at any moment. The people that are
being reset obviously are coming back in, refitting and
reconfiguring. That is where resources come from that set up
the people who are moving into the getting-ready set, so that
when they are ready and they are called upon they have had the
training, equipment, and resources they need to go down range
and do their jobs.
But I would very much like to see what you have, and if we
are short, sir, we will work to identify those shortfalls for
you.
General Schoomaker. We need to look at this, because we may
disagree on what it is you are talking about here. I am unaware
of that level of underfunding.
Senator Bill Nelson. What I am trying to do is help you.
General Schoomaker. Sir, I can use all the help I can get,
believe me. But you have presented something here that just
does not resonate with me. We have been working so closely
together, so I am surprised I would not know something like
that.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I want to help General
Schoomaker, because jihadists, as I have reported to you, are
going across the Syrian border and they are killing our
American men and women. There is an offer out there on the
table which I have reported to you all, to General Myers, to
the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense, etcetera.
There is an offer on the table to seal that border, as
presented by President Assad. If that had not filtered down to
you, General Schoomaker, I would suggest that that is something
you might want to follow up on. It is obviously of considerable
concern to you to be able to secure that border.
General Schoomaker. Sir, I watched the Secretary's
testimony when you raised that issue. I have been on that
border and I know what it takes to seal borders, and that would
be an incredible effort if that were possible.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, I want to thank all of you for service to the
country. We are all grateful and we thank you for being here
today.
General Schoomaker, I want to just focus on one area and
that is the HMMWVs, light-skinned HMMWVs. I visited a wonderful
young person, and I am sure you have too, out at Walter Reed on
Saturday. He had been wounded December 10, losing both of his
legs in Iraq. We have had 16 killed from Massachusetts. A great
number of those have been as a result of riding in light-
skinned HMMWVs.
The wonderful young person is Private John Hart. Brian
Hart, his father, and his mother Alma ask that the one thing to
try and make sure is that we are not going to let these young
people out there in light-skinned HMMWVs. You are aware of this
issue and the problem.
We have had conflicting testimony in recent months and also
going back to 2003, on the numbers that are going to be needed
in terms of the HMMWVs and also the add-on armor kits. Starting
on September 30, 2003, HMMWV requirements were 1,723. When you
were here on November 17, the number that was mentioned was
3,600. Now I believe 4,149 is the exact figure.
The up-armored HMMWV is more of a challenge. If we go
strictly with the up-armored HMMWV, it could be as late as the
summer of 2005 before we would have all of them. Secretary
Brownlee was talking about 3,600 when he testified on November
19. You are now talking about 4,100 at the present time.
In the budget for this year you have $355 million, which is
818. In 2005 it is $156 million. For HMMWV add-on armor kits it
is $209 million for this year and none for 2005. Medium truck
add-on armor kits saw zero funding in 2004 and will see zero
funding in 2005 for heavy truck add-on armor kits, its zero
funding in 2004 and zero funding in 2005.
Does the President's 2005 budget fully fund your
requirement for the up-armored HMMWVs?
General Schoomaker. Sir, your numbers are correct on the
up-armored HMMWVs. The difference in when we testified before
you last on this issue and now is the marine requirement.
Senator Kennedy. Marine and Air Force too, I believe.
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir. The requirement has
quadrupled. Our total requirement for the entire Army in the
future is about 11,000 up-armored HMMWVs. We did not have that
requirement before. The answer is, against the entire Army
requirement, no, it is not funded here. It is going to take us
years to do that.
I think you know that Secretary Brownlee had the chief
executive officers (CEOs) of both AM General and O'Gara-Hess
together this week or last week. They are looking at how to
increase the production levels at the facilities. We are
raising production levels from 80 to 220 a month, and right now
in those plants they are working two 10-hour shifts. We are
looking at how we might be able to increase it further.
Senator Kennedy. I think the area and the requirement of
the greatest need is obviously Iraq and having sufficient
numbers of either the armored HMMWVs or the armor kits. I am
just wondering when we are going to be able to get those. How
are we going to be able to tell the parents of these kids that
we do not have armored HMMWVs or armor kits available?
General Schoomaker. Sir, we are producing the add-on armor
kits in great number.
Senator Kennedy. Well, the 2004 funding is $209 million and
there is none in 2005. You have $209 million for 2004 vehicles;
in fiscal year 2005, zero out. You only have enough in the
request for 818 HMMWVs. Given the magnitude of this problem and
the magnitude of the problem today in Iraq, it is difficult to
see how something as basic as these HMMWVs and the body armor
are not being met.
We have the statement from Lieutenant General James Helmly,
who said: ``The suddenness, the uncertainty, the rapidity with
which we mobilized the units not only caught them, the Army,
flat-footed but it meant you had shortages of body armor that
came up, shortages of up-armored HMMWVs.'' That is January 21,
2004. He did not mean you. I know you have come in to it.
What we are asking is why the budget now for the Army does
not reflect the need that you have in Iraq to make sure that
every one of those young soldiers is going to be in an armored
HMMWV or going to be guaranteed that the add-on armor kits are
going to be there.
General Schoomaker. Sir, the budget is only part of the
answer. We are using the current supplemental funding to fund
much of the level of effort that we have going on, including
the local efforts I know you are aware of all of the local
efforts that are going on to manufacture things.
The Army never intended to up-armor every HMMWV, until this
kind of situation arose that we have today. We never intended
to have this number of HMMWVs. We have taken armored units,
artillery units, and all kinds of other units, and put them
into HMMWVs as motorized formations, which never existed
before. This is an area where you cannot fix it overnight. It
is a matter of physics.
Senator Kennedy. I understand that this was not
anticipated. Many of us thought that might be the case. It was
not anticipated.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to just ask if the General could
provide, from the supplementary other funding, all the funding
that you have available. I want to know so I can tell this
family exactly whether or not HMMWVs and the body armor these
parents are talking about have the highest priority.
General Schoomaker. Sir, force protection is our highest
priority.
Senator Kennedy. I talked to General Abizaid 5 months ago
and he said: ``The supplemental request will permit the
services to rapidly resolve this equipment problem, rapidly
resolve the procurement of up-armored HMMWVs.'' That was 6
months ago.
General Schoomaker. Sir, we have tripled the number of up-
armored HMMWVs in theater.
Senator Kennedy. Okay, but how many are necessary to be
replaced in Iraq today? How many young people are going out on
patrol today in Iraq in the light-skinned HMMWVs?
General Schoomaker. Sir, I do not know.
Senator Kennedy. If any of them are going out it is wrong,
I think. You would agree, would you not?
General Schoomaker. Sir, there are some people that do go
out there and they go out on purpose, but there is capacity
there for people to use the up-armored ones for their patrols.
Senator Kennedy. General, we can get into this. You will
have a tough time convincing the young boy I saw, who lost both
his legs 4 weeks ago in a light-skinned HMMWV.
Now, if there are areas that are passive, okay. I think
that it is a tragedy if we are not ensuring that every young
serviceman that goes on out in any dangerous area in Iraq, is
not going to be adequately protected. I do not understand it.
If you have the supplementary funding and the production list,
I want to know how we are going to guarantee this so I can tell
tell the Hart family, that there is not going to be a young
person that is going to go out on a patrol in a risky area in
Iraq that is not going to have the adequate protection. We
ought to be able to do that. I am sure you agree with that.
General Schoomaker. Sir, I do. I am with you 100 percent.
We will provide you with that data.
Senator Kennedy. If we can get that from you and the
supplementary services and what is happening over there in
terms of these patrols, I would appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.
When I opened the question period of this hearing, the
question period, my first question related to the HMMWVs and
their status. I think Acting Secretary Brownlee and the Chief
of Staff are doing their very best. I should point out that in
my detailed discussions with you, General, about the issue of
the HMMWV, you carefully pointed out to me that there are some
missions during which the men are safer using the lighter
weight HMMWV. Am I not correct on that?
General Schoomaker. Sir, there are people making choices on
which vehicle they want. The choices are not random, but
because the nature of the mission requires it, they choose not
to use the up-armored HMMWV. This whole measure of protection
against IEDs and other things is a matter of a multitude of
capabilities, as has been discussed, to include some that we
should not discuss here.
I am confident that we are doing everything we can to move
increasingly more up-armored HMMWVs and other armored vehicles
into theater to do exactly what Senator Kennedy is talking
about. We share the same goal here.
Chairman Warner. It is important that you share the same
goal.
Senator Kennedy. I thank the chair, but the fact is you are
below the requirement that the Army has set for themselves and
this budget which we are having our hearing on does not provide
the makeup of the requirement that the Army itself has set.
That is my point. If it does and I am wrong and you are making
it up with supplementary funds, then I look forward to hearing
from you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
General Hagee, do you wish to make any further comments
about the HMMWVs that will be in your units going over?
General Hagee. No, sir. I have already addressed that in my
statement, sir.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Now, Senator Levin, you and I will conclude here. Would you
like to lead off and we will just alternate with questions?
Senator Levin. I would be happy to do that.
Just on this HMMWV issue, is the facility that is armoring
the HMMWVs working three shifts?
General Schoomaker. I do not know how many shifts they are
working. I am told they are working 20 hours a day, and I
believe that is two shifts of 10 hours.
Senator Levin. Can we check that out?
General Schoomaker. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Just to make sure that they are working 24-
7? As to whether there is anything more that we can do
moneywise, we do not have to wait for a supplemental. This
issue is important enough that it could be done tomorrow if
there is any indication that the budget is the reason. If it is
not the reason, then is the facility going 24-7? If it is not,
then we expect it will be.
General Schoomaker. Sir, I will get you all of the facts on
this.
[The information referred to follows:]
No, the facility that is up-armoring the HMMWV is currently working
two 10-hour shifts each day. During these shifts, the contractor is
producing 185 vehicles for March, 205 vehicles for April, and 220
vehicles per month for May through August 2005. This contractor is
fully capable of meeting our needs.
Senator Levin. General, one of the disadvantages of the new
unit rotation approach is that the expertise that is gained and
the relationships with Iraqis that have been built over a 12-
month period are severed abruptly. They are cut abruptly in a
major way as these whole units rotate. It would be much less
dramatic if it was individual rotation. Is that an issue which
is being addressed in some way?
General Schoomaker. Sir, as I mentioned, we are stretching
this rotation and the turnover over a period of 4 or 5 months
for exactly that reason. I know for instance the unit that I
talked to in the training base the other day has already made
four trips over there and is doing right-seat rides. This
period of handoff here is deliberate and the intention is to
make sure to pass all the contacts to one another and be
comfortable in that regard.
General Hagee. Senator, I would like to add that we are
doing the same thing in the Marine Corps. We are working very
closely with the 82nd Airborne Division over there. We have
already made several trips over there, and we are going to take
our time in the handover to ensure that we are completely
familiar with that battleground.
Chairman Warner. I will shift to a question here now for
the CNO. The subject is shipbuilding, which is something that
you and I have worked on for many years. The budget request for
the Navy's shipbuilding and conversion account is almost $1.5
billion less than last year. The Navy states there are nine
ships in the budget request, but two of these ships, one DD(X)
and one LCS, which has been your ship from the beginning, are
funded with the research, development, test, and evaluation
(RDT&E) funds at a fraction of what these ships will eventually
cost.
I am also concerned that the budget request projects only
six ships in the fiscal year 2006 budget.
Can you enlighten us as to why DOD reduced the shipbuilding
and conversion account by 13 percent in this particular request
before us here today? You have often spoken of your 375-ship
Navy. I think we are at 297 this morning, thereabouts?
Admiral Clark. 294 this morning, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. 294.
Admiral Clark. Yes, sir.
Well, the path to 375 is to start buying new ones and to
buy the kind of ships that we need for the future. The LCS will
allow us to buy the kind of ships we need to dominate the near-
land arena and we are going to have to buy them in numbers.
They are going to be smaller ships, but we are not buying them
just so we can buy small ships to have numbers. Because it is
plug-and-play, it is going to be a revolutionary kind of a
concept in the way we build, outfit, and put the combat systems
in the ship, again with very low manning. That is what we need
in the future.
Your specific question about why this number is lower than
last year is that each year when I have come to testify before
this committee I have been trying to make this number bigger.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, I have balanced this
the best I know how. Because we have been allowed under the
procurement rules to procure the first ship of a class in R&D,
the number for this particular year is a lower number. The
reality is that if we had paid for it all in 1 year the
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) number itself would be
remarkably bigger.
The other thing about it is that we have several ships that
are being done in modernization programs that constitute major
segments of the total SCN fund. I am talking specifically about
the SSGNs and the engineering-refueling overhauls in the
submarines and so forth.
As I have said before, we need to think about
recapitalizing the ships in the Navy with a stream of
resources. I have said that I am reaching for a $12 billion
stream and that is what I have been doing.
I have testified in response to a previous question about
the importance of DD(X) and the importance to our future Navy.
Where I see ourselves today, Mr. Chairman, is here. We have
been working to get to the point where we are today, where the
ships are going to start rolling off the line, and this is a
great victory for the Navy, and it has happened because we had
the support of Congress to get here.
This is not a finished task. In order to create the
resources to recapitalize the Navy, we are trying to transform
the way we do business in the Navy. The resources that have
allowed us to move from the number I talked to you about when I
started this job--I had just between 4 and 5, it was under $5
billion that year in the account. In the whole decade of the
1990s it was barely over $6 billion per year. This is the hole
that we created.
I am pleased that this year, in new construction, we are at
almost $10 billion, and with the other modernization we are at
$11.1 billion. We are on the way. We are not there and we have
to keep working at it.
It is exactly what we are working on right now, the
development of the program for next year. We take a dip next
year, but we are looking at that hard to see how we can recover
from that. 2006 happens to be a very difficult year for us.
When the Secretary of Defense was here he raised a question
about the gap that we have taken in DD(X) in 2006. I will tell
you that there is a learning curve to be had in any
shipbuilding project, as in any development program. If I had
plenty of resources, I would have funded that ship in 2006 and
kept right on going as fast as we could. The fact is I am
required to put all of the money in 1 year to buy a ship for a
4- to 6-year construction or a 6- or 7-year construction for a
carrier and I did not have the resources in the 2005 bill to
put it in 2006. We will be working that hard to see how we can
improve that number for next year. We desperately need to do
that to get to the size Navy we need.
The other point that was made is that the Navy is more
capable than it has ever been before--a very factual statement.
Lethal platforms. There is one area, though, where numbers
really count. The laws of physics still prevail and I have not
figured out a way to have one of these ships be in more than
one place at one time.
I never said 375 is the exact number. It is about the right
number. As you analyze the scenarios and the kind of forward
presence that the Nation wants when representing the country,
that number will ebb and flow. It is the target for us to reach
for and we are seeking to rechannel funds so we can realize the
Navy of the future.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Admiral. I know from the many
years I was privileged to serve in this body it is not a matter
of preference to the Navy, but we are very conscious as a
Nation of the need for the sea lanes to be kept open, not only
for security purposes but also for protecting our commerce.
Therefore, Congress has historically been very supportive of
shipbuilding for the United States Navy. Thank you.
Senator Levin, why do you not take a question.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to ask General Schoomaker about the effect of
rotation on the capability of the forces that we have there. As
I understand it, the 4th Infantry Division is modern and
digitized. The 101st Air Assault Division has a huge helicopter
fleet. Both of those units are coming out. Will their
replacements be as capable?
General Schoomaker. The geometry and the way General
Abizaid is changing the shape of Iraq over there, require
different kinds of capabilities. The forces that we are putting
in there are sufficient for the tasks that he wants them to
perform.
I think you know that the Stryker brigade is going to be
one of the areas where the 101st was, for instance, in the
north. This is one of the areas where he is starting to move
more things towards local control. We are meeting his
requirement with the force structure that he wants.
I ought to remind you that, even though the 4th Infantry
Division was there, for instance, we basically dismounted them
out of most of their heavy platforms and put them in HMMWVs to
do the kind of things that they were going to do, such as
motorized force, artillery, in some cases armor, and infantry.
We are meeting the need that he articulated, and it certainly
is not the same kind of force that went in and fought the war
and then stayed.
Senator Levin. This is sort of a follow-up to that, Mr.
Chairman.
What did Secretary Rumsfeld mean when he said that the
capability of the security forces in Iraq will increase?
General Schoomaker. I believe he is talking about our Iraqi
security forces.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Let us talk about another aspect of
intelligence. We have had a lot of discussions, of course,
about the WMD and things like that. However, we must as a
Nation constantly be improving our intelligence from lessons
learned. We cannot wait until six different committees look
into the intelligence as they are looking at the issues now. On
a real-time basis, we have to contribute to the Intelligence
Community and strengthen the decisions and the knowledge that
we think are best.
I would like to ask all of you this question. There has
been significant attention paid to the national intelligence,
as we said. There were reports shortly after major combat
operations concluded in Iraq about problems with tactical
intelligence. What is your assessment of the intelligence
support provided to the battlefield commanders in the Iraq and
Afghanistan theaters of operations? What improvements to
national, theater, and tactical intelligence need to be made
now to best support our combat forces and others all over the
world who are relying on this intelligence? What initiatives
have you taken in your respective military departments to
ensure the strongest tactical intelligence?
Why do we not give you a rest, General, and we will start
in with General Jumper.
General Jumper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The biggest
problem we found as a result of our lessons learned from OIF
was our bomb damage assessment and how we were able to get
accurate and timely bomb damage assessment to the commanders on
the ground. Part of this is what I call an administrative
problem. It is a problem of definition in what it takes to
score an enemy vehicle destroyed, which I think really has to
be relooked. We are undertaking that now to try and get those
definitions which are more useful to the field commander, who
is much more concerned about whether he is going to have to
deal with an enemy tank company in the next 5 or 6 hours than
he is with whether or not the national intelligence was able to
score a kill because the turret was separated from the body of
the tank.
It is that sort of detail we are trying to correct, and we
are also trying to organize ourselves so that we take advantage
of all the sensors that are over that battlefield. Among the
Services here, we have hundreds of vehicles over that
battlefield with sensors that can be turned on to this
surveillance problem after they deliver their weapons. That is
one thing we are going to focus on with some energy, in order
to get that corrected. It has been a chronic issue with late
Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) and we are going to take that
one head-on.
You will see money in our budget against this notion of
being able to network the platforms we already own. We saw some
magnificent results during the dust storm in OIF. During the
depth of that dust storm, we put together our JSTARS vehicles
with a Global Hawk vehicle, networked the bombers and some of
the assets from the other Services, in order to know exactly
when reinforcements were moving down out of Baghdad toward
especially the Medina Division south of Baghdad, we were able
to coordinate with our space efforts to know exactly when the
dust storm was going to be there and then to network those
assets to be able to destroy them as they moved down, even
before they got into position.
Chairman Warner. What about the targeting? Your targeting
is highly dependent on accurate intelligence.
General Jumper. That intelligence, of course, was the real-
time surveillance that was made available because we were able
to focus those platforms on that particular problem.
The question is, then, how do we arrange these assets so
that we can shift from some of the national priorities of
collecting intelligence to be analyzed into putting those same
assets against the real and emerging problems that exist on the
battlefield at any one moment, like we were able to do during
the dust storm?
With proper networking, you can treat this as an
interleaved solution. You can focus for just very short periods
of time, seconds or minutes, on one problem long enough to get
an answer and then go back to another chore, much like you do
with a network of computers.
This is what we are trying to do. There is money in the
program to be able to do this with networking, with programs
like the E-10A, and other command and control efforts along
with the Intelligence Community to network this in a proper
way.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
General Hagee.
General Hagee. Yes, sir. This is an issue that we are
addressing, just like the logistics issue that Senator Clinton
brought out. Sir, when you talk about tactical intelligence,
you are talking about information that is fleeting, and it is
really important that you get it quickly to the user on the
ground.
I would divide this into three main areas. One is UAVs, and
General Jumper talked a little bit about that and the ability
of our UAVs to quickly get that information down to the
individual marine or soldier who is on the ground. We are
addressing that in this particular budget.
The second area, which General Jumper talked about quite a
bit, is having these various sensors be able to talk to one
another, to fuse this information and turn the data into actual
intelligence quickly for that individual on the ground. We are
addressing that large area.
The third area has to do with human intelligence (HUMINT).
When you get right down to it, there is just some information
that you can only get via HUMINT. I believe that we need to do
much better in this particular area. Having discussed some of
this with Director Tenet, I know he feels exactly the same way
and is doing what he can to increase this Nation's HUMINT
capability.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. I likewise want to
see emphasis put on HUMINT.
Admiral?
Admiral Clark. Well, there are several areas that I would
focus on. I would start by saying that there were some great
victories in intelligence and we are focusing on all the things
that did not turn out right. I happen to believe that one of
the first things that we need to focus on is continued work to
turn strategic intelligence into tactical intelligence with the
speed of light. We are unable to do that and get it to the end
user. What I believe happens today is that there is a lot of
intelligence that is there, and we own it, but we cannot get it
to the right place.
Let me give you an example of things that worked very well.
It has been little talked about, but we were able to determine
that they were trying to and were ready and prepared to deploy
mines in the waterways. If they had done so we would have been
working for months to get them all out of there. Fortunately,
we saw them doing it. We had the intelligence to get it done.
Here is what I think that leads to. I believe the future is
going to have a much greater focus and influence on a
requirement for pre-hostilities. This is why I believe that
gets me to sensors. General Hagee mentioned UAVs. It is all
unmanned sensors. We had, for the first time ever, a half dozen
pre-production models of unmanned sensors over there working in
the waterways. It is important to have the ability to know
before hostilities start and to be able to operate
clandestinely in enemy territory or in near-land arenas.
Lacking that, you cannot play your hand until hostilities
start.
We have to have the platforms and the sensors to be able to
do that. We need unmanned vehicles in the air and on the
surface. A major problem for us is we have to sort ourselves
out in the waterways, where it is free for everybody to be. You
cannot do that with a large platform. This is why a low-cost
LCS is so important to me. We have to have a smaller platform
that can react with speed and saturate and dominate the area
with unmanned vehicles, so that we own the space.
Networking is vitally important. General Jumper mentioned
that. Let me go to the next point.
We call it Automatic Target Acquisition (ATA). ATA is
really fundamentally machine-to-machine discussions instead of
machine-to-human, by human-to-machine discussions. We have to
exploit our technical advantage there.
I would say that the other issue with sensors is we have
programs in the budget that are going to vastly improve our
capability. Working with the Air Force, Active Electronically
Scanned Array (AESA) radar is coming. It will tremendously
improve our ability to see the ground. Then we have to be able
to communicate it, just as Senator Clinton talked about the
whole issue of communications. The modern communications that
will carry these data streams is a primary investment priority
for the Nation.
Chairman Warner. Did you wish to include in that the
programs for countering anti-ship missiles?
Admiral Clark. Absolutely.
Chairman Warner. That is a growing concern to this Senator.
Admiral Clark. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. All right, thank you.
Now, General Schoomaker.
General Schoomaker. Sir, thank you. I will be very brief
here.
We learned a lot. We have a lot of lessons learned. There
are about 127 areas specifically in tactical intelligence from
OIF lessons learned and OEF. About 107 of those have been
rectified and are working.
There are four key areas. One of them is tactical
collection. It has already been spoken to here across the
board. It really is saying that every soldier is a sensor, and
you are collecting from everybody that is in touch with the
space. It has to do with HUMINT, it has to do with the
integration of UAVs, and it has to do with the kinds of things
that you can do and live.
It really is an issue of understanding that intelligence is
an operation. It cannot be a union issue here. You have to
fight for knowledge, and that is one of the things that we
know. It is things like having a common operating picture for
both blue forces and red forces.
The second one is in reporting, and that is reporting from
the soldier all the way up to the national level. We are not
making the best use of our information technology (IT)
infrastructure, of our processes and all the rest of it, still
legacy.
Also crucial is access to national level intelligence.
There is still too much difficulty in terms of accessing
databases across the board in a timely fashion. I am now
talking about the tactical level, which is still very
complicated.
Chairman Warner. That is something we should address very
promptly. I would appreciate if you would give me a little
memorandum on how you see that problem and what recommendations
you would like to make to Congress to step into this situation.
General Schoomaker. Sir, this is a huge issue and I think
we all share this question of how we really get access so that
we can mine all of what we really know in a way that is
coherent.
Chairman Warner. Let us close out on this issue. You will
come back to me and coordinate your memorandum with the other
Service Chiefs. Senator Levin and I serve on the Intelligence
Committee, and that, to me, is something we should pay a high
level of attention to.
General Schoomaker. Sir, I would add this last point and I
will quit. That is, networking the analytical centers, so that
we are not only networking Services but are networked across
the interagencies and the joint services, national through
tactical, is very important to us.
The last point I will make is that one of the things that
makes our future formation so powerful is that we are putting a
significant reconnaissance, surveillance, and target
acquisition (RSTA) capability within those formations. We are
talking about the modular brigades, ground cavalry kinds of
organizations, UAVs, and scouts with the kinds of optics and
sensors that we need. The payback on this in terms of
capability is huge and that is one of the main centerpieces of
what we are doing.
Chairman Warner. As a seasoned combat soldier, you know
that intelligence is an enormous force multiplier.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
I want to go back to the issue of national intelligence and
the shortfalls and errors there. I asked you about whether or
not you had been interviewed relative to the effect of impact
of prewar national intelligence on the planning for or conduct
of OIF and you indicated no. Now I want to ask you another
question relating to the national intelligence, and that is
whether or not you have seen any reports or analyses of the
impact of that national intelligence on the conduct of OIF.
Have you seen any reports on the issue inside your service or
anywhere else?
It does not make any difference where we start. General
Jumper, again we will give you the first shot.
General Jumper. Sir, I am scanning here. That is a broad
question. I cannot recall anything particular that analyzed
that. If I come up with something I will get back to you
immediately.
[The information referred to follows:]
Sir, I have staffed this issue with our Senior Intelligence Office,
the Director for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, and
his staff. We have no documentation or other indications of any reports
of analysis concerning the impact of prewar national intelligence on
the conduct of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
General Hagee.
General Hagee. No, sir, I have not.
Senator Levin. Admiral Clark.
Admiral Clark. No, I have not.
Senator Levin. General.
General Schoomaker. Sir, we only have the lessons learned
kind of information within our own resources. I have seen that,
but nothing else.
Senator Levin. In terms of what I am talking about, you
have not seen that kind of an analysis?
General Schoomaker. To the best of my knowledge I have not,
sir.
Senator Levin. Now, I have a pending request, as our
chairman knows, that is sitting on the Secretary of Defense's
desk. It is a pending report to have interviews with our
military leaders, including our commanders in the field, to see
if we cannot make an assessment of the impact of our national
intelligence on the conduct of OIF. I am just hopeful that we
can get a positive answer from the Secretary of Defense. There
just is no justification, it seems to me, for the delay in
getting a positive answer, and it is essential that this
committee and other committees look at that aspect of our
prewar intelligence.
I am just going to state this. I am not going to ask you a
question on this. I am just going to state this as a fact, that
we are awaiting the answer to that request. It seems to me that
it is a responsibility of this committee and the similar
committee on the House to understand that impact. I know that
the Secretary of Defense has representatives here. Perhaps we
can get a prompt answer and a positive answer to my request.
Chairman Warner. On that point, when you and I were
visiting with the Secretary, I think it was last week, we
discussed a range of those inquiries and he seemed to indicate
that he is going to take these under serious consideration.
Senator Levin. I hope he does. I think our responsibility
is a heavy one here for the future well-being of this country
as well as for any accountability and responsibility in the
past. The future it seems to me requires that we do everything
we possibly can to understand the effect of our intelligence on
operations and planning, as well as the other aspects of
intelligence for other purposes. That is right within the
purview of this committee, and I would hope that the Secretary
of Defense would help us carry out that responsibility with a
positive answer.
I have just one last question for General Hagee. There have
been press reports that some of the Marine Corps officers
believe that the Army was too confrontational in its approach
in Iraq and unnecessarily antagonized the population, and that
the Marines were going to pursue something less confrontational
as a way of encouraging greater Iraqi cooperation against the
insurgents. I am wondering if you would comment on those press
reports, and tell me whether they are accurate or not?
General Hagee. Sir, I have seen those press reports and I
can tell you that the Army and the Marine Corps are working
together very well to ensure that we have learned all the
lessons that they have gathered over there and that we can
implement them when they go in.
When the Army first went in, the battlefield looked a
certain way and, because of the great performance of those
soldiers over there, that battlefield has changed. Both the
Army and the Marine Corps are changing their tactics to respond
to that change.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Gentlemen, we have had an excellent hearing and we will be
submitting additional questions for the record. Thank you very
much and pass a well-done down to your troops.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner
spare parts and logistics support
1 and 2. Senator Warner. General Schoomaker, last year, Congress
supported the Army's request for significant increases in funding for
fiscal year 2004 to address challenges in the Army's spare parts and
logistics support program. Current estimates indicate, however, that
the Army will only be able to spend approximately 70 percent of what
was authorized by Congress. Why is the Army unable to fully execute the
amount authorized by Congress? What are the consequences for the Army
of not spending the funding for spare parts and logistics support
program that was authorized by Congress?
General Schoomaker. In the fiscal year 2004 budget request the Army
assumed risk in base operations support (BOS) to support an emergent
requirement to increase the inventory of spare parts. The realignment
plan, developed prior to operations in Iraq, was a 3-year effort to
increase spares on the shelf in anticipation of future needs. With the
onset of war in 2003, the Army used fiscal year 2003 supplemental funds
to accelerate the replenishment of repair parts. As a result, the funds
originally budgeted for this effort are no longer required for this
program and will be realigned to BOS, the original source of these
funds. This action does not reduce the availability of spare parts.
3. Senator Warner. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, and General
Jumper, departmental and Service investments in basic research serve
many purposes, one of which includes training of the future defense
workforce in disciplines of critical importance to our national
security. Do you feel confident that the current investment trend will
ensure an adequate number of appropriately-trained domestic experts to
fill the Department of Defense's (DOD) need for an innovative workforce
in key disciplines such as mechanical, aerospace and chemical
engineering, computer architecture, mathematics, physics, and
oceanography?
General Schoomaker. Basic research supports the fundamental
training of graduate students in the key disciplines indicated, and
these individuals can contribute to our future defense workforce needs.
The current funding streams are sufficient to ensure an adequate number
of students to fill the DOD's needs, assuming other significant
factors, such as sudden funding reductions, competition with private
industry for similar resources, or a decline in the number of native-
born U.S. citizens acquiring advanced technical degrees, do not disrupt
the trend.
Admiral Clark. I am confident that both our investments and the way
in which we have structured our research and development (R&D) programs
will ensure an adequate number of the kinds of domestic research
scientists and engineers that you have mentioned. Between the Naval
Research Lab and the In-house Laboratory Independent Research (ILIR)
program, we have roughly $115 million going annually to help develop
appropriately trained scientists and engineers in key disciplines.
In addition, we are working with the National Science Foundation
(NSF) to start a $10 million pilot program, commencing in fiscal year
2005, that is focused on bringing into the Naval Research Enterprise
the next generation of scientists and engineers. This program, called
Naval Research--Science and Technology for America's Readiness (N-
STAR), is focused on revitalizing connections between the Navy's R&D
centers and the Nation's universities.
General Jumper. The current Air Force Science and Technology (S&T)
investment portfolio, including over $215 million for basic research,
is focused on providing technology that ultimately enables warfighting
capabilities. Although there may be a perception that overall basic
research funding is in decline, Air Force ``core'' basic research has
actually increased about $13 million or almost 5 percent real growth
over the fiscal year 2004 President's budget. This Air Force basic
research investment is closely linked with academia and this link is
expected to attract, develop, and produce graduates that can compete in
future job markets that support our endeavors in delivering the
warfighting capabilities needed to ensure our national defense. While
recruiting and retaining scientists and engineers (S&Es) continues to
be a challenge, we have no indication that there will be a shortage of
S&Es in the future.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
tankers
4. Senator McCain. General Jumper, according to the Air Force,
``There is only a negligible amount of funds in the fiscal year 2005
budget that falls under the tanker lease heading, and no funds to
actually lease aircraft. Should the current review and Congress concur
leasing is the best way ahead, funds could be reallocated using the
normal budgeting tools.'' Exactly what funding is there in this budget
that relates in any way to the tanker program?
General Jumper. There is no money included in the fiscal year 2005
President's budget for the KC-767A program. The KC-767A program
accelerates the start of our tanker recapitalization effort. However,
the tanker recapitalization program of record in the fiscal year 2005
President's budget, PE41221F KC-135 Tanker Replacement, has funding
that starts in fiscal year 2006 and notionally delivers its first
aircraft in fiscal year 2010, depending on the recommendation of the
analysis of alternatives.
5. Senator McCain. General Jumper, from the Air Force's statement,
am I to understand that it is your intention to fund the lease of up to
20 tankers by reprogramming from other systems?
General Jumper. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2004 authorized leasing 20 tankers and buying 80 more under
multiyear authority. If the program is approved by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD), we intend to submit an above threshold
reprogramming for fiscal year 2005 funds.
force protection
6. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, I am perplexed about a
situation dealing with base security forces. The Army active duty,
Reserve and National Guard security forces are, according to your words
and every outside expert, stretched thin. In fact, at Fort Huachuca in
Arizona and Army bases elsewhere, security forces, military police
(MP), and gate guards are supplemented by the civilian guards. Why are
Army and National Guard service members guarding Air Force bases?
General Schoomaker. In September 2002, OSD and the Air Force asked
the Army to provide force protection augmentation at Air Force
installations based on the Air Force's inability to sustain global
force protection and security levels. In December 2002, the Secretary
of the Army signed a Memorandum of Agreement providing force protection
augmentation at Air Force installations for 2 years. We are currently
in the second year. Army augmentation is scheduled to end in November
2004.
7. Senator McCain. General Jumper, why are you using Army guardsmen
and reservists to provide gate guard and base security force protection
and have chosen not to augment or replace your base security force with
contract or civilian security guards?
General Jumper. The use of Army guardsmen was, and remains today, a
stopgap measure used until longer-term solutions like civilian and
contractor guard forces are fully developed. Since the service
agreement was started in January 2003, we have shifted from a mobilized
Army augmentation force to a 100-percent volunteer force in the second
year of this 2-year agreement. Originally, the Army provided over 8,000
soldiers to augment Air Force force protection capabilities. Today,
that number has been reduced to less than 5,300 soldiers. We are using
every available means to meet these increased demands through
utilization of technology infusion, Air Reserve component volunteers,
manpower realignments within end strength limits, civilian conversions,
and contract development. Our goal remains the same: reduce reliance on
mobilized Guard and Reserve Forces as alternatives come online.
future combat system
8. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, an independent assessment of
the Future Combat Systems (FCSs) ``other transaction authority''
agreement conducted by a subcontractor called CommerceBasix highlighted
the financial risk associated with this $15 billion agreement that was
being negotiated with Boeing. Among other things, this due diligence
assessment concluded that if the Army did not address the issues it
identified in the May 31, 2003 version of the ``other transaction
authority'' agreement, the Army's contractually based financial risk
could exceed $1 billion. To what extent were the issues raised in this
assessment adequately addressed in the final ``other transaction
authority'' agreement with Boeing?
General Schoomaker. The other transaction agreement executed
between the Department of the Army and Boeing for the system
development and demonstration (SDD) phase of the FCS program contained
sufficient contractual provisions to provide necessary protections for
both the Army and Boeing. We are of the opinion that the contractual
issues raised in the CommerceBasix findings were addressed in the SDD
other transaction agreement and that the provisions provided sufficient
safeguards for the government's $14.1 billion program investment.
9 and 10. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, to what extent have
you evaluated the Army's legal and financial risks associated with the
final ``other transaction authority'' agreement with Boeing? Will you
provide a copy of documents that reflect your evaluation to this
committee?
General Schoomaker. As previously responded, I have not undertaken
any evaluation regarding the FCS. The Acting Secretary of the Army has
commissioned the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) study and the
Army will release the study in the June 2004 timeframe.
11. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, did Army Acquisition Chief
Claude Bolton, at any time, convey CommerceBasix' analysis, or any
information regarding this analysis, to Boeing?
General Schoomaker. Not to my knowledge.
12. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, if Mr. Bolton conveyed
CommerceBasix' analysis, or any information regarding this analysis,
please indicate to whom, and when, he did so.
General Schoomaker. I have no knowledge of this.
13. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, please provide a copy of
both the May 31, 2003, and the final version of the FCSs ``other
transaction authorization'' agreement.
General Schoomaker. The information requested is attached.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
end strength
14. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, you are redesigning the
U.S. Army and growing the number of brigades to meet the challenges of
the new century. Why does your budget not reflect this?
General Schoomaker. Lessons from Operation Iraq Freedom (OIF) and
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) have taught us that we need more agile
forces, capable of operating in a joint environment, and we need them
as soon as possible. We did not arrive at a decision to implement the
redesign until after the budget was finalized. Because of the immediacy
of the requirement, we plan to reconfigure OIF 1 units during their
reset process. Some of these units may deploy to meet OIF 3 force
requirements, so we need to reconfigure them immediately. As this
requirement is directly related to continuing the global war on
terrorism, we believe supplemental funds are appropriate.
15. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, paying for the 30,000
increase in troops is not included in the budget. Do you plan on
relying on supplemental spending bills for the next 4 years to pay for
this increase?
General Schoomaker. This requirement is directly related to the
global war on terrorism and is being made under emergency authority.
Because the increases are above authorized strength, we believe the
supplemental appropriations are a proper way to fund them.
16. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, supplemental bills are
submitted by the administration for emergency spending requests. Why is
future end strength considered an emergency-spending request?
General Schoomaker. As we fight the global war on terrorism, we
must adapt our forces and our methods to best engage our enemy. We need
to implement the lessons that we have learned in Iraq and Afghanistan
as soon as possible. We need to change the way our units are organized
and how they fight now. The associated requirement for a strength
increase is a direct result of the global war on terrorism and its
immediate, but temporary nature, is our reasons for using supplemental
funds.
17. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, every outside independent
expert has called for increasing Army end strength. The demands of the
global war on terror have stretched our military thin. Will the
administration continue to oppose legislative efforts by Congress to
increase end strength?
General Schoomaker. While I oppose a permanent increase in the
Army's end strength, I strongly support a temporary increase of 30,000
that allows the necessary flexibility for the Army, while fighting the
global war on terrorism, to increase the number of Active Force Brigade
Combat Teams (BCTs) from 33 to 43 between now and fiscal year 2007. A
determination for an additional 5 BCTs (for a total of 48) will be made
at a later date. This temporary measure will enable the Army to field
standardized unit designs and transition to a unit-based personnel
management system. Our intent is to make the Army more ready and
relevant for the unpredictable nature of the emerging strategic
environment. Once this restructuring is complete, the Army will return
to their authorized strength by fiscal year 2009.
18. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, we are relying more and
more on our reservists. According to the testimony of General Myers,
``some missions like the ones in Bosnia and Kosovo are almost
exclusively made up of Reserve and Guard units.'' Reports indicate that
nearly 40 percent of the soldiers in the Iraqi and Afghan theaters are
reservists or guardsmen. I am concerned about the retention problems
that may arise in the near future due to this reliance. What are you
doing to encourage reservists to re-enlist?
General Schoomaker. The Army Selected Reserve (SELRES) strength was
211,380 as of January 29, 2004, or 3.1 percent above its
congressionally mandated end strength objective. The Army Reserve began
to notice a drop in attrition and increase in strength soon after the
first round of calls to active duty (January 2003) in support of
Operations Noble Eagle (ONE) OEF. Since this time, the Army Reserve has
been in a continuous state of mobilization with an average of 28
percent of its troop program unit (TPU) strength called to active duty
in support of ONE/OEF/OIF rotations. On average, 1.9 percent of the
SELRES strength attrits each month. The mobilized population has not
been able to follow this ``normal pattern'' of attrition and may act on
this ``pent-up'' attrition upon their return. The Army Reserve is
expecting losses between 22 percent and 34 percent of pent-up attrition
(based on 12 to 18 months of mobilization) from this population within
7 to 9 months of their return. Based on these expected demobilization
losses, the Army Reserve end strength is projected to fall to between
203,490 and 207,481 by the end of the fiscal year and within the 2
percent congressional allowance by the beginning of the fourth quarter,
depending on the timing of demobilization losses and the attrition
patterns experienced.
The Chief, Army Reserve (CAR), tasked the Office of the Chief, Army
Reserve (OCAR) Retention Transition Division to form a Retention Task
Force to develop and institute initiatives to retain as many of these
demobilizing soldiers as possible. Some of the ongoing initiatives
include:
(1) Completion of a demobilization survey, administered by a
retention and transition noncommissioned officer (NCO), by each
returning soldier.
(2) Counseling provided to each soldier during the demobilization
process pointing out that they could immediately use tuition assistance
upon their return, and identifying opportunities in the Army Reserve to
continue their careers, such as the Active Guard Reserve program,
warrant officer program, or options for commissioning.
(3) Free marriage retreats, conducted by Army Reserve chaplains,
offered to all redeploying soldiers and their spouses.
(4) Retention and transition NCOs are contacting redeployed
soldiers during the 90-day reconstitution period giving these soldiers
a chance to share their mobilization experience and to encourage them
to stay in the Army Reserve.
(5) Family readiness groups and commanders are conducting welcome
home activities during the first Army Reserve training assembly
scheduled after redeployment.
The Army Reserve realized improvements in first term reenlistment
figures in February; however, it remains below mission for the second
straight month and for the year. Additionally, careerists lagged for
the 4th straight month. Upon review of the causes of the careerist
shortfall, it was discovered that the systems used to update
reenlistment dates had not caught up to the change in policy requiring
Reserve component soldiers in ranks of staff sergeant or above to
reenlist for an indefinite term. There are currently over 1,000
reenlistment contract packets awaiting input into the personnel
accounting systems. A software change package is due out at the end of
March 2004. This will enable the Army Reserve to remedy the situation
by the end of April 2004. Retention of demobilizing soldiers continues
to be monitored closely to determine the effects of mobilization on
retention.
19. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, the biggest strength of our
military is the men and women who serve. We have major commitments
across the globe including 330,000 Army troops deployed to 120
countries. The United States will have a major presence in Iraq and
Afghanistan for the foreseeable future. Are the budget priorities of
the Service in line with the increased demands we are putting on our
soldiers?
General Schoomaker. Absolutely. The fiscal year 2005 budget
emphasizes manning the force, taking care of our soldiers and their
families, and sustaining the quality of the force. The Army's request
reflects a strength increase of 2,400 in the active component as
authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2004. This budget also provides soldiers with an average pay increase
of 3.5 percent.
The Army is transitioning to an improved manning system designed to
increase unit readiness by increasing stability and predictability for
unit commanders, soldiers, and families. The Army is also implementing
incentives and manning initiatives to meet recruiting and retention
goals in order to enhance warfighting capabilities.
The fiscal year 2005 budget begins a rebalancing of the active and
Reserve components based on rapid response operations, high demand
units, and rotational requirements. To improve force manning in the
active component in fiscal year 2005, we will increase authorizations
to equal requirements by adding 1,043 authorized spaces to existing
active units. This initiative will bring them to their full requirement
level in fiscal year 2005 ensuring their campaign quality capabilities.
Additionally, beginning in fiscal year 2005, the Army will bring the
Reserve component force structure allowance under programmed end
strength. This initiative will improve manning and readiness and will
reduce operational tempo (OPTEMPO) stress in the remaining units types.
The Army will also convert 917 Reserve component spaces from less used
structure such as field artillery to high demand units such as MPs and
civil affairs.
While we are at war and addressing global war on terrorism
emergency requirements, these initiatives will relieve some of the
pressure on our soldiers, while still providing the right mixes of
capabilities for our Army.
20. Senator McCain. Admiral Clark, I am a little concerned that the
Navy is going to face a problem training new aviators over the next
couple of years. There have been stories of the Navy turning away
hundreds of qualified aviators already in the aviation pipeline.
Currently, few pilots are leaving the Navy to fly commercially because
the airlines are not hiring. When this trend changes and the commercial
airlines start to hire, the Navy is going to have a shortage of junior
officers. What is being done to ensure that there are an adequate
number of junior aviators?
Admiral Clark. We access enough junior officers as prospective
aviators each year to allow for training attrition and to properly fill
first-tour requirements in each squadron. We are continuously updating
our models to validate actual performance while taking measures to
incentivize the behaviors we want to optimize our investment in naval
aviators. This includes a continuing commitment to a robust bonus
program that helps lessen the economic disadvantage for a pilot serving
in the military. We have worked hard to improve the quality of service
for all of our dedicated professionals, including those in naval
aviation where we are experiencing record retention. As a result, we
now have an opportunity to both increase the level of experience in our
squadrons and more selectively choose department heads and executive/
commanding officers in key aviation leadership billets that those
junior aviators will aspire to.
21. Senator McCain. General Hagee, I was recently contacted by the
father of a constituent who expressed concern that his son is being
redeployed to Iraq. On his son's first deployment, he flew F-18s, but
now he is being sent back to Iraq as a MP. Are the Marines that short
of troops that we are now sending aviators back to Iraq to serve on the
ground? Is this not a perfect example of why we need to increase end
strength?
General Hagee. I can assure you that the Marine Corps is not
sending our F-18 pilots back to Iraq as MPs. We have embedded within
our ground combat units, billets for naval aviators to serve as air
officers. These Marine aviators advise the unit commanders on the
employment of all types of aviation support from close air support to
helicopter resupply, medical evacuation, etc. It is not uncommon to
take advantage of our aviator's recent combat experience by rotating
pilots from the cockpit to the ground combat units to take advantage of
their expertise. This relationship has always been an important part of
our air-ground team philosophy and been in existence since the
introduction of aviation into the Marine Corps. This is how we normally
do business and is not related to any shortfall in end strength.
national call to service
22. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, since you are pursuing a
temporary increase in manpower levels for the Army which will need to
be phased out in a short time and could well reside in the Reserves,
does it not make sense to employ the 18-18-18 National Call to Service
(NCS) Act to augment the required end strength you are pursuing?
General Schoomaker. The Army has implemented a National Call to
Service Program (NCSP) and established a 1-year test of the program so
we can quantify the impacts of this program. We want to allow the NCSP
to mature and to complete the 1-year test to help us make better
decisions on the program and its place in the Army. Currently, our
force stabilization and modularity efforts are key. The temporary
strength increase of the Army will need to occur across all parts of
the military structure not just the initial entry soldier. Our solution
is focused on long-term results for shaping the Army as a whole.
23. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General
Jumper, and General Hagee, I would like you to discuss the
implementation of the 18-18-18 plan that Senator Bayh and I included in
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. In
particular, what percentage of your total force will be made up of
personnel under this type of contract?
General Schoomaker. Since implementation of the NCSP on October 1,
2003, the Army has had 250 soldiers enlist under this option. Overall,
the fiscal year 2004 goal for the NCSP is 1,450, which equals 2 percent
of the initial fiscal year 2004 accession mission and 0.3 percent of
the total Active Force.
Admiral Clark. In this first year of implementation of NCSP, the
Navy's goal of 1,000 NCSP accessions was achieved. This represents 2.5
percent of the Navy's entire fiscal year 2004 accessions and 0.3
percent of fiscal year 2004 total active enlisted strength.
We are embarked on an effort to develop a 21st century human
resources strategy which will baseline how we acquire, develop and
retain the people needed to keep our Navy the best the world has known.
We intend to assess the 18-18-18 methodology to see how we can better
exploit opportunities to show young people the benefits of service.
General Jumper. Senator, the 18-18-18 plan was included in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 as the NCSP. I
am proud to say the Air Force hit the ground running with this program.
We were the first Service to bring someone on active duty and have not
let up since then. We have accessed approximately 300 airmen since the
program began on October 1. Our plan is to access 370 airmen this
fiscal year and an additional 365 next year. This will be 1 percent of
our non-prior service enlisted accessions each of those years.
General Hagee. The Marine Corps is currently planning on recruiting
up to 1 percent of our yearly accession mission via the NCSP. We are
implementing this program over a 3-year period; 175--fiscal year 2004,
275--fiscal year 2005, and 350--fiscal year 2006.
24. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General
Jumper, and General Hagee, do you envision expansion of this program?
General Schoomaker. The Army approached this program somewhat
differently than the other Services. On behalf of the Army, Rand
Corporation is conducting a 1-year study that ends on September 30,
2004, to determine market expansion as well as effects this program
might have on our other enlistment programs. We placed this program in
10 of our 41 recruiting battalions. The Rand report will follow in the
December 2004/January 2005 timeframe. We project expanding this program
nationwide on October 1, 2004. Upon completion of the study, the number
of personnel allowed into the program could very well grow, but at this
time, we want this program to mature.
Admiral Clark. Yes, we currently plan to double the NCS accession
next year.
General Jumper. We are taking a cautiously optimistic view of the
program and do anticipate the program's expansion in the future. We are
interested in establishing some type of metric to indicate what the
majority of these enlistees will choose to do at the end of their
training plus 15-month commitment. This will allow us to better
establish a plan to ensure sustainment of these Air Force Specialty
Codes is not affected.
General Hagee. At this time, the Marine Corps does not envision
expansion of this program. We will continue to evaluate this position.
25. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General
Jumper, and General Hagee, what is the role of the 18-18-18 plan
playing in each of the Services?
General Schoomaker. The NCSP was implemented to give applicants a
chance to serve the Nation for a limited amount of time (15 months plus
training). If they chose not to reenlist for active duty, they would
then serve 2 years in the Selected Reserves and the rest of their
service in the Individual Ready Reserve or a national service program.
The Army continues to shape its programs to attract high quality
men and women to serve as soldiers. The NCSP is a short-term enlistment
option that we are focusing on the college markets. The NCSP currently
has 30 percent of its enlistees with some college versus 25.7 percent
of the Army's total year to date enlistments. This program will benefit
both the Active and Reserve component in today's Army and well into our
future Army.
Admiral Clark. Sailors enlisted under the NCSP plan play a key role
in filling critical skill shortages within the Naval Reserve. For
fiscal year 2004, we have dedicated fully of our NCSP enlistment
quotas toward two skills most urgently needed in the Selected Reserves:
Hospital Corpsman (HM) and Master at Arms (MA). U.S. Navy Reserve has a
long-term priority need for corpsmen with both training and follow-on
experience. NCSP HMs will directly support the Reserve mission of
providing field medics to Marine Corps units (many of which are engaged
in OEF and OIF). Those recruits enlisted as NCSP HMs will not only have
received required formal technical schooling, they will also bring an
additional 15 months of Fleet or Fleet Marine Force experience with
them as they affiliate with their Reserve units. The NCSP MAs will also
serve to beef up the Navy antiterrorism/force protection mission, for
much the same reason as HMs--a combination of formal technical training
coupled with follow-on fleet experience in a variety of assignments.
The remaining 12 percent of this fiscal year's NCSP enlistees are
dedicated (in smaller numbers) to other Reserve Force missions
including intelligence, anti-mine warfare, and naval aviation. For
fiscal year 2005, Navy plans to double the number of NCSP enlistees,
with those sailors continuing to be enlisted into ratings and skills in
high demand in the Reserves.
General Jumper. This program has provided our recruiters with
another tool to try and reach more of America's finest youths. We are
encouraged by the results but the trends are unclear. Our desire was to
bring in people that would not have otherwise considered the Air Force
as a career option. While this is true in some situations, the trend
indicates most young people would have enlisted either way but opted
for the NCSP believing it provided the greatest incentives. One of the
roles we hoped this program would play is to help with manning our Air
Reserve component forces. We will not know how this succeeds until the
first of these airmen become eligible to make those career decisions
late in fiscal year 2005.
General Hagee. At this time, the Marine Corps is using the NCSP as
an additional incentive program to attract the ``best and brightest''
youth into our Marine Corps. We continue to evaluate the success of the
program and are looking at innovative ways to use the program to
possibly attract critical skill personnel to support our Selected
Marine Corps Reserve Units such as intelligence and MPs. The Marine
Corps has a Total Force Working Group looking at this issue.
munitions
26. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, you have directed a ``blank
sheet approach'' to determine the ``real'' requirement for munitions.
When will you program the ``real'' requirement into the budget process?
General Schoomaker. We will program the new warfighting requirement
in the fiscal year 2006 budget submission. I have given guidance
relative to this year's programming efforts to conduct an operational
assessment of planning factors and modeling results used to determine
war reserve munitions requirements. The intent is to tightly link the
munitions risk assessment and prioritization decisions to projected
warfight requirements informed by the current operational environment.
As the Army matures its thinking about the best way to approach the war
reserve munitions requirement, we will work with OSD to document the
modifications required of the process, as laid out in DOD Instruction
3000.4, DOD Munitions Requirements Process.
Additionally, we have identified an fiscal year 2005 unfunded
requirement (UFR) to fill high-priority training ammunition shortfalls
in small and medium calibers and mortar rounds.
27. Senator McCain. General Jumper, why has the Air Force chosen to
leave a joint program after development is complete and the weapon is
integrated on five Air Force platforms in favor of a single-service
development program which has yet to be developed or integrated on any
platform?
General Jumper. Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW)-A is integrated on
four United States Air Force (USAF) platforms, but with numerous
restrictions, issues, and ``workarounds.'' After 12 years in the JSOW
program, the USAF has dropped zero in combat. Based on program
documentation, combat, and developmental and operational test data,
JSOW's operational utility for the USAF, and successful integration on
USAF platforms, has not been proven. The USAF based its decision to end
JSOW-A procurement on capability requirements and analyses of a wide
range of platforms and weapons that can provide the required
capabilities. We balanced capabilities, cost, and risk during the
fiscal year 2005 program objective memorandum (POM). We analyzed
numerous platforms and weapon options to ensure the required
capabilities (direct attack, standoff outside point, area and theater
defenses) are being provided and procured, and Wind Corrected Munitions
Dispenser Extended Range (WCMD-ER) is just one of the many technical
solutions being applied by the USAF to provide the required
capabilities. Defense budget plans, the Integration Capability Review
and Risk Assessment process, and Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency
studies support the decision. The analyses showed the capability
requirements could be met with a mix of existing and planned platforms
and weapons. The planned JSOW-A procurement (475 through fiscal year
2004) will provide an effective ``bridge'' until other capabilities
reach sufficient inventories.
28. Senator McCain. General Jumper, given the Navy's success with
the JSOW in OIF, how can you justify the risk of weapon development
when an existing joint program is established and already integrated on
multiple platforms?
General Jumper. The USAF analyzed numerous platforms and weapon
options to ensure the required capabilities (direct attack, standoff
outside point, area and theater defenses) are being provided and
procured, and WCMD-ER is just one of the many technical solutions being
applied by the USAF to provide the required capabilities.
JSOW is integrated on four USAF platforms, but with numerous
restrictions, issues, and ``workarounds.'' The USAF has used zero in
combat after 12 years of participation in the JSOW program. Based on
program documentation, combat, and developmental and operational test
data, JSOW's operational utility for the USAF, and successful
integration on USAF platforms, has not been proven.
29. Senator McCain. General Jumper, how does the Air Force plan to
deal with the unexploded ordnance issue for the BLU-97 sub-munitions in
WCMD and WCMD-ER?
General Jumper. The reliability of the USAF's current cluster bombs
is approximately 95 percent. The USAF is further improving the
reliability of its current cluster bombs with the use of WCMD kits and
the procurement of a new cluster bomb, Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW), which
has a reliability of 99 percent.
One of the biggest issues in the past with cluster munitions was
that we did not have guided delivery systems to ensure precision. The
baseline, and now the extended-range WCMD allows the USAF to deliver
the submunitions to precise locations (inertial navigation system and
Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) guidance), which make it easier for
the troops to avoid unexploded ordinances as they advance. After the
conflict ends, clean up is much safer and efficient. In addition, there
are sensors in SFW that look for targets vice the BLU-97 Combined
Effects Munition's generalized explosion on impact. The weapon also has
three built in self-destruct modes if no target is found. This
combination of features has improved the reliability of the USAF's
cluster bombs to 99 percent.
30. Senator McCain. General Jumper, can you explain why the BLU-97
submunition unexploded ordnance hazard issue does not make the existing
submunitions inventory obsolete?
General Jumper. The reliability of the USAF current cluster bombs
is approximately 95 percent. The USAF is further improving the
reliability of its current cluster bombs with the use of WCMD kits,
WCMD-ER kits, and the procurement of a new cluster bomb, SFW, which has
a reliability of 99 percent through three redundant self-destruct/
deactivation features. Just like SFW, any cluster weapon submunitions
the USAF may procure in the future would comply with all established
policies and directives.
The baseline, and now the WCMD-ER allows the USAF to deliver the
submunitions to precise locations (inertial navigation system and GPS
guidance), which make it easier for the troops to avoid unexploded
ordinances as they advance. After the conflict ends, clean up is much
safer and efficient.
31. Senator McCain. General Jumper, have you conducted a business
case analysis which shows a clear cost-benefit advantage to the DOD
(not the USAF) to pursue WCMD-ER over JSOW-A, which includes
development and integration costs?
General Jumper. The Air Force decision to cancel the JSOW-A was not
based on a comparison between WCMD-ER and JSOW-A. Rather, the USAF
performed a Capability Requirements and Risk Assessment (CRRA) of our
delivery platforms and munitions. This in-depth analysis determined
JSOW-A provides a redundant capability relative to a number of other
weapons and delivery platforms. The planned USAF inventory offers
several capable and less expensive standoff alternatives to JSOW, such
as Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) and WCMD-ER, as well as Joint Direct
Attack Munition (JDAM), WCMD, and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile
(JASSM) that could be dropped from stealth aircraft. All these weapons
are existing programs established and funded by Congress.
Collectively, these programs mitigate the near term risk with JSOW
cancellation. No single weapon addresses the entire target set--some
are adequate for parts of the target set and are significantly less
expensive. One business case consideration is we already have over
100,000 rounds for tactical munitions dispensers which can be converted
to WCMD for $20,000 each, or WCMD-ER for $68,000 each versus JSOW which
is well over $200,000 each.
Thus, the final USAF decision was to maintain our total buy of
JSOW-As at 475 missiles and redirect $398 million of savings toward
other priorities. OSD and JCS/J-8 validated the decision, but directed
the Air Force transfer $100 million to the Navy to offset program costs
incurred by Air Force withdrawal and ensure continuance of ongoing
production (i.e., maintenance of minimum sustaining rate).
32. Senator McCain. General Jumper, we understand that in recent
conflicts, enemy air defenses have not been very capable. However, in
future conflicts that is likely to change. How much does WCMD-ER
decrease the survivability of the aircraft compared to JSOW-A given the
high radar cross section of WCMD-ER?
General Jumper. The USAF based its decision to end JSOW-A
procurement on capability requirements and analyses of a wide range of
platforms and weapons that can provide the required capabilities. We
balanced capabilities, cost, and risk during the fiscal year 2005 POM.
The USAF analyzed numerous platforms and weapon options to ensure the
required capabilities (direct attack, standoff outside point, area and
theater defenses) are being provided and procured, and WCMD-ER is just
one of the many technical solutions being applied by the USAF to
provide the required capabilities.
Like question #33, this question was addressed in the USAF's
analyses during the fiscal year 2005 POM and prior performance
comparisons for area attack weapons. The WCMD and WCMD-ER provide more
submunitions per delivery truck than JSOW, or, in other words, more
probability of damaging the target per weapon. The USAF also looked at
the target sets and concluded that a mobile target set (troops or
vehicles on the move) are protected by mobile anti-aircraft artillery
or surface-to-air missile systems, and both JSOW and WCMD-ER have
similar survival capabilities in this scenario. Due to the increased
firepower with WCMD-ER, as well as similar survival capabilities as
JSOW against mobile threats, USAF analyses showed the requirement for
fewer aircraft sorties to complete wartime campaigns. This translates
to lower platform attrition and increased aircrew survivability.
33. Senator McCain. General Jumper, how does WCMD-ER's range,
approximately half of JSOW's range, adversely effect survivability and
mission effectiveness?
General Jumper. The USAF based its decision to end JSOW-A
procurement on capability requirements and analyses of a wide range of
platforms and weapons that can provide the required capabilities. They
balanced capabilities, cost, and risk during the fiscal year 2005 POM.
The USAF analyzed numerous platforms and weapon options to ensure the
required capabilities (direct attack, standoff outside point, area and
theater defenses) are being provided and procured, and WCMD-ER is just
one of the many technical solutions being applied by the USAF to
provide the required capabilities.
This question was addressed in the USAF's analyses during the
fiscal year 2005 POM and prior performance comparisons for area attack
weapons. The WCMD and WCMD-ER provide more submunitions per delivery
truck than JSOW, or, in other words, more probability of damaging the
target per weapon. The USAF also looked at the target sets and
concluded that a mobile target set (troops or vehicles on the move) are
protected by mobile anti-aircraft artillery or surface-to-air missile
systems, and both JSOW and WCMD-ER have similar survival capabilities
in this scenario. Due to the increased firepower with WCMD-ER, as well
as similar survival capabilities as JSOW against mobile threats, USAF
analyses showed the requirement for fewer aircraft sorties to complete
wartime campaigns. This translates to lower platform attrition and
increased aircrew survivability.
34. Senator McCain. General Jumper, with the large Air Force
investment in stealth technology on aircraft and other weapons such as
JASSM, why would the Air Force choose to develop a non-stealth weapon
that cannot be carried inside the bay of the Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF)?
General Jumper. The utility of stealthy platforms is the ability to
avoid or minimize the aircraft's exposure to enemy threats. The USAF's
``kick down the door'' concept of operations (CONOP) relies on stealth
technology to penetrate enemy defenses and roll them back. This will
allow less stealthy platforms to conduct follow-on operations with
reduced risk. WCMD, which will be carried internally on the JSF,
contains the same number of submunitions as WCMD-ER, so the stealthy
platform with WCMD carried internally meets the initial roll back
concept, and WCMD-ER, carried externally on JSF and non-stealthy
platforms, continues the attacks with standoff capability.
depot maintenance
35. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, the Army budget submission
funds depot maintenance at 72 percent of the requirement (1 percent
more than last year) and BOS services to 70 percent of requirement (4
percent more than last year). Will your continued underfunding of this
requirement not drive us toward a hollow force?
General Schoomaker. The Army's depot maintenance program is funded
in accordance with Army priorities and is balanced against other high
priority Army programs. In fiscal year 2004, the Army received $1.2
billion emergency supplemental funding for depot-level reset in
addition to the peacetime budget for depot maintenance. The reset
workload is specifically being driven by planned unit rotations into
the Iraqi theater of operations. A key portion of the Army's depot
maintenance funding is the $491 million for recapitalization
requirements, which bring equipment back to a near-new condition.
dd(x)
36. Senator McCain. Admiral Clark, how is the Navy progressing in
selecting a hull design for the DD(X) and what are some of the dilemmas
that you are facing?
Admiral Clark. The Wave Piercing Tumblehome Hull (WPTH) has been
tentatively selected as the baseline for the Ship Preliminary Design
Review (PDR). Scale model testing to validate predictions that the WPTH
will meet stability and stealth criteria is due for completion later
this month.
As risk mitigation, we have designed and are still testing a Semi-
Wave Piercing Tumblehome Hull (SWPTH) as an alternative, credible back-
up to the revolutionary WPTH.
37. Senator McCain. Admiral Clark, crew size will be dramatically
reduced on the DD(X). Do you see any potential threats in reducing the
crew size to around 100?
