[Senate Hearing 108-417]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-417
SYRIA: U.S. POLICY DIRECTIONS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 30, 2003
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire Virginia
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Black, Hon. J. Cofer, coordinator, Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, Department of State.......................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Burns, Hon. William J., Assistant Secretary, Bureau for Near
Eastern Affairs, Department of State........................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Clawson, Patrick, Ph.D., deputy director, Washington Institute
for Near East Policy........................................... 24
Prepared statement........................................... 25
Jouejati, Murhaf, Ph.D., adjunct professor, George Washington
University, and adjunct scholar, Middle East Institute......... 35
Prepared statement........................................... 37
Leverett, Flynt L., Ph.D., visiting fellow, Saban Center for
Middle East Studies, Brookings Institution..................... 40
Prepared statement........................................... 42
Murphy, Hon. Richard, Senior Fellow for Middle East Policy,
Council on Foreign Relations................................... 29
Prepared statement........................................... 30
(iii)
SYRIA: U.S. POLICY DIRECTIONS
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Thursday, October 30, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:14 a.m. in
Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar
[chairman] presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar [presiding], Chafee, Coleman, and
Biden.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
The Chairman. This hearing of the Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order. Today we are delighted to welcome
Ambassador William Burns, Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern Affairs, and Ambassador Cofer Black, the
Counterterrorism Coordinator, for a timely review of United
States foreign policy towards Syria.
We also welcome our distinguished second panel: Dr. Patrick
Clawson of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy;
Ambassador Richard Murphy of the Council on Foreign Relations;
Dr. Murhaf Jouejati of the Middle East Institute; and Dr. Flynt
Leverett of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the
Brookings Institution.
Hopes that reform could take root in Syria after the fall
of Saddam Hussein have dimmed in the past few months. Instead,
tensions have increased between the United States and Syria,
and a cycle of retaliation and revenge has overtaken and
derailed possible progress in the Road Map to Peace for the
Israelis and the Palestinians. The Israeli retaliatory attack
on an Islamic Jihad terrorist camp in Syria underscored that
the ``no war and no peace'' status quo in the region cannot be
taken for granted.
Many experts thought that when President Bashar Al-Asad
replaced his father 3 years ago he would adopt a more pragmatic
approach to negotiations with Israel and to internal political
and economic reforms. Syrian cooperation with the United States
in relation to al-Qaeda terrorists held promise for cooperation
in other areas. Secretary Burns noted last June in his
testimony that ``the cooperation the Syrians have provided in
their own self-interest on al-Qaeda has saved American lives.''
But Syria's failure to stop terrorist groups, including
Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, from using
Syria as a base for training and planning suicide bombings in
Israel has continued. Syria also has failed to withdraw its
forces from Lebanon or open a dialogue for peace. It reportedly
has continued to maintain stockpiles of chemical weapons and to
pursue development of lethal biological agents. Moreover, Syria
is working against coalition forces in Iraq by refusing to
release nearly $3 billion in assets stolen from the Iraqi
people.
The Senate's discussions of the Syria Accountability Act
have been based on the presumption that the most effective
response to Syrian behavior is expanding sanctions against that
country. This is a natural conclusion, but Syria's presence on
the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism
already brings with it a number of sanctions and restrictions.
More importantly, as we give the administration additional
sticks to use against Syria, we should be careful about
restricting our government's flexibility in responding to
diplomatic opportunities that might present themselves.
Syria has shown some ability to make better choices: for
example, supporting UN Security Council Resolution 1441
following Secretary Powell's presentation in February and
voting for the more recent Resolution 1511, which calls upon
all nations to support the U.S.-led effort in Iraq.
Even as we tighten restrictions on Syria, we should be
emphasizing to the Syrians why it is in their best interest to
recalculate their approach toward the United States. Syria
shares a 400-mile border with Iraq. With more than 135,000
United States troops deployed in Iraq, Syria needs to
reconsider where its future security interests lie.
This is not a threat of U.S. military action, but a
statement of the new reality on Syria's borders. Moreover,
Syrian forces that continue to occupy Lebanon are draining the
already stagnant Syrian economy while providing few positive
returns. Continued Syrian occupation of Lebanon only invites
further possible military action from Israel.
The Syrian leadership also must adjust to the end of its
under-the-counter oil deals with Saddam Hussein. Syria must
negotiate new and transparent arrangements to meet energy
needs. Syria's moribund economy will not survive without
opening up to investment and trade, particularly with Iraq.
Significant benefits to Syria could accrue from an economically
vibrant Iraqi trading partner, increased trade with Europe and
the United States and even possible membership in a Middle East
Free Trade Agreement.
In this context, Syria may find motivation to return to the
negotiating table. A deal on the Golan Heights that would
provide security guarantees for Israel while respecting Syria's
sovereignty could be a key to resolving a host of other
problems, including Syria's occupation of Lebanon, its support
of Palestinian terror groups, and its economic and political
isolation.
Although success of such an agreement would depend
ultimately on the parties themselves, I would be interested to
hear from our witnesses what the United States can and should
do to promote a viable settlement. We look forward to our
witnesses' recommendations on the other issues and hope that
the discussion will lead to help inform our policy towards
Syria.
I would like to call now upon the distinguished ranking
member of our committee, Senator Biden, for his opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I am delighted with our first panel from the State
Department. I have very high regard for both gentlemen, as well
as our second panel, which I am anxious to hear.
I suggest we basically have three options with regard to
our policy toward Syria right now. But I think there is a
reality that we should all just sort of face up to. That is, I
for one think that Syrian conduct relative to its neighbors, to
support for terror, to opening up its economy, and every other
aspect that we are going to examine about Syria's present
government and Syria's present activity, as well as the
bilateral relationship with the United States, in my view
depends almost wholly upon our success or failure in Iraq.
If in fact we are successful and stay the course in
securing the peace and a stable government in Iraq, I think it
will have a transforming impact upon Syrian conduct. Quite
frankly, if we--if any of the scenarios that are discussed that
relate to failure, either pulling out prematurely or not being
able to secure the peace and a transition to a government
viewed as legitimate--that is, essentially a representative
republic--then I think it is Katy bar the door.
I think we will reap the whirlwind, not, quite frankly,
just in Syria, but in the entire region. I think it will be the
end of modernity, any notions of it in the Arab world. I think
it will temporarily bring to a halt any reasonable prospect of
any notions of democratization, and it will end, I think for
the foreseeable future, the prospects of nation states in the
region cooperating in curtailing terrorist organizations,
cabining their capability. It will have the exact opposite
effect.
I quite frankly think Bashar Asad has two people looking
over--two circumstances looking over his shoulder: his father's
old cabinet. When I sat with him, and I think we were together,
Dick--I cannot recall, to be honest with you now, I have made
so many trips lately--in his office for an hour and a half, it
was interesting to watch. In our business, after doing this for
3 decades, part of what the plain old politician part of us
hopefully brings to the table is we are not all that bad at
assessing what the other guy is thinking or what the other
guy's motives are or what the other guy needs in the deal.
I sat there and I looked at a guy who looked to me very
conflicted. On the one hand he was modern enough to understand
there had to be significant change in his country. On the other
hand, every time he would even squint in that direction there
would be a foreign minister or someone else sitting there
glaring, literally, at him. I mean that in the literal sense.
So that is one. Assuming Asad is attempting to moderate or
ameliorate his relationships in the region, he has that one
problem. The second problem he has is he is sitting atop a part
of the world, in a part of the world, he just has no idea which
way it is going to go right now. The honest to God truth is--
and everyone with whom I speak in the world--and I told this
bad joke; I might as well tell it again because it sort of is a
homely way of explaining it.
There used to be a joke about the coach who had a center
fielder who in four innings made seven errors. And he pulls
George out and he puts in Joe or John. The first play after he
puts in John is a routine pop fly to center field and John
drops the ball. The coach goes crazy. He calls time out and
calls John in, says: What the devil is the matter with you,
John? John looks at the coach and says: Coach, George screwed
up center field so badly no one can play it.
Well, the truth of the matter is the rest of the world is
looking right now. It is a bit of humor. Sometimes you need a
little bit of humor to leaven how deadly serious this is. But I
still think it is fully within our grasp to secure the peace in
Iraq, but it is going to require some significant further
change in policy to do so in my view.
I think the rest of the world is standing around looking
now: Do I want to play in center field? I am not at all sure. I
am not at all sure friend or foes have reached a conclusion as
to what the outcome is going to be. But when they reach that
conclusion I think it is going to impact upon and inform their
judgments on every other aspect of their relationship with us
in the region.
So we will talk about the Syria Accountability Act. We will
talk about a number of other things here. But I just want to be
clear, which I have been earlier with both the State Department
personnel here, that I am going to ask their view at some point
about how connected they think the possibilities are with
regard to Syria and success or failure in Iraq.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you and I yield.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Biden.
Gentlemen, before I ask for your testimony I need to
announce that we are going to have a roll call vote in about 3
minutes. So it is the intent of the chair to recess the hearing
so that members who are here can vote. Some of our colleagues,
we presume, are proceeding to the floor to vote and will be
returning. In this way, your testimony will not be conflicted
with people coming and going. We will be back because we look
forward to hearing from you.
Now, let me just say at the outset that your statement and
that of our following panel will be placed in the record in
full. Be prepared to present as you wish your material in some
summary form that would expedite the questions of the
committee.
We are likely to have another roll call vote, I am advised,
at 12:30. So hopefully between these two roll call votes we
will have an excellent hearing. If we are not finished at that
point, we will continue after that vote so that all members
have an opportunity to ask their questions of the witnesses.
But for the moment, the hearing is recessed and we will be
back very shortly.
Senator Biden. Thank you, gentlemen.
[Recess from 10:29 a.m. to 10:58 a.m.]
The Chairman. The hearing is called to order again. The
vote was postponed again and again, as you may have surmised,
but is taking place and members will be rejoining us.
Ambassador Burns, we welcome you. We appreciate your coming
and look forward to your testimony. Would you please proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. BURNS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU
FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Burns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted
to be here this morning and, with your permission, I will
submit my prepared statement for the record and offer just a
few brief summary comments.
The Chairman. It will be published in full.
Ambassador Burns. Mr. Chairman, our relations with Syria
today are poor. Six months ago, Secretary Powell outlined in
clear and candid terms for President Asad serious American
concerns about Syrian behavior in a number of areas. The
Secretary made equally clear our continuing commitment to
comprehensive peace in the Middle East, including on the
Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli tracks. He stressed the new
strategic possibilities in the region with the liberation of
Iraq and urged Syria to reconsider its own interests and
actions in light of those possibilities.
Unfortunately, Syria has failed to make the fundamental
changes that Secretary Powell emphasized last May. It is true
that Syria has taken some positive steps on Iraq in recent
weeks. It voted for United Nations Security Council Resolution
1511, it is demonstrating cooperation on the issue of former
Iraqi regime assets in Syrian banks, and it has improved
control of its border with Iraq. While much more remains to be
done, these recent steps are welcome. They are in Syria's
interest as much as America's because Syria should have as big
a stake as any country in a stable, unified Iraq.
In other areas, however, Syria's actions continue to pose
profound problems. Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of
terrorist groups harbored by Damascus. Groups such as Hamas and
Palestinian Islamic Jihad continue to operate out of Syria,
directing and supporting attacks on innocent civilians in
Israel and the occupied territories. Such attacks are
reprehensible, deeply destructive of legitimate Palestinian
aspirations for statehood, and totally contradictory to Syria's
professed commitment to comprehensive peace.
Syria simply cannot have it both ways. It cannot claim an
interest in a political solution and the resumption of
negotiations for the return of the Golan and at the same time
shelter terrorists determined to do all they can to prevent
such a political solution. And it certainly cannot have it both
ways with the United States in the post-September 11th world.
It is true that Syria has offered valuable cooperation
against al-Qaeda. That is in both our interests and we welcomed
it. But that does not outweigh Syria's continued support for
other terror groups. In concert with Iran, Syria supports
Hizballah, an extremely dangerous terrorist organization with
global reach and the ability to threaten coalition forces in
Iraq. Beyond its support for terrorism, we continue to have
serious concerns about Syria's continued presence in Lebanon
and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.
Mr. Chairman, we take no particular satisfaction in
highlighting our continuing troubles with Syria. We ought to be
able to work together to revive hope for Arab-Israeli peace,
shape the emergence of a stable Iraqi neighbor, fight violent
extremists who threaten us all, and create a better economic
future for Syria and its people. Dialogue and diplomacy between
the United States and Syria have always been difficult and
often frustrating. But in years past American administrations
have sometimes found solid ground on which to build with Syria.
I hope that our efforts at engagement can eventually produce
that again in the future.
But in the mean time, we face some real problems in Syrian
behavior that we cannot afford to ignore. Action on the Syria
Accountability Act certainly makes clear the depth of
Congressional concern on these issues and the consequences of
inaction by Syria. The administration will continue to work
hard in our direct contacts with Syria as well as in concert
with our friends and allies in the international community and
the region to drive home to the Syrian regime the need, in all
our interests, for fundamental changes in behavior.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Burns follows:]
Prepared Statement of William J. Burns
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, for the
opportunity to speak about the U.S.-Syria relationship.
I think it might be useful to frame today's discussion of our
relationship with Syria in the context of the four goals that drive our
overall agenda in the Middle East. First, the emergence of an Iraq that
is unified, stable, democratic, and prosperous. Second, the achievement
of the President's vision of two states, Israel and Palestine, living
side-by-side in peace and security. Second, achievement of the
President's vision of two states, Israel and Palestine, at peace and
secure with each other and the region. Third, the elimination of the
threat of terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. And
fourth, support for homegrown efforts at economic and political reform
as the best means to achieve lasting peace, and prosperity and
democracy in the region.
It is through this policy prism that we must view Syria's actions
and draw conclusions about the course of our relationship.
Unfortunately, Syria's record with regard to these four foreign policy
priorities is poor. In his visit to Damascus in May, the Secretary of
State spoke candidly to Syrian President Bashar Al Asad about our
concerns about Syrian behavior and identified the issues that the
Syrian regime needed to address in order to develop a positive and
productive relationship with the United States. Secretary Powell made
clear that the United States remained committed to comprehensive peace
in the region, including on the Syrian and Lebanese tracks, and
remained ready for an improved bilateral relationship. But he also
explained that the Syrians needed to establish that they were prepared
to play a constructive role in the search for regional peace before we
could envision progress on these fronts. I reinforced the Secretary's
message in Damascus in August.
We have been very direct with the Syrians about our concerns. The
issues emphasized in the Syria Accountability Act have been reflected
in our ongoing dialogue with Damascus for months now. While we have
seen some positive steps with respect to Iraq, we remain deeply
concerned on other critical areas--particularly terrorism and WMD.
Iraq
In the months leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the
Administration had two areas of particular concern with respect to
Syria's relationship with the regime of Saddam Hussein: illicit oil
trade and illicit transshipment of dual-use and military-related items
into Iraq. Despite repeated warnings, the Asad regime allowed these
actions to continue, even after the beginning of Coalition military
action in Iraq. Fortunately for all concerned, decisive U.S. engagement
in the early days of the conflict brought an end to these activities.
We have been clear: there is no issue of greater importance for the
United States than the safety and security of U.S. and Coalition
personnel in Iraq. To this end, during his May visit, the Secretary
focused on the need for Syria to secure its borders with respect to
both high-level figures of the former Iraqi regime who might seek
safehaven in Syria, as well as those individuals who might seek to
infiltrate Iraq from Syria to bring harm and instability. In addition,
the Secretary noted the importance of securing former regime assets
held in Syrian banks so that they might be returned to their rightful
owners, the Iraqi people.
Though Syria has taken steps over the past several months to
address these areas of concern, their efforts fall short of what is
necessary. On the border, we have witnessed increased vigilance on the
part of Syrian security forces. But the porous nature of the Syrian-
Iraqi border and cross-border tribal ties mean that Syria continues to
be a preferred route for those seeking to undermine Coalition efforts
to establish stability and a peaceful transition to democracy in Iraq.
On the issue of former Iraqi regime assets, a joint U.S.-Iraqi
forensic accounting team recently departed Damascus, where they worked
closely with Syrian officials to obtain information related to the
disposition of Iraqi assets in Syria. We continue to call on Syria, and
nations around the world, to live up to their obligations under UNSCR
1483 and return these funds to the Iraqi people, where they belong.
We are pleased with Syria's recent vote in support of UNSCR 1511
and its decision to attend the Iraqi donors conference in Madrid. We
hope this represents a new readiness by Syria to fully support the
stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq.
Israel/Palestinians
While the Syrian leadership publicly affirms its support for
comprehensive peace in the Middle East and its desire to restart
negotiations for the return of the Golan Heights, it continues to offer
safehaven to Palestinian rejectionist groups whose terrorist actions
undermine both progress toward President Bush's two-state vision and
the aspirations of the Palestinian people. Damascus claims that the
offices of HAMAS, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the PFLP-GC are purely
informational in nature. Such claims are simply not credible.
Individuals associated with these groups continue to engage in
operational activities from their Damascus base. Syria's refusal to
seriously address this issue and sever ties with these terrorist
organizations delays the day when Syria's own territorial claims can be
addressed via negotiations.
Syria maintains an unhelpful approach in the UN Security Council,
where it has sponsored unbalanced resolutions related to Israel-
Palestine conflict and refused to include language condemning
terrorism.
Terrorism and WMD
Syria, in concert with Iran, also provides support--including safe
haven and transit for personnel and materiel between Iran and Lebanon--
to Lebanese Hizballah, another terrorist organization whose activities,
particularly in South Lebanon, are a destabilizing factor in the
region. Hizballah's global reach--and the threat it could pose to our
forces in Iraq--makes it an organization of particular concern to the
United States and our allies in the global war on terrorism.
With respect to Syrian cooperation against Al-Qaeda, this
Administration has acknowledged that Syrian cooperation earlier in the
war on terrorism was has been valuable and has saved American lives.
This cooperation, however, is not sufficient to outweigh Damascus'
continued support for other terror groups.
On weapons of mass destruction, Under Secretary Bolton noted in
Congressional testimony earlier this fall our concern about Syria's
nuclear R&D program and the need to watch for any activity or evidence
of foreign assistance that could facilitate a Syrian nuclear-weapons
capability. We are aware of Syrian efforts to acquire dual-use
technologies that could be applied to a nuclear weapons program. Syria
is a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons and has a standard fullscope safeguards agreement with
the IAEA, but has not yet signed the IAEA Additional Protocol to its
safeguards agreement. Syria has signed, but not ratified, the
Biological Weapons Convention. Nevertheless, Syria is fully committed
to expanding and improving its chemical and biological weapons
programs, which it believes serve as a deterrent to regional
adversaries. Damascus is pursuing both solid- and liquid-propellant
missile programs and relies extensively on foreign assistance in these
endeavors.
Reform
President Asad assumed power over three years ago in an atmosphere
of optimism--a so-called ``Damascus Spring.'' The fact that early
expectations about the pace and degree of reform the new President
would pursue may have been overly ambitious does not diminish the
disappointment with the lack of progress to date. Efforts thus far--
including the demilitarization of Syrian public schools by ending
military-style school uniforms and mandatory military summer camp, a
refocusing of the ruling Ba'ath Party's role in government, and
creation of private universities--are mere ``glimmers'' and much
remains to be done to address endemic corruption, infringement of
fundamental human rights such as freedom of expression and association,
and a lackluster commitment to meaningful economic reform.
