[Senate Hearing 108-705]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-705
Senate Hearings
Before the Committee on Appropriations
_______________________________________________________________________
Department of
Homeland Security
Fiscal Year
2005
th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION 108
H.R. 4567/S. 2537
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES
Department of Homeland Security, 2005 (H.R. 4567/S. 2537)
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001
S. Hrg. 108-705
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before a
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
on
H.R. 4567/S. 2537
AN ACT MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2005, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
__________
Department of Homeland Security
Nondepartmental witnesses
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
__________
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky TOM HARKIN, Iowa
CONRAD BURNS, Montana BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama HARRY REID, Nevada
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah PATTY MURRAY, Washington
BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
LARRY CRAIG, Idaho DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
James W. Morhard, Staff Director
Lisa Sutherland, Deputy Staff Director
Terrence E. Sauvain, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Department of Homeland Security
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama TOM HARKIN, Iowa
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
LARRY CRAIG, Idaho PATTY MURRAY, Washington
Professional Staff
Rebecca Davies
Les Spivey
James Hayes
Carol Cribbs
Kimberly Nelson
Charles Kieffer (Minority)
Chip Walgren (Minority)
Alexa Sewell (Minority)
Scott Nance (Minority)
Administrative Support
Avery Forbes
C O N T E N T S
----------
Tuesday, February 10, 2004
Page
Department of Homeland Security.................................. 1
Thursday, February 26, 2004
Department of Homeland Security: Office of the Under Secretary
for Emergency Preparedness and Response........................ 141
Tuesday, March 2, 2004
Department of Homeland Security.................................. 189
Tuesday, March 9, 2004
Department of Homeland Security.................................. 295
Tuesday, March 23, 2004
Department of Homeland Security.................................. 357
Tuesday, March 30, 2004
Department of Homeland Security.................................. 465
Nondepartmental Witnesses........................................ 571
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:02 a.m., in room SD-106, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Cochran, Stevens, Specter, Domenici,
Gregg, Craig, Byrd, Inouye, Leahy, Harkin, Mikulski, Kohl, and
Murray.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
STATEMENT OF HON. TOM RIDGE, SECRETARY
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. The hearing of our committee will please
come to order.
Today we begin our review of the fiscal year 2005 budget
request for the Department of Homeland Security. I am pleased
to welcome to the hearing the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security, the Honorable Tom Ridge.
Under the Secretary's leadership, this new department,
which became operational not quite 1 year ago, has undertaken
the challenge to improve the safety and security of the United
States. Merging some 180,000 employees from 22 separate
agencies into a new department has been a very challenging
endeavor. Recent events have underscored our awareness that
challenges still lie ahead as the department continues its work
to prevent terrorism, to reduce the Nation's vulnerability to
terrorist acts, and to increase our disaster response
capabilities.
While we all understand that more will be done, the
administration with the active support of this committee and
the Congress is succeeding to improve our intelligence-
gathering capabilities; achieve a greater degree of
coordination and cooperation among all those involved in
homeland security; develop and deploy new detection
technologies; and heighten security of our borders, ports,
transportation systems, and other critical infrastructure.
We will review this year's budget request and work with
you, Mr. Secretary, to provide the resources the department
requires to manage its responsibilities and to successfully
carry out its mission. For fiscal year 2005, the President's
budget requests $40.2 billion to fund programs and activities
of the department, including mandatory and discretionary
appropriations, user fee collections, and trust funds.
At this point, I am very pleased to yield to other senators
on the committee, first to my distinguished friend from West
Virginia, who is the ranking Democrat on this subcommittee,
Senator Byrd, for any statements he might wish to make.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my colleagues on the
committee, and welcome, Mr. Secretary.
As we approach the 1-year anniversary of the creation of
the Department of Homeland Security, this subcommittee will be
holding a series of hearings on the President's request for
your agency. These hearings will focus not just on the budget
request for the department, but also on the effectiveness of
the department in using the resources that have been available
to it to make this country safer. I look forward to your
testimony on efforts to secure the homeland by other Federal
agencies, by State, regional, and local governments, and by the
private sector.
ALERT LEVEL CHANGE
On Sunday, December 21, you raised the Nation's terror
alert level to orange. In justifying this action you said, and
I quote, ``The strategic indicators, including Al Qaeda's
continued desire to carry out attacks against our homeland, are
perhaps greater now than at any point since September 11.'' In
explaining why you thought there was a high risk of terrorist
attack, you said, and I quote, ``Information indicates that
extremists abroad are anticipating near-term attacks that they
believe will rival or exceed the scope and impact of those that
we experienced in New York, at the Pentagon, and in
Pennsylvania 2 years ago.''
That was a pretty sobering assessment. When I read your
testimony, I note that the President claims he is seeking a 10-
percent increase for your department. I thought perhaps the
administration had finally gotten the message that it was time
to back up the President's rhetoric on homeland security with
real resources.
FISCAL YEAR 2005 BUDGET INCREASE
But, Mr. Secretary, I was disappointed to learn that when
one looks at the details in the President's budget, the 10-
percent increase is just another puffed-up gimmick. The fact is
that the Department of Homeland Security receives only a 4-
percent proposed increase in discretionary spending, only
slightly more than enough to cover inflation and the 2005 pay
raise.
In the fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security Appropriations
Act, Congress approved advanced appropriations of $2.5 billion
for Project BioShield for the period from fiscal year 2005 to
fiscal year 2008. In your budget presentation, you include the
entire $2.5 billion as 2005 spending, despite the fact that
those funds are supposed to last 4 years.
Your own budget documents show that you expect to spend
only $890 million of the $2.5 billion in fiscal year 2005.
After adjusting the budget request for that gimmick, the
increase in the fiscal year 2005 budget is only 4 percent. So
that means that the President is seeking a 4-percent increase
when you believe that the threat of another terrorist attack is
higher than at any time since September 11.
I share the view, Mr. Secretary, that this Nation is at
risk of more terrorist attacks. We continue to be vulnerable to
a wide range of potential threats. On December 15, 2003, the
advisory panel to assess domestic response capabilities for
terrorists involving weapons of mass destruction issued their
final report. The panel, which was headed by the former
Republican Governor of Virginia, James Gilmore, concluded that
the department must learn from history without falling into the
trap of fighting the last war by concentrating too heavily on
the tactics and techniques used by the September 11 terrorists.
Yet in this budget, 97 percent of the budget for the
Transportation Security Administration is for aviation security
with a focus on more airline hijackings. What about the
security of our ports? What about our buses, our trains? Why
does the President propose to reduce grants to ports for
improved security by over 60 percent, when over 95 percent of
all overseas trade coming in or out of the country moves by
ship? Why does the President refuse to increase resources for
securing cargo on passenger aircraft?
Eight days ago, in this very room, Senate employees were
quarantined and decontaminated for an attack with a dangerous
toxin, ricin. Clearly, the risks of a chemical or biological
attack in this Nation remain high. According to the EPA, over
100 chemical plants located throughout the country could affect
over 1 million people if the plants were attacked.
In February of 2003, the National Infrastructure Protection
Center, which is now part of your department, issued a threat
warning that Al Qaeda operatives also may attempt to launch
conventional attacks against the U.S. nuclear and chemical
industrial infrastructure to cause contamination, disruption,
and terror. Nuclear power plants and industrial chemical plants
remain viable targets. And yet, Mr. Secretary, the President's
budget does not include the request of the Post Office for $779
million to develop biodetection systems that would help protect
citizens across the Nation and for ventilation and filtration
systems to protect their employees. The President also proposes
to cut by 10 percent the HHS program designed to equip and
train State and local health agencies to detect and respond to
biological or chemical attacks.
FUNDING FOR FIRST RESPONDERS
In June of 2003, the Council on Foreign Relations' report,
authored by Former Senator Rudman and others, entitled,
``Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously
Unprepared,'' asserted that America will fall approximately $98
billion short of meeting emergency responder needs in the next
5 years, if current funding levels are maintained.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency, part of your
department, in a report entitled ``A Needs Assessment of the
U.S. Fire Service,'' found that only 13 percent of the fire
departments have the equipment and training to handle an
incident involving chemical or biological agents. And yet, Mr.
Secretary, the President's budget proposes to cut grants that
equip and train police, fire, and emergency medical care
personnel by $729 million. Fire grants alone are to be reduced
by 33 percent.
In addition to these resource issues, this Subcommittee
will also examine the effectiveness of our homeland security
programs. We will ask questions about your methods for
collecting and sharing intelligence. Just last week, we learned
that the White House had been the target of a ricin attack.
Sharing information with State and local law enforcement is a
critical ingredient to effective deterrence.
We will also ask if the department is doing everything
possible to make sure that State, local, and regional
governments are effective partners in deterring a terrorist
attack. We will ask whether we are providing the right
incentives, including money, to make sure that chemical and
other industries are doing their fair share to make this
country more secure.
CAPPS II
Finally, we will closely examine your plan to implement
CAPPS II, a new information system for screening airline
passengers. And I encourage you not to implement the new system
until the requirements of the law have been met.
Mr. Secretary, you and the 179,000 employees in your
department are to be commended for your efforts to preserve our
freedoms, to protect America, and to secure our homeland. We
share your vision. I share your belief that we are a vulnerable
Nation. We will ask many questions in an effort to understand
what more needs to be done and what needs to be done
differently in order to respond to the terrorist threat. We
look forward to your testimony.
Senator Cochran. Senator Gregg, you are recognized for any
opening statement you may have.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JUDD GREGG
Senator Gregg. Well, Mr. Chairman, first, I appreciate your
holding this hearing. And I appreciate Governor Ridge's
attendance. And I have a lot of questions. I have obviously
been involved in this issue, as many members of this panel
have, for a long time. And just to highlight a couple of them
quickly, I am very concerned about the discussion as to how
this money is going out to first responders.
THREAT-BASED DISTRIBUTION
I am totally supportive of the department's effort to do a
threat-based distribution. I think we need to look at the
history of this. The original concept here was created by the
Domenici-Nunn bill, which the Defense Department had. And the
idea was we were going to train the top 162 cities first and
make them capable of handling a major threat event. That whole
concept was carried forward under the prior committee that had
jurisdiction over first responders, which was my committee,
CJS. We set up the first responder money. And we wanted to make
it a threat-based approach.
This idea that we are just going to put money across the
board to every community in America, we cannot afford that.
What we need to do is focus it. And I congratulate the
department for that. And I hope you will give us some more
expansive thoughts on that and assure us that it is a threat-
based approach for distribution there.
ENTRY-EXIT
Secondly, I am concerned about the exit-entry issue. The
technology appears to me to be serious problems with that
technology. And I am not sure that Customs and the Border
Patrol activities are going to get the technology they need. I
would like to get an update on that.
COUNTERTERRORISM COMMUNICATION
I am concerned about the communication efforts in the area
of counterterrorism. There appears to be lapses there. And the
bioterrorism issue is our problem. We, as a Congress, have not
passed BioShield. You have given us a proposal. We have not
passed it. You should have that in hand. And if you want to
castigate us on that, we deserve it. And please do today.
AIRPORT SECURITY
And I am very concerned about the amount of money we are
spending on airport security, as Senator Byrd outlined, and
whether or not we are effectively addressing the threat coming
across our borders by focusing so many resources on airport
security. Anybody who goes through airport security today knows
a lot of it is regrettably mindless security, which we have to
get a handle on. Literally, you go into some of these airports,
and you will have 20 or 30 security people standing there for
an airport that has 20 flights a day. And it does not seem to
have much relationship, especially now that we have secured the
cockpit doors and these planes cannot be used as missiles any
longer, but can still be blown up, of course.
But the ports are a threat. Other entry points are a
threat. And are we over-weighting our security efforts to
airports, to the transportation of individuals versus
transportation of cargo through ports or in airplanes?
So there are a lot of questions. I look forward to hearing
your answers and thoughts. And I would like to hear from you,
so I will not take any more time. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Inouye.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE
Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, I request that my full
statement be made part of the record.
Senator Cochran. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Senator Inouye. I just want to state that, as one living
far away, I am a constant air traveler. And as such, I have
been in a position to note differences, if any. And I must
commend the Secretary, because there has been much improvement
in our security system, as far as the air operations are
concerned. Little things, such as they are not giving any
preference to big shots, which I think is a clear indication of
better discipline. The operation is much smoother. It moves
faster and, I believe, much more effective.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Secondly, coming from the ocean, I am naturally concerned
about port security. I commend you for the increase in your
funding there. But as my colleague from West Virginia
indicated, I hope that improvements can be made on the grand
picture.
With that, I would like to thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Ridge. Thank you, Senator.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Daniel K. Inouye
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to discussing with Secretary Ridge the
fiscal year 2005 budget for the Department of Homeland Security. In my
review of the budget documents I was pleased to note the emphasis
placed on port security, an issue of great importance to my state.
However, I am concerned by many of the planned program consolidations
and reductions that will impact state first responders. I am interested
to learn how you will ensure that the Federal Government maintains the
intent and results of the current programs that are proposed for
consolidation.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Stevens.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR TED STEVENS
Senator Stevens. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr.
Secretary. I join my colleague from Hawaii, Senator Inouye. I
think the two of us spend more time on airplanes than any other
member of the Senate. And there is no question that the system
is improved. It was my privilege to spend some time with the
members of our Nation who manage airports over the recess right
after Christmas. And that was the general consensus, that
everything has improved.
But one of the things that almost everyone there expressed
a hope was that we would analyze this now and see what is the
threat. The threat in the beginning was perceived to be one
thing. We basically have equipment now to examine for metal,
for guns, for knives. But we are dealing with many substances
now that those people who manage airports would like to work
with you in order to see how we could address the possible
broad spectrum of threats that affect us now.
NATIONAL ALERT SYSTEM
The only other question, if I am not here, Mr. Chairman, I
would like to put it on the record, pertains to the national
alert system. The Appropriations Committee provided specific
money for a study concerning the national alert system, which
currently still deals only with radio.
And we affirmatively believe that the mechanisms of
communications now are so--there are such a myriad of methods
now that there ought to be some consideration given to a
ubiquitous system that no matter what form of communication you
listen to or use, you would receive a message, whether it is
over a cell phone or a blackberry or a computer or your radio
or the television or cable, that every system would have an
announcement of items of national concern. Not local concern.
Leave that to the local people to decide what they want to do.
But the national alert system, I think, needs to be reviewed.
And we asked for a study. And my question pertains to when we
will receive that study.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Harkin.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR TOM HARKIN
Senator Harkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
ask that my full statement be made a part of the record.
Senator Cochran. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Senator Harkin. Just a couple of comments, Mr. Secretary.
Again, as we all know, we cannot protect the Nation perfectly
against every conceivable threat. And, therefore, we have to
make choices and devote our limited resources to those threats
that we judge to be most likely and most serious. So this poses
some very difficult choices for our first responders, those
people out on the front lines.
I made it a point, when this department was created, when I
was appointed to this subcommittee, to go around the State of
Iowa, to talk with the Governor, his staff, others in State
Government. We visited each of 99 counties in Iowa to talk to
the local emergency management personnel, the firefighters,
police, EMS people, other officials. I wanted to find out what
was on their minds, what they thought was most important, what
they thought was working, what was not.
Again, aside from all the other things, I was told by
almost all these people that the biggest challenges they face
today are the same they faced prior to 9/11: Crime,
methamphetamine, natural disasters. FEMA is now a part of
Homeland Security. It has become a really remarkable, world-
class organization dealing with fires, floods, tornadoes,
things that happen every year. We cannot renege on our
commitment to help people in need due to these natural
disasters. That is why I and others have fought so hard to keep
the fire grant program.
INCREASED BURDENS ON FIRST RESPONDERS
The first responders in Iowa would tell me that they are
frustrated. When the alert level changes, they learn about it
from CNN and not from the department. They do not know why the
alert level is raised or what kind of threats they ought to be
looking for. They tell me they are obliged to respond to vague
mandates they do not fully understand, taking time away from
other priorities. Often these mandates are unclear and costly.
At the same time, some current reporting requirements are
onerous and illogical. One county emergency manager in Iowa
told my staff that he is required to report on contingency
plans in case there is a tidal wave. And as he understands it,
he is not allowed to answer ``not applicable.''
And again, these increased burdens are coming at a time
when State and local governments are hurting. Many are already
laying off police, fire and emergency management personnel. The
vast majority of firefighters in the United States are
volunteers. Increased training requirements are needed. And
they are burdensome. And at the time, local governments just do
not have the wherewithal to do this.
AGRO-TERRORISM
One last thing I would just mention is agro-terrorism and
the focus on the subject of agro-terrorism and what can be done
with a small amount of agricultural commodities. I am concerned
that perhaps we are not focusing enough on the subject of agro-
terrorism and what could be done to interrupt our food supply,
to contaminate food. Not that it might kill a lot of people,
but just to spread terror, from things that could be done to
our food supply chain.
PREPARED STATEMENT
With that, Mr. Secretary, thank you. I compliment you on
the job you are doing very well down there and look forward to
working with you to keep this going.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Ridge. Thank you, Senator.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Tom Harkin
President Kennedy said that ``to govern is to choose.'' We cannot
protect the Nation perfectly against every conceivable threat. We have
to choose. We have to devote our limited resources to address those
threats we judge to be the most likely and most serious. This poses
difficult choices for Congress and the Administration, as well as for
local communities. It poses especially difficult choices for the first
responders, those men and women who are truly on the front line--and
whose lives are on the line when emergencies arise.
One of my highest priorities since being appointed to the Homeland
Security Appropriations Subcommittee has been to address directly the
needs of these front-line professionals all across Iowa. My staff and I
have had numerous conversations with the Governor of Iowa, with his
staff, and with others in State government. I also asked members of my
Iowa staff to visit each of the state's 99 counties to talk with local
emergency management personnel, firefighters, police, EMS and other
officials. I wanted to get the best ideas from these front-line
professionals: What do they think is most important when it comes to
homeland security. What do they think is working, and what is not.
These meetings have been extraordinarily valuable to me. Security
is on people's minds. Not surprisingly, Iowans were more than eager to
share their insights and priorities. And their input has shaped my own
approach to homeland security issues here in Washington.
When the creation of a new Department of Homeland Security was
first proposed, I supported the effort. We knew then that balancing,
and probably shifting, among competing priorities would be a challenge.
We must do all we can to protect the America from terrorist threats.
But, at the same time, it remains vitally important that we protect
Americans from other, more likely hazards. It is important that we not
focus exclusively on large cities and major strategic assets. Frankly,
I am extremely concerned about the shift of priorities in this proposed
budget away from rural areas. Rural communities will continue to face
major challenges. But, under this budget, they will face those
challenges with fewer resources.
It is a mistake to redirect funds from badly needed current
programs. That just creates new holes in our homeland security
infrastructure. In fact, wherever possible, we should aim to expand and
strengthen existing emergency-response mechanisms. We should increase
the capacity of local authorities to prevent or respond to terrorist
threats and to deal more effectively with the much more common threats
and emergencies they face.
Iowans told my staff that the biggest challenges Iowans face today
include many of the same problems they faced in June of 2000: crime,
the methamphetamine scourge, natural disasters.
Over the past several years, FEMA, now part of Homeland Security,
has become a truly remarkable, world-class organization for dealing
with fires, floods, tornados, and earthquakes. These things occur every
year, regardless of other threats, and they continue to threaten lives
and livelihoods. We cannot renege on our commitment to help people in
need due to these natural disasters. This is exactly why I and others
have fought hard to ensure that the fire grant program is retained.
At the same time, first responders in Iowa tell me that they are
frustrated. When the alert level changes, they learn about it from CNN,
not from the Department of Homeland Security. They don't know why the
alert level is raised, or which kinds of threats they ought to be
looking out for. They are obliged to respond to vague mandates that
they don't fully understand, taking time away from other priorities.
Often, these mandates are unclear--and costly. While some funding is
flowing, communities are unsure how exactly they should be spending it,
and they fear spending it in a way that might not meet a later mandate.
At the same time, some current reporting requirements are onerous
and illogical. One county emergency manager in Iowa told my staff that
he is required to report on contingency plans in case there is a tidal
wave--and, as he understands it, he is not allowed to answer ``not
applicable.'' I suspect that if a tidal wave big enough to cause damage
in Iowa were to hit the United States, our least concern will be
inadequate tidal wave planning in rural Iowa!
These increased burdens are coming at a time when State and local
governments are hurting. Many already are laying off police, fire, and
emergency management personnel. The vast majority of firefighters in
the United States are volunteer. Increased training requirements for
these personnel, while useful, can be extremely burdensome. We are
losing firefighters in Iowa. If we at the Federal level are going to
create mandates, then funds must follow those mandates.
Finally, I would like to mention the subject of agri-terrorism. As
my colleagues know, a major agri-terrorism event could easily cause
billions of dollars in losses. Anyone who has spent time in rural
America knows the difficulty in trying to guard against every avenue of
vulnerability. The key to protecting U.S. agriculture is making sure
that our intelligence and response capabilities are in place both to
prevent acts of terrorism in the first place, and to respond quickly
should an attack occur. I think we are still falling short on response.
I am very disappointed not to see more resources directed to building
the capacity of our agricultural first-response system. We really need
to take a hard look, and make sure we are doing all we can to protect
U.S. agriculture and rural communities.
I have been working closely with my State government--particularly
with the state Homeland Security director, Ellen Gordon--to identify
appropriate state and Federal responses to agri-terror. Iowa has been
working overtime trying to map out a comprehensive plan to deal with
this very difficult issue. I applaud their good work. And I look
forward to working with Secretary Ridge and with my colleagues to give
greater focus and priority to the threat of agri-terrorism.
Senator Cochran. Senator Mikulski.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR BARBARA A. MIKULSKI
Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Mr.
Secretary. Mr. Chairman, I, too, ask unanimous consent that my
full statement be in the record.
Senator Cochran. Without objection, it is so ordered.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Barbara A. Mikulski
First of all, Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for your personal
visit to Maryland when Hurricane Isabel hit last September. It was of a
magnitude that we have not seen for more than 80 years in Maryland. And
your personal visit and the excellent response of FEMA is indeed
appreciated. I'm here to thank you on behalf of the people of Maryland
for coming to the State and touring the hard hit areas and for your
team doing such a good job.
I'd also like to thank the Department of Homeland Security and all
of our security agencies for averting another terrorist attack on the
United States of America. Through classified briefings and others, I
know that the threat over the holidays was indeed real. The fact that
were sitting here today having this hearing with no TV cameras shows
that something must be working right. But for what you did over the
holidays--and when I say you, I mean every single person who worked
overtime--while we were sitting there having turkey and opening
presents, there were people putting themselves out there. So I just
wanted to say thank you, again, on behalf of the people of Maryland and
all of us here, for all that you do to keep us safe.
I have four areas of concern, however, that I want to address in
the Department of Homeland Security fiscal year 2005 budget: High
Threat Urban Area funding, Fire Grants, Port Security, and Coast Guard
funding.
First of all, I am very concerned about cuts to grant programs for
State and local governments. The funding request for key first
responder programs is down to $3.2 billion, which is $474 million less
than last year. The State block grant program, which is distributed by
formula, is reduced from $1.7 billion to $750 million. The Fire Grant
program is reduced from $750 million to $500 million. However, I am
happy to see an increase in grants to high threat, high density urban
area funding, which is doubled to $1.45 billion.
The High Threat Urban Areas funding is extremely important. The
Mayor of Baltimore recently said that ``Cities are on the front line of
homeland security, but in the back of the line funding. . . . The
Administration and Congress should act now to direct appropriate
homeland security funds to cities and eliminate the bureaucracy of a
middle man.'' So while I applaud the President for recognizing the
critical funding needs of our high threat, high-density regions, I hope
I can work with you and the Members of the Committee to ensure that
this money is getting where it is needed most: in the hands of the
police, firefighters, and other emergency responders on the front
lines.
I am very concerned about the Fire Grant program, which is one of
the true grassroots programs that we have. Senator Bond and I worked so
hard on Fire Grant funding when FEMA was in our VA-HUD bill. However,
this year's budget calls for $500 million in funding, which is $246
million less than the 2004 level and $400 million less than the
authorized level. I believe there is a compelling need to fund this
program at its authorized level. In 2003 the U.S. Fire Administration
received over 20,000 applications totaling $2.5 billion in requests. We
know from FEMA and the National Fire Protection Association that at
least 57,000 fire fighters lack personal protective clothing. That item
in and of itself speaks to the enormous need in this area.
Another area of concern is the budget request for port security
grants. President Bush's request calls for $46 million in Port Security
Grants, which is well below last year's level of $124 million. The
Coast Guard estimates that $5.4 billion is needed for port security
improvements. I want to echo again comments about Baltimore and how
deeply concerned we are about the fact that our ports continue to be
vulnerable. And its not only about money, but its also about a smarter,
more efficient strategy for protecting our critical infrastructure.
I am very supportive and proud of our U.S. Coast Guard, which is
truly one of the most efficient and effective of all Federal agencies.
The men and women of the Coast Guard put their lives on the line
everyday to apprehend drug smugglers, protect our marine resources, and
safeguard our environment. However, since September 11th they have been
called on more than ever to protect our borders and ports. We need to
provide the Coast Guard with the resources to meet these new
challenges. Yet, the Guard operates a fleet of ships airplanes that are
nearing the end of their useful life. In fact, some of their ships date
back to World War II. That's why I am a strong supporter of the Coast
Guard Deepwater Program, which would replace these antiquated systems
with cutting edge technology.
And last, but not at all least, I would hope that you would comment
on one of the biggest changes that you are proposing: the combining of
24 grant programs into a new office called the Office of State and
Local Government Coordination and Preparedness. I presume the fire
grants move over there. I believe you talk about it on page seven of
your testimony. This is a big deal because people have complained about
the need for a more efficient and effective coordination between
Federal, State, and local governments, particularly as it relates to
resources like we talked about--better communication and coordination.
But I'd like to know where you're heading with this consolidation.
And also, what will it mean? Will it be a disruption for all those who
know how to apply? Is this going to be a whole new set of rules,
regulations, and trade routes that our first responders will have to
learn to be able to come to Washington for help? Or is this really
going to solve the problems that mayors and governors have raised with
you? But again, a really heart-felt gratitude for all that you do. I
look forward to your testimony today.
Senator Mikulski. First of all, Mr. Secretary, thanks are
in order. I want to thank you for your personal visit to
Maryland when Hurricane Isabel hit. It was of a magnitude that
we have not seen for more than 80 years in Maryland. Your
personal visit and the excellent response of FEMA is
appreciated. I am here to thank you on behalf of the people of
Maryland for coming and for your team doing such a good job.
Additionally, I would like to thank the Department of
Homeland Security and all of our security agencies for averting
another attack on the United States of America. Through
classified briefings, I know that the threat over the holidays
was indeed real. And the fact that we are sitting here today
having a conversation with no TV cameras shows that something
must be working right. I would like to thank you for what you
did over the holidays--and when I say you, I mean every single
person who worked overtime. While we were sitting at home
having turkey and opening presents, there were people who were
putting themselves out there. So I just wanted to say thank
you, and again on behalf of the people of Maryland and all of
us, for everyone who worked so hard.
In terms of where we are in homeland security, I want to
echo concerns about the fire grant program, which is one of the
true grassroots programs that we have. And, of course, Senator
Bond and I worked so hard on that program when FEMA was over in
our VA/HUD bill. The cut is $246 million from last year. And I
would like to hear your elaboration on it.
FEMA and the National Fire Protection Association found
that at least 57,000 firefighters lack personal protective
clothing. That item in and of itself, where we have to protect
the protector, speaks to the enormous need.
PORT SECURITY
The other is the whole issue of port security, which,
again, echoing my comments, affects a Maryland port. We are
deeply concerned about the fact that our ports continue to be
vulnerable. And it is not only about money, but it is also
about a more efficient strategy.
GRANT CONSOLIDATION
And last but not at least, I would hope that you would
comment on the fact that one of the biggest changes is that you
propose combining 24 grant programs into a new office called
the Office for State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness, one of which is moving FEMA over there. I presume
the fire grants move over there. And I believe you talk about
it on page seven of your testimony.
This is really a big deal, because people have complained
about the need for more efficient and effective coordination
between our State and local governments, particularly
resources, like we talked about, communication coordination.
But to move 24 grant programs, I would like to know where you
are heading and also what will it mean. Will it be a disruption
for all those who knew how to apply? Is this going to be a
whole new set of rules, regs, trade routes that they have to
learn to be able to come to Washington, or is this really going
to solve the problems that mayors and governors have raised
with you?
But again, a really heartfelt gratitude.
Secretary Ridge. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Murray.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATTY MURRAY
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And
thank you to Senator Byrd and all of our colleagues for their
comments today. I welcome you, as well, Mr. Secretary, and
appreciate the tremendous job you are doing for our country.
And I especially want to echo the comments of Senator Mikulski
and thank you and everyone in your department for all of the
work you do tediously every day to protect all of us. We all do
appreciate it.
PORT SECURITY
I agree with my colleagues. A lot has been done in the area
of airport security. All of us know tremendous changes have
been made. Where I continue to have a tremendous concern is in
the area of port security. And I know you joined the President
last week in Senator Hollings's backyard at the Port of
Charleston. And the White House issued a press release and
described the event as the President focusing on seaport and
cargo security. But I noticed that only a couple of minutes of
his speech actually talked to that. And I think that kind of
rhetoric without the backup is deeply concerning to me and to
everyone, really, in this country.
We saw last week that a small bit of ricin shut down three
buildings here on this campus for an entire week. A container
coming into one of our terminals with an explosive device or
any kind of biological agent could have a devastating effect
obviously on human life, but a huge impact on the economy, if
any of our ports or all of our ports were to shut down for any
amount of time.
OPERATION SAFE COMMERCE
And I think you know what I am concerned about is that the
backup is not there for the words and the rhetoric that the
administration is focused on port security. I noticed in the
President's budget request that a very promising security
initiative, called the Operation Safe Commerce is killed in the
President's budget. That is a program that is just beginning.
And the first cargo ship actually with that in place is coming
into my home State in Tacoma in just a couple weeks. And I
think it is just not a good way to go, to kill that before it
has even gotten started.
MARITIME TRANSPORTATION ACT
Another example is the President's budget director last
week on the Budget Committee told me that the White House is
committed to implementing the Maritime Transportation Act, the
law that ensures that all of our ports and all the vessels
calling on them have approved security plans. Mr. Bolton said
the President was committed to implementing that, but his
budget only provides 7 percent of the funding that the Coast
Guard testified to us they would need to implement that.
COAST GUARD
And the third example is that the administration is adding
new homeland security duties to the Coast Guard's mission
without providing them the support necessary to accomplish
those tasks, as well as to deal with its traditional missions
that are so critical. We all know the Coast Guard is stretched
thin. They are working long hours. They are a dedicated group
of people. But I think we need to back up what we are asking
them to do in terms of homeland security duties and provide
them with the funds. So I will be asking you about that today.
CUTS IN GRANT FUNDING
I share with my colleagues the concern about first
responder grants that are being cut. And I want to mention as
well the emergency management planning grants that go out to
communities are being cut and restricted. If our communities
cannot plan for a disaster, they will not know what to do if
something occurs. And I think it is really important that we
maintain our focus and our funds in that direction.
So those are some of the issues that I will raise in the
question and answer period. But again, Mr. Secretary, thank you
for the job you do for our country.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Patty Murray
I want to join you, Senator Byrd, and the rest of our colleagues in
welcoming Secretary Ridge today. He has been handed a tough task in a
very difficult time. I know he is committed to keeping our country
safe, and I thank him for his leadership.
Mr. Secretary, I want to work with you to ensure our budget will
actually deliver the security we both seek for our country.
Just last week, you joined President Bush at an event in Senator
Hollings' backyard at the Port of Charleston.
A White House press release described the event this way--quote--
``President Bush Focuses on Seaport and Cargo Security.'' He stood in
front of a Coast Guard cutter and a container barge, yet he only
focused on port security for about two minutes of his 30 minute speech.
Sadly that seems par-for-the-course for this White House.
The President offers a few words about port security here and
there, but does not make the financial commitment we need to actually
keep our ports safe.
And, the latest example came just last week with the President's
budget request.
The President wants to kill a promising port security initiative
called Operation Safe Commerce.
Mr. Secretary, as you know, our largest ports have been working to
improve cargo security through Operation Safe Commerce for the past 2
years. In fact, the first cargo ship using this innovative program will
arrive at the Port of Tacoma later this month, setting a new standard
for port security. The President's budget would end Operation Safe
Commerce.
That's just one disappointing example in this budget.
Here is another example: Last week the President's budget director
told me the White House is committed to implementing the Marine
Transportation Act. That's the law which will ensure all of our ports--
and the vessels calling on them--have approved security plans.
Mr. Bolton said the President was committed to implementing MTSA,
but his budget only provides 7 percent of the funding the Coast Guard
says is required.
And, here's a third example, the Administration is adding new
Homeland Security duties to the Coast Guard's mission without providing
the support necessary to accomplish these new tasks as well as its
traditional mission.
Mr. Secretary, we all agree that the Coast Guard is doing an
admirable job balancing its many missions. However, the Coast Guard is
stretched thin, and this budget stretches it further.
These brave men and women are working longer hours and doing more,
but the President's budget offers no relief.
It's one thing to give a speech in front of our Coast Guard assets
and quite another to actually provide the men and women of the Coast
Guard with the tools they need to do the job.
Words won't help protect our Nation's seaports, but--
--Operation Safe Commerce,
--adequate support for the Coast Guard,
--and funding for marine security plans will make our ports safer.
And that is my focus today.
I do have other concerns with this budget beyond port security, for
example:
I am concerned that first responder grants would be cut by more
than $800 million.
I am also concerned that Emergency Management Planning Grants would
be cut and restricted, putting our emergency management and response
system in jeopardy.
These are some of the issues I hope to explore with the Secretary
this morning.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
INVITATION TO SECRETARY RIDGE TO MAKE A STATEMENT
Mr. Secretary, we have a copy of the statement you
prepared. It will be made a part of the record. We invite you
to make any additional statement you think would be helpful to
our understanding of the budget request. You may proceed.
Secretary Ridge. Senator, if I might just highlight some of
the points for my opening address and summarize it briefly.
Senator Cochran. That will be fine.
STATEMENT OF SECRETARY TOM RIDGE
Secretary Ridge. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd, members of the subcommittee, I
am certainly grateful for the opportunity to appear before you
today and present the President's budget and priorities for the
Department of Homeland Security in the coming year.
With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security,
that charge was given to us, 22 different agencies and nearly
180,000 employees, brought together to pursue a single mission.
The recent ricin scare serves as a very difficult and poignant
and relevant reminder that terrorism is a threat that we must
confront each and every day with the same commitment and the
same sense of urgency we all remember from the day our Nation
was attacked 2 years ago.
As we prepare to celebrate the first year of the
department, it is important to remind the public that it has
been with the steadfast support of this Congress and the
resources you have provided that have made it possible for the
department to not only carry out a vigorous and ambitious slate
of security initiatives, but also to say to Americans with
confidence today that we are indeed safer.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS ACHIEVED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
We have strengthened airline security, increased vigilance
at our borders and ports, forged unprecedented partnerships
across the private sector and with State and local government,
improved information sharing, launched robust efforts to engage
citizens in preparedness efforts, and distributed funds and
resources for our dedicated first responders.
FISCAL YEAR 2005 BUDGET REQUEST
To highlight an observation made by Senator Byrd, his
analysis of the budget is correct. If you include the entire
BioShield amount within the $40.2 billion, it is a 10-percent
increase. If you add the nondiscretionary money and some of the
fee increases we request, it is about a 6-percent increase. And
then just with the discretionary money appropriated by
Congress, it is about a 4.4-percent increase. We believe the
increase in funding will provide the necessary resources we
need to expand and improve existing projects and programs, as
well as build new barriers to terrorists who wish to do us
harm.
prepared statement
I think the balance of my testimony highlights the areas
that we have sought an increase, Mr. Chairman. But since you
have the testimony as part of the record, I assume some or all
of it has been digested. I think it would probably be even more
useful for all of us just to engage in the kind of
conversation, the question and answer that has been so fruitful
in the past. If my entire statement is included as part of the
record, I would conclude by again thanking my colleagues in
public service for the opportunity to appear before you and
look forward to the ensuing conversation.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Tom Ridge
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd and Members of the Subcommittee: I am
honored and pleased to appear before the Committee to present President
Bush's fiscal year 2005 budget for the Department of Homeland Security.
Before beginning to outline our fiscal year 2005 budget request, I want
to thank you for the strong support you showed for the Department in
the fiscal year 2004 budget and for the fact that that appropriation
was passed in time for it to be signed by the President on October 1,
2003--the first day of the fiscal year.
The $40.2 billion request represents a ten percent increase in
resources available to the Department over the comparable fiscal year
2004 budget and reflects the Administration's strong and continued
commitment to the security of our homeland. The fiscal year 2005 budget
is a $3.6 billion increase over fiscal year 2004, and it includes
increased funding for new and expanded programs in border and port
security, transportation security, immigration enforcement and
services, biodefense, incident preparedness and response, and the
implementation of a new human resources system that will reward
outstanding performance. The budget also continues our momentum toward
integrating intelligence, operations and systems in a way that
increases our Nation's security.
The Department of Homeland Security has made great organizational
strides during the first year of operations. Nearly 180,000 employees
and a budget of $31.2 billion were brought under DHS less than a year
ago. The Department established a headquarters operation and
successfully began operations on March 1, 2003--bringing together the
legacy agencies and programs that now make up DHS. Customs, border and
immigration activities have been reformulated into new agencies that
will increase the effectiveness of our dedicated employees. DHS
continues to create new ways to share information and intelligence
within the Department and between levels of governments, and
horizontally across agencies and jurisdictions. Already, over 350
different management processes have been consolidated to 130, and DHS
has begun consolidating 2,500 support contracts into roughly 600.
While DHS invested considerable time to make the many
organizational improvements that will improve our effectiveness, much
was also accomplished programmatically. The fiscal year 2003
Performance and Accountability Report provides a comprehensive
discussion of our accomplishments of the past year. We believe that in
the twelve months since the creation of the Department, we have made
substantial progress. Through the hard work of our dedicated and
talented employees, America is more secure and better prepared than we
were one year ago.
We have achieved many results since our creation, including:
--improving the collection, analysis and sharing of critical
intelligence with key Federal, State and local entities;
--allocating or awarding over $8 billion to state and local first
responders to help them prevent and prepare to respond to acts
of terrorism and other potential disasters;
--strengthening border security through the ``One face at the
border'' initiative, which will cross-train officers to perform
three formerly separate inspections--immigration, customs and
agriculture. This will allow us to target our resources toward
higher risk travelers;
--instituting innovative new systems like US VISIT to identify and
track foreign visitors and students and to screen for possible
terrorist or criminal involvement;
--safeguarding air travel from the terrorist threat by hardening
cockpit doors, instituting 100 percent checked baggage
screening; and training more than 50,000 Federal passenger and
baggage screeners;
--increasing safeguards on maritime transportation and port
infrastructure;
--expanding research and development in the defense of our homeland,
through the creation of programs such as the Homeland Security
Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) which has already
engaged hundreds of private companies and universities in
developing new cutting-edge technologies;
--launching an ambitious, collaborative effort involving input from
employees at all levels, unions, academia, and outside experts
to design a modern human resources system that is mission-
centered, fair, effective and flexible;
--initiating a five-year budget and planning process and commencing
the development of an integrated business and financial
management system (Project eMerge2) to consolidate
the 50 different budget execution systems, 43 different general
ledgers, and 30 different procurement systems inherited by DHS;
and
--successfully transferring more than $50 billion in assets, $36
billion in liabilities and more than 180,000 employees to the
Department.
FISCAL YEAR 2005 BUDGET REQUEST
The fiscal year 2005 budget for the Department of Homeland Security
builds upon the significant investments to date to our safeguard
against terrorism, while also sustaining the many important
departmental activities not directly related to our fight against
terrorism. The President's budget clearly demonstrates the continuing
priority placed on the Department of Homeland Security in providing
total resources for fiscal year 2005 of $40.2 billion. This is an
increase of 10 percent above the comparable fiscal year 2004 resource
level, $9 billion (29 percent) over the 2003 level and $20.4 billion
(103 percent) over the 2001 level.
STRENGTHENING BORDER AND PORT SECURITY
Securing our border and transportation systems continues to be an
enormous challenge. Ports-of-entry into the United States stretch
across 7,500 miles of land border between the United States and Mexico
and Canada, 95,000 miles of shoreline and navigable rivers, and an
exclusive economic zone of 3.4 million square miles. Each year more
than 500 million people, 130 million motor vehicles, 2.5 million
railcars, and 5.7 million cargo containers must be processed at the
border. Conditions and venues vary considerably, from air and sea
ports-of-entry in metropolitan New York City with dozens of employees
to a two-person land entry point in North Dakota.
During fiscal year 2005, we will continue to strengthen our border
and port security. Our budget seeks over $400 million in new funding to
maintain and enhance border and port security activities, including the
expansion of pre-screening cargo containers in high-risk areas and the
detection of individuals attempting to illegally enter the United
States. Our budget also includes an 8 percent increase for the Coast
Guard to upgrade port security efforts, implement the Maritime
Transportation Security Act, and enhance other activities.
Specifically, our budget includes an increase of $25 million for
U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Container Security Initiative
(CSI) which focuses on pre-screening cargo before it reaches our
shores. We are also seeking an increase of $15.2 million for Customs
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). C-TPAT focuses on
partnerships all along the entire supply chain, from the factory floor,
to foreign vendors, to land borders and seaports. To date, nearly 3,000
importers, 600 carriers, and 1,000 brokers and freight forwarders are
participating in C-TPAT, surpassing the Department's original goal of
participation of the top 1,000 importers. In order to further protect
the homeland against radiological threats, the budget seeks $50 million
for next generation radiation detection monitors.
As well as continuing development for secure trade programs, the
President's budget also seeks an increase of $20.6 million to support
improvements for the National Targeting Center and multiple targeting
systems that focus on people and/or goods. These systems use
information from diverse sources to provide automated risk assessments
for arriving international air passengers, shipments of goods to our
country, and land border passenger traffic.
The United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
(US VISIT) program's goals are to enhance the security of our citizens
and our visitors; facilitate legitimate travel and trade across our
borders; ensure the integrity of our immigration system; and respect
the privacy of our welcomed visitors. US VISIT represents a major
milestone in our efforts to reform our borders. DHS deployed the first
increment of US VISIT on time, on budget, and has met the mandates
established by Congress as well as including biometrics ahead of
schedule. The budget seeks a total of $340 million in fiscal year 2005,
an increase of $12 million over the fiscal year 2004 level. Through
fiscal year 2005, over $1 billion will be used to support this
initiative.
Our budget also seeks an increase of $64.2 million to enhance land-
based detection and monitoring of movement between the ports, and $10
million to plan, procure, deploy and operate unmanned aerial vehicles.
In addition, the budget request for U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) includes an increase of $28 million to increase the
flight hours of P-3 aircraft. The P-3 has already proven itself to be a
key asset in the battle against terrorism as demonstrated in the days
immediately following the September 11, 2001 attacks when P-3s flew
airspace security missions over Atlanta and Miami.
The Coast Guard funding increase includes over $100 million to
implement the Maritime Transportation Security Act, to support the
Coast Guard's ability to develop, review and approve vessel and port
security plans, ensure that foreign vessels meet security standards,
improve underwater detection capabilities, and increase intelligence
capacity. The budget also maintains the Coast Guard's ongoing
Integrated Deepwater System initiative, funding the program at $678
million, an increase of $10 million over the fiscal year 2004 funding
level.
ENHANCING BIODEFENSE
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget reflects $2.5 billion for
Project BioShield that will be available in fiscal year 2005 to
encourage the development and pre-purchase of necessary medical
countermeasures against weapons of mass destruction. Project BioShield
allows the Federal Government to pre-purchase critically needed
vaccines and medications for biodefense as soon as experts agree that
they are safe and effective enough to be added to the Strategic
National Stockpile. The Administration is moving forward in purchasing
the most important countermeasures and high on the list are next-
generation vaccines for both smallpox and anthrax.
The Department's efforts to improve biosurveillance will involve
the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) and
Science and Technology (S&T) directorates. In S&T, the budget requests
$65 million increase to enhance current environmental monitoring
activities, bringing the total fiscal year 2005 investment in this area
to $118 million. One key component of this initiative will be an
expansion and deployment of the next generation of technologies related
to the BioWatch Program, a biosurveillance warning system. In IAIP, $11
million increase is included to integrate, in real-time,
biosurveillance data collected from sensors throughout the country and
fuse this data with information from health and agricultural
surveillance and other terrorist-threat information from the law
enforcement and intelligence communities.
The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) is responsible for
managing and coordinating the Federal medical response to major
emergencies and federally declared disasters. For 2005, FEMA's budget
includes $20 million for planning and exercises associated with medical
surge capabilities. In addition, the budget transfers funding ($400
million) for the Strategic National Stockpile to the Department of
Health and Human Services to better align the program with that
agency's medical expertise.
IMPROVING AVIATION SECURITY
We have made great strides to improve the safety of the aviation
system from acts of terrorism. For example, we have made significant
investments in baggage screening technology--over $2 billion to
purchase and install Explosive Detection System machines (EDS) and
Explosive Trace Detection machines (ETD) to the Nation's airports from
fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2005; hardened cockpit doors; deployed
45,000 Federal passenger and baggage screeners at the Nation's
airports; and trained pilots to be Federal Flight Deck Officers. The
President's fiscal year 2005 budget seeks to enhance our efforts in
this regard and would provide an increase of $892 million, a 20 percent
increase over the comparable fiscal year 2004 level, for the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Additional funding for
TSA supports aviation security, including efforts to maintain and
improve screener performance through the deployment of technology.
The Department implemented a substantially improved air cargo
security and screening program last year, and the President's budget
sustains funding to continue program deployment and screening
technology research. In addition, the fiscal year 2005 budget seeks a
total of $61 million to accelerate development of more effective
technologies to counter the threat of portable anti-aircraft missiles.
ENHANCING IMMIGRATION SECURITY AND ENFORCEMENT
Comprehensive immigration security and enforcement extends beyond
efforts at and between the ports-of-entry into the United States. It
extends overseas, to keep unwelcome persons from reaching our ports,
and to removing persons now illegally residing in the United States.
The Administration is committed to stronger workplace enforcement in
support of the President's temporary worker proposal announced January
7, 2004.
The requested increases include $186 million for U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE)--whose appropriated budget overall
increases by about 10 percent--to fund improvements in immigration
enforcement both domestically and overseas, including more than
doubling of current worksite enforcement efforts and approximately $100
million increase for the detention and removal of illegal aliens.
Detention and Removal of illegal aliens present in the United States is
critical to the enforcement of our immigration laws and the requested
funding will expand ongoing fugitive apprehension efforts, the removal
from the United States of jailed illegal aliens, and additional
detention and removal capacity.
Our proposal for ICE also includes an increase $78 million for
immigration enforcement. As part of the President's proposed new
temporary worker program to match willing foreign workers with willing
U.S. employers, enforcement of immigration laws against companies that
break the law and hire illegal workers will increase. The fiscal year
2005 President's Budget includes an additional $23 million for enhanced
worksite enforcement. This more than doubles existing funds devoted to
worksite enforcement and allows ICE to hire more Special Agents devoted
to this effort. With these resources, ICE will be able to facilitate
the implementation of the President's temporary worker program
initiative by establishing a traditional worksite enforcement program
that offers credible deterrence to the hiring of unauthorized workers.
Without such a deterrent, employers will have no incentive to maintain
a legal workforce.
Our budget also seeks $14 million to support our international
enforcement efforts related to immigration, including enabling ICE to
provide visa security by working cooperatively with U.S. consular
offices to review visa applications.
We are a welcoming Nation, and the hard work and strength of our
immigrants have made our Nation prosperous. Within the Department, the
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (CIS) has improved the
administration of immigration benefits to the more than seven million
annual applicants. For fiscal year 2005, the President's budget seeks
an additional $60 million, for a total of $140 million, to achieve a
six-month processing for all immigration applications by 2006, while
maintaining security.
INCREASING PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE CAPABILITY
Though the primary mission is to protect the Nation from terrorism,
the Department's responsibilities are diverse. The ships that interdict
threats to our homeland are also used to help mariners when they are in
distress and protect our marine resources from polluters and illegal
fishing. While we must be prepared to respond to terrorist attacks, we
are more often called upon to respond to natural disasters
To support the Department's efforts to respond, the President's
Budget includes an increase of $10 million, for a total of $35 million
in fiscal year 2005, for the Homeland Security Operations Center
(HSOC). Pursuant to the Initial National Response Plan, the HSOC
integrates and provides overall steady state threat monitoring and
situational awareness and domestic incident management on a 24/7 basis.
The HSOC maintains and provides situational awareness on homeland
security matters for the Secretary of Homeland Security, the White
House Homeland Security Council and the Federal community. In addition,
the HSOC provides the Department's critical interface to all Federal,
State, local & private sector entities to deter, detect, respond and
recover from threats and incidents.
The National Incident Management System (NIMS) is designed to
ensure that all levels of government work more efficiently and
effectively together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from
domestic emergencies and disasters, regardless of cause. For fiscal
year 2005, the Department requests $7 million to ensure that the major
NIMS concepts involving incident command, coordination, communication,
information management, resource management, etc., are incorporated
into and reflected in FEMA's national disaster operational capability.
This funding will provide for plan development, training, exercises and
resource typing at the Federal, State, and local levels
SUPPORTING STATE AND LOCAL FIRST RESPONDERS
The Department has initiated consolidation of the two principal
offices responsible for administering the grants awarding process for
emergency responders and State/local coordination, the Office of State
and Local Government Coordination and the Office of Domestic
Preparedness. This consolidation provides an opportunity to tie all DHS
terrorism preparedness programs together into a cohesive overall
national preparedness program designed to support implementation of
State Homeland Security Strategies.
The fiscal year 2005 budget continues to support the Nation's first
responders and seeks a total of $3.6 billion to support first-responder
terrorism preparedness grants with better targeting to high-threat
areas facing the greatest risk and vulnerability. For fiscal year 2005,
funding for the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) doubles from $727
million to $1.45 billion. Since March 1, 2003, DHS awarded or allotted
over $8 billion to support state and local preparedness. Between fiscal
year 2001 and the fiscal year 2005 budget request, over $14 billion in
assistance will be made available for programs now under DHS. Our
request for fiscal year 2005 is slightly higher than funding sought for
these programs in fiscal year 2004.
INVESTING IN HUMAN CAPITAL AND BUILDING DEPARTMENTAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Our employees are our single greatest asset and we are committed to
investing in the development and motivation of our workforce. To
support our efforts in creating a model personnel system, the
President's fiscal year 2005 budget seeks $133.5 million for the
implementation of a new DHS human resources system that is mission-
centered, fair, and flexible by rewarding top performers. The fiscal
year 2005 budget specifically provides additional resources that will
be used for training supervisory personnel to administer a performance-
based pay system and to create the information technology framework for
the new system. Our new system will ensure that DHS can manage and
deploy its resources to best address homeland security threats and
support information technology tools for workforce management.
We also seek additional funds to invest in the Department's core
infrastructure. Our budget request seeks a total of $56 million, an
increase of $17 million to support a new resource management system.
This funding will support the design, development, and implementation
for a single Department-wide financial management system. It will
provide decision-makers with critical business information, e.g.,
budget, accounting, procurement, grants, assets, travel, in near
``real-time'' and eliminate stovepipes within existing systems and
processes.
An increase of $45.1 million is also sought to continue expanding
the DHS presence at the Nebraska Avenue Complex (NAC). These resources
will enable DHS to perform tenant improvements to the facility and
relocate U.S. Navy operations, pursuant to congressional authorization,
from the NAC to leased facilities.
CONCLUSION
We have a dedicated and skilled team in DHS who understand that
what they are doing is important. We have the support of our partners
in government and the public and private sectors. I thank the Congress
for its support, which has been critical to bringing us to this point.
Our homeland is safer than it was a year ago, but we live in
dangerous times and cannot count on times to change. That is why the
Department of Homeland Security was created, and why we are moving
forward. I am grateful to be here today to talk about the work we are
doing to make America a safer home for us, for our children and
generations to come.
Thank you for inviting me to appear before me today, and I look
forward to answering your questions.
STATUS OF RICIN INCIDENT INVESTIGATION
Senator Cochran. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. I
think one of the most recent events that has attracted
everybody's attention here in Washington and certainly affected
this very building we are having the hearing in today is the
ricin incident that was discovered in the office of Senator
Bill Frist here in the Dirksen Building. Could you tell us what
the status of that investigation is? Has it been determined
whether this toxin was delivered by mail or in what way this
happened, or are we still trying to determine these events?
Secretary Ridge. Senator, it is my understanding that the
focal point of the investigation initially has been with the
Capitol Police. The FBI has and is prepared to continue to
assist. I do not believe there are any further developments
beyond what has been transmitted in the newspapers. We still
have no idea who may have been responsible for it. To my
knowledge, to date we have not identified if it was a letter
that was in which the contents were contained that broke open
during the screening process. So again, it is an ongoing
investigation. And I think your Capitol police have the lead.
As it was related to me, I am not sure there is enough of
the ricin that has been preserved for more detailed analysis.
And that will probably impede the investigation somewhat. But
even if it is true, obviously the resources of the FBI, the
Capitol Police, and others are committed to trying the very
best to identify the source.
INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT CANCELLATIONS
Senator Cochran. One other recent event that Senator
Mikulski mentioned was during the holiday season; there were
several international flights that were canceled. Suspicion of
possible terrorist activity was reported in the news as the
reason for that. We heard from some airline executives and
ambassadors from foreign countries how cancellation of flights
like this caused disruption of service and make it difficult
for the traveling public to make plans in the future. But, we
understand the overriding importance of trying to guarantee the
safety of our homeland.
Do you think the department was justified in the
cancellation of these flights and whether this indicates that
we are under continued threats of terrorist activity in the use
of intercontinental flights in the future?
Secretary Ridge. Senator, the decisions to cancel those
flights were obviously made in consultation with our allies in
Great Britain and in France and in Mexico. Obviously, we note
from the very outset the extraordinary inconvenience it causes
probably a couple thousand passengers. We understand that.
Trying to put it in context, I dare say that this week in
international aviation there will probably be more
cancellations for mechanical failure and for weather than were
seen when we canceled it for potential terrorist activity. So
we do try to put it in context but clearly with the
understanding that we need to try to keep commercial aviation
both safe and flying.
FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS ON INTERNATIONAL FLIGHTS
A couple of concerns that were expressed to you by the
ambassadors had to do with the executive amendments that I
directed to be sent out specifically to the airlines with
regard to the ability upon request to put Federal air marshals
on those international flights. While I do not regret the
decision to send that directive out, it would have been more
appropriate had there been more time to send the notification
out through diplomatic channels first, rather than dealing
directly with the airlines. So I understand that completely.
Since that time, however, our discussions with, again, Air
France, Great Britain, British Airways, and others, we are
working on a protocol, one that will give us an opportunity to
deal government to government first. We all agree that is the
best way to do it, to share intelligence about these flights
and review that as far enough in advance as we possibly can to
avoid either delays or the cancellations in the future. But
given the threat stream reporting that we saw, it was a
collective judgment that, under all the circumstances as we
knew them, it was a collective decision to cancel those
flights. And I think it was a very appropriate decision.
AVIATION SECURITY
A continuing concern we have, Senator, with regard to
aviation security is reflected in the threat streams where
there are continuing references from multiple sources, in spite
of the additional security measures we have taken on domestic
and international flights, that terrorists would still seek to
target those flights for possible terrorist actions. So we are
mindful that they do like to go back to targets and tactics
that they used previously. That is why our guard remains up and
remains vigilant.
TERRORIST THREAT INTEGRATION CENTER
Senator Cochran. I am going to ask one other question and
hope that all Senators will be aware that we will have ample
opportunity to ask whatever questions any senator has. But, I
am going to limit my time to 5 minutes and hope other Senators
will do that as well in the first round of questions, and then
we can go back and revisit any issues that remain important to
discuss.
Let me ask you one final question in this round, and that
is your evaluation of the effectiveness of the intelligence-
gathering center that was created in the Department of Homeland
Security to integrate and bring together intelligence that is
available to the department to assess the threat status that we
may face, the potential terrorist attacks that may be planned
by others. It is the Terrorist Threat Integration Center
(TTIC). What is your evaluation of that? Is it working? Do you
have the funding that you need, if this budget request is
followed, to carry out the intelligence role that the
department has established for itself?
Secretary Ridge. Senator, the Congress has been very
generous to the Department in providing several hundred million
dollars to set up the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate. That is our analytical arm. And it is
through those dollars that we expanded probably $15 million or
$20 million last year as our contribution to the Terrorist
Threat Integration Center. We have analysts in that Threat
Integration Center. It is the coordination point for
information from the entire intelligence community as it
relates to homeland security issues.
We are very comfortable with the relationship. Congress has
vested in us the authority and the responsibility to go back to
anywhere we deem necessary within the intelligence community to
put intelligence requirements on the CIA or TTIC to give us
more additional information, if we have questions and seek
answers.
So as the TTIC evolves and as our agency matures, the
relationship gets better and better every day.
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
Senator Byrd.
UNDERFUNDED AND UNDERSTAFFED IMMIGRATION SYSTEM
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary, our immigration
system is underfunded and understaffed. The Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement has just over 13,000
criminal investigators to, among its many other
responsibilities, locate and remove 8 million to 12 million
illegal aliens. Following the passage of the 1986 amnesty for
2.7 million illegal aliens, the INS had to open temporary
offices, hire new workers, and divert resources from
enforcement areas to process amnesty applicants. The result was
chaos that produced rampant fraud.
IMPACT OF PRESIDENT'S AMNESTY PROPOSAL
The backlog of immigrant applications is even larger today,
six million and rising. The President's amnesty proposal would
dump another eight million immigrant applications on an already
beleaguered immigration system.
It took only 19 temporary visa holders to slip through the
system to unleash the horror of the September 11 attacks. The
President's amnesty would shove 8 million illegal aliens
through our security system, many of whom have never gone
through any background check. If there are no new resources in
the budget to implement the President's amnesty proposal, the
implementation of the reform proposal would create incredible
stresses on an already overly stressed border security system.
It is a recipe for disaster.
While I note that the budget has several modest proposals
to deal with existing shortcomings, could you explain to the
committee how much additional money is included in the
President's budget to implement the President's amnesty
proposal?
Secretary Ridge. Senator, there are, as you pointed out,
increases in several areas within the budget, not specifically
related to the President's proposal, inasmuch as the President
laid out some principles, recognizing the reality of several
million undocumented aliens who present in this country,
recognizing that we need to validate their presence, which is
far different than pushing them to the front of the line for
citizenship purposes, and also recognizing the need that once
he stated the principles, that this is an issue of high
visibility and probably considerable controversy. And whether
we can get it done this year or next year remains to be seen.
But I think the President offered the proposal,
understanding that once the Congress worked its will around the
principles that he enunciated, that there would be adequate
resources, depending on the kind of program that Congress
enacted to enforce it. Senator, I could not agree with you
more. Our ability to take the President's proposal and to
fashion a satisfactory conclusion will require an investment of
resources for enforcement. That number, that amount remains to
be calculated based on the kind of program that the Congress,
working with the administration, designs.
I will tell you in the meantime, Senator, the increases
that are reflected in this budget are for detention beds, are
for more surveillance equipment along the borders. We are going
to use in pilot form this year, Senator, some additional
technology along the borders to deal with, as best we can, the
continued flow of illegal immigrants across the border. But I
think the broader issue of the resources necessary to make sure
that the President's initiative and the congressional
initiative is fully enforced. That is a discussion to be had at
a later date.
Senator Byrd. To be had when?
Secretary Ridge. At a later date, Senator.
LEGACY INS PROGRAM FUNDING
Senator Byrd. Yes. Well, I understand that. The increases
for a number of the programs in the budget are directed to
ongoing and long underfunded legacy INS activities, and not to
the President's new initiative. I recognize that there are
increases in your budget for fugitive operations and the
institutional removal program, legal program backlog
elimination. But these increases merely reflect the direction
of much-needed additional dollars to perform the tasks that
your agencies must do in any event.
For instance, from 1992 to 2002, the number of worksite
enforcement investigations dropped from 1,063 to just 13. These
activities represent ongoing programs which your department
inherited upon the abolition of the long-maligned Immigration
and Naturalization Service. What new resources are you
requesting specifically, understanding that the Congress has
yet to act, of course, if it does, when it does? What new
resources are you requesting that specifically will be used to
implement an alien amnesty program in the event that such is
legislated into law?
REQUEST FOR FUGITIVE OPERATIONS TEAMS
Secretary Ridge. Senator, there are two areas of increase
that we requested to help with contemporary enforcement of the
law as it exists today. It does not speak to any changes in the
law that may exist tomorrow. But we have requested an increase
of $50 million for 30 additional fugitive operations teams so
that the people we have identified as absconders, those
individuals who have either had their hearing and have been
determined after the hearing process basically to be persona
non grata, to exit this country, or those who refuse to show
for their hearing and therefore lost any legitimacy to their
presence. We want to basically nearly triple the amount of
those teams. So there is $50 million for that.
REQUEST FOR WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT
I believe, Senator, we have asked for an additional $20-
some million to assist with more agents to deal with workforce
enforcement. So the additional dollars for the detention beds,
for the fugitive operations team, and for the workplace
enforcement are consistent with the needs based on the law as
it exists. But as I said before, clearly, once Congress works
its will, if it chooses to do so, around the President's
initiatives, matching willing worker with willing employer,
will obviously need additional resources. That cannot be
denied.
RESOURCES REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT THE PRESIDENT'S AMNESTY PROGRAM
Senator Byrd. Well, looking at the plan that has been
proposed by the President, Mr. Secretary, how much do you
believe would be necessary to implement the President's
principles, as set forth in that plan?
Secretary Ridge. Senator, at this point, it would be the
grossest form of speculation. And I choose not to engage--the
Senator has asked a serious question. He deserves a serious
answer. And at this juncture, since the President has just
articulated some principles that he would like to see embodied
in a piece of legislation, again, it really depends on the
legislation and the mandates associated with the legislation
for us to determine how many additional agents we might need,
perhaps the use of additional technology along the borders. So
it is very difficult for us to make that determination at this
point, Senator.
Senator Byrd. Are you suggesting, Mr. Secretary----
Secretary Ridge. Well, the only thing I could tell you,
Senator, is we will need more.
Senator Byrd. I would expect that answer. Are you
suggesting that there are no estimates around what the
President's plan would cost?
Secretary Ridge. I suggest to you, Senator, that we can in
time develop some internal estimates, but we have no final
figures now, again, because we do not know what mandates or the
requirements that Congress may impose on the Executive Branch
in order to fulfill the goals of the legislation.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will pursue this a
bit further.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Gregg.
Senator Gregg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Governor, I call you Governor----
Secretary Ridge. Good.
Senator Gregg [continuing]. Because as a former Governor,
we all recognize that is the most significant position.
Secretary Ridge. I have a response, Governor.
AL QAEDA
Senator Gregg. On 9/11 we were attacked, obviously. And the
attack was generated by the Islamic fundamentalist movement,
which is called al Qaeda, which has a lot of different forms
that it has mutated into across the world. What is the number
one threat today that your agency considers it must address in
the area of an attack on our country? Where does it come from
and what is it?
Secretary Ridge. Are you talking, Senator, necessarily the
individuals or the type of attack?
Senator Gregg. First the individuals.
Secretary Ridge. Clearly al Qaeda.
SOURCE OF MOST SIGNIFICANT THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES
Senator Gregg. Where do you--what do you see as the source
of the most significant threat to our country? And what do you
see as the potential target or type of threat which they
represent?
Secretary Ridge. Senator, we still look at al Qaeda as the
major international terrorist organization that we need to
combat and to deal with. But as--I think you used the right
word in your question. There are a lot of mutations that have
developed. I mean, al Qaeda can be seen as, one, a very close
group of very disciplined leaders who have had tactical control
over and operational control of the attacks on 9/11.
But since that time, we have obviously disrupted their
communications. We have decapitated a lot of their leadership.
And one of the concerns that, I think, all of us have is that
the individual cells, many of whom have been loosely connected
to the al Qaeda structure now, because of the decapitation,
because of the difficulty in communication, may have a tendency
to operate on themselves, operate on their own rather than
having a direct control from bin Laden and that small group of
people associated with planning that attack.
So again, it is al Qaeda, the organization. But over the
period of time we have identified obviously the change in its
structure and, therefore, probably the change in the kind of
terrorist groups that are prepared to operate even
independently.
The same notion of Jihad, but not quite as directly
connected to al Qaeda. And we know they train thousands in
Afghanistan. The extremist schools have been pumping out
students of hatred, who look at this country as evil and vile
and have joined different forms of the Jihadist movement.
Senator Gregg. It is still Islamic fundamentalism.
Secretary Ridge. Correct.
PRIMARY THREAT, TARGET, AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS
Senator Gregg. And what do you see, the second question
was, what do you see as the primary threat, target, delivery
systems?
Secretary Ridge. First of all, from an operational point of
view, Senator, when it comes to research and development, we
need to spend a great deal of time just looking at weapons of
mass destruction, massive catastrophic effects, radiological,
nuclear, biological, and chemical. The threat reporting stream
that we pay attention to still on a regular basis identifies
aviation, still talks about potential biological attacks. There
continue to be, on a fairly consistent basis, generic
references to just about every kind of attack imaginable under
WMD weapons.
And so while we have focused on aviation security that was
the congressional focus, that is what TSA was initially focused
on, we have also gone out now to start worrying about
vulnerabilities that exist elsewhere that could be used as
either a target or a mechanism to deliver any of those kinds of
weapons.
Senator Gregg. That being laid down as a premise--and I
obviously think you are absolutely right, and you are the
expert, and I think you are on track--which is the threat is
fundamentalist Islam and the threat is the potential that they
use a weapon of mass destruction or some mutation of that
against us, what then becomes the priorities within your
department as to how to respond to that?
And should not counterintelligence be the number one event?
Because, obviously, we cannot tolerate a weapon of mass
destruction attack. And should not the capacity to deal with
weapons of mass destruction be the number two? Or what is your
prioritization of how you respond to those two items of threat,
the people who would cause it and what it involves?
Secretary Ridge. Well, clearly, our primary responsibility
in dealing with the environment that you and I agree exists is
to prevent, deter, respond, and prevent the terrorist attack.
But the point of that spear is the military and the CIA and the
FBI. We do have a role in preventing the attack in that when we
get actionable information or information that is relevant to
protecting a particular site in this country, we are obliged,
and it is part of our mission, to take action to protect that
site.
REDUCING VULNERABILITY TO TERRORIST ATTACKS
But basically, our primary mission is to help reduce our
vulnerability to those kinds of attacks. That is the primary
mission of the Information Analysis Unit, because we have been
given the charge by Congress to take whatever information we
get that we deem credible, map it against the potential
vulnerability, and make sure that we do everything possible to
harden that particular target or targets to reduce the risk of
a potential attack.
So I think we have set priorities in our Science and
Technology Directorate. Some of the first grants have gone out
to deal with the technology of detection and protection. And so
as we take a look to combat a potential biological attack, we
are expanding again, because the Congress has given us hundreds
of millions of dollars to conduct this research. The technology
of detecting a bioagent, be it in a community, in a subway, in
a form of transportation, is something that is a very, very
high priority. The technology of protection is equally as
important to us, because in the event we ask our first
responders to get out and assist those who have been impacted
by a biological event, we want them to not only know the kind
of environment they are going into, but be protected against
the effects of that environment.
So we have set priorities in the science and technology
area. We have set process of setting priorities in the critical
infrastructure piece. We cannot, Senator, possibly expect
that--we have to set priorities when it comes to infrastructure
protection.
We have targeted, for example, in chemical facilities. We
have already conducted, I think, nearly 20 site visits of the
largest facilities that we believe, if they were a target of a
terrorist attack, would have the most catastrophic
consequences, particularly in the loss of human life and
developing standards of security and prevention that we would
think these companies need to apply at these specific places.
We are going to develop those standards for energy and
telecommunication sites and the like.
So we have set priorities within each individual unit.
Although generically, every day we worry about different forms
of attack from a weapon or weapons of mass destruction.
Senator Cochran. The time of the Senator has expired.
Senator Harkin.
Senator Harkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CUTS IN GRANTS TO STATES TO UPGRADE THEIR PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEMS
Mr. Secretary, I understand that grants to States to
upgrade their public health systems are being cut by $105
million in the fiscal year 2005 budget to provide funds for
your biosurveillance initiative. Mr. Secretary, our State and
local public health infrastructure has been allowed to
deteriorate. These funds to upgrade our State and public health
systems are necessary, not only to protect Americans from
bioterrorism but also to protect Americans from natural
outbreaks of disease, like SARS and West Nile Virus.
In my own state, we have used these funds to increase the
number of epidemiologists in the field and increase the number
of scientists in our labs. With a cut in their State funding
grant, they will have to make cuts in these important programs.
Why has the administration chosen to cut funding for public
health improvements when we still have a long way to go before
our public health system is where it should be?
Secretary Ridge. First of all, Senator, I cannot speak
necessarily to the Health and Human Services budget. I am aware
of a biosurveillance initiative that both Secretary Thompson
and I are working on that is part of the President's budget
that I believe is--while it may be viewed as simply an anti-
terrorism initiative, it is really a public health initiative.
And that is the biosurveillance piece that Secretary Thompson
and I announced about a week or 10 days ago, where, through a
combination of funds from the Department of Homeland Security
and from Health and Human Services totaling nearly $275
million, that we will connect multiple sources of information
from hospitals, pharmacies, veterinary clinics, and the like to
determine to have a national surveillance system.
And I think public health experts would agree that the most
important thing we can do in terms of public health is to
identify, as early as possible, whatever bioagents are plaguing
a community or communities. Now that is whether it is a
terrorist has conducted a biological attack or that mother
nature threw something at us.
So again, I think the $275 million that is part of the
President's budget is a very, very significant improvement in
the country's and the public health community's ability to
detect and therefore respond more quickly and save more lives.
So I think it is a very significant initiative. And I really
cannot speak to other adjustments that may have been made in
that budget, because I do not know.
Senator Harkin. I was just concerned about the cut in the
funds for the public health system. It seemed like that $105
million cut was shifted to biosurveillance. I have no problem
with it. I agree with everything you have just said. I was just
concerned about the cuts.
Secretary Ridge. Senator, I am sorry. I did not mean to
interrupt.
Senator Harkin. That is okay.
Secretary Ridge. Congress was very generous, I believe, in
2002, maybe it was the supplemental, where there was, I think,
$2.2 billion sent out to the States and locals. And it is my
understanding that some of that money is yet to be called down.
It is still awaiting allocation to the States or the
communities. So again, I cannot speak to that specifically, but
that is my understanding.
AGRO-TERRORISM CONCERNS
Senator Harkin. I will take a look at that. My last
question had to deal with what I raised in my opening
statement. And that was about agro-terrorism, as we have called
it here. You know, again, we have seen what has happened with
mad cow disease. But diseases do not have to jump to humans to
cause widespread panic. A gallon of suspicious milk would cause
every parent in America to demand answers from the government
immediately. It is not just a Midwestern issue. We have 10,000
hogs that are trucked out of North Carolina every day. And as
we know, meat slaughtered in one place might wind up all over
America within 24 hours from one point.
So I guess my question is: In this budget, can you assure
us that the needs of the rural areas and farm communities will
continue to be met? And just briefly, are you satisfied that
you are integrating this agriculture and the possibility of
agro-terrorism possible threats in the future, that you are
fully integrating this into your threat assessments?
Secretary Ridge. Well, first of all, Senator, I will assure
you that any information that we have with regard to agro-
terrorism where credible and corroborated, we communicate to
the people that need to know. Secondly, I believe there is a
rather substantial initiative in the budget for the Department
of Agriculture that speaks to address some of the legitimate
concerns that you have identified today.
And thirdly, you should know that we are working on an
interesting project that Homeland Security will fund in part
with Iowa's governor and Homeland Security advisor, where you
are pulling together a multiple State consortia to deal with
the transfer of information and analysis, I guess using some of
the labs. And I think his Homeland Security advisor has been or
is scheduled to come in town so we could work the funding
requirements out and collaborate our work in the Homeland
Security with the Department of Agriculture.
Senator Harkin. I was glad to hear you are working with the
multi-state partnership for security and agriculture.
Secretary Ridge. Right.
Senator Cochran. The time of the Senator has expired.
Senator Harkin. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Stevens.
NEW DHS REGULATIONS SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING REQUIREMENTS
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As I
indicated, I would like to put a question concerning the
national alert system and also, Mr. Secretary, or Governor, if
you prefer, I have a copy of a letter that our Governor, former
Senator Murkowski, wrote to you. And I would like to put it in
the record and ask you if you have responded to that, if you
would give me a copy of the response to his letter.
I want to ask you a little bit more mundane question,
though. Your bill, appropriations bill, was approved in the
regular order. As Senator Byrd and I said, it went across the
floor, went to conference, was signed by the President
separately before the omnibus bill. How is your department
doing? Are we looking forward to any kind of a supplemental
request from your department before October 1?
Secretary Ridge. No, sir.
[The information follows:]
Letter From Frank H. Murkowski
State of Alaska,
Office of the Governor,
Juneau, February 9, 2004.
Hon. Tom Ridge,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Secretary: Alaskans have great respect for the Department
of Homeland Security's (DHS) mission to protect the Nation against
further terrorist attacks, guard our borders and airports, and protect
our critical infrastructure. At the same time, DHS is also charged with
protecting the rights of American citizens and enhancing public
services. These sometimes conflicting obligations seem to require that
the DHS be ever mindful of the impacts new regulations will have on the
U.S. economy. Providing for the Nation's security while maintaining
economic stability within our country is indeed a challenge. I don't
envy the task.
Please let me relate my perception of how some recent DHS actions
have impacted Alaska as well as the Nation's security. On August 2,
2003, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) published in
the Federal Register a notification suspending the Transit-without-Visa
(TWOV)/International-to-International (ITI) program. This suspension
requires all international passengers transiting Alaska to obtain a
U.S. visa for a 2-hour technical fuel stop, even at a special, secure
transit facility. The new visa requirement caused Cathay Pacific
Airways to move all passenger operations from Ted Stevens Anchorage
International Airport (Anchorage) to Vancouver, British Columbia,
Canada to avoid that burden.
On December 22, 2003, the DHS increased the threat level to
``Orange'' status. The increase in threat level immediately suspended
Progressive Clearance. The threat level was reduced to ``Yellow''
status on January 9, 2004; however, Progressive Clearance suspension
remained in effect until February 6, 2004. Suspension of this program
requires Korean Air to do full clearance at the first port of entry,
even if the ``entry'' is merely a refueling stop for almost all
passengers. The airline must download all of the bags, forcing the
passengers who would otherwise never leave the secure transit facility,
to instead leave that area and proceed to an unsecure area to claim
their bags.
Not only does the airline have to upload all the bags again, but
all passengers, having been forced to leave the sterile CBP processing
area, must be rescreened. This requires an extended ground time and
doubles ground handling costs incurred in Anchorage.
On December 5, 2003, the CBP published a Final Rule in the Federal
Register to implement a new regulation requiring all carriers, foreign
and domestic, to submit electronic manifests to CBP for all cargo
destined for the Unites States. These new regulations will put an
extreme hardship on the cargo carriers transiting Alaska between Asia
and Europe, and places Alaska's key role in that transit at risk.
Again, these carriers have to option to move operations to a foreign
country to avoid new security regulations.
These new regulations have already caused the loss of 14 weekly
international passenger flights and could cause the loss of up to 54
international cargo flights per week to the State of Alaska.
The State Department and the DHS have stared their intention to
reinstate the TWOV/ITI programs and operate as the ``Air Transit
Program''. But to date, CBP has not advanced the program further.