Admiral Clark. No truly revolutionary program is entirely without
risk. That said, the potential benefits of this program--from
improvements in precise, time-critical strike and joint fires to leap-
ahead technologies like the integrated power system and electric
drive--are integral to our success in the future, joint battlespace.
This ship will command more than 110 times the area of today's naval
fire support systems, with the growth potential to accommodate new
capabilities such as the electromagnetic rail gun at lower future
development cost. Our crew size objective for DD(X) is 125 personnel
and we have established a threshold of 175. DD(X) will not only deliver
substantially more combat power ashore than today's combatants which
require twice that crew size, it will lower total ownership costs and
will provide a baseline for spiral development of technology and
engineering to support a range of future seaframes including the
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and CG(X). Further, we are conducting
extensive analysis of all ship functions, including damage control, to
mitigate the risk associated with a small crew size by automating many
of the systems operated manually in today's fleet.
38. Senator McCain. Admiral Clark, an argument could be made that
designing a new destroyer is not the most cost-effective way to bring
the Navy's fleet of ships into the 21st century. Why do you believe
that the DD(X) fulfills the needs of the Navy better than continuing to
build the DDG-51, which only costs $750 million?
Admiral Clark. The DDG-51 is an outstanding multi-mission platform
that has served this Nation well and will continue to do so far into
this century. It is the Air and Missile Defense backbone of our Carrier
and Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs), and it provides substantial
strike capacity with its Vertical Launching System. But the reality is
that the DDG-51 was originally designed for 20th century missions in
blue water, leaving us with a capability gap in the littoral and in
projecting precise, persistent combat power well inland in response to
the 21st century needs of this Nation. DD(X) helps fill the gap where
the DDG-51 cannot. DD(X) will command more than 110 times the area of
today's naval fire support systems, with the growth potential to
accommodate new capabilities such as the electromagnetic rail gun and
directed energy weapons at lower future development cost. While the
DDG-51 may have a lower initial production cost than DD(X), we estimate
that we will achieve significant reductions of 25-50 percent in
operations and support costs over the life of the DD(X) as compared to
the DDG-51. The DD(X) is the right ship for our future.
transformation
39. Senator McCain. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General
Jumper, and General Hagee, I notice in the new budget there are large
increases in funding for already existing programs. How does this
year's budget proposal figure into your long-term transformation plans?
General Schoomaker. The Army views its transformation as a
continuous process encompassing the entire force. It combines advanced
technologies, organizations, highly adaptive leaders and soldiers, and
improved processes with new concepts to create sources of dominant
military power that are responsive, deployable, agile, versatile,
lethal, survivable, and sustainable.
The Army continues to make difficult choices to cancel and
restructure programs to invest in transformational capabilities. In the
fiscal year 2005 budget we are terminating 14 systems and restructuring
15 systems to realign $423 million. Some of these investments are
already providing results in the form of new capabilities today, such
as in the new Stryker BCT formations being fielded and operating in
Iraq.
Other major fiscal year 2005 future force related R&D and
acquisition efforts include Stryker, which is funded in fiscal year
2005 to buy 310 vehicles for Stryker BCT 5, (2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry
Division, Hawaii) to begin fielding in fiscal year 2006; and $1.2
billion for aviation modernization. The budget request also funds
procurement of high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs).
$156.3 of the $303.7 million for HMMWVs will used to procure 818 Up-
Armored HMMWVs (UAHs). This increased funding for UAHs is due to
lessons learned from recent operations.
This budget request puts us one step closer to realizing a more
responsive modularized force. The modularized brigades are
strategically responsive, joint interdependent, precision force,
dominant across the full range of military operations that we envision
as necessary in the future global security environment.
Admiral Clark. The Navy budget request for fiscal year 2005
reflects a shift in focus to transformational surface combatants and
sea basing capabilities. Offensive capabilities include DD(X), CVN 21,
and nuclear-powered cruise missile attack submarine (SSGN) which will
incorporate innovative technologies and concepts to project joint fires
and Special Operations Forces faster and to significantly greater
distances than today. LCS will utilize novel warfighting modules to
transform maritime dominance in the littorals against increasing
numbers of mines, submarines, and small combatants. The Multi-mission
Maritime Aircraft (MMA) will revolutionize broad-area anti-submarine
and surveillance coverage.
To link these platforms into a networked force, we've requested
funding for FORCEnet enablers such as Deployable Joint Command and
Control and Joint Tactical Radio Systems. Unmanned Airborne and
Underwater Vehicles (UAV/UUV) such as the Long-term Mine Reconnaissance
System (LMRS) and Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAV will
provide persistent and pervasive reconnaissance and surveillance
capabilities to the joint force. These existing programs exemplify the
intention of the Navy's 2005 budget request to accelerate investments
for a transformed, joint, netted, and sea-based force.
General Jumper. Transformation is a process of constant change and
adaptation, integrating revolutionary technologies with revolutionary
organizations and operational concepts. The Air Force fiscal year 2005
budget proposal is carefully balanced to support this transformative
process, both today and over the long-term. It recognizes that key
capability areas are in different stages of maturity. Some are in very
early S&T stages that will not be deployed for decades to come. Some
are in advanced stages of production and deployment as we speak, and
others are somewhere in between.
Almost half ($16.7 billion) of the USAF's $36 billion fiscal year
2005 modernization request is for new ``enabling'' technologies
supporting transformation in all the Services. It includes more than $2
billion for space systems such as GPS II and GPS III and the
Transformational Communications Satellite; almost $2 billion in
research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) for directed
energy, hypersonics, and Joint Battlespace Infosphere; and more than
$57 million for Airborne Electronic Attack. Likewise, half of the
inflation-adjusted Air Force increase from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal
year 2005 targets programs forming the leading edge of joint
transformation today, like Link 16, the Global Hawk UAV, F/A-22, and
precision munitions like JDAM.
These current and future capabilities (which also include the
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) communications satellite,
Automated Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), Combat
Information Transport System, Distributed Common Ground System, Joint
Tactical Radio System, E-10, and Space-Based Radar (SBR)) produce
``transformation'' when they combine in the seamless machine-to-machine
integration of all systems. They are dramatically reshaping warfare by
enabling joint forces to produce the effects of mass without having to
mass forces. They achieve an order of magnitude increase in the number
of targets affected per sortie and dramatically reduce the time it
takes to put the cross hairs over a target from hours to minutes--and
do it much more precisely. They greatly reduce the forward logistics
footprint, protect our information systems, protect our Nation and
forces from ballistic and cruise missile attacks, and rapidly deploy
forces anywhere in the world.
The USAF Transformation Flight Plan details all these efforts.
General Hagee. The fiscal year 2005 President's budget sustains the
Marine Corps focus of main effort; current readiness and warfighting
excellence, while also funding key transformational concepts like
Seabasing and Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. Working with our Navy
partners, these concepts will provide America assured access around the
globe and revolutionize the way we deploy and employ forces both in
peacetime and in conflict. The current budget supports the continued
development and fielding of key systems like the MV-22 Osprey, the
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), and the short takeoff vertical
landing (STOVL) JSF. When these and other critical enabling systems
enter service with the Corps, they will significantly enhance the
already potent capabilities represented by today's naval expeditionary
forces.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
readiness
40. Senator Sessions. General Schoomaker, this committee applauds
the performance of the Army's deployed men and women in OIF, OEF, and
the global war on terrorism. A lingering concern I have is not the
readiness of the soldiers in uniform, but rather the readiness of their
equipment and the substantial reset effort faced by the Army. In the
past the Army harvested significant dollars from current force programs
to pay for the future force. Army systems are now accumulating a year's
worth of wear and tear in a month, a decade in a year, in what is
acknowledged to be some of the harshest environment on Earth. Most of
the deployed track and wheeled vehicle equipment is now in need of
overhaul, rebuild, and upgrade. I am told in the Army budget brief that
the Army has approximately $1.8 billion planned for the restoration of
10/20 standards. But I am deeply concerned that 10/20 standards are not
acceptable repair levels for our key combat systems, many of which will
need complete rebuilding of suspensions systems, engines, and the black
boxes that run them following their arduous duty in Iraq. These systems
are well beyond the 10/20 standard of repair, which I am told is being
applied to most equipment returning from Iraq. What is your plan to
have the industrial base and their public-private partnerships bring
this equipment back to the depot condition our soldiers deserve?
General Schoomaker. The Army covers depot maintenance requirements
by funding major end items, (tanks, helicopters, wheeled vehicles and
communications equipment) and secondary components (engines,
transmissions, and suspension systems). Both programs deliver a product
in accordance with national maintenance program standards that ensure
all deterioration and damage are restored and repaired to a serviceable
condition. In fiscal year 2004, the Army received $1.2 billion
emergency supplemental reset funding for depot level overhauls and
rebuilds in addition to our peacetime budget for depot maintenance. The
U.S. Army Forces Command also received $251.6 million in reset funding
specifically targeted for 10/20 level work. The Army is using reset
funding to have its industrial base and industry partners restore key
combat systems to the 10/20 standard condition our equipment was in
when it deployed with our soldiers. To date, the Army has expanded its
industrial base by establishing over 40 partnerships between the Army's
depots and private industry.
comanche
41. Senator Sessions. General Schoomaker, I know that Comanche has
had a troubled past within the Army, in part due to increased
requirements and in part due to it serving as a ``bill-payer'' for
other programs. It seems the Army finally got it right with this last
restructure, that the program is doing well and meeting all performance
criteria. So well in fact, that the Army fully funded it once again in
the latest budget. Tell me what the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) review means?
General Schoomaker. Senator, the study was directed by OMB as part
of their response to the fiscal year 2005 budget submission. They
directed OSD to conduct the study, but did not divulge their reasoning
for the study to the Army, nor did they direct any tasks to the Army.
42. Senator Sessions. General Schoomaker, will the Comanche remain
the critical part of the future force we expect it to be?
General Schoomaker. Armed reconnaissance is a critical component
that will allow the Future Force to see first, understand first, act
first and finish decisively. The Comanche is the platform the Army
currently envisions for this role.
43. Senator Sessions. General Schoomaker, can you comment on
whether the Comanche is in fact meeting its key performance parameters
and milestones as outlined in the restructured program?
General Schoomaker. The Comanche is performing well in its current
phase of development. It is expected to meet key performance
parameters.
jstars
44. Senator Sessions. General Jumper, we understand Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft are crucial
to U.S. forces and played a pivotal role in sandstorm battles during
OIF. JSTARS's contribution was so important that aircrew members
incurred additional risk continuing missions over hostile territory
with engines shut down. The E-8C aircraft have known mission-degrading
problems with aging engines. While the entire aircraft was reworked
previously, the engines were not. Congress suggested that the Air Force
study the best fix for the problem. Are you close to a cost-effective
decision to remedy the situation?
General Jumper. The Air Force intends to address our preferred
JSTARS engine approach in the fiscal year 2006 POM. Meanwhile, we have
prepared and are staffing the DOD's response to Congress' request for a
study of three JSTARS re-engining options. The three potential options
are: (1) maintain the current engine, (2) lease a replacement engine,
or (3) purchase a replacement engine. Information to include associated
costs are included in the response to Congress.
45. Senator Sessions. General Jumper, what are the associated costs
and when will you begin to execute a creditable program to remedy the
situation?
General Jumper. The Air Force intends to address our preferred
JSTARS engine approach in the fiscal year 2006 POM. Meanwhile, we have
prepared and are staffing the DOD's response to Congress' request for a
study of three JSTARS re-engining options. The three potential options
are: (1) maintain the current engine, (2) lease a replacement engine,
or (3) purchase a replacement engine. Information to include associated
costs are included in the response to Congress.
shipbuilding program
46. Senator Sessions. Admiral Clark, our Navy has performed
superbly, carrying the fight to the enemy, surging quickly, and
bringing impressive sea power to the global war on terrorism. I am
happy to see that shipbuilding and aircraft programs continue to
provide for recapitalization of your equipment that is badly needed. I
am concerned however that your ship inventory will drop to 290 ships.
Is the shipbuilding program keeping pace sufficiently to deliver the
force structure needed?
Admiral Clark. We are on the right track with this year's
shipbuilding program to deliver the kind of force structure that we
need for the 21st century. That said, we cannot undo history. We simply
did not buy enough ships in the 1990s. Over that decade, our
shipbuilding budget averaged just over $6 billion per year, all while
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) was estimating that $12 billion
in shipbuilding per year was necessary merely to sustain the force
structure as it was. While I don't think that the 290 ships that we are
projecting for fiscal year 2005 are enough to meet the long-term needs
of this Nation, our budget request provides for a steady rise in that
number beyond fiscal year 2005, and it will continue to rise as we
build the new ships in the program.
47. Senator Sessions. Admiral Clark, must we act to provide the
advanced appropriations this year for the Amphibious Assault Ship
Replacement (LHA(R))?
Admiral Clark. The Navy/Marine Corps Team would benefit from an
advanced appropriations approach to the procurement of LHA(R). Fiscal
pressures experienced in this budget build, and the full-funding policy
for ship procurement, caused us to move the planned procurement of
LHA(R) from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2008. In doing so, we have
added some risk to the maintenance of a stable industrial base. Split-
funding would allow us to mitigate this workload risk and avoid the
potential for the layoff and rehiring of the skilled workers that will
be needed to build these ships in the future.
transformation plans
48. Senator Sessions. General Schoomaker, I support Secretary
Rumsfeld's efforts to transform the DOD and have been informed that the
Army is aggressively operationalizing the concepts of a lighter force
and evolution into the BCT units of action. However, I have two
concerns:
First, I am aware that as part of your reorganization you have
developed plans to fundamentally change the mission tasking of over
100,000 troops or 20 percent of the Army. In this process you intend to
eliminate the following types of units or battalions: 24 artillery, 10
air defense, 11 engineer, 19 armor, and 65 ordnance. In addition, you
intend to convert these for high demand units such as 149 MP companies,
16 transportation units, and several civil affairs units. I believe
that as we move forward, we need to know the specific impacts this
massive change will have on Army procurement requirements for major end
items. I am especially concerned about armor, wheeled vehicles, and
aviation requirements for the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) as
projected. In addition, a sense of the impact to operating costs,
spares, and training dollars as the old units are eliminated and new
units are created is necessary.
Second, I have seen in the press that the manning for the BCT will
be between 4,000 and 5,000 troops. At 48 brigades, this accounts for
about only half of the Army's current authorized end strength or
approximately 240,000 troops at most. What then are the specific
transformation plans for the other half of the Army?
General Schoomaker. The 100,000 troops restructured to address the
rebalancing of force structure within the active component/Reserve
component affects about 12 percent of the Army's combat structure. This
initiative has been captured in three major phases: global war on
terrorism requirements; Secretary of Defense guidance on utilization
and employment of Reserve component forces; and recent Army efforts to
minimize impacts on high demand units, establishing trainees,
transients, holdees, and students (TTHS) accounts in both the Army
National Guard and the Army Reserve; and decreasing Reserve component
over structure to help shape more ready and relevant Reserve component
forces. These types of force structure changes are typical of the force
sizing analysis and programming the Army goes through for each FYDP
submission. The equipping impacts for the force structure changes
generated in phase two required reprogramming $181.2 million of
equipment procurement in the POM 2005-2009. The impacts on manning,
equipping, and training generated by the changes in phase three will be
captured in the upcoming POM. Armor, wheeled vehicles, and aviation
requirements for the FYDP, as previously projected, will reflect these
approved force structure changes. However, projected requirements from
these changes should have minimal impacts on the procurement of major
end items due to the projected cascading of equipment and the force
designs of the BCT units of action. Additionally, equipment for units
designated for inactivation or conversion will cascade to fill
shortages as the Army reorganizes to meet global war on terrorism
operational demands and evolves structure to the new BCT units of
action. Major aviation end items are not eliminated, but rather
restructured under a new design. Overall, this initiative will
rebalance the forces and improve their readiness to meet operational
demands.
Army transformation is a comprehensive effort intended to reinvent
the Army at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The 48 BCTs
(43 maneuver brigade units of action and 5 Stryker BCTs) will comprise
the ``tip of the spear'' at the tactical level, but they require
command and control and a broad range of support to deploy and
successfully accomplish their assigned missions. By fiscal year 2009,
the strength of the 48 BCTs is estimated at approximately 168,000
soldiers. The remainder of the deployable operating force will total
approximately 171,000 soldiers and will include Special Operations
Forces (SOF), combat support, combat service support, and command and
control elements.
Combat support and combat service support elements will be
organized under support units of action (SUAs) and doctrinally
configured to operate with and in support of the maneuver brigade units
of action. Variants of the SUA will include the Aviation SUA (full
spectrum multifunctional aviation operations), Protect SUA (force
protection and security to lines of communication and rear areas),
Reconnaissance and Surveillance SUA, Strike SUA (lethal and non-lethal
strikes), and Sustain SUA (logistical support).
The nature of modern operations requires that Army command and
control formations become more flexible than our current divisions and
corps. Above the BCT level, two higher units of employment (UEx and
UEy) will orchestrate tactical engagements into battles, major land
operations, and when designated as a joint task force, campaigns. The
design of both the UEx and UEy incorporates the capability for either
to become a joint task force for smaller scale contingencies with
little or no augmentation.
The generating force constitutes the part of the Army, which is
generally nondeployable, but performs title 10 functions and provides
critical support to the operating force. Accomplishing such functions
as recruiting, institutional training, acquisition, and power
projection platform operations, the generating force will support the
transformation, becoming more efficient, and declining in military
strength to approximately 85,000 by fiscal year 2009.
Finally, as a consequence of force stabilization initiatives, the
Army anticipates reducing the number carried as TTHS from 63,000 to
58,000.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
ship procurement
49. Senator Collins. Admiral Clark, I very much appreciate the
commitment you have shown in your budget to fully fund the construction
of three DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. We are entering a very
crucial period as the DD(X) destroyer program begins to ramp up. I
appreciate that the DOD's fiscal year 2005 budget submission begins the
funding for the construction of the first DD(X) destroyer. I am,
however, concerned about the DOD future shipbuilding plan, specifically
the transition between the DDG and DD(X) programs. The Navy is
apparently slipping the construction of the second DD(X) destroyer 1
year, from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2007. If this occurs, it
will be the first year in over 20 years that our Navy will not be
procuring a major surface combatant. This threatens to exacerbate an
already significant problem with regard to overall fleet size, as well
as significantly disrupt our Nation's industrial base. I would like you
to comment on the impact a year without destroyer procurement would
have on the continuing reduction in the size of the fleet and the
viability of our industrial base.
Admiral Clark. I am on record before Congress as saying that I do
not believe we have enough ships in the inventory for the needs of this
Nation, and we are doing all that we can to make up for the acquisition
holiday in shipbuilding during the decade of the 1990s. This budget
request puts us on the right track--in the form of $11.1 billion in the
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account--to deliver the kind of
force structure that we need for the 21st century. That said, fiscal
year 2006 is going to be a tough year for us. We are going to have to
make some hard decisions, and one of those decisions is about the
procurement of a DD(X). If I thought we had the money to accelerate the
procurement of DD(X) while balancing that against our other
commitments, then we certainly would do that. At this point, it appears
that we will not have that kind of flexibility. Let me assure you,
however, that I am sensitive to the business needs of our partners in
the shipbuilding industry as well as to the importance of maintaining
the unique skills required to build the best surface combatants in the
world. In order to mitigate the impact of the transition on the
industrial base, we have developed a DD(X) acquisition strategy to
provide the best value for the Navy with considerations for industrial
base viability. This includes a portion of the lead ship detail design
and construction effort being performed at General Dynamics Bath Iron
Works, as well as Northrop Grumman Ship Systems.
50. Senator Collins. Admiral Clark, as of January 30, 2004, our
fleet consists of only 294 ships. You have suggested that a more
appropriate fleet size would be approximately 375 ships to meet current
and future threats. The current rate of Navy ship procurement falls far
short of meeting this goal. I realize that the ships of the future will
have greater capability than those ships built only a decade or two
ago, but part of a fleet's capability is its numbers, particularly when
the U.S. might face multiple challenges in different parts of the world
and worldwide presence has long been a mission of the Navy. How do you
envision the U.S. Navy's capability to meet current and growing
worldwide threats with less than a 300-ship Navy?
Admiral Clark. The shipbuilding program provides for investment in
new construction to deliver the kind of force structure we need for the
21st century. Fundamentally, that means a force structure measured in
terms of aggregate capabilities as well as the number of hulls.
However, as you have correctly pointed out, numbers do matter if we are
to have sufficient capacity to deliver those capabilities to the far
corners of the Earth. Our budget request provides for a steady rise in
that number, reaching 308 in fiscal year 2009.
The most pressing challenge we face is obtaining the new
capabilities we need to shape the Navy of the future and address the
threats you have addressed. We need the DD(X) and LCS capabilities in
the fleet as soon as possible. LCS in particular provides the kind of
platform that is designed to take on the enemies we face in the post-
September 11 environment. We are at risk without it. In the interim, we
are maximizing our existing capability to meet the challenging threats.
This past year led to the restructuring our training and maintenance
processes under the Fleet Response Plan (FRP) and Sea Swap in order to
derive the maximum amount of operational availability from each of our
ships and air wings.
maritime norad
51. Senator Collins. Admiral Clark, I've been following with
interest your thoughts about a ``maritime'' North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD). Do you anticipate that idea will become
policy?
Admiral Clark. While I cannot say for sure that this will become
policy, such an approach has three elements that I consider important
in providing homeland security and force protection. First, is my view
that the Nation needs to develop the global maritime awareness that can
reduce our port vulnerability. We can best do this by partnering with
the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and with our allies to ensure timely
dissemination of intelligence and by assisting in littoral
identification and tracking of contacts of interest and/or concern.
Second, we need to better define and enhance naval roles in global
merchant ship tracking in relation to Navy homeland security/homeland
defense missions. The third element would be to identify, in
conjunction with the USCG, the technologies required for global surface
vessel tracking and identification and develop a concerted plan for
their implementation.
52. Senator Collins. Admiral Clark, you noted in one speech that on
a small scale, San Diego has a maritime warning center staffed by the
Navy, Coast Guard and harbor police. Is there a maritime surveillance
infrastructure in place that covers the Nation and the world that would
serve as a basis for a ``maritime NORAD''?
Admiral Clark. We do not have an integrated national maritime
surveillance infrastructure in place today. The San Diego warning
center you are referring to is one of two prototype Joint Harbor
Operations Center (JHOCs), with the second prototype in Hampton Roads,
Virginia. Navy and Coast Guard have worked together closely on this,
and have agreed to co-share costs for development of these two sites.
Our goal is to enable Navy and Coast Guard to more closely support each
other in our shared harbor security responsibilities.
``one shipyard''
53. Senator Collins. Admiral Clark, I would like you to bring us up
to date on the ``One Shipyard'' concept and how that will improve the
capability, efficiency, and the viability of our naval shipyards, such
as Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine, which has been
designated as a center of excellence for the overhaul and refueling of
our nuclear submarines.
Admiral Clark. ``One Shipyard'' is our conceptual approach to
improved use of the ship.maintenance and construction industrial base
through resource and infrastructure sharing.
Our objective is to capitalize on shipyard availability and
employee skill sets in a way that provides more effective and efficient
use of the limited maintenance resources needed to support our
readiness; to provide better workload predictions and stability to our
public and private shipyards; and, to leverage unique employee skill
sets across the span of the industry in a way that lets us minimize
some of the personnel strain of homeport shifts for our sailors between
deployments.
This should result in improved health and stability for both our
private and public shipyards, the right readiness for our Navy and
better employee opportunity.
ballistic inserts
54. Senator Collins. General Schoomaker, given that the U.S. has
been in Iraq for nearly a year and that we had some indication that we
would possibly go into Iraq for several months prior to that, how is it
that the number of ballistic inserts for the troops' body armor failed
to keep up with the number of troops in-theater?
General Schoomaker. Prior to the war, the Army was procuring and
fielding Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) to all units preparing to
participate in OIF. During the first part of the war, the major combat
operations phase, our soldiers were adequately equipped with IBA. Our
requirement for IBA was considerably less at the onset of the war
because tank crews and other armored vehicle crews did not require IBA
as their vehicles protected them. Since major combat operations have
ended, our requirements for IBA have substantially grown due to a
different operational environment and guidance from the commanders
directing OIF. Today, most of our soldiers are dismounted from their
armored vehicles as they conduct dismounted patrols throughout the
Iraqi countryside in an effort to have closer contact with the Iraqi
people.
55. Senator Collins. General Schoomaker, why didn't we have enough
ballistic inserts for the troops' body armor?
General Schoomaker. Prior to the war, the Army had set different
procurement objectives for the Outer Tactical Vest (OTV) and the Small
Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI), the two major components of IBA. Since
then, the Army's updated procurement objectives for both OTVs and SAPI
are now the same. Therefore, our SAPI procurement was accelerated to
our current rate of 25,000 sets per month in order to meet our current
IBA requirements. Given the absolute critical nature of this life-
saving equipment, we must allow the manufacturers' requisite time to
meet quality production standards. The strictest quality control
measures are in place to ensure no soldier or civilian is needlessly
placed at risk in a substandard piece of body armor.
56. Senator Collins. General Schoomaker, how can we change the
procurement system to ensure that our troops have the necessary gear
when they are sent into combat, not a year after it started? I ask this
question not only for the body armor, but other equipment needs which
may emerge as well.
General Schoomaker. We can do two things. First, we can plan for
potential requirements beyond those in approved program levels and
second, we can add options into critical contracts to allow for
accelerated production. This will encourage more proactive thinking
about contingency requirements and potential obstacles to rapid
production and may reduce risk. However, this will not eliminate all
risk. The noncontiguous urban threat of OIF necessitated that every
soldier and DOD civilian in theater receive body armor. This was a
divergence from the original guidance to issue only combat soldiers
body armor. Once we recognized an increased risk, the requirement
changed and the procurement system then used all possible means to
respond. We will work to improve our procurement system, but we cannot
eliminate all risk from changing threats.
reports of abuse
57. Senator Collins. General Schoomaker, The Denver Post has
recently reported that female soldiers are returning from Iraq and
seeking assistance from civilian rape-crisis centers. I know Secretary
Rumsfeld has ordered an inquiry, but can you tell me what the Army is
doing to investigate these reports and ensure that women who wear the
uniform are protected from such abuse?
General Schoomaker. Our U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command is
actively investigating or has completed investigations in 86 sexual
assault crimes reported in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of
responsibility (AOR). When the evidence warrants, our Army takes a
tough and aggressive stance on prosecuting sexual assault cases. Our
Army is committed to providing strong support to victims of all crimes
whether in a deployed environment or in garrison. As with all criminal
allegations, there is a presumption of innocence until a case is fully
investigated and, if appropriate, tried in a court of law. As you are
well aware, the system that you have given us--through the Uniform Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ)--provides commanders with the necessary
process to ensure good order and discipline in our force. By protecting
the rights of the accused and victims alike, the UCMJ provides the
tools necessary to ensure the integrity of our investigatory and
military justice system.
The Army is committed to ensuring that the victims of sexual
assault are properly cared for and treated and that their medical and
psychological needs are properly met. Currently, we are assessing our
Army's policies and programs to determine whether they properly provide
appropriate support services to victims both in garrison and in a
deployed environment. To ensure that our current policies and programs
are effective, the acting Secretary of the Army has directed the
establishment of a task force to conduct a detailed review of the
effectiveness of our Army's policies on reporting and properly
addressing allegations of sexual assault. This review will examine our
policies, programs, procedures, and training with regard to the
prevention of sexual assault. The task force will further review the
processes in place to ensure a climate exists where victims feel free
to report allegations and leaders at every level understand their
responsibilities to support those victims. This task force will render
its report by the end of May 2004. However, if the task force
identifies actions, which can be taken sooner to improve the Army's
policies, programs, or procedures, our Army will implement them as
appropriate.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
vision for the navy reserve
58. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Clark, the Navy deserves great
credit for thinking innovatively about how to manage the increased
demands placed on the fleet and your sailors, and in developing the FRP
to allow for greater availability, deployability, and surge capacity of
our carriers and air wings. The other Services have similar challenges
as the Navy and are also taking steps and thinking creatively about how
to meet increased demands without increasing people or resources. The
Reserve components play a major role in all of our Services and have
made enormous contributions over the past several years. Although I
believe the Reserves should be managed in a unique way from a personnel
standpoint, I am in favor of giving the Reserve components the same
robust responsibilities and demanding of them the same level of
performance as the Active Force. With this comes resourcing the
Reserves with adequate hardware and committing them to high-level
training requirements. If we do not do this, we cannot expect
reservists to want to stick around just to ``pinch-hit'' or perform
tasks that no one else wants to do. With this in mind, can you share
your vision for how you plan to take advantage of your Navy Reserve
sailors in a way that truly capitalizes on their capabilities and
desire to serve the Navy and the United States?
Admiral Clark. My vision for the future is a seamlessly integrated
and balanced Active and Reserve Force rather than the two-tiered system
that has resulted in separate standards and procedures in place today.
This is a two-way integration. We will balance the force by instilling
one standard for training and readiness, ensuring Reserve Forces have
access to front-line equipment, and streamlining headquarters functions
in a way that will support the seamless integration of Reserve Forces
when they are needed.
c-17 public-private partnership
59. Senator Chambliss. General Jumper, I believe that public-
private partnerships provide great synergy between the government and
industry and represent a great capability to provide extended depot
maintenance for our military hardware. I am pleased with the progress
the Air Force has made with the C-17 partnership in particular and am
very pleased to hear that the Air Force will consider software as a
``core'' requirement and resource our air logistics centers
appropriately to accomplish this core workload. Can you outline how
software maintenance and sustainment for the C-17 program will be
accomplished and how the government and industry can partner together
to ensure the Air Force's logistics and sustainment requirements in
this area continue to be met?
General Jumper. The C-17 System Program Office (SPO) has developed
preliminary strategies and requirements necessary to establish
Government organic software support capability for the C-17 aircraft.
In the near term, the Air Force and Boeing Company will be partnering
to develop C-17 component diagnostics software Test Program Sets (TPSs)
at all three Air Logistic Centers. In the long-term, the Air Force and
the Boeing Company will partner to establish C-17 aircraft operational
flight program software maintenance capability.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
air national guard
60. Senator Graham. General Jumper, since the 1950s, the Air
National Guard has followed a policy of maintaining at least one flying
mission in every State. This policy is no doubt due to the invaluable
contributions that the Guard provides not only to the national defense
but also in recognition of the positive role Guard members play in
their communities offering most individuals their only exposure to the
military. Do you intend to continue that longstanding policy?
General Jumper. I appreciate your long-standing support for our
Nation's men and women in uniform as well as your concern for the
continued relevance of our citizen airmen of the Air National Guard.
The support of Congress will be critical as we transform the DOD to
meet the national security requirements of the 21st century.
The DOD anticipates an overall reduction in the number of manned
aircraft as we transform. This is due not only to constrained
resources, but also the capabilities the Nation will require from the
DOD in the future. Information age warfare requires a different
portfolio of capabilities than industrial age warfare, and we are
transforming the joint force to meet that challenge. Also, the aircraft
the DOD is planning on procuring will be vastly more capable than our
current legacy systems, which will result in a lower number of aircraft
being procured. The DOD is also very interested in the potential of
unmanned systems.
The USAF is committed to ensuring the Air National Guard is a full
and equal partner in the Air Force of the future. I strongly support
their efforts to ensure the future relevancy of the Air National Guard
in their transformation plans. Our shift to capabilities based planning
and the resulting shift in focus away from legacy systems require a
commensurate change of focus by the Air National Guard. Lieutenant
General James has developed a strong transformation vision and I am
confident that his approach will help to ensure a relevant Air National
Guard.
The Air Force and Air National Guard assure me their intent is to
maintain a Guard flying unit in every State; however, first and
foremost, they are committed to providing a relevant and more capable
Air National Guard presence in every state, to provide required
capabilities to the joint force. While it has always been a goal, there
is no stated policy to keep a flying unit in each State. The DOD
believes such a policy would not be in the best interests of the
Nation. The Air Force and Air National Guard leadership require the
flexibility to transform the Air National Guard to ensure it has the
required capabilities needed for the future.
61. Senator Graham. General Jumper, in addition, can you provide me
with a list of the facilities on the east coast that offer
opportunities for blackout, runway, and field operations?
General Jumper. Senator Graham, we have two Air National Guard
facilities on the east coast which have backup power generators in case
of blackout that can be used for field operations. The two units are
the 102nd FW, Otis AGB, Massachusetts and the 169th FW, McEntire AGS,
South Carolina.
military retention
62. Senator Graham. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General
Hagee, and General Jumper, in your opinion, what effect will the lack
of targeted pay raises have on military retention in light of improving
economy and the current strain on military forces?
General Schoomaker. Attitude and opinion surveys of the active Army
have consistently shown that the amount of basic pay is one of the top
reasons why soldiers report that they are leaving or thinking about
leaving the Army before retirement. In the fall 2003 Sample Survey of
Military Personnel, 14.4 percent (second most important) of enlisted
personnel and 6.7 percent (third most important) of officers cited
amount of basic pay as one of the most important reasons for leaving or
thinking about leaving the Army before retirement.
Admiral Clark. Although our analysis may support further targeted
pay raises in the coming years, it really is too soon to tell what, if
any, effect the lack of targeted pay raises may have on retention this
year. But, I can tell you that retention in the Navy has never been
better, thanks in large part to the support of your committee for both
targeted and uniform pay raises. Together, we have made great strides
in closing the gap between military and private sector pay for those
with comparable levels of education and experience.
The Secretary of Defense is appointing an Advisory Committee on
Military Compensation to examine, among other things, future targeted
raises. I do believe that targeted pay raises and other incentive pays
will be incredibly important in our future, not only for retention, but
for our ability to shape and develop the kind of skills and behaviors
we will need for our high-tech future as well.
General Hagee. The targeted pay raises provided in fiscal year 2000
through fiscal year 2004 accomplished their objectives to adjust basic
pay for those grades where the pay differentials needed to be
comparable to the private sector and ensure quality force retention. At
this time, we should be able to concentrate on across the board pay
raises for all pay grades. Judicious use of special pays and retention
bonuses should be pursued in those exceptional cases where recruitment
or retention are challenges.
General Jumper. Targeted pay raises over the past several years
have made tremendous strides in closing the gap between military and
comparably educated civilians. The pay gap currently exists with our
mid and senior enlisted grades. Over the past 2 years, our retention in
these grades has improved and we anticipate retention remaining stable.
Over the past 3 years we have heavily targeted these grades to close
the gap, in an effort to meet the recommendations of the 9th
Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC). The 9th QRMC
recommended that military pay reach the 70th percentile of what
comparably educated civilians earned. The 2001 targeted pay raises
closed the gap by 23 percent and subsequent targeting has made
significant progress. The administration's fiscal year 2005 3.5 percent
across-the-board pay raise, coupled with past targeting efforts, will
close the gap by 70 percent.
63. Senator Graham. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General
Hagee, and General Jumper, what effect do you believe the current stop-
losses will have for long-term recruiting and retention goals?
General Schoomaker. We believe recruiting and retention goals for
the Army's stop-loss programs will not affect the long-term. Stop loss
does not normally affect the accessions achievement mission. However,
prior service recruiting into the National Guard and Army Reserve has
been affected because of regular Army stop loss.
It is still too early to determine whether Army stop-loss programs
have negatively impacted active Army retention program. We are slightly
below glide path with regards to our annual retention mission, but
remain guardedly optimistic we will achieve the mission by the end of
the fiscal year. As the Army implements force stabilization
initiatives, the need to use stop-loss programs will diminish over
time.
Admiral Clark. Because Navy's use of stop-loss was in effect for
only 1 month and affected only 2,600 Navy Field Medical Service
Technicians (Hospital Corpsman) out of our total Active and Reserve
Force of more than 463,000 personnel, we do not believe it will have an
impact on long-term recruiting nor on retention.
General Jumper. Air Force stop-loss ended in June 2003 and by
January 2004, all affected personnel either retired, separated,
reenlisted, or decided to stay. Today, no Air Force personnel are
affected by stop-loss. Stop-loss has had little or no negative impact
on retention and recruiting as the Air Force is currently exceeding
both retention and recruiting goals.
General Hagee. The Marine Corps has not used stop-loss in fiscal
year 2004.
64. Senator Graham. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General
Hagee, and General Jumper, could you comment on the plan mentioned by
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Pace to restructure the Reserve
component to utilize the ``most pertinent skill-sets?'' How do you plan
to accomplish this goal in light of the DOD's stated goal of managing/
reducing its reliance upon the Guard and Reserve?
General Schoomaker. The Army actively seeks to rebalance its
current active component/Reserve component mix to best match the
current strategy and 1-4-2-1 force sizing construct. For fiscal years
2004-2009, the Army made significant headway in reducing the stress
placed on existing high demand units, both active component and Reserve
component, by converting about 19,500 spaces in less utilized force
structure. In response to the directives set forth in the Secretary of
Defense's July 9, 2003, memorandum on Rebalancing Forces, the Army took
actions through two program change packages, to rebalance approximately
10,000 spaces of active component and Reserve component force structure
required in the first 15 days of a rapid response operation. This
mitigates stress on select Reserve component high-demand units. The
Army intends to convert an additional 80,000 spaces of lower priority
force structure to meet future operational requirements. In addition to
these actions, I directed a thorough review of all Army force structure
with the intent of improving the readiness and deployability of Army
units and ensuring a correct balance between active component and
Reserve component forces. The end state of these self-initiated actions
will be a more relevant Army, properly balanced and postured as a full
joint warfighting partner.
Admiral Clark. These two goals are not mutually exclusive. In fact,
I see them as complementary. We are reducing our overall reliance upon
the Reserves by rebalancing the force in some key areas; specifically:
Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP): Active
component strength increases in our dedicated security forces
(officer, enlisted, and civilian), permit us to meet day-to-day
or elevated AT/FP requirements. Even in situations requiring
the highest levels of force protection readiness, we can
fulfill those requirements for a short period with active
component personnel before resorting to Reserve component
augmentation.
Naval Coastal Warfare (NCW): We have created
additional NCW capability in the active component by
establishing the Mobile Security Force (MSF), and
reapportioning end strength from accelerated ship
decommissionings. Having an active component NCW capability
relieves the Reserve component from meeting each and every
short-term and short-notice NCW requirement.
Naval Aviation: Planning is underway to merge certain
aviation missions that are resident in both the active
component and Reserve component by converting some independent
Reserve component squadrons into active component squadron
augment units. This will have the benefits of populating active
component squadrons with highly experienced Reserve component
pilots, improving equipment commonality, and reducing (but not
eliminating) the need for Reserve component maintenance
personnel and infrastructure.
Fleet Marine Force (FMF) (HM8404) Corpsmen: Several
hundred Reserve component HM8404 corpsmen billets in support of
Reserve Marine Corps units have been reclassified as Functional
Area Code (FAC) A, meaning that in the event of mobilization,
active duty HM8404 corpsmen will transfer from shore duty at
naval hospitals to fill these requirements. Their hospital
billets will be backfilled with Reserve component corpsmen as
necessary to sustain hospital operations. The HM8404
classification is historically difficult to recruit, train, and
retain in the Reserves. This change will ensure Reserve Marine
Corps units are properly manned when required, and will
effectively employ Reserve component corpsmen at naval
hospitals using skills that are easier to gain and maintain in
the Reserves.
General Hagee. The Marine Corps is unique due to the fact that our
Reserve component mirror images our active component and has the
primary mission to augment and reinforce it. We traditionally integrate
our active component/Reserve component units within our Marine Air-
Ground Task Forces using the Total Force approach. In regard to the
active component/Reserve component mix, we are constantly reviewing our
mix based on lessons learned. We are currently getting ready to kick-
off a general officer lead review within the Marine Corps to address
this specific problem.
General Jumper. The Air Force has always had a strong relationship
with our Reserves. The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve operate
side-by-side with our Active Force, both in times of peace and times of
conflict. We continue to enjoy a great spirit of volunteerism that
complements the Active Force, and hinges on the professionalism,
readiness, and front-line equipment of our Active Reserve Component
(ARC). We seek to preserve the relevance of the ARC, while not
overtaxing them with an operational tempo that is insensitive to the
part-time nature of the Reserves. We are transforming as a Total Force
Team--in the technologies we all use, the operational concepts we
employ, and the structures under which we are organized. Given the
increased capabilities of newer weapon systems and the fiscal
realities, the Air Force is not necessarily planning to recapitalize
our fleet on a one-for-one basis. Furthermore, the pending Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) actions will focus on reducing excess
capacity in our installations across our total force. These factors,
combined with the increased crew ratios called for by the capabilities
of our emerging weapon systems, call for innovative management of our
most valuable asset, our people. The Air Force plans to capture the
talent and experience of our reservists and guardsmen by integrating
our active and Reserve units as both migrate into the newest weapons
systems.
As we move units into emerging mission areas, we are consciously
placing guardsmen and reservists in missions least disruptive to their
dual status as members of both the military and the civilian
workforce--those areas that exploit reach-back to the United States
while supporting operations abroad. An example of this would be the
increased use of the Guard and Reserve in space, intelligence, and even
UAVs. These efforts also capitalize on the high tech skills these
members bring from their civilian experience. As we make these changes,
we are mindful of the unique cultures of the Guard and Reserve. We seek
to preserve those cultures and their associated strengths. We are
aggressively working our force development programs to ensure they
address the needs of our total force, at both the personal and
organizational level. We take great pride in leading the DOD in the
integration of our Reserve component, and will make the pertinent skill
sets of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve central to our
transformational efforts.
earmyu
65. Senator Graham. General Schoomaker, recently, retired Sergeant
Major of the Army Jack Tilley said eArmyU was the best thing the Army
has ever done for its enlisted soldiers. Currently, how many posts
offer eArmyU, and do you believe the program should be extended Army-
wide?
General Schoomaker. eArmyU is currently implemented at 14
installations. However, soldiers have rotated and are participating
from locations Army-wide, to include Iraq. The program is a good
retention tool--21 percent of participants have reenlisted or extended
to be eligible. By offering unprecedented access, choice, and
flexibility in an online learning environment, we are attracting
soldiers who have never taken college courses before at a rate of 27
percent. Student satisfaction surveys indicate that soldier morale has
improved. Expanding eArmyU will increase soldier access to education
enabling them to fit their continuing education around their duties,
family time, field training, and other obligations. Because we do not
know what the total demand for this program is, it is difficult to
determine the cost. We are currently assessing the cost for program
expansion.
reduction in training dollars for reserve soldiers
66. Senator Graham. General Schoomaker, we are all cognizant of the
very significant contributions of the Reserves to ongoing contingency
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as other locations in the
global war on terrorism. Indeed, it is very clear to me that we could
not effectively wage this war without our citizen soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines.
I am certain that you and your colleagues in the DOD have long
since carefully calculated the offsets resulting from members of the
Reserve component being placed on active duty and mobilized and paid
with active duty appropriations. I further assume that the President's
budget request reflects those offsets.
What I am concerned about is the need to train those members of the
force who have not yet been mobilized and those who have been mobilized
and returned home to their units. Can you assure the members of this
committee that there is sufficient funding in the Reserve component's
budget for fiscal year 2005 to support the training requirements to
maintain and restore their mobilization readiness?
General Schoomaker. The fiscal year 2005 Reserves training budget
ensures the funds necessary to conduct military occupational specialty
(MOS) training (individual training), professional military education
(PME) training (leader training), and the necessary OPTEMPO to support
collective training for those units preparing for mobilization and
deployment while in a Reserve status, as well as, enabling recently
demobilized units to maintain their readiness edge. As the OIF/OEF
missions stabilize and the Army moves to a train-alert-deploy strategy,
ample time will be available for Reserve component soldiers and units
to meet C1/C2 readiness standards prior to mobilization.
67. Senator Graham. General Schoomaker, I know that the cost is
significant and that the Reserves' training budget reflects a reduction
of more than $600 million in fiscal year 2005. Can you give me some
idea of how you may have reached the requested budget figure and how it
is related to the level of funding needed to support the readiness
training for those who remain in and return to their Reserve unit? I
would hate to see the vital recruiting and retention efforts of our
Reserve Forces undermined by funding reductions in their training
accounts, reductions that sap readiness and morale and penalize the
very men and women who have served so bravely and so well at such
sacrifice to themselves, their families, and communities.
General Schoomaker. The offsets for the fiscal year 2005 reduction
of $600 million in Reserve component training budget reflects the
projected mobilization and deployment of 150,000 Reserve soldiers to
support the ongoing global war on terrorism missions. The $600 million
represents a cost avoidance of the drill pay and annual training pay
for those soldiers mobilized since their pay and allowances are paid
from the active duty military pay account. As I mentioned above, the
fiscal year 2005 Reserve training budget ensures the funds necessary to
conduct MOS training (individual training), PME training (leader
training), and the necessary OPTEMPO to support collective training for
those units preparing for mobilization and deployment while in a
Reserve status, as well as enabling recently demobilized units and
soldiers to maintain their readiness edge.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Dole
end strength
68. Senator Dole. General Schoomaker, while end strength is
certainly an area of concern, I am more concerned about force mix
particularly, the total force of active, Reserve, and Guard. How are
you addressing the short-term issue of manning high demand career
fields?
General Schoomaker. The Army is committed to manning skills
critical to the successful execution of the global war on terrorism.
Thus, the Army has taken several steps to ensure these jobs remain
filled. First, when possible, individual active Army soldiers are
reassigned to deployed units to fill critical requirements. To minimize
the need for replacements, the Army offers monetary bonuses to soldiers
willing to reenlist in, or re-classify to, many high-demand career
fields. Concurrently, recruiting efforts focus on enlisting soldiers
into these skills. However, it takes time to recruit and train these
new soldiers, and they do not have the experience or advanced training
necessary for some jobs.
The Army also relies upon Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA)
and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) soldiers, retiree recalls, various
other voluntary mobilizations, and mobilized Reserve and National Guard
units to augment the manning efforts. An IMA is an individual reservist
who is pre-assigned to an active Army, DOD, or other government agency.
The IRR is an Army manpower pool primarily consisting of individuals
who have had training, have served previously in the active component
or the SELRES, and may have some period of mandatory military service
obligation remaining. The IRR consists of trained soldiers who may be
called upon to replace soldiers or fill vacancies in Reserve or active
units.
69. Senator Dole. General Schoomaker, in your proposal to reassign
some units (namely air defense and artillery units) to units such as MP
and civil affairs, are we sacrificing a capability of a core mission in
order to meet a short-term requirement?
General Schoomaker. No, the defense strategy emerging from the 2001
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) had significantly different
requirements than the previous strategy. The Army recognized a need for
change to support a new force-sizing construct and made plans to divest
of cold war structure to meet the demands of the emerging strategic
environment. We conducted extensive analyses to ensure we retain the
required capabilities, including air defense and artillery, to conduct
the full range of missions.
guard and reserve
70. Senator Dole. General Schoomaker, with this month's deployment
of North Carolina's 30th Heavy Enhanced Separate Brigade, I have been
made painfully aware of some of the problems faced by our National
Guard units as they mobilize. What are you doing to guarantee that
these service members are expediently transitioned to active duty
payrolls and that their lodging and subsistence are of the same quality
as the active units training on the same bases?
General Schoomaker. The Army National Guard is doing what it can to
ensure that the transition to active duty is as smooth as possible. For
example, we coordinate with the Power Projection Platforms to obtain
the best lodging, subsistence, and training available. We also send
support teams as necessary to solve problems. As regards to what the
active component is doing in this area, we do not have information on
that.
71. Senator Dole. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, with the proposed 20-25 percent reduction in
domestic facilities with BRAC and movement away from large, forward
operating bases (FOBs), how are you planning to accommodate Guard and
Reserve training, basing, and quality-of life needs when worldwide
operations require a manpower ``spike''?
General Schoomaker. A 20-25 percent reduction in domestic
facilities through BRAC is not an official Army policy. Although there
may exist excess capacity in DOD facilities, that excess does not
equate to a comparable reduction in facilities through BRAC. The BRAC
committee is taking into consideration all scenarios in developing
recommendations for closures. Reserve units are not moved/changed as
liberally as active units when it comes to domestic facilities. They
are built around communities that can support and maintain a unit
structure within a particular population. Once the BRAC recommendations
are approved, the Army station and installation plans will have to be
updated to take care of the future requirements of possible spikes in
manpower.
Admiral Clark. Because the majority of our Reserve training is
conducted at the supported fleet active command, at designated training
sites, or through the use of distance learning, there should be little
impact on training accomplishment. With respect to basing, if Naval
Reserve Activities (NRAs) are closed or reduced in numbers, we will
seek efficiencies though joint base ventures with the other military
Services in order to optimize resources across DOD. This same kind of
collaborative effort applies to quality of life needs as well, through
the use of other Service Family Support Centers, military health care
facilities, recreational facilities, etc.
General Jumper. First, as you are aware, there are no specific Air
Force goals or target lists for the upcoming 2005 congressional
authorized BRAC. Not only does the BRAC process allows us to dispose of
excess facilities, it frees up valuable funds to fully sustain our
needed facilities and systems so they remain effective through their
expected life. We owe to our professional airman who voluntarily serves
the Air Force and their nation a steady investment program to restore
and modernize our critical facilities and infrastructure systems, while
continually advancing our ability to protect our people and resources
from the growing threat of terrorism. Second, today's airmen realize
deployments are a vital part of the Air Force's critical mission of
projecting air and space power globally. Our goal is to provide these
expeditionary airmen and their families with the training, tools, and
quality of life they need to continue to successfully sustain the
mission. As we continue to support ongoing operations and prepare for
an uncertain future, we are examining and acting on lessons learned
from our recent experiences.
We are continuing to pursue seamless Air Reserve component and
active duty integration at home, leveraging the capabilities and
characteristics of each component, while allowing each to retain their
cultural identity. We continue to explore a variety of organizational
initiatives to integrate how our Active, Guard, and Reserve Forces are
based and trained. These efforts are intended to expand mission
flexibility, create efficiencies in our Total Force, and prepare for
the future. Today's Future Total Force team included a number of
blended or associate units that are programmed or in use.
Finally, the combat readiness of our forces is a direct result of
the strides made in terms of quality of life for our airman and our
families. For instance, the Air Force Reserve participated in the
Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program to better provide long term
care insurance coverage for its members and their families. This
program affords members of the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard
insurance coverage for a variety of home and assisted living care
requirements. Additionally, the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2004 provided improvements to the TRICARE Program in
support of Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve members. These will
pay dividends in the quality of life for our Guard and Reserve members.
General Hagee. The Secretary of Defense has established a process
for the 2005 round of BRAC that will assess all U.S. installations,
both active and Reserve, equally. He has also established and published
the final selection criteria to be used in the analytical process for
making realignment and closure recommendations. These criteria include
among others the ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and
Future Total Force requirements at both existing and potential
receiving locations to support operations and training. I believe the
BRAC process will assure that sufficient and appropriate infrastructure
is retained, as needed.
72. Senator Dole. General Schoomaker, while I understand the
temporary nature of many of the facilities now housing our Guard and
Reserve units training for deployment, the deplorable state of some of
those facilities is not understandable. How does this budget remedy
this situation?
General Schoomaker. The Army has a sustained, ongoing program to
demolish excess facilities, especially World War II temporary wooden
barracks and facilities. Unfortunately, the global war on terrorism has
forced us to use some of the remaining World War II temporary wooden
buildings. Recognizing the unacceptable state of some of those
facilities, we are vigorously working to upgrade them with operations
and maintenance, Army (O&MA) funds from the supplemental appropriation
that supports global war on terrorism. In addition, we are developing a
long-term solution to rebuild key mobilization and power projection
centers at selected installations with military construction funds.
Using available O&MA funds, the Army has repaired and upgraded
temporary buildings and support facilities at installations where
Reserve soldiers deploy, as well as other locations. These
installations include Fort Lewis, Washington; Fort Leonard Wood,
Missouri; Fort Carson, Colorado; Fort Benning, Georgia; Fort Stewart,
Georgia; Fort Drum, New York; Fort Dix, New Jersey; Fort Eustis,
Virginia; Camp Atterbury, Indiana; and Aberdeen Proving Ground,
Maryland. Typical improvements involve latrines, showers, heating and
air conditioning systems, smoke alarms, plumbing and electrical
systems, lighting, floor coverings, ceilings, windows, and roofs. We
will continue in fiscal year 2005 to improve the facilities from which
our soldiers deploy.
73. Senator Dole. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, while our latest military innovations have been
significant in ``winning the war,'' we seem to have a way to go in
``keeping the peace.'' How does your Service's transformation vision
address the need to maintain post-war stability operations or
peacekeeping capabilities?
General Schoomaker. The Army's transformation plan will provide us
with a range of modular, interchangeable formations that can operate
across the spectrum of warfare. We are adjusting our force structure,
particularly that of the Army National Guard, to reduce our Cold War-
era capabilities set with one more suited to current and future threats
and missions. As an example, we are deactivating 22 National Guard
field artillery battalions and using that opportunity to increase our
force structure in such capabilities as MPs and civil affairs.
Admiral Clark. The Navy transformation vision reflects a supporting
role for stability operations and peacekeeping activities. The Navy
will maintain maritime dominance gained during combat operations, such
as by the mission-reconfigurable LCS and advances in undersea warfare.
Where fire support is called for, warships like DD(X) and aircraft like
the Naval JSF and FA-18E/F will support joint and coalition ground
forces operating at significantly greater ranges inland. From the
safety of the sea military and humanitarian/commercial material can
rapidly enter the area. Lastly, distributed and networked naval forces
will achieve an additional long term effect in support of the
President's Proliferation Security Initiative, denying the use of the
high seas to those trying to transport weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) into or from the area.
For sailors who regularly operate on or close to the shore in post-
combat situations, the Navy works closely with other Services to
provide effective protection. Naval Special Warfare, Naval Coastal
Warfare, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal units utilize state-of-the-art
force protection equipment and technologies to protect personnel. This
not only includes such items as weapons, chemical, biological, and
radiological (CBR) equipment, body armor and up-armored vehicles, but
detection systems that provide forewarning and afford preemptive
actions against various threats. Ships used to monitor sea lanes during
stability operations are provided a variety of small arms, halogen
lights, body armor, and night vision devices to aid force protection.
The Shipboard Protection System will provide increased capability
through incremental technology insertions.
General Hagee. The institutional agility and tactical flexibility
demonstrated by the Marine Corps' participation in ongoing stability
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan reflect our larger and ongoing
Marine Corps transformation process. Stability and peacekeeping
operations are not new to the Corps, with a history that includes the
Boxer Rebellion in China, the ``Banana Wars'' in the Caribbean, and
multiple armed interventions in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and
Lebanon. More recently, marines and Marine units have supported
peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations at length in both Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo. Today, the Navy-Marine Corps Team continues to
play a critical role in the global war on terrorism and in the
establishment of stability and security throughout the world. During
this past year, the Marine Corps, both active and Reserve, was engaged
in stability and peacekeeping operations in the Arabian Gulf, the Horn
of Africa, Liberia, the Georgian Republic, Colombia, Guantanamo Bay,
and the Philippines.
As the Nation's ``Force in Readiness,'' we principally prepare to
fight and win our country's first battles. As a learning organization,
however, we relentlessly adapt to develop the capabilities required to
meet the demands of tomorrow, and there is no question that
capabilities for peacekeeping and stability operations will continue to
be required. While we constantly transform our total force, ongoing
changes to our organization, equipment, and training will provide us
with greatly enhanced capabilities for stability and peacekeeping in
the Marine Corps of the next decades.
Organizationally, we have recently conducted a Force Structure
Review of the entire Corps, and are implementing a number of changes
that will provide us an increased ability to more effectively
accomplish missions across the range of operations. The reestablishment
of our first active component civil affairs billets in decades along
with additional Reserve civil affairs forces will provide us with the
systematic ability to plan, coordinate, and conduct the civil-military
operations (CMO) so necessary in these environments. Similarly, the
addition of active component information operations (IO) and
psychological operations (PSYOP) personnel will add non-destructive
alternatives to our commanders' ``toolboxes'' during stability and
security operations. By growing and reorganizing our intelligence,
counterintelligence, and human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities, we
will enable our deployed operating forces to be both more effective and
more efficient. A substantial increase in our explosive ordnance
disposal forces will enhance our ability to deal with the common
threats peacekeeping forces face, and we continue to examine
alternatives to provide additional MP units. Finally, by increasing the
number of our maneuver units, including additional infantry and light
armored reconnaissance formations, we extend our ability to better
influence action where it most matters--along city streets and across
farmer's fields.
The most decisive factor in success of these units will be the
ability of the individual marine and his small unit leaders. Recent
improvements in technology provide these marines with a wider array of
capabilities. For example, the tactics and abilities of the junior
leader are significantly enhanced by the fielding of the Advanced
Combat Optical Gunsight (ACOG), the Personal Role Radio (PRR), and the
PRC-148 radio. The ACOG is an internally adjustable, compact telescopic
sight that can be used easily in low light or at night and enables more
discriminate use of small-arms fire. The PRR is a small transmitter-
receiver that allows patrolling warfighters to communicate over short
distances, even through thick walls or heavy cover, without shouting,
hand signaling, or relaying messages. The PRC-148 radio is a multi-band
compatible squad system that has ultra-high frequency (UHF) and very
high frequency (VHF) capabilities, enabling small unit users to link to
the support and heavy weapons of the entire joint force. Each of these
items are examples of the equipment we are aggressively pursuing to
enable the rapid development and immediate distribution of information
required to make decisions at the lowest level, where stability
operations are won or lost.
Real transformation depends upon a change in culture, however, not
a change in equipment. The ongoing training for stability deployments
and operational experience our marines are now developing will have a
critical impact on our stability operations and peacekeeping
capabilities for years to come. Our Project Metropolis (ProMet) Team
has rigorously trained units for stability operations in Iraq,
especially in urban environments. As part of our naval transformation
vision of the increased joint and coalition unity of effort typical of
peacekeeping, preparation for these deployments also includes an
extensive training program involving the participation of our partner
militaries. Our transformational technologies have recently been used
in joint training exercises with British, Canadian, and Australian
units as well. Each of these efforts is teaching a great number of our
future leaders how to be ``No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy,'' lessons
they are internalizing today for tomorrow's requirements of organizing,
training, and equipping our future Corps.
In short, we anticipate a continued need for the capabilities that
are required for stability and peacekeeping operations, and are
actively adapting our force with these requirements in mind. The Marine
Corps does not look upon these as new competencies, however, and will
employ them according to our maneuver warfare philosophy and
expeditionary heritage. Our transformation will provide our future
leaders with greater depth and additional options with which to place
our adversaries on the ``horns of a dilemma'' during combat or
peacekeeping. However, these options will increasingly include non-
kinetic effects, Horn 10 and PSYOP to CMO and the training of local
forces. We continue to believe that every operation requires an
aggressive combined-arms approach, and the recognition that they remain
an often-bloody contest of human will. The innovation, change and
adaptation we depend upon will continue to create the capabilities
required across the range of tomorrow's operations, and ensure the
Corps continues it role as the Nation's total force in readiness.
General Jumper. The Air Force's transformation plan identifies the
capabilities we need to prevail in the future security environment.
While broadly conceived, many of them, especially our joint force
``enabling'' capabilities, are directly relevant to future stability
and peacekeeping operations. Our agile airlift fleet, for example, will
be a key conduit of external aid and support, while giving joint and
coalition forces needed mobility in areas of poor or nonexistent
infrastructure. Our global Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) umbrella will
lend clarity to an often chaotic operating environment by linking
together distributed ``blue'' forces and furnishing them with precision
navigation; establishing a coherent joint logistics picture; and
providing persistent situational awareness against dispersed threats in
urban areas and other complex terrain. Our ability to inflict a wide
range of effects, including non-kinetic, non-lethal effects, will be a
critical force multiplier for a Joint Force Commander (JFC) striving to
establish order and security in the post-conflict phase.
As DOD refines its vision for stability operations through the
draft Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept, the Air Force will
continue to identify Air Force capabilities crucial in enabling this
aspect of transformation. All of our projected transformational
capabilities are detailed in the USAF Transformation Flight Plan.
74. Senator Dole. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, the welfare of the military family is undoubtedly a
key to the success of our All-Volunteer Force. I would like to take
this opportunity to thank the countless volunteers and military family
advocacy employees for their dedicated work during OEF and OIF. How are
your Services formalizing the family advocacy mission and how is this
mission included in you transformation vision?
General Schoomaker. Taking care of families is a dynamic and
integral part of Army Transformation and the ``Installations as Our
Flagships'' focus area. Army Community Service provides a full range of
services to help soldiers and families adapt to the military lifestyle.
The Army is adjusting family programs and resources to better support
our soldiers and their families and to meet our goal to provide them
the same qualify of life as is afforded the society they are pledged to
defend.
Admiral Clark. The Navy's Family Advocacy Program (FAP) is formally
established through Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) instructions. It is a mandated program addressing the issue of
child maltreatment and domestic abuse/domestic violence, including
prevention, reporting, intervention, follow-up, and evaluation. Service
to military families is formalized through longstanding fleet and
family support programs provided on all Navy bases. Reservists who are
deployed are informed of services available at each Navy base.
For families living in remote areas, we have implemented a ``One
Source'' program, which allows active and Reserve members of the Navy
family to contact a professional counselor via toll-free telephone
numbers for a wide range of assistance, including timely referral and
assistance to the broad array of FAP resources.
General Jumper. The Community Readiness Consultant (CRC) model will
optimize resources and meet validated community level needs at each
installation. CRC allows Family Support Centers (FSCs) to be proactive
in individual/community support. Our current system encourages families
to be passive recipients rather than active participants in their own
lives and in the life of the community. The CRC model will allow FSC
staff to provide services in the FSC and at the units. CRCs and
Community Readiness Technicians provide more efficient and effective
delivery of counseling/consulting services to Total Force members and
families.
Additionally, the program delivery fits community/family needs with
more flexible tools to respond to changing and emerging needs of
families/communities. The CRC utilizes the FSC automated Management
Information System to assist with assessments, performance based
measures and return on investment. The CRC model will provide a multi-
skilled FSC staff to help build a strong, vibrant community through
collaboration with other agencies, ensuring cost effective utilization
of resources; thus meeting the community needs through outcome
measures.
General Hagee. The military lifestyle is challenging. The Marine
Corps works very hard to provide ``combined arms support''--integrating
the programs that address prevention and intervention needs for Marines
and their families. In addition to the ``hometown'' support that
families enjoy on our bases and stations, Marine Corps Community
Services (MCCS) offers numerous programs that are specifically focused
on prevention of domestic violence. Formally established in 1986, the
FAP is a commander's program designed to prevent and treat domestic
violence. The centerpiece of this program is a philosophy of
Coordinated Community Response (CCR) that involves the command and
brings to bear the host of supporting agencies and civilian community
support resources to effectively address domestic violence.
Prevention of family violence is our primary focus with initiatives
such as the Mentors in Violence Prevention (MVP) program and the New
Parent Support Program, as well as local training and education
efforts. The MVP program was established to encourage the participation
of male marines in efforts to prevent rape, battering, sexual
harassment, and all forms of male violence against women. The MVP
program is a ``marines helping their fellow marines'' program, which
encourages marines to become involved when they see abusive situations.