In short, Mr. Chairman, while Syria has decided to work
constructively with the United States in some areas, on balance, we
remain very concerned that the government in Damascus continues to
exert a negative influence on several of the critical foreign-policy
priorities I outlined at the beginning of my remarks. In some
instances, it seems that Syria harbors the illusion that cosmetic steps
will be enough to defuse our concerns. In others, there seems to be a
misplaced belief in Damascus that U.S. engagement in Iraq and with the
Israelis and Palestinians will prevent us from pursuing a robust agenda
with Syria. Both judgments are ill-considered and fail to grasp the
depth of our concerns, and those of the international community.
Until Syria shows itself committed to comprehensive peace in the
region through concrete actions, it will continue to find itself at
odds with the United States and increasingly isolated internationally.
The Syrian regime has some tough choices to make. It can continue
to harbor and support groups devoted to terror, and engage in behavior
that calls into question its commitment to regional peace and
stability. Or it can act in ways that reflect new strategic realities
in the region and help restore hope for a resumption of the Syrian-
Israeli track, encourage the emergence of a stable Iraqi neighbor, and
create a better economic future for Syria. But it can't have it both
ways.
The irony we face, Mr. Chairman--if Damascus' public statements are
to be believed--is that the U.S. and Syria share a common vision for
the region: a peaceful and stable Iraq ruled by Iraqis, and a just and
comprehensive peace between Arabs and Israelis. The challenge we face
is in charting a course that will persuade Syria to take the necessary
actions to contribute to that vision.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Ambassador Burns.
Ambassador Black, do you have testimony at this time or
have you come in support of Ambassador Burns?
Ambassador Black. I come in support. I have a couple of
brief introductory remarks if that is acceptable.
The Chairman. Fine, I would appreciate that.
HON. J. COFER BLACK, COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Black. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee, for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss Syria's role as a state sponsor of terrorism.
There is no doubt that many past Syrian actions are in dire
conflict with U.S. interests in the region and that the current
posture of the Syrian government towards terrorism continues to
be wholly unacceptable. As a state sponsor of terrorism, Syria
has repeatedly shown an unwillingness to fundamentally change
its behavior regarding support for terrorism.
While we continue to have hope for eventual improvements in
Syrian attitudes, policies, and actions, we see little at this
time to indicate that Syrian support for terrorism is
diminishing. Syria remains a security concern not just because
of terrorism, but also because of their pursuit of weapons of
mass destruction. Since Under Secretary John Bolton has
recently testified on the latter, which is in his area of
expertise, I will discuss briefly the former.
The threat to our country posed by states who both sponsor
terrorism and pursue weapons of mass destruction is one which
we cannot and will not ignore. Syria, a sponsor of numerous
terrorist organizations, is a country whose actions we must
follow carefully in this regard. While there is currently no
information indicating that the Syrian government has
transferred weapons of mass destruction to terrorist
organizations or would permit such groups to acquire them,
Syria's ties to numerous terrorist groups underlie the reasons
for continued attention.
The threat posed by Syria can best be understood by
addressing three areas: border security, which is directly
related to the security of our forces in Iraq; Syrian
government support for Palestinian rejectionist groups; and
Syrian support for Lebanese Hizballah. Obviously, many of you
share these concerns, which is why the Syria Accountability Act
is under consideration in Congress.
Regarding Iraq, Syria took a series of hostile actions
towards coalition forces in Iraq. Syria allowed military
equipment to flow into Iraq on the eve of and during the war.
Syria also permitted volunteers to pass into Iraq to attack our
servicemembers during the war. In the period following the
conclusion of major military action, foreign fighters have
continued to transit into Iraq from Syria.
While the situation on the Syrian border has improved in
recent weeks, it is still a major source of concern for us. We
see indications that the Syria-Iraq border is more secure now
than it has ever been. To put the issue in proper context, in
the past there was not the security need for the Syrian
government to secure the border to the extent that they must do
so now. That is only one factor in this problem.
While it is understandable that the Syrian authorities may
have had initial problems in ramping up, what we have found
unacceptable was the manner in which the Syrians delayed taking
effective action. We are cautiously optimistic that the
situation will continue to improve along the border.
We also remain concerned about the possibility of anti-
coalition activity being organized inside of Syrian territory.
As we have said for some time, Syria provides a safe haven and
material support for several Palestinian rejectionist groups,
including Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, and the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for
the Liberation of Palestine, the Abu Mousa Organization, and
the Popular Struggle Front.
The Syrian government maintains that the offices of these
groups are used solely for press purposes and play no
leadership or operational role in the conduct of terrorist
attacks. We reject this argument, have seen evidence that some
of these offices are in fact used clearly for operational
purposes. Even if this were not the case, we would continue to
insist that the Syrian government close these offices, which
maintain vocal public support for these nefarious
organizations. Syrian tolerance of Palestinian rejectionist
groups' offices in their country shows a lack of commitment to
support reasonable efforts towards a comprehensive peace
between Israel and Palestine.
Syria also continues to provide safe haven and a policy
cover to Hizballah in Lebanon, which has killed hundreds of
Americans and numerous others in the past. Syrian support for
Hizballah continues to be a major impediment towards progress
in our counterterrorism efforts. Syria allows resupply of
Hizballah from Iran via Damascus. Syria also allows wanted
Hizballah terrorists, including Amag Mugniyah, to transit Syria
and find safe haven there. The Syrian military presence in
Lebanon supports Hizballah actions there.
In Syria we see a convergence of hostile rhetoric and a
history of support for terrorism. Our bilateral relationship
with Syria is a complex one. We share Congress' concerns with
respect to Syria and have been engaged in extensive direct
dialogue with the highest levels of the Syrian government on a
full range of issues, including terrorism, weapons of mass
destruction, Lebanon, and Iraq.
Unfortunately, these conversations have borne little fruit
in changing Syrian actions on support for terrorism. While
there may have been areas of cooperation on certain
counterterrorism issues between our two governments, this is
not sufficient to counter our grave concern about Syria's
continued support for group such as Hamas, PFLP-GC, PIJ,
Hizballah, and others.
It should be noted that what we ask of Syria is not unusual
nor is it exceptional. We ask them to join the community of
nations which reject terrorism as a political tool. We ask them
to cease support for groups whose only goal is to kill and to
maim in the pursuit of policies which seek to destroy rather
than support peace.
We remain optimistic that continued engagement with Syria
will one day lead to a change in Syrian behavior, a change that
will allow them once again to interact with us on a normal
footing. But that change must come from the Syrian government.
We will judge them on their actions.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for allowing me to make
my opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Black follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Cofer Black
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss Syria's role as a
state sponsor of terrorism.
There is no doubt that many past Syrian actions are in direct
conflict with U.S. interests in the region and that the current posture
of the Syrian government toward terrorism continues to be wholly
unacceptable. As a state sponsor of terrorism, Syria has repeatedly
shown an unwillingness to fundamentally change its behavior regarding
support for terrorism. While we continue to have hope for eventual
improvements in Syrian attitudes, policies and actions, we see little
at this time to indicate that Syrian support for terrorism is
diminishing.
Syria remains a security concern not just because of terrorism, but
also because of its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Since
Undersecretary John Bolton has recently testified on the latter, which
is his area of expertise, I will focus on the former. The threat to our
country posed by states who both sponsor terrorism and pursue weapons
of mass destruction is one which we cannot and will not ignore.
Syria, a sponsor of numerous terrorist organizations, is a country
whose actions we must follow carefully in this regard. While there is
currently no information indicating that the Syrian government has
transferred WMD to terrorist organizations or would permit such groups
to acquire them, Syria's ties to numerous terrorist groups underlie the
reasons for our continued attention.
The terrorist threat posed by Syria can best be understood by
addressing three areas: border security, which is directly related to
the security of our forces in Iraq; Syrian government support for
Palestinian rejectionist groups; and Syrian support for Lebanese
Hizballah.
Obviously, many of you share these concerns, which is why the
Syrian Accountability Act is under consideration in Congress.
Iraq
Syria took a series of hostile actions toward Coalition forces in
Iraq. Syria allowed military equipment to flow into Iraq on the eve of
and during the war. Syria also permitted volunteers to pass into Iraq
to attack our service members during the war.
In the period following the conclusion of major military action,
foreign fighters have continued to transit into Iraq from Syria. While
the situation on the Syrian border has improved in recent weeks, it is
still a major source of concern for us.
We see indications that the Syria-Iraq border is more secure now
that it has ever been. To put the issue in proper context, in the past
there was not the security need for the Syrian government to secure the
border to the extent they must now do so. That is only one factor in
this problem. While it is understandable that the Syrian authorities
may have had initial problems in ramping up, what we found unacceptable
was the manner in which the Syrians delayed taking effective action. We
are cautiously optimistic that the situation will continue to improve
along the border.
We also remain concerned about the possibility of anti-coalition
activity being organized inside of Syrian territory. I refer you to the
intelligence community for its assessment of this issue.
Palestinian Terror Groups
As we have said for some time, Syria provides safehaven and
material support for several Palestinian rejectionist groups, including
HAMAS, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP-GC) and the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Abu Musa Organization (AMO), and
the Popular Struggle Front (PSF). The Syrian government maintains that
the offices of these groups are used solely for press purposes and play
no leadership or operational role in the conduct of terrorist attacks.
We reject this argument and have seen evidence that some of these
offices are, in fact, used for operational purposes. Even if this were
not the case, we would continue to insist that the Syrian government
close these offices which maintain vocal public support for these
nefarious organizations.
Syrian tolerance of Palestinian rejectionist groups' offices in
their country demonstrates a lack of commitment to support reasonable
efforts toward a comprehensive peace between Israel and the
Palestinians.
Lebanese Hizballah
Syria continues to provide safe haven and political cover to
Hizballah in Lebanon, a group responsible for killing hundreds of
Americans and numerous others in the past. Syrian support for Hizballah
continues to be a major impediment towards progress in our
counterterrorism efforts. Syria allows resupply of Hizballah from Iran
via Damascus. Syria also allows wanted Hizballah terrorists, including
Imad Mugniyah, to transit Syria and find haven there. The Syrian
military presence in Lebanon supports Hizballah actions there.
Conclusion
In Syria we see a convergence of hostile rhetoric and a history of
support for terrorism. Our bilateral relationship with Syria is a
complex one. We share Congress' concerns with respect to Syria and have
been engaged in extensive, direct dialogue with the highest levels of
the Syrian government on a full range of issues--including terrorism,
WMD, Lebanon and Iraq. Unfortunately, these conversations have borne
little fruit in changing Syrian actions on support for terrorism. While
there may have been areas of cooperation on certain counterterrorism
issues between our two governments, this is not sufficient to counter
our grave concern about Syria's continued support for groups such as
HAMAS, PFLP-GC, PIJ, Hizballah, and others.
It should be noted that what we ask of Syria is not unusual nor is
it exceptional. We ask them to join the community of nations which
reject terrorism as a political tool. We ask them to cease support for
groups whose only goal is to kill and maim in the pursuit of policies
which seek to destroy rather than support peace. I remain optimistic
that continued engagement with Syria will one day lead to a change in
Syrian behavior--a change that will allow them once again to interact
with us on a normal footing. But that change must come from the Syrian
government--we will judge them on their actions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Ambassador Black.
The chair would suggest a first round of questioning of
maybe 7 minutes for each of us, and we may wish to have another
round if members have not asked all the questions that they
would like.
Let me begin by commenting that I appreciated Senator
Biden's opening statement. He will probably amplify that
further on his own, but it would appear to me that cooperation
with Syria immediately following military activity in Iraq
looked more promising than does that activity today. Now,
without having any thermometer with which to gauge why people
become more interested in cooperating and why they begin to
slack off in that, it would appear to be that the Syrian
government, including the chief leader, the president of the
country, as well as advisers for his father and for himself,
may be more tentative in their judgment about our success, that
of the United States and the coalition, in Iraq.
To what extent in your judgment are they inclined over the
course of days or weeks to take more of a wait and see attitude
as opposed to taking activities that are more in consonance
with the foreign policy objectives that you have stated? I
gather, from reading your papers and those of our other
witnesses, that most see the Syrians as a pragmatic people,
without necessarily oversentimental ties with the Palestinians
or with al-Qaeda or with others who are out there.
But where do their interests lie and to what extent will
our success in Iraq lead them back to a path of more
cooperation and then perhaps to some fulfillment pragmatically
of their own foreign policy objectives? Do you have a thought
on that, Ambassador Burns?
Ambassador Burns. Yes, Senator Lugar. I think you are
right. I do not think, at least in my experience, sentiment has
ever been the driving impulse in Syrian foreign policy. I think
there were a number of miscalculations that the Syrian regime
made in the period just before Operation Iraqi Freedom and the
beginning of military conflict. A lot of activities across the
Iraqi border which--
The Chairman. Were there miscalculations perhaps that there
would not be military activity, in other words that there would
not be an attack on Iraq at all?
Ambassador Burns. Either that there would not be an attack
or that it would be far more complicated and protracted than
turned out to be the case. I think certainly the rapid success
of the coalition militarily got the attention of the Syrian
regime. I think that was reflected in the nature of the
conversation that Secretary Powell had in early May when he
visited Damascus.
In recent weeks, as I mentioned to you, Mr. Chairman, in
several areas connected to Iraq there have been some signs of
Syrian actions consistent with our interest in a stable,
unified Iraq: the vote in favor of Resolution 1511, cooperation
over the last couple of weeks with a team of Iraqi and American
experts investigating frozen assets in Syrian banks from the
former Iraqi regime. There has been a degree of cooperation
that we had not seen before and, as Ambassador Black also
mentioned, improved efforts on the part of the Syrians to
control their border with Iraq.
So in all those areas there are at least some indications
of a recognition of the importance of responsible behavior with
regard to Iraq and of Syria's interest, which ultimately is
what is going to drive Syrian policy, in a unified, stable Iraq
and progress toward the Iraqi people regaining control of their
own affairs.
Much more remains to be done and we will certainly push
hard to see that performance, again in Syria's interest as well
as America's, strengthened and improved in the future.
The Chairman. What other factors could influence Syria to
become more cooperative, in addition to contributing to its
perception that the coalition is being successful in Iraq? Thus
far it does not appear that economic difficulties in the
country have led to particular changes. I suspect that the
Senate is likely after this hearing to act on the Syria
Accountability Act, which you have mentioned, and that it
probably will pass the act, as the House of Representatives
did. That would impose additional sanctions, hopefully with
flexibility for the administration in the event that diplomatic
activity becomes more promising.
In fact we already have a number of sanctions on the
country now and it does not appear that economic changes seem
to be operative or at least determinative in terms of their
activities. What else, in addition to success in Iraq, might
change the picture?
Ambassador Burns. Mr. Chairman, I think success in Iraq,
which we are determined, as you know, to achieve, I think is
crucial, not just with regard to Syrian behavior, but with
regard to our interests throughout the region. I think the
other argument that we will continue to try and drive home and
that we have made repeatedly to President Asad and others in
the Syrian leadership is that Syria is falling farther and
farther behind the global economy and a recognition that I
think is growing in many other societies in the Arab world that
economic, social, political modernization is long overdue.
It is very interesting in recent reports, there have been
development reports that have been put out, a growing
understanding in the region that home-grown economic and
political reform is absolutely essential. There are things the
United States could do to help in the region in support of that
effort, and our hope certainly is that in Syria, as in other
societies, there will be an appreciation of self-interest in
moving in those directions, though we have not seen a lot of
evidence so far.
The Chairman. Ambassador Burns, it appears that economic
indicators show that many, if not most, states in the Middle
East continue to have deteriorating economic circumstances.
This does not appear to have been determinative of their
foreign policy. In other words, a growing gap occurs with the
rest of the world, sliding downhill very rapidly.
Some persons come to us and come to you and they say: Well,
these are autocratic regimes, people who have their own agendas
quite apart from the ordinary needs of common people for jobs
and economic progress. But these regimes are supported. We are
accused of supporting them, of propping them up, even in the
midst of total default.
In other words, Syria is not an archetype of this, but it
is another case in which the economy is not quite a disaster,
but heading rapidly to the rocks and shoals comparatively. Yet
at the top there does not appear to be any change that is
affecting any of that.
Now, we may be right that we can try to cajole them: You
ought to do more to help your people and we will do something
here. But I am not sure that is working. That is why I probe
this a little bit further.
Ambassador Burns. Well, Mr. Chairman, it is not sinking in
in certain societies, you are absolutely right. The truth is
that stability in the Middle East, like anyplace else, is not a
static phenomenon, and societies in the Middle East, like other
parts of the world, that adapt, that adjust, that take the
initiative on political, social, economic reform and look ahead
are going to succeed, and those that do not are going to fall
further and further behind and ultimately become failed
regimes.
I think that is simply the reality. It is not a function of
American preaching as it is facts and, as I said, realities
that have to be absorbed.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Ambassador.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, again welcome. I say this not in any pejorative
way. The neoconservative view and influence within the
administration has argued and written fairly extensively that
our use of power when necessary, particularly in the face of
the disapprobation of the rest of the world, presents us with
an opportunity to leverage that power to get malcontents in
other parts of the world to straighten up, as my uncle used to
say, straighten up and fly right.
I think there is some truth to what they say, what they
write. Some in the administration and some close advisers to
the administration outside the administration argue that when
we moved successfully in Iraq and our shock and awe program or
initiative that we would see a change in behavior on the part
of Syria relative to all our concerns, particularly support for
terrorists.
It looked like, for a moment anyway, or at least
temporarily, when the Secretary of State made his visit to meet
with the president of Syria shortly after the Syrians
miscalculated in that they thought we would have a longer slog,
to use a term from our Secretary of Defense, in bringing about
the collapse of the Syria regime, they looked like they were
going to take some concrete actions. If I am not mistaken, we
demarched them with some specific requests relating to the
location, the support, the visibility, the headquarters of and
the offices of Hizballah and others.
The initial, if memory serves me, the initial response
seemed to be that they were going to take some action, and they
did take some at least cosmetic actions. There were proposals
from some of us--and I am not suggesting they were not shared
by State or the President--that one of the things that we could
do to also aid and abet the effort on the Road Map would be to
insist that the Syrians allow the Lebanese army to replace on
the Israeli border the forces that are there now, and that
would have taken, the assumption was, the acquiescence at least
of the Syrians, if not the direct intervention of the Syrians.
So we all kind of waited to see what was likely to happen.
Am I correct in suggesting that at the end of the day, that is
today, not much did happen, notwithstanding what we may or may
not have thought would happen after the visit of the Secretary
of State? This is no veiled criticism of the Secretary of
State. Did we see any activity initially and if we did, did it
change? Or where are we today in terms of the specific requests
made by the United States of America to the Syrian government
to close down offices, etcetera?
Ambassador Burns. Sir, I think there has been some
incremental change, as you mentioned. But the honest answer is
it is certainly short of the mark that Secretary Powell had
emphasized during that meeting in early May.
With regard to Iraq, as I said, there has been some recent
movement on 1511, on borders, on assets held in Syrian banks;
still more to be done. With regard to Palestinian terrorist
groups--and Ambassador Black may want to add to this--there
were some essentially cosmetic changes, as you mentioned,
certain offices closing down, but still cadre of people in
groups like Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas continuing to
operate, harbored by the Syrians, continuing to be involved
financially, logistically, in terms of planning and direction
of attacks against innocent civilians; a continuing
relationship with Hizballah.