Anchorage is one of only six airports in the Nation that currently
conform to Customs and Border Protection facility requirements.
Anchorage has spent a great deal of money to reconfigure our
international passenger terminal to ensure it meets the requirements to
maintain the ITI and TWOV programs.
The TWOV and ITI programs operate in Anchorage differently than any
other airport in the Nation. Anchorage is a technical stop for Cathay
Pacific between Hong Kong and Toronto, All passengers participating in
the ITI and TWOV programs arrive and depart on the same carrier, same
flight, and same aircraft from the same gate.
The suspension of this program has been detrimental in two ways to
the United States. The first and foremost was a reduction in overall
border security; the United States lost the ability to scrutinize and
crosscheck these passengers against all U.S. security databases.
The second is the negative economic impact to the State of Alaska,
as well as the city of Anchorage. The loss of these Cathay Pacific
flights cost the State over $1.1 million each month. It has also caused
many of the airport tenants to reduce staff that normally support these
flights.
In summary, Anchorage has a secure passenger transit facility that
conforms to CBP technical requirements. We have securely processed
these passengers for years into the terminal building and right back
onto the same aircraft. We believe that the program increases U.S.
security overall.
In the Final Rule (RIN 1651-AA49) CBP's own analysis shows the new
Advanced Cargo Information provision will cost air carriers substantial
amounts of money to implement. CBP estimates the total annualized cost
to air carriers could range from $345 million to $4.7 billion. These
costs include not only implementation of new systems, procedures, and
equipment but also the cost of delays and service degradation.
All Asia-Europe flights currently transiting Alaska have the option
of flying instead through Russia enroute to Europe. At this point, the
routing through Alaska is more efficient and economical for the
carriers. It may be less efficient and more costly than flying through
Russia after implementation of these regulations.
A single wide-body cargo tech stop is worth approximately $25,000
to the local economy in airport fees, airport services, crew lodging,
and fuel in Alaska. Each week Anchorage and Fairbanks have 54
international in-transit flights. Flights re-routed through other
airports would cost the State economy $1,350,000 each week and
$70,200,000 each year.
All of these new regulations are intended to increase the level of
security; however, if the new regulations cause carriers to avoid
entering the United States we lose on two fronts. One, the economic
loss from the business going to another country, and secondly, and more
importantly, we lose the opportunity to have a cursory review, under
existing programs, of the passengers and cargo on these flights
transiting Alaska. The unfortunate outcome of these flights rerouting
to other countries is a reduction in the overall level of security.
I request that you please review the overall impacts of all new
regulations, but specifically these three regulatory programs. I ask
that the DHS/CBP permanently reinstate the TWOV/ITI and Progressive
Clearance programs for international passenger flights transiting
Alaska and exempt international-to-international transit cargo
freighter flights operating through Alaska from the cargo manifest
requirements. Granting our request not only protects U.S. economic
interests but also improves and enhances U.S. intelligence and total
security.
Sincerely yours,
Frank H. Murkowski,
Governor.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much.
Thank you very much, Mr. Senator.
Senator Cochran. Senator Mikulski.
CONSOLIDATION OF GRANT PROGRAMS INTO THE OFFICE FOR STATE AND LOCAL
COORDINATION AND PREPAREDNESS
Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, as I indicated, I am disappointed in the
funding for both fire grants and port and cargo security. But
we will be arguing those within the committee. I would like to
come back to some of the policy issues raised in your testimony
and on your plans. This goes to the fact that one of the
biggest changes in the Homeland Security budget that is
proposed is the combining of 24 grant programs from TSA, FEMA,
Office of Domestic Preparedness, into something call the Office
for State and Local Coordination and Preparedness.
Could you tell me, number one, what is the rationale? And
how will this make it more efficient and effective? Because
this is a whole new thing. And, of course, you are aware of the
mayors' criticisms that money from Homeland is not getting down
to them.
Secretary Ridge. Senator, there are several parts to your
question. I hope I can address all of them in my response.
During the past year, consistent with the President's national
strategy, but also consistent with many of the concerns that I
have heard from your colleagues in Congress, there has really
been publicly expressed a preference to be able to go to one
place within the Department of Homeland Security to access all
the grants for State and locals.
And heretofore, it was scattered over three or four
different units. And so the consolidation of the 24 grants
within this new office gives us an opportunity, one, I think,
to develop a much more effective delivery system and hopefully
in time to make the awarding of the grants simpler. There will
always be a question of how much. And that is always going to
be debated on the Hill as to how much money should be put in
the grant programs.
But the Congress has said, and the President wants us, once
the dollar determination is made, is get the dollars out as
quickly as possible. We think it will certainly help with
coordinating the planning and the implementation and clearly
the assessment. Several Senators have commented today that we
need to start looking at the effectiveness of the dollars we
have sent out to the community.
So what we will set up within this new department, there
will be a single portal. There will be one website that folks
can go to get the information they need. They will develop
relationships, I think the personal-professional relationships
with the people in this one unit. We will draw down on the
expertise from TSA and FEMA to make sure that the grant
programs are administered as effectively as possible.
We told our friends in the fire community, even though the
fire grant program is moving from FEMA to the new facility, it
will still be peer review. The grants will still be made
specifically to the firefighters. And they will not see
effectively any change. And the debate will continue to be how
much money they put in the program.
IMPACT OF TRANSFER OF GRANT PROGRAMS FROM FEMA
Senator Mikulski. Mr. Secretary, may I jump in here?
So is FEMA moving to this office----
Secretary Ridge. No.
Senator Mikulski [continuing]. Or categories of FEMA, like
the fire grant program and the emergency management performance
grants?
Secretary Ridge. Yes. Those grants will be moved to this
new unit. But FEMA still operates under the Emergency and
Preparedness Response Unit of the department. And FEMA
continues to maintain authority over grants that relate to
natural disasters, the administration of the natural disaster
relief programs, the natural mitigation program. They are still
responsible for flood mapping. So they retain some of their
traditional responsibilities. But some of those programs that
had to do with terrorism and preparedness for terrorist event
move into this new unit within the department.
Senator Mikulski. What about the criticism of the mayors?
DELIVERY OF STATE AND LOCAL DOLLARS
Secretary Ridge. The mayors have voiced publicly and
privately on many times their frustration with the delivery
mechanism to get the dollars that you appropriated, that we
requested, you appropriated to get it down to them. I would
assure you, Senator, that we are prepared to deliver those
dollars. The logjam that we need to break, if not blow up, has
to do with the communications between the mayors and the
governors and how they distribute those dollars. Because we
have asked the governors to take the lead in developing a
statewide strategy.
Congress has said 20 percent can stay in the State capital.
The other 80 percent has to flow through down to the mayors.
Their frustration, I think, is legitimate. I think there are
many reasons for it. We are going to take a look at some of the
States where the money has been practically all distributed,
where people are not complaining, to see if we can develop some
best practices that we will go back to the governors with and
get them to use them. And if we need to put it in terms of a
regulation so that they distribute the dollars that way, we
will.
I plan on meeting with the governors privately, when they
come into town in a couple weeks, to address that very
legitimate frustration that some of the mayors have directly.
We need to do everything we can to avoid just sending out
grants to thousands and thousands of municipalities because we
will never be able to build a statewide and then a national
infrastructure. So the mayors are right. We have to do a better
job of getting the money to them. We are prepared to distribute
it, but we need to work with the mayors and the governors to
come up with a better distribution mechanism.
Senator Mikulski. Well, just two points, Mr. Secretary.
First of all, I am glad that you are going to meet with the
Governors. You are part of that unique organization. And I
think you understand their needs. And what we saw with
hurricane Isabel, for example, it was a statewide catastrophe.
And we needed Governor Ehrlich's response and local response.
So we need you to work with the Governor and figure out how to
effectively coordinate.
The second thing, in terms of this new one stop shop, I
would really invite your staff to meet with mine so that we
truly understand it. A lot of us have put a lot of effort into
establishing these grant programs. And the idea of a one-stop
shop seems very attractive. But we also want to know how that
also enables this effective coordination. Because if we do not
coordinate, this is not going to work.
So thank you very much. And again, many thanks for all that
you helped us with.
Secretary Ridge. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Murray.
Senator Murray. I would be happy to defer to Senator
Domenici, if he would----
Senator Cochran. Senator Domenici.
Senator Domenici. Well, thank you very much. Am I on? Can
you hear me?
Senator Cochran. Yes, sir. Thank you, sir.
Senator Domenici. First, Mr. Secretary, it is nice to be
with you.
Secretary Ridge. Thank you, sir,
Senator Domenici. I do not get an opportunity to visit with
you very often. I am very proud of what you have been doing. I
am fully aware it has not been an easy thing.
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER (FLETC) IN ARTESIA, NEW MEXICO
The reason I am going to bring a very small issue to you is
because I do not think continuing to communicate with the
department brings results. No aspersions. But in our State of
New Mexico, we have an institution called FLETC, the Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center, Artesia, in New Mexico. FLETC-
Artesia is a pretty big place, which grew over a decade from a
college center to a fully run and operated Federal law
enforcement training center.
Needless to say, that part of New Mexico is very proud of
it, as we are. We are now training, expanding the training
base. As you know, hundreds of new U.S. marshals are being
required to be trained. FLETC is also the campus chosen to
provide training for airline pilots who choose to carry
firearms in the cockpit, and that is an election. FLETC
provides this training to Federal flight deck officers. in
addition to the basic advance training.
Now feedback from these trainees who have been in Artesia
is almost universally positive. The training site is pretty
new, pretty good. The places to live in are pretty fine. It is
a small town, nonetheless. Artesia is about 3 hours from any
large city. Now when we started FLETC-Artesia, that was a big
plus. Now it is beginning to be well known, maybe that's a good
thing.
But I will tell you what will make it a plus and keep it a
very reasonable facility for training your people. It is the
capacity to have flight service enhanced so that people can get
there easier than just riding on a bus.
You know that this entire committee and then the Congress
went out on a limb. We said we will not earmark funding for the
new department. Therefore, you got it all. You probably were
glad to have it. Now after a year and a half, you are probably
thinking that, maybe they should have given me some direction
on a few of these; I would not be having so much trouble. In
any event, we could have gotten earmarked funding for this
FLETC, because we have invested a huge amount of tax dollars.
AIR SERVICE TO ARTESIA, NEW MEXICO
FLETC put out a request seeking feedback from airlines who
might provide service. My understanding is that there has been
a response, and it was positive. The estimates are that it
would take about $800,000 to provide the service for the rest
of the year. This would make a rather fantastic facility
available for the extra training beyond the few hundreds that
we train for--as people who watch our borders and the like.
I am not sure you know about it. But can I lay it before
you today and assume you will know about it after this
discussion. You can pass it on to somebody to look at it.
Secretary Ridge. Senator, I am now nearly fully briefed. I
know a lot more than I did when I walked into the hearing room.
And one question I would like to just ask you is whether or
not, from your perspective, that the facilities at Artesia are
being fully used. In other words, if we enhanced the ability to
get more people there for the training program, do the existing
facilities have the present capacity to train more people?
Senator Domenici. The answer is yes. What is happening is,
that it is such a good facility, but for its distance, it is
almost full all the time. We are constantly being harped upon
by internal observers that we ought to take some of the people
that are there and put them somewhere else so they would not
have to travel.
Secretary Ridge. Senator, since you raised it to my
attention, it becomes my responsibility to look into it and get
back to you. And I will.
[The information follows:]
Enhancing Flight Service/Transportation for Trainees to FLETC
In the post September 11, 2001 period, there has been real,
sustained growth in the use of all FLETC training centers, including
the Artesia, NM center. Although the absence of regular and reliable
service to the Artesia area has been an obstacle to wider use of that
location in the past, recently we have increased utilization to almost
capacity because the FLETC Glynco site is at maximum capacity and the
agencies need to train within specific timeframes. FLETC is
experimenting with conducting more basic training programs at Artesia
in fiscal year 2004 and there has been increased use of the site for
Flight Deck Officer training, among others, for specialized training.
With this in mind, FLETC will track closely the issues and usage of the
Artesia site and report back their findings in fiscal year 2005. Should
the travel service continue to be a problem, the Department will
consider looking at other possible solutions.
Senator Domenici. I appreciate it.
Now what about the time? Am I out?
Senator Cochran. If Senator Murray has no objection, you
can ask another question.
CONSTRUCTION OF NISAC FACILITY AT KIRTLAND AIR FORCE BASE
Senator Domenici. All right. Let me ask a question with
reference to a project that is called NISAC, N-I-S-A-C. You may
recall, when you first came into this job, you were still in
some temporary office. We brought some people from Sandia and
Los Alamos, and they showed you this computerization,
computerized program, that gets put to use and continues to be
upgraded.
Anyone whom you would assign to run the office could locate
every piece of infrastructure in the United States and then
locate them vis-a-vis themselves and others. For example, if
they were to take out a dam, what are the repercussions. A
little machine shows you what happens. This big dam is broken
down. It will tell you water will go as far as L.A. One of the
bad things about it, we hope nobody else gets it. So far, it
just belongs to you, to us.
But it is terrific from the standpoint of, answering a
hypothetical question with reference to what happens if
something else happens, either in the electricity system or
energy system, the water system. This facility is adjacent to
Sandia National Labs. One of the items that transferred from
the Department of Energy to the Department of Homeland Security
with this act was an appropriation of $7.5 million for the
construction of a NISAC facility at Kirtland Air Force Base to
be used by your department for the purposes intended.
So I am just going to inquire and put it in here in writing
what happened, why the delay, and why is it not moving ahead?
What is the status of the $7 million that we set aside? When
can the committee expect Homeland Security to break ground on
this NISAC facility, which the record, as I reflect it, would
clearly indicate is your baby? You are going to use it. It is
not going to sit there.
Secretary Ridge. Senator, I remember their presentation.
You know better than most the extraordinary work that the
national labs have done for 60 years for this country, the
variety of different ways. And you also know that our
department is happily tied in with the national labs in several
very meaningful ways.
I cannot give you the specific answer to that question
either, but it is incumbent upon me to do so. And I will.
[The information follows:]
Construction of NISAC Facility at Kirtland Air Force Base
IAIP continues to move forward with the plans to build the
facility, giving full consideration to the elements of the program and
our obligation to comply with NEPA and other Federal statutes
applicable to Federal construction projects.
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much.
Secretary Ridge. Yes, sir.
Senator Domenici. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Murray.
EFFORT TO IMPROVE CARGO SECURITY THROUGH OPERATION SAFE COMMERCE
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, as I mentioned in my earlier comments, the
country's three largest cargo centers, load centers, have been
working with the Department of Homeland Security and some of
the private sector clients for the last 2 years in an effort to
improve cargo security through Operation Safe Commerce. The
ports of Seattle and Tacoma, the ports of Los Angeles, Long
Beach, and New Jersey and New York have been really
enthusiastic partners and are anxious to be meaningful
contributors to the overall port security effort. And they are
continuing to offer their facilities, their expertise, their
goodwill, both domestically and abroad, to ensure our success.
As you know, taxpayers have already committed to $75
million for Operation Safe Commerce with the goal of really
learning what works and what does not when it comes to securing
containers. Unfortunately, because of the delay in funding
Operation Safe Commerce, this pilot program is just now getting
off the ground. But nonetheless, the load centers involved with
this important program should have strong data about best
practices, technology, and hardware this year.
So I was really shocked when I saw the White House was
eliminating this port security effort in their budget. And I
wanted to tell you I think that is really shortsighted and
really abandons the progress that our governments, our ports,
our shippers in the private sector have been working really,
really hard to achieve.
STATUS OF OBLIGATION OF FUNDS APPROPRIATED FOR OPERATION SAFE COMMERCE
So I wanted to ask you two questions this morning. First of
all, only $58 million of the $75 million that Congress
appropriated for Operation Safe Commerce has been obligated.
Can you give us a time line for when the last $17 million that
was appropriate is going to be obligated?
Secretary Ridge. Senator, I cannot. I know that they draw
down against the appropriation based upon their expansion of
the pilot and whether or not sitting within the Department are
invoices to be paid. I could not tell you, unless I go back and
check. But I will certainly be pleased to do so.----
Senator Murray. If you could have someone get back to us,
because----
Secretary Ridge [continuing]. It is clearly the intent of
Congress with the appropriations over a 2-year period to have
three very robust and very comprehensive pilots. I think that
is also the reason that there is no funding in 2005. These are
pilots. There are to be lessons learned. And again, $75 million
for three pilot programs is a very, very substantial
investment. We still need to see what lessons we learned and
whether or not they are applicable to ports across the country.
Senator Murray. Well, Mr. Secretary, I can tell you that if
we do not continue to fund that in the next year, much of the
progress that has been made, much that is just now being
implemented, we will not be able to get the results back. And
as you know, the point of Operation Safe Commerce was to find
out what works out there and then be able to apply it to the
other ports. If we do not find out what works, if we do not
have the risk analysis back, if we do not have the results
back, it will never get--the lessons learned will never be
shared. And we will never have lessons learned.
So I was really surprised that the administration is
working to kill this program in the budget.
Secretary Ridge. Well, I do think that if they need
additional money on top of the $75 million, clearly a couple of
those communities would have access to substantial additional
dollars under the Urban Area Security Initiative that would be
a follow-on.
Senator Murray. If you are planning on funding it under
that, that would put them against all first responders. I think
port security, and I think you would agree with me, is such a
high concern that we cannot start pitting these people against
other really important issues. We need to fund this, fund it
specifically, get the answers back.
And again, this program, private sectors come together,
ports have come together. Everyone is working very hard. They
are just now beginning to learn what they need to do. And I
think we should not shut them off.
Secretary Ridge. Well, Senator, it will be incumbent upon
me to get back and answer that first question to see where the
additional $17 million are to be applied to the existing
programs.
[The information follows:]
Timeline for Obligating the Last $17 Million Appropriated for Operation
Safe Commerce
TSA anticipates that the Request for Applications for the $17
million appropriated in fiscal year 2004 for Operation Safe Commerce
(OSC) is on track to be released early this summer, with final award
anticipated in the fall. This funding will be used to build on current
OSC pilot projects, and may include other supply chains. The
expenditure of the remaining funds will be fully coordinated within the
Department and Congress to ensure that the cargo security efforts
through OSC are integrated into broader departmental initiatives to
secure the cargo supply chain security.
Senator Murray. Well, would you agree that it would be wise
to continue this program in the next fiscal year in order for
us to learn what we can, to make sure that we are doing all we
can to secure our ports?
Secretary Ridge. Senator, it has been my impression that
three pilots at $75 million, there ought to be some lessons
learned with this infusion of very, very significant dollars.
Senator Murray. Well----
Secretary Ridge. And I guess the reason that the dollars
were terminated is that we felt that you did have the
collaboration. It is a great program. You do--one of the things
that the Coast Guard has done historically very well, probably
better than any other agency, is on a day-to-day basis they
work with the private sector quite well. But you have three
major ports, 2-year funding stream, $75 million. And the view
is that is quite a bit of experimentation. There ought to be
plenty of lessons learned after those $75 million are spent on
pilot programs.
Senator Murray. Well, because the funding was delayed, they
are just at the point now of beginning to implement. The first
container ship comes in in a few weeks to the Port of Tacoma
that is--that they will begin to be able to analyze it. I know
that the programs, the CSI and the C-TPAT are also out there.
But I am positive you are aware of a recent GAO study that
is called Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target
Security Inspections of Cargo Containers that those two
programs do. It is very critical of the methodology that is
incorporated in the customs and border protection initiatives.
And I am happy to share that with you. It is extremely
critical.
CONTINUATION OF OPERATION SAFE COMMERCE
But I think the point of Operation Safe Commerce is that we
can learn from what they are doing to make sure that we are
doing the reporting and analyzing, inspection, analyzing the
risk levels. And if we do not continue this program, we are not
going to have the information to do what is right in the
future. We can be spending a lot of money in a lot of areas in
ways that do not work.
Secretary Ridge. Well, it is conceivable, Senator, and I do
not offer this as the answer to the concern you have, but in
the budget we are asking for more money for personnel to
support our National Targeting Center. And I think there is a
direct link between the lessons you learn dealing with the
supply chain coming into ports and the National Targeting
Center, which is at the heart.
Senator Murray. Yes. I have been around long enough to know
that if you do not name it, it does not get funded.
Secretary Ridge. Well, I think when you have a new
department and a department particularly that relies on the
notion that we will never be able to inspect all 22 million
containers that come into this country every year, and we have
three major pilot programs out there, that there are lessons
learned and that we ought to--if there is a possible
connection, we ought to try to make it. I do not know if there
is. It just seems to me, Senator, that after a couple years,
there ought to be a couple lessons learned after $75 million
has been spent.
Senator Murray. Again, only $57 million has gone out. We
still are waiting for the rest of it. And I think that we
should not judge too soon on that. But I am happy to work with
your office and supply information.
Mr. Chairman, let me ask one more quick question under my
time.
FUNDING FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT
The budget that was sent over includes $100 million for the
implementation of the Maritime Transportation Security Act,
MTSA. Admiral Collins testified before us last September that
it would take $7.3 billion over 10 years to implement the MTSA,
including $1.5 billion this year. I am very concerned that the
President's request is 7 percent of what the commandant told us
he needs to succeed. Do you share that concern?
Secretary Ridge. Well, again, I do not have the
understanding of the context with which the commandant shared
that information with you. It is my understanding, however,
that the sum that he was talking about included the additional
security measures that would need to be employed at ports and
vessels. That is not a sum that was necessary for the Coast
Guard to conduct the studies at ports of interest or the safety
security studies on vessels.
So I think there is sufficient money in here for the Coast
Guard to do its work. The gap is a place where we need to have
a public debate as to whether or not it is the taxpayer's
responsibility to fund, continue to fund port security or
whether or not, since these basically are intermodal facilities
where the private sector moves goods in and out for a profit,
that they would be responsible for picking up most of the
difference.
So I think the dollars that we received this year empowers
the Coast Guard and gives them the manpower to do port
assessments and to look at 10,000 vessels and to do the
security analysis. I think the gap is----
Senator Murray. Are you suggesting that it is----
Secretary Ridge [continuing]. The dollars for security.
Senator Murray. So if I heard you correctly, you are saying
that the private industry must now come up with this $7 billion
over the next 10 years to implement the security for our
Nation?
PRIVATE SECTOR SHARE OF PORT SECURITY
Secretary Ridge. Well, we have an $11 trillion economy.
Much of it is driven through imports and exports. Major
companies use our ports. I can only refer back to the Federal
investment, the State investment, and local investment in the
ports of Philadelphia and Newark. There is plenty of public
money in these ports already. They provide the land. They buy
the cranes. They in many instances employ the personnel. So the
notion that there is not much of a public investment in the
courts, I do not think is, based on my experience in
Pennsylvania, it is not accurate.
At some point in time in the distribution chain--and my
view is that ports are part of the supply chain and the
distribution chain of the private sector----
Senator Murray. Well, Mr. Secretary----
Secretary Ridge [continuing]. That they ought to be able to
defray some of the expenses associated with it.
Senator Cochran. The time of the Senator has expired.
Senator Murray. Mr. Secretary, just let me comment very
quickly. I am listening to your logic, but I would just
respectfully say that if one terminal or port in this country
said, we are not going to ante up the money, we do not have it,
and a terrorist used that weak link to come into this country,
all of us would be paying for the consequences of that.
Secretary Ridge. Well, Senator, this will be debated,
obviously, in this subcommittee and on the floor of both
chambers, and I am sure Congress has been generous. I think
there is over a half a billion dollars out in port grants. I
think this year the budget allows for nearly $50 million in
port grants. I think it is going to be very important at some
time in the near future that we engage the very appropriate
public debate as to how much additional taxpayer financing
should go into a piece of infrastructure that basically
supports the private sector.
They have a commercial and business interest in securing
their supply chain. And I think, again, we will continue to
provide, there is no doubt in my mind we will continue to
provide some Federal resources, no doubt in my mind that States
and local communities are going to continue to support their
port authorities and their ports. But I also think we need to
elevate the discussion so we determine what the role of the
private sector is to help secure that infrastructure for
themselves.
Senator Murray. I look forward to that debate. Thank you.
Secretary Ridge. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Senator Specter.
Senator Specter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, on Friday I landed at Tom Ridge Airport in
Erie. And I want to report to you that it is a great airport.
Secretary Ridge. Thank you, Senator.
WAY TO RECONFIGURE THE CALCULATION FOR HIGH-RISK AREAS TO INCLUDE THE
TOM RIDGE AIRPORT AND ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA
Senator Specter. I then went to a meeting of first
responders and heard the concern that among the 50 high-risk
areas, Erie is not included, largely because of the population
factor. But they have a port, and they have access to a border
with Canada. And my question to you is: Is there some way to
reconfigure that calculation to include the Tom Ridge Airport
and Erie?
Secretary Ridge. Senator, the funding streams that Congress
has generally supported the past 2 years through the Office of
Domestic Preparedness had one portion that went to the States
that was driven strictly by population, another portion that
went to urban areas, where the Congress gave the department the
flexibility to look at population density, critical
infrastructure, the threat level, and make the appropriation.
One of the adjustments, based on our thinking in terms of
how we can better direct those dollars is to look at that one
pool of money that historically goes to the States by formula,
notwithstanding that every State, large or small, should get a
certain level of funding, but to see, based on a broader
statewide analysis of critical infrastructure, that those
States should get actually more money depending if the critical
infrastructure is in there.
Senator Specter. Mr. Secretary, I am hesitant to interrupt
you, but there is very limited time and I want to ask you three
more questions.
Secretary Ridge. Yes.
Senator Specter. I would like you to take a look to see, if
you might, we can figure the high-risk areas to include Erie.
When you talk about the general fund, the minimum for each
State is three-quarters of 1 percent, which means that 40
percent of the funding, general fund and first responders, is
taken off on the small States. And that has a very
disproportionate share. For example, in Pennsylvania per capita
we receive $5.83, and Wyoming receives $38.31. And that is the
fund where we have to look to a city like Erie, community like
Erie.
Last August, I visited some 33 counties on first responders
and designated one of my top deputes to review our State. What
can you say about providing a little more equity for the
general fund, especially when Erie is not a high-risk area and
has to limit its intake from the general fund?
Secretary Ridge. Well, Senator, I think our strategic
decision to deal with that issue, not community-specific but to
deal with the notion that every State should still get some
minimum funding, but not all of that money in that program
should be allocated strictly on population. Now that our agency
has matured and now that we have strategic plans from the
individual States every governor has submitted a strategic plan
based on their needs, we have asked for the flexibility to
distribute those dollars differently than just on a strict
funding formula.
FLEXIBILITY IN AUTHORITY TO DISTRIBUTE FUNDS TO HIGH-RISK AREAS
Whether or not Congress gives us that flexibility to do so,
so that States like Pennsylvania would have more resources to
support communities such as Erie, or I would say Senator Levin
would tell you support communities like Port Huron, which is a
small community of 30,000 people, that has chemical farms,
energy infrastructure, and all kinds of basically critical
infrastructure, and they get nothing either.
So that is our response to the need to address some of the
needs of smaller communities.
Senator Specter. The issue of your authority, Mr.
Secretary, has been a discussion which you and I have had on
many occasions. And as more information is coming to light
about September 11, there are more indicators, more evidence,
that if all of the information had been collected in one spot,
9/11 might well have been prevented.
And I know that there has been a change with the FBI and
the CIA and other intelligence agencies to try to have better
coordination. And this is a very involved matter. But I would
appreciate it if your department, if you would give us an
answer in writing, because we do not have time to go into it
now, as to your evaluation as to how it is working.
As I am sure you will remember, when we passed the bill in
October of 2002 and the House of Representatives had left and
it was take it or leave it in the Senate and I wanted to offer
an amendment to give you the authority, as Secretary, to direct
and have the critical authority, the issue went all the way to
the President. And it was either get the bill in its form
without having that authority and you or having it deferred
until the spring. But I would like your evaluation as to how
that is working.
HOW THREAT DETERMINATIONS ARE MADE
And the final question I have within my 5 minutes, Mr.
Chairman, is: What can you tell us within the bounds of
security as to how you make the risk assessment on the
different gradations? There is obviously enormous concern about
whether, when, where there will be another 9/11. It has sort of
recessed from our minds as time passes. But I know it is very
much on your mind and very much on the President's mind. And
you took some extra precautions recently over the holiday
season. And you had made a comment that you thought that the
precautions you took may well have averted another 9/11. And I
think the expression you used was that you had a gut reaction
to come to that sense or that conclusion.
Secretary Ridge. Right.
Senator Specter. I would be interested to know, and I think
everybody would be interested to know, how you make the threat
assessments, where you think we are generally at risk today,
and, to the extent you can specify, how you think the
precautions which you took may have prevented another 9/11.
Secretary Ridge. Senator, I will try to be brief, but it
does call for a fairly lengthy----
Senator Specter. Oh, take your time. My time is over. Take
your time.
Secretary Ridge. Thank you, Senator. First of all, every
single day, at least three times a day, there is formal
interaction between the intelligence community, and that
includes the Department of Homeland Security. Every morning the
Attorney General, the FBI Director, the CIA Director, the
Deputy, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and others meet
with the President, Vice President, to go over the threat
information from the previous day.
Twice a day, later on that morning and in the afternoon, by
secure video, the intelligence community examines the threats
of that particular day, but obviously looks back at the
reporting stream for previous days to see whether or not there
was additional corroboration, whether or not they render any
judgments with regard to the credibility, but over a period of
time, Senator, through that process and that constant
interaction at the Terrorist Integration Center, the
interaction of the professional analysts, the CIA, even on ad
hoc basis.
PROCESS FOR RAISING THREAT LEVEL
At some point in time prior to about a week or so prior to
when we raised the threat level in December--I say a week. I do
not recall specifically. But at some point in time, the volume
of the reporting, the nature of the reporting, assessments
based on the credibility of the reporting were such that we
began to look at the possibility of raising the national threat
level. That process over a 24-, 36-hour period then led to the
meeting of the President's Homeland Security Council. And that
is Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense and the
Attorney General, the FBI Director, the Secretary of
Transportation, yours truly.
It is then discussed among these principals. And based upon
that discussion, we made the decision to recommend to the
President for the foreseeable future we raised the threat
level. That, in very short fashion, is the process that we
engage in to raise in.
I note it is a process we have engaged in the past where we
didn't raise it. And it had been 6 months since we took the
national threat level up.
Finally, Senator, I would say to you and your colleagues on
the committee and, for that matter, the entire country, as we
do, as this department works with the private sector to harden
certain chemical facilities and energy facilities and the like,
as we continue to do a better job of informing State and local
law enforcement, as we continue to do our job, I believe we
will raise the threshold even higher to go to the next threat
level. Because initially, the national warning system was based
simply on what we heard and perceived to be the threat. But
there is also a risk analysis that we can now, because of the
Department, have to plug into that equation.
That may be the threat, but what is the risk based on, the
precautionary or preventive or security measures that have been
in place? You could have the same threat with no security, and
you might want to raise it. You could have the same threat
level but with more security and say, we are comfortable
enough, given the present circumstances, perhaps to target
information privately to a particular place, a particular site,
but not take the entire country up.
That would be the goal, because we are quite aware of the
fact that raising the level nationally is a blunt instrument.
Normally it requires a labor intensive response. But as we
build permanent security measures across-the-board at the State
and local level and in the private sector, it should be more
difficult to take it up, because we will have reduced the risk
by adding additional security measures.
Senator Specter. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Your time has expired, Senator. Thank you.
Senator Leahy.
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will put my
post-statement in the record.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Patrick J. Leahy
Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for coming to testify before us
today.
We are entering the second year of this subcommittee and in that
time there have been many changes to your department and there are new
challenges facing the country. I appreciate your appearance here to
discuss the Administration's priorities in the new fiscal year.
For the past year, you have supervised many constituents of mine
who are former employees of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
and who now work for the Bureaus of Customs and Border Protection,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and Citizenship and Immigration
Services.
A year ago, I praised them to you and told you they would exceed
your expectations--I trust that they have done so.
At the same time, you and others at the Department told me that you
would make full use of these excellent employees, and that the Vermont
workforce would not decline as part of the reorganization. You have
kept that pledge, and I look forward to continuing to work with you to
ensure that these employees contribute to protecting and enhancing our
Nation.
I would like to turn however to President Bush's proposed homeland
security budget for fiscal year 2005 that was sent up here by the
Administration and share with you a few of my concerns.
I was extremely disappointed that the budget drops the all-state
minimum formula, which I authored, from the State Homeland Security
Grant Program administered by the Office for Domestic Preparedness
(ODP). This formula assures that each state's first responders receive
a minimum of .75 percent of those grants to help support their basic
preparedness needs.
Not only would this change result in the loss of tens of millions
in homeland security funding for the fire, police and rescue
departments in Vermont and other small- and medium-sized states, but
also deal a crippling blow to their efforts to build and sustain their
terrorism preparedness.
Mr. Secretary, you and I have spoken many times in public and
private on how to fairly allocate domestic terrorism preparedness funds
to our states and local communities. We both agree that each State has
basic terrorism preparedness needs and, therefore, a minimum amount of
domestic terrorism preparedness funds is appropriate for each state. We
both agree that highly populated, highly threatened and highly
vulnerable areas have terrorism preparedness needs beyond those basic
needs for each state. Most importantly, though, we both agree that
homeland security is a national responsibility shared by all states,
regardless of size.
On January 28, I spoke with Sue Mencer, the Executive Director of
the new Office of State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness (SLGCP), about the merging of organizational units within
the Homeland Security Department. During our exchange I mentioned the
importance of the all-state minimum requirement and Ms. Mencer assured
me that the fiscal year 2005 DHS budget proposal would include the .75
percent all-state minimum.
You can imagine my surprise, then, when I read in the President's
budget proposal that the grants to States for addressing State and
local homeland security requirements and Citizen Corps activities and
law enforcement terrorism prevention grants would be allocated among
the states based on population concentrations, critical
infrastructures, and other significant terrorism risk factors. Not only
was I troubled to see that grants to States for addressing State and
local homeland security requirements and Citizen Corps activities and
law enforcement terrorism prevention grants had been cut by nearly $1
billion, but without the all-state minimum protection for smaller
states, there is no assurance of funding under these programs.
I wrote the all-state minimum formula to guarantee that each State
receives at least .75 percent of the national allotment to help meet
their national domestic security needs. I strongly believe that every
state--rural or urban, small or large--has basic domestic security
needs and deserves to receive Federal funds to meet those needs.
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, we have worked
together to meet the needs of all State and local first responders from
both rural and urban areas. Now, however, it appears that the President
wants to shortchange rural states, rolling back the hard-won progress
we have begun to make in homeland security. Our fire, police and rescue
teams in each State in the Nation deserve support in achieving the new
homeland security responsibilities the Federal Government demands.
I ask that you support a budget supplement amendment to restore the
.75 percent minimum to the State Formula Grants Program. I look forward
to speaking and working further with you and my colleagues on this
matter.
Representatives of urban states have argued that Federal money to
fight terrorism is being sent to areas that do not need it and is
``wasted'' in small towns. They have called the formula highly
politicized and insisted on the redirection of funds to urban areas
that they believe face heightened threat of terrorist attacks.
What critics of the all-state minimum seem to forget, though, is
that since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the American people have
asked ALL State and local first responders to defend us as never before
on the front lines in the war against terrorism. Vermont's emergency
responders have the same responsibilities as those in any other State
to provide enhanced protection, preparedness and response against
terrorists. We must ensure that adequate support and resources are
provided for our police, fire and EMS services in every State if we
expect them to continue protecting us from terrorists or responding to
terrorist attacks, as well as carry out their routine responsibilities.
Most of the cuts to the formula-based and law enforcement
prevention grants were made to increase to $1.4 billion the
discretionary grants for use in 50 specific high-threat, high-density
urban areas. While I recognize that enhancing the security of those
urban areas represents a critical national priority, I cannot support
both a drastic reduction in the formula-based and law enforcement
prevention grants and a barring of small states' access to even a
portion of the more than $2.7 billion that the formula-based and law
enforcement prevention grants and Urban Area Security Initiative grants
would total.
Fostering divisions between states ignores the real problem: the
President has failed to make first responders a high enough priority.
We should be looking to increase the funds to our Nation's first
responders. Instead, we see the President proposing to cut overall
funding for our Nation's first responders by $800 million. These cuts
will affect each state, regardless of size or population.
The Hart-Rudman report on domestic preparedness argued that the
United States will fall approximately $98.4 billion short of meeting
critical emergency responder needs over the next 5 years if current
funding levels are maintained. Clearly, the domestic preparedness funds
available are still not enough to protect from, prepare for and respond
to future domestic terrorist attacks anywhere on American soil.
Senator Leahy. Governor Ridge, it is always good to have
you back here.
Secretary Ridge. Senator, thank you.
Senator Leahy. I have not flown into the Tom Ridge Airport,
but----
Secretary Ridge. You do not have that many flight options,
Senator. But----
Senator Leahy. Should you come to Burlington, Vermont, feel
free to stop by the Leahy Center.
PROPOSAL TO DROP THE ALL-STATE MINIMUM FORMULA FOR ALLOCATING STATE
HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT FUNDS
Governor, I have to state that I really was disappointed
that the President's proposed budget for fiscal year 2005 drops
the all-state minimum formula. I authored that. They dropped it
from the State homeland security grant. And you probably do not
need reminding, but this says that each State will receive a
minimum three-quarters of 1 percent of those grants to help
support the first responders basic preparedness.
I thought I would bring this up because with the makeup of
this subcommittee, that would affect all but, I think, one or
two on this subcommittee. So it may be more than a passing
interest. But more than that, it would result in the loss of
millions of dollars in homeland security funding for fire,
police, rescue departments in small and medium-sized States. I
think it would create a crippling blow for their efforts to
build and sustain their terrorism preparedness.
And these small States, each have a particular need that
may be different. Some are like my State. They are a border
State. Others have major ports in them, may have natural--or
may have energy facilities important not just to their State
but to the rest of the country. And you and I have spoken about
how to fairly allocate domestic terrorism preparedness, funds
to our States and local communities. You have been very
forthcoming on that, as have your staff.
I thought we had agreed that fire, police, emergency
medical rescue teams in each State deserve support in carrying
out the new homeland security responsibilities that the Federal
Government demands of it. So I was surprised, knowing that on
the one hand these States are being required to carry out these
demands. You read that in the budget there will be allocated
among the States based on population concentrations, critical
infrastructures, and other significant terrorism risk factors,
as determined by you.
IMPACT ON RURAL STATES
I believe it means the administration wants to shortchange
rural States, wants to roll back the hard-won progress we have
begun to make in homeland security by slashing the protections
in the all-state minimum. Now I am strongly committed to the
critical national priority of enhancing urban areas. I have
supported legislation, especially some of the particularly
targeted urban areas where we are today in New York City and
elsewhere.
But I cannot go and tell rural areas that, sorry, you are
not big enough to have to worry, even though, if I was planning
a terrorism attack, I would know that, for example, attacking
the Tom Ridge Airport is going to get as much international
coverage as attacking JFK or LAX, because it is a United States
airport within our boundaries.
So would you agree that homeland security is a national
responsibility shared by all 50 of the States regardless of
their size?
Secretary Ridge. Senator, yes. I think one of the
challenges for the Department of Homeland Security is to
integrate the capacity we have within our States and local
communities, match it up with the Federal effort to combat
terrorism. So there is a shared fiscal responsibility. There is
a shared operational responsibility. It is a national plan, not
just a Federal one.
Senator Leahy. But then in these States they have to do a
certain amount of minimum--I do not know whether it was the
State of Idaho or West Virginia, Vermont. There is only one
State smaller than Vermont in population, Wyoming. But whatever
the State is, they have to do a certain amount of minimum
preparation, communications. Whether it is in a State of half a
million or four million, they have to do certain basic things.
You have to have basic ideas for planning, for response
equipment, fire, police, and so forth.
SUPPORT OF FUNDING TO RESTORE THE THREE-QUARTERS OF 1 PERCENT MINIMUM
TO THE STATE FORMULA GRANTS PROGRAM
So if you accept the fact that there are certain minimum
things that have to be done wherever we are, would you support
a budget supplement amendment to restore the three-quarters of
1 percent minimum to the State formula grants program, which
include the State homeland security grant program, the Citizen
Corps, and the law enforcement terrorism prevention grants
program?
Secretary Ridge. Senator, I would much prefer the approach
as embodied in the President's budget, that as we take a look
at the dollars that have historically been allocated to States
Strictly on a formula, that the Secretary be given the
flexibility, understanding that he has just testified now and
believes that there ought to be some minimum that goes to every
State and territory.
Senator Leahy. What is that minimum?
Secretary Ridge. We would certainly have to sit down and--
--
Senator Leahy. I mean, it is .75 now. Is that too much? Too
little?
Secretary Ridge. Senator, frankly, I would like to take a
look at all of the statewide plans that the Governors have
submitted to us and make that determination. And we certainly
cannot deal with this privately. I will have to be engaged with
you and your colleagues here, because I am mindful that there
are basic infrastructure needs in all 50 States and
territories. But the language that we have submitted in this
document would give the Department some flexibility based on
needs, not just on population.
Senator Leahy. I understand. But on that flexibility, you
have to understand that a lot of smaller States and rural areas
are concerned because, one, it shows there is no guarantee that
they will get anything. And secondly, when the President had
proposed an $805 million cut in funds for the Office of
Domestic Preparedness, those are programs that directly benefit
the police, fire and medical rescue units, you put that
together with the fact of this safety net for smaller States is
gone, at the same time of an 18.4 percent cut in funds for the
Office of Domestic Preparedness, $805 million is there.
You have the Hart-Rudman Terrorism Task Force report saying
that we are going to almost $100 billion short of meeting
critical emergency responder needs through this decade's end,
if these current fundings are going on. You know, if I am a
Governor--and you have been a Governor; I have not--if I am a
Governor, I am going to be asking how is my State first
responders going to be able to fulfill the mandates coming from
Washington when the President is proposing to decrease, not
expand, but decrease the money, expand the amount that is
required.
I mean, every time we go up to orange alert or whatever,
the requirements go up. Every time there is even a regional
threat, the requirements go up.
What is being asked of these State and local groups goes up
all the time, but the money is going down. And even the
guarantee of what money was there within the budget is now
gone. If you were a Governor of one those States, you would be
kind of worried.
Secretary Ridge. Senator, first of all, I would say to you
that the President's commitment in the 2005 budget to first
responders' dollar amount in terms of the budget proposal is as
strong as it was in 2004. The difference that we are talking
about are the additional funds that Congress added to the
President's request. So I think we need to understand that the
President----
Senator Leahy. Well, not really, if I might.
Secretary Ridge. Well----
FIRST RESPONDER FUNDING
Senator Leahy. This fiscal year, Congress appropriated $4.2
billion for first responders and homeland security needs. We
are a lot more alert since then, but the administration has
proposed a $3.5 billion package for fiscal year 2005 that cuts
the Fire Act and grants programs to State and local areas. And
you have put that along with the President's opposition to
using Federal dollars to hire fire and rescue, even though we
know what that was like on September 11 at the World Trade
towers or over here at the Pentagon.
No, I do not say that you could say the commitment is still
there. The cuts are there; the commitment is not.
Secretary Ridge. Senator, we arrive at differing
conclusions based on the same figures. Maybe that is the
trouble with the new math.
Senator Leahy. Oh, the figures are less.
Secretary Ridge. If I recall correctly, and I will stand
corrected, Senator, but by and large, if you take a look at the
request in 2004 for the fire grants and admittedly, we have
shifted some money from one pool, the State direct funding
grant, to the urban area security initiative, but by and large
the President's request is close to what it was in 2004. The
Congress added additional money. And I think that is what you
are referring to as a cut. But the President's commitment, in
terms of his budget request, is nearly the same as it was in
2004.
Senator Cochran. The time of the Senator has expired.
Senator Leahy. Thank you. I will submit further questions,
if I might, for the record. And I applaud you for holding this
hearing. I think it is going to be a subject of more than a
little discussion in this committee.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Secretary Ridge. Yes, it is.
Senator Cochran. Senator Kohl.
Senator Kohl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CANCELLED INTERNATIONAL FLIGHTS
Secretary Ridge, I would like to return to the question of
those canceled flights----
Secretary Ridge. Yes, sir.
Senator Kohl [continuing]. Of which I believe there were 13
from France, Britain, and Mexico. In one case, British Airways
flight 223, as you know, was canceled four times. Evidently,
this was done because of specific information that our
intelligence community obtained about potential threats on
board these flights.
Common sense would suggest that when we have detailed
information about a particular flight, then heightened
screening measures could ensure that no dangerous instruments
be taken on board these flights which might allow individuals
to hijack. Was cancellation the only option?
Secretary Ridge. As we discussed the threat with the
airlines, and it was an ongoing discussion through that entire
period, it turned out from everyone's point of view to be the
best option.
Senator Kohl. Does this imply that screening procedures in
other countries are inadequate?
Secretary Ridge. Well, since that time, and even prior to
that time, Great Britain and to that extent France have
significantly, I do not want to say improved, because they had
a high level of screening to start with. But it is far more
intense than it has ever been.
But there was some concern in the public discussion, about
our preference to use air marshals. And that those kinds of
requests need to be vetted. We use thousands of them. Other
countries do not provide that kind of security in such a robust
or comprehensive fashion that we do.
So again, as we explored options to deal with the threat,
it was decided by the airlines, they thought their best option
was to cancel the flights. And we agreed with them.
Senator Kohl. Well, what kind of security can be
instituted, for example, to protect against biological or
chemical kinds of threats on an aircraft?
Secretary Ridge. Well, you highlight from my perspective,
Senator, probably one of the most effective. And that is far
more rigorous and intense screening. And I think under the
circumstances that was certainly an option that they were
prepared to consider.
I think in time, as we develop the technology of detection
and put it aboard different modes of transportation, that will
ultimately advise us that an attack has occurred, but will
obviously not have given us the capacity to prevent the attack.
And I think probably the most important focus that we should
have with regard to aviation security, mindful of the need to
identify weapons, but we should be more focused on the
individuals who might be carrying the weapons. I mean, that is
at the heart of the CAPS II Program that we want to use for
domestic aviation purposes.
TECHNOLOGY OF DETECTION
So additional screening, yes, I believe the international
standards, particularly among our allies in Europe. And they
have really ramped up their screening, but not everybody has
done that internationally. One of the first series of grants we
sent out through the department was to identify the technology
of detection that would enable us to--we would be advised that
an incident had occurred. And we would obviously have to
respond to it as quickly as possible. But it is still not to a
point where we can put it in any form of transportation.
And until such time, the most important thing for us to do,
while we continue to focus on weapons, continue to have people
go through metal detectors, continue to search through the
contents of the carry-on luggage, continue to screen the
luggage that goes in the hold, the most important focus should
be the individuals and the likelihood that they would be a
terrorist.
SCREENING FOR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Senator Kohl. You must know the answer to this question. Do
we have the capacity to screen for biological weapons?
Secretary Ridge. We do not have the technology yet
available to do that. We are looking for it. Right now----
Senator Kohl. So that--not necessarily in the case of those
canceled flights, but generally speaking, when it comes to
biological weapons, it then becomes a determination as to
whether or not the individual----
Secretary Ridge. Correct.
Senator Kohl [continuing]. Is somebody that might be
suspected or capable of taking a biological weapon on a plane.
And that might cause a cancellation----
Secretary Ridge. Correct.
Senator Kohl [continuing]. Not the screening, because we do
not have that capacity right now.
Secretary Ridge. Correct. It is a high priority for the
Department in terms of its research and development. But right
now, we have to rely on individual screeners. And we have
certainly, since the Department has been created, discovered
from interrogation of detainees, training manuals, and other
sources, means of, potential means of, delivery of those kinds
of weapons or ingredients. The screeners are aware of them. But
it still comes down to the capacity of the screener to, again,
funnel that information, take a look at what is being carried
on or what is located in the suitcase and make a determination
that it needs to be pulled out and examined. And we do not have
the technology to assist the screener yet.
Senator Kohl. Okay. Do I have time for one more question?
Senator Cochran. The Senator does have time for one more
question, yes.
Senator Kohl. Thank you.
FRAUDULENT DOCUMENTS
Secretary Ridge, initially we were told that all September
11 hijackers entered the country legally, many of them on
student visas, then disappeared into the shadows of our society
to avoid detection. But now the independent commission is
telling us that many of the hijackers could have, or probably
should have, been stopped at the border prior to entering.
It turns out that a number of the hijackers had fraudulent
visas or lied on their applications. Apparently, immigration
inspectors, whether it was because of insufficient resources or
training, lacked the ability to catch these terrorists before
they entered the country. Recognizing that there is a problem
here, what is being done to train our INS inspectors to enable
them to spot fraudulent and deficient visas in order to stop
potential terrorists at the border?
Secretary Ridge. Senator, you raise a very significant
problem in the international community generally. That is one
of fraudulent documents, whether they are using them to verify
their existence here in the United States with fraudulent
social security cards or driver's licenses or whether they are
using them to come across our borders with visas and passports.
Number one, there is, I think, very significant training
that has been required and provided to the men and women at our
ports of entry. Number two, the Congress has told us that we
need an entry-exit system so we can mark the arrival, as well
as the departure of people coming into the country. That is
part of the US VISIT protocol, where, by using facial
identification and fingerprint scans, we have already reviewed
about a million people coming into the country, and we have
sent over 100 people back. We did not allow them to enter
because of information we had on the database; not necessarily
because they were terrorists, but because there were other--
basically, it was a criminal reference.
That same kind of identification protocol will be employed
in consular offices by the end of this year, the photographs
and the fingerprint scans, so at least we can make sure that
the folks that receive the passport are the ones who are
checking in with the passport when they try to come into the
country. So you take that, you couple it with additional
training to look for fraudulent passports, we have
substantially improved that capacity. But we have to be forever
vigilant.
I must tell you that on a fairly regular basis, Senator--
and I get a daily report from Customs and Border Protection. We
have, on a fairly regular basis, these very, very dedicated men
and women at the border turn folks away because of the
fraudulent nature of their visa or their passport. They do not
pretend to say that they catch them all. But their antenna is
up, and they are as sharp as we want them to be. We continue to
give them information as to what to look for.
You know, from time to time, we discover that other
countries have had passports stolen. We work with those
countries to get identifying characteristics on those
passports. That information is pushed down to the ports of
entry.
So again, it is a continuing process of education,
vigilance. I think the US VISIT Program is going to help us
quite a bit, as well.
Senator Kohl. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
And Mr. Chairman, I will submit my questions for the
record.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Kohl.
Senator Craig.
IMMIGRATION AND BORDER SECURITY
Senator Craig. Mr. Chairman, on a variety of questions, I
will submit them for the record so the Secretary can respond. I
want to focus just in one area.
And I apologize, Secretary, for being late for your
testimony. But during the questioning, I have had an
opportunity to read it, and I appreciate it.
Let me focus only on one area now and that is the issue of
immigration and securing our borders. And I am very pleased
that our President is now leading on that issue as it relates
to an undocumented workforce in this country. I say that
because my State and many States across the Nation need that
workforce.
Without question, there is a need in our economy for six or
eight million foreign nationals to be here working and
receiving good pay and doing services that our own citizens
choose not to. So it is so important that we make this system
work.
I think one of the unknown consequences of border security
post 9/11, while we were intending to lock people out, we
locked a lot of people in who were moving back and forth across
our borders, providing services, going home to their loved
ones, and because of now the toughness at the border, choosing
to stay in because they cannot, once get out, come back. And in
my State of Idaho, at the peak of the agricultural season, we
may have anywhere from 19,000 to 20,000 undocumented. I have
some legislation in that area now that we are working on.
UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS
But here is what I have found and where my question takes
me today in dealing with local law enforcement and undocumented
workers. I see you are going to hire some more agents. Well, we
have gone from 3,000 to 10,000 at the border. And we have begun
to stem the tide of an undocumented workforce. We arrested over
800,000 last year and deported them, and there are millions
within the country. Why? Because of what is here for them to do
and to make money and to go home to their loved ones, if they
can, or to stay here.
In one county of mine, the county sheriff tells me that he
arrested or apprehended over 1,200 undocumented workers. That
was borne by county taxpayer expense. They were jailed at
county taxpayer expense. Let me suggest to you that it is my
experience, in having focused on this issue for the last 5
years, that the National Immigration Service and now the new
service is relatively inadequate in being able to effectively
find undocumented workers. But I know who does, local law
enforcement.
Now I would suggest to you that you review your idea of
hiring more agents and you concentrate on cooperative
partnerships with local law enforcement, maybe with some
assisted training. As it relates to their normal course of law
enforcement, they are the ones who find, in most instances, the
undocumented workers or the undocumented foreign nationals in
this country. And some may be certainly people of bad
reputation. Others are simply here to work.
Also, I would suggest, and you just got into the business
of talking about fraudulent documentation. And I understand
here you talk about providing certain deterrents to the
employers as an incentive to maintain a legal workforce. That
is legitimate when the documentation is legitimate.
But to find a person whose livelihood would be destroyed
because they cannot find the work and they hire foreign
nationals who have documentation to do their work, to harvest
the food that goes onto the shelves of America, and then to put
them at risk because they accepted the documents that were
available, you see where I am going, it becomes the ultimate
catch-22.
And so I am proud of what the President is doing. I know it
is highly controversial. I happen to disagree a little bit on
the fine points of the issue. But he has been willing to step
up and address the issue, the 8 to 12 million undocumented that
we have in this country and the laxness and the slackness that
we have had at our borders for decades.
But having said that, reform is at hand. And you are
leading that. And I greatly appreciate it. But I would suggest
that if the answer is simply to hire more Federal agents, why?
The biggest thing that I have been frustrated with over the
years is that when you had drug apprehension or all of those
other kinds of things, and every agency developed its own
police force--and out in my State, the Forest Service, they had
to have law enforcement. BLM had to have law enforcement.
COOPERATIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT WITH LOCAL ACCOUNTABLE LAW ENFORCEMENT
Well, I know what they used to do. They used to develop
cooperative law enforcement agreements with local accountable
law enforcement. And that is where the rubber really hits the
road on a daily basis. And I think that it is not only cost
effective, but with right and reasonable training, it can be
phenomenally responsive for a lot less cost.
That is an observation. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.
But I would ask you, Mr. Secretary, to take a comprehensive
look at that. We have some legislation moving now. I would lots
rather see you take the initiative now and begin to get it on
the ground, because our counties are experiencing a lot of
costs in those hot areas of high intensity undocumented
workers. And often, it is they who pick up the phone and call
the INS and tell them: Hey, here are your people. Come get
them.
Secretary Ridge. Thank you, Senator. I would look forward
to having that, continuing this discussion privately, because
however this plan evolves, it will only be effective if the
right level of resources are given to the right people in order
to enforce it. And our limited experience with collaboration
with the States, in terms of apprehension and detention of
illegal aliens, has been mixed. Some States are willing to do
it; other are not.
Part of the reason may be philosophical. Others may be
fiscal. Either way, you have 650,000 men and women in local law
enforcement that should be viewed as a potential asset and
resource in enforcing the new law, whatever it might be.
Senator Craig. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
COAST GUARD OFFSHORE PATROL CUTTERS
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Craig.
Mr. Secretary, one of the responsibilities that the
department has is the United States Coast Guard operations,
particularly for patrolling our coasts and ports, contributing
to our security of the homeland in that way. The budget request
includes $26.2 million to support the operation of five patrol
coastal cutters that are being transferred to the Coast Guard
from the Navy. My question is whether your office, and you
personally, have information that will let us know what the
time frame is for the Coast Guard receiving these patrol
coastal cutters from the Navy and whether there is funding that
is sufficient in this budget request to convert the Coast Guard
cutters into mission-capable boats for the operation of the
missions that are required.
Secretary Ridge. Senator, I believe that the deployment
decision with regard to those five vessels should be
forthcoming in the next month or two. I know that they are
looking at two. They are looking to just narrow the gaps in
existing coverage. I know one of the venues they are looking at
is in Mississippi. I dare not speak for the Commandant. But
there is an interest in distributing those five cutters in two
different ports.
They certainly are going to maintain their capability. I
think we have sufficient resources once they are deployed to
use them effectively. But the decision as to when and where
they will be deployed, I believe, is in the next 4 to 6 weeks.
ALTERATION OF BRIDGES
Senator Cochran. One of the other counts in the Coast
Guard's budget request of interest to some of us is in the
funding for alteration of bridges. There is no funding in this
budget request that would permit the Coast Guard to carry out
its responsibility of removing obstructions to commerce on
navigable waters. There is a backlog of work that needs to be
done to help ensure the safe navigation of rivers and ports. It
is my hope that your office will take a look at that and let us
know what funding may be useful to the Coast Guard to continue
certain bridge projects that are already under way but which
are not fully funded in this budget request.
It forces this committee to add funds to help ensure the
navigability of waters of the United States. So it is something
that has to be done, it seems to me. And working with your
office or with the Coast Guard, getting some indication of what
that funding level ought to be would be very helpful to us.
Secretary Ridge. Senator, we will certainly acknowledge
your inquiry and get back to you as quickly as possible. I do
not know what the Coast Guard's plans are to continue to remove
these navigational obstructions or to make those kinds of
adjustments in ports. I need to get back to you in response.
[The information follows:]
Alteration of Bridges
The Coast Guard's Alteration of Bridges request is zero in fiscal
year 2005, because obstructive highway and combination railroad/highway
bridges are eligible for funding from the Federal Highway
Administration's Federal-Aid Highway program. It is estimated that a
total of $15.1 million is needed to complete the three Truman-Hobbs
bridge alteration projects actively under construction: the Florida
Avenue Bridge in New Orleans, Louisiana; the Sidney Lanier Bridge in
Brunswick, Georgia; and, the Limehouse Bridge, in Charleston County,
South Carolina. All three of these bridges are highway bridges. In
addition, there are five bridge projects with completed designs for
alteration: the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Bridge in Burlington,
Iowa; the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Bridge in Fort Madison, Iowa;
the Chelsea Street Bridge in Boston, Massachusetts; the EJ&E Bridge in
Divine, Illinois; and, the CSXT (14 Mile) Bridge in Mobile, Alabama.
NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN
Senator Cochran. Okay. The Secret Service, as we know, has
responsibility for monitoring counterfeiting and investigating
counterfeiting of our currency. It has the National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children, as well. The budget transfers
funding for the national center from the Secret Service budget
to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The
question I have is: We want to be sure this does not hinder the
Service's ability to provide support for the center.
If we could have an indication that the funds that are
being transferred will support the Secret Service's mission,
that would be helpful.
Secretary Ridge. Senator, I feel confident in telling you
that the transfer of the responsibility to ICE was done in
consultation with the Secret Service. It has been at the hub of
their new initiative called Operation Predator. And we will
give you the confirmation that you seek in writing.
[The information follows:]
Grant Funding for the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children
The President's budget proposes that the funding for a $5,000,000
grant for the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
(NMEC), which in fiscal year 2004 is funded in the U.S. Secret
Service's appropriation, be placed in fiscal year 2005 in an
appropriation to U.S. Immigration and Custom Enforcement. In fiscal
year 2004 this grant will be made available by the U.S. Secret Service
to the NMEC for activities related to the investigations of exploited
children. Transfer of this grant funding to the ICE does not affect the
Service's support for the Center for Missing and Exploited Children.
The Service will continue to provide forensic and other related support
to the NCMEC.
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
AMNESTY FOR ILLEGAL ALIENS
Mr. Secretary, you indicated earlier that you are not
prepared to give us estimates on the cost of the implementation
of the President's principals on amnesty for illegal aliens.
Are you in a position to have some indication of how many more
agents would be transferred from security and enforcement to
carry out the President's plan?
Secretary Ridge. Senator, I do not at this time. Your
colleague, Senator Craig, suggested in a colloquy that we just
had, however, that we might want to consider, whenever that
plan is enacted, the use of State and locals and support them
in that effort rather than additional enforcement officers at
the Federal level. I suspect it will end up being some measure
of both. Because whenever the initiative is passed, enforcement
is a critical piece of it. But we just cannot give you those
specific numbers of either people or money at the present time,
Senator.
Senator Byrd. I believe you indicated, in response to an
earlier question, that you did not anticipate any supplemental
requests from the department.
Secretary Ridge. At the present time, Senator, we do not.
Senator Byrd. So, how does this play into the amnesty
proposal, if we do not anticipate any supplemental? If we do
expect any legislation on the President's proposal, what do you
think might be the situation with regard to a supplemental?
Secretary Ridge. Senator, first of all, I was here back in,
I think it was, 1985 or 1986 as a Member of Congress when we
went through this issue before. And as you and I are well
aware, back then amnesty and those folks were able to just
assume, I think, a different position even in terms of their
own citizenship. There is a little bit difference, there is a
significant difference, between what the President wants to do
in this program and what we did in the past.
But in any event, we are going to need substantial
resources to enforce it. And I am still not in a position,
Senator, until we better understand Congress' will and the
requirements or mandates that you may impose on the department,
what the final dollar amount will be.
CAPPS II
Senator Byrd. The department has been making preparations
to implement CAPPS II, a new information system for screening
airline passengers to determine if a passenger is a security
risk prior to their boarding an aircraft. Based on our staff
discussions with the department on the status of CAPPS II, we
have very real concerns that the department has not made
sufficient progress in meeting their criteria and addressing
concerns that we all have.
What are your plans for this system? How do you believe
that you have met the requirements of the law for deployment of
this important system?
Secretary Ridge. Senator, first of all, I would welcome,
either by letter or personal conversation with you or your
staff the specific concerns that you have with the CAPPS II
program. Secondly, it is our intention, Senator, to test, to
begin testing the program sometime later this year. There have
been some delays associated with the testing, as we have dealt
with some of the privacy issues associated with the use of
name, address, date of birth, and other passenger name records
that we would use as part of the database to get the program
off and running.
We have reached agreement with the European Union that we
can use their passenger name records as part of our testing
protocol. And we are trying to allay the legitimate concerns of
members of Congress and the public generally that the
information at our disposal will be for a very specific and
very limited use. And it will enable us to target potential
terrorists on the other side and enable us, we think, probably
to reduce the amount of secondary screening and reduce the
inconvenience and the delays at our commercial airports.
So I do not know the specific objections you have raised.
One of the insertions into the Homeland Security Act from
Congress was the insistence that we have a privacy officer. And
Attorney O'Connor and her staff have been working on these
privacy issues, working with me to convince the European Union
that the information would be for a very limited and restricted
use. And we need to convince members of Congress and the
traveling public that it will be for a limited and restricted
use, as well.
Senator Byrd. Our concerns are detailed in the fiscal year
2004 Homeland Security Appropriations Act. Our concerns are
that the department has not yet addressed the requirements of
the law.
Secretary Ridge. Well, part of it may be our need to--we
may have a difference of opinion on this, Senator. We certainly
would look to secure bipartisan support for this test so that
we could add an additional layer of protection to passenger
travel. We have spent enormous sums of money, and very
appropriately so, when we targeted commercial aviation, toward
detecting weapons.
And while I think we need to maintain our focus on weapons,
I think ultimately, as we combat terrorism, the primary focus
should be on those who might carry the weapons, trying to
identify the terrorist or potential terrorist rather than the
weapon that he or she may be carrying. And I think the CAPPS II
program gives us an opportunity in part to do just that.
OVERDUE CONGRESSIONAL REPORTS
Senator Byrd. In the fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security
Appropriations Act and associated reports, the Congress
directed the department to report to the committee on important
issues ranging from the protection of critical infrastructure,
hiring issues surrounding intelligence analysts and
cybersecurity specialists, developing an inventory of the
research and development work being done by department elements
other than the Office of Science and Technology, and in
preparing a report on the effectiveness of the homeland
security advisory system, including efforts to tailor the
system so that alerts are raised on a regional rather than
national basis.
To date, the department has delivered only 14 percent of
the mandated reports. It seems that for an issue as sensitive
as the security of our homeland, the Department would want to
have an informed Congress as an active participant in the
policy process. Is it your view that this committee should
expect these reports to come along soon?
Secretary Ridge. Senator, I certainly hope so. To put it in
context for you, Senator, we have sent quite a few up. But GAO
alone, GAO alone has asked the department to submit information
for 420 reports. That is in addition to probably 2,500
congressional inquiries. That is in addition to a lot of the
other work that we are doing to try to keep, as you very
appropriately point out, to keep our colleagues in this effort,
because we are partners in building this department, keep
everybody informed.
While I regret the delay, and I am trying to explain it,
not excuse it, but we are doing our very best we can to get to
GAO and to the members the information they have requested. And
we will do everything we can to expedite it for you, Senator.
Senator Byrd. Well, I hope you will do that. The GAO, as
you well know, is an arm of the Congress. I am sure that the
information that the GAO is seeking is of great importance to
the Congress. We just do not act as a rubberstamp for the
administration. We hope to be a partner in the effort.
Secretary Ridge. Well, Senator, we respect the inquiry. As
I said before, we fully intend to comply. It is just some of
these reports require hundreds and hundreds of man hours to get
the information and get it back to you. And we will do our best
to expedite it.
Senator Byrd. Do I have time for another question?
Senator Cochran. Yes, sir.
PLAN FOR ADJOURNMENT
Senator Byrd. Incidently, what is the Chairman's plan as to
proceeding further and whether or not we will have another
opportunity to have Secretary Ridge before us?
Senator Cochran. Senator Byrd, our plan was to adjourn the
hearing at 12:30 today. We were going to have hearings with
other under secretaries and others who have jurisdictional
responsibilities in the department. If there are other
questions that need to be submitted, we have an opportunity to
submit them in writing. But I have not discussed with the
Secretary another hearing with him personally, but we would be
glad to do that, if that is your request.
Senator Byrd. Very well. I hope we might at least think in
terms of possibly hearing the Secretary again, if there needs
to be. I understand that we will have other opportunities with
other witnesses. And so, the questions that we have in mind may
be asked and answered there.
Incidently, Governor, in an earlier conversation relative
to the title of governor, do you remember?
Secretary Ridge. Yes, sir. Yes, I do.
Senator Byrd. Well, my history taught me that in the
colonies and in the States, the people did not think too much
of their governors. Is that your recollection?
Secretary Ridge. No, it is not, sir.
Senator Byrd. I think you might fail a history test. Maybe
you should go back and review that a little bit.
Secretary Ridge. I will, Senator.
Senator Byrd. They did not have much use for the royal
governors. Do you remember?
Secretary Ridge. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Byrd. They were much more dependent upon and
confident in their elected assemblies than they were of their
governors. Pennsylvania was one of those early States, I
believe, too. I believe it was one of the 13, was it not?
Secretary Ridge. It was the second State, Senator.
Senator Byrd. All right. Well, I just have one more
question, Mr. Chairman.
FIRST RESPONDERS
Others have touched upon this. Local police, firefighters
and emergency medical teams are a community's first line of
defense. But they seem to be almost the last priority for the
President in his budget. Now others have touched upon this,
which indicates that there is a widespread concern with respect
to the first responders, and the fact is that trickle-down
theory that we have heard so much about in many other respects
is not working too well in this situation.
Cuts come despite continued warnings, cuts in these local
responders' budgets. From think tanks, commissions, and from
first responders themselves come these warnings, that our
Nation is not adequately prepared to respond to another act of
terrorism. How do you justify these cuts?
Secretary Ridge. Senator, if I could put the predictable
and, I think, understandable attention that you and all of
Congress and first responders put on the notion of additional
money to support their mission. If Congress sees fit to, at the
minimum, appropriate to first responders the dollars requested
in the 2005 budget, this Administration and this Congress will
have made available to State and local first responders nearly
$15 billion over the past 3 years. This year's grant fire grant
is $2 billion. It has been delivered directly to firefighters.
The President's budget this year, as I mentioned to Senator
Leahy, is a total amount very nearly identical to the amount of
money the President requested back in 2004. Obviously, the
Senate and the House chose to rearrange the priorities, which
is certainly their prerogative because you do have that power
of the purse, and actually gave to the first responders more
money than was requested.
But I do think that the President's commitment has been
strong. And it has been consistent throughout the years. This
year we are altering or seek congressional support of altering
how those dollars are distributed. But I would say to the
Senator that the President's commitment has been consistent and
across the board to support the first responders at a very
significant level of funding.
Senator Byrd. There are billions of dollars, as you would
agree, in the pipeline for first responders that have not been
spent. We continue to hear complaints that come up from these
people who were the first on the scene. That is why we have put
the strict time lines on the Office for Domestic Preparedness
and on the states to get the money to the first responders
where it is needed. I hope that we will do a better job of
getting the monies to these first responders.
FUNDING FOR FIRE DEPARTMENTS
The fact is, according to FEMA, only 13 percent of fire
departments have the equipment and training to handle an
incident involving chemical or biological agents. Fire
departments have only enough radios to equip half the
firefighters on a shift and breathing apparatuses for only one-
third. How do we justify a 33-percent cut to fire grants?
Secretary Ridge. Senator, two parts to your question. You
are absolutely right, Senator. The Congress mandated that the
Department of Homeland Security be prepared to distribute the
dollars you appropriated within a time certain. We are prepared
to do that. I think it was a 45-day period. We are ready to do
that.
Where we need to take a leadership role, and we would
rather not mandate it, I would rather work with the Governors
and the mayors to come up with a distribution scheme that
everybody is comfortable with. Right now, the distribution of
these proceeds varies from State to State, Senator. We are
ready to send the checks out. Most of the logjam is in the
collaboration between the cities and the States and their
applying for the money.
We will take it upon ourselves in this department to try to
work with our partners, because they are partners in this
effort, to see if we can come up with a distribution scheme so
that when we hit that time table to distribute the dollars, I
am confident Congress will also mandate that in the 2005
budget, that we can get them out quicker to the first
responders.
It is not your Department of Homeland Security. We are
ready to distribute. But the logjam really is in the
communication and collaboration at the State and local level. I
do not mean to repeat myself. I apologize. But I had planned on
meeting with the Governors, when they are in town in about 2
weeks, to address this question specifically. It is out there.
We still have a few dollars left from 2002, more than half the
dollars, I think, left from 2003. We have to get this money out
the door.
PROCUREMENT POLICY ISSUES
Part of it, I think, is tied up in procurement policies,
Senator. By the way, West Virginia, when I visited your first
responders down there, have taken a regional approach toward
building capacity around their States, so that not every
community has the same thing. But within regions, they have
built the same capacity. And that is obviously an approach that
I think is the right way to go. I cannot tell you whether or
not they have any problems with distributing the dollars. I
suspect that they are not. But they have taken a regional
approach. And we want to see if that could be part of the
answer to breaking the logjam to getting these dollars to our
first responders.
URGENCY TO GET FUNDS TO FIRST RESPONDERS
Senator Byrd. Well, I thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Chairman, you recall that we had hearings in this
committee last year, the year before. Every time, we have these
hearings and, in the meantime, we hear from these first
responders that the money that Congress appropriates seems to
be taking an awfully long time to get to them. They have taken
the position all along that they need the money. They need to
find a way to get it directly to them without all of the
trickle-down apparatuses that are in between and which have a
way of slowing down the delivery of these funds that Congress
takes a very great interest in bringing to the attention and
into the hands of these responders.
I am glad that there seems to be a greater sense of
urgency, as I listen to the Secretary. I hope that that will
carry through and that these people at the local level who are
the first people to respond will see the results of this
greater sense of urgency.
I hope, Mr. Secretary, that you will continue to press to
get this money out the door and to these people who are on the
job. Thank you.
Thank you very much.
Secretary Ridge. Thank you, Senator.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Byrd.
Mr. Secretary, we appreciate your cooperation with our
subcommittee. Senators may submit written questions to you, and
we ask you to respond to them within a reasonable time.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM
Question. The Homeland Security Advisory System has evolved from a
nationwide threat level status to more specific targeted areas since
the latest threat level decrease in January. While the threat level is
currently at an ``Elevated Condition'', which is declared when there is
a significant risk of a terror attack, our country's airports, aviation
industry, and specific high threat cities remain at the ``High
Condition'', the threat level that indicates a high risk of terrorist
attacks. This more targeted threat level status helps focus limited
resources on the most credible threat areas and at the same time allows
security personnel and first responders in other parts of the country
to ``stand down'' while remaining vigilant.
What further enhancements do you envision for the Homeland Security
Advisory System with the improvement of intelligence detailing specific
terrorist threats for certain metropolitan areas and specific sectors
of industry?
Answer. With each raising and lowering of the Homeland Security
Advisory System (HSAS), the Department of Homeland Security learns new
lessons and improves its notification process. As the system has
evolved, it has come to reflect the need for certain metropolitan areas
and/or specific areas of industry to be notified at different times or
at different levels than others. As such, DHS has become adept at
providing information to such specific audiences as states and sectors
through Homeland Security Information Bulletins and Advisories.
Additionally, Department officials speak personally with
representatives and officials of threatened states and industries, when
the need arises. This personal communication, along with the ability of
the system to allow DHS to communicate to certain areas what their
alert level should be embody the enhancements that have been
implemented thus far.
Question. What steps are being taken by the Department's
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate to
notify Congress and other key members of the Administration before a
change in the Homeland Security Advisory System threat condition is
announced publicly?
Answer. Key congressional members are notified telephonically when
a decision has been made to raise the threat level and, circumstances
permitting, before the public announcement is made. Members notified
are: the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House, the Majority leader,
Minority leader and President pro tem of the Senate, the Chair and
ranking member of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee and both House and Senate
Homeland Appropriations Subcommittees.
Due to the tight timeline typically surrounding the announcement of
alert level changes, the list of those personally notified in advance
is necessarily limited to Congressional leadership and leadership of
the committees of appropriations, and committees of overarching DHS
authorization. Normally the scheduling of these calls will involve
notification of key staff as well, but in those cases where it might
not, DHS Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) will make telephonic and
e-mail notifications at the same time.
Notification includes the change, when it is expected to be
announced and the non-classified context in which the decision was
made. If a member cannot be reached, their most senior staff member
available is informed on their behalf. Notifications are made by Senior
DHS Officials, typically the Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary for
IAIP, and the Under Secretary for BTS. DHS callers may vary depending
on operational circumstances but calls will not fall below the
Assistant Secretary level. DHS, in concert with CIA and FBI will
schedule a classified, Members only intelligence briefing as soon as
possible after the announcement. If the change occurs when the Congress
is in recess, a similar briefing is provided to relevant staff
directors.
When the threat level is reduced, DHS OLA notifies key
congressional staff including staff of the Speaker and Minority Leader
of the House, the Majority leader, minority leader and President pro
tem of the Senate, the Chair and Ranking Member of the House Select
Committee on Homeland Security, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
and both House and Senate Homeland Appropriations Subcommittees so that
they may, in turn, inform their members before a formal announcement is
made.
Despite these efforts at advance notice, the Department must in
each case make arrangements with the media prior to the Secretary's
announcement of the change in the threat level, in order to fulfill the
DHS responsibility to properly notify the public. As such, DHS is not
able to control media and public speculation regarding the nature of
DHS announcements up to the scheduled time of the press conference.
CYBER SECURITY
Question. The National Cyber Security Division as part of the
Department's Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate recently unveiled the National Cyber Alert System which
intends to deliver information to home computer users and technical
experts in business and government agencies to better secure their
computer systems from the latest computer viruses.
How would you rate the performance of the new National Cyber Alert
System's response to the most recent computer virus outbreaks,
including the ``MyDoom'' virus that affected not only computers
worldwide but also computers within the Federal Government?
Answer. I would rate the response to the National Cyber Alert
System as positive, but not good enough. On the first day of NCAS
launch, the Department's United States Computer Emergency Readiness
Team (US-CERT) was bombarded by more than one million hits from would-
be subscribers. More than 250,000 direct subscribers rely on the
National Cyber Alert System to maintain their cyber vigilance and an
additional estimated one million additional users receive national
cyber alerts and information products indirectly through relationships
with the Information Technology Association of America, various
industry associations, the Stay Safe Online program, and others.