For the past 2 years the MVP program courses have been offered at the
Senior NCOs' Academies, the 1st Sergeants' Courses, The Career Courses
(NCOs) and the Advanced Courses (SNCOs).
The New Parent Support Program helps ``replace'' the extended
family available to new parents. It educates and supports families with
children up to 6 years of age. It gives our new parents someone to call
if they have questions, problems or concerns--questions that if in
their hometowns they might have asked Mom, Grandma, or an older sister.
This program consists of home visitation, classes and outreach through
Play Morning, Single Parent Support Groups, Mom's Basic Training,
Parenting Classes, and Daddy's Baby Boot Camp. The program successfully
reduces the number of child abuse/neglect cases.
75. Senator Dole. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, given that our current deployments are drawing
heavily on Guard and Reserve Forces, what are you doing to ensure
necessary and appropriate support for all families, especially those
from rural communities who live long distances from military
installations?
General Schoomaker. The Army's goal is to provide accessible
services and information for all family members. We are currently
developing a multi-component family support network that will optimize
information flow and program support to active, Guard, and Reserve
families regardless of their proximity to Army installations.
The Army's family and soldier readiness system includes assistance
centers, readiness groups, rear detachments, and unit liaisons. Army
Community Service (ACS) provides Reserve component family program
personnel with information, training, and other assistance, and unit
commanders use ACS and other resources to ensure soldiers and families
are prepared and supported before, during, and after deployments.
Army One Source (AOS) is one example of a program that meets the
needs of geographically dispersed families. AOS is a 24-hour, 7-day-a-
week toll-free information and referral telephone service available to
soldiers, deployed civilians, and their families worldwide. AOS refers
individuals to local civilian counselors for assistance as needed.
Admiral Clark. We have recently implemented a program called,
``Navy One Source,'' which is particularly helpful for families of
active and Reserve personnel in remote or isolated areas who require
information/referral services. The program offers access to highly
qualified staff of consultants through a toll-free telephone number and
via the World Wide Web. A wide range of assistance is available,
including, but not limited to, guidance on preparing for the arrival of
a new born, preparing for deployment, counseling on relationship or
financial difficulties, locating qualified child care resources and
purchasing an automobile. The program's response is tailored to the
callers' needs, is fully confidential, and is provided at no cost to
users.
General Jumper. We make every effort to ensure we stay in contact
with and provide great support to our families, and especially those
far removed from military installations. Our FSCs serve as the core of
our outreach and care to these families before, during, and after
deployments. They collaborate with appropriate State, and local
resources to maximize support and services with our affected families.
We have Family Readiness NCOs specifically trained to provide family
assistance during times of crisis such as war, real world
contingencies, and natural disasters. We facilitate as much family
communication as possible to keep the family ties strong--especially
during deployments. Our FSCs offer email connectivity, morale call
programs, letter writing programs, video phones, and phone cards to
encourage family communication. We also keep family members informed
using unit spouse support groups, key spouse training, and town hall
meetings. Families of the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard also
benefit from the services coordinated by Family Readiness Directors
assigned to our Reserve units as well as Guard Family Assistance
Centers throughout the U.S.
We rely heavily on our technology-based systems to increase our
capability to address the needs of our geographically separated
families. Air Force Crossroads, (www.airforcecrossroads.com) our
community Web site developed in 1999, posts updated information on
family readiness and all of our family support resources from childcare
and parenting, to job search and managing finances. Through Air Force
Crossroads, we host a very active Spouses Forum Give chat room for
spouses to meet, share concerns and support each other. Participants
are able to quickly link to FSC staff if needed. Air Force One Source,
(www.airforceonesource.com) launched earlier this year, is a geography-
independent, 24-hour call center, and interactive Web-based service.
Twenty-four hours a day, our total force and their families can use
either a toll-free telephone number or the web to contact staff for
counseling and referral on issues including deployment/reunion,
parenting/child care, grief/loss, education, older adult care/
information, legal, financial, and emotional well-being.
General Hagee. Over the past year, the Marine Corps has gathered
lessons learned on family support from OEF and OIF 1. We will continue
to refine this support for all future deployments, but have established
family outreach through multiple communication mechanisms (i.e., touch,
virtual, voice, etc.) to address the different needs of our Marine
Corps families.
Our Key Volunteer Network (KVN) served as the official
communication link between deployed commands and the families. The KVN
is primarily a spouse-to-spouse connection that commanders use to pass
important, factual, and timely information on the status and welfare of
the operational unit. As spouse leaders, the key volunteers
respectively interact with the commander regarding the welfare of the
command's family members.
The establishment of an OIF Family Information Hotline that has
been re-activated for OIF 2 and a deployment support Web site assist
with today's vast information and public contact requirement,
regardless of the location of the caller or user. Both are specifically
designed to sort the information needs of callers or users, and re-
direct them to specific response or support capabilities. The Marine
Corps is also very fortunate to have MCCS OneSource, a DOD employee
assistance pilot program operated for the Marine Corps by Ceridian
Corporation, as yet another touch point for family member support.
Available Corps-wide in January 2003, over 26,000 uses occurred by
telephone, email, or online in 2003, with increased uses in the months
of March and April during the height of the conflict. This program can
be especially useful for remote users such as the families of activated
reservists. The program is available 24/7/365 via toll free telephone
and Internet access.
The most frequently asked about areas were in the categories of
deployment status, parenting, childcare, everyday issues, and
education. The families of activated reservists found helpful
information on military programs such as TRICARE and other benefits and
services. In addition to the expanded communications tools such as
hotlines, Web site, and MCCS One Source, families of deployed Marines
have access to the established family support programs on Marine Corps
installations as well as through Unit Family Readiness Officers and
Peacetime Wartime Support Team members located at each of our Reserve
Training Centers.
The scope and hours of operation of morale, welfare, and recreation
(MWR) programs are adjusted as necessary during deployments. Families
can receive pre-deployment briefs in person or online, as well as
assistance in developing proactive, prevention-oriented plans such as
family care plans, powers of attorney, family financial planning, and
enrollment in the Dependent Eligibility and Enrollment Reporting System
(DEERS) to minimize the stress of everyday decisions after the Marine
has deployed. For post-deployment, the Marine Corps has also set up a
Return and Reunion program to assist marines, sailors, and family
members in transitioning to a more normal lifestyle. Additional
services are provided to those who need respite childcare, assistance
coping with separation, or specialized support in areas such as
spiritual guidance, coping, and social skills.
advanced threat infrared countermeasures/common missile warning system
(atircm/cmws)
76. Senator Dole. General Schoomaker, in light of the threats posed
by Iraqi insurgents to our helicopters, could you elaborate on the
Army's November 2003 decision to stick with its multiyear procurement
of the ATIRCM/CMWS?
General Schoomaker. In the months leading up to the November 2003,
low-rate initial production (LRIP) decision for ATIRCM, the Army
evaluated all cost, performance, and schedule implications of the
program. This included an evaluation of all competing systems. The Army
decided to stay with the multiyear procurement of the ATIRCM/CMWS
because it was the only system that fully met all technical and
scheduled requirements of the program, no other system could be fielded
faster, and ATIRCM was 50 percent cheaper than any competitor.
Concurrent with this decision, the Army decided to accelerate the
installation of aircraft survivability equipment on all deployed
aircraft. The modular design of the ATIRCM/CMWS equipment facilitated
the execution of that decision by allowing near-term CMWS deployment to
better counter existing threats while the ATIRCM jam head could
continue through its scheduled development and testing program for
deployment against future threats.
77. Senator Dole. General Schoomaker, this system is not available
for conventional units until 2010. By not accelerating this program,
are we passing up an opportunity to provide our troops better
protection in helicopters?
General Schoomaker. Our conventional Army Aviation forces are
scheduled to start receiving the CMWS with the Improved Countermeasure
Munitions Dispenser (ICMD) in the fourth quarter fiscal year 2004. This
will be accomplished under an accelerated fielding of aircraft
survivability equipment approved by the acting Secretary of the Army on
January 15, 2004. This system will provide an enhanced countermeasure
capability against all known manportable air defense missile threats.
To supplement CMWS/ICMD, the Army has also approved the accelerated
fielding of a multi-band laser jammer, known as the ATIRCM, for fiscal
year 2007. Together, these systems will provide our aircraft with a
comprehensive flare/laser countermeasure capability for the future.
78. Senator Dole. General Schoomaker, while we wait on the
development and acquisition of future technologies, are there any
interim systems available that could bridge this gap or are you finding
that the threat (possibly small arms fire and rocket propelled grenades
(RPGs)) requires a lower-tech solution?
General Schoomaker. In early December 2003, the Army selected the
ALE-47 Flare Dispenser Countermeasure System for installation on
Chinook (CH-47) aircraft operating in theater. This effort is ongoing
and will include all type aircraft scheduled to deploy for future
operations. Concurrent with this activity, the Army has also upgraded a
fleet of C-23 fixed-wing aircraft with a missile warning and flare
dispenser system. In addition, the Army recently approved funds for
procuring ballistic protection systems (BPS) for both the CH-47 and
Black Hawk (UH-60) aircraft operating in theater. The BPS lines the
cargo/passenger compartment of the aircraft types noted and will
provide enhanced protection against small arms projectiles.
strategic lift
79. Senator Dole. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, each of your Services are transforming and
investing heavily towards the next generation of capabilities. Yet less
than 5 percent of the procurement and RDT&E budget, across the
Services, is dedicated to strategic lift. Our national military
strategy requires our forces to be capable of operating in multiple
theaters at varying levels of conflict. Do you believe the defense
budget request sufficiently resources and programs strategic lift to
support our national security strategy and your Service's needs?
General Schoomaker. Current directives, policy, guidance and vision
beginning with the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National
Military Strategy (NMS), require the military to be able to overcome or
defeat enemy anti-access and area denial efforts. To meet the
requirements of the combatant commanders, lethal ground combat
formations must arrive intact and ready for immediate employment.
The DOD should continue efforts to modify and improve current
inter-theater (strategic lift) and intra-theater lift platforms, and
field technologies that increase the number of usable theater entry
points. The Army continues to facilitate joint interdependence in
support of the combat commander's requirements by engaging the OSD and
Service counterparts for support of Army strategic/intra-theater lift
requirements.
The Mobility Requirements Study for fiscal year 2005, finalized in
January 2001, validated the sea and airlift requirements in a pre-
September 11 environment. The new Mobility Capabilities Study, to be
completed in June 2005, will validate lift requirements throughout DOD.
With regard to strategic airlift, the Army supports the Air Force's
position that at least 222 C-17s are required. Greater capabilities for
strategic lift platforms and intra-theater lift platforms will enable
us to deliver combat power faster into austere environments. Inter-
theater and intra-theater lift capabilities are linked and must be
complementary to meet the JFC's requirements. Super short take-off and
landing, heavy-lift vertical take-off and landing, and high-speed
shallow draft vessels, are developing technologies that support the
Army's Future Force.
Admiral Clark. In an unconstrained environment we could see needs
that would suggest more spending on strategic lift. However, we are
living with constraints and the budget presented presents a balanced
approach that we believe properly resources strategic lift. We have
asked for $117.0 million in the R&D account under the National Defense
Sealift Fund (NDSF). This represents an increase of $103.6 million over
the amount appropriated in fiscal year 2004. The bulk of this increase
is to fund the concept development for the Maritime Prepositioning
Force (Future) (MPF(F)) platform--which is envisioned to be the
prepositioned centerpiece of our sea basing efforts in the coming
years. In addition, we have requested $140.3 million to maintain our 8
Fast Sealift Ships (FSSs) and 11 large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off
(LMSR) ships in a 4-day readiness status. Finally, we have requested
$221.5 million to maintain the 68 ships of the Maritime
Administration's Ready Reserve Force (RRF) in near-term readiness
status. We expect to continue our extensive analysis of this critical
area in the fiscal year 2006 budget build.
General Hagee. The Director, OSD Program Analysis and Evaluation
(PA&E) and Director of Logistics (J4), Joint Staff are conducting the
Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS) that will answer these questions with
a substantial degree of accuracy. The overall study, which will be
completed in March 2005, will examine the global mobility platforms and
enablers needed to execute the defense strategy and support service
transformation in the 2012 time frame. The study will identify mobility
capability gaps, overlaps, or excesses and provide associated risk
assessments; and recommend mitigation strategies where possible. The
study will also identify and quantify alternatives in mobility
capabilities to support the defense strategy from point of origin to
point of use and return. Upon completion of the study, the Marine Corps
will be able to accurately and with specificity, respond to the
questions you raise.
General Jumper. Our capability to project power anywhere in the
world at any time is a key to meeting the current and anticipated
challenges facing this Nation. These capabilities include the ability
to airlift materiel and personnel across strategic distances and
provide air refueling support to our own and coalition forces.
Currently, the requirements to obtain these capabilities are defined in
studies such as the Mobility Requirements Study-05. However, this study
was based on earlier versions of the NSS and defense planning that did
not anticipate the OPTEMPO of our post-September 11 world. To address
the environment we find ourselves in today, the Air Force is engaged
with the OSD and Joint Staff in a new and comprehensive MCS. We
anticipate results will be available in the summer 2005 timeframe.
The Air Force has allocated approximately 14 percent of procurement
and RDT&E funding in the fiscal year 2005 budget proposal for strategic
lift capabilities (C-17, C-5, and Materiel Handling Equipment). The MCS
will refine our airlift and air refueling requirements and the Air
Force will continue to balance priorities, risk and resources to
sustain our critical mobility capability.
80. Senator Dole. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, I applaud the support given by each Service in the
effort to privatize housing for military families. Not only does this
budget provide our military families with better living conditions but
it does so at a lower cost to our taxpayers. In North Carolina this
privatization plan calls for transferring, renovating, replacing, or
building well over 8,000 family residences in just the next decade. Are
the installation commanders being allowed to tailor these privatization
projects for their respective communities?
General Schoomaker. Installation commanders are encouraged to
develop a project that meets local codes and installation design
criteria. The Army has set minimum standards for a few basic criteria
such as overall unit size but other aspects are within the installation
purview and are negotiated at the installation.
Admiral Clark. Yes. Installation commanders are instrumental in
concept development and in the determination and articulation of the
needs their communities.
General Hagee. Marine Corps installation commanders are actively
engaged in the development and execution of privatization projects for
their communities. Installation commanders and their personnel
participate in the development of the scope of work required and in
determination of neighborhood phasing plans for larger privatization
projects that will be executed in phases over a period of 2 or 3 years.
Installation commanders approve the privatization concepts for their
bases or stations prior to concept approval by Headquarters Marine
Corps. Installation commanders or their designees, as well as command
sergeants major, are also involved in the source selection and
negotiation process.
General Jumper. The installation commander and his staff play a
critical role throughout the privatization of an installation's
housing. Their role starts with collecting and validating the data, for
the Housing Marketing and Requirements Analysis (HRMA), which
determines the number of on-base housing units required to support the
installation. The staff is also integral in the development of the
Housing Comprehensive Plan (HCP), which identifies the construction and
renovation requirements needed to bring the installation's housing to
an adequate condition.
Once the determination is made that a privatization initiative is
feasible at a particular installation, the commander and staff serve as
members of the Project Development Team (PDT) along with
representatives from the Major Command and Air Force Center for
Environmental Excellence. The PDT is charged with defining the scope
and desired amenities to be included in the concept and request for
proposal. Following concept approval, representatives from throughout
the installation serve as members of the Acquisition Support Team
reviewing proposals and serve as advisors. Finally, once an offer or is
selected, installation personnel become the main focus as the terms of
the transaction are finalized, the transition process is initiated, and
development/long-term operations commence. This direct involvement of
the installation commander and staff throughout the privatization
process ensures the sustained success of the installation's housing
privatization initiative.
81. Senator Dole. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, how is the construction of new schools and other
necessary support facilities being factored into privatization plans?
General Schoomaker. The Army engages local school authorities early
and continuously throughout the planning process to assess possible
impacts of added or shifting student loads on school requirements. The
Army provides development scope and schedule information to school
officials to assist with planning for school requirements. The Army
does not include school construction in the privatization development
plan; however, the Army may offer land and infrastructure support for
schools.
Admiral Clark. Privatization projects are subject to the review
requirements imposed by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
The normal NEPA process includes coordination with local officials to
assess any consequent impacts on schools and other necessary support
facilities. The Department of the Navy factors into our privatization
projects the normal development fees or impact fees customarily charged
to all residential construction developers. Our projects include all
costs normally associated with any other private development in the
community. In situations where a new school is proposed to accommodate
an increased student loan the Navy may make land available to the
school district through the privatization process. In some
circumstances the Navy may include funding for specific infrastructure
improvements in the cost of the project. In New Orleans, for example,
the Navy privatization project included a little more than $1 million
for the construction of a sewage lift station to support the 545 new
homes being constructed.
General Hagee. Marine Corps privatization projects to date have not
resulted in a requirement for construction of new schools because much
of the privatization has been rehabilitation/reconstruction of existing
stock, with limited deficit reduction. As a result, there has been
little increased demand put on the local school systems. Each of the
projects has, however, included construction of community support and
recreation facilities. As Public-Private Venture (PPV) projects are
developed, an assessment of environmental impacts, which include school
impacts must be completed. As part of this process we engage local
officials, including those representing schools to ensure their
requirements are considered. Also, local school districts generally
receive a higher level of school impact aid for children of military
families living in privatized military housing located on government-
land leased to the private partner than they would receive from
traditional military housing.
General Jumper. The Air Force looks upon its housing privatization
projects as community developments, not just houses. The community as a
whole is examined to determine the housing requirements as well as the
requirement for ancillary facilities. These ancillary facilities can
include schools, community centers, playgrounds, recreational areas,
and other support-type facilities. Identified requirements are then
worked into the project in order to provide a full, complete
neighborhood community for the military member and their family.
At the current time, none of our projects have determined the need
for additional schools beyond what the local community can provide.
However, they have determined the need for other ancillary facilities
such as swimming pools, community centers, and playgrounds. These
requirements have been included in the privatization process. The Air
Force is conscious of our responsibility to the American taxpayer and
ensures that the community requirements included in our projects are
consistent with those found in similar housing developments privately
owned in the local community.
joint warfighting capabilities
82. Senator Dole. General Hagee, in preparation for OIF 2, you
mentioned that the Marines are drawing on lessons learned from your
sister Services, coalition partners, inter-departmental agencies, and
the Marine Corps' own ``Small Wars'' experience. According to recent
news articles, the Marine Corps is planning to take a ``fresh''
approach as it prepares to take over in areas currently occupied by the
United States Army (for example, emphasizing restraint and cultural
sensitivity while living among the Iraqi population in platoon size
elements). Does this mean that the Marines and the Army will
deliberately employ different strategies in OIF 2? If so, isn't this
contrary to your priority of enhancing joint warfighting capabilities?
General Hagee. The Marine Corps continually evaluates new
techniques and technology to address the unique requirement of this
operational environment. This includes the re-evaluation and potential
incorporation or modification of previously utilized strategies. This
includes the Marine Corps' own historical lessons learned as well as
other Services, as applicable to Marine Corps contribution to joint
operations in OIF 2.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman
joint system development
83. Senator Lieberman. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General
Hagee, and General Jumper, it is my understanding that the Joint
Requirement Oversight Council's (JROC) primary functions are to assist
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in providing you the best
possible guidance on the degree to which budget proposals conform to
the warfighting community's requirements and to ensure that joint
warfighting capabilities and joint interoperability issues are
highlighted in your budget guidance to Congress. In the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Congress required the
DOD to address perceived shortcomings in the joint weapons development
process, specifically with the definition of joint (i.e. non-stove
piped) requirements:
-- First, to shift the JROC's primary focus towards more
strategic issues;
-- Second, to integrate joint experimentation activities fully
into each new defense program's requirements, capabilities, and
acquisition process; and
-- Finally, to shift the focus of Joint Warfighting Capability
Assessment (JWCA) teams to directly support the JROC in
analyzing broader, future joint warfighting requirements.
Since 2001, I have not heard nor have I seen notable progress in
the efficiencies and successes of developing testing and fielding new
and innovative weapons programs. What progress has the DOD made in the
joint development arena?
General Schoomaker. The issue of progress in gaining efficiencies
and successes in developing, testing, and fielding of new and
innovative weapons programs can be addressed in several ways. These
issues are directly tied to the JROC's role in defining future joint
requirements and program development. The JROC has already directed
numerous changes to joint training and experimentation. It is extremely
rare for any weapons program to reach fruition in a short 3-year time
period. Programs which had the most visibility over the past few years
had their roots and origins in developmental concepts and warfighting
concepts that were in place long before 2001. Clearly, there is both
good and bad to this situation. This more deliberate approach ensures
that the right weapon for the right purpose, integrated in the right
way, is put in the hands of the Joint Force. The Joint Force is an
incredibly complex entity with countless moving parts. Accelerating the
acquisition and fielding of systems for the Joint Force introduces some
risk into the process. Sometimes those risks are worth taking as
evidenced by the progress made in confronting the improvised explosive
device threat in Iraq. This is a clear case of how the JROC can
directly influence the rapid development and fielding of urgently
needed capabilities.
Most often, the Joint Force requires a more mature system and
concept before it can safely and cost efficiently procure and field a
new capability. To this end, the JROC has implemented significant
procedural changes to the Services' acquisition processes that
ultimately ensure a joint synergy which spans the spectrum of
capability development.
In 2001, the chairman's vision of the future was encapsulated in a
document known as the Joint Vision. Between the strategic level of
thought about warfighting contained in the Joint Vision and the actual
development of service concepts and programs, there was very little
guidance. The Secretary of Defense expressed his concern that, by the
time major acquisition programs rose to the level where he could impact
them, they were too far into development and the Services were so
deeply invested he had no opportunity to make influential decisions.
Most importantly, the Secretary was constrained to merely deciding
whether to allow a program to proceed (and at what level) or to kill a
program.
Implementation of the new Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (JCIDS) is rapidly rectifying this situation. At
fruition, JCIDS will ensure the Services develop programs that are
designed from inception to support overall requirements of the Joint
Force and facilitate effective integration of these programs into the
Joint Force. The management process that accompanies JCIDS, a group of
Functional Capabilities Boards, which subsume the JWCAs, is directly
focused on those issues that you highlighted from the 2001 National
Defense Authorization Act. These boards ensure that, early in a
program's life, it is determined to what extent that program fills a
critical gap in our joint capabilities, or to what extent it provides a
complimentary or redundant capability. This same Functional
Capabilities Board process will determine the relative value of
increasing our capability in a specific area, and whether the increase
in capability is worth the investment.
JCIDS will do all of this at fruition. Obviously, JCIDS represents
a significant cultural change to previous methods of developing,
prioritizing, and fielding new capabilities. Inculcating this new and
more efficient process will take some time. The analytical tools that
support decisions made under JCIDS are being implemented concurrently
and require Service-wide dissemination. This is well under way.
Programs presented to the JROC are now subjected to a level of scrutiny
that is more detailed, more focused, and more prescriptive than at any
time in the past. Programs that started as ``service centric''
capabilities have been returned to the Services for revision or
cancellation. Some of these revised programs will be reborn as a more
efficient and cost effective joint capabilities.
Combat developers and programmers are learning that the time to
find out what the other services may want or need from an Army system
is early in the program development cycle as opposed to when it is
ready for production. The Services are learning to effectively leverage
capabilities of other Services to avoid developing a service unique
solution.
The Army and its sister Services have worked very closely with the
JROC and the Joint Staff to develop a set of concepts that provide a
common framework which delineates how the Joint Force will fight in the
future. This conceptual framework provides the critical link between
individual Service efforts and the Joint Vision. Equally important, it
integrates combatant commanders into the JROC process. The creation of
Joint Operating Concepts provides an opportunity for the combatant
commanders to directly influence the development of future warfighting
concepts. The creation of Joint Functional Concepts has provided a much
more detailed framework for understanding the common needs and purposes
of Service capabilities, and for understanding those cases that require
Service-unique needs and capabilities. The integration of these
concepts into a jointly agreed upon, integrated framework provides the
foundation for a truly Joint Force. These concepts will not answer
every warfighting question or issue. They will provide a succinct focus
to our experimentation community and provide them a clearly defined
process by which to evaluate lessons learned.
Admiral Clark. Progress in the joint development arena is
exemplified, but not limited to the following programs; each is
included in the President's budget request, and each has a record of
meeting notable joint and cross service requirements. In each example,
warfighting effectiveness and economic efficiencies were gained through
the joint development process.
JSF. The JSF is part of the family of tri-service, next-generation
trike aircraft that will be the single fighter airframe for DOD.
Joint Aerial Common Sensor (JACS). JACS is a research, development
and acquisition program designed to replace our aging EP-3 airborne
information warfare and tactical signals intelligence (SIGINT)
aircraft.
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS). JTRS is a software
programmable, multi-band, multi-mode family of net-workable radios,
capable of simultaneous voice, data, video communications and mobile ad
hoc networking.
Deployable Joint Command Control System (DJC2). DJC2 will provide a
standing, fully deployable, scalable, and standardized command and
control (C2) capability to the Regional Combatant Commanders (RCCs) and
JFCs.
General Hagee. Since 2000, there have been many changes in the
processes that identify and validate joint capabilities. This will have
a significant effect on joint development, testing and fielding of new
and innovative weapons systems. In June 2003, the chairman implemented
the JCIDS (CJCSI 3170.1C). The procedures established in the JCIDS
support the chairman and the JROC in identifying, assessing and
prioritizing capabilities needs as specified in title 10. JCIDS
implements a capabilities-based approach that better leverages the
expertise of all government agencies, industry, and academia to
identify improvements to existing capabilities and to develop new
warfighting capabilities. JCIDS is an enhanced methodology utilizing
joint concepts that will identify and describe existing or future
shortcomings and redundancies in warfighting capabilities, describe the
attributes of effective solutions and identify the most effective
approach or combination of approaches to resolve those shortcomings.
The process inherently promotes efficiency while enhancing capabilities
of the joint warfighter particularly important while faced with current
fiscal challenges.
One example of the JCIDS process at work to achieve efficiencies
and successes in the development, testing, and fielding of new and
innovative weapons programs is evident in the JROC's recent action to
combine two similar, but different, programs, namely the Army's FCS and
the Marine Corps' MAGTF Expeditionary Future Fighting Vehicle (MEFFV).
To optimize research and development efforts, the JROC recommended
forming a Joint Program Office (JPO). While the Army's FCS is an
integrated family of vehicles, personal equipment, sensors and C2
devices, the Marine Corps' MEFFV is being developed as a replacement
for our aging feet of main battle tanks and light armored vehicles.
Despite the similarities, each Service has different warfighting
capability needs based upon specific methods of employment, performance
parameters, missions, and organizational structure. JCIDS ensures that
similarities are leveraged thus reducing the cost of redundant
development efforts. We expect to achieve efficiencies in management,
research, development and acquisition with the combining of these two
future programs.
General Jumper. The Air Force continues to look for ways to
maximize joint development and testing, working with the Navy, Army,
Marine Corps, and SOF community to identify opportunities.
Interoperability is one of the most important factors as we move toward
a capabilities based and network centric construct, which continues to
be reviewed and directed by the JROC and the Air Force. We are also
increasing the emphasis on joint programs and the use of one Service's
program to satisfy the requirements of multiple Services. There are
many examples, but some are of particular note. The Air Force-Navy JSF
program will be developed with three variants for use by the Air Force,
Navy, and Marine Corps, all of which maximize common parts, components,
and maintenance. The Air Force's Family of Advanced Beyond Line of
Sight Terminals (FAB-T) will develop and field satellite communications
(SATCOM) terminals to replace the current U.S. Military Communications
Satellite Program (MILSTAR) Command Post Terminals for all Services,
the Joint Staff and OSD. At the same time, the Air Force is procuring
Tactical UHF, Multi-Band, Multi-Mode Radios (MBMMRs) from the U.S.
Special Operations Command (SOCOM) Program Office. The Air Force and
Navy are also working very closely on developing joint weapons such as
the JASSM and the JDAM. The Department is also pursuing programs such
as the JTRS, which uses a common waveform repository to ensure
interoperability while greatly reducing development costs. We have also
changed the Air Force's focus on operational testing, working now to
get the operational testers, from all affected Services, involved in
the development effort as soon as possible. In this way, many potential
issues are identified early in the program, allowing the opportunity to
address them. As a result, our success in operational testing continues
to improve, enabling us to get critical capabilities into the field as
quickly, and safely, as possible.
84. Senator Lieberman. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General
Hagee, and General Jumper, do you see an evolving and more substantive
role for the JROC in future joint requirement definitions and program
development? Please share with me the recent and future innovations the
DOD has or is currently pursuing to promote more effective joint
experimentation/training.
General Schoomaker. The changes emanating from the National Defense
Authorization Action of 2001 has led to concrete deliverables, in terms
of weapon systems, by mid-2004. Most systems being delivered today do
not reflect these changes. However, the systems of the future,
especially those systems currently funded for research, development,
and acquisition in the POM have been affected by the changes begun in
2001. The maturation of the JCIDS process ensures the force you see in
2010 will be vastly more jointly integrated, efficient, and capable
than any force designed and programmed under the old way of doing
business.
Admiral Clark. Yes, there is an evolving and more substantive role
for the JROC. The JCIDS, recently codified in Chairman's Instruction
3170.01C on June 24, 2003, provides an enhanced role for JROC in future
requirements definition and program development. All new Service
programs are vetted through a joint review process that validates and
approves new requirements and programs that bridge identified gaps in
joint warfighting capabilities. This new process, which includes
participation from all Services, the OSD, and other applicable
agencies, assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
JROC in identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint military
requirements.
Regarding innovations that promote more efficient joint
experimentation and training, the JROC works closely with all combatant
commanders, especially with United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM),
on joint experimentation and training. JFCOM serves as DOD's
experimentation, joint training, interoperability and force provision
``transformation laboratory.'' One innovation promoting more efficient
joint training is JFCOM's Joint National Training Capability (JNTC).
Identified in the DOD's training transformation plan, this effort
broadens and deepens the reach of joint force training through a
networked collection of interoperable sites and nodes that synthesize
personnel, doctrine and technology. This initiative will provide the
participants with a global, network-centric capability that strengthens
military transformation efforts, which promote joint warfighter
effectiveness.
General Jumper. In the summer of 2003, the JROC changed from a
requirements-based system to a capabilities-based system. A
capabilities-based process implements rigorous up-front analysis,
ensuring more programs get visibility of the joint community. This new
process drives jointness from the top-down, strengthening joint
warfighting capabilities; links strategic direction to strategic
investment decisionmaking; provides an engine for force transformation,
and integrates material and non-material solutions to capability gaps
and shortfalls. These are all challenges the new processes were created
to meet. The long-term objective is for ``born joint'' capabilities
development to drive system acquisitions. We are on our way to making
this a reality.
The Air Force has taken many steps to ensure more effective joint
experimentation and training. We have stood up an Air Force Liaison
office at JFCOM to help facilitate our efforts to assist them with
concept development and the joint experimentation roadmap. A product of
this relationship is our partnering with JFCOM to co-host the Air
Force's primary wargame, Unified Engagement 04.
General Hagee Yes. The JROC is taking an evolving and more
substantive role in future joint requirement definitions and program
development through the JCIDS. Under the JROC's direction the new JCIDS
process replaced the old Requirements Generation System. JCIDS ensures
greater visibility of capability proposals and established programs
across each of the Services and agencies. The new process was
established based on the need for a joint concepts-centric capabilities
identification process that will allow joint forces to meet the full
range of military challenges of the future. Meeting these challenges
involves a transformation that requires the ability to project and
sustain joint forces and to conduct flexible, distributed and highly
networked operations. The process must produce capability proposals
that consider the full range of doctrine, organization, training,
materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF)
solutions to advance joint warfighting. Joint experimentation is used
to validate the concepts that feed the JCIDS process. Joint
experimentation explores concepts to identify joint and component
DOTMLPF change recommendations and capabilities needs. Experimentation
provides insight and understanding of concepts and capabilities that
are possible given the maturity of specific technologies.
JFCOM has been a major component of the joint concept development
and experimentation program for the DOD since 1999. On October 1, 2002,
the JFCOM was designated as the DOD's agent for transforming our
Nation's joint warfighting forces. As such, their mission is to
participate in the larger DOD effort to craft a military force in which
combatant commanders, Service branches, and multinational partners work
in concert to develop and produce new concepts and prototypes for
waging war.
An important catalyst for transforming military capability is the
joint Concept Development and Experimentation (CDE) Campaign. This
campaign aims to collaboratively develop concepts that, through
vigorous debate, refinement, and experimentation, can be translated
into warfighting capabilities that strengthen the effectiveness of
combatant commanders in the field. Perhaps more important than
fostering the creation of new concepts, the campaign serves as a
mechanism to synchronize the efforts of combatant commanders, Services,
and interagency partners as we collectively develop concepts and plan
experiments in the course of transforming the military.
JCIDS, under the JROC's direction, will continue to be a critical
process to ensure the DOD is responsibly and efficiently meeting our
national security requirements.
The Marine Corps has historically conducted concept-based
experimentation to help chart future combat development and deliver
advanced capabilities to the operating forces. The Marine Corps premier
wargame for 2004, ``Sea Viking,'' continues this tradition with a
series of events designed to inform senior leaders on key issues
affecting the Future Joint Force. JFCOM, in collaboration with the
Services, has been tasked with developing the joint forcible entry
capability enhancements required to overcome a potential range of anti-
access/area denial strategies. The Sea Viking campaign will assess
future Sea Based Marine Expeditionary capability sets, ESG/Force
capability sets, and Sea Based Command and Control capability sets
required for joint forcible entry operations. This will help inform the
ongoing Joint Staff, Joint Forcible Entry Capabilities Based
Assessment.
office of force transformation
85. Senator Lieberman. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General
Hagee, and General Jumper, the Director of the DOD's Office of Force
Transformation (OFT), Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, has said recently
that military transformation, ``lies at the heart of our new approach
to defense'' and that it ``is not [just] a goal for tomorrow, it is a
fundamentally important endeavor that we must embrace in earnest
today.'' I agree. However it remains to be seen exactly how the OFT is
furthering military transformation and how exactly it works
collaboratively with the JROC and JFCOM to promote a unified path for
the development, test, and implementation of joint force doctrine.
Please explain to me the current projects, near- and long-term
objectives, and the process used by OFT to coordinate with the Service
branches and combatant commands.
General Schoomaker. Vice Admiral (Retired) Cebrowski's office has
been an advocate and a catalyst for advancing Defense transformation.
OFT promotes synergy between the Services and JFCOM ensuring that
transformation strategy is open to challenge by a wide range of
innovative ideas. OFT regularly meets and coordinates with the Services
and JFCOM to facilitate transformation roadmap development. Using these
roadmaps, and other sources, OFT provides recommendations and revisions
to the Strategic Planning Guidance ensuring U.S. forces continue to
operate from a position of overwhelming military advantage. OFT also
conducts an annual Strategic Transformation Appraisal of Defense
Transformation. In this appraisal, OFT identifies key barriers to
military competition that are systemic across the DOD and identifies
joint capabilities gaps. OFT's Transformation Trends highlights new and
emerging issues for key decisionmakers within the Department, the
military services, commercial industry, and the technology world.
Admiral Clark. The Navy interacts directly with OFT to produce the
Naval Transformation Roadmap. This is an annual DOD requirement and
includes our current projects and near- and long-term objectives. OFT
analyzes the service and joint roadmaps and provides feedback to the
services individually and to DOD leadership collectively. Additionally,
OFT leads a congressionally-mandated study of Naval Architecture this
year. Navy officials have provided briefings and data to the OFT in
support of this effort.
General Jumper. OFT is a key player in most aspects of OSD's
transformation strategy articulated in Secretary Rumsfeld's
Transformation Planning Guidance. It regularly meets and coordinates
with the Services and JFCOM to help guide transformation roadmap
development. OFT uses these roadmaps, which include the Air Force
Transformation Flight Plan, as well as DOD science and technology
efforts and other sources, to conduct the annual ``Strategic
Appraisal'' of DOD transformation. In this appraisal, OFT identifies
major issues or shortfalls that may exist across the DOD impeding
transformation progress. These shortfalls provide inputs to OSD's
Strategic Planning Guidance, which, in turn, informs future Service POM
development. Finally, OFT initiates rapid RDT&E programs through the
Transformation Initiative Program and the Joint Rapid Acquisition
Program.
With regard to the Air Force specifically, OFT is collaborating
with us on several programs. OFT and the Air Force Research Laboratory
(AFRL) are working together to develop the new Rapid Response Launch
Vehicles for tactical satellites (launch is scheduled for May). We are
also working with OFT on developing airborne relay mirrors; adding
transformation to our academy and professional military education
curriculums; and in inserting transformational concepts into our
Service wargames.
General Hagee. The OFT has a direct role in influencing how our
transformational objectives will be pursued. Under the guidance from
certian documents like the Transformation Planning Guidance, as well
as, joint documents such as the Joint Operations Concepts, and the
Joint Operating Concepts, the Marine Corps, in conjunction with the
Navy, develops an annual Naval Transformation Roadmap. Shortly
thereafter, OFT conducts a strategic appraisal of the DOD, that
provides valuable feedback on the capabilities and strengths of each
Service's transformational plans in the current-, near-, and far-term.
By performing these efforts, OFT ensures that the individual service
efforts match the joint environment and the goals set forth by the
Secretary of Defense.
The ultimate objective is a rational, sustained effort to create
and maintain a concept-based force development system. By setting
transformational goals early in the planning process, prioritized
decisions can be made to ensure that the right initiatives are pursued
in support of our vision of the future joint force.
Additionally, certain joint transformational concepts are
championed by OFT and influence our naval concepts, as well as, our
capabilities development. For instance, the Sense and Respond Logistics
concept is an OFT-sponsored initiative to improve our naval concept of
sea basing and at the same time provides joint capability enhancements
for the JFC. Sense and Respond Logistics is envisioned as an approach
that yields adaptive, responsive demand and support networks that
operate in alternate structures that recognize operational context and
coordination.
support to national guard and reserve forces
86. Senator Lieberman. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General
Hagee, and General Jumper, I realize that a great deal of effort has
been put on the fielding of IBA and up-armored HMMWVs to all of our
military and civilian personnel engaged in combat operations world-
wide. The DOD has made progress working with industry officials and
greatly increasing production of these critical force protection
supplies. This good work, however, does not excuse the fact that our
military was woefully unprepared and ill-equipped to engage in a low
intensity type conflict, as we are currently experiencing in Iraq.
Furthermore, I have received countless correspondences from concerned
Connecticut residents, whose loved-ones are valiantly serving in
deployed Guard and Reserve units supporting OIF. However, these men and
woman have not been adequately provided critical assets needed to
perform their duties: ammunition, personal protection devices, armored
vehicles, etc. With the military promoting a Total Force concept, where
Guard and Reserve units play an active and important role in conducting
operations as Active-Duty Forces, it is inexcusable that these brave
men and women are not adequately supported by there leadership. What
are you doing to ensure that this situation does not occur in future
combat or peacekeeping deployments?
General Schoomaker. We can do two things. First, we can plan for
potential requirements beyond those in approved program levels and
second, we can add options into critical contracts to allow for
accelerated production. This will encourage more proactive thinking
about contingency requirements and potential obstacles to rapid
production and may reduce risk. However, this will not eliminate all
risk. The noncontiguous urban threat of OIF necessitated that every
soldier and DOD civilian in theater receive body armor. This was a
divergence from the original guidance to issue only combat soldiers
body armor. Once we recognized an increased risk, the requirement
changed and the procurement system then used all possible means to
respond. We will work to improve our procurement system, but we cannot
eliminate all risk from changing threats.
Admiral Clark. We undertook a comprehensive effort to ensure all of
our personnel participating in OIF were properly equipped for the types
of operations they were asked to perform. Based on lessons learned from
last year, we have restructured unit allowance lists for many of these
units, such as Naval Construction Force (``Seabees'') and Expeditionary
Logistics Support Force (cargo handling) units, to upgrade their
personnel protection capabilities to meet new mission requirements.
Navy resource sponsors have realigned current year funds to provide the
identified new, or additional, gear to those units. The Navy makes no
distinction in equipping its Active and Reserve Forces for deployment
to OIF. Like units with like missions, are equipped the same to safely
perform their operational duties. Additionally, we have made every
effort to ensure that all Navy individuals enroute to the CENTCOM
theater receive everything needed to maximize their safety while on the
ground by sending them through one of the two Army continental United
States (CONUS) Replacement Centers (Reserve components). As our
missions evolve in the future, we will continue to evaluate planned
operating environments and to resource Active and Reserve Forces to
safely and effectively perform their designated missions.
General Hagee. The Marine Corps is completely committed to ensuring
that our Reserve Forces are equipped equally with their active duty
counterparts. In particular, our procurement strategies for ammunition,
personal protection devices and armored vehicles have been designed to
provide Marine Forces Reserve, with the same equipment as I, II, and
III Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs), the active duty commands to
which our Reserve units join upon mobilization. Allow us to be more
precise.
1. Ammunition: Again sir, there is no distinction between active
duty and Reserve marines for ground ammunition. Each marine receives
sufficient ammunition assets to conduct all pre-deployment training
including: weapons handling, individual live firing with known
distance, unit cohesion engagement skills and any other type training
deemed appropriate by any and all commander's from the unit level to
the combatant commander. Live ammunition is initially issued in bulk
and is referred to as a Combat Load. A Combat Load is the quantity of
ammunition that can be carried on the individual marine's body or
transported with organic vehicles. For example: the M16A2 Rifle Combat
Load is 350 rounds of ball ammunition, ten rounds of tracer ammunition.
Additionally, commanders at any level have the authority to increase
Combat Loads, based on their personal threat assessment, without
recourse. Ammunition re-supply or sustainment is provided daily in
sufficient quantities to regenerate each marines original Combat Load.
The Marine Corps has sufficient quantities of ammunition in the CENTCOM
AOR to sustain all deployed Marine forces for extended periods at
intense (assault) engagements levels. Globally, the Marine Corps has no
shortages of ground ammunition to support deployed forces. To date,
since the inception of the global war on terrorism (OEF, OIF 1, OIF 2),
there has been no ammunition shortages for Marine Corps Forces deployed
during combat operations. We are confident that our ammunition
processes and funding profile will continue to ensure that sufficient
ammunition is available for future combat or peacekeeping operations
for both our Reserve and Active Forces.
2. Personal Protection Devices: As in the case of ammunition there
is no distinction between active duty and Reserve marines in terms of
equipment for personal protection. Essentially, when we refer to
personal protection in regard to the global war on terrorism (OEF, OIF
1, OIF 2) we are referring to the procurement and issue of SAPI plates
and the OTV in which the SAPI plates are worn. At the outset of OIF the
USMC was already producing SAPI plates and OTVs to equip all our
forces. However, the surge demand for combat in OIF 1 required us to
not only shift our fielding plans to focus all items coming off the
production lines to I MEF's Reserve and active duty units but to also
direct some redistribution of SAPI plates and OTVs from the other MEFs
in support of I MEF. To date, the Marine Corps has completed the SAPI
plate fielding push required to meet the OIF 2-1 requirement, resulting
in all active and Reserve marines deployed in theater having two SAPI
plates and one OTV. We are now returning to the established fielding
rate of 4,800 plates per month over the next year. In addition, we are
preparing to let a contract, in support of OIF 2-2, for an additional
14,000 plates with delivery this summer. We anticipate an estimated
delivery of 18 months to meet our acquisition objective of 267,154
plates. In the interim, the Marine Corps will redistribute plates as
necessary to both Reserve and active duty units in order to meet any
emergent contingencies requiring future combat or peacekeeping
deployments.
3. Armored Vehicles: As with all our efforts to equip our forces
there have been no distinctions with our active duty and Reserve
marines in regard to armored vehicle procurements. As we saw in OIF 1,
the balance of armored vehicles to unarmored vehicles within our Marine
formations (i.e., Tanks, Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AAVs), Light
Armored Vehicles (LAVs), armored HMMWVs versus un-armored HMMWVs and
trucks) served us very well in the swift defeat of Iraqi conventional
formations. As we are just now beginning the re-introduction of Marine
Forces back into Iraq in support of OIF 2-1, the USMC has accomplished
a surge effort to augment vehicle hardening armor within our tactical
wheeled vehicle fleet (i.e., HMMWVs and trucks) ensuring that every
Marine HMMWV and truck with I MEF's Reserve and active duty units in
Iraq will have armor kits available by March 19. Concurrently, we are
reassessing our long-term tactical wheeled vehicle armoring strategy
and have directed the Marine Corps Combat Development Command to
recommend an appropriate mix of armored to unarmored tactical wheeled
vehicles for foreseeable future contingencies. In the interim, we are
confident that if necessary to support imminently emergent future
combat or peacekeeping operations we will be able to conduct another
surge effort to provide ``just-in-time'' armor kits.
In closing, I want to assure you, yet again, that inside the Marine
Corps there is no differentiation between our Active-Duty Forces and
our Reserve Forces when it comes to equipment for combat, especially in
regard to efforts to prepare for future combat. Our transformation
efforts whether through our Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, through
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) or through other
venues consistently rely on Reserve participation and input. Each
marine's welfare and success in battle is foremost in our efforts and
every marine will receive our unstinting efforts in their behalf now
and in the future.
General Jumper. The Air Force remains committed to ensuring all our
airmen (Active Duty, Guard and Reserve) are equipped to meet current
and future requirements across the realm of military operations. We
strive to ensure Air Force solutions to capability and equipment
shortfalls are ``total force'' solutions that provide continuous
seamless integration of the Air Reserve component when called to
action. The challenges our airmen are facing in OIF both demand and
deserve our utmost attention and we are committed to solving those
issues. The Air Force is working aggressively to equip all of our
warfighting airmen to ensure mission accomplishment at the least
possible risk. For example, we have provided 8,000 sets of IBA to our
deployed personnel and we are focused on completing a $100 million
central purchase of IBA. We are also working closely with the Army and
the Joint Staff to reallocate limited resources, such as up-armored
vehicles, to ensure those critical assets are available for the
combatant commanders' highest priority missions.
post-conflict operations
87. Senator Lieberman. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General
Hagee, and General Jumper, in response to the many lessons learned from
the military's difficulties in post-war Iraq, I understand that the
Pentagon has begun an investigation into the creation of a military
force specializing in peacekeeping and reconstruction activities
following future conflicts. What can you tell me about your overall
vision for this capability?
General Schoomaker. Rather than have a portion of our forces
specialized in a niche array of tasks, the Army's modular brigade units
of action will be organized to perform in a variety of roles and
missions. In order to maintain our flexibility and a depth of
capabilities for long-term rotational operations, our forces will be
multi-functional rather than narrowly focused. Our objective is to
create a force that can sustain a rotational campaign-level of effort,
in which forces can rapidly transition from traditional combat
operations, such as raids and deliberate attacks to stability and other
support and stability tasks, such as presence patrols and
reconstruction efforts. Our recent experiences tell us we must be able
to transition literally overnight--to the point of executing combat
operations in one sector, while simultaneously performing stability
operations in an adjacent sector. In fact, our successes in stability
and support operations have been greatly enabled by our ability to
rapidly shift from traditional peacekeeping tasks in order to conduct
decisive offensive action.
Admiral Clark. My vision for the future of these operations ashore
is fundamentally and necessarily about how we will conduct operations
at, and from the sea. By providing a joint, networked and secure sea
base from which to apply persistent sensors, command and control,
strike and logistics, we can ensure that we have not just a smaller
logistic and support footprint ashore, but the right footprint ashore.
Additionally, by moving a large proportion of supporting fires and
tactical aircraft to sea, we could reduce our force protection
requirements as well. Thus, we can focus more of our marines and
soldiers on the ground toward accomplishing, rather than supporting the
mission.
This is part of what I like to call the strategic speed and
operational agility that we, along with our number one joint partner,
the United States Marine Corps, are in the process of improving.
Together, we are working toward a naval force that can rapidly seize
the initiative on the kinds of non-contiguous and chaotic battlefields
that are so prevalent in Iraq. We will achieve that kind of speed and
agility by getting lighter, by investing in C\4\ISR and precision
fires, and by fundamentally altering our concepts of operation.
General Hagee. Marine Forces are trained and equipped for success
in the full spectrum of combat operations. We view peacekeeping and
reconstruction activities as routine operational requirements which are
encompassed within our scope of operations. Our troops are adept at
transitioning from combat operations to peacekeeping and reconstruction
operations. We view peacekeeping and reconstruction operations as the
foundation for the successful re-establishment of stabilization in a
post combat environment and are prepared to remain until civil
authorities become capable of providing the basic needs of their
society. We remain committed to maintaining our dedication to
warfighting excellence in these operational areas.
General Jumper. The Air Force currently operates at all levels of
the spectrum of operations providing a diverse range of capabilities
from close air support to humanitarian assistance to ISR. The Air Force
studied lessons learned from Afghanistan and was able to incorporate
those lessons directly into Iraqi operations. Logistics planning
allowed a comprehensive base draw down, while at the same time
effectively supporting humanitarian airlift operations. The use of
radio frequency tags enhanced in-transit visibility and automated
decision tools allowed airlift planners to maximize limited staging
space. Additionally ISR operations, especially UAVs provided valuable
support in reconnaissance and surveillance of potential hotspots. All
the while, space systems provided precise location for GPS equipped
units and equipment, and over the horizon communications. The Air Force
has placed airmen in Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) and CENTCOM
to ensure that the full range of air and space power meets the
combatant commander needs. Because of the flexibility of the Air
Force's projected force structure, the Air Force will continue to make
substantial contributions to efforts to attain stability and restore
conditions that can promote democracy and liberty.
88. Senator Lieberman. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General
Hagee, and General Jumper, what level of interaction do you foresee
this capability having with international forces, either through the
United Nations (U.N.) or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)?
General Schoomaker. We are designing our forces and command modules
to be capable of joint and coalition operations. If the global war on
terrorism continues at its current pace, we foresee significant
interaction with coalition forces in order to achieve our common goals
and objectives.
Admiral Clark. I anticipate that we are going to have to continue
to be able to work well with international forces if we are going to be
successful in these types of operations. Ongoing NATO missions in
Afghanistan, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Balkans demonstrate the
high degree of interaction and interoperability required for
international post-conflict operations. We expect that the
interoperability between NATO forces, gained over many years of
cooperative training and operations, will continue as a key element to
our success in this regard. We have also gained important experience
working with non-NATO forces in the post-conflict environment. In fact,
since May 2003, there have been 85 maritime assets from 15 nations (see
Table 1) employed by the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, CENTCOM in
support of OEF and OIF.
One of the outcomes of all of this practical experience has been
the emergence of a need to enhance our ability to exchange secure data
with our friends and allies. Given the level of interaction with them
that we expect in future operations, we have pursued a technology
called the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System
(CENTRIXS). This is a standing global network allowing U.S. and
coalition nations to share secure operational and intelligence
information in support of combined planning and decision making in
multinational operations. CENTRIXS, already being used by several
partner nations, is scheduled for full certification in the fall of
2004.
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General Hagee. The Marine Corps continually evaluates new
techniques and technology to address the unique requirement of this
operational environment. This includes the re-evaluation and potential
incorporation or modification of previously utilized strategies. This
includes the Marine Corps' own historical lessons learned as well as
other Services, as applicable to Marine Corps contribution to joint
operations in OIF 2.
General Jumper. The U.S. Armed Forces historically rely on
international forces, whether in coalition or alliances, to provide
forces and capabilities to accomplish each military operation's
strategic objectives and end-state. Throughout the operations of the
last decade we have learned the positive impact regular training
interaction brings to multinational operations culminating in unity of
effort. I will continue to ensure any capabilities developed for the
Air Force will account for the fact we are likely to deploy and employ
in a multinational environment. As much as possible we will stress
compatibility, interoperability, interchangeability, and commonality
with not only NATO and the U.N., but other regional forces as well.
89. Senator Lieberman. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General
Hagee, and General Jumper, what progress has the DOD made in developing
a concept for transforming and implementing our military's post-
conflict force structure?
General Schoomaker. The OSD has introduced several initiatives to
shape transformation. OSD Transformation Planning Guidance and
Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) will help the Services properly
structure their forces for the emerging strategic environment. We are
implementing initiatives to transform our force, e.g., modularity,
force stabilization, military to civilian conversions, and active
component/Reserve component rebalancing which complement OSD's efforts.
These Army initiatives will improve our broad-spectrum capabilities for
both combat and post-conflict operations by increasing high demand
capabilities such as infantry, military police, SOF, and various
support units. They will improve our force readiness, decrease
turbulence, and enhance our ability to respond quickly. Overall, the
initiatives will yield a force that is more ready and relevant to the
Nation's needs in war and peace.
Admiral Clark. In light of our lessons learned from OEF and OIF, we
are working with JFCOM, in concert with the Joint Staff, the other
Services and the combatant commanders, to develop a set of concepts for
conducting stability operations. When completed, these concepts will be
integrated into the joint process to identify capability and
supportability shortfalls, compare alternatives for improving joint
capabilities, and lead to appropriate resource decisions.
The Navy-Marine Corps team is working now to develop the concepts
and design the structure that will help provide a joint, networked and
secure sea base from which to apply persistent sensors, C\2\, strike
and logistics. This would allow us to have not just a smaller logistic
and support footprint ashore, but the right footprint ashore.
Additionally, by moving a large proportion of supporting fires and
tactical aircraft to sea, we could reduce our force protection
requirements ashore as well. Thus, we can focus more of our marines and
soldiers on the ground toward accomplishing, rather than supporting the
mission.
This is part of what I like to call the strategic speed and
operational agility that we, along with our number one joint partner,
the Marine Corps, are in the process of improving. Together, we are
working toward a naval force that can rapidly seize the initiative on
the kinds of noncontiguous and chaotic battlefields that are so
prevalent in Iraq. We will achieve that kind of speed and agility by
getting lighter, by investing in C\4\ISR and precision fires, and by
fundamentally altering our concepts of operation.
General Hagee. With regard to transformation plans and implementing
our military's post-conflict force structure, the following is
submitted. This is an excerpt from the February 12, 2004, Deputy
Commandant, Plans, Policies, and Operations draft statement to the
Subcommittee on Military Readiness of the House Armed Services
Committee that was delivered on March 11, 2004.
Opportunities for modernization are rare, and opportunities for
true transformation come but once in a generation, if at all. That is
why we feel compelled to emphasize here the importance of our
acquisition priorities and program initiatives such as the MV-22
Osprey, our number one aviation priority, the KC-130J, representing a
significant increase in operational efficiency and enhanced refueling
and assault support capabilities, the EFV which will reduce the
vulnerability of our naval forces and greatly enhance operational and
tactical mobility for our surface assault elements, the STOVL JSF which
represents a great improvement in reliability and combat capability
over existing legacy platforms, the Lightweight 155mm Howitzer, a more
capable, deployable, survivable, and accurate weapon than current
indirect fire systems, and the CH-53X and UH-1Y/AH-1Z aircraft which
promise greater safety, survivability, and supportability over the
current fleet of aging airframes.
Concepts like Tactical Air integration, Logistics Modernization and
Command and Control, and improvements in intelligence and information
operations are equally essential to true transformation, and we are
focusing our efforts on the technology and processes that facilitate
transformation.
Most important of all to our future readiness are our sea basing
initiatives in partnership with the Navy. We hold a deep and abiding
conviction that sea basing initiatives hold the greatest promise for
transforming the Marine Corps-Navy team into a more flexible,
responsive crisis response force, able of projecting power across the
full spectrum of operational capabilities anywhere in the world.
This year, the Marine Corps has continued to refine plans for the
Marine Expeditionary Brigade of 2015, in concert with our concept for
sea-based operations. Similarly, the analysis of alternatives for our
Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future), a critical component of sea
basing, will provide valid choices for achieving sea basing
capabilities. These initiatives will complement, rather than replace,
the amphibious lift and forcible entry capacity of the LHA(R), LPD-17,
and LHD, and will provide the Nation a deployment and employment
capability unmatched in the modern world.
In addition to the above items, the Commandant of the Marine Corps
has recently directed experimentation with a concept for distributed
operations, whereby Marine Forces will be able to operate in a more
decentralized manner with smaller tactical units to better extend
operation reach and control in an extended battlespace.
General Jumper. The Air Force is not planning to create a separate
military force to deal with post-conflict operations. The USAF
currently operates at all levels of the spectrum of operations
providing a diverse range of capabilities from close air support to
humanitarian assistance to ISR. The USAF took lessons learned from
Afghanistan and was able to incorporate those lessons directly into
Iraqi operations. Logistics planning allowed a comprehensive base draw
down while at the same time effectively supporting humanitarian airlift
operations. The use of radio frequency tags enhanced in-transit
visibility and automated decision tools allowed airlift planners to
maximize limited staging space. Additionally ISR operations, especially
UAVs, provided valuable support in reconnaissance and surveillance of
potential hotspots. All the while, space systems provided precise
location for GPS equipped units and equipment, and over the horizon
communications. The USAF has placed airmen in CJTF-7 and CENTCOM to
insure that the full range of air and space power meets the combatant
commander needs. The built-in flexibility of the projected force
structure will allow the Air Force to substantially contribute to
efforts to attain stability and restore conditions that can promote
democracy and liberty.
research and development off-shoring
90. Senator Lieberman. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General
Hagee, and General Jumper, many experts in the defense and intelligence
communities are seriously concerned about the loss to the U.S. economy
of the high-end semiconductor chip-manufacturing sector to East Asian
countries, the likely subsequent loss of the semiconductor research and
design sectors, and the grave national security implications that this
would entail. The composition of the global semiconductor industry has
changed dramatically in recent years. National trade and industrial
policies of East Asian countries which have capitalized on these
changes are driving a migration of semiconductor manufacturing to that
region, in particular to China, through a large array of direct and
indirect subsidies to their domestic semiconductor industry. This
migration is occurring at a time when these components are becoming a
crucial defense technology advantage to the U.S., due to the present
and future needs of advanced processors in the defense and intelligence
communities. Informed elements of the military and intelligence sectors
have made clear that relying on semiconductor integrated circuits
fabricated outside the U.S. (e.g. in China, Taiwan, and Singapore) is
not an acceptable national security option. Is the DOD engaged in
analyzing this issue and are you planning to outline the potential
long-term solutions of this problem with respect to the DOD?
General Schoomaker. This is an effort led by the OSD, in which the
Army participates. On October 10, 2003, the Acting Deputy Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) established a
strategy to ensure access to trusted suppliers of leading edge,
critical integrated circuits in sensitive defense weapons. That
strategy consists of identifying dependable producers and exploring
needed refinements to the strategy.
Admiral Clark. The DOD is engaged in this issue. On October 10,
2003, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established a formal approach to
ensure access to trusted suppliers of leading edge, critical integrated
circuits for use in defense systems. The Department is actively
exploring alternatives and has established a Defense Science Board Task
Force to examine the subject, which began its study in March 2004.
General Hagee. The Marine Corps depends on the semi-conductor chip
industry for processing and delivering critical information and
appreciates the national security implications of the industry's
domestic decline and the potential security implications of relying on
development and manufacture of semiconductor chips in foreign
countries. The Marine Corps, however, has not yet linked this concern
to the loss or threat of capability nor developed a service-specific
solution to this situation and, as the matter effects the whole of the
DOD, we respectfully defer to the leadership of the Joint Staff and/or
the expertise of the National Security Agency (NSA) to address any
long-term solutions the DOD has undertaken.
General Jumper. The Air Force analyzes source of supply issues on a
case-by-case basis and has not addressed the semiconductor industry as
a whole or focused on the movement of production capability offshore.
However, this is an area being studied by the DOD and the current
approach calls for establishing a ``trusted foundry'' to ensure
critical defense systems have a trusted source of semiconductor
components--a source that can manufacture sensitive defense designs in
confidence, ensuring these components have not been modified or their
integrity compromised, and can guarantee these components and the
underlying technology are available when needed by the DOD.
Where there is concern is in the move offshore of the materials and
components used in building these integrated semiconductor components-a
large portion of the companies manufacture items such as ceramic
packages, high-purity silicon wafers, die materials, quartz products,
resins, and optical equipment are foreign-based or foreign-owned. These
items are not unique to military parts and the commercial market drives
their economics and technology. However, with an annual world market
for semiconductors and semiconductor equipment of almost $300 billion,
the industrial base for these components should remain strong. As for
the integration of these components, current military requirements are
met predominately by the large vertically integrated United States
defense manufacturers--companies such as Lockheed Martin, Northrop-
Grumman, Raytheon, and Honeywell who have design and fabrication
capabilities to ensure military unique performance and security
requirements are met.
91. Senator Lieberman. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General
Hagee, and General Jumper, I understand that a foundry to ensure DOD
access to a short- and mid-term supply of cutting edge integrated
circuits may address immediate national security concerns. What kinds
of long-term strategies are being considered to ensure DOD first and
assured access to critical advanced components from trusted domestic
sources?
General Schoomaker. This is an effort led by the OSD, in which the
Army participates. Long-term strategies being considered include
assessing the possibility of additional research investments by the DOD
and policy changes to help our integrated circuit suppliers compete in
worldwide markets.
Admiral Clark. I understand that the DOD is actively exploring
long-term strategies and has established a Defense Science Board Task
Force to examine this subject. These strategies will examine the root
cause of offshore migration, the options for policy and DOD investment,
alternatives to onshore trusted foundries and the development of
requisite inspection technologies, enabling alternative inherently
trustworthy processing technologies. There are currently two trusted
foundries producing Rad Hard circuits in the United States. I
understand the DOD is using Title III funds to upgrade these foundries
to support current and future DOD Rad Hard circuit requirements.
General Hagee. The Marine Corps is aware of the NSA proposal to
establish a trusted foundry to ensure DOD first and assured access to
critical advanced components from trusted domestic sources. However,
long-term strategies of this nature are developed and lead by the DOD.
We respectfully defer to the NSA at the DOD/agency level to provide
insight on the long-term strategies to be considered and developed.
General Jumper. Maintaining a strong industrial base for integrated
circuits is a key element to ensuring the DOD with first and assured
access to critical advanced components from trusted domestic sources.
The DOD's Manufacturing Technology program aids in this quest by
developing manufacturing technologies that enable affordable production
and sustainment of current and future weapon systems.
Another option for assured access is the Defense Production Act
Title III program, which establishes, maintains, and/or expands a
production capability necessary for national defense. This program is
currently being used to establish a domestic fabrication capability for
radiation-hardened microelectronics to meet critical requirements from
the combined space community, including the Air Force, the Missile
Defense Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration.
92. Senator Lieberman. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General
Hagee, and General Jumper, what programs currently exist that address
the issue of first and assured access to critical advanced components
from trusted domestic sources?
General Schoomaker. The principal program facilitating first and
assured access to critical requirements is the Defense Priorities and
Allocation System (DPAS). This program implements authority contained
in Title I of the Defense Production Act. DPAS allows us to work
through the Commerce Department to require priority acceptance and
performance of orders placed with domestic sources, if those orders are
within their capability.
Admiral Clark. I understand the DOD and the NSA have undertaken a
pilot program to address the vulnerability of critical Application
Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) used in mission essential defense,
communications, and national security systems. The program is a first
step to support in identifying short and mid-term solutions that could
supply the Department with advanced technology trusted ASICs. It is
consistent with the approach set forth by the Deputy Secretary of
Defense on October 10, 2003. The program is further defined in the
subsequent interim guidance on the use of Trusted Integrated Circuits
set forth January 27, 2004, from the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for AT&L. The pilot program covers the requirements to ensure
trust from basic circuit design to the finished wafer scale devices
(not yet delineated into individual dies or packaged at this stage).