You are right, Senator, the Secretary did emphasize,
Secretary Powell did emphasize, in early May the concerns we
have about Lebanon, the value of allowing the Lebanese armed
forces to deploy fully to the border, and we have not seen
significant movement in that direction.
Senator Biden. I understand that cooperation between Syria
and our military in the Mosul area of Iraq has been pretty
good, with cross-border trade picking up, Iraqi oil being
exported to Syria. And you both know better than I, this region
of Iraq has had close historical ties with Syria.
Now, the question that I keep wrestling with--and our
witnesses I expect will speak to this a little bit as well--is,
there is no doubt in my mind, and I may be wrong, but there is
no doubt in my mind that the degree to which cooperation will
take place on this broad front of concerns we have is directly
related to whether or not they believe we are going to succeed
in the region, in Iraq.
Prior to us going into Iraq, a number of us made visits to
heads of state throughout the region, and privately every head
of state did say what the administration was saying they were
privately saying: We have no love for Saddam Hussein; take him
down, but if you take him down make sure you finish the job. I
do not know how many times I heard that stated.
That was the drumbeat in the background of the
administration saying: Although the world says they are against
us, they are really not against us; they are really for us
doing this. But the tagline always was: Get the job finished,
meaning establish stability when it is all said and done. Do
not just replace him--I mean, do not just topple him, but
replace him.
So there is no doubt in my mind that what you are seeing is
a sort of temporary paralysis in the region deciding which way
is in my naked self-interest to go, based on whether the
Americans are going to finish the job. But what I do not have a
sense of--and I realize this is a fairly broad question, but I
respect both your judgments, and that is why I am asking it--
what does your instinct tell you about whether or not they
would like us to succeed in Iraq?
I am ambivalent on that point. I am not--I can see a
scenario where if I am sitting in Damascus it is very much in
my interest for there to be on the one side a stable non-
threatening Iraq to my north. On the other side, I can say:
Well, God, I hope any of those notions of democracy or
representative government do not spread to me; it could be
dangerous.
Have you run the calculus as to whether or not--not whether
or not they are trying to make it more difficult and not
whether or not their feinting and bobbing and weaving has
anything to do with the outcome. What do you think they think
is in their interest? And is it split within Syria between the
old guard, if there is an old and new guard, because that is
another--you know, we always look for these things. We are
always looking for Jeffersons behind some rock somewhere who is
going to pop up and democratize a nation. They seldom, if ever,
exist.
But I realize the question is fairly broad, but would you
be willing to engage us a little bit in your sense of what you
think Iraq would--I mean, what you think Syria would view as in
their interest relative to Iraq? The reason I ask the
question--and I conclude with this--is because assume there
was--it was in their interest for them to have a say in what
emerges in Baghdad whenever. Then is the six plus two
arrangement that we used in Afghanistan, does that have any--is
there any reason for us to be engaging Syria about the future
of Iraq?
That is more like an essay question. I apologize, but I
would appreciate it if you would just speak to us a little bit
about that.
Ambassador Burns. Sure, I would be glad to try to, Senator
Biden. First, as you suggested, historically there is no love
lost between the Ba'athists in Damascus and the Saddam Hussein
regime in Baghdad. A long history of tension between the two of
them. So objectively in many ways it would seem at least to be
in Syria's political interest to see that regime gone.
Commercially, there has been a lot of interaction in the past
and in the future a healthy Iraqi economy, a prosperous, stable
Iraq, would seem to offer a number of possibilities for all of
its neighbors.
I think you are right, Senator, to suggest that, in fact I
am certain that, there are some well-entrenched interests in
Syria who view the prospect of a unified, prosperous,
politically progressive or democratic regime and system of
governance emerging in Iraq as threatening in some respects.
But I think the bottom line probably is the Syrian regime is
looking very carefully at what is going on in Iraq, and I think
the real bottom line, as you suggested, is that success in
Iraq, defined as the Iraqi people regaining control of their
own affairs and living in peace with their neighbors, will
probably have as great an impact as anything else on the
calculations not just of the Syrian regime but others in the
region. That is why the President is so determined to help
Iraqis achieve that result.
But I think there is a certain conflict in the minds of
many Syrians in the regime about that outcome.
Senator Biden. Mr. Black, do you have any comment?
Ambassador Black. Senator, I could only echo what
Assistant Secretary Burns said, but also what you have said. I
think it is right on the mark. They are very pragmatic. They
assess their environment and they will attempt to encourage
those relationships and those situations that are in their
interest.
I think we all would hope that they would appreciate that a
free Iraq that is prosperous, that is a good trading partner,
on the whole is clearly to their advantage.
Senator Biden. I thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.
Senator Chafee.
STATEMENT OF HON. LINCOLN CHAFEE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE ISLAND
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to the
witnesses.
We had an opportunity in the last several weeks to visit
the region and in our trip to Turkey we were fortunate enough
to meet with Prime Minister Erdegan, and I asked him about the
Syria Accountability Act, what would his advice be. He said
that Asad really wants to steer his country more towards the
middle--and of course Turkey shares a long border, of course,
as you know, with Syria, and you might argue who would know
better than someone who shares that long border with Syria the
dynamics there.
He said, as I was saying, that Asad wants to steer his
country more towards the middle, and of course he has some
political dynamics and some generals that make it difficult,
but he does want to go in that direction; and by passing this
bill it just will make that harder.
According to Congressional Research Service, most if not
all of the sanctions contemplated by the Accountability Act,
the Syria Accountability Act, can already be imposed by the
administration. Through the good work of Chairman Lugar, the
House-passed version of the bill will be amended here in the
Senate to give the President more flexibility in waiving the
bill's sanctions. This means that a bill that a bill is widely
perceived as a crackdown on Syria, but it has little
substantive effect.
So is this legislation really a lose-lose for the United
States? Are we getting little additional muscle against Syria
while further antagonizing the Arab world? I also say on our
trip to the region, the same was true in Jordan; we heard the
exact same thing: This passage would be a mistake; we are doing
exactly what I said, forcing Syria to react in the opposite
direction, and that the timing is not good.
Can you comment, Secretary Burns?
Ambassador Burns. Yes, sir. First, I would say that I hope
that the impression that you heard from Turkish leaders is
right. I hope that we will see actions on the part of the
Syrian leadership that open up further possibilities in the
future to work together on issues, whether it is Iraq or in
other areas.
As I said in my opening remarks, unfortunately we have not
seen that kind of a fundamental change in behavior so far. The
administration's position, as you know, sir, with regard to the
Syria Accountability Act is that we are not going to oppose its
passage. We are quite appreciative of the efforts of the
chairman and others to look at ways in which the President's
flexibility in conducting foreign policy and our policy towards
Syria can be preserved, and we believe that is very important,
and we will take a careful look at the language as it emerges.
I think finally, Senator, it is hard for me to assess right
now what the impact of passage of the Syria Accountability Act,
should it be passed by the Congress, will be on Syrian
behavior, on our relations with Syria. We have made very clear
in repeated conversations with the Syrian leadership that
inaction in the areas Secretary Powell first outlined last May
is going to have consequences.
We have made equally clear, as I said before, our
willingness to build on issues or areas that should be of
common concern for us. So I can only hope, I guess to conclude,
that we will begin to see that kind of movement.
But in the mean time, we have to recognize that we have
some quite significant problems in the relationship and those
problems are reflected in the Syria Accountability Act.
Senator Chafee. As you testified, you do not know how
Syria will react. So is it not worth the risk, if already the
President has the powers to impose sanctions? Why take the risk
on a high profile? We all know how these types of legislation
get high visibility in the Arab world. Why even risk it if you
do not know how they will react? The President already has the
powers. Is it just the train is going down the track, you know
the votes are going to pass, and you cannot stop it, so you are
just having a not-opposed attitude? But why take that risk?
Ambassador Burns. Well, sir, as I said, we obviously hope
that not just the Syria Accountability Act should it pass, but
the other points we have tried to emphasize in our direct
contacts with the Syrians--and I would add also in what we have
urged others, our friends in Europe, in the Quartet, and in the
region, to emphasize to the Syrians in their own contacts, that
that will have an impact.
So our hope is, not just in terms of disincentives, which
the Syria Accountability Act represents, but also in terms of
the potential for a more normal kind of relationship, which we
believe to be very much in Syrian self-interest, that taken
together those steps will have an impact. But our position on
the Syria Accountability Act remains as I described it.
Senator Chafee. All right, very good. Thank you.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
Senator Coleman.
STATEMENT OF HON. NORM COLEMAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I greatly appreciate your testimony, clearness
in an area in which there is not always clarity. I believe we--
I think we would all like Asad to steer a course to the middle.
If we could get there that would be great. My question is how
we get there, and I think first we have got to look at how they
act or how they are acting.
Clearly, in the buildup to Operation Iraqi Freedom and your
testimony, Secretary Burns, illicit oil trade, illicit
transshipment of dual use and military-related items, I think
night goggles that were used to kill our soldiers potentially,
and today very clearly Syria being involved in supporting Hamas
and Hizballah and a whole range of terrorist organizations that
kill people; and as I read the testimony, not just in terms of
sometimes a physical presence, but operationally. It seems that
this is an operational center for folks that are out there
undermining the peace process, taking lives.
So the question is how do you impact that? It appears to me
that this, quote, ``pragmatic'' formula is that the stronger we
are, the more likely they will be to perhaps steer a middle.
But it does not seem like it is because there is a desire to
steer a middle. It does not seem like because there is an
interest in it. It is because if we are strong all of a sudden
they may stop doing what they are doing and have been doing for
a long time, which is supporting terrorism.
Are there--help me understand if that is it. It almost
seems as if they kind of play with two hands: On the one hand
they take some actions regarding al-Qaeda and when it looked
like we were plowing through Iraq those seemed to be
substantive actions; and at the same time, it is like somebody
picking your pocket, in this case I think more than picking
your pocket, I think clubbing you over the head with support of
terrorism.
Other than being strong, in which we force somebody to
simply do the right thing, are there other things that we can
do vis a vis with Syria? How do you deal with a nation like
this beyond just simply being stronger than they would like you
to be?
Ambassador Burns. Well, Senator, a very complicated issue
which we now continue to wrestle with. Obviously, success in
Iraq, success in our other policies in the region, is
critically important, as both Senators Lugar and Biden
emphasized.
Second, we continue to stress our commitment to
comprehensive peace in the region. It is important for us to
continue to do everything we can to revive some hope in the
Road Map and in prospects for peace between Palestinians and
Israelis and to keep the door open on the Syrian and Lebanon
tracks as well.
It is important for us in our conversations, not just
directly with the Syrians but also with the Quartet, with the
other European friends, with other partners in the region, to
work with them to help drive home those same points in Syria,
because this is not just an interest of the United States. It
is I believe a widely shared interest.
We hope also that that longer term need, which is as true
in Syria, at least as true in Syria, as any other society in
the Arab world, to modernize economically, to open up more
educational and political opportunities, is going to be a
direction in which that regime wants to move.
So again, I do not have any magic formula to offer,
Senator. It requires an awful lot of hard work. It requires a
lot of very candid discussions. It requires us drawing lines
where we have to draw lines on aspects of Syrian behavior, and
that is what we are determined to do.
Senator Coleman. I appreciate that. I would note in
particular with other partners. If other partners came to us
and said Asad is trying to steer towards the middle, go back
and tell them: Well, tell him to stop supporting Hizballah
because they are going to try to kill us, stop supporting Hamas
because they are undermining the possibility of peace in the
Middle East. And to Abdullah, who has been a good ally and
somebody I believe we can trust, the same message, though:
Deliver the message to the Syrians that if there is to be peace
they have got to be part of the process and they have got to be
part of the solution, not, as we used to say in the sixties,
simply part of the problem.
Ambassador Burns. Yes, sir, Senator. The only thing I
would add to that is that is particularly true with regard to
the legitimate aspirations and interests of Palestinians in
moving toward a state. The actions that groups like Hamas and
Jihad have taken have done as much to undermine those
aspirations as anything else, made it that much more difficult
for the Palestinian Authority to pull itself together and
provide the kind of leadership that the Palestinians need and
deserve.
That is a message that the Syrians need to hear, not just
from us but from others as well.
Senator Coleman. You have a difficult job in a difficult
area of the world, and I appreciate the work that you do.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. I am anxious to get to the second panel as
well, Mr. Chairman, but I have one question.
Bill, can you tell us a little bit about U.S.-European
attitudes and where they diverge relative to Syria? The
Europeans historically have had a slightly different take on
all the Middle East, quite frankly, than we have. That does not
suggest that their take has anything to do--that it is
intentionally counterproductive to our interests.
But do our allies in Europe agree with our approach to
Syria? Is there any realistic possibility of getting on the
same page and forging a united front with regard to Syria and
their support of terror? Tell me a little bit about--you should
have a lot of discussions with them as well. I mean, where are
we in terms of that dynamic?
Ambassador Burns. I think it is a very important point,
Senator. Obviously, the Syrians need to hear, if we are going
to have any impact on their behavior, not just from the United
States, but from others. I think some of our friends in Europe
have been pretty direct with the Syrian leadership about some
of the concerns that I described to you today, again simply
because they reflect real concerns on the part of Europeans as
well.
That is certainly true with regard to Syria's support for
terrorist groups. I think it is increasingly true also with
regard to the negative impact that Syrian harboring of those
groups has had on the chances to revive the Road Map. Some of
our Quartet partners have also been pretty direct with the
Syrians about those concerns.
At the same time, we have all tried to make clear that the
door is open toward comprehensive peace, that this
administration, like its predecessors, is committed to doing
everything we can to work with the parties to revive progress
on that track as well. So I guess to answer your question,
Senator, I think there is potential to do more with our friends
in Europe on the issue of Syria. I think we need to keep
working hard at it. I would not want to pretend to you that our
interests and approaches are identical because they are not,
but I think there is a fair amount of overlap, which we need to
keep working on.
Senator Biden. Well, it seems to me that to the extent
that we could harmonize those views we would have a--maybe I
have been here too long, but I remember when we used to say--I
remember when the gentleman about to testify was ambassador in
that area of the world and we always talked about it in terms
of U.S.-Soviet influence, and we talked about the Syrians
having a godfather to the north and the reason we were not
going to make much progress with Syria.
And when the wall came down and when the Soviet empire
crumbled and the ability of or the desire, both ability and
desire, of the former Soviets, now Russians, was not nearly as
invasive or involved or as capable of affecting events, there
was the brief moment where there was hope that the rest of the
world united would be able to bring some sense with a common
purpose, a common front.
It seems to me that is one of the real lost opportunities.
I do not mean just--I am not talking about this administration,
the last administration. I mean, rationalizing the policy to
the extent that you can.
I did not tell the truth there. I have one more question.
Mr. Black, I asked you this in a different context, but if you
are able to publicly answer this it would be useful. Has the
United States concluded that weapons of mass destruction from
Iraq were dispersed to Syria, as General Clapper of the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency told the New York Times? Do
you have any hard evidence that that is the case, as stated by
Clapper, General Clapper, that Iraqis did disperse to Syria
weapons of mass destruction?
Ambassador Black. I appreciate the question. I will have
to take it for the record. I specialize in counterterrorism.
Weapons of mass destruction is the preserve of others. If I
may, Senator, let me take that for the record and get back to
you on that.
[The information referred to above was not available before
this hearing was sent to press.]
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.
Let me just carry that one step further. Are any of our
allies, or at least countries with whom we have very strong
relations, in addition to our European allies, active with us
in our diplomacy with Syria? For example, have Egypt, the Saudi
Arabians, or anyone else in the neighborhood, for maybe their
own national interests, been involved with us in moving the
Syrians toward a more constructive situation?
Ambassador Burns. Yes, sir. We have had extensive
conversations with the Egyptians, with the Jordanians, as well
as with the Saudis and others, about this issue. It was a
subject, for example, in Secretary Powell's meeting with
President Mubarak about a week ago in Sharm el Sheikh. So it is
natural for us to consult carefully with our friends in the
region.
We do not always see eye to eye on these issues, but I
think there is a shared interest in trying to drive home the
message about working as hard as we all possibly can to fight
terrorism and violence, which again have done so much to
obstruct our deep interest in reviving hope in the Road Map. I
am sure those consultations will continue and I am sure efforts
will continue on the part of our friends in the region.
The Chairman. I join all members of our committee in
thanking you--
Senator Boxer. Could I have--
The Chairman. Yes, I am sorry.
Senator Boxer. I just snuck in on you.
The Chairman. Senator Boxer.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Thank you. Thank you so much. In the nick
of time, I stopped the inevitable gavel.
The Chairman. Exactly.
Senator Boxer. As the author of the Syria Accountability
Act, I want to thank Chairman Lugar for his help now. He is
very determined that we have a waiver, the broad waiver. It is
in place, and I think we are ready to go.
I wanted to, because I know there are some who do not favor
it, to lay out why I think it is important very briefly and
then ask one question to you, either of you who wishes to
answer.
I have always believed in life that the truth will set you
free. You have to tell the truth. I especially think it is
important in foreign policy. Now, clearly diplomacy means that
you tell the truth in the most sensitive way, and you are the
masters of that. I am not good at that, but you are very good
at that, and I really have to say that our chairman and ranking
member are very good at that. I am a little more to the point,
although I think Senator Biden is known for speaking straight
from the shoulder quite often.
But when it comes to Syria, it is about time we just told
the truth. I feel that way about Saudi Arabia, although I do
not quite know what the truth is because we cannot get
information that we really ought to have. But that is another
hearing for another time.
So really what we are saying is that the President can
impose sanctions, and I wanted it to be must impose sanctions,
but with the compromise he can impose sanctions, which I think
are very wisely ratcheted up, if Syria does not cease providing
support for international terrorist groups and does not allow
terrorist groups such as Hamas, Hizballah, Palestinian Islamic
Jihad, and others to maintain facilities in territory under
their control.
This is a terrible problem. This is a haven for terrorists.
You know, as the President said after 9-11, we cannot have
people shielding terrorists. So we can no longer walk away. I
am the happiest person when Syria helps us in some way or
another. I encourage that. But still in all, you cannot really
help us in the long run if you are allowing these terrorists to
be there.
Lebanon occupation, another one. Development and deployment
of long-range ballistic missiles and research into such
weapons, and ceasing all support for terrorist activities
inside of Iraq, and I know others have talked about that.
So what do we do here? We just simply give the President
or, shall we say, we--as Senator Chafee said, the President
could do this anyway, but the Congress will go on record when
we finally pass this act, which I think is long overdue--and I
disagreed so strongly with the administration when Secretary
Powell said this will not helpful, having this act, this will
not be helpful. That was just a few months ago.
Then he went over there and sat with Syria and said: You
know, you have got to watch out for that Congress; they are
going to pass the Syria Accountability Act. Well, I thought
that was pretty helpful of us to have that there.
So you know, I just think when I look at this list:
prohibiting export to Syria of any item on the U.S. munitions
list, imposing two or more of the following sanctions: the
export of products of the U.S. other than food and medicine to
Syria; and prohibiting U.S. business from investing and
operating; prohibiting Syrian aircraft from taking off or
landing in the U.S. And it goes on: diplomats in D.C. can only
travel within a 25-mile radius.
That is harsh. It is very harsh. But what they are doing is
harsh. And if we hope to wrap our arms around this terrorism
issue, we have to start telling the truth and putting something
behind it. Frankly, if you were to ask people, I am a person
what so hesitates to move towards war. I am probably the last
person, one of the last, that will vote for war. I have done
it, but I do it very rarely.