NCAS is new and will continue to evolve and improve over time.
Importantly, the National Cyber Alert System is but a small portion of
the work being done within the Department's IAIP Directorate, both to
prevent incidents and in response to specific events in cyberspace. In
partnership with the Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination
Center (CERT-CC) at Carnegie Mellon University; my department works
with over 150 cyber security experts from across the Federal
Government; and collaborates with key elements from the Departments of
Justice, Defense, Treasury, Energy, and State; the FBI and the
Intelligence Community; and the private sector to prevent, respond to,
manage, and recover from cyber incidents.
Question. The Department's new initiative ``Live Wire'' will test
civilian agencies' security preparedness and contingency planning by
staging cyber attack exercises to evaluate the impact of widespread
computer disruptions. Recent instances, such as the power outages in
the Northeast this past August, are an example of how an attack on our
critical infrastructures, such as a cyber attack by terrorists on our
Nation's utility industry, could cascade across a wide region if the
proper precautions are not taken immediately.
Does the Department currently test the vulnerabilities of computer
systems in the government and private sector to simulate a terrorist
attack on the Nation's cyber infrastructure and if so, how will ``Live
Wire'' build upon any current program if funded?
Answer. Live Wire is the first of a series of cross-sector, cross-
discipline exercises that test the Nation's ability to respond to a
large-scale, coordinated cyber attack and allow the Department to learn
important lessons that improve our preparation for real emergencies. We
have hired outside experts to assist in our vulnerability analyses and
continue to work with the private sector Information Sharing and
Analysis Centers to augment our technical capabilities and knowledge.
We created the Cyber Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG)
to promote interagency cooperation in advance of and during cyber
incidents and to assess cyber consequences flowing from an attack or
natural calamities. This activity is a direct outgrowth of the Live
Wire experience, where the need to establish a baseline of cyber
activities across the Federal Government and improve communication
channels were identified. Other cyber activities also stand to benefit
from exercises like Live Wire. To date, the Department has focused on
building the technical capability of the US-CERT and establishing the
National Cyber Alert System. We are also examining possible system-wide
impacts on critical infrastructures caused by cyber dependencies and
interconnectedness
BIOSURVEILLANCE SYSTEM
Question. The President's budget proposes to establish a National
BioSurveillance Group led by the Department of Homeland Security that
will include the Department of Health and Human Services and the
Department of Agriculture to create a national biosurveillance system
to help shape current and proposed disease surveillance systems and to
guide research and development of new technologies and capabilities.
How will the Department's Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection directorate lead the coordination of efforts with the
Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of
Agriculture to integrate biosurveillance data from across the country
in order to verify a chemical or biological terrorist attack?
Answer. As is directed in Homeland Security Presidential Directive/
HSPD-9, Defense of United States Agriculture and Food, the Department
of Homeland Security, through the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate is currently leading
coordination efforts to integrate biosurveillance data across the
country. This involves the formation of an inter-agency working group.
The goal of this group is to identify and develop options available to
each agency, which will culminate in a report which outlines the
building of a biosurveillance program within IAIP and projects what
will be needed to develop and maintain a credible system. The working
group has been meeting weekly in an effort to present the report to the
Assistant Secretaries of Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection and the Under Secretary of IAIP in April. The draft report
will then be presented to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of DHS,
with the goal of having a finished report delivered to the President in
May of this year.
Question. Also, as part of this initiative, how will the
Department's Science and Technology Directorate expand its
environmental monitoring activities in the Nation's largest
metropolitan areas?
Answer. The Department's Science and Technology Directorate will
work with its BioWatch partners to expand the number of collectors in
the highest threat metropolitan areas. This expansion is based on
detailed modeling studies that determine the optimum number of
collectors for densely populated regions and a request from the cities
to provide additional collectors for their high priority facilities and
sites. The expansion will draw on small modifications to the current
BioWatch technology, in particular, the use of additional automation
and detection equipment to enable cost-effective analysis of the
significantly increased sample load. Plume modeling for a variety of
potential release scenarios and meteorological conditions will be used
to optimize the layout and the coverage of the ensemble of collectors
for each of the selected metropolitan areas. Localities will help
determine where additional collectors should be placed based on their
prioritized critical facilities needs (e.g., transit systems;
stadiums). In addition, each metropolitan area will be provided a small
number of collectors that they can deploy at special events as they
arise. A pilot study will be completed this spring and summer in New
York City to determine the best configuration options to consider for
deployment use in fiscal year 2005.
TERRORIST WATCH LIST
Question. Over the course of the last 2 years, the Administration
has been working towards a government-wide consolidation of terrorist
watchlist information. While the government-wide responsibility has
been given to another Department, there are still multiple watchlists
within the Department of Homeland Security.
Congress provided the Department with $10 million for watchlist
integration in this year's appropriation--what is the status of that
project?
Answer. DHS is a partner in the multi-agency Terrorist Screening
Center. The Terrorist Screening Center became operational in December
of 2003 and is now conducting 24 hour a day, 7 days per week
operations. It is the single coordination point for Terrorist
Encounters and thus enables a coordinated response for Federal, State,
and Local Law Enforcement. The TSC has received more than 1,000 calls
to date and has identified over 500 positive matches.
Question. How is the Department's watchlist being integrated with
other agencies watchlists at the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
Terrorist Screening Center?
Answer. TSC remains on schedule to bring the first version of its
consolidated Terrorist Screening Database online by the end of the
year. This database will be accessible to queries from Federal, State,
and local agencies for screening purposes and will provide immediate
responses to Federal border-screening and law-enforcement authorities.
Each parent organization of the individual watchlists provides
Assignees to the Terrorist Screening Center for real-time access to
TTIC and FBI databases. All new nomination and updates to existing
records are therefore performed at the TSC.
Question. Is it possible today for every law enforcement officer
and intelligence analyst at the Department of Homeland Security to
access one list of suspected terrorists?
Answer. Currently, DHS intelligence analysts continue to access
information utilizing the information provided by the TSC specific to
each individual list. However, as the preceding answer indicates, TSC
plans to consolidate these lists into a single database in the near
future.
Transportation Security Administration
Question. Over 54 percent of the President's budget request for the
Transportation Security Administration for fiscal year 2005 is
dedicated for aviation passenger and baggage screeners pay, benefits,
training, and human resource services. At the same time, three major
grant programs currently administered by the Transportation Security
Administration dealing with trucking security, port security grants,
and Operation Safe Commerce are to be reorganized under the Office for
Domestic Preparedness pursuant to the Department's reorganization
authority. The fiscal year 2005 budget proposes to reduce or terminate
funding for these programs.
Will the Transportation Security Administration continue to have
responsibility for security over all sectors of transportation or will
aviation security continue to be the main focus of this agency?
Answer. The Border and Transportation Security Directorate of DHS,
in partnership with the Coast Guard, has jurisdiction over the security
of all modes of transportation and is charged with coordinating all
activities of the Department under the Homeland Security Act. The Coast
Guard and organizations within BTS either have primary or subsidiary
responsibilities in each transportation area. TSA clearly has a primary
transportation role within BTS, and this role does not change merely by
the transfer of grant distribution and management activities to ODP.
Question. What funding will be available for fiscal year 2005 to
increase security of railways, roadways, and all other modes of
transportation in light of the Administration's proposal to terminate
intercity bus and trucking grants?
Answer. The responsibility of securing our Nation's transportation
systems is a shared responsibility between government, local operators,
and private companies who profit from that system. The aviation system
is treated no differently, though understandably has received the most
Federal focus to date given the clear nature and level of the aviation
threat. We will continue to undertake transportation security programs
on a threat-based, risk management basis.
With respect to rail and mass transit specifically, DHS, DOT, and
other Federal agencies are working together to enhance rail and transit
security in partnership with the public and private entities that own
and operate the Nation's rail and transit systems. The DHS grant
program for improving rail and transit security in urban areas has
awarded or allocated over $115 million since May 2003. Additionally,
the Administration has requested $24 million for TSA to advance
security efforts in the maritime and surface transportation arenas. DHS
will conduct the following activities and initiatives to strengthen
security in surface modes:
--Implement a pilot program to test the new technologies and
screening concepts to evaluate the feasibility of screening
luggage and carry-on bags for explosives at rail stations and
aboard trains;
--Develop and implement a mass transit vulnerability self-assessment
tool;
--Continue the distribution of public security awareness material
(i.e., tip cards, pamphlets, and posters) for motorcoach,
school bus, passenger rail, and commuter rail employees;
--Increase passenger, rail employee, and local law enforcement
awareness through public awareness campaigns and security
personnel training;
--Ensure compliance with safety and security standards for commuter
and rail lines and better help identify gaps in the security
system in coordination with DOT, with additional technical
assistance and training provided by TSA;
--Continue to work with industry and State and local authorities to
establish baseline security measures based on current industry
best practices and with modal administrations within the DOT as
well as governmental and industry stakeholders, to establish
best practices, develop security plans, assess security
vulnerabilities, and identify needed security enhancements; and
--Study hazardous materials (HAZMAT) security threats and identify
best practices for transport of HAZMAT.
Question. How will the Transportation Security Administration
coordinate with the Office for Domestic Preparedness on the grant
programs (trucking security, port security grants, intercity bus
grants, and Operation Safe Commerce) that will be moved from TSA
pursuant to the reorganization?
Answer. It is anticipated that TSA, other BTS organizations with
transportation security responsibilities and the Coast Guard will
continue to provide the necessary operational expertise for the grant
programs through participation in pre-award management functions. These
functions include determination of eligibility and evaluation criteria,
solicitation and application review procedures, selection
recommendations and post award technical monitoring.
These organizations will also continue to leverage existing
transportation expertise by working with industry stakeholders and DOT
modal administrations to ensure that Federal security grants facilitate
the seamless integration of security planning activities by industry
stakeholders and governmental stakeholders at the regional, state, and
local levels.
Question. Congress provided $85 million for the Transportation
Security Administration for fiscal year 2004 to provide additional
screeners to inspect air cargo and also for the research and
development of explosive detection systems in order to perform
screening of the larger palletized, bulk air cargo.
With the increase in funding provided, how many additional
screeners have been hired to inspect air cargo to date and when do you
expect to be fully staffed?
Answer. The funding provided in the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2004 (Public Law 108-90) enabled TSA to hire 100
new cargo inspectors. All 100 cargo inspector positions have been
selected, and paperwork is being processed by TSA Human Resources. We
anticipate extending job offers to these applicants and bringing them
on board within the next 2 months.
Question. What enhancements are being made to the current Known
Shipper program to guarantee the safety of air cargo?
Answer. Since 9/11, significant enhancements have been made to the
known shipper program. The Known Shipper Program was started in 1996 at
FAA with the development and implementation of comprehensive known
shipper requirements. The current requirements for new shippers
applying for known shipper status have been strengthened. In addition,
the authenticity of established known shippers has been verified as
meeting the new requirements. In order to substantiate the legitimacy
of known shippers further, air carriers have been required to conduct
site visits of known shippers' facilities. Additionally, TSA is
currently developing a Known Shipper Database, which will allow TSA to
vet applicants to the program more thoroughly for legitimacy by
comparing data submitted by applicants against terrorist watch lists,
other government data bases, and other publicly available information.
Eventually, TSA's Known Shipper Database will be one part of a larger
freight assessment database intended to target high risk cargo
shipments for additional screening.
Question. Would it currently be feasible to inspect 100 percent of
all air cargo being placed on aircraft, as proposed by some in
Congress, and, in your opinion, how do you feel the flow of commerce
would be affected if air cargo was restricted from being placed on
aircraft unless 100 percent inspection of air cargo took place?
Answer. Not only is 100 percent physical inspection infeasible, it
is not desirable. The sheer volume of air cargo transported in the
United States renders the inspection of all air cargo infeasible
without a significant negative impact on the operating capabilities of
the entire transportation infrastructure of the United States and the
national economy. Anything more than a targeted, focused physical
inspection protocol on high risk cargo for the long term risks homeland
security resources and critical management focus on known security
risks. The DHS goal is to ensure that all cargo is screened to
determine risk and that 100 percent of high-risk cargo is inspected.
TSA is aggressively pursuing next-generation technological solutions
that will allow us to enhance security for air cargo. Meanwhile, TSA is
taking steps to implement measures outlined in the Air Cargo Strategic
Plan and is doing everything possible to ensure that cargo going on
planes is secure, including the requirement that all cargo transported
on passenger aircraft originate from a known shipper.
Question.The President's fiscal year 2005 budget requests a $25
million increase for the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-screening
System (CAPPS II) currently being tested by the Transportation Security
Administration. This system, when completely functional, will enable
air carriers to perform an analysis on the ticketed passengers based on
authentication from commercial data providers, and will also check
passenger names against a government supplied terrorist watch list.
However, CAPPS II has been slow in developing because of delays in
obtaining passenger data needed for testing due to privacy concerns by
air carriers.
How is the Department working with the airlines to alleviate
privacy concerns in light of recent disclosures that air carriers have
shared passenger records with other government agencies and private
contractors without the passengers' knowledge?
Answer. The disclosure of passenger records by air carriers
triggered concerns because passengers were not told that the
information they provided to make a reservation was being shared with
another entity (the government) for another purpose (national
security). In at least one instance, the air carrier's own published
privacy policy stated that passenger information would not be shared
with anyone else. Bearing this experience in mind, the Department is
committed to working with privacy advocates, airlines, passengers, and
the travel industry to provide greater understanding and awareness of
the purposes and scope of CAPPS II and to ensure that individual
privacy rights are protected.
DHS plans to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) seeking
public comment on the collection of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data.
Certain aircraft operators, foreign air carriers, and operators of
computer reservation systems would be required to provide PNR
information for each individual who makes a reservation. The proposal
will also require regulated parties to take reasonable steps to ensure
that the passenger is provided notice of the purpose for which the
information is collected, the authority under which it is collected,
and the consequences of a passenger's failure to provide the
information.
The CAPPS II system will only be accessible to persons who require
access for the performance of their duties as Federal employees or
contractors to the Federal Government. The airlines, airline personnel,
and the computer reservation systems will not have access to
information contained in CAPPS II. All contractors, contractor
employees and Federal Government employees who will have access to and/
or who will be processing personal data will sign a written privacy
policy and acknowledge that they are bound by the strict terms of the
privacy policy. All personnel with access to the system will have a
government security clearance based on the level and type of
information accessed. At a minimum, a Department of Defense (DOD)
Secret Clearance will be required. The guiding principle for access
will be ``need-to-know.'' Access will be compartmentalized, thus
allowing access to persons based only on their individual need-to-know
and only to the extent of their authorization (e.g., a person might be
permitted to access information with regard to the unclassified portion
of the system, but be denied access to classified areas). CAPPS II also
will have substantial security measures in place to protect the system
and data from unauthorized access by hackers or other intruders.
Question. How can assurances be made to prevent identity theft by a
would-be terrorist intent on using legitimate individuals information
to get around the CAPPS II background checks?
Answer. While no system can be 100 percent effective, we believe
that the CAPPS II system will be a great advancement in defeating
identity fraud. The CAPPS II design includes an information-based
identity assessment process, which is an improved version of the best
practices used by the banking and credit industries to combat identity
theft and fraud. This capability is a substantial improvement to the
current system.
CAPPS II will incorporate best practices developed in the private
sector for discovering cases of identity fraud. In the case of an
identity thief who steals a legitimate identity, any number of indicia,
including errors or inconsistencies in the information, could reveal
the theft. Further, CAPPS II will make use of a database containing up-
to-date information about stolen identities, which will further protect
against identity thieves who use this means to enable them to attack
the civil aviation system.
No system can be 100 percent effective, which is why CAPPS II will
be part of a layered ``system of systems'' involving physical scrutiny,
identity-based risk assessment, and other security precautions on
aircraft and at airports.
Question. The Inspector General completed last week a review of
background checks for Federal airport passenger and baggage screeners
that listed twelve recommendations for the administrator of
Transportation Security Administration to improve its management of the
background check process.
What procedures have been put into place to guarantee all passenger
and baggage screeners that are currently employed and also individuals
who are applying for a screening position have a full background check?
Answer. All screeners employed by TSA as of May 31, 2003, except
for a small number of exceptions detailed below, have received
fingerprint based criminal history record checks based on FBI criminal
history records, pre-employment background checks which examine
Federal, county, and local law enforcement records, credit history, and
TSA watch lists (No-Fly and Selectee); and Access National Agency Check
with Inquiries (ANACI) background checks conducted by the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM). These checks were completed by October 1,
2003. The limited exceptions included individuals on military or sick
leave, and some screeners under the private screening pilot program.
All of the exceptions have received fingerprint based criminal history
checks and pre-employment background checks. In addition, OPM ANACIs
have been completed or are in the process of being completed on all
contract screeners and on screeners who have returned from sick or
military leave.
Since June 1, 2003, TSA has required that screener applicants
receive the aforementioned fingerprint based criminal history check and
pre-employment background check before they are hired. TSA does not
extend offers of employment to applicants until these checks are
successfully adjudicated for each applicant. Once hired, all new
screeners then undergo the more thorough OPM ANACI check, which
typically takes 3-6 months to complete. This check reviews education,
employment history, credit history, references, criminal history,
military records, and citizenship. The combination of timely check
before hiring and more thorough OPM checks soon thereafter provides a
layered approach to personnel security for new screeners.
TSA maintains a database that tracks the progress of screener
investigations from which routine reports can be generated and reviewed
to determine the status of all investigations.
Emergency Preparedness and Response
BIOSHIELD
Question. Does the lack of authorization for the administration's
BioShield initiative inhibit your ability to obligate the funds
appropriated for the program?
Answer. The fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security Appropriations Act
provided $885 million to be spent for development of biodefense
countermeasures for the current fiscal year. Absent authorizing
legislation, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has relied upon
this authority to obligate funds for biodefense countermeasure
activities. DHS, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the
Homeland Security Council, and the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) recognize the importance of expeditious progress in developing
much-needed countermeasures while following Congressional intent. In
that vein, all parties have sought to follow the principles set forth
in the proposed legislation in developing the interagency agreement for
next-generation anthrax vaccine. A FEMA contracting officer has
authority to sign contracts related to the obligation of BioShield
funds.
Question. For what purposes do you intend to use the funds made
available for fiscal year 2004?
Answer. Over the past 10 months, the WMD Medical Countermeasures
subcommittee has developed countermeasures information of interest to
administration policymakers who will make the BioShield procurement
decisions. The WMD subcommittee commissioned an end-to-end analysis of
medical countermeasures to Category ``A'' biological agents (anthrax,
smallpox, plague, botulinum toxin, tularemia, Ebola, and other
hemorrhagic fever viruses). Working groups developed initial
requirements for four high-priority bioweapon countermeasures for which
there is high need and a reasonable expectation that products will be
available in the near term:
--Next-generation anthrax vaccine (recombinant Protective Antigen,
rPA)
--Anthrax immune therapy
--Next-generation smallpox vaccine (modified vaccinia, MVA or LC16m8)
--Botulinum antitoxin
Question. Why does the President's fiscal year 2005 budget propose
to transfer the Strategic National Stockpile from the Department of
Homeland Security's Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate to
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) but not the BioShield
program? Please explain why the Stockpile is more appropriately managed
by the Department of Health and Human Services and why BioShield is
more appropriately managed by the Department of Homeland Security.
Answer. The President's Budget for fiscal year 2005 proposes to
transfer the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) back to HHS where it
will be better aligned with HHS' medical and scientific expertise and
responsibilities. The SNS is an operational program, consisting of
copious amounts of physical inventory and medical materiel. Since its
mission is time-critical, it should possess a single, undisputed
management structure for rapid decision-making. Although the daily
operations of the SNS have not been affected in a significant manner by
the transfer from HHS to DHS, the single command structure for the
program that would result from the transfer back to HHS would
streamline operations. DHS will maintain its ability to deploy the
Stockpile in accordance with the SNS statute, 42 U.S.C. 300hh-12, as
amended, and thus, the potential response needs of the DHS mission will
not be compromised in any manner.
The BioShield program differs substantially from the SNS in that it
is a policy-driven program that is most successful as a joint venture
between homeland security and health experts. The major programmatic
aspect/activity of BioShield is product development, which is performed
by private companies. The BioShield program was specifically
constructed to spur development of countermeasures for which no
commercial markets exist against current and emerging threats to the
United States, for inclusion in the SNS.
Since DHS is responsible for assessing current and emerging threats
against the United States, including biological and chemical threats,
the BioShield program, which helps to ensure our Nation's health
security and is one of the many facets of the Department's efforts to
combat terrorism, is therefore more appropriately managed by DHS than
by HHS.
Question. How are decisions being made as to the appropriate
expenditure of BioShield funds? Has an assessment been done of our
vulnerabilities to biological attacks to guide decisions as to the
investments which should be made to develop, produce and pre-purchase
vaccines or other medications for the Nation's biodefense? Who is doing
such an assessment and what priorities have been established?
Answer. There are several steps taken to determine appropriate
biodefense countermeasures development and the use of BioShield funds.
DHS and HHS are seeking to adhere to the intent of the proposed
BioShield authorizing legislation now awaiting action in the Senate.
The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate
of DHS is responsible for determining a material threat. After that,
the WMD Countermeasures subcommittee group co-chaired by DHS, HHS, and
the Department of Defense, part of the Homeland Security Council Policy
Coordinating Committee (PCC), develops countermeasures information of
interest to the PCC, which then makes procurement decisions. The WMD
Countermeasures subcommittee has completed an analysis of Category
``A'' biological agents (anthrax, smallpox, plague, botulinum toxin,
tularemia, Ebola, and other hemorrhagic fever viruses). Working groups
developed initial requirements for four high-priority bioweapon
countermeasures for which there is high need and a reasonable
expectation that products will be available in the near term:
--Next-generation anthrax vaccine
--Anthrax immune therapy
--Next-generation smallpox vaccine
--Botulinum antitoxin
ANTHRAX VACCINE
Question. What is the Strategic National Stockpile requirement for
anthrax vaccine?
Answer. DHS and HHS have entered into an interagency agreement to
purchase recombinant Protective Antigen (rPA) vaccine to protect 25
million persons. The government will consider later purchase of
additional anthrax vaccine contingent on new vaccination delivery
system technology and other cost-saving factors such as reduced dose
requirements.
Question. Are we filling at least part of the anthrax vaccine
requirement with an FDA-approved product currently available?
Answer. The Stockpile currently maintains a small amount of the
only FDA-licensed pre-exposure vaccine against anthrax (Anthrax Vaccine
Adsorbed, or AVA). Currently, it has limited production capacity, and
rectifying that problem would be very expensive and take several years
to accomplish. AVA is not currently licensed for children or for the
elderly. However, in order to ensure that some type of anthrax vaccine
is available until the development and procurement of rPA, DHS and HHS
have signed an interagency agreement for the purchase of AVA through
the Department of the Army. This agreement will provide approximately 2
million doses in fiscal year 2004, 1.5 million doses in fiscal year
2005, and 1.5 million doses in fiscal year 2006.
United States Secret Service
WHITE HOUSE MAIL PROCESSING
Question. The Secret Service budget includes $16,365,000 for White
House mail screening. The Committee requested in the fiscal year 2004
bill that a detailed long-term plan for the establishment of a fully
operational White House mail facility be provided to the Committee.
When can the Committee expect to receive this report?
Answer. An interim report was submitted to the Committee on
February 10, 2004. This interim report stated that the Department of
Homeland Security is aggressively developing a plan to support mail
operations for the entire Department. One facet of this development
process will evaluate incorporation of a combined mail facility
supporting the White House and Department components located within the
Washington D.C. metropolitan area. The Secret Service has contracted
for a study to review several of the secure mail processes currently in
operation and following conclusion of this review will make a
recommendation to the Department as to a method of processing mail and
the potential for a combined facility. This study is expected to be
completed in April, 2004. A final report will be submitted to the
Committee in June 2004.
Since the interim report was submitted to the Committee, the White
House and Secret Service have determined that the requirements for
processing White House mail are not compatible with consolidation into
a DHS mail processing facility. Therefore the June report will be a
plan for processing White House mail in a separate facility, not a
combined facility.
COUNTERFEITING AND FINANCIAL CRIMES
Question. Colombia and Bulgaria continue to be hot spots for
counterfeit currency. Does the fiscal year 2005 Homeland Security
budget include funding to concentrate on these areas?
Answer. For almost 30 years, Colombia has remained the largest
producer of counterfeit U.S. currency in world. In May of 2001, the
Secret Service received a 2-year allocation of $1.5 million through the
State Department's ``Plan Colombia'' fund, and implemented plans to
train and equip a local anti-counterfeiting force to work in
conjunction with Secret Service agents in the seizure and suppression
of counterfeit U.S. dollars manufactured in Colombia. Through the
funding provided under Plan Colombia, the Secret Service and Colombian
law enforcement authorities were able to make a tremendous impact on
counterfeit production and distribution networks. This ultimately led
to significant reductions in the amount of Colombian-manufactured
counterfeit U.S. dollars that reached the streets of the United States.
The 2-year execution of Plan Colombia led to the seizure of $123.3
million in counterfeit U.S. currency, the suppression of 33 counterfeit
printing plants, and over 164 arrests. This resulted in a 37 percent
decrease in the amount of Colombian-produced counterfeit U.S. dollars
passed on the American people.
Second only to Colombia, organized criminal groups in Bulgaria are
the world's second leading producer of counterfeit U.S. currency.
Counterfeit currency produced in Bulgaria continues to be passed in the
United States and throughout Eastern and Central Europe. There is
strong evidence that the same organized criminal groups producing
counterfeit U.S. currency in Bulgaria are also involved in human
trafficking and narcotics trafficking.
Bulgaria is a country undergoing a dramatic transition as they seek
to enter the European Union, restructure their criminal code and remove
corrupt officials from government. The Secret Service believes that
additional efforts must be made to capitalize on these efforts and work
with local law enforcement officials to dismantle the counterfeiting
operations in Bulgaria. Additionally, the Bulgarian government has
expressed its willingness to work with foreign law enforcement and has
requested additional support from the Secret Service.
While the Department of Homeland Security fiscal year 2005 budget
request does not include a specific funding request to continue these
efforts, the Secret Service receives funding in its base budget that
allows it to continue its strong overseas investigative efforts and
cooperative partnerships with the foreign law enforcement communities
in Colombia and Bulgaria.
Question. What role will the Secret Service play in protecting our
Nation's extensive network of financial systems from terrorists and
hackers? Does the fiscal year 2005 budget request provide adequate
funding to guard against this growing problem?
Answer. The Secret Service's core investigative mission is to
safeguard the financial and critical infrastructures of the United
States. The Department's fiscal year 2005 funding request provides
adequate funding for the Secret Service to continue the array of
programs it has developed to work with its law enforcement, private
sector and academic partners in strengthening these networks and
preventing intrusions and compromises of these essential
infrastructures. These programs include:
Electronic Crimes Task Forces (ECTFs)
The groundbreaking task force model developed by the Secret Service
emphasizes information sharing and a pooling of resources and expertise
to produce a collaborative effort to thwart cyber criminals and to
detect, investigate, and most importantly, to prevent electronic
crimes. Members include other Federal, State and local law enforcement
agencies, prosecutors, private sector representatives from the
financial services, telecommunications and IT sectors, and academic
experts from leading universities. These members build trusted
partnerships and have made tremendous strides in the communities they
serve in a short period of time.
Providing these ECTFs with training, resources and manpower is
paramount to the Secret Service's statutory mission to protect
financial payment systems and critical infrastructures. Directed by
Public Law 107-56 (the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001) to expand its ECTF
model from a single task force in New York to a nationwide network, the
Secret Service has since established additional ECTFs in Boston, Miami,
Washington, D.C., Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Charlotte, Las
Vegas, Cleveland, Houston, Dallas, and Columbia, South Carolina.
Electronic Crimes Special Agent Program (ECSAP)
Currently, the Secret Service has trained 118 agents in this
program, which provides certified instruction to special agents in the
preservation and examination of computer forensic evidence. The Secret
Service has based these agents in field offices throughout the country,
and they have become indispensable assets to the communities they serve
and their law enforcement and private sector partners.
CERT/CSPI (Critical Systems Protection Initiative)
In a continuing partnership with Carnegie Mellon's Computer
Emergency Response Team (CERT), the Secret Service has established a
training program addressing the cyber security of critical
infrastructures. The expansion of e-commerce and proliferation of
websites providing financial and personal information to the public has
made it essential that Secret Service personnel and their partners
understand the interdependency of computer networks. Through risk
assessments and identification of vulnerabilities, the Secret Service
has adopted a more proactive approach to prevent terrorists and hackers
from exploiting our financial systems.
CERT/NTAC Insider Threat Study
In cooperation with Carnegie Melon's CERT, the Secret Service's
National Threat Assessment Center and Criminal Investigative Division
are conducting studies that specifically target the banking and
financial services industries. Again, due to the trusted partnerships
the Secret Service has developed with these entities, successful
efforts have been made to gather information and provide operationally-
critical threat and asset vulnerability.
Question. Identity theft has been called the fastest growing crime
in the United States. The Congressional Research Service reports that
identity theft has grown in three consecutive years. Does the fiscal
year 2005 budget include funding to counter this growing problem?
Answer. The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes funding levels
that fully support the Secret Service's investigative responsibilities,
including its identity theft investigations. Although there are no new
initiatives in the budget for preventing and investigating identity
crimes, the Secret Service has several existing programs aimed at
stemming the tide of this growing crime. These initiatives include:
The Identity Crime Interactive Resource Guide CD-ROM & Video
This highly successful Secret Service initiative, in partnership
with the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, the International Association
of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), was
designed to provide useable tools and resources to local and State law
enforcement officers and to assist with their identity crimes
investigations and case management. This joint effort gives local and
State law enforcement officers the information they need not only to
assist victims of identity crimes but also to initiate their own
investigations.
The CD ROM/Video is an ongoing project that requires amending,
updating and adding new investigative resources as they become
available. The Secret Service is currently working on the production
and distribution of an updated version of the CD-ROM, the development
of a similar web-based initiative, and deploying the Resource Guide on
the Secret Service extranet and the DHS portal webpage. To date, more
than 40,000 of these CD-ROMs have been distributed to local and State
police agencies and local, State and Federal prosecutors.
Forward Edge
The Secret Service also joined with the IACP and the National
Institute for Justice to produce the interactive, computer-based
training program known as ``Forward Edge,'' which takes the next step
in training officers to conduct electronic crime investigations.
Forward Edge is a CD-ROM that incorporates virtual reality features as
it presents three different investigative scenarios to the trainee. It
also provides investigative options and technical support to develop
the case.
While over 30,000 of these training tools have been distributed to
the Secret Service's law enforcement partners, an updated version of
Forward Edge is currently under development. This version will
incorporate the video, virtual reality and 3D models but will also add
adaptations made in reaction to new challenges posed by emerging
technology and criminal activity.
Best Practices for Seizing Electronic Evidence
This pocket-size guide produced by the Secret Service assists law
enforcement officers in recognizing, protecting, seizing and searching
electronic devices in accordance with applicable statutes and policies.
Over 320,000 ``Best Practices Guides'' have been distributed free of
charge to local and Federal law enforcement officers.
Identity Crime Training Seminars
In a joint effort with the Department of Justice, the U.S. Postal
Inspection Service, and the FTC, the Secret Service is hosting Identity
Crime Training Seminars for law enforcement officers across the United
States. Each seminar consists of 8 hours of training focused on
providing local and State law enforcement officers with tools and
resources that they can immediately put into use in their
investigations of identity crime. Additionally, officers are provided
resources and information that they can pass on to members of their
community who are victims of identity crime. Other critical partners in
these training seminar efforts are Discover Financial Services, the
American Association of Motor Vehicles Administrators (AAMVA) and the
State DMVs from each community.
Office for Domestic Preparedness
GRANT CONSOLIDATION
Question. The announced reorganization of grant programs within the
Department of Homeland Security moves the responsibility for all of the
grant programs under TSA to ODP--Port Security grants, Intercity Bus
grants, Trucking industry grants, and Operation Safe Commerce, and
programs such as the Emergency Management Performance Grants from EP&R
to ODP. How will you ensure that TSA and EP&R are still involved with
the oversight of these programs, especially with reduced funding as
proposed for 2005?
Answer. The Office for Domestic Preparedness and the Office of
State and Local Government Coordination both maintain close
communication and contact with EP&R. The creation of the Office of
State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness will not
inhibit or impede the already established relationship between ODP/
OSLGC and EP&R & TSA.
ODP currently coordinates closely with EP&R and will continue to do
so, as it does with other DHS components. For example, ODP and EP&R are
working closely on the transfer of the Pre-Positioned Equipment Program
from ODP to EP&R. Additionally, ODP and EP&R have worked closely on the
Top Officials (TOPOFF) Exercise Program, and are currently working
together on the planning of TOPOFF 3. Finally, EP&R is part of ODP's
internal DHS review team for the state homeland security strategies,
which each State was required to complete and provide to ODP by January
31, 2004.
OSLGCP will maintain strong ties to operational subject matter
experts within the current offices and agencies as appropriate. For
example, while responsibility for crafting policy and guidelines for
the Port Security Grant Program would reside within OSLGCP, program
development will still have significant input from and access to
subject matter experts in the Coast Guard, MARAD, and TSA. The
Department fully intends to use existing resources and subject matters
experts to ensure that OSLGCP has the proper staffing levels and
resources to effectively administer its activities and programs.
BASIC STATE GRANT PROGRAM
Question. The 2005 budget request proposes a significant reduction
to the Basic State Grant program of the Office for Domestic
Preparedness (ODP)--as well as abandoning the State minimum in the
historically-used formula for distributing the money to states. I
understand the need to balance resources between the states and the
needs of our urban areas. We tried to achieve that balance in the
fiscal year 2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act and
the fiscal year 2004 Appropriations Act. The President's fiscal year
2005 budget proposal seems to have tipped the balance too far in the
direction of the high-threat urban areas--and does not allow for the
basic mission of the ODP to be carried out. ODP's mission is to ensure
a basic level of preparedness in all states. What is the rationale for
the proposed reduction in funding for the Basic State Grant Program?
Answer. The President's fiscal year 2005 budget request provides
significant support for the mission and programs administered by the
Office for Domestic Preparedness. As you know, The Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) designated ODP as the principal
Federal agency responsible for the preparedness of the United States
for acts of terrorism, including coordinating preparedness efforts at
the Federal level, and working with all State, local, tribal, parish,
and private sector emergency response providers on all matters
pertaining to combating terrorism, including training, exercises, and
equipment support. The President's request includes $3.561 million,
which is a $3.3 million increase from the fiscal year 2004 request.
With these resources, ODP will be able to maintain its role in
enhancing the security of our Nation.
It is important to remember that we are operating in a fiscal and
security environment where we must ensure maximum security benefits are
derived from every security dollar. To do that, we must be able to take
a new look at the way in which we allocate resources. Additionally,
given the Department's improved ability to analyze risks, threats, and
vulnerabilities, the Department is better able to provided targeted
funds to increase the security of the Nation. The Department will
continue to work with the states and territories to provide the
resources they need--equipment acquisition funds, training and exercise
support, and technical assistance--to deter, prevent, respond to, and
recover from acts of terrorism.
Question. The President's budget proposes an unprecedented amount
of discretion for the Department in allocating grants. Is it
appropriate to be requesting these changes through appropriations
language--or should the administration instead submit a formal
legislative proposal to change grant allocations to the Congress for
consideration by the respective authorizing Committees of jurisdiction?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security has been discussing and
working with Members of Congress and different committees, including
the House Select Committee on Homeland Security and the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee, on these issues. At this point, both
Committees are considering legislation that would authorize various
aspects of ODP's mission. The Department supports much of this
legislation (HR 3266 and S. 1245, respectively) in their current forms
and, in particular, supports the Committee's intent, and is working
with Chairman Christopher Cox, of the House Select Committee on
Homeland Security, and Chairman Susan Collins, of the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee. The Department will continue to work
with these Committees on these pieces of legislation and on other
pieces of legislation that address authorization of ODP's grant
programs.
Question. What threat information will be taken into account when
allocating the basic State grant funds?
Answer. As a requirement to receive their fiscal year 2004 Homeland
Security Grant Program funds, and additional funds in fiscal year 2005,
states conducted threats and vulnerabilities assessments and, based on
that information, developed homeland security strategies. The states
were required to provide completed homeland security strategies to the
Office for Domestic Preparedness on January 31, 2004. At this point,
ODP has received strategies from all the states and territories, the
District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. ODP and an
internal DHS Review Board have approved a majority of these strategies.
A few states and territories are working to provide additional
information and details to finalize their strategies, but ODP
anticipates that all strategies will be approved in the next few weeks.
These strategies are critical resources to the states in the
efforts to distribute funds in the most effective manner to address the
homeland security needs. They too are important because they will allow
the Department to match the preparedness needs as outlined in the state
homeland security strategies with resources available from the Federal
Government. The information provided in these strategies will allow the
Department to make informed decisions on how funds will be distributed
and what factors the Department will use to make this determination.
Question. The budget materials talk about the expanded activities
that the Basic State Grant can be used for--including protection of
critical infrastructure. If the Basic State Grant can be used for this
purpose, why is a separate $200 million critical infrastructure grant
program being proposed?
Answer. The President's fiscal year 2005 budget request includes
$200 million for targeted infrastructure protection as part of the
Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) program. The goal of this $200
million is to provide targeted funding to specific critical
infrastructure based on analyses performed by the Department of
Homeland Security's Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate. These funds will supplement the assistance provide under
the UASI program and the State Homeland Security Grant Program. While
the state-based grants will be dedicated to generally enhancing
security and preparedness, the $200 million for infrastructure
protection will be targeted to specific cites thereby assisting states
in their efforts to secure potentially higher threat targets.
Question. Please provide the Committee with state-by-state
breakouts of all grants provided through the fiscal year 2000, 2001,
2002, 2003, and 2004 appropriations, including supplementals. Include
in the breakouts the status of the grants, dates awarded, obligation
amounts, and drawndown amounts.
Answer. Please see the table below entitled ``State-by-state
Breakout''.
Question. In addition, please provide obligations and disbursements
for National Exercises, the Center for Domestic Preparedness, the
National Consortium for Domestic Preparedness, technical assistance,
equipment--for each of these years.
Answer. ODP has completed the preliminary data collection for the
response to this question. The data collected involves over 4,400 lines
of accounting and, if printed on 810 paper, would require
2,264 pages of data. To ensure an accurate response, the data needs to
be analyzed and a quality analysis be performed. This effort will take
additional time to ensure proper analysis and response.
Further, in order to ensure the most responsive answer to the
question, ODP would request the opportunity to discuss the data with
Appropriations Committee staff while the data is being analyzed. This
discussion would provide preliminary information and to ensure that ODP
properly understands the request and that the final answer is fully
satisfactory.
2000-2004 GRANT ALLOCATIONS: STATE GRANTS
[In dollar amount]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000 State 2001 State 2002 State
Domestic Domestic Domestic 2003 State 2003 State 2004 Homeland
State Preparedness Preparedness Preparedness Homeland Homeland Security Grant Totals
Equipment Equipment Equipment Security Grant Security Grant Program
Grant Grant Grant Program I Program II
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alabama................................. 1,172,000 1,228,000 5,317,000 9,457,000 25,049,000 36,853,000 79,076,000
Alaska.................................. 380,000 389,000 2,783,000 4,995,000 13,230,000 19,465,000 41,242,000
Arizona................................. 1,239,000 1,319,000 5,770,000 10,584,000 28,033,000 41,243,000 88,188,000
Arkansas................................ 788,000 821,000 4,141,000 7,394,000 19,585,000 28,815,000 61,544,000
California.............................. 7,167,000 7,666,000 24,831,000 45,023,000 119,256,000 175,457,000 379,400,000
Colorado................................ 1,091,000 1,158,000 5,220,000 9,480,000 25,111,000 36,944,000 79,004,000
Connecticut............................. 943,000 984,000 4,626,000 8,265,000 21,893,000 32,211,000 68,922,000
Delaware................................ 407,000 419,000 2,887,000 5,185,000 13,733,000 20,206,000 42,837,000
District of Columbia.................... 561,000 366,000 2,747,000 4,910,000 13,006,000 19,136,000 40,726,000
Florida................................. 3,409,000 3,631,000 12,967,000 23,654,000 62,655,000 92,182,000 198,498,000
Georgia................................. 1,868,000 1,993,000 7,797,000 14,188,000 37,579,000 55,288,000 118,713,000
Hawaii.................................. 503,000 515,000 3,172,000 5,693,000 15,079,000 22,186,000 47,148,000
Idaho................................... 510,000 530,000 3,226,000 5,803,000 15,375,000 22,621,000 48,065,000
Illinois................................ 2,801,000 2,964,000 10,604,000 18,879,000 50,005,000 73,571,000 158,824,000
Indiana................................. 1,499,000 1,580,000 6,400,000 11,399,000 30,194,000 44,422,000 95,494,000
Iowa.................................... 856,000 892,000 4,308,000 7,656,500 20,282,000 29,841,000 63,835,500
Kansas.................................. 807,000 844,000 4,151,000 7,401,000 19,603,000 28,842,000 61,648,000
Kentucky................................ 1,084,000 1,136,000 5,048,000 9,001,000 23,838,000 35,073,000 75,180,000
Louisiana............................... 1,175,000 1,228,000 5,331,000 9,451,000 25,037,000 36,836,000 79,058,000
Maine................................... 513,000 530,000 3,213,000 5,751,000 15,232,000 22,409,000 47,648,000
Maryland................................ 1,337,000 1,407,000 5,881,000 10,585,000 28,037,000 41,251,000 88,498,000
Massachusetts........................... 1,552,000 1,632,000 6,579,000 11,711,000 31,020,000 45,638,500 98,132,500
Michigan................................ 2,329,000 2,457,000 8,958,000 15,918,000 42,162,000 62,032,000 133,856,000
Minnesota............................... 1,251,000 1,318,000 5,631,000 10,076,000 26,690,000 39,267,000 84,233,000
Mississippi............................. 833,000 869,000 4,255,000 7,582,000 20,083,000 29,547,000 63,169,000
Missouri................................ 1,402,000 1,474,000 6,079,000 10,834,000 28,697,000 42,221,000 90,707,000
Montana................................. 436,000 447,000 2,967,000 5,303,000 14,047,000 20,668,000 43,868,000
Nebraska................................ 602,000 623,000 3,502,000 6,254,500 16,568,000 24,376,000 51,925,500
Nevada.................................. 620,000 655,000 3,693,000 6,771,000 17,935,000 26,387,000 56,061,000
New Hampshire........................... 501,000 519,000 3,187,000 5,727,000 15,172,000 22,321,000 47,427,000
New Jersey.............................. 1,968,000 2,072,000 7,948,000 14,222,000 37,671,000 55,424,000 119,305,000
New Mexico.............................. 618,000 639,000 3,574,000 6,401,000 16,956,000 24,946,000 53,134,000
New York................................ 4,099,000 4,321,000 14,953,000 26,492,000 70,172,000 103,243,000 223,280,000
North Carolina.......................... 1,848,000 1,962,000 7,706,000 13,908,000 36,840,000 54,203,000 116,467,000
North Dakota............................ 385,000 392,000 2,794,000 4,983,000 13,200,000 19,421,000 41,175,000
Ohio.................................... 2,624,000 2,769,000 9,897,000 17,510,000 46,378,000 68,235,000 147,413,000
Oklahoma................................ 959,000 1,001,000 4,656,000 8,304,000 21,996,000 32,362,000 69,278,000
Oregon.................................. 945,000 992,000 4,637,000 8,336,000 22,081,000 32,487,000 69,478,000
Pennsylvania............................ 2,791,000 2,934,000 10,512,000 18,570,000 49,189,000 72,370,500 156,366,500
Rhode Island............................ 459,000 472,000 3,063,000 5,489,000 14,540,000 21,392,000 45,415,000
South Carolina.......................... 1,062,000 1,119,000 5,028,000 9,017,000 23,882,000 35,138,000 75,246,000
South Dakota............................ 406,000 414,000 2,868,000 5,131,000 13,591,000 19,996,000 42,406,000
Tennessee............................... 1,400,000 1,477,000 6,140,000 10,978,000 29,080,000 42,786,000 91,861,000
Texas................................... 4,434,000 4,735,000 16,196,000 29,538,000 78,238,000 115,110,000 248,251,000
Utah.................................... 695,000 727,000 3,849,000 6,937,000 18,374,000 27,033,000 57,615,000
Vermont................................. 375,000 383,000 2,772,000 4,963,000 13,147,000 19,342,000 40,982,000
Virginia................................ 1,688,000 1,788,000 7,062,000 12,716,000 33,683,000 49,556,000 106,493,000
Washington.............................. 1,455,000 1,538,000 6,276,000 11,294,000 29,917,000 44,015,000 94,495,000
West Virginia........................... 634,000 654,000 3,567,000 6,340,000 16,792,000 24,705,000 52,692,000
Wisconsin............................... 1,356,000 1,425,000 5,925,000 10,565,000 27,985,000 41,173,000 88,429,000
Wyoming................................. 352,000 357,000 2,696,000 4,827,000 12,784,000 18,809,000 39,825,000
Puerto Rico............................. 1,267,000 1,120,000 4,894,000 8,727,000 23,118,000 34,014,000 73,140,000
Virgin Islands.......................... 372,000 277,000 861,000 1,542,000 4,085,000 6,009,000 13,146,000
American Samoa.......................... 230,230 187,600 892,000 1,482,000 3,926,000 5,776,000 12,493,830
Guam.................................... 328,000 284,000 828,000 1,596,000 4,226,000 6,217,000 13,479,000
N. Mariana Islands...................... 138,770 92,400 835,000 1,496,000 3,963,000 5,830,000 12,355,170
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTALS............................ 72,525,000 75,726,000 315,700,000 566,295,000 1,500,000,000 2,206,902,000 4,737,148,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HIGH THREAT URBAN AREA GRANTS
Question. The 2005 President's budget proposes a doubling of the
funds available in the High Threat Urban Area grants. From $727 million
in 2004 to $1.4 billion in 2005. This funding increase is offset by a
reduction in the Basic State Grant program funding.
Will this funding be used to expand the number of jurisdictions
that are eligible to receive these grants?
Answer. The purpose of the Urban Areas Security Initiative is to
provide an ongoing, dedicated funding stream to support densely
populated urban areas with key national infrastructure assets and a
demonstrated threat history. Under this program, DHS, through ODP, is
currently supporting 50 urban areas. At this point, it is difficult to
provide a definitive answer to your question on expansion of UASI. As
you know, the Department based funding decisions based on a combination
of three variables three variables, which resulted in an assignment of
a terrorist risk estimate for each city. The variables were (1) a
combined threat index derived from classified CIA and FBI threat data,
along with the number of FBI terrorism cases opened in a region, (2) a
count of critical public and private sector assets, weighted for
vulnerability, and (3) population density. Each of these three
variables was normalized and then weighted and summed to give an
overall terrorist risk estimate. The Department will likely use a
similar method to distribute funds made available for continuation of
this program in fiscal year 2005. Given the fluid nature of threats and
risk, it is difficult to predict the number of urban areas that will
receive funding through the fiscal year 2005 program.
Question. Will expanding the number of cities involved dilute the
purpose of the program, which is to focus resources on those areas of
the country with the most significant threats?
Answer. Again, the Department has not made a final decision on the
number of urban areas that will receive support under the UASI program
in fiscal year 2005. The number of urban areas receiving support will
ultimately depend on the information that IAIP receives from the CIA
and the FBI, along with the other factors, that have been considered
when determining UASI allocations.
Question. On the one hand you are proposing to reduce the funding
available through the Basic State grant program--of which one purpose
is to ensure that contiguous jurisdictions are working together--while
on the other, increasing the funds available in the High Threat Urban
Area grants so you can enhance the ability of contiguous jurisdictions
within urban areas to respond jointly. How is your proposal an
improvement over the way these programs have been funded in fiscal
years 2003 and 2004?
Answer. As you know, with the support of the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees, the Department of Homeland Security has
administered dual funding programs--a formula-based state minimum
program and a high-threat, high-density program--since fiscal year
2003. The Department and Administration firmly support this dual
approach because it allows for baseline preparedness levels while
targeting funds to high-threat, high-density urban areas across the
country.
The Department and the Administration have also consistently
supported an increase in funds for the high-threat, high-density urban
areas program to meet the unique needs and challenges of the Nation's
urban areas. With the funds provided to the Urban Areas Security
Initiative and the state formula grant program, the Administration's
fiscal year 2005 budget request supports both minimum levels of funding
for states to continue their efforts to enhance security and targeted
funds for the Nation's urban areas.
u.s. visitor and immigrant status indicator technology (us visit)
Question. In January you deployed the first phase of the US VISIT
system to 115 airports and 14 seaports.
How is the system performing so far?
Answer. By January 5, 2004, the US VISIT system encompassed 99
percent of all foreign visitors, with visas, entering the country by
air, and as of March 1, more than 1.69 million foreign visitors have
been processed under US VISIT procedures, with over 150 initial matches
against existing watch lists, resulting in the identification of 62
criminals guilty of rape, homicide, hit and run death, drug
trafficking, probation violations, assault, wire fraud, conspiracy,
etc. The Department of State has also processed 235,883 individuals
utilizing the US VISIT system, with 75 watch list matches on 32
criminals.
The increase in security at our airports and seaports provided by
US VISIT has not had a negative effect on wait times, nor our
commitment to service. The pilot program exercised in Atlanta prior to
the implementation of the capabilities on January 5, 2004 identified an
increase of less than 15 seconds in inspection time to capture the
finger scans and digital photo. An analysis of 20 major airports
utilizing data for the December, 2003, January and February 2004
timeframes, indicate that there was no impact on CBP's ability to meet
45 minute time frames on airline inspections.
After early system evaluation it is clear that visitors appreciate
the effort we are making to enhance security while simultaneously
facilitating the process for law-abiding, legitimate travelers.
Question. The budget states that you expect to deploy an exit
capability at up to 80 airports and 14 seaports this year. Can you give
us an update on the exit pilots you are currently running as a part of
US VISIT?
Answer. On January 5, 2004, US VISIT implemented two exit pilots:
one at an airport and one at a seaport of entry.
In fiscal year 2004, US VISIT will continue to pilot and evaluate
various exit alternatives, e.g. intelligent work stations/kiosks and
hand held devices at various locations in airports and seaports.
In fiscal year 2005, based upon these pilot evaluations, US VISIT
will initiate implementation of the selected exit solution at the
remaining 79 airports and 11 seaports, continuing implementation in
fiscal year 2005.
Exit processing is to be provided at land border ports following
the entry implementation of US VISIT functionality in secondary at the
50 largest land ports in conjunction with RF technology implementation
in fiscal year 2005. As various exit components are implemented, we
further strengthen the immigration system by identifying people who do
not comply with the terms of their admission.
Question. One of the requirements of the Enhanced Visa Security Act
is for the countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program to issue
biometrically-enabled machine-readable travel documents--and for the
Department of Homeland Security to have the equipment at ports-of-entry
to be able to read those documents by October of 2004. Do the
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State expect that
the October deadline will be met by the Visa Waiver countries?
Answer. By October 26, 2004, VWP countries must certify that they
have a program to issue biometrically enhanced passports in order to
continue in the VWP Most, if not all, of the VWP countries have
informed the United States that they will not be able issue
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) compliant passports by
October 26 due to technical and other factors. Changing the deadline
would require Congressional action, and a memorandum concerning this
issue was forwarded to Congress signed by Secretaries Ridge and Powell
requesting an extension of the deadline to November 30, 2006. As part
of the decision to request the extension of the deadline, and to
provide an additional measure of security while standards and
technology solutions progress, the Secretary will require beginning
September 30, 2004, all VWP travelers process through US VISIT. US
VISIT has funding in the fiscal year 2004 expenditure plan to implement
this requirement at all POE's (in excess of 330 individual ports).
Question. The US VISIT program office is currently reviewing the
proposals for the prime integration contract. Given that it may be
several more months before this contract is awarded and work can
begin--how do you expect to meet the deadline of deploying the entry
and exit capabilities to the 50 busiest land ports by the end of this
calendar year?
Answer. Significant up-front planning has been and is being
accomplished in all aspects of this increment, especially in the
information technology and facilities work areas which well positions
the Prime Integrator to assist us in meeting our implementation
deadlines.
INTEGRATION OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS
Question. The Chief Information Officer has been working for over a
year on the integration and consolidation of information technology
systems. The budget request for 2005 includes significant resources for
implementing a new Department-wide human resources system, and a new
financial management system.
The Department staff identified over 40 different general ledger
systems, 30 different procurements processes, and 20 different
approaches to managing travel costs. Have you seen any savings yet from
consolidating computer systems?
When do you expect to see savings?
Answer. We are still in the development phase of this project and
therefore cannot estimate when savings may be realized.
Question. Is the $56 million requested for eMERGE going to cover
the remaining costs of developing and implementing the financial
management system?
Answer. No. This is for fiscal year 2005 only--implementation will
continue through fiscal year 2006.
Question. If not, what is the current estimate for the full cost of
implementation?
Answer. 2004 and 2005 Projected Costs for eMerge are below. Costs
in 2006 have not yet been determined.
[In millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 2005
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual Recurring........................ $2.0 $10.5
IT Investments.......................... 8.0 56.0
Working Capital......................... 24.8 10.0
-------------------------------
Total............................. 34.8 76.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PERFORMANCE BASED PAY SYSTEM
Question. Under Departmental Operations, $102 million is requested
for training of supervisory personnel to administer a performance-based
pay system and to create the framework for the new system. While the
proposal for Department-wide Technology includes a request for $21
million to design, develop and implement a new human resource
information technology system. Exactly how much will the new human
resources system cost?
Answer. We are projecting fully loaded life cycle costs of $408.5
million for complete system implementation. It is important to note
that the $102.5 million is requested for full implementation of the new
system (including project management, systems design, training and
communications, etc.), not just the training aspects of system
implementation. Major components of this figure include $102.5 million
for system implementation, $10 million for Coast Guard performance
pool, an estimated $165 million for other component performance pools,
and a 6-year life cycle cost of $131 million for human resources
information technology.
Question. When do you anticipate the computer system will be
finished and fully implemented?
Answer. We are anticipating that technology systems to support
implementation of the new DHS human resources system will be completed
during fiscal year 2007.
Question. The Department of Defense is currently planning to fund a
conversion to a performance-based pay system without requesting
additional funding. Why does your budget call for an increase?
Answer. Fully funding a new system, such as the one proposed by
DHS, is viewed as a critical component in ensuring its successful
implementation. Adequate funding to support implementation, with
particular emphasis on requirements for supervisory and managerial
training, have been raised as key concerns by the Administration, key
DHS stakeholders, and union representatives.
Question. When do you anticipate that the ``demonstration project''
to test the new Department of Homeland Security pay-for-performance
system will be operational within the U.S. Coast Guard?
Answer. We anticipate that the U.S. Coast Guard will be completely
operational by January 2006.
Question. When do you anticipate that the new pay system will be
fully implemented and operational across the entire Department?
Answer. At this point we anticipate that the new system will be
operational in all of DHS by January 2007.
FUNDING TRANSFERS/LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
Question. The President's budget proposes legislation to transfer
the $153 million emergency food and shelter program to the Department
of Housing and Urban Development, and indicates that enactment of
authorizing legislation will be pursued to return the $400 million
Strategic National Stockpile back to the Department of Health and Human
Services. The fiscal year 2005 funding request for the Department of
Homeland Security assumes no funding for either of these programs. Will
the requisite legislative proposals be transmitted to the Congress as
soon as possible and support given for their enactment into law prior
to the start of the appropriations process?
Answer. FEMA is currently working with the appropriate authorizing
and appropriations committees on the legislative language to transfer
the Emergency Food and Shelter program to the Department of Housing and
Urban Development in accordance with the President's fiscal year 2005
budget request.
The President's fiscal year 2005 Budget includes $400 million for
the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) and proposes transferring this
program to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Language
to effectuate the transfer of SNS from DHS to HHS has been added to
S.15, the Project Bioshield Act of 2003.
Question. Another request in the fiscal year 2005 budget is for
appropriations language to credit revenues and collections of security
fees to the Federal Protective Service. As I understand it, these
revenues and collections are currently credited to the General Services
Administration's Federal Buildings Fund. Is this requested
appropriations language sufficient to authorize the transfer of fee
collections from the General Services Administration to the Department
in lieu of a legislative proposal? Why?
Answer. Prior to the transfer of the Federal Protective Service
(FPS) from the General Services Administration (GSA) to the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), GSA collected security fees from its client
agencies as a part of the rent bill. GSA deposited the collections into
the Federal Building Fund and allocated the security funds in support
of FPS law enforcement and security operations. In fiscal year 2005,
GSA will serve as the billing agent for these fees. The GSA will
continue to bill the security fees concurrent with the rent billing
process, but the security revenue will be deposited directly to the FPS
account. The revenues and collections will not be deposited into the
Federal Buildings Fund and no transfer to FPS will be required. The FPS
will continue to be funded by offsetting collections, and the
appropriations request represents the obligational authority necessary
to spend the estimated revenues and collections received for law
enforcement and security services that FPS will provide.
This process is consistent with the authorities transferred to the
DHS in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law. 107-297, Sec. 403
and Sec. 422) and the authorities vested in and retained by the
Administrator of GSA.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY HEADQUARTERS
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget requests $65.1 million to
consolidate Department of Homeland Security headquarters operations at
the Nebraska Avenue complex (NAC). It also indicates that the
administration will propose legislation to transfer the ownership of
the Nebraska Avenue complex from the Navy to the General Services
Administration.
When will the legislative proposal to transfer the ownership of the
Nebraska Avenue complex be submitted to the Congress?
Answer. The legislation was transmitted to the House on February
12, 2004 and the Senate on February 18, 2004. Since the NAC is
currently owned by the Navy, the Majority Leader's office referred the
proposal to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). While the SASC
has included its version of the Administration proposal in the annual
defense authorization bill, the Department is concerned that delays in
passage of that larger legislation will hamper DHS' mission to ensure
our Nation's security. The Department will continue to work with the
appropriate Committees to expedite the consolidation of DHS
headquarters operations at the NAC.
Question. Is the $65.1 million requested for relocation of the Navy
and improvement of existing structures at the Nebraska Avenue complex
contingent on the enactment into law the authorization of this
transfer?
Answer. The $65.1 million will fund improvements at the NAC as well
as the cost to relocate Naval operations to alternate facilities.
Without enactment of the legislation transferring ownership of the
property to GSA, the Navy will not be able to complete their moves from
the NAC due to the Defense Base Realignment Act (BRAC.
Question. The fiscal year 2004 appropriations Act provides $20
million to the Department for alteration and improvement of facilities
and for relocation costs necessary for interim housing of the
Department's headquarters' operations. Please update us on the use of
these funds.
Answer. To date, $7,411,789 has been obligated: $4,657,220 for Navy
Relocation, $2,344,569 for space preparation in Building 1 (Sec/Dep
Sec), Building 3 (1st and 3rd floor swing space), Building 7,
Facilities and Security Badging, and $410,000 for Architectural and
Engineering Services for Buildings 1, 4 and 5.
The remaining $12,588,211 is committed for Building 19, 1st and 2nd
floors for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP)
and Buildings 4 and 5 for Border Transportation Security (BTS), Public
Affairs and Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS). The design/
space layout for Building 19 is at approximately 70 percent completion,
and design/space layout for Buildings 4 and 5 is at 100 percent.
Question. Once the Nebraska Avenue complex is transferred from the
Navy to the General Services Administration (GSA) as proposed, won't
the Department be required to make rental payments to the GSA on this
location? Is this additional cost assumed in the Department's fiscal
year 2005 budget? If not, why? What will be the estimated annual rental
of space payment on the Nebraska Avenue complex once it is transferred
from the Navy?
Answer. Yes, rental payments to General Services Administration
(GSA) will be required. Our fiscal year 2005 request includes $14
million ($4 million increase from fiscal year 2004) for department-
related rent expenditures.
GSA is currently conducting building condition evaluations and a
site appraisal. We will not have refined cost until these activities
are complete. However, through consultation with GSA, DHS is currently
estimating the following rental costs:
--fiscal year 2005 $5.8 million (staggered occupancy)
--fiscal year 2006 $13.1 million (mostly occupied)
--fiscal year 2007 $14.4 million (fully occupied)
These estimates are based on the following rent breakout:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Base Rent................................. $29.00 per rentable square
feet (prsf)
Operating Rent............................ 8.90 prsf
T/I Allowance............................. 4.64 prsf
GSA Fee of 8 percent...................... 3.80 prsf
-----------------------------
Total............................... 46.34 prsf (for 5 year
period)
43.06 prsf (for 10 year
period)
Average Approx............................ 45.00 prsf \1\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Does not include parking.
United States Coast Guard
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget request proposes
consolidating all of the research and development components of each
agency within the Department of Homeland Security into the Science and
Technology Directorate, to include the Coast Guard's Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation account. The fiscal year 2004 enacted
level for research and development within the Coast Guard was $14.9
million; however, this budget proposes only $13.5 million for Coast
Guard research and development within Science and Technology.
Can you explain the approximately $1.4 million decrease in
requested funding for the Coast Guard's research and development?
Answer. The fiscal year 2004 and earlier CG R&D appropriations
included project funds in addition to operating costs of the CG R&D
Center at Avery Point, CT. The $13.5 million requested in the fiscal
year 2005 S&T budget does not include any project funds; the request is
intended to fund only facility and personnel (support and technical)
costs at the Coast Guard (CG) R&D Center. This level is consistent with
prior year costs. The fiscal year 2004 enacted level was a significant
reduction from the fiscal year 2004 request of $22 million and prior
year appropriations causing an imbalance between operating costs and
project funding for fiscal year 2004.
Question. Will this line item for Coast Guard research and
development continue to be decreased in subsequent fiscal years until
there is one lump-sum research and development account within Science
and Technology for all of the agencies at the Department of Homeland
Security?
Answer. No. The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and Coast
Guard (CG) are preparing a formal agreement that will detail the
coordination and funding mechanisms for future CG R&D capabilities. The
foundation for that agreement is the consolidation of funding requested
in the fiscal year 2005 budget. S&T and the CG have further agreed upon
a base level of additional project funding in the amount of $5 million
that will be specifically targeted toward non-security related projects
including maritime science and research. This funding will be designed
to support CG mission-programs such as Marine Environmental Protection,
Living Marine Resources, Search and Rescue, Aids to Navigation and
Marine Safety. The specific projects in support of these mission-
programs will be prepared annually for S&T concurrence.
In addition to this $18.5 million in funding, the Coast Guard will
submit security-related research requests through S&T for coordination
across all portfolios and DHS components. The Coast Guard has submitted
a maritime security R&D portfolio detailing approximately $50 million
in vital maritime security research initiatives. This portfolio has
been validated by S&T portfolio managers and will be considered in the
development of future spending priorities and commitments from S&T.
Project funding levels for CG and other DHS component requests will
depend on the risk and cost associated with the project, effect on
agency missions, linkage to S&T strategic objectives, and
executability.
Question. How will consolidating the research and development
account into Science and Technology affect the Coast Guard in general,
in terms of control over research projects of particular interest to
the Coast Guard and access to all ongoing research at the Department?
Answer. Through its portfolio manager at S&T, the CG will have
direct access to, and visibility of all S&T research and initiatives.
The CG will, at a minimum, retain control of the projects in support of
its non-Security mission programs. The integration of funding and
effort will go far to minimize redundancy and maximize the
effectiveness of Coast Guard R&D while ensuring that all Coast Guard
mission requirements remain a key part of S&T planning and resource
decisions.
Question. How will this consolidation directly affect the Coast
Guard Research and Development Center in Groton, Connecticut?
Answer. There are currently no plans by DHS S&T to make changes to
the location or personnel staffing levels of the CG R&D Center.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Stevens
ALASKA-CANADA BORDER SECURITY
Question. The Department of Homeland Security has recently
indicated that it is formulating plans to increase security along the
Alaska-Canada border. What steps will the Department of Homeland
Security take to ensure that the heightened security along the border
will not negatively impact the shipments of goods to Alaska?
Answer. Inordinate delays with Alaska-Canada at Alaska-Canada's
border with truck cargo are not anticipated. Truck traffic is
relatively small at the border ports of entry. In addition, most of the
cargo is low risk and easily and quickly scanned for radiation with
personal radiation detectors.
This is in spite of the fact that since 9/11, several measures have
been implemented to increase security along the Canadian/Alaskan
border. Staffing has increased significantly due to various
Congressional initiatives. Additional physical barriers have been
installed at multiple crossing points, and several other security
implements have been employed to further ``harden'' the border between
Alaska and Canada.
The ports of Skagway and Dalton Cache are now operational 24 hours
a day, 7 days a week (24/7). Additional staffing and operational hours
have increased CBP's vigilance at these two important ports of entry.
The port of Alcan continues to operate on a 24/7 schedule.
The port of Poker Creek, a busy, seasonal crossing, is now jointly
staffed by CBP and Canada Border Services Agency personnel. This
collaboration has led to a safer, more efficient, border security
operation.
The staffing enhancements and scheduling changes have helped to
meet the new challenges posed by the recent implementation of the Bio-
Terrorism Act. CBP continues to work with carriers, importers,
commercial fishermen, and even professional dog sled mushers to
minimize potential disruptions and delays. To date, there haven't been
any problems and we don't anticipate any.
COAST GUARD
Question. The fiscal year 2005 Homeland Security budget includes
$6.2 billion for the United States Coast Guard. Does this amount ensure
that the Coast Guard will comply with Section 888 of the Homeland
Security Act? This provision requires that the Coast Guard maintain its
traditional missions of Search and Rescue, Fisheries Enforcement, Drug
Interdiction, and Aids to Navigation.
Answer. The Coast Guard will continue to support all the programs
specified in Section 888 of the Homeland Security Act. The Coast
Guard's fiscal year 2005 budget proposes budget authority of $7.46
billion, a 9 percent increase over fiscal year 2004, and continues the
Coast Guard's effort to enhance capability and competencies to perform
all safety and security missions. Due to the Coast Guard's multi-
mission nature, full support of the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2005
budget proposal, which includes funding for Integrated Deepwater
System, Rescue 21, Response Boat-Medium and Great Lakes Icebreaker
projects, will assist in the performance of all mission areas. Coast
Guard is gaining capacity with operational funding of eleven 87-foot
Coastal Patrol Boats and five 179-foot Patrol Coastals transferring
from the Navy. These additional assets will provide more resource
hours, which will be applied to all mission areas. However, even with
this additional funding, the Coast Guard must be judicious in the
allocation of a finite resource base across traditional and homeland
security missions to effectively deliver essential daily services to
the American public.
To successfully do this, the Coast Guard is working to develop a
Strategic Blueprint, which provides a description of the strategies and
processes for allocating Coast Guard resources to reduce risk within
each mission program, and to accomplish stated performance goals. The
post-9/11 environment demands that the Coast Guard focus on reducing
risk and strive to achieve performance goals in each program through a
continual examination of its authorities, capabilities, competencies
and partnerships. The Strategic Blueprint documents how the Coast Guard
enables the operational commander to make decisions regarding the
employment of resources to counter risks in an ever-changing
environment.
Question. The United States Coast Guard recently completed a
successful test of two ``Predator A'' unmanned aerial vehicles in King
Salmon, Alaska. The Coast Guard will test a ``Predator B'' unmanned
aerial vehicles in Alaska during the month of June. Do you consider the
use of Predators and other unmanned aerial vehicles to be a cost
effective tool to assist the Department with maintaining traditional
and security related missions?
Answer. Yes, the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) is a cost
effective tool to meet some operational requirements for DHS and the
Coast Guard. The Coast Guard's current Integrated Deepwater System
(IDS) implementation plan includes the acquisition of two types of
UAVs, the High Altitude Endurance UAV and the Vertical Takeoff and
Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VUAV), with the goals of increased
Operational Effectiveness (OE) and reduced Total Ownership Costs (TOC).
The Coast Guard is currently acquiring the Bell HV-911 ``Eagle Eye'' as
the Vertical Takeoff and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VUAV) for
shipboard deployable operations. The VUAV is a short-range, low
maintenance aircraft, which will allow the Coast Guard to extend the
surveillance, classification and identification capability of its major
cutters through its speed, range, and endurance and do so more cost
effectively. This asset will be used for maritime homeland security,
search and rescue missions, enforcement of laws and treaties including
illegal drug interdiction, marine environmental protection, and
military preparedness.
To mitigate risk and learn more about using Medium and High
Altitude Long Endurance (MALE/HALE) UAVs, the Coast Guard has conducted
demonstrations in Alaska to evaluate the efficacy of using MALE/HALE
UAVs, like the Predator UAVs, for Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).
These demonstrations are also building organizational partnerships
within DHS, NASA, DOD and the private sector for the future use of
UAVs. DHS and the Coast Guard have had limited experience with UAV
operations, and no experience with Beyond Line of Sight UAV operations.
The results of the exercises and subsequent data analysis will assist
in the development of tactics, techniques and procedures for use in any
future DHS/USCG UAV operations (including Predator B), and will be used
to develop, validate, verify or accredit ongoing environmental,
operational, regulatory, and cost benefit studies.
NATIONAL ALERT SYSTEM
Question. Last year, Congress included $10 million to improve our
national alert system. We directed the Department of Homeland Security
to report on how the existing nationwide radio network, administered by
NOAA, can be expanded so that it can reach more citizens. It was
intended that Homeland would consult with the FCC to develop a system
that would be ubiquitous and would cross a full range of mediums and
technologies to alert the public to a terrorist threat. For instance,
Americans should be alerted to a threat through the use of not just
radio but also wireline and cellular telephones, e-mail and instant
messaging systems, radio and television broadcasts, and personal
digital assistants. The report was also supposed to evaluate how the
system is being tailored to send out regional threats in addition to
nation-wide threats.
This report was due on December 15, 2003. Mr. Secretary, it is my
understanding that the Appropriations Committee has not yet received
the report. Please tell us what the status is.
Answer. The congressional report has been cleared by OMB and the
Department. We anticipate delivery of the report to the congressional
Appropriations Subcommittees by May 21, 2004.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici
NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS CENTER
Question. Secretary Ridge, the Department of Homeland Security has
taken ownership of the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis
Center, or NISAC. NISAC was developed by Sandia and Los Alamos National
Laboratories to simulate and analyze various events and the cascading
effects on critical infrastructure in the United States. Following the
September 11th terrorist attacks, NISAC took on added importance as the
Administration and Congress focused on homeland security.
The fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security Appropriations Act had
approximately $23 million for NISAC. Would you please give the
Subcommittee the status of the allocation of the fiscal year 2004
funding?
Answer. The Homeland Security Appropriations Act of did not contain
a specific line item for the National Infrastructure Simulation and
Analysis Center. However, the Department obligated $20 million in
November 2004 for NISAC efforts that will be performed by Los Alamos
National Laboratory ($10 million) and Sandia National Laboratory ($10
million). Some of the planned NISAC activities include chlorine
industry studies, analyses of rail system and electric power
disruptions, assessments of Hurricane Isabel impacts on infrastructure,
port and inland waterway modeling, as well as urban infrastructure
modeling.
Question. How much is in the President's fiscal year 2005 budget
request to support activities by NISAC?
Answer. The fiscal year 2005 request for the NISAC is $27 million.
Question. What are some of the activities envisioned in the fiscal
year 2005 budget for NISAC?
Answer. NISAC fiscal year 2005 activities are expected to include
expansion of the Center's efforts to develop National and Regional
Tools into additional regions and cities of the Nation. Additionally,
NISAC will begin developing consequence analysis and decision support
tools to support the following:
--Expansion of the urban infrastructure suites models for
transportation, telecommunications, water, public health and
energy to additional high threat urban areas.
--Expansion of the dynamic simulation models to selected east and
west coast ports.
--Expansion of the interdependent energy infrastructure simulation
system
--Expansion and testing of the waterways asset prioritization tool in
concert with the U.S. Coast Guard and Army Corps of Engineers.
--Continued expert analysis and support to short term actions for the
Department's primary missions by using the Center's developing
infrastructure models and creating new ones where necessary.
Question. One of the items that transferred from the Department of
Energy to the Department of Homeland Security with NISAC was an
appropriation of $7.5 million for the construction and equipping of a
NISAC facility at Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico,
which is adjacent to Sandia National Lab. Those funds have not been
released for their intended purpose.
What is the delay in moving forward on this important facility?
Answer. The Homeland Security Appropriations Act did not explicitly
appropriate $7.5 million for a NISAC facility Nonetheless, the
Department is drafting a letter to the Department of Defense to begin
the necessary coordination to build a DHS building on DOD property. We
expect to initiate site surveys, followed by a possible site selection
this summer. DHS has retained sufficient funds to complete the survey
and site selection process.
Question. What is the status of the $7.5 million appropriation
specifically for the NISAC facility? Are those funds being held for the
intended purpose?
Answer. Yes.
Question. When can the Subcommittee expect the Department of
Homeland Security to break ground on the NISAC facility in New Mexico?
Answer. The program manager has initiated discussions with the
Kirkland Base Commander concerning the availability of suitable sites
on Kirkland for the NISAC and we have begun coordination with the
Department of Defense to address requirements for building a DHS
facility on DOD property. The groundbreaking date will be dependent on
the identification of a suitable site for the NISAC.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (UAVS)
Question. Secretary Ridge, I have written to you on two different
occasions in support of exploring the option of using unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) to monitor our borders, particularly the Southwest
border. I also noticed in your testimony that there is $10 million in
the President's Budget to ``plan, procure, deploy and operate unmanned
aerial vehicles.'' In New Mexico, we have some experience with UAVs. In
fact, the Physical Sciences Laboratory at New Mexico State University
operates a Department of Defense sponsored UAV validation and test
facility. Because of the already established presence of UAVs in New
Mexico, I have also invited you to visit Las Cruces to see for yourself
this work and evaluate Las Cruces as a potential site for housing the
UAV wing responsible for border surveillance.
Given the $10 million request for UAVs, can you expand upon the
plans you have for them?
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection has been evaluating the
possibilities of using UAV technology to enhance its border security
mission since June 2003. The initial evaluation process indicates that
UAVs may indeed have a role in that mission. A pilot program is
underway to acquire a UAV system and deploy it to various border areas
to further evaluate their effectiveness and to further develop concepts
of operation utilizing UAVs in CBP's mission. The $10 million budget
request will support that effort in fiscal year 2005 during which a
fully self-supporting UAV package will be leased either via an existing
DOD-owned contract or through a competitive CBP procurement process.
Question. How many UAVs does the Department currently have?
Answer. DHS does not possess any UAV systems.
Question. How many UAVs does the Department plan to acquire?
Answer. Several agencies including CBP, Coast Guard and TSA
regularly coordinate UAV programs in a working group. The working group
is currently developing high-level requirements to be applied towards
any future DHS-wide acquisition of UAVs. No concrete commitment has yet
been made towards the type or quantity of UAV system acquisition due to
the variety of needs and requirements among the agencies.
The Coast Guard's current Integrated Deepwater System (IDS)
implementation plan includes the acquisition of two types of UAVs, the
High Altitude Endurance UAV and the Vertical Takeoff and Landing
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VUAV), with the goals of increased Operational
Effectiveness (OE) and reduced Total Ownership Costs (TOC). The Coast
Guard is currently acquiring the Bell HV-911 ``Eagle Eye'' as the
Vertical Takeoff and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VUAV) for
shipboard deployable operations.
Question. Where does the Department plan on stationing these UAVs?
Answer. UAV usage within DHS is in the very early developmental
stages. A number of potential sites are being considered and no final
decisions have been made at this time.
Question. When can you join me in Las Cruces to evaluate the Las
Cruces International Airport as a potential home for the UAV program?