Additional trusted ASIC sources will be identified and certified as
required in the ongoing program. If necessary, the pilot program will
expand by engaging additional trusted domestic suppliers of critical
high end ASICs to encourage multiple sources and increased access to
the most advanced technologies.
General Hagee. Headquarters, Marine Corps C4 Department is aware of
the NSA proposal to establish a trusted foundry to ensure DOD first and
assured access to critical advanced components from trusted domestic
sources. We respectfully defer this response to NSA.
General Jumper. As mentioned, the DOD's current approach to address
the issue of first and assured access to critical advanced components
from trusted domestic sources calls for establishing a ``trusted
foundry'' to ensure critical defense systems have a trusted source of
semiconductor components available when needed by the Department.
In addition, the DOD's Manufacturing Technology program helps
strengthen the industrial base by developing manufacturing technologies
that enable affordable production and sustainment of current and future
weapon systems. The Defense Production Act Title III program can also
assist by establishing, maintaining, and/or expanding a production
capability necessary for national defense as is currently being done in
the case of radiation-hardened microelectronics.
93. Senator Lieberman. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General
Hagee, and General Jumper, does the DOD have plans to maintain the
critical semiconductor equipment industry (i.e. lithography, photo
masks) in the U.S., either through a government-industry consortium or
through more direct intervention?
General Schoomaker. This is related to an effort led by the OSD and
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The Army
participates. We understand that maintaining the critical semiconductor
equipment industry will be addressed as part of an upcoming Defense
Science Board study entitled: High Performance Microchip Supply.
Separately, but in close coordination with OSD and DARPA, the Army does
fund direct research of improved semiconductor fabrication equipment as
part of our effort to achieve Army research objectives. We plan to
continue that funding effort.
Admiral Clark. The DOD does not currently have plans to address
maintenance of the semiconductor equipment industry. However, if any
aspect of the semiconductor industry changes in such a manner that
creates vulnerabilities or diminishes capabilities, we will explore
options and take necessary action.
General Hagee. Respectfully, we must defer to the Joint Staff and/
or OSD to provide information on any DOD-wide plans to support the
semi-conductor equipment industry.
General Jumper. The DOD has not formulated any plans to establish a
government-industry consortium or directly intervene in the
semiconductor equipment industry. Accounting for less than 2 percent of
total market sales of semiconductors and associated equipment, makes it
difficult for the DOD to directly influence the industry. In fact, the
last major consortium effort, SEMATECH, dropped Federal sponsorship in
1996 and now includes international manufacturers. Instead, the DOD is
currently pursuing a ``trusted foundry'' approach, which could
contribute to the maintenance of a viable semiconductor industrial
base.
94. Senator Lieberman. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General
Hagee, and General Jumper, will Congress have the opportunity to
discuss the proposed solutions as they evolve?
General Schoomaker. Yes.
Admiral Clark. I expect the DOD will continue, as always, to work
with Congress to explore solutions for securing trusted
microelectronics for our warfighters.
General Hagee. The Marine Corps will afford Congress the
opportunity to discuss proposed solutions that are participated in and
in support of the operational requirements that are of interest.
General Jumper. As mentioned, the DOD is currently looking to
existing efforts, such as the ``trusted foundry'' approach, its
Manufacturing Technology program, and the Defense Production Act Title
III program to provide for first and assured access to critical
semiconductor components. Should additional solutions become necessary,
Congress will be an essential element in the formulation and
implementation of a national policy with regards to the semiconductor
industry and other critical industries that support national defense.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
science and technology investment
95. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, all of the Services have reduced their investments
in transformational S&T programs significantly below the fiscal year
2004 appropriated levels. What role do these S&T programs play in the
transformation of our Nation's military?
General Schoomaker. The fiscal year 2005 budget submission reflects
the Army's sustained commitment to make leap-ahead S&T investments that
will provide high payoff transformational capabilities for our
soldiers. At $1.8 billion, the fiscal year 2005 S&T budget request
continues the transformational programming strategy established last
year.
Army S&T is committed to providing America's Army with sustained
overmatch in land combat. To do so, the Army S&T retains a dynamic
portfolio of technology investments that is responsive to the
warfighters' needs of today and the future. The Army S&T mission is to
conceptualize and develop future leap-ahead technologies that are
necessary to maintain a superior land combat capability unmatched
anywhere in the world while exploiting opportunities to accelerate the
transition of proven innovative technologies to enhance the
capabilities of the Current Force. The Army's S&T program is well
balanced to provide high payoff needs of the Future Force while seeking
rapid transitions for critical capabilities into the Current Force.
Admiral Clark. The Navy S&T accounts reflect the balance of
priorities among the competing fiscal requirements. The fiscal year
2005 Navy S&T budget request declines by 1.4 percent compared to the
fiscal year 2004 budget request, but is well focused on supporting the
warfighting capabilities outlined in the latest Naval Transformation
Roadmap.
The role of naval S&T is to guide innovation that will provide
technology-based options for transformational Navy and Marine Corps
capabilities, including capabilities that promise to fundamentally
change how we prepare for, fight and win wars. A great deal of our
transformational effort towards ``The Next Navy and Marine Corps'' is
lodged in the Future Naval Capabilities (FNCs). We have strengthened
alignment of the FNC process with the naval capabilities development
process that establishes our warfighting program requirements and
priorities.
The relatively mature technologies involved in FNCs are in many
cases the result of long term S&T investments in discovery and
invention programs with 6.1 and early 6.2 funding. The focus of this
discovery and invention portion of the S&T portfolio is largely on
areas where the Navy is the only significant U.S. sponsor such as ocean
acoustics and underwater weaponry. This stable, long term investment is
essential to keeping the pipeline full of transformation enabling
technologies for ``The Navy and Marine Corps After Next''.
The final transformational S&T investment is in the area of
Innovative Naval Prototypes. Examples of these ``game-changing''
technologies include the free electron laser, the electromagnetic
railgun, unmanned underwater vehicles, the X-Craft, and super-
conducting electric drive motors.
General Hagee. Naval S&T is pursuing innovative technology
prototypes for equipment that we hope will have transformational impact
in the future. There are numerous examples. We are developing a
reconfigurable rotor blade for the MV-22 tiltrotor aircraft that when
delivered will assist this revolutionary aircraft extend its range and
load capacity to keep up with anticipated expansion of mission
requirements. In effect, we are using S&T investment now to plan to
upgrade a technology not yet operational.
Another example is our investment in autonomous mobile sensors--
Dragon Eye UAV and Dragon Runner Unmanned Ground Vehicle--as a means of
providing the tactical element on the ground to see over the next hill
or around the next comer. Dragon Eye is in the process of fielding;
however, when coupled with potentially transformational changes in
concepts of operations for ground units our ground forces may emerge
from planned experimentation over the next couple of years into a
distinctly different force.
Still another example includes technologies leverage off of GPS
permitting ground forces to know precisely their own location. Systems
such as Blue Force Tracker--and specifically the Iridium-based
Expeditionary Tactical Communications System as a surrogate for a
future low-earth orbit tactical communications network, coupled with
projects such as the Target Handoff System (Experimental) providing
precise targeting and the ability to digitally coordinate targeting
between the forces on the ground and tactical aircraft, may open the
door for emerging new concepts for employing distributed operations on
the future battlefield.
General Jumper. Air Force S&T programs play a pivotal role in the
transformation of our Nation's air and space force. The United States
Air Force is continuing to transform to a capabilities-focused
Expeditionary Air and Space Force. We are doing this through the
development of the CONOPs for each of the seven major tasks the Air
Force must be capable of accomplishing to support the combatant
commanders. Our goal is to make the warfighting effects and
capabilities we need to achieve them the drivers for everything we do.
This is especially true for our S&T program. We have taken the effects
and capabilities required by the seven CONOPs and transformational
goals and mapped them to the long-term challenges and the short-term
objectives identified in the congressionally-directed S&T planning
review completed in February 2002. A prime example of the role Air
Force S&T plays in this transformation is in the area of space
communications technology. We have increased our investment in this
area and are working to identify, develop, and demonstrate the wideband
technologies needed to build a space-based laser communications network
to provide higher data throughput. There are other technologies, such
as directed energy, microsatellites, and more that will significantly
change future warfighting capabilities.
3 percent investment goal
96. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, the DOD has again failed to meet its own goal of 3
percent investment of the DOD topline into S&T programs. Does your
Service still desire to achieve that 3 percent level?
General Schoomaker. The Army supports the DOD's stated goal of
investing 3 percent of Total Obligation Authority (TOA) in S&T. Over
the past 4 years, the Army has sustained increases to its S&T
investments to accelerate fielding the FCS and other Future Force
capabilities while also seeking to identify mature technologies that
can be provided to the Current Force--today's soldiers.
Admiral Clark. The fiscal year 2005 Navy S&T budget request
stabilizes funding at 0 percent real growth for the first time in 3
fiscal years, and though it is not 3 percent of Navy TOA, it does
provide a sufficient level of investment in this very important program
for this year. Three percent remains our goal, but at the same time, we
must recognize and balance competing investment priorities from year to
year. We have done that in this year's budget and I expect we will
continue to do so in the years to come.
General Hagee. The Marine Corps complies with proposed Science
Policy Council guidance to maintain or increase S&T investment at
levels programmed in the fiscal year 2005 President's budget.
General Jumper. The S&T funding goal of 3 percent applies to the
DOD S&T program as a whole vice by individual Service. Therefore, when
taking into account other non-Service S&T funding, such as funding
managed by the DARPA, the individual Service goal can be lower. With
respect to the Air Force S&T program, it is funded at almost 2 percent-
close to a more realistic goal of 2 to 2.4 percent. At $1.9 billion in
the fiscal year 2005 President's budget, Air Force S&T is funded at a
level to achieve the warfighting capabilities needed to support Air
Force Core Competencies. I believe this is a more meaningful yardstick
by which to measure the adequacy of S&T funding.
97. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, is there a different investment goal that has been
set for your Service?
General Schoomaker. The Army is committed to a strong S&T program,
but we have not set specific investment goals for S&T. We carefully
evaluate our S&T investments to develop the technologies that will
enable specific full spectrum capabilities for the Army's Future Force,
while seeking opportunities to transition proven innovative
technologies to the Current Force faster.
Admiral Clark. The Navy's investment goal has been established by
the DOD. It complies with DPG, and is consistent with the other
Services.
General Hagee. The Marine Corps complies with proposed Science
Policy Council (SPC) guidance to maintain or increase S&T investment at
levels programmed in the fiscal year 2005 President's budget.
General Jumper. The Air Force has not set a formal percentage
investment goal for its S&T program. However, I feel that 2 to 2.4
percent is a realistic goal and will maintain current and future
warfighting capabilities.
defense laboratories
98. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, what role do your defense laboratories and
engineering centers play in the development of transformational
technologies for your Service?
General Schoomaker. The Army's laboratories and engineering centers
play a critical role in developing and maturing the needed technologies
in support of the Army's transformation objectives. A good example of
the role the Army's labs and engineering centers have contributed to
these objectives is the development and maturation of the Army's
technology base in support of the FCS; the centerpiece of the Army's
Future Force and key element of the Army's Transformation campaign
plan. The Army's laboratories and engineering centers play a key role
in maturing the technology base in partnership with the private sector
to an adequate technical readiness level that enables the Army to
proceed to a successful Milestone B system development and
demonstration decision for the FCS. Additionally, the Army's
laboratories and engineering centers helped to identify the critical
technology areas deemed to be centrally important to successful
development of the FCS architecture and its component platforms, and
potential solution sources in order to achieve baseline threshold key
performance parameters. The successful development of these critical
technologies is essential to reduce the technical risk in the
acquisition and fielding of the FCS equipped unit of action. As
detailed engineering designs are developed and refined, it is expected
that additional critical technologies will be identified in order to
meet designated capability levels (threshold or objective). Here again,
the Army's labs and engineering centers will play a major role in
maturing these technologies to adequate technology readiness levels to
achieve these needed capabilities for the FCS equipped unit of action.
Admiral Clark. The labs and centers have a long history of
developing technological innovations that have made significant
contributions to transforming the fleet and force. The Navy's
scientists and engineers continue to push the state of the art to
achieve order of magnitude increases in warfighting effectiveness. As
an example, the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) continues its
leadership in the development of unmanned platforms and technology for
improved ISR capabilities. NRL has used its world-class expertise in
these areas to deliver the Dragon Eye, a small UAV, for small unit
tactical reconnaissance. The Dragon Eye is small, light, easy to
transport, and easy to fly. Developed at NRL, this UAV has transitioned
into the Marine Corps Force and is with the I MEF in Iraq. Scientists
at NRL are continuing this effort to develop the next generation of
transformational sensors and platforms in advanced tactical
reconnaissance.
General Hagee. Our laboratories and engineering centers, e.g., the
NRL, Naval Surface Warfare Centers, and the Marine Corps Warfighting
Laboratory, provide the synergy, expertise and coordination imperative
for transformational technologies and experimentation.
General Jumper. The various AFRL research sites are crucial in the
development of the transformational technologies required as the Air
Force continues to transform to a capabilities-focused Expeditionary
Air and Space Force. In particular, there are many world-class research
efforts ongoing across the AFRL. For example, we have completed and
recently transitioned initial breakthrough work on eye and sensor laser
protection developed at the Human Effectiveness Directorate, Brooks
City Base, Texas, and at the Materials and Manufacturing Directorate,
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. The information data wall
currently being used in Afghanistan and Korea is the result of
outstanding efforts by the Information Directorate at Rome, New York.
We are also proud of our work at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, and
their development of the Elastomeric Coating polymer, which is capable
of protecting key buildings and installations from close proximity
explosions, such as air dropped weapons or truck bombs and is currently
being installed in the Pentagon Reservation. In addition to conducting
world-class research, the AFRL works closely with universities and
industry to focus their research efforts on transformational
technologies relevant to the Air Force. These are but a few of the
extraordinary contributions being made in our laboratory facilities
around the country.
laboratory personnel demonstrations
99. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
and General Jumper, what is the status of the ongoing laboratory
personnel demonstrations that are being executed at many of your
Service laboratories?
General Schoomaker. Since late fiscal year 1997, five Army-unique
personnel demonstration projects were implemented under section 342 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995. These
demonstration projects were individualized experiments designed by each
laboratory to meet its specific needs and requirements and they were
``generally similar in nature to China Lake,'' that is, most civilian
personnel management decisions were delegated to the laboratory
director at each Army laboratory. Two additional Army laboratories have
designed and submitted demonstration project proposals; however, those
proposals were not approved due to the emergence of the OSD National
Security Personnel System (NSPS) and the OSD Best Practices Initiative.
One Army laboratory has been approved for a second, 5-year experiment
by its local bargaining unit. Currently, OSD is in the process of
replacing all Army laboratory demonstration project experiments with a
personnel demonstration project known as the Best Practices Initiative.
It is generally agreed that these personnel authorities have enhanced
the ability of the Army laboratories to successfully discharge their
mission of support to the warfighter.
Admiral Clark. Our laboratory personnel demonstrations at the Naval
Sea Systems Command Warfare Centers and the NRL are fully implemented
and operating well. They will continue until such time as the DOD
issues its final Federal Register notice for the DOD Best Practices
Demonstration Project. Once this notice is published, the Best
Practices Demonstration Project will supersede these Laboratory
Demonstration Projects and both these demonstration projects and their
employees will be converted to the Best Practices Demonstration
Project. The conversion schedule is still to be determined.
If the Best Practices Demonstration Project is not implemented
prior to October 1, 2008, the DOD NSPS may supersede the Laboratory
Demonstration Projects at that time.
General Hagee. The following is a partial excerpt of what Admiral
Cohen approved: ``Our current personnel demonstration projects at the
Naval Sea Systems Command Warfare Centers and the NRL are fully
implemented and operating well. They will continue until such time as
the DOD issues its final Federal Register notice for the DOD Best
Practices Demonstration Project. Once this notice is published, the
Best Practices Demonstration Project will supersede these Laboratory
Demonstration Projects and both these demonstration projects and their
employees will be converted to the Best Practices Demonstration
Project. The conversion schedule is still to be determined.''
General Jumper. At present, the Air Force Laboratory Demonstration
Project, or Lab Demo, is currently ongoing and continues to provide the
AFRL with flexibilities key to hiring critical S&E talent. These key
flexibilities include a simplified classification system, broadband pay
levels, and contribution-based compensation, all of which have been
very successful and have ensured lab-unique requirements were
accommodated. Once the recently authorized NSPS is implemented we
anticipate it will also produce positive results in shaping our S&E
workforce.
100. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General
Hagee, and General Jumper, how have these demonstrations programs
helped your laboratories fulfill their missions?
General Schoomaker. The fundamental thesis of the Army's laboratory
demonstration projects is to attract and retain a high-quality
workforce to achieve quality Army laboratories and quality laboratory
products. Army laboratories have been enhanced by providing individual
laboratory directors/commanders greater managerial control over
personnel functions and concurrently, expanding the opportunities
available to employees through a more responsive and flexible
laboratory personnel system unique to each laboratory, Specific
demonstration project features which enhance the ability of the
laboratory to attract high-quality employees include: (1) market-based
salary setting by managers (broad banding), (2) new appointment
authorities (Distinguished Scholastic Achievement and quality grouping
which has abolished the OPM's ``Rule of Three''), (3) classification
authority delegated to the laboratory director/commander, and (4)
simplified classification which has transformed Army laboratories from
antiquated classification-driven organizations to world-class
performance-based laboratories, just to identify a few. Specific
demonstration project features which enhance the ability of the
laboratory to retain high-quality employees include: (1) compensation
linked directly to employee performance which tracks straight to
laboratory goals, (2) accelerated compensation for laboratory local
interns, i.e., newly hired out of colleges/universities, (3)
extraordinary performance recognition and compensation beyond that of
the normal pay-for-performance processes, and (4) ability of the
laboratory director to make a counter-offer (basic pay adjustment) as a
result of a private sector employment offer to a mission-critical
laboratory employee. The success of these demonstration features is
illustrated by the fact that over the last 5 years, laboratories
operating under provisions of personnel demonstration projects have
been selected four out of five times as the Army's Research and
Development Organization of the Year. These features, which mirror
commercial practice, have further enabled the laboratories to become
and remain competitive with their private sector counterparts.
Admiral Clark. These demonstrations have helped personnel managers
hire and retain highly skilled scientists, engineers and technicians,
pay higher starting salaries as a recruitment tool, and reward high
performing individuals. We believe that these tools will help us
compete with the aggressive private sector jobs market for these highly
skilled people.
General Hagee. The following was what Admiral Cohen approved: ``The
ability to hire and retain highly skilled scientists, engineers and
technicians is critical to effective execution of the tasks assigned to
our laboratories and centers. The demonstration projects have had
overall positive impact on laboratory effectiveness because management
has the capability, flexibility, and authority to pay higher starting
salaries as a recruitment tool and reward high performing individuals
thus retaining more of their top performers. This is critical in these
times of technical personnel shortages and an aggressive private sector
jobs market for highly-skilled personnel.''
General Jumper. As mentioned, the flexibilities authorized by
Congress under the laboratory personnel demonstrations projects have
been very successful in enabling us to hire critical S&E talent for our
workforce. This infusion of talent has helped to revitalize and bring
new ideas into the S&E community, providing a larger talent pool from
which to draw as we continue our transformation to a capabilities-
focused Expeditionary Air and Space Force.
101. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General
Hagee, and General Jumper, are there any other specific personnel
authorities that your laboratory directors need to better accomplish
their unique Service missions?
General Schoomaker. The DOD laboratories have identified a number
of specific personnel authorities which would certainly provide the
opportunity to further enhance the Army's laboratories, to include: (1)
an increase in the pay cap of difficult-to-recruit categories of DOD
laboratory S&E to $200,000 (an authority provided to the National
Institutes of Health); (2) an increase in the traditional 3R
authorities (recruitment and relocation bonuses, and retention
allowances) to 100 percent of basic pay, to permit retention allowance
lump sum payments, and to permit the option of retention allowances as
increases to basic pay, in order for the DOD S&T laboratories to
attract and retain top quality S&E; (3) concurrently, to ensure a
continuing flow of fresh new young S&E talent into the DOD laboratories
by providing a financial incentive to older S&E to retire, an increase
in the Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay to $50,000; (4) personnel
services contracting to hire administrative and clerical labor,
currently prohibited by Federal Acquisition Regulation 37-104, which
would permit the laboratories to devote scarce in-house resources to
the laboratory missions of research, development, and engineering
support; and (5) restoration of the section 1113 authority from the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, which provides
the ``authority for the experimental personnel program for scientific
and technical personnel'' which terminates in October 2005. The full
range of additional authorities for Army laboratory directors and
commanders, requiring either new legislation or DOD policy revision,
can be found in OSD, Research and Engineering, commissioned study
titled ``DOD Laboratory S&E Workforce Framework of HR Features for the
Alternative Personnel System'' published on September 30, 2002.
Admiral Clark. There are two such authorities in the area of S&E
candidate recruiting that would help to better accomplish our
laboratory missions.
First, authorization of a Direct Appointment of National Research
Council (NRC) and American Society for Engineering and Education (ASEE)
Postdoctoral Fellowship Program Participants upon successful completion
of their programs would eliminate a duplicative, second competitive
action under current Federal Government Direct Hire or Delegated
Examining Authority. This could streamline the recruitment process
(reducing work hours by an estimated 24 hours per case), and reduce
hiring time by 4 to 12 weeks.
Second, authorization of a Direct Appointment Authority for
scientific, engineering, or medical occupations, to include an
exemption from Title V hiring regulations, would provide true ``on-the-
spot'' hiring authority. This authority would be applied only to those
positions and occupations that meet the criteria of the OPM Research
Grade Evaluation Guide or Part III or the OPM Equipment Development
Grade Evaluation Guide and require specialized experience.
General Hagee. Not all the labs and centers need exactly the same
personnel authorities, as their staffing and recruiting challenges are
often different. For example, some of the Navy's warfare/systems
centers need to fill large numbers of entry-level positions every year,
so the flexibility granted by their demonstration projects (categorical
ranking and distinguished scholar) have been of benefit to them. In
contrast, more than half of the hires made by the NRL are PhDs with
specialized experience at the GS-12 level or above, so such open
registers are of lower utility.
Below are two specific personnel authorities that would benefit
some or all of the Navy labs and centers.
Recommendations to Improve Recruitment of S&E Candidates with
Specialized Experience
(1) Authorize a Direct Appointment of NRC and ASEE Postdoctoral
Fellowship Program Participants upon successful completion of their
associateship programs. This proposal would allow the appointment of
specially qualified NRC and ASEE participants upon completion of their
associateship program. NRC and ASEE Participants compete through an
extensive national recruitment effort and rigorous evaluation scheme to
qualify for consideration. This competition is significantly more
stringent than the competition required under the Direct Hire or
Delegated Examining Hiring Authorities. This proposal, if accepted,
would eliminate a duplicative, second competitive action under current
Federal Government Direct Hire or Delegated Examining Authority,
streamline the recruitment process (reducing work hours by 24 hours per
case), and reduce hiring time by 4 to 12 weeks.
(2) Authorize a Direct Appointment Authority for scientific,
engineering, or medical occupations. This proposal, which includes an
exemption from Title V hiring regulations, would provide a true ``on-
the-spot'' hiring authority for scientific and engineering research
positions in professional scientific, engineering, or medical
occupations that meet the criteria of the OPM Research Grade Evaluation
Guide or Part III or the OPM Equipment Development Grade Evaluation
Guide and require specialized experience.
General Jumper. Previously mentioned flexibilities, such as a
simplified classification system, broadband pay levels, and
contribution-based compensation, have been very successful and have
ensured lab-unique requirements were accommodated as we worked to hire
critical S&E talent for our workforce. Once the recently authorized
NSPS is implemented, we anticipate it will also produce positive
results in shaping our S&E workforce. Until NSPS is fully implemented,
it is too early to forecast if additional personnel authorities will be
required to recruit and retain S&E talent for the laboratory.
repair requirements
102. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, you say in your posture
statement that the Army has determined repair requirements for all OIF
I units, and that the resulting workload is ``immense'' and a
``significant expansion of normal maintenance activities.'' You state
further that Army readiness is directly dependent on the reset program,
and that ``continued resourcing will be needed'' to ensure the Army's
recovery from current operations. What is the total estimate for the
Army's reset program, at present?
General Schoomaker. The initial fiscal year 2004 cost estimate to
reconstitute OIF and OEF equipment was based on experience from past
operations, in-theater technical inspections, and emerging maintenance
data emanating from current operations. The reset plan takes into
consideration the full spectrum maintenance operations, from
organizational level to depot. The estimate for fiscal year 2004 reset
totals $5.2 billion: $2.9 billion for 10/20 and delayed desert damage,
$1.5 billion for depot maintenance, and $.8 billion for Army
prepositioned stocks, munitions, and second destination charges.
Estimates are for the fiscal year 2004 reset; we have not identified
fiscal year 2005 reset cost requirements.
103. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, how much of this has already
been funded by the fiscal year 2004 supplemental?
General Schoomaker. The fiscal year 2004 emergency supplemental
funded $1.2 billion in depot maintenance requirements and $2.0 billion
in 10/20 level maintenance and delayed desert damage. Additionally, we
received another $208 million for transportation to move equipment to
the depots and to commercialize some in-theater communications
capability. This was particularly important in that it permitted us to
redeploy several of the Army's unique communications units who were
approaching their 1-year mark for deployment. We also received $712
million in investment funds to purchase communications equipment,
replacement stocks for our prepositioned equipment sets, and lethality
and survivability equipment for both active and Reserve component
soldiers.
104. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, how much is included in the
fiscal year 2005 budget request?
General Schoomaker. As I stated earlier, the fiscal year 2005
budget only addresses peacetime requirements. The Army staff is
developing cost estimates for the repair of OIF 2 and OEF 4/5 equipment
that will return from theater. At this point, it is too early to
discuss those estimates with a high degree of confidence. I do know
that the fiscal year 2005 budget request does contain $89.1 million to
purchase lethality and survivability equipment for our troops.
105. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, how do you expect to fund
the remainder?
General Schoomaker. While we have not yet received guidance on the
focus of an emergency supplemental for fiscal year, I would expect some
of the reset requirements to be funded from that source. In addition to
requirements for fiscal year 2005, there will still be outstanding
requirements from fiscal year 2004, especially in the investment
accounts. Reset requirements are incremental to normal peacetime
operations and so far have been appropriate candidates for using
supplemental funds. Reset is critical to future readiness. If funding
for reset is not provided to the Army in a fiscal year 2005
supplemental, we will be forced to balance risk within the base budget
to meet the requirement.
106. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, what is your current
estimate of how much additional funding the Army would need from an
fiscal year 2005 supplemental, at least for reset purposes?
General Schoomaker. We have not yet received guidance from the OSD
on what the focus of a fiscal year 2005 supplemental will be, but I
have little reason to believe that resetting the force will be any less
expensive than it will be for returning OIF I forces. Additionally,
there will be some items we cannot get to in fiscal year 2004 for which
the requirements will carry into fiscal year 2005.
university research programs
107. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General
Hagee, and General Jumper, what role do your investments in fundamental
(6.1) research at small high-tech businesses and universities play in
the fulfillment of your Service missions?
General Schoomaker. The Army's basic research program produces new
knowledge to fuel revolutionary advances and leap-ahead technology that
enable Army Transformation. The program invests in world-class
expertise (government, academic, and industry) and state-of-the-art
equipment. It balances its investment between in-house Army unique
research and leveraging external scientific research that has great
potential for military applications.
The Army maintains an extramural basic research program that is
balanced between its two major components: (1) the single investigator
program that invests in the brightest minds at our leading universities
and is a key source of next-generation of scientists and engineers with
an understanding of military problems, and (2) larger scale
partnerships with universities and industry to take advantage of
commercial investments and the cutting edge research at outstanding
universities in areas critical to the Future Force.
In regard to the second component, the external basic research
program takes advantage of the power of academia and industry, focuses
world-class research on Army challenges, allows flexibility to capture
new discoveries, trains the next generation of scientists and engineers
critical to the advancement of Army technology, and complements
internal efforts through the following centers:
Collaborative Technology Alliances (CTAs) are
industry-led 6.1 collaborations between the government,
industry and academia, combining industry investment in areas
critical to transformation while taking advantage of cutting
edge research at universities, and the Army laboratories'
understanding of military requirements to leverage state-of-
the-art technology for military applications.
University Affiliated Research Centers are university-
led 6.1 and shared 6.2 collaborations between universities,
industry, and Army laboratories where industrial partners
provide competence in related technologies, expertise in
transitioning technologies from laboratories to the industrial
sector, and cost share.
Centers of Excellence are university 6.1 research
centers established by the Army, and provide partnering
opportunities between academia and Industry through cooperative
agreements, when there is a significant synergy between the
Center and the production capabilities of industry, but only
the university is funded.
The Army's new Flexible Display Center is university-
led, with strong industry participation and collaboration with
Army laboratories but has 6.2, 6.3, and ManTech funding.
The Army also engages small businesses with S&T investments through
the small business innovative research program; however, this involves
applied research. The Army continues to exploit the opportunities
created by these organizations to accelerate development of
transformational capabilities to a lighter, smaller, smarter, and
faster force.
Admiral Clark. The 6.1 (S&T Account) investments that we have made,
including those made in small, high-tech businesses and in
universities, have assisted in the fulfillment of the Navy's mission in
one of the most fundamental ways possible: they have laid the
groundwork for our future. Much of the maturing technology being
delivered today for incorporation into platforms, weapons, sensors, and
process improvements are the result of long-term investments in
research and invention programs in 6.1 and early 6.2 funding
categories. These investments also serve to attract the Nation's best
scientific talent, most of which resides in small, high-tech companies
and in universities. This helps focus them on uniquely naval problems
such as Ocean Acoustics and Underwater Weaponry that might otherwise
receive little attention.
General Hagee. The Marine Corps has no 6.1 funding. The Office of
Naval Research (ONR) supports the 6.1 requirements for the Navy.
However, the following was what Admiral Cohen approved ``Yes,
historically, The ONR's investment in basic research helps support the
training of research S&E. The NRL receives a large share of the Navy's
6.1 investment (roughly $100 million annually). The Navy's warfare
centers and medical labs share the ILIR program (about $15 million
annually). These funds are used to help develop appropriately trained
scientists and engineers in key disciplines.
In addition, ONR is working with the National Science Foundation
(NSF) to start a $10 million pilot program, commencing in fiscal year
2005, that is focused on bringing into the Naval Research Enterprise
the next generation of scientists and engineers. This program, called
N-STAR, is focused on revitalizing connections between the Navy's
research and development centers and the university community.''
General Jumper. Basic Research, or 6.1, plays a key role in the Air
Force S&T program, laying the foundation for later Applied Research, or
6.2, and Advanced Technology Development, or 6.3, efforts. In fact, Air
Force ``core'' Basic Research is funded at $217.3 million in the fiscal
year 2005 President's budget--an increase of almost $13 million or
almost 5 percent real growth, over the fiscal year 2004 President's
budget. With approximately 70 percent of Air Force 6.1 funding going
primarily to universities and some small high-tech companies, they play
a fundamental role in helping to fulfill our Air Force mission.
personnel for commander joint task force
108. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General
Hagee, and General Jumper, I understand the decision has been made to
establish a combined force headquarters in Iraq in between CJTF-7 and
General Abizaid. I would like each of you to give me your military
judgment about the need for an additional headquarters, as well as some
estimate of how much each of your Services would be expected to
contribute and the impact of providing still more senior servicemen and
women as headquarters personnel.
General Schoomaker. The Army is fully supportive of the combatant
commander's structuring headquarters to provide the required command
and control, unity of command, and unity of effort in their area of
operations. It is important to have a headquarters structured to meet
these requirements as the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
conducts the transfer of authority in Iraq. This new headquarters will
focus on coordinating the counterinsurgency campaign, civil-military
operations, building Iraqi security and Armed Forces capabilities, and
reconstruction efforts.
The planning for the combined force headquarters is ongoing;
therefore, we do not have defined personnel requirements. It is
anticipated that the new headquarters will be formed from existing
headquarters, maximize the capabilities within those headquarters, and
through efficiencies avoid large increased demand for additional senior
soldiers.
Admiral Clark. Senator, it is my understanding that this decision
is not final. However, JFCOM has been directed to develop options and
recommendations for replacing CJTF-7, the single joint headquarters
currently responsible for all strategic, operational and tactical
issues in Iraq, with a command structure that consists of two joint,
combined headquarters: a multinational force headquarters that would
tackle the strategic and politico-military issues in Iraq, and a
subordinate warfighting headquarters that would focus on operational
and tactical tasks.
In my view, such a structure would improve current CJTF-7
headquarters span of control challenges, enhance our effort to
establish a secure and stable Iraq, and at the same time, permit
General Abizaid to focus on integrating and commanding the larger war
on terror and regional security efforts throughout all of CENTCOM.
While the specific service manpower contribution is yet undefined, I
expect to be able to address any manpower concerns as JFCOM's
recommendation comes forward.
General Hagee. As this question was generated in March 2004, it is
overcome by events. CJTF-7 has become Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-
I). The Commander of the CENTCOM is the appropriate entity to answer
the question on personnel and force requirements to support any
combined force headquarters.
General Jumper. Doctrine and our current command structure informs
us as to what this new combined force headquarters should be, and that
is the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) and staff. The
JFLCC is responsible for planning coordinating and executing all land
component actions in the AOR. The Air Component, commanded by the
JFACC, is prepared and primed to provide the required support to the
JFLCC in this endeavor. In addition, we are prepared to provide an Air
Component Coordinating Element (ACCE) in the JFLCC headquarters as we
did during OIF to facilitate and synchronize our operations. We feel
this is the ``best practices'' option and should be used in this
situation, as it is the most efficient for managing limited air
resources. However, we will support the combatant commander's proposed
C2 structure to the best of our ability and our limited resources. We
will provide a limited ACCE, but we will not be able to field a
component headquarter for this new combined force headquarters, nor do
we believe it is best to distribute air resources down to this new
command.
budget
109. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, Admiral Clark, General
Hagee, and General Jumper, I understand that, at the current pace of
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, you may still be short as much as
$5-10 billion beyond funds provided in the fiscal year 2004
supplemental. Is that true, and if so, how do you expect to address
these shortfalls?
General Schoomaker. Based on input from the field, we do have
shortfalls. We are working to minimize these by asking our commanders
to redouble their efforts to carefully review expenditures and
reconcile supply requisitions to avoid duplication. As the field
submits additional requirements, a group in the Army Staff, led by the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (G3), Lieutenant General Dick
Cody, carefully reviews and validates them. Once requirements are
validated, they are prioritized for available funding. To fund these
critical, emerging priorities, we are reviewing all Army programs to
determine if these new requirements are so compelling that we need to
defer other planned expenditures to fund them. This is an ongoing
process and it will undoubtedly continue through the remainder of the
year. At mid-year, we will discuss shortfalls with OSD and we expect
some relief. Right now, I believe we may need help in the range of
about $3 billion for operations and maintenance-type requirements.
Finally, we may have to come back with an omnibus reprogramming action
to meet our most critical requirements.
Admiral Clark. The fiscal year 2004 supplemental was predicated on
a post-OIF pace of operations. For the Navy, this assumption has
changed dramatically because of the decision to deploy a MEF and
supporting Navy elements. Our current estimate is that the Navy will
incur over $700 million in unplanned costs during fiscal year 2004
related to this OIF 2 deployment. This estimate is likely to change as
we gain experience with the pace of operations and actual return costs.
At this time, the DOD plans to realign the necessary funds, both from
the amounts provided in the supplemental and the fiscal year 2004
appropriations act, to cover the increased costs of OIF 2.
General Hagee. Our current shortfall estimate continues to evolve
with recent deployments in support of OIF 2 and OEF 5. We intend to
address these shortfalls with assistance from the Iraqi Freedom Fund
(IFF) and internal reprogramming actions. The Marine Corps continues to
work with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to resolve the
balance and address changing requirements as operating tempo and actual
manpower fluctuate.
General Jumper. The Air Force received $350 million less than
requested for operations and maintenance (O&M) in the fiscal year 2004
supplemental. We have asked the DOD for $252 million from the IFF for
O&M items such as airlift, combatant commander support, and our support
to the Army. Provided our current O&M program is not reduced, we
believe we can make it to the end of the year through prudent
management. However, we will have to bypass and/or delay some items or
activities we deem important, but not mission critical.
110. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, I believe that the Army is
currently spending about $3.5 billion each month to support operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that, assuming OIF 2 develops as is
currently projected (that is, no major force reductions beyond what is
already anticipated), you would run through your ``base budget'' by as
early as March 2004. What is your current estimate for how much the
Army would need to support planned operations in Iraq in fiscal year
2005 and how soon do you need those funds?
General Schoomaker. We are currently spending about $1 billion a
month in military pay and an average of $2.5 billion a month in O&M to
sustain operations in the global war on terrorism. These expenditures
are incremental to our normal, peacetime operating costs. Our
preliminary data for January indicates that we have a total year to
date O&M expenditure, base program and global war on terrorism, of
$19.4 billion. Our base O&M program for fiscal year 2004 is $25.5
billion. If we had been forced to conduct our current level of
operations without having received the fiscal year 2004 supplemental
early in the year, we would be in a position to ``burn out'' in March.
At this point, we have not received guidance from the OSD on what
the parameters of a fiscal year 2005 supplemental will be. We would
expect the parameters to include a cost of sustaining operations and we
will develop cost estimates for resetting our returning units, but we
do not know what the scope of the mission will be as we begin fiscal
year 2005. If our fiscal year 2005 burn rate were similar to fiscal
year 2004, we would exhaust our O&M base budget by mid-March 2005, and
our military personnel, Army base budget by the end of May 2005.
111. Senator Reed. General Schoomaker, how different would the
impact be if you received those funds in October or November as opposed
to March or April?
General Schoomaker. We do not yet know the level of effort that
will be required in fiscal year 2005. If we assume it will remain the
same as what we are providing in fiscal year 2004, as you stated in
your previous question, we would normally prefer to receive
supplemental funding earlier in the year, rather than later. If forced
to fund operations in support of global war on terrorism ahead of
receiving a supplemental, we lose the flexibility to address critical
emerging requirements and are forced to pay, in the short term, for
current operations from our base appropriations. As an example, in our
O&M program through end of January, a third into the fiscal year, we
are 42 percent obligated overall. Without the supplemental, we would be
about 76 percent obligated against our base O&M program. If we had not
received the early supplemental, and with only a quarter of the base
program left, we would be forced to defer nearly all spending beyond
operations in the theater until supplemental funding is received.
[Whereupon, at 1:03 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2005
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 2, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
SERVICE SECRETARIES
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
Collins, Chambliss, Cornyn, Levin, Akaka, and Ben Nelson.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Brian R. Green,
professional staff member; William C. Greenwalt, professional
staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member;
Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Thomas L.
MacKenzie, professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer,
professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff
member; and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Creighton Greene, professional staff
member; Maren R. Leed, professional staff member; Gerald J.
Leeling, minority counsel, Peter K. Levine, minority counsel;
and Michael J. McCord, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Andrew W.
Florell, and Nicholas W. West.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul,
assistant to Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Jayson Roehl, assistant to Senator Allard; Arch
Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; James P. Dohoney,
Jr. and Derek J. Maurer, assistants to Senator Collins; Clyde
A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Meredith Moseley,
assistant to Senator Graham; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to
Senator Cornyn; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill
Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; and
Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Warner. Good morning, everyone. We have a most
unusual day before us. The Senate has, on the floor, a series
of at least five to seven amendments. The votes start at 11:30,
therefore we're going to try and get this hearing completed in
2 hours time; otherwise it would be a very considerable
inconvenience to our distinguished witnesses.
So we welcome you with that cheerful news. I know how well
you've prepared, and you have, each of you, a half-hour opening
statement, ready for a barrage of questions. [Laughter.]
But I think, in this instance, Senator Levin and I will
give short statements. We'll proceed, then, to receive
hopefully somewhat abbreviated statements on your behalf, and
then you'll just have to work with us as we have members coming
and going through the course of the hearing.
We start this hearing this morning with news reports out of
Baghdad which are quite disturbing. In our hearts and minds are
the welfare of the men and women of the Armed Forces and a very
large number of civilians, who are doing their very best to
bring about a degree of democracy in that troubled part of the
world. So the posture statements this morning relate, of
course, to the President's defense budget, which, in itself, is
subject to scrutiny here on Capitol Hill by a number of persons
who have considered the overall fiscal situation facing the
Nation. Acting Secretary Brownlee, Secretary England, and
Secretary Roche, we welcome you.
We'll start by recognizing, again, the professionalism of
the men and women of our Armed Forces, together with our
coalition partners. They have been very successful in executing
complex joint military operations around the world in the
ongoing global war on terrorism. In Iraq and Afghanistan, our
forces defeated brutal regimes quickly, with precision, and
continue to provide stability and support as those nations move
toward democracy. The men and women of the Armed Forces--
active, Reserve, and National Guard--supported by civilian
employees and contractors, have performed magnificently. This
is proof of the training, equipment, and readiness that you
have provided, their service, and their sacrifices, and the
sacrifices of their family--we always must remember that--are
deeply appreciated, most particularly by those who lost their
lives and those who bear the wounds of this conflict and the
conflicts, of course, in Afghanistan.
Military operations continue at a high tempo in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the Balkans, and elsewhere around the world. At
the same time, we must prepare now for the future, a future
fraught with new threats and new challenges.
The President's budget request anticipates this uncertain
future. That's why this Senator strongly supports the
President's budget, at the level of $401.7 billion for defense.
The budget continues the President's strong commitment to
safeguard America, and sends a strong signal, to the world, of
America's resolve.
Since our Nation was attacked on September 11, much has
been asked of each of your respective Services. Over the past
several years, we have seen hundreds of thousands of soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines deployed around the world, to
fight the global war on terrorism, and to maintain our forward
presence. At the same time, we have asked the services to
transform to meet future threats. We're all aware of the hard
choices you must make in your departments when deciding whether
or not to trade a dollar of today's readiness to invest a
dollar in modernizing for this challenging and uncertain
future. I know each of you is looking for better, more
efficient ways to use your limited resources, from developing
new capabilities, to introducing new organizational structures,
to better integrating the Guard and Reserve with the Active
Force. The Army's modular brigades, the Navy's fleet response
plan, and the Air Force's aerospace expeditionary force concept
are but a few of the innovations and capabilities that we look
forward to discussing with you today.
As Congress works its will on the President's budget
request, we must be mindful of the potential problems. We are
putting increased demands on our forces around the world,
increased demands on their families, and increased demands on
our Reserve and National Guard. We are fortunate, as a Nation,
with a military that has responded to these demands with
extraordinary commitment, but even the best military has its
limits.
As we perform our annual budget review, we must, and we
will, carefully analyze the effects of these challenges on our
men and women in uniform, and their families. Congress will,
I'm confident, make the investments needed to ensure we have
the people, the capabilities, and the facilities necessary to
meet these future threats.
There are many questions. To assist the committee, I hope
each of you will address the following in your opening
statements. Do we have enough people in your respective
military departments, the right mix of people, and the
capabilities in your departments to meet the threats of the
foreseeable future? Are we doing all we can to ensure that our
forces deployed overseas, both active and Reserve components,
have the best possible equipment and support? Are the lessons
learned from recent military operations being rapidly, real-
time integrated within your departments and the operational
forces? As we reposition forces to meet new global threats, do
we have the facilities, the infrastructure, and the mobility
that we will need? Are we doing everything we can to provide a
safe, constructive environment for the patriotic young men and
women who volunteer to serve our Nation? These are but a few of
the issues we hope to explore with you today.
We have the best Armed Forces in the world. We don't say
that boastfully. It's absolutely substantiated by fact. It can
be sustained with smart investment, strong leadership, and the
continued sacrifices of our individual soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines, and their families. We will do our part by
providing them the resources they need to successfully execute
their missions in the cause of freedom, and to protect us here
at home. I commend each of you. You've been in office now for
some period of time, and I think you've done commendable
performances in leadership of your respective departments.
So, Senator Levin?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me join you in
welcoming our witnesses and thanking them for their service to
this Nation.
Our forces, as you indicate, Mr. Chairman, continue this
year to be heavily engaged in ongoing operations, including a
rotation of troops and equipment in and out of Iraq that has
been said to be the largest since World War II. Nearly 120,000
troops will depart Iraq, to be replaced by nearly 110,000
others. The demand on the Active Force, particularly the Army,
is so great that the proportion of Reserve component forces
serving in Iraq will increase from the current 20 percent to
nearly 40 percent of the total in this next rotation. Marine
Corps units, which were withdrawn last summer, will be
returning to Iraq in this rotation to replace some of the
departing Army units. Those same Army units, after a very short
rest, will be busy reorganizing, retraining, and refurbishing
their equipment in preparation for a potential return to Iraq
in a year's time.
It is reported that 11,000 U.S. troops operating in Eastern
Afghanistan are coordinating offensive actions more closely
with Pakistani forces operating in Western Pakistan in a
renewed effort to go after the principal terrorist threat to
our Nation. Additionally, almost 40,000 more U.S. troops stand
their ground in Korea, confronting the undeniably-serious
conventional and potential nuclear threats posed by the regime
in North Korea. Thousands more serve in stability operations in
the Balkans and the Sinai, and now, once again, in our own
hemisphere, in Haiti.
So I join with you, Mr. Chairman and other members of this
committee, in renewing our pledge to our military men and
women, and to their families, that we will work to ensure that
they continue to receive the best training and the best
equipment that our Nation can provide, and that they and their
families are appropriately compensated and supported as is
befitting the service that they render to our Nation.
The President's defense budget request for $420 billion
represents an estimate of the cost of the normal operations of
the activities within the defense budget function for fiscal
year 2005. However, the budget does not include any request to
support the incremental costs that our military forces in
fiscal year 2005 will incur in continuing operations in Iraq,
Afghanistan, or Haiti. Administration officials have further
said that they do not intend to seek any funds for a
supplemental to pay for these incremental costs this calendar
year. That is not a responsible way to support our troops, and
it is not responsible budgeting. We should provide for those
costs that we can reasonably predict that our forces will
incur. We should not force our Armed Forces to rob from
existing requirements to pay for these operations.
Congress provided an extra $65 billion to support
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal year 2004. It
turns out that these funds will not even be sufficient to cover
all the incremental costs of these operations until the end of
the fiscal year. So we cannot count on any excess carryover
funding to address these problems in fiscal year 2005 until a
mid-year supplemental can be enacted.
At an earlier hearing before this committee, the Chiefs of
Staff of the Army and Air Force, the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO), and the Commandant of the Marine Corps all expressed
concerned about waiting until after the end of calendar year
2004 to submit a supplemental budget request. Hopefully, our
service secretaries will tell us this morning whether they
share the concerns of their service chiefs; and, if so, whether
they are urging the Secretary of Defense and the President to
seek such supplemental funding from Congress on an urgent and a
timely basis.
The delay in requesting the supplemental is only part of
the problem. Press reports indicate that administration
officials plan on asking for $50 billion in supplemental
funding for fiscal year 2005, but the requirement will likely
be much higher. In fact, Army officials have indicated that the
Army's requirement alone may equal or surpass that amount. The
Army Chief of Staff testified that the Army is currently
spending $3.7 billion a month in Iraq, and $900 million a month
in Afghanistan. He has also testified that he received approval
from the Department of Defense to temporarily increase Army end
strength by 30,000 soldiers, an increase that he intends to pay
through supplemental appropriations. That will potentially add
an additional cost of nearly $4 billion a year.
One other point about supplementals. The current
supplemental is probably insufficient to meet the current needs
of the Armed Forces through September 30. Ongoing funding needs
are apparently several billion dollars higher than that which
the President requested from Congress and which we appropriated
for the supplemental for this year. Consequently, the Army will
have to find the funding in its regular budget this year to
make up the sizeable difference.
This under-funding of supplemental requirements is already
having an effect on the transformation effort. Recently, the
Army decided to terminate its only new helicopter program, the
Comanche. Although the Army leadership has said that the
changing operational environment, coupled with the emerging
ability of joint systems to provide the capability originally
intended of Comanche were factors in that decision, it seems
clear that funding constraints were of equal, if not greater,
significance.
Meanwhile, the Army must still deal with significant
unfunded requirements to complete armoring of trucks in Iraq
and Afghanistan, and for the refurbishing of the heavily used
equipment from those ongoing military operations.
Having terminated its future air-combat system, I would
hate to see the Army forced to do the same to its ground future
combat systems to meet requirements related to ongoing
operations that may also go unfunded by future supplemental
appropriations.
While perhaps not as extreme as the Army, the other
services are facing similar challenges, as the leaders of those
services have recently testified. We, in Congress, cannot allow
those challenges to become problems through the neglect to
address them on a timely basis.
So, Mr. Chairman, I, again, look forward to discussing
these and other issues with our witnesses this morning.
Senator Inhofe [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Levin.
Without objection, some of you who weren't here during
Senator Warner's opening statement, we will have votes at
11:30, and we're going to try to expedite this, so, if you
don't mind, we won't have further opening statements, and we'll
go right ahead into the opening statements of our secretaries.
We'll start with Secretary Brownlee.
Secretary Brownlee, let me mention, this morning we had an
Army Caucus meeting. It was very well attended. General
Schoomaker did an excellent job.
We'll recognize you now for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. LES BROWNLEE, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
Secretary Brownlee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today, along with the
Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air Force. When
I appear before this distinguished committee with the wonderful
public servants to my left, I have to admit, again, I feel much
like a mule entered in the Kentucky Derby here, but I shall do
my best.
I'm especially honored to have the opportunity to testify
before this distinguished committee on the status of the Army.
I have a prepared posture statement, and, with your permission,
would like to submit that statement for the record.
Senator Inhofe. Without objection, all full statements will
be a part of the record.
Secretary Brownlee. Let me begin by expressing my gratitude
for your tremendous support for our soldiers, who are serving
our country around the world, as well as to their families at
home. This support comes from the members, as well as from your
dedicated, professional, and personal staff. Your interest and
involvement in the Army's activities has made a significant
difference in our soldiers' welfare and their mission
accomplishment. To the Members and staff of this distinguished
committee, on behalf of the United States Army, thank you all.
I know that you're deeply interested in the great work our
soldiers are doing, their training and morale, and how we are
equipping them. In the last 9 months, I've visited our troops
in Iraq three times, and those in Afghanistan twice, and
traveled to our posts in Germany, South Korea, and here in the
United States. I'm grateful to have the opportunity to share
what I've learned with you.
As Senator Levin indicated, we have proposed to grow the
Army, temporarily, by 30,000 soldiers over the next several
years, using the authority in title 10, and to be paid for from
supplemental appropriations. We will plan to use these
resources to stand up at least ten new combat brigades over the
next several years, and we ask for your support in that
endeavor.
Many of you have asked me about measures we are taking to
protect our forces in Iraq. I would like to address two in
particular. First, the number of up-armored high-mobility
multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) in the Central Command
area of responsibility is now over 2,000, compared to about 500
last spring. You will recall that when General Schoomaker and I
testified before this committee in November, we estimated then
that we would be unable to satisfy the CJTF-7 requirement in
Iraq of 3,000 up-armored HMMWVs until May 2005. The committee
indicated that they found that unacceptable, as did we, and we
have worked with the manufacturers to steadily increase
production of these vehicles, and will continue to do so, going
from 185 produced this month, up to 220 per month by May,
which, with summary distribution, will enable us to produce the
current Central Command Combined Forces Land Component Command
(CENTCOM CFLCC) requirement of 4,149 vehicles by August 2004.
I've talked to the chief executive officers of these
companies that build these up-armored HMMWVs, and visited their
production lines. They are committed to and capable of
increasing production rates to up to 450 per month to help us
fill our requirements even faster. While this will require
additional resources, I am working within my budget and with
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) so that we can
achieve this accelerated production level as quickly as
possible.
Second, there has been concern about every soldier having
the best-available protection against bullets and explosive
fragments. To provide this protection, we increased the
production of interceptor body armor last fall, and are
currently producing and shipping 25,000 sets monthly to the
theater of operation. There are now sufficient stocks of
interceptor body armor (IBA) to equip every soldier and the
Department of Defense (DOD) civilian in Iraq and Afghanistan,
and we will fill our requirement for the remainder of the
soldiers and DOD civilians in theater by the end of this month.
In summary, we are producing enough interceptor body armor so
all soldiers now rotating into theater will be issued a set of
body armor either before they deploy into Iraq or immediately
after arrival in Afghanistan.
Underlying everything we are doing and planning to do is
the most important point I want to make here today. We are an
army at war, serving a Nation at war.
Let me comment on a matter of grave importance to the
senior leadership of the Army, sexual assaults on soldiers by
fellow soldiers. Such attacks not only weaken unit cohesion and
lessen combat power, they are wrong. They will not be
overlooked, and they will not be tolerated. The Army is
committed to identifying and holding accountable those who
commit such actions, as well as committed to providing proper
care for the victims of such attacks. We are dedicated to
creating an environment and command climate where these young
women feel free to report these incidents through multiple
venues: the chain of command, medical channels, chaplains, as
well as their peers. We will properly care for those who have
been assaulted, and investigate and take appropriate action
against those perpetrating these crimes. It is the right thing
to do, and we are going to do it.
The Army provides relevant and ready campaign-quality land
power to combatant commanders as a part of the joint force. To
better do this, we are transforming the Army itself in response
to lessons learned and experience gained by the Army's recent
2\1/2\ years with combat in the global war on terror, as well
as the operational environments envisioned in the foreseeable
future.
Last Monday, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Pete
Schoomaker, and I, announced the termination of the Comanche
helicopter program as part of a major restructuring and
revitalization of Army aviation. In lieu of completing
development and procuring 121 Comanche helicopters in the
fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2011 Future Years Defense
Plan (FYDP), we will propose to reallocate these resources to
procure almost 800 new aircraft for the active and the Reserve
components. As a part of our total program over the FYDP, we
will also enhance, upgrade, and modernize over 1,400 aircraft
in our existing aviation fleet. This program to revitalize Army
aviation reflects the changed operational environment, and will
provide the modularity and flexibility we must have to achieve
the joint and expeditionary capabilities that are so essential
to the Army's role now and in the future.
Additionally, we are restructuring our Active and Reserve
Forces to meet the challenges of the day, and to more
effectively use the resources that Congress and the American
people have entrusted to us. This is an ongoing process, and we
will keep Congress fully informed.
The fiscal year 2005 President's budget we've submitted,
when amended to reflect the termination of Comanche, represents
a balanced consideration of both our current and long-term
requirements, and provides our Army with the resources we need,
excluding war-related costs.
The tempo of our current operations is high, and has human
and material costs. We appreciate the assistance of Congress in
addressing these issues as we work to restore our units and
equipment to the high levels of readiness necessary to continue
to meet our obligations to the Nation.
In all that the Army has accomplished, and in all that it
will be called upon to do, the American soldier remains the
single most important factor in our success. Today, our
soldiers are present in over 120 countries around the world,
representing the American people and American values with
courage and compassion.
I want to express my appreciation for the service and the
enormous sacrifices made by our soldiers, especially those who
have given the last full measure--and their families--as we
meet the challenges and risks posed by the war on terror. Our
deepest thanks go to the members of our active and Reserve
component units, as well as to the thousands of the Department
of Army civilians who are also deployed overseas in harm's way.
Regardless of where our soldiers serve, they perform as the
professionals they are, with skill, courage, and dedication.
They embody the values of our Army and our Nation, serving
selflessly, and seeking only to do what must be done before
returning home.
Despite remarkable successes, our fight is far from over.
It will take time to win the war on terror. Our enemies are
resolute, but hardline al Qaeda operatives in Iraq have already
recognized that they cannot dislodge our forces by fear or
intimidation. Our commitment to prevail in Iraq and elsewhere
is unshakeable. I have seen the resolution in our soldiers'
eyes, and heard the determination in their voices. We must do
our part to ensure they have all they need to do the job we
have set before them. When the American people and our leaders
stand behind them, they can accomplish any task on earth.
We are transforming the Army while retaining the values
critical to the Army's achievements of the past 228 years. The
fiscal year 2004 defense legislation and supplemental
appropriations have enabled the Army to do that which it has
been asked to do. I look forward to discussing with you how the
fiscal year 2005 budget request will permit us to continue
meeting our obligations now and in the years to come.
Mr. Chairman, in closing, I would like to thank you and the
members of this distinguished committee for your continuing
support for the men and women in our Army, an army at war, and
a full member of the joint team deployed and fighting terror
around the world.
I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you today,
and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Brownlee and
General Schoomaker follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. R.L. Brownlee and Gen. Peter J.
Schoomaker
Our Nation is at war. The security of our homeland, the global war
on terror, and sustained engagement around the world define today's
complex and uncertain strategic environment. The future will be no less
ambiguous.
We must prepare now to meet the challenges of tomorrow. Rather than
focusing on a single, well-defined threat or a geographic region, we
must develop a range of complementary and interdependent capabilities
that will enable future Joint Force Commanders to dominate any
adversary or situation. A capabilities-based approach to concept and
force development, as articulated in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense
Review, is the major focus of defense transformation.
Over the past year our Army has met the demands of the global war
on terror, with more than 325,000 troops deployed around the world in
over 120 countries. The Army was instrumental in the defeat of Saddam
Hussein and the Taliban and the subsequent liberation of more than 46
million people from oppression and despair. The Army remains a central
and critical participant in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation
Enduring Freedom. Although these and other operations have stressed the
force, our soldiers have responded magnificently.
Our Army's commitment to the Nation remains absolute. While we
execute the global war on terror, our Army simultaneously continues its
organizational and intellectual transformation to meet the challenges
of the 21st Century. In support of the National Security Strategy and
the National Military Strategy we are improving our warfighting
readiness and ability to win decisively. We also remain dedicated to
the well-being of our soldiers, their families, and our civilian
workforce.
The United States Army is the most powerful land force on earth.
With this power comes a great responsibility. American soldiers show by
their daily actions that they understand this, and are fully worthy of
the trust the American people have placed in them.
For 228 years the Army has never failed the Nation, and it never
will.
R.L. Brownlee,
Acting Secretary of the
Army.
Peter J. Schoomaker,
General, U.S. Army, Chief of
Staff.
purpose of the posture statement
The Army Posture Statement provides an overview of today's Army.
Focusing on the soldier, the centerpiece of the force, it explains the
current and future strategic environments that provide our mandate for
transformation. Our core competencies and how we intend to meet our
current demands and future challenges are outlined. It describes what
we must become in order to provide more ready and relevant forces and
capabilities to the Joint Team.
2004 army posture statement executive summary
Our Nation at War
Our Nation, and our Army, are at war. It is a different kind of
war, fought against a global terrorist network and not likely to end in
the foreseeable future. In the days following the attacks on September
11, 2001, President Bush spoke candidly to the Nation. ``These
terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way
of life.'' He added: ``The only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to
our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it and destroy it where it
grows.''
Our Army exists to fight and win our Nation's wars. We are an
integral member of the Joint Team committed to winning in fulfillment
of our responsibilities to national security. We are fighting to
preserve the American way of life and to safeguard the many freedoms
our citizens enjoy. Our soldiers and their families have not forgotten
the events of September 11, which launched us to action in Afghanistan
and Iraq. They are reminded daily of the ongoing conflict through
separation, concern for forward-deployed loved ones and, most
regrettably, news of casualties. Our Army continues the mission and
remains committed to defeating our enemy.
Our Army's Core Competencies
As our Army fights the current war and remains dedicated to
transforming, we are focused on our two core competencies: (1) Training
and equipping soldiers and growing leaders; (2) Providing relevant and
ready land power to combatant commanders as part of the joint force.
Our Army must be an agile and capable force with a Joint and
Expeditionary Mindset. This mindset is the lens through which we view
our service. We must be mobile, strategically deployable and prepared
for decisive operations whenever and wherever required. We must be
lethal and fully interoperable with other components and our allies, as
well as flexible, informed, proactive, responsive, and totally
integrated into the joint, interagency, and multinational context. Our
management and support processes must reflect and support these same
characteristics.
Strategic Environment--Our Mandate for Transformation
At the end of the Cold War, the United States had no peer
competitor. Our Army was much larger and was built around heavy,
mechanized, and armored formations. Because America stood as the lone
superpower during this time of global realignment, we were able to
downsize our force structure. Today, the future is uncertain and
presents many challenges. The emerging challenges manifest themselves
as new adaptive threats, employing a mix of new and old technologies
that necessitate changes to the ways in which the elements of our
national power are applied.
The 21st century security environment is marked by new actors and a
noteworthy proliferation of dangerous weapons, technologies and
military capabilities. While threats from potentially hostile regional
powers remain, increasingly non-state actors, operating autonomously or
with state-sponsorship, also are able to endanger regional and global
security. These forces--insurgents, paramilitaries, terrorists,
narcotraffickers, and organized crime--are a growing concern. They
often are networked and enabled by the same tools and information
systems used by state actors. Our adversaries will rely more frequently
on indirect and asymmetric methods, such as anti-access and area-denial
strategies, unrestricted warfare and terrorism, to mitigate their
relative disadvantage. The most dangerous of these threats are the
development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)--
including biological or chemical agents, or radiological ``dirty
bombs''--to attack the United States. This security environment
requires that the Army have the capability to dominate throughout the
spectrum of conflict and to plan for multiple future contingencies.
As a result of this adaptive enemy and our worldwide commitments,
current organizations, systems and facilities are and will continue to
be stressed. We now rely on our Reserve component to support our
operations to a degree not seen since World War II. As of January 14,
2004, there were more than 164,000 Reserve component soldiers mobilized
with over 139,000 of them serving overseas. The institutional Army is
being asked to do more, applying lessons learned from current
operations. These lessons are critical to our organizations and
individual soldiers as they prepare for worldwide missions. Therefore,
the current and future strategic environments require the Army to have
the capability to dominate throughout the spectrum of conflict and to
plan for multiple contingencies. These new security challenges, coupled
with the current war on terrorism, require a different approach.
Army Focus Areas
Last summer, Army leaders identified immediate focus areas
instrumental to adapting Army organizations and processes that will
help us to better meet the Nation's security requirements. All of our
focus areas should be viewed in the context of our ongoing efforts to
retain the campaign qualities of our Army while simultaneously
developing a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset. Of these focus areas, a
critical enabler is the redesign of our resource processes to be more
flexible, responsive, and timely. Our goal is to be a better Army every
day--better able to execute our core competencies as members of the
Joint Team.
Adapting Resource and Acquisition Processes
The resource process is at the core of our Army's mission success.
Our Nation faces a cunning and adaptive enemy, predictable only in his
zeal and intent. We are just as cunning and our soldiers are constantly
changing tactics and techniques in order to disrupt the enemy's plans.
In the same way, our resource and acquisition processes must become
more flexible, responsive, and timely in order to take immediate
advantage of technological improvements and to sustain the quality of
the force over time.