So why would I support this? Because this is a way to avoid
a military confrontation, because we are sending a very clear
signal. We are not going to surprise someone in the middle of
the night and attack them. We are saying this is bad, this is
wrong, this goes against world norms, and we are ready to push
forward with economic sanctions.
I think that is a way to avoid a confrontation. That is the
last thing we need. It is the last thing we want. We all want a
peaceful world.
So my question, and then I am done, is: What really
triggered the change of the administration on my bill? That is
my question.
Ambassador Burns. Thanks, Senator Boxer. I think we have
worked very hard, and I do not think anybody has worked harder
than Secretary Powell, to try and speak the plain truth on
these issues, as candidly and directly as we could with the
Syrian leadership. We continue to hope for changes in Syrian
behavior and we will continue to work hard to achieve them, but
hope alone is not a reliable basis for policy. The
administration has recognized that there are elements of Syrian
behavior right now which cause real problems for our interests,
as they have for years.
It was against that backdrop that the White House took the
decision that we would not oppose the passage of the Syria
Accountability Act. As I said, it is very hard--as I said, I am
sorry, Senator Boxer, before you came--
Senator Boxer. I am sorry, I am involved with these fires.
Ambassador Burns. Not at all, no.
It is hard to predict what the impact is going to be. We
certainly hope that the passage of the act, should it be
passed, as well as our continuing direct efforts with the
Syrians, our efforts with the Europeans and others, is going to
have an impact, a positive impact.
Senator Boxer. So there was not anything specific that
changed your mind that they are doing since the war or anything
else? It is just an accumulation of behavior that all of a
sudden you thought this is the time?
Ambassador Burns. It is an accumulation. I am not sure if
it was an all of a sudden decision as much as it is an
accumulation of efforts on our part that did not produce, have
not yet produced, all the results we want to see. We are going
to keep at it, keep open the possibility of more normal
relations, but that is going to require tangible actions on the
part of the Syrian leadership.
Senator Boxer. Thank you for your flexibility.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Boxer, for
coming to the hearing at a timely moment.
Senator Boxer. Yes, right.
The Chairman. Well, we thank you both again, and we will
now proceed with our next panel. That panel includes Dr.
Patrick Clawson, the Honorable Richard Murphy, Dr. Murhaf
Jouejati, and Mr. Flynt Leverett.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for joining us this morning.
I would like for you to testify in the order that I introduced
you, and that will be first of all Dr. Patrick Clawson. Please
proceed.
STATEMENT OF PATRICK CLAWSON, PH.D., DEPUTY DIRECTOR,
WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Dr. Clawson. Thank you, sir. Let me summarize my
statement, please.
Since assuming the Syrian presidency in June 2000 on the
death of his father, Hafez Al-Asad, Bashar Asad has established
a track record. The regime change in Syria has been bad for
Syria, bad for the Middle East, and bad for U.S.-Syrian
relations. In every area of concern to the United States,
Bashar Asad's rule has been worse than that of his father,
which is impressive given how bad a ruler was his father, and
the problems are growing, not diminishing.
Let me just briefly summarize the areas where Bashar's
track record has been worse than that of Hafez Asad. On the
areas where we had differences with Hafez Asad and where we had
good reason to hope that Bashar would make a difference, things
have gotten worse. For instance, anti-peace process terrorism.
My boss, the Director of the Washington Institute, Dennis Ross,
has written in the Wall Street Journal, ``Hafez Asad was no
slouch when it came to threatening Israel, but he controlled
the flow of Iranian arms to Hizballah and he never provided
Syrian weapons directly. Bashar Asad seems to lack his father's
sense of limits.''
Hafez Asad never met with the secretary general of
Hizballah, Mr. Nasrollah. Bashar Asad meets with him frequently
and treats him like his senior adviser and mentor.
Second, weapons of mass destruction. Rather than just
maintaining the already troubling capabilities that Syria had
when he came to office, Bashar Asad has plowed ahead with
developing more sophisticated capabilities, worse chemical
weapons, and longer range missiles.
On Lebanon, despite Israeli withdrawal in May 2000, Bashar
Asad has insisted that Hizballah retain its arms, thereby
making it a destabilizing and radical force in Lebanese
politics.
On economic and political reform, the great hope was that
Bashar Asad would make economic growth his priority, and indeed
there was a Damascus spring with limited liberalization when he
came to office. But winter set in early. For participating in
civil society meetings 2 years ago, 10 human rights activists
have been sentenced to prison for 2 to 5 years and just this
week a military court is trying 14 more human rights activists.
On the areas where Hafez Asad had some minimal cooperation
with U.S. interests, things have gotten worse under Bashar.
Peace negotiations with Israel, they are completely shut down.
Damascus now rarely bothers to pretend that it is willing to
talk to Israel. On the issue of Iraq, under Hafez Asad for
better than 10 years there was a ``do no evil'' approach, not
getting in the way of U.S. policy towards Iraq. Now, instead
Bashar Asad has shown a willingness to work with the worst
forces in Iraq. Not only did he cooperate closely with Saddam
Hussein on economic relations while Syria was still in power,
but even as Saddam's regime was falling Bashar Asad remained
friendly and provided assistance to the Saddamites.
Then finally there is the question of radical Islamist
terrorism. One can complain about many things about Hafez Asad,
but he had a firm hand, indeed a cruel and inhuman hand, toward
Islamist terrorists. Bashar Asad I am afraid has changed that
approach. Initially, after the September 11th, 2001, attacks
Syria did cooperate with the United States against al-Qaeda,
but that has changed.
Ambassador Black, Mr. Black, was referring earlier to our
ambiguous--our dissatisfaction, excuse me, with the ambiguous
record of the Syrians. Let me just note, there was a very
interesting case in Italy recently in which the Italian
prosecutors going after an al-Qaeda cell showed that Syria, in
their words, had ``functioned as a hub for an al-Qaeda
network,'' and the detailed telephone wiretaps that the Italian
police presented showed how this al-Qaeda cell had been
coordinating its activities in Syria and through Syria.
So Bashar Asad seems to be campaigning to join the axis of
evil. He needs to be confronted with a starker choice: bigger
sticks if he persists in his path, but bigger carrots if he
makes significant progress in some of the areas of our concern.
Whether or not the Syria Accountability Act becomes law,
the United States has a variety of other instruments it could
use to turn up the heat on Syria. The Asad regime cares deeply
about statements by top U.S. officials about the legitimacy of
that government and there is much that we can do to reach out
to support pro-democracy activists in Washington. It is
interesting to note that in 2 weeks time there will be a
meeting here in Washington of Syrian pro-democracy activists.
Two years ago, the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy published an optimistic monograph full of hope the
Bashar Asad would improve governance, open up Syria to the
outside world, let Lebanon regain its sovereignty, and make
peace with Israel. That study, prepared under my direction by
an Israeli scholar, showed what an opportunity Bashar Asad had.
He has not made good use of his first 3 years.
Let us hope that, if faced with starker choices between a
better future and real risks for his regime, he will make
better use of the coming years.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Clawson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Patrick Clawson
Since assuming the Syrian presidency in June 2000 on the death of
his father Hafez Al-Asad, Bashar Al-Asad has established a track
record. The regime change in Syria has been bad for Syria, bad for the
Middle East, and bad for U.S.-Syrian relations. In every area of
concern to the United States, Bashar Asad's rule has been worse than
that of his father--which is impressive, given how bad a ruler was his
father. And the problems are growing, not diminishing. The risk is that
if Washington basically ignores Syria, Bashar Asad will go from bad to
worse.
Bashar Asad's track record makes depressing reading. Things have
gotten worse in the areas where Hafez Asad was a problem--and where
there was good reason to hope Bashar Asad would make improvements:
Anti-peace-process terrorism. Commenting about Bashar Asad's
provision to Hizballah of Syrian 270 mm rockets which threaten
Israel's third largest city (Haifa), Washington Institute
Director Dennis Ross wrote in the Wall Street Journal, ``Hafez
Asad was no slouch when it came to threatening Israel. But he
controlled the flow of Iranian arms to Hizballah, and he never
provided Syrian weapons directly. Bashar Asad seems to lack his
father's sense of limits.'' 1 Besides the provision
of these dangerous rockets, another sign of Bashar Asad's
imbalance is that Hafez Asad never met with Hizballah Secretary
General Sayyed Hassan Nasrollah; Bashar Asad not only meets and
telephones Nasrollah often, but Bashar Asad goes so far as to
treat Nasrollah like his respected mentor and advisor. While
Bashar Asad promised Secretary of State Colin Powell during his
May 2003 visit to Damascus that Syria would take concrete steps
against terrorists operating out of Syria, Powell has described
Syria's actions since then as ``limited steps'' which ``are
totally inadequate.'' 2
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Dennis Ross, ``The Hidden Threat in the Mideast,'' Wall Street
Journal, June 24, 2002.
\2\ Press conference by Colin Powell, June 20, 2003.
WMD. Rather than just maintaining Syria's already troubling
capabilities to hit Israel with hundreds of CW-tipped Scud
missiles, Bashar Asad has ploughed ahead with developing more
sophisticated capabilities, including more toxic and persistent
chemical weapons such as VX and longer-range missiles.
According to reports from the CIA, Syria is building up a
domestic missile industry, working on both solid propellant and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
liquid propellant product capabilities.
Lebanon. Hafez Asad had the excuse of Israeli occupation of
southern Lebanon which he could claim as justification for the
continued Syrian military presence in Lebanon and for Syria's
insistence that Hizballah be allowed to have a potent military
militia, years after all civil-war-era militias were disarmed.
Israeli withdrawal in May 2000 ended that excuse, but Bashar
Asad has insisted that Hizballah retain its arms, thereby
making it a destabilizing radical force in Lebanese politics.
He has pulled about half of the 30,000 Syrian troops out of
Lebanon but he has used Syrian secret police to continue to
control the increasingly restive Lebanese.3
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Estimates of Syrian troop strength in Lebanon differ; the
source here is Alfred Prados, ``Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral
Issues,'' Congressional Research Service paper IB92075, updated October
10, 2003, p 5.
Economic and political reform. The great hope was that
Bashar Asad would make economic growth his priority, and that
he would therefore allow more space for the private sector and
more interaction with the outside world--civil society could
begin to emerge. Initially, there was a Damascus Spring with
limited liberalization--but winter came early, as those
expressing criticisms were rounded up. For participating in
civil society meetings in 2001, ten human rights activists were
sentenced to prison for two to five years.4 Last
week, a military court began a kangaroo trial of fourteen human
rights activists arrested for attending an August 2003 lecture
marking the fortieth anniversary of the declaration of a state
of emergency in Syria. Meanwhile, the September 2003 government
reshuffle bodes ill for the few economic reforms Bashar Asad
instituted in his first year. The new prime minister, Muhammad
Naji Otri, can best be described as an old-style Ba'athist
hack.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Amnesty International regularly covers the miserable human
rights situation in Syria; cf. its October 21, 2003 press release about
the start of the military court trial.
And on the areas where Hafez Asad had at least some minimal
cooperation with U.S. interests, things have gotten dramatically worse
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
under Bashar Asad:
Peace negotiations with Israel are completely shut down.
Damascus rarely bothers to pretend it is willing to talk to
Israel. Syria has been unhelpful to initiatives to advance the
peace process, including its efforts to twist the 2002 Saudi
initiative at the Arab League to convert it from an offer to
Israel normal relations with the Arab world into a restatement
of maximalist Arab demands. Furious at the Saudi initiative,
Bashar Asad went so far as to organize a rare mass protest in
Damascus against the plan. Syria has encouraged the fiction
that Israel has not fully withdrawn from Lebanon, despite the
UN Security Council's firm determination that Israel has
fulfilled its obligations under UN resolutions. Syrian policy
appears to confirm the skeptics who thought that an Alawite-
dominated government wants to keep the conflict with Israel
going so as to justify its repressive rule as necessary for
national unity against the external enemy.
The ``do no evil'' approach towards Iraq has been replaced
with a bold willingness to take risks to work with the worst
forces in Iraq. Whereas his father had a cold if not hostile
relationship towards Saddam, Bashar Asad embraced him, re-
opening an oil pipeline which had been closed for twenty years;
between one and two billion dollars a year worth of oil flowed
through that pipeline, though it is not clear how the revenue
was shared between the two dictators. Bashar Asad flat-out lied
to Secretary of State Colin Powell when he personally promised
in March 2001 that any revenue from the pipeline would go into
the UN oil-for-food program--a promise Powell thought
sufficiently important that he had President Bush woken to
share the good news. To be sure, in November 2002, Syria voted
in the UN Security Council for Resolution 141 demanding Iraqi
compliance with past UN orders, but it seems that Syria, like
France, believed that resolution could be invoked to prevent
U.S. military action against Iraq.
Syrian policy got worse as the war approached. Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld has accused Syria of sending Saddam's
forces on the eve of the war night-vision goggles, antitank
weapons, aircraft parts, and ammunition.5 During the
war, Bashar Asad allowed thousands of irregulars to cross the
border to fight on Saddam's side; busloads of Syrian jihadists
were joined by warriors from across the Arab world. What is
particularly difficult to understand is why Bashar Asad
remained friendly to the Saddam clan even after they lost
power; Rumsfeld has accused Damascus of providing safe haven to
fleeing Ba'ath officials.6 As recently as September,
both Defense and State Department officials referred to a
continuing flow of resistance volunteers across the Syrian
border.7 There are credible reports that Syria
remains a safe haven for former Saddamites. Treasury Department
officials have pressed Syria, with no known success, to live up
to its obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1443 to
surrender to the U.S.-administered Fund for Development in Iraq
the $3 billion in Iraqi assets held in Syrian-controlled
banks.8
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ For references, see Max Abrahms, ``When Rogues Defy Reason:
Bashar's Syria,'' Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2003, p 53.
\6\ For references, see the excellent article by Eyal Zisser,
``Syria and the United States: Bad Habits Die Hard,'' Middle East
Quarterly, Summer 2003, pp 29-38.
\7\ See Prados, ``Syria: U.S. Relations,'' p 6.
\8\ Douglas Jehl, ``U.S. Believes Syrian Banks Hold $3 Billion in
Iraqi Funds,'' New York Times, October 21, 2003, p. A8.
The firm--indeed, cruel and inhumane--control over Islamists
under Hafez Asad has been replaced with a permissive attitude
for those who wish to attack U.S. interests. The concern in
Hafez Asad's time was his vicious repression of those with even
modest Islamist tendencies, most evident in the 1982 slaughter
of 10,000 residents of Hama. Initially, the hope was that
Bashar would ease the state's heavy hand on the genuinely
religious while at the same time preventing radical Islamist
terrorists from using Syrian soil. And indeed, right after the
September 11, 2001 attacks, Syria did cooperate with the United
States in going after al-Qaeda elements. But as State
Department coordinator for counterterrorism Coffer Black said
in May 2003, ``We clearly don't have the full support of the
Syrian government on the Al-Qaeda problem. They have allowed
Al-Qaeda personnel to come in and virtually settle in Syria
with their knowledge and their support.'' 9
Moreover, according to Italian prosecutors in their indictment
of al-Qaeda members, ``Syria has functioned as a hub for an al
Qaida network.'' The Italian police wiretaps found that the
suspects'' conversations ``paint a detailed picture of
overseers in Syria coordinating the movement of recruits and
money.'' As State Department spokesman said on October 8 when
asked about the Syrian Accountability Act, ``Frankly, the
Syrians have done so little with regard to terrorism that we
don't have a lot to work with.'' 10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Black's statement and the Italian indictment referred to in
the next sentence are from Matthew Levitt, ``Terror from Damascus, Part
II: Hizballah and Al-Qaeda Terrorist Activity in Syria,'' Washington
Institute Peacewatch No. 421, May 9, 2003.
\10\ Cited in Prados, ``Syria: U.S. Relations,'' p 15.
And then there is Syrian vitriol directed against the United
States. Bashar Asad has warned Arabs against U.S. friendship, calling
it ``more fatal than its hostility.'' 11 Syria's attitude
towards the war with Iraq was spelled out by Foreign Minister Faruq
ash-Shara: ``We want Iraq's [that is, Saddam's] victory.''
12 Bashar Asad seems to be campaigning to join the axis of
evil. He needs to be confronted with a starker choice: bigger sticks if
he persists in this path, but bigger carrots if he makes significant
progress in several of the areas outlined above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ In his speech at the Arab summit at Sharm al-Sheikh, as
carried on Syrian television, March 1, 2003.
\12\ Syrian Arab News Agency, March 30, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is in this context that the Syrian Accountability and Lebanese
Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 recently passed the House of
Representatives. This Act provides the President flexibility, such that
he could initially impose modest penalties from the list of six in the
law while at the same time he could suggest to Damascus that failure to
make progress on the matters of concern to Washington would lead him to
impose some of the tougher penalties in that list of six. Some might
say that the Act is largely symbolic, but do not underestimate the
importance of symbols. The reaction by Damascus to the Act's progress--
extensive coverage in the Syrian press and frequent statements by
Syrian officials--demonstrates how deeply the Syrian government cares
about the U.S. stance towards their actions.
Whether or not some version of the Syrian Accountability and
Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act becomes law, the United States has
a variety of other instruments it can use to turn up the heat on Syria.
Washington can hit hard at the legitimacy of the Asad dynasty through
tough statements from top officials supporting democracy in Syria.
Radio Sawa, which has a wide audience among Arab youth, could do tough
reporting about Syria's corruption, human rights violations and
miserable economic performance. U.S. officials at various levels could
meet in public with Syrian dissidents. It is encouraging to note that
there will be a meeting in Washington in two weeks time of Syrian pro-
democracy activists. Were State Department officials to attend the
meeting, the message to Damascus would be clear.
At the same time, the United States could consider some carrots.
Initial steps could build on Bashar Asad's interest in computer
technology, e.g., providing computer education--either over the
internet or via a Peace Corps program in Syria--and enhancing training
opportunities for Syrians in the United States. Should relations
improve further, Washington could help promote Syria as a place where
U.S. companies--especially in telecommunications, high tech, and oil/
gas exploration--should pursue business.
It would be useful if U.S. actions were coordinated with the
European Union (EU), which is planning to sign a trade association
agreement with Syria in the near future. Surely it would be appropriate
for the EU to adopt towards Syria the same stance it has about Iran's
problematic policies; just as the EU openly says that progress towards
a trade cooperation agreement with Iran must go hand in hand with
progress on WMD proliferation, counter-terrorism, the stance on Middle
East peace, and human rights, so any EU agreement with Syria should be
contingent on progress on these fronts. The United States could offer
to the EU that it would help strengthen Brussels hand in negotiations
on these points by making clear that progress made with the EU would
also lead Washington to provide trade- and investment-related breaks
for Syria, e.g., relief on the $366 million in debt Syria owes to the
U.S. government--relief which would have little practical implication
for U.S. taxpayers, since Syria has not made payments on that debt for
years ($245 million is in arrears).
Two years ago, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
published an optimistic monograph full of hope Bashar Asad would
improve governance, open up Syria to the outside world, let Lebanon
regain its sovereignty, and make peace with Israel.13 That
study, prepared under my direction by an Israeli scholar, showed what
an opportunity Bashar Asad had. He has not made good use of his first
three years. Let us hope that if faced with starker choices between a
better future and real risks for his regime, he will make better use of
the coming years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Yossi Baidatz, Bashar's First Year: From Ophthalmology to a
National Vision, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy
Focus No. 41, July 2001.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Clawson.