Answer. I appreciate the Senator's offer and respectfully suggest
that our staffs try to coordinate a future departmental visit to that
site.
CHARTER FLIGHTS TO FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER IN ARTESIA,
NEW MEXICO
Question. Secretary Ridge, as you know, one of the Federal
Government's premier training sites for law enforcement officers is
located in Artesia, New Mexico. It is known as FLETC-Artesia (Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center). When terrorists attacked us in
September of 2001, Congress quickly required the training of hundreds
of new Air Marshals. It was FLETC-Artesia that met the impressive
challenge of training these new Air Marshals, quickly ramping up the
program and bringing in three 727's to be used in this training.
FLETC-Artesia is also the campus chosen to provide training for
airline pilots who choose to carry firearms in the cockpit (also known
as Federal Flight Deck Officers). They provide this training in
addition to basic and advanced training for a number of other agencies.
Feedback from trainees who have been to Artesia is almost
universally positive. In fact, one of the few complaints has to do with
one of its greatest assets--its location. Because Artesia is over 3
hours from the nearest large cities (Albuquerque and El Paso), there is
a lot of wide open space to conduct training exercises. Unfortunately,
it is also difficult to get to Artesia--this is the biggest complaint.
The good news is that I believe there is a solution to this problem. I
have been working with the officials at FLETC-Artesia, FLETC
Headquarters in Glynco, Georgia, and in the Border and Transportation
Safety Directorate on a plan to provide charter services from a major
air hub, like Dallas-Fort Worth, to Roswell, which is a 30 minute bus
ride from FLETC-Artesia. Ultimately, I believe the airlines will see
how beneficial this is to them and will schedule regular service along
this route. I also believe the client-agencies will quickly see the
benefits of shorter travel times, fresher students, and better trained
employees.
FLETC-Artesia recently put out a Request for Information seeking
feedback from airlines who might provide this service. My understanding
is that the response was positive and that estimates are that it would
take $800,000 to provide this service for the rest of the fiscal year.
As a member of the Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee, I
joined with my colleagues in deciding not to earmark that bill. This
meant that there was no opportunity for me to work with my colleagues
to place money in that bill for this project. Instead, we left it up to
you to determine how best to spend the money to protect our Homeland.
Will you commit to improving the training of our Federal law
enforcement officials by approving funds for this charter service?
Answer. In the post September 11, 2001 period, there has been real,
sustained growth in the use of all FLETC training centers, including
the Artesia, NM center. Although the absence of regular and reliable
service to the Artesia area has been an obstacle to wider use of that
location in the past, recently we have increased utilization to almost
capacity because the FLETC Glynco site is at maximum capacity and the
agencies need to train within specific timeframes. FLETC is
experimenting with conducting more basic training programs at Artesia
in fiscal year 2004 and there has been increased use of the site for
Flight Deck Officer training, among others, for specialized training.
With this in mind, FLETC will track closely the issues and usage of the
Artesia site and report back their findings in fiscal year 2005. Should
the travel service continue to be a problem, the Department will
consider looking at other possible solutions, including some
subsidizing of air service into the Artesia area. This may require
additional authorizing language.
Question. How can we in Congress help provide the best training
possible for our Federal law enforcement officers, particularly within
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center?
Answer. Both Congress and the Administration share a common goal of
ensuring all Federal law enforcement officers have the opportunity for
the highest quality training, especially in this period of national
concerns with security of the homeland. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) is indebted to your leadership and that of others in
Congress, who have long and actively supported the concept of
consolidated training that is represented by the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). Since the events of September 11,
2001, FLETC has undertaken increasingly more training responsibilities
and we are proud of the achievements that have been made by the FLETC
staff and, indeed, its 76 partner agencies. With the generous support
of Congress, FLETC has added many new facilities and improved upon the
delivery of critical training, such as terrorism, first responder, and
international financial crimes over the last few years. In addition to
FLETC's Glynco, GA, Artesia, NM, and Cheltenham, MD training sites, the
DHS has entrusted two other sites to FLETC for law enforcement training
in Charleston, SC and Harpers Ferry, WV in fiscal year 2004 and fiscal
year 2005, respectively. At this point, we believe the resources,
funding, and support for consolidated training are meeting fully the
changing dynamics of Federal law enforcement training.
FIRST RESPONDERS
Question. Secretary Ridge, as you know, long before the terrorist
attacks of September 11, New Mexico Tech was working as part of a
consortium with Louisiana State University and Texas A&M to provide
training to first responders. Since the attacks the need for this
training has become more important.
How much is included in the President's fiscal year 2005 Budget for
the training of first responders?
Answer. $92 million is included in the President's fiscal year 2005
Budget for the training of first responders. As well, states and
localities may choose to use their grant funding to support additional
training.
Question. There has been a lot of discussion about standardization
of equipment used by first responders. What are your thoughts about
standardization of training for first responders?
Answer. The Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) is the principal
component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) responsible for
preparing the United States for acts of terrorism. In carrying out its
mission, ODP is the primary office responsible to providing training,
funds for the purchase of equipment, support for the planning and
execution of exercises, technical assistance and other support to
assist states and local jurisdictions prevent, plan for and respond to
acts of terrorism ODP provides more than 30 different types of training
courses. These courses are tailored for a broad spectrum of emergency
responders, including fire service, hazardous materials, law
enforcement, emergency medical services, public health, emergency
management, public works agencies, governmental administrative,
healthcare, and public safety communications
ODP's training efforts fall into three different categories: (1)
in-residence (training provided at one the National Domestic
Preparedness Consortium (NDPC) facilities), (2) on-site or mobile
training (training provided at a local agency by request through an
NDPC member or other ODP training partner), and (3) Website-based
training. In-residence or ``residential training'' occurs at one of the
five members of the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium (NDPC).
On-site training is provided by either one of the members of the NDPC
or through one of ODP's other training partners. This training is
provided directly at a State or local first responder agency upon
official request through that state's state administering agency for
ODP funds. ODP's Website-based training efforts are administered by the
Texas Engineering and Extension Service, which offers three online
courses for emergency responders.
ODP draws on a large number of resources to develop and deliver a
comprehensive national training program. In addition to the NDPC, ODP
works with a large number of national associations and organizations,
along with other agencies from the local, State, and Federal levels, to
provide training to our Nation's emergency prevention and response
community. This approach aligns closely with the President's National
Strategy for Homeland Security issued in July 2002, which called for a
consolidated and expanded training and evaluation system to support the
Nation's emergency prevention and response community.
To ensure compliance with nationally accepted standards, these
courses have been developed and reviewed in coordination with other
Federal agencies, including the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), the Department of Energy, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI),
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), as well as with
professional organizations such as the International Chiefs of Police,
the International Association of Fire Chiefs, and the National
Sheriff's Association.
Question. What potential do you see for future use of this
consortium?
Answer. New Mexico Tech recently entered into negotiations for the
purchase of the town of Playas, New Mexico. This former mining town was
virtually abandoned when the mine was closed. New Mexico Tech plans to
use this town as a real-world training site.
Question. What role do you foresee Playas playing in the training
of first responders?
Answer. Playas will be jointly developed by the New Mexico
Institute of Mining and Technology and the New Mexico State University
using funds already made available to the New Mexico Institute of
Mining and Technology through the Department of Homeland Security's
Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP). As you are aware, ODP has
funded the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology since Fiscal
year 1998 as part of the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium.
As part of the Consortium, the New Mexico Institute for Mining and
Technology supports ODP's mission of assisting State and local
governments plan and prepare for incidents of domestic terrorism by
providing critical training to the Nation's first responders.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FUNDING
Question. Secretary Ridge, the Department of Homeland Security has
a significant research budget to develop new technologies to secure the
United States against terrorist attacks. I know that the Department has
made significant progress in setting up the mechanisms to allocate
science and technology funding to industry, universities, and national
laboratories. This is a vital mission of your Department.
I understand that the Department is still in the process of
allocating fiscal year 2003 science and technology funding. What is the
current time line for completing this allocation of funding?
Answer. The Science and Technology Directorate has ``execution
plans,'' that is, identified scope of work, for all remaining fiscal
year 2003 funds and fully expects to have all remaining funds allocated
by the end of fiscal year 2004.
Question. The Department is now engaged in the allocation of fiscal
year 2004 science and technology funding. How do you plan to allocate
fiscal year 2004 funding in a more timely manner?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security has existed now for
just over a year. Like the rest of the Department, the Science and
Technology Directorate has been working hard to develop effective and
efficient procedures and policies, including those necessary for
selection of performers of the work to be done and the subsequent
contractual processes and allocation of funds. As these procedures get
established, projects will be awarded and funded in a more timely
manner. I am pleased to say that in the last 3 months, the Science and
Technology Directorate has made significant progress in allocating its
available funding into the hands of those researchers who are
developing and transitioning the vital technologies and tools to make
the Nation safer. Both the Under Secretary for Science and Technology
and I will continue to monitor the status of project selection and
funding, and expect to see continued progress.
Question. I note that this year, the Department's budget submission
is improved over last year as one would expect. Although there are
security considerations, could you describe your plans to ensure
transparency in the Department of Homeland Security budget? Both the
Departments of Defense and Energy make their supporting budget
documents public. Will you follow suit
Answer. The Science and Technology Directorate prepares its annual
Congressional Justification in an open and unclassified manner and will
continue to do so as long as programs do not move into the sensitive
realm. In addition, the Science and Technology Directorate prepares its
written testimony for the record for each of its budget-related
hearings in an unclassified document. This written testimony contains
the supporting documentation for its budget request and becomes
publicly available.
Question. One of the biggest challenges in the science and
technology area has to be coordinating the allocation of funding
between near-term and applied technology and basic, long-term R&D
funding.
What level of coordination is being provided by your office, Mr.
Secretary, to ensure an appropriate split between near-term and long-
term R&D?
Answer. I have delegated the responsibility for determining the
appropriate split between near-term and long-term research and
development to the Under Secretary for Science and Technology and he
keeps me and others informed, although the final responsibility is
mine. In the approximately 1 year that this Department has been in
existence, the Science and Technology Directorate has focused its
initial efforts on near-term development and deployment of technologies
to improve our Nation's ability to detect and respond to potential
terrorist acts. However, we recognize that a sustained effort to
continually add to our knowledge base and our resource base is
necessary for future developments. Thus, we have invested a portion of
our resources, including our university programs, toward these
objectives. The following table indicates the Science and Technology
Directorate's expenditures in basic research, applied research, and
development to date, excluding construction funding.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE R&D INVESTMENTS
[In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Fiscal year
Fiscal year 2004 2005
2003 (actual) (estimated) (proposed)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Basic........................................................... $47 $117 $80
Applied......................................................... 59 56 229
Developmental................................................... 398 608 643
-----------------------------------------------
Total..................................................... $504 $781 $952
-----------------------------------------------
Percent basic................................................... 9.3 15.0 8.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our initial expenditures in basic research are heavily weighted by
our investments in university programs. These university programs will
not only provide new information relevant to homeland security, but
will also provide a workforce of people who are cognizant of the needs
of homeland security, especially in areas of risk analysis, animal-
related agro-terrorism, bioforensics, cybersecurity, disaster modeling,
and psychological and behavioral analysis. In addition, the Science and
Technology Directorate is allocating a portion of its resources to
high-risk, high-payoff technologies and expects to gradually increase
its investments in long-term research and development to a level
appropriate for its mission and the Department.
Question. What do you envision as the role of the Department of
Homeland Security in investments in future R&D to meet homeland
security requirements?
Answer. At the current time, the Science and Technology Directorate
is working hard with available funds to fill critical gaps in our
Nation's ability to prevent, protect against, respond to and recover
from potential terrorist attacks; however, we are all well aware that
it is only with a strong investment in long-term research that we can
we feel confident we are maintaining a robust pipeline of homeland
security technologies to keep us safe for the decades to come.
Successful businesses reinvest 10-15 percent of their total budget in
research and development; the Science and Technology Directorate will
strive in future years to invest a similarly significant portion of its
resources into long-term research.
INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION
Question. Mr. Secretary, the Department of Homeland Security
combines the programs and personnel for many Federal agencies. Creating
a culture as one department is a real challenge, but there are
capabilities throughout the Federal Government that can assist your
Department in meeting homeland security threats.
I would encourage the Department to develop strong positive
relationships with other Federal departments and agencies where there
is opportunity for collaboration and cooperation to make your job
easier.
Is it correct that your Department has worked with both the
Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) as
it develops its programs to meet homeland security threats?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security has worked very closely
with the Department of Energy (DOE) and NNSA from the very early stages
of the development of the Science and Technology (S&T) program. The DOE
laboratories provided extensive technical expertise and advise
regarding the S&T program development.
Question. How would you characterize these interactions?
Answer. The Department's interactions with DOE and NNSA have been
very positive. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) S&T staff
has an open communication relationship with DOE senior managers as well
as with the DOE field personnel. Since some of the S&T staff came from
DOE, there are close ties and good relationships that facilitate
developing the processes of how DOE and DHS work together. When issues
arise, they are quickly elevated so that communication occurs between
the appropriate parties in both Departments and a resolution achieved.
Question. What potential do you see for future collaborations?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security fully expects to
continue and enhance its collaborations with the DOE and NNSA, as well
as other Federal agencies conducting work of relevance to homeland
security. For example, the S&T Directorate is committed to utilizing
the extensive capabilities of all DOE laboratories and to engage them
in all aspects of our research, development, testing and evaluation
(RDT&E) program. The Directorate's Office of Research and Development
is developing an enduring RDT&E capability through stewardship of the
homeland security complex. To meet the Federal stewardship goal, the
DOE laboratories will play a significant role in assisting in the
strategic planning of the threat-based programs such as radiological/
nuclear and biological countermeasures programs. The DOE laboratories
also have significant existing capabilities and facilities for
addressing terrorist threats, thus DHS will contribute support for some
existing DOE facilities and reach-back into these unique capabilities.
In addition, the DHS University Scholars and Fellows program is working
with the DOE laboratories to place students with DOE mentors.
Question. The science and technology directorate at the Department
has had discussions with the DOE national laboratories in such areas as
radiological and nuclear and bioterrorist threats. The labs have
significant capabilities to assist the Department of Homeland Security.
Do you envision these collaborations continuing? Are there any barriers
to such activities? If so, can Congress assist in addressing these
issues?
Answer. The Department's Science and Technology Directorate will
continue to utilize the DOE laboratories to address S&T requirements
including key threat areas such as radiological, nuclear and biological
countermeasures. Collaborations between DHS and DOE have been very
successful to date, and the Science and Technology Directorate plans to
continue these collaborations well into the future. There are currently
no barriers to these collaborations. If circumstances change, the
Department will bring this to the attention of Congress.
FEMA--CERRO GRANDE FIRE
Question. Mr. Secretary, when FEMA joined your Department, you
inherited the Cerro Grande fire assistance program. The devastating
Cerro Grande Fire occurred in New Mexico in May 2000. This fire
consumed almost 48,000 acres of forest, destroyed nearly 400 homes and
caused damage or injury to 1,000 families, countless businesses, the
county of Los Alamos, the State of New Mexico, four Indian pueblos, and
Los Alamos National Laboratory.
I would remind my colleagues that this fire was started by the
Federal Government when a controlled burn at Bandelier National
Monument burned out of control. For that reason, the Congress enacted
the Cerro Grande Fire Claims Assistance Act of 2000, and appropriated
$455 million to FEMA to establish a claims program to compensate
victims of the fire.
The fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security Appropriations Act included
$38.1 million to continue paying claims under the Act. Based upon
information from the Department, the conferees on the fiscal year 2004
bill stated that, and I quote, ``this funding will fully cover all
remaining Cerro Grande fire claims'' (end quote).
Would you please provide the Subcommittee with a summary of the
claims activity under the Cerro Grande Fire Assistance Act of 2000?
Please include the number of claims filed, processed, approved, and
declined by category of claim (individual, business, Native American,
governmental).
Answer. The Office of Cerro Grande Fire Claims (OCGFC) has received
a total of 21,515 claims: 13,700 individual/household claims; 1,861
business claims; 6 Pueblo/Native American claims; 20 governmental
claims; and 4,562 subrogation claims from the insurance industry. The
balance of the claims consisted of small-dollar-amount claims, not-for-
profit claims, or streamlined claims (both business and individual
claims under $10,000). With the exception of the pending appeals and
arbitrations (see answer below), virtually all of the claims have been
resolved. OCGFC has not kept records by category on the numbers of
claims approved in whole or in part, or denied in whole or in part.
Question. Please provide the Subcommittee with information on the
number of claims that have been appealed and the general status of
those appeals.
Answer. OCGFC has received 718 Administrative Appeals, of which
only 28 are still pending. The remainder have been accepted, denied, or
withdrawn. Of the 135 arbitrations that have been filed with OCGFC, 120
arbitrations are complete, and 15 arbitrations are pending.
Question. What is the status of subrogation claims for insurance
companies that assisted individuals and businesses in the immediate
aftermath of the fire? Will insurance companies be adequately
reimbursed for their expenses, and what factors are taken into account
in determining their appropriate payments?
Answer. Of the 4,562 subrogation claims filed with OCGFC, all but
42 were determined to be eligible. OCGFC has made 56 percent partial
payments on the subrogation claims. We have reimbursed insurers and
reinsurers only the amounts that they paid out under their insurance
policies, and we have not reimbursed subrogation claimants for their
expenses of administering the claims they received from their insureds.
These expenses are currently the subject of litigation.
Question. Finally, what is the status of the funding remaining for
Cerro Grande fire claims and for administrative expenses?
Answer. As of March 25, 2004, $55,596,000 remained in available
claims funds and $950,000 was available to cover administrative
expenses. 5. Is it correct that there is sufficient funding remaining
under current appropriations to satisfy pending claims, anticipated
favorable appeals, and subrogation claims by insurance carriers? If
not, what is the estimated amount needed to fulfill these obligations?
Answer. We believe that there are sufficient funds to settle all
remaining claims.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby
Question. Mr. Secretary, the President's request provides $50
million for the Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP). This is $5
million below the fiscal year 2004 enacted level and well below the
level necessary to train our Nation's first responders. As you point
out in your budget justification the CDP is the only live agent
training facility available to our Nation's first responders. With a
budget of $75 million, the CDP can train almost 100,000 first
responders. This is almost twice the 55,000 they plan to train this
year with $55 million. The CDP serves a vital role in our Nation's
first response capability. Could you please explain then, why the CDP's
budget has been cut for fiscal year 2005?
Answer. As you know, the Center for Domestic Preparedness is a
Department of Homeland Security-owned and operated facility that
provides training to our Nation's emergency responders. CDP offers live
chemical agent training--the only facility in the world that provides
such training to civilian emergency responders. CDP has provided
training for emergency responders since it was established in 1999, and
is widely recognized as a world leader in the training of emergency
response personnel in the handling of live chemical agents.
The CDP has received significant funding over the years. The
President's fiscal year 2005 budget request provides $50 million for
the continued operations of the Center. This level is equal to the
amount requested by the Administration in the fiscal year 2004 request.
Beginning in fiscal year 2005, the NDPC funding will be used solely to
cover their fixed operating expenses. States will be required to pay
for the costs of sending their emergency responders to NDPC facilities.
The NDPC facilities, therefore, will not have to cover the full-costs
of participating emergency responders, which reduced enrollment
flexibility. This flexibility will likely allow NDPC members to train
additional emergency responders without incurring the additional travel
and financial costs of enrollment.
Additionally, the Department and ODP are strongly encouraging
states to institutionalize awareness and performance level training at
State facilities. One of the overarching goals of the Homeland Security
Grant Program, which will provide more than $2.2 billion to states and
territories in fiscal year 2004, is to provide sufficient resources to
allow states and territories to develop their own capacity to offer
awareness and performance level training courses. The Department and
Administration will continue to support this effort in fiscal year
2005, which will allow NDPC members to concentrate on specialized
training courses.
Question. Mr. Secretary, in your statement you mentioned that you
have provided $20 million for planning and exercises associated with
medical surge capabilities. What assets does DHS plan to commit to
training medical personnel to respond to large scale disasters or a WMD
event?
Answer. DHS currently is planning to use the Noble Training Center
to assist in training medical personnel for medical surge capability.
In the President's Budget for fiscal year 2005, DHS has requested an
increase of $15 million to develop one fixed and one mobile medical
surge hospital module, and an increase of $5 million for associated
planning, training, and exercises to validate and demonstrate the
medical surge capacity provided by these modules. The fixed module
would essentially consist of a package of hospital supplies, equipment,
materials, etc., that could be pre-positioned in a high risk area and
quickly inserted into or assembled in a pre-existing space, facility,
or structure to provide hospital capabilities. Similarly, the mobile
module would consist of a complete package of hospital supplies,
equipment, materials, etc., that could be rolled in from another
location and placed in a pre-existing structure, or the mobile module
would include the structure (trailers, tents, etc.) in which the
hospital would be housed. Planning, training, and exercises associated
with the use of these modules will allow the concept to be refined.
Additionally, this activity will help in identifying potential
locations, factoring in significant criteria including: overall
population of the jurisdiction; population density in and around the
location; hazards and risk prevalent in the location (including
natural, technological, and terrorist incidents); existing hospital
capacity, strength, and organization; and existing medical response and
public health system.
The major elements of the medical surge capacity enhancement
program will include facility, equipment, supply, and pharmaceutical
procurement; leased space for storage of field facilities; salaries and
benefits for additional staff required for equipment maintenance, and
program and fiscal management; dedicated ground transportation for
field facilities; life-cycle costs for equipment, pharmaceutical, and
supply replacement; field exercises and system evaluations;
identification and implementation of corrective actions; and
development of web-based interactive and hands-on training curricula
for facility set-up, maintenance, operation, and demobilization.
Also, through the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) Online
Training Program, NDMS is responding to the need to improve the ways in
which its response team medical personnel respond to large-scale
disaster and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) events. The training
program is designed specifically for disaster responders; providing the
critical information needed to help them better perform their jobs
under the most austere conditions. The online training program ensures
that NDMS response team medical personnel will have appropriate
orientation and training for optimal field performance.
Training opportunities are also offered during the annual NDMS
Conference. With several pre-conference, main, and plenary sessions and
training demonstrations available, NDMS response team medical personnel
are provided access to the latest in emergency management, disaster
response, and coordination capabilities. Additional training is also
provided to NDMS response team medical personnel through their State-
and locally sponsored exercises and training courses. These exercises
and training courses are designed to enhance organization and rapid
response capability.
Question. Recently, the President in Homeland Security Presidential
Directive #8 defined a ``first responder'' as: those individuals who in
the early stages of an incident are responsible for the protection and
preservation of life, property, evidence, and the environment,
including emergency response providers as defined in section 2 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101), as well as emergency
management, public health, clinical care, public works, and other
skilled support personnel (such as equipment operators) that provide
immediate support services during prevention, response, and recovery
operations.'' Wouldn't you agree that medical and hospital personnel
are crucial to ``preservation of life''? Why then have we done so
little to ensure they are prepared?
Answer. Medical, public health and hospital personnel are an
essential component of the Nation's response capability. The Department
of Homeland Security recognizes their importance, as has Congress. The
Department, through programs administered by the Office for Domestic
Preparedness (ODP) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
provides support to the emergency medical services and to hospital
providers.
ODP, in particular, administers the Homeland Security Grant Program
and the Urban Areas Security Initiative, which provide funds to states
and urban areas, respectively, to enhance homeland security efforts
across the Nation. In fiscal year 2004, ODP will provide more than $2.2
billion to states, localities, and the emergency response community
through HSGP. Additionally, through UASI, ODP will provide an
additional $746 million. Emergency medical personnel, including
Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) and ambulatory services, and
hospitals and hospital providers are eligible to receive assistance
through these two programs. HSGP and UASI fund a range of activities,
including the acquisition of specialized equipment, the provision of
training, and exercise support.
ODP also administers a robust training program through the National
Domestic Preparedness Consortium (NDPC). Through the NDPC, along with
other training partners, ODP offers nearly 40 courses for the emergency
response community. As part of the training effort, emergency medical
personnel and public health officials are eligible to attend a number
of different courses offered. A few examples of the training courses
that emergency medical and public health officials are eligible to
attend include: ``Emergency Response to Terrorism: Basic Concepts,''
``Emergency Medical Services: Basic Concepts for WMD Incidents,''
``Emergency Response to Domestic Biological Incidents--Operations
Level,'' ``Emergency Medical Services Operations and Planning for
WMD,'' and ``Hospital Emergency Management: Concepts and Implications
of WMD Terrorist Incidents.''
In fiscal year 2005, DHS and FEMA will be responsible for two
programs that strive to prepare medical and hospital personnel to deal
with mass casualty incidents: the National Disaster Medical System
(NDMS) response teams and the Noble Training Center. Both have major
linkages in supporting the ``first responder'' infrastructure.
NDMS is a coordinated effort by FEMA and other Federal agencies, in
collaboration with the States and other public and private entities, to
provide health and medical services to the victims of public health
emergencies. The System organizes approximately 8,000 intermittent
Federal employees into more than 107 medical and specialty response
teams. The System can also provide for patient evacuation and
definitive medical care of disaster victims.
The incorporation of NDMS into DHS has improved response capability
by enhancing coordination between health and medical response
organizations and other functional disaster response activities. This
will ensure that future planning and response efforts are well-
coordinated and efficient. The reorganization has centralized emergency
response functions within one Department. This will also allow for the
sharing of training activities and programs to include local, State,
and Federal disaster drills and field exercises, and will enhance the
coordination of logistical functions that support emergency response,
thereby improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the response.
This reorganization will also ensure that threat information is
received in a timely manner and will enable increased readiness actions
to be taken in order to reduce response time.
The Noble Training Center (Noble) also transferred from HHS to DHS.
While the program resided at HHS, a 5-year strategic plan was developed
for it by a consortium of universities that included Vanderbilt
University, the University of Alabama at Birmingham, and Louisiana
State University. The strategic plan identified immediate and continued
training needed for medical first responders, as well as for the
medical community, to be able to quickly identify and treat victims of
a WMD attack. The plan identified training needs for hospital emergency
room physicians and nurses, emergency medical technicians and
paramedics, and hospital engineers and administrators. This training
would include treatment modalities relating chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear assaults to ensure that all hospital
personnel, including medical, engineering, and administrative, would be
prepared to effectively treat victims. In addition, Noble is currently
working with HHS' Health Resources and Services Administration and its
Hospital Preparedness program to train some of the grantee hospital
personnel at Noble this year.
In addition to the work that ODP is doing in this area, the
Department is working with the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) on a related project called Project BioShield. The fiscal year
2005 request includes $2.5 billion for this effort to encourage the
development and pre-purchase of necessary medical countermeasures
against weapons of mass destruction, and improved bio-surveillance by
expanding air monitoring for biological agents in high-threat and high-
value targets such as stadiums and transit systems. This provides
significant funds for this effort, which was funded at $885 million in
fiscal year 2004. Further, the President's fiscal year 2005 budget
request includes $20 million for the Department's Emergency
Preparedness and Response Directorate for studies and pilot programs
for medical surge capabilities. Also, since 2001, over $4.5 billion has
been made available in Federal public health preparedness grants for
counterterrorism.
Comment.--The Noble Training Center (Noble) at Fort McClellan,
Alabama was established as a medical training center for medical first
responders. According to FEMA, ``Noble Training Center is unique in
that it is the only hospital facility in the United States devoted to
medical training for hospital and healthcare professionals in disaster
preparedness and response.'' From fiscal year 1999 to fiscal year 2001,
I helped send additional resources to Noble to help them build their
capability, much like what was done at CDP.
However this money seems to have disappeared and today Noble has,
to my knowledge, not grown in capability or capacity to train medical
personnel. While I understand that much of this took place while Noble
was under the direct control of the Public Health Service, it is my
understanding that virtually no activity has taken place at the Noble
Training Center since DHS took control.
Question. Will the Department make a habit of allowing valuable
assets to sit unused?
Answer. DHS is making extensive use of the Noble Training Center
and is very pleased to have Noble as an element in the DHS training
system. During fiscal year 2003, the Department delivered the most
ambitious schedule of training ever at Noble, and it is delivering an
even greater slate of activities during fiscal year 2004.
For fiscal year 2003, DHS delivered the schedule of training
activities that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) had
set up and offered a number of FEMA courses at Noble. Activities for
the year included several offerings of the ``Healthcare Leadership and
Administrative Decision-making in Response to WMD Incidents'' course,
which was conducted under contract by Auburn University and its
subcontractors, which included the University of Alabama at Birmingham,
Vanderbilt University, and Louisiana State University. DHS delivered
additional courses at Noble in partnership with the Centers for Disease
Control and Preparedness (CDC) to prepare CDC's emergency response
teams. One of the Department's goals for fiscal year 2004 is to train
more than 1,300 students at the facility. The total number of students
trained in all prior years was 2,274.
Question. What is the Department doing to correct this poor use of
taxpayer's money?
Answer. When Noble was transferred to DHS in March 2003, it was
assigned to FEMA. FEMA officials quickly analyzed the situation at
Noble, inspecting the facility and examining instructional programs. At
the time, Mike Brown, Acting Under Secretary for EP&R, established the
following priorities for Noble: (1) correct deficiencies in the
infrastructure to ensure that the facilities and systems would support
a world-class training activity; (2) maximize the utilization of Noble
by offering a full schedule of first-rate instructional programs
targeted at planning and response for mass casualty events; and (3)
integrate Noble into the DHS/FEMA training system managed by the United
States Fire Administration, which includes the National Fire Academy
and the Emergency Management Institute (EMI). Efforts to meet these
goals began at once. In addition to offering the aggressive schedule of
training described above, DHS also:
--Awarded a contract to the SEI Group, Inc. of Huntsville, Alabama,
to manage the Noble physical facility
--Awarded a contract to DECO Security Services, Lorton, Virginia, to
provide security for the facility
--Arranged for classroom support to be provided through an existing
EMI contract
--Continued work on a $1 million healthcare weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) curriculum development project with Auburn
University and its subcontractors (Work on this project is
scheduled for completion by June 30, 2004.)
During fiscal year 2004, in addition to a full slate of
instructional programs, the following key activities are underway to
improve the Noble facilities:
--Update Noble's phone system and computer network
--Renovate 2 dormitory buildings to provide housing for 160 students
at a time
--Retrofit the third floor of Noble to create a state-of-the-art
exercise and simulation training area
Question. I would like to know specifically, how many hospital and
healthcare professionals have been trained at Noble Training Center and
how many Federal dollars have been spent at Noble to date?
Answer. Since its inception, Noble has conducted the following
training:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TRAINING ACTIVITY PARTICIPANTS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hospital Leadership and Decision-making................. 717
National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Training.............. 293
Integrated Health and Medical WMD Training.............. 250
Emergency Coordinator Augmentee......................... 150
Nunn, Lugar, Domenici Hospital Preparedness............. 54
Epidemic Intelligence Service (WMD)..................... 277
Mass Immunization Training.............................. 63
Tactical Emergency Medical Service in a WMD incident.... 36
Hazardous Materials for Healthcare Train-the-trainer.... 41
Integrated Emergency Management for CDC response staff.. 162
Emergency Response to Domestic Bioterrorism............. 20
Critical Actions Aimed Toward Emergency Response........ 76
Radiological Emergencies (Commissioned Corps)........... 135
---------------
Total Participants................................ 2,274
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on careful analysis of HHS records and FEMA's current
spending plan, by the end of fiscal year 2004, HHS and DHS will have
spent approximately $17.8 million on the Noble Training Center. This
figure excludes salary and expenses for two full-time Federal employees
at Noble and student expenses paid directly by HHS. The by-year
breakdown is as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 1999........................................ $2,800,000
Fiscal year 2000........................................ 845,000
Fiscal year 2001........................................ 1,500,000
Fiscal year 2002........................................ 4,000,000
Fiscal year 2003........................................ 1,369,092
Fiscal year 2004........................................ 7,300,000
---------------
TOTAL............................................. 17,814,092
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comment.--Just around the corner from Noble is the Center for
Domestic Preparedness, the pinnacle of first responder training. The
CDP has been a training facility for roughly the same amount of time as
Noble. This fiscal year CDP is scheduled to train in excess of 50,000
first responders. I can only guess that the differences are due to
management.
Question. Can you explain to me why these two centers are in such
contrast?
Answer. We cannot address HHS' utilization of Noble. However, since
DHS assumed responsibility for Noble in March 2003, it has played a key
role in the Department's overall efforts to prepare emergency
personnel, and it is an important part of the Department's plans for
the future. Noble has joined FEMA's training team, which will train
more than 250,000 personnel in fiscal year 2004.
Question. How many responders do you plan to train at Noble this
year?
Answer. We expect to train 1,320 personnel at Noble in fiscal year
2004 in the following courses:
--7 ``Healthcare Leadership for WMD Incidents'' courses for 490
participants
--6 Metropolitan Medical Response System exercise-based, integrated
emergency management courses for 420 participants
--3 CDC partnership courses for 180 personnel
--9 Radiological Emergency Response Operations courses for 230
participants
Based on funding of approximately $4.3 million we have maximized
our deliveries as we ramp up effort for fiscal year 2005 and for fiscal
year 2006. The Noble facility cannot currently accommodate as many
students as can the CDP facility, given existing facility sizes and
infrastructure.
Question. How much do you propose to spend in these efforts?
Answer. In fiscal year 2004, $4.3 million is allocated for the
Noble Training Center. Additional funding from other DHS sources is
expected to bring total expenditures for Noble this year to
approximately $7.3 million.
Question. Is there any action being taken to tap into the expertise
of the CDP?
Answer. Yes. Collaboration between the CDP and FEMA training
officials has been in progress for some time. We are currently working
on the following plans:
--Consolidating student support services and logistical support
between CDP and Noble
--Conducting joint medical training for first responders
--Conducting outreach training for Tribal emergency personnel
Question. What are your intentions for Noble in the next 2 years?
Answer. We are making extensive use of the Noble Training Center
(Noble) and are very pleased to have it as an element in the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) training system. During fiscal year 2003,
DHS delivered the most ambitious schedule of training ever offered at
Noble, and is undertaking an even more ambitious slate of activities in
fiscal year 2004.
Noble was transferred to DHS in March 2003, and was assigned to the
Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate (EP&R)/FEMA. FEMA
officials quickly analyzed the situation at Noble, inspecting the
facility and reviewing instructional programs. At that time, Acting
Under Secretary for EP&R Mike Brown established three priorities for
Noble: (1) Correct infrastructure deficiencies to ensure that the
facilities and systems would continue to support world-class training
activities; (2) maximize the utilization of Noble by offering a full
schedule of first-rate instructional programs targeted at planning and
response for mass casualty events; and (3) integrate Noble into the
training system directed by DHS' United States Fire Administration,
which manages the National Fire Academy and the Emergency Management
Institute (EMI). Efforts to meet these goals began at once and continue
today. In addition to offering an aggressive schedule of training, FEMA
has also:
--Awarded a contract to manage the Noble physical facility to the SEI
Group, Inc. of Huntsville, Alabama
--Awarded a contract to provide security for the facility to DECO
Security Services, Lorton, Virginia
--Arranged for classrooms and support to be provided through a pre-
existing contract supporting the EMI
--Continued work on a $1 million healthcare weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) curriculum development project with Auburn
University and its subcontractors (Work on this project is
scheduled for completion by June 30, 2004.)
During fiscal year 2004, in addition to a full slate of
instructional programs, the following key activities are underway to
improve the Noble facilities:
--Update of Noble's phone system and computer network
--Renovation of 2 dormitory buildings to provide housing for 160
students
--Retrofitting of the third floor of Noble to create a state-of-the-
art exercise and simulation training area
DHS expects to train 1,320 personnel at Noble in fiscal year 2004
in the following courses:
--7 ``Healthcare Leadership for WMD Incidents'' courses for 490
participants
--6 Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) exercise-based
integrated emergency management courses for 420 participants
--3 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) partnership
courses for 180 personnel
--9 Radiological Emergency Response Operations courses for 230
participants
In fiscal year 2005, using the existing funding level and
leveraging other funding sources, DHS plans to train 2,125 participants
as follows:
--7 Healthcare Leadership courses for 420 participants
--8 MMRS exercise-based integrated emergency management courses for
600
--5 Hospital Emergency Management courses for 150 personnel
--4 Hospital Emergency Incident Command System train-the-trainer
offering for 120 participants
--7 Radiological Emergency Response Operations courses for 155
responders
--1 Advanced Radiological Incident Operations training course for 30
responders
--1 Radiological program train-the-trainer course for 30 trainers
--5 Response Team training for CDC staff, with a total of 300
participants
--8 Disaster cadre training courses (various titles) for 320 students
In addition, EMI is currently assessing training needs for the
National Disaster Medical System cadre. While the cadre's initial
training is currently offered online, Noble is being considered for use
in meeting some of the cadre's exercise-based course requirements.
Also, for fiscal year 2005, DHS will continue to collaborate with
the Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP), and plans to join forces
with CDP to deliver training. This joint training will simulate the
responder/hospital personnel interface that is critical during a mass
casualty event.
Comment.--When we began this adventure, it was my belief that the
proximity of CDP and Noble would allow us to provide one of the best
comprehensive incident response training programs in the country. Not
only do we have the only live agent training facility, but just around
the corner is ``the only hospital facility in the United States devoted
to medical training for hospital and healthcare professionals in
disaster preparedness and response.'' This would provide the
opportunity for municipalities, communities, regions and states to know
that their responders are prepared from the site of the incident
throughout the hospital, not just to the emergency room door. This is
an opportunity for comprehensive training that must not be ignored if
we expect our first responders and medical personnel to act fluidly in
the event of a disaster.
Question. I would like your thoughts on this concept.
Answer. While each organization has its special expertise, we
believe that bringing CDP and other FEMA training activities closer
together will greatly enhance services for the Nation's emergency
responders.
Question. Mr. Secretary, I continuously hear of concerns from my
localities regarding the speed at which funds are dispersed to their
final destination. What is the Department doing to ensure that these
funds are put to use more quickly?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security takes seriously our
responsibility to provide resources to our Nation's emergency
prevention and response community and to ensure that this assistance is
provided in most efficient, effective and responsible manner. I believe
that Congress also supports this goal. Indeed, Congress has provided
strict timeframes within the last several appropriations acts for the
Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) and the Department of Homeland
Security. In the fiscal year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Act, the
fiscal year 2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, and
the fiscal year 2004 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations
Act, Congress required that ODP allocate funds to states within 30 days
of the enactment of these acts. Congress further required that states
apply for their allocated funds within 30 days of the allocation or
availability of funds. Congress required that ODP make awards to states
within 30 days of receipt of application, or receipt of updated
homeland security strategies, whichever was later. Additionally,
Congress required that states obligate or pass-through funds to units
of local government within 60 days of receipt of an award from ODP.
These timeframes have certainly expedited the award of funds to
states under the Homeland Security Grant Program and the Urban Areas
Security Initiative. However, some complaints of the slowness of funds
reaching localities are legitimate and understandable. There are
certain impediments to localities receiving their funds from their
states that are outside of the control of the Department of Homeland
Security. For instance, some states can not accept Federal funds unless
they have been previously included in their State budget. Depending on
when the State legislature convenes, the transference of funds and
support to localities might be delayed. Additionally, as pointed out in
the December 1, 2003 survey by the National Emergency Management
Association, a number of other factors at the State and local level
serve to impede the timely transfer of homeland security funds to
localities, including State and local bid requirements for Federal
funds, Further, equipment inventory stock might also prevent speedy
delivery of equipment to State and local emergency responder agencies.
The Department and ODP are making every effort to expeditiously
award funds to states. With the assistance of Congress, we have made
great strides in providing funds and other assistance to states and
units of local governments. Unfortunately, because of certain State and
local restrictions, funds might experience a delay at the State and
local levels. On March 16, 2004, Secretary Ridge announce that
formation of the Homeland Security Funding Task Force charged with
examining the first responders funding process and ensuring Federal
grant money monies move quickly to the end user: first responders.
Question. I applaud the consolidation of grants under the ODP. I
believe a one-stop shop is an important part to making the grant
process more accessible to all entities. Will you develop a mechanism
to ensure that funds are used in a manner that ensures the proper
distribution of assets? Will the different grants be working in
conjunction? Or in other words how will ODP ensure that the right hand
knows what the left hand is doing?
Answer. On January 26, 2004, I announced my intention to
consolidate the Office for Domestic Preparedness with the Office for
State and Local Government Coordination to form a new office--the
Office for State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness. As
I explained at the time, this consolidation is in direct response to
requests from the field, which date back to 1998, to provide State and
local governments with a ``one-stop-shop'' and one central focal point
for grants, assistance, and other interactions related to homeland
security.
This consolidation will place 25 various State and local support
programs and initiatives within one office to ensure simplified and
coordinated administration of these programs. I firmly believe that
this consolidation will benefit both DHS and the State and local
emergency response community. As part of this effort, the new Office
will issue application kits and provide awards that combine several
different grant programs. ODP took the first step in this direction
through the fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security Grant Program, which
combined three separate ODP-administered programs under one single
application kit. The new Office of State and Local Government
Coordination and Preparedness will use this combined application kit as
a model for future grant programs.
Further, the new Office of State and Local Government Coordination
and Preparedness will depend on the subject matter experts within the
agencies previously administering these consolidated programs to ensure
that invaluable experience and expertise with these programs is not
lost. The Department is currently working to ensure that that this
expertise is not lost, but continues to guide the development and day-
to-day management of these programs. Through these efforts, I am
confident that the new office will provide assistance to states and
localities in a more efficient, coordinated, and streamlined manner. I
appreciate your support for the consolidation and look forward to your
continued support on this and other Department initiatives.
Question. Mr. Secretary, your budget provides the Coast Guard with
$678 million for the Integrated Deepwater System. I remain concerned
with the Coast Guard's management of the Deepwater procurement and how
the Coast Guard is prioritizing use of its funds. The Coast Guard and
OMB appear to have lost sight of the priorities of legacy replacement
and the goal of reduced operational expenses. Every dollar spent poorly
in this procurement process delays the Coast Guard's ability to obtain
the best, most modern equipment to protect the homeland. The funding
will acquire two UAV's, a National Security Cutter, three SRP's, one
LRI, and IDS patrol boats. Noticeably absent is the Maritime Patrol
Aircraft, the CASA CN-235. Why were funds for the MPA not included? How
does the Coast Guard intend to make up for the loss of this critical
asset? How many MPA does the USCG intend to purchase? When can we
expect the Coast Guard to request funding for the MPA?
Answer. The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2005 budget requests funds
for the Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) to missionize the third CASA
aircraft, which was funded for acquisition in fiscal year 2004. This
missionization includes the logistic complement required for Full
Operating Capability and partial spare parts used for the logistics
system start up. The Coast Guard is currently acquiring the CASA CN235-
300M as the Deepwater MPA. The delivery of the first two MPA is
scheduled for 2006, with full operational capability in late 2006 or
early 2007.
The Coast Guard will use existing aircraft in the Coast Guard
inventory to ensure the Nation's highest maritime security and safety
priorities are met until new aircraft are delivered.
The number of Maritime Patrol Aircraft in the current
Implementation Plan is 35. Simultaneously, the Coast Guard is working
to align the Deepwater Program with the strategic goals and objectives
of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS Management Directive
1400 established an Investment Review Process, which included an
interagency Investment Review Board (IRB) and Joint Requirements
Council (JRC). The Investment Review Process is designed to ensure that
spending on investments directly supports and furthers DHS missions;
optimal benefits and capabilities are provided to stakeholders and
customers; acquisition oversight of new investments is provided
throughout their life cycle; and portfolios are managed to achieve
budget goals and objectives. The Coast Guard is working aggressively
with the IRB and JRC and its newly chartered Aviation Council to ensure
capital funds provide the best Departmental investment. The DHS Joint
Requirements Council (JRC) partially reviewed DHS Aviation Requirements
in January 2004 at their first meeting. Until DHS and Coast guard
decisions are made on future aviation requirements, it is difficult to
project the exact mix of aircraft in the final Deepwater solution.
The Maritime Patrol Aircraft is an essential element of the
Deepwater system of systems approach to the recapitalization of Coast
Guard assets. The Deepwater plan projects future funding for MPAs to
achieve its long-term project goals.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Judd Gregg
Question. Mr. Secretary, I would like to address the matter of the
Customs Services' ability to meet the increased needs of new and
growing airports and seaports for inspections services. If Customs is
not able to expand its services into new, economically growing
communities around the country then not all areas of the country will
be able to share in the economic benefits of international trade and
tourism--and as a result then the economic growth of the Nation as a
whole will also be restricted.
My concerns in this regard have been raised by my experience in
working with Customs unsuccessfully to provide inspection services to
the Pease International Tradeport in Portsmouth/Newington, New
Hampshire. When I was governor, I helped take the first steps to create
the Tradeport following the BRAC closing of Pease Air Force Base with
the vision of it becoming a commercial air terminal open to
international flights and thus helping to drive the economy of not only
New Hampshire, but the entire region.
Unfortunately, despite spending over $35 million in Federal and
State funds to build a commercial terminal, according to Customs' own
specifications, we have been unsuccessful in getting Customs' to either
approve the use of the facility as is--or to even tell us what the
post-9/11 modifications are that Customs insists are now needed. Even
more frustrating has been Customs refusal to provide inspection
services, even over the short-term, so that DOD chartered aircraft
currently carrying U.S. military personnel home from Iraq and
Afghanistan can land and refuel at Pease on their way to the troops'
ultimate destinations within the United States. While Customs says on
the one hand that it does not have the manpower to service these 11-15
flights every 45 days, it also says it could do these inspections at
current manpower levels--if Pease paid economically exorbitant and
untenable fees to the Customs service.
I would note that two Customs inspectors actually have offices on
Pease Tradeport's premises and the local Air National Guard unit has
been trained to provided such inspection services; however Customs will
neither use the local Customs officers or allow the Air National Guard
unit to provide the necessary inspection services so that the DOD
charter flights can land at Pease.
As many of us in New Hampshire had hoped for at Pease Tradeport's
actual opening in 1998, Pease's close proximity to Boston's Logan
airport is now becoming an attractive as a convenient point for
servicing planes and crews of various commercial airlines' domestic and
international flights, which are increasingly facing difficulties with
flight scheduling, customs, and gate access due to Boston's limited
space and heavy traffic. However, Pease Tradeport's value as an
alternative for airlines is largely negated when Customs is either
unwilling or unable to provide even minimal inspection services.
Again, my parochial experience in this regard has raised my
concerns about Customs--and thus DHS'--ability to expand its inspection
services into new, economically growing communities throughout the
country and whether the benefits of international trade and tourism are
going to be confined to areas of the country that already enjoy them
for the foreseeable future.
In light of the 35 percent increase in Customs positions that the
Congressional Research Service says Congress provided funding for in
fiscal year 2002 alone, do you feel the President's budget request, if
approved by Congress, provides the Department with the needed
flexibility to respond to the need for Customs services to all areas of
the country that need them, including up and coming areas of the
country like NH?
Answer. The Pease International Tradeport issue is currently under
review by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Office of Field
Operations (OFO). OFO has conducted a study of the facility to
determine what additional security modifications will need to be
implemented. The results of this study should be compiled shortly.
The Department of Homeland Security, in particular CBP, is
committed to providing security for our Nation without impeding the
free flow of commerce. The fiscal year 2005 President's Budget should
provide CBP with the flexibility to align our staff to existing
workload and provide services where needed.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Larry Craig
UTILIZATION OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL LABS
Question. Secretary Ridge, on January 30, 2004, you received a
letter signed by the entire Idaho Congressional delegation expressing
our objections to guidelines issued by the DHS Office of Research and
Development. These guidelines describe DHS's approach to the
utilization of Department of Energy national laboratories. A copy of
this letter is enclosed herewith. I am aware that you have received
similar letters from other members of Congress and that issues
surrounding the implementation of the DHS research agenda may be the
subject of current GAO investigation.
How do you intend to address the issues raised in the Idaho
delegation's letter and when can I expect a response?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security, through Section 309 of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, is provided access to the national
laboratories and sites managed by the Department of Energy to carry out
the missions of DHS.
The DHS Science and Technology Directorate, wishing to make the
best use of each of these laboratories and sites in consonance with
statute, regulation, and policy, asked laboratories and sites to make a
decision regarding their desired mode of interaction with the
Directorate--to participate in S&T's internal strategic planning and
program development processes or, if otherwise permissible under
applicable law, regulation, contract, and DOE policy, to respond to
certain types of S&T solicitations open to the private sector.
On March 31, 2004, the following national laboratories and sites
communicated their decision to Under Secretary McQueary to participate
in S&T's internal strategic planning and program development processes:
Argonne National Laboratory, Bechtel Nevada, Brookhaven National
Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory,
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory,
and the Sandia National Laboratories. The designation of intramural/
extramural is therefore no longer necessary for the nine labs under
consideration.
An external review will be conducted to assess the baseline
capabilities of the national labs to provide the Department with an
enduring capability to meet long-term mission requirements. The results
of this review will be utilized by the Homeland Security Science and
Technology Advisory Committee to advise the Department on options for
establishing a long-term strategic relationship with the national
laboratories.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
CHEMICAL PLANT SECURITY
Question. Mr. Secretary, you and I have previously discussed the
role of the Department of Homeland Security as it pertains to the
protection and security of chemical plants in this country. Your
Department continues to take a ``hands-off'' approach by relying on
voluntary efforts by the chemical plant industry to assess
vulnerabilities and take protective actions.
We know that the EPA has estimated that over 100 plants located all
over the country could affect over 1 million people, if attacked. We
know that the Department of Justice released a study in April of 2000,
concluding that, ``the risk of terrorists attempting in the foreseeable
future to cause an industrial chemical release is both real and
credible.'' We know that in February of 2003, the National
Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), which is now part of the
Department of Homeland Security, issued a threat warning that, ``Al
Qaeda operatives also may attempt to launch conventional attacks
against the U.S. nuclear/chemical-industrial infrastructure to cause
contamination, disruption, and terror. Based on information, nuclear
power plants and industrial chemical plants remain viable targets.''
We know that the Homeland Security Act requires DHS to analyze the
vulnerabilities to our critical infrastructure and take protective
actions to strengthen them. However, when you testified last year, you
indicated that the chemical industry was better suited to assess
vulnerabilities and take appropriate security measures.
Last November, 60 Minutes reporter Steve Croft and Carl Prine, an
investigative reporter at the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, found their
way in to numerous chemical plants containing dangerous materials
without a hint of resistance. This revelation clearly highlighted the
fact that the chemical industry was doing little to nothing to improve
security at chemical plants.
A July 2003 survey by the Conference Board found that since 9/11,
U.S. corporations have increased their spending on security by only 4
percent.
Mr. Secretary, do you maintain the position that the chemical
industry is better suited to assess vulnerabilities and take protective
actions to secure chemical plants? Does your budget request address
this issue in any way? If so, how much is included for chemical plant
security?
Answer. We look to the private sector as the primary agent of
change when it comes to assessing vulnerabilities and taking protective
measures at their individual facilities. As you know, 85 percent of
critical infrastructures are privately owned. Our role is to provide
the tools (standards, techniques, best practices) necessary to do an
effective job. We have a genuine program to assess whether this
approach is effective and will make adjustments as necessary.
Several initiatives are underway to help protect the Nation's
chemical plants. We will spend about $18 million for protective
measures at the 360 chemical plants on the fiscal year 2004 Protective
Measures Target List. This amount funds site assistance visits by my
security specialists to assess vulnerabilities and help establish
buffer zone protection plans. Approximately $4.1 million is for the
acquisition of web cam monitors for local law enforcement agencies to
install on public right-of-ways adjacent to 17 critical chemical sites
to extend their buffer zones.
Question. What more can you do to make sure that the chemical
industry responds with a robust program to secure their plants?
Answer. DHS Protective Security Advisory Teams visited the 17
critical sites last year to provide training and assist site personnel
and local law enforcement develop Buffer Zone Protection Plans to make
it more difficult for terrorists to conduct surveillance or attack one
of our facilities.
For the remaining 343 sites, we will visit each one to provide
training, support, and recommendations to owners and operators and
local law enforcement. Each site has its own particular needs. Some
visits will focus on ``inside the fence'' issues with plant security
personnel to identify and reduce vulnerabilities. Others will involve
the development of buffer zones in cooperation with local law
enforcement. Some sites will need both types of assistance. We intent
to have visited all 360 chemical facilities by the end of the year. We
have also published two reports, the Characteristics and Common
Vulnerabilities Report and the Potential Indicator of Terrorist
Activity (PI) Report, to assist owners and operators of chemical
facilities. The former characterizes and discusses common
vulnerabilities for chemical manufacturing facilities producing and
handling large quantities of inherently hazardous materials while the
latter discusses potential indicators and warnings of terrorist
activity that law enforcement and plant security personnel can use to
better protect their facilities.
We have established a protection, training, and planning program
for State homeland security personnel, local law enforcement, chemical
facility operators and site security personnel. Periodic drills among
the protective community will be conducted to exercise the chemical
facilities plans in the case of a potential terrorist attack and we
intend to factor chemical plant security into national exercises.
Finally, the Department is in the process of developing plans for
deploying a cadre of Protective Security Advisors (PSAs). Each one will
have responsibility for a specific region of the country and will
maintain a close relationship with the chemical plant owners and
operations in their area. The advisors will facilitate information
sharing, organize protective security training, assist in emergency
coordination, and represent the Department in the communities in which
they are posted. Security Augmentation Teams (SATs) are also being
developed that will consist of approximately 25 personnel drawn
primarily from major urban SWAT units. The teams will focus on
protecting high-value sites, such as critical chemical facilities.
Their operations concept is to develop working relationships with the
site's permanent protective security team and become familiar with the
site's specific vulnerabilities. The development of these two programs
are in the early stages but are being closely monitored by my office.
IMMIGRATION
Question. How much of a reduction in the more than 6,000,000
petitions pending with U.S. Citizenship and Immigrant Services do you
expect to achieve this year with the $160,000,000 requested in the
President's budget?
Answer. With the additional resources requested in 2005, USCIS will
achieve the President's goals of eliminating the backlog and achieving
a 6-month processing time for all immigration applications by 2006. In
order to achieve this goal, USCIS will:
--Reengineer processes to achieve greater efficiencies;
--Update policies and procedures to streamline adjudications and
increase the percentage of cases completed at initial review by
an adjudicator; and
--Manage production against milestones--beginning with
collaboratively setting goals, reporting progress, and
identifying additional improvement opportunities.
USCIS is finalizing its Backlog Elimination Plan and will provide
this plan to Congress in the coming months. The plan will include a
road map to eliminating the backlog with defined milestones.
Question. How many new petitions do you expect the President's
Immigration Reform Plan to generate?
Answer. This information will be available once Congress has
drafted the legislation and the specifics are known.
Question. What lessons from the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control
Act (IRCA) legalization programs have been applied to the President's
Immigration Reform Plan?
Answer. The IRCA planning teams developed a strategy that enabled
the Service to quickly expand its adjudicative capacity through the
establishment of temporary regional processing centers and local
interview offices. Temporary employees were hired and trained
specifically to adjudicate that workload. INS reassigned experienced
executives and managers at all levels to oversee operations, but relied
heavily on the skills or retired executives and managers (reemployed
annuitants). This strategy enabled the Service to continue its efforts
to process the normal casework plus handle the surge in workload caused
by the passage of IRCA. Key components of IRCA were: the development of
the regional processing center concept, development of a modular office
plan for field interviewing sites, automated data systems to record
transactions, and receipt of authority from Congress to expedite
certain leasing and contracting requirements. In addition, INS received
authority to reemploy annuitants without salary offset. The reemployed
annuitant program was absolutely critical to the overall success of the
program.
INS worked closely with Congress prior to the passage of IRCA, and
that cooperation was also instrumental in INS being able to meet the
requirements for the legalization provisions of IRCA.
Question. What were the total costs of IRCA's two legalization
programs (please break down by main components) and how much revenue
was generated in total by the fees charged to process IRCA
applications?
Answer. The IRCA program was totally fee-funded. Therefore, the
number of applications filed and their respective fees determine the
total cost of the program. Our analysis to date of the program has
determined a total application workload of approximately 2,700,000,
with costs/fee revenues totaling $245,000,000. The breakdown of this
program is as follows: (1) Application for Permanent Residency
(2.68,000,000 applications/$241 million), (2) Application for Status as
a Temporary Resident (6,700 applications/$3.7 million).
Question. How much will the President's Immigration Reform Plan
cost, and what components comprise the total cost?
Answer. It is expected that costs associated with the workload
would be covered with fees like all other application and petition
processing.
Question. If the President's Immigration Reform Plan is funded
through fees, what proportion of the funds will be distributed to U.S.
Citizenship and Immigrant Services (to adjudicate petitions), to
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (for investigations and
enforcement), to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (for background
checks), to the Department of Labor (for labor certification and
worksite enforcement), and to the Department of State's Bureau of
Consular Affairs (for visa issuances)?
Answer. CIS costs associated with the temporary worker program will
be covered by application fees. The 2005 Budget requested additional
funding to support Immigration and Customs Enforcement, an additional
$23,000,000 to more than double the resources devoted to worksite
enforcement.
Question. How many full-time equivalent [FTE] personnel will be
necessary to implement the President's Immigration Reform Plan? What
level of fees or additional appropriations would be necessary to hire
those additional FTEs without further increasing the deficit?
Answer. This information will be available once Congress has
drafted the legislation and the specifics are known.
Departmental Management
DHS HIRING FREEZE
Question. According to a March 26, 2004 Wall Street Journal
article, certain DHS agencies have declared a ``hiring freeze'' in the
Bureaus of Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement because of a potential budget shortfall of approximately
$1.2 billion. Could you please explain to the subcommittee whether this
shortfall is actually a ``computer glitch'' resulting from the
combining of the budgets from legacy agencies or has the agency simply
failed to request sufficient funding for front line staffing as it
continues to roll out new border security initiatives such as One Face
at the Border, US VISIT, C-TPAT, and C.S.I.?
Answer. During a review of the status of execution of the fiscal
year 2004 budget, ICE and CBP determined that implementation of hiring
restrictions was a prudent managerial measure to ensure that they
manage their overall requirements within their fiscal year 2004
appropriations. It was also determined that additional focus was
required to work through funding realignments related to the
establishment of the three new Bureaus.
The Department established a review team composed of staff from the
Chief Financial Officer's Office, Border and Transportation Security,
CIS, CBP, ICE, and the Coast Guard to assess the situation. The review
team engaged in a detailed budget reconciliation effort between the
three Bureaus resulting in an internal realignment of $212 million with
possible subsequent internal realignment of approximately $270 million
pending final documentation and billing. The work has been on-going,
but agreements have been reached to realign funds to cover costs of
services incurred by the Bureaus. Formal memoranda of agreement will be
implemented between the three Bureaus and help ensure that funding is
aligned with services rendered.
There is no $1.2 billion shortfall as reported by the Wall Street
Journal.
Security initiatives such as One-Face-at-the-Border, US VISIT, C-
TPAT and CSI were sufficiently funded through the appropriations
process and are not contributing to accelerated rates of expenditures.
Question. Funds for these accounts are apportioned on a quarterly
basis. Was the anti-deficiency act violated for any of the CIS, CBP or
ICE accounts for fiscal year 2003 or fiscal year 2004?
Answer. The anti-deficiency act has not been violated for the CIS,
CBP or ICE accounts in fiscal year 2003 or fiscal year 2004.
TSA REPROGRAMMING PROPOSAL
Question. What is the status of the TSA reprogramming proposal?
Answer. TSA has proposed a modest reprogramming request for fiscal
year 2004 in order to meet critical needs. The Department delivered a
reprogramming request to the appropriations committees on April 23,
2004. TSA will follow up on answers to questions posed by Committee
staff who have been briefed on the request.
FTE
Provide a chart, broken by DHS agency, that have the following
headings: fiscal year 2003 on-board end of year, fiscal year 2004 on-
board current, fiscal year 2004 projected on-board end of year, fiscal
year 2003 FTE, fiscal year 2004 funded FTE, fiscal year 2005 FTE
request.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY FISCAL YEAR 2003--2005
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal
Fiscal year On-
Fiscal year 2003 Fiscal board Fiscal
Component/Bureau year 2003 On-Board year 2004 Projected Fiscal year 2005 Comment
FTE End of On-board end of year FTE FTE
fiscal Currently fiscal
year year
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Border & Transportation Security:
Office of the Under Secretary 5 5 27 40 67 75
US VISIT..................... .......... .......... .......... 64 64 102
U.S. Bureau of Customs & 38,452 40,178 \1\ 41,847 \2\ 41,298 \3\ 40,076 41,001 SEE FOOTNOTE (CBP)
Border Protection.
Immigration and Customs 35,955 34,708 15,861 15,000 14,749 15,550 Fiscal year 2003 includes Legacy INS; Fiscal
Enforcement \4\. year 2004 onboard does not include FTE for
Federal Air Marshal Service
Transportation Security 58,612 55,920 51,646 53,046 51,346 52,503
Administration.
U.S. Coast Guard--Civilian....... 6,341 6,773 6,717 7,237 6,492 6,821 Direct and reimbursable
U.S. Coast Guard--Military....... 39,219 39,644 39,981 39,938 39,874 40,259
U.S. Secret Service.............. 6,019 6,209 6,292 6,493 6,381 6,506
Emergency Preparedness & Response 5,432 5,726 5,682 5,970 4,780 4,776 Direct
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration 9,625 9,100 8,875 9,000 9,795 9,937 Decrease in on-board due to hiring freeze
Services.
Federal Law Enforcement Training 831 908 931 934 934 936
Center.
Information Analysis & 226 226 263 543 729 737
Infrastructure Protection.
Science & Technology............. 79 34 57 180 180 218 FTE numbers do not include: sin public health
service FTE spt S&T; staff at the envir
measurements lab; staff at PIACD and IPAs
Departmental Management:
Departmental Operations...... 274 359 445 617 708
Office for Domestic 129 57 69 146 146 197
Preparedness.
Wireless/IT.................. 15 5 5 15 15 15
Inspector General............ 372 396 402 500 457 502
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals..................... 201,312 200,163 179,014 180,849 176,702 180,843
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: On-Board are positions not FTE (full time and part time).
\1\ Fiscal year 2004 on-board is as of 2/7/04 Current on-board numbers are positions not FTE. Full-time 40,227; Part-time 1,620.
\2\ Consistent with CBP staffing report required by the fiscal year 2004 Appropriations Act. End of year on-board will vary significantly resulting from
transfer of employees between CBP and ICE. These transfers are result of the organizational realignment required by the creation of DHS.
\3\ Discretionary and Mandatory FTE that was built off the fiscal year 2003 actual FTE and includes additional positions appropriated by Congress.
Estimated FTE usage at the end of fiscal year 2004.
\4\ Does not include FAMS.
DHS PERSONNEL REGULATIONS
Question. Concerns have been raised with regard to the adequacy of
funding for the Department of Homeland Security, specifically funding
for first responders and other frontline personnel. In light of funding
limitations for frontline positions, do you believe spending over $100
million to design a new pay system is the right priority for DHS? When
does the department anticipate that the new pay system will be fully
implemented and operational within all bureaus within DHS? How much of
the $100 million will actually be used for salaries for front line
personnel?
Answer. Our current schedule anticipates that full deployment of
the new system will be completed in calendar year 2006. None of the
$100 million will be used for salaries of front-line personnel, but
rather will support key activities associated with the design and
deployment of the new HR flexibilities. A sizeable amount ($31 million)
of this request will be directed to training for front-line employees
and managers. While $100 million may seem to be a lot, we view this as
a necessary, and appropriate, investment in our people and the human
capital systems they work under. We envision the flexibilities
contained in this language to be a key catalyst to our ability to
attract and retain the right talent for DHS and believe we will reap
the benefits from this investment for many years to come.
Additionally, investments in human resources information technology
are required to identify further organizational savings and allow the
eventual redirection of staff resources to front-line work. A 6-year
life cycle cost of $131 million for human resources information
technology is projected and is essential to ensure the necessary common
technology platform to support the successful deployment of HR
flexibilities and ensure they achieve the intended results. Absent this
investment in HR technology, it would be difficult, if not impossible
in some components, to implement the HR flexibilities because of the
varying quality and maturity of components' existing HR technology
capabilities.
Question. What will be the annual cost for conducting the local and
national pay surveys to private contractors to implement the pay for
performance system?
Answer. We have not yet costed-out this service. We do know that
there are several commercial market survey instruments available to us
for this purpose, and we have already initiated lessons-learned
discussions with other Federal agencies that already use a component of
market-based pay. We have been told by one agency (FAA) that their
recurring annual survey costs are estimated at $30,000 per year.
Question. What does DHS believe will be the full cost for
implementing a new pay system?
Answer. We are projecting a fully loaded life cycle costs of $408.5
million to support full system implementation. Major components of this
figure include the $102.5 million for system implementation, $10
million for Coast Guard performance pool, an estimated $165 million for
other component performance pools, and a 6-year life cycle cost of $131
million for human resources information technology. Some of the
component performance pools could come from existing salary and expense
funding spent on within grade and quality step increases.
Question. How many different pay rates will there be for DHS
employees in the pay for performance system as opposed to the clear 15
Grade Ten Step GS pay scale?
Answer. We are anticipating that there will be between 10 and 15
major occupational clusters of positions (i.e. administrative, law
enforcement, etc,). According to our estimates, we are envisioning 4-5
broad pay bands within each cluster to define entry-level, journey-
level, senior expert, and supervisory pay groupings.
Question. What will the annual administrative cost be for the pay
for performance system?
Answer. We do not have this level of information yet, but are
currently benchmarking with organizations with similar systems. We are
envisioning that the bulk of these recurring costs will be in
supervisory and managerial training, not salary administration, and
view that as a positive commitment to the organization and our people.
Question. How much of the $100 million will be allocated by
contracts?
Answer. We anticipate the bulk of the $100 million will be
allocated by contract. Major breakdown of overall costs includes: $27
million for program management, oversight and evaluation; $31 million
for training and communications to support system implementation; $42
million for detailed systems design and implementation support
(business process reengineering, compensation expertise, etc.) It's
important to note that of the one-third allocated for managerial and
employee training which will likely be managed by contract, there will
be a direct and tangible deliverable to the government beyond the
contractor services. Most of the services being provided by contractors
are those where specialized skills and knowledge are required for a
fairly short duration.
DEPARTMENTAL COMPARISONS
Question. When compared to the Departments of Treasury,
Transportation, Justice, and Commerce, the Office of the Secretary of
the Department of Homeland Security is spending incredible sums of
money in areas such as Legislative Affairs, Public Affairs, and the
Chief of Staff. For example, based on fiscal year 2004 enacted numbers,
the Departments of Treasury, Transportation, Justice, and Commerce have
an average of 17 and 17.5 FTE respectively in their Public Affairs and
Legislative Affairs offices. DHS, in contrast, has 43 and 49 FTE in
these two offices. The Office of the Secretary at DHS spends $8.1
million on Public Affairs and $5.9 million on Legislative Affairs while
the other four Departments average $1.6 million each on Public Affairs
and $1.7 million each on Legislative Affairs.
The Departments of Treasury, Justice, and Commerce have an average
of 11 FTE and spend an average of $1.1 million each in their Chief of
Staff office while DHS has 31 FTE in this office and spends $5 million.
(Information on the Office of the Chief of Staff for the Department of
Transportation was not available). Why is DHS spending so much more on
their Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, and Chief of Staff Offices
in comparison to other Departments?
DEPARTMENTAL COMPARISONS FISCAL YEAR 2004--ENACTED
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chief of Staff Public Affairs Legislative Affairs
-------------------------------------------------------------------
FTE Cost FTE Cost FTE Cost
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dept of Homeland Security................... 31 $5,047,000 43 $8,168,000 49 $5,907,000
Dept of Transportation...................... ....... ........... 19 1,889,000 24 2,267,600
Dept of Treasury............................ 12 1,393,279 17 1,725,620 13 1,459,292
Dept of Commerce............................ 7 1,109,000 12 1,882,000 12 1,605,000
Dept of Justice............................. 14 820,859 20 944,187 21 1,506,177
Average..................................... 11 1,107,713 17 1,610,202 17.5 1,709,517
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Answer.
CHIEF OF STAFF'S OFFICE
The Chief of Staff's Office currently consists of 31 FTE positions.
The function of the Office is to support the mission of the Department
through coordination of the 22 agencies and directorates that have been
consolidated into the Department of Homeland Security. The Chief of
Staff's Office is also responsible for all operational functions that
relate to the Immediate Office of the Secretary (budget, information
technology, personnel and advance), and offices that fall under the
budget supervision of the Chief of Staff's Office.
Confronting one of the largest organizational transformations in
United States Government history, the Chief of Staff's Office functions
as the central point for coordinating the massive consolidation and
reorganization challenges of the new Department. To ensure a high-level
of initial access and to meet the critical and complex goals of
Homeland Security's mission, the Chief of Staff's Office includes the
Office of Policy and the Office of Counternarcotics.
The Chief of Staff's Office manages the day-to-day activities of
the Department and assists in guiding the long-term goals of Homeland
Security. With the inherent challenges of a concurrent creation of a
new Department, reorganization, consolidation, and several new offices,
the Chief of Staff's Office seeks to streamline, coordinate, and
deliver highly effective initiatives and policies that will ensure our
safety, response capacity and our freedoms.
To accomplish these goals, the Chief of Staff's Office utilizes the
Office of Policy to coordinate all policy decisions that affect the
Department. Due to the rapidly evolving nature of the Department, the
Office of Policy continues to be a vital facet for developing and
monitoring the range of issues the Department of Homeland Security
confronts.
The Office of Counternarcotics serves a vital function for Homeland
Security as the Department works to address drug related activities
that impact the security of our Nation.
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is a new department with
unique responsibilities and a complex mission that includes facets of
responsibility not undertaken by other government agencies. Consistent
with the overarching mission of the department, the DHS Office of
Public Affairs (OPA) has created and maintained several programmatic
responsibilities to support the department's critical mission areas
that exceed traditional press office functions.
The congressional inquiry specifically compares the full-time
equivalent (FTE) and budget allotment of DHS OPA to the Departments of
Treasury, Transportation, Commerce and Justice, and requests
justification for the apparent differences between DHS and the other
departments.
There are three primary justifications for the DHS FTE allotment
and budget:
Scope of Mission.--DHS Office of Public Affairs contains many
functions that either do not exist at other agencies or are contained
in other parts of the organization and are thus funded by those
offices. These additional functions were strategically placed within
the Office of Public Affairs to ensure consistency of message to
external audiences and to develop synergies between these various
functions. Information follows about the multiple functions that are
contained within DHS OPA.
Different Comparables.--Comparing the DHS Office of Public Affairs
to Treasury, Commerce, DOJ, and DOT is an inaccurate comparison. DHS
OPA is more analogous to the Department of Defense and the Department
of State, in terms of the media's interest in department activities,
the importance of communicating accurate, timely information to the
public, and the international implications of the department's
activities.
In addition, both DOD and DOS public affairs support programmatic
efforts similar to the Department of Homeland Security, including
public education campaigns, a speaker's bureau and other public liaison
functions. It should be noted that DHS's current FTE allocation (43) is
considerably lower than the public affairs FTEs at the Pentagon (56
FTEs in just OSD public affairs, excluding the large public affairs
staffs at the armed services level) and at the Department of State (170
FTEs at headquarters, excluding embassy public information officer
staff).
It should also be noted that DHS has a total of 180,000 employees--
substantially more than the other departments that DHS is being
compared to.
The Department of Homeland Security's mission is to prevent
terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's
vulnerability to terrorism, and to minimize the damage from potential
attacks and natural disasters. To support these missions and ensure
consistency in public information, DHS OPA performs functions not
included in other department's staffing numbers; either because those
functions sit elsewhere in the department or they are they are unique
to DHS. Below is a brief description of these functions and
specifically how they further the department's mission.
--Public Education.--The Office of Public Education's goal is to
create and sustain public education campaigns that raise the
level of national citizen preparedness. This program directly
supports the department's mission to reduce America's
vulnerability to terrorism and to minimize damage in the event
there is another attack.
In February 2003, DHS OPA launched the Ready campaign, a
comprehensive, bilingual public education campaign designed to
educate and empower Americans to prepare for potential
emergencies and reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism in
the event that there is another attack. This campaign
experienced the most successful launch in Ad Council history
and continues to grow. With congressional support in 2004, DHS
hopes to expand the campaign to offer a three-pronged strategy
for preparing communities: Ready, Ready for Business, and Ready
for School.
The Office of Public Affairs has also partnered with the National
Academies of Science and the Radio and Television News
Directors Foundation to host ten tabletop exercises designed to
facilitate real discussion between media and government
officials about crisis. This program will supply members of the
media with resources to aid in the dissemination of reliable
information during a crisis and will provide the government
with a better understanding for how to best work with media in
providing critical information to the American public during
times of crisis.
Finally, DHS OPA is working to engage the American public
directly in homeland security issues through a partnership with
the Council for Excellence in Government (CEG). These CEG town
hall meetings have taken place across the Nation and top
officials at the Department of Homeland Security have
participated to directly hear citizen's concerns and ideas
firsthand. Additional public education initiatives of this
nature are in the works for the future as well.
--Public Liaison.--The goal of the Office of Public Liaison (OPL) is
to educate key constituent organizations about DHS policy
initiatives, organize opportunities for dialogue and provide
groups with one point of contact to exchange information and
address concerns. Due to the wide range of issues handled by
the department, the OPL interacts with think tanks,
associations, ethnic groups, universities, and others. OPL also
runs the DHS Speakers Bureau, which organizes and responds to
hundreds of incoming speaking invitations. Placement of the
Office of Public Liaison within DHS OPA is consistent with DOD
and DOS.
--Incident Communications.--The Homeland Security Act of 2002
outlines DHS authority and responsibilities in the event of a
possible terrorist attack. DHS OPA has put several processes in
place to support that legislative mandate as well as Homeland
Security Policy Directive-5 (HSPD-5), which specifically
requires the department to inform the American people about any
terrorist-related events. ``The Secretary shall ensure that, as
appropriate, information related to domestic incidents is
gathered and provided to the public . . .'' This requires a
full crisis management capability that is always in place and
ready to respond and lead the national effort to comply with
HSA 2002 and HSPD-5. This is especially true since we lead the
Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG).
The DHS OPA staff has the primary Federal leadership role in
overseeing the public information components of the National
Response Plan (NRP) and National Incident Management System
(NIMS). This includes interagency content coordination as well
as state/local government and private sector coordination.
These documents and procedures are cornerstones for all major
incident public affairs response activity, and ensure that
Federal, State, and local communicators function as one voice
in delivering critical information and instructions to the
public. This function is essential--the public cannot be told
different information from authority figures during an
emergency situation.
DHS OPA coordinates planning and operational actions with State
and local authorities, which includes training and briefing to
State public affairs staffs, exercise activity, and real-world
incident management. DHS OPA also conducts interagency table
top exercises to evaluate and improve upon Federal and
department incident response capabilities. In order to inform
the media about what they can expect from the Federal
Government during a terrorist incident, DHS OPA has created a
reference manual with media guidance that is near distribution.
DHS OPA currently maintains a staffing presence in the DHS
Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) for the majority of
the time, requiring numerous, back-to-back staff shifts.
Ultimately, DHS OPA will be responsible for providing 24/7
coverage in the HSOC, which is currently operational 24 hours a
day.
Finally, DHS OPA also coordinates directly with international
counterparts and non-governmental organizations to ensure that
the department's capabilities are known and to gain information
about best practices being used around the world. Examples
include participation in the multi-discipline National Disaster
Risk Communications Initiative and continuous coordination with
counterparts in Great Britain.
--Historian.--The DHS Historian and historical staff are vital to the
formation, preservation, and dissemination of the institutional
memory of the Department. The DHS Historian also oversees and
directs the recording and preservation of the history of the
Department through the publication of a wide range of
historical studies aimed at a diverse audience, making the
Historian and historical publications essential to a broad-
based public awareness of the work and history of the
Department.