Resetting our Force
Quickly resetting our forces upon their redeployment from current
operations is a strategic imperative. The reset program incorporates
lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF), retrains essential tasks, adjusts pre-
positioned stocks of equipment and ammunition, and brings unit
equipment readiness back to standard. Units must recover quickly in
order to provide the combatant commanders with land-power capabilities
for future requirements. We will face challenges as we rotate troops
from deployment to home station, while simultaneously maintaining
vigilance and readiness.
Continued congressional support and adequate resources are needed
to accomplish our reset tasks and to mitigate the risk we have incurred
to our Current and Future Forces. The fiscal year 2004 defense
legislation and supplemental appropriation delivered substantial
assistance toward covering the cost of current operations and
initiating the reset process. We fully appreciate the exceptional
support members and their staffs have provided this year. But, the job
is not complete. In fact, it has only just begun.
Mitigating Strategic Risk Through Increased Land Power Capability
Today our Army is executing operations in defense of the homeland
(Operation Noble Eagle); stability and support operations in the
Balkans (Stabilization Force/Kosovo Force); peacekeeping in the Sinai
as part of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) and combat
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom/
Operation Iraqi Freedom). We are also forward stationed in Korea and
elsewhere. Approximately two-thirds of our active and Reserve combat
formations were deployed in fiscal year 2003 and will be deployed in
fiscal year 2004.
These deployments, coupled with planned future rotation of units
into OIF and OEF, the largest movement of Army troops since World War
II, have highlighted already existing stress to our force. To mitigate
risk, the Army is embarking on a series of initiatives. The first
initiative is resetting forces returning from OIF and OEF to a standard
higher than before their deployment. A second establishes force
stabilization measures to reduce turbulence amongst soldiers, units,
and their families. Third, the Army is internally rebalancing active
and Reserve component forces to better posture our existing force
structure to meet global commitments. Lastly, we are beginning to
increase the number of available combat brigades through improved force
management and modular reorganization. This increase allows the Army to
improve strategic flexibility, sustain a predictable rotation cycle,
and permits the Reserve component to reset.
To facilitate this end state, the Army will seek to maintain, or
even to increase temporarily, its current level of manning. These
measures, when resourced, will mitigate risk and ultimately provide
increased capability to combatant commanders.
Conclusion
Our Nation is at war and our Army is at war; we remain ever
relevant and ready to meet today's challenges. Yet there is much more
to do. We are prioritizing wartime requirements, incorporating next-
generation capabilities into current systems where appropriate, and
preserving essential investments in the Future Force. We also are
becoming more joint and expeditionary. We do not move forward alone,
but as part of the Joint Team. We need the support of the American
people and the U.S. Congress. With this backing, we'll continue to
carry the fight to our enemies to provide security here at home.
core competencies
Our Army has two core competencies, supported by a set of essential
and enduring capabilities. These core competencies are: (1) training
and equipping soldiers and growing leaders; and (2) providing relevant
and ready land-power capability to the combatant commanders as part of
the joint force. Additionally, our Army's senior leadership has
established immediate focus areas and issued specific guidance for
planning, preparation, and execution of actions aimed at rapidly
effecting necessary transformation in support of these core
competencies. See Addendum I (available at www.Army.mil) for more
information on the Army's focus areas.
train and equip soldiers and grow leaders
Our Army prepares every soldier to be a warrior. Our training
replicates the stark realities of the battlefield in order to condition
soldiers to react instinctively in combat. Such training is essential
to building soldiers' confidence in themselves, their equipment, their
leaders, and their fellow soldiers. Constant training in weaponry and
field craft, and a continuous immersion in the warrior culture, give
soldiers the skills they need to succeed on the battlefield. Mental and
physical toughness are paramount to the development of the warrior
ethos and apply to all soldiers from private to general. Every soldier
is called upon to be a leader.
The Soldier
The American soldier remains the centerpiece of our combat systems
and formations and is indispensable to the Joint Team. Adaptive,
confident, and competent soldiers, infused with the Army's values and
warrior culture, fight wars, and win the peace. As a warrior, every
soldier must be prepared to engage the enemy in close combat; the modem
battlefield has no safe areas. Our Army trains our soldiers to that
standard, without regard to their specialty or unit. The soldier--
fierce, disciplined, well-trained, well-led, and well-equipped
ultimately represents and enables the capabilities our Army provides to
the joint force and the Nation.
Our soldiers are bright, honest, dedicated, and totally committed
to the mission. All share common values, a creed and a warrior ethos.
Our Army defines selfless service as putting the welfare of our Nation,
Army and subordinates before your own. Soldiers join the Army to serve.
Most Americans do not fully realize the personal sacrifices these
soldiers and their families endure. However, our soldiers know that
they have done their part to secure our Nation's freedoms and to
maintain the American way of life.
Our Soldiers' Creed captures the warrior ethos and outlines the
professional attitudes and beliefs that characterize our American
soldier. The warrior ethos is about the refusal to accept failure and
the conviction that military service is much more than just another
job. It defines who soldiers are and what soldiers do. It is linked to
our long-standing Army values, and determination to do what is right
and do it with pride.
Recruiting and Retaining a High-Quality Volunteer Force
All of our soldiers are warriors whose actions have strategic
impact. Because we are at war and will be for the foreseeable future,
we must recruit soldiers who have the warrior ethos already ingrained
in their character, who seek to serve our Nation, and who will have the
endurance and commitment to stay the course of the conflict. We must
recruit and retain soldiers who are confident, adaptive, and competent
to handle the full complexity of 21st century warfare.
We will continue to bring the highest quality soldier into the
force. All newly enlisted soldiers are high school graduates (diploma
or equivalent) and 24 percent have some college. These young Americans,
who believe service to our Nation is paramount, make our success
possible. They display a willingness to stand up and make a difference.
Our recruiting and retention efforts continue to be successful. The
active Army met its recruiting and retention goals in fiscal year 2003.
The Army National Guard exceeded its retention goals for fiscal year
2003 and simultaneously met its end strength objectives. The Army
Reserve met its recruiting goals and all but one retention target in
fiscal year 2003. Most importantly, all components sustained their end
strength requirements.
We do not know yet the effect the high operational pace of recent
months will have on our recruiting and retention in fiscal year 2004
and future years. We must carefully monitor recruiting and retention
trends and adequately resource our successful recruiting and retention
initiatives. Incentives such as the Enlistment Bonus Program, The Army
College Fund, and the Loan Repayment Program, have successfully enabled
the Army to execute precision recruiting in fiscal year 2003. Our
Special Forces Candidate ``Off the Street'' initiative continues to
attract highly motivated and qualified warriors. Significantly,
Selective Reenlistment Bonuses, such as the Present Duty Assignment
Bonus and the Theater Selective Reenlistment Bonus, which are intended
to enhance unit stability, have helped us realize our retention
successes. For more information on recruiting, see Addendum C.
Civilian Component Enhances our Capabilities
Army civilians are an integral and vital part of our Army team.
They are essential to the readiness of our Army at war and our ability
to sustain operations. Our civilian employees share our Army values.
They are smart, resourceful, and totally committed to supporting our
soldiers and our Army to do whatever it takes to meet the challenges
that come our way. These dedicated civilians perform critical, mission-
essential duties in support of every functional facet of combat support
and combat service support, both at home and abroad. Army civilians
serve alongside soldiers to provide the critical skills necessary to
sustain combat systems and weaponry. They work in 54 countries in more
than 550 different occupations. In fiscal year 2003, nearly 2,000 Army
civilians deployed to southwest Asia in support of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and the global war on terrorism
(GWOT). They have the education, skills, and experience to accomplish
the mission while ensuring continuity of operations for all commanders.
Realistic Training--Essential to Mission Success
Tough, realistic training ensures that our soldiers and units
maintain readiness and relevance as critical members of the joint
force. Our Army's combined-arms training strategy, including an
appropriate mix of live, virtual, and constructive training, determines
the resource requirements to maintain the combat readiness of our
troops. We revised our training ammunition standards to allow Combat
Support and Combat Service Support units to conduct live fire exercises
under conditions similar to those they might encounter in combat.
The Army's tempo of operations (OPTEMPO) budget is among its top
priorities. Our leadership is committed to fully executing the active
and Reserve component ground and air OPTEMPO training strategies, which
include actual miles driven and hours flown, as well as virtual miles
associated with using simulators. The flying hour program is funded to
achieve a historic execution level of live flying hours per aircrew per
month. If units exceed the historic execution level, our Army will
increase their funding. Thus far this year, OPTEMPO execution reports
show units exceeding their programmed miles driven and hours flown.
These are the units that are aggressively preparing for deployments to
OIF and OEF, as well as the units who recently have returned and are
preparing for future operations. Our combined arms training strategy is
working and sustaining our warfighting readiness. We see the results
every day in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Joint and Expeditionary
Our Army is the dominant ground component of the Joint Team and
provides the Joint Force Commander a campaign quality force with unique
and complementary capabilities. We are vital and indispensable members
of the Joint Team first and are a Service second. We must remain aware
that our Army always conducts operations--offensive, defensive,
stability, and support--in a joint and expeditionary context. Acting in
concert with air and naval power, decisive land power creates a synergy
that produces a joint force with abilities far exceeding the sum of the
individual service components. Our Army can: support civil authorities
at home and abroad; provide expeditionary forces at the right time and
the right place; reassure our allies and multinational partners; deter
adversaries and, should deterrence fail, decisively defeat the enemy;
and win the peace through post-conflict operations, in concert with
interagency and multinational efforts. Our Army must continually
examine the capabilities resident in and required by the joint force.
We will concentrate our energies and resources on those attributes
which our Army is best suited to provide to the joint force. Our Army
will arrive on the battlefield as a campaign-quality force fulfilling
the requirements of the Joint Force Commander--lethal, agile, mobile,
strategically responsive, and fully interoperable with other components
within the interagency and multinational context.
Train and Educate Army Members of the Joint Force
Our Army is taking action across a broad front to make jointness an
integral part of our culture by including this concept in our education
and training programs. We have always produced leaders with the right
mix of unit experience, training, and education. As we look to the
future, we know that, to meet our current and future leadership
requirements and those of the joint force, we must redesign aspects of
our Army's training and leader development programs to include lessons
learned from current operations. Our objectives are to increase our
ability to think and act jointly and to provide our soldiers with the
latest and most relevant techniques, procedures and equipment that will
make them successful on the battlefield. Additionally, the changes
acknowledge the current and projected pace of operations and
deployments. As a result, we will be better prepared for the current
and future strategic environments.
Maintaining a ready Current Force today and achieving a transformed
Future Force tomorrow requires a shift in the way units train for joint
operations. Our Army's Training Transformation Initiative (TTI), which
supports the June 2003 Defense Department Training Transformation
Implementation Plan, provides dynamic, capabilities-based training and
mission rehearsal in a joint context.
Leader Development--Train for Certainty, Educate for Uncertainty
Leader development is an essential part of our Army's core
competencies and the lifeblood of our profession. It is the deliberate,
progressive and continuous process that develops our soldiers and
civilians into competent, confident, self-aware, adaptive, and decisive
leaders. They emerge prepared for the challenges of 21st century
combined arms, joint, multinational, and interagency operations.
Army leaders at all levels bear responsibility for America's
soldiers and accomplishing the mission, whatever it may be. The range
of missions and their complexity continue to grow, presenting our
leaders with even greater challenges than previously experienced. The
evolving strategic environment, the gravity of our strategic
responsibilities, and the broad range of tasks that the Army performs
require us to review, and periodically to refocus, the way we educate,
train and grow professional warfighters.
We have a training and leader development system that is unrivaled
in the world. Our professional military education prepared our officers
and noncommissioned officers to fight and win in Iraq and Afghanistan.
We will continue to develop our leaders with the right mix of
operational assignments and training and education opportunities that
meet the current and future requirements of the Army and joint forces.
Our leader training focuses on how to think, not what to think. We will
maintain our investment in the future by sustaining the highest quality
leader training and education for our Army.
Combat Training Centers (CTC)/Battle Command Training Program (BCTP)
The CTC program is a primary culture driver for our Army.
Additionally, our CTCs are a primary enabler of, and full participant
in, the Joint National Training Capability. The CTCs develop self-aware
and adaptive leaders and soldiers and ready units for full spectrum,
joint, interagency, and multinational operations. CTCs continuously
integrate operational lessons learned into the training. Our Army
enhances the training experience offered by our CTCs (National Training
Center in California, Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana,
Combat Maneuver Training Center in Germany and Battle Command Training
Program based in Kansas) by increasing the focus on development of
capabilities essential to joint operations. Leader training and
development during CTC exercises hone the joint and expeditionary
mindset and promote our Army's warrior culture.
provide relevant and ready land power capabilities to the combatant
commander and the joint team
To meet global commitments across the full spectrum of military
operations, our Army has mobilized more than 164,000 Reserve component
soldiers. More than 325,000 American soldiers are serving overseas and
more than 23,000 soldiers are supporting operations within the United
States. This high operating tempo is no longer an exception. Sustained
operations and deployments will be the norm for our Army forces
supporting multiple and simultaneous shaping and stability operations
around the globe. At the same time, we will continue to contribute to
joint force execution of major combat operations, homeland security
missions, and strategic deterrence.
Army Global Commitments
Our Army is engaged in more than 120 countries throughout the
world. To highlight our Army's commitment, a review of the major
warfighting formations of the active and Reserve component serves as a
measurable benchmark. Over 24 of the Army's 33 active component brigade
combat teams (BCTs), and 5 of our 15 Reserve component Enhanced
Separate Brigades (ESB) were deployed in fiscal year 2003. This trend
will continue in fiscal year 2004, with 26 of 33 active component BCTs
and 6 of our 15 Reserve component ESB brigades projected for
deployment.
The majority of these combat formations are deployed in the U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), effectively
executing stability and support operations. More than 153,000 soldiers
are supporting CENTCOM operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and the
Horn of Africa. We are currently in the middle of the largest movement
of troops since WWII, as we rotate more than eight-and-a-half divisions
and two ESBs to or from the theater. The approximate ratio of active to
Reserve component forces today is currently 63 to 37 percent,
respectively. Once our current rotation is complete, the ratio will
change to approximately 54 to 46 percent, active to Reserve component.
Since September 11, we have mobilized almost half of the Reserve
component. They are trained, professional, and ready to execute any
task.
Army support to other combatant commanders remains high. U.S.
Northern Command's (NORTHCOM) Army component, U.S. Army Forces Command,
provides more than 23,000 active and Reserve component soldiers for
duty in the defense of our homeland. These troops are available for
missions including Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA),
emergency preparedness, and antiterrorist operations. The Army Reserve
provides to NORTHCOM significant voice and data connectivity necessary
to execute real-time operations. U.S. European Command provides forces,
such as V U.S. Corps, to CENTCOM; and to Stability Force (SFOR) and
Kosovo Force (KFOR) in the Balkans. U.S. Pacific Command supports
ongoing operations in the Philippines, as part of the global war on
terrorism, in addition to maintaining more than 31,000 soldiers on the
Korean Peninsula. U.S. Southern Command is fully engaged as the
headquarters for 1,500 soldiers executing detainee operations at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; has deployed 740 soldiers to Joint Task Force--
Bravo at Soto Cano Airbase, Honduras; and is assisting the government
of Colombia in its war on narcoterrorism. U.S. Special Operations
Command's Army component provides professional, dedicated, and
specially trained soldiers to each combatant commander. These soldiers,
working closely with conventional forces, have been instrumental to our
success in the global war on terrorism. In addition to Federal
missions, our Army National Guard (ARNG) plays an important domestic
role, routinely responding to State emergencies. In fiscal year 2003,
there were 280 requests for emergency support, ranging from basic human
needs to engineering support during natural disasters. Our ARNG has
fielded 32 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Civil Support Teams (CST),
which assist first responders in the event of an incident. Another 12
CSTs are due to be activated within 18 months. To date, these teams
have responded to 74 different requests for support. Also, more than
8,000 ARNG soldiers have executed critical force protection duties at
148 Air Force installations in CONUS.
Resetting the Force
The extraordinary demands major combat and stability operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq are placing on our equipment and personnel require
that our Army quickly reset returning units for future national
security needs. The reset program will incorporate lessons learned from
OIF and OEF, retrain essential tasks, adjust prepositioned stocks of
equipment and ammunition, and bring unit equipment readiness back to
standard. The objective is to ensure our Army forces are ready to
respond to near-term emerging threats and contingencies. However, reset
cannot be viewed as a one-time event. Reset will continue to be key to
our future readiness as our military executes our national security
missions.
Through reset, all returning active duty and Army Reserve units
will achieve a sufficient level of combat readiness within 6 to 8
months of their arrival at home station. The Army National Guard will
take longer to achieve the desired level of readiness. The goal for
these units is to reestablish pre-deployment readiness within 1 year.
Our Army also will take advantage of reset as an opportunity to
reorganize units into modular designs that are more responsive to
regional combatant commanders' needs; that better employ joint
capabilities; that reduce deployment time; and that fight as self-
contained units in nonlinear, noncontiguous battlespaces. This effort
began with the 3rd Infantry Division and will soon be expanded to
include the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).
In addition to investing in new equipment to replace items that
were destroyed or worn out during combat and stability operations, the
reset program will repair major items used in OIF and OEF. Repair
requirements have been determined for all OIF I units and the workload
for this comprehensive effort is immense: about 1,000 aviation systems;
124,400 communications and electronics systems; 5,700 combat/tracked
vehicles; 45,700 wheeled vehicles; 1,400 missile systems; 9 Patriot
battalions; and approximately 232,200 items from various other systems.
This effort represents a significant expansion of normal maintenance
activities, requiring the increased use of continental United States
(CONUS) and outside the continental United States (OCONUS) based depot,
installation and commercial repair facilities.
Reconfiguring existing Army prepositioned stocks for global
coverage of potential missions is a major component of the reset
process. The intent is for each stock to have sufficient combat power
to meet the immediate threat, as well as enough materials to render
relief in other contingencies.
Congressional support, in the form of supplemental appropriations,
has been invaluable in beginning the reset effort. Our readiness
depends directly on the successful execution of the reset program, and
it will remain an ongoing priority for the foreseeable future.
Continued resourcing will be needed to ensure that our Army can fight
the current war and posture itself for future missions.
Transformation: Moving from the Current to the Future Force
The goals of Army transformation are to provide relevant and ready
forces that are organized, trained and equipped for full-spectrum
joint, interagency and multi-national operations and to support Future
Force development. Army transformation occurs within the larger context
of changes to the entire U.S. military. To support our Army staff in
the execution of transformation, the Army leadership directed the
establishment of an Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Futures
Center, operational as of October 2003.
Our current force is organized, trained and equipped to conduct
operations as part of the joint force. It provides the requisite
decisive land power capabilities that the Joint Force Commander needs
across the range of military operations: support to civil authorities
at home and abroad; expeditionary forces; the ability to reassure
friends, allies and multinational partners; dissuading and deterring
adversaries; decisively defeating adversaries should deterrence fail;
and winning the peace as part of an integrated, interagency, post-
conflict effort. Our future force is the operational force the Army
continuously seeks to become. Informed by national security and
Department of Defense guidance, it is a strategically responsive,
networked, precision capabilities-based maneuver force that is dominant
across the range of military operations envisioned for the future
global security environment.
As our Army develops the future force, it simultaneously is
accelerating select future doctrine, organization, training, materiel,
leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) capabilities into our
current force. This process will be fundamental to our success in
enhancing the relevance and readiness of our Army and prosecuting the
global war on terrorism. Similarly, the operational experience of our
current force directly informs the pursuit of future force
capabilities.
Balancing Current and Future Readiness
Balancing risk between current and future readiness remains a
critical part of our Army's transformation process and one that
requires continual assessment to ensure that plans and programs are
aligned with overall requirements. Without question, the issue of
current operational readiness is our Army's highest priority. During
the past several years, our Army made a conscious decision to accept a
reasonable degree of risk to the readiness of our current force in
order to permit investment in capabilities for our future force. This
risk came in the form of reductions in and limitations to modernization
and recapitalization programs. As part of the past four budget
submissions, our Army made difficult choices to cancel and restructure
programs, shifting resources to the development of transformational
capabilities. Some of these investments have already produced results:
for example, the new Stryker Brigade Combat Team formations now being
fielded, the first of which is currently deployed on the battlefield in
Iraq. Others are helping to develop emerging technologies and
capabilities that will be applied to our force throughout the coming
decade.
Besides the ongoing efforts related to equipping the current force,
our Army also has begun other major initiatives that will improve our
readiness and relevance in the future. These include an effort to
realign active and Reserve component units and capabilities, in order
to make our Army more readily deployable and available to Joint Force
Commanders; home-basing and unit-focused stability, which will improve
readiness and reduce personnel turbulence; and the reorganization of
Army units into more modular and capability-based organizations.
While the previous decisions to accept reasonable risk in our
current force were considered prudent at the time, the strategic and
operational environment has significantly changed in light of the
large-scale engagement of Army forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom and
other expeditionary operations. Ever-changing demands on our force,
coupled with our commitment to mitigating risk to our soldiers, have
necessitated re-examination and transformation of our Army's resource
process and business practices (see Addendum H at www.Army.mil).
Making the Resource Process More Responsive
The resource process is our Army's center of gravity. Without the
right people, the proper equipment, top-notch installations, and
adequate dollars to support all appropriately, our Army would not be
able to fulfill its duty to our Nation.
In order to maintain our premier warfighting capability, Army
resource processes must be flexible, dynamic, transparent, and
responsive to both our requirements and those of the joint force. This
is especially true in today's environment. We are at war against
conventional and unconventional enemies, and simultaneously pursuing
transformation. Our resource process must be transformed to allow us to
keep pace with changes brought on by the enemy. Though we anticipate
the battle against terrorism will last for years, possibly decades, we
cannot program and budget in advance for that war. Our Army obviously
cannot ignore our country's current security needs, yet it would be
equally imprudent to deviate from the development and fielding of our
Future Force. Balancing these requirements will be one of our toughest
tasks.
The GWOT requires a host of radical paradigm shifts in the way we
view the face and nature of our global operating environment, as well
as in the way that we conduct operations. Responsible yet creative
stewardship of our resources will remain absolutely necessary. Internal
controls must be tightened and waste eliminated; outsourcing non-core
functions is still an important option. Risk will continue to be a
factor and our resourcing decisions must take this into account.
We must transform our resource processes and adjust our priorities
to meet the challenge of the current strategic environment. Because we
cannot mass-produce a volunteer Army, the retention of the right
volunteer force is an imperative. This force is essential to the combat
effectiveness of an increasingly complex and technologically
sophisticated Army. We must refine and streamline the resource,
acquisition, and fielding processes for equipment and supplies, as we
cannot make up for lost time in a crisis.
Accelerated Acquisition and Fielding
We have adapted and continue to improve our acquisition and
fielding processes. In 2002, as soldiers reported equipment shortages
in Afghanistan and elsewhere, we implemented the Rapid Fielding
Initiative (RFI) to ensure that all of our troops deploy with the
latest available equipment. Equipment fielding schedules were revised
to support unit rotation plans, and procurement and fielding cycles
were radically compressed.
In coordination with field commanders and our soldiers, a list of
more than 40 mission-essential items, including the Advanced Combat
Helmet, close-combat optics, Global Positioning System receivers,
soldier intercoms and hydration systems, was identified for rapid
fielding. Laying the foundation for acquisition transformation, RFI
already has equipped nine BCTs. In fiscal year 2004, RFI will upgrade a
minimum of 18 BCTs and 8 ESBs, serving in OIF and OEF. Additionally, we
are accelerating fielding of select future capabilities to our current
force. These items include thermal weapon sights, enhanced night vision
goggles, improved body armor, the Future Combat Rifle, and a new sniper
rifle. Congressional support for regular budget and supplemental
spending requests enables our Army to put this improved equipment in
the hands of our soldiers.
With this support, our Army also has instituted a Rapid Equipping
Force (REF) that works directly with operational commanders to find
solutions to operational requirements. These solutions may be off-the-
shelf or near-term developmental items that can be made quickly
available. For example, the REF established a coordinated effort to
supply U.S. forces with immediate solutions to counter improvised
explosive device (IED) threats. Currently, IED teams are on location
providing expertise and material solutions, to safeguard our soldiers.
We are acting aggressively to improve the armor protection of our
armored and light-skinned vehicles. Other recent examples of REF
products are the Well-Cam and PackBots. The Well-Cam is a camera
attached to an Ethernet cable and a laptop that enabled soldiers in
Afghanistan to search wells for weapons caches. PackBots are
operational robots used to clear caves, buildings, and compounds so
soldiers are not unnecessarily put in harm's way.
RFI and REF provide timely support to our relevant and ready forces
and to the combatant commanders, and facilitate Army transformation.
Balancing our Active and Reserve Component Force Structure
Currently, neither our active nor Reserve component is optimized
for today's rapid deployability requirements. We will continue ongoing
efforts to restructure our forces in order to mitigate stress; to align
better with the current and projected security environments; and to
offer campaign-quality land power capabilities to the combatant
commanders. By doing so, we will ensure that our Army provides the
responsiveness and depth required to achieve strategic and operational
objectives, while simultaneously defending our homeland.
Our Army is restructuring and rebalancing more than 100,000
positions in our active and Reserve component force structure. These
conversions increase the active component capabilities available to
support the first 30 days of a rapid response operation. In response to
Secretary of Defense guidance, we have already completed approximately
10,000 positions. For example, the ARNG provisionally organized 18
additional military police (MP) companies. Between fiscal year 2004 and
fiscal year 2009, our Army will divest approximately 19,500 positions
of less frequently used active and Reserve component force structure to
further resource critical high demand units such as military police,
civil affairs, and Special Operations Forces. We project that future
rebalancing efforts will convert an additional 80,000 positions of
lower-priority force structure. Despite these changes, our Army will
remain stressed to meet anticipated requirements. To ensure that our
Army can fulfill its commitment to our Nation, we should have the force
capability level required to facilitate rebalancing, resetting,
restructuring, and transforming of the Army.
Military-to-civilian conversions are another way to improve
manpower efficiency. More military personnel will fill the operational
force if they are moved out of positions that can be prudently
performed by civilians. To improve the Army's ability to better support
worldwide commitments, it is essential to start this process now.
Our Reserve component relies heavily on full-time support (FTS)
personnel to sustain support of current contingencies while
restructuring the force. FTS personnel perform the vital, day-to-day
organizational, administrative, training and maintenance activities
that ensure the highest level of soldier and unit readiness. To
guarantee that our Army's Reserve component will continue to fulfill
ever-increasing demands with trained and ready units, our Army plans to
raise FTS authorizations by 15 percent, from the current level of
71,928 to 85,840, by fiscal year 2012. In 2003, the Army Reserve began
implementation of the Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative. The
goal is to better meet contingency requirements and to improve unit
readiness.
Achieving Greater Combat Capability with Modular, Capabilities-Based
Unit Designs
Modular units are interchangeable, scalable, and tailorable
formations, which provide the Joint Force Commander with a
strategically responsive force that greatly increases his ability to
defeat any adversary. Modularity enables us to tailor our capabilities
to the requirements of the situation and delivered at the right time
and the right place. Modularity permits the combatant commander to
optimize his warfighting tool set.
Moving toward independent, echelon-above-brigade headquarters will
enhance modularity. In accordance with our unit of employment (UE)
construct, a UE will provide the command-and-control structure into
which modular, capabilities-based units of action (UA) are organized to
meet combatant commander requirements. These UAs will incorporate
essential maintenance, intelligence, and communications functions
previously provided by higher-level organizations. Our UE headquarters,
while able to accept joint capabilities such as a standing joint force
headquarters element, will have an organic capability, depending on the
contingency, to function as a joint task force or joint force land
component command headquarters like we have already done in Afghanistan
and Iraq.
Force Stabilization
The great demands placed on our Army have forced us to re-examine
many of our long-standing personnel and basing practices. As a result,
our Army is transitioning to an improved manning system, designed to
augment unit readiness by increasing stability and predictability for
commanders, soldiers, and families. Force Stabilization will allow
Reserve component soldiers to plan for their deployments while
supporting their civilian jobs and their community commitments. It
places greater emphasis on building and sustaining cohesive,
deployable, combat-ready forces for combatant commanders.
The home-basing initiative keeps our soldiers in their assignments
at specific installations longer, thus reducing unit turbulence and
increasing unit cohesion. Unit focused stability synchronizes our
soldiers' assignments to their units' operational cycle, providing a
more capable, deployable, and prepared unit.
Installations as Our Flagships
Our installations are an essential component in maintaining the
premier Army in the world. For the warfighter, installations are the
platforms from which we project military power. Our installations
perform the following key missions: (1) provide effective training
facilities; (2) rapidly mobilize and deploy the force; (3) provide
reachback capabilities; (4) sustain and reconstitute the force; and (5)
care for our families. As power projection platforms, our installations
must be equipped with a robust information infrastructure that gives
the deployed commander quick and efficient reach-back capabilities. All
of these missions help to maintain our Army's deploy ability and
fighting edge.
Historically, we have accepted risk in our infrastructure and
installation services in order to maintain our current readiness. The
cumulative effect on our installations is that commanders rate more
than 50 percent of our facilities as ``adversely affecting mission and
training requirements.'' We have adjusted our management processes to
be more effective stewards of our resources. In 2002, we established
the Installation Management Agency (IMA) to create a corporate-focused
structure that provides efficient installation management worldwide.
The IMA uses creative management programs to sustain quality
installations and maintain the well-being of the entire Army family.
The Installation Information Infrastructure Modernization Program
(I3MP) enhances the installation's role in power projection and
provides the architecture to address the essential reach-back
requirement. Additionally, our Installation Sustainability Plan
addresses ways to fulfill environmental requirements without impacting
current or future training. Other important progress include
modernization of barracks and housing; a Residential Communities
Initiative; and divestiture of redundant facilities infrastructure and
non-core utility systems through privatization.
In the past few years, the administration and Congress have helped
us to begin addressing our infrastructure challenges. We requested 94
percent of funding required for sustainment of our installations in
fiscal year 2004. We have made progress in improving our installations
by adjusting existing programs and developing new management
strategies. However, there is much still left to do in order to upgrade
our installations to better support the mission, soldiers, and our
families.
Army Families and Well Being
People are the heart and soul of the Army--soldiers, civilians,
family members, and retirees. Our readiness is inextricably linked to
the well being of our people. The Army family, for both the active and
Reserve component, is a force multiplier and provides the foundation to
sustain our warrior culture. We have placed significant emphasis on our
Reserve component this year in recognition of their contributions to
the global war on terrorism. With the help of the administration and
Congress, many improvements have been made including the retention and
increase of Imminent Danger Pay, Family Separation Allowance, and a
sizable pay raise. Other key well-being initiatives include the Spousal
Employment Partnership, new TRICARE policies for the Reserve
components, and improvements in barracks and family housing. For more
information on other Army well-being initiatives, see Addendum D
(available at www.Army.mil)
Introducing New Capabilities into Current Force
While at war, the urgency to accelerate the development and
fielding of new and enhanced capabilities to our fighting forces in the
field has never been greater. Our Army is making significant strides in
this regard with the employment of a new brigade combat team
organization, equipped with the latest available technology, to provide
the combatant commander with enhanced warfighting capabilities. The
rapid fielding of the Stryker vehicle demonstrates our Army's ability
to use the acquisition and resource processes to meet a combatant
commander's urgent needs.
Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT)
In 2003, our Army deployed our first SBCT, the 3rd Brigade, 2nd
Infantry Division, to Operation Iraqi Freedom, delivering its enhanced
capability to the joint force in record time: 4 years from broad
concept to deployment. Exceptional support from Congress and the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, along with close collaboration between the
Army and industry, made this achievement possible.
Stryker brigades are our Army's first truly network-centric force,
filling the capability gap between light- and heavy-force units with
infantry-rich, mobile force that is strategically responsive,
tactically agile, and more lethal. Improved battlespace awareness and
battle-command technologies embedded in our SBCTs enhance combat
effectiveness and survivability by integrating data from manned and
unmanned air and ground-based sensors and providing real-time,
continuous situational understanding. Planned enhancements will
incorporate still-developing technologies. Significantly, our SBCTs
will improve our Army's understanding of future force processes,
helping us to formulate an advanced warfighting doctrine that will
serve as an important bridge to the development of our unit of action,
the structural foundation of our future force.
This spring, our second SECT at Fort Lewis, Washington, will become
operational. Our third SECT, in Alaska, will be available in 2005.
Continued OSD and congressional support will ensure that subsequent
brigades in Hawaii, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania, are fielded between
2004 and 2008.
Future Capabilities
Our Army plans to field a number of systems this decade that will
provide a foundation for informing the transformation of our current
force capabilities into those needed by our future force. Once fielded,
these systems will perform as interdependent systems of systems and
will greatly enhance joint warfighting capabilities. Our future
capabilities programs are designed to enhance the campaign-quality
land-power capabilities that we provide to the combatant commanders.
Our programs undergo continuous reviews to ensure they meet the
capability requirements of the joint force. When required, we
restructure programs, revise requirements and reprogram resources. The
following are just a few of the key transformational systems our Army
will begin to field during the next 6 years:
The Network. Our future force situational dominance will depend
upon a comprehensive, ubiquitous, and joint-interoperable command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) architecture (the Network) that enables the
Joint Force Commander to conduct fully interdependent and network-
centric warfare. The network will provide the backbone of our future
force and the future joint force, enabling the maneuver commander to
effectively coordinate battlefield effects. Some of the more important
systems within our network include:
Warfighter Information Network--Tactical (WIN-T). WIN-
T will be the communications network of our future force,
optimized for offensive and joint operations, while providing
the combatant commander the capability to perform multiple
missions simultaneously.
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS). JTRS is a family
of common, software-defined, programmable radios that will
become our Army's primary tactical radio for mobile
communications.
Distributed Common Ground System--Army (DCGS-A). DCGS-
A is a single, integrated, ground-based, ISR processing system
composed of joint, common hardware and software components and
is part of the DOD DCGS family of systems.
Aerial Common Sensor (ACS). This ISR system and
platform will use robust sensor-to-shooter and reach links,
(such as DCGS-A ground stations), to provide commanders at
every echelon the tailored, multi-sensor intelligence required
for joint operations.
Future Combat Systems (FCS). By extending the network capabilities
into the unit of action, the FCS provide a system of systems capability
that was not previously available to soldiers and commanders in joint
operations. The core of our future force's maneuver unit of action is
the Future Combat Systems, comprised of 18 manned and unmanned
platforms that are centered around the soldier and integrated within a
C\4\ISR network. FCS will provide our soldiers greatly enhanced
situational awareness, enabling them to see first, understand first,
act first, and finish decisively. Our FCS platforms will offer the
joint force networked, lethal direct fire; indirect fire; air defense;
complementary non-lethal fires and effects; and troop transport
capability. In May 2003, FCS moved, on schedule, into the system
development and demonstration phase. Our Army is aggressively managing
our FCS development effort and intends to achieve initial operational
capability by the end of the decade.
Army Science and Technology
The Army Science and Technology (S&T) program provides our Army
superiority in both human and materiel systems arenas--preventing
technological surprise. The Army S&T program retains a dynamic
portfolio of investments that are responsive to warfighter needs today
and into the future. The priority for Army S&T is to pursue paradigm-
shifting technologies that can alter the nature of the military
competition to our advantage in the future and, where feasible, to
exploit opportunities to accelerate the transition of proven
technologies to our current force.
The Army S&T program exploits technology developments from the
other services, defense agencies, and commercial industry as well as
international communities. The S&T program focuses on technology
relevant to our Army and joint capabilities. It synchronizes
operational concepts development and acquisition programs through
transformational business practices that speed technology fielding to
the soldier. The Army's S&T program is balanced to satisfy the high
payoff needs of the future force while seeking rapid transitions for
critical capabilities to our current force.
Joint Operational Concepts (JOpsC)
The joint force has transitioned from independent, de-conflicted
operations to sustained interoperability. It must now shift rapidly to
joint interdependence. To that end, we are reviewing training
requirements, traditional relationships and developmental and
institutional programs. This process includes ensuring that our
operational concepts are nested inside those employed by the joint
force. The concepts and initiatives listed below discuss particular
Army emphasis areas; these areas are not all-inclusive. Functional
concepts and other Army initiatives that support the JOpsC are
discussed in detail in Addendum J (available at www.Army.mil).
Actionable Intelligence
Our Army also is focused on attaining actionable intelligence--
intelligence that provides situational understanding to commanders and
soldiers with the speed, accuracy, and confidence necessary to
influence favorably current and future operations. Actionable
intelligence achieves its intended purpose of empowering greater
individual initiative and self-synchronization among tactical units by
fusing information across organizations and echelons--accelerating the
speed of decisionmaking and the agility of operations.
Focused Logistics
Our Army's current actions around the world in support of the
global war on terrorism present a view of future military operations
and provide valuable insights as we transform our logistics systems
from the current to the future force. The successes enjoyed during OIF
were the result of the integrated logistics team of soldiers,
civilians, and contractors, all of who developed innovative solutions
to a range of challenges caused by four major capability gaps in the
current logistics system. To sustain combat power, our Army must have
the ability to ``see the requirements'' on-demand through a logistics
data network. We require a responsive distribution system, enabled by
in-transit and total-asset visibility and managed by a single owner who
has positive end-to-end control in the theater. Our Army needs a
robust, modular, force-reception capability--a dedicated and trained
organization able to quickly open a theater and support continuous
sustainment throughout the joint operations area. Lastly, we need an
integrated supply chain that has a single proponent, who can reach
across the breadth and depth of resources in a joint, interagency, and
multinational theater. As we move from the current force to the future
force, we will build confidence in the minds of the combatant
commanders by delivering sustainment on time, every time.
a commitment to our nation
Our Nation and our Army are engaged in a global war on terrorism--a
war of survival against an insidious and cruel enemy that threatens our
civilization and our way of life. This enemy is actively targeting the
interests of America and our allies, both within our own country and
abroad.
Defeating this enemy require the continued, strong support of our
Nation. The steadfastness of our Nation in this effort is readily
apparent. Ordinary Americans are doing their part and will continue to
do so. Congressional support for our troops has been critical to our
success. The industrial base also has responded, accelerating
production of items essential to our soldiers' protection and
warfighting ability.
Our Army, too, remains committed to its heritage of preserving
freedom. American soldiers display unrelenting tenacity, steadfast
purpose, quiet confidence, and selfless heroism. For America to survive
and flourish throughout the 21st century, our Army must defeat
decisively the threats that challenge us today. To accomplish this
essential task, we must recognize some important truths.
The fight against terror will be a long one
Our Army must simultaneously deter aggression, defeat
the forces of international terrorism, and maintain our
campaign qualities
We must continue to modernize to meet the challenges
of our future
Our operational tempo is high and will remain so
Sustained operations and deployments will be the norm
for our soldiers--NOT the exception
Old rules and operational methods may no longer apply;
we will not achieve victory with a business-as-usual approach
Congressional backing for reset, our continued transformation to
the future force, our rebalancing and restructuring of the active and
Reserve component, and improvements to our installation infrastructure
is essential to continued mission readiness. We fully appreciate the
exceptional support members and their staffs provided this past year.
The support of the American people and their elected representatives in
the United States Congress is essential.
Our Army's commitment to the future is certain. We will continue to
provide our Nation, the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the
combatant commanders a unique set of core competencies and
capabilities. We remain dedicated to training and equipping our
soldiers and growing leaders. We will continue to deliver relevant and
ready land power to the combatant commanders and the joint force. We
will protect our country and our way of life as we have for 228 years.
It is our privilege, our duty, and our honor to do so.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Secretary Brownlee, for an
excellent opening statement.
Secretary England.
STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON R. ENGLAND, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Secretary England. Senator, thank you very much. I know
time is short, so I'll keep my remarks also very short.
First, I do want to thank the committee for confirming me
the second time and allowing me to come back to have this great
privilege and honor, of course to appear before this committee,
but to serve our men and women in uniform, our sailors and
marines. They are absolutely magnificent. I am convinced this
is the finest naval force the world has ever seen, and I thank
this committee for your great support, because without your
support we would not have the ability that we have to defend
freedom and liberty that we all so cherish in this country. So
I thank you.
I am pleased to report that the naval forces we are
deploying today and that we plan to deploy for the future,
which is contained in our fiscal year 2005 budget request, are
vastly different, and they're also vastly better than what I
reported during my first committee discussion here about 2
years ago. I can tell you that naval transformation is well
underway. It is reflected in our budget, and it is crucially
important as we move forward into the future. So I would
appreciate your support.
I do want you to know that the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO), the Commandant, and myself are committed to being very
effective and also very efficient. So you will see, in this
budget, a continuation of the past 2 years, where we have
continued to move money from what I call the ``back end of the
business'' into our weapon systems. We continue to be more
effective. We work very hard to be good stewards of our
citizens' money, and we continue that, and you will see that
reflected in the 2005 budget.
I do want to comment that people are, indeed, our most
important asset. While we have a lot of requests in the budget,
in terms of weapon systems, people are our most important
asset. We are a strong, well-trained, and highly-motivated
combat-ready force. I would like you to know that retention
across the Department of the Navy is at record levels. So we
are retaining our people, they want to serve in our naval
forces, they want to serve our country, and our recruiting
continues to be robust. We have the very best people, our
morale is very high, and they are pleased to deploy, and defend
and protect this great Nation.
As I sit here today, the naval forces continue to
demonstrate their value to our Nation. We are today redeploying
our marines to Iraq, also our naval forces, as part of
Operation Iraqi Freedom II. Of course, with what's happened in
the last few days, our Marine Forces are now also in Haiti. The
Navy-Marine Corps team is a force in readiness. We are
prepared, at any time, to support our Nation, whenever,
wherever.
So ladies and gentlemen of this very important committee,
I, again, thank you for the opportunity to be here. I thank you
earnestly for the opportunity to again serve my Nation as the
Secretary of the Navy. Our sailors, our marines, and their
families are proud to serve this Nation, and I am privileged
and proud to serve them. I'm also privileged and proud to serve
with the other secretaries here today, and specifically with
our great CNO and our magnificent commandant.
So it's a pleasure being with you today. Thank you for your
support, and I do look forward to your questions and
discussion.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Secretary England follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Gordon R. England
value to our nation--the navy/marine corps team
I. Introduction
During my last appearance before this committee in February 2002
and as reported in that statement, the Navy and Marine Corps
contributions in the ``War Against Terrorism'' have been significant
and important in the overall success of U.S. military forces. This
continues to hold true today. Our Navy and Marine Corps team projects
decisive, persistent, joint power across the globe, in continuing to
prosecute the war on terrorism.
Projecting power and influence from the sea is the enduring and
unique contribution of the Navy and Marine Corps to national security.
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) demonstrated the strategic agility and
operational flexibility that forward deployed naval expeditionary
forces provide. This committee's support has been vital for the Navy
and Marine Corps team to exploit the access afforded by the seas and to
respond to the full spectrum of contingencies. Congressional support
has led to increased readiness which was proven in OIF, where dispersed
military forces networked together fought as a single, highly
coordinated joint team.
Naval warfare will continue its progression to operate in a joint
environment in responding to new threats and to the increased
asymmetric capabilities of our enemies. We will be bold and continue to
develop new capabilities and concepts, and fund them in quantities that
are relevant to tomorrow's emerging threats. We have embraced
transformation. We are addressing the challenge to operationalize our
vision, Naval Power 21, with technological, organizational, and
doctrinal transformation.
The following statement highlights key elements of the fiscal year
2005 President's budget applicable to the Department of the Navy (DON)
within the balanced scorecard approach of managing operational,
institutional, force management, and future challenges risks.
II. Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Priorities--Underway with Naval Power 21.
The fiscal year 2005 Department of the Navy budget fulfills our
essential warfighting requirements. We are resourced to fight and win
our Nation's wars and our number one priority, the war against
terrorism, is reflected across each allocation. Additionally, we
continue to invest in future technologies and capabilities that are
part of a broader joint warfighting perspective. The Navy and Marine
Corps are continuously working with other Services to draw on the
capabilities of each Service, to eliminate redundancy in acquisition,
and create higher levels of military effectiveness. A prime example is
our agreement with the Department of the Air Force to merge our two
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) programs into a single program that
will produce a common family of radios for use aboard our ships,
submarines, and aircraft. The following summarizes the fiscal year 2005
budget request priorities for the Department of the Navy:
Personnel Salary and Benefits
Smart, motivated, and capable people are a key element to any
successful transformation effort. Our Navy and Marine Corps are
increasingly a technologically advanced maritime force and we are in
competition with the private sector to attract and retain the best men
and women we can find. Accordingly, our budget includes a 3.5 percent
basic pay raise for all military personnel. Additionally, housing
allowances have been increased to buy down out-of-pocket housing
expenses for our military personnel. Concurrent with this commitment to
provide an appropriate level of pay and benefits to our sailors,
marines, and their families is a responsibility to operate this
Department as efficiently and effectively as possible. While we want
the best people we can get to serve in the Navy and Marine Corps, we
don't want a single person more than we need to properly operate the
force. Job satisfaction comes not only just from compensation, but also
from meaningful service--we owe it to our people to ensure that they
are given duties and equipment appropriate to a volunteer force.
Operations and Maintenance
The operations and maintenance accounts are funded with over a $2
billion increase. The present environment requires naval forces to be
both forward deployed and capable of surging when called. This account
will help develop the transformational Fleet Response Plan (FRP). This
is the means to institutionalize the capability to maintain a more
responsive force that is ready to surge, more efficient to maintain,
and able to reconstitute rapidly.
Shipbuilding Account
The Department's shipbuilding plan supports our transformational
vision and increases the number of new construction ships from seven in
fiscal year 2004 to nine in fiscal year 2005 plus one SSBN Engineered
Refueling Overhaul (ERO). Initial LCS and DD(X) platforms are funded
from the RDT&E account. Additionally, the Navy's fiscal year 2005
spending plan completes the purchases of the last 3 DDG-51 class ships
for a total of 62 ships.
Aviation Account
The Department's fiscal year 2005 budget request is structured to
maintain the continued aviation superiority of the Navy and Marine
Corps. The naval aircraft procurement plan emphasizes replacing costly
stand-alone legacy platforms with more efficient and capable integrated
systems. The number of aircraft requested increases from 99 in fiscal
year 2004 to 104 in fiscal year 2005 which includes 5 VXX helicopters.
The budget continues to maximize the return on procurement dollars,
primarily through the use of multi-year procurement (MYP) for the F/A-
18E/F, the E-2C, the MH-60S, and the KC-130J programs. Development
funding is provided for Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), MV-22, AH-1Z/UH-1Y,
CH-53X, EA-18G, and the Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA). The
budget reflects an amended acquisition strategy for the V-22 to fund
interoperability issues and cost reduction initiatives.
Munitions Account
During OEF and OIF, the Department expended less precision ordnance
than projected. In this environment, the precision munitions purchases
for fiscal year 2005 have been decreased for JDAMs and LGBs. This
decrease in procurement provides no increased risk to the DON but
merely reflects the lower utilization rates of expended ordnance.
RDT&E Account
An increase of $1.4 billion reflects our commitment to future
transformational capabilities and technology insertion for major
platforms including DD(X), LCS, CVN-21, V-22, Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF), Advanced Hawkeye (AHE), and MMA. As demonstrated in recent
operations, our naval forces have been able to project overwhelming
combat power because they are technologically superior. We continue to
sustain a robust RDT&E effort as we transform the Navy and Marine Corps
to the next generation of combat systems.
Effectiveness and Efficiency
A guiding principle in all we do is improving effectiveness to gain
efficiency. The very best organizations are the most efficient
organizations. If you are very efficient, you incorporate technology
more quickly, you can develop new systems and capabilities, and you can
bring them on line faster. Underlying all of the previous accounts and
our execution of them is a continuing and concerted focus to achieve
the most efficient organization. The Fleet Response Plan, TacAir
Integration, and establishment of the Commander Naval Installations are
a few of our initiatives to improve effectiveness within the
Department.
Our objective for the fiscal year 2005 budget request is to move
forward with Naval Power 21. This budget builds upon the foundation
laid in the fiscal year 2004 program and reaffirms our commitment to
remain globally engaged today while developing future technology to
ensure our future military superiority. We are also continuing to
emphasize the Department's commitment in the areas of combat
capability, people, technology insertion and improved business
practices. With our fiscal year 2005 budget request we are committed to
executing this vision.
III. Calendar Year 2003 Operational Successes (A Nation at war)
The extraordinary capability of our joint forces to project power
around the world in support of vital national objectives was
demonstrated over the last year. The maritime contribution to our
success in the defeat of Saddam Hussein's Baathist forces, as well as
in support of other joint engagements in the global war on terrorism,
was significant. The rapid deployment and the warfighting capability of
your naval force in the liberation of Iraq provided an example of the
importance of readiness and the responsive capabilities to support our
Nation's objectives in an era of unpredictability and uncertainty. The
demonstrated importance of our multi-dimensional naval dominance, our
expeditionary nature, our ability to deal with complex challenges, and
adaptability of our forces are illustrative of the high level of return
on investment of your naval force.
The accomplishments of this past year tell the naval forces
readiness story and its return on investment. The ships, aircraft,
weapon systems, and readiness you funded provided our sailors and
marines the tools necessary to remain the premiere maritime and
expeditionary combat ready force. In preparing for and conducting
operations in the Iraq theater, speed of expeditionary operations and
sustainment were important military competencies. Naval forces applied
dominant, persistent, decisive, and lethal offensive power in support
of coalition warfighting objectives. The speed, agility, flexibility,
and persistence of naval combat capability helped end a regime of
terror and liberate a people during OIF.
The past year has been one of significant accomplishment. Our men
and women operating in the air, on and under the sea, and on the ground
are at the leading edge in the global war on terrorism. As in OEF, we
once again have demonstrated naval forces' unique value in contributing
to the security of our Nation and our friends and allies.
During OIF, more than 50 percent of our force was
forward deployed. The deployment of seven Carrier Strike Groups
(CSGs) and eight large deck amphibious ships proved our ability
to be both a surge and a rotational force demonstrating our
flexibility and responsiveness.
Navy and Marine Corps aircraft flew more than 8,000
sorties and delivered nearly 9,000 precision-guided munitions.
Over 800 Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired from 35
coalition ships, one-third of which were launched from
submarines. The highest number of TLAMs launched in 1 day
occurred on March 21, 2003--nearly 400 Tomahawks.
Navy Special Forces, MCM, Explosive Ordnance Disposal
(EOD), and coalition counterparts cleared more than 900 square
miles of water, ensuring the safe passage of critical
humanitarian relief supplies to the Iraqi people.
Marines from the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF),
supported by Sea Basing concepts, made one of the swiftest
combat advances in history. They fought 10 major engagements,
destroying 9 Iraqi divisions in the 450 mile advance into Iraq.
Eleven Maritime Prepositioned Force (MPF) ships
provided equipment and sustainment for over 34,000 marines and
sailors and 14 amphibious ships embarked and delivered another
12,000 marines and sailors and their equipment.
Since the end of major combat operations, naval forces have been
instrumental in supporting the coalition's goals of security,
prosperity and democracy in Iraq. Coalition maritime forces have
diligently supported the United Nations Security Council Resolution
1483. They have queried over 6,000 vessels, boarded close to 3,500 and
diverted approximately 430. These forces have confiscated and returned
to the Iraqi people approximately 60,000 barrels of fuel. Additionally,
seaward protection of the Al Basara Oil Terminal (ABOT) is enabling the
generation of critically needed oil revenue. Since re-opening, the ABOT
has pumped 261,500,000 barrels of oil valued at over $7.5 billion.
Navy Seabees and Marine Engineers, as the I MEF Engineer Group,
undertook construction initiatives that built and repaired major
roadways and bridges, and completed major utility restoration projects.
In all, 150 projects valued at $7.1 million were completed.
Naval EOD forces are working with Army counterparts in support of
the coalition forces and Iraqi Police and are collecting over 2,000
pounds of unexploded ordnance per week.
iv. navy and marine corps today (current readiness)
Today's naval forces exist to control the seas, assure access, and
project power beyond the sea to influence events and advance American
interests. Navy and Marine Corps forces continue to lead the way to
secure the peace by responding with speed, agility, and flexibility.
The value of naval forces continues to be demonstrated through the
projection of decisive, persistent, joint power across the globe. The
investment in training, maintenance, parts, ordnance, flying hours,
steaming days, and combat ready days coupled with our forward presence
and our ability to surge has positioned naval forces as the most
effective and efficient military force.
Congress' investment in readiness over the past several years has
paid large dividends for naval forces during OIF. With combat forces
operating in two fronts in the GWOT our readiness investments have
resulted in enhanced naval forces ready to strike on a moment's notice,
anywhere, anytime. Our success in deploying 9 out of 12 aircraft
carriers and 10 out of 12 big deck amphibious ships to major combat
areas of operation in demanding environments is attributable to the
continued improvements in current readiness.
The Department is in the process of re-deploying Navy and Marine
Forces in preparation for Operation Iraqi Freedom II. Navy and Marine
Forces will deploy in two 7-month rotations with the first beginning
this month. This initial ground rotation will include about 25,000
marines, 3,500 marine reservists, over 5,000 active duty Navy, and 800
naval reservists.
Since the return of our forces from OIF we have invested heavily in
constituting the Navy and Marine Corps team for the next fight.
Continued successful programmed investment will ensure we have the most
capable forces to face the unique challenges ahead. The fiscal year
2005 budget continues a broad range of modernization and readiness
initiatives for naval forces.
Acquisition Programs
The Fleet and Marine Forces continue to take delivery of the most
sophisticated weapon systems in the world. In 2003, the Navy launched
the first of two new classes of ships, U.S.S. Virginia (SSN 774) and
U.S.S. San Antonio (LPD 17), commissioned the aircraft carrier U.S.S.
Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), and continued timely delivery of the Arleigh
Burke class guided missile destroyers and F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets.
We are continuing to build on previous budgets to ensure we equip
and train our forces to help us continue to meet the challenges of the
future. What the DON budget will buy to advance our vision in Naval
Power 21:
Shipbuilding
The fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2009 shipbuilding rate of 9.6
battle force ships per year is up from 8.4 battle force ships per year
for the same period in fiscal year 2004. The fiscal year 2005 budget
request closes the procurement gap and with the exception of a slight
reduction in fiscal year 2006, provides an upward trend through the
FYDP, procuring 17 battle force ships by fiscal year 2009. The fiscal
year 2005 to fiscal year 2009 investment is an average of $13 billion
per year in new construction. The fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2009
plan also procures three Maritime Pre-positioned Force (Future) (MPF
(F)) ships and a MPF (F) aviation variant. While our build rate drops
to six in fiscal year 2006, this is a reflection of a shift to the next
generation surface combatants and sea basing capabilities.
The Navy has nine new ships and one SSBN refueling requested in the
fiscal year 2005 budget, as well as substantial shipyard/conversion
work. This investment includes:
Three DDGs ($3.4 billion)
One Virginia class submarine SSN-774 ($2.5 billion)
One LPD-17 ($967 million)
Two T-AKE ($768 million)
One DD (X) ($221 million) (RDT&E funded)
One Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) ($108 million) (RDT&E
funded)
One SSBN conversion/refueling ($334 million)
Fiscal year 2005 marks the final year of DDG 51 procurement,
bringing to closure a 10-ship fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2005 MYP
contract awarded in fiscal year 2002. The Navy will move to the DD(X)
and LCS hulls as quickly as possible. In addition to vitally needed new
capability, these ships will increase future shipbuilding rates.
Investment in these platforms will also help maintain critical
industrial bases.
The Department is modernizing its existing submarine with the
latest technology while, at the same time, continuing to replace aging
fast attack submarines with the new Virginia class submarine. The
Virginia class design is complete and the lead ship (SSN 774), will
commission on schedule. Fiscal year 2004 funded the first of five
Virginia class submarines under a MYP contract. The second submarine of
the MYP contract is funded in fiscal year 2005. Consistent with
congressional approval of 5 year-five ship MYP authority (fiscal year
2004 to fiscal year 2008) for SSN 774, the Navy is maintaining one
submarine per year through fiscal year 2008.
The DON accelerated one LPD from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year
2005 leveraging fiscal year 2004 advanced procurement resources
provided by Congress. The lead ship detail design has been completed
and lead ship construction is over 80 percent complete with a
successful launch in July 2003. Production effort is focused on a
November delivery. The LPD 17 class ship represents our commitment to a
modernized expeditionary fleet.
The fiscal year 2005 budget request also provides for procurement
of two auxiliary cargo and ammunition ships (T-AKEs) in the National
Defense Sealift Fund. These will be the seventh and eighth ships of the
class. Lastly, the fiscal year 2005 budget request accelerates the lead
MPF (F) from fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2007 to reflect an
emphasis on sea basing capabilities.
DD(X) is a centerpiece to the transformational 21st century Navy
and will play a key role in the Naval Power 21 strategic concept. This
advanced warship will provide credible forward naval presence while
operating independently or as an integral part of naval expeditionary
forces. The DD(X) lead ship design and initial construction contract
will be awarded in fiscal year 2005.
Conversion and Modernization
The fiscal year 2005 budget request proposes advanced procurement
funds for the U.S.S. Carl Vinson (CVN 70) Refueling Complex Overhaul
(RCOH), now scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2006. CVN 70 has
sufficient reactor fuel for one additional surge deployment.
Funding for the Ticonderoga class cruiser modernization effort
began in fiscal year 2004 and continues in fiscal year 2005. The
cruiser modernization effort will substantially increase the service
life and capability of CG 47 class ships. The conversion will reduce
combat system and computer maintenance costs, replace obsolete combat
systems, and extend mission relevance service life. Fiscal year 2005
will fund advanced procurement items for the first cruiser
modernization availability in fiscal year 2006.
Funding is included in fiscal year 2005 to complete the conversion
of the third and the overhaul of the fourth hull of four Ohio class
SSBNs to SSGNs. The SSGN conversion provides a covert conventional
strike platform capable of carrying up to 154 Tomahawk missiles. The
fiscal year 2006 budget request will complete the conversion of the
last SSGN. All four of these transformed platforms will be operational
by calendar year 2007.
Aircraft Production
Consistent with the fiscal year 2004 program, the fiscal year 2005
budget request reflects continued emphasis on re-capitalizing our aging
aircraft. Our focused efforts to aggressively ``shore up'' operational
readiness by providing requisite funding for our Flying Hour Program,
Ship Depot Maintenance, Ship Operations, and Sustainment, Re-
capitalization, and Modernization accounts continue. While we continue
to make substantial investments in readiness accounts and working
capital accounts, we identified the resources to procure 104 aircraft
in fiscal year 2005. The Department's aircraft procurement plan
emphasizes replacing costly legacy platforms with more efficient and
capable integrated systems. This has resulted in significant
investments in transformational aircraft and program investments across
the spectrum of aviation capabilities. Such valuable investments in
more capable aircraft have allowed a reduction of 40 aircraft from
fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2009.
During the past year, we continued to enjoy the fruits of our
aviation investments with the successful first deployment and
operational employment of the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet in support of
OIF. Highly praised for tactical capability and platform reliability,
the F/A-18 E/F program has been funded to provide a transformational
radar, helmet mounted sight, advanced targeting pod and integrated
weapons system improvements. Additionally, we recently awarded a second
MYP contract that includes the EA-18G airframe to replace the Navy's
aging EA-6B beginning in fiscal year 2009.
All helicopter missions continue to be consolidated into the MH-60R
and MH-60S airframes. These helicopter platforms are the cornerstone of
Navy helicopter concept of operations designed to support the CSG and
ESG in various mission areas.
The Department significantly increases the funding requested for
MMA. MMA will provide the Navy with strategic blue water and littoral
capability by re-capitalizing the P-3 Maritime Patrol Aircraft broad
area anti-submarine, anti-surface, maritime and littoral Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability.
Progress continues towards delivering a high-quality aircraft to
the Marines and Special Forces including increasing capability and
interoperability of the aircraft, investing to reduce production costs,
and maximizing production efficiency. Since the resumption of V-22
flight-testing, in May 2002, the V-22 is satisfying the threshold
levels for all its key performance parameters and reliability and
maintainability measures. V-22 test pilots have recorded more than
1,100 flight hours since that time. The V-22 program will continue Low
Rate Initial Production (LRIP) until the Milestone III decision
expected late calendar year 2005.
The Department will continue to procure the AH-1Z/UH-1Y. These
aircraft meet the Marine Corps' attack and utility helicopter
requirements by providing increased aircraft agility, airspeed, range,
and mission payload. They provide numerous capability improvements for
the Marine Corps, including increased payload, range and time on
station, improved sensors and lethality, and 85 percent component
commonality. The KC-130J MYP is funded and supported in this budget.
The advantages include an all digital cockpit that reduce aircrew
manning requirements, a new propulsion system that provides more cargo
capability, and increased fuel delivery.
Mine Warfare Programs
In keeping with the Department's goal to achieve an organic mine
warfare capability in 2005, the budget request supports the development
and procurement of five organic airborne systems integrated into the
MH-60S helicopter: the AQS-20A Mine-hunting System, the Airborne Laser
Mine Detection System (ALMDS), the Airborne Mine Neutralization System
(AMNS), the Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System (RAMICS), and the
Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep (OASIS) system. The fiscal
year 2005 budget request also supports the development and procurement
of the Remote Minehunting System (RMS) integrated into DDG-51 hulls 91-
96, and the Long-term Mine Reconnaissance System (LMRS) integrated into
SSN-688. The ALMDS, AQS-20A, and RMS will reach an initial operating
capability in fiscal year 2005. The budget request supports the
transition of assault breaching technologies into acquisition, which
will provide a capability to detect, avoid, and defeat mines and
obstacles in the surf and craft landing zones. In fiscal year 2005, we
will continue with our Surface Mine Countermeasures (MCM) mid-life
upgrade plan. We have initiated a product improvement program for the
engines of the MCM-1 Avenger class mine countermeasure ships to enhance
their reliability and availability. We are upgrading our minesweeping
capability with new acoustic generators and magnetic sweep cables, and
have programmed resources to replace our maintenance-intensive mine
neutralization system (AN/SLQ-48) with an expendable mine
neutralization system.
Munitions
The Standard Missile (SM) program replaces ineffective, obsolete
inventories with the procurement of more capable SM-2 Block IIIB
missiles. The Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) program continues
procurement of the improved guided missile launching system and the
upgraded Block I missile, providing an enhanced guidance capability
along with a helicopter, air and surface mode. In addition to SM and
RAM, the fiscal year 2005 budget request provides funding to continue
production of the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) and will support
the first Full Rate Production (FRP) contract award of 82 U.S. and 288
international missiles. We have committed to replenish our precision
munitions inventories and to do so, we will utilize a 5-year MYP to
maximize the quantity of Tomahawk missiles procured.
Marine Corps Expeditionary Capability
The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), formerly the Advanced
Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV), will provide surface assault
elements the requisite operational and tactical mobility to exploit
opportunities in support of joint operations. The EFV will be capable
of carrying a reinforced Marine rifle squad at speeds in excess of 20
nautical miles per hour from over the horizon in sea state three. Once
ashore, the EFV will provide Marine maneuver units with a world-class
armored personnel carrier designed to meet the threats of the future.
Production representative vehicle procurement occurred in fiscal year
2003 and will deliver in fiscal year 2005. IOC will be released in
fiscal year 2008 and FOC in 2018.