Ambassador Richard Murphy.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD MURPHY, SENIOR FELLOW FOR MIDDLE EAST
POLICY, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Ambassador Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
the invitation to speak to the committee. My statement has been
submitted for the record. I will only touch on its highlights.
Syria has been a perennial source of frustration for
successive American administrations, which have nonetheless
seen fit to stay in as close touch as possible, knowing that
Damascus could play a key role in a general Arab-Israeli peace
process. There is a great deal of mutual frustration and our
meeting today takes place at a time when there is regrettably
little prospect for forward movement on the Arab-Israeli peace
process.
Syria nonetheless, as Dr. Clawson said, it is sensitive to
statements by American leaders and it very much values
continued dialogue with the United States. It would, I know,
welcome a renewed peace process.
But our dialogue is so often the dialogue of the deaf. We
see Syria as unresponsive to our demands that it curb
terrorism. Syria considers that our Middle East policy is so
biased towards Israel that we blur any distinction between
actions of terrorists and those engaged in acts of national
resistance. They would cooperate with us on al-Qaeda, but not
on Palestinian terrorists or not on the Lebanese Hizballah.
Second, they complain that we play down how insecure Syria
and others feel in the Arab world when facing Israel, the
region's superpower.
While its negotiating approach is influenced, of course, by
the history of its dismemberment, that is the territorial
losses it suffered between the two world wars at the hands of
Britain and France, it partially explains its longstanding
conviction that Israel itself was established as part of the
game of imperialism to divide the Arabs. In its view Israel
remains expansionist and it argues that a general Middle East
peace could have been achieved long ago had the Arabs only
stuck together.
Well, this year--Ambassador Burns talked about the
accumulation of frustrations--our frustration, our irritation,
blew up over events connected with Iraq and the war. The
administration's withdrawal of its earlier objections to the
Syria Accountability Act is one of the tangible signs of this
current attitude. The new problems were over issues of military
supplies reaching Iraq from Syria before the war and its
presumed encouragement of fighters crossing the border since
the war to target our troops. Intelligence is apparently mixed
both on this latter issue and whether Syria received stocks of
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction before the war.
Now, the President has disavowed any intent to invade
Syria, but Syria is frequently described as on the wrong side
of terrorism, and there is certainly an appetite for regime
change in some quarters of this administration. The removal of
the Saddam Hussein regime was actually a political plus for
Damascus, eliminating a rival to its leadership claims in the
Arab east, but a major economic loss in terms of the benefits
received from discounted Iraqi oil.
What can Syria do to redirect its policies offensive to the
United States? Certainly the list would include improving their
border controls, avoiding encouragement of fighters seeking to
transit Syria for Iraq, better control over both extremist
Palestinian organizations, including expelling their leaders,
and ensuring that Hizballah does not trigger a major conflict
with Israel. I think the Syrian leadership has been in part
constrained by the presence of 400,000 Palestinians in Syria in
how they treat their leaders.
What should be our policy direction? First and foremost
would be to find a way to revive the peace process. Syrian
anxiety at being overlooked tempts it to tolerate and perhaps
even encourage the acts of Palestinian extremists and
Hizballah.
Second, I would like to suggest a different way of dealing
with Syrian weapons of mass destruction programs. Their extent
I do not know. Certainly their chemical program has been talked
of for 20 years--nothing new. But I suggest that we go beyond
our rhetorical support for a Middle East region free of weapons
of mass destruction to launch actual negotiations for a
regional approach to their control. Our current policy is to
pursue controls on a state by state basis, but excluding
Israel. We have tended to assume that Israel would fiercely
oppose a regional approach, preferring to avoid any discussion
of its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction.
I think it is time to reexamine this in the light of what
caught my attention in a recent article in the Los Angeles
Times, that Israel was considering placing nuclear-tipped
warheads on its missiles in its submarines. Now, the sources
were anonymous, easily deniable, and they were quickly denied.
But they provide a tantalizing hint that Israel just might be
ready to use awareness of its arsenal in a new way.
Could this mean that it might be prepared to go beyond the
position of Prime Minister Rabin in the mid-nineties, that
Israel would sign the NPT 2 years after a regional peace had
been achieved one that would include more than the Arab world?
Verification procedures for a regional free zone would have to
meet the most demanding standards. Additional U.S. bilateral
guarantees of Israeli security would probably be required.
I have offered this suggestion believing that any approach
that might restrain the rush throughout the region--and we have
been worried sick ever since it started in South Asia and moved
west--to acquire nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare
capabilities should be explored. The risk of a broader conflict
must always be in the minds of our policymakers. Israel's
October 5 attack on the terrorist training center in Syria was
warning that further actions could come and the problem could
escalate. And a regional approach to arms control could also
help rebuild our credentials as a dependable, fair-minded
mediator in the Middle East.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Murphy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard W. Murphy
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your invitation to testify to the
committee on the current direction of U.S. policy towards Syria.
The current state of U.S.-Syrian relations is poor and,
regrettably, I see no early prospect of significant improvement. The
sense of mutual frustration in Washington and Damascus is sharp, and
the prospect that this will add tensions to an already highly unstable
region is worrisome. Each perceives the other as deaf to its positions
and neither displays much readiness to accommodate the other. The
Administration views Syria as unresponsive to its demands to curb
terrorism and to cooperate fully with Washington on Iraq. Syria
considers America's regional policy so biased towards Israel that it
overlooks how insecure this makes Syria, and other Arab states.
The United States has played the indispensable role since the 1973
war in communicating between Syria and Israel, and at times actively
mediated negotiations for an overall agreement. Many in Washington have
recognized that while Damascus can be irritating and frustrating to
deal with, Syria has the potential to play a key role in establishing a
general peace in the region. This paradox has kept successive American
presidents and secretaries of state convinced of the value in
maintaining a dialogue with Damascus. For its part, Syria has
consistently wanted to maintain a dialogue with Washington, despite the
stormy political relationship.
The President and senior officials have disavowed any intent to
invade Syria, stating that there are other ways to resolve our
disagreements. However, for a variety of reasons including differences
over the definition of terrorism, Lebanon, and Iraq policy, tensions
between the two countries are increasing. The White House withdrawal of
its earlier opposition to congressional action on the Syrian
Accountability Act is a clear signal of this.
Two American initiatives could reverse the downward spiral of U.S.-
Syrian relations: restarting the Arab-Israeli peace process and U.S.
sponsorship of negotiations for a WMD free zone in the Middle East.
Both present tough but not insuperable challenges. Without our
undertaking one or both, I suspect that the American appetite for
regime change in Damascus will increase, as Damascus remains obstinate
because it sees few incentives to behave differently.
I. SOURCES OF SYRIAN-U.S. FRICTIONS: TERRORISM, LEBANON, IRAQ
Syrian Attitude Toward Terrorism
One of the sorest points in the U.S.-Syrian relationship has been
Syria's sponsorship of groups which Washington considers terrorist. We
disagree over what constitutes terrorism. Damascus considers that
Washington deliberately blurs the distinction between terrorism and
legitimate acts of national resistance. Thus it could fully cooperate
with the U.S., for at least the first year following 9/11, against al-
Qaeda, which it agreed had engaged in illegitimate attacks on
innocents. But it classifies as legitimate resistance any organizations
connected with the Arab-Israeli conflict. This includes the religiously
inspired organizations, such as the Lebanese Hizballah militia and
Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas, and the several radical secular
Palestinian factions, such as the PFLP-GC. All of these have had
representatives in Damascus.
Washington reportedly has evidence that operational orders have
been given from these offices and that the leaders are not there just
for public relations purposes as claimed. After Secretary Powell's last
visit to Damascus the Syrian government closed the offices of the
Palestinian factions, but the personnel involved continue to live in
Syria. The Syrian government has said that these individuals cannot be
expelled because they have no place to go.
Israel's October 5 attack on what it called a terrorist training
site a dozen or so miles from Damascus was its first attack on Syrian
territory since 1973. There was no Syrian military reaction. President
Bashar Al-Asad said that ``what happened will only make Syria's role
more effective and influential in events in the region . . .'' Was this
a threat of a Syrian reply through proxies such as Hizballah and
Palestinian extremists? It may simply have been his way of
acknowledging Syria's own incapacity for any meaningful military reply.
Its military strength has eroded; its principal arms supplier, the
USSR, is no more; and no supplier is interested in extending Syria
credit for arms.
Administration officials have noted pointedly that Syria is ``on
the wrong side'' of the war against terrorism, and have implied serious
consequences if Syria does not change its behavior. Influential
advocates of action against Syria outside the Administration have
publicly urged the ``roll back'', (words which presumably mean
``overthrow'') of the Syrian regime. These threats have pushed Syria
off balance and may explain its decision to soft pedal the deep
penetration by U.S. forces into Syria in hot pursuit of a convoy of
trucks last June, and our subsequent detention for several days of
Syrian border guards.
Lebanon
The Syrian military presence in Lebanon is an older bone of
contention. The U.S. first criticized Syria's military presence in
Lebanon in 1982, using a formula calling for the departure from Lebanon
of ``all foreign forces,'' i.e. Syrian and Israeli. In 2000 when Israel
pulled its own forces out from its eighteen year occupation of southern
Lebanon, America did not immediately demand that Syria do the same. In
part this was because doubts have persisted in some quarters in Beirut
and Washington that Lebanon, in the aftermath of its long civil war,
could afford to dispense with the Syrian military presence. For its
part Syria consistently defended its presence as one invited by Lebanon
in 1975, and also as necessary for Syria's own security, citing the
threat to Syria posed by Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Secretary
of State Powell in March revived the demand that Syria remove all its
forces from Lebanon. In language not generally used by the Secretary
concerning that situation, Powell called for Damascus to end its
``occupation.''
Iraq
A further friction developed just as the Bush Administration was
entering office. Syria began to test a new pipeline from Iraq,
connecting with a long disused pipeline across Syria, to the
Mediterranean. Washington protested that this was breaking the UN
sanctions, which only allowed the export of Iraqi oil under the UN
``Oil for Food'' program. Syria disingenuously replied that it was only
testing the pipeline, asking in any case why Washington was permitting
both Jordan and Turkey to benefit economically from Iraqi oil while
coming down hard on Syria.
Last spring, Washington's frustrations with Syria exploded into
sharp anger as it charged Damascus with continuing to allow shipment of
military materiel to Iraq, a traffic which the U.S. had urged it to
stop for at least a year prior to the Iraqi war. In post-war Iraq,
Washington has also accused Syria of allowing infiltration of jihadis
from Syria and other Arab and Muslim countries to target American and
other coalition forces, and pressed Syria to return official Iraqi bank
balances.
II. SYRIAN EFFORTS TO DEVELOP WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Damascus probably has missile warheads loaded with chemicals and a
large stockpile of missiles. This has been talked about for at least
the past fifteen years. Some years back Israeli intelligence privately
acknowledged that this Syrian capability has probably been developed
for defensive, not offensive, purposes. Syria may also have researched
biological weapons, but less is known of this program. The United
States has criticized Syria's chemical and biological weapons programs
and some assert that it is seeking nuclear weapons.
Syria scoffs at the American view that the Arabs have nothing to
fear from Israeli possession of WMD, but that Israel has everything to
fear from their possessing WMD. Syria stresses that it has real
security concerns vis-a-vis Israel.
III. SYRIA'S UNEASY RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS
Syrian orators often recall the memory of their capital's past
glories. They describe Damascus as the leader of the Arab East and
superior, morally at least, to most of the Arab World. Their leaders
used to attack the behavior of other Arab leaders such as Egypt's Sadat
and Jordan's King Hussein for weakening Arab Unity through engaging in
unilateral negotiations with Israel. Syria has consistently maintained
that a general and lasting Arab-Israeli peace could have been achieved
much earlier had Arab ranks remained united. They proudly contrasted
Syria's preservation of a ``principled position of steadfastness'' with
Egyptian and Jordanian ``betrayal of Arab Unity.'' The fact that Sadat
achieved through negotiations the return of all of Egypt's territory
occupied by Israel in 1967, and not through ``steadfastness'' but
rather through a more practical bargaining position, is an awkward and
unmentioned fact. This assertion that Syria always takes a principled
stand understandably galls other Arabs.
Damascus has long viewed its neighbors in Lebanon and Jordan as
somehow less legitimate entities than Syria, even in its truncated
condition caused by its loss of territory engineered by France and
Britain after the First World War. This mindset has led Syria to reject
proposals to exchange embassies with Lebanon ever since Syrian and
Lebanese independence in 1946, and to its readiness in the eighties to
engage in activities destabilizing to Jordan.
Syria respects Israel's military might and has chosen not to join
battle with Israel since 1973. Historians one day may find evidence
that in his collaboration with President Anwar Sadat in their surprise
attack on Israel in 1973, President Hafez Al-Asad shared the same
assumption as the Egyptian leader: the war aimed at a political, not a
military, ``victory''; something had to be done to bring the Arab-
Israeli stalemate to world attention; and the United States needed a
push to restart negotiations for its resolution. This worked out well
for Egypt, which achieved a full return of its territory. But Israel
showed no interest in continuing to negotiate with Syria after its
first disengagement agreement in 1974. Israel preferred, as Abba Eban
once said, to focus on making peace with Egypt, the country that could
make war.
Perhaps because it has throughout history experienced foreign
meddling in its neighborhood, Damascus has tended to see the
establishment of Israel as just another move by the West to establish a
bridgehead to divide and weaken the Arabs. Damascus has never
understood the passion behind the logic of Zionism. Syrians from all
walks of life have long enjoyed repeating the myth that over the front
entrance of the Knesset in Jerusalem is the inscription ``From the Nile
to the Euphrates,'' signifying Zionism's expansionist aims. Throughout
the eighties Hafez Al-Asad said he saw no differences between Israeli
political leaders who in his opinion were all committed to expanding
Israel's territorial limits, a goal which he was determined to do
everything in his power to prevent.
While asserting that Arab Unity must be the primary goal of all
Arabs, Damascus keeps a close eye on Syria's national interests. When
Hafez Al-Asad, Syria's President from 1970 to 2000, disagreed with
Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in the seventies, he did not hesitate,
despite wide Arab World support for Arafat, to set up a rival
Palestinian civil and military leadership. Similarly in 1975 Al-Asad
came to the help of Lebanon's Maronite President when he was asked to
send troops to fight the Palestinians. In 1983 Syrian artillery fired
on Arafat's forces in Tripoli, Lebanon.
On another front, Al-Asad found it expedient to cooperate with
Shiite Iran beginning in 1982, in supporting the creation and
subsequent training and funding of the Shiite Hizballah militia in
Lebanon. That was the same year in which he brutally suppressed a
religiously based Syrian organization, the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood.
Some have explained his readiness to work with Iran as reflecting his
uneasiness at being a member of Syria's minority Alawite community,
long treated as second class by the majority Sunni population. It is
just as likely that he was comfortable working with any force, whether
secular or religious, which bolstered Syria's leadership at home and in
the region.
IV. IMPACT OF THE U.S. OCCUPATION OF IRAQ ON SYRIA
The removal of Saddam's regime is a political gain for Syria.
Forgotten amid the welter of accusations leveled against Damascus today
is the fact that for 30 years Al-Asad and Saddam were political rivals
and occasional enemies.
But the elimination of Sadam's regime proved costly. The war
brought an immediate shutdown of the oil pipeline between the two
countries. Syria had been profiting by as much as $1 billion a year
through importing heavily discounted Iraqi oil for its domestic
consumption and exporting its own production at world prices. This
revenue source is unlikely to resume.
There are no reliable Iraqi-Syria trade statistics, but over the
past five years Iraq became an increasingly important market for Syrian
exporters. Baghdad presumably wanted to reward the Syrian government
for its cooperation on arms supply, and favored Syrian merchants for
contracts under the UN ``Oil for Food'' program.
One irony of the post-war situation is that while the United States
Congress has been debating the Syrian Accountability Act, which
includes the option of applying rigorous economic sanctions, the U.S.
military in Iraq has encouraged Syrian exports to Iraq. It has
authorized, for example, purchases of Syrian propane gas for Iraqi
households, and allowed power swaps between northern Syria and the city
of Mosul. In a demonstration of Syrian entrepreneurial skills, the
volume of trade in ``white'' consumer goods between Syrian factories
and its trading companies and the Iraqi market, has steadily increased.
American investment, outside of three companies operating in the energy
sector, remains minimal. The two way trade between the United States
and Syria is just over the $300 million level.
Syria has not made it easy for foreign investors and it has failed
to unleash the energies and talents of its own business community. In
part this probably reflects the Ba'ath Party's doctrinal suspicion of
businessmen in general and its view that all outsiders are out to
exploit Syria and provide no benefit in return. Today the Syrian
economy is sluggish. The decision of President Bashar Al-Asad in his
first year in office to privatize the banking industry, a surprising
challenge to longstanding Ba'ath party doctrine, has yet to have a
practical result.
V. PAST ACTIONS TO INFLUENCE SYRIAN POLICY
Syria, in common with most countries, responds to both carrots and
sticks. The close cooperation developed by Henry Kissinger with Al-Asad
in 1974 produced the Golan disengagement. Syria has fully respected the
terms of that agreement for 30 years: there has been no infiltration or
other provocations launched against Israel from that sector.
As for its responding to sticks, there is the memorable example set
by Turkey in 1998. Long frustrated by Syria's harboring of PKK leader
Abdullah Ocalan, Ankara thereupon demanded his expulsion and moved its
army to the border. Damascus expelled Ocalan and he was finally seized
by Turkish agents in Kenya.
Israel's October 5 attack on a Syrian site was chosen to send a
political message, not to kill Syrians. It is reasonable to assume,
however, that if Israel traces any terrorist acts as having been
directly ordered from Damascus by Palestinian groups located there, or
if there is a major revival of Hizballah attacks across the Lebanese-
Israeli border, the Sharon government may decide to repeat its message
against Syria on a broader scale. The consequences of that decision are
unpredictable. It is probable that at some point the Syrian leadership
will feel obliged to find a way to reply and risk a broader conflict in
the region. That is, what Bashar Al-Asad will ``understand'' from the
Israeli use of force, will be his need to respond in kind.
VI. OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY. SANCTIONS? PEACE PROCESS? WMD FREE ZONE?
The Syria Accountability Act contains a provision for broad
economic sanctions on Syria. Given the limited U.S.-Syrian trade and
investment, our leverage is small. Washington could urge Syria's
neighbors to cut off their trading links with Syria, but they probably
would be unwilling to do so. The United States should reflect on the
wisdom of cutting trade in light of the harm done to the Iraqi
population, but not its leadership, during the thirteen years of U.N.
sanctions against that country.
Does Syria feel enough pressure, or sense sufficient rewards ahead
to comply with Washington's demands to expel known Palestinian
extremist leaders, assure that Hizballah will continue to avoid
provocative cross border actions, and to close its borders more
effectively to jihadis seeking a holy war against American forces in
Iraq?
Syria may find it in its interests to do some of the above. Any
public action taken by Damascus against Palestinians, however, carries
some risk for Syria; it could negatively affect its 400,000 resident
Palestinians. This could be a problem for Syria given the current
stalemate in the peace process.
Syria would unquestionably like to be part of a reinvigorated peace
effort. It is as anxious today as ever that its interests not be
overlooked and sees that best achieved through a revival of
negotiations under the peace process. Unfortunately, there seems little
early prospect of renewed U.S. activity in terms of Israeli-Palestinian
talks and none affecting the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli
tracks.