The work of the DHS Historian and records managers in collecting
and preserving historically important records is also a
critical element in ensuring government transparency in general
and, specifically, public accountability of a Cabinet
department charged with protecting the American people and way
of life.
Activities include the production of a range of reference,
policy, and historical background assessment papers; providing
expert historical knowledge essential for informed decision
making; maintaining the institutional history of the
Department; providing professional assistance to the historical
and archival activities of the directorates and bureaus within
the Department; and producing such documentary collections as
may be deemed necessary.
--Web Content and Development.--The work of the DHS Web team is of
particular importance because OPA is tasked with building a
functioning website that is consistent across the DHS bureaus
and useful to the American public seeking information about the
department's missions and policies. Pew research in April 2002
found that 68 million American adults had used government
agency Web sites--a sharp increase from the 40 million who had
used government sites in March 2000. An average of 1.7 million
pages is viewed each week on the DHS website. During the most
recent Orange alert, 2.5 million pages were viewed weekly.
--Employee Communications.--The Employee Communications function
ensures that key policy, procedural, and operational
information from headquarters is disseminated and understood by
the department's 180,000 employees. This function is critical
to establishing a new culture for DHS employees folded in from
22 component bureaus and agencies. Employee Communications
researches communication needs, promotes two-way communication,
and provides a comprehensive range of tools such as a weekly e-
newsletter, roundtable sessions with principals, and the
intranet website.
--Speechwriting.--The Speechwriting staff supports the Office of
Public Affairs' public education mission by writing public
remarks for the Secretary, Deputy Secretary and other
spokespeople. This includes support for DHS senior leadership
during time of national crisis, when there is a particular need
for timely, straightforward public information. Current
staffing levels are consistent with those at DOS.
--Communications/Press Office.--Due to the department's mission,
including its international impact, DHS OPA receives an
extremely high call volume from reporters interested in
homeland security issues. OPA also has taken proactive steps to
provide the public with timely information about homeland
security issues, such as giving advice to holidays travelers,
educating companies about their rights under the newly enacted
Safety Act, and guiding Americans to be alert when using rail
transportation.
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
The Department of Homeland Security's Office of Legislative
Affairs' (OLA) responsibilities are commensurate to the overarching
mission of the Department, both diverse and far-reaching in scope. The
legislative duties of the Department are comparable to other large
Federal agencies sharing multiple committee jurisdictions and
addressing a large volume of Congressional inquiry and activity.
The Office of Legislative Affairs is responsible for the
development and advancement of the Department's legislative agenda.
This includes the establishment and maintenance of constructive
congressional relations, the development of Departmental protocols for
interaction with Congress and contributing to the formulation of and
communication of the Department's strategic message.
Specifically, OLA coordinates staffs and develops material for
congressional hearings to include creating briefing books and editing
written testimony. OLA assists with witness preparation of oral
testimony, including coordinating and scheduling policy and subject-
focused pre-briefing prior to a hearing date. They also coordinate and
manage legislative briefings in advance of a hearing. The briefings
provide the policy landscape, possible questions and answers,
information on other witnesses, and other last minute insights.
Additionally, OLA staff coordinates and tracks deliverables which
result from hearings, including questions for the record.
Further, OLA is responsible for all congressional mail sent to DHS.
This involves recording and tracking correspondence, assigning due
dates, ensuring letters are answered in a timely manner and proofing
and editing all correspondence for the Assistant Secretary's signature.
Currently, more than 80 House and Senate Committees claim
jurisdiction over the Department's many important functions. These
committees include the Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Committees on Appropriations, and other committees addressing homeland
security issues related to transportation and infrastructure,
agriculture, science, energy, commerce, taxes, government affairs,
intelligence, judicial issues, financial services and international
relations.
DHS OLA places the highest priority on responding to all
Congressional oversight inquiries in a factual and timely manner. This
broad interest in the Department and its mission produces multiple
hearings and Congressional briefings, numerous solicitations of
response to Congressional questions and requires adequate resources to
be devoted to sufficiently respond to such inquiry.
For example, in 2003, the Department of Homeland Security testified
at 148 hearings--some including multiple witnesses from both the full
Department, as well of each of its directorates. From January 28th
through April 22nd of this year, the Department has produced witnesses
for 82 hearings. Additionally, in 2003, DHS OLA was responsible for 838
briefings of Congressional members and staff. This year, DHS OLA has
already conducted 509.
Congressional inquiry that specifically compares the full-time
equivalent (FTE) and budget allotment of DHS OLA to that of other
Federal Departments requires an examination of not only the unique
functions of the DHS OLA but also requires a thorough inspection of the
personnel numbers of other Legislative Affairs offices outside of DHS.
For example, other departments with comparable missions report
similar or greater resources devoted to Legislative Affairs. DHS OLA
shares similar personnel numbers not only within the Legislative
Affairs offices of other departments, but also support staff, some
greatly exceeding that of DHS OLA.
NEBRASKA AVENUE COMPLEX
Question. Legislation authorizing the transfer of the property from
the Navy to GSA has been submitted. What is the status of the
legislation in the various authorizing committees? What has the
Department been doing to educate the authorizers and the leadership of
the urgency in moving this legislation by April 30?
Answer. The proposed legislation from the Administration
transferring the Nebraska Avenue Complex to the General Services
Administration for the use of the Department of Homeland Security was
submitted to Congress for consideration by letter from General Services
Administrator Stephen A. Perry to Speaker of the House J. Dennis
Hastert dated February 12, 2004, and by letter to Vice President
Cheney, as President of the Senate, dated February 18, 2004. House and
Senate Leadership, House and Senate Authorization Committees, and House
and Senate Appropriation Committees have been briefed on the NAC
legislation and the necessity of passing the legislation as soon as
possible. A freestanding bill has been reported out of the House Armed
Services and Transportation and Infrastructure Committees. Similar
legislation has been reported out of the Senate Armed Services
Committee as part of the fiscal year 2005 Department of Defense
Authorization bill. Additionally, since February, the Appropriations
and Authorizing Committees staffs have both toured the NAC in
preparation for the introduction of the legislation.
Question. What would it cost to lease the equivalent amount of
space in Washington, DC for fiscal year 2005 and for fiscal year 2005-
2009?
Answer. Using an average of $46.34 per square foot (assuming a 5
year lease), the equivalent cost of leasing approximately 450,650
square feet of floor space (approximate NAC requirement), the cost
would be $20,883,000 in fiscal year 2005 and for the period fiscal year
2005-2009 would be $106,523,000 (assuming an average cost inflation of
5 percent per annum). These costs do not include the cost of parking.
GRANT CONSOLIDATION
Question. What is the status of Secretary Ridge's proposal to
consolidate TSA, FEMA, ODP and other grants in the Office of State and
Local Government Coordination and Preparedness? Have any funds been
officially transferred? If the proposal is still going forward, how
many people from TSA and FEMA will be (or have been) transferred? Are
they people associated only with grant stewardship, or are subject
matter experts also being transferred?
Answer. The move to create a one stop shop for grants is based upon
input from the user or grantee community and is designed to enhance
coordination of the multitude of preparedness and security grants
currently administered by the Department (ODP, FEMA and TSA). The one-
stop shop consolidation will allow DHS to gain a global perspective on
all of the grants to ensure that redundancies are minimized, funds are
directed to the highest best use and DHS can proactively make
recommendations to states, localities and other recipients on mutual
aid and dual use opportunities.
Moving the TSA grants to SLGCP will provide DHS with concrete
benefits. First, it will allow the substantial bulk of the TSA
personnel who are not impacted by the consolidation to focus on their
core mission of transportation security. Next, it creates internal (to
DHS) and external (to recipients) improved efficiencies because only
one DHS team (SLGCP) will interact with grant recipients rather than
two separate teams (one at SLGCP and one at TSA) and, more importantly,
recipients who apply for more than one type of grant (e.g. a UASI and a
TSA grant) will only need to deal with one DHS team (SLGCP).
Final policy responsibility for grant guidance and grant
distribution will reside with the Office of State and Local Government
Coordination & Preparedness. However, overall hazards and
transportation security policy input will remain with FEMA, TSA, as
well as the Coast Guard, and MARAD. And, to ensure the continuing
involvement of TSA in the grant process, ODP will create a distinct
office dedicated specifically to transportation related grants. This
office will work closely with TSA in developing transportation security
grant policy.
HIRING PRIORITIES
Question. Recently, in the midst of budget constraints during this
period of increased demand to protect the homeland, the Department
announced its intention to hire a director of its Hollywood
entertainment liaison office. This position would pay up to $136,466.
This salary would pay the entry level salaries of 5 TSA screeners, 4
ICE Special Agents, 4 U.S. Border Patrol Agents, 8 Coast Guard non-rate
enlistees or 3 U.S. Secret Service Special Agents. How can the
Department justify the creation of such a position when hiring for
front line activities within the Department is ongoing and there are
hiring freezes in other parts of the Department?
Answer. Public Affairs utilized an open, funded position from one
of its bureau offices to create the Director of Entertainment Liaison
position. By taking an FTE from an office where reorganization had
created efficiencies in workload, the position utilized those
efficiencies to create a position with value added to the Department.
The Entertainment Liaison Office is a necessary addition to the
Office of Public Affairs. This person will work with television and
movie producers to ensure that they do not take ``editorial license''
with Homeland Security matters that could provide the public with false
impressions or inaccurate information. We spend a great deal of effort
to educate people to help them to be better prepared for any possible
disaster--natural or manmade. Millions of Americans get information
through the entertainment industry. This position will help to ensure
that these people get an accurate portrayal of the department's
mission, policies, and activities, while proactively working to help
the American public better identify DHS functions. The Entertainment
Liaison office will guide the direction of documentaries and law
enforcement ``reality'' shows to provide real information about how the
country is better prepared today.
This is not a unique position in government. Many other Federal
agencies already utilize a liaison with the entertainment industry. The
CIA has a Hollywood liaison, and the Department of Defense houses a
large staff to serve the same function.
CONTRACTING OUT
Question. During the April 30, 2003, hearing, Secretary Ridge
testified that he would provide the Subcommittee by August 2003 the
fiscal year 2004 Management Plan of the Department. To date, that has
not been submitted. Please submit the Plan. What are the Department's
plans for fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005 for contracting out
work currently provided by DHS personnel?
Answer. The Department has engaged in a 2004 Competitive Sourcing
Plan that provides for the competition of approximately 1,500
commercial FTE at CIS and the USCG. No decisions have yet been reached
regarding whether to retain the work in-house or convert it to contract
performance. Competition based decisions are expected in the August/
September timeframes. The Department is currently working with its
Organizational Elements to identify opportunities for additional
competitions in the fiscal year 2005 completion timeframe and based
upon the 2003 FAIR Act inventory of commercial and inherently
governmental functions, but we have not yet made any final decisions
regarding what will be competed or the form of competition (streamlined
or standard).
FUNDING FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS AND PORT SECURITY GRANTS
Question. Provide for the record the response to my March 9, 2004
letter to Secretary Ridge.
Answer. The Secretary appreciates the question and the opportunity
to respond. A response to the Senator's March 9, 2004 letter to the
Secretary is forthcoming.
Transportation Security Administration
IMPLEMENTATION OF AIR CARGO STRATEGIC PLAN
Question. Please provide an update on all steps taken to date to
implement your 11/03 Air Cargo Strategic plan. How are you integrating
the hiring of 100 air cargo inspectors into that plan and what is the
status of that hiring effort?
Answer. The Air Cargo Security Plan outlines a layered security
strategy based on TSA's threat-based, risk managed approach to
security. TSA is focused on numerous strategies to secure cargo
aircraft, perimeters, facilities, and personnel. TSA plans to publish a
Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) soon that will include
requirements for further implementation of the Plan. But it is
important to note that a significant number of measures called for by
the Plan have already been implemented:
--As of April 18th, 2004, 75 out of the 100 cargo inspectors have
been hired and are on board. The remainder has been tendered
offers of employment, which are currently being processed. We
expect the remaining inspectors to be on board within the next
two pay periods. These inspectors will be deployed throughout
the United States and under the supervision of the local
Federal Security Director.
--A security directive requiring foreign all-cargo carriers to comply
with the same cargo security procedures as domestic air
carriers has been issued.
--A security directive requiring passenger and all-cargo carriers to
perform random inspections of air cargo has been issued.
--TSA's research and development budget for fiscal year 2005 includes
$55 million to develop new technologies for inspecting cargo
for explosives, radiation, chemical, and biological agents, and
other dangerous substances.
--The Known Shipper database has been expanded by involving more
companies and collecting more information to enhance shipper
and supply chain security
--To assist TSA in evaluating the latest technology available for
identifying high-risk cargo, a Request for Information (RFI)
was issued on April 12. The RFI will close on April 30th.
--Explosives Trace Detection (ETD) and Explosives Detection System
(EDS) technology have been evaluated to determine their
viability in conducting targeted air cargo inspections. The EDS
Pilot program is progressing towards an operational phase. TSA
has selected three vendors to test their machines against eight
commodities. There are five airports selected to participate in
the pilot; MIA, DFW, ORD, ATL, LAX. The first screening is
scheduled to begin at the end of May and finish at the end of
June.
AIR CARGO SCREENING: LEVERAGING DOD RESEARCH
Question. In his January 26, 2004 testimony before the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Peter F.
Verga, spoke to three Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD)
efforts currently underway at DOD. One of them, the Air Transportable
cargo screening ACTD, is designed to detect explosive threats in pallet
cargo loads moving through the military transportation system. Is your
agency aware of this effort and is its use under consideration for one
of the pilot air cargo demonstration projects called for and funded in
the fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security Appropriations Act? If not, why
not? If so, please describe the testing being conducted--including the
location, timeframe, and level of funding.
Answer. Both agencies benefit from research and development
projects designed to provide technologies for screening cargo to be
carried on board an aircraft. TSA has been in contact with the
Department of Defense (DOD) regarding the Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration (ACTD), and will be working with DOD personnel to ensure
that efforts undertaken by either TSA or DOD are complementary.
WAIT TIMES AT AIRPORTS
Question. Last summer, my staff requested information regarding the
wait times for airline passengers nationwide and at the JFK, LAX, MIA,
ATL, Charleston, WV, and Jackson, MS airports on a month-by-month basis
for fiscal year 2003 and 2004. They are still waiting for this
information. The wait times should be presented graphically with data
on the level of airport screeners at each of the requested locations.
Please provide the information.
Answer. TSA's plan for wait time data collection rotates the
responsibility of collecting passenger security checkpoint wait time
data among different airports throughout the year. Each month,
approximately 26 airports are instructed to conduct a wait time study
of two consecutive weeks. These airports are selected according to
their geographical and size categories in order to allow TSA to
extrapolate across the full range of airport diversity. All Category X
and I airports--as well as select Category II, III and IV airports--
will be chosen to collect data at least three times each over the
course of the year. The monthly airport selections are balanced in
order to provide consistent data for headquarters analysis. In March,
the average wait time for this sample of airports was 3.1 minutes with
an average of 10.4 minutes at peak time. Please see attachment for
airport specific information.
The average peak wait times are the wait times encountered by
passengers during the airport's high passenger volume periods. This is
an average of all the checkpoint's peak times at each of the selected
airports over the given month.
DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINTS BY TSA SCREENERS
Question. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) employees
have filed numerous discrimination complaints. Employees have filed
complaints for a litany of reasons from poor agency management to
failing to address the security problems at airports nationwide. As of
January 2004 the agency faced a backlog of approximately 1,800
discrimination complaints. How has TSA addressed this problem and what
plans are being considered to alleviate the backlog of discrimination
complaints?
Answer. In January 2004, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR)
implemented a ``Backlog Elimination Strategy.'' With this strategy, the
OCR sought to both eliminate the backlog of discrimination complaints,
develop a system that would promote rapid processing and resolution of
current complaints, and perhaps, most important, improve service to our
customers. During fiscal year 2003, OCR received in excess of 1,800
informal complaints of discrimination. In January 2004, the OCR had a
backlog of 476 informal complaints that required action. As of April 8,
2004, OCR had a backlog of 8 informal complaints requiring action.
We have trained all of our EEO counselors and many OCR staff
members in alternative dispute resolution techniques and have provided
our EEO counselors with additional counselor training. We are proud to
say that OCR's strategy of addressing EEO complaints is not reliant on
the ``pushing of paper.'' We are providing training to TSA managers
that focuses on management practices that promote equal employment
opportunity and are working closely with various TSA offices to
identify and address potential civil rights issues.
AIR MARSHAL TRAINING
Question. In December 12, 2003 written testimony to Senator
Hollings, the General Accounting Office stated that funding cuts and
delays would push back into mid-2004 advanced air marshal training--
scheduled for completion in January 2004 for those air marshals hired
between October 2001 and July 2002. What is the current status of
advanced air marshal training? Have all air marshals hired through the
end of fiscal year 2003 received the required advanced training?
Answer. Phase II Training, the equivalent of advanced training for
Federal Air Marshals, continues at the Federal Air Marshal Training
Center in Atlantic City, NJ. Presently, the last class is scheduled to
begin on May 31, 2004. At the end of that class, approximately 136
Federal Air Marshals will not have attended Phase II for the following
reasons: debilitative medical conditions (61) active military duty
(39); and administrative positions (36). The 36 Administrative
Positions represent 36 Federal Air Marshals (FAMs), who have background
investigation issues and/or disciplinary action pending. When those
matters have been adjudicated, the FAMs will attend Phase II Training.
These numbers may be reduced as personnel in those categories become
available to attend Phase II Training, since training positions remain
available to include the above.
CANINE TEAMS--DIVERSION FROM CURRENT MISSIONS
Question. The Secretary has proposed to increase rail security by
diverting K-9 teams to rail stations. Yet, there is no new money for
this purpose. Where are the K-9 teams being diverted from and what
impact is the diversion having on those missions?
Answer. DHS has announced that it will create Rapid Response Teams
to augment local dog teams through the Federal Protective Service
(FPS). FPS, working with TSA, will determine how best to mobilize
existing dog teams across the Federal Government during heightened
alerts. We have no intention of taking K-9 teams away from screening
air cargo and protecting other Federal infrastructure. TSA is
developing a program to partner with local authorities to provide
explosives detection training for current and future dog teams.
REGISTERED TRAVELER
Question. What are the costs in fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year
2005 to implement the registered traveler program, how much of that
cost will be covered by fees on the registered travelers, and what will
be the expected increase in wait times for non-registered travelers if
the registered traveler program is implemented with no increase in the
screener workforce?
Answer. TSA intends to conduct Registered Traveler (RT) Pilots at a
limited number of airports beginning in June 2004. The pilot programs
will assess improvements in security and enhancements in customer
service for passengers. The pilots will last approximately 90 days.
Results of these pilots will be analyzed to determine the program's
effect on security and service.
During the RT Pilots, TSA will test technology, including biometric
tools, to enhance identity verification at the passenger security
checkpoint, in conjunction with business processes, including potential
reconfiguration of select checkpoint lines and lanes. TSA will be
testing a range of technology and operational variables. The RT Pilots
will monitor and assess possibilities for a secure and expedited travel
experience for those who volunteer for the program. The number of
participants in the RT Pilots will be capped at 10,000, spread across a
small number of airport locations. It is anticipated that this small RT
Pilot test will not have a detrimental effect on either those who do
not volunteer or on the screener workforce. Upon conclusion of the
pilots, determination will be made regarding best practices and
necessary enhancements required for larger implementation of the
program.
The cost of the RT Pilots will be funded through $5 million
appropriated for the Registered Traveler program in the Homeland
Security Appropriations Act, 2004 (Public Law 108-90). Contrary to
media reports, TSA is not planning to charge a fee to passengers who
participate in the 90-day RT Pilots.
TSA will await the results and analyses of the Pilots prior to
making any decisions regarding the implementation of a Registered
Traveler program in fiscal year 2005, including any costs that may be
incurred by passengers who wish to participate in the voluntary
program. The fiscal year 2005 request includes $15 million to pay for
additional start-up costs, such as IT infrastructure and staffing
associated with an RT program. TSA anticipates that future operational
program costs for the Registered Traveler Program would be covered by
fees incurred by participants. Thus, the Registered Traveler Program
would become self-funded.
Until the pilot has been conducted and the results fully evaluated,
staffing requirements and their implications cannot be fully
understood. However, TSA remains committed to its customer service
objectives and minimizing the wait time for the traveling public.
Emergency Preparedness and Response
PROJECT BIOSHIELD
Question. How can the Department justify spending between $1
billion and $1.5 billion on experimental anthrax experimental vaccines
not approved by FDA and unlikely to be approved for many years, when
these vaccines have been developed by companies who have never had a
commercially manufactured vaccine approved by FDA?
Answer. Anthrax tops virtually every biowarfare threat analysis,
because of its high fatality rate (as demonstrated by the October 2001
attacks, where 45 percent of those with inhalation anthrax died),
persistence in the environment, ease of production, and ease of
aerosolization. Although antibiotic treatments are available, the use
of an anthrax vaccine would provide pre-exposure protection for first
responders and remediation workers. In a post-attack scenario, a
vaccine would shorten the course and increase the effectiveness of
treatment antibiotics when given to large exposed populations, and
facilitate re-entry into contaminated space. It would also provide
protection if a terrorist deployed antibiotic-resistant anthrax. Other
important anthrax treatment modalities such as anthrax antitoxins,
which can potentially save the lives of those already ill, are under
advanced development and may become available for BioShield
procurements in the future.
The current licensed anthrax vaccine, Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed
(AVA), has many disadvantages for civilian use, including a primary
requirement of 6 doses over 18 months with annual boosters and a
limited production capacity (the only producer has a maximum production
of 6.6 million doses per year). However, it is currently available,
effective, and safe; and newer, 3-dose schedules are being evaluated.
Through an interagency agreement between the Department of Defense
(DOD) and DHS, the manufacturer could provide 5 million doses to the
stockpile by 2006.
Project BioShield provides for the acquisition of licensable
products with the term ``licensable'' defined as within 8 years. This
provision allows the Department to consider competitive bids proposed
by companies that have a validated current Good Manufacturing Practices
production process capable of scaled commercial production, as well as
products that have been tested in appropriate animal models for
efficacy and in human clinical trials for safety. New recombinant
Protective Antigen (rPA) anthrax vaccines made using genetic
recombinant biotechnology are being developed as next-generation
anthrax vaccines. In preliminary studies, rPA vaccines protected
animals against lethal anthrax aerosol challenge. Two manufacturers--
one of them in the United States--are developing rPA vaccine under
contract with the National Institutes of Health (NIH). Human trials to
evaluate safety began in the summer of 2003. NIH contracts for advanced
development, process development, and further clinical testing were
awarded in September 2003. A 3-dose schedule has been suggested as
likely, although studies could result in a 1-2 dose schedule in certain
situations. Cost is estimated at $10 per dose. Initial rPA delivery to
the Strategic National Stockpile is expected in 2004 as an
investigational product.
Two manufacturers have nearly completed phase I clinical trials,
and further clinical and animal testing plans appear reasonable to NIH
and Food and Drug Administration reviewers. Recent progress reports to
NIH indicate steady progress by both manufacturers with no major
obstacles envisioned. NIH will continue to support and monitor the
current development of the product through phase II clinical trials.
HHS will request monthly progress reports from the manufacturers
and will host interagency risk management meetings to review the
reports and to intervene when necessary. Also, a significant percentage
of the contract payment will not be available until after licensure,
both for pre-exposure and post-exposure use.
After consideration of the anthrax threat, public health need,
advanced development progress, manufacturing capability, and cost, the
Policy Coordination Committee of the Homeland Security Council
recommended, and the Deputies Committee approved, procurement of
additional anthrax vaccine.
Question. Why doesn't DHHS adopt a near-term to long-term policy
for stockpiling of anthrax vaccine with product available now for the
next 5 years and with next generation vaccines thereafter? Isn't a
mixed approach being used for the procurement of other vaccines?
Answer. DHS and HHS are working closely to develop both a near-term
and a long-term strategy for stockpiling existing prophylactics and/or
pharmaceuticals to protect against or to treat exposures to anthrax
while continuing to seek and encourage the development of next-
generation anthrax vaccines. Currently, the Strategic National
Stockpile (Stockpile) contains a sizable inventory of antivirals for
treatment of anthrax exposure, and due to their current availability,
the Stockpile is markedly increasing its caches of such
countermeasures--enough to treat 12 million people with an increase to
30 million by the end of this year. Additionally, DHS, through an
interagency agreement with DOD, is purchasing the only FDA-licensed
anthrax vaccine, AVA, in fiscal year 2004, fiscal year 2005, and fiscal
year 2006--for a total of 5 million doses to be added to the Stockpile.
As a result, the Stockpile will contain ample amounts of prophylaxis
for anthrax exposure, and will serve as a bridge until the next-
generation anthrax vaccine, rPA, is accepted into the Stockpile.
Question. Please provide an expenditure plan by quarter for fiscal
year 2004 and fiscal year 2005 for Project Bioshield that identifies
specific procurements for which decisions or solicitations have been
made to date and general purposes or goals for remaining obligations.
Answer. Over the past 10 months, the Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) Medical Countermeasures subcommittee has developed
countermeasures information of interest to administration policymakers
who will make the BioShield procurement decisions. The WMD subcommittee
commissioned an end-to-end analysis of medical countermeasures to
Category ``A'' biological agents (anthrax, smallpox, plague, botulinum
toxin, tularemia, Ebola, and other hemorrhagic fever viruses). Working
groups developed initial requirements for four high-priority bioweapon
countermeasures for which there is high need and a reasonable
expectation that products will be available in the near-term:
--Next-generation anthrax vaccine (rPA)
--Anthrax immune therapy
--Next-generation smallpox vaccine (modified vaccinia, MVA or LC16m8)
--Botulinum antitoxin
STOCKPILE
Question. Please provide an expenditure plan by quarter for fiscal
year 2004 and fiscal year 2005 for Strategic National Stockpile that
identifies specific procurements for which decisions or solicitations
have been made to date and general purposes or goals for remaining
obligations.
Answer. The fiscal year 2004 Strategic National Stockpile spending
plan has already been provided to the Appropriations Committee on May
11, 2004, during a Strategic National Stockplie (SNS) briefing. A
fiscal year 2005 spending plan is being formulated by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, but it has yet to be provided to DHS.
REGIONAL OFFICE AND IMPACT ON EXISTING FEMA REGIONAL STRUCTURE
Question. Please provide an update on the Department's plans to
establish a regional structure. What impact will this new structure
have on FEMA'S 10 regional offices and their longstanding and
successful linkages with State and local emergency managers?
Answer. An effective Department of Homeland Security (DHS) field
operational management concept is essential to ensure that the
Department fulfills its mission in leading the national unified effort
to protect America. Of the 22 agencies that now comprise the
Department, 7 have regional structures. DHS is conducting a baseline
analysis regarding a regional concept of operations that would ensure
effective management of field operations both on a day-to-day basis and
during incidents
One of the core missions of DHS regional offices would be to
collaborate with Federal, state, local, tribal and private sector
stakeholders within the region to coordinate homeland security
activities. To ensure that the DHS regional offices are able to perform
this coordination function, FEMA regional offices will continue to
partner with State and local governments to help ensure that
communities throughout the Nation can prepare for, respond to and
recover from incidents and disasters.
Question. How will those relationships be protected under a new
regional structure?
Answer. Over the years, FEMA regional offices have developed such
productive working relationships with their State and local partners
that it is often touted as the hallmark of intergovernmental
coordination and collaboration between a Federal agency and its
constituent stakeholders. In recognition of these valuable
partnerships, the Department is working to design a regional construct
that will capitalize upon these excellent relationships to enable the
more effective and efficient delivery of DHS services to external
stakeholders.
DISASTER RELIEF
Question. Please provide the Subcommittee with an update on
disaster relief funds.
Answer. As of April 28, 2004, $1.487 billion remains unobligated in
the Disaster Relief Fund If obligations occur at the 5-year average of
$249 million per month for the remaining 5 months of the fiscal year
and FEMA realizes another $200 million in recoveries of prior year
obligations (actual recoveries through March 31 equal $194 million),
FEMA will end the year with an unobligated balance of $442 million,
which is close to the estimate of $453 million in the fiscal year 2005
President's budget. In summary (in thousands of dollars):
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unobligated Balance, 4/28............................... $1,487,265
Estimated recoveries.................................... 200,000
Obligations May 1-Sept. 30 (5 $249 million)... -1,245,000
---------------
Estimated unobligated balance 9/30/04................... 442,265
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Of course, any large hurricane or other disaster events during the
remainder of the fiscal year could significantly impact these
estimates.
United States Secret Service
CAMPAIGN LABOR COSTS
Question. The fiscal year 2004 budget includes $64 million in costs
associated with the 2004 campaign protection program. This budget was
based on a historical average of 603 ``protection days'' covering
multiple candidates. How many candidates have received protection
during the 2004 campaign? Provide the date protection started for each
candidate. Does the Secret Service still anticipate that 603 protection
days will be required for the presidential campaign? What savings does
the Secret Service anticipate from the campaign program, if any?
Answer. As you note, the Secret Service's campaign protection
estimate is based on the historical average of the number of protection
days provided for the last four elections. The Administration believes
this is the most appropriate method for developing estimated campaign
protection costs, since it does not presuppose a set number of
candidates or particular days on which protection will begin or end.
To date, the Service has provided protection for two candidates and
one spouse. Following the Democratic Convention, the Service will
provide protection to the Vice-Presidential nominee and the Vice-
Presidential nominee's spouse. Baring protection being provided to a
third party, an independent candidate or, on the Republican ticket,
someone other than the sitting President or Vice President, 421 days of
protection will be provided.
Of the $64 million budgeted for the campaign program, $40.0 million
is for direct costs related to protection, and $24 million is for labor
costs relative to personnel that are being reallocated from the
Service's investigative activity to the campaign in order to staff the
protective effort. These reallocated labor costs are covered by the
Service's base budget. To the extent these personnel are not required
for campaign-related work; they will continue their investigative
activities.
Because of lower than originally projected campaign activity, the
direct costs are now estimated to total only $33 million. The
Department and the Secret Service will work with Congress to find
appropriate uses for any excess campaign protection funding.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Projected dates of Protection
Candidate/Nominee Protection Days
------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Kerry......................... February 20, 2004 224
through September 30,
2004.
Mrs. Kerry \2\..................... April 13, 2004 through 85.5
September 30, 2004.
John Edwards....................... February 22, 2004 11
through March 3, 2004.
Dem. VP Nominee \1\................ July 26, 2004 through 67
September 30, 2004.
Dem. VP Spouse \1\ \2\............. July 26, 2004 through 33.5
September 30, 2004.
------------
Total Projected Campaign Days ...................... 421
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Estimated VP Nominee and Spouse start dates.
\2\ Protection for spouses are projected as \1/2\ day of protection.
``FORCE MULTIPLIER'' TO FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS
Question. On February 24, 2004, the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and the Secret Service announced a new agreement to provide
force multiplier to Federal air marshal service. According to the
Department, this initiative would enable the ICE FAMS the flexibility
to deploy their Federal Marshals to a wider range of flights. Other
than providing the ICE FAMS with travel information for armed personnel
traveling on U.S. commercial flights during their normal course of
business, what specific responsibilities will Secret Service agents
have on these flights that they didn't have before February 24, 2004?
In many cases, Secret Service agents travel from one city to another
following several hours of protection responsibilities. Does this mean
that U.S. Secret Service agents will then be asked to substitute as
Federal air marshals when traveling on official business?
Answer. The objective of the Force Multiplier Program (FMP) is to
capitalize on the presence of literally thousands of armed Federal law
enforcement officers (LEOs) that routinely travel throughout the
country on commercial carriers in support of the missions of their
respective agencies. Essentially, the FMP is a system that would allow
the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) to track and coordinate LEO
flight activity to optimize the use of Federal Air Marshals and
otherwise enhance the level of LEO coverage provided to the Nation's
civil aviation system.
While USSS Special Agents are participating in the Force Multiplier
Program, they will not be acting as ``de facto FAMs'' and are not a
substitute for Federal Air Marshals (FAMs). While they receive a
briefing, they are neither fully trained nor tactically positioned on
the aircraft to serve as FAMs. The USSS Special Agents will have no
additional responsibilities while aboard U.S. commercial flights during
the course of their official travel. It will, however, heighten their
awareness within the aviation domain and allow the FAMS to monitor the
presence of armed LEOs on flights. In the event of an in-flight crisis,
the USSS Special Agents would react accordingly to the threat as
prescribed by applicable statutes and their agency policy.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Citizenship and Immigration
Services
IMMIGRATION-RELATED CASEWORK--ASSISTANCE TO CONGRESSIONAL OFFICES
Question. I am troubled by the reports I am receiving from members
of my staff about the difficulties that they are having in obtaining
help from your agency for my constituents. Under the current
reorganization regime, my staff is finding that their efforts to get
answers to even some of the most basic questions about visas and
immigration processes are meeting with resistance from agency staff.
Contacts, both e-mails and follow-up phone calls, from my office to
district office staff in your agency are not receiving timely
responses. It sometimes takes days to get even an acknowledgment of an
inquiry. In many cases, contract personnel, particularly at the service
centers, are less acquainted with the intricacies of immigration law
than are members of my own Senate staff. On many occasions my staff has
made inquiries only to receive responses that are strictly scripted.
Even more disturbing, calls from my Senate office are not even being
answered at headquarters. I would like to know what efforts are being
made to monitor service to the public and to ensure that Congressional
inquiries are handled promptly?
Answer. The Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) is also troubled if you and your staff are not receiving timely
and appropriate responses to your inquires from USCIS personnel and
appreciate your bringing it to his attention. You should know that the
Standard Operating Procedures for all congressional units, both here at
USCIS headquarters and in the field, specifically state that all phone
calls from congressional offices must be returned within 24 hours, e-
mails within 10 days, and written correspondence or faxes within 30
days. If this is not being done, then the Director would be happy to
look into any specific instances or cases you could provide to me.
However, it is important to note that some case resolution (which
should be considered distinct from the return of a phone call or the
answer to a letter), because of its complexity, may take considerably
longer.
The Director appreciates you bringing this to his attention and
wants to assure you that customer service is one of the top three
priorities of USCIS. We will continue to commit ourselves to building
and maintaining an immigration services system that provides
information and benefits in a timely, accurate, consistent, courteous
and professional manner and ensure that those values are exhibited in
our congressional units.
It appears that the above question regarding responsiveness
primarily relates to immigration services issues under the purview of
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). However, the
Assistant Secretary, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) wants to
ensure you that ICE is fully committed to providing timely and
informative responses to all congressional inquiries. The ICE office of
Congressional Relations can be reached at (202) 514-5232 to assist in
immigration casework relating to detention and removal, humanitarian
parole and other matters under ICE's jurisdiction. For your
information, USCIS Office of Congressional Relations can be reached at
(202) 514-5231.
Office for Domestic Preparedness
METROPOLITAN MEDICAL RESPONSE SYSTEM
Question. Provide a detailed description of how fiscal year 2002,
fiscal year 2003, and fiscal year 2004 funds appropriated for the
Metropolitan Medical Response System have been spent. Has the
Department fully met the requirements of cities, as laid out in the
MMRS contracts? If not, how much work, and in which cities, remains to
be done? How much of the fiscal year 2004 appropriation is obligated?
What are the plans for remaining funds? If the Department does not plan
to obligate all appropriated fiscal year 2004 funds for MMRS, please
provide a rationale; the proposal for how remaining funds will be
spent; and indicate whether you will submit a reprogramming or transfer
proposal to the Committee.
Answer. In fiscal year 2002, the Metropolitan Medical Response
System (MMRS) program was located in the Department of Health and Human
Services' (HHS') Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health
Emergency Preparedness (OAS PHEP). The funds were used to initially
establish an MMRS in 25 new jurisdictions at a cost of $400,000 each,
for a total of $10 million (this was less than the historical cost of
$600,000 for an MMRS contract), and to fund special projects in MMRS
jurisdictions.
In fiscal year 2003, $49.1 million of the $50.1 million
appropriation was allocated to MMRS within the HHS OAS PHEP, and is
broken out as follows:
--$200,000 was provided to each of the 25 fiscal year 2002
jurisdictions to ``make them whole'' for baseline capability
development, for a total of $5 million
--Funds for fiscal year 2003 Program Support Contracts, providing
$280,000 for capability sustainment and optional operational
area expansion, were obligated for each of the 122 MMRS
jurisdictions, for a total of $34.16 million
--A total of $2.4 million was used to establish 3 new MMRS
jurisdictions and to upgrade Atlanta to MMRS status ($600,000
for each)
--$3 million was provided to the National Emergency Training Center
(NETC) for MMRS training course development and for Noble
Training Center facility upgrades
--$1.5M was spent on the final phase of a special project to obtain a
mobile field hospital for the Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North
Carolina, MMRS
--The remainder was used for technical support contract fees,
official travel, printing, and other overhead expenses
In fiscal year 2004:
--$3 million was transferred to the NETC for 1 MMRS course
development and 2 facility upgrades at the Noble Training
Center
--$500,000 has been used for staff travel and administrative expenses
As of May 5, 2004, 65 of the 124 MMRS jurisdictions have completed
their baseline capability development. Of these 65 jurisdictions, 24
have begun work under the fiscal year 2003 Program Support contracts.
None of the jurisdictions has yet completed its fiscal year 2003
Program Support contract. Of the remaining 59 jurisdictions:
--25 jurisdictions have nearly completed their baseline capability
development (only 1 or 2 deliverables remaining)
--13 jurisdictions are on track (have 3 or more deliverables
remaining and are on schedule to complete them)
--21 jurisdictions are delayed
As an incentive for completing baseline capability development,
activation of the fiscal year 2003 Program Support Contract (up to
$280,000) is conditional upon completion and approval of all
deliverables required in the initial MMRS contract, and its
modifications. The table below provides the information by
jurisdiction.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Submitted
Technical and Cost
2003 Sustainments Proposals for the
Baseline Deliverables Completed Started Fiscal Year 2003
Program Support
Contracts
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Akron, OH....................... Anaheim, CA....... Akron, OH
Albuquerque, NM................. Aurora, CO........ Albuquerque, NM
Anaheim, CA..................... Bakersfield, CA... Amarillo, TX
Anchorage, AK................... Birmingham, AL.... Anaheim, CA
Arlington, TX................... Columbus, GA...... Anchorage, AK
Aurora, CO...................... Columbus, OH...... Arlington County,
VA
Austin, TX...................... Denver, TX........ Arlington, TX
Bakersfield, CA................. Fremont, CA....... Austin, TX
Baltimore, MD................... Fresno, CA........ Baton Rouge, LA
Baton Rouge, LA................. Honolulu, HI...... Shreveport, LA
Birmingham, AL.................. Indianapolis, IN.. Chattanooga, TN
Boston, MA...................... Jacksonville, FL.. Cincinnati, OH
Chesapeake, VA.................. Las Vegas, NV..... Dallas, TX
Chicago, IL..................... Mesa, AZ.......... Dayton, OH
Cleveland, OH................... Milwaukee, WI..... El Paso, TX
Columbus, GA.................... Minneapolis/St. Fort Wayne, IN
Paul, MN.
Columbus, OH.................... Nashville, TN..... Fremont, CA
Dallas, TX...................... Omaha, NE......... Fresno, CA
Denver, CO...................... Phoenix, AZ....... Ft. Worth, TX
Detroit, IL..................... Riverside, CA..... Garland, TX
El Paso, TX..................... Salt Lake City, UT Glendale, CA
Ft. Wayne, IN................... San Antonio, TX... Glendale, AZ
Fort Worth, TX.................. San Diego, CA..... Greensboro, NC
Fremont, CA..................... St. Louis, MO..... Hampton Roads
District Planning
Commission
Fresno, CA...................... .................. Hialeah, FL
Glendale, AZ.................... .................. Honolulu, HI
Honolulu, HI.................... .................. Houston, TX
Houston, TX..................... .................. Huntington Beach,
CA
Huntington Beach, CA............ .................. Irving, TX
Huntsville, AL.................. .................. Southeast Alaska
Region
Indianapolis, IN................ .................. Los Angeles, CA
Jacksonville, FL................ .................. Las Vegas, NV
Kansas City, MO................. .................. Lexington, KY
Las Vegas, NV................... .................. Lincoln, NE
Long Beach, CA.................. .................. Little Rock, AR
Los Angeles, CA................. .................. Lubbock, TX
Memphis, TN..................... .................. McAllen, TX (Rio
Grande)
Mesa, AZ........................ .................. Mesa, AZ
Miami, FL....................... .................. Mobile, AL
Milwaukee, WI................... .................. New Orleans, LA
Minneapolis, MN................. .................. NY City Mayor's
Office
Mobile, AL...................... .................. Oakland, CA
Nashville, TN................... .................. Oklahoma City, OK
Newport News, VA................ .................. Omaha, NE
New York, NY.................... .................. Phoenix, AZ
Oklahoma City, OK............... .................. Portland, OR
Omaha, NE....................... .................. Richmond, VA
Philadelphia, PA................ .................. Riverside, CA
Phoenix, AZ..................... .................. San Antonio, TX
Portland, OR.................... .................. San Bernardino, CA
Riverside, CA................... .................. San Diego, CA
Salt Lake City, UT.............. .................. San Jose, CA
San Antonio, TX................. .................. Santa Ana, CA
San Diego, CA................... .................. Seattle, WA
San Francisco, CA............... .................. Spokane, WA
San Jose, CA.................... .................. St. Louis, MO
Seattle, WA..................... .................. St. Petersburg, FL
Shreveport, LA.................. .................. Stanislaus County,
CA
St. Louis, MO................... .................. Stockton, CA
St. Paul, MN.................... .................. Tacoma, WA
St. Petersburg, FL.............. .................. Tampa, FL
Syracuse, NY.................... .................. Toledo, OH
Tampa, FL....................... .................. Tucson, AZ
Tulsa, OK....................... .................. Tulsa, OK
Wichita, KS..................... .................. Wake County, NC
Wichita, KS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
As of April 30, 2004, $3.5 million of the $50 million appropriation
has been obligated. The funds that Congress has appropriated for MMRS
over the last several years have been used to establish certain
capabilities, to get the program up to its baseline, and to facilitate
transfer of the program to the localities for continuation, once the
baseline is established. We will reach the baseline this fiscal year
(2004), and therefore no additional funding is being requested. As
such, the Department has submitted to the House and Senate
Appropriations Subcommittees a notification, dated April 27, 2004, of
its intent to reprogram $40 million of the $50 million MMRS
appropriation. Should this reprogramming be approved, the remaining
funds, approximately $6 million, would be used to develop a plan to
terminate the program as currently structured and to seek the
continuance, in some form, of its key components in the eventual ``one-
stop shop'' grants operation to be administered by the DHS Office of
State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness. Under this
arrangement, FEMA would have no further role in the MMRS program for
fiscal year 2004, and there will be no Federal program in fiscal year
2005.
There are other Federal programs that provide more narrowly
focused, but related, support. These include the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention-Health Resources and Services Administration
(HRSA) Bioterrorism Preparedness Grants and the HRSA Hospital Grants;
the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) Training and Exercise
Programs and Equipment Grants; and ODP Urban Area Security Initiative
funding to the designated States, which will then work with counties
and cities to form regions that will work together through mutual aid
agreements, interoperable communications, statewide intelligence
centers, and community and citizen participation.
OBLIGATIONS
Question. How does ODP verify that States have obligated funds to
cities, as required in the State formula and UASI grants? What are the
mechanisms for States to notify ODP, and for ODP to verify that
obligation was made? What does ``obligate'' mean in this program? What
steps must a city take to be able to get funds from the State for a
particular expenditure?
Answer. For the fiscal year 2003 State Homeland Security Grant
Program (SHSGP), Part I and II and Urban Areas Security Initiative
(UASI) Part I and II grants, ODP's grant guidance notes that states
were expected to obligate 80 percent of equipment funding for SHSGP I,
80 percent of first responder preparedness funding in SHSGP II, 50
percent of CIP funding in SHSGP II, and 80 percent of all funding for
the UASI II program to units of local government within 45 days. To
that end, ODP set up a follow-up system whereby ODP would notify the
State 10 days out from the 45th day (via a letter) that ODP expects
states to certify that they had obligated these funds. The
certification was done via a ``fax back'' form to their ODP
preparedness officer. On the 46th day after the grant award, we sent
out a letter reminding them of the obligation requirement, with an
accompanying fax back form that required them to certify that they had
met this obligation requirement, and to further explain (through a
narrative) how the funds were being used.
We received a majority of the fax backs within the allotted time,
and ODP is relying on the certification of those states that they have
met the statutory requirement. For states that did not provide the
information, or noted that they did not comply, we provided a number of
options. ODP offered technical assistance to help them comply with
certification. In other cases, states notified us of a date they would
be in compliance (in some states, legislatures and other elected bodies
need to meet so that can hold up Federal funding obligation). The last
resort for states who did not comply was the notification that ODP
intended to put a hold on the state portion of their funding until they
came into compliance.
In fiscal year 2004, the Homeland Security Grant Program and the
Urban Area Security Initiative grantees will certify their obligations
through the Initial Strategy Implementation Plan (ISIP), which is due
60 days after grant award. The grantees will submit this form to ODP,
and failure to submit the form will cause funding to be
administratively held, as noted in the special condition in the grant.
Obligation for ODP purposes means: (1) a definite commitment which
creates a legal liability for the payment of funds for goods and
services ordered or received, or; (2) a commitment during the grant
period to pay under a grant, subgrant, and/or contract determinable
sums for services or goods ordered or received during the grant period;
(please note that this does not include operational costs associated
with raising the threat level in the State Homeland Security Grant
Program-Part 2; please reference the ODP Grant guidelines for specific
details) or (3) evidence that funds are encumbered, such as a purchase
order or requisition, to cover the cost of purchasing an authorized
item during the grant period.
In terms of eligible subgrantees (such as cities, counties, regions
and other units of government) to receive funds from the state, ODP
leaves the discretion to the State as to who will receive subgrants.
This varies from State to State; as mentioned earlier, it can be
cities, counties, regions, port authorities, tribes, and other local
units of government. As well, most states make it clear to their locals
that there may not be an expectation that everyone will receive a
subgrant. This will be based upon risk, threat, population or other
means. If a locality is chosen as a subgrantee, the State makes a
subgrant award document available to them, with instructions for how to
proceed with procurement or other items, such as training procurement
or exercise planning. Depending on the requirements in the grant, in
most cases subgrantees are required to submit detailed budget
worksheets to the State in order to receive their funding. Since ODP
operates on a reimbursement basis, the locality will have to order
items from a vendor, and then receive the item before the monies can be
reimbursed. States are the only unit of government authorized to make
drawdowns against the U.S. Treasury for ODP funds.
TRAINING
Question. How does the Department plan to spend the $60 million for
competitive training? Please provide a break down of continuing
training costs.
Answer. The funding breakdown of the $60 million ($59,646,000 with
the 0.59 percent rescission) for continuation of ODP's current training
programs, as well as the competitive training grant program is as
follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Competitive Training Grants............................. $33,646,000
Naval Postgraduate School............................... 14,000,000
National Sheriff's Association.......................... 3,000,000
Dugway Proving Ground................................... 3,000,000
IACLEA.................................................. 1,500,000
Michigan State University............................... 500,000
Virtual Medical Campus (WVU)............................ 2,000,000
International Association of Chiefs of Police........... 2,000,000
International Association of Firefighters............... 1,000,000
---------------
Total............................................. 59,646,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TASK FORCE
Question. The Secretary has established a task force responsible
for identifying roadblocks in moving homeland security funding from
States to cities, and for identifying solutions. Who makes up the task
force? How many meetings have there been to date? What problems have
been identified?
Answer. Secretary Ridge has established a Homeland Security Funding
Task Force composed of state, county, city, and tribal representatives
to examine the funding process and ensure that Department of Homeland
Security funds move quickly to local first responders. The primary goal
of the Task Force is identify State and local funding solutions that
work effectively--``best practices''--and can be extended to situations
where there are impediments to efficient and effective distribution of
State and local homeland security funds.
The Department expects the Task Force to provide a report to the
Secretary within the next several weeks that will identify several
``best practices'' for ensuring the expeditious award of funds to local
first responders. The report will also identify barriers to the quick
and efficient award of funds to local first responders and offer
recommendations to address these barriers. The Task Force, led by Mitt
Romney, Governor of Massachusetts, is composed of 20 representatives
who have first-hand experience in homeland security issues and whose
expertise in this area should allow for a thorough examination of the
issue.
As of May 2004, the Task Force has met twice, and has also convened
two conference calls to discuss the issues surrounding the most
efficient and effective means to ensure that homeland security funds
are passed through to local first responders.
state grants (including law enforcement terrorism prevention grants)
Question. How much of the fiscal year 2002 funds have been
obligated, and expended, by state? At a national level, describe the
uses of the funds and how much has been spent on those uses. Please
provide the same information for fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004
funds.
Answer. Please see charts below for information on the fiscal year
2002 and fiscal year 2003 State formula grant programs. At this point,
ODP does not have information on the fiscal year 2004 program as many
states have only recently received their awards. Overall, though, these
awards could be used for a variety of purposes, including procurement
of specialized equipment, exercise support, and training. In all
instances, draw down information is provided to ODP by the States and
reflect State and local draw down amounts. Often times, these draw down
reports require ODP to validate the accuracy of the amounts reported.
Given that ODP is relying on State- and local-generated information,
this process can be time-consuming. Currently, ODP is still verifying
correct draw down amounts from States and localities. The result of
this is that State and local draw down amounts exceed obligated amounts
due to State and local reporting inaccuracies. ODP's validation process
will reconcile these numbers to reflect more accurate final draw down
amounts.
HIGH THREAT, HIGH DENSITY URBAN AREA SECURITY GRANTS
Question. How much of the fiscal year 2002 funds have been
obligated, and expended, by state? At a national level, describe the
uses of the funds and how much has been spent on those uses. Please
provide the same information for fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004
funds.
Answer. Please see attached charts below. Overall, though, these
awards could be used for a variety of purposes, including procurement
of specialized equipment, exercise support, and training.
FISCAL YEAR 2002 OBLIGATION & DRAWDOWN
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STATE AWARD AMOUNT OBLIGATION DRAWDOWN
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ALABAMA.............................. $5,317,000.00 $5,317,000.00 $3,227,957.57
ALASKA............................... 2,783,000.00 2,783,000.00 116,217.02
AMERICAN SAMOA....................... 828,000.00 713,671.00 713,671.00
ARIZONA.............................. 5,770,000.00 5,770,000.00 3,275,843.00
ARKANSAS............................. 4,141,000.00 4,141,000.00 1,812,350.69
CALIFORNIA........................... 24,831,000.00 24,695,730.27 6,770,544.91
COLORADO............................. 5,220,000.00 5,220,000.00 2,185,101.69
CONNECTICUT.......................... 4,626,000.00 3,132,870.26 3,132,870.26
DELAWARE............................. 2,887,000.00 2,887,000.00 2,522,055.43
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA................. 2,747,000.00 2,558,690.00 2,558,690.00
FLORIDA.............................. 12,967,000.00 12,967,000.00 10,092,752.25
GEORGIA.............................. 7,797,000.00 7,797,000.00 1,322,400.00
GUAM................................. 892,000.00 892,000.00 782,785.64
HAWAII............................... 3,172,000.00 3,172,000.00 388,734.56
IDAHO................................ 3,226,000.00 837,369.26 837,369.26
ILLINOIS............................. 10,604,000.00 10,135,950.00 6,421,617.60
INDIANA.............................. 6,400,000.00 4,710,688.00 4,341,379.22
IOWA................................. 4,308,000.00 4,288,520.64 4,288,520.64
KANSAS............................... 4,151,000.00 4,047,426.32 4,047,426.32
KENTUCKY............................. 5,048,000.00 5,048,000.00 860,155.73
LOUISIANA............................ 5,331,000.00 5,255,906.92 2,932,832.10
MAINE................................ 3,213,000.00 2,759,787.38 2,759,787.38
MARYLAND............................. 5,881,000.00 5,881,000.00 5,058,472.14
MASSACHUSETTS........................ 6,579,000.00 6,283,971.94 6,067,184.38
MICHIGAN............................. 8,958,000.00 8,958,000.00 6,797,636.52
MINNESOTA............................ 5,631,000.00 5,631,000.00 4,232,332.00
MISSISSIPPI.......................... 4,255,000.00 4,255,000.00 134,618.95
MISSOURI............................. 6,079,000.00 6,079,000.00 4,512,600.00
MONTANA.............................. 2,967,000.00 2,967,000.00 2,356,138.40
NEBRASKA............................. 3,502,000.00 2,365,560.04 2,365,560.04
NEVADA............................... 3,693,000.00 2,932,185.27 2,932,185.27
NEW HAMPSHIRE........................ 3,187,000.00 3,187,000.00 566,551.14
NEW JERSEY........................... 7,948,000.00 7,948,000.00 .......................
NEW MEXICO........................... 3,574,000.00 861,485.41 861,485.41
NEW YORK............................. 14,953,000.00 10,860,400.00 8,000,000.00
NORTH CAROLINA....................... 7,706,000.00 7,339,690.00 4,589,749.00
NORTH DAKOTA......................... 2,794,000.00 2,788,952.00 1,935,923.60
NORTHERN MARIANAS (MP)............... 835,000.00 634,948.00 631,569.00
OHIO................................. 9,897,000.00 9,897,000.00 6,894,513.59
OKLAHOMA............................. 4,656,000.00 4,450,000.00 474,551.16
OREGON............................... 4,637,000.00 4,637,000.00 1,322,762.23
PENNSYLVANIA......................... 10,512,000.00 10,512,000.00 5,524,635.76
PUERTO RICO.......................... 4,894,000.00 4,602,000.00 415,718.67
RHODE ISLAND......................... 3,063,000.00 2,448,593.17 1,170,550.04
SOUTH CAROLINA....................... 5,028,000.00 5,028,000.00 3,805,485.55
SOUTH DAKOTA......................... 2,868,000.00 2,799,987.64 2,744,690.06
TENNESSEE............................ 6,140,000.00 5,854,806.53 2,847,838.44
TEXAS................................ 16,196,000.00 16,196,000.00 3,954,498.71
UTAH................................. 3,849,000.00 3,849,000.00 2,331,617.46
VERMONT.............................. 2,772,000.00 2,772,000.00 1,883,177.41
VIRGIN ISLANDS....................... 861,000.00 861,000.00 133,381.16
VIRGINIA............................. 7,062,000.00 7,062,000.00 5,853,231.82
WASHINGTON........................... 6,276,000.00 5,733,465.11 4,979,929.00
WEST VIRGINIA........................ 3,567,000.00 3,567,000.00 3,567,000.00
WISCONSIN............................ 5,925,000.00 4,842,045.00 4,137,494.44
WYOMING.............................. 2,696,000.00 2,157,207.03 2,157,207.03
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL.......................... 315,700,000.00 295,372,907.19 170,631,350.65
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FISCAL YEAR 2003 SHSGP I
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grantee Award Amount Obligation Amount Drawn Down
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alabama.............................. $9,457,000.00 $9,457,000.00 $175,934.60
Alaska............................... 4,995,000.00 4,995,000.00 184,464.63
American Samoa \1\................... 1,482,000.00 1,482,000.00 .......................
Arizona.............................. 10,584,000.00 10,584,000.00 2,074,597.00
Arkansas............................. 7,394,000.00 7,394,000.00 3,383,376.03
California........................... 45,023,000.00 45,021,503.60 5,141,147.64
Colorado............................. 9,480,000.00 9,480,000.00 771,927.24
Connecticut \1\...................... 8,265,000.00 2,688,030.55 .......................
Delaware............................. 5,185,000.00 5,185,000.00 .......................
District of Columbia................. 4,910,000.00 4,910,000.00 .......................
Florida.............................. 23,654,000.00 23,654,000.00 3,194,791.29
Georgia.............................. 14,188,000.00 11,344,100.00 2,749,000.00
Guam................................. 1,596,000.00 1,596,000.00 138,141.80
Hawaii............................... 5,693,000.00 5,693,000.00 160,895.41
Idaho \1\............................ 5,803,000.00 5,396,000.00 1,210,840.19
Illinois............................. 18,879,000.00 17,353,243.00 6,532,800.91
Indiana.............................. 11,399,000.00 11,399,000.00 4,859,561.60
Iowa \1\............................. 7,656,500.00 7,656,500.00 232,884.14
Kansas............................... 7,401,000.00 6,353,209.03 264,327.00
Kentucky............................. 9,001,000.00 8,527,000.00 2,789,560.10
Louisiana............................ 9,451,000.00 9,451,000.00 182,686.24
Maine................................ 5,751,000.00 5,751,000.00 1,589,384.57
Maryland............................. 10,585,000.00 10,585,000.00 1,223,974.47
Massachusetts........................ 11,711,000.00 ....................... 68,752.97
Michigan............................. 15,918,000.00 15,918,000.00 899,860.42
Minnesota............................ 10,076,000.00 10,076,000.00 614,470.00
Mississippi.......................... 7,582,000.00 7,582,000.00 1,001,844.54
Missouri............................. 10,834,000.00 10,834,000.00 3,358,900.00
Montana.............................. 5,303,000.00 5,303,000.00 367,734.49
N. Mariana Islands................... 1,496,000.00 1,234,698.00 749,082.00
Nebraska............................. 6,254,500.00 6,254,500.00 1,618,344.69
Nevada............................... 6,771,000.00 6,771,600.00 1,259,918.90
New Hampshire........................ 5,727,000.00 5,727,000.00 858,982.35
New Jersey........................... 14,222,000.00 14,222,000.00 .......................
New Mexico........................... 6,401,000.00 6,401,000.00 133,918.45
New York \1\......................... 26,492,000.00 14,872,000.00 19,000,000.00
North Carolina....................... 13,908,000.00 13,908,000.00 1,228,130.00
North Dakota......................... 4,983,000.00 4,983,000.00 1,046,030.93
Ohio................................. 17,510,000.00 17,510,000.00 3,551,943.24
Oklahoma............................. 8,304,000.00 6,847,000.00 414,231.39
Oregon............................... 8,336,000.00 8,336,000.00 2,118,757.40
Pennsylvania......................... 18,570,000.00 18,570,000.00 3,286,780.86
Puerto Rico.......................... 8,727,000.00 8,727,000.00 .......................
Rhode Island......................... 5,489,000.00 5,489,000.00 1,899,312.04
South Carolina....................... 9,017,000.00 9,017,000.00 485,499.18
South Dakota......................... 5,131,000.00 5,131,000.00 217,204.19
Tennessee............................ 10,978,000.00 10,978,000.00 490,436.93
Texas................................ 29,538,000.00 29,538,000.00 3,520,908.18
U.S. Virgin Islands.................. 1,542,000.00 1,542,000.00 134,353.56
Utah................................. 6,937,000.00 6,937,000.00 1,190,912.95
Vermont.............................. 4,963,000.00 4,963,000.00 1,466,921.25
Virginia \1\......................... 12,716,000.00 8,031,200.00 6,369,466.20
Washington........................... 11,294,000.00 11,194,000.00 6,653,422.04
West Virginia........................ 6,340,000.00 6,340,000.00 5,034,308.70
Wisconsin............................ 10,565,000.00 10,565,000.00 5,577,914.15
Wyoming.............................. 4,827,000.00 4,827,000.00 1,101,205.77
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.......................... 566,295,000.00 524,584,584.18 112,579,842.63
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Verification of Obligation Data in Progress
FISCAL YEAR 2003 SHSGP II
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grantee Award Amount Obligation Amount Drawn Down
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alabama.............................. $25,049,000.00 $22,448,099.99 $2,077,219.12
Alaska............................... 13,230,000.00 11,466,000.00 82,013.14
American Samoa \1\................... 3,926,000.00 3,403,000.00 398,076.00
Arizona.............................. 28,033,000.00 28,033,000.00 3,124,190.00
Arkansas............................. 19,585,000.00 16,974,000.00 4,718,796.73
California........................... 119,256,000.00 119,186,813.00 22,821,978.15
Colorado............................. 25,111,000.00 25,111,000.00 1,587,461.43
Connecticut \1\...................... 21,893,000.00 3,326,834.23 .......................
Delaware............................. 13,733,000.00 13,733,000.00 .......................
District of Columbia................. 13,006,000.00 1,734,000.00 1,753,163.37
Florida.............................. 62,655,000.00 62,655,000.00 6,932,847.97
Georgia.............................. 37,579,000.00 37,579,000.00 2,764,500.00
Guam................................. 4,226,000.00 4,226,000.00 .......................
Hawaii............................... 15,079,000.00 15,079,000.00 1,183,054.77
Idaho................................ 15,375,000.00 14,350,000.00 2,059,200.37
Illinois............................. 50,005,000.00 44,656,232.00 258,979.73
Indiana.............................. 30,194,000.00 26,285,402.27 9,776,430.67
Iowa \1\............................. 20,282,000.00 17,689,625.12 1,337,200.95
Kansas \1\........................... 19,603,000.00 16,989,000.00 24,886.33
Kentucky............................. 23,838,000.00 20,660,000.00 2,204,308.52
Louisiana............................ 25,037,000.00 22,741,123.28 569,112.82
Maine................................ 15,232,000.00 15,232,000.00 2,403,869.60
Maryland............................. 28,037,000.00 28,037,000.00 519,347.05
Massachusetts........................ 31,020,000.00 31,020,000.00 8,321,342.08
Michigan............................. 42,162,000.00 36,227,500.00 469,974.88
Minnesota............................ 26,690,000.00 23,845,370.12 693,032.00
Mississippi.......................... 20,083,000.00 20,083,000.00 654,920.00
Missouri............................. 28,697,000.00 28,697,000.00 5,048,400.00
Montana.............................. 14,047,000.00 13,110,500.00 205,653.27
N. Mariana Islands................... 3,963,000.00 3,963,000.00 186,642.00
Nebraska............................. 16,568,000.00 16,568,000.00 4,128,342.94
Nevada............................... 17,935,000.00 17,935,000.00 845,533.87
New Hampshire........................ 15,172,000.00 13,362,968.47 6,664,255.98
New Jersey........................... 37,671,000.00 37,671,000.00 2,318,264.63
New Mexico........................... 16,956,000.00 13,635,150.00 68,600.00
New York \1\......................... 70,172,000.00 70,172,000.00 63,000,000.00
North Carolina....................... 36,840,000.00 36,840,000.00 455,173.00
North Dakota......................... 13,200,000.00 11,440,410.00 247,219.42
Ohio................................. 46,378,000.00 46,378,000.00 3,047,735.70
Oklahoma............................. 21,996,000.00 21,996,000.00 183,361.58
Oregon............................... 22,081,000.00 19,403,038.00 1,344,549.74
Pennsylvania......................... 49,189,000.00 49,189,000.00 2,255,466.08
Puerto Rico.......................... 23,118,000.00 23,118,000.00 .......................
Rhode Island \1\..................... 14,540,000.00 12,603,756.96 9,285,838.00
South Carolina....................... 23,882,000.00 23,882,000.00 830,961.88
South Dakota......................... 13,591,000.00 13,591,000.00 3,499,236.39
Tennessee............................ 29,080,000.00 29,080,000.00 28,493.47
Texas................................ 78,238,000.00 78,238,000.00 1,412,151.75
U.S. Virgin Islands.................. 4,085,000.00 4,085,000.00 2,358,158.50
Utah................................. 18,374,000.00 18,374,000.00 3,388,302.90
Vermont.............................. 13,147,000.00 13,147,000.00 559,083.58
Virginia............................. 33,683,000.00 29,861,000.00 21,240,605.96
Washington........................... 29,917,000.00 27,080,797.47 1,614,935.49
West Virginia........................ 16,792,000.00 14,553,000.00 .......................
Wisconsin............................ 27,985,000.00 27,985,000.00 12,926,737.90
Wyoming.............................. 12,784,000.00 12,784,000.00 149,005.29
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.......................... 1,500,000,000.00 1,411,514,620.91 224,028,615.00
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Verification of Obligation Data in Progress.
FISCAL YEAR 2003 UASI I
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amount Drawn
Grantee Award Amount Obligation Down
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New York City............................................. $24,768,000.00 ................ ................
National Capital Region................................... 18,081,000.00 ................ ................
Los Angeles............................................... 12,422,000.00 ................ ................
Seattle................................................... 11,201,000.00 $1,597,300.00 $65,825.45
Chicago................................................... 10,896,000.00 2,700,000.00 ................
San Francisco............................................. 10,349,000.00 42,000.00 ................
Houston................................................... 8,634,000.00 ................ ................
-----------------------------------------------------
Total............................................... 96,351,000.00 4,339,300.00 65,825.45
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FISCAL YEAR 2003 UASI II
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grantee Award Amount Obligation Amount Drawn Down
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NEW YORK............................. $135,266,607.00 $33,816,652.00 $82,816,652.00
New York City, NY................ 125,000,000.00 ....................... .......................
Buffalo, NY...................... 10,266,607.00 ....................... .......................
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION.............. 42,409,851.00 ....................... .......................
ILLINOIS............................. 29,975,733.00 ....................... .......................
Chicago, IL...................... 29,975,733.00 ....................... .......................
TEXAS................................ 34,165,283.00 963,124.96 7,987.72
Houston, TX...................... 23,766,700.00 ....................... .......................
Dallas, TX...................... 10,398,583.00 ....................... .......................
CALIFORNIA........................... 62,202,490.00 ....................... 134,049.00
Los Angeles, CA.................. 18,874,838.00 ....................... .......................
San Francisco, CA................ 18,587,312.00 ....................... .......................
San Diego, CA.................... 11,359,682.00 ....................... .......................
Sacramento, CA................... 6,912,795.00 ....................... .......................
Long Beach, CA................... 6,467,863.00 ....................... .......................
WASHINGTON........................... 18,186,668.00 600,000.00 13.09
Seattle, WA...................... 18,186,668.00 ....................... .......................
MASSACHUSETTS........................ 16,727,125.00 1,718,408.00 .......................
Boston, MA....................... 16,727,125.00 ....................... .......................
COLORADO............................. 15,568,474.00 ....................... .......................
Denver, CO....................... 15,568,474.00 ....................... .......................
PENNSYLVANIA......................... 21,038,924.00 ....................... .......................
Philadelphia, PA................. 14,215,223.00 ....................... .......................
Pittsburgh, PA................... 6,823,701.00 ....................... .......................
MISSOURI............................. 19,548,603.00 2,466,979.96 365,000.00
St. Louis, MO................... 9,850,142.00 ....................... .......................
Kansas City, MO.................. 9,698,461.00 ....................... .......................
FLORIDA.............................. 18,959,558.00 3,695,318.60 3,296,000.00
Miami, FL........................ 13,184,569.00 ....................... .......................
Tampa, FL........................ 5,774,989.00 ....................... .......................
OHIO................................. 13,859,426.00 202,370.00 7,874.27
Cincinnati, OH................... 7,991,055.00 ....................... .......................
Cleveland, OH.................... 5,868,371.00 ....................... .......................
MICHIGAN............................. 12,272,550.00 ....................... .......................
Detroit, MI...................... 12,272,550.00 ....................... .......................
NEW JERSEY........................... 11,892,942.00 ....................... .......................
Newark, NJ....................... 11,892,942.00 ....................... .......................
ARIZONA.............................. 11,033,467.00 200,000.00 14,469.00
Phoenix, AZ...................... 11,033,467.00 ....................... .......................
MARYLAND............................. 10,900,944.00 2,725,236.00 1,464,126.51
Baltimore, MD.................... 10,900,944.00 ....................... .......................
HAWAII............................... 6,870,891.00 ....................... 1,717,723.00
Honolulu, HI..................... 6,870,891.00 ....................... .......................
OREGON............................... 6,766,108.00 150,000.00 1,151.99
Portland, OR..................... 6,766,108.00 ....................... .......................
LOUISIANA............................ 6,282,661.00 1,570,665.00 .......................
New Orleans, LA.................. 6,282,661.00 ....................... .......................
TENNESSEE............................ 6,071,695.00 30,000.00 .......................
Memphis, TN...................... 6,071,695.00 ....................... .......................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.......................... 500,000,000.00 48,138,754.52 89,825,046.58
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STATE PLANS
Question. States were to submit their plans to the Department by
December 31, 2003. How many State plans were delivered by that date?
How many State plans have now been submitted? How many, and which,
State plans have not yet been approved? In reviewing the plans, what
lessons have been learned about DHS plan requirements and what best
practices have been identified?
Answer. Each State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, and the territories were required to submit their
assessments and strategies by January 31, 2004. Much of how the States
and territories will distribute and utilize Homeland Security Grant
Program funds will be influenced by the results of the State Homeland
Security Assessments and Strategies.
These assessments and strategies are critically important to both
the States and the Federal Government. They provide a wealth of
information regarding each State's vulnerabilities, capabilities, and
future requirements, as well as each State's preparedness goals and
objectives. They provide each State with a roadmap as to how current
and future funding, exercise, training, and other preparedness
resources should be directed and targeted, and they provide the Federal
Government with a better understanding of needs and capabilities.
All assessments and strategies have been received and reviewed or
currently are under review by an intra-DHS review board comprised of
representatives from major Department components. Of those 56
strategies, 53 have been approved by the Department. The remaining
three--Idaho, Northern Marianna Islands, and the District of Columbia--
should be approved soon. ODP officials are continuing to work with
officials from these states and territories to ensure that the
requisite information and changes are made to their strategies.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Ernest F. Hollings
SEAPORT SECURITY IMPLEMENTATION COSTS
Question. The Coast Guard has estimated that the cost of meeting
security mandates from the Maritime Transportation Security Act will be
$1.1 billion initially and then $7.1 billion over the next 10 years.
The deadline for submitting port security plans to the Coast Guard
passed at the end of 2003 and many ports and facilities either turned
in nothing, or submitted reports that the analysis was still pending.
It has been reported that the Coast Guard also does not have the
personnel resources to review and evaluate the assessments when they
are turned in.
Most shipping activity is controlled by State, local and private
sector operations, and the Federal presence is minimum. The ports are
not deep pocketed, and tend to focus all activity on efficiency.
Relying on them as the total source of funding will ensure that we get
weak port security. By way of comparison, this would be like saying at
the Southwest Border, where a rancher's ranch borders the Rio Grande
and the Mexican border; ``we have concerns about illegal immigration
over your land, and we want you to put up gates and fences and conduct
surveillance of your property, and if you don't we will take your ranch
away from you''. While the protection of our border is a shared burden,
the Administration budget proposal does not adequately address it's
obligation.
The cost of securing our seaports is high, yet not impossible to
cover. The Coast Guard has published estimates that the cost will be
over $7 billion over the next 10 years. Why has the administration only
provided $46 million in the budget to meet this need?
Answer. The President's Budget provides $1.9 billion for port
security in the Department of Homeland Security, a 13 percent increase
over the 2004 level.
Within the 2005 total is $1,675 million for Coast Guard port,
waterway, and coastal security activities, including over $100 million
to implement the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA).
The DHS port security total also includes $164 million in U.S.
Customs and Border Protection for the Container Security Initiative and
the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism as well as the $46
million in the Office for Domestic Preparedness for port security
grants.
The Administration's budget request supports the President's
National Strategy for Homeland Security. This strategy provides the
basic framework to mobilize and organize the Nation--Federal, State and
local governments, the private sector, and the American people--in the
complex mission of protecting our homeland.
To date, the Coast Guard has received approximately 97 percent of
the Facility Security Plans that it anticipates receiving in response
to the Federal Maritime Security Regulations that were promulgated
under the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA). The Coast Guard
is currently reviewing these Facility Security Plans with the
assistance of one of the Nation's premier engineering companies, Black
and Veatch. The review process includes three stages that concludes
with an on-site examination to ensure that the security measures
outlined in the plan are appropriate and are being fully implemented.
The Coast Guard has allocated the resources necessary to conduct a full
review of each Facility Security Plan before July 1, 2004 when all
facilities are required to be operating under their approved plans.
The estimated costs of meeting the security mandates from the
Maritime Transportation Security Act do not account for the security
measures that companies have already taken to enhance security. For the
sake of good business practice, or to comply with regulations
promulgated by other Federal and State agencies, many companies have
already made substantial investments to upgrade and improve security of
their operation. We also realize that not every company engaged in
maritime commerce would implement the requirements for increased
security in exactly the same manner. Depending on each company's
choices, some companies could spend much less than what was anticipated
in the regulatory analysis for the MTSA regulations.
The Department fully understands there will be short-term costs,
particularly for many smaller ports or companies with less security
experience. The Coast Guard is fully engaged with the maritime industry
to help alleviate the burden. The Department has also awarded or made
available a total of nearly $500 million in port security grants over
the past 2 years and anticipates convening the fourth round of grants
in spring 2004.
The security requirements of the Maritime Transportation Security
Act were developed with the full cooperation of the private sector. The
implementation of these requirements will complement the Department's
already strong response.
OVERALL COAST GUARD BUDGET REQUEST ONLY 6 PERCENT INCREASE
Question. The Commandant of the Coast Guard testified that the
Coast Guard was on track to restore resources and performance of non-
security missions, such as search and rescue of stranded mariners, to
pre-9/11 levels. However, a draft GAO report (non-public until mid-
March) finds that the resource hours dedicated to the search and rescue
mission search & rescue is down 22 percent from pre-9/11 levels. The
resource hours dedicated to many other non-security missions, such as
fisheries enforcement, living marine resources, and drug interdiction,
are all down as well.
Does this budget really fund the Coast Guard at sufficient levels?
The request is really only a 6 percent increase over what we enacted
last year, if you include the supplementals. Why is Coast Guard getting
so little of the increase when it has so many responsibilities related
to security and non-security missions?
Answer. Yes, the fiscal year 2005 budget request is sufficient to
fund Coast Guard operations. A 6 percent increase is not a fair
comparison since the fiscal year 2004 Coast Guard budget includes
supplemental funding provided for Iraqi Freedom and Hurricane Isabel.
Supplemental appropriations are for specific purposes and are non-
recurring. Therefore, the fiscal year 2005 Coast Guard budget would not
reflect this funding.
While the draft GAO report referenced in this question noted that
that the resource hours for non-homeland security programs decreased,
the report also had the following conclusion: ``The Coast Guard's
performance results--measures used to track each program's annual
progress--generally did not mirror the trends in resource use. Instead,
results for programs GAO reviewed were generally stable or improved
regardless of the resources applied, and nearly all of the programs
that GAO reviewed met their performance targets.'' (Draft GAO-04-043,
March 2004).
Search and Rescue (SAR) is a demand driven mission. While resource
hours for SAR are down, it is due to less distress calls than from lack
of resource hours. Also from the GAO report: ``. . . the search and
rescue program's target for fiscal year 2003 was to save 85 percent of
mariners in distress and the program achieved this goal by saving over
87 percent of them.''
While resource hours are an important measure, the Coast Guard
relies on the judgment of the operation commander to apply available
resources based on the risks in the relevant area of operations. This
flexibility is critical to apply Coast Guard resources to the numerous
missions mandated in Section 888 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
Question. I am hearing reports that the Coast Guard's resource
hours for most non-security missions are still down below pre-9/11
levels. For example, I've heard that the search and rescue mission is
down 22 percent from pre-9/11 levels. What can you tell me about that?
Answer. In fiscal year 2003, search and rescue operational
activity, as reported by cutters, aircraft and boats (ashore) in the
Abstract of Operations (AOPS), was 22 percent lower than pre-9/11
levels. The pre-9/11 level is defined as the annual average of the
eight-quarter period beginning with the 4th quarter of fiscal year 1999
and ending with the 3rd quarter of fiscal year 2001.
The observed decrease in operational activity does not necessarily
reflect reduced readiness or responsiveness. Search and rescue is a
demand-driven mission. As such, a decrease in search and rescue
resource hours is a result of a reduction in the number of distress
calls received. Further, search and rescue operational activity may
also be affected by any number of the following factors:
--The economy--boating activity mirrors the economy's fluctuations.