Also critical to Marine Corps transformation efforts is the Joint
Lightweight 155mm Howitzer (LW-155). This system will enter FRP in
fiscal year 2005, and our budget includes a request for a Joint Marine
Corps--Army MYP. Another transformational component of the fiscal year
2005 budget, the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), will
continue LRIP delivery.
Alignment
The DON is transforming to dramatically reduce operating and
support costs. Changes will embrace efficiency and result in increased
effectiveness and a higher readiness standard in concert with the
overarching goals of the President's management agenda. We have made
several fleet and shore organizational changes that have shown great
potential in maximizing the way forces can be employed and supported.
Fleet Response Plan (FRP)
FRP provides a model for a new joint presence concept that will
transform how the U.S. military is employed. It refines maintenance,
training, and readiness processes in order to increase the number of
combat ready ships and aircraft throughout the fleet. FRP ensures six
employable Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) always are ready to respond to
a crisis, plus two additional CSGs capable of deploying to the fight
within 90 days of notification (``6+2''). With the implementation of
FRP, half of the fleet either could be deployed or postured to surge,
able to arrive swiftly with the overpowering combat power needed either
to deter or defeat the hostile intentions of an adversary, or to win
decisively in combat against a significant enemy.
TacAir Integration
The Navy and Marine Corps team embarked on a Tactical Aircraft
Integration plan that will enhance our core combat capabilities and
provide a more potent, cohesive, and affordable fighting force. The
culmination of a long-term effort to an increased level of readiness
from the resources given to us, TacAir integration seeks to generate a
greater combat capability from naval TacAir. Through TacAir
integration, the Department will reduce the number of tactical aircraft
(JSF and F/A-18) from 1,637 to 1,140 aircraft by 2021. This integration
will provide increased combat capability forward and is in concert with
enhanced sea basing concepts. A cornerstone of this plan is the global
sourcing of the Department's TacAir assets and the funding and
maintenance of legacy aircraft at the highest level of readiness until
they are replaced by the JSF and the Super Hornet (F/A-18 E/F).
Training Resource Strategy (TRS)
TRS was developed to provide high quality training to our deploying
combat forces. The training of our high technology force in modern
warfare has shifted to a network of existing ranges and installations
stateside. Fully implemented, TRS has resulted in more training
options, reduced pre-deployment training transit time, and has
increased productive training days. The U.S.S. Enterprise was the first
CSG to deploy under the TRS, utilizing six training ranges, each unique
to the successful completion of her qualification. TRS supports the FRP
and will quickly respond to surge requirements by delivering and
bringing to bear a capable fighting force.
Current and future readiness requirements underscore the continued
need for realistic training and maximized use of training and testing
ranges. While we continue to find ways to enhance readiness through
increased use of information technology and simulation, live training
on actual ranges and training areas remains critical during the
essential phases of the training cycle. Maintaining training realism
and access to these ranges has been of keen concern to our naval
forces. We continue to balance the need to maintain a ready and capable
force with the need to be sensitive to environmental and encroachment
issues.
For the last 2 years, Congress has addressed critical Navy needs
regarding encroachment. Readiness-specific changes to the Marine Mammal
Protection Act (MMPA), Endangered Species Act, and Migratory Bird
Treaty Act will help the Navy meet training and operational needs. The
Navy and Marine Corps has and will continue to demonstrate leadership
in both its military readiness role and as an environmental steward of
the oceans we sail and the lands we train upon. We are pursuing
opportunities for acquiring land buffers adjacent to our training
lands. We are implementing the Integrated Natural Resources Management
Plans prepared under the Sikes Act to address endangered species
concerns in lieu of designating critical habitats. We will continue
operational actions to minimize harm to marine mammals, as we continue
investments in research into marine mammal biology and behaviors. The
MMPA is due for reauthorization in this legislative cycle. To maintain
our military readiness, your support is necessary to retain the proper
balance between environmental protection and military readiness during
the reauthorization debate.
Carrier Strike Group (CSG)/Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG)
CSG alignment is complete and the first Pacific Fleet Expeditionary
Strike Group (ESG-1), centered on the U.S.S. Peleliu Amphibious Ready
Group and the embarked Marines of the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit
(Special Operations Capable), is completing an 8-month deployment. The
Navy deployed an Atlantic Fleet ESG, the U.S.S. Wasp Amphibious Ready
Group, last month.
The ESG adds to the ARG/MEU, a robust strike, anti-air, anti-
surface, and anti-subsurface capability of a cruiser, destroyer,
frigate and attack submarine and for the first time, the Advanced
Swimmer Delivery System (ASDS). These combined capabilities give the
Combatant Commander a wider variety of options and enables independent
operations in more dynamic environments.
Vieques/NSRR closure
The former training ranges on Vieques have been closed and the
property has been transferred to the Department of the Interior (DOI),
Fish and Wildlife Service. We have active cleanup and range clearance
programs underway at disposal sites on both east and west parcels. We
are working with the appropriate agencies to negotiate a Federal
Facilities Agreement governing cleanup activities. We are refining
costs to complete cleanup estimates for range areas and resolve
litigation issues filed by the residents of Vieques. We will close
naval Station Roosevelt Roads by 31 March, as directed by the Fiscal
Year 2004 Defense Appropriations Act. Naval Activity Puerto Rico will
serve as the caretaker organization following operational closure.
Puerto Rico has established a Local Redevelopment Authority, and we
will proceed quickly to property disposal.
Commander Navy Installations Command (CNI)
We have aligned all Navy shore installations under a single command
that will allow us to make better decisions about where to invest
limited funds. By consolidating all base operations worldwide and
implementing common support practices the Navy expects to save a
substantial amount of money over the next 6 years.
Communications
FORCEnet will provide the overarching framework and standard
communication mechanism for future combat systems. Navy Open
Architecture, in conjunction with the FORCEnet standards, will provide
a common open architecture for warfare systems aboard surface,
subsurface and selected airborne platforms such as the E-2C Advanced
Hawkeye. A critical subset application already being procured is the
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), which will be installed on 38
ships and 4 squadrons (16 aircraft) by fiscal year 2006. CEC includes
robust data communication capability among cooperating units in support
of sensor netting. In the future, CEC will also include a Joint Track
Manager to create a single integrated air picture of sufficient quality
to support fire control application for each combat control system.
Navy Marine Corps Internet (NMCI) is operational and providing
commercial IT services for more than 300,000 DON employees and 2
combatant commanders. To date, we have ordered 330,000 of the expected
345,000 fiscal year 2004 seats. Implementing NMCI has enabled us to
increase the security posture of our networks and has given
unprecedented visibility into IT costs. As we roll out NMCI we are
doing away with the over 1,000 separate networks that the Navy used to
run. We have reduced the number of legacy applications in the Navy's
inventory from 67,000 to about 31,000 and begun further efforts to
reduce this number to around 7,000--an almost 90-percent reduction. As
we proceed with NMCI, we anticipate other opportunities for progress in
areas such as enterprise hosting, software release management, IT
resource analysis and technology insertion.
We have designed the NMCI operational evaluation to provide
critical information necessary to determine how well NMCI is supporting
mission of the user and to judge how well service level agreement
metrics measure the service. As part of the spiral development process,
NMCI worked with the testing community to segment the testing effort
into a local evaluation of network services and a higher-level
assessment of other enterprise services. Testing was completed 15
December 2003; the final report is due in April.
V. Navy and Marine Corps in Transformation (Future Readiness)
The Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps
consider the culture of transformation integral to the development of
future combat capabilities. Innovative capabilities will result in
profound increases in military power, maintaining the Navy and Marine
Corps team as the preeminent global naval power. We are now at the
point of delivering on many of our transformational goals.
We have embraced a vision in how naval forces will contribute to
joint warfighting in the future. This vision can only be implemented
with the support of Congress. This section describes the principal
components of Naval Vision 21.
Acquisition Programs
The fiscal year 2005 budget request supports continued funding for
accelerated development of several critical technologies into the CVN
21 leadship. This transformational 21st century ship, the future
centerpiece of the Navy Carrier Strike Group, will bring many
significant changes to the fleet. These changes include a new
electrical power generation and distribution system, the
electromagnetic aircraft launching system, a new enlarged flight deck,
weapons and material handling improvements, and a crew reduction of at
least 800. Construction of the CVN 21 remains on track to start in
fiscal year 2007.
Critical components of Sea Power 21 are the DD(X) and LCS. These
ships, designed from the keel up to be part of a netted force, are the
centerpieces of the 21st century surface combatant family of ships.
DD(X) will be a multi-mission combatant tailored for land attack. LCS
is envisioned to be a fast, agile, relatively small and affordable
combatant capable of operating against anti-access, asymmetric threats
in the littorals. The FYDP includes $2.76 billion to develop and
procure modular mission packages to support three primary missions of
mine countermeasures, anti-submarine warfare, and anti-terrorism and
force protection. Detail design and construction of the first LCS is
planned to begin in fiscal year 2005.
The V-22 Osprey, a joint acquisition program, remains a top
aviation acquisition priority. The V-22's increased capabilities of
range, speed, payload, and survivability will generate truly
transformational tactical and operational opportunities. With the
Osprey, naval forces operating from the sea base will be able to take
the best of long-range maneuver and strategic agility, and join it with
the best of the sustainable forcible-entry capability. LRIP will
continue until the Milestone III decision is made late calendar year
2005. We expect to move from LRIP to FRP in calendar year 2006.
Another important joint program with the Air Force, the JSF has
just completed the second year of a 10-11 year development program. The
program is working to translate concept designs to produce three
variants. This is a complex process requiring more initial development
than we predicted. JSF development is experiencing typical challenges
that affect System Development and Demonstration (SDD) program schedule
and cost. LRIP was deferred and research and development increased to
cover SDD challenges. The current issues are solvable within the normal
process of design fluctuation, and have taken prudent steps necessary
to meet these challenges.
The plan to re-capitalize the P-3 Maritime Patrol Aircraft with the
MMA was further refined this past year in collaboration with the Broad
Area Maritime Surveillance--Unmanned Aerial Vehicle or BAMS-UAV
program. With a MMA IOC of fiscal year 2013, we also developed a robust
sustainment plan for the current P-3 that includes special structural
inspections and kits that extend the platform service life by a minimum
of 5,000 hours. Additionally, the Department has decided to join the
Army's Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) program as the replacement platform
for the aging EP-3.
In order to maintain Electronic Warfare (EW) superiority, the
Department is pursuing both upgrades in current Airborne Electronic
Attack (AEA) capability as well as a follow-on AEA aircraft to replace
the aging EA-6B. The Navy has selected the EA-18G as its follow-on AEA
aircraft and will begin to replace Navy EA-6Bs in fiscal year 2009.
Continuing an emphasis on transformational systems, the Department
has budgeted R&D funding through the FYDP for several aviation
programs. The Advanced Hawkeye (previously known as E-2 Radar
Modernization Program (RMP)) is funded through the FYDP with the first
production aircraft in fiscal year 2009. A fully automated digital
engine control and improved generators have been incorporated into the
aircraft to improve performance and reliability. Additionally, the
Department has included funding to support procurement of required
capabilities in the fleet, such as Advanced Targeting Forward Looking
Infrared and the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems.
The fiscal year 2005 budget continues to demonstrate the
Department's commitment to developing, acquiring and fielding
transformational UAV technologies for ISR and tactical missions. The
budget includes funding for a second Joint Unmanned Combat Air System
(J-UCAS) demonstrator and continues development of the BAMS. The Navy's
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV-N) is incorporated into J-UCAS under
a DOD joint program office.
Helicopters
The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes an incremental
approach to developing a replacement for the current aging Presidential
helicopter. The Presidential Helicopter Replacement Aircraft (VXX) will
enhance performance, survivability, communications, navigation, and
executive accommodations inherent in the existing fleet of Presidential
airlift helicopters.
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
The fielding of a National Ballistic Missile Defense capability is
critical to protecting the U.S. homeland against the evolving ballistic
missile threat. As part of the President's directive to accelerate the
fielding of a BMD Initial Defensive Operations capability by September
2004, the Navy will deploy, on a continuous basis, a DDG to serve as a
Long-Range Surveillance and Tracking (LRS&T) platform. Additionally,
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (ABMD) continues its development and
testing of the SM-3 missile in order to support deployment of a sea-
based mid-course engagement capability by December 2005. Since November
2002, ABMD had two of three successful intercepts with the SM-3 Block 0
missile. The Navy is also evaluating the benefits associated with
developing a Sea-based Terminal Missile Defense capability. A viable
regional and terminal sea based ballistic missile defense system is
important to ensure the safety of U.S. forces and the flow of U.S.
forces through foreign ports and air fields when required.
FORCEnet/Navy Open Architecture (OA)/Space/C\4\I
FORCEnet is the operational construct and architectural framework
for naval warfare in the Information Age which integrates warriors,
sensors, networks, command and control, platforms and weapons into a
networked, distributed combat force, scalable across the spectrum of
conflict from seabed to space and sea to land. FORCEnet is the core of
Sea Power 21 and Naval Transformation, and is the USN/USMC vehicle to
make Network Centric Warfare an operational reality. It is being
implemented in coordination with transformation initiatives in the
Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard--enhancing efficiency, joint
interoperability, and warfighting effectiveness. DD(X), LCS, CVN-21,
SSGN, Virginia class SSNs, San Antonio class LPDs, and MMA are examples
of platforms that are being designed from inception to perform in the
netted environment of the future. Systems being procured and produced
under the FORCEnet concept are CEC, Naval Fires Network (NFN), and
Airborne/Maritime/Fixed (AMF) JTRS.
The Navy is engineering a single open architecture for all warfare
systems called Navy Open Architecture. Future systems will be designed
to this architecture while legacy systems will be migrated to that
single architecture where it is operationally and fiscally feasible.
This integrates the Command and Control and Combat systems information
flow using open specifications and standards and open architecture
constructs, to support FORCEnet and other global information networks.
Further, this significantly reduces the development and maintenance
costs of computer programs. The Navy and its Joint Service partners
continue to jointly engineer the Joint Track Manager and plan to
implement it into Navy Open Architecture as the Open Architecture Track
Manager. This joint focused application will be populated in all naval
warfare systems that conform to the single OA warfare system
architecture.
The Navy and Marine Corps continues to pursue the maximum use of
space to enhance our operational capabilities. We look to leverage
existing systems and rapidly adapt emerging technology. For example,
the Navy has long been the leader in ultrahigh frequency (UHF)
satellite communications (SATCOM). The Navy is the executive agent for
the next generation UHF SATCOM system. This program, the Mobile Users
Objective System, will be the system used by all DOD components for
their UHF communications needs.
Sea Basing and Strategic Sealift
Sea Basing is a transformational operating concept for projecting
and sustaining naval power and a joint force, which assures joint
access by leveraging the operational maneuver of sovereign,
distributed, and networked forces operating globally from the sea.
The Sea Basing concept has been endorsed by the other military
services and its importance was confirmed when DOD announced a Joint
Sea Basing Requirements Office will soon be established. Central to the
staying power of naval forces will be the Maritime Pre-positioned
Force-Future MPF (F). The fiscal year 2005 budget accelerates the lead
MPF (F) from fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2007 to reflect an
emphasis on Sea Basing capabilities.
Infrastructure
Prior Rounds of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
The Department of the Navy completed the closure and realignment of
activities from the 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995 rounds of BRAC. All that
remains is to complete the environmental cleanup and property disposal
on all or portions of 23 of the original 91 bases. We have had
significant successes on both fronts. We are successfully using
property sales as a means to expedite the disposal process as well as
recover the value of the property for taxpayers. We sold 235 acres last
year at the former Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin, California on the
GSA Internet Web site for a net $204 million. We sold 22 acres at the
former naval Air Facility Key West, Florida, in January 2004 for $15
million. The City of Long Beach, California, opted to pre-pay its
remaining balance on a promissory note, and gave us $11 million to
conclude its purchase of the former Naval Hospital Long Beach,
California. We are applying all funds to accelerate cleanup at
remaining prior BRAC locations. More property sales are planned that
will be used to finance remaining prior BRAC cleanup actions. Of the
original 161,000 acres planned for disposal from all four prior BRAC
rounds, we expect to have less than 7 percent (or about 11,000 acres)
still to dispose by the end of this fiscal year.
BRAC 2005
The Fiscal Year 2002 Defense Authorization Act authorized another
round of BRAC in 2005. We will scrupulously follow the process laid out
in the law. We will treat each base equally and fairly, whether
considered for closure or realignment in the past or not. In no event
will we make any recommendations concerning any closures or realignment
of our bases until all the data has been collected, certified and
carefully analyzed within the overall BRAC 2005 statutory framework.
BRAC 2005 gives us the opportunity to transform our infrastructure
consistent with the significant changes that are, and will be,
happening with the transformation of our force structure. The Secretary
of Defense is leading a process to allow the military departments and
defense components to closely examine joint use opportunities. Military
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated the force multiplier
benefits of joint operations. We will apply those approaches to our
shore infrastructure. We will look beyond the traditional stovepipes of
Navy bases and Marine Corps bases in BRAC 2005 and take a joint
approach matching military requirements against capacity and
capabilities across the Department of Defense.
The added benefit is the opportunity to eliminate excess capacity
and seek greater efficiencies in our shore infrastructure. Continuing
to operate and maintain facilities we no longer need diverts precious
resources from our primary mission. Resources freed up as a result of
this process will be used to re-capitalize our ships, aircraft,
equipment, and installations for the future.
Better Business Practices
The DON has implemented several continuous improvement initiatives
consistent with the goals of the President's management agenda that
enable realignment of resources in order to re-capitalize.
Specific initiatives include: converging our Enterprise Resource
Planning (ERP) pilots into an end-to-end operating system;
incorporating proven world class efficiency methodologies such as Six
Sigma and Lean concepts into our day-to-day operations; and
implementing additional Multi-Ship/Multi-Option (MSMO) repair contracts
and Performance Based Logistics (PBL) agreements. Of note, Lean
efficiency events that concentrate on increasing velocity and
productivity in our Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Departments
(AIMD) were initiated on U.S.S. George Washington (CVN 73) and U.S.S.
Harry Truman (CVN 75). The outcome of these events will allow us to
improve our afloat AIMD processes and influence our future manning
requirements on CVN 21 Class carriers. These are the first Lean events
conducted on Navy warships.
These continuous improvement initiatives enable us to increase our
combat capabilities with the expectation that we become more efficient,
agile, flexible, and reliable at a reduced cost of doing business.
VI. Our Total Force (Sailors, Marines, and Civilians)
Today more than other time in recent history our sailors and
marines have a greater understanding and appreciation for service to
country. In time of war they have shown the Nation the highest
standards of military professionalism and competence. The heaviest
burdens in our war on terror fall, as always, on the men and women of
our Armed Forces. We are blessed as a Nation to have a 228-year legacy
where magnificent men and women volunteer to protect and defend
America. Sailors and marines--along with our civilian workforce--remain
the strong and steady foundation of our naval capabilities.
Active Duty
The Navy and Marine Corps again met enlisted recruiting and
accession goals in 2003, and continue to attract America's finest young
men and women to national service. The Navy achieved recruiting goals
for a fifth consecutive year and in February completed the 31st
consecutive month of attaining goals for accessions and new contracts.
The Marine Corps met its 8th year of meeting monthly and annual
enlisted recruiting goals and its 13th year of success in officer
recruiting. Both Services are well positioned for success in meeting
2004 officer and enlisted accession requirements.
During 2003, the Navy implemented a policy requiring 94 percent of
new recruits be high school diploma graduates (HSDG), and Navy
recruiters succeeded by recruiting 94.3 percent HSDG. Navy Recruiting
continued to seek the best and brightest young men and women by
requiring that 62 percent of recruits score above 50 on the Armed
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT); Navy recruiters excelled with a rate
of 65.7 percent. Navy recruiting also sought to increase the number of
recruits with college experience in fiscal year 2003, recruiting more
than 3,200 applicants with at least 12 semester hours of college.
The Marine Corps accessed 97.1 percent high school diploma
graduates in fiscal year 2003, exceeding their annual goal of 95
percent and ensured the Marine Corps recruited the highest quality
young men and women with 70.3 percent of Marine Corps recruits scoring
over 50 on the AFQT. This achievement exceeded their annual goal of 60
percent of accessions scoring above 50 on the AFQT. The Marine Corps
began fiscal year 2004 with a 58.8 percent starting pool in the Delayed
Entry Program and has continued to achieve its monthly recruiting goals
during the second quarter of fiscal year 2004. The Marine Corps Reserve
achieved fiscal year 2003 recruiting goals, assessing 6,174 non-prior
service marines and 2,663 prior service marines. Navy Recruiting was
also successful in Naval Reserve recruiting by exceeding the enlisted
goal of 12,000 recruits for fiscal year 2003.
Retention
Retaining the best and brightest is as important as recruiting
them. Military compensation that is competitive with the private sector
provides the flexibility required to meet that challenge.
The Marine Corps has achieved first-term reenlistment goals over
the past 9 years. They have already achieved 79.8 percent of their
first-term retention goal and 59.8 percent of second tour and beyond
goals. Officer retention is at a 19-year high.
Retention in the Navy has never been better. For the third straight
year, we experienced the highest retention in history. Retention goals
for all categories were exceeded. As a result, at-sea personnel
readiness is exceptional and enlisted gaps at sea are at an all-time
low.
Notwithstanding our current success in retention, we are constantly
on alert for indicators; trends and developments that might affect our
ability to attract and retain a capable, trained and talented
workforce. We are aware that we need to compete for the best, and
ensure continuing readiness, through a variety of means including
effective compensation and bonus programs.
The Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) remains the primary tool
available to the Navy and Marine Corps for retaining our best and
brightest enlisted personnel. SRB represents an investment in the
future of our Navy and Marine Corps. The Department of the Navy has a
proven track record in the judicious management of this program and
other continuation pays used to keep the right force mix to meet the
Nations requirements. Your continued support of the SRB program as a
proven and highly effective tool is important and appreciated.
Attrition
Navy leaders reduced attrition 10 percent from a year ago and 33
percent from fiscal year 2000, while Marine Corps First-Term Post Boot
Camp attrition continues the favorable downward trend begun in fiscal
year 1999. For the Marine Corps, fiscal year 2003 attrition was at a
historical low, down 1,773 from the previous year. This drop is due
largely to a reduction in misconduct and incidents of desertion.
The Department's ``Zero Tolerance'' drug-use policy continues to be
strictly enforced, widely disseminated, and supported throughout the
leadership. Through a comprehensive random drug testing program,
educational programs, and command support, the Navy and Marine Corps
team achieved an 18-percent reduction in attrition even while testing
rates increased.
Training
The Navy and Marine Corps have defined their respective strategies
for advancing into the future as part of a joint force. The Services
have developed strategies that clearly define how Navy and Marine
forces of the 21st century will be equipped, trained, educated,
organized and used in our continued efforts to control the seas, to
project American military influence abroad, and to protect our borders.
Marine Corps' Strategy 21 defines as its vision and goal the
development of enhanced strategic agility, operational reach, and
tactical flexibility and enabled joint, allied, and coalition
operations.
Navy's Sea Power 21 defines its commitment to the growth and
development of its service members. Sea Warrior is the ``people'' part
of Sea Power 21. Its focus is on growing individuals from the moment
they walk into a recruiting office through their assignments as Master
Chiefs or Flag Officers, using a career continuum of training and
education that gives them the tools they need to operate in an
increasingly demanding and dynamic environment. Transformation for the
future, leveraging technology and tapping into the genius of our people
to make them more efficient and effective--creating a single business
process for the range of human resource management activities is
exactly what Sea Warrior is all about. Our goal remains attracting,
developing, and retaining the more highly skilled and educated
workforce of warriors that will lead the 21st century Navy.
Reserves
Reserves remain an integral part of our Navy and Marine Corps team.
The Department of Defense is undergoing a transformation to a more
responsive, lethal and agile force based on capabilities analysis
rather than threat analysis. Last July, Secretary Rumsfeld issued a
memorandum, Rebalancing Forces, in which he directed the Services to
promote judicious and prudent use of rebalancing to improve readiness
of the force and to help ease stress on units and individuals. Three
areas of focus of the Services are:
-- Enhance early responsiveness.
-- Resolve stressed career fields.
-- Employ innovative management practices.
The Navy recently completed a study focused on redesigning the
Naval Reserve so that it is better aligned with, and operationally
relevant to, Active Forces. Working groups have been chartered to
implement key points of the study. Implementation has commenced and
will continue through this year and next. The three main areas of focus
are Personnel Management, Readiness and Training, and Organizational
Alignment. The Navy is transforming the Naval Reserve so that it is
fully integrated with Active Forces. Reservists are shifting away from
thinking of ``Naval Reserve requirements'' to ``Navy requirements''--a
shift that includes goals, capabilities, and equipment. The Navy
mission is the Naval Reserve mission. One Navy, one team, is the
message.
Naval and Marine Corps reservists are filling critical joint and
internal billets along with their active counterparts. Naval and Marine
Corps Reserve mobilization is a requirements-driven evolution and
reservists, trained and ready, are making significant contributions.
While the numbers of mobilized reservists can fluctuate as GWOT
requirements dictate, our objective is to keep the number of mobilized
personnel at a minimum.
Since September 11, 2001, the Navy has mobilized over 22,000
reservists with a peak of just over 12,000 during OIF. This is from a
Selected Reserve population of just over 87,000. Mobilized commissioned
naval units include Coastal Warfare, Construction Battalion, and
Aviation communities, while individuals were mobilized primarily from
Security Group, Naval Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and Physical
Security augment units. We anticipate a steady state of approximately
2,500 mobilized naval reservists this year.
The Marine Corps has mobilized over 22,000 reservists from an
authorized Selected Reserve end strength of 39,600 and just over 3,500
from the Individual Ready Reserve. Currently mobilized reservists
number just under 6,500. With OIF II requirements, the number of
mobilized Marine reservists is expected to increase by approximately
7,000. OIF II marines will deploy in two rotations of approximately 7
months each, augmenting Marine Corps capabilities in Infantry, Armor,
Aviation, Command, Control, Computers and Intelligence, Military
Police, and Civil Affairs.
Civilian Personnel
A large part of the credit for the Navy's outstanding performance
goes to our civilian workforce. These experienced and dedicated
craftspeople, researchers, supply and maintenance specialists, computer
experts, service providers, and their managers are an essential part of
our total naval force concept.
In the past, our ability to utilize these skilled human resources
to accomplish the complex and fast-developing missions of the 21st
century has been limited by the requirements of a 19th century
personnel system. The Fiscal Year 2004 Defense Authorization Bill now
allows DOD to significantly redesign a National Security Personnel
System (NSPS) for the civilian workforce. This change represents the
most significant improvement to civilian personnel management since the
1978 Civil Service Reform Act.
The DON has volunteered to be in the first wave of conversions to
NSPS later this year. The Department expects to transition as many as
150,000 of our dedicated, hard-working civilians to the new system this
year. We will work closely with DOD to ensure we meet this aggressive
timeline. We are also working Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement
Act streamlining initiatives alongside NSPS to ensure we use these
tools to produce a robust and capable workforce.
The reforms will provide supervisors and managers greater
flexibility in managing our civil service employees, facilitate
competition for high quality talent, offer compensation competitive
with the private sector, and reward outstanding service. It will build
greater pride in the civilian workforce and attract a new generation of
civilians to public service. Properly executed, these changes also will
assist us in better utilizing the Active-Duty Force by making it easier
to employ civilians in jobs currently filled by uniformed military
personnel.
NSPS legislation will have a transformational effect on
organizational design across the Department. NSPS will improve
alignment of the human resources system with mission objectives,
increase agility to respond to new business and strategic needs, and
reduce administrative burden. The NSPS Act authorizes a more flexible
civilian personnel management system that allows us to be a more
competitive and progressive employer at a time when our national
security demands a highly responsive system of civilian personnel
management. The legislation also ensures merit systems principles
govern changes in personnel management, whistleblowers are protected,
discrimination remains illegal, and veterans' preference is protected.
The process for the design of NSPS is specified by statue and covers
the following areas: job classification, pay banding, staffing
flexibilities, and pay for performance.
The foundation for NSPS is a more rigorous tie between performance
and monetary awards for employees and managers. Basic pay and
performance incentives should be tied directly to the performance
measurement process--supervisory personnel are also rewarded for
successfully performing managerial duties. Implementation of this
system will be a significant step forward by linking employees'
performance to mission accomplishment and enabling better management of
scarce resources throughout the DON.
We are faced with a monumental change in how we will do business
and an even larger cultural change from one of entitlement to one that
has a performance-based compensation. This will be a huge effort and we
are determined to ensure successful implementation. We will continue to
scrutinize our human resource business methods. As we implement the
bold initiatives in NSPS, we will take a hard look at our
administrative policies with a specific eye on those that are
burdensome or add no value.
Quality of Service
We will continue to provide an environment where our sailors and
marines, and their families have confidence in themselves, in each
other, in their equipment and weapons, and in the institution they have
chosen to serve. This year, with your help, we continued the
significant advances in compensation, in building the structure to
realize the promise of the revolution in training, in improving
bachelor and family housing, and in strengthening our partnership with
Navy and Marine Corp families.
The Department remains committed to improving living conditions for
sailors and marines, and their families. Our policy is to rely first on
the private sector to house military families. As a result, along with
the initiative to increase Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH), the need
and consequently the inventory for military family housing is going
down. Additionally, we are partnering with the private sector in
Public/Private Ventures (PPV) to eliminate inadequate housing.
At the top of nearly any list put together in our partnership is
the promise of medical care for sailors, marines, and their families.
Naval medicine is a force multiplier, ensuring our troops are
physically and mentally ready to whatever challenges lie ahead. High
quality care and health protection are a vital part of our ability to
fight the global war on terrorism and execute other worldwide mission.
Naval medicine today is focused on supporting the deployment readiness
of the uniformed services and promoting, protecting and maintaining the
health of all those entrusted to naval medicine care--anytime,
anywhere.
Safety
The Navy and Marine Corps are working to meet the Secretary of
Defense's goal of reducing mishaps by 50 percent from fiscal year 2002
to the end of fiscal year 2005. We have many initiatives in place and
planned for the near future. We have seen real progress in reducing
private motor vehicle fatalities, which are down 20 percent from the
fiscal year 2002 baseline. We have begun applying technologies now used
in commercial aviation to provide a visual and quantitative feedback
loop to pilots and mechanics when either the pilot or aircraft has
exceeded specific safety of flight parameters. We will continue to
press forward with safety both to take care of people, our most
precious asset, and to allow us to invest elsewhere.
Shaping the Force
The Navy is making an effort to reduce its active duty manpower as
part of the DON transformation program. This is the first step and an
integral part of our strategy to properly shape both the officer and
enlisted force. Today, as the Navy moves to a more efficient and surge-
ready force, maintaining the correct skill sets is more important than
ever. We are convinced we can get the job done with fewer people; by
eliminating excess manpower we can focus better on developing and
rewarding our high-performing forces. Additionally, reducing manpower
gradually today will ensure the Navy is properly manned when a new
generation of optimally manned ships joins our force, with completely
revised maintenance, training, and war-fighting requirements. We will
ensure any manpower reductions will be preceded by reductions in
functions.
VII. Summary
Naval forces remain a critical and unique element of our national
security strategy. The Navy and Marine Corps team answers the
President's call to duty by being the first on station--with staying
power. Our forces exploit the open oceans and provide the combatant
commander with persistent sovereign combat naval forces. This is the
value that credible forward deployed naval forces provide our Nation.
The fiscal year 2005 budget unifies many of our innovative and
transformational technologies with Naval Power 21. Sustaining
investment in naval forces continues to protect and promote American
interests by allowing the forward deployed Navy and Marine Corps team
to shape the international security environment and to respond to the
full spectrum of current and future crises.
With our fiscal year 2005 budget request we focus on people, combat
capability, technology insertion, and improved business practices.
Additionally, we continue to work with our joint service partners in
organizing, equipping and training to fight jointly. With continued
congressional support the Department of the Navy will position the Navy
and Marine Corps team as part of the most formidable military force in
the 21st century.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Secretary England.
Secretary Roche.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES G. ROCHE, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
Secretary Roche. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin,
and members of the committee. It's my great pleasure to appear
before this distinguished body to represent the 700,000 active,
Guard, Reserve, and civilian airmen who are engaged in
defending our Nation.
General John Jumper and I are certainly proud of their
achievements and service this past year, from combat
operations, to homeland defense, to their daily efforts that
guarantee the health, security, and morale of our force.
They've contributed significantly to our Nation's global fight
against terrorism, to our military achievements in Iraq and
Afghanistan. They are devoted American servants, and have my
utmost respect and confidence. But I'd also like to say how
honored I am to serve alongside General John Jumper. He is an
outstanding leader, and, like my two colleagues, it's a delight
to work with him.
Our highest priority continues to be a focus on warfighting
and delivering the capability that enables us to remain
decisive in combat. Combatant commanders rely on us to provide
the full spectrum of air and space capabilities, all while
protecting our homeland. Through the efforts of this committee,
your colleagues in Congress, and dedicated professionals in the
Department, we are proud to report that we are meeting these
objectives.
As we highlight in our written testimony, we continue to
adapt the Air Force to realize the President and Secretary
Rumsfeld's vision of transformation. Our strategy is to exploit
the sources of strength that give us the military advantages
that we enjoy today. Our goal is to build a portfolio of
advantages, one that uses operational concepts to guide
investments, is relevant to the joint character of warfare, and
is useful in the increasingly asymmetric conduct of warfare. To
date, we've made great progress in applying this approach.
In terms of strategy, we refocused Air Force strategic
thinking on core competencies, we refined our air expeditionary
forces, and focused our training to support homeland defense,
close-air support, and close partnering with land, maritime,
and special operations forces. We are putting our space
programs on track. We've increased the unity of effort among
the Air Force, the National Reconnaissance Office, and
intelligence community, and we have enhanced space support for
the warfighter, bringing a joint perspective to our role as the
Department of Defense's executive agent for space. We've made
significant investments in our people over the past time.
With respect to capabilities, we've delivered a transformed
Air Force to the battlefield--armed Predators, Global Hawks,
bombers working closely with battlefield airmen on the ground,
new tactics for time-sensitive targets, networked intelligence
surveillance, reconnaissance, and the combined air operations
center.
Where it makes sense, we've integrated active, Guard, and
Reserve units as part of our future total force, and we
continue to do so when it enhances our combat capability,
increases our surge capacity, enables us to achieve
efficiencies in how we organize, train, and equip our total
force.
We have engaged with industry to stabilize production of
critical Air Force capabilities--the F/A-22, C-17, Predators,
Global Hawk, and other systems--thereby, increasing
efficiencies in the supplier base.
We are transforming the F/A-22 by integrating new avionics
and weapons that will make it the premier air-to-ground strike
system in heavily defended areas, as well as highly effective
against cruise missiles, in addition to its role in deterring
any nation from challenging our ability to gain and maintain
air dominance. Our F/A-22 budget request continues much needed
program stability, and supports the transition from development
to operational tests with initial operational capability (IOC)
at the end of fiscal year 2005.
Our next step is to focus in four distinct mission areas,
all with demonstrable capabilities to support land and surface
forces. We are realistically modernizing our special operations
aircraft, starting with needed recapitalization of our
helicopter force, continuing with the tools essential to link
air and ground capabilities.
We are increasing our attention to close air support from
various altitudes. In this regard, we will seek to update an
as-yet-to-be-determined number of A-10s, and we will acquire
the short-takeoff vertical landing (STOVL) version of the Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF) by further expanding our opportunities for
integration with our Marine Corps brethren.
We are developing a long-range strike strategy that
includes an investment plan to sustain our legacy force, and
possibly a future stealthy regional bomber.
We are focusing on joint warfighting in space, working with
other interested parties on rapid insertion of microsats, as
well as potential methods of protecting our space assets.
Beyond establishing and maintaining air dominance, there
are initiatives where we are pressing forward with families of
UAVs or remotely-piloted aircraft, many of which will support
land combat directly and in real time. We are building a
portfolio of sensing capabilities, and we continue to develop
ground-moving target-indicator capabilities, cruise missile
defense technologies, as well as new integration of battlefield
command and control (C2) capabilities, all focused on dramatic
support of land forces.
In the interest of time, Mr. Chairman, I'll move past some
of this.
One of the concerns in our budget that I would like to
highlight is the growing pressure and increased cost in our
military healthcare system. Improvements to Tricare benefit
over the past several years, coupled with escalating premiums
and co-pays in the civilian sector, are driving many retirees
and family members to choose Tricare. Over the past 2 years, we
have seen an 8 percent increase in the number of retirees using
our system. From one point of view, this is a good story,
validation that we are caring for our retired service members.
It comes, however, with significant cost growth. This year, the
Department reprogrammed over $600 million to pay for this
growth, costs increasingly absorbed by the Services. Although
you will mark the DOD health program as a separate
authorization, I ask that you keep this increased usage and
cost in mind as you consider any proposed expansion of
benefits.
Finally, our budget request includes increases of both
research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and
procurement to support our emphasis on transformation and
modernization consistent with the strategy we've discussed. Our
proposed budget makes a significant investment in a number of
critical joint programs: C-17s, C-130Js, Predators, Global
Hawks, and joint space capabilities, including transformational
communications, space-based radar, and military satellite
communications. We are also investing in a wide range of joint
weapons for close-air support and precision strike, including
more than 23,000 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs). In
addition to our increased focus on air-to-ground concepts of
operations (CONOPs), we are proud of our continued investment
in these joint warfighting capabilities needed by our combatant
commanders.
Finally, our tanker recapitalization initiative is on hold.
The initiative is complicated enough, so I am in complete
agreement with Secretary Rumsfeld's desire to ensure that it
was not tainted by any illegality. Meanwhile, as I told the
committee 2 years ago, we are programming money, starting in
fiscal year 2006, to conduct a KC-X tanker replacement program,
which will be a normal new-aircraft procurement.
Let me close today on the subject of sexual assault. With
the help of this committee, your counterparts in the House, the
Fowler panel, and the reinvigorated Air Force Academy Board of
Visitors, we have taken a wide range of actions at the Academy
to protect our cadets and to implement a system of response,
investigation, and victim care consistent with that in the
operational Air Force. Since the implementation of the Agenda
for Change, in March of last year, and the release of the
Fowler Panel Report, I am pleased to report that there has been
meaningful progress across multiple fronts. The Academy senior
leadership is aggressively focused on the areas of basic cadet
training, officer development, and cadet discipline systems. In
the area of prevention, we have sought outside experts to
review and assist in training faculty, staff, and leadership.
We have incorporated almost all of the Fowler recommendations
to enhance training, implemented a tough new alcohol policy,
and, most important, we have created an integrated response
team for victims of sexual assault.
But we continue to refine our approach. For instance, based
on the Fowler Panel's recommendation of confidentiality we have
attempted to strike a balance between the needs of the victim
and the necessity of investigating felony allegations. While
this is proving to be a difficult concept to implement, we
sincerely believe it is in our best interest to remove barriers
to victims coming forward so that we can prosecute criminal
offenders.
Whether we look at the record numbers or increasing quality
of female applicants to the Academy, our initial indications
are very positive. As of today, the Academy admissions office
has received over 3,000 applications from women, an increase of
over 35 percent, and the largest number of female applicants in
the history of the Academy. The increases in the average grade
point averages across all four classes of cadets, both male and
female, appear to show that we are continuing to instill an
improved climate for learning, as well. These are initial good
signs, but we are in a long-term agenda to change the culture,
and we know there is much to do, so we will remain focused.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to inform the committee of a
recently commissioned assessment we've ordered of our sexual
assault response system across the Air Force. General Jumper
and I have tasked our major-command commanders to include
education, training, and prevention, reporting procedures,
response programs, and program oversight in these comprehensive
reviews. We directed this assessment across our major commands
prior to the recent articles about Sheppard Air Force Base. In
fact, we did it very quietly in the fall of this year to do a
review of our Pacific air forces in order to get a benchmark as
to how our Active Force was doing relative to the things that
we learned from the Air Force Academy's situation.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am proud to be a
part of the finest air force in the world, and am honored to be
part of the joint team that has done much to defend America and
our interests. With your continued support and the investment
this budget makes in adapting our force for the demands of this
new era, we will continue to deliver for our citizens.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Roche follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. James G. Roche
Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and distinguished members of the
committee, the Air Force has an unlimited horizon for air and space
capabilities. Our Service was borne of innovation, and we remain
focused on identifying and developing the concepts of operations,
advanced technologies, and integrated operations required to provide
the joint force with unprecedented capabilities and to remain the
world's dominant air and space force.
Throughout our distinguished history, America's Air Force has
remained the world's premier air and space power because of our
professional airmen, our investment in warfighting technology, and our
ability to integrate our people and systems together to produce
decisive effects. These Air Force competencies are the foundation that
will ensure we are prepared for the unknown threats of an uncertain
future. They will ensure that our combatant commanders have the tools
they need to maintain a broad and sustained advantage over any emerging
adversaries.
In this strategic environment of the 21st century, and along with
our sister Services, our Air Force will continue to fulfill our
obligation to protect America, deter aggression, assure our allies, and
defeat our enemies. As we adapt the Air Force to the demands of this
era, we remain committed to fulfilling our global commitments as part
of the joint warfighting team. In partnership, and with the continuing
assistance of Congress, we will shape the force to meet the needs of
this century, fight the global war on terrorism, and defend our Nation.
The 2004 Posture Statement is our vision for the upcoming year and
is the blueprint we will follow to sustain our air and space dominance
in the future. We are America's Air Force--disciplined airmen, dominant
in warfighting, decisive in conflict.
introduction
In 2003, U.S. and coalition military operations produced
unprecedented mission successes--across the spectrum of conflict and
around the globe. The joint warfighting team demonstrated combat
capability never previously witnessed in the history of conflict.
Integrating capabilities from air, land, sea, and space, the U.S. and
coalition allies achieved considerable progress in the ongoing global
war on terrorism. In our most recent engagements, our Armed Forces
fulfilled our immediate obligations to defend America, deter
aggression, assure our allies, and defeat our enemies.
The foundation of these achievements can be found in the Department
of Defense's (DOD) commitment to teamwork and excellence. Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was a joint and coalition warfighting effort from
planning to execution. Air, ground, maritime, and space forces worked
together at the same time for the same objectives, not merely staying
out of each other's way, but orchestrated to achieve wartime
objectives. Our air and space forces achieved dominance throughout the
entire theater, enabling maritime and ground forces to operate without
fear of enemy air attack. Our airmen demonstrated the flexibility,
speed, precision, and compelling effects of air and space power,
successfully engaging the full range of enemy targets, from the
regime's leadership to fielded forces. When our ground and maritime
components engaged the enemy, they were confident our airmen would be
there--either in advance of their attacks, or in support of their
operations. America's Air Force was there, disciplined, dominant, and
decisive.
These operational accomplishments illustrate the growing maturation
of air and space power. Leveraging the expertise of our airmen, the
technologies present in our 21st century force, and the strategies,
concepts of operation, and organizations in use today, the U.S. Air
Force continues to adapt to meet the demands of this new era, while
pursuing the war on terrorism and defending the homeland.
On September 11, 2001, the dangers of the 21st century became
apparent to the world. Today, the U.S. faces an array of asymmetric
threats from terrorists and rogue states, including a threat that poses
the gravest danger to our Nation, the growing nexus of radicalism and
technology. As we continue our work in Afghanistan and Iraq, we stand
ready to respond to flashpoints around the world, prepared to counter
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to unfriendly states
and non-state entities.
We are adapting to new and enduring challenges. As we do, we are
exploiting the inherent sources of strength that give us the advantages
we enjoy today. It is a strategy predicated on the idea that, if we
accurately assess our own advantages and strengths, we can invest in
them to yield high rates of military return. This approach helps us
create a portfolio of advantages allowing us to produce and continue to
exploit our capabilities. Our goal is to create a capability mix
consistent with operational concepts and effects-driven methodology,
relevant to the joint character and increasingly asymmetric conduct of
warfare.
Since 1945, when General Henry ``Hap'' Arnold and Dr. Theodore von
Karman published ``Toward New Horizons,'' the Air Force has evolved to
meet the changing needs of the Nation--with the sole objective of
improving our ability to generate overwhelming and strategically
compelling effects from air and now, space. It is our heritage to adapt
and we will continue to do so. During this comparatively short history,
we became the best air and space force in the world through our focus
on the development of professional airmen, our investment in
warfighting technology, and our ability to integrate people and systems
to produce decisive joint warfighting effects.
The Air Force is making a conscious investment in education,
training, and leader development to foster critical thinking,
innovation, and encourage risk taking. We deliberately prepare our
airmen--officer, enlisted, and civilian--with experience, assignments,
and broadening that will allow them to succeed. When our airmen act in
the combined or joint arena, whether as an Air Liaison Officer to a
ground maneuver element, or as the space advisor to the Joint Force
Commander (JFC), this focused professional development will guide their
success.
We are also investing in technologies that will enable us to create
a fully integrated force of intelligence capabilities, manned, unmanned
and space assets that communicate at the machine-to-machine level, and
real-time global command and control (C2) of joint, allied, and
coalition forces. Collectively, these assets will enable compression of
the targeting cycle and near-instantaneous global precision-strike.
As we cultivate new concepts of global engagement, we will move
from analog to digital processes and adopt more agile, non-linear ways
of integrating to achieve mission success. This change in thinking
leads to capabilities including: networked communications; multi-
mission platforms which fuse multi-spectral sensors; integrated global
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); robust, all-
weather weapons delivery with increased standoff; small smart weapons;
remotely-piloted and unattended aircraft systems; advanced air
operations centers; more secure position, navigation, and timing; and a
new generation of satellites with more operationally responsive launch
systems.
Investment in our core competencies is the foundation of our
preparation for future threats. They ensure we have the tools we need
to maintain strategic deterrence as well as a sustained advantage over
our potential adversaries. Ultimately, they ensure we can deliver the
dominant warfighting capability our Nation needs.
Potential adversaries, however, continue to pursue capabilities
that threaten the dominance we enjoy today. Double-digit surface-to-air
missile systems (SAMs) are proliferating. China has purchased
significant numbers of these advanced SAMs, and there is a risk of
wider future proliferation to potential threat nations. Fifth-
generation advanced aircraft with capabilities superior to our present
fleet of frontline fighter/attack aircraft are in production. China has
also purchased, and is developing, advanced fighter aircraft that are
broadly comparable to the best of our current frontline fighters.
Advanced cruise missile technology is expanding, and information
technology is spreading. Access to satellite communications, imagery,
and use of the Global Positioning System (GPS) signal for navigation
are now available for anyone willing to purchase the necessary
equipment or services. With this relentless technological progress and
the potential parity of foreign nations, as well as their potential
application in future threats, the mere maintenance of our aging
aircraft and space systems will not suffice. Simply stated, our current
fleet of legacy systems cannot always ensure air and space dominance in
future engagements.
To counter these trends, we are pursuing a range of strategies that
will guide our modernization and recapitalization efforts. We are using
a capabilities-based planning and budgeting process, an integrated and
systematic risk assessment system, a commitment to shorter acquisition
cycle times, and improved program oversight. Our goal is to integrate
our combat, information warfare, and support systems to create a
portfolio of air and space advantages for the joint warfighter and the
Nation. Thus, we continue to advocate for program stability in our
modernization and investment accounts.
The principal mechanisms that facilitate this process are our Air
Force Concepts of Operation (CONOPs). Through the CONOPs, we analyze
problems we'll be asked to solve for the JFCs, identify the
capabilities our expeditionary forces need to accomplish their
missions, and define the operational effects we expect to produce.
Through this approach, we can make smarter decisions about future
investment, articulate the link between systems and employment
concepts, and identify our capability gaps and risks.
The priorities that emerge from the CONOPs will guide a reformed
acquisition process that includes more active, continuous, and creative
partnerships among the requirement, development, operational test, and
industry communities who work side-by-side at the program level. In our
science and technology planning, we are also working to demonstrate and
integrate promising technologies quickly by providing an operational
``pull'' that conveys a clear vision of the capabilities we need for
the future.
We are applying this approach to our space systems as well. As the
DOD's Executive Agent for Space, we are producing innovative solutions
for the most challenging national security problems. We have defined a
series of priorities essential to delivering space-based capabilities
to the joint warfighter and the Intelligence Community. Achieving
mission success--in operations and acquisition--is our principal
priority. This requires us to concentrate on designing and building
quality into our systems. To achieve these exacting standards, we will
concentrate on the technical aspects of our space programs early on--
relying on strong systems engineering design, discipline, and robust
test programs. We also have many areas that require a sustained
investment. We need to replace aging satellites, improve outmoded
ground control stations, achieve space control capabilities to ensure
freedom of action, sustain operationally responsive assured access to
space, address bandwidth limitations, and focus space science and
technology investment programs. This effort will require reinvigorating
the space industrial base and funding smaller technology incubators to
generate creative ``over the horizon'' ideas.
As we address the problem of aging systems through renewed
investment, we will continue to find innovative means to keep current
systems operationally effective. In OIF, the spirit of innovation
flourished. We achieved a number of air and space power firsts:
employment of the B-1 bomber's synthetic aperture radar and ground
moving target indicator for ISR; incorporation of the Litening II
targeting pod on the F-15, F-16, A-10, and the B-52; and use of a
Global Hawk for strike coordination and reconnaissance while flown as a
remotely piloted aircraft. With these integrated air and space
capabilities, we were able to precisely find, fix, track, target, and
rapidly engage our adversaries. These examples illustrate how we are
approaching adaptation in the U.S. Air Force.
Ultimately, the success of our Air Force in accomplishing our
mission and adapting to the exigencies of combat stems from the more
than 700,000 active, Guard, Reserve, and civilian professionals who
proudly call themselves ``airmen.'' In the past 5 years, they have
displayed their competence and bravery in three major conflicts: the
Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. They are a formidable warfighting
force, imbued with an expeditionary culture, and ready for the
challenges of a dangerous world.
Poised to defend America's interests, we continue to satisfy an
unprecedented demand for air and space warfighting capabilities--
projecting American power globally while providing effective homeland
defense. This is the U.S. Air Force in 2004--we foster ingenuity in the
world's most professional airmen, thrive on transitioning new
technologies into joint warfighting systems, and drive relentlessly
toward integration to realize the potential of our air and space
capabilities. We are America's airmen--confident in our capability to
provide our Nation with dominance in air and space.
air and space dominance in a new environment
The U.S. Air Force ensures a flexible, responsive, and dominant
force by providing a spectrum of operational capabilities that
integrate with joint and Coalition Forces. To sustain and improve upon
the dominance we enjoy today, the Air Force will remain engaged with
the other services, our coalition partners, interagency teams, and the
aerospace industry. As we do, we will incorporate the lessons learned
from rigorous evaluation of past operations, detailed analyses of
ongoing combat operations, and thoughtful prediction of the
capabilities required of a future force.
The pace of operations over the past year enabled us to validate
the function and structure of our Air and Space Expeditionary Forces
(AEFs). Operations in 2003 demanded more capability from our AEFs than
at any time since their inception in 1998. However, for the first time
we relied exclusively on our AEFs to present the full range of our
capabilities to the combatant commanders. Through our 10 AEFs, our AEF
prime capabilities (space, national ISR, long range strike, nuclear,
and other assets), and our AEF mobility assets, we demonstrated our
ability to package forces, selecting the most appropriate combat ready
forces from our total force, built and presented expeditionary units,
and flowed them to the theaters of operation in a timely and logical
sequence. We rapidly delivered them to the warfighters, while
preserving a highly capable residual force to satisfy our global
commitments.
More than three-fourths of our 359,300 active duty airmen are
eligible to deploy and are assigned to an AEF. Through much of the past
year, Total Force capabilities from 8 of the 10 AEFs were engaged
simultaneously in worldwide operations. The remaining elements were
returning from operations, training, or preparing to relieve those
currently engaged. By the end of 2003, more than 26,000 airmen were
deployed, supporting operations around the world.
In 2004, we will continue to use the AEFs to meet our global
requirements while concurrently reconstituting the force. Our number
one reconstitution priority is returning our forces to a sustainable
AEF battle rhythm while conducting combat operations. Attaining this
goal is about revitalizing capabilities. For most airmen, that will
include a renewed emphasis on joint composite force training and
preparation for rotations in the AEF. Through the AEF, the Air Force
presents right-sized, highly trained expeditionary units to JFCs for
employment across the spectrum of conflict.
Global War on Terrorism
The year 2003 marked another historic milestone for the U.S. and
the Air Force in the global war on terrorism. Since September 11, 2001,
air and space power has proven indispensable to securing American
skies, defeating the Taliban, denying sanctuary to al Qaeda and other
terrorist organizations, and most recently, removing a brutal and
oppressive dictator in Iraq. This global war on terrorism imposes on
airmen a new steady state of accelerated operations and personnel tempo
(PERSTEMPO), as well as a demand for unprecedented speed, agility, and
innovation in defeating unconventional and unexpected threats, all
while bringing stability and freedom to Afghanistan and Iraq. The Air
Force and its airmen will meet these demands.
Operation Noble Eagle
High above our Nation, airmen protect our skies and cities through
air defense operations known as Operation Noble Eagle (ONE). The Total
Force team, comprised of active duty, Air National Guard, and Air Force
Reserve airmen, conducts airborne early warning, air refueling, and
combat air patrol operations in order to protect sensitive sites,
metropolitan areas, and critical infrastructure.
This constant ``top cover'' demands significant Air Force assets,
thus raising the baseline of requirements above the pre-September 11
tempo. Since 2001, this baseline has meant over 34,000 fighter, tanker,
and airborne early warning sorties were added to Air Force
requirements.
This year the Air Force scrambled nearly 1,000 aircraft, responding
to 800 incidents. Eight active duty, 8 Air Force Reserve, and 18 Air
National Guard units provided 1,300 tanker sorties offloading more than
32 million pounds of fuel for these missions. Last year, over 2,400
airmen stood vigilant at air defense sector operations centers and
other radar sites. Additionally, in 2003, we continued to
institutionalize changes to our homeland defense mission through joint,
combined, and interagency training and planning. Participating in the
initial validation exercise Determined Promise-03, the Air Force
illustrated how its air defense, air mobility, and command and control
capabilities work seamlessly with other agencies supporting NORTHCOM
and Department of Homeland Security objectives. The integration and
readiness that comes from careful planning and rigorous training will
ensure the continued security of America's skies.
Operation Enduring Freedom--Afghanistan
Operation Enduring Freedom--Afghanistan (OEF) is ongoing. Remnants
of Taliban forces continue to attack U.S., NATO, coalition troops,
humanitarian aid workers, and others involved in the reconstruction of
Afghanistan. To defeat this threat, aid coalition stability, and
support operations, the Air Force has maintained a presence of nearly
24,000 airmen in and around the region. Having already flown more than
90,000 sorties (over 72 percent of all OEF missions flown), the Air
Force team of active, Guard, and Reserve airmen continue to perform
ISR, close air support (CAS), aerial refueling, and tactical and
strategic airlift.
While fully engaged in ONE and OIF, the men and women of the Air
Force provided full spectrum air and space support, orchestrating
assets from every service and 10 different nations. Of these, Air Force
strike aircraft flying from nine bases flew more than two-thirds of the
combat missions, dropped more than 66,000 munitions (9,650 tons) and
damaged or destroyed approximately three-quarters of planned targets.
In 2003 alone, Air Force assets provided more than 3,000 sorties of on-
call CAS, responding to calls from joint and/or Coalition Forces on the
ground.
Last year, the Air Force brought personnel and materiel into this
distant, land-locked nation via 7,410 sorties. Over 4,100 passengers
and 487 tons of cargo were moved by airmen operating at various Tanker
Airlift Control Elements in and around Afghanistan. To support these
airlift and combat sorties and the numerous air assets of the coalition
with aerial refueling, the Air Force deployed over 50 tankers. In their
primary role, these late 1950s-era and early 1960s-era KC-135 tankers
flew more than 3,900 refueling missions. In their secondary airlift
role, they delivered 3,620 passengers and 405 tons of cargo. Without
versatile tankers, our Armed Forces would need greater access to
foreign bases, more aircraft to accomplish the same mission, more
airlift assets, and generate more sorties to maintain the required
duration on-station.
Operations in Afghanistan also highlight U.S. and coalition
reliance on U.S. space capabilities. This spanned accurate global
weather, precise navigation, communications, as well as persistent
worldwide missile warning and surveillance. For example, OEF relied on
precision navigation provided by the Air Force's GPS constellation,
over-the-horizon satellite communications (SATCOM), and timely
observations of weather, geodesy, and enemy activity. To accomplish
this, space professionals performed thousands of precise satellite
contacts and hundreds of station keeping adjustments to provide
transparent space capability to the warfighter. These vital space
capabilities and joint enablers directly leveraged our ability to
pursue U.S. objectives in OEF.
Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch
During the past 12 years, the Air Force flew over 391,000 sorties
enforcing the northern and southern no-fly zones over Iraq. With the
preponderance of forces, the Air Force, along with the Navy and Marine
Corps, worked alongside the Royal Air Force in Operations Northern
Watch (ONW) and Southern Watch (OSW). Manning radar outposts and
established C2 centers, conducting ISR along Iraq's borders, responding
to almost daily acts of Iraqi aggression, and maintaining the required
airlift and air refueling missions taxed Air Force assets since the end
of Operation Desert Storm. Yet, these successful air operations had
three main effects: they halted air attacks on the ethnic minority
populations under the no-fly zones; they deterred a repeat of Iraqi
aggression against its neighbors; and they leveraged enforcement of
United Nations Security Council Resolutions. Throughout this period,
our airmen honed their warfighting skills, gained familiarity with the
region, and were able to establish favorable conditions for OIF. For
more than a decade, American airmen rose to one of our Nation's most
important challenges, containing Saddam Hussein.
Operation Iraqi Freedom
On 19 March 2003, our airmen, alongside fellow soldiers, sailors,
marines, and coalition teammates, were called upon to remove the
dangerous and oppressive Iraqi regime--this date marked the end of ONW/
OSW and the beginning of OIF. OIF crystallized the meaning of jointness
and the synergies of combined arms and persistent battlefield
awareness.
In the first minutes of OIF, airmen of our Combat Air Forces (USAF,
USN, USMC, and coalition) were flying over Baghdad. As major land
forces crossed the line of departure, Air Force assets pounded Iraqi
command and control facilities and key leadership targets, decapitating
the decisionmakers from their fielded forces. Remaining Iraqi leaders
operated with outdated information about ground forces that had already
moved miles beyond their reach. As the land component raced toward
Baghdad, coalition strike aircraft were simultaneously attacking Iraqi
fielded forces, communications and command and control centers,
surface-to-surface missile launch sites, and were supporting special
operations forces, and ensuring complete air and space dominance in the
skies over Iraq. Due to these actions and those during the previous 12
years, none of the 19 Iraqi missile launches were successful in
disrupting coalition operations, and not a single Iraqi combat sortie
flew during this conflict. Twenty-one days after major combat
operations began, the first U.S. land forces reached Baghdad. Five days
later, the last major city in Iraq capitulated.
The Air Force provided over 7,000 CAS sorties to aid land forces in
the quickest ground force movement in history. Lieutenant General
William S. Wallace, Commander of the U.S. Army V Corps said, ``none of
my commanders complained about the availability, responsiveness, or
effectiveness of CAS--it was unprecedented!'' As Iraqi forces attempted
to stand against the integrated air and ground offensive, they found a
joint and coalition team that was better equipped, better trained, and
better led than ever brought to the field of battle.
Training, leadership, and innovation coupled with the Air Force's
recent investment in air mobility allowed U.S. forces to open a second
major front in the Iraqi campaign. Constrained from access by land, Air
Force C-17s airdropped over 1,000 paratroopers from the 173rd Airborne
Brigade into northern Iraq. This successful mission opened Bashur
airfield and ensured U.S. forces could be resupplied.
Before 2003, the Air Force invested heavily in the lessons learned
from OEF. Shortening the ``kill chain,'' or the time it took to find,
fix, track, target, engage, and assess was one of our top priorities.
This investment was worthwhile, as 156 time-sensitive targets were
engaged within minutes, most with precision weapons. The flexibility of
centralized control and decentralized execution of air and space power
enabled direct support to JFC objectives throughout Iraq. Coalition and
joint airpower shaped the battlefield ahead of ground forces, provided
intelligence and security to the flanks and rear of the rapidly
advancing coalition, and served as a force multiplier for Special
Operations Forces. This synergy between Special Operations and the Air
Force allowed small specialized teams to have a major effect throughout
the northern and western portions of Iraq by magnifying their inherent
lethality, guaranteeing rapid tactical mobility, reducing their
footprint through aerial resupply, and providing them the advantage of
``knowing what was over the next hill'' through air and space-borne
ISR.
The Air Force's C\2\ISR assets enabled the joint force in
Afghanistan as well. This invaluable fleet includes the RC-135 Rivet
Joint, E-8 Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS),
and the E-3 AWACS. This ``Iron Triad'' of intelligence sensors and C2
capabilities illustrates the Air Force vision of horizontal integration
in terms of persistent battlefield awareness. Combined with the Global
Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle and Predator remotely piloted aircraft,
spaced-based systems, U-2, and Compass Call, these invaluable system
provided all-weather, multi-source intelligence to commanders from all
services throughout the area of responsibility.
OIF was the Predator's first ``networked'' operation. Four
simultaneous Predator orbits were flown over Iraq and an additional
orbit operated over Afghanistan, with three of those orbits controlled
via remote operations in the U.S. This combined reachback enabled
dynamic support to numerous OIF missions. Predator also contributed to
our operational flexibility, accomplishing hunter-killer missions,
tactical ballistic missile search, force protection, focused
intelligence collection, air strike control, and special operations
support. A Hellfire equipped Predator also conducted numerous precision
strikes against Iraqi targets, and flew armed escort missions with U.S.
Army helicopters.
Space power provided precise, all-weather navigation, global
communications, missile warning, and surveillance. The ability to adapt
to adverse weather conditions, including sandstorms, allowed air, land,
and maritime forces to confound the Iraqi military and denied safe
haven anywhere in their own country. As the Iraqis attempted to use
ground-based GPS jammers, Air Force strike assets destroyed them, in
some cases, using the very munitions the jammers attempted to defeat.
As Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld noted, this new era was
illustrated by the coalition's ``unprecedented combination of power,
precision, speed, and flexibility.''
During the height of OIF, the Air Force deployed 54,955 airmen.
Ambassador Paul Bremer, Chief of the Coalition Provisional Authority,
pronounced, ``In roughly 3 weeks [we] liberated a country larger than
Germany and Italy combined, and [we] did so with forces smaller than
the Army of the Potomac.'' Led by the finest officers and non-
commissioned officers, our airmen flew more than 79,000 sorties since
March of 2003. Ten thousand strike sorties dropped 37,065 munitions.
The coalition flew over 55,000 airlift sorties moved 469,093 passengers
and more than 165,060 tons of cargo. In addition, over 10,000 aerial
refueling missions supported aircraft from all services, and 1,600 ISR
missions provided battlespace awareness regardless of uniform, service,
or coalition nationality. This was a blistering campaign that demanded
a joint and combined effort to maximize effects in the battlespace.