There should be attention given to the question of whether it would
serve America's regional interests to sponsor negotiations for a Middle
East free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Current American policy
is to treat each nation's WMD programs, Israel excepted, as a separate
problem and to threaten, or persuade each country in turn, to stop such
programs. Since Pakistan and India carried out their atomic tests in
1998, the pace of proliferation has increased. We have fought a war
with Iraq because of its programs. We view with alarm Iran's alleged
efforts to develop nuclear weapons and Syria's pursuit of WMD. The
rumored Saudi interest in acquiring nuclear technology from Pakistan is
disquieting. This is not a country by country problem, but a larger
challenge facing the United States and the entire region.
The conventional wisdom in Washington seems to be that it would be
bad policy, not to mention bad politics, to go beyond a rhetorical call
for a Middle East free of WMD. The problems of verification in the
region are described as virtually insuperable. Of at least equal
importance, it is said that any such effort would bring Washington into
an unproductive, head on confrontation with Israel.
True, Israel has usually shied away from any discussion of its own
WMD arsenal. Usually, that is, but not always. In 1995 Israeli Foreign
Minister Peres stated Israel's readiness to sign the NPT two years
after a regional peace agreement. The nuclear issue was raised but
quickly cut off in a Knesset debate in 2000. However, on October 12,
2003, the Los Angeles Times published an extraordinary story by its
reporter Douglas Frantz in which he described leaks by senior Israeli
and American officials about outfitting Israeli submarines with nuclear
tipped missiles. This was described as a signal to Iran of Israeli
determination not to allow an Iranian nuclear weapons program to
proceed.
This indication of a new willingness by Israeli sources not only to
acknowledge their country's possession of a nuclear arsenal but to
describe its potential use raises the question of whether Israel would
balk at an American initiative to engage it in negotiations for a
region free of WMD. Even though Frantz's Israeli sources claimed
anonymity, and the leaks he reported were therefore officially
deniable, the story is a hint that Israel may be rethinking how to use
its possession of WMD as deterrence. Clearly verification procedures of
a WMD free zone would have to meet the most demanding standards.
Guarantees of Israeli security through peace agreements, together with
bilateral US commitments, would be required. But any approach which
might restrain the rush to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological
warfare capabilities in the volatile Middle East should be explored. It
would also help to rebuild American credentials as a dependable
mediator in the Middle East if Washington were to lead regional
negotiations on WMD.
In sum, despite all of the historical baggage which burdens the
U.S.-Syrian dialogue, there are a few steps we each can take to improve
the relationship, to calm rising tensions and to avoid a broader war.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Ambassador Murphy.
The chair would like to recognize now Dr. Murhaf Jouejati.
STATEMENT OF MURHAF JOUEJATI, PH.D., ADJUNCT PROFESSOR, GEORGE
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, AND ADJUNCT SCHOLAR, MIDDLE EAST
INSTITUTE
Dr. Jouejati. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much
for inviting me to be here today.
What brings me here also is a love for my native Syria and
my love for my being a U.S. citizen, of which I am very proud.
This love for the two, though, is mixed with a lot of
frustration, all the more so that I think the U.S. and Syria
have really at the end of the day the same objectives, which is
peace and stability in the Middle East.
What I will do here, again since it is in my written
testimony, I will just gloss over and in very general terms, in
the hope that we can get to specifics in the question and
answer session. Before I do, may I just correct just a few
misconceptions that I have heard this morning.
Certainly, with respect to the Syrian economy, Syria is
gradually liberalizing its economy. Syria seeks membership in
the WTO. Syria has several free trade agreements with numerous
Arab countries and Syria is currently negotiating with the EU
to become an associate partner in the year 2010.
Yes, there are U.S.-Syrian tensions. Certainly there are
U.S.-Syrian tensions, but I think these have first and foremost
to do with the Arab-Israeli conflict and, as Senator Boxer said
earlier, the truth will set you free. I think it has to do with
U.S. support to Israel despite Israel's continued occupation of
Arab territories and this despite the United Nations
resolutions.
We explored what is wrong with the Syrian approach. Let us,
if I may, let us also explore what may be wrong with the U.S.
approach towards Syria. When we in the United States use the
old stick approach with Syria, the best we can get is
halfhearted cooperation. This is true in Lebanon and, although
there has been to date four redeployments of Syrian troops,
although Syria has kept the peace in Lebanon for quite a long
time, although Syria has put the lid on Palestinian fighters in
Palestinian refugee camps and also curtailed Hizballah
activities in the south of Lebanon, Syria needs to withdraw
from Lebanon. So it is a halfhearted cooperation.
In Iraq there is Syrian cooperation with the United States
and this General Petraeus can talk more about it than I. Syria
is, for example, supplying electricity to the north of Iraq,
specifically Mosul. We can talk also to Sir Jeremy Greenstock,
who is the top British official in the U.S. occupation
authority in Iraq, who has very recently said that he was
astounded by Syrian cooperation. But there too we have a
problem with Syria. Yes, Syria did--or at least there was
smuggling across the border of night vision equipment, and so
on.
With terrorism we have a major problem. Part of the problem
is that Syria and the Arab world and the third world at large
simply do not see it the way we see it, this question of
Palestinian, quote unquote, ``terrorism'' when the Palestinians
are defending their legitimate rights to determine their
future.
But on the question of terrorism--here the distinction
becomes very clear--Syria has been probably one of the closest
partners with the United States in the war against al-Qaeda, so
much so that senior American officials, including this morning,
have said that Syria has saved American lives.
By using the stick, Mr. Chairman, we are unwittingly
delaying the reforms in Syria that we are hoping for. We are
unwittingly uniting the new guard and the old guard, and there
is, there is that division in Syria between new guard and old
guard, and as we are applying the stick to Syria this can only
bring them together in fear. We are uniting the state and
society, whereas there was a gap between state and society, and
society now increasingly is increasingly vocal in demanding
change in Syria.
By applying pressure to Syria, which is seen on the Syrian
street as doing Israel's bidding, it is only delaying that
movement of democratization. The case in point of the U.S.
stick delaying reforms in Syria is the very recent cabinet
reshuffle in Syria, in which President Asad wanted to make
major changes, including the appointment of a non-Ba'athi prime
minister, a man who is the president of the Damascus chamber of
commerce. According to my information, President Asad wanted to
overhaul the whole foreign policy apparatus. But this had not
been done at the end of the day and he appointed again an old
guardist in order not to seem or to give the appearance that he
is bowing to American pressure.
Furthermore, using the stick against Syria is going to
further aggravate Arab public opinion, which is already very
inflamed at our unconditional support to Israel and our
occupation of Iraq. It is going to give, this stick against
Syria, to give further munition to Islamic fundamentalists.
Again, the Syria Accountability Act is going to be seen as the
U.S. doing Israel's war against Arabs and Moslems.
Finally, that stick against Syria and that anti-Syrian
rhetoric that is coming out of Washington is going to--and I
hope not, but--to bring the Middle East to the precipice. The
case in point is that this has encouraged Israel to strike deep
inside Syria, as it had on October 5th. And although Syria was
restrained, the Israelis have threatened more strikes, at which
point I think Bashar Asad would be under tremendous pressure to
reply in kind, and this will set off a spiral of violence that
we will not be able to control.
Mr. Chairman, if we want Syria's total cooperation we can
get it. All we need to do is to convince Syria that its
security interests are not threatened, this not only with word
but by deeds. This entails the resumption of the Middle East
peace process based on Resolution 242, based on the Saudi plan,
which all the Arab states have accepted and which the U.S. has
endorsed.
Then when the U.S. uses the stick with the recalcitrants,
either Arab or Israeli, then we might move the region toward
peace. Then there will be no more terror. Then we will be doing
Israel a favor as its security policy has failed. Then we will
do Syria and the Arabs a favor and, most of all, Mr. Chairman,
we will be doing ourselves a favor.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Jouejati follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Murhaf Jouejati
Summary: The recent tension in the U.S.-Syrian relationship must be
viewed in the context of Syria's opposition to the U.S. war against
Iraq. Syria's anti-war stance stems not out of love for the Saddam
regime but because Damascus opposes unilateral action in general and
fears encirclement by American power in particular.
To be sure, Washington's displeasure is not confined to Syria's
anti-war stance. It has to do with broader concerns regarding Syria's
external action, including alleged Syrian support of terrorism, efforts
to develop weapons of mass destruction, and the destabilization of its
neighbors.
The aim of this essay is to show that these concerns are inaccurate
and that the persistence of Washington's aggressive approach toward
Syria may impede rather than advance the U.S. national interest.
Syria and Terrorism
With regard to the claim that Syria harbors terrorist
organizations, Syria indeed hosts a number of militant Palestinian
organizations that Washington considers ``terrorist'' but that Syria,
together with other Arab and developing countries, regards as ``freedom
fighters.'' Therein lies the greatest irritant in U.S.-Syrian
relations. Syria provides these groups safe haven because it believes
in their legitimate right to resist Israel's illegal occupation of
their land.
While there is no evidence to support the claim that Syria provides
material or financial assistance to these groups, the hypothesis
according to which Syria allows them to engage in business and other
money-making activities to finance and sustain their operations is
plausible.
But this state of affairs seems to have changed following the
meeting a few months ago between Secretary of State Colin Powell and
Syrian President Bashar Asad in Damascus. Many reports indicate that
Syrian authorities satisfied Washington's demand of shutting down
Palestinian operations in Syria. More precisely, leaders of the Syria-
based militant Palestinian groups moved out of Syria (into neighboring
Lebanon) voluntarily in order to alleviate the anti-Syrian pressures
emanating from Washington. Whether the closure of their offices is
temporary or permanent is not altogether clear. What is clear however,
is that whether militant Palestinian groups maintain offices in
Damascus or not neither bolsters nor diminishes their ability to resist
Israel's military occupation of their land.
At any rate, Syria has consistently prohibited militant Palestinian
groups the use of its territory to launch military attacks against
Israel, and this since 1970. This policy is part and parcel of Syria's
broader policy of scrupulously adhering to the terms of the
disengagement and cease-fire agreements with Israel that former U.S.
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger brokered in 1974. Other than
militant Palestinian groups, Syria does not permit any politically-
motivated organization to operate on its soil.
With regard to Hizballah, Syria maintains relations with that group
from a distance. There are no known Hizballah offices, training camps,
or military bases in Syria. Hizballah operates from bases in the south
of Lebanon. However, although Syrian officials deny providing Hizballah
other than moral support, evidence suggests that Syria has served on
occasion as a conduit for Hizballah-bound arms and equipment supplied
by Iran.
Having said that, while Syria has some influence over Hizballah
(Damascus can cut-off the supply route at will), the degree of that
influence is exaggerated. Hizballah enjoys a fairly high degree of
autonomy. At any rate, Iranian influence over Hizballah seems to be
greater than that of Syria.
In sum, although Syria harbors groups that Washington considers
``terrorist,'' Syrian support is largely of a symbolic nature. To
assert, therefore, that Syria supports terrorism is highly inaccurate,
especially that, since 9/11 to date, Syria has been one of Washington's
closest partners in the war against international terrorism:
Syria has been ``completely cooperative'' in investigating
al-Qaeda and persons associated with that organization,
according to a senior CIA official. That cooperation was
highlighted by the revelation last year that Syria ``saved
American lives,'' according to Richard W. Erdman, the chief
State Department specialist for Syria. Indeed, Syrian security
services tipped off the CIA of an impending al-Qaeda attack
against the administrative unit of the fifth fleet headquarters
in Bahrain. If successful, that operation would have killed a
large number of American troops.
Syrian intelligence tipped off Canadian and U.S. authorities
of a planned al-Qaeda attack against a U.S. target in Canada.
Syrian cooperation was also highlighted by an earlier
revelation that a key figure in the September 11 plot, Mohammad
Haydar Zammar, had been arrested in Morocco and sent to Syria
for interrogation, with American knowledge. Although U.S.
officials have not interrogated Zammar directly, Americans have
submitted questions to the Syrians who have in turn relayed
Zammar's responses to the CIA.
Damascus provided information on September 11 hijacker
Mohammed Atta, an Egyptian citizen who worked on an engineering
project in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo in the mid-1990s.
Damascus also supplied information on Ma'mun Darkazanli, a
Syrian businessman who allegedly served as a financial conduit
to al-Qaeda members and prayed in the same mosque in Hamburg,
Germany, as did Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi, who piloted the
hijacked planes that blew up the World Trade Center. Darkazanli
also allegedly managed the bank accounts of Mamdouh Salim, a
top al-Qaeda member awaiting trial in the U.S. on charges of
participating in the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in
Africa.
Syrian officials have avoided arresting certain suspects so
they can continue to monitor their conversations and movements
and report back to the United States.
Syria's war against al-Qaeda underscores the distinction Damascus
makes between terrorist groups and national resistance movements. An
impartial verdict as to whether is Syria is a state sponsor of
terrorism must await an international consensus over this definitional
problem.
Syria and WMD
With regard to the claim that Syria is developing weapons of mass
destruction, that program dates back to the 1980s as part of the late
Hafez Asad's policy of reaching strategic parity with Israel, a state
whose nuclear stockpile includes over three hundred nuclear warheads.
From his perspective, maintaining a balance of power with Israel in
that field, no matter how lopsided, is the best guarantee to maintain
quiet along the Golan front.
Having said that, Syria's arsenal of chemical and biological
weapons is said to be too insignificant to pose a threat to U.S.
interests in the region. According to the internationally renown
military analyst Anthony Cordesman, Syria's WMD program is ``silly.''
At any rate, Washington must support Syria's recent proposal to the
United Nations to ban non-conventional weapons throughout the Middle
East, not oppose it as it has in recent times.
Syria: a Destabilizing Factor?
With regard to the claim that Syria is a ``destabilizing'' factor
in the Middle East, the evidence suggests the opposite:
As mentioned above, Syria has scrupulously adhered to the
1974 cease-fire agreement with Israel along the Israel-occupied
Golan front;
Syria's military presence in Lebanon helped end the Lebanese
civil war. Syria restored peace in that country by disarming
all local militias (except Hizballah). Although, as mentioned
above, Syria has limited influence over Hizballah, Syria's
military presence in Lebanon helps curtail the activities of
that group in the south of Lebanon. It also keeps the lid on
armed elements in Palestinian refugee camps in that country.
At any rate, given the overall improvement in the security
situation in Lebanon over the past few years and the expansion
in the size of Lebanon's armed forces, Syria, in keeping with
the Tai'f accords and in coordination with Lebanese
authorities, has, to date carried out four redeployments.
With regard to the infiltration of jihadists into Iraq, a
top British official said recently that Syria and Iran, accused
by some U.S. officials of subverting efforts to stabilize and
rebuild Iraq, had in fact been cooperative. Sir Jeremy
Greenstock, the most senior British official in the U.S.-led
occupying administration, said a dialogue was under way with
Damascus and Tehran to encourage them to back more openly the
postwar drive to create a new Iraq. ``I think on the whole that
they have been quite cooperative,'' said Greenstock, Britain's
former ambassador to the United Nations, when asked if Syria
and Iran were actively trying to destabilize Iraq.
In the same vein, Gen. David Petraeus, Commander of the 101st
Airborne division, acknowledged Syria's cooperation. Syria is
providing electricity to northern Iraq, especially the city of
Mosul, from its own electricity grid. Gen. Petraeus also lauded
Syrian efforts to curb the infiltration of jihadists into Iraq
despite Syria's limited resources. Although Syria can not
prevent all fighters from slipping across the long, porous
border with Iraq, Syria is doing everything it can. According
to Syria's Foreign Minister, ``We have tightened our
checkpoints and are turning people back. But the border is long
and we cannot cover it all.''
In sum, the characterization of Syria as a ``destabilizing'' force
in the Middle East does not fit the evidence.
The U.S. Approach
In light of the above, the approach that Washington adopted vis-a-
vis Syria is the wrong approach, and this for several reasons. First,
the U.S. is unwittingly undermining the reforms that were taking shape
in Syria before the war on Iraq. Just as Bashar Asad's reformist team
was beginning to gain ground in the new guard/old guard competition,
U.S. pressure came to unite the two camps.
The new cabinet that Asad put in place in mid-September is one case
in point. Asad decreed the separation of the Ba'ath Party from the
state and its day-to-day operations and was in the process of
engineering the formation of a technocratic government. Asad planned to
invite Rateb Shallah, the U.S.-educated president of the powerful
Damascus Chamber of Commerce, to form a new government. The choice of
Shallah made sense given the latter's important Washington connections
and close ties to the international business community. Asad also
wanted to overhaul the foreign policy apparatus by removing Farouk al-
Shara--Syria's staunchly anti-U.S. foreign minister--and replacing him
with his deputy, Walid Mouallem, a professional diplomat who commands
considerable respect in Washington. Asad also intended to remove the
veteran Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas, and to replace him with Army
Chief of Staff Lt. General Hassan Turkmani.
Although the decision to make important personnel changes was meant
to improve the standing of his regime in U.S. eyes, it was also meant
to satisfy Syria's domestic needs: Asad had become increasingly
frustrated with the slow pace of the economic and administrative
reforms that he had promised upon assuming power three years ago.
Although the outgoing government instituted several important measures,
including the establishment of private banks and private universities,
it had done little to arrest the declining quality of life of the
average citizen.
But against the background of Washington's saber rattling and
unsubtle hints regarding de-Ba'athification, Asad, in a last-minute
decision, scrapped his list of ministerial candidates and instead,
called on an ``old-guardist,'' Naji al-Otari, the 59-year-old
parliamentary speaker to head the new cabinet. Asad was concerned with
appearing as bowing to U.S. pressures. This underscores what I have
written elsewhere:
If the U.S. continues to exert pressure against Syria, it risks
having Syria run in the other direction. A historical analysis
of Syria's behavior shows that external pressure against Syria
does not always work. When Syria feels the heat, it generally
runs in the other direction. The U.S.-Israel strategic alliance
in the early 1980s pushed Damascus into the Soviet embrace. The
Turkish-Israeli alliance of 1996 drew Syria closer to Iraq.
Second, as a result of mounting U.S. pressure and anti-Syrian
rhetoric, Washington unwittingly bridged the gap between the state and
society in Syria. Given Syrian society's intense Arab nationalist
sentiment, and given popular mistrust of U.S. intentions (in large part
due to unconditional U.S. support of Israel), the state-society gap
(which helped advance the cause of democratization by pushing the state
towards reform) has narrowed, further weakening the emerging civil
rights movement.
Third, continued U.S. pressure against Syria threatens to further
alienate the broader Arab public. Moreover, it plays into the hands of
radical Islamic fundamentalists who can now point to the threat of U.S.
sanctions against Syria as further evidence that the U.S. is carrying
out Israel's war against Arabs and Muslims.
Finally, by persisting in its pressure against Syria, the U.S.
might precipitate unintended consequences. Washington's tough anti-
Syrian rhetoric has emboldened Israel, Syria's arch nemesis. Israel's
October 5 air strike deep into Syrian territory would probably not have
taken place had it not been for Israel's impression that it had
Washington's ``green light.'' President Bush's tacit approval of that
air strike may have made matters worse: Following his statement that
Israel need not feel constrained in defending itself, Israel threatened
Syria with further military action, in which case the Asad regime is
likely to retaliate despite its inferior military position vis-a-vis
Israel, a move that, in turn, might unleash Israel's vastly superior
force against Syria and/or Lebanon.
Conclusion
In sum, in its attempt to bring Syria to heel, the intense pressure
that Washington is applying against Syria threatens Syrian cooperation
against al-Qaeda and in Iraq. Another unintended consequence is that
Washington might inadvertently thwart Bashar Asad's efforts to reform
Syria, threatening in the process the small gains that the civil rights
movement in Syria has made in the past three years. In addition, the
U.S. risks further alienating the Arab and Islamic worlds, and, more
importantly, might bring the Middle East to the precipice.