--Weather patterns and number of severe storms.
--Improved safety equipment onboard vessels.
--Better built craft; modern vessels are more reliable.
--Better communications that prevent false overdue cases.
--Increased use of private towing companies providing non-emergency
assistance.
The Coast Guard continues to respond to all urgent search and
rescue calls.
INTELLIGENCE DISSEMINATION
Question. Section 70113, of the MTSA mandated a single system of
collection and analysis on vessels, cargo, crew, and passengers
entering into the U.S. Maritime intelligence had traditionally been
developed in response to the needs of the U.S. Navy, and the Office of
Naval Investigations (``ONI'') was crucial during World War II as they
were responsible for de-encrypting German and Japanese naval codes.
Later during the Cold War, this agency was charged with the tracking of
Soviet naval assets and submarines. The first efforts in tracking and
monitoring commercial maritime shipping occurred in the 1980's, when
the Coast Guard was brought into the naval intelligence world,
primarily to help track vessels that might be involved in drug running.
The current headquarters for the Maritime Intelligence Center
(``MIC'') located in Suitland, Md, houses Navy and Coast Guard
officials. There were 1,500 Navy officers and about 40 Coast Guard
officers working the unit. Since then, some strides have been taken to
improve the unit, including the formal recognition of the Coast Guard
into the intelligence community, appointment by the Coast Guard of the
first head of Coast Guard intelligence, and a slight increase of
resources. However, much remains to be done in this area, and the
agencies have not cooperated at all to forge a common program. In
response to your concerns about coordination of intelligence, you
earmarked $25 million to TSA, in hope that bringing new money to the
pot might stimulate a more coordinated effort. Given that we only
inspect 2 or 3 percent of our cargo entering into U.S. ports, and good,
coordinated intelligence will be vital.
Mr. Secretary, you mentioned in your testimony that DHS is working
to improve the sharing of intelligence. You have a major issue facing
you in developing a coherent policy that will allow for the
dissemination of intelligence reports to many of the different
personnel involved in Homeland Security. First off, you have to collect
certain information from officials at places like the CIA, or FBI, and
get it presented to your department. Then you have to analyze it and
verify it, and then pass the information out to the people who we can
provide the highest degree of oversight and security. In many cases,
this may be an official who works at a power plant, or is in charge of
a rail terminal, or chemical facility, and who are currently not able
to receive government security information that is classified. In the
case of homeland security many officials that will provide security
will either be from the private sector, or local or State officials.
Even within the Federal Government, and within your Agency, we are
experiencing coordination problems. The Maritime Transportation
Security Act mandated the creation of a single system of information
collection and analysis in order to bring together information on ship
movements, and connect it to information on cargo and shippers, and
information on crew members and passengers to make sure that we have
the best information possible to evaluate risk.
Yet, since the passage of our legislation, there have been no
efforts at all to coordinate this information. In fact, since we passed
the bill, Customs who used to have a presence at the Coast Guard
Maritime Intelligence Center has eliminated its presence, and started
construction of a new cargo intelligence facility. This is ludicrous.
What are you going to do to make sure that the public can receive and
act upon our intelligence, and increase homeland security, and can you
take steps to start to harmonize the own agencies within your
Department?
Answer. The Office of Information Analysis (IA) works in close
connection with the State and Local and Private Sector Directorates
within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in order to provide
timely and valuable threat-related information to the State and local
officials and private sector workforce that protect and provide for our
Nation's people and infrastructure. This involves receiving and acting
on feedback from such individuals, updating and specifying recommended
protective measures, and communicating directly with first responders
and State officials when necessary. Additionally, in an effort to unite
and coordinate Department wide efforts, the Assistant Secretary for
Information Analysis hosts a twice monthly meeting of the intelligence
and operations directors and/or their representatives from each DHS
entity. This meeting is used to coordinate policies and efforts, to
ensure close and consistent communication, and to discuss
recommendations for improvements in information sharing. The Department
has taken preliminary steps to harmonize the intelligence efforts of
its 20 plus separate entities by identifying legacy and new analytic
resources as well as the missions and capabilities of the respective
offices.
The Department of Homeland Security is coordinating information
sharing. The Coast Guard has taken a leadership role within DHS to
ensure that maritime intelligence products are accurate and available
to the DHS Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP)
Directorate and throughout the entire Federal Government. The Coast
Guard Command Center is co-located with the National Response Center
(NRC) sharing threat information and reports of suspicious activities
from the maritime industry and other maritime stakeholders. In
addition, the Coast Guard has provided access to its intelligence
databases, advice to other agencies developing intelligence-shared
architectures, and exchanged intelligence analysts and liaison officers
with other agencies active in the maritime arena. These liaison
officers work with the following organizations: Terrorist Threat
Integration Center, Defense Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Border and Transportation Security, U.S. Navy, IAIP,
National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Drug
Intelligence Center, El Paso Intelligence Center, and Joint
Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism. The Coast Guard and
Navy also continue to build an effective joint intelligence partnership
to enhance maritime domain awareness. The Coast Guard's Intelligence
Coordination Center is co-located with the Office of Naval
Intelligence, which comprises the National Maritime Intelligence Center
(NMIC).
Further, the Coast Guard and Border and Transportation Security
(BTS) have exchanged personnel to enhance data sharing between the CG
Intelligence Coordination Center's COASTWATCH (which analyzes
information from notice of arrival reports on vessels, people, and
certain dangerous cargoes approaching U.S. ports) and BTS' National
Targeting Center (cargo tracking process). Additionally, the Coast
Guard's two Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers are collocated with
the U.S. Navy Shipping coordination Center to exchange Maritime
Homeland Security (HLS) and Homeland Defense (HLD) information.
PASSENGER SCREENING & CHECKPOINT ISSUES
Question. A provision in the fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security
Appropriations bill that was signed into law by President Bush on
October 1, 2003, maintains a cap on TSA's full-time staffing at 45,000
positions. TSA has been trying to meet this employment cap since it was
first imposed, and over the last 6 months has cut more than 6,000
screener positions from its workforce.
Does the employment cap of 45,000 positions in the fiscal year 2004
Homeland Security Appropriations bill provide TSA the flexibility it
needs to devise appropriate staffing levels for individual facilities?
Answer. TSA is managing to keep the workforce under the 45,000 FTE
level by creating a more flexible workforce. TSA is better coordinating
airline schedules and passenger load with staffing needs, is increasing
the proportion of part-time to full-time screeners, and is
strategically using its mobile national screener force to meet seasonal
fluctuations in workload. TSA expects to have a part-time screener
workforce of close to 20 percent by the end of the current fiscal year.
Part-time screeners create additional operational flexibility when
scheduling screeners to satisfy varying levels of demand. As a result
of reducing excess capacity at periods of lower demand, TSA is seeking
to make more FTEs available to the system as a whole during peak
periods.
Question. How will TSA deal with the employment cap as air traffic
returns to more normal traffic growth levels?
Answer. We share Congress' desire to ensure that our screeners are
deployed effectively and efficiently to maximize the safety and
security of the traveling public. TSA will continue to review its
workforce requirements at each airport, considering the number,
location, and balance of full-time and part-time screeners. We will
engage airport operators and air carriers to ensure that growth rates,
changes in flight schedules, and other concerns, such as new technology
that improves screener performance and efficiency, are incorporated
into our planning. As we move forward into the busy summer travel
season, we will gain a better understanding of whether or not screener
staffing levels are adequate for the long term.
Question. Do you believe that this is a situation where budgetary
issues may end up driving operational issues rather than the actual
threat levels?
Answer. Budgetary considerations are not driving decisions on the
level of aviation security provided by our screening operation.
Ensuring adequate operating efficiency on the part of airlines and
airports given the need to maintain high security is a continuing
challenge that TSA will work through as we refine and improve screening
operations.
Question. Would it be more effective for TSA to develop staffing
standards for screeners that are based on ensuring that the average
aviation security-related delay experience by passengers does not
exceed 10 minutes per boarding?
Answer. TSA is in the process of completing work on the development
of staffing standards for each airport based on modeling which include
criteria such as passenger wait times.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
ALL-STATE MINIMUM
Question. I was disappointed that President Bush's proposed budget
for fiscal year 2005 drops the all-state minimum formula, which I
authored, from the State Homeland Security Grant Program. This formula
assures that each State receives a minimum of 0.75 percent of those
grants to help support their first responders' basic preparedness
needs.
Not only would this change result in the loss of millions in
homeland security funding for the fire, police and rescue departments
in small- and many medium-sized states, but also deal a crippling blow
to their efforts to build and sustain their terrorism preparedness.
Mr. Secretary, you and I have often spoken on how to fairly
allocate domestic terrorism preparedness funds to our states and local
communities. I thought we both agreed that fire, police and emergency
medical rescue teams in each State deserve support in achieving the new
homeland security responsibilities the Federal Government demands.
Imagine my surprise, then, when I read in the fiscal year 2005 budget
proposal that the State Homeland Security Grant Program would be
allocated among the states based on population concentrations, critical
infrastructures, and other significant terrorism risk factors, as
determined by you.
Mr. Secretary, does the Bush Administration want to shortchange
rural states, rolling back the hard-won progress we have begun to make
in homeland security by slashing the protections provided to us by the
all-state minimum?
Answer. The provision of homeland security funds to all states and
territories is essential to the Federal, State, and local effort to
enhance national security. I have said consistently that I believe
there should be a minimum level of preparedness across the country. The
language in the President's fiscal year 2005 request for the Department
of Homeland Security recognizes that factors other than a minimum
formula and population should be considered in making overall funding
allocations. The language further states that the Secretary should have
the latitude and discretion to make this determination based on a
number of factors, including population concentrations, critical
infrastructure, and other significant terrorism risk factors.
Terrorism and the threat of terrorist acts are not static, as is
the current formula included in the USA PATRIOT Act. Instead, threats,
risks, and vulnerabilities are fluid and can change based on a number
of factors. The Department of Homeland Security should not be
constrained by a formula and distribution method that does not change
to meet current and future security needs. As you know, each State has
submitted an updated homeland security strategy as a requirement of
receiving and distributing fiscal year 2004 Office for Domestic
Preparedness grant funds. It is the Department's expectation that these
strategies, and periodically updated strategies, will provide
invaluable information to determine appropriate funding levels for all
states--large and small, urban and rural.
The Administration and Congress share the goal of enhancing the
Nation's ability to deter, prevent, respond to, and recover from acts
of terrorism. The Administration firmly supports the notion that
security needs to be improved across the Nation. The Administration,
however, has consistently supported a change in the USA PATRIOT Act
formula so that we can apply more factors than just population to
distributing and expending limited homeland security resources.
Question. Mr. Secretary, would you agree that homeland security is
a national responsibility shared by all states, regardless of size?
Answer. I strongly support the idea that homeland security is a
national responsibility shared by all states, regardless of size. That
is why I firmly believe that there should be a minimum level of
preparedness across the country. Since its creation last year, the
Department has provided more than $8 billion to support and enhance the
security of states and localities. The President's fiscal year 2005
budget request continues this strong support and commitment to the
Nation's emergency prevention and response community. The President's
budget clearly demonstrates the continuing priority placed on homeland
security through requesting $40.2 billion in total new resources for
fiscal year 2005, which is an increase of 10 percent above the
comparable fiscal year 2004 level.
Question. Mr. Secretary, do you agree that each State has basic
terrorism preparedness needs and, therefore, a minimum amount of
domestic terrorism preparedness funds is appropriate for each state?
Answer. I strongly support the idea that homeland security is a
national responsibility shared by all states, regardless of size. That
is why I firmly believe that there should be a minimum level of
preparedness across the country.
Question. Mr. Secretary, would you support a budget supplement
amendment to restore the 0.75 percent minimum to the State Formula
Grants Program, which include the State Homeland Security Grant
Program, the Citizens Corps and the Law Enforcement Terrorism
Prevention Grants Program?
Answer. I strongly support the President's fiscal year 2005 budget
request that provides for additional factors to be considered when
making determinations on how to distribute homeland security funds to
states and localities. While I support the concept behind the PATRIOT
Act--that every State should receive minimum levels of support--I
firmly believe that funding allocations decisions should be based on a
number of other factors not included in the PATRIOT Act formula,
including the presence of critical infrastructure and other significant
risk factors. With the input that the Department is receiving from the
states through their updated homeland security strategies, and with the
more robust intelligence analysis and data collection capabilities
within the Department, the Department will be better able to prioritize
support for your efforts to prevent, prepare for, and respond to
terrorist incidents. The President's fiscal year 2005 request
recognizes this enhanced ability, and provides the Secretary of
Homeland Security the latitude and discretion to determine appropriate
funding levels to the states.
FIRST RESPONDERS
Question. President Bush often says that he wants to ensure that
our State and local first responders receive the resources necessary to
do the job the American public expects them to do.
I find that hard to believe, though, when I read that he proposes
an $805 million, or 18.4 percent, overall cut in funds for Office for
Domestic Preparedness funding programs that directly benefit police,
fire and medical rescue units. The Administration argues this is
justified because it does not believe those funds are ``targeted'' to
homeland security capabilities.
I believe, however, that the current Administration has failed to
make first responders a high enough priority by consistently
underfunding homeland security efforts of every state.
The Hart-Rudman Terrorism Task Force Report argued that our Nation
will fall approximately $98.4 billion short of meeting critical
emergency responder needs through this decade's end if current funding
levels are maintained.
Clearly, the domestic preparedness funds available are still not
enough to protect from, prepare for and respond to future domestic
terrorist attacks anywhere on American soil.
Would you agree, Mr. Secretary, that to be truly protected from,
prepared for and able to respond to future terrorist attacks we should
be looking to increase the funds to our Nation's State and local first
responders, rather than decrease them, as proposed by the President?
Answer. The President's fiscal year 2005 request includes more than
$3.5 billion to support ODP programs and activities. This represents a
$3.3 million increase over the Fiscal year 2004 request. The fiscal
year 2005 request includes funds to continue the Homeland Security
Grant Program which includes the State Homeland Security Program at
$1.4 billion; the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program at $500
million; and the Citizen Corps Program at $50 million. Funds are also
provided for the continuation of the Urban Areas Security Initiative at
$1.4 billion; the Fire Act Program at $500 million; the Emergency
Management Performance Grants at $170 million; as well as for ODP's
training, exercise, and technical assistance efforts.
The continuation of these efforts, and the $3.3 million increase in
ODP's overall request, coupled with the President's request for a 10
percent increase in funding for DHS as a whole, provides ODP, and the
entire Department, with the resources we require to help secure the
Nation from acts of terrorism. The Administration and Department remain
committed to providing our Nation's emergency prevention and response
community the resources they need to continue to secure our Nation from
future acts of terrorism.
FIRE SERVICES
Question. After paying repeated lip service to the great sacrifices
made by our Nation's first responders, last week President Bush
unveiled a budget that cuts total Federal assistance to first
responders by $800 million.
This fiscal year Congress appropriated $4.2 billion to address
first responder and homeland security needs. Despite heightened terror
alerts and multiple studies documenting the pressing needs of the fire
service, the administration has proposed a $3.5 billion package for
fiscal year 2005 that cuts the FIRE ACT and grant programs to State and
local jurisdictions.
Consistent with the President's opposition to using Federal dollars
to hire fire fighters, the budget does not include any funding for the
newly authorized SAFER (Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency
Response) program, which fire departments nationwide argue is critical
to maintaining their commitment to public safety.
The budget also proposes cutting a total of $435 million from first
responder grants to states and other important fire service programs,
including eliminating the $60 million grant program for Urban Search
and Rescue and the $60 million competitive training grant programs. An
additional $20 million has been slashed from the fund for technical
training and national exercises.
Each year since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Congress has
increased President Bush's proposed appropriations to the fire service.
And it is now incumbent upon us to do that again.
Mr. Secretary, this is a time when our Nation needs to support our
communities' firefighters. On September 11th, the Nation saw that the
first on the scene at the World Trade Center were the heroic
firefighters of New York City. Those real-life heroes, 343 of whom gave
the ultimate sacrifice, should remind us of how essential that support
is.
We hear a lot of rhetoric from this Administration about the need
to secure our homeland and keep our Nation safe. It is very unfortunate
that the President has decided not to put his money where his mouth is.
These cuts are unconscionable and lack clear understanding of the many
problems facing our Nation's first responders--especially those serving
in our fire departments.
Aside from rearranging the deck chairs at DHS, how will your budget
plan at least as much money out to our brave firefighters as it did
last year?
Answer. The Department is strongly committed to addressing the
needs of the Nation's first responders. In fiscal year 2005, the DHS
budget request includes $3.6 billion for terrorism and emergency
preparedness grants and assistance. Since March 1, 2003, the Department
has allocated and awarded more than $8 billion in overall grant funding
for States and Territories to enhance the abilities of their first
responders. President Bush is the first president to request funding
for the fire service and the emergency medical services, and the first
to call specifically for funding of the Assistance to Firefighter Grant
Program in his budget. When the 2004 grant process is completed, DHS
will have distributed almost $2 billion to more than 20,000 local fire
departments, and the President's fiscal year 2005 Budget has proposed
another $500 million. From fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2004,
the Administration as a whole has approved or requested more than $17
billion for State and local fire departments, law enforcement, public
health biodefense, and emergency response. In addition, the Bush
Administration has trained more than 700,000 first responders since
September 11, 2001.
IMMIGRATION
Question. The President's budget proposes a 40 percent cut in the
amount of directly appropriated funds for the Bureau of Citizenship and
Immigration Services (CIS), from the nearly $235 million appropriated
for the current year to $140 million for fiscal year 2005.
You mention in your written testimony the President's guest worker
proposal. If Congress approves such a guest worker plan, it would
drastically increase the workload of CIS. Why is the President
proposing a 40 percent cut in an agency whose workload he wants to
increase dramatically?
Answer. The President's fiscal year 2005 Budget is not proposing a
cut in the USCIS budget. In fact, the President's budget includes a
$300 million increase over last years levels, including an additional
$60 million in discretionary funding towards backlog reduction efforts
aimed at achieving a 6-month processing time for all immigration
benefit applications by fiscal year 2006.
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget reflects the current
proposal recently adopted by USCIS to adjust its fee schedule through
the rulemaking process. This fee adjustment includes amounts for
administrative support services ($155 million) previously funded
through appropriated funds (tax dollars). Thus, this proposal has no
impact on the USCIS budget except for the fact that the funding source
for these services will be by way of fees versus tax dollars. With the
exception of the $140 million in appropriated backlog reduction funds,
USCIS will be a wholly fee-funded agency in fiscal year 2005.
Beginning in fiscal year 2002, USCIS has been receiving a total of
$100 million in funds for backlog reduction to achieve the 6-month
processing time. The $100 million is made up of $80 million in
appropriated funds and $20 million in premium processing fees. The
President is proposing a 60 percent increase for backlog reduction
efforts in fiscal year 2005, bringing the total backlog reduction funds
from $100 million to $160 million ($140 million in appropriated funds
and $20 million from the premium processing fees).
Question. Speaking of the guest worker program, I wrote to the
President last month and asked him to submit a legislative proposal to
Congress that would implement his plan. As you know, we have a short
legislative year ahead of us. Why has the President not already
submitted proposed legislation? Will he do so?
Answer. On January 7, 2004, the President announced principles in
creating a new temporary worker program that would match willing
foreign workers with willing U.S. employers when no Americans can be
found to fill the jobs. We look forward to working with Congress to
develop legislation that incorporates the best ideas for the American
worker and our foreign visitors. Through the principles outlined by the
President, the best course to the end goal of opportunity, security,
safety, compassion, jobs and growth can be achieved.
Question. President Bush has promised to reduce the average wait
time for applicants for immigration benefits to 6 months by 2006. In
light of that goal, and the increased burden the President would place
on the CIS through the guest worker program, why does the President's
budget not seek any directly appropriated funds for backlog reduction?
Answer. As answered above, the President is seeking in the fiscal
year 2005 budget a 60 percent increase in the total funds towards
backlog reduction efforts, from $100 to $160 million, including $140
million in appropriated funds. CIS will meet the President's goals no
later than 2006. CIS does not believe that the President's Temporary
Worker Proposal will impact the backlog.
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Question. DHS published a proposed rule on critical infrastructure
information, or CII, on April 15, 2003. What is the current status of
the CII rule?
Answer. The Interim Final Rule establishing the regulations (6 CFR
29) to implement the CII Act of 2002 were published in the Federal
Register for immediate implementation on February 20, 2004. Has DHS
received CII submissions from corporations? If so, how many? How is DHS
handling such information?
Answer. We have not received any submissions under the Interim
Final Rule as of March 1, 2004.
Question. Despite the lack of a final rule on the handling of CII,
are submissions effectively restricted from public disclosure and from
transmittal to other Federal agencies?
Answer. The Interim Final Rule has been published and submissions
meeting all the requirements of the Act and the implementing
regulations (known as Protected Critical Infrastructure Information
(PCII)) are exempt from release under the Freedom of Information Act.
PCII may be shared with other Federal agencies engaged in critical
infrastructure activities authorized under the CII Act and with State
and local governments performing those activities that have signed
agreements with DHS.
Question. Secondly, as I understand it, DHS received numerous
substantive comments on the proposed rule, including many submissions
that raised concerns with the draft rule. If substantive changes are
made, based either upon these comments or other reasons, will DHS issue
a new proposed rule before finalizing this controversial provision?
Answer. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was published for comment
on April 20, 2003. A total of 117 comments were received. Based on
these comments the draft regulation was revised and an Interim Final
Rule was published for immediate implementation on February 20, 2004.
DHS issued an Interim Final Rule to provide a framework necessary to
receive voluntarily provided Critical Infrastructure Information and
protect it from public disclosure, while allowing the Department to
adapt as program operations evolve. The Department has asked for
additional comments on the Interim Final Rule by May 20, 2004. These
comments will help DHS determine whether possible supplemental
regulations are needed as experience is gained in implementing the CII
Act of 2002.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Harkin
Question. I have heard from the Iowa State Secretary of Agriculture
that the Department of Homeland Security is no longer funding certain
veterinary positions assigned to monitoring for animal diseases that
USDA used to fund before the funding stream was switched to the
Department of Homeland Security. As the recent case of a BSE-positive
cow in Washington showed, our State Departments of Agriculture are our
front lines of defense against animal diseases, whether intentionally
or naturally caused, and our veterinarians are our calvary. These
positions, which were funded through a USDA grant program, provide
States with essential animal disease preparedness and response
capability. Many of the postions funded through the program are
essential to states bioterrorism planning and response efforts as well.
Why did your department cease funding for these positions when the
authority for the program was switched as part of the Homeland Security
Act? How are States supposed to make up for the loss in animal disease
monitoring capabilities? Are you considering reinstating the program?
Answer. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is responsible
for the monitoring for animal diseases. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) is responsible for conducting document verifications of
certain restricted meats and for ensuring compliance with entry
requirements for animals and animal by-products set by USDA. USDA
retained authority for the animal disease-monitoring program and
veterinary positions referred to in the question. DHS has no
involvement in the funding of these positions. This question would be
best directed to USDA.
Question. The Emergency Management Grant Program (EMPG) was
transferred with FEMA to the Department of Homeland Security. It is the
grant program that funds the basic emergency management functions of
State and government. This is the money Ellen Gordon and her team use
to prepare for hurricanes, floods, hazardous materials spills,
accidents, or any other kind of disaster.
When EMPG was moved to DHS, the Bush Administration tried to merge
it into the new terrorism First Responder grant program. States argued
to keep it separate because they did not want their broad emergency
response functions shifting to a terrorism-only focus. Congress agreed
and the program has been kept separate--and has been fully funded.
In his fiscal year 2005 budget request, Bush proposes to cut it by
5 percent--but, more importantly, to cap personnel costs at 25 percent
of the grant award.
If that were to be endorsed by the Congress, Iowa would lose one-
third of our entire emergency management function and our local
governments would lost between 20-30 percent of their staff.
Exercises planned would have to be canceled. The critical
coordination between our traditional emergency management planning and
our post-9/11 planning would be severely impacted. This is not the time
to be cutting staff in this area.
I am very concerned with the requirement in the budget request that
only a certain percentage of the Emergency Management Performance Grant
program can be used to pay for personnel. As you know, this is the
program which undergirds our very critical need to be prepared for any
kind of disaster, whether terrorism, floods, hurricanes, earthquakes,
etc. While it is never popular to pay for the services of staff, these
staff do the work of coordinating our response plans and their work is
very, very critical to us (particularly as the terrorism grants are
threatening to shift to urban areas). Can you tell me the rationale
behind this change and how you believe it will impact preparedness in
our communities?
Answer. The Administration's fiscal year 2005 request for the
Emergency Management Planning Grants is $170 million, which is higher
than any previous request for this program. The funds will be used to
assist the development, maintenance, and improvement of State and local
emergency management capabilities, specifically to build local capacity
for homeland security needs.
As you note, though, the request does cap the amount that states
can use for salaries, thereby significantly increasing the amount of
funds available for planning, training and exercises. The request
shifts the emphasis to Federal support for planning while properly
aligning responsibility for staffing and salaries with the states and
local governments. The Administration and Department have consistently
supported the idea that homeland security is a shared responsibility
between Federal and State and local governments. Additionally, it is
important to remember that we are operating in a fiscal and security
environment where we must ensure maximum security benefits are derived
from every security dollar. To do that, we must be able to take a new
look at the way in which we allocate resources, including sharing
financial responsibility with our State and local partners.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Herb Kohl
DISASTER MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TEAMS
Question. Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, or DMATs, can provide
states with valuable extra capacity in the case of a disaster or
terrorist attack. These volunteer teams act as important reserves
without costing the taxpayers a great deal of money. However, neither
Wisconsin nor our neighbor Illinois has a DMAT. This is especially
troubling considering how many people live between Milwaukee and
Chicago. The State of Wisconsin is behind the effort to create a new
team, but I hear the Department of Homeland Security has put a stop to
creating new teams because of some problems with current teams. If
teams are not meeting requirements then eliminate those teams, but in
areas without a team, Homeland Security needs to move forward. While
the National Guard used to be an option when states faced a crisis,
Guard Units may not be available now with the war in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Don't these teams provide additional capability at a reasonable
cost? Will the Department reconsider its moratorium on new Disaster
Medical Assistance Teams?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS') National
Disaster Medical System (NDMS) has received a number of inquiries over
the past year from communities wanting to start new Disaster Medical
Assistance Teams (DMATs). DHS is pleased at the level of interest and
enthusiasm supporting the Nation's capacity for health and medical
response during times of disasters. Rather than adding teams at this
time, DHS is focused on strengthening existing teams to enhance depth
of membership and rapidness of response under the new national response
plan and incident management system, as required in HSPD-5.
The Department will consider the creation of new NDMS teams once it
has reviewed the strategic capability and locations of the existing
teams, and it has brought the teams to full operational capability.
NDMS teams provide significant enhancement to a region's medical
capacity. The costs of developing, supplying, training, and maintaining
these teams are significant. The Department feels these costs are
reasonable for the benefit provided by these emergency reserve medical
assets.
In the event of a public health emergency, the Milwaukee and
Chicago region could be served by any of the 110 teams currently within
the NDMS. This geographic area is within a 12-hour ground response
radius for five existing Operational DMATs including MI-1, MO-1, OH-1,
and OH-5. In addition, two Developmental DMAT teams (MN-1, KY-1)
bordering this area could be used to support a response in the
Milwaukee and Chicago area.
During this moratorium, NDMS' recommendation to communities
interested in developing DMATs has been to support NDMS teams already
within their states or regions. While this is not always possible, many
of these requests come from communities within states that already have
DMATs. When the NDMS office makes such a recommendation, it also
ensures that the existing DMAT leadership in the area is notified.
There are other strategies for motivated communities besides the
creation of DMATs. The Medical Reserve Corps through HHS' Office of the
Surgeon General may be a model to help focus the community's motivation
into developing a coordinated medical response asset. In addition,
there are other volunteer organizations, such as the American Red Cross
and National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, that welcome
the support of health care professionals.
SECURITY IN THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR
Question. Secretary Ridge, the President has unveiled a new food
and agriculture defense initiative. This new effort puts you in charge
of organizing security with USDA and the FDA.
I would like to hear your thoughts on how to coordinate these
activities and how protection of food and agriculture rank in your
overall perspective of homeland security threats. I ask this because
you now have responsibility for the Plum Island animal disease
laboratory in New York. Prior to last year, Plum Island was funded
through the Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee, where I am Ranking
Member. As part of the President's fiscal year 2004 request, more than
$6 million of USDA funding for research and diagnostic activities were
transferred to your Department from USDA and agreements were supposed
to be reached to reimburse USDA employees for that work. I understand
those agreements have not yet been completed.
Last year I expressed some concerns about transferring agricultural
programs out of USDA. In fact, last May, when Secretary Veneman
appeared before the Agriculture Subcommittee, I asked her about these
transfers and she agreed that there was a concern among livestock
producers that their priorities would not be reflected in programs
conducted by your Department. She did say that USDA and DHS would work
together to develop a research and diagnostics program to meet the
needs of both Departments. In report language to accompany the fiscal
year 2004 appropriations bill for your Department, you were instructed
to report to the Congress by January 15th on a comprehensive strategy
to combat agroterrorism.
What is the status of that report, and how can you assure farmers
and ranchers across America that your Department is better suited to
combat agroterrorism than USDA? How do you intend to engage USDA in
this strategy?
Answer. DHS is committed to enhancing the Nation's agricultural
security by complementing the mission of USDA as the sector-specific
agency for agriculture [and USDA and the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) for food security] and bringing a new sense for urgency and
investments to enhance the Nation's capability to anticipate, prevent,
detect, respond to, and recover from the intentional introduction of
foreign animal disease.
The report requested by Congress, 'A National Strategy for
Agricultural Biosecurity' builds on the strengths of each agency to
develop comprehensive preparedness and response capabilities. USDA's
Agricultural Research Service (ARS) will continue its basic research
and early discovery work, USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service (APHIS) its diagnostics (including the Foreign Animal Disease
Diagnostic Laboratory), while DHS will invest in advanced development
research to expedite the transition of capabilities to operational end-
users in USDA and DHS. DHS will also provide capability for certified
forensics analysis in support of law enforcement.
The report was drafted by a working group of senior officials and
scientists from the respective agencies (DHS, USDA APHIS and ARS), with
representation of key industry groups. The draft report is complete and
is currently undergoing final interdepartmental reviews prior to
transmittal to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees.
This report and the DHS/USDA strategic partnership are executed in
accordance with the Homeland Security Act of 2002; fiscal year 2004
appropriations for DHS and USDA; as well as Homeland Security
Presidential Directive/HSPD-9 ``Defense of United States Agriculture
and Food'' and HSPD-7 ``Critical Infrastructure Identification,
Prioritization, and Protection,'' both of which delineate the roles of
sector-specific agencies.
As part of DHS's extensive commitment to agricultural security, it
is also establishing two University Homeland Security Centers (HS-
Centers); one in foreign animal and zoonotic diseases, and one in post-
harvest food security. These new HS-Centers were awarded in April 2004.
Additionally, DHS is coordinating with USDA on a review team for high-
consequence reference scenarios for strategic planning for DHS's
programs and activities on biological and chemical countermeasures.
Finally, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred the
facilities and liabilities' of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center to
DHS from USDA. A working group of program staff and scientists from the
two departments have worked closely on a variety of aspects of this new
collaboration including enhancing the operations, facilities and
security on the island, developing a joint R&D plan for foreign animal
diseases which emphasizes foot-and-mouth disease and roadmaps for
assays and diagnostics, and vaccines and anti-virals.
Question. What is the status of completing an agreement with USDA
for reimbursement for research and diagnostic work at Plum Island?
Answer. The statement of work for reimbursement of research and
diagnostic work at Plum Island Animal Disease Center for fiscal year
2004 has been agreed to by DHS and USDA. The reimbursable agreement is
currently being implemented at Plum Island Animal Disease Center.
Question. The President's request for the Food and Agriculture
Defense Initiative includes a $5 million item for research at DHS. What
will be the focus of this research and where will it be conducted?
Answer. As summarized above, one of the reference scenarios is
focused on bulk food contamination and is based on one of a series of
food vulnerability studies conducted by the Homeland Security Council
(HSC) Interagency Food Working Group during fiscal year 2003-fiscal
year 2004. These studies form the basis for the design and
implementation of food shields' to protect critical central food
processing nodes in the production system.
DHS is currently funding an end-to-end systems study for the
reference scenario on bulk food contamination, and this study will be
followed in fiscal year 2005 by a design for a food sensor,' a
requisite next step in the implementation of a food shield' based on
requirements identified in the systems study. The food sensor funding
is included in the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request.
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
Question. The Homeland Security Act established a Directorate of
Information Analysis within the Department of Homeland Security. In
July 2003 there were only 53 analysts and liaison officials within that
Directorate, with plans to triple that number. President Bush has since
created the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC--pronounced ``T-
Tick''), which includes the CIA's Counterterrorist Center (CTC) and the
FBI's Counterterrorism Division. This did not relieve DHS of its
intelligence analysis responsibilities, but TTIC's assigned
responsibilities are very similar to those of DHS.
In your opinion, does the creation of multiple organizations to
analyze terrorist-related intelligence thwart the initial goal of the
Department of Homeland Security, that is to centralize this function
and facilitate cooperation and information sharing among the various
intelligence related agencies? If not, what is being done to preserve
this goal that is not immediately apparent from the fractured structure
of these functions? Would it be better to consolidate these functions
in one place, either within DHS or within the CIA in the form of TTIC?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security, as stated in the
Homeland Security Act, is singularly focused on the protection of the
American homeland. DHS/IAIP independently analyzes threat-related
information it receives from the entire Intelligence Community, other
DHS entities, and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center and issues
warning products to State and local officials and the private sector
after matching terrorist threats and capabilities with our Nation's
vulnerabilities.
In contrast, the TTIC is responsible for the analysis of all
international terrorism threat information, whether collected
domestically or abroad. TTIC uses this information to create an overall
threat picture and to issue reports to the appropriate IC members.
Accordingly, the TTIC is vital to serve the entire Intelligence
Community. While TTIC is an essential resource upon which DHS relies to
complete its mission, they are also integral to completing the mission
of other entities within the Intelligence Community.
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANTS
Question. I am also concerned about the Administrations cuts and
policy changes to the Emergency Management Performance Grants. Not only
is there $9 million less than last year, but the $170 million that is
included in the President's budget will no longer fund all hazard
planning. This is a real disappointment for county emergency managers
in my state. They used these funds to help them prepare for terrorist
attacks as well as natural disasters like floods and tornados. A
reduction in funding, especially when adjusted for inflation, could
force some counties to reduce staff as well as leave them unprepared
for non-terrorism catastrophes.
Why did the Administration reduce these funds, and why did they
prohibit these funds from being used for all hazard planning?
Answer. The Administration's fiscal year 2005 request for the
Emergency Management Planning Grants is $170 million, which is higher
than any previous request for this program. The funds will be used to
assist the development, maintenance, and improvement of State and local
emergency management capabilities, with the specific goal of building
capabilities for homeland security needs.
As you note, though, the request does cap the amount that states
can use for salaries, thereby significantly increasing the amount of
funds available for planning, training and exercises. The request
shifts the emphasis to Federal support for planning while properly
aligning responsibility for staffing and salaries with the states and
local governments. The Administration and Department have consistently
supported the idea that homeland security is a shared responsibility
between Federal and State and local governments. Additionally, it is
important to remember that we are operating in a fiscal and security
environment where we must ensure maximum security benefits are derived
from every security dollar. To do that, we must be able to take a new
look at the way in which we allocate resources, including sharing
financial responsibility with our State and local partners.
FLIGHT CANCELLATIONS
Question. Most of the flights stopped were from British Airways and
Air France, but every day airlines based in more volatile regions land
in this country. We never hear about planes from Morocco or Pakistan
not being allowed to land. Are airlines that fly from the Middle East
and Africa somehow safer than those that fly from Paris and London?
Answer. Flight cancellations during the holiday period were based
upon specific intelligence that warranted such action. Appropriate
information was shared with our foreign counterparts and foreign air
carriers, which sometimes led to their decisions to cancel flights and/
or implement enhanced security measures. These actions were not
necessarily tied to the Nations from which the flights originated. In
principle and practice, DHS does not recommend or take security actions
based solely upon the origin or destination of a flight independent of
specific information that may pertain to that location.
Question. Are the cancellations a result of limited intelligence
cooperation between the United States, Britain and France making it
harder to determine who is on these planes? Or is the problem exactly
the opposite, we are getting good information about European flights,
but it is difficult to figure out if a threat is flying on a plane from
Islamabad?
Answer. As I indicated above, flight cancellations over the holiday
period were based on specific intelligence that warranted such action,
and were examples of good intelligence cooperation. The cancellation of
these particular flights is unrelated to the question of how robust our
capacity is to assess the security of flights originating in other
parts of the world.
Question. Are flights out of these major airports more attractive
to terrorists than flying from Karachi or Rabat? Is there something our
European allies are NOT doing that makes these good targets, or do we
just not have a good way of monitoring what might be going on in other
countries?
Answer. These cancellations were not based on an assessment of
security practices at European airports, which are generally fully
compliant with ICAO standards and deemed to be of high quality. Again,
during the holiday period, DHS received specific information and shared
it appropriately with French and British allies, resulting in decisions
being made to cancel these flights. DHS and our European allies
continue to work in close collaboration to share best practices and
enhance aviation security.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patty Murray
Question. Mr. Secretary, I agree that CSI and C-TPAT are important
pieces of our cargo security system but they aren't going to do the job
alone. In fact, they have significant issues that would benefit from
Operation Safe Commerce moving forward.
You may be aware of a recent GAO study entitled, ``Preliminary
Observations on Efforts to Target Security Inspections of Cargo
Containers.''
This report is clearly critical of the lack of methodology
incorporated in these Customs and Border Protection initiatives.
The report states that--quote--``while CBP's strategy incorporates
some elements of risk management, it does not include other key
elements, such as a comprehensive set of assessments that experts told
GAO are necessary to determine risk and the types of responses
necessary to mitigate that risk.''
The report says ``CBP's targeting system does not include a number
of recognized modeling practices, such as subjecting the system to peer
review, testing and validation.''
The report goes on further to say that--quote--``CBP does not have
a national system for reporting and analyzing inspection statistics and
the data provided to us by ports were generally not available by risk
level, were not uniformly reported, were difficult to interpret, and
were incomplete.''
Mr. Secretary, for the sake of our Nation's security it is
imperative that we are able to learn from all of our port security
programs.
We must tie them together and rapidly institute a large-scale,
operational cargo security program in the United States. And, for the
sake of our economy, we must get this right.
What are your reactions to this report?
Answer. In general, GAO's report ``Challenges Remain in the
Targeting of Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection,'' is
constructive, and CBP will be initiating several corrective actions in
fiscal year 2005 to address issues identified by GAO. However, GAO's
assertion that CBP does not ``incorporate all key elements of a risk
management framework and recognized modeling practices'' is not
accurate. Although CBP characterizes its approach to risk management
for terrorism as a ``layered approach,'' the fundamental components of
this approach can also be characterized within GAO's risk management
framework. The following provides a brief discussion of the
relationships between the Automated Targeting System (ATS) and several
CBP initiatives within GAO's risk management framework to demonstrate
the fulfillment of the framework's key elements.
The key elements of GAO's Risk Management Framework are:
--Threat Assessment
--Criticality Assessment
--Vulnerability Assessment
--Risk Assessment
--Risk Characterization
--Risk Mitigation
--Monitoring and Evaluation
--Repetition of the Risk Management Process
CBP and GAO's Risk Management Framework
--Threat (event) Assessment.--CBP utilizes incoming intelligence from
various sources that include the U.S. Intelligence community to
identify threats. These threats include general assessments as
discussed in GAO's report (e.g. vulnerability of supply chains
and containerized cargo) as well as classified, specific
threats regarding individuals. Collection of these threat
assessments is an ongoing activity. Also, targeting is
integrated into CBP's Treasury Enforcement Communication System
(TECS) enforcement database to ensure that specific
intelligence is integrated with targeting activity. Also,
incoming intelligence is evaluated by the National Targeting
Center to develop targeting strategies appropriate to the risk.
Responses to certain threats may be expanded to include
additional targeting rules for ATS, lookouts, and/or cargo
targeting criteria.
--Criticality Assessment.--As GAO indicates, criticality assessments
``help provide a basis for prioritizing protection relative to
limited resources'' for a critical asset. With respect to
``national security, economic activity, and public safety''
this critical asset is the flow of trade in both a free and
secure manner. This goal is fundamental to CBP's operations.
CBP cannot inspect all cargo coming into the United States;
however, the organization can and does prioritize shipments by
risk and does inspect all high-risk cargo (mandatory
inspections through threshold targeting) coming into the United
States. While ATS provides a system for prioritizing and
targeting high-risk cargo through transactional targeting
rules, C-TPAT provides a programmatic mechanism for identifying
relatively low risk supply chains and allows CBP to direct
resources to other higher-risk entities.
--Vulnerability Assessment.--As indicated in GAO's report, there has
been extensive work regarding vulnerability assessments
concerning maritime assets (specifically containerized cargo),
and other agencies that contributed to this work include the
FBI, CIA, academic, think tank and business organizations. As
discussed extensively with GAO, CBP's layered approach to this
vulnerability includes initiatives such as C-TPAT, Non-
Intrusive Inspection Technology (NII), Container Security
Initiative (CSI), and ATS targeting.
--Risk Assessment.--GAO defines risk assessments to ``include
scenarios under which two or more risks interact creating
greater or lesser impacts; they also include the filtering and
ranking or prioritization of risky events.'' Where an ``event''
can be a shipment, ATS utilizes a battery of rules to vet and
prioritize the shipment transactions by scoring the different
variables of each transaction and ranking/prioritizing the
transactions by total scores for each transaction. To the
extent that risk assessments might also be in the form of
intelligence reports, this information is also integrated into
targeting through the development of specific rules, lookouts,
cargo criteria, TECS records, and the performance of targeting
``sweeps'' by the National Targeting Center when warranted.
--Risk Characterization.--GAO defines risk characterization as
``designating risk on a scale, for example low, medium, or
high.'' As defined, risk characterization is inherent to the
ATS targeting program as a decision support tool that generates
risk scores to prioritize cargo for inspection.
--Risk Mitigation.--GAO indicates that risk mitigation may involve
risk acceptance, risk avoidance, risk reduction, and risk
sharing. In terms of risk acceptance (taking no action) and
risk sharing, CBP minimizes inspections through the C-TPAT
Program. A certain level of risk acceptance is also inherent to
targeting higher risk cargo for inspection and not inspecting
lower risk cargo. In terms of risk avoidance (taking action to
avoid activities that involve risk), CBP increases inspections
through the use of NII (e.g. x-rays and radiation pagers)
instead of increasing time consuming physical exams that would
limit the number of shipments that can be inspected and
increase vulnerabilities.
CBP is also actively engaged in activities identified by GAO's
systems approach to risk mitigation: personnel (e.g. training),
processes, technology, infrastructure, and governance. ATS
training classes are being implemented on an ongoing basis (Sea
Cargo) and with the deployment of new ATS threshold targeting
rule sets (e.g. Northern Border Truck, Southern Border Truck,
and Rail). The Manifest Review Unit (MRU) Handbook will be
updated in fiscal year 2005 to address process and governance
issues. For technology, the additional development of software
and acquisition of hardware upgrades is ongoing. For
infrastructure, certain ports analyze their local flow of
traffic for improved efficiency and some are receiving upgrades
to physical examination resources.
--Monitoring and Evaluation.--A key element to CBP's ability to
monitor and evaluate the performance of targeting will be the
ability to accurately capture findings. As GAO pointed out, CBP
is hampered by non-integrated sub-systems for recording
findings. The full implementation of the ATS findings module
will provide CBP with a single place for recording the
findings, increase the accuracy of the findings, and facilitate
reporting, monitoring and evaluation.
With respect to peer review, CBP is actively working with other
Government agencies such as FDA and USDA as well as foreign
government agencies such as the Canadian Customs and Revenue
Administration (CCRA) to further develop targeting concepts.
CBP hopes to expand on these collaborative efforts in fiscal
year 2005. With respect to testing and validation, CBP will
also be conducting internal security exercises that test our
layered enforcement in fiscal year 2005.
--Repetition of the Risk Management Process.--The activities
previously described are ongoing and fulfill the ``loop'' of
assessments, mitigation, and monitoring and evaluation.
In conclusion, while CBP can always do a better job of fulfilling
and expanding upon all of the key elements of the risk management
framework described by GAO, CBP does actively engage in activities that
fulfill these key elements.
CBP and GAO's Modeling Practices
The following provides a brief discussion of CBP's initiatives in
terms of the issues identified with respect to ATS development and
``recognized modeling practices.''
--Conducting external peer review.--As indicated earlier in this
document, CBP is actively working with other Government
agencies such as FDA and USDA as well as foreign government
agencies such as the Canadian Customs and Revenue
Administration (CCRA) to further develop targeting concepts.
CBP hopes to expand these collaborative efforts in fiscal year
2005.
--Incorporating additional types of information.--CBP agrees with the
premise that ``linkages'' to other sources of information can
enhance targeting. Linkages between manifest and entry
information to TECS records represents such an effort.
Recently, FDA information was integrated into CBP's ATS system,
and CBP is actively working with USDA to integrate some of
their data into ATS. Other large, commercial sources of
information such as Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) are also being
explored but will require a lengthy cost-benefit analysis,
proof of concept, and significant budget procurement. Another
effort involves the procurement of container tracking
information.
--Testing and validating through simulated terrorist events.--As
discussed with GAO, ABC News did conduct their own ``test'' of
importing a shipment of radioactive material, and ATS did
successfully target this shipment for mandatory inspection. CBP
will be conducting its own ``red team'' simulations in fiscal
year 2005.
--Using random inspections to supplement targeting.--As discussed
earlier, the stratified random sample of CBP's Compliance
Measurement Program will be utilized to further evaluate the
performance of the ATS targeting.
DATA INTEGRITY ISSUES
Question. The GAO Report also made the following conclusion: ``CBP
does not have a national system for reporting and analyzing inspection
statistics and the data provided to us by ports were generally not
available by risk level, were not uniformly reported, were difficult to
interpret, and were incomplete''.
Currently, CBP has a number of non-integrated subsystems through
which it reports its examination findings. CBP's effort to ensure data
consistency for reporting purposes and analysis is hampered by these
multiple subsystems and CBP is addressing this issue through the
implementation of a ``Findings Module'' within its Automated Targeting
System. This module, which will be completed in fiscal year 2004, will
provide CBP with a single place for recording and retrieving its
examination findings, which will increase the accuracy of those
findings and facilitate CBP's reporting, monitoring and evaluation
activities.
Please explain why the Administration would abandon Operation Safe
Commerce--a program specifically designed to test various cargo-
security techniques, and the analysis associated with them, to create a
true container security program for our country?
Answer. The President's fiscal year 2005 budget request for DHS
includes $1.9 billion for port security activities, including $126
million for the Container Security Initiative (CSI). The funding for
this initiative, which is $25 million more than the fiscal year 2004
level of funding, focuses on pre-screening cargo before it enters the
United States. The first phase of CSI focused on implementing the
program at the top 20 foreign ports, which ship approximately two-
thirds of the containers to the United States. Phase II expands the
program to additional ports based on volume, location, and strategic
concerns. Phase III further increases security at the highest risk
ports.
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget request also includes $50
million for the development of the next generation of screening
devices, which can be used at the Nation's port facilities.
Additionally, the budget request includes $64.2 million to enhance
land-based detection and monitoring activities between ports. Further,
the budget request includes $46 million for port security grants to be
administered by the Office for Domestic Preparedness and more than $1.4
billion for the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI). The UASI
program, among other things, can be used to support security
enhancements at our Nation's port facilities.
The Department firmly believes that these resources will allow us
to properly and effectively enhance security at our Nation's port
facilities.
--Operation Safe Commerce.--A program specifically designed to test
various cargo-security techniques, and the analysis associated
with them, to create a true container security program for our
country.
DHS is not abandoning Operation Safe Commerce. As you know, OSC is
a collaborative pilot effort between the Federal Government, the three
largest U.S. container load centers (Los Angeles/Long Beach, Seattle/
Tacoma, and New York/New Jersey), private industry, and the maritime
community, to develop and share best practices for the secure and
expeditious movement of containerized cargo. OSC's goal is to serve as
a test bed to examine methods to increase supply chain security,
protect the global supply chain, and facilitate the flow of commerce.
The Administration continues to administer OSC in fiscal year 2004 as a
multi-agency program with participants from the Departments of Homeland
Security, Transportation, State, Commerce, and Justice. An Executive
Steering Committee (ESC) was formed to provide guidance for OSC. The
ESC is co-chaired by the Transportation Security Administration, Bureau
of Customs and Border Protection, and the Department of Transportation.
Congress has provided $75 million for this program over a 2-year
period to conduct three very robust and comprehensive pilots at the
selected locations. The expected test period is 1 year. At this point
in time, Seattle/Tacoma has progressed furthest. There, the first
container shipment tracked by the program is expected to arrive by the
end of March 2004. First arrivals are expected in April 2004, for the
Port of New York/New Jersey and in June 2004, for the Port of Los
Angeles/Long Beach. As we complete each of the pilots, we will
ascertain the lessons learned and whether program elements are
applicable to ports across the country. We are hopeful that any
positive results of OSC will eventually be adopted by ports, cargo
companies and, where appropriate, incorporated into both existing and
future cargo security efforts by DHS and international governments.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Cochran. Our next hearing on the budget request for
the Department of Homeland Security will be held on Thursday,
February 26, in room 124 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building.
At that time, the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness
and Response, Mr. Michael Brown, will be here to discuss the
budget for the programs under his jurisdiction.
Until then, the subcommittee stands in recess.
[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., Tuesday, February 10, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday,
February 26.]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:20 a.m., in room SD-124, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran, (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Cochran, Specter, Byrd, and Murray.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Office of the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL D. BROWN, UNDER SECRETARY,
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
DIRECTORATE
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ARLEN SPECTER
Senator Specter [presiding]. Good morning, ladies and
gentlemen.
I was attending a Judiciary Committee executive session
upstairs where we are trying to move forward on the
confirmation of many judges, when I heard that this hearing
lacked a Republican. It should not be too hard to find a
Republican in the Senate complex on a Thursday morning. And
then I received a summons from Senator Byrd. Now, a summons
from Senator Byrd is not quite like a subpoena.
But it is close. And you know what happens when you do not
respond to a subpoena. There is a bench warrant, and that could
be very serious. So, I left the Judiciary Committee exec room
to convene this hearing. I am going to have to return shortly.
Today this subcommittee will continue the review of the
fiscal year 2005 budget request for the Department of Homeland
Security. We are pleased to welcome the Under Secretary of the
Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate, Mr. Mike
Brown. We will review this year's budget request and work with
you, Mr. Brown.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Homeland security is obviously a top priority for this
country, reflected in the President's budget request for an
increase of 9.7 percent, whereas the discretionary funding got
only a half of 1 percent, defense some 7 percent.
Without objection, the full statement, which had been
prepared for Senator Cochran will be included in the record,
and we now turn to your testimony.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Thad Cochran
The hearing will come to order.
Today we continue our review of the fiscal year 2005 budget request
for the Department of Homeland Security.
I am pleased to welcome to this hearing the Under Secretary of the
Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate, Mike Brown.
Our Committee will work hard to provide the funds this Directorate
needs to carry out its responsibilities and perform its mission
successfully.
We thank you for submitting a copy of your statement in advance of
this hearing. It will be made a part of the record, and we invite you
to make any comments you think would be helpful to the committee's
understanding of the budget request.
Now, I will yield to Senator Byrd and other Sentors who may wish to
make opening statements.
Senator Specter. Excuse me. The custom is to call on the
ranking member, the ranking member of the full committee,
former President Pro Tempore, chairman of the full committee,
and so many titles. If I went through them, you would not have
any time left, Mr. Brown.
Senator Byrd.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD
Senator Byrd. Thank you. America has done some great
things. It put a man on the moon, brought him back to earth
safely again, but it has never been able to produce a truly
good loudspeaker system.
I appreciate your kind remarks about me. Plato thanked the
gods for having been born a man, for having been born a Greek,
and for having lived in the age of Socrates. I thank the gods
for permitting me to live in the same age and serve at the same
time in the United States Senate with a chairman and also a
Pennsylvania Senator on this committee who presided over this
committee with such dignity and skill. I thank Senator Specter
for his remarks.
Mr. Chairman, the Senator from Pennsylvania had turned to
me for a statement. May I proceed?
Senator Cochran [presiding]. Please.
Senator Byrd. Welcome, Mr. Brown. No relation to Jimmy
Brown, the newsboy of this town, but a good man nevertheless.
In April of last year, when you testified before this
subcommittee, I asked you how Congress could be sure that the
agencies merged into the new Department of Homeland Security
with specific missions unrelated to homeland security, such as
preventing and responding to natural disasters, would have the
resources to accomplish their missions. In your response, you
assured the committee that FEMA would continue--and I quote--
``to protect our Nation's institutions from all types of
hazards through a comprehensive, risk-based, all-hazards
approach.''
ALL-HAZARDS EMERGENCY PLANNING
In your written testimony today, you stress a continued
commitment to all-hazards emergency planning, but frankly, as I
see it, the President's policies ignore that commitment. I will
repeat that again. As I see it, the President's policies ignore
that commitment.
States and local communities look to FEMA to provide the
resources and expertise that they need to meet a wide range of
challenges. Today, possibly more than ever before, our States
and local communities have to be ready to cope with disasters
such as floods, earthquakes, chemical incidents, disease in our
food supply, and other public health emergencies. Given the
events of 9/11, States and communities must also prepare for
preventing or responding to terrorist attack. And this is why a
focus on all-hazards preparedness is so important.
However, rather than embrace the all-hazards approach to
emergency planning, the President's budget undermines it.
Rather than develop the capacity to respond to a terrorist
attack within the framework of all-hazards planning, the
President's budget, in essence, mandates that State and local
governments give priority to anti-terrorism programs at the
expense of other potential disasters.
TRANSFER OF SEVERAL ALL-HAZARDS PROGRAMS FROM FEMA INTO A NEW OFFICE OF
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT COORDINATION AND PREPAREDNESS
The Administration proposes to transfer several all-hazards
programs out of FEMA and into a new Office of State and Local
Government Coordination and Preparedness. That office's
mandate, as laid out in the Homeland Security Act, is to help
State and local governments effectively combat terrorism.
Under the consolidation proposal announced by the Secretary
on January 26, 2004, and under the President's budget proposal
for fiscal year 2005, emergency management performance grants,
community emergency response team grants, and the metropolitan
medical response system will all be shifted into this newly
expanded office. And yet, this new office does not have the
expertise or the regional staff experienced in all-hazards
planning. FEMA has that expertise.
Yesterday I joined with Representative Martin Sabo, the
ranking member of the House Appropriations Homeland Security
Subcommittee, in sending a letter to Secretary Ridge urging him
not to proceed with the reorganization of the emergency
management performance grants and community emergency response
team programs, along with several Transportation Security
Administration programs.
PROPOSED CUTS TO FIRE GRANTS FUNDING
Furthermore, the administration proposes to cut funding for
fire grants by $246 million and emergency management
performance grants by $9 million and, at the same time, mandate
that States give priority to terrorism preparedness. This is a
squeeze play that States cannot afford.
I will give you a rhetorical question at this point. Where
do these policies leave a small town fire department in West
Virginia or Mississippi, or other rural States, that needs to
purchase breathing apparatus or equipment to deal with a
chemical spill? We have one of the largest chemical complexes
in this country, in the Western Hemisphere as a matter of fact,
in the Kanawha Valley. So this comes home to us in West
Virginia.
PROPOSAL TO LIMIT THE AMOUNT OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT FUNDS THAT CAN BE
SPENT ON SALARIES
The President also proposes to limit the amount of
emergency management funds that can be spent on salaries. This
provision would drive a stake through the heart of State and
local all-hazards planning efforts.
TERRORIST ATTACK CONCERNS
I am as concerned as anyone about the possibility of future
terrorist attacks, but I am also greatly concerned that
preparing for such an attack will come at the expense of
preparing for other types of disasters if this administration's
budget proposal is enacted.
There are elements in the budget request that are
praiseworthy. The Administration is again requesting $200
million for the flood map modernization initiative. This
initiative is so important to flood-prone States such as West
Virginia. I am also pleased to see an adequate and timely
budget request for the disaster relief fund. Last year we came
very close to running out of money in the disaster relief fund
and nobody--not even OMB it seems--wants to go through that
again this year.
Also, the Administration's budget recognizes the importance
of pre-disaster and post-disaster mitigation funds. Post-
disaster mitigation funds help communities pay for mitigation
activities right after a disaster occurs, when communities have
the will and the momentum to complete such projects. I hope we
can do even more post-disaster mitigation in the future.
West Virginia endured four Federally declared disasters
last year. No State is more grateful for, and no State is more
in need of, FEMA's programs and expertise than West Virginia.
And I want to compliment you on the excellent work that you and
your staff have done. You have not failed us in West Virginia
where we are very keenly aware of and live often with disasters
that are not manmade.
So, I look forward to hearing your testimony, Mr. Under
Secretary, and to working with you to preserve FEMA's all-
hazards planning programs.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your patience and
kindness.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Byrd.
Senator Murray.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATTY MURRAY
Senator Murray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you so much. I join my colleagues in welcoming you
here today. You have a tremendous task before you and I thank
you for your service.
FIRST RESPONDER FUNDING
My colleague, Senator Byrd, discussed the more visible
issues regarding first responder funding. I too am very
concerned about the proposal to shift the homeland security
grants into the Office of Domestic Preparedness. Streamlining
these programs is a key element to ensure our local communities
get the needed resources in a timely manner, but the programs
that are traditionally supported by TSA and FEMA I do not
believe should be forced to compete with our first responders
for funding.
I am also really concerned that the President's budget
request cuts State grants for first responders by $990 million.
It cuts training for first responders by $103 million and
eliminates the COPS program. That is almost $2 billion in cuts
for first responders nationwide at a time when our State and
local budgets just do not have the capacity to absorb those
additional costs. So, I am very concerned about that. I am
confident that Congress will prevent this administration from
decimating those essential first responder programs and I want
my colleagues to know that I will work with them to restore
that.
I do have a number of questions for you and I will wait for
my time. But thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this
hearing.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Brown, we have a copy of your statement which we
appreciate very much your submitting to the committee in
advance of the hearing. It will be made a part of the record in
full. We encourage you to make whatever comments you would like
to make in support of the budget request that will be helpful
to our understanding of the request. You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL D. BROWN
Mr. Brown. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
Senator Byrd, thank you for your kind comments, and Senator
Murray, you also.
My name is Michael Brown. I am the Under Secretary for
Emergency Preparedness and Response of the Department of
Homeland Security. I am, indeed, honored to appear before you
today to talk about FEMA's accomplishments over the past year
since we became a part of the Department of Homeland Security.
But more importantly, I want to highlight some of our
priorities for fiscal year 2004 and discuss why support of the
President's budget request for 2005 is critical to ensure that
FEMA can continue to fulfill its traditional mission.
FEMA has undergone changes since becoming a part of
Homeland Security, both externally and internally, but we have
not changed our focus. As part of the Homeland Security
Department, FEMA has continued the tradition of responding to
help disaster victims and those in need wherever disaster or
emergencies strike.
On March 1, FEMA will celebrate its first full year as a
part of the Department of Homeland Security. We are proud to be
part of this historic effort and are more committed than ever
to do our duty as defenders of the homeland. We believe that
the Federal-wide consolidation of all-hazards preparedness,
mitigation, response, and recovery programs brings real benefit
to the American public.
FISCAL YEAR 2003 ACCOMPLISHMENTS
In fiscal year 2003, FEMA responded to 62 major disasters
and 19 emergencies, covering 35 States, 4 U.S. territories, and
the District of Columbia. These disasters included the record
number of tornadoes in the Midwest, the unfortunate loss of the
Space Shuttle Columbia, Hurricane Isabel, and the absolutely
devastating wildfires in California. In fiscal year 2003, FEMA
obligated nearly $2.9 billion in fiscal year 2003 disaster
funds to aid people, victims and communities that were
overwhelmed by these disasters.
FISCAL YEAR 2004 PLANS
In fiscal year 2004, FEMA is focusing on our five major
program areas: mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery,
and national security.
Our mitigation efforts center on modernizing our Nation's
flood maps, providing pre-disaster mitigation grants and
enhancing the national flood insurance program.
In the Preparedness Division, we will support the
Department's efforts to put into place a national incident
management system that will help improve coordination of
disaster response at all levels, and we will also publish
mutual aid system development, credentialing, and equipment
interoperability standards.
In 2004, our response capabilities continue to grow as we
field enhanced response teams and resources, improve our
response times, put into place plans for catastrophic events,
and improve our training. For those impacted by disasters, FEMA
continues to provide appropriate and effective disaster
recovery assistance.
Finally, we are ensuring that the FEMA national security
program has adequately staffed, trained, equipped, and
exercised the continuity of operations and the continuity of
Government programs.
FISCAL YEAR 2005 BUDGET REQUEST
Looking ahead to fiscal year 2005, the President's budget
request is critical to ensuring that FEMA can continue to
fulfill its traditional mission. The President's budget again
requests $150 million for the pre-disaster mitigation program
to help minimize the devastation caused by natural disasters.
The budget also requests $200 million to continue the
replacement and modernization of the Nation's flood insurance
rate maps, and includes $7 million in new budget authority for
the development and implementation of the national incident
management system as part of the national response plan. These
two initiatives will ensure that all levels of government
across the Nation are prepared to work together efficiently and
effectively employing a single national approach to domestic
incident management.
The President's budget request includes $8 million in new
budget authority for four incident management teams to act as
the core field level response management teams for major
disasters, emergencies, and acts of terrorism.
The President's budget also provides $2.9 billion for
disaster relief, a level consistent with the average non-
terrorist disaster costs over the past 5 years.
I can assure you, Senators, that President Bush appreciates
the importance of recovery. I had the distinct honor of joining
the President in touring Missouri last spring after the
devastating tornadoes struck Pierce City, Missouri. It was
absolutely a downpour. The President gets out of the car, and
goes over to visit with a couple who were standing in front of
their damaged storefront. This couple also had damages to their
home, but using FEMA's temporary housing, our immediate needs
assistance, their insurance, and SBA home and business loans,
this couple is now recovering. The President recognizes the
importance of this type of all-hazards planning, as evidenced
by his $2.1 billion request for the disaster relief fund.
OFFICE OF NATIONAL SECURITY COORDINATION
In fiscal year 2005, FEMA's Office of National Security
Coordination will also continue to carry out its mandated
mission to provide executive agent leadership, to ensure
continuity of national operations in response to all-hazards
emergencies in order to guarantee the survival of an enduring
constitutional government.
In summary, during the last year, FEMA has continued to
carry out its traditional mission. Successful implementation of
the new initiatives and the ongoing activities I have discussed
today will improve our national system of mitigating against,
preparing for, responding to, and recovering from disasters and
emergencies caused by all hazards.
PREPARED STATEMENT
In closing, on a personal note, I want to thank you, Mr.
Chairman, Senator Byrd, Senator Murray, for the absolute
wonderful support that you have given FEMA over the past years.
I would be happy to answer any questions that you might have at
this time.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael D. Brown
Introduction
Good morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. I am
Michael Brown, Under Secretary for the Emergency Preparedness and
Response Directorate (EP&R) of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), which includes the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
I am honored to appear before you today to talk about FEMA's
accomplishments of this past year since it has become part of the
Department of Homeland Security. More importantly I want to highlight
our priorities for fiscal year 2004 and why support of the President's
Budget request for fiscal year 2005 is critical to insure that FEMA can
continue to fulfill its traditional role of preparing for, mitigating
against, responding to, and recovering from disasters and emergencies
caused by all hazards.
FEMA has undergone significant changes since becoming part of DHS--
both external and internal--but it has not changed its focus. As part
of DHS, FEMA continues its tradition of responding to help disaster
victims and those in need whenever disasters or emergencies strike.
Transition into the Department of Homeland Security
On March 1st, FEMA will celebrate its first full year as part of
the Department of Homeland Security. We are proud to be part of this
historic effort and are more committed than ever to our duty as
defenders of the Homeland. We made significant strides in our first
year as a component of the Department, and we continue to see the
advantage of and realize benefits from being part of a larger
organization. We believe that the Federal-wide consolidation of all-
hazards preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery programs
brings real benefit to the American public.
Since March 1st of last year, FEMA has worked to merge disaster-
related public health programs from the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) into a comprehensive and unified national response
capability. These programs include the National Disaster Medical System
(NDMS), which is designed to provide a single, integrated, national
medical response capability to augment the Nation's emergency medical
response capability when needed for major disasters and Federally
declared emergencies. Another important public health-related program,
the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), maintains large quantities of
essential medical items that can be provided for the emergency health
security of the United States in the event of a bioterrorist attack or
other public health emergency and to support State and local
communities during emergencies.
FEMA also successfully merged a multiplicity of other disaster
response teams and assets from different departments and agencies to
create a unified national response capability within the Department of
Homeland Security. Among these teams and assets, now merged within
FEMA's Response Division, are the:
--National Disaster Medical System,
--Domestic Emergency Support Team, and
--Strategic National Stockpile
FEMA has also been given operational control of the Nuclear
Incident Response Team in certain circumstances, including the event of
an actual or threatened terrorist attack.
As we settle into DHS, we continue to leverage the extensive
experience and capabilities of the Department's other components. For
example, in responding to Hurricane Isabel, we received aerial imaging
and aviation support from our friends at Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) and the U.S. Coast Guard. We are partnering with the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate to
improve our damage prediction and resource placement decisions and to
take advantage of their critical infrastructure resources and
expertise. We look forward to continuing and increasing such
cooperation in the future.
Fiscal Year 2003 Accomplishments
In fiscal year 2003, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
obligated nearly $2.9 billion in disaster funds to aid people and
communities overwhelmed by disasters, including floods, ice and winter
storms, wildfires, tornadoes, hurricanes, typhoons, and tropical
storms. In addition, FEMA obligated $6.8 billion to fund projects
associated with the September 11 response. Overall, FEMA responded to
62 major disasters and 19 emergencies in 35 States, 4 U.S. Territories
and the District of Columbia. These events included the record Midwest
tornadoes, Super Typhoon Pongsona and Hurricanes Claudette and Isabel.
The 19 emergencies declared in 2003 included the loss of the Space
Shuttle Columbia, the President's Day snowstorm, and the Northeast
power outages.
While the California fires in October left an indelible mark in our
memories, the Nation's fire season in 2003 was not as busy, with
exceptions, in Montana and Arizona. But in the areas impacted, the
fires were devastating and severe. In fiscal year 2003, FEMA approved
assistance for 34 fires in 11 States, compared with 83 fires in 19
States in fiscal year 2002.
In fiscal year 2003, Congress supported the President's efforts to
promote disaster mitigation, through the creation and funding of two
important initiatives: the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grant Program and
the Flood Map Modernization Program. Great strides have been made in
both of these areas in the last year. These two programs will
ultimately result in the reduced loss of life and property throughout
our Nation.
FEMA's Preparedness Division awarded more than $160 million in
Emergency Management Performance Grants to the States to maintain and
improve the national emergency management system. To date, the United
States Fire Administration has awarded over $650 million in grants to
fire departments across the Nation as part of the Assistance to
Firefighters Grant Program. Both of these programs are now requested in
the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) portion of the Department's
budget for fiscal year 2005 and we are working very closely with ODP on
transferring these programs. FEMA also provided a total of 17
interoperable communications equipment grants for $79.57 million, and
the Emergency Management Institute, the National Fire Academy (NFA) and
the Noble Training Center together trained more than 290,000 fire and
emergency management and response personnel nationwide.
In our response to Hurricane Isabel, last September, we
demonstrated a more forward-leaning and proactive response posture and
made every effort to improve communication, coordination and timely
delivery of critical disaster supplies. FEMA increased the frequency of
daily video teleconferences with the impacted States and meteorological
and river forecasting centers, jointly planned response actions with
the States, pre-positioned materials, and opened multiple staging areas
and mobilization centers in anticipation of response needs. These and
other changes we have made allow us to continue to improve Federal
disaster response efforts. We will continue to take advantage of the
lessons learned and best practices from Isabel and other disasters, and
apply them in our programs to change the impact of future events.
Also during fiscal year 2003, FEMA launched the Continuity of
Operations Readiness Reporting System, a single automated system that
allows Federal Executive Branch departments and agencies to report the
state of their Continuity of Operations capabilities and readiness. The
System has been tested and will be fielded this year. In addition to
technology upgrades and improvements, FEMA's Office of National
Security Coordination maintained a 24/7 operational readiness
capability in support of National Security programs, including the
initial planning and coordination for an interagency Continuity of
Operations exercise, Exercise Forward Challenge 2004, to take place
later this year.
Fiscal Year 2004 Priorities
In fiscal year 2004, FEMA is focusing on its five major program
areas: Mitigation, Preparedness, Response, Recovery, and National
Security.
Our Mitigation efforts center on modernizing our Nation's flood
maps, providing Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) grants, and enhancing the
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). For Map Modernization over 300
mapping projects, valued at approximately $85 million, were launched
nationwide in fiscal year 2003 and we are working with State and local
representatives to identify projects for fiscal year 2004. The PDM
grants will again provide stable funding to assist State and local
governments to reduce risks. The number of NFIP policies will be
increased by 5 percent.
Our Preparedness Division will support the Department's efforts to
put into place a National Incident Management System (NIMS) that will
help improve coordination of disaster response at all levels. In
addition, we will publish Mutual Aid System Development, Credentialing
and Equipment Interoperability Standards. Our support for training and
exercises continues to enhance the Nation's emergency management
capabilities and increasing fire preparedness remains a central
mission.
In 2004, our Response capabilities continue to grow. We will field
enhanced response teams and resources, improve our response times, put
plans into place for catastrophic events, and improve our training. We
will continue to consolidate and integrate all of our different
disaster response programs, teams, and assets; design new approaches;
and implement new efficiencies that will result in a more unified,
integrated, and comprehensive approach to all-hazards disaster
response. We want to elevate our operational response capabilities to a
whole new level of proficiency, one that will further the principles of
the National Response Plan (NRP) and the National Incident Management
System (NIMS) to better serve the American people.
For those impacted by disasters, FEMA continues to provide
appropriate and effective disaster recovery assistance. Simultaneously,
we continue to focus on re-designing our Public Assistance Program and
developing a catastrophic incident housing recovery strategy. These
efforts will enhance our current capabilities and better position us to
recover from a catastrophic event.
Finally, we are ensuring that the FEMA National Security Program
has adequately staffed, trained, equipped, and exercised Continuity of
Operations (COOP) and Continuity of Government (COG) programs to
guarantee the survival of Enduring Constitutional Government.
Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Highlights
The President's fiscal year 2005 Budget for FEMA:
--Assumes a $2.9 billion spending level for disaster relief--a level
consistent with the average non-terrorist disaster costs over
the past 5 years. This includes more than $2.1 billion in new
disaster funds, as well as funds expected to remain available
from prior years. This is over $300 million more than the
fiscal year 2004 appropriation.
--Continues implementation of Project BioShield, which encourages the
development and purchase of necessary medical countermeasures
against weapons of mass destruction. Through an advance
appropriation, $2.5 billion is made available beginning in
fiscal year 2005. These funds will be obligated through fiscal
year 2008.
--Includes $20 million in new budget authority for planning and
exercises associated with improving medical surge capabilities.
--Includes $8 million in new budget authority for four Incident
Management Teams (IMTs) to act as the core, field-level
response teams for major disasters, emergencies, and acts of
terrorism.
--Includes $7 million in new budget authority for development and
implementation of the National Incident Management System
(NIMS), specially designed to provide a basic framework of
organization, terminology, resource identification and typing;
training and credentialing; and communications protocols to
deal effectively with incidents of all sizes and complexities
involving Federal, State, and local governments, Tribal
Nations, and citizens.
--Continues the President's Pre-Disaster Mitigation program, which
helps to minimize the devastation caused by natural disasters
through a competitive grant process that supports well-designed
mitigation projects. In fiscal year 2005, we will initiate
post-disaster evaluations to begin documenting losses avoided
and assessing program impact.
--Continues the replacement and modernization of the Nation's Flood
Insurance Rate Maps.
--Transfers the Strategic National Stockpile to DHHS. As a result of
the transfer, $400 million is moved to DHHS to maintain the
stockpile and strengthen its future capacity with new and
needed medical products as soon as they become available.
--Transfers the Emergency Food and Shelter Program to the Department
of Housing and Urban Development.
Mitigation
FEMA's mitigation programs are an essential part of the Department
of Homeland Security's charge to protect the lives and property of
Americans from the effects of disasters. Mitigation programs provide us
the opportunity not only to develop plans to reduce risks, but more
importantly, to implement those plans before disaster strikes.
In previous years, Congress supported the President's efforts to
promote disaster mitigation by creating and funding two initiatives:
--Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grants, and
--Flood Map Modernization.
The intent of the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grants is to provide a
consistent source of funding to State, local, and Tribal governments
for pre-disaster mitigation planning and projects that primarily
address natural hazards. The plans and projects funded by this program
reduce overall risks to the populations and structures, while reducing
reliance on funds from Federal disaster declarations. The competitive
nature of the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program encourages communities to
assess their risks, to evaluate their vulnerabilities, and to implement
mitigation activities before a disaster strikes. This budget proposes
support for both pre-disaster and post-disaster mitigation assistance.
The Flood Map Modernization Program provides the capability to
broaden the scope of risk management. This enables more expansive use
of the geospatial base data needed to develop the flood maps.
Communities, lenders, insurance agents, and others use the maps and the
flood data approximately 20 million times a year to make critical
decisions on land development, community redevelopment, insurance
coverage, and insurance premiums. As flood hazard data is updated, the
current flood map inventory is being changed from a paper map system to
a digital one. New technology will enhance the usefulness and
availability of flood data to all customers. The new system also
supports the development and distribution of geospatial data of all
hazards, both natural and man-made.
The fiscal year 2005 budget will continue to update flood maps
nationwide and increase State and local capability to manage flood
hazard data. By the end of fiscal year 2005, digital GIS flood hazard
data covering 50 percent of our Nation's population will be available
online.
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) has a significant
impact on reducing and indemnifying this Nation's flood losses. Prior
to the creation of the NFIP, floodplain management as a practice was
not well established, and only a few states and several hundred
communities actually regulated floodplain development. Flood insurance
was not generally available. We are working diligently to refine and
expand our all-hazards risk communication strategy to meet the goal of
a 5 percent increase in NFIP policy ownership. This increase in
insurance policy ownership will reduce reliance on the Disaster Relief
Fund and will foster individual economic stability.
Preparedness
FEMA's Preparedness Division helps ensure our Nation is prepared to
respond to emergencies and disasters of all kinds. The Preparedness
Division is responsible for Federal, State, local, and community
emergency preparedness programs; assessments and exercises; grants
administration; the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program and the
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program. The U.S. Fire
Administration works to prevent fire deaths and damage to property, and
carries out its mission through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and
support. The training programs offered at the National Fire Academy and
the Emergency Management Institute promote the professional development
of command level firefighters, emergency managers, and emergency
responders, and are an important aspect of the U.S. Fire
Administration's duties.
The Noble Training Center, located at Ft. McClellan, Alabama, is a
new addition to FEMA. Transferred from DHHS in fiscal year 2003, the
Noble Training Center is the only hospital facility in the United
States devoted entirely to medical training for Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD). In fiscal year 2005, Noble will continue to train
medical personnel for State and local hospitals, emergency medical
services, and the National Disaster Medical System.