Today, Air Force airmen continue to contribute to the joint and
coalition team engaged in Iraq. At the end of the year, 6,723 airmen
from the active duty, Reserve, and Air National Guard conducted a wide
range of missions from locations overseas, flying approximately 150
sorties per day including CAS for ground forces tracking down regime
loyalists, foreign fighters, and terrorists. On a daily basis, U-2 and
RC-135 aircraft flew ISR sorties monitoring the porous borders of Iraq
and providing situational awareness and route planning for Army patrols
in stability and support operations. Providing everything from base
security for 27 new bases opened by the coalition to the lifeline of
supplies that air mobility and air refueling assets bring to all joint
forces, Air Force airmen are committed to the successful accomplishment
of the U.S. mission in Iraq.
Other Contingency Operations
In 2003, the Air Force remained engaged in America's war on drugs
and provided support to NATO ground forces in the Balkans. Since
December 1989, Air Force airmen have been an irreplaceable part of the
interagency fight against illegal drug and narcotics trafficking.
Deployed along the southern U.S., in the Caribbean, and Central and
South America, airmen perform this round-the-clock mission, manning
nine ground-based radar sites, operating ten aerostats, and flying
counter drug surveillance missions. The Air Force detected, monitored,
and provided intercepts on over 275 targets attempting to infiltrate
our airspace without clearance. Along with our interagency partners,
these operations resulted in 221 arrests and stopped hundreds of tons
of contraband from being smuggled into our country.
In the Balkans, airmen are fully committed to completing the
mission that they started in the 1990s. Today, Air Force airmen have
flown over 26,000 sorties supporting Operations Joint Guardian and
Joint Forge. These NATO-led operations combine joint and allied forces
to implement the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia-Herzegovina and enforce
the Military Technical Agreement in Kosovo. At the end of 2003,
approximately 800 airmen were supporting NATO's goal of achieving a
secure environment and promoting stability in the region.
Additionally, the Air Force engaged in deterrence and humanitarian
relief in other regions. While the world's attention was focused on the
Middle East in the spring of 2003, our Nation remained vigilant against
potential adversaries in Asia. The Air Force deployed a bomber wing--24
B-52s and B-1s--to the American territory of Guam to deter North Korea.
At the height of OIF, our Air Force demonstrated our country's resolve
and ability to defend the Republic of Korea and Japan by surging bomber
operations to over 100 sorties in less than 3 days. This deterrent
operation complemented our permanent engagement in Northeast Asia. The
8,300 airmen who are stationed alongside the soldiers, sailors,
Marines, and our Korean allies maintained the United Nations armistice,
marking 50 years of peace on the peninsula.
Our strength in deterring aggression was matched by our strength in
humanitarian action. In response to President Bush's directive to help
stop the worsening crisis in Liberia, we deployed a non-combat medical
and logistics force to create a lifeline to the American Embassy and
provide hope to the Liberian people. An Expeditionary Group of airmen
provided airlift support, aeromedical evacuation, force protection, and
theater of communications support. Flying more than 200 sorties, we
transported and evacuated civilians and members of the Joint Task Force
(JTF) from bases in Sierra Leone and Senegal. The 300 airmen deployed
in support of JTF-Liberia reopened the main airport in Monrovia, and
ensured the security for U.S. military and civilian aircraft providing
relief aid.
Strategic Deterrence
The ability of U.S. conventional forces to operate and project
decisive force is built on the foundation of our strategic deterrent
force; one that consists of our nuclear-capable aircraft and
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile forces, working with the U.S. Navy's
Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines. In 2003, these forces as well as
persistent overhead missile warning sensors and supporting ground-based
radars provided uninterrupted global vigilance deterring a nuclear
missile strike against the U.S. or our allies. The dedicated airmen who
operate these systems provide the force capability that yields our
deterrent umbrella. Should that deterrence fail, they stand ready to
provide a prompt, scalable response.
Exercises
The Air Force's success can be attributed to the training,
education, and equipment of our airmen. Future readiness of our
operations, maintenance, mission support, and medical units will depend
on rigorous and innovative joint and coalition training and exercising.
This year we are planning 140 exercises with other services and
agencies and we anticipate being involved with 103 allied nations. We
will conduct these exercises in as many as 45 foreign countries.
Participation ranges from the Joint/Combined command post exercise
Ulchi Focus Lens with our South Korean partners to the tailored
international participation in our FLAG exercises and Mission
Employment Phases of USAF Weapons School. From joint search-and-rescue
forces in Arctic Sarex to Partnership for Peace initiatives, our airmen
must continue to take advantage of all opportunities that help us train
the way we intend to fight.
In addition to previously designed exercises, recent operations
highlighted the need for combat support training. During OEF and OIF,
the Air Force opened or improved 38 bases used by joint or coalition
forces during combat. Our Expeditionary Combat Support teams
established secure, operable airfields in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan,
Pakistan, and in Iraq. They also built housing, established
communications, and erected dining facilities that are still used by
other services and follow-on forces today. To prepare our airmen for
these missions, we have created Eagle Flag, an Expeditionary Combat
Support Field Training Exercise. During this exercise, combat support
personnel apply the integrated skills needed to organize and create an
operating location ready to receive fully mission capable forces within
72 hours. From security forces and civil engineers to air traffic
controllers and logisticians, each airman required to open a new base
or improve an austere location will eventually participate in this
valuable exercise.
Our ranges and air space are critical joint enablers and vital
national assets that allow the Air Force to develop and test new
weapons, train forces, and conduct joint exercises. The ability of the
Air Force to effectively operate requires a finite set of natural and
fabricated resources. Encroachment of surrounding communities onto Air
Force resources results in our limited or denied access to, or use of,
these resources. We have made it a priority to define and quantify the
resources needed to support mission requirements, and to measure and
communicate the effects of encroachment on our installations, radio
frequency spectrum, ranges, and air space. We will continue to work
with outside agencies and the public to address these issues. The Air
Force strongly endorses the Readiness Range and Preservation
Initiative. It would make focused legislative changes, protecting the
Air Force's operational resources while continuing to preserve our
Nation's environment.
Lessons for the Future
As we continue combat operations and prepare for an uncertain
future, we are examining lessons from our recent experiences. Although
we are currently engaged with each of the other services to refine the
lessons from OIF, many of the priorities listed in the fiscal year 2005
Presidential budget submission reflect our preliminary conclusions. The
Air Force has established a team committed to turning validated lessons
into new equipment, new operating concepts, and possibly new
organizational structures. Working closely with our joint and coalition
partners, we intend to continue our momentum toward an even more
effective fighting force.
One of the most important lessons we can draw was envisioned by the
authors of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. ONE, OEF, and OIF all validated
jointness as the only acceptable method of fighting and winning this
nation's wars. In OIF, the mature relationship between the Combined
Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) and the Combined Forces Air
Component Commander (CFACC) led to unprecedented synergies. The CFACC
capitalized on these opportunities by establishing coordination
entities led by an Air Force general officer in the supported land
component headquarters and by maintaining internal Army, Navy, Marine
Corps, and coalition officers in his own headquarters. Both of these
organizational innovations enabled commanders to maximize the
advantages of mass, lethality, and flexibility of airpower in the area
of responsibility.
Another lesson is the Air Force's dependence on the Total Force
concept. As stated above, September 11 brought with it a new tempo of
operations, one that required both the active duty and Air Reserve
Component (ARC) to work in concert to achieve our national security
objectives. The synergy of our fully integrated active duty, Air
National Guard and Air Force Reserve team provides warfighters with
capabilities that these components could not provide alone.
Our Reserve component accounts for over one-third of our strike
fighters, more than 72 percent of our tactical airlift, 42 percent of
our strategic airlift, and 52 percent of our air refueling capability.
The ARC also makes significant contributions to our rescue and support
missions, and has an increasing presence in space, intelligence, and
information operations. In all, the ARC provides a ready force
requiring minimum preparation for mobilization. Whether that
mobilization is supporting flight or alert missions for ONE, commanding
expeditionary wings in combat, or orchestrating the Air Force Special
Operations roles in the western Iraqi desert, the ARC will remain
critical to achieving the full potential of our air and space power.
A third lesson was validation of the need for air and space
superiority. Through recent combat operations, the Air Force maintained
its almost 50 year-old record of ``no U.S. ground troops killed by
enemy air attack.'' Without having to defend against Iraqi airpower,
coalition commanders could focus their combat power more effectively.
In addition, air and space superiority allowed airmen to dedicate more
sorties in support of the ground scheme of maneuver, substantially
reducing enemy capability in advance of the land component.
We also need to continue to advance integration and planning--
integration of service capabilities to achieve JFC objectives,
interagency integration to fight the war on terrorism, and information
integration. Integration of manned, unmanned and space sensors,
advanced command and control, and the ability to disseminate and act on
this information in near-real time will drive our combat effectiveness
in the future. Shared through interoperable machine-to-machine
interfaces, this data can paint a picture of the battlespace where the
sum of the wisdom of all sensors will end up with a cursor over the
target for the operator who can save the target, study the target, or
destroy the target.
Finally, there are three general areas for improvement we consider
imperative: battle damage assessment, fratricide prevention/combat
identification, and equipping our battlefield airmen. First, battle
damage assessment shapes the commander's ability for efficient
employment of military power. Restriking targets that have already been
destroyed, damaged, or made irrelevant by rapid ground force advances
wastes sorties that could be devoted to other coalition and joint force
objectives. Advances in delivery capabilities of our modern fighter/
attack aircraft and bombers mean that ISR assets must assess more
targets per strike than ever before. Precision engagement requires
precision location, identification, and precision assessment. Although
assets like the Global Hawk, Predator, U-2, Senior Scout, and Rivet
Joint are equipped with the latest collection technology, the Air
Force, joint team, and Intelligence Community must work to ensure that
combat assessments produce timely, accurate, and relevant products for
the warfighters.
We are also improving operational procedures and technology to
minimize incidents of fratricide or ``friendly fire.'' In OIF, major
steps toward this goal resulted from technological solutions. Blue
Force Tracker and other combat identification systems on many ground
force vehicles allowed commanders situational awareness of their forces
and enemy forces via a common operational picture. Still, not all joint
or coalition forces are equipped with these technological advances. We
are pursuing Fire Support Coordination Measures that capitalize on the
speed and situational awareness digital communications offer rather
than analog voice communications and grease pencils.
A third area we are actively improving is the effectiveness of the
airmen who are embedded with conventional land or Special Forces. With
assured access to Air Force datalinks and satellites, these
``Battlefield Airmen'' can put data directly into air-land-sea weapon
systems and enable joint force command and control. We have made great
progress in producing a Battlefield Air Operations Kit that is 70
percent lighter, with leading-edge power sources; one that will
increase the combat capability of our controllers. This battle
management system will reduce engagement times, increase lethality and
accuracy, and reduce the risk of fratricide. This capability is based
upon the good ideas of our airmen who have been in combat and
understand how much a single individual on the battlefield can
contribute with the right kit.
Summary
The airmen of America's Air Force have demonstrated their expertise
and the value of their contributions to the joint and coalition fight.
These combat operations are made possible by Air Force investments in
realistic training and education, superior organization, advanced
technology, and innovative tactics, techniques, and procedures. In the
future, our professional airmen will continue to focus advances in
these and other areas guided by the Air Force CONOPs. Their charter is
to determine the appropriate capabilities required for joint
warfighting and to provide maximum effects from, through, and in air
and space. This structure and associated capabilities-based planning
will help airmen on their transformational journey, ensuring continued
operational successes such as those demonstrated in 2003.
ensuring america's future air and space dominance
Air Force lethality, mobility, speed, precision, and the ability to
project U.S. military power around the globe provide combatant
commanders the capabilities required to meet the Nation's military
requirements and dominate our enemies. Consistent with the DOD's focus
on Joint Operating Concepts, we will continue to transform our force--
meeting the challenges of this era, adapting our forces and people to
them, and operating our service efficiently. We will adopt service
concepts and capabilities that support the joint construct and
capitalize on our core competencies. To sustain our dominance, we
develop professional airmen, invest in warfighting technology, and
integrate our people and systems together to produce decisive joint
warfighting capabilities.
developing airmen--right people, right place, right time
At the heart of our combat capability are the professional airmen
who voluntarily serve the Air Force and our Nation. Our airmen turn
ideas, tools, tactics, techniques, and procedures into global mobility,
power projection, and battlespace effects. Our focus for the ongoing
management and development of Air Force personnel will be to: define,
renew, develop, and sustain the force.
Defining our Requirements
To meet current and future requirements, we need the right people
in the right specialties. The post-September 11 environment has taxed
our equipment and our people, particularly those associated with force
protection, ISR, and the buildup and sustainment of expeditionary
operations. Our analysis shows that we need to shift manpower to
stressed career fields to meet the demands of this new steady state,
and we are in the process of doing this. We have realigned personnel
into our most stressed specialties and hired additional civilians and
contractors to free military members to focus on military specific
duties. We have also made multi-million dollar investments in
technology to reduce certain manpower requirements. We have redirected
our training and accession systems and have cross-trained personnel
from specialties where we are over strength to alleviate stressed
career fields, supporting the Secretary of Defense's vision of moving
forces ``from the bureaucracy to the battlefield.''
Since 2001, we've exceeded our congressionally mandated end
strength by more than 16,000 personnel. In light of the global war on
terrorism and OIF, DOD allowed this overage, but now we need to get
back to our mandated end strength. We are addressing this issue in two
ways: first, by reducing personnel overages in most skills; and second,
by shaping the remaining force to meet mission requirements. To reduce
personnel, we will employ a number of voluntary tools to restructure
manning levels in Air Force specialties, while adjusting our Active
Force size to the end strength requirement. As we progress, we will
evaluate the need to implement additional force shaping steps.
We are also reviewing our ARC manpower to minimize involuntary
mobilization of ARC forces for day-to-day, steady state operations
while ensuring they are prepared to respond in times of crisis. Since
September 11, 2001, we've mobilized more than 62,000 people in over 100
units, and many more individual mobilization augmentees. Today, 20
percent of our AEF packages are comprised of citizen airmen, and
members of the Guard or Reserve conduct 89 percent of ONE missions. We
recognize this is a challenge and are taking steps to relieve the
pressure on the Guard and Reserve.
In fiscal year 2005, we plan to redistribute forces in a number of
mission areas among the Reserve and Active components to balance the
burden on the Reserves. These missions include our Air and Space
Operations Centers, remotely piloted aircraft systems, Combat Search
and Rescue, Security Forces, and a number of high demand global
mobility systems. We are working to increase ARC volunteerism by
addressing equity of benefits and tour-length flexibility, while
addressing civilian employer issues. We are also looking at creating
more full-time positions to reduce our dependency on involuntary
mobilization.
We are entering the second year of our agreement to employ Army
National Guard soldiers for Force Protection at Air Force
installations, temporarily mitigating our 8,000 personnel shortfall in
Security Forces. As we do this, we are executing an aggressive plan to
rapidly burn down the need for Army augmentation and working to
redesign manpower requirements. Our reduction plan maximizes the use of
Army volunteers in the second year, and allows for demobilization of
about one third of the soldiers employed in the first year.
Future Total Force
Just as in combat overseas, we are continuing to pursue seamless
ARC and active duty integration at home, leveraging the capabilities
and characteristics of each component, while allowing each to retain
their cultural identity. We continue to explore a variety of
organizational initiatives to integrate our Active, Guard, and Reserve
Forces. These efforts are intended to expand mission flexibility,
create efficiencies in our total force, and prepare for the future.
Today's future total force team includes a number of blended or
associate units that are programmed or are in use. The creation of the
``blended'' unit, the 116th Air Control Wing at Robins Air Force Base,
Georgia, elevated integration to the next level. With an initial
deployment of over 730 personnel, and significant operational
achievements in OIF, we are now examining opportunities to integrate
active, Guard, and Reserve units elsewhere in order to produce even
more measurable benefits, savings, and efficiencies.
The reasons for this type of integration are compelling. We can
maximize our warfighting capabilities by integrating Active, Guard, and
Reserve Forces to optimize the contributions of each component.
reservists and guardsmen bring with them capabilities they have
acquired in civilian jobs, leveraging the experience of ARC personnel.
Integration relieves PERSTEMPO on the Active-Duty Force. Because ARC
members do not move as often, they provide corporate knowledge,
stability, and continuity. Finally, integration enhances the retention
of airmen who decide to leave active service. Because the Guard and
Reserve are involved in many Air Force missions, we recapture the
investment we've made by retaining separating active duty members as
members of the ARC.
Renewing the Force
To renew our force, we target our recruitment to ensure a diverse
force with the talent and drive to be the best airmen in the world's
greatest Air Force. We will recruit those with the skills most critical
for our continued success. In fiscal year 2003, our goal was 5,226
officers and 37,000 enlisted; we exceeded our goal in both categories,
accessing 5,419 officers and 37,144 enlisted. For fiscal year 2004, we
plan to access 5,795 officers and 37,000 enlisted.
In the Air Force, the capabilities we derive from diversity are
vital to mission excellence and at the core of our strategy to maximize
our combat capabilities. In this new era, successful military
operations demand much greater agility, adaptability, and versatility
to achieve and sustain success. This requires a force comprised of the
best our Nation has to offer, from every segment of society, trained
and ready to go. Our focus is building a force that consists of men and
women who possess keener international insight, foreign language
proficiency, and wide-ranging cultural acumen. Diversity of life
experiences, education, culture, and background are essential to help
us achieve the asymmetric advantage we need to defend America's
interests wherever threatened. Our strength comes from the collective
application of our diverse talents, and is a critical component of the
air and space dominance we enjoy today. We must enthusiastically reach
out to all segments of society to ensure the Air Force offers a
welcoming career to the best and brightest of American society,
regardless of their background. By doing so, we attract people from all
segments of society and tap into the limitless talents resident in our
diverse population.
In addition to a diverse force, we also need the correct talent
mix. We remain concerned about recruiting health care professionals and
individuals with technical degrees. To meet our needs, we continue to
focus our efforts to ensure we attract and retain the right people. We
will also closely monitor ARC recruitment. Historically, the Air
National Guard and Air Force Reserve Command access close to 25 percent
of eligible, separating active duty Air Force members with no break in
service between their active duty and ARC service.
Developing the Force
Over the past year, we implemented a new force development
construct in order to get the right people in the right job at the
right time with the right skills, knowledge, and experience. Force
development combines focused assignments and education and training
opportunities to prepare our people to meet the mission needs of our
Air Force. Rather than allowing chance and happenstance to guide an
airman's experience, we will take a deliberate approach to develop
officers, enlisted, and civilians throughout our Total Force. Through
targeted education, training, and mission-related experience, we will
develop professional airmen into joint force warriors with the skills
needed across the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of
conflict. Their mission will be to accomplish the joint mission,
motivate teams, mentor subordinates, and train their successors.
A segment of warriors requiring special attention is our cadre of
space professionals, those that design, build, and operate our space
systems. As military dependence on space grows, the Air Force continues
to develop this cadre to meet our Nation's needs. Our Space
Professional Strategy is the roadmap for developing that cadre. Air
Force space professionals will develop more in-depth expertise in
operational and technical space specialties through tailored
assignments, education, and training. This roadmap will result in a
team of scientists, engineers, program managers, and operators skilled
and knowledgeable in developing, acquiring, applying, sustaining, and
integrating space capabilities.
Sustaining the Force
The Air Force is a retention-based force. Because the skill sets of
our airmen are not easily replaced, we expend considerable effort to
retain our people, especially those in high-technology fields and those
in whom we have invested significant education and training. In 2003,
we reaped the benefits of an aggressive retention program, aided by a
renewed focus and investment on education and individual development,
enlistment and retention bonuses, targeted military pay raises, and
quality of life improvements. Our fiscal year 2003 enlisted retention
statistics tell the story. Retention for first term airmen stood at 61
percent, exceeding our goal by 6 percent. Retention for our second term
and career airmen was also impressive, achieving 73 percent and 95
percent respectively. Continued investment in people rewards their
service, provides a suitable standard of living, and enables us to
attract and retain the professionals we need.
One of the highlights of our quality of life focus is housing
investment. Through military construction and housing privatization, we
are providing quality homes faster than ever before. Over the next 3
years, the Air Force will renovate or replace more than 40,000 homes
through privatization. At the same time, we will renovate or replace an
additional 20,000 homes through military construction. With the
elimination of out-of-pocket housing expenses, our Air Force members
and their families now have three great options--local community
housing, traditional military family housing, and privatized housing.
Focus On Fitness
We recognize that without motivated and combat-ready expeditionary
airmen throughout our total force, our strategies, advanced
technologies, and integrated capabilities would be much less effective.
That is why we have renewed our focus on fitness and first-class
fitness centers. We must be fit to fight. That demands that we reorient
our culture to make physical and mental fitness part of our daily life
as airmen. In January 2004, our new fitness program returned to the
basics of running, sit-ups, and pushups. The program combines our
fitness guidelines and weight/body fat standards into one program that
encompasses the total health of an airman.
technology-to-warfighting
The Air Force has established a capabilities-based approach to war
planning, allowing us to focus investments on those capabilities we
need to support the joint warfighter. This type of planning focuses on
capabilities required to accomplish a variety of missions and to
achieve desired effects against any potential threats. Our
capabilities-based approach requires us to think in new ways and
consider combinations of systems that create distinctive capabilities.
Effects Focus: Capabilities-Based CONOPs
The Air Force has written six CONOPs that support capabilities-
based planning and the joint vision of combat operations. The CONOPs
help analyze the span of joint tasks we may be asked to perform and
define the effects we can produce. Most important, they help us
identify the capabilities an expeditionary force will need to
accomplish its mission, creating a framework that enables us to shape
our portfolio.
Homeland Security CONOPs leverages Air Force
capabilities with joint and interagency efforts to prevent,
protect, and respond to threats against our homeland--within or
beyond U.S. territories.
Space and Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance CONOPs (Space
and C\4\ISR) harnesses the integration of manned, unmanned, and
space systems to provide persistent situation awareness and
executable decision-quality information to the JFC.
Global Mobility CONOPs provides combatant commanders
with the planning, command and control, and operations
capabilities to enable timely and effective projection,
employment, and sustainment of U.S. power in support of U.S.
global interests--precision delivery for operational effect.
Global Strike CONOPs employs joint power-projection
capabilities to engage anti-access and high-value targets, gain
access to denied battlespace, and maintain battlespace access
for required joint/coalition follow-on operations.
Global Persistent Attack CONOPs provides a spectrum of
capabilities from major combat to peacekeeping and sustainment
operations. Global Persistent Attack assumes that once access
conditions are established (i.e. through Global Strike), there
will be a need for persistent and sustained operations to
maintain air, space, and information dominance.
Nuclear Response CONOPs provides the deterrent
``umbrella'' under which conventional forces operate, and, if
deterrence fails, avails a scalable response.
This CONOPs approach has resulted in numerous benefits, providing:
Articulation of operational capabilities that will
prevail in conflicts and avert technological surprises;
An operational risk and capabilities-based
programmatic decisionmaking focus;
Budgeting guidance to the Air Force Major Commands for
fulfilling capabilities-based solutions to satisfy warfighter
requirements;
Warfighter risk management insights for long-range
planning.
Modernization and Recapitalization
Through capabilities-based planning, the Air Force will continue to
invest in our core competency of bringing technology to the warfighter
that will maintain our technical advantage and update our air and space
capabilities. The Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment (CRRA)
process guides these efforts. Replacing an outdated threat-based review
process that focused on platforms versus current and future warfighting
effects and capabilities, our extensive 2-year assessment identified
and prioritized critical operational shortfalls we will use to guide
our investment strategy. These priorities present the most significant
and immediate Air Force-wide capability objectives.
We need to field capabilities that allow us to reduce the time
required to find, fix, track, and target fleeting and mobile targets
and other hostile forces. One system that addresses this operational
shortfall is the F/A-22 Raptor. In addition to its contributions to
obtaining and sustaining air dominance, the F/A-22 will allow all
weather, stealthy, precision strike 24 hours a day, and will counter
existing and emerging threats, such as advanced surface-to-air
missiles, cruise missiles, and time sensitive and emerging targets,
including mobile targets, that our legacy systems cannot. The F/A-22 is
in low rate initial production and has begun Phase I of its operational
testing. It is on track for initial operational capability in 2005. A
complementary capability is provided by the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter,
providing sustainable, focused CAS and interservice and coalition
commonality.
We also recognize that operational shortfalls exist early in the
kill chain and are applying technologies to fill those gaps. A robust
command, control, and sensor portfolio combining both space and
airborne systems, along with seamless real-time communications, will
provide additional critical capabilities that address this shortfall
while supporting the Joint Operational Concept of full spectrum
dominance. Program definition and risk reduction efforts are moving us
towards C\4\ISR and battle management capabilities with shorter cycle
times. The JFC will be able to respond to fleeting opportunities with
near-real time information and will be able to bring to bear kill-chain
assets against the enemy. Additionally, in this world of proliferating
cruise missile technology, our work on improving our C\4\ISR
capabilities--including airborne Active Electronically Scanned Array or
AESA radar technology--could pay large dividends, playing a significant
role in America's defense against these and other threats. To create
this robust command and control network, we will need a flexible and
digital multi-service communications capability. We are well on our way
in defining the architecture to make it a reality. The capabilities we
are pursuing directly support the Department's transformational system
of interoperable joint C\4\ISR.
There is a need for a globally interconnected capability that
collects, processes, stores, disseminates, and manages information on
demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support people. The C2
Constellation, our capstone concept for achieving the integration of
air and space operations, includes these concepts and the future
capabilities of the Global Information Grid, Net Centric Enterprise
Services, Transformational Communications, the Joint Tactical Radio
System, and airborne Command, Control, and Communication assets, among
others.
One of the elements of a sensible strategy to maintain U.S. power
projection capabilities derives from a global aerial refueling fleet
that serves Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and coalition aircraft. Our
current fleet of aging tankers met the challenges of OEF and OIF but is
increasingly expensive to maintain. The fleet averages more then 40
years of age, and the oldest model, the KC-135E, goes back to the
Eisenhower administration. Recapitalization for this fleet of over 540
aerial refueling aircraft will clearly take decades to complete and is
vital to the foundation and global reach of our Air Force, sister
services, and coalition partners. The Air Force is committed to an
acquisition approach for this program that will recapitalize the fleet
in the most affordable manner possible.
Capabilities-driven modernization and recapitalization efforts are
also taking place on our space systems, as we replace constellations of
satellites and ground systems with next generation capabilities. The
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle has completed six successful
launches. Using two launch designs, we will continue to seek
responsive, assured access to space for government systems. Space-Based
Radar will provide a complementary capability to our portfolio of radar
and remote sensing systems. We will employ internet protocol networks
and high-bandwidth lasers in space to transform communications with the
Transformational Satellite, dramatically increasing connectivity to the
warfighter. Modernization of GPS and development of the next-generation
GPS III will enhance navigation capability and increase our resistance
to jamming. In partnership with NASA and the Department of Commerce, we
are developing the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System, which offers next-generation meteorological
capability. Each of these systems supports critical C\4\ISR
capabilities that give the JFC increased technological and asymmetric
advantages.
Space control efforts, enabled by robust space situation awareness,
will ensure unhampered access to space-based services. Enhanced space
situation awareness assets will provide the information necessary to
execute an effective space control strategy. However, we must be
prepared to deprive an adversary of the benefits of space capabilities
when American interests and lives are at stake.
Additional capability does not stem solely from new weapon system
acquisitions. It results from innovative modernization of our existing
systems. One example is incorporating a Smart Bomb Rack Assembly and
the 500-lb. version of the Joint Direct Attack Munition into the
weapons bay of the B-2. In September 2003, we demonstrated that the B-2
bomber is now able to release up to 80 separately targeted, GPS-guided
weapons in a single mission. This kind of innovation reduces the number
of platforms that must penetrate enemy airspace while holding numerous
enemy targets at risk. The second order consequences run the gamut from
maintenance to support aircraft.
We will also address the deficiencies in our infrastructure through
modernization and recapitalization. Improvements to our air and space
systems will be limited without improvements in our foundational
support systems. Deteriorated airfields, hangars, waterlines,
electrical networks, and air traffic control approach and landing
systems are just some of the infrastructure elements needing immediate
attention. Our investment strategy focuses on three simultaneous steps:
disposing of excess facilities; sustaining our facilities and
infrastructure; and establishing a sustainable investment program for
future modernization of our facilities and infrastructure.
Finally, we need to continue to modernize and recapitalize our
information technology infrastructure. To leverage our information
superiority, the Air Force is pursuing a modernization strategy and
information technology investments, which target a common network
infrastructure and employ enterprise services and shared capabilities.
Science and Technology (S&T)
Our investment in science and technology has and continues to
underpin our modernization and recapitalization program. Similar to our
applied-technology acquisition efforts, the Air Force's capability-
based focus produces an S&T vision that supports the warfighter.
The Air Force S&T program fosters development of joint warfighting
capabilities and integrated technologies, consistent with DOD and
national priorities. We will provide a long-term, stable investment in
S&T in areas that will immediately benefit existing systems and in
transformational technologies that will improve tomorrow's Air Force.
Many Air Force S&T programs, such as directed energy, hypersonics,
laser-based communications, and the emerging field of nanotechnology,
show promise for joint warfighting capabilities. Other technology
areas, such as miniaturization of space platforms and space proximity
operations, also show promise in the future. Through developments like
these, the Air Force S&T program will advance joint warfighting
capabilities and the Air Force vision of an integrated air and space
force capable of responsive and decisive global engagement.
Capabilities-Based Acquisition/Transforming Business Practices
To achieve our vision of a flexible, responsive, and capabilities-
based expeditionary force, we are transforming how we conceive, plan,
develop, acquire, and sustain weapons systems. Our Agile Acquisition
initiative emphasizes speed and credibility; we must deliver what we
promise--on time and on budget. Our goal is to deliver affordable,
sustainable capabilities that meet joint warfighters' operational
needs.
We continue to improve our acquisition system--breaking down
organizational barriers, changing work culture through aggressive
training, and reforming processes with policies that encourage
innovation and collaboration. Already, we are:
Realigning our Program Executive Officers (PEOs). By
moving our PEOs out of Washington and making them commanders of
our product centers, we have aligned both acquisition
accountability and resources under our most experienced general
officers and acquisition professionals.
Creating a culture of innovation. Because people drive
the success of our Agile Acquisition initiatives, we will focus
on enhanced training. Laying the foundation for change, this
past year 16,500 Air Force acquisition professionals, and
hundreds of personnel from other disciplines, attended training
sessions underscoring the need for collaboration, innovation,
reasonable risk management, and a sense of urgency in our
approach.
Reducing Total Ownership Costs. With strong support
from the Secretary of Defense, we will expand the Reduction in
Total Ownership Cost program with a standard model ensuring
that we have accurate metrics.
Moving technology from the lab to the warfighter
quickly. Laboratories must focus on warfighter requirements and
researchers need to ensure technologies are mature, producible,
and supportable. Warfighters will work with scientists,
acquisition experts, and major commands to identify gaps in
capabilities. With help from Congress, we have matured our
combat capability document process to fill those gaps. During
OIF, we approved 37 requests for critically needed systems,
usually in a matter of days.
Tailoring acquisition methods for space systems. In
October 2003, we issued a new acquisition policy for space
systems that will improve acquisitions by tailoring acquisition
procedures to the unique demands of space systems.
Transformation of our business processes is not limited to
acquisition activities. Our Depot Maintenance Strategy and Master Plan
calls for financial and infrastructure capitalization to ensure Air
Force hardware is safe and ready to operate across the threat spectrum.
Our increased funding for depot facilities and equipment modernization
in fiscal years 2004-2009, along with public-private partnerships, will
result in more responsive support to the JFC. We expect to maximize
production and throughput of weapon systems and commodities that will
improve mission capability.
Our logistics transformation initiative will revolutionize
logistics processes to improve warfighter support and reduce costs. The
goal of the Air Force's logistics transformation program, Expeditionary
Logistics for the 21st Century, is to increase weapon system
availability by 20 percent with zero cost growth. Our current
initiatives--depot maintenance transformation, purchasing and supply
chain management, regionalized intermediate repair, and improved
logistics command and control--will transform the entire logistics
enterprise.
Our depots have put some of these initiatives into place with
exceptional results. In fiscal year 2003, our depot maintenance teams
were more productive than planned, exceeding aircraft, engine, and
commodity production goals and reducing flow days in nearly all areas.
Implementation of ``lean'' production processes, optimized use of the
existing workforce, and appropriate funding, all contributed to this
good news story. In addition, our spares support to the warfighter is
at record high numbers. In 2003, supply rates and cannibalization rates
achieved their best performance since fiscal year 1994 and fiscal year
1995, respectively. Fourteen of 20 aircraft design systems improved
their mission capable rates over the previous year, with Predator
unmanned aerial vehicles improving by 11 percent, and B-1 bombers
achieving the best mission capable and supply rates in its history.
Thanks to proper funding, fleet consolidation, and transformation
initiatives, spare parts shortages were reduced to the lowest levels
recorded across the entire fleet.
Financing the Fight
An operating strategy is only as good as its financing strategy.
Similar to acquisition, logistics, and other support processes, our
finance capabilities are strong. We are taking deliberate and
aggressive steps to upgrade our financial decision support capability
and reduce the cost of delivering financial services. Our focus is on
support to our airmen, strategic resourcing and cost management, and
information reliability and integration. The initiatives that will get
us there include self-service web-based pay and personnel customer
service, seamless e-commerce for our vendor payment environment,
budgets that link planning, programming, and execution to capabilities
and performance, financial statements that produce clean audit opinions
while providing reliable financial and management information, and
innovative financing strategies.
integrating operations
The Air Force excels at providing communications, intelligence, air
mobility, precision strike, and space capabilities that enable joint
operations. Our airmen integrate these and other capabilities into a
cohesive system that creates war-winning effects. Integration takes
place at three levels. At the joint strategic level, integration occurs
between interagencies and the coalition. Integration also takes place
within the Air Force at an organizational level. At its most basic
level, integration takes place at the machine-to-machine level to
achieve universal information sharing which facilitates true
integration at every level.
Integrating Joint, Coalition, and Interagency Operations
The ever-changing dynamics of global events will drive the need to
integrate DOD and interagency capabilities and, in most cases, those of
our coalition partners. Joint solutions are required to produce
warfighting effects with the speed that the global war on terrorism
demands. Fully integrated operations employ only the right forces and
capabilities necessary to achieve an objective in the most efficient
manner. We must also integrate space capabilities for national
intelligence and warfighting.
We are pursuing adaptations of our C2 organizations and
capabilities to support this vision. While the Air Force's global C2
structure has remained relatively constant, throughout our 57-year
history, the demands of a changing geopolitical environment have
stressed current C2 elements beyond their design limits.
We have conducted an extensive review of our C2 structures to
support the National Security Strategy objectives of assure, dissuade,
deter, and defeat as well as the SECDEF's Unified Command Plan. We will
enhance our support for the JFC and our expeditionary posture through a
new Warfighting Headquarters Construct. This will enable the Numbered
Air Forces to support unified combatant commanders in a habitual
supported-supporting relationship. Working with their strategy and
planning cells on a daily basis will ensure that Air Force capabilities
are available to the JFC's warfighting staff. This new headquarters
will provide the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) with sufficient
staff to focus on planning and employment of air, space, and
information operations throughout the theater.
We are also adapting the capabilities of our CAOCs. The CAOCs of
each headquarters will be interconnected with the theater CAOCs, all
operating 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. They will be operated as a
weapons system, certified and standardized, and have cognizance of the
entire air and space picture. This reorganization will increase our
ability to support our combatant commanders, reduce redundancies, and
deliver precise effects to the warfighters. As we near completion of
the concept development, we will work with the Secretary of Defense and
Congress to implement a more streamlined and responsive C2 component
for the combatant commanders and national leadership.
Integrated operations also depend on integrated training. We
continue to advance joint and combined interoperability training with
our sister services and the nations with which we participate in global
operations. The Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) will improve
our opportunities for joint training. The aim of the JNTC is to improve
each service's ability to work with other services at the tactical
level and to improve joint planning and execution at the operational
and strategic levels. The Air Force has integrated live, virtual, and
constructive training environments into a single training realm using a
distributed mission operations (DMO) capability. JNTC will use this DMO
capability to tie live training events with virtual (man-in-the-loop)
play and constructive simulations. Live training in 2004--on our ranges
during four Service-conducted major training events--will benefit from
improved instrumentation and links to other ranges as well as the
ability to supplement live training with virtual or constructive
options. These types of integrated training operations reduce overall
costs to the services while providing us yet another avenue to train
like we fight.
Integrating Within the Air Force
The Air Force is continuing to strengthen and refine our AEF. The
AEF enables rapid build-up and redeployment of air and space power
without a lapse in the Air Force's ability to support a combatant
commander's operations. The Air Force provides forces to Combatant
Commanders according the AEF Presence Policy (AEFPP), the Air Force
portion of DOD's Joint Presence Policy. There are ten AEFs, and each
AEF provides a portfolio of capabilities and force modules. At any
given time, two AEFs are postured to immediately provide these
capabilities. The other eight are in various stages of rest, training,
spin-up, or standby. The AEF is how the Air Force organizes, trains,
equips, and sustains responsive air and space forces to meet defense
strategy requirements outlined in the Strategic Planning Guidance.
Within the AEF, Air Force forces are organized and presented to
combatant commanders as Air and Space Expeditionary Task Forces
(AETFs). They are sized to meet the combatant commander's requirements
and may be provided in one of three forms: as an Air Expeditionary Wing
(AEW), Group (AEG), and/or Squadron (AES). An AETF may consist of a
single AEW or AEG, or may consist of multiple AEWs or AEGs and/or as a
Numbered Expeditionary Air Force. AETFs provide the functional
capabilities (weapon systems, expeditionary combat support and command
and control) to achieve desired effects in an integrated joint
operational environment.
One of our distinctive Air Force capabilities is Agile Combat
Support (ACS.) To provide this capability, our expeditionary combat
support forces--medics, logisticians, engineers, communicators,
Security Forces, Services, and Contracting, among several others--
provide a base support system that is highly mobile, flexible, and
fully integrated with air and space operations. ACS ensures responsive
expeditionary support to joint operations is achievable within resource
constraints--from creation of operating locations to provision of
right-sized forces. An example of this capability is the 86th
Contingency Response Group (CRG) at Ramstein Air Base, organized,
trained, and equipped to provide an initial ``Open the Base'' force
module to meet combatant commander requirements. The CRG provides a
rapid response team to assess operating location suitability and
defines combat support capabilities needed to establish air
expeditionary force operating locations.
Another example of ACS capability is the light and lean
Expeditionary Medical System (EMEDS) that provides the U.S. military's
farthest forward care and surgical capability. Air Force medics jump
into the fight alongside the very first combatants. Whether supporting
the opening of an air base or performing life saving surgeries, these
medics bring an extraordinary capability. They carry backpacks with
reinforced medical equipment, permitting them to perform medical
operations within minutes of their boots hitting the ground.
Complementing this expeditionary medical capability is our air
evacuation system that provides the lifeline for those injured
personnel not able to return to duty. The other services and our allies
benefited greatly from this capability in OEF and OIF. The Army and
Navy are now developing a similar light and lean capability. The
success of EMEDS is also apparent in the reduction of disease and non-
battle injuries--the lowest ever in combat.
Horizontal Machine-to-Machine Integration
We also strive to increasingly integrate operations at the most
basic level--electron to electron. Victory belongs to those who can
collect intelligence, communicate information, and bring capabilities
to bear first. Executing these complex tasks with accuracy, speed, and
power requires assured access and the seamless, horizontal integration
of systems, activities and expertise across all manned, unmanned, and
space capabilities. Such integration will dramatically shorten the kill
chain.
Machine-to-machine integration means giving the warfighter the
right information at the right time. It facilitates the exchange of
large amounts of information, providing every machine the information
it needs about the battlespace and an ability to share that
information. In the future, we will significantly reduce the persistent
challenges of having different perspectives or pictures of the
battlefield. Examples would be to ensure that the A-10 could see the
same target as the Predator or to guarantee that the F-15 has the same
intelligence about enemy radars as the Rivet Joint.
We want a system where information is made available and delivered
without regard to the source of the information, who analyzed the
information, or who disseminated the information. It is the end product
that is important, not the fingers that touch it. The culmination of
the effort is the cursor over the target. It is an effect we seek, and
what we will provide.
The warfighters' future success will depend on Predictive
Battlespace Awareness (PBA). PBA relies on in-depth study of an
adversary before hostilities begin in order to anticipate his actions
to the maximum extent possible. We can then analyze information to
assess current conditions, exploit opportunities, anticipate future
actions, and act with a degree of speed and certainty unmatched by our
adversaries. PBA also relies on the ability of air and space systems to
integrate information at the machine-to-machine level and produce high-
fidelity intelligence that results in a cursor over the target. The
result--integrated operations--is our unique ability to conduct PBA and
impact the target at the time and place of our choosing. This machine-
to-machine integration will include a constellation of sensors that
create a network of information providing joint warfighters the
information and continuity to see first, understand first, and act
first.
The C2 Constellation is the Air Force capstone concept for
achieving the integration of air and space operations. Our vision of
the C2 Constellation is a robust, protected network infrastructure, a
globally based command and control system to encompass all levels of
the battle and allow machines to do the integration and fusion. It uses
Battle Management Command and Control & Connectivity and consists of
command centers, sensors, and systems like the U-2, Space Based Radar,
the Distributed Common Ground System, and our CAOCs. Given the C2
Constellation's complexity, the Air Force recognizes the need for an
architecture to address myriad integration issues--methodically--so all
elements work in concert.
securing america's next horizon
Armed with the heritage of air and space power in combat, the
lessons learned from our most recent conflicts, and the powerful
advances in technology in the 21st century, we stand ready to deliver
decisive air and space power in support of our Nation. Whether called
to execute a commanding show of force, to enable the joint fight, to
deliver humanitarian assistance, or to protect our Nation from the
scourge of terrorism, we will deliver the effects required. Our ability
to consistently answer the call is our dividend to the Nation, a result
of our sustained investment in people, technology, and integration.
Our portfolio of advantages provides dividends on the battlefield.
We bring to bear a diversified collection of capabilities, which answer
the needs of a spectrum of combat and humanitarian operations. As one
would with any investment, we will monitor, maintain, and adjust our
investments as needed to reflect the demands of a dynamic environment.
Transformational initiatives in the way we organize, train, and equip
reflect such adjustments, changes that will result in significant gains
for our force, for the joint team, and for our Nation. Yet, we will not
shift our focus from the core competencies that have provided the
foundation for our success and continue to do so. The success of the
Air Force resides in the airmen who employ the technology of
warfighting through integrated operations with our joint and coalition
partners. This is our heritage and our future. This is America's Air
Force.
Senator McCain [presiding]. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary England, relative to our deployments to Haiti, I
understand now that the lead element of the stability force
could grow up to 2,000 American troops and could stay up to 3
months. What is the mission? How many marines and other
military personnel will we send? Do you expect marines to
remain in Haiti after a U.N. peacekeeping force deploys?
Secretary England. Senator, today we have 370 marines
deployed, who are actually in Haiti this morning, the latest
number. We still have marines going to Haiti. Understand
initially we will have about 900 marines in Haiti. It could be
more, but I think that all depends--my understanding on what
our support is from other countries. Of course, we do have
support from about five other countries, as of yesterday, that
I was aware of: Canada, France, a couple of other countries
here in the hemisphere. So I believe we need to see what
happens here in the next days and weeks, but this should
stabilize within the next 90 days, and our marines will be back
in Camp Lejeune. But, obviously, it depends on how things work
out and the kind of support we have from our friends and
allies. But, it does seem to be coming together.
The last report I had, just looking at the news this
morning, at least where our marines are deployed things seem to
be quieter, so hopefully we'll have a stable situation. This is
a peacekeeping force. I hope we'll have stable situation
shortly.
Senator Levin. The hope is that they'll be back in 90 days?
Secretary England. Yes, sir, that's our expectation.
Senator Levin. In my opening statement, I talked about the
adequacy of our funding and apparently the lack of a decision
of the administration not to request a 2005 supplemental during
this calendar year. The problem is that the budget that's
before us represents a peacetime budget, and it just doesn't
pay for incremental costs of operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. When the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air
Force, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the
Marine Corps, were in front of us, they all testified to a
cash-flow difficulty that they're going to face if the Defense
Department does not submit a fiscal year 2005 supplemental
funding request to Congress during this calendar year. I'm
wondering whether or not you share those concerns that were
expressed to us.
First, Secretary Brownlee, do you share those concerns that
unless we have a supplemental for 2005 filed with us this year,
that we're going to have some cash-flow problems?
Secretary Brownlee. Sir, we're certainly concerned,
because, as you indicated earlier what our burn rate is, out of
the $65.1 billion that Congress provided for supplemental
appropriations for fiscal year 2004, the Army received roughly
40 of that. So by moving some funds within the Army, and
relying on some assistance from OSD, we believe we can get to
the end of fiscal year 2004. When the fiscal year 2005 budget
is approved, we will have some limited ability to cash-flow out
of that. Again, with assistance from the administration, we
believe we could get to sometime early next spring before we
would get into trouble.
Senator Levin. So you believe that without a supplemental
for 2005 adopted this calendar year, that you're going to be
okay through the spring of 2005?
Secretary Brownlee. In conferring with OSD and looking
within the Army at what we have, and our current level of
spending, we believe we can get there, sir.
Senator Levin. Secretary England.
Secretary England. Well, Senator, the Department of the
Navy--our deployments are in our base budget. If you'll notice,
for example, the war supplemental, I mean, we draw down
relatively small funds from the war supplemental because we
fund our ongoing operation as part of our base budget. So all
the deployment of our ships, our sailors and marines, we were
forward-deployed every day, 24/7. That's accounted for in our
base budget.
Senator Levin. Is the rotation of the marines accounted
for?
Secretary England. It is--the marines that are going
overseas now are not accounted for, so we do have a marginal
cost there. That marginal cost, we are working with OSD, we do
expect to be funded. That's out of the fiscal year 2004
supplemental; that's out of the Operation Iraqi Freedom fund.
So we do not see a problem with that deployment. Now, if we
have deployments next year, that's another issue.
But, nonetheless, for the Department of Navy, it's a
relatively small amount of money. Of course, the CNO already
testified it was not an issue with him.
I, frankly, believe that the Marine Corps costs, we can
accommodate out of our total budget. A lot of the Marine Corps
funding, of course, comes out of the Navy side of the budget,
not the Marine Corps side of the budget.
Senator Levin. I'm wondering, going back to you, Secretary
Brownlee, whether or not you are familiar with General
Schoomaker's testimony----
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir, I am.
Senator Levin.--because he said that the fact that the Army
operation in Iraq was only funded until the end of September
created a real concern as to how to bridge from the end of this
fiscal year until the time when supplemental funding is
available. He said he just didn't have any answer----
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin.--where he's going to get the funding. You
apparently do have an answer to that.
Secretary Brownlee. Sir, if you look just at the funds that
have been provided to the Army today, he's certainly right.
What I said was that, assuming that we will get additional
assistance from the administration, from OSD, they have----
Senator Levin. Additional to what?
Secretary Brownlee. Sir, OSD can move monies and provide
additional assistance to us also from other services. They have
transfer accounts. They have other monies there.
Senator Levin. Are you talking about----
Secretary Brownlee. I am assured by them that, with their
assistance, we can make it, in accordance with the way I laid
it out. Now, what General Schoomaker was looking at was
strictly those funds that have been provided today in the
fiscal year 2004 budget for the Army, plus the supplemental
funds that we have received to date. He's right about that. We
would probably run out in 2004. We would probably need some
assistance, quite frankly, from OSD to get to 2004 with some of
the other things that we're planning to do.
Senator Levin. Well, he was talking about the bridge
between the end of this fiscal year to the time when the 2005
supplemental is adopted----
Secretary Brownlee. Well----
Senator Levin.--because there's no provision in the 2005
budget for these incremental costs. So the question is----
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir. What I indicated was that,
presuming the fiscal year 2005 budget was passed, and we got
our share of that, we would have some limited capability to
cash-flow funds out of third- and fourth-quarter funds early;
and with some additional assistance from the administration, we
could probably make it through this--I don't know--somewhere
around this time next year, maybe the end of March--how much
assistance we would get, but I've----
Senator Levin. You have----
Secretary Brownlee.--in conferring with OSD, that's what
they've told us--that they have--can release additional funds
to us.
Senator Levin. You've gotten that assurance from OSD?
Secretary Brownlee. I have conferred with them, and that's
what they've told me, sir, that they would----
Senator Levin. Thank you.
My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Senator Levin.
Secretary Roche, when does the Air Force anticipate making
a decision concerning the lease/purchase of the tankers?
Secretary Roche. Senator, we would expect that the
inquiries that the Secretary of Defense has asked to be put in
place, which include, clearly, the Inspector General's review
of any illegalities, which also include a Defense Science Board
review, from scratch, of the tanker recapitalization to be
done, plus one or two other things, that when those are
finished, then we'll make that decision. I don't know an exact
date. It's months from now.
Senator McCain. The defense authorization bill required the
conduct of an analysis of alternatives. Are you aware of that?
Secretary Roche. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Would you anticipate making that decision
before the analysis of alternatives is completed?
Secretary Roche. The way the analysis of alternatives is
structured, Senator, is that it assumes that there was the
NDAA-approved lease. An 80 purchase out of a 100, and then the
analysis of alternatives picks up from that point forward. If,
on the other hand----
Senator McCain. Right, you assume that.
Secretary Roche. Yes, sir----
Senator McCain. Why would----
Secretary Roche.--the people----
Senator McCain.--why would you assume that----
Secretary Roche. Because----
Senator McCain.--Mr. Secretary, when the language of the
legislation says--just calls for an analysis of alternatives?
Secretary Roche. Senator, as I understand, and I've talked
to Mike Wynne and others about this, it picks up that period.
However, if there is continued delay, the work that would be
done in that analysis of alternatives would always--would also
inform the basic initial purchase, as well if we stayed to the
KC-X program, if we don't lease. You'll recall, sir, the lease
was a way to accelerate procurement, that all along we have
been planning monies in the regular program, for a KC-X
program. If any one of the committees objected, we would stick
with that plan. This NDAA directed analysis of alternatives
would also substitute for the analysis of alternatives that
would be done as part of the KC-X program.
Senator McCain. Well, of course, e-mails that we receive
from Boeing clearly indicated that you intended to lease as
many as 300 tanker aircraft----
Secretary Roche. No, sir. With all due respect, sir, I
never, ever used a number greater than 100, because only the
number 100 was used in the fiscal year 2002 appropriations act.
Others used other numbers; I cut Boeing off in any
conversations of anything above 100.
Senator McCain. That's not what the e-mails indicate, but
we'll--hopefully we'll get to the bottom of that sooner or
later.
Now, who's going to conduct the analysis of alternatives?
Secretary Roche. It hasn't been determined yet, sir. It'll
be one of the Federally-Funded Research and Development Centers
(FFRDCs), or it will be determined by the OSD as to who
conducts it. I'm not sure who they will choose.
Senator McCain. So they haven't even begun the analysis of
alternatives.
Secretary Roche. They haven't begun the analysis of
alternatives. Quite separately, we have had the Rand
Corporation doing work, which is precursor to analysis of
alternatives, but it's not clear that OSD will choose Rand to
be the----
Senator McCain. But you've had the Rand Corporation do the
precursor, the same----
Secretary Roche. That was for our own information.
Senator McCain.--the same corporation that got $30 million
for Project Air Force last year, and will get $25 million again
this year.
Secretary Roche. But that's precursor for the Air Force,
Senator. The OSD will choose which organization will do the
analysis of alternatives, as required by the NDAA.
Senator McCain. Well, in a Boeing briefing to the Board of
Directors, on--June 2002, ``Element operational requirement
document (ORD) objective: Establish clearly defined
requirements in ORD for the USAF tanker configuration that
results in an affordable solution that meets the USAF mission
needs and will prevent an AOA from being conducted.'' You never
heard any information that the Boeing Corporation wanted to
prevent an analysis of alternatives.
Secretary Roche. No, sir. I never discussed that with them.
As I've told you once before, I did have a discussion with the
Deputy Secretary of Defense in the presence of the other
service secretaries, service chiefs, people from OSD, as to
whether or not an analysis of alternatives was required for the
tanker lease. I argued at that time that given the subject
matter, that one was not; and it was agreed to at that time. I
testified to that effect to you, I believe, last year, sir.
Senator McCain. You, of course, don't recall you telling
the Boeing lobbyists to--a meeting with the Boeing lobbyists
where you told them to put pressure on Mr. Wynne on the
tanker----
Secretary Roche. Senator, thank you----
Senator McCain.--deal----
Secretary Roche.--for the question, Senator.
Senator McCain. Let me finish my question.
Secretary Roche. If I may answer----
Senator McCain. Can I finish the question?
Secretary Roche.--the question--may I answer the question?
Senator McCain. Can I finish the question----
Secretary Roche. Oh, I'm sorry.
Senator McCain.--Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Roche. I'm sorry.
Senator McCain. Thank you. In that and other e-mails that
we got from Boeing, you met with the lobbyists from Boeing and
said, ``You have to put pressure on Mr. Wynne in order to get
this deal expedited.'' That clearly does not indicate that you
had some support for analysis of alternatives. But last time
you testified--and let me finish my question--you didn't recall
that meeting with the Boeing lobbyists.
Secretary Roche. Yes, sir. The reason was, you gave a name
of a person, and it happened to be the same name of the program
manager of our F/A-22 program, so it was very confusing. I
then, at the time, asked you if you would read some of the
introductory paragraphs so I could fix the letter in my mind,
and, in fact, we may have a difference in what we were looking
at. This is an issue that occurs after OSD-Program Analysis and
Evaluation (PA&E) sends a letter on a Friday night to me
objecting to the language in a report--in a report--that I
would be doing for Congress. This was done a month after the
lease has been approved, and a month after the lease has been
announced. At that time, the person--who has never met me
before--uses the word ``pressure,'' but it doesn't make sense,
because the lease has already been approved--the lease has
already been publicly announced. The concern, and my upset, was
the fact that it appeared there was a rear-guard action going
on against my cover letter bringing the matter to the point of
Congress. I've told you there was no pressure; Mr. Wynne has
told you there was no pressure, and, Senator, I believe if
you'll read a few lines down that same e-mail, the individual
reports that there would be a meeting that afternoon--this is a
Monday--that afternoon.
Further, if I may answer, sir, this was not a lobbyist, nor
did I call him in. This meeting had been scheduled weeks in
advance, and the individual was the head of all of the military
programs in the Boeing company, and we discussed other
programs, as well. By the way, the matter of concern was
resolved by 4 o'clock that afternoon.
Senator McCain. Well, I have never heard of a Secretary of
the Air Force calling in a lobbyist to tell him to ``put
pressure on''----
Secretary Roche. Senator, I did not call----
Senator McCain. That's an e-mail----
Secretary Roche.--I did not call in a lobbyist, Senator.
Senator McCain. That's an e-mail.
Secretary Roche. Please--please, I'm trying to answer that.
I did not call in any lobbyists. The meeting you're referring
to is a meeting with a line executive. He was not called in.
The meeting had been scheduled well in advance. I did not ask
him to put on pressure. Senator, the subject matter was my
report that I would sign or not sign, not the lease itself.
It----
Senator McCain. Obviously----
Secretary Roche.--all occurred months earlier.
Senator McCain. Obviously, your testimony is in direct
contradiction to the e-mails that we received. If you would be
forthcoming with the e-mails that you used, and other members
of the Air Force, during the conduct of this investigation--and
your steadfast refusal to do so indicates that everything is
not going to be cleared up until such time as we find out all
information. There is more than--and I think the Defense
Inspector General's report will have some very interesting
things involved in it.
The ORD--is my time up? My time has expired, Mr. Secretary,
but I want to repeat again, I've never seen, in 22 years in the
United States Navy and now 22 years in Congress, anything like
the deal that you tried to pull off. We will continue to try to
save the taxpayers $5 billion or $6 billion, which would have
happened if we hadn't had the right kind of intervention and
the right kind of information, because you were greasing the
skids with the Boeing Aircraft Corporation, and Boeing has
taken appropriate action by relieving their chief executive
officer and CFO of their responsibilities. Unfortunately, we
haven't seen a single thing done by the United States Air Force
to correct this kind of situation, which evolved in a most
scandalous fashion.
Secretary Roche. Senator, you know that I respectfully
disagree with your characterization of that, that I was trying
to get a more rapid acquisition of tankers, that I believe
everything was done in accordance with the fiscal year 2002
Appropriations Act, that everything was done by the book, as
best as I could tell. I did not call in lobbyists. I never have
for the companies. I certainly did not tell them to pressure
anybody. The pressure--under the circumstances, the date of--if
you look at the date of the e-mail, Senator, it makes no sense
having to do with the lease. The issue had to do with a letter,
a critique of my draft report to Congress.
Senator McCain. Well, obviously, we will let others judge
the facts.
Secretary Roche. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Again, it's very unfortunate, particularly
in light of all the investigations that are going on, that you
and the Secretary of Defense will not allow the Senate Armed
Services Committee to exercise its oversight duties by having
access to all communications, which, by the way, I'm sure are a
standard form that you signed when you--when your nomination
was submitted to this committee for your confirmation as
Secretary of the Air Force, which says, as we showed Mr. Wynne,
that you will make available to the committee all
communications, as requested.
But, as I think you may know, Mr. Secretary, we won't quit,
and there's lots more to come.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner [presiding]. I've been working with Senator
McCain on this issue, with the Secretary of Defense, and I'm
hopeful that we can reconcile this issue, because right now
exercising the rights under--that this Senator has in the
Senate, all civilian nominees for the Department of Defense are
in abeyance by floor action. That's your right, and that sends
a very strong signal as to the support Senator McCain has to
establish the rights of co-equal branches of the government to
perform their respective work. So it may well be above your pay
grade, Mr. Secretary, but we simply have to resolve this issue.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
It's good to have you here this morning. I wanted you to
know that I am, and we are, proud of our soldiers, our sailors,
our marines, and our airmen for what they're doing for our
country. Personally, I would like to do all I can to support
our troops.
This is a question for all of you. I want to follow up on
discussions you were having earlier with Senator Levin. You
were talking about funding shortfalls for the remainder of
fiscal year 2004. Secretary Brownlee, Army officials have cited
unfunded requirements of up to $10 billion for this year, which
you suggested OSD might be able to help you with, perhaps by
moving funds from other services. However, press reports note
that the Departments of the Navy and Air Force may have
shortfalls of $1.6 billion and $375 million, respectfully. I
have two questions here. Would each of you please tell me how
much your Department expects to seek, during the upcoming mid-
year review; and if you do not receive these funds, the second
part is, what actions will you take to continue conducting
operations for the rest of the fiscal year?
Secretary Brownlee, I want you to know we had a good Army
Caucus meeting this morning, and it was filled with standing-
room only, and we heard from the Chief. We had a good exchange,
and look forward to more of that in the future. Will you start,
Secretary Brownlee?
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir. Sir, we are still putting
together what we're going to ask for in the mid-year review,
and I'd be happy to provide that for the record, but we are
just not complete in putting that together.
I can tell you that I've consulted OSD, requesting
assistance with some of the actions we've taken to accelerate
the production of up-armored HMMWVs and body armor. We still do
have some capability within the Army to reprogram funds and
move those around, and we will intend to do that where we can.
But I have conferred with people in the OSD comptroller's shop,
and they assure me that they will help us; and to what extent,
I can't tell you right now. But I have gone to them with this
situation, and they have assured me that they are capable of
providing assistance. Some of it, I'm sure we're going to have
to find ways to do ourselves, and we will. Whether or not there
will be a significant shortfall from that, I think we'll know
better after the mid-year review.
Senator Akaka. Secretary Brownlee, I and some of my
colleagues visited some of the troops who were wounded and
injured, and I tell you that we're so happy to know that the
body armor that they now have has saved many of their lives.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Senator Akaka. Are there any other improvements to the body
armor that are being planned? I say that because many of them
had limb problems and leg problems.
Secretary Brownlee. Sir, could we talk about that in a
different session?
Senator Akaka. Surely.
Secretary Brownlee. I do not want to talk about the
capabilities of our body armor and what it might or might not
be able to do.
Senator Akaka. All right, thank you.
Secretary England.
Secretary England. Senator, the $1.6 billion you referred
to in the press, that was reported--quoted a letter from the
Navy comptroller to the DOD comptroller, Mr. Zakheim--a request
in that general amount of $1.6 billion. That $1.6 billion is to
cover the incremental cost, fiscal year 2004, sending our
marines to Iraq, so it's the cost of being there, plus special
equipment, armoring for their vehicles, special equipment. We
have, frankly, told the Marine Corps, anything they need we
will fund and provide to them, and so we are evaluating a lot
of new capability.
I thank the Army, because a lot of the lessons learned in
working with them--our marines have physically been with the
Army many, many months--lessons learned to apply when our
marines deploy. Those funds, we are working with OSD, we have
received some of that money from OSD. Some things we wanted to
do right away, so we did our own reprogramming to provide some
money right away, because we did not want any time lags,
because the marines are going quickly.
So we do not have an issue here. I mean, it's a relatively
modest amount of money within our total budget. We are getting
help from OSD, and we do have some flexibilities within the
budget. So those bills are being paid. That is our fiscal year
2004. There is the Iraqi Freedom fund, which was the fiscal
year 2004 supplemental, that is available, because we are
substituting--as you'll recall, Army was originally going to be
going, and we are substituting for some of the Army personnel,
right? Marines are taking Army personnel, in terms of 82nd
Airborne. So some of that funding that was going for that total
effort with the Army will now come to the United States Marine
Corps. So this is not an issue for us, sir.
Secretary Roche. Senator, in fiscal year 2004, the Air
Force should be able to make it without a problem, assuming
there are no new contingencies and assuming the source of money
that OSD supposedly has for the Army does not come from the Air
Force. It could be a matter of robbing Peter to pay Paul. But
assuming none of that, we should be able to make 2004 fine.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. I wonder, Secretary----
Chairman Warner. I would ask forbearance if the ranking
member wants----
Senator Levin. If you would forebear.
Senator Inhofe. Certainly.
Senator Levin. I do appreciate that. I just want to get
back in this question of documents on the Boeing lease just for
1 minute.
Transcending the issues involved in the Boeing lease is the
question of whether or not Congress has a right to documents.
This is a very fundamental issue. Frankly, the Defense
Department has been kicking this can down the road and raising
the argument that somehow or other we may not be entitled to
so-called pre-decisional documents.
There's no basis in law for the Department of Defense
denying Congress predecisional documents. The only legal basis
for denying us documents is executive privilege, which
obviously is not involved here and not being asserted here.
Now, we had Mr. Wynne in front of us. He said that was
above his pay grade. Then we had the Secretary of Defense in
front of us, and he said something like, ``It's still being
considered.'' I just talked to the chairman and Senator McCain,
and I think we have a responsibility, frankly, representing the
Senate here, as just a committee of the Senate, in insisting on
these documents, and, if necessary, getting the Secretary of
Defense or the General Counsel of the Defense Department here
in front of us to answer this, because there is no way that a
self-respecting Congress cannot insist upon these documents,
unless there's an executive privilege issue. It's got nothing
to do with the issues involved in the Boeing case. It's
separate and apart from those issues.