A wiser course would be to emulate the British approach vis-a-vis
Syria, one that engages Damascus through dialogue. Specifically,
Washington must seize on the above mentioned instances of Syrian
cooperation in Iraq by proposing, among other things, to carry out
joint U.S.-Syrian patrols along the Syrian-Iraqi border.
In the longer term, Washington will obtain total Syrian
cooperation, not only in Iraq, but in the Middle East at large, if it
engages in a balanced approach to peace-making in the Middle East. In
this regard, Washington needs to show that it is determined to help
solve the Arab-Israeli conflict, first, by including Syria and Lebanon
in its current attempts to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli dispute, and
second, by demonstrating that Washington expects the parties to the
conflict, including Israel, to abide by the terms of UN Security
Council land-for-peace Resolutions. According to senior Syrian
officials, if Israel were made to implement its share of the land-for-
peace equation, namely the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the
territories it occupied in June 1967, Syria would, in addition to
normalizing diplomatic and other relations with the Jewish state,
disband all anti-Israel groups. In the final analysis, is it not these
twin objectives--peace in the Middle East and the end of terrorism that
the U.S. is aiming for?
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Jouejati.
Mr. Leverett.
STATEMENT OF FLYNT L. LEVERETT, PH.D., VISITING FELLOW, SABAN
CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Dr. Leverett. Mr. Chairman, like the other members of the
panel, I have submitted my full statement for the record. I
will just touch on a few points here.
I would submit that today the United States does not really
have a policy toward Syria if by policy we mean a series of
measures and initiatives rooted in a strategy for changing
Syrian behaviors that are inimical to our interests and
eliciting more constructive behavior from the Syrian regime.
Let me very briefly put a little bit of historical
perspective on that. During the 90's, from the Madrid
Conference in 1991 until the summit between President Clinton
and the late Hafez Al-Asad in March 2000, the way that we
thought about a strategy toward Syria was in the context of the
Syrian track of the Middle East peace process. It was assumed
that once we got Syria and Israel to do the deal that all of
our bilateral concerns with Syria, particularly those related
to its state sponsorship of terrorism, would be taken care of
in the context of that agreement.
But of course, that agreement never came, and with the
effective collapse of the Syria track in 2000 we have been left
adrift in our policy toward Syria without a strategy, without a
sense of how to accomplish what it is we want to accomplish
with Syria.
I would suggest that--and I would respectfully disagree
with Ambassador Murphy and Dr. Jouejati on this--that it is a
mistake to make the basis for a new strategy toward Syria a
resumption of the Syrian track of the Middle East peace
process. As important as I think that a peace between Syria and
Israel would be for the region and for U.S. interests in the
region, the reality is that we are not going to have a
meaningful Syria track any time soon. Given what else is going
on in the region, given the composition and the positions of
the present Israeli government, we are not soon going to be
able to restart the Syria track on terms that would to have any
meaning for the Syrian regime.
I think what we need is a strategy that will let us
accomplish our policy goals toward Syria without waiting for a
climate that is more conducive to a resumption of the Syria
track.
I would pick up on something that Patrick Clawson said. We
need both bigger sticks and bigger carrots with regard to Syria
if we are going to construct such a strategy. There has been a
lot of discussion of sticks with regard to Syria. The Syria
Accountability Act is very much oriented in that direction. I
do not hear very much discussion nowadays about carrots for
Syria and I think that is a serious deficiency in the policy
debate right now.
If we are not willing to talk with specificity about the
carrots as well as the sticks, we are never really going to be
able to modify Syrian behavior. Both when I was in government
and even more since I have left government and in some ways am
able to speak more freely with Syrians and others in the
region, the consistent message that I hear from Syria with
regard to our policy differences with the regime in Damascus
is: You keep telling us you want us to change our behavior, but
you will not tell us what is in it for us if we do.
I think we should make it clear both what is in it for
Syria if it behaves more constructively and what will happen to
them if they do not behave more constructively. Let me suggest
a couple of areas and how this approach might work in those
areas.
With regard to terrorism and Syria's designation as a state
sponsor of terrorism, that designation is eminently justified
by the record of Syrian behavior. But all we do, frankly, in
terms of engaging Syria on this is to reiterate over and over
the same list of complaints and tell them we want them to stop.
I think we need to create--to use a word that has been
taken over for other purposes, but I will use it here--we need
a road map for Syria on the terrorism issue. We should be very
clear that we want them to do specific steps--expel these
leaders, close these offices, stop these activities--but also
indicate that if they were to do those things in a way that was
verifiable and we were confident they had done them, that we
would be prepared to take Syria off the state sponsors list
because at that point Syria would effectively be out of the
terrorism business as far as the United States was concerned.
We need to use both carrots and sticks.
Similarly, on getting them to take a more cooperative
stance toward what we are doing in Iraq, I could not agree more
with Senator Biden's suggestion that what we need is an
analogue to the six plus two framework that was, I think, very,
very helpful to us in late 2001, early 2002, in dealing with
Afghanistan. We need an analogue for that with regard to Iraq.
I think that would be good for our own interests in Iraq,
but in the context of today's topic I think it would be an
important way of reassuring the Syrians that what we are doing
in Iraq is not directed against their interests and that in
fact their regional interests could be accommodated in what we
are trying to do in Iraq. Again, we need both carrots and
sticks.
With regard to the Syria Accountability Act, I certainly
welcome and encourage the efforts to put a national security
waiver in. I think if people are looking for other ways to
increase the range of flexibility that is granted to the
executive in implementing the act, assuming that it passes, I
would also consider putting in sunset provisions with the
various measures, put in a time limit, so that at the end of
the time limit the executive and the Congress are going to have
to revisit the situation and see if these kinds of measures are
still appropriate.
Will such an approach, the kind of approach I have
suggested, really work with the Syrians, particularly given
some of the things that we have heard about Bashar Al-Asad
today? I think that there are a number of competing images of
Bashar Al-Asad in public discourse about Syria today. You heard
one from Patrick Clawson: Bashar is essentially the loyal son
of the regime, may in fact be even more ideological, more anti-
American in his orientation than his late father.
You have heard another from Mr. Jouejati, that Bashar is
someone who really does want to take Syria in a more
constructive direction, but is hemmed in by an old guard.
Particularly in Israeli analytic circles, you hear a third
view: Bashar is simply inexperienced, not up to the job, does
not really know what he is doing.
I could argue the case for any one of those there views of
Bashar with a sort of selective application of evidence. I
think that what this suggests is that Bashar's situation is
very, very complicated and that if we are going to engage him,
if we are going to get anything more than tactical adjustments
in Syrian behavior, we are going to have to be very clear, very
explicit, about what we want him to do, but also very clear
about both rewards and benefits, depending on the choices that
he makes.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Leverett follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Flynt Leverett
Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, members of the committee, thank you
for the opportunity to speak with you about an important and timely
issue in U.S. Middle East policy: how to deal with Syria. I have been
involved with U.S. policymaking toward Syria for almost a decade--as a
senior analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, on the State
Department's Policy Planning Staff, as a Senior Director for Middle
East Affairs at the National Security Council, and, now, as an analyst
and commentator in the think-tank world. I hope that, on the basis of
this experience, I might offer the Committee some perspective on
current difficulties in U.S.-Syrian relations.
The source of these difficulties, I believe, is a serious policy
vacuum toward Syria. Because of this vacuum, we have no way to resolve
our outstanding differences with Syria, such as its longstanding
support for Palestinian terrorist organizations and Lebanese Hizballah,
its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, its hegemonic position in
Lebanon, and more recently, its efforts to undermine U.S. policy goals
in Iraq.
Let me put this argument in historical perspective. For almost a
decade, from the Madrid conference in 1991 until 2000, successive
Republican and Democratic administrations thought about engaging Syria
primarily in the context of the Syrian track of the Arab-Israeli peace
process. In this approach, our outstanding bilateral differences were
to be resolved as part of a peace settlement between Israel and Syria.
For example, it was generally understood that, as part of such a
settlement, Syria would have no need for and would sever its ties to
Palestinian rejectionists and disarm Hizballah fighters in southern
Lebanon. Similarly, Syria's pursuit of WMD would be put into a less
threatening and ultimately more soluble context.
Of course, the peace treaty between Israel and Syria that U.S.
mediators worked so hard to facilitate never came. Moreover, in a six-
month period in 2000, the underpinnings of the U.S. approach to the
Syrian track and the management of the U.S.-Syrian relationship
disappeared.
In March of that year, the failure of the Clinton-Asad
summit in Geneva marked the collapse of the Syrian track.
Two months later, in May, the IDF withdrew from southern
Lebanon.
A month after that, Syrian President Hafez al Asad died and
was succeeded by his son, Bashar.
In September, the intifada al Aqsa began.
As a result of these events, the Bush administration came to office
with no inherited operational framework for policy toward Syria. A year
later, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
President Bush launched our war on terror. Syria, under Dr. Bashar's
leadership, offered the United States intelligence cooperation against
Al Qaida and related groups, but did nothing to reverse its own
terrorist ties. In the context of a global war on terror, Syria's
status as a state sponsor of terrorism pursuing WMD capabilities has
become a source of increasing friction between Washington and Damascus.
Moreover, in light of the ongoing U.S. involvement in Iraq and mounting
tensions between Israel and Syria, it seems clear that strained
relations with Damascus complicate the pursuit of broader U.S.
interests in the region.
Unfortunately, the Bush administration has had little success to
date in getting Syria to modify its problematic behaviors or in
cultivating a more constructive relationship with the Asad regime,
despite letters and phone calls to Dr. Bashar from President Bush,
personal meetings with Secretary Powell, and visits by other senior
officials such as Ambassador Burns. The lack of results stems, in my
view, from the policy vacuum I just described. Three years into its
tenure, the Bush administration has failed to develop a genuine
strategy for changing problematic Syrian behaviors and resolving the
outstanding bilateral differences between Washington and Damascus. The
United States still lacks a framework for constructively engaging Syria
apart from the Syrian track of the peace process.
What should such a strategy look like? As I have noted in other
settings since leaving government, a strategy for modifying the
behavior of rogue regimes has to be rooted in hard-nosed, carrots-and-
sticks engagement. We have to contrast the benefits of cooperation with
the likely costs of noncooperation--in other words, to tell rogue
leaders what's in it for them if they change their behavior, and make
sure they understand what will happen to them if the don't.
Would such a strategy work with regard to Syria, as it has worked
to move Sudan in a positive direction on terrorism and to induce Libya
to meet its international obligations in the PanAm 103 case? Or, is
Syria more analogous to Afghanistan under the Taliban or Saddam
Hussein's Iraq--an irredeemable regime, incapable of modifying its
behavior, regardless of the incentives and disincentives put in front
of it? The answers to these questions lie in an assessment of Dr.
Bashar as national leader.
Currently, three alternative ``images'' of Bashar dominate
discussion and debate about Syria in the region, in Europe, and here in
the United States.
Some believe that he is a closet reformer, hemmed in by an
``old guard'' he inherited, along with his position, from his
father. He is not an incorrigible thug like Saddam Hussein or a
religious ideologue like Mullah Omar.
Others see Bashar as a loyal son of both father and regime,
seeking to protect Syria's Ba'athist order; some analysts in
this camp suggest that Bashar may in fact be more ideological
in his approach to foreign policy than his father, perhaps
under the influence of Hizballah's Sheikh Hassan Nasrollah.
A third school sees Bashar as inexperienced, unable to play
the game of regional maneuvering with anything like his late
father's acumen.
In reality, all three assessments contain elements of truth.
Bashar has demonstrated some reformist impulses. He is not
an ideological fanatic like Mullah Muhammad Omar or an
incorrigible thug like Saddam Hussein. He is young, educated
partly in the West, and married to a British-born woman who was
once in J.P. Morgan's executive training program and passed up
admission to Harvard's MBA program to marry him. Bashar has
made it clear that Syria needs to modernize, and that its long-
term interests would be served by better relations with the
United States, but has been constrained by his father's still-
powerful retainers.
Bashar can indeed fall into the most strident sort of
Ba'athist, anti-American rhetoric, and he has not demonstrated
much flexibility on foreign policy, where he appears to be
trying to follow the strategic ``script'' he received from his
father. This script acknowledges the desirability of a better
relationship with the United States but makes a strategic
breakthrough dependent on meeting conditions rooted in the
tensions of Syrian domestic politics.
Bashar is obviously less experienced than his father, and
certainly makes more than his share of mistakes.
What all of this suggests is that Bashar could be a suitable
subject for diplomatic engagement, but only if engagement provides him
with a clear roadmap to the desired goal and empowers him to move in
that direction. It is not enough to complain about problematic Syrian
behaviors: we have been doing that for 24 years, since we first
sanctioned Syria as a state sponsor of terror. Instead, we must give
Bashar explicit and specific targets for reversing problematic
behaviors. And engagement must be backed by a set of policy tools that
would impose significant costs for continued non-compliance with U.S.
requirements but also promise significant benefits in the event of
cooperation--in other words, carrots and sticks.
There is a lot of discussion in Washington right now about new
sticks in our Syria policy. But I don't hear much discussion about
carrots; indeed, the Bush Administration resists intensely any such
discussion. But this leaves us with a dysfunctional policy. We must be
prepared contrast the prospective costs of non-cooperation, such as
economic sanctions, with the prospective gains from cooperation.
Prospective gains could include:
Syria's removal from the list of state sponsors of
terrorism, provided it expels terrorists from its territory,
renews counterterrorist cooperation with the United States
against Al Qaida, and broadens that cooperation to include
Syria's own terrorist links. In the 1990s, we made Syria's
removal from the list contingent on a peace treaty with Israel
that never came; we should now tie removal to changes in
Syria's relations with terrorists. Taking Syria off the list
would allow American economic aid to flow to the country for
the first time in decades and substantially increase assistance
from international financial institutions.
Accommodation of Syrian interests in Iraq, if Damascus
helped tackle the security problems there. This could include
facilitation of Syrian-Iraqi trade and Syrian participation in
Iraqi reconstruction, but should also allow for a strategic
dialogue between Washington and Damascus on Syria's regional
interests. The Syrian regime has had a chronic fear of regional
marginalization. Following the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Syria's
principal forum for having its regional interests considered by
the United States was the Syrian track. We should now indicate
a willingness to begin talking with Bashar about Syria's
regional interests, but only on condition that he take steps to
cut his country's links to terrorists and begin cooperating
with U.S. goals in Iraq.
We should also make an exception to allow Middle East Partnership
Initiative (MEPI) funding to go to NGOs in Syria. Right now, our policy
does not even allow U.S. Government funds to go to civil society
activists or micro-entrepreneurs in Syria because of the prohibition on
any U.S. Government money going to a state sponsor of terrorism. This
prevents us from engaging and empowering reformists in Syria who could
support a Bashar willing to take the tough decisions we require.
A smartly constructed package of carrots and sticks would empower
Asad to show the regime's inner circle and his public that Syria
interests would be better served by cooperation with the United States
than by continued resistance. This is the key, in my view, to a more
constructive U.S. relationship with Syria. Thank you for your
attention.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Leverett.
We will have questions now of the panel, and Senator Biden
and I will go back and forth. I would suggest that we try maybe
8 minutes and we will alternate.
Mr. Leverett, let me proceed with your thoughts. I was
following intently your line of thought on offering carrots.
Someone else said earlier in some part of our dialogue that we
should have larger carrots, larger sticks. Try to further
sharpen, if you can, the choice of carrots. In other words, I
am not certain I have a clear perception of what it is that we
ought to be doing that is more attractive.
For example, the second carrot idea on Iraq: Maybe many
other countries are confused about our policy in Iraq, although
as Americans we do not see much confusion. We are struggling
mightily with our coalition partners to try to bring about a
regime of human rights, of democracy, of some economic freedom
for the people of the country, of a new idea, which some
countries in the region might find dangerous, ideas that could
spread and that could lead to instability.
Now, it would appear that we are being opposed from day to
day by people who may be a part of the previous regime of
Saddam, maybe persons coming in from other countries who want
to join the war against terror on the side of whoever is trying
to disrupt this. The killings of the UN people, the Red Cross
people, of innocent Iraqis, quite apart from targets of
American soldiers, are extremely violent and fairly consistent.
So when we approach Syria and say, we think you ought to be
on our side on this, and there is ambivalence, to say the
least, from the Syrians this is confusing for us, however
confusing it may be for the Syrians. So try on for size again
the Iraq situation. How do we have a carrot there that is
meaningful?
Dr. Leverett. I think, to put it in context from a Syrian
perspective, one of the chronic concerns of the Syrian regime--
this certainly goes back to the time of Hafez Al-Asad, but I
think it very much continues in the way that Bashar and the
people around him look at the regional situation--the biggest
fear from Damascus's standpoint is one of regional
marginalization, that the United States is going to be able
over time literally to encircle Syria with a series of pro-
western regimes.
You have Israel and you have the whole history of efforts
to broker a separate peace with Lebanon. You have Jordan now
very firmly in the American camp; Saudi Arabia; go on around
the region. And now you have Iraq flip over in a big way.
The Chairman. What would be wrong with that? Why is that
not in the best interests of the world, for that to happen?
Dr. Leverett. Because at that point, if the Syrian track
of the peace process is still unresolved, there is, from a
Syrian perspective, no particular reason why the United States
or the rest of the world really has to pay attention to that
issue. The United States would have the strategic position that
it wanted, Syria is in no position on its own to threaten
Israeli strategic interests in a fundamental way, and at that
point Syria could be ignored. I think that is the biggest fear
that a Syrian leader has.
What something like a six plus two framework for Iraq could
do in helping us manage the Syrian relationship is assuage that
concern and help the Syrian leadership to understand that we in
fact do want to accommodate their legitimate regional interests
as part of what we are trying to do in the region.
The Chairman. Well, let us say that we did try to
understand their legitimate interests, which might be
settlement of the Golan Heights dilemma, for example. Can you
parse that type of activity as to simply street antipathy to
Israel, in which finally you try to work out various things
pragmatically? Syrian leadership may be influenced by the
street or maybe the other way around--I do not know, maybe
both--and just simply say: We do not like Israel; as a matter
of fact, we just wish they were not there.
Therefore we get back again and again to the question of,
why are you in the United States interested in an Israel that
is finally accepted by everybody and that lives in peace and
negotiates, as opposed to taking a position of indifference,
that Israelis just have to fend for themselves and the United
States will not be involved?
I mean, is there ever any way out of that kind of dilemma,
perhaps simply by working through the other elements of the
settlement of the Syrian situation?
Dr. Leverett. I believe that there is, Senator. I think
that as a result of the work that was done during the 1990's on
the Syria track that we understand very well what the
requirements are for peace that would meet Syrian needs on
return of territory, full withdrawal of Israel from the Golan,
and Israel's needs for security guarantees and normal relations
with Damascus afterwards. We know what that agreement would
look like.
We are just simply not in a position at this point to
deliver on that or try to make it happen in a very feasible
way. I think that the Syrians, without any great altruism
toward Israel, have basically made the calculation that over
the long run that is in their interest, that is the best deal
that they can hope for strategically to help their place in the
region, to help their position with us. I think if we get back
into an environment in which the kind of deal I was talking
about would be feasible, the Syrians would go for it.