In fiscal year 2005, FEMA's Preparedness Division will work with
other components of the Department to develop the National Incident
Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Plan (NRP). These
initiatives will ensure that all levels of government, across the
Nation, work together efficiently and effectively, employing a single
national approach to domestic incident management.
FEMA's Preparedness Division will continue to provide the States
with technical assistance in their all-hazards planning. To avoid
duplicative planning, our efforts will be closely coordinated with
those of the Office for Domestic Preparedness to update State terrorism
preparedness plans.
As part of our effort to prepare our citizens for all disasters,
the Division will oversee the Community Emergency Response Teams, or
CERT. This program, begun as a civilian training program by the Los
Angeles Fire Department, has become a nationwide effort to train
citizens in first aid and basic firefighting and emergency response
techniques. CERT-trained citizens are able to provide those basic
emergency services that would otherwise occupy the first responders.
FEMA provides train-the-trainer programs to allow as many citizens as
possible to receive this training across the country. The CERT program
has grown from 170 teams in 28 States and Territories in March of 2002
to over 900 teams in 51 States and Territories.
Response
FEMA's Response Division is responsible for integrating national
emergency response teams, systems and assets into a comprehensive and
fully coordinated, national capability that supports States and
communities in responding to all types of disasters, including acts of
terrorism. This is accomplished by arranging the necessary and
appropriate national assets, establishing a consolidated national
incident response system, and effectively coordinating strategic
resources in full partnership with Federal, State, local, and tribal
governments, the private sector, volunteers, and citizen partners.
The fiscal year 2005 Response Division budget proposes to:
--Create four Incident Management Teams (IMTs) and formulate plans
for full implementation in fiscal year 2006; the IMT is a
highly responsive and flexible response team that will be able
to quickly establish a strong Federal leadership capability in
any disaster environment or high threat situation, including
acts of terrorism involving the use of WMD;
--Continue all-hazards catastrophic disaster response planning for
one additional U.S. city, based on the pilot disaster planning
template developed for New Orleans, Louisiana. The template
will be used in the future as a basis for all-hazards
catastrophic planning for other high risk areas of the country;
and
--Continue efforts to develop the capability to provide intermediate
emergency housing aimed at meeting the needs of large numbers
of disaster victims displaced from their homes as a result of
large scale and catastrophic disasters
FEMA's Response Division will also continue to implement measures
to reduce response times for its teams and delivery of disaster
supplies.
Additional funding requested in fiscal year 2005 implements the
National Incident Management System--NIMS. FEMA's goal for 2005 is to
focus on the readiness of Federal response teams and the integration of
Federal capabilities with that of State and local jurisdictions. We
will conduct outreach to our Federal response partners and State and
local counterparts to ensure connectivity and synchronization of
response capabilities under NIMS, and will conduct NIMS and Incident
Command System (ICS) training for Federal response teams. These
activities will ensure we have the baseline skills for all teams to
operate under NIMS and be fully integrated into the NIMS/ICS doctrine.
As highlighted previously, the President's fiscal year 2005 budget
proposes an initiative to develop FEMA's medical surge capability.
Under this initiative, FEMA will evaluate supplemental capabilities for
both a fixed and mobile facility to demonstrate the utility of using
alternate facilities to support medical surge activities, as well as
the utility of having a surge capacity that can be mobilized,
transported, and made operational within set timelines. The second part
of this initiative is to implement the concept through two pilot
projects.
Recovery
FEMA's Recovery Division leads and coordinates the timely delivery
of Federal disaster assistance to individuals and communities.
In fiscal year 2005, the Recovery Division will continue to provide
assistance to individuals for temporary housing, damaged personal
property, crisis counseling, disaster unemployment, and disaster legal
services. FEMA responded to over 2.5 million calls last year, from
people seeking to register for disaster assistance and to have their
questions answered. The Recovery Division processed more than half a
million individual disaster applications.
The Individual Assistance Programs that meet victims' most basic
needs provide assistance for housing, personal property losses, and
medical and funeral expenses. In each disaster we ask our customers,
the disaster victims, what they think of the service we provided to
them. I am pleased to tell you that we consistently earn very high
marks from our customers when they are surveyed. In fiscal year 2005 we
will continue to invest in technology that ensures we continue to meet
our customers' expectations.
FEMA's Public Assistance Program, which accounts for the bulk of
recovery expenditures out of the Disaster Relief Fund, is the primary
means for community recovery. State and local governments and certain
non-profit organizations can be reimbursed to repair facilities to
their pre-disaster condition, as well as for costs associated with
debris removal and emergency protective measures. FEMA is focusing on
redesigning the Public Assistance Program to be more efficient and
better prepared to meet the needs of a catastrophic or terrorist event
by moving toward a web-based, user friendly, estimated based program,
communities will be able to recover faster. In order to better prepare
for the transition to a redesigned program, FEMA is establishing a
methodology for estimating the total cost of large projects versus
determining final costs after work is complete. Implementing the Public
Assistance Program using cost estimates will allow State and local
governments to better budget for recovery, improve our estimates of
disaster expenditures, and reduce administrative costs and closeout
timelines. In addition, we are working on proposed revisions to the
Public Assistance Insurance Rule, which was last revised in 1991. The
Stafford Act requires applicants for Public Assistance grants to
``obtain and maintain'' insurance on a damaged facility as a condition
of receiving assistance. In the past, there have been concerns about
this rule imposing a pre-disaster insurance requirement for all
hazards. The proposed rule will not require insurance before disaster
strikes, except for flood insurance in identified flood hazard areas,
as required by the Stafford Act. The purpose of the rule is to simply
clarify issues not adequately addressed in the current rule, such as
eligible deductibles.
The Fire Management Assistance Grant Program is another key
resource for States and local governments to mitigate, manage, and
control forest or grassland fires to prevent damages that may otherwise
result in a major disaster declaration.
I assure you that President Bush appreciates the importance of
Recovery. I had the honor of joining the President in touring Missouri
last spring after the devastating tornadoes struck Pierce City. Even
though it was pouring rain during our visit, the President got out of
his car to go over and talk to a couple who were standing in front of
their damaged store front. They also had damages to their home. Using
FEMA's temporary housing, immediate needs assistance, their insurance,
and SBA home and business loans, this couple is recovering.
The massive California Wildfires of 2003 scorched over 750,000
acres and claimed 24 lives. During the response to the wildfires, the
President and Secretary Ridge wanted me to be intimately involved in
the coordination efforts between the Federal agencies doing work there.
Through the formation of a pair of interagency bodies, the Washington-
based California Fires Coordination Group and the field-level Multi-
Agency Support Group, FEMA's Recovery Division was instrumental in
assuring that each of our Federal partners was coming to the table with
comprehensive plans that were complementary to each other, that
minimized the sort of bureaucratic ``stove piping'' that results in
duplication of efforts, and that continued to focus on the needs
identified by the State and local communities as priorities. Our shared
success is the natural result of FEMA's commitment to ``all-hazards''
emergency management, and a focus on a scaled approach to meet the
challenges of any kind of incident, from the floods, fires, and storms
that happen all too often, to the catastrophic scenarios that we
prepare for, but hope will never come to pass.
We take our mission to help communities and citizens recover very
seriously. My goal is to continue to do the work we do now better and
faster, and to build on our current recovery capabilities to be better
prepared to face a catastrophic natural or terrorist event.
National Security
In fiscal year 2005, FEMA's Office of National Security
Coordination will continue to carry out its mandated mission to provide
Executive Agent leadership to ensure continuity of national operations
in response to all-hazard emergencies in order to guarantee the
survival of an enduring constitutional government. Funding in fiscal
year 2005 will be used to ensure that all Federal Executive Branch
departments and agencies attain and maintain a fully operational
Continuity of Operations (COOP) capability. FEMA will provide
assistance to Federal departments and agencies to help them attain and
maintain fully operational contingency capabilities. FEMA will develop
and implement a test, training, and exercise program that culminates in
a complete exercise of the Continuity of Government (COG) program. In
addition, we will provide technical support and guidance to our
interagency, regional, State and local stakeholders across the Nation.
Conclusion
During the last year, FEMA has been busy but we continue to carry
out our mission to prepare for, mitigate against, respond to, and
recover from disasters and emergencies caused by all-hazards. The key
to our continued improvement will be to take the lessons learned from
previous disasters and incorporate them into our preparedness,
planning, and procedures, so that we do an even better job of
responding next time. We evaluate the lessons learned from each
disaster and make plans to incorporate the new approaches and remedy
problems. Hurricane Isabel provided such an opportunity, and it
validated our priority to reduce disaster response times and improve
our capability to gather information and effectively and efficiently
manage the Federal Government's response to Presidentially-declared
disasters.
Successful implementation of the new initiatives and the on-going
activities I have discussed today will improve our national system of
mitigating against, preparing for, responding to, recovering from
disasters and emergencies caused by all hazards.
In closing, I want to thank the Members of the Subcommittee for
their past support of FEMA and I appreciate the opportunity to testify
before you today. I would now be pleased to answer any questions you
may have.
STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Some of the questions that we have relate to the proposals
to make transfers of authority and responsibility within the
executive branch, some from the new Department of Homeland
Security to the Department of Health and Human Services. I
observed in Senator Byrd's statement concerns about that, and I
was going to ask about that as well.
One of the transfers that I notice includes a transfer of
the Strategic National Stockpile to the Department of Health
and Human Services. Why is this a priority of the
administration? Do you think that would be an appropriate thing
to do and would enable us to do a better job of defending
against attacks or terrorist attacks in this area?
Mr. Brown. Senator, the beauty of transferring the
stockpile back to HHS is that it truly aligns the budget
requirements and the operations requirements in one Department.
The important thing to note is that FEMA does not lose its
ability to deploy the stockpile in times of emergency. Under
the national response plan, we will still be able to deploy the
stockpile and utilize it as necessary to aid victims. So, what
we have done is actually realign operations and budget within
one Department.
DISASTER RELIEF FUND
Senator Cochran. There is also a question about whether
some of the funding requests are sufficient to enable you to
carry out your mission and to fulfill your responsibilities
under the law. In particular, we notice that in the President's
budget for disaster relief there is a request for $2.1 billion,
but also included is a transfer of $7 million to preparedness,
mitigation, response, and recovery for the urban search and
rescue teams.
Is this an indication that you really need more money for
disaster relief than is reflected in the budget request?
Mr. Brown. No, Senator, it is not. In fact, I would say in
response to Senator Byrd's comments earlier about last years
episode with the disaster relief fund, that President Bush
absolutely recognizes the importance of the DRF being fully
funded, and in this case by requesting $2.15 billion, we are
going to be able to do that.
I will tell you that we learned some lessons in FEMA last
year because of that experience with the DRF. I am very pleased
to say that our cash management systems have gotten much
better. Our recoveries have gotten much better, and so this
$2.15 billion, combined with the carryover we are going to have
from good cash management, and from the recoveries that we are
going to make in the current DRF funding, will be fully funded
in the DRF this year. I think that is a reflection of the
President's understanding that this pool of money needs to be
available so that FEMA can do its job without worrying if there
is enough money or putting some programs on hold. It is a
recognition of the importance of that fund.
Senator Cochran. Well, I am impressed with the job that the
Department has done in such a short period of time,
reorganizing itself under the new Department's management
structure, but including some agencies like FEMA, which is I
suppose one of the principal responsibilities of this
directorate which you chair, and to do so in a way that did not
diminish in any respect the capacity of the Government to
respond to natural disasters and the traditional role that FEMA
has played. So, I congratulate you on the management function
that you are providing and the responsibilities that you are
carrying out in that regard.
We are going to work hard to be sure that we appropriate
the money that you need and that our communities need when they
are confronted with natural disasters. In my part of the
country, we have been besieged with hurricanes, floods,
tornadoes, and many other natural disasters, and FEMA has been
right there and has helped lead the way, working with local
officials and volunteers who come to respond to those
situations. We know how important your work is and we
appreciate the fact that you are dedicating yourself to help
run this agency so people who do need help in these situations
get it.
Mr. Brown. Senator, I very much appreciate those comments.
FIRE GRANT PROGRAM
Senator Cochran. Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Under Secretary, in my opening statement,
I had a question which I said was rhetorical for that purpose.
Where do these policies leave a small town fire department,
let's say in Sophia, West Virginia, that needs to purchase
breathing apparatus or needs equipment to deal with a chemical
spill? Let us say we are talking about a town in Kanawha County
on the river near the great complex of chemical industries that
have been located there and have served the country so well
through the years. Where does the policy leave a small town
fire department that needs to purchase breathing apparatus or
equipment to deal with a chemical spill?
Mr. Brown. Senator, I would tell you that I think the fire
grant program is one of the best programs in the Federal
Government. It is incredibly efficient, organized, and directly
affects and helps needs like those you are identifying. In
addition to that, it has a peer review process that will take
fire departments from West Virginia, Mississippi, Washington,
or wherever they are from, and the peers themselves, the fire
departments, look at where the need is the greatest and give us
advice about where those dollars should go.
I will tell you that the President's request this year for
$500 million in fire grants is the same amount that the
President requested last year. He recognizes the importance of
first responders. He also recognizes the importance of this
program.
We are doing absolutely everything to ensure that the fire
grant program is not deteriorated in any way by its movement to
ODP. We are providing detailees. We are providing programmatic
support. We are doing everything to make sure that program
stays intact. Congress recognized that last year and said, as
this transfer takes place, the U.S. Fire Administration should
remain a vital part of the grant program, and indeed they are.
FEMA is doing everything to support ODP to keep this program
operating the exact same way it always has so that it does help
fire departments like you describe.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Brown, if it is one of the best programs,
a statement with which I agree, why is the President proposing
to cut it by 33 percent?
Mr. Brown. Well, the President's request is the exact same
as he made last year, and Congress added an extra $249 million
to it last year. The President is reiterating his same request
from last year.
Senator Byrd. But he is cutting the program by 33 percent.
Why is he doing that?
Mr. Brown. His request is the same request he made last
year.
Senator Byrd. I understand that. You said that already. But
on what basis? Why is he doing that?
Mr. Brown. The President's overall request for first
responders is actually an increase. There was $8 billion last
year for first responders, and that is increasing by about $900
million this year. So, overall for first responders, there is
actually an increase.
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANTS
Senator Byrd. Do I have time for one more question on this
round?
Senator Cochran. Yes.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, first, you are proposing to
cut emergency management performance grants by $9 million.
Second, you are proposing to target those reduced emergency
management dollars to terrorism activities, in essence,
mandating that States put terrorism projects at the top of
their priority list or risk losing funding. Finally, you are
proposing to hinder the States' flexibility by capping at 25
percent the amount of each grant that can be spent on salaries.
West Virginia spends more than half of its EMPG funds on
salaries. I understand that nationwide State and local
governments use over 50 percent of their grant funds for the
salaries that pay for emergency planning professionals. In West
Virginia, EMPG is an essential source of funds to help State
emergency managers reduce the threat of floods, assist flood
victims, and to prepare for potential chemical spills. The all-
hazards approach to emergency management is a critical tool for
State officials.
Earlier this week, I received a letter from Stephen Kappa,
K-a-p-p-a, the Director of the Office of Emergency Services in
West Virginia. Perhaps you know him, do you?
Mr. Brown. Yes sir, I do.
Senator Byrd. In his letter, Director Kappa concluded that
the President's proposals for emergency management would have--
and I quote here--``a devastating impact on emergency
preparedness at the State and local levels.'' He, Mr. Kappa,
concluded that--quote, again--``West Virginia and other States
must balance our preparedness efforts to appropriately
integrate terrorism, not to the detriment or exclusion of the
existing national emergency response system that supports day-
to-day public safety needs.'' That is the end of that excerpt
from Mr. Kappa's letter to me.
Today if FEMA focuses too myopically on terrorist threats,
it could jeopardize the all-hazards approach to emergency
management that has been built up over the past 25 years, and
we will be in danger of repeating past mistakes.
I am very disappointed with the President's emergency
management proposal. Please explain, if you will, to a couple
of Senators, who have been here quite some time from flood-
prone States, such as West Virginia and Mississippi, why these
proposals make sense.
Mr. Brown. Senator, let me first state that I understand
the concern that has been expressed by you and others about
this change on the cap. I recognize that concern. In addition
to that, the reason that FEMA has always been successful under
James Lee Witt's leadership, under Joe Albaugh's leadership,
has been that we have always understood that it is the ability
of our State and local partners to do their job that helps make
us successful. We must continue our relationships with the
State and local agencies to understand what their capacities
are, what their abilities are, what they have, and what they
can and cannot do. One way that we will do that is through the
EMPG. By changing the cap, it increases necessarily the amount
of money that is now available for training and exercises at
the State and local government. The administration believes
that personnel costs are truly a shared cost and the State and
locals should share some of the costs of that personnel, with
this change, we are increasing the amount of money that we can
now use to exercise and train those personnel to make them even
more robust in the future.
Senator Byrd. Is that the answer to my question?
Mr. Brown. Yes, sir.
Senator Byrd. That is all on this round, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Senator Murray.
CUTS TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANTS
Senator Murray. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
I want to follow up on the question that Senator Byrd asked
because I am also hearing from everyone in my State they are
deeply concerned about this cap and obviously the cuts to the
EMPG program. It is really the backbone for many of our
communities in responding to all types of hazards. Senator Byrd
mentioned floods. Certainly earthquakes and all the other
disasters that people have to prepare for are also included.
They have added to this now, obviously, terrorism. I am very
concerned because EMPG really is the lifeblood for many of the
emergency programs in my State and across the country.
A good example is Kitsap County. It has several military
bases, a population of about 240,000, and about one-fifth of
the emergency management budget comes from EMPG funding. That
county uses its funding to support their office operations and
to provide public education to help prepare the cities and
residents in that county for all types of hazards. But not
every community in my State is like that, and for those
communities, EMPG funding is not some kind of enhancement. It
is actually not unusual to see almost 80 percent of the Federal
EMPG allocation used to hire dedicated emergency management
professionals, which is really important.
So, when we see these recommended limitations, many of the
communities in my State and probably across the country tell us
they are going to have to terminate their emergency management
program. That would place our entire emergency management
response system in jeopardy. So, I share Senator Byrd's concern
and I think we need to understand that the cap in particular
will dramatically impact many of our counties to where they are
not doing this, and that is, I do not think, the direction your
agency wants to go.
So, if you want to respond, I am happy to listen.
Mr. Brown. In response, Senator, I would just say again
that I understand those concerns greatly. I want to emphasize
that we believe that a robust State and local system is
necessary for FEMA to be able to succeed because, remember,
FEMA only steps in when it is beyond the capabilities of State
and local governments to respond to a disaster, whether it is
natural or manmade. With the change in this cap, we will now
use those additional resources to train the people at the State
and local level to exercise them more at the State and local
level than we have in the past.
Senator Murray. But if there is nobody there to train, we
are going to be----
Mr. Brown. We would ask the States to see if they cannot
find money to keep those people in place, because I do not want
to lose those people either. I want to keep them there and
train them and exercise them.
Senator Murray. Well, remember, our States and our local
communities are suffering from a very difficult budget crisis
right now.
Mr. Brown. I understand.
Senator Murray. And if we just count on them coming up with
the money, they are going to turn to us and talk about Federal
mandates and complain to us, and it will be back on our
shoulders when there is a response that cannot be taken care
of.
Mr. Brown. I understand that, Senator.
Senator Murray. So, Senator Byrd, I want to work with you
on that concern because I share it.
Senator Byrd. Thank you. You have heard the company line.
PUTTING THE STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE BACK UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Senator Murray. The chairman mentioned the issue of the
Strategic National Stockpile being put back under the
Department of Health and Human Services. I think it is a
positive change. I think it will help streamline the Federal
decision-making in time of a crisis, but I am concerned that
with this change, the Department of Homeland Security will no
longer be connected to the public health community and our
Nation's doctors and nurses are our first responders,
particularly in time of a biological attack. They are the ones
we need to sound the alarm, and we need to make sure that the
immunologists and the virologists and the State public health
officials are part of that coordinated effort to manage and
respond to a crisis if it involves bioterrorism. So, I am
concerned about that and want to know from you how we are going
to engage our public health professionals and keep them part of
this loop.
Mr. Brown. Oh, absolutely. In fact, I hope I can alleviate
those concerns because, while the stockpile does transfer back
to HHS, it is only the budget and operations. We would still
deploy the stockpile. We would still handle the logistics of
the stockpile.
NATIONAL DISASTER MEDICAL SYSTEM
In addition to that, we still have the National Disaster
Medical System within FEMA, which we are looking at and
assessing. I think we have a very good relationship with NDMS.
I think they are very proud to be a part of FEMA now. We are
really trying to invigorate that system to make it part of the
first responder community. So I think those concerns that you
have, while they are certainly legitimate concerns, we are
addressing those. I think we are on the right track to
incorporate NDMS fully into our response system.
Senator Murray. Well, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I do have a few other questions, but I know
we have a vote in a few minutes. I would like to submit them,
if I can, in particular involving Hammer Training Facility and
our ability to train some of our local responders that I would
like to get a response back from you.
Mr. Brown. Certainly.
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
BIOSHIELD
Mr. Secretary, let me ask you about the budget request as
it relates to the BioShield initiative. The request asks for a
substantial increase in funding from $885 million for this
fiscal year to the level of $2.5 billion for fiscal year 2005.
What is the justification for that substantial increase?
Mr. Brown. Mr. Chairman, that will fully fund the BioShield
program, as the President announced in the State of the Union a
couple of years ago. That will enable us to create, as I said
last year, this venture capital fund, if you want to call it
that, so that we are ready to create a market for any kind of
antibiotics or other medicines that we need to respond to a
bioterror threat. There currently is no way to encourage the
pharmaceutical companies or the drug companies to venture into
these areas and create things for which there is no market
other than the fact that we have intelligence that may tell us
that there is a specific threat, a specific pathogen that
terrorists are trying to use. This will enable us to create
that market and produce those antibodies for that particular
kind of attack.
Senator Cochran. There is a failure by the Congress to pass
legislation that authorizes the BioShield program. Does this
lack of legal authority impair in any way the administration's
efforts to help protect our national security from a threat
that this program seeks to address?
Mr. Brown. Mr. Chairman, we are going to use the excellent
language that you put in the appropriations, and use that as
authorization to move forward, because we think our mandate
from you and from the Congress is to use this money, and to use
it for these kinds of threats. So that is what we will do.
Senator Cochran. To what extent are your funds going to be
expended in this year and for what specific purposes?
Mr. Brown. We currently are looking at some additional
anthrax vaccines and some additional kinds of antibiotics that
we need to develop.
Senator Cochran. The President's budget proposes in this
area to make some transfers, transfer the Strategic National
Stockpile from Homeland Security to the Department of Health
and Human Services. But it does not suggest that BioShield
should be transferred. Why is it more appropriate for the
stockpile to be managed by HHS and BioShield to be managed by
the Department of Homeland Security?
Mr. Brown. Primarily because in BioShield, the resources
that will be used in it are going to be based upon the threats
that the Department of Homeland Security, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and others develop through their intel
gathering processes. So, as we understand and determine what
those threats are, that BioShield money will be there for us to
use to respond to those specific threats. Now, we will still
work with the CDC, with HHS, and others in the development of
those drugs and pharmaceuticals, but because we have the threat
information, we believe that program should remain within DHS.
Senator Cochran. To your knowledge, is there an assessment
being done by the administration on our vulnerabilities to
biological attacks, and if so, who is doing the assessments?
Mr. Brown. There is an assessment that is being carried
forth, primarily by the Department of Homeland Security. Since
September 11th, everything has changed in the Federal
Government. And when I say that DHS is leading it, you can rest
assured that we do not do anything without incorporating all of
our Federal partners. We talk to HHS. We talk to CDC. We talk
to anyone who may be involved to make sure that we get the
right kind of information and that we get the right kind of
response.
Senator Cochran. I assume that your directorate has had
some involvement in the recent events that have been in the
news and with those that we are also familiar with here in
Congress, the ricin incident here in this building, and the
anthrax events of the recent past. To what extent is the
Department actively involved in these episodes? What do you do?
What did you do in connection with those events?
Mr. Brown. Everything from information-sharing among the
Departments to the Capitol Police. We were in constant contact
with them, for example, during the State of the Union or any
other national security special event such as that. We deploy
the National Disaster Medical System. You probably did not have
a chance to see it during the State of the Union, but we had
incredible teams all around these buildings, all within the
Capitol, ready to respond to any type of event. So with FEMA
and the Department of Homeland Security still being seen as the
first responder on behalf of the Federal Government, we have an
intimate involvement in all of those activities.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much for your efforts to
protect our security.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Cochran. Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, one of the best with
whom I have ever served. I am talking about you.
Senator Cochran. I understand. You are embarrassing me.
PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION
Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, in fiscal years 2003 and 2004,
Congress appropriated $150 million for a new pre-disaster
mitigation fund. $150 million was a compromise with the
Administration which proposed to spend $300 million on pre-
disaster mitigation and to eliminate any funds for post-
disaster mitigation.
This year, the administration requests $150 million for
pre-disaster mitigation, and requests that 7.5 percent of the
amount a State receives for a disaster from FEMA be provided
for post-disaster mitigation.
I am pleased that the Administration recognizes the
importance of post-disaster mitigation. In West Virginia, the
$5.6 million received from this program will be used to acquire
and demolish repetitive lost properties in the flood plain and
relocate residents. To date, none of the non-planning pre-
disaster funds from either 2003 or 2004 have been made
available to States. West Virginia wants to spend the money on
moving people out of the flood plain before another disaster
strikes. It is unacceptable that this money is stuck at FEMA.
When can States expect to have pre-disaster mitigation
funds in hand?
Mr. Brown. Senator, we have received well over 400
applications for that money. 140 grants have been awarded for
planning and for specific mitigation projects. To date, $49
million has been obligated. $15 million of that was for
planning and $34 million for actual projects. $70 million will
go out on a rolling basis before the end of the calendar year.
So, we have received those 400 applications, and we have
already obligated 49. We have also awarded 140 grants. That
money will start going out the door. I want to get those people
out of those repetitive places just as badly as you do, sir.
Senator Byrd. I am not so sure about that. Be careful what
you say.
Mr. Brown. Sir, we will get those funds out. It is a
process of requesting 400 applications, getting the planning
for those applications done, and the grant money out for those
planning grants. And we will continue to get those monies out
on a rolling basis.
Senator Byrd. The 2003 money was appropriated 12 months
ago. I simply do not understand why it has taken so long to get
the money out the door.
Until fiscal year 2003, States received an additional 15
percent in disaster relief funds for post-disaster mitigation
projects. Earlier this week, I received a letter from a host of
emergency management groups, including the International
Association of Emergency Managers, the American Public Works
Association, and the Association of State Flood Plain Managers,
urging Congress to restore the hazard mitigation grant program
formula to 15 percent from its current level of 7.5 percent.
What is your opinion of this proposal?
Mr. Brown. Senator, I am for anything that we can do to
mitigate disasters, pre-disaster or post-disaster. To the
extent that we can get money out the door to help folks, we are
going to do that.
Senator Byrd. What is your opinion of this proposal?
Mr. Brown. We will certainly take it under consideration
and look at it, Senator.
Senator Byrd. You are going to take it into consideration
and look at it?
Mr. Brown. We certainly will.
Senator Byrd. Well, I am going to call you in a few days
and see how long you have been looking at it. Okay?
Mr. Brown. Excellent.
PROPOSED CUTS TO FIRE GRANTS FUNDING
Senator Byrd. I have just one more question, Mr. Chairman,
and I may have others for the record.
In December 2002, FEMA issued a report entitled, ``A Needs
Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service''. That report found that
half of all fire engines being used by our fire departments
were over 15 years old. It found that 57,000 fire fighters
lacked personal protective equipment, and that 41 percent of
fire department personnel involved in wildland fire fighting
lacked formal training in those duties.
Last year you could not approve over $1.7 billion of
applications because of a lack of funds.
Given the serious deficiencies in basic fire fighting
equipment and skills that you found, do you think that the
administration's proposal to cut fire grant funding by 33
percent and to focus fire grants on terrorism-related
activities will undermine the ability of our local fire
fighters to respond to emergencies in their communities?
Mr. Brown. No, sir, it will not because we will continue to
make certain that under the fire grant program whatever monies
we have available go to the highest critical needs, so that we
start solving the worst needs that we have in the country
first. We will keep the program in place that way and make
certain that the money goes where it should go.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Byrd, very much for
your assistance with the work of this committee. I appreciate
it.
Mr. Secretary, the budget request includes an increase of
$7 million for a national incident management system to support
the President's national strategy for homeland security. This
incident management system is proposed to be a single
coordinating system to bring together the Federal, State, and
local governments, tribal Nations, and citizens during
emergencies, disasters, or other catastrophic incidents.
How will the national incident management system differ
from other systems that are designed to deal with all-hazard
events within the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the
Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate?
Mr. Brown. Senator, one of the problems we have now is that
while we have a fairly good, unified command system around the
country--first responders generally understand unified command
and command and control systems--what we lack is a unified
national incident management system with a common language by
which we can all exercise and train to that common language.
This $7 million will enable us to do that. So, when we bring in
teams from anywhere in the country or mutual aid teams are
helping other teams, they will walk into that situation with a
common language, a common training. They will have exercised
under a common system so that everyone will be on the same
page, so to speak, when they are responding to any kind of
disaster.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Cochran. Mr. Secretary, we appreciate very much
your cooperation with our committee, your making available your
statement to us, and the opportunity to visit with you to talk
about the budget request in advance of the hearing.
Senators may submit written questions, as you know. We hope
that you will be able to respond to them within a reasonable
time.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
BIOSHIELD
Question. Without Congressional approval of BioShield, who has the
authority to sign contracts related to the obligation of BioShield
funds?
Answer. The fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security Appropriations Act
provided $890 million to be spent for development of biodefense
countermeasures for the current fiscal year. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the
Homeland Security Council, and the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) recognize the importance of expeditious progress in developing
much-needed countermeasures while following Congressional intent. In
that vein, DHS and HHS have sought to ensure that the development of
the interagency agreement for next-generation anthrax vaccine is in
line with the proposed BioShield legislation. Until such time as the
BioShield Act is passed, a FEMA contracting officer has the authority
to sign interagency agreements with HHS, which, in turn, will execute
contracts with manufacturers.
ANTHRAX VACCINE
Question. Is the procurement of an anthrax vaccine conducted
through the Strategic National Stockpile or BioShield? Is this the
responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security or the Department
of Health and Human Services?
Answer. Anthrax vaccine (recombinant Protective Antigen, or rPA)
procurement will be funded by the Biodefense Countermeasures
appropriation included in the fiscal year 2004 DHS appropriation, but
will be acquired for exclusive placement in the Strategic National
Stockpile (SNS). The SNS discretionary appropriation is used to
purchase items for which there is a significant commercial market. The
BioShield program was specifically constructed to spur development of
countermeasures for which no commercial market existed, as is the case
with rPA, for inclusion in the Stockpile.
DHS is responsible for assessing current and emerging threats
against the United States. The Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Medical Countermeasures subcommittee, an interagency group co-chaired
by DHS, HHS, and the Department of Defense, has developed
countermeasures information of interest to officials who will make the
BioShield procurement decisions. The WMD subcommittee commissioned an
end-to-end analysis of medical countermeasures to Category ``A''
biological agents (anthrax, smallpox, plague, botulinum toxin,
tularemia, Ebola and other hemorrhagic fever viruses). Working groups
developed initial requirements for four high-priority bioweapon (BW)
countermeasures for which there is high need and a reasonable
expectation that products will be available in the near term, with rPA
development topping the list.
The DHS Secretary enters into an interagency agreement with the HHS
Secretary, whose department is responsible for providing medical,
scientific, acquisition, technical, and procurement expertise, and is
to establish technical requirements, identify suppliers, negotiate and
evaluate proposals, enter into contracts, assess contractor
performance, and perform administrative services. HHS also must ensure
all the necessary steps have been taken for the licensing of the
finished product.
Additionally, DHS is in the process of finalizing an interagency
agreement with the Army for the acquisition of Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed
(AVA). This agreement will be funded from the Public Health Programs
(SNS) appropriations account.
Question. When will the Department of Homeland Security or the
Department of Health and Human Services procure the doses for which it
has identified a requirement? What is that requirement? How many doses
over what period of time will be necessary to meet it?
Answer. DHS and HHS are now finalizing an interagency agreement to
purchase recombinant Protective Antigen (rPA) vaccine to protect 25
million persons. The government will consider later purchase of
additional anthrax vaccine contingent on new vaccination delivery
system technology and other cost-saving factors such as reduced dose
requirements. A three-dose schedule is currently being evaluated, which
would require a total purchase of 75 million doses. This initial
agreement for fiscal year 2004 is for $134 million. Projections for
obtaining the entire 75 million-dose requirement cover 5 years.
Additionally, DHS is now finalizing an interagency agreement with the
Department of the Army for up to 5 million doses of AVA.
Question. Are we filling at least part of that requirement with an
FDA-approved product currently available?
Answer. The Stockpile currently maintains a small amount of the
only FDA-licensed pre-exposure vaccine against anthrax (Anthrax Vaccine
Adsorbed, or AVA). Currently, it has limited production capacity, and
rectifying that problem would be very expensive and take several years
to accomplish. AVA is not currently licensed for children or for the
elderly. However, in order to ensure that some type of anthrax vaccine
is available until the development and procurement of rPA, DHS and HHS
have signed an interagency agreement for the purchase of AVA through
the Department of the Army. This agreement will provide approximately 2
million doses in fiscal year 2004, 1.5 million doses in fiscal year
2005, and 1.5 million doses in fiscal year 2006.
STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE
Question. The proposal to transfer the Strategic National Stockpile
from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) back to the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) in fiscal year 2005 requires
legislative action by the authorizing committee. Has such legislation
been submitted by DHS, and if so, what action has been taken by the
authorizing committee?
Answer. Language to effectuate the transfer of SNS from DHS to HHS
has been added to S. 15, the Project Bioshield Act of 2003.
Question. How has the fiscal year 2004 transfer from HHS to DHS,
and the proposed fiscal year 2005 transfer from DHS to HHS, affected
the daily operations, personnel, and activities of the program? Have we
crippled the program in any way by continuing to shuffle it between
departments? How are decisions being made at this time in regard to the
Stockpile?
Answer. The daily operations of the Stockpile have not been
affected in any significant manner. Personnel and normal operations are
nearly unchanged since the transfer from HHS to DHS and decisions are
being made much as they always have been made at the Stockpile. The
motivation to return the program to HHS is due to the desire to create
a single command structure for the program, and to streamline
operations once again. HHS will, however, have the obligation to deploy
the stockpile when so requested by the Secretary of DHS. As such, the
potential response needs of the DHS mission will not be compromised in
any manner.
METROPOLITAN MEDICAL RESPONSE SYSTEM
Question. What is the direct impact of the elimination of funding
within Emergency Preparedness and Response in fiscal year 2005 for the
Metropolitan Medical Response System?
Answer. The funds that Congress has appropriated for the
Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) over the last several years
have been used to establish certain capabilities, to get the program up
to its baseline, and to facilitate transfer of the program to the
localities for continuation, once the baseline is established. We will
reach the baseline this fiscal year (2004), and therefore no additional
funding is being requested.
Secretary Ridge has proposed a reorganization (a letter was sent to
Members of Congress on January 26, 2004), wherein the MMRS program for
fiscal year 2004 will be transferred to a newly established Office of
State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness. Under this
arrangement, FEMA would have no further role in the MMRS program for
fiscal year 2004, and there will be no Federal program in fiscal year
2005.
We cannot precisely estimate the number of local jurisdictions that
would continue the MMRS program without Federal resources support. We
are fairly certain that a large number of them, as an element of
prudent preparedness and operational necessity, will attempt to
maintain MMRS-type mass casualty integrated response preparedness and
seek to use Federal funds from other programs to support eligible
portions of MMRS-type capabilities.
Question. Are the program activities of the Metropolitan Medical
Response System being met within any other areas of the President's
budget?
Answer. There are other Federal programs, which provide more
narrowly focused, but related, support. These include the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention-Health Resources and Services
Administration (HRSA) Bioterrorism Preparedness Grants and the HRSA
Hospital Grants; the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) Training
and Exercise Programs and Equipment Grants; and ODP Urban Area Security
Initiative funding to the designated States, which will then work with
counties and cities to form regions that will work together through
mutual aid agreements, interoperable communications, statewide
intelligence centers, and community and citizen participation.
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANTS
Question. What will happen to the all-hazards preparedness,
mitigation, response, and recovery activities of the Emergency
Management Performance Grants if the primary focus for all grant
programs within the Office for Domestic Preparedness is required to be
homeland security activities?
Answer. Effective State and local all-hazards planning capabilities
are critical to the success of FEMA in responding to disasters, but at
this time, the Administration feels strongly that resources be focused
toward building local governments' homeland security capabilities.
Question. If a 25 percent cap is placed on the amount of grant
funding allowed for personnel costs, many county and local emergency
management offices may have to close due to the funding shortfall. The
emergency management offices are critical to the preparation of the
local community prior to disasters, which is the key to ensuring
survival of its citizens during a disaster. The 25 percent cap on
personnel costs could result in as much as a 60 percent decrease in
emergency management staff nation-wide. If this happens, how will it
affect FEMA's ability to operate in the field during a disaster? Would
the direct costs to FEMA increase if more FEMA personnel were required
to travel to the disaster site for assistance due to lack of local
emergency management personnel?
Answer. Currently, Emergency Management Performance Grants funds
are disproportionately used to pay salaries, which is predominately a
State/local responsibility. The cap on personnel costs is intended to
ensure that the State and local governments assume more responsibility
for their personnel costs. This would allow a greater percentage of
grant funds to be utilized by State and local governments for training
and exercises, further enhancing readiness capabilities.
PREPAREDNESS, MITIGATION, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY
Questions. For fiscal year 2004, the Emergency Preparedness and
Response Directorate proposed to establish one pilot Incident
Management Team to develop the base structures and procedures for the
four Incident Management Teams requested in the fiscal year 2005
budget.
Where will the one pilot Incident Management Team be located?
What criteria were used to determine this location?
Where are you in the process of establishing this pilot team?
What is the time-frame for having the pilot team fully operational?
Answer. The Pilot Incident Management Team (IMT) will be collocated
with the Coast Guard facility in Elizabeth City, North Carolina. This
location was chosen for the Pilot IMT primarily due to the efficiencies
that can be achieved through use of existing Coast Guard facilities,
air transportation, and available space. Our goal in fiscal year 2005
is for IMTs to be fully activated within 15 hours of initial disaster
notification and to have an average IMT response time for arrival at a
disaster site within 22 hours. Our current average response time for
all existing response teams is 72 hours for arrival on scene; the
response time for the IMTs will help to reduce this overall average to
60 hours by fiscal year 2005. Geographic proximity and transportation
support will be crucial to achievement of this goal.
Also, this geographic location is ideal for its close proximity to
high-risk areas in the eastern United States. The Pilot IMT is our
development phase of this initiative and the timing for its inclusion
into our response system coincides perfectly with the onset of the 2004
hurricane season. This location will also afford us the possibility of
real-time disaster scenarios in which the IMT can be utilized,
exercised, and evaluated for future development of other teams in
fiscal year 2005.
We are currently engaged in the acquisition of support equipment
and recruitment of personnel, and we plan to have the Pilot IMT at an
operational status by September 2004. The development and validation of
procedures and operational doctrine will be complete by that time as
well. Operational status will be constantly augmented and improved as
we continue to exercise the teams and to enhance our procedures and
doctrine through remedial actions.
In the future, the IMTs will be referred to as Federal Initial
Response Support Teams (FIRST), a name which differentiates them from
existing response teams and which follows incident management protocols
more closely. This name change is proposed in the draft National
Response Plan (NRP) and will be made official when the NRP is
finalized.
Questions. The fiscal year 2005 budget requests an increase of $6.2
million for four Incident Management Teams to act as the core, field-
level response teams for major disasters, emergencies, and acts of
terrorism. It is my understanding that this funding will be used to
secure half of the personnel needed, secure two locations for housing
and deployment of teams, complete studies regarding transportation
needs, and develop plans for full implementation of four teams in
fiscal year 2006.
Will the $6.2 million support two Incident Management Teams or
four? If $6.2 million only supports two fully functional teams, will
another $6.2 million be needed in fiscal year 2006 for the other two
teams? If not, then what is the anticipated need to complete this
initiative?
How will the locations for the Incident Management Teams be chosen?
Do you anticipate expanding beyond four teams after fiscal year
2006?
What is the projected annual funding needed to maintain these teams
once they are in place and fully operational?
Answer. At the time the budget was developed, the plan was for two
full teams staffed by 10 full-time equivalent (FTE) positions. Current
plans are to use the funding requested in the fiscal year 2005 budget
to establish four teams with 5 FTEs to provide better coverage across
the country. The Pilot Team will be established in fiscal year 2004 and
three additional teams will be established in fiscal year 2005. We have
chosen locations for the teams that take advantage of existing DHS
transportation and support assets without requiring a large team
structure. Much of the work for site selection is being done in fiscal
year 2004 to be ready for establishment of the teams. Establishment of
the teams, however, is not an end stage for readiness.
Locations for the IMTs are being identified based on geographic
location as well as collocation with exiting Coast Guard assets that
will be utilized to support the IMTs in their operations. Elizabeth
City, North Carolina, and Sacramento, California, have been chosen as
potential sites on the East and West coasts of the United States. This
will allow the IMTs to have a quick response across the country,
including Alaska and Hawaii, through ground and/or air transportation
provided through support from the Coast Guard.
Our goal in fiscal year 2005 is for IMTs to be fully activated
within 15 hours of initial disaster notification and to have an average
IMT response time for arrival at a disaster site within 22 hours. Our
current average response time for all existing response teams is 72
hours for arrival on scene; the response time for the IMTs will help to
reduce this overall average to 60 hours by fiscal year 2005. Geographic
proximity and transportation support will be crucial to achievement of
this goal.
At this point, we are concentrating on the establishment of the
four teams planned for fiscal year 2005. It would not be fiscally
responsible for us to plan for additional teams until we have
thoroughly tested our capability with the four teams. We plan to
conduct a thorough review of each team through exercises,
credentialing, and after-action remediation before we make a
determination on needs for future development. In order to provide
support to the IMTs, we are also developing augmentation plans that
will seamlessly link our regions and existing team structure to the
IMTs.
We anticipate that the $6.2 million budget will be programmed in
outyears to provide maintenance of caches and equipment, exercise
support, training, further development, and planning support for the
IMTs.
In the future, the IMTs will be referred to as Federal Initial
Response Support Teams (FIRST), a name which differentiates them from
existing response teams and which follows incident management protocols
more closely. This name change is proposed in the draft National
Response Plan (NRP) and will be made official when the NRP is
finalized.
Questions. The President's budget request includes a $1.8 million
increase for the Mobile Emergency Response System to develop a
temporary workforce to assist in the daily operations, deployments and
necessary training and exercise programs to ensure that all response
teams can provide a 24-hour response time to communities impacted by
disasters, emergencies, terrorist events, or weapons of mass
destruction incidents.
How is this workforce trained, maintained, and called into action
when needed? In general, how will the temporary workforce operate?
How many workers make up the temporary workforce?
What is the projected annual funding requirement to maintain the
Mobile Emergency Response System?
Answer. Every effort will be made to hire experienced personnel who
are already trained, qualified, and experienced in the desired general
skill areas. Once hired, they will be paired with permanent full-time
employees for on-the-job-training on specific systems. Their skills
will be maintained and kept current in the same manner by which the
permanent full-time employees' skills are kept current. As new systems
are introduced and current systems are upgraded, they will be provided
a combination of contractor and in-house instruction. They will also be
provided training literature and manuals as well as opportunities for
continuing on-the-job-training. They will be called into action by
using FEMA's Automatic Deployment Database. FEMA developed this system
several years ago to rapidly activate and deploy its temporary
workforce known as Disaster Assistance Employees, who provide most of
the staffing at Disaster Field Offices.
The Mobile Emergency Response System (MERS) temporary workforce
will be called into action as training, daily operations, and
deployment needs develop. In general, the temporary workforce will be
used to reinforce and extend the capabilities of the MERS. When
training opportunities occur, they will be activated for the period of
the training. When deployments occur, they will be utilized in several
important ways. They will report to the home bases to replace deployed
permanent full-time employees to sustain ongoing daily operations. They
will also deploy with full-time employees to increase and extend the
scope of field operations and will deploy in the place of unavailable
full-time employees.
The initial goal is to have 50 MERS temporary employees. Although
all the temporary employees will be available to assist any of the 5
(MERS) Detachments, the initial goal will provide 10 temporary
employees per unit. The final goal is to have 100 MERS temporary
employees. This would equate to 20 temporary employees per unit.
Once all hiring activities are completed, the projected annual
funding to maintain a 100-person MERS temporary workforce is
approximately $3.2 million.
Questions. An increase of $5 million is requested to develop one
fixed and one mobile module to demonstrate medical surge capacity. An
additional $15 million is requested to develop two pilot projects to
evaluate one fixed and one mobile medical surge facility.
How will the locations for the pilot projects be determined?
What follow-on appropriations will be required to support this
project?
What is the anticipated timeframe for expanding this project
nation-wide?
Answer. Department staff will develop standardized evaluation
criteria that will be used to assess potential locations for the pilot
projects. It is currently anticipated that a significant number of
factors will be incorporated in the evaluation criteria, including:
overall population of the jurisdiction; population density in and
around the location; hazards and risks prevalent in the location
(including natural, technological, and terrorist incidents); existing
hospital capacity; strength and organization of existing medical
response and public health systems; existing State or local plans for
surge capacity; availability of existing Federal and non-Federal
facilities with adequate storage space, site access, and proximity to
commercial ground and air transportation; proximity to sources of
medical equipment and pharmaceutical suppliers; and proximity to FEMA
regional offices.
FEMA continues to work with the Administration on the program
details and budgetary requirements for future years.
It is anticipated that if the program is funded beginning in fiscal
year 2005 without delay, procurement will begin for the two pilot units
in fiscal year 2005.
URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE
Question. Why has the administration requested only $7 million to
support the FEMA urban search and rescue program when the annual
preparedness grants of $150,000 that were previously generated under a
$7 million budget were insufficient to properly maintain and operate
these task forces?
Answer. A funding level of $7 million is requested for Urban Search
and Rescue (US&R) for fiscal year 2005. The program will be funded in
the Preparedness, Mitigation, Response and Recovery account, rather
than from Disaster Relief, where it has historically been funded. Since
2001, FEMA has received more than $100 million in both regular and
supplemental appropriations to upgrade equipment for and to train the
US&R teams to perform under a variety of scenarios, including those
involving WMD.
Question. Since all 28 teams have been made Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) capable, what is the projected funding level for
maintaining that WMD capability in fiscal year 2005?
Answer. The fiscal year 2005 President's Budget requests $7 million
for the US&R program.
Question. Although funding was provided in fiscal years 2003 and
2004 for the purchase of a second equipment cache, is it true that FEMA
has not moved forward on this acquisition of equipment and materials
for the 28 task forces? If so, why not? What happened to those funds?
Answer. The US&R program is committing funds for the 2nd Equipment
Cache initiative. This includes $22.4 million in fiscal year 2003 funds
and $27.3 million in fiscal year 2004 funds through an interagency
agreement with the Defense Logistics Agency, and a subordinate
acquisition contractor to assist the US&R program office staff and to
allow for the bulk purchase of the myriad tools, supplies, and
equipment that will be procured (a full cache has some 6,500 items). An
ad hoc Tiger Team made up of US&R logistics specialists from selected
US&R task forces has been convened to address the purchase,
organization, cache packaging, and other necessary issues for
developing the prototype standardized cache that will be duplicated and
distributed to the 28 US&R task forces in the system. Initial meetings
have already been conducted and subsequent meetings are scheduled.
Furthermore, we are finalizing the lease of necessary warehouse
space to allow for the receipt of the ordered items; developing the
organization, cache packaging scheme, and mobilization load plan of a
standardized cache; and resolving other related issues. Due to the
large size and complexity of a full US&R cache, the procurement and
development is being addressed in a phased approach by cache function,
such as rescue, communications, medical, logistics, etc. To expedite
the process, each segment will be forwarded to all task forces as the
segment is addressed. We anticipate the warehouse lease being finalized
in mid-March. The overall initiative is in progress and on target with
identified timelines. We anticipate the task forces will begin
receiving initial cache shipments in the latter half of calendar year
2004. Fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 funding provides for the
first- and second-year phases of the overall 3-year acquisition.
Funding for the third phase from fiscal year 2005 is indeterminate.
Question. There seem to have been some delays in the progress of
enhancement intended by Congress for the urban search and rescue
program: a lack of progress in acquiring the second equipment cache for
all 28 task forces; delay in the acquisition of ground transportation;
development of additional training programs and task force evaluations
have not been accomplished. What steps are being taken to rectify the
delays and lack of progress?
Answer. The identified aspects of the US&R program are in process
and on target. The US&R program is committing funds for the 2nd
Equipment Cache initiative. This includes $22.4 million in fiscal year
2003 funds and $27.3 million in fiscal year 2004 funds. An ad hoc Tiger
Team made up of US&R logistics specialists from selected US&R task
forces has been convened to address the purchase, organization, cache
packaging, and other necessary issues for developing the prototype
standardized cache that will be duplicated and distributed to the 28
US&R task forces in the system. Initial meetings have already been
conducted and subsequent meetings are scheduled.
Furthermore, we are finalizing the lease of necessary warehouse
space to allow for the receipt of the ordered items; developing the
organization, cache packaging scheme, and mobilization load plan of a
standardized cache; and resolving other related issues. We anticipate
the warehouse lease being finalized in mid-March.
The acquisition of ground transport vehicles, which will allow for
movement of the US&R equipment cache, is also on target. In fiscal year
2003 funding, $11.2 million ($400,000 per task force for trucks and
trailers) and $3.9 million ($138,000 per task force for command and
support vehicles) is being provided to the 28 task forces for this
procurement at the sponsoring agency level.
The US&R program office has received and approved the task forces'
acquisition plans for the fiscal year 2003 acquisition. We anticipate
that all task forces will have the truck/trailer assets in place by the
middle of 2004. Acquisition of command vehicles will follow in the same
vein with the awarding of the fiscal year 2004 Preparedness Cooperative
Agreements, which are also in process.
US&R training requirements are also in process and on target.
Another $2 million in fiscal year 2003 funds has been committed and
eight national US&R specialist-training classes are scheduled and being
conducted in calendar year 2004 (including the development of three new
classes). For fiscal year 2004, $1.9 million is being obligated for
nine national training classes scheduled during 2005. A comprehensive
US&R Task Force Administrative Training Course has been developed and
was recently delivered for the sponsoring agency task force program
managers and grants managers of the 28 task forces. The US&R Task Force
Readiness Evaluation Program is currently under development by US&R
program staff and selected task force members. Prototypes for US&R
Preparedness Cooperative Agreement reporting, monthly operational
readiness reporting (using web-based online access), and onsite peer
evaluation/readiness checks are in progress or have been developed. We
anticipate the pilot onsite inspections to begin in the mid-to-latter
half of calendar year 2004.
EMERGENCY FOOD AND SHELTER PROGRAM
Question. The transfer of the Emergency Food and Shelter Program
from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) requires legislative action by the
authorizing committee. Has the Department sent a request to the
authorizing committee for legislative language to be considered? If
not, why? If so, what is the current status of the legislative
proposal?
Answer. FEMA is currently working with the appropriate authorizing
and appropriations committees on the legislative language to transfer
the Emergency Food and Shelter program to the Department of Housing and
Urban Development in accordance with the President's fiscal year 2005
budget request.
FLOOD MAP MODERNIZATION
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes $200 million
for the Flood Map Modernization project. How will this funding be used?
Answer. Fiscal year 2005 funding will be used to continue to
implement the Multi-Hazard Flood Map Modernization Program. FEMA's
vision for the program entails providing credible flood maps and data
for communities nationwide that are more accurate, up-to-date, easier
to use, and readily available. FEMA intends to accomplish the
following:
--Network the Nation using the latest Internet portal technology to
provide access to general flood hazard, risk, and mitigation
information, and convert the maps from paper to a digital
format. The information will be tailored to the needs of
specific partners, stakeholders, and users.
--Leverage the use of Federal, State, and local resources, and
transfer ownership and use of flood maps and data to the State
and local levels by building and maintaining effective
partnerships with State, regional, and community entities in
the development of the maps and data
--Use clear data standards to ensure that the modernized flood hazard
maps reflect the best available data that suits the risk level
for the given area
--Reduce processing time and costs for flood map updates and increase
accountability for spending by implementing results-oriented
systems and standards that will facilitate the rapid exchange
of data between our partners, staff, and contractors
--Communicate widely, effectively, consistently, and continuously to
maximize our partners', stakeholders', and users' understanding
of flood hazards and the risks the hazards pose to life and
property
Primarily, the fiscal year 2005 funding will be used to initiate
and complete flood map updates nationwide based on our 5-year Multi-
Hazard Implementation Plan (MHIP) for completing the work in fiscal
years 2004 through 2008. FEMA will use the MHIP to establish goals and
baseline with existing priorities; to document and understand flood map
update needs identified by State, regional, and local partners and
stakeholders; and to develop prioritization criteria and a sequence for
scoping counties and watersheds in the priority areas based on
floodplain management, hydrologic, hydraulics, and terrain needs. The
MHIP will be reevaluated annually to account for changing needs,
natural disasters, and new partnerships; to prioritize changes; and to
update mapping priorities, as appropriate.
FEMA will provide a precise accounting of the engineering studies
to be performed and the flood maps to be produced once development of
the MHIP is completed; will scope the map update projects identified in
coordination with State, regional, and local partners and stakeholders;
and will contract the required map updates with our contractors and
with State, regional, and local participants in our Cooperating
Technical Partners (CTP) program.
Question. The final contract for the national flood map
modernization project has been continuously delayed over the last
several months. Why? When exactly will the contract be finalized?
Answer. The National Service Provider (NSP) contract was awarded on
March 11, 2004. FEMA experienced some delays in finalizing the contract
with the NSP due to the need to ensure the completeness and accuracy of
this performance-based contract. More discussions and negotiations were
needed than for a conventional compliance-based contract. The NSP is
now on the ground in each of the ten regions as well as in
headquarters, performing in accordance with the results-based contract,
and on schedule to deliver initial functionality.
Question. Since this is a performance-based contract, have the
guidelines been developed for how performance will be measured? What
level of funding is available or will be provided for the contract for
``independent contractor'' monitoring?
Answer. FEMA has developed guidelines for how performance on the
NSP contract will be measured and performance metrics have been closely
linked to the strategic goals of DHS and FEMA.
A detailed program management plan that outlines how performance
will be measured has been developed. FEMA has negotiated a performance
requirement summary with the NSP that describes each specific
measurement and its acceptable quality levels. We have established a
specific team that will be responsible for monitoring performance
measurements and reporting results on a frequent basis.
FEMA has assigned specific responsibilities for monitoring and
measuring not only the contract performance, but program performance as
well. We are providing the NSP with incentives to effectively manage
all mapping activities and build partnerships and capabilities while
producing high-quality flood maps using accurate, credible data.
In addition, FEMA is procuring the services of an independent
contractor to help monitor the NSP's performance and to verify that
program outcomes are truly achieved. The projected funding level for
this independent contractor is approximately $1.2 million for fiscal
year 2004.
Question. There is concern about conflict of interest with the
company who has won the national contract and how much work they may be
doing on the sub-contractor level. Are there guidelines in place to
ensure there is no conflict of interest? How will identified conflicts
of interest be avoided or mitigated?
Answer. During the source selection process, one of the key issues
was identifying mechanisms to avoid conflicts of interest or the
appearance of conflict. Each offeror included presentations on means of
avoiding such conflicts. The contract has established that the NSP will
have an aggressive Organizational Conflict of Interest (OCI) management
program consistent with Federal Acquisition Regulation 9.5.
The NSP, which is a team of experienced contractors led by one
primary contractor, has proposed a conflict of interest management
approach that will be put into place upon contract award. Under the
proposed approach, the prime contractor will not pursue any contracts
for engineering studies with our regional offices or with States under
our CTP program. The proposed approach also includes a reporting
requirement for all other members of the NSP team to disclose all
ongoing contracts and pursuit of contracts to the prime contractor for
screening to identify potential OCI issues, perceived or actual. The
prime contractor will inform our Contracting Officer in writing of any
work that could pose a potential OCI so that appropriate measures may
be taken to eliminate the OCI.
Question. Without valid data the people at the State and local
level won't have confidence in the maps, making them virtually useless.
What guidelines are in place for an independent review of the process
itself and the new digitized maps to ensure the revised maps have valid
data? How will FEMA ensure that the flood hazard ``data'' has been
updated or is current before converting it into new digital maps?
Answer. A fundamental tenet of the Multi-Hazard Flood Map
Modernization Program is that State and local involvement in the
modernization of the flood maps is essential for program success.
State, regional, and local partner involvement is particularly vital
for the identification and use of best available, accurate data that
are appropriate for the flood risk in the area being mapped. We are
maximizing our partners' involvement and contributions in this critical
area by establishing clear quality standards; by making appropriate use
of Internet technology, automated data collection and processing tools;
and through use of independent quality reviews.
FEMA has developed criteria for assuring the quality of flood
hazard maps and supporting data. FEMA implemented Digital Flood
Insurance Rate Map base map standards in 1998 and Light Detection and
Ranging system standards in 2000. Both standards were updated when the
consolidated Guidelines and Specifications for Flood Hazard Mapping
Partners was published in February 2002.
State, regional, and local review and acceptance of new and
existing data will be achieved at key milestones throughout the flood
map update process--from the initial identification of flood map update
needs as part of the MHIP, to the scoping of the flood map update, to
the preparation and adoption of the final maps.
Through our web-based flood hazard data collection and delivery
system, we will make component data, such as topographic data,
available for use by our mapping partners as it is developed. This will
allow for data quality verification at the State, regional, and local
levels at numerous points in the flood map update process. These
reviews will help to assure that the data reflect a level of analysis
and effort commensurate with the flood risk faced by the mapped
communities.
In addition to providing access to the data as it is developed, we
are assuring quality by providing data collection and processing tools
for our partners and contractors to use in performing map update
projects. These tools have been designed with quality checks built in
to minimize errors and to assure internal consistency in the collection
and processing of the data. To ensure the tools are used properly, we
will provide appropriate training and support to the partners and
contractors who are using the tools for map update projects.
FEMA is using the latest Internet portal technology to allow State,
regional, and local partners to obtain current status information on
the progress of a map update. This access will give our partners a more
significant role in the management of the program.
Furthermore, FEMA has incorporated a quality standard into the
performance measurement system for the program, and plans to establish
an independent contract to perform independent verification and
validation and to measure the quality of the products produced. The
independent contractor also will help monitor the NSP's performance and
verify that program outcomes are achieved.
Finally, FEMA is continuing the very effective practice of
requiring independent quality reviews as part of the flood map update
process. This practice was institutionalized when we published our
consolidated Guidelines and Specifications for Flood Hazard Mapping
Partners in February 2002. We include the independent quality review
requirement in all mapping project-related contract documents developed
with our contractors and with participants in the CTP program. These
independent reviews help to assure map updates are completed
efficiently and are consistent with FEMA standards.
By requiring independent quality reviews throughout the map update
process, we are assuring that products resulting from each activity
meet FEMA standards before the next activity is started. We also are
assuring that the maps and related products and data are internally
consistent. These reviews also provide an opportunity for providing
task-specific training to partners who may not be completely familiar
with FEMA quality standards. The frequent independent quality reviews
also eliminate the costly rework that can result when an error is made
early in the processing and is not identified before processing
continues.
Question. Is the schedule of trying to have completely revised,
digitized flood maps for the entire country in 5 years realistic?
Answer. Based on our current schedule, we believe our plan for
preparing and distributing updated, digitized flood maps is realistic.
However, we will be better prepared to provide a precise accounting of
the type of engineering study to be performed in each county when we
complete the development of our 5-year implementation plan (MHIP);
scope the map update projects identified in coordination with State,
regional, and local partners and stakeholders; and contract the
required map updates with our contractors and participants in our CTP
program.
Question. Is $200 million a year still an accurate estimate of the
cost for this project, not just to convert the old paper maps into
digitized maps but to truly revise them with the most accurate flood
plain data? Are we sacrificing quality at any level for quantity of
maps completed?
Answer. Based on the information we have to date, we believe the
funding requested will be adequate to meet our initial program goals.
We will validate our original program baseline and provide a precise
accounting of when and how the funding will be expended later this
year, after we have completed the development of our 5-year
implementation plan (MHIP), scoped the map update projects identified;
determined the contributions that may be made by State, regional, and
local partners through the CTP program; and contracted the required map
updates.
One of the primary objectives that our NSP was asked to meet was
the creation of credible flood maps for use by partners, stakeholders,
and other users. The maps will reflect the best data available and will
be appropriate for the level of risk associated with the mapped area.
In addition, we have incorporated a quality standard into our
program performance standards to ensure quality of maps produced.
Question. Beyond the 5 years anticipated to complete the project,
how much follow-on funding is anticipated in the out-years to maintain
the digitized map?
Answer. At the present time, we cannot formulate a precise cost for
maintaining the digitized maps. The cost of maintaining the digitized
maps will depend on several factors, including the total cost savings
realized by eliminating routine production of paper maps (e.g., manual
updates, warehousing), and the level of State and local participation
in maintaining the new maps that will be realized by expanding our CTP
program. We will be able to estimate the maintenance budget for the
program after we complete our 5-year implementation plan (MHIP);
coordinate with States, regional agencies, and local communities; and
assess each State's desired level of program participation as
identified in its State Business Plan.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Ted Stevens
Question. FEMA Region X has denied the use of Stafford Act disaster
funds for two airports in Alaska (Northway Airport and Gulkana
Airport). The repairs of these airports total $13,675,693. FEMA claims
that it does not have the authority to perform these repairs and claims
that the Federal Aviation Administration is authorized to perform these
repairs. The FAA disagrees and claims that its agency lacks authority
to provide for disaster repairs. Who has the legal responsibility for
repairs to disaster damaged runways and airports?
Answer. The appeal from the State of Alaska has been received and
is currently under review. We will notify your office once a decision
has been reached and the applicant has been informed.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
Question. What percentage of fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004
EMPG funds are being used to pay salaries nationally? Please provide
breakouts by State and include State and local government personnel
expenses.
Answer. In an attempt to be as responsive as possible to the
questions of the Committee, we have developed the information in the
table below. It is a statistical extrapolation based on budget levels
for ``Personnel'' and ``Fringe Benefits'' submitted by the States on
FEMA Form 20-20, ``Budget Information--Non-construction Programs.'' The
States are not required to maintain or to submit detailed information
on the exact percentages of their personnel costs funded with Emergency
Management Performance Grant (EMPG) funds, therefore, we must emphasize
that the data and methodology underlying this analysis are of known
inadequacy, and the results below may not provide a complete or
accurate assessment of the amount of EMPG funds used to pay salaries.
The indications that we are able to derive from this analysis are
that the amount of the Federal share of EMPG funds budgeted by the
States for salaries and fringe benefits varies greatly, ranging from
about 16 percent to about 72 percent. The average of the percentages
was about 37 percent. For the Insular Areas, which are not required to
share cost, the percentages ranged from about 56 to about 72 and
averaged about 67 percent.
Very little data is available for use of pass-through, or subgrant,
EMPG funds for salaries and benefits at the local level. What we do
have indicates that the number is higher than at the State level,
probably averaging 80 percent or more.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated
Percent of Percent of
Reg./St. Name EMPG Federal Personnel Fringe Federal Share Estimated Pass-through
Share Benefits for Salaries/ Pass-through Salaries/
Fringe Fringe
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
National Totals......................................... 154,885,912 75,144,375 16,416,336 37.40 115,843,873 ..............
Region 1................................................ 12,185,673 7,177,474 2,189,927 34.75 7,164,177 ..............
Connecticut......................................... 2,407,428 1,477,757 603,221 43.22 1,404,291 ..............
Maine............................................... 1,609,597 611,124 291,873 28.05 1,464,192 ..............
Massachusetts....................................... 3,457,781 3,062,227 673,690 54.02 1,595,952 ..............
New Hampshire....................................... 1,667,748 733,957 237,289 29.12 959,703 ..............
Rhode Island........................................ 1,599,677 891,015 285,125 36.76 1,136,623 ..............
Vermont............................................. 1,443,442 401,394 98,729 17.32 603,416 ..............
Region 2............................................ 15,011,754 4,632,915 1,311,370 45.25 2,742,707 ..............
New Jersey.......................................... 4,139,084 1,031,739 201,641 29.80 1,672,122 ..............
New York............................................ 7,703,460 2,500,000 859,250 43.61 215,085 ..............
Puerto Rico......................................... 2,536,400 737,895 156,026 35.24 855,500 ..............
Virgin Islands...................................... 632,810 363,281 94,453 72.33 ..............
Region 3................................................ 7,329,496 5,003,332 1,383,750 46.67 6,025,436 ..............
Delaware............................................ .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ..............
District of Columbia................................ 1,501,603 1,793,206 284,000 69.17 410,000 ..............
Maryland............................................ .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ..............
Pennsylvania........................................ .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ..............
Virginia............................................ 3,889,095 2,306,396 810,356 40.07 3,195,436 ..............
West Virginia....................................... 1,938,798 903,730 289,394 30.77 2,420,000 ..............
Region 4................................................ 29,591,145 18,954,422 0 33.48 25,329,569 ..............
Alabama............................................. 3,823,967 3,696,461 .............. 48.33 2,500,000 ..............
Florida............................................. 7,233,935 2,617,511 .............. 18.09 4,279,886 ..............
Georgia............................................. 4,123,419 4,040,060 .............. 48.99 3,687,500 ..............
Kentucky............................................ 1,809,701 1,309,020 .............. 36.17 1,340,853
Mississippi......................................... 2,318,816 1,521,486 .............. 32.81 1,936,342 ..............
North Carolina...................................... 4,253,671 2,399,006 .............. 28.20 5,149,520 ..............
South Carolina...................................... 2,669,936 1,320,078 .............. 24.72 3,317,468 ..............
Tennessee........................................... 3,357,700 2,050,800 .............. 30.54 3,118,000 ..............
Region 5................................................ 24,931,917 11,509,247 4,558,027 30.80 22,249,984 ..............
Illinois............................................ 5,580,907 3,608,501 1,479,486 45.58 2,927,069 ..............
Indiana............................................. 3,365,504 1,200,538 497,218 25.22 4,288,816 87
Michigan............................................ 4,709,793 2,504,359 1,192,078 39.24 3,034,000 ..............
Minnesota........................................... 2,972,911 1,294,766 455,809 29.44 3,547,586 78
Ohio................................................ 5,184,208 1,981,083 553,436 24.44 3,852,513 86
Wisconsin........................................... 3,118,594 920,000 380,000 20.84 4,600,000 88
Region 6................................................ 17,990,977 4,333,511 1,184,259 28.34 11,282,574 ..............
Arkansas............................................ 2,179,451 1,376,311 415,921 41.12 991,384 41
Louisiana........................................... 2,791,271 673,366 121,206 28.47 1,581,860 93
New Mexico.......................................... 1,862,907 331,978 107,487 23.59 1,244,156 75
Oklahoma............................................ 2,415,000 531,156 137,871 27.70 1,764,007 ..............
Texas............................................... 8,742,348 1,420,700 401,774 20.85 5,701,167 75
Region 7................................................ 6,752,153 4,277,632 1,152,392 38.98 6,945,990 ..............
Iowa................................................ 1,600,520 1,094,279 364,760 45.58 5,000 ..............
Kansas.............................................. 1,511,233 850,063 212,712 35.16 3,230,491 ..............
Missouri............................................ 2,295,781 1,712,376 428,095 46.62 1,954,000 ..............
Nebraska............................................ 1,344,619 620,914 146,825 28.55 1,756,499 ..............
Region 8................................................ 11,212,298 4,176,758 1,244,091 28.98 11,553,304 ..............
Colorado............................................ 2,899,310 1,079,936 152,671 21.26 3,949,354 ..............
Montana............................................. 1,621,942 693,757 222,002 28.23 2,173,008 ..............
North Dakota........................................ 1,524,180 651,240 201,884 27.99 2,137,116 ..............
South Dakota........................................ 1,569,201 .............. 0.00 .............. ..............
Utah................................................ 2,121,554 978,743 431,343 33.23 2,373,456 ..............
Wyoming............................................. 1,476,111 773,082 236,191 34.19 920,370 ..............
Region 9................................................ 21,734,734 10,460,851 1,968,488 48.28 12,300,869 ..............
Arizona............................................. 3,123,049 4,104,686 416,372 72.38 45,308 ..............
California.......................................... 13,350,374 3,599,274 690,715 16.07 6,735,231 ..............
Hawaii.............................................. 1,676,149 1,338,168 431,158 52.78 2,022,655 ..............
Nevada.............................................. 1,992,530 646,106 201,491 21.27 3,036,516 ..............
American Samoa...................................... 431,942 243,092 46,176 66.97 10,756 ..............
Guam................................................ 589,350 299,847 117,248 70.77 84,365 ..............
CNMI................................................ 471,340 202,678 62,628 56.29 366,038 ..............
FSM................................................. 50,000 .............. .............. 0.00 .............. ..............
RMI................................................. 50,000 27,000 2,700 29.70 20,300 ..............
Region 10............................................... 8,145,765 4,618,233 1,424,032 42.81 10,249,263 ..............
Alaska.............................................. 1,173,241 1,223,577 429,905 70.47 693,000 ..............
Idaho............................................... 1,501,310 1,090,683 368,881 48.61 1,543,055 63
Oregon.............................................. 2,205,226 721,252 274,074 22.57 3,415,126 79
Washington.......................................... 3,265,988 1,582,721 351,172 29.61 4,598,082 ..............
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. What percentage of fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004
EMPG are being used for homeland security activities nationally? Please
provide this information for each State.
Answer. State and local entities have not been required to maintain
detailed reports which segregate their program expenditures on a
percentage-of-use basis.
That being said, FEMA would contend that very nearly all of the
State and local emergency management agencies' resources are being used
for all-hazards preparedness activities, including terrorism. The
capabilities developed and maintained in such areas as training,
exercising, command and control, communications, and even
administration are essential for homeland security (as broadly defined)
as well as for hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, hazardous materials
accidents, plane crashes--any and all mass-casualty situations.
Question. On what equipment, training and exercises were the fiscal
year 2003 fire grants spent? What was requested?
Answer. Below is a list of eligible equipment and training under
the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program. Approximately $440
million to $460 million was expended in fiscal year 2003 on these kinds
of items. These represent 80-85 percent of the activities supported for
and applied for under the Fire Operations and Firefighter Safety and
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) program areas. The Fire Operations and
Firefighter Safety program area is the largest request area in the
program, representing 13,888 of the 20,136 applications initially
submitted, and nearly $1.377 billion of the $2.468 billion (inclusive
of non-Federal share) requested. EMS applications totaled 216 for
$14,145,120.
Basic Firefighting Equipment
Adapters, Wyes, & Siamese
Foam eductors and foam concentrate
Hose--(3\1/2\ inches or less)
Hose--Large Diameter (LDH 4 inches or larger)
Hydrant and spanner wrenches
Ladders
Nozzles
Portable deluge sets
Power saws
Ropes, harnesses, carabineers, pulleys, etc.
RIT pack
Wildland
Other basic equipment
Communications
Base station
Computer aided dispatch (CAD)
Computers
Headsets
Mobile radios
Mobile date terminal (MDT)
Pagers
Two-way pagers
Portable radios
Repeaters
Other communications
EMS
ALS airway equipment
BLS airway equipment
Suction
Automated external defibrillators (AED)
Defibrillator/monitor
Blood pressure cuffs
Pen lights
Pulse oximeters
Stethoscopes
Thermometers
Backboards
Cervical collars
Splints
Vest extrication devices
Other EMS
EMS/Rescue
AEDs
Powered/mechanical extrication tools/equipment
Stretchers, backboards, splints, etc.
Technical rescue equipment
Various supplies
Other EMS/rescue
Hazardous Materials (Hazmat)
Computers
Decontamination, clean-up, containment, and packaging equipment
Monitoring and sampling devices
Reference library
Spark-proof tools
Suppression
Other Hazmat
Investigation
Cameras
Lights, portable
Computers
Monitoring and sampling devices
Hand tools
Other investigation
Specialized
All-terrain vehicles
Rehab equipment
Compressors/cascade/fill station (fixed)
Skid unit
Compressors/cascade/fill station (mobile)
Thermal imaging devices
Fixed generator
Washer
Portable/mobile generator
Boats (13 feet in length and under)
Portable pump
Other specialized
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE) LIST
Structural
Helmets
Pants, coats
Boots
Goggles
Gloves
Hoods
PASS devices
Accountability systems
Flashlights
Complete set of turnout
Hearing protection
Respiratory
Self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)--30 minutes with face piece--
no extra bottle
SCBA--30 minutes with face piece--with extra bottle
SCBA--45 minutes with face piece--no extra bottle
SCBA--45 minutes with face piece--with extra bottle
SCBA--60 minutes with face piece--no extra bottle
SCBA--60 minutes with face piece--with extra bottle
Spare cylinders-30 minutes
Spare cylinders-45 minutes
Spare cylinders-60 minutes
Face pieces
Respirators
Air-line units
Wildland
Helmets
Boots
Goggles
Gloves
Pants, coats
Jumpsuits/coveralls
Accountability systems
Shelters
Canteens
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
SCBA/chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear environment respirators
Chemical/Biological Suits (Must conform to NFPA 1994, 2001 edition)
Other WMD-related PPE
Other PPE
Encapsulated Suits
Tyveck suits
Splash suits
Escape masks
Proximity and entry suits
Wet and dry suits
Infection control
TRAINING PROGRAM TITLES LIST
Operations (NFPA 472)
Firefighter I, Firefighter II (NFPA 1001)
Instructor Training (NFPA 1041)
Driver/Operator (NFPA 1002)
Officer Training (NFPA 1021)
Basic Wildland Firefighting
Wildland Firefighter Certification
Airport Rescue Firefighting (ARFF) (NFPA 1003)
RIT Training
Confined Space Rescue--Awareness level
Vehicle Rescue
Technical Rescue/Urban Search and Rescue--Awareness level (NFPA 1670/
1006)
Technical Rescue/Urban Search and Rescue--Operations level (NFPA 1670/
1006)
Technical Rescue/Urban Search and Rescue--Technician level (NFPA 1670/
1006)
Hazmat--Technician/Specialist level
Infection Control (NFPA 1581)
Medical First Responder Training
Emergency Medical Technician--Basic (EMT B)
Emergency Medical Technician--Intermediate (EMT I)
Paramedic Training (EMT-P)
Mass Casualty Incident Training (MCI)
NIIMS (Unified Command)
Incident Management Course (IMC)
Integrated Emergency Management Course (IEMC)
Fire Inspector (NFPA 1031)
Fire Investigator (NFPA 1033)
Fire Educator (NFPA 1035)
Telecommunications/Dispatcher
Safety Officer
Question. TOPOFF 2 highlighted the fact that a large-scale
bioterrorism attack does not qualify as a Major Disaster under the
Stafford Act. How did the Emergency declaration differ from the
response and resources that a Disaster would have triggered? Is a
legislative change to the Stafford Act necessary? Will you request such
a change?