So, Mr. Chairman, you have plenty on your plate, I know.
But, nonetheless, this request of Senator McCain is really a
request that relates to the powers of this body to oversee the
operations of the Department of Defense. If this were a Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) request, then the predecisional issue
is relevant. This isn't a FOIA issue; this is an oversight
issue on the part of Congress.
So, Mr. Chairman, I would support Senator McCain in really
insisting that we get the documents, but get an answer, so that
if the answer is going to continue to be no, that then I think
this becomes a leadership issue of the whole Senate. The Senate
will decide whether we can accept a stonewalling on this kind
of a request from an executive branch. I don't care if the
executive branch is Democratic or Republican. This goes beyond
any political issue. It's got nothing to do with the merits of
this issue. It has to do with the institutional question of
obtaining documents, which are not subject to executive
privilege.
Chairman Warner. That's clear, very much, Senator. I've
been trying to work with Senator McCain on this. So I think you
see a unified front. Gentlemen, this is, of course, at the
Secretary's level, but I think it's helpful to communicate, in
this type of forum, the sincerity and the commitment of this
committee, because we are a coequal branch of government, and
we have our functions to perform, and it's essential that we
have the appropriate documents to do our oversight.
So we'll proceed now. Thank you for your indulgence,
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Levin.
I know, Secretary Brownlee, you're unable to respond fully to
Senator Akaka's question, but I would like to have you repeat
something that General Schoomaker said this morning at the Army
Caucus, and that I believe you said, but I want to re-emphasize
that----
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe.--because there is media here, and I want
everyone to hear it. That is that every troop in Iraq and
Afghanistan, in terms of body armor, how are they equipped?
Secretary Brownlee. Has body armor. Sir, as of yesterday
afternoon, there were some additional combat service support
troops in Afghanistan, to the tune of about 2,700, that I
understand did not have interceptor body armor. Now, that
doesn't mean there's not enough in Central Command to outfit
everybody. There is. But they have to get it to these people,
and----
Senator Inhofe. But the point the General is making, if we
hadn't taken action, it would take some 20 years, at the rate
that we were going, to get adequate body armor to these
troops----
Secretary Brownlee. That's true.
Senator Inhofe.--which are now going to take----
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir. We now have more than enough
in theater to equip every soldier. It's a matter of
distribution within the theater, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. As all of you know, we've talked
about the President's budget, and there is, right now, some
talk about another $9 billion cut--up to, I think, to be fair
with them. If this were to take place, it would be up to around
$3 billion for each branch that you represent here today--can
you tell us where that would come from?
Secretary Brownlee. No, sir. It would be very difficult for
us to absorb any cut right now. As I indicated earlier, I think
we'll require assistance from OSD, at our current burn rate, to
get to fiscal year 2004; and in fiscal year 2005, we will
probably be cash-flowing out of the third and fourth quarters
in the early months of fiscal year 2005.
Senator Inhofe. Any comments, Secretary England----
Secretary England. Well, Senator----
Senator Inhofe.--either or you?
Secretary England. Yes, I do want to make a comment here,
because, Senator, my comment earlier about efficiency and
effectiveness, we have been reducing the costs of our naval
forces. We're actually reducing the number of people in the
Department of the Navy, so we have become very, very efficient,
and, I believe, much more effective. Now, when you become more
efficient, then it is much harder to absorb reductions, in
terms of funding, because you don't have any margin left.
So we have not looked at this. Obviously, we have to do
some analysis, but certainly it would be difficult to absorb.
If we have to do it, certainly we would do it, but it's very
hard, based on what I believe has been very effective work on
our part in being a much more efficient organization.
Senator Inhofe. Secretary Roche.
Secretary Roche. I would not know where to get that money
from at this point, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, well, I wanted to get you guys on the
record, because this is going to be a discussion on the floor.
I agree with you, I don't know where it would come from. I look
at something, Secretary Brownlee, that sets, as the law, that
says you have to field a non-line of sight (NLOS) cannon----
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe.--by 2008. A definition of ``fielding'' is
that a prototype, or what it is. Nonetheless, we know that we
need that for our kids, for our----
Secretary Brownlee. Sure.
Senator Inhofe.--troops over there, that capability.
Let me make one comment, I'm sorry that Senator McCain
left, I just wanted to mention something about the discussion
with General Jumper before this committee as to Tinker Air
Force Base and some of the things that were stated about
doctoring up charts and so forth. I did some checking myself to
find that when they talked about the degree of corrosion that
had taken place, they broke it down in different areas--
fuselage, bulkhead fitting, wings, and such as that.
The fifth point was left off, which they should not have
done, I agree with Senator McCain in that respect and that is
the chart using bulkhead fittings and the fact that there are
four occurrences out of 82 aircraft, or a 5-percent occurrence
factor. Now, I think that was kind of implied, and I would have
felt the same way if I had looked at this in isolation, that
we're presenting a problem that's greater than it is. However,
when you stop and realize that only a third of that which is
done is done at Tinker, it could very well be that the others,
in order to get up to the service life of all vehicles, is 11.5
percent. That would mean perhaps in some other areas it's 20
percent.
Second, if you look at some of the other parts of the
charts, such as the chart that would be corrosion and service
life report on the fuselage skin body, that report, which was
the fifth point that was left off, said the history of 82
aircraft and 18 occurrences, 22 percent occurrence factor,
which is greater than the 18.5 percent. If the intent were to
try to make it look as if the problem is not as great as it is,
I don't think that that would have been left off. It's just my
comment. I'm not requiring any response, just that I did take
the time to go down and look and see what that situation was,
and I believe that to be true.
End strength, Secretary Brownlee, we've talked about all
the things that you guys are doing over there. We've talked
about OPTEMPO over and over and over again before this
committee and all levels of the United States Army, and I would
say the same thing with perhaps the Marine Corps, too. The
temporary increases up to 30,000 soldiers, I would just like to
just ask you to answer the question, where are we in end
strength? What would you share with us this morning?
Secretary Brownlee. Well, sir, what we have proposed is to
grow the Army by 30,000 over the next several years to create
at least 10 additional combat brigades, and to use the
authority in title 10 that allows the President to waive the
requirements of end strength to allow us to do that. You will
recall, when we were--the Chief of Staff and I were here last
November, we advised the committee then that we were already
20,000 over our authorized end strength, and that we had done
that in accordance with that authority in title 10, and we were
paying for those additional 20,000 out of supplemental
appropriations. So it seemed reasonable to presume that if we
took those 20,000 and about another 10,000 and used that to
stand up 10 new combat brigades that could then be of very much
use in the fight we're in now, that that would be appropriate
to do, both in terms of the authority and in terms of the
intent of the funding, and that that would allow the Army,
then, the kind of headspace and flexibility we could also use
to go in and, over the next several years, find, within our
current authorized end strength, an additional 30,000 spaces of
efficiencies, so that hopefully at the end of a 3-year or 4-
year period, we would be able to keep those 10 combat brigades,
but, at the current end strength----
Senator Inhofe. Yes, thank you very much Secretary
Brownlee.
Mr. Chairman, I'm hoping we'll have a second round. I had
some--I've been spending quite a bit of time in California.
Chairman Warner. Well, let's see what we can do. The votes
will start at--I think it is 11:35, giving the first ones 15
minutes to vote. We'll try and do that, because I, myself, have
not taken time on questions yet.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. But we'll try that, Senator.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I would say that trying to find $1.6 billion,
and moving it around, may be, as Secretary Roche said,
something like robbing Peter to pay Paul, but it may be robbing
Peter to pay Peter. I think that's the concern that I would
have. The budgeting process back here is the equivalent of
making a pie a piece at a time. I know the accountants try to
account, but I would hope that we don't end up obscuring, in
the process of creating money and obligations. So I'm very
cautious. I want to suggest caution, because pushing off
obligations into the future isn't the most accountable way of
handling these ongoing obligations or contingent obligations.
Secretary Roche, I'd like to go back to a little less
controversial subject, ongoing sexual assault cases in the
military. Last week, the Personnel Subcommittee of this
committee had a service-wide hearing on the subject, and I know
that when--since the new Air Force Academy leaders took over,
there have been a continuing number of reports, 21 reports, of
sexual misconduct. Secretary Rumsfeld has ordered a review of
the Department policy on sexual assault and the treatment of
victims. Last week, we heard about that.
Do you foresee any further delay in the completion of the
Department's investigation of the Air Force Academy and sexual
assault cases? We have issues with soldiers, airmen, and
cadets, as you understand, and perhaps you can give us your
thoughts and projections about that.
Secretary Roche. Yes, Senator. To begin with, the numbers
are used to pick up many different things. Sometimes the
numbers that you hear are old cases that are only now being
reported. If you look at incidents that have occurred since----
Senator Ben Nelson. Subsequent to----
Secretary Roche.--subsequent to the Agenda for Change,
we've actually had only 10 cases, involving cadets. There have
been others on the base itself, and down at the prep school
we've had two incidents.
The Inspector General's report, there's two parts to that.
The Air Force Inspector General, I had asked--it was folded
into the larger picture--to look at every single case that had
been adjudicated or not adjudicated where a victim, or alleged
victim, had problems either with the way it was handled or the
way they were dealt with. I would expect that the Air Force
part of that to be done in this month; and most of the cases,
in fact, have been submitted for extra review down to OSD.
With regard to the Inspector General, the Department's
overall review, you would have to ask him. I know that, as
cases came up, it took more time, as there were more leaders
from the past that had to be interviewed. That took more time.
I can't tell you where they are on that.
Senator Ben Nelson. Okay. Well, last week I suggested that
I thought the military was taking a serious approach to this,
but I was a little concerned about the lack of outrage. I must
say, Secretary Roche, what you said today was as close to
outrage as I've heard. It seems like perhaps we are getting to
the point where it's not simply a matter of taking this
seriously, but being outraged by the fact that it has occurred
in the past, and other outrage will emerge if it continues into
the future, I can assure everyone----
Secretary Roche. Senator, you recall that I gave a speech
at the Air Force Academy, a year ago right about now, which was
all outrage.
Senator Ben Nelson. All right. I just want to make sure
we're outraged by these incidents. More importantly, we're
serious about dealing with them.
Senator Ben Nelson. I think there is a sincere effort. I do
think that we need to continue to pursue it aggressively with
modifications to current systems, as we discussed last week.
Secretary Brownlee, with respect to the Patriot advanced
capability, I'm a strong advocate of the missile defense
system, and I've supported the Patriot advanced capability,
PAC-3. But, after the recent reports from weapons experts
saying that the problems with the Patriot missile system
weren't fixed before the weapon was deployed in Iraq, I must
admit I'm greatly concerned. You may--and I'm sure that if you
haven't, you will--see the 60 Minutes segment concerning the
flaws. My understanding is that the Patriot had 12 engagements
in the Iraqi war, of which one quarter of these engagements
were with our own planes, not something that we had planned on,
nor something that we can accept as being normal.
In fact, during March of last year, a U.S. Air Force pilot
flying an F-16 fighter jet received a signal he was being
targeted by radar. He believed it was coming from an enemy
missile. He fired one of his own missiles, obviously in self
defense, and hit one of our own Patriot batteries, which was
tracking his aircraft as an enemy target.
I guess the question I have is, what evidence can the Army
provide us to ensure that in the future, for our aircraft and
service men and women, that they will not be targets of our own
defense system? What steps are being taken? Clearly, this is a
serious concern. It's one I've had about deployment before all
the research and development has been concluded. Racing to
judgement, racing to deploy has its adverse consequences. It
appears that that's what occurred here. No one expects
perfection, but it looks to me like the malfunction is related
to the lack of total research and development before
deployment.
Secretary Brownlee. Sir, I don't think we know the answer
to that yet. I'm sure, the Central Command investigation is not
complete. We're still waiting for the result of that. But we've
looked very specifically at the system. These things occur as a
result of not just problems with the technology--and this may
be the case----
Senator Ben Nelson. Well, it could be training, as well.
Secretary Brownlee. It could be training. It could be other
situations on the battlefield. This was a very highly
electronic battlefield, as you well know. These systems and the
way they are employed have a lot to do with this. In this
particular case--and, again, we don't have the conclusions of
the study, but we know that we had moved our systems forward,
more so than we had done in previous wars, and we did this for
obvious reasons. As the troops near Baghdad--neared Baghdad,
everyone was concerned that they might come under a chemical
attack of some kind, and so we had moved these systems forward.
We're looking very closely at what impact that might have had,
both on the awareness of the pilots, as well as the systems and
how the systems operated.
So, quite frankly, sir, we're still awaiting the outcome of
the Central Command investigation to see what that says.
Senator Ben Nelson. Well, two thoughts. One is, were our
military men and women safer as a result of the battlefield
testing of this program, or would they have been safer without
it? Did it make our men and women safer, and our military
capacity stronger?
Secretary Brownlee. Sir, given a threat that had emerged as
we had expected it to emerge, I certainly would say they are
safer. Even given what they did come up against, I would say
they are safer.
Senator Ben Nelson. But, is battlefield testing, while it's
important to do so, risky with high-tech equipment until we
know what the incident of intervention with other technologies
and other sensitive equipment might bring?
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir. If you're focusing on the
PAC-3 interceptor--and, again, we don't know yet--but I would
be surprised if that turned out to be what was at fault here.
There may be problems within the Patriot system, but I'm--I
would be rather surprised if it were in the PAC-3 interceptor.
Senator Ben Nelson. Well, we would hope to get a better
success ratio than we had, would you agree with that?
Secretary Brownlee. I certainly don't believe we can have
the incidence of fratricide. None of those are acceptable----
Senator Ben Nelson. Right.
Secretary Brownlee.--in any way. Whatever we have to do to
fix that, we have to fix it.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
My time is expired, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator, for raising the
important subject of this sexual abuse. The full force and
effect of this committee is behind you in making, hopefully, a
zero-tolerance correction of that problem.
Senator Collins, that's a problem in which you've been
involved. You're next recognized.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Brownlee, like many of my colleagues, I have
heard repeated concerns expressed by the families of our guard
members and reservists who are serving in Iraq about the
shortages of body armor and fortified HMMWVs. In fact, one
soldier was home on leave, in December, and called me
personally to talk about this and the consequences that he
feared for the members of his unit.
I'm very pleased, therefore, to hear from you this morning
of the progress that has been made. But when I look at your
chart in your testimony, it indicates that a year ago only 12
percent of the soldiers in Iraq were equipped with body armor,
and only 500 HMMWVs were fortified. Why were we so ill-
prepared? Why didn't we have more body armor and more fortified
HMMWVs available to protect our troops? There seems to be such
a discrepancy. I'm pleased with the progress, but I'm wondering
why it was so misjudged.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, ma'am. Quite honestly, we were not
producing this body armor at a rate that would allow us to
equip all the soldiers with body armor before we went in. What
we did was use what we had and equip those soldiers that were
infantry and front-line soldiers that would be most likely to
come under attack.
The requirement for up-armored HMMWVs, proportionally, had
never been that great because most of these kinds of HMMWVs
were not viewed as favorably for tactical situations because
their performance is somewhat degraded by the heavy weight of
the armor. So there wasn't a feeling that all HMMWVs should be
up-armored. It was when we got into the operational environment
in which we found ourselves, that began in June and July last
summer, that we realized that all soldiers were being exposed
to these kinds of attacks, and that convoys, in particular,
were exposed to these kinds of improvised explosive devices
(IED) attacks. That's when we began to ramp up to provide those
as soon as we could, and we've redistributed, from all over the
world, the up-armored HMMWVs that we've had in other places.
We've moved--I think the last ones are just moving in there
now, should all be in there in April. We began a crash program
on the body armor. We're now producing at rates up to 25,000
per month.
I also regret that we were not more farsighted here. We
simply were not prepared for that kind of a counterinsurgency
that attacked our convoys and our soldiers in the rear, as it
has proven to be.
Senator Collins. Secretary England, I know that you're
expecting, of course, a shipbuilding question from me, and I'm
not going to disappoint you in that regard. I very much
appreciate the commitment that you've shown in your budget to
fully fund the construction of three guided missile destroyers
(DDGs) this year, and we've certainly made a lot of progress.
When I look back at 2000, the year 2000, I think we were
spending only $4.8 billion for shipbuilding and conversion
budget; it's now more than twice as much, at $11.1 billion.
That's a significant and much-needed improvement.
I remain, however, very concerned about the Department's
future shipbuilding plan, particularly as it affects the
transition from the DDG to the experimental destroyer (DD(X)).
The Navy appears to be slipping the construction of a second
DD(X) destroyer by 1 year, from fiscal year 2006 to 2007. If
this occurs, it would be the first year in more than 20 years
that our Navy will not be procuring a major surface combatant.
My concern is twofold. One is that it will exacerbate the
already significant problem with regard to the size of our
fleet, and we have the CNO's recent testimony on the ideal size
of the fleet of being around 375 vessels. But, it also has a
significant impact on our industrial base, our ability to keep
the skilled workers that we need, and to keep some competition
in the shipbuilding industrial base.
So I would ask that you comment on what are the Navy's
plans to ensure that we keep moving toward increasing the size
of our fleet, something study after study has demonstrated we
need, and also the impact on the stability of our industrial
base.
Secretary England. Thanks, Senator. Two comments here.
First of all, for the DDX--DDG to DDX conversion, you're right,
we do have a void in 1 year. My hope and expectation is we can
fix that as we go along, because that is an out year. That's a
plan; it's not an actual at this point. Our issue, of course,
is affordability. We are required to fully fund a ship at the
very beginning. Of course, that's very difficult for us to do.
I mean, it would be better if we could partially fund, but we
have to fully fund. So, in this case, we literally had to move
the total amount of about $2 billion to the right, rather than
to the left. Now, hopefully, we can fix that as we go along.
On the other hand, I will tell you, the industrial base is
always of a concern. We do not want voids in the industrial
base. That's not good for our industry; it's also not good for
us, because it's costly and disruptive. We do have a study
underway. Assistant Secretary John Young has been conducting
this study on the industrial base. That is finished, I believe,
now, and will be briefed to you very shortly. It could be
today, tomorrow--but, I mean, this week, I believe, we will be
briefing you. As part of that, we have worked with the
leadership of all the major shipyards to make sure we do
understand their issues and problems, because it's in our
interest not to have those problems in our shipyard. So we are
paying attention to it. We do not want breaks in our production
line. We will continue to address that so that's not an issue
for the industry. We don't want that to be an issue in the
industry.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you,
Secretary Brownlee.
Secretary Brownlee. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Chambliss, I wonder if you'd
indulge the Chair. I haven't asked any questions. I want to ask
one question while our distinguished colleague from Maine is
here, because she has been an absolute leader on this issue,
and that is, Secretary England, that it's been reported that
the Navy will be the first service to implement the new
flexible hiring authorities contained in the National Security
Personnel System (NSPS), which Congress adopted last year, and,
additionally, that you will take on a special role for the
entire Department, it's my understanding, to assist in the
implementation of the new civilian personnel bylaw and
regulation. I commend you for stepping up and accepting that
challenge.
So give us a little overview of how the Department has
handled the initial steps toward the implementation of the
NSPS, and how you see your role in the coming year.
Secretary England. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Deputy
Secretary Wolfowitz has asked if I would assist in the
implementation, just because of my experience and background
with large organizations, and particularly with the union
groups and representative employees. So about 2 weeks ago, I
did start to engage in this process. I have had the first
review with the Department of Defense personnel. I have another
one scheduled for this Thursday. So I'm still, myself, trying
to understand the total implementation process. I do know it
has moved along rather quickly. The question really is one of
consultation in the process that we're using. So this is really
a question of process.
The Department of Navy did volunteer to be the department--
the lead department in implementing NSPS, which is perhaps how
I got asked to assist in this matter. So I'm really not in a
position to give you definitive input at this time. But in
approximately 2 weeks, I would be pleased to come back and meet
with you and other members of the committee.
Chairman Warner. We'll accept that. Because there's been
some concern, my understanding--the Senator might wish to
elaborate--about the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), a
separate entity within our Federal system, and their
coordination, collaboration, whatever you want, partnership, I
would hope, in this implementation. Am I correct in that,
Senator?
Senator Collins. You are correct. The OPM, under law, is
supposed to be involved in the development of the new system.
That's very important, because OPM has unique expertise in the
Federal Government that I think can be very helpful to the
Department. I think it's very important that even at these very
initial stages, that not only the Department go forward, but
that it engage in a collaboration with OPM and with the Federal
employee unions.
Chairman Warner. Well, I thank you, Senator.
Secretary England. I'm sorry. Senator, I will be meeting
with the director, Kay Cole James, at a breakfast meeting this
Friday, so it would have been sooner, frankly, except my own
schedule out of town, et cetera. So we will be meeting, having
those discussions this week.
Chairman Warner. Good. Well, that's reassuring. Because
this committee took a very strong leadership role on this
issue, which was quite controversial, and I think we moved very
strongly in the direction in which the President and the
Secretary of Defense so desired because of the uniqueness of
this particular Department. But we're also running comparisons
as to how this is operating in your former Department, Homeland
Security. So we're going to be a constant oversight on this as
you move ahead on it.
Secretary England. I appreciate it, sir. This is a very
important piece of legislation. I thank you for passing it last
year. It is incumbent on us now to do it appropriately and
correctly, and we are working to do that, sir. I will be
pleased to work with you and other members of the committee.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Chambliss, thank you very much.
Secretary Brownlee. Mr. Chairman, I wasn't sure if Senator
Collins might have to leave, and I'd just like to correct the
record----
Chairman Warner. Yes.
Secretary Brownlee.--on one thing that I said. I indicated
there were 2,700 soldiers in Afghanistan who did not today have
body armor. That's 700, not 2,700. I'm advised they'll have
them by Friday.
Senator Collins. Thank you very much. That's good news.
Secretary Brownlee. One other issue. With respect to
priorities to Reserve components versus actives, just so you'll
know, we have mobilized and will deploy three separate brigades
from the National Guard, enhanced brigades the 30th, out of
North Carolina; the 39th, out of Arkansas; and the 81st, out of
Washington State. The Chief of Staff of the Army and I made a
decision that they would have first priority over the active
components in equipping them with the rapid fielding initiative
equipment, which also includes the body armor. So they will get
all the array of soldier items that--it's about $3,000 per
soldier, and includes sunglasses and knee pads, and all these
things--and they have a higher priority on that for this
deployment than any of the actives.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Before I ask a question or two, I just want to make a
comment, first of all to associate myself with the comments of
Senator McCain and Senator Levin on this critical issue of
document production. This is a fundamental issue that we have
to resolve, and I know under your leadership, Mr. Chairman, we
will.
Second, with respect to the implementation of these new
civilian rules, as the chairman and Senator Collins know, I had
some real misgivings about moving as quickly as the Department
of Defense wanted to move last year during the authorization
process. Thanks to Senator Collins' particularly strong
leadership on another committee, we did work through that and
we have something that I think will work. Secretary England,
you know what great respect I have for your abilities, and I'm
very pleased to hear you say that we're moving on this and
we're going to do it in the right way, because it's very
sensitive with our civilian force. The morale is pretty high,
and we don't need to do anything right now to jeopardize that.
So I'm very pleased to hear you're doing this.
Secretary England. Right, sir. Thank you.
Senator Chambliss. Secretary Roche, I want to visit with
you for a minute about the F/A-22. Last week I had a visit with
the Air Force, as well as visited the plant in Marietta, a
production facility, to discuss the status of the program, and
I came away with great confidence that while there are still
some minor glitches--and I say minor; any glitch in a weapon
system is a glitch, but when you look at the complexity of this
weapon system and the problems that we've had with it, as we
have with every major weapon system through the course of
research, development, and now in production--the glitches we
have now are truly minor glitches, but we're working through
those, and that everything is headed in the right direction. We
may be a little bit behind on the testing schedule, but it's
anticipated, by both the Air Force and Lockheed, that we're
going to catch up on that testing within the short term, not
the long term.
There's an article in the paper today by the Bloomberg News
that has a less positive assessment, and I wanted to get your
comments on that article.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
There's one statement in there that I'm particularly
concerned with. We have an independent assessment being done by
the Pentagon. The director of the Independent Program Analysis
that's doing that study makes a statement that indicates to me
that he doesn't understand the capability of this weapon system
and the real ability of this weapon system to ensure that we're
able to maintain air superiority.
We've been able to maintain air superiority over the last
several conflicts we've been involved in. It's been the reason
that we have suffered the least amount of casualties in any
major conflicts that we've been engaged in in the last 30
years. The F-15C has been a great weapon system. It's done its
job well. But it's my understanding that there is in production
right now, by the Russians, a weapon system that is comparable
to the F-15C, and that if we're going to rely on the F-15C with
upgrades or modifications in the future, that we are not going
to be able to maintain air superiority.
The F/A-22 has the ability to penetrate enemy lines, fire
one, two, three shots, in some instances, before it's even
detected. I want to make sure that you have an opportunity to
address this issue relative to air superiority and the real
need of the F/A-22. I understand it's your number-one program,
and I appreciate that fact. But, if we're going to continue to
have these darts thrown at a weapon system that's going to
allow us to maintain air superiority, and to ensure that we're
going to be able to engage in conflicts with the least loss of
life possible, I think it's critically important that we get
that message out to the American people, as well as to Members
of the House and Senate.
So I'm throwing that out to you for your comments on what I
know is a very important issue to the United States Air Force.
Secretary Roche. Without filibustering the issue, sir, let
me make the following points with regard to the status of the
program now. We know of no major obstacles. But as you go
through tests and evaluations, things come up. It has in every
other program; and it will in this one, as well. But with the
major problems that came up, I think we have two track records
to be proud of. One, each issue that people were so concerned
about in the past, we've fixed. Two, the stability of funding
has caused stability in the production line, which is making
the production of the aircraft more efficient over time. It is
a very complex system.
The entry into initial tests--operational tests was based
on events, not dates. The limiting problem we have now is
having the sortie generation rate, which has to do with the
failure of small parts on the plane such that you don't get
enough sorties per day. We are working that. Part of the
problem is the diminished material sources, very few
subcontractors, and parts that were presumed to never fail are
failing. That will apply to any plane that we build in the
United States. Joint Strike Fighter will face the same problem.
It's good to know it now so that we hopefully can prepare a bit
for that. But we are working each of those down, and we will
enter into the test program when we have the sortie generation
in place.
The pilots who have flown the plane just are awestruck at
it. I've had a chance to be with them at Edwards, at Nellis,
Tyndall. At Tyndall, meet with all the maintainers, and then
the planes took off, flew, came back; no discrepancies
whatsoever on the aircraft. Its capabilities of stealth, super-
cruise, advanced avionics are all playing out as we expected
them to play.
We also have modified the aircraft so that it's more of an
air-to-ground airplane than it was the past, to specifically
support land forces. So one of the reasons that the Army could
give up on a deep-strike system is that that's a responsibility
that we will take, and that the F/A-22 would be our premier
system, to go deep to focus on moving targets, which are very
hard to bomb, typically, and we're doing that. It's also the
only aircraft that really gives you a good chance against
cruise missiles, mainly because of super-cruise. You could put
the same electronics on something like an F-15, but you can't
super-cruise.
The F-15s will never be stealthy. They are large in radar
cross-section. We will maintain some as a bridge, as we
transition to the F/A-22. But the F/A-22, among other things,
deters anybody from building a system and thinking they could
achieve air dominance, because they can't. The planes that the
former Soviet Union is now constructing are very good. In fact,
if we put our pilots in those new planes, against our pilots in
our planes, our F-15s, our pilots in their planes will win
because it's advanced technology. But you bring the F/A-22 into
the picture, and that changes dramatically.
So I believe it is a system that is more and more oriented
toward ground support, in terms of deep interdiction, moving
targets, working with special operating forces that are
distributed. It is specifically being oriented to targets that
are moving. Increasingly, enemies of ours know that if you
stand still, you're easily bombed, but if you move, you can, in
fact, avoid us. It is the only aircraft that we have that gives
us a reasonable chance to take more than one shot against a
cruise missile.
So I believe it'll stand the test of people looking at it.
If someone wants to do yet another study of it, I believe
that's not unreasonable. This is not a cold war system today,
just as the B-1 is no longer a cold war system. We've made
enough transitions in the B-1 to make it very appropriate for
this era, and we believe we've done the same thing to the F/A-
22.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
My time has expired, Mr. Chairman, but I have a written
question that I'm going to submit.
Chairman Warner. Why don't you go ahead, you can take
another question.
Senator Chambliss. Okay.
Secretary Roche, I noticed, in your written statement, you
make reference to the 116th Control Wing at Robbins AFB, which
flies the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
(JSTARS) and 116th to the 1st blended active Reserve wing in
the Air Force, in the entire military. I'm proud of the work
the 116th has done. We worked through some difficult issues
there. Boy, I'll tell you, the morale of the Guard and the
Active Force is unsurpassed within those folks, and, Les, you
know what a great job JSTARS does for your folks, and it's such
a great weapon system, and this is a great integration of the
active and Reserve component.
This model truly does move us to the total-force concept
that the Secretary is talking about with respect to every
branch of the Service. I want to just ask each of you if you
have looked at the blend between the Guard and the Active Force
that we've accomplished with the Air Force, and, Secretary
Roche, how you intend to expand on this as we move forward.
This issue of force structure continues to be an active and
vital issue. Secretary Brownlee, you have addressed it in a
certain way within the Army. But I think this blended-force
concept is the wave of the future, with the way Secretary
Rumsfeld is talking. So I'd ask each one of you, will you just
comment on what you see here, how you think your respective
branch is going to deal with this, are you going to move in
that direction?
Secretary Roche, why don't we start with you, because
you're the one with the experience on it.
Secretary Roche. Well, and you, as well, since you helped
me. We did have to get through some difficult times. It has
proven itself in combat, which, as Admiral Burke once told me,
is the only real test of a weapon system, is how it performs in
combat. JSTARS, as a blended wing, has performed magnificently.
We should also make sure everyone realizes that there are
Army officers onboard the JSTARS at all times, so it's not just
Air Force officers.
It has worked very, very well. We have taken that concept
and expanded it, especially in the area of unmanned vehicles
and remotely piloted aircraft. We've done another unprecedented
move, with the help of some wonderful guardsmen in California
and Nevada. We actually have California guardsmen and Nevada
guardsmen in with Reserves and Active Force, right from the
beginning on our Predator developments and our Predator
control, so that it'll be done at the same time.
We are looking at other areas. We have some in space, some
for helping our Strategic Forces Command. We're looking
wherever it may make sense to do it, because it brings the
Guard into our most modern systems. Because the newer systems
are so much more usable, we can have multiple crews for the
same aircraft. So we expect to do this with the F/A-22, as
well. It appears to be something that, where it makes sense to
do, it really, really pays off, and there are other
constitutional issues you helped us with.
So I commend it. It doesn't work in every case, but we're
finding more and more places where it is in the interest of
both the Guard and the Active Force to bring the experienced
folks from the Guard together with the full-time people on
active duty, and you get a much higher crew ratio. If you have
to go to war, the active people take it, but then, coming
behind them, are the Guard folks who supplement the original
active group.
JSTARS works just beautifully, and I'll be flying with them
in the area here shortly.
Secretary England. Senator, of course, two services; first,
though, I'll comment about the United States Marine Corps. Our
Reserves are ready to go at literally 7-day notice--whatever
their transportation time, they're ready to go into combat, so
they actually work with our Active Force, indistinguishable,
ready to go on a moment's notice, literally, and that's working
well, has worked for the United States Marine Corps.
The Department of the Navy, we are combining our assets
between active and Reserve. We are actually reducing our assets
as a result, because we do want a total force, in terms of
integrated Reserve and Active Force. In fact, we are reducing
the size of our force, largely brought about with our
integration between our active and our Reserve components.
So we do this across the board. Our ships, our airplanes,
everything we do, this is a very active integration. I think
you will see, over time, that we will likely continue to shrink
both our assets and our force somewhat as we continue this
integration.
So we're committed to it. At any given time, about 25
percent of our reservists are actually doing active duty. The
pilots that fly commercial airlines--when they're not flying
commercial airlines, they're flying for the United States Navy,
a lot of them, those that are in our Reserve organization. So
you will see more and more integration of our Reserves and our
Active Force. Again, our Marine Corps is already highly
integrated at the moment.
Secretary Brownlee. Sir, we have some multi-composition
units at echelons above division that are primarily
headquarters units. As we stand up these new brigades in the
active component, we will stand up new brigades in the Reserve
component. They will all be standardized and modularized.
There is not an intent right now to blend them, I don't
think, in the sense you are talking because, although we do
have active component soldiers integrated in with our Guard and
Reserve units--anyway, we have some 5,000 that are out there;
senior officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) integrated
in these units--they're not blended in the way that you might
have described. We'll have to take a look at that to see how it
would work with these kinds of units. I'm just not sure how it
would, but we'll certainly take a look at it.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. It's a very important question,
Senator Chambliss.
Just a follow-on with the Secretary of the Army, we see
that the force structure in Iraq now will be comprised of 40
percent National Guard.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. When will that figure be reached, that 40
percent level?
Secretary Brownlee. Sir, right now, in the rotation that
we're doing, of moving forces over and bringing them back, we
are about 30 percent complete with shipping forces over, and
about the same amount coming back.
Chairman Warner. Yes.
Secretary Brownlee. We will not complete these rotations
until sometime in April/May, so I would say it would be--in
that time frame, is when it would be complete.
Chairman Warner. As those units depart, to what extent can
yourself and the Secretary of Defense assure the individual
guardsmen that, subject to some changes, which are not
foreseeable, their commitments will be for what period of time?
Secretary Brownlee. Sir, their commitments are for 1 year
boots-on-the-ground in----
Chairman Warner. In Iraq----
Secretary Brownlee.--theater. Yes, sir. In Iraq.
Chairman Warner. So maximum is----
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner.--365 days, the boots depart.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir. But their mobilization
periods of time, of course, are longer because they have to be
trained up----
Chairman Warner. Correct.
Secretary Brownlee.--mobilized, trained up, and then
brought back and demobilized. So it can be up to another 6
months, depending on how long they're training; in some cases,
longer than that, depending on their training.
Chairman Warner. What's the composition, in Afghanistan, of
Guard and Reserve?
Secretary Brownlee. I'd have to look at the proportions. I
know we have a unit from the 45th Oklahoma National Guard, that
unit is in Operation Pegasus, which is training the Afghan
army. I'd have to look at the proportion. I know there are
about 11,000 troops there; about 10,000 of those are Army. I
would suggest probably about 20 percent of that may be Guard.
I'll have to get that number for you.
Chairman Warner. My understanding is perhaps there's a unit
from Alaska. Would you check on that and provide a response?
Secretary Brownlee. I will. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
As of March 1, 2004, there were no Alaska National Guard members--
Army or Air--assigned to operations in Afghanistan. Units and
individual augmentees had previously and subsequently have been
assigned to that area of operations.
Chairman Warner. I thank you very much.
Now that my colleague, the ranking member, has returned--I
was absent on the floor during the course of your opening
comments with regard to the budget, but I would like to make
these observations. That is that, in a report released last
November, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) examined 46
cases since fiscal year 1990 in which funds were appropriated
for military operations. CRS concluded, and I quote, ``Since
1990, Congress generally has funded combat operations with
supplemental appropriations,'' Some have suggested Congress
begin budgeting for operations in Iraq through the regular
appropriations process.
So I'd call on you, Secretary Brownlee--you've had,
obviously, the longest experience in this area, both with this
committee and other periods of your distinguished career--can
you, in your judgement as the acting secretary, reliably
estimate the cost for your respective service of military
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for fiscal year 2005 today?
Secretary Brownlee. No, sir. I certainly couldn't have done
it at the time we put the budget together. That's why I think
that the Congress has routinely funded military operations like
this out of supplementals. If I'm correct, I think we did the
operations in the Balkans for at least 3 years, or more, funded
them through supplemental appropriations, and I would suggest
that those operations were far more certain and stable than the
situation we find ourselves in in either Afghanistan or Iraq.
Chairman Warner. Before I leave you, I'm just going to ask,
for the record, you were questioned by members of the committee
with regard to the body armor.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. You, very frankly, said, ``We just failed
to estimate the needs.'' But my recollection is that the orders
for this originated in the previous administration and----
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner.--this buildup. So I think it would be
important for the record--I'm not trying to be political --but
this is a sequential operation, and having been in your job
some many years ago, what occurs in the previous administration
is carried over, and it takes time to ramp up and get second
sources to meet contingencies.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir. It does, sir. While we had
already looked and started to increase the numbers of these, we
just weren't there yet, in terms of volume.
Chairman Warner. Well, I think it would be helpful if you
would----
Secretary Brownlee. I will do that.
Chairman Warner.--talk about the origin of the program----
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner.--and how it transitioned from the previous
administration to the Bush administration, and the steps taken
by the Bush administration, most recently mentioned today, to
try and bring up an adequate supply.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The fielding of Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) to the Army started in
early 2000. IBA is the successor to the Personnel Armor System for
Ground Troops (PASGT) vest and the Interim Small Arms Protective Over
(ISAPO) vest. As you may know, IBA consists of an Outer Tactical Vest
(OTV) and a set of two Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI). The OTV
replaces the PASGT vest and SAPI replaces the ISAPO. IBA was originally
intended for dismounted infantry, military police, Special Forces, and
the National Guard's enhanced separate brigades; units that faced the
highest probability of direct contact with enemy forces. At the time,
the Army assumed some risk in not planning to equip support troops and
other soldiers towards the rear of the battlefield. We did not believe
these troops faced the same threat, as did our dismounted combat
forces.
The Army originally programmed about $46.8 million to procure
36,000 sets of IBA to be issued to the priority units mentioned above.
Our original rate of production was 1,000 OTVs and 375 sets of SAPI per
month. Additional IBA were to be produced following the first 36,000
sets, and unit commanders would be able to locally purchase on their
own if they determined they had a need for IBA. The first 5,000 sets of
IBA the Army produced were fielded to soldiers in Kosovo between March
2000 and July 2001. The next set of 5,000 produced was placed in a war
reserve contingency stock.
Immediately after September 11, 2001, SAPI production was increased
to 1,600 sets per month, and shortly thereafter, we released IBA sets
from our contingency stocks to the 10th Infantry Division and 101st
Airborne Division in preparation for what became Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF). In June 2002, the Army directed IBA to be issued to all
soldiers in support of OEF and production was further increased to
3,300 sets per month.
In late 2002, in anticipation of possible military operations in
Iraq, the Army again committed resources to further increase IBA
production. By the time the Army commenced combat operations into Iraq,
more than 83,000 OTVs and 50,000 sets of SAPI had been issued. Because
of this effort, the Army conducted the first phase, major combat
operations, of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) with sufficient quantities
of IBA. Many of the brave soldiers assigned to the 3rd Infantry
Division did not require IBA because they conducted their superb attack
from the protection of their tanks and armored fighting vehicles. At
this point in time, the Army thought it had enough IBA on-hand and
reduced production quantities.
It was not until we moved into the next phase of OIF, when the
threat changed, and we were determining exactly how many soldiers would
be necessary in Iraq, did we find ourselves falling short of having
enough IBA on-hand. The tank crews and armored vehicle crews that
fought and won the first part of the war were now being required to
dismount their vehicles and conduct patrols and missions on foot,
significantly increasing our IBA requirement overnight.
With the help of Congress and resources from the Iraqi Freedom
Fund, the Department again surged the industrial base's production of
IBA, this time to our present rate of 25,000 sets of IBA per month.
Today, the Army is committed to procuring a total of 840,000 sets
of IBA. We expect to accomplish this objective during fiscal year 2006.
This will ensure that every single soldier in the operational Army,
whether active or Reserve component, has their own set of IBA.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Now, back to the question of the budgeting, Mr. Secretary.
Can you estimate the cost of your military operations, Navy and
Marine Corps, for 2005?
Secretary England. No, sir. We don't know what our
requirements will be for 2005. I mean, we are now operating off
of fiscal year 2004 funding; and, of course, that all changed
late last year, when the Marines were requested to go to Iraq.
So even that was very late for Department of the Navy. So I
don't know what the situation will be next year, what we will
be requested to do next year. I mean, our budget----
Chairman Warner. For the balance of this year. I mean, you
have the Haiti operation. That's a costly one.
Secretary England. Yes, but I----
Chairman Warner. It's an example of how you couldn't
anticipate----
Secretary England. Yes, it is--right, sir, it is a
situation that you cannot anticipate in advance, absolutely.
Chairman Warner. Mr. Secretary, do you concur with your
colleague?
Secretary Roche. Absolutely, sir.
Chairman Warner. On the Comanche, Secretary Brownlee,
frankly, I support the decision of the Secretary of Defense and
yourself on that. Please provide, in today's record, if you
feel there are any facts that were not stated by the
administration at the time this important contract was
terminated. Do you have any new information regarding that
termination that you can share with us this morning? I presume
it's going on in an orderly way.
Secretary Brownlee. It is, sir. On the 26th, we met with
members of industry who were involved in the program, and Mr.
Bolton met with them, I spoke with them, and we certainly told
them that exactly what the decision was and how it originated
and why we made it. There is, of course, as a result of this,
with the program of revitalizing Army aviation--this will, in
fact, require the procurement of an additional 800 new
helicopters, plus the refurbishment of about 1,500 others.
Chairman Warner. I want to commend the manner in which you,
personally, and others, handled this very difficult decision.
Cancellations are not easy. But, I'm the focal point of all
types of communications and criticisms from 360 degrees, and
it's been a fairly low level on this one, and obviously there's
a good deal of disappointment in various geographic sectors of
our Nation and with certain producers and manufacturers. But I
think, thus far, it's the right decision, and it's going to
stay in place.
Secretary Brownlee. Thank you, sir. I hope that the amended
budget arrives over here this week. It left the Army last week,
to OSD, and I understand it's already at OMB, so Congress will
receive it, hopefully, this week.
Chairman Warner. Congress, understandably, in the 25 years
that I've been here with my good friend, Senator Levin, we've
seen many, many efforts to work on behalf of Guard and Reserve.
This year, we anticipate the committee will receive a request
from members. So let's just talk a little bit about it.
A steady stream of legislative proposals have been brought
forward in Congress that would greatly enhance the benefits
provided guardsmen and reservists, and I think they're well
deserved. I don't criticize them at all. Lowering the age at
which retired reservists may start collecting retired pay has
been proposed. Extending Tricare benefits to all reservists has
been proposed. There are various other proposals, all very
expensive.
Now, what impact would, let's say, that entire program
have, if we were to enact it, on the regular forces? I come
back, drawing on modest experience of my own as a member of the
Reserve, and integrated during the Korean conflict into active
units, there's a certain stature that the active person has,
and his family--he or she, as the case may be--and the
commitments that they make. But if we bring them up to where
they're all absolutely equated in benefits, how does that work?
Secretary Brownlee. Let me just suggest two things,
Senator. First of all, you and I both know how valuable the
Reserve components are, both Guard and Reserve, and----
Chairman Warner. Let's say essential.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir, absolutely.
Chairman Warner. Absolutely essential.
Secretary Brownlee. They're just absolutely critical to our
operations now. I refer to them as the ``second-greatest
generation,'' and I believe that. But I do have some concerns.
If all the benefits are the same, for both active and Reserve,
then people who are in the active might question why they
shouldn't just have a second job and be in the Reserves. The
other thing is that when the costs of the Reserve components
begin to equate to the cost of the active components, then,
within the Department of Defense, decisions will have to be
made as where the money should be invested, and should we
invest as many of our dollars in a Reserve component, as
opposed to an active component, which does still have some
restrictions on the use, as opposed to the active. So I just
think we have to move very carefully in that area--
Chairman Warner. Time is so short, and we're going to have
this vote here in a moment. I think you've answered it very
carefully. As much as we all desire to give the Guard and
Reserve everything to which they are entitled, the Army would
have to decide, well, if their costs are parallel, then
probably we're better off having an active person, vice a Guard
or Reserve, because that individual has continuity and stays
in, and they're subject now, as we well know, to recycling back
over to these forward posts----
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner.--with a greater frequency.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Secretary England.
Secretary England. You expressed it very well, Mr.
Chairman. The Department of the Navy----
Chairman Warner. I expect no less, from a former Secretary,
for an old-timer, but I----
Secretary England. No, you've expressed it very well, and I
would say that you've captured exactly the feeling of the
Department of the Navy, sir.
Chairman Warner. Well, I would hope. Secretary Roche----
Secretary Roche. I concur.
Chairman Warner. You concur. I hope that, in your
capacities, you'll counsel with the head of the Guard and
Reserve units and meet with the very important retired
organizations, who take an active role in this. Because we're
getting pretty close to that parallel situation.
I think we'd better touch a little bit, Secretary England,
on the Osprey. We did the V-22, and those programs are always
under close scrutiny here. This year, we limited production of
the V-22s to a minimum sustaining rate, identified as 11
aircraft until certain testing was successfully accomplished.
The fiscal year 2005 budget for eight V-22s for the Marine
Corps, and three for the special ops, represents the fourth in
a row at the minimum sustaining rate.
I visited down with the special operations command in the
recess period, and they're very heavily relying on a prompt
delivery of this system. So give us a little update on the V-
22, how it's progressing, and when you would anticipate these
tests would be completed.
Secretary England. Mr. Chairman, I'm pleased to tell you
the testing is going well. We do have what I guess you'd call a
few hiccups, but the testing is going very, very well. We're
very, very pleased with the progress. I continue to believe
that the V-22 is one of the most transformational programs we
have. It will change the character of our Marine Corps, in
terms of the ability to do deep-type operations. We would have
liked to have had them for the operation we had in Iraq,
frankly, because we were so far inland, it would have been a
magnificent airplane to have.
So it is very, very important. We are designing literally
our future, in terms of some of our ships and our Marine Corps,
as we go forward, and our Navy, to accommodate the V-22. So the
testing is going well. We support it very, very strongly.
This is the final test, in terms of major items, although I
believe, frankly, the major items are behind us. So we should
be increasing our rate. We plan to do this about 50 percent a
year now, starting next year, because we don't want the rate to
go up too fast and cause problems. But you will see this rate
to continue to increase now as we finish up the test program.
We then want to get this to the maximum rate as soon as
possible.
Chairman Warner. Yes, Secretary Roche?
Secretary Roche. Mr. Chairman, it's an interesting program.
It's run by the Navy for the Marine Corps, and there's an Air
Force colonel who is the program director. The reason is that
our Air Force Special Operations Command has a great interest
in this program. So I'd like to second all the comments made by
my colleague, Gordon England. We follow this very closely. In
fact, the reason that we have the organization we do now is
that 2\1/2\ years ago, I went to Gordon and said, ``Wouldn't it
be better if we were part of your program now, rather than
waiting 2\1/2\ years and telling you what we thought you should
have done better?'' He absolutely agreed, opened it up to the
Air Force, and we have been key to it ever since. Our special
operators are looking forward to this aircraft. I think you
know that the one that we will buy will have various and sundry
additional equipment on it, which will give the Marine Corps a
chance to see some of that tested, as well.
We see this as being very important for our infiltration
and exfiltration in special operations, potentially for long-
range combat search and rescue. So we are gearing our Special
Operations Command on the assumption that this aircraft will be
part and parcel of our Air Force.
Chairman Warner. As you proceed on this--I got into
considerable detail, and I was given an exceedingly good
briefing by knowledgeable people in the special operations, but
they explained to me just, sort of, some basic concerns that
they're having, which I think are readily understandable by
all, and that is on your descent, in the vertical descent,
oftentimes you have to kick out that rope or other sustaining
devices for those very brave individuals to exit that aircraft
and hit that ground. The amount of the thrust down is
complicating that. Has that been brought to your attention?
Secretary Roche. Yes, sir. In particular----
Chairman Warner. The safety of those individuals.
Secretary Roche.--in particular, for search and rescue,
having the hoist all the way aft was not a good design. But the
program has looked at a center box, which would be just inboard
from where the normal door on the port side would be for a
rescue helicopter. That box works out, and you fly in in such a
way, you actually put a null, an air null, beneath that one
area. We believe that that will allow us to do combat search
and rescue (CSAR). If you can do CSAR, you can certainly send
people down the ropes. But they have had a problem----
Chairman Warner. Now, time won't permit more detail. I just
wanted to alert you to a concern.
My colleague, Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Just on the budget
issue, the Army chief of staff testified, when he was here,
that the Army is currently spending $3.7 billion a month in
Iraq, and $900 million a month in Afghanistan, in incremental
costs for those operations. Is it not foreseeable that those
incremental costs are going to continue in the next year, since
we know it's 110,000 troops rotating in?
Secretary Brownlee. Sir, that's the current burn rate. I
anticipate that it might continue somewhat at that level, but I
don't know. I mean, we could reach a situation where we had to
send more forces, or we could reach a situation where we might
draw down.
Senator Levin. Isn't it reasonably foreseeable that it's
going to be at least 110,000, since that's your plan?
Secretary Brownlee. Sir----
Senator Levin. That is your plan.
Secretary Brownlee. That's our plan.
Senator Levin. Well, then why don't we budget for it? This
isn't in the middle of combat. You have a plan, 110,000 folks.
Secretary Brownlee. Well, sir, at the time that we
submitted our fiscal year 2004----
Senator Levin. No. No, no, now. The question is not whether
there's a supplemental. That's a given, that there's going to
be a supplemental. The question is whether we have a
supplemental in a timely way so that we can avoid some gap in
there. That's the issue. There's going to be a supplemental for
2005.
Secretary Brownlee. Sir, I----
Senator Levin. The question is, since you're planning
there's going to be at least 110,000 soldiers in there, why not
fund for what you're planning? Why not budget for what we're
planning----
Secretary Brownlee. Senator----
Senator Levin.--with a supplemental?
Secretary Brownlee. If you're talking about the timing of a
supplemental----
Senator Levin. Yes.
Secretary Brownlee.--is that what you're talking about?
Sir, that's above my level, but I----
Senator Levin. But have you talked to the Secretary about
the need for that?
Secretary Brownlee. It's been discussed in meetings, sir.
But I'm not sure where he is on that.
Senator Levin. But have you urged----
Secretary Brownlee. Whether it's his----
Senator Levin.--that the supplemental be filed before the
end of the year so we know that we can properly, without gaps
in funding, sustain that level of forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan?
Secretary Brownlee. Sir, I make my needs known to the OSD
Comptroller and to the Secretary of Defense. If they believe
they have sufficient funds to do that, then they tell me that.
I really don't--I'm not part of their decisionmaking process on
when supplementals get drawn up or requested.
Senator Levin. Well, it's really an unsettling answer from
you, I have to tell you, because we know we're planning on
110,000 being rotated in, and so that's our plan. Yet we're not
funding for that plan. So this is a reasonably foreseeable
expense, because it's based on a plan that we've filed, and so
I'll express myself on that.
I guess I'll ask the question again. You've indicated that
you believe we will need a supplemental at some point.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Are we better off with that supplemental
before those incremental costs have to be spent? Are we not
better off having a supplemental for 2005, since we know
there's incremental costs that are going to be there, in a way
in which we have the funds to pay those incremental costs as
they're incurred? Isn't that better budgeting?
Secretary Brownlee. We would be better off having those
funds before we had to cash-flow out of other accounts to the
extent that we did harm to those accounts.
Senator Levin. All right.
Secretary Brownlee. But, Senator, because you've been here
a lot longer than I was around here, that routinely these
supplementals have been requested and approved by Congress.
Sometimes when they came too late, yes, it was detrimental. If
they were timely, the Services were able to adjust and get by.
Senator Levin. Again, there's no argument over whether
there's going to be a supplemental, so when you say ``routinely
there are supplementals,'' that's a given.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. The issue is when will this supplemental be
presented to us.
Just a couple of other questions. Secretary Brownlee,
there's a program in Korea, I understand, called the Korean
Augmentation to the U.S. Army.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Are you familiar with that program?
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. I think it's called KATUSA?
Secretary Brownlee. KATUSA program, yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Where individual Republic of Korean soldiers
are integrated into our units----
Secretary Brownlee. Right.
Senator Levin.--in a number of positions that would
normally be filled by U.S. soldiers?
Secretary Brownlee. Yes.
Senator Levin. This program was begun during the Korean
War, and apparently has continued with some success. Would that
program have merit in Iraq?
Secretary Brownlee. I've asked the same thing, sir. I
really have. It may have. We're kind of embarked in a little
bit different direction here than we were in Korea, in that
right now we are standing up an Iraqi government, or in the
process of doing that, and I think we want to build some
institutions there, rather than taking them into ours. But it's
interesting, I've asked the same question, whether or not that
might have merit.
Senator Levin. Would you let the committee know, then,
about what your thinking is on that----
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir----
Senator Levin.--as it evolves?
Secretary Brownlee.--I will. Be happy to.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA) program
began in July 1950 as a way to supplement under strength U.S. units
following the outbreak of war in June 1950. The situation in Iraq is
significantly different than the early months of the Korean War. U.S.
units deploying to Iraq are at full strength and do not need
augmentation in order to be combat effective. Additionally, the KATUSA
program allowed U.S. forces to draw upon trained soldiers in the
already established Republic of Korea Army. While there may be some
benefit to integrating a small number of Iraqis into U.S. units to
provide host-nation language, cultural, and regional expertise, in
exchange to Iraqi exposure to U.S. leadership, tactics, techniques, and
procedures, the decision to do so should only be made by the Combatant
Commander, General Abizaid, and the commander in Iraq, Lieutenant
General Sanchez.
Senator Levin. Two quick ones, because we're, I see, in the
second half of our vote already. This has to do with a comment
which was made to me by a family support group president for a
deployed National Guard unit----
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin.--last weekend, telling me that soldiers have
to wait in line for hours to use the phone in Iraq. When they
get their calls through, they're charged a connectivity fee
that could be as high as $9, and then a per-minute fee up to
$6, again depending on the calling card. Last year, we
authorized service members who were in Operations Enduring
Freedom and Iraqi Freedom to be provided, without cost, prepaid
phone cards for what we thought was an adequate amount----
Secretary Brownlee. Yes.
Senator Levin.--120 calling minutes. But apparently that
provision of the act has not yet been implemented, and I don't
know why. If it's true, would you find out if, in fact----
Secretary Brownlee. I will, sir. If you could----
Senator Levin. Would you also just take a look at this
problem? Because this----
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin.--is a very striking problem, when we have
people out there who are being charged apparently that much to
make phone calls home, when they're not supposed to be charged
anything to make phone calls home.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Armed Services Exchanges provide the unofficial
telecommunications system using the AT&T network. These services are
not always readily available due to limited communications
infrastructure and mission restrictions. However, as of April 2004, the
Army and Air Force Exchange Service provided over 50 calling centers
with over 1,600 phones and 640 satellite phones. Calls made from the
exchange call centers using the AT&T telephone calling cards,
commercial credit cards, and AT&T prepaid phone cards are not charged a
connection fee. If a member places a collect call, there is a
connection fee of $.89 to $6.50. If a member uses the Exchange Global
AT&T 550 unit prepaid phone card, the calling rates are: $0.19 per
minute from Kuwait call centers, $0.32 per minute from Afghanistan and
Iraq call centers, and $0.76 per minute for satellite phones.
The Defense Department's Defense Switched Network (DSN), an
official telephone system, is available in some portions of the theater
of operation. Soldiers in the Iraqi theater of operations, regardless
of their component, can call at no cost during non-duty hours on the
DSN system. The DSN connects the caller to a switch operator at the
installation closest to the destination telephone number. If long
distance service is required beyond the selected installation, the call
is connected to a commercial network, from which the soldier may elect
to use any prepaid card, calling card, and commercial credit card or
collect service of their choice. On average, more than 50,000 telephone
calls are made each day using the DSN system.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir. After the hearing, if I could
get the information for where that is, there are still some
isolated spots that continue to get reported where we don't
have adequate phone service, so I'd like to know where that is.
Senator Levin. All right. Well, I can't tell you where in
Iraq it is----
Secretary Brownlee. Okay.
Senator Levin.--offhand, but we will give you the name of
the lady----
Secretary Brownlee. Okay.
Senator Levin.--who is in charge.
There was some discussion about the sexual assaults problem
that we obviously have here, which seems to be endemic and
deeper than anybody could have hoped. Does the Army have
systems in place, and programs in place, in deployed locations
to offer victims of sexual assaults there the medical and
psychological and legal help that they need in deployed
situations?
Because we're running out of time, let me just----
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin.--raise that, bring it to your attention.
Secretary Brownlee. I will.
Senator Levin. If you could give us an answer, for the
record, to that one.
Secretary Brownlee. I will.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Army remains committed to taking care of every soldier, to
include dealing expeditiously with any soldier complaint or allegation
of misconduct and to ensuring that whether in garrison or deployed, the
support services provided are the same. When a soldier reports a
possible criminal act, including a sexual assault, the Army is resolved
to investigate the allegations thoroughly and promptly and to provide
immediate care and support to the victim. The Army has law enforcement
and legal personnel who are deployed to the battlefield to assure
timely investigative support and assistance to commanders and victims.
We also provide medical care and mental health care expertise to our
soldiers through our appropriately staffed Combat Support Hospitals in
Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Army is dedicated to ensuring that the victims of sexual
assault receive proper care and treatment and that their medical and
psychological needs are properly met. To ensure that our current
policies and programs are effective, the Acting Secretary of our Army
has directed the establishment of a Task Force to conduct a detailed
review of the effectiveness of our Army's policies on reporting and
properly addressing allegations of sexual assault. This review will
examine our policies, programs, procedures, and training with regard to
the prevention of sexual assault. The task force will further review
the processes in place to ensure a climate exists where victims feel
free to report allegations and leaders at every level understand their
responsibilities to support those victims. This task force will render
its report by the end of May 2004.
Senator Levin. Secretary England, you and I have talked
about the civilian personnel issue, and I know that's been
raised again here today by a number of my colleagues. I'm glad
it has, I'm glad you're in charge now. I hope you'll, frankly,
start from ground zero on this one. It got off on the wrong
foot. There was a lot of effort made by our chairman, by
Senator Collins, and others here to work out something which
would preserve collective bargaining rights, which would also
involve the unions collaboratively in working out the
processes. I'm glad you're willing to take a fresh look at
that. That's your assurance to me, personally, and I gather
your assurance here this morning, and we look forward to that.
Secretary England. Yes, Senator.
Senator Levin. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to all of our witnesses.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin, for your very
strong, constructive participation on this committee.
I, likewise, have a number of questions, gentlemen--Joint
Strike Fighter, Joint Unmanned Combat Aerial System, and
obviously I was going to end up on shipbuilding--but that's not
possible. We've done our very best under the time constraints
given this committee today, and I think your responses and
participation have been very, very constructive and helpful to
the committee in the continued responsibility we have in
oversight.
I said, when we started, I commend each of you for the work
that you're doing. I continue to finish this hearing with that
commendation. Well done.
I also think your chiefs did a very good job the other day,
Senator Levin----
Senator Levin. They did, indeed.
Chairman Warner.--when they appeared before the committee.
So that civilian uniform team is working for the best interests
not only for the men and women--for the Armed Forces, but the
whole Nation. I commend you.
Thank you very much.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
sexual assault at the air force academy
1. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Roche, General Michael Moseley
recently testified before the Personnel Subcommittee of the Senate
Armed Services Committee. I would like some clarification of certain
points he made in the testimony he submitted for the record: First,
with regards to the sexual assault allegations at the Air Force
Academy, General Moseley stated that confidentiality for victims has
proved to be ``difficult to implement'' and that the Air Force
``believe[s] it is in America's best interest'' to ``eliminate any
chance for offenders to commit future crimes.'' Does this statement
mean that the Air Force has completely abandoned the idea of affording
confidentiality to victims of sexual assault? If so, I would like a
more detailed rationale for why the Academy will not offer
confidentiality to victims.
Secretary Roche. The Air Force has not abandoned the idea of
affording confidentiality to victims of sexual assault. As in the past,
victims always have the option of confidentially reporting an assault
to a chaplain; Further, in an effort to comply with recommendations of
the Fowler Commission, the Air Force has drafted a confidentiality
policy for the Academy with the intention of applying it at the Academy
Reservation to all military and civilian personnel, and then reviewing
this policy after appropriate implementation for possible extension to
the active duty Air Force. However, implementation of this draft policy
has been delayed as the Department of Defense (DOD) considers the
legitimate competing interests pertaining to victim needs, command
responsibilities, and law enforcement obligations. These are matters
with significant cross-service implications, and we are working with
DOD towards the resolution of these issues.
2. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Roche, I would like a detailed
plan as to how the Air Force is going to publicize this denial of
confidentiality so that women cadets and potential cadets are fully
informed.
Secretary Roche. The existing policies and procedures, including
availability of chaplain confidentiality and off-base referral
services, have been widely disseminated among academy personnel and are
a focal point of training for incoming cadets. To the extent we, in
coordination with the Department of Defense, extend confidentiality to
other entities, that too will become an integral part of cadet
education and a matter of public record. Please see the answer to
Question Number 1.
3. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Roche, General Michael Moseley
recently testified before the Personnel Subcommittee of the Senate
Armed Services Committee. I would like some clarification of certain
points he made in his testimony. General Moseley commented that only a
``few'' cases of assault have occurred in the Air Force and that no
reports of assaults have occurred in Iraq or Afghanistan. He went on to
state that the Air Force has ``this matter fully in hand'' According to
DOD's numbers, the Air Force has had at least seven reported cases of
assault in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.
Additionally, the Air Force is now investigating 20-25 allegations at
Sheppard Air Force base alone. Is the DOD wrong here and does the Air
Force really mean to say it has resolved the problem of sexual assault?
If not, what did General Moseley mean by saying the matter was, ``fully
in hand?''
Secretary Roche. The Air Force did report opening investigations
within the deployed environment in southwest Asia. However, the
locations involved are Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Kyrgyzstan, Saudi Arabia,
United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. There were no cases in Iraq or
Afghanistan. The Air Force has been working on our sexual assault
deterrence and response capabilities since completion of the Working
Group Report on the Air Force Academy (AFA). As a result of the
implementation of the Agenda for Change at the AFA, discussions at
Corona Fall, and the Pacific Air Forces study, General Moseley formed a
Headquarters Sexual Assault Integrated Planning Team and directed all
major command commanders to assess their sexual assault deterrence and
response programs using a specified template. As we have seen at
Sheppard Air Force Base, these reviews sometimes raise issues and
allegations covering a considerable span of time that require careful
examination before any valid conclusions can be drawn. Results and
recommendations from that effort will be presented at the May Corona
conference.
4. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Roche, General Michael Moseley
recently testified before the Personnel Subcommittee of the Senate
Armed Services Committee. I would like some clarification of certain
points he made in his testimony: General Moseley quoted a cadet
commending the Academy on the ``countless number of briefings on sexual
harassment'' that she received. While I am pleased to know there are
several briefings on sexual harassment, sexual harassment is not the
same as sexual assault. Is the Academy also holding numerous briefings
on sexual assault prevention and education, particularly on what a
cadet should do if assaulted and what their rights are?
Secretary Roche. Sexual assault is clearly not the same thing as
sexual harassment. The Academy has an extensive program of training
addressing sexual assault, to include what a cadet should do if
assaulted and what the rights of the victim are. The Academy Response
Team (ART) takes an active role in education of both cadets and
faculty/staff in the areas of sexual assault and sexual harassment.
Several examples;