The Chairman. That point of view is an important one. It is
held by a good number of people who have studied this area a
long time, in the same way that some of the same people hold
the view that we know what a Palestinian-Israeli settlement
will look like. We have been down that trail many, many times
before.
So in other words, in our minds' eyes we have an idea of
what the settlement is. But then you get back to the problem.
Nevertheless, even though we have pronounced the Road Map
strategy and even got steam rapidly generated behind that, we
may not know how it all ought to come out or whether it is off
track. We are back to a situation which all of you have
described today, which, to say the least, is disheartening.
Let me ask Dr. Clawson: in your analysis of the new
leadership you were more oblique about that than perhaps your
panel members, and maybe correctly so. But if this is a new
regime, with a new president who has problems that are even
greater, what might bring him back into this framework that we
are talking about, in which we finally realize some objectives
from the past, deal with the reality, and move on? Is that in
the cards at all with this leadership?
Dr. Clawson. I would be very pessimistic about progress
soon on a Syrian-Israeli peace because, as all of us has
emphasized, Bashar has found it extremely difficult to break
with the old guard of the past. And for him to accept a deal
which his father refused would be dynamite in the Syrian
political scene. Since the deal which in fact Bashar--excuse
me--Hafez Asad refused when offered him by President Clinton in
Geneva in the spring of the year 2000 was extraordinarily close
to what it was the Syrians had long told us they would insist
on, involving an extraordinarily extensive Israeli withdrawal,
I think it would be very difficult, very difficult, for Bashar
to make progress on this front.
I am more optimistic on some of the other fronts. I think
there is some real prospects that we could make progress on the
Lebanon issue, on Hizballah, on Iraq, and I think that that
could create an environment where down the road we could
imagine getting back to the kind of Geneva deal, which is about
the best that we are going to see for the Syrians.
The Chairman. So you might make headway there? In other
words, it is not just a question that the new leader has to be
there for quite a long while before he consolidates his own
authority, confidence, and what have you?
Dr. Clawson. That would help, but I also think he could
consolidate his authority and confidence in his rule faster if
he can show that he can deliver on some of these other issues
and get some of the carrots that Flynt was mentioning. And I
would quite agree with him.
My great concern is at the moment Bashar does not believe
that there are any sticks in the United States. He looks at
what happened with the oil pipeline from Iraq, where we talked
tough and we did not do a darn thing about it, and he directly
liked to Colin Powell about it, and yet there were no
consequences as far as he could see. He continued to get the
revenue.
So he does not believe that there are any sticks from us
and he does not believe there are any carrots from us. So he
does not see any reason to change his behavior.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Dr. Jouejati, you and Professor Clawson
come at this completely differently. You basically say that you
have to get the Palestinian-Israeli track, the Israeli-Syrian
track, settled before you are going to make any progress on
these other things. And Dr. Clawson, unless I misunderstand
him, says it is going to work the other way; you will be able
to get some progress moving the other way before you get to the
Golan.
Could you, because you seem very certain of what you are
saying, could you tell us what you think Syria believes it
needs in order to, quote, ``do a deal''? What is it do you
believe--how far would the Israelis have to go to get yes for
an answer in terms of at least the Israeli-Syrian relationship?
Dr. Jouejati. Thank you, Senator Biden. Israel would have
to not so much please the whims of Syria, but to abide by UN
resolutions.
Senator Biden. Oh, I got that. Look, we have an old
expression where I come from: Let us not kid a kidder. We all
know what the UN resolutions are.
I would like you to be as specific with me as you were on
other parts of your views about Syria. What specifically is it?
Is it--I mean, can you describe it, not in the context of UN
resolutions, in the context of concrete action that you believe
would have to occur in order for Syria to say, we have got a
deal with Israel?
Dr. Jouejati. To withdraw totally to the June 4th lines of
1967 from the Golan Heights and to see on the Palestinian-
Israeli track at least some positive developments that might
lead in the end to the establishment of a Palestinian state
very much in conformity with the vision of President Bush.
This is a longstanding Syrian demand, and where I do
disagree with Dr. Clawson when he says about the old guard and
the new guard, here on this very issue I believe the old guard
and the new guard are very, very much united. President Asad,
the late President Asad, had he been able to obtain from the
Israelis that commitment to withdraw to the June 4th lines, I
think there would have been peace between Syria and Israel. I
do not think Bashar Asad can accept any less, though.
Senator Biden. Excuse me. What you just said contradicts
that. You just said that it would have to be the total
withdrawal and there would have to be progress, whatever, not
defined, progress with regard to the rest of the issue with the
Palestinians.
Dr. Jouejati. Right. In other words, Syria--Syria by
virtue of its past, by virtue of its national role conception
as the champion of Arab rights, cannot be seen, I believe,
because this would hurt the legitimacy of the regime, cannot be
seen as operating in isolation, as having a separate peace
treaty with Israel.
Senator Biden. So this notion of two tracks is one that
goes to a dead end from your standpoint? There is no
possibility of a two-track solution, unless the second track
simultaneously ends where the first track ends and consistent
with what the Syrians think is the appropriate settlement,
correct?
Dr. Jouejati. Well, let me try to be more clear than I
have been. I think--and I may be wrong--that President Asad
when he went to Geneva to meet with President Clinton to talk
about all this, I think at the end of the day he would not have
signed a peace treaty. He would have waited for further
development on the Palestinian track. But his--from his angle,
from his Syrian angle, he would have been satisfied that Israel
had delivered to Syria what Syria demands.
And I think the same applies to this President.
Senator Biden. But what would the former Asad and the
present one do if that were delivered? I mean, you know,
delivery is a two-way street. What delivery would come? Would
they cease and desist supporting Hizballah? Would they call
effectively a time out while the negotiation went on? Would
they, as for example the practical--I am not trying to be
argumentative. I am trying to understand. Practically speaking,
you could have a circumstance where you had a--Hizballah and
Syria have two different agendas. Hizballah's clear agenda is
no Israel, period.
Now, that I assume is not Syria's agenda. Syria's agenda is
a settlement between, that is fair, and establishment of a
Palestinian state that is free and fairly arrived at, and total
withdrawal to the pre-June borders, the June 4 borders before
the war, on the Golan.
But my dilemma here is when folks like you talk to me about
this, I mean from both perspectives, is that you never connect
all the dots. There is a third dot and the third dot that
matters most to Israel, assuming Israel were acting from your
perspective much more rationally, is that terrorists cease and
desist and support for terrorists cease and desists.
But it is clear that the Jihad and Hizballah has made it
very clear it will not cease and desist, period, until there is
no Israel. They are not signed onto a two-state solution. They
have not signed onto the notion that there would be any
compromise on Jerusalem, compromise on anything.
So it seems to me your prescription for how to proceed with
Syria is fundamentally flawed. Explain to me why I am wrong
about that?
Dr. Jouejati. Senator, what Syria will give in return--you
ask what will Syria deliver. That is the normalization of
relations with Israel, and normalization here--and it has been
talked about between Syrians and the Israelis on the official
level--would be the establishment of diplomatic relations--
Senator Biden. Got that.
Dr. Jouejati. With an Israeli embassy in Damascus, with an
Israeli flag waving over it.
Senator Biden. That would be a wonderful thing as long,
that flag waving over it, if they were not still funding and
supporting Hizballah. Let us get to Hizballah.
Dr. Jouejati. Moreover, Syria will have a mutual security
arrangement with Israel on the Golan Heights. There would be a
joint water-sharing mechanism on Lake Tiberias.
Senator Biden. Got that.
Dr. Jouejati. And when there is peace, Senator, between
Syria and Israel, there is no need for PIJ to have an office in
Damascus, there is no need for Hamas to--
Senator Biden. Why is there no need? Because remember, the
second part of your equation here is that the Palestinian track
has to be one, since they view themselves, the Syrians, as the
leader of the Arab world and the region, is that the
Palestinians have to be satisfied. And yet you have the very
people they are funding now saying there is no satisfaction
available short of elimination of the state of Israel. So that
is what confuses me.
Dr. Jouejati. No, I do not think there is any room for
confusion. Israel--Syria, rather, Syria has accepted de facto
Israel within its '67 boundaries and so have all the Arab
states.
Senator Biden. Well, I know, I know--
Dr. Jouejati. There are marginal groups, Senator, like
Hamas and PIJ and so on--
Senator Biden. Yes, the ones that they are supporting. So
what I want to know is what gets them to stop supporting those
groups?
Dr. Jouejati. What stops them to--what gets them to stop
supporting these groups is peace with Israel, and that assumes
Israel's withdrawal from occupied territories.
Senator Biden. Notwithstanding the fact that it is not
sufficient for the very groups they are supporting?
Dr. Jouejati. These groups as far as Syria is concerned
and I think as far as all Arab states are concerned would then
occupy a very, very marginal position. Inside Syria it would
then be illegal for any group that wants to wage war against
Israel to exist on Syrian soil.
Senator Biden. Well, that is kind of encouraging, because
the truth of the matter is, you know, Israel does not have much
to worry about from Syria except their support for terrorist
groups. I mean, what the hell difference does it make to Israel
whether it has peace with Syria but for that issue? I mean,
what flows from there other than that? So that seems to me to
be the ultimate.
We talk about carrots and sticks. We talk about who needs
what. Syria very much wants to regain its self-respect, wants
to regain the Golan, wants Israel off, quote, ``its''
territory. I understand that part of the equation. But I do not
know what, absent an up-front acknowledgment, if that occurs,
there will be a ceasing and desisting.
In my conversations in Syria, the kind of thing that I
heard--we all hear all kinds of conversations, Mr. Ambassador;
we all get told different things; it is not a monolithic voice
that comes out of Damascus or any country--is that the fact of
the matter is that we cannot be seen as letting down the
Palestinians, and the voice of Mr. Arafat now and the voice of
Hizballah and the voice of the Fatah and the voice is simply
one that suggests right now that there is no--there is no
outline for peace that falls within the framework of all those
groups.
There is an outline for peace that falls within the
framework of the negotiations of the vast majority of the
Palestinians and everybody knows what they are. I mean, like
you said, Mr. Leverett, everybody knows what is needed in these
various deals. Everybody knows there has got to be compromise
on Jerusalem, not absolute. Everybody knows that there has got
to be elimination of the vast majority of the settlements, but
compromise on the remaining some of the settlements. Everybody
knows there--everybody knows the pieces. Everybody knows there
cannot be an absolute right of return.
Yet those basic points are fundamentally rejected by, they
are nonstarters for, the very groups that are blowing up people
right now. So I do not--I find it--I have lost, quite frankly,
faith in the credibility of Mr. Arafat and-or Mr. Asad and
others without their up-front acknowledgment that they are the
elements they are willing to negotiate, which is a de facto, a
de facto disagreement with the very people that are blowing
folks up.
Anyway, I am taking too much time, but I find it--and I
also have--I mean, carrots and sticks. It is self-evident that
if they stop supporting these groups, Mr. Leverett, they will
be taken off the terrorist list. They know that. How is that a
carrot? How is that a carrot? I do not get that. I do not see
any carrots here you are offering, and the sticks you are
offering are ones that I think you have all figured out. Asad
knows the stick is not going to be--this President has no
capacity as a political matter to invade Syria now.
Dr. Clawson. Senator, do not underestimate how much Mr.
Asad cares about the kind of rhetorical stance that we take,
and how the kind of coverage that has been given to the
deliberations in Congress over the Syria Accountability Act
indicates that Damascus is hypersensitive to the kinds of
things we have to say. I think that Damascus, for instance--
Senator Biden. Give me any evidence of that based on their
conduct?
Dr. Clawson. What we heard from the first panel was that
in the last few weeks there has been greater cooperation around
the question of the $3 billion in funds and about border
control. I think that that is distinctly related to the
progress that the Syria Accountability Act--
Senator Biden. I see zero evidence of that. The evidence
of that relates to the progress being taken on the ground in
the regions that we are occupying in the areas that they have
been cooperating. I think you guys are smoking something. I
mean, I do not see this at all. I mean, I think this is like an
academic exercise at a great university about how we write the
term paper.
I mean, I really think there is very little connection to
reality here, because the converse is true. If in fact they
were worried about our actions and Congress's actions and the
President's threats, there would have been a continuum of the
cooperation that began immediately after, immediately after, we
invaded Iraq, which then there was some accountability, because
they really were worried that the voices of the Richard Perles
and the Wolfowitzes and the neocons may in fact be not an echo,
but be the voice of America, and there are 120,000 troops
sitting on their northern border and they were worried they
would pivot and move south.
Once they figured out that there was no possibility of them
pivoting anywhere, all of a sudden things began to change. At
least I think that. It is presumptuous of me to say. I do not
know that any more than you know that there has been any
movement based upon the Syria Accountability Act.
Anyway, I am frustrated, as you can see. But I am sure you
all are from a lifetime of dealing with it.
The Chairman. Let me start my questioning just by
responding, or rather allowing each of you to speak. Dr.
Jouejati.
Dr. Jouejati. May I, Senator? On the question of Iraq, I
think Syrian cooperation has been increasing in the past and
what the Syrians are comforted by is that they have--they are
seeing now the beginnings of a timetable. This is especially
true--
The Chairman. Let us get it straight. There is no straight
line cooperation. There is no straight line cooperation. Let us
get it straight now. There is some cooperation in some areas
and less cooperation in other areas. There is no straight line
here factually. There is none.
Dr. Jouejati. Factually, Senator, first of all, the assets
that the Iraqis have are reported to be far less than $3
billion. This is number one.
Two, according to my understanding and to the information I
have, yesterday a senior official of the Department of Defense
invited the Syrian charge d'affairs in Washington to thank him
for Syria's cooperation on that score, on the unfreezing of the
assets.
Senator Biden. Well, they froze the assets, then they drew
down the assets to pay off what was owed to them by the Iraqis,
and now they are ready to talk about the rest of the assets.
That seems to me to be logical, but it does not demonstrate a
new-found cooperation.
Dr. Jouejati. The new-found cooperation is of course in
the presence of those Treasury Department folks who are in
Damascus and who have talked with the Central Bank of Syria
folks, and as a result we have now, at least in the Department
of Defense, some happy people according to them and the Syrian
charge d'affairs. This is on one level.
On the other level, again I can only speak to what General
Petraeus is saying--my information is not from the Syrian
government--and also to Sir Jeremy Greenstock, and they seem to
be very happy with Syrian cooperation first on the score of
trying to stop the jihadists from going to Iraq. And the
Syrians do not succeed all the time because it is a long and
porous border and because they do not have the necessary
resources.
Two, again, Syria--and this is, it is making money out of
it, of course, but it is providing the area of Mosul with
electricity and that has a stabilizing effect. So again, Syrian
cooperation, Syria's increased cooperation if I want to be more
accurate, on the score of Iraq, as a result that now there is a
comfort that the United States has a timetable for a
constitution and for this and that, and this was not the case
earlier.
Senator Biden. I hope you are right. There is decreased
cooperation in al-Qaeda. There is decreased cooperation in
other areas, but it is kind of interesting. But go ahead.
The Chairman. Ambassador Murphy, will you have any comment?
Ambassador Murphy. Just a brief comment, Mr. Chairman. I
hear Senator Biden virtually saying that he cannot foresee any
way that Hamas and Jihad can ever change. Well, I do.
Senator Biden. Oh, yes, I am saying that.
Ambassador Murphy. Well, you have asked if we are smoking
something. No, it is Federal premises; we are not smoking; we
are trying to clear that air. The fact is, I look at Avigdor
Liberman sitting on the opposition bench in the Knesset; now
actually in the cabinet, who has had a lifelong commitment to
the expulsion of every last Palestinian from Israel. I foresee
a day when there is a peace agreement with the Palestinians.
Senator Biden. Are you comparing him to Hamas and Jihad?
Ambassador Murphy I am comparing his absolute view that
that is the only solution for Israel with the Hamas view that
Israel should not exist.
Senator Biden. I see.
Ambassador Murphy. One day there will be a Palestinian
parliament, Hamas and Islamic Jihad will be in opposition, but
there will be peace. And I agree there will only be peace if
the Palestinian leadership and countries like Syria exert the
control to keep them from doing more than making speeches on
the opposition bench.
Senator Biden. Well, I agree with that. That does not
constitute a change in their attitude.
Ambassador Murphy. Today there is--look closely also at the
Hizballah situation. Where does the operetta continue? On that
tiny section of the Lebanese-Israeli border of the Shabah
Farms. It is not raging up and down the Lebanese-Israeli
frontier.
Senator Biden. Why?
Ambassador Murphy. Is it self-control of--
Senator Biden. Why?
Ambassador Murphy. I do not know.
Senator Biden. I think I do and I think you do.
Ambassador Murphy. I think it is a combination of Syrian
pressure--
Senator Biden. Bingo.
Ambassador Murphy I think it is also perhaps Hizballah's
own interests within the Lebanese political world.
Senator Biden. Bingo.
Ambassador Murphy. Iran, I do not know. Do you have a view
on Iran's role?
Senator Biden. No, I think those are fully sufficient.
Some might argue that was the case because Israel may decide to
go beyond what they did, speaking of sticks.
The Chairman. Dr. Clawson.
Dr. Clawson. At an Arab summit 2 years ago, Bashar Asad is
reported to have told the other Arab leaders that they can
ignore the words coming out of Washington because Washington's
words do not mean very much and the United States does not do
very much to back up either its threats or its promises. I
think that is very much an attitude that he has displayed over
the last 2 years.
It is very hard for us to get his attention and to take
very seriously what we say either way, about sticks or carrots.
So it is important that we measure our words and that we find a
way to demonstrate our credibility to this fellow, who
unfortunately does not take us very seriously. To the extent
that he does take us seriously, then I think that we can get
some degree of cooperation out of him through a combination of
sticks and carrots.
But at the moment we have quite low credibility with him
because he does not think that we carry through very much on
what we say. The episode with the oil pipeline from Iraq has
hurt us very, very badly in that regard, because he was making
an awful lot of money off that pipeline and he directly
promised the Secretary of State that that pipeline would not be
opened until the money was put under the UN, and he knew the
Secretary of State had the President woken up to be told this
wonderful news. Yet, when Bashar paid no attention to that
there was no consequence from the United States.
It would not have been hard for us to bomb the pumping
stations inside Iraq and to shut that pipeline down. We did not
do it, and as a result we have very little credibility with
this guy and it is going to take a long time to reestablish
that credibility.
But I would hope that we can do that by offering measured
and small, small, sticks, which is all we are doing with the
Syria Accountability Act, and I would offer some small carrots
and I suggested some, like computer education and any
potentially discussing debt relief, meanwhile coordinating with
the Europeans, who have got this great big carrot that they are
dangling in front of the Syrians at the moment, this Trade
Association Agreement that they have been negotiating for
decades.
For gosh sakes, let us persuade the Europeans that before
they sign that, get something from the guy. Based on what the
Europeans have done with the Iranians, which is said no
progress on economics until there is progress on human rights
and on weapons of mass destruction, on the peace process, on
terrorism, let us ask the Europeans: Okay, what can we do to
work with you to see that you take that same approach regarding
Syria.
The Chairman. Let me intrude at this point, because we
would enjoy continuing the dialogue for a long time, but a roll
call vote is under way. There are 7 minutes left to go and
Senator Biden and I will need to do our duty in another forum.
But we thank you very much for coming to this hearing.
Senator Biden. We thank you all very, very much.
The Chairman. It has been very, very helpful for our
understanding, we hope for those who have joined us in the
hearing room and for the American people who watch this on C-
SPAN. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 12:58 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]