Answer. The scenario in TOPOFF 2 did result in an emergency
declaration. The Stafford Act provides authority for the President to
declare either a major disaster or an emergency, as a situation may
warrant. In the case of TOPOFF 2, where the nature of the incident was
not one contemplated for major disaster declarations, an emergency
declaration was determined to be appropriate. The emergency declaration
makes available the same response resources and assistance as would be
available for a major disaster. It also makes available assistance for
individuals under the Individuals and Households Program. The primary
difference in assistance that would be available under a major
disaster, but not for an emergency declaration, is assistance for the
repair, replacement, and restoration of public facilities that sustain
physical damage from the event. This was not a factor in the
bioterrorism attack in TOPOFF 2, nor would it be expected to be a
factor in such types of events in general. In contrast, should a
terrorist event also include fire or explosion, it then would be within
the type of event contemplated as a major disaster under the Act; as a
practical matter, public assistance would then be available to address
physical damages likely to occur in such cases. Accordingly, it is
FEMA's position that the types of events that are addressed by major
disaster or emergency declarations, respectively, are adequate and
appropriate to the types of assistance available under the respective
declaration authorities of the Stafford Act.
Question. What is currently contained in the Strategic National
Stockpile? How will fisccal year 2004 and proposed fiscal year 2005
funds be spent? How much anthrax vaccine is needed? From where will the
Department procure the needed anthrax vaccine, and how long will the
process take?
Answer. The Strategic National Stockpile currently contains anthrax
exposure treatments, smallpox vaccine, nerve agent treatment, and
radiation countermeasures, as well as a limited amount of botulinum
antitoxin.
Proposed Stockpile funding for fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year
2005 will be used to sustain its 12-Hour Push Packages and Vendor
Managed Inventory, to increase stocks for anthrax antibiotics and
vaccine, to purchase smallpox vaccine, and to develop botulinum
antitoxin plasma. The Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Medical
Countermeasures subcommittee, an interagency group co-chaired by the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), DHS, and the Department
of Defense, has recommended the eventual procurement of enough anthrax
vaccine to inoculate 25 million people.
HHS will be the procurement agent for the anthrax vaccine and will
request proposals for the vaccine development. The time requirement for
the actual procurement of the vaccine will be dependent on clinical
trials and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) licensure processes.
The Stockpile currently maintains a small amount of the only FDA-
licensed pre-exposure vaccine against anthrax (Anthrax Vaccine
Adsorbed, or AVA). Currently, it has limited production capacity, and
rectifying that problem would be very expensive and take several years
to accomplish. AVA is not currently licensed for children or for the
elderly. However, in order to ensure that some type of anthrax vaccine
is available until the development and procurement of rPA, DHS and HHS
have signed an interagency agreement for the purchase of AVA through
the Department of the Army. This agreement will provide approximately 2
million doses in fiscal year 2004, 1.5 million doses in fiscal year
2005, and 1.5 million doses in fiscal year 2006.
Question. Please detail how the fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year
2005 proposed funding for Project BioShield will be spent.
Answer. Over the past 10 months, the WMD Medical Countermeasures
subcommittee has developed countermeasures information of interest to
administration policymakers who will make the BioShield procurement
decisions. The WMD subcommittee commissioned an end-to-end analysis of
medical countermeasures to Category ``A'' biological agents (anthrax,
smallpox, plague, botulinum toxin, tularemia, Ebola, and other
hemorrhagic fever viruses). Working groups developed initial
requirements for four high-priority bioweapon countermeasures for which
there is high need and a reasonable expectation that products will be
available in the near term:
--Next generation anthrax vaccine (recombinant Protective Antigen,
rPA)
--Anthrax immune therapy
--Next generation smallpox vaccine (modified vaccinia, MVA or LC16m8)
--Botulinum antitoxin
Question. Provide the status of the Disaster Relief Fund. What are
the carryover funds from fiscal year 2004, current balance?
Answer. As of March 10, 2004, the unobligated balance in the
Disaster Relief Fund was $1.813 billion. The fiscal year 2005 budget
request includes an estimated carryover of $453 million from fiscal
year 2004 into fiscal year 2005.
Question. What is the justification for requesting $0 for the
Metropolitan Medical Response System? Provide a legislative history of
MMRS, including its genesis and original intent. What costs are
incurred by EP&R, and what costs are incurred by local governments?
What will EP&R's role be in the MMRS if no funds are appropriated in
fiscal year 2005? How many cities are expected to continue the program
without Federal resources support?
Answer. The funds that Congress has appropriated for the
Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) over the last several years
have been used to establish certain capabilities, to get the program up
to its baseline, and to facilitate transfer of the program to the
localities for continuation, once the baseline is established. We will
reach the baseline this fiscal year (2004), and therefore no additional
funding is being requested. Since 1995, the Federal Government has
publicly articulated a necessity to improve planning and response to
acts of terrorism involving WMD. The Defense Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act of 1996, Public Law 104-201, states in Section 1412--
Emergency Response Assistance Program, paragraph (h)(2), ``Of the
amount available for the program pursuant to paragraph (1), $10,500,000
is available for use by the Secretary of Defense to assist the
Secretary of Health and Human Services in the establishment of
metropolitan emergency medical response teams (commonly referred to as
`Metropolitan Medical Strike Force Teams') to provide medical services
that are necessary or potentially necessary by reason of a use or
threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction.''
In 1997, HHS initiated the MMRS program to provide support for the
development of a response system in the event of a terrorist attack. On
March 1, 2003, the MMRS program was transferred to DHS.
DHS is responsible for sponsoring the MMRS program, a system-based
approach to mass casualty/surge capacity preparedness and response,
developed to enhance existing local first responder, medical, public
health, and emergency planning in the event of a terrorist attack.
Through contracts administered by FEMA, DHS is responsible for
providing funding and technical assistance to plan, develop, equip, and
identify training to local governments in 125 identified jurisdictions,
based on threat and population.
MMRS program duties have been absorbed as additional duties by
existing FEMA staff. Costs to absorb these duties include approximately
$770,000 to fund regional salaries, set at 50 percent of the time for
18 staff members currently administering the program; approximately
$408,000 to fund two staff years at the Noble Training Center and two
staff years at headquarters; and an estimated $350,000 for travel.
There are no cost-sharing requirements for local governments.
Secretary Ridge has proposed a reorganization (a letter was sent to
Members of Congress on January 26, 2004), wherein the MMRS program for
fiscal year 2004 will be transferred to a newly established Office of
State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness. Under this
arrangement, FEMA would have no further role in the MMRS program for
fiscal year 2004, and there will be no Federal program in fiscal year
2005.
We cannot precisely estimate the number of local jurisdictions that
would continue the MMRS program without Federal resources support. We
are fairly certain that a large number of them, as an element of
prudent preparedness and operational necessity, will attempt to
maintain MMRS-type mass casualty integrated response preparedness and
seek to use Federal funds from other programs to support eligible
portions of MMRS-type capabilities.
Question. Provide specific examples of capacity at the Department
of Housing and Urban Development that FEMA does not have for operating
the Emergency Food and Shelter program.
Answer. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is
the primary Federal agency responsible for the administration of
homeless assistance programs. While FEMA has successfully administered
the Emergency Food and Shelter (EFS) program over the years, there are
ways that the program could be improved by moving it to HUD.
Specifically, the following examples demonstrate the capacity of HUD to
operate the program:
--HUD, as mandated by Congress, is currently assessing all homeless
assistance programs to determine the need for structural
changes to the programs in order to address the President's
goal to end homelessness in the next 10 years. The EFS program
is the only homeless assistance program not included in this
assessment. In order to ensure an integrated approach to
assisting persons facing housing emergencies and to meet this
goal, it would be more logical for the program to be
administered by HUD. FEMA does not have the capacity to perform
this requirement.
--HUD is able to link housing and supportive services for chronically
homeless persons to other comprehensive services through its
numerous other homeless assistance programs and mainstream
housing programs. FEMA does not have any other homeless
assistance programs.
--HUD has the staffing and financial resources to improve the
administration and delivery of the EFS program.
--HUD has the capacity to ensure that homeless assistance/prevention
programs are not duplicative, allowing for scarce resources to
be utilized more efficiently and effectively. Currently, the
EFS program provides funding to the same agencies that HUD
programs fund for the same services and individuals. FEMA does
not have the capacity to monitor which agencies are duplicating
services.
--As FEMA's mission evolves under the Department of Homeland
Security, its resources must be focused entirely on natural
disasters and catastrophic events, such as the terrorist
attacks of 9/11. The EFS program does not fit within the goals
and objectives of DHS or of FEMA.
Question. How many staff vacancies do you have in EP&R at this
time?
Answer. Vacancies in directly funded programs total 256. This
excludes the Disaster Relief Fund and 88 newly funded positions in the
Mitigation program for Flood Map Modernization and Pre-disaster
Mitigation activities.
Question. Provide the numbers of FTE that have been detailed and
transferred out of FEMA since the Department was created. From which
offices were the transfers made, and to which offices did FTE go?
Answer. In fiscal year 2003, there were 200 FTE budgeted for FEMA's
Office of Inspector General, which transferred in its entirety to the
Department. The only transfers of positions that have occurred are
those positions associated with the Office of Inspector General; no
other FEMA positions have been transferred. FEMA has documented
approximately 85 FTE details since March 1, 2003, to various components
of the Department.
Question. Provide the number of positions (filled and unfilled) and
the Salaries and Expense funds spent within each FEMA office, before
February 1, 2003 and currently. Please indicate which positions are in
the regional offices and the headquarters offices. Do not include EP&R
FTE detailed out of the Directorate.
Answer. The tables below provide the positions and Salaries and
Expense in FEMA as of February 1, 2003, and as of February 21, 2004.
FEBRUARY 2003
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Positions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Organization Encumbered Vacant TOTAL \1\ S&E
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Office of Director............. 15 4 19 $968
National Security.............. 27 20 47 905
General Counsel................ 31 3 34 1,184
Equal Rights................... 10 0 10 283
Regional Operations............ 3 0 3 107
Inspector General.............. ( \2\ ) ( \2\ ) ( \2\ ) ( \2\ )
External Affairs............... 52 7 59 1,853
Administration & Resource 4 1 5 210
Planning \3\..................
Human Resources................ 62 2 64 2,103
Financial & Acquisition 130 21 151 4,365
Management....................
Facilities Management.......... 64 7 71 7,876
Response & Recovery............ 327 69 396 12,675
Fed. Insurance & Mitigation.... 153 27 180 5,607
U.S. Fire Administration....... 196 7 203 6,272
National Preparedness.......... 74 7 81 2,759
Information Technology......... 191 17 208 6,867
----------------------------------------
Subtotal Headquarters.... 1,339 192 1,531 54,033
----------------------------------------
Subtotal Regions......... 771 45 816 25,991
----------------------------------------
TOTAL.................... 2,110 237 2,347 80,024
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In 2003, encumbered total excludes positions funded under Disaster
Relief and the Working Capital Fund.
\2\ Inspector General (IG) personnel activity was handled by Bureau of
Public Debt. In fiscal year 2004, the entire IG office was transferred
to the Department of Homeland Security.
\3\ Office abolished in 2003.
FEBRUARY 2004
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Positions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Organization Encumbered Vacant TOTAL \1\ S&E
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Office of the Under Secretary.. 22 4 26 $1,022
National Security.............. 38 12 50 1,579
General Counsel................ 32 3 35 1,221
Equal Rights................... 9 1 10 275
Regional Operations............ 3 1 4 106
External Affairs............... 40 14 54 1,643
Human Resources................ 55 10 65 1,711
Financial & Acquisition 140 16 156 4,504
Management....................
Facilities Management.......... 60 8 68 8,009
Recovery....................... 73 7 80 2,939
Mitigation..................... 148 32 180 5,662
Preparedness................... 249 38 287 8,006
Response....................... 314 51 365 13,582
Information Technology......... 174 22 196 7,013
----------------------------------------
Subtotal Headquarters.... 1,357 219 1,576 57,272
----------------------------------------
Subtotal Regions......... 770 37 807 25,966
----------------------------------------
TOTAL.................... 2,127 256 2,383 83,238
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In 2004, encumbered total excludes positions funded under Disaster
Relief, National Disaster Medical System, and the Working Capital
Fund.
Question. Also please provide the number of Senior Executive
Service positions which FEMA had on Feb. 1, 2003 and the number it has
now. Please include the filled and vacant, indicate political and
career and the division or department. If a position has been moved,
indicate where it was located before and to where it has been
transferred.
Answer. The tables that follow provide the number of Senior
Executive Service (SES) positions in FEMA. FEMA has a set number of SES
slots that the Under Secretary can use for any SES position. Each time
an SES position becomes vacant, the slot returns to the Under
Secretary's ``SES pool'' and the Under Secretary can reallocate it to
another FEMA organization based on a determination of the most critical
SES need. As the charts indicate, from February 2003 to March 2004,
some SES positions were realigned to best support new mission critical
responsibilities.
There was no net change in the number of FEMA's allocated SES slots
between February 2003 and March 2004. In February 2003, FEMA's
allocation was 54 permanent slots and one term allocation for a total
of 55 slots.
As a result of FEMA's transition into DHS, 2 slots were transferred
(the only 2 SES slots transferred outside of FEMA) to the DHS Office of
the Inspector General (OIG). Although OIG originally had three
incumbents, one had retired. However, DHS provided 2 slots from its
overall allocation to FEMA for 2 positions in the Office of the Under
Secretary.
The term appointee in the Information Technology Services Division,
identified in the February 2003 order, resigned and the one slot was
lost. However, again as a result of transitional activities, one slot
was transferred to FEMA from the Department of Health and Human
Services as an encumbered position. Therefore, FEMA's allocation was
then and is now 55 slots.
FEBRUARY 2003 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Encumbered Encumbered Encumbered
Organization Career Non-Career Term Vacant Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Office of the Director................................ 2 1 .......... 1 4
Office of National Security Coordination.............. .......... .......... .......... 1 1
Office of the General Counsel......................... .......... .......... .......... 2 2
External Affairs Division............................. .......... 1 .......... 2 3
Administration & Resource Planning Division........... .......... 1 .......... ......... 1
Human Resources Division.............................. .......... 1 .......... ......... 1
Finance & Acquisition Management Division............. 2 .......... .......... ......... 2
Facilities Management & Services Division............. 2 .......... .......... ......... 2
Mt. Weather Emergency Operations Division............. 1 1 .......... ......... 2
Response & Recovery Directorate....................... 5 1 .......... \2\ 2 8
Federal Insurance & Mitigation Directorate............ 6 .......... .......... ......... 6
U.S. Fire Administration.............................. 2 1 .......... ......... 3
Office of National Preparedness....................... 1 .......... 1 ......... 2
Office of the Inspector General \1\................... 3 .......... .......... ......... 3
Information Technology Services Division.............. 5 1 1 ......... 7
Region 1.............................................. .......... 1 .......... ......... 1
Region 2.............................................. .......... .......... .......... 1 1
Region 3.............................................. .......... .......... .......... 1 1
Region 4.............................................. 1 .......... .......... ......... 1
Region 5.............................................. .......... 1 .......... ......... 1
Region 6.............................................. .......... 1 .......... ......... 1
Region 7.............................................. .......... 1 .......... ......... 1
Region 8.............................................. .......... 1 .......... ......... 1
Region 9.............................................. .......... 1 .......... ......... 1
Region 10............................................. .......... 1 .......... ......... 1
---------------------------------------------------------
Total........................................... 30 \4\ 15 2 8 \3\ 57
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Determination order of February 2003 did not include OIG SES members since they received personnel services
from the Bureau of Public Debt.
\2\ Two additional vacancies were listed on determination order (which were subsequently canceled).
\3\ SES slots allocation (maximum number that could be filled) was 55.
\4\ Ceiling of 19 non-career (political).
MARCH 10, 2004 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (FEMA)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Encumbered Encumbered Encumbered
Organization Career Non-Career Term Vacant Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Office of the Under Secretary--Emergency Preparedness 3 2 .......... 2 7
& Response...........................................
Office of National Security Coordination.............. .......... 1 .......... ......... 1
Office of the General Counsel......................... .......... .......... .......... 1 1
Office of External Affairs Coordination............... .......... .......... .......... 1 1
Human Resources Division.............................. .......... .......... .......... 1 1
Finance & Acquisition Management Division............. 2 .......... .......... 1 3
Facilities Management & Services Division............. 1 .......... .......... 1 2
Mt. Weather Operations................................ 2 1 .......... ......... 3
Response Division..................................... 3 .......... 1 2 6
Recovery Division..................................... 2 1 .......... 2 5
Mitigation Division................................... 4 .......... .......... 2 6
Preparedness Division................................. 2 1 .......... 1 4
Information Technology Division....................... 5 .......... .......... ......... 5
Region 1.............................................. .......... .......... .......... 1 1
Region 2.............................................. .......... .......... 6 1 1
Region 3.............................................. .......... .......... .......... 1 1
Region 4.............................................. 1 .......... .......... ......... 1
Region 5.............................................. .......... 1 .......... ......... 1
Region 6.............................................. .......... 1 .......... ......... 1
Region 7.............................................. .......... 1 .......... ......... 1
Region 8.............................................. .......... 1 .......... ......... 1
Region 9.............................................. .......... 1 .......... ......... 1
Region 10............................................. .......... 1 .......... ......... 1
---------------------------------------------------------
Total........................................... 25 \1\ 12 1 17 55
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Ceiling of 19 non-career available for fill.
Question. Please describe how the amounts of CAP-SSSE funds
provided to each State are determined. Describe the States'
responsibilities and how they've changed, if at all, in recent years.
As income associated with the Federal policy fee has increased, have
funds provided by FEMA to the States increased proportionally?
Answer. The purpose of the Community Assistance Program--State
Support Services Element (CAP-SSSE) is to provide, through a State
grant mechanism, a means to ensure that communities participating in
the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) are achieving the flood
loss reduction objectives of the NFIP. CAP-SSSE is intended to
accomplish this by funding States to provide technical assistance to
NFIP communities and to evaluate community performance in implementing
NFIP floodplain management activities with the goal of building
community and State floodplain management expertise and capability.
Using CAP-SSSE funding, States now provide a significant portion of the
technical assistance to NFIP communities. Without this State support,
FEMA regions would not have enough staff to implement the program. CAP-
SSSE capitalizes on partnering with the staff of State agencies to
provide this assistance.
CAP-SSSE grant fund allocations to States are determined by the
FEMA regional offices. In general, States are provided a baseline
funding amount to develop basic floodplain management capabilities to
assist the FEMA regions in providing technical assistance to
communities. After the baseline amount is established, other factors
such as the number of participating communities in the State,
population growth rate, and number of NFIP insurance policies, as well
as each State's capability to provide assistance and overall technical
support needs, are considered in determining the final allocations. All
States participate in the program and receive funds in varying amounts.
FEMA regional offices and the designated State agency negotiate a CAP-
SSSE agreement that specifies activities and products to be completed
by a State in return for CAP-SSSE funds. There is a 25 percent non-
Federal match for all States receiving CAP-SSSE funds. In some cases, a
State's ability to provide the required funding match may affect
funding levels.
In recent years, States' responsibilities have been changing in
order to support nationwide map modernization implementation.
Specifically, States have been more involved in map modernization
planning activities to assist in implementing this important
initiative. Finally, CAP-SSSE grant funds are not directly linked to
Federal policy fee income. However, total CAP-SSSE funds have increased
by 40 percent over the past 2 years to assist States in their
floodplain management activities and in meeting the challenges of map
modernization.
Question. When will DHS release 2004 CAP-SSSE funds to the FEMA
Regions for distribution to the states?
Answer. Fiscal year 2004 CAP-SSSE funds were released to the FEMA
regions in November 2003. Many States have already received their
fiscal year 2004 CAP-SSSE funding allocation. Some of the FEMA regions
are still negotiating with the States regarding the content of the
State Work Plans. Once the State Work Plans are finalized and approved,
the remaining funds will be awarded.
Question. Are all of the Federal Personnel paid with funds
collected from the Federal Policy fee working directly on National
Flood Insurance Program projects?
Answer. Yes. Each year we carefully monitor the program assignments
paid from the National Flood Insurance Fund to ensure that those
Federal employees are performing NFIP work.
Question. Describe how DHS and HUD are working together to assure
that HUD regulations address installation of manufactured homes
specifically in flood hazard areas.
Answer. On December 27, 2000, the Manufactured Housing Improvement
Act (MHIA) became law (Public Law No. 106-569) and for the first time
established a requirement that HUD develop national model manufactured
home installation standards. DHS has participated in this development
process by submitting to the non-Federal consensus committee,
established by the MHIA, proposed flood disaster-resistant provisions,
consistent with NFIP, which would apply to manufactured homes sited in
flood hazard areas. On December 18, 2003, the consensus committee
approved DHS' proposed provisions and included them in the final
recommended national model manufactured home installation standards
submitted to the HUD Secretary. In accordance with the law, the HUD
Secretary has 1 year (December 18, 2004) in which to act on these
recommended standards.
Question. Will DHS coordinate with HUD to include in existing
Federal regulations (24 CFR Part 3282.303(c)), a requirement that State
administrative agency plans must require licensed installers and/or
dealers to determine whether a proposed manufactured housing site is
located in a FEMA identified flood hazard area before installation?
Answer. Changes to 24 CFR Part 3282.303(c) are not anticipated by
HUD. Rather, under the MHIA, State installation programs for their
licensed installers and/or dealers must include standards that meet or
exceed the protection provided by the national model manufactured home
installation standards that are currently being developed by HUD. A key
provision of the model standards reads, ``Prior to the initial
installation of a manufactured home, it shall be determined whether the
home site lies wholly or partly within a special flood hazard area.''
In this way, States will be fulfilling 3282.303(c) in assuring that
homes are properly installed in their States.
Question. Will DHS coordinate with HUD to require manufacturers
installation manuals to specifically state whether model installation
designs are intended for use in flood hazard areas?
Answer. Under the MHIA, manufacturers shall provide with each home
designs and instructions for the installation of the manufactured home
that have been approved by a design approval primary inspection agency
(DAPIA). Once the national model installation standards have been
established, DAPIAs may not issue approvals unless the designs and
instructions for installation provide equal or greater protection than
the protection provided under the national model standards. A key
provision in the new national model installation standards is that
manufactured homes located wholly or partly within flood hazard areas
shall be installed using methods and practices that minimize damage in
accordance with the flood damage reduction requirements contained in
the NFIP regulations. Specific to foundation systems used in the
manufacturers' instructions, the standards also require that, in flood
hazard areas, the piers, anchoring, and support systems shall be
capable of resisting loads associated with design flood and wind
events.
Question. What priority are you giving to preparing new floodplain
delineations to replace or refine approximated flood hazard areas,
rather than simply converting them to a digital format? How much of the
fiscal year 2005 request for flood map modernization will be spent on
preparing new floodplain delineations? On digitization of existing
paper maps?
Answer. FEMA's current priority is working with States and local
governments to identify those communities at greatest risk and to
provide updated geospatial data. The long-term performance goal for the
Multi-Hazard Flood Map Modernization Program is for the U.S. population
to have up-to-date digital flood hazard data and maps for flood-prone
areas. FEMA is developing flood data and producing maps for communities
that reflect the level of analysis and effort commensurate with the
flood risk faced by each community. Part of the mapping process
involves a needs assessment during which FEMA works with the local
community to determine mapping needs and to assess whether existing
local data are sufficiently accurate to meet local needs and NFIP
criteria. All assessments will be coordinated with States, regional
agencies, and local communities.
During the next 6 months, FEMA will be working with national,
State, and local partners and stakeholders to assemble an integrated 5-
year implementation plan for the Multi-Hazard Flood Map Modernization
Program. We will use the plan to establish goals and baseline with
existing priorities; to document and understand flood map update needs
identified by State, regional, and local partners and stakeholders; and
to develop prioritization criteria and a sequence for scoping counties
and watersheds in the priority areas based on floodplain management,
hydrologic, hydraulic, and terrain needs. The plan that will be
developed is the MHIP for fiscal years 2004-2008.
FEMA will provide a precise accounting of the new engineering
studies and floodplain boundary delineations once we complete the
development of the MHIP; will scope the map update projects identified
in coordination with State, regional, and local partners and
stakeholders; will determine the contributions that may be made by
State, regional, and local partners through the Cooperating Technical
Partners (CTP) program; and will contract the required map updates with
our contractors and with participants in our CTP program.
FEMA plans to update the flood maps based on the level of flood
risk associated with an area and the accuracy of the existing data for
that area. For some areas, there may not be a need to perform a new
engineering study because the flood hazards and related risk are
accurately portrayed on the flood map and are appropriate for the area.
For example, for recently mapped areas, we will use the accurate
available data to create a digital map.
Our modernization effort is predicated on using the best available
data and clear data standards. To that end, it is not our intention to
convert inaccurate flood maps to a digital format.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
Question. I have noted that the Emergency Preparedness and Response
Directorate, which includes the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), has slowly shifted its emphasis from all-hazards to terrorism.
The President's budget request includes legislative language that would
give ``priority to homeland security activities.'' The intent of FEMA,
however, was to insure broad-based, all-hazards approaches to State and
local preparedness and response efforts. This shift is cause for great
concern.
I strongly believe that a reliable emergency infrastructure--
adequately resourced at the Federal, State and local levels--must build
upon the all-hazards emergency management approach and address the
needs of the entire emergency system, including, but not limited to:
law enforcement, fire, emergency medical services, public health, the
911 communications system and emergency management. Currently, a
greater focus on terrorism has increased the role of emergency managers
and the immediate needs of all responders to ensure adequate
preparedness. Meanwhile, natural hazards continue to be the pervasive
disaster that occurs regularly. In 2003, for example, there were 56
major disaster declarations, 19 emergency declarations and 46 fire
suppression authorizations--none of which were terrorist-related.
Mr. Brown, would you agree that natural disaster preparedness must
not suffer as a result of homeland security efforts, but rather should
be viewed as the most frequent opportunity to validate domestic
preparedness efforts and to also build best practices? If not, please
explain why you think our emergency response system must be focused on
terrorism rather than all-hazards and how that benefits us.
Answer. Although the Department of Homeland Security is focused on
terrorism and protecting the homeland, the President, Secretary Ridge,
and I are committed to an all-hazards approach of preparedness,
response, and recovery from all events, including natural disasters.
Recent efforts to improve response to and recovery from a terrorism
event do not diminish FEMA's commitment to dealing with the destruction
of a natural disaster--just the opposite. FEMA has enjoyed a long
history of focusing on all hazards, and I believe that being part of
DHS has strengthened that approach. As you mention, FEMA has
successfully continued to respond to and recover from a multitude of
natural disasters in the past year. At the same time, these efforts do
provide us with opportunities to better prepare not only for terrorism
events, but also for catastrophic events, whether they be natural or
caused by terrorism.
Question. The President's fiscal year 2005 budget request for the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) proposes changes to the Emergency
Management Performance Grants (EMPG) Program that would severely impact
State and local emergency management. In the fiscal year 2003
Consolidated Appropriations law (Public Law 108-7), Congress called the
EMPG Program ``the backbone of the Nation's emergency management
system.'' In fiscal year 2004, Congress increased EMPG funding to $179
million, directed that EMPG would remain in the Emergency Preparedness
and Response Directorate where the focus is an all-hazards approach to
emergency management, and ordered the continuation of funding personnel
expenses.
I was surprised to read, therefore, that the President's fiscal
year 2005 request cuts EMPG funding by $9 million and also proposes a
25 percent cap on the use of funds to support personnel salaries. Since
the functions of emergency management are almost 100 percent personnel
driven (i.e., planning, coordinating, exercise design, public
education, and hazards at the State and local levels and would result
in losses of 70 percent of their emergency management staff response to
and recovery from actual incidents), this provision would have a
devastating effect on emergency management agencies nationwide. The cap
would eliminate current personnel responsible for planning for and
responding to all
Mr. Brown, now is the time when we should be building the capacity
of our Nation's emergency management agencies. Why, then, is this
Administration seeking to weaken it?
Answer. The EMPG personnel cap is intended to ensure that State and
local governments assume responsibility for their personnel costs.
Effective State and local emergency management capability is not the
primary responsibility of the Federal Government, rather, it is a
shared responsibility. In exchange for absorbing some of these
personnel costs, DHS will increase the amount of funding that goes to
the State and local governments for training and exercises. If the
State and local governments can reprioritize some of their monies to
keep their personnel intact, then DHS will spend the funding freed up
by that on training and exercises to make sure they are still capable
of doing what DHS needs them to do. DHS feels that by imposing the
personnel cap, the Department will be able to do more to build the
capabilities of the States rather than weaken them.
Question. I am very concerned about the state of the floodmap
modernization program. I saw in your budget submission that almost $40
million of fiscal year 2004 funds would be distributed this year.
However, my home State of Vermont has received no funds thus far, and
it appears that several of the state's grants requests have been acted
upon very slowly if at all.
You are asking for another $293 million this year for the program,
yet I am beginning to question whether the benefits of this program are
really flowing to the communities that need to update their maps, and I
wonder whether the program is taking too broad an approach to be useful
at the local level.
Mr. Brown, can you please tell me specifically what this program is
going to do for my home State of Vermont. Is FEMA going to stick to a
verbal commitment made to the State to support its Fluvial Hazards Risk
Assessment Initiative through Map Modernization funding opportunities?
What is the status of Vermont's grant applications for other programs
that will help prepare for flooding, such as the Pre-Disaster
Mitigation program? Answer. FEMA's Mitigation Division administers two
major programs that involve extensive coordination and planning with
State and local officials--the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program (PDM)
and the Multi-Hazard Flood Map Modernization Program.
FEMA's PDM fiscal year 2003 funds will be awarded on a competitive
basis with a national priority on funding mitigation projects that
address National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) repetitive flood loss
properties. The national evaluation of fiscal year 2003 PDM competitive
grant applications submitted by the October 6th application deadline
was completed on November 21, 2003. All projects funded under the PDM
program must be cost-effective, consistent with environmental laws and
regulations, and contribute to a long-term mitigation solution.
The sub-applications identified for selection will be approved for
funding in phases. We have approved a list of sub-applications
identified as Phase I and Phase II. An application from North Troy,
Vermont, The River Road Acquisition Project, is included in Phase II.
FEMA's Region I staff soon will be contacting Vermont Emergency
Management staff to discuss program and grants management requirements
that must be addressed in order to make a final determination and to
proceed with a grant award for this project. A final phase of PDM
awards will follow later this spring. Because of the competitive nature
of this program, details about the status of the remaining sub-
applications cannot be released until funding decisions are made. At
that time, I will provide an update to you. In fiscal year 2003,
Vermont also received a $248,275 non-competitive planning grant to help
the State and its local communities protect lives and property by
developing multi-hazard mitigation plans.
In addition, we have a number of Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
(HMGP) projects that address flood hazards underway in Vermont. FEMA
recently obligated $233,575 for 13 projects and planning grants in
various Vermont communities with HMGP funds made available after
disaster declaration DR-1428-VT (severe storms and flooding, July
2002). The final project to be awarded under DR-1428-VT is in Richford,
Vermont. FEMA is providing $54,375 for a project to relocate the town's
water main from a precarious location under the river where it is
subject to damage from ongoing scouring. The U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers is the lead agency on this project. We are waiting to review
their environmental assessment and expect, if there are no problems, to
obligate funds this spring. Vermont Emergency Management currently is
soliciting applications for HMGP projects that will be funded following
disaster declaration DR-1488-VT (severe storms and flooding, September
2003).
Under the Multi-Hazard Flood Map Modernization Program, FEMA has
provided $800,000 to fund flood map updates for Windsor County, Windham
County, Washington County, and the Towns of Hinesburg, Stowe, and West
Rutland. FEMA plans to distribute preliminary versions of the updated
flood maps for Windsor and Windham Counties and the three towns during
this summer. FEMA will send these preliminary versions to community and
county officials, State officials, and other key stakeholders to
facilitate a thorough review. The study being performed for Washington
County, which is still in the scoping phase, includes a component of
the Fluvial Hazard Morphology initiative, specifically, riverine
erosion assessment protocol and tools developed by the Vermont Agency
of Natural Resources.
The FEMA regional office staff in Boston has a regional business
plan that describes its 5-year strategic plan for executing the Multi-
Hazard Flood Map Modernization Program. The Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources has expressed an interest in taking some responsibility for
managing local flood hazard data and is preparing its State business
plan to identify the activities it desires to undertake and its 5-year
flood map project priorities. FEMA will use this information to update
the regional and National business plans for the Multi-Hazard Flood Map
Modernization Program.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Herb Kohl
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANTS
Question. I am concerned about the Administration's budget cuts and
policy changes to the Emergency Management Performance Grants. First, I
disagree with the President's decision to move the grants from FEMA to
the Office of Domestic Preparedness. No one in my State thinks this is
necessary, and they are concerned that this diminishes the role and
power of FEMA. FEMA was one of the most successful agencies to be
folded into Homeland Security and it would be a shame if the Department
undermined FEMA by taking away programs it handled well in the past. I
think the Administration should avoid trying to fix grant programs that
are not broken.
In addition, not only is there $9 million less than last year for
the grants, but the $170 million that is included in the President's
budget will no longer fund all hazard planning. This is a real
disappointment for county emergency managers in my state. They used
these funds to help them prepare for terrorist attacks as well as
natural disasters like floods and tornados. A reduction in funding,
especially when adjusted for inflation, could force some counties to
reduce staff as well as leave them unprepared for non-terrorism
catastrophes.
Why did the Administration reduce these funds, and why did they
prohibit these funds from being used for all hazard planning?
Answer. The Emergency Management Planning Grant Program provides
vital support to the State and local emergency management system. The
purpose of EMPG is to assist the development, maintenance, and
improvement of State and local emergency management capabilities, which
are key components of a comprehensive national emergency management
system for disasters and emergencies that may result from natural
disasters or accidental or man-caused events. At this time, the
Administration's priority is assisting states in building capabilities
for homeland security.
These grants are a critical part of our homeland security efforts
and an existing strength that must be maintained. The President's
fiscal year 2005 request includes $170 million for continuation of this
program, which is the most any administration has requested for this
program. In fact, the fiscal year 2005 request is $20 million or more
than 10 percent above the fiscal year 2004 request.
The funding increase, and restriction on the amount of funds that
can be used for salaries, will result in a more robust emergency
planning and management system at the State and local effort.
Follow up: The Administration has also decided to allow only 25
percent of these grants to be used to pay personnel costs. The counties
in my State have used these grants to hire people that facilitate
disaster planning and help the local communities to make the best use
of the State and Federal funds they receive. The emergency management
community in my State has told me that this would force them to lay-off
workers and planners, leaving them less prepared for any disaster. Will
the Administration change its position on capping personnel costs, and
if not, how do you expect the states and counties to continue to pay
for this staff?
Answer. The Administration's fiscal year 2005 request for the
Emergency Management Planning Grants is $170 million, which is higher
than any previous request for this program. The funds will be used to
assist the development, maintenance, and improvement of State and local
emergency management capabilities, with a focus on building local
capabilities for homeland security.
As you note, though, the request does cap the amount that states
can use for salaries, thereby significantly increasing the amount of
funds available for planning, training and exercises. The
Administration's budget request still allows for award funds to support
salaries. The request shifts the emphasis to Federal support for
planning while properly aligning responsibility for staffing and
salaries with the states and local governments. The Administration and
Department have consistently supported the idea that homeland security
is a shared responsibility between Federal and State and local
governments. Additionally, it is important to remember that we are
operating in a fiscal and security environment where we must ensure
maximum security benefits are derived from every security dollar. To do
that, we must be able to take a new look at the way in which we
allocate resources, including sharing financial responsibility with our
State and local partners.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Cochran. Our next hearing on the budget request for
the Department of Homeland Security will be held on Tuesday,
March 2, in this same room. At that time, the Under Secretary
for Science and Technology, Dr. Charles McQueary, and the Under
Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection, Mr. Frank Libutti, will be here to discuss the
budget for the programs under their jurisdiction.
Until then, the subcommittee stands in recess.
[Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., Thursday, February 26, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday,
March 2.]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 2, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., in room SD-124, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Cochran, Stevens, and Byrd.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
STATEMENTS OF:
DR. CHARLES E. McQUEARY, UNDER SECRETARY, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE
LIEUTENANT GENERAL FRANK LIBUTTI, UNDER SECRETARY, INFORMATION
ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. The meeting will please come to order.
We appreciate very much the attendance of our witnesses at
today's hearing. We continue our review, today, of the fiscal
year 2005 budget request for the Department of Homeland
Security, with specific consideration being given to the
programs and activities of the Science and Technology
Directorate, and the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate.
I am pleased to welcome the Under Secretary for Science and
Technology, Dr. Charles E. McQueary, and the Under Secretary
for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection,
Lieutenant General Frank Libutti.
The President is requesting $1.04 billion for Science and
Technology, and $865 million for Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection.
We appreciate the witnesses submitting their statements in
advance. They will be printed in the hearing record and we
invite you to make any remarks that you think would be helpful
to the Committee's understanding of the budget request. But
before proceeding, I want to yield to my distinguished friend
and colleague, Senator Robert C. Byrd, for any opening
statement that he may wish to make.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Mr. Under Secretary McQueary and Mr. Under
Secretary Libutti.
Oh, by the way, Happy Birthday. Happy Birthday.
Dr. McQueary. Thank you.
HOW IAIP FUNDS ARE BEING SPENT
Senator Byrd. Over 1 year ago, the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate was established to
enhance the sharing of threat information amongst all levels of
Government and the private sector, to assess vulnerabilities of
our critical infrastructure sectors, and to provide resources
to protect them. However, it has been quite difficult for this
subcommittee to receive information on what your budget is
being spent on, or how the funding is being awarded.
I understand that our staffs had a constructive meeting
yesterday, and I hope that this cooperation will continue. Not
only do we hope it, but we expect it to continue.
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
When it comes to protecting this Nation's critical
infrastructure, the Administration tells us that the private
sector is taking care of it. Yet, there is no mandate on the
private sector to make investments in security. Their
involvement is voluntary. There are no benchmarks for Congress
to use in assessing the private sector's role in critical
infrastructure protection.
And so that is why, today, I am sending a letter asking the
General Accounting Office, which is an arm of the Congress, to
provide this subcommittee with an assessment of private sector
investments to improve the security of our critical
infrastructure such as chemical plants and ports since
September 11, 2001.
INFORMATION ANALYSIS
Regarding information analysis, it is a mystery to me why
this Administration, which celebrated the creation of this new
department as a great success, has gone to great lengths to
splinter its functions in the area of intelligence.
The President created the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center, but gave primary responsibility to the CIA. He followed
up this decision by establishing the Terrorist Screening Center
within the FBI, creating further confusion about this
Department's role in intelligence sharing.
Experts who follow this situation are concerned. The
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, better known
as the Gilmore Commission, concluded in December that the IAIP
directorate ``does not have significant analytical power'' to
do what it takes, to analyze and disseminate intelligence
information.
IAIP STAFFING
In the area of staffing, the IAIP directorate is barely
keeping its head above water. After a year in existence, IAIP
is struggling to meet its staffing goals. My understanding is
that very few of the authorized intelligence analysts are on
board.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY BUDGET
Let me turn now to Science and Technology. The Science and
Technology Directorate's budget is the eighth largest R&D
budget in the Federal Government. The budget request for fiscal
year 2005 is just over $1 billion. There is concern whether
this budget is sufficient to address the various threats that
we face, such as a biological, chemical or radiological attack.
Last year this subcommittee received hundreds of requests
from members for research and technology projects at major
universities. Rather than earmark projects, the subcommittee
significantly increased the university account and allowed the
department to select projects through a competitive process.
Unfortunately, the President responded to this approach by
proposing to substantially reducing funding for this purpose
next year.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on why this
cut is appropriate.
Mr. Chairman, I beg you to pardon my tardiness and I thank
you for allowing me to proceed with my opening statement.
Senator Cochran. Dr. McQueary, we have a copy of your
statement and we invite you to make any comments and remarks
about the budget request which you think would be helpful to
our understanding of the request that you're making.
You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF DR. CHARLES E. MC QUEARY
Dr. McQueary. Thank you, Chairman Cochran. And Senator
Byrd.
It's been several months since I have appeared before you
and I welcome the opportunity to do so again.
It is a pleasure to be here today and have a chance to talk
about the research and development activities of the Department
of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate.
The Nation's advantage in science and technology is key to
securing the homeland. The most important mission for the
Science and Technology Directorate is to support the efforts of
the dedicated men and women who protect and secure our
homeland.
HIGHLIGHTS OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS
When I first reported to you about activities last year, we
had just begun our work. The Directorate has accomplished much
since its inception last March. And I would like to give you a
few brief highlights, and several others are included in the
written testimony that I have submitted.
First, we have deployed monitoring systems that operate
continuously to detect biological pathogens in approximately 30
cities in the United States. We have also set up test beds to
provide accurate radiation and nuclear warnings at air and
marine cargo points, ports in cooperation with the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey. We have established the
first series of interoperability guidelines for the Nation's
wireless emergency communications network.
In another effort, we have greatly reduced the time it
takes to develop national standards for technologies to protect
the homeland.
Our new standards for radiation detection equipment will
help put needed technologies into the hands of first responders
quickly. And, our Homeland Security Advance Research Project
Agency, or HSARPA, has started extensive research for next
generation biological and chemical, as well as radiological and
nuclear detectors.
We have awarded the first round of 100 Homeland Security
fellowships and scholarships to build U.S. leadership in
science and technology. And we have also established the first
university-based Homeland Security Center of Excellence to
address both the targets and means of terrorism. And, we have
become active contributors in numerous inter-agency working
groups throughout the Federal Government.
In accomplishing this, we have doubled the staff of this
directorate with some of the country's brightest and most
dedicated people. We started the Directorate on March 1, last
year, with 87 people and 53 of those were transferred in bulk
from the Environmental Measurements Laboratory in Manhattan,
New York. So the basic staff was quite small for carrying the
program that we had responsibility for forward. Today, we are
at about 210 people, which is exactly where we had hoped to be
on our plan of adding staff to the organization.
However, as we all know, the threats to our homeland remain
diverse and daunting. We must constantly monitor current and
emerging threats, and assess our vulnerabilities to them. And
we must develop new and improved capabilities to counter them,
and be prepared to respond to and recover from a potential
attack.
PRIORITIZATION OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS
The Science and Technology Directorate has prioritized its
research and development efforts based on the directives and
recommendations of many sources, including the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, President Bush's National Strategy and
nine Homeland Security Presidential Directives as well as the
report of the National Academies of Science on making the
Nation safer, and reports from the Gilmore, Bremer, and Hart-
Rudman Committees.
We have identified and integrated the information in these
sources for review and evaluation by our scientific staff, and
it provides the basis for determining the Research and
Development needed to meet our mission.
We recognize that many organizations are contributing to
the Homeland Security's Science and Technology base. Congress
recognized this as well and the Homeland Security Act of 2002
directed the Under Secretary of Science and Technology to
coordinate the Federal Government's civilian efforts to
identify and develop countermeasures to current and emerging
threats. We take this responsibility very seriously.
We began this coordination process by evaluating and
producing a report on the Department of Homeland Security
research and development activities underway that were not
under the direct cognizance of the Under Secretary for Science
and Technology. Where appropriate, Science and Technology will
absorb these research and development functions in this fiscal
year.
We are now initiating the effort needed to coordinate
Homeland Security research and development across the entire
United States Government. Discussions are ongoing with the
Federal departments and agencies, as well as the Office of
Management and Budget, the Office of Science and Technology
Policy, and the Homeland Security Council to ensure the best
possible coordination.
FISCAL YEAR 2005 PLANS
At this time, I would like to briefly describe our fiscal
year 2005 plans. We have an overall budget request of $1.04
billion, which you identified, which is an increase of $126.5
million or about 14 percent over fiscal year 2004. With these
funds Science and Technology will continue to make progress in
securing the homeland.
For example, under President Bush's new biological-
surveillance initiative, which accounts for most of the
increase in funding, additional capability will be implemented
quickly in the top-threat urban areas to provide more than
twice the current capability.
We will continue to provide the science and technology
capabilities and enduring partnerships needed to develop
methods and tools to test and assess threats and
vulnerabilities to protect our critical infrastructure and
enhance information exchange.
We will continue to work in cyber security both through
partnerships and by creating low-cost and high impact solutions
to identified cyber security challenges. And of course, this is
done in concert with my good friend, General Libutti.
We will wrap-up our work in counter-MANPADS to improve
technology to protect commercial aircraft from the man-portable
air defense systems or the shoulder-fired missiles, which
present a vulnerability to our commercial aircraft industry.
We will award contracts in fiscal year 2005 for integrating
commercial prototype equipment on selected commercial aircraft
and conduct test evaluation including a live-fire range test.
In conclusion, this year the scientists and engineers in
the Science and Technology Directorate have accomplished more
than I could have expected. I am proud to have shared some of
these success stories with you today. We have appended a more
comprehensive summary of the accomplishments to date for the
record.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Yet, we also recognize that there is much more to do and we
will be working just as hard in fiscal year 2005. I look
forward to working with you, with my colleagues in other
Federal agencies, and with private industry and academia to
continue this work and improve our ability to protect our
homeland and our way of life.
This concludes my prepared statement, and I will be
prepared to answer questions at the appropriate time.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Charles E. McQueary
INTRODUCTION
Good morning. Chairman Cochran, Senator Byrd, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to be with you today to
discuss the research and development activities of the Department of
Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate.
The Nation's advantage in science and technology is key to securing
the homeland. The most important mission for the Science and Technology
Directorate is to develop and deploy cutting-edge technologies and new
capabilities so that the dedicated men and women who serve to protect
and secure our homeland can perform their jobs more effectively and
efficiently--these men and women are my customers.
When I last reported to you about our activities, we had just
started our work. Since its inception less than a year ago, the Science
and Technology Directorate has:
--deployed continuously operating biological pathogen detection
systems to approximately 30 United States cities;
--set up testbeds for radiation and nuclear warnings at air and
marine cargo ports in cooperation with the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey;
--established the first series of interoperability guidelines for the
Nation's wireless emergency communications network;
--established the first national standards guidelines for radiation
detection equipment;
--awarded the first Homeland Security Fellowships and Scholarships;
--established the first Homeland Security University Center of
Excellence;
--transferred the Plum Island Animal Disease Center from the
Department of Agriculture to the Science and Technology
Directorate;
--engaged private industry in bringing innovative and effective
solutions to homeland security problems through the interagency
Technical Support Working Group and issuance of HSARPA's first
two Broad Agency Announcements and a Small Business Innovative
Research Program solicitation;
--initiated a development and demonstration program to assess the
technical and economic viability of adapting military
countermeasures to the threat of man portable anti-aircraft
missiles for commercial aircraft;
--collaborated with and assisted other components of the Department
to enhance their abilities to meet their missions and become
active contributors in interagency working groups--all while
staffing this Directorate with some of this country's brightest
and most dedicated people.
I continue to be energized by and proud of the scientists,
engineers, managers, and support staff in the Science and Technology
Directorate. We have accomplished a great deal in a short amount of
time and are positioning the Directorate to make continuing
contributions to the homeland security mission of the Department.
However, the threats to our homeland remain diverse and daunting.
We must constantly monitor current and emerging threats and assess our
vulnerabilities to them, develop new and improved capabilities to
counter them, and mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks should they
occur. The Science and Technology Directorate must also enhance the
conventional missions of the Department to protect and provide
assistance to civilians in response to natural disasters, law
enforcement needs, and other activities such as maritime search and
rescue.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE ORGANIZATION
Because our Department is relatively new, I'd like to describe the
way we are structured. We have four key offices in the Science &
Technology Directorate, each of which has an important role in
implementing the Directorate's RDT&E activities. Individuals with
strong credentials have been appointed to head each office and we
continue to strategically add highly skilled technical, professional
and support staff. These offices are: Plans, Programs and Budgets;
Research and Development; Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects
Agency; and Systems Engineering and Development. In addition, we have
created the Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations and
Incident Management to offer scientific advice and support.
Crosscutting the four key offices, the Science and Technology
Directorate is implementing its activities through focused portfolios
that address biological, chemical, high explosives, radiological and
nuclear, and cyber threats; support the research and development needs
of the operational units of the Department; support the development of
standards; develop an enduring R&D capability for homeland security;
and receive valuable input from private industry and academia as well
as national and Federal laboratories. I will talk about the offices
first and then about the portfolios.
Office of Plans, Programs and Budgets
The Office of Plans, Programs and Budgets operates under the
supervision of Dr. Penrose Albright. He has organized this office into
the portfolios I just mentioned, each of which is focused on a
particular discipline or activity; taken together, these portfolios
span the Directorate's mission space. As I will cover the portfolios in
detail later in this testimony, I will limit myself here to a summary
explanation. The staff of each portfolio is charged with being expert
in their particular area; with understanding the activities and
capabilities extant in Federal agencies and across the broad research
and development community; and with developing a strategic plan for
their particular portfolio, to include near-, mid-, and long-range
research and development activities. In addition, we have staff that is
charged with understanding the threat from a technical perspective,
with integrating the various portfolios into a coherent overall plan,
and with developing the corresponding budget and monitoring its
financial execution.
Finally, the Office of Plans, Programs and Budget is responsible
for executing the Directorate's implementation responsibilities for the
SAFETY (Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies)
Act.
Office of Research and Development
We are fortunate to have Dr. Maureen McCarthy as our Director of
Science and Technology's Office of Research and Development (ORD). Dr.
McCarthy has served as Chief Scientist for the National Nuclear
Security Administration and the Department of Energy (DOE) and was
previously DOE's senior representative to the Homeland Security
Transition Planning Office. She will lead the office as it strives to
provide the Nation with an enduring capability in research,
development, demonstration, testing and evaluation of technologies to
protect the homeland. This office also plans to provide stewardship to
the scientific community and to preserve and broaden the leadership of
the United States in science and technology.
Activities within ORD address the resources that can be brought to
bear to better secure the homeland through the participation of
universities, national laboratories, Federal laboratories and research
centers. Directors have been appointed to lead efforts in each of these
areas and staff is being added rapidly.
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency
Dr. David Bolka joined us in September 2003 as director of the
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, known as HSARPA.
Dr. Bolka made significant contributions in advancing technical and
scientific projects in his prior work with Lucent Technologies and Bell
Laboratories, following a notable career in the United States Navy.
HSARPA is the external research-funding arm of the Science and
Technology Directorate. It has at its disposal the full range of
contracting vehicles and the authority under the Homeland Security Act
to engage businesses, federally funded research and development
centers, universities and other government partners in an effort to
gather and develop viable concepts for advanced technologies to protect
the homeland.
HSARPA's mission, as stated in the Homeland Security Act of 2002,
is to support basic and applied homeland security research to promote
revolutionary changes in technologies that would promote homeland
security; advance the development, testing and evaluation, and
deployment of homeland security technologies; and accelerate the
prototyping and deployment of technologies that would address homeland
security vulnerabilities. Its customers are State and local first
responders, and Federal agencies that are allied with homeland security
such as the United States Coast Guard, United States Secret Service,
the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency and others.
About 60 percent of the Science and Technology Directorate's
appropriation in fiscal year 2004 will be executed directly through the
private sector with HSARPA managing about half of that. At least 5 to
10 percent of HSARPA's funds are dedicated for revolutionary, long-
range research for breakthrough technologies and systems.
Office of Systems Engineering and Development
Mr. John Kubricky joined us in early October 2003 as our Director
of the Office of Systems Engineering and Development (SE&D). He is
tasked with leading the implementation and transition of large-scale or
pilot systems to the field through a rapid, efficient and disciplined
approach to project management. Mr. Kubricky previously served as
Advanced Program Development Manager for Northrop Grumman and has held
senior positions with California Microwave and Westinghouse Defense.
One of the Science and Technology Directorate's challenges is to
evaluate a wide spectrum of military and commercial technologies so
rapid, effective and affordable solutions can be transitioned to the
Department's customers that include first responders and Federal
agencies. In some cases, military technologies could be candidates for
commercialization, but rigorous systems engineering processes need to
be applied to ensure a successful transition. SE&D's role is to
identify and then, in a disciplined manner, retire risks associated
with such technologies to ready them for deployment to the field. In
doing so, the office must view each technology through the prism of
affordability, performance and supportability--all critical to end-
users.
SE&D must weigh considerations such as the urgency for a solution,
consequences of the threat, safety of the product, and lifecycle
support as new products are introduced. Products must be user friendly,
have a minimum of false alarms, require little or no training and
consistently provide accurate results. SE&D will demonstrate and test
solutions before they are released to the field, and will validate that
those solutions meet user expectations.
Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations and Incident
Management
We created the Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations and
Incident Management to serve as the Science and Technology
Directorate's technical support for crisis operations. The office
provides scientific advice and support to the Office of the Secretary
of Homeland Security in assessing and responding to threats against the
homeland. This office's activities are primarily focused on the
biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear threats.
results from current research and development (r&d) spending and fiscal
YEAR 2005 PLANS: PORTFOLIO DETAILS
As I have mentioned, the Science and Technology Directorate has
organized its efforts into research and development portfolios that
span the set of product lines of the Directorate.
Four portfolios address specific terrorist threats:
--Biological Countermeasures
--Chemical Countermeasures
--High Explosive Countermeasures
--Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures
Four portfolios crosscut these threats:
--Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and Assessment--this portfolio
includes our support to the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate, including our critical
infrastructure protection and cybersecurity activities.
--Standards
--Emerging Threats
--Rapid Prototyping
We also have portfolios that support the operational units of the
Department (Border and Transportation Security; Emergency Preparedness
and Response, United States Coast Guard and United States Secret
Service) in both their homeland security and conventional missions.
Our University and Fellowship Programs portfolio addresses the need
to build an enduring science and technology capability and support
United States leadership in science and technology.
Our most recent program, Counter-MANPADS, is seeking to improve
technologies to protect commercial aircraft from the threat of MAN-
Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS).
In addition, the Science and Technology Directorate is responsible
for the management of one of the United States government's E-Gov
Initiatives, the SAFECOM Program. There are tens of thousands of State
and local public safety agencies, and 100 Federal law enforcement
agencies that depend on interoperable wireless communications. The
SAFECOM (Wireless Public SAFEty Interoperable COMmunications) program
is the umbrella initiative to coordinate all Federal, State, local, and
Tribal users to achieve national wireless communications
interoperability. The placement of SAFECOM in the Department of
Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate allows it full
access to the scientific expertise and resources needed to help our
Nation achieve true public safety wireless communications
interoperability.
At this time I would like to briefly describe some of our
accomplishments to date and our fiscal year 2005 plans. As can be seen
in the following chart, we have an overall fiscal year 2005 budget
request of $1.039 billion, which is an increase of $126.5 million (13.9
percent) over the fiscal year 2004 levels. The request includes $35
million for construction of facilities. In addition, the increase
includes President Bush's request for an additional $65 million to
enhance and expand the BioWatch Program.
[Dollars in millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increases/Decreases from
Fiscal year Proposed fiscal year 2004 to 2005
Budget activity Fiscal year 2004 less fiscal year -------------------------------
2003 Amount rescission 2005 Amount Percent
Amount Amount increase
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Budget Activity M&A............. $0.0 $44.2 $52.6 $8.4 19.1
Salary and expenses......... 0.0 44.2 52.6 8.4 19.1
Budget Activity R&D............. 553.5 868.7 986.7 118.0 13.6
Bio Countermeasures (incl. 362.6 285.0 407.0 122.0 42.8
NBACC).....................
High-Explosives 0.0 9.5 9.7 0.2 2.1
Countermeasures............
Chemical Countermeasures.... 7.0 52.0 53.0 1.0 1.9
R/N Countermeasures......... 75.0 126.3 129.3 3.0 2.4
TVTA (incl. CIP & Cyber).... 36.1 100.1 101.9 1.8 1.8
Standards................... 20.0 39.0 39.7 0.7 1.9
Components.................. 0.0 34.0 34.0 0.0 0.0
University & Fellowship 3.0 68.8 30.0 -38.8 -56.4
Programs...................
Emerging Threats............ 16.8 21.0 21.0 0.0 0.0
Rapid Prototyping........... 33.0 73.0 76.0 3.0 4.1
Counter MANPADS............. 0.0 60.0 61.0 1.0 1.7
R&D Consolidation 0.0 0.0 24.1 24.1 ..............
transferred funds..........
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total enacted 553.5 912.8 1039.3 126.5 13.9
appropriations and budget
estimates................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Biological Countermeasures
Biological threats can take many forms and be distributed in many
ways. Aerosolized anthrax, smallpox, foot and mouth disease, and bulk
food contamination are among the threats that can have high
consequences for humans and agriculture. Our Biological Countermeasures
portfolio uses the Nation's science base to prevent, protect, respond
to and recover from bioterrorism events. This portfolio provides the
science and technology needed to reduce the probability and potential
consequences of a biological attack on this Nation's civilian
population, its infrastructure, and its agricultural system. Portfolio
managers and scientists are developing and implementing an integrated
systems approach with a wide range of activities, including
vulnerability and risk analyses to identify the need for vaccines,
therapeutics, and diagnostics; development and implementation of early
detection and warning systems to characterize an attack and permit
early prophylaxis and decontamination activities; and development of a
national bioforensics analysis capability to support attribution of
biological agent use.
In fiscal year 2003 and 2004, the Biological Countermeasures
portfolio:
Deployed BioWatch to approximately 30 cities across the Nation.
BioWatch consists of air samplers that detect the release of biothreat
pathogens, such as anthrax, in a manner timely enough to allow for
effective treatment of the exposed population. In addition, with
additional funds provided by Congress in fiscal year 2004, we were able
to integrate environmental monitoring data with biosurveillance to
provide early attack alerts and assessments. The environmental
monitoring activities include not only BioWatch, which provides
continuous monitoring of most of our major metropolitan areas, but also
targeted monitoring that is temporarily deployed for special national
needs, such as a Homeland Security Elevated Threat Level. While serving
the primary function of mitigating attacks, both BioWatch and
environmental monitoring systems also play a significant deterrent
role, since terrorists are less likely to attack when they know that
defensive systems prevent them from attaining their goals.
Established the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures
Center, which provides scientific support for intelligence activities,
prioritizes biothreats, and conducts bioforensic analyses for
attribution and hence deterrence.
In fiscal year 2005, we will build upon our past work and continue
to deploy and improve wide area monitoring systems for urban areas.
Under President Bush's new Biosurveillance Initiative, which accounts
for most of the fiscal year 2005 increase in funding, additional
capability will be implemented quickly in the top threat urban areas to
more than twice the current capability. We will be working on
decontamination technologies and standards for facilities and outdoor
areas, and a National Academy of Science study characterizing
contamination risks will be completed in fiscal year 2005. At a smaller
scale, we will define requirements for expanded technology in detect-
to-warn scenarios relevant to facilities monitoring. At the same time,
we will be building our capabilities in the National Biodefense
Analysis and Counterterrorism Center (NBACC) and at Plum Island Animal
Disease Center (PIADC). At the NBACC, we are focusing first on
bioforensics and development of a biodefense knowledge center; for
agro-bioterrorism, we are prioritizing countermeasures to foreign
animal diseases. We are requesting additional funding in fiscal year
2005 for Plum Island to improve the facilities and security of this
important research and development site.
Chemical Countermeasures
The National Research Council Report Making the Nation Safer points
out that ``chemicals continue to be the weapon of choice for terrorist
attacks.'' The large volumes of toxic industrial chemicals and
materials along with the potential for chemical warfare agents and
emerging threat agents constitute a broad range of threats that may be
applied to virtually any civilian target.
Our Chemical Countermeasures portfolio provides the science and
technology needed to reduce the probability and potential consequences
of a chemical attack on this Nation's civilian population. The
portfolio places high priority on characterizing and reducing the
vulnerability posed by the large volumes of toxic industrial materials
in use, storage or transport within the Nation. The research and
development activities include prioritization of efforts among the many
possible chemical threats and targets, and development of new detection
and forensic technologies and integrated protective systems for high-
value facilities such as airports and subways. These activities are
informed by end-user input and simulated exercises.
Over the past year, our Chemical portfolio completed Project
PROTECT--Program for Response Options and Technology Enhancements for
Chemical/Biological Terrorism--a program conducted in collaboration
with the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA).
PROTECT, an operational chemical agent detection and response
capability, significantly decreases response time, which in the event
of an attack will save human lives. PROTECT is deployed in Metro
stations and is operated by the WMATA.
In fiscal year 2005, our focus will be on protecting facilities
from chemical attacks and controlling the industrial chemicals that may
be used for such attacks. Our scientists, working with the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP), will
complete a detailed end-to-end study of three reference scenarios, to
culminate in recommendations for top-level architectures,
identification of key gaps, and a ``report card'' showing present, mid-
term (3-year), and long-term (5-plus year) capabilities. We will
qualify candidate off-the-shelf sensors for demonstration in an
application to facilities protection. We will also address response and
recovery. Working with the user community, we will develop first-
generation playbooks for responding to the three reference scenarios
and develop technical requirements for personal protection equipment.
High Explosives Countermeasures
The High Explosives Countermeasures portfolio addresses the threat
that terrorists will use explosives in attacks on buildings, critical
infrastructure, and the civilian population of the United States. The
Science and Technology Directorate's portfolio is closely coordinated
with the activities ongoing in the Transportation Security
Administration to ensure that research and development (R&D) activities
are complementary, not duplicative. R&D priorities in this portfolio
have focused on the detection of vehicle bombs and suicide bombers, and
on providing the science and technology needed to significantly
increase the probability of preventing an explosives attack on
buildings, infrastructure and people.
This portfolio in fiscal year 2005 will develop and field
equipment, technologies and procedures to interdict suicide bombers and
car and truck bombs before they can reach their intended targets while
minimizing the impact on the American way of life. We will complete
testing and evaluation of known procedures and commercial off-the-shelf
devices applicable to indoor or outdoor interdiction of suicide
bombers, and develop a training package for local law enforcement,
including recommended equipment and procedures. In addition, we will
support the development of new devices to interdict suicide bombers and
study the feasibility of using existing detectors to identify
explosives in trucks. Finally, we will analyze the costs and benefits
of hardening aircraft cargo containers, cargo bays, and overhead bin
storage compartments to better withstand the effects of an explosion.
Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures
Potential radiological and nuclear threats range from the
deliberate dispersal of small amounts of radioactive material to the
detonation of an improvised or stolen nuclear weapon to an attack on
our nuclear power industry. Our Radiological and Nuclear
Countermeasures portfolio provides the science and technology needed to
reduce both the probability and the potential consequences of a
radiological or nuclear attack on this Nation's civilian population or
our nuclear power facilities.
On August 19, 2003, our Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures
portfolio formally assumed management of the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey radiation detection test bed. The test bed was
previously managed by the United States Department of Energy. Following
the transfer, we have broadened the project scope beyond testing and
evaluating individual pieces of technology to a systems approach,
including response protocols and operational concepts. As part of the
Science and Technology Directorate's effort, radiation detection
sensors will be deployed and operated by Federal, State, and local
inspectors and police at land, maritime and aviation venues. By judging
the efficacy of deployed systems over time, we will be able to inform
future decisions on detection technology R&D investment, deployment of
urban monitoring systems, configurations best able to enhance security,
and viable ways to defend against a radioactive dispersal device or an
improvised nuclear device.
For fiscal year 2005, we plan to leverage our previous technology
and capability successes and place a high priority on providing the
end-user community with the most appropriate and effective detection
and interdiction technologies available to prohibit the importation or
transportation and subsequent detonation of a radiological or nuclear
device within U.S. borders. Specifically, we will do the following:
--Integrate at least five Federal, State, and local sites into an
operational detection system architecture to detect
radiological and nuclear threats;
--Establish a test and evaluation capability, and test and evaluate
90 percent of the fiscal year 2005 prototype technologies
developed in the portfolio's programs;
--Demonstrate two advanced characterization technologies for crisis
response; and
--Demonstrate a prototype for automatic radiological imaging analysis
that enhances current imaging systems at one pilot site.
Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and Assessment
Our Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and Assessment (TVTA)
portfolio is one of our largest portfolios, and includes our scientific
and technical support to the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection (IAIP) Directorate. TVTA includes our R&D activities in
Critical Infrastructure Protection and Cybersecurity. Activities in
this portfolio are designed to help evaluate extensive amounts of
diverse threat information; detect and document terrorist intent;
couple threat information with knowledge of complex, interdependent
critical infrastructure vulnerabilities; and enable analysts to draw
timely insights and distribute warnings from the information. This
portfolio provides the science and technology needed to develop methods
and tools to test and assess threats and vulnerabilities to protect
critical infrastructure and enhance information exchange; this
portfolio also includes a Biometrics Program and a Cybersecurity
Program.
In fiscal year 2004, TVTA:
--Developed and installed an operational component, the Threat-
Vulnerability Mapper (TVM), as part of the Threat and
Vulnerability Integration System for the Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection Directorate. The TVM provides
counterterrorism analysts with a simple, straightforward way
not only to depict the geographic distribution of threats
across the United States, but also to search the underlying
databases for information on the possible actors, agents,
potential severity of attacks, and extent of the
vulnerabilities to and effects of such attacks.
--Co-funded the Cyber Defense Technology Experimental Research
(``DETER'') Network with the National Science Foundation, a
$5.45 million, 3-year research project to create an
experimental infrastructure network to support development and
demonstration of next-generation information security
technologies for cyber defense. This is a multi-university
project led by the University of California at Berkeley.
--Developed a Decision Support System focused on prioritizing
investment, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery
strategies related to Critical Infrastructure Protection. The
initial proof-of-concept began in August 2003 and a case study
is being conducted in February 2004. The prototype model will
include representation of all 14 critical infrastructure
sectors/assets and their interdependencies.
--Developed advanced algorithms for speeding the creation of DNA
signatures for biological pathogen detection through the
Advanced Scientific Computing Research and Development program.
These discoveries will result in cheaper, faster and more
reliable bio-detectors for homeland security.
In fiscal year 2005, TVTA will provide the science and technology
capabilities and enduring partnerships needed to develop methods and
tools to test and assess threats and vulnerabilities to protect
critical infrastructure and enhance information exchange. The Threat-
Vulnerability Mapper is only one component of a large Threat and
Vulnerability Information System that we will continue to build,
drawing upon advances in the information and computer sciences as well
as innovative analytic techniques. Our objective is to continually
improve an analyst's capability to answer threat-related questions. The
Science and Technology Directorate will contribute to the capability to
produce high-quality net assessments and assessments of weapons of mass
destruction.
We will develop advanced computing algorithms in support of
improved aerosol dispersion models, blast effects calculations, neutron
interrogation models, bioinformatics, and scalable information
extraction; improved algorithms make more accurate information
available faster. We will continue to provide, in collaboration with
other relevant organizations, the science and technology and associated
standards needed in the development of biometrics for precise
identification of individuals and develop instrumentation to aid
authorized officials in detecting individuals with potentially hostile
intent. In the cybersecurity area, the DETER Network testbed will be up
and running, and we will competitively fund several low-cost, high-
impact solutions to specific cybersecurity problems.
Standards
Ensuring that standards are created and adopted is critically
important for homeland security. We need consistent and verifiable
measures of effectiveness in terms of basic functionality,
appropriateness and adequacy for the task, interoperability,
efficiency, and sustainability. Standards will improve the quality and
usefulness of homeland security systems and technologies. Our Standards
portfolio cuts across all aspects of the Science and Technology
Directorate's mission and all threats to improve effectiveness,
efficiency, and interoperability of the systems and technologies
developed, as envisioned in the Homeland Security Act.
Our Standards portfolio continues to actively engage the Federal,
State, and local first responders to ensure that developed standards
are effective in detection, prevention, response, management, and
attribution. This portfolio also conducts the essential activities in
order to meet the requirement of the SAFETY (Support Anti-Terrorism by
Fostering Effective Technologies) Act in developing certification
standards for technologies related to homeland security.
In fiscal year 2004, our Standards portfolio:
--Created initial standards guidelines, with formal standards nearing
completion, for radiation pagers, hand-held radiation dosimetry
instruments, radioisotope identifiers and radiation portal
monitors. These standards were developed under the auspices of
the American National Standards Institute's Accredited American
Standards Committee on Radiation Instrumentation.
--Published guidelines for interoperable communications gear. Common
grant guidance has been developed and incorporated in the
public safety wireless interoperability grant programs of both
the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland
Security;
--Launched the SAFETY Act process for evaluating anti-terrorism
technologies for potential liability limits.
In fiscal year 2005, the Standards portfolio will continue to work
on many fronts and with many partners to establish needed standards for
technologies (including equipment), processes, and systems. We will
especially focus on two major milestones. First, we will establish
technical standards and test and evaluation protocols for
decontamination technologies and analysis across the ranges of weapons
of mass destruction. Second, we will publish a ``Consumer's Report'' on
radiation and bioagent detection devices for Federal, State, and local
users.
Emerging Threats
It is truly the threats we do not yet know that are often the most
terrifying. Our Emerging Threats portfolio addresses the dynamic nature
of terrorist threats, as science and technology advancements enable new
agents of harm and new ways to employ them. This portfolio places high
priority on developing the capability to use innovative, crosscutting,
out-of-the-box approaches for anticipating and responding to new and
emerging threats. Successful identification of emerging threats will
permit capabilities to be developed to thwart these emerging threats
before they are used.
Relevant R&D is underway at other agencies and organizations; thus,
partnerships in this area hold great potential for synergistic focus on
homeland security. Work is being done and will continue to be pursued
in partnership with the Departments of Energy, Defense, Justice, and
Agriculture, the intelligence community, and the National Institutes of
Health.
In fiscal year 2003 and 2004, our scientists in the Emerging
Threats portfolio established informal partnerships with the
intelligence community and with the United States Secret Service in
order to leverage ongoing activities in support of over-the-horizon
assessment.
In fiscal year 2005, we will leverage the activities started during
fiscal year 2004, and continue to focus on developing the capability to
use innovative, crosscutting, out-of-the-box approaches for
anticipating and responding to new and emerging threats and to develop
revolutionary technologies to combat them.
Rapid Prototyping
By accelerating the time needed to develop and commercialize
relevant technologies, the Science and Technology Directorate will
ensure that operational end-users will be better able to prevent
terrorist attacks, reduce the Nation's vulnerability, and minimize the
damage and assist in recovery if attacks occur. Our Rapid Prototyping
portfolio advances the Directorate's mission to conduct, stimulate and
enable research, development, test, evaluation and timely transition of
homeland security capabilities to Federal, State and local operational
end-users.
In fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004, the Rapid Prototyping
portfolio provided funding of $30 million each year through our
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) to the
interagency Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) to solicit ideas,
concepts and technologies for 50 requirement areas of interest to both
the Department and TWSG; initial contracts have been made and HSARPA
will provide the programmatic monitoring of those efforts for the
Science and Technology Directorate. This portfolio also provided
support through HSARPA for a joint port and coastal surveillance
prototype testbed designated ``HAWKEYE'' with the United States Coast
Guard. Funding has been made available to support the creation of a
Technology Clearinghouse as required in the Homeland Security Act of
2002.
In fiscal year 2005, this program will continue to provide a
mechanism for accelerated development of technologies relevant to
homeland security in a process driven by technology developers. Through
rapid prototyping and commercialization, these technologies will be
made available to operational end-users as quickly as possible, thus
increasing their capability to secure the homeland.
Support to Department of Homeland Security Components
As I have mentioned, the operational components of the Department
are my customers. The Department of Homeland Security's Science and
Technology Directorate supports the missions of the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate, Border and
Transportation Security (BTS), Emergency Preparedness and Response
(EP&R), United States Coast Guard (USCG), and United States Secret
Service (USSS). Our TVTA portfolio supports the mission of the IAIP
Directorate as previously indicated. This portfolio places high
priorities on high-risk, high-reward research and development relevant
to homeland security that might not otherwise be conducted in support
of the missions of BTS, EP&R, USCG, and the USSS.
In fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004, we continued to support
the conventional missions of these operational components. Ongoing
activities within BTS, USCG and USSS focus on preventing terrorists and
terrorist weapons (particularly weapons of mass destruction) from
entering the United States, on detecting and preventing cyber attacks,
supporting maritime transportation, safety and economy (Port and
Channel navigation, Search and Rescue, and Aquatic Nuisance Species
Remediation), and on preventing attacks on United States Secret Service
protectees and high-visibility venues.
Support to Border and Transportation Security
The Science and Technology Directorate supports all elements of BTS
enforcement and facilitation processes through identifying operational
requirements, developing mission capabilities-based technological needs
and implementing a strategic plan. We are providing systems engineering
support to various BTS programs including US VISIT and Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles.
The Science and Technology Directorate's support to the BTS
Directorate is accomplished by implementing a capabilities-based
technology planning process. The capabilities-based approach
establishes the scope of effort and framework for a technology plan.
Through a series of user conferences and technology opportunity
conferences, requirements are developed and prioritized for new and
improved capabilities. Operational personnel identify capabilities and
technology personnel identify potential development opportunities.
Capability gaps and possible technology solutions are proposed, and a
budget is developed to distinguish between both funded and unfunded
needs.
The Science & Technology Directorate co-chairs with BTS, the
Department's Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Working Group, which is
currently focused on developing the Border and Transportation Security
operational requirements for UAVs and related technologies, e.g.,
aerostats, blimps, lighter than air (LTA) ships, and fixed and mobile
towers. The starting point for the requirements generation process is
six BTS capability objectives we have identified that could benefit by
the utilization of UAVs: surveillance and monitoring communications,
apprehension, targeting, intelligence, deterrence, and officer safety.
Functional capabilities that could be filled or improved through the
application of UAVs and other technologies have been identified. Based
on these high-level requirements, the Science and Technology
Directorate is developing concepts of operations and assumptions that
will be used in conducting an Analysis of Alternatives that will
include UAVs and other technologies.
In fiscal year 2005 we will be involved in a wide range of
activities supporting the components, based upon their needs. For BTS,
we will focus on discovering and implementing technologies that include
improved screening and inspection, access control, document
verification and validity, and data compression and analysis.
Support to Emergency Preparedness and Response
The Nation has more than 750 regionally accredited community
colleges. Community colleges train more than 80 percent of our
country's first responders; these first responders are critical for
homeland security. The Science and Technology Directorate has a
responsibility to ensure that these first responders have the necessary
tools available to them to perform their jobs effectively and safely on
a daily basis. This portfolio has a key role in our meeting that
responsibility.
The scope of our EP&R portfolio includes research, development,
test and evaluation for State, local and Federal emergency responders
and emergency managers. Particular emphasis is placed on technology
integration at all levels of government, technology insertion for
weapons of mass destruction detection and monitoring systems, and long-
term sustained performance and interoperability to enhance State and
local preparedness.
Our work in the EP&R portfolio focuses on three major areas:
--Technology development for first responders
--Scientific and technical support to Federal response
--Technology integration--Safe Cities
The Safe Cities Program, a new initiative in fiscal year 2004, is
focused on implementing technology and operational system solutions in
local communities/regions. This program is being piloted in a select
number of cities in fiscal year 2004 and will be conducted in close
cooperation with State and local emergency managers and city planners
to identify capability needs and gaps that advanced technologies being
developed by the Science and Technology Directorate can meet. The Safe
Cities Program seeks to provide technology and operational solutions
that are sustainable by the communities in which they are implemented.
The Safe Cities Program will enable us to better understand the
operational context into which new technologies will be inserted. The
Program will result in the creation of an infrastructure that
facilitates the evaluation of new technologies in real-world operating
environments as well as providing a venue for integrating these
technologies with existing State and local systems.
In fiscal year 2005 the EP&R portfolio will continue its focus on
technology development and technical guidance for first responders
(State and local), scientific and technical support to the EP&R
Directorate; and expansion of technology integration--Safe Cities.
Support to United States Coast Guard
The Science & Technology Directorate is integrating a major
research program into a United States Coast Guard operational testbed
in south Florida. The HAWKEYE program injects technologies (such as
Surveillance, Command & Control, Sensor Fusion, and Communications)
allowing simultaneous evaluation of technology performance as a direct
impact on mission execution.
Support to the United States Secret Service
We have coordinated with the United States Secret Service and
established its first direct-funded R&D program. Based upon
appropriated funding, four initiatives have been identified and
prioritized, and are underway in fiscal year 2004. In addition, there
will be joint activities in support of the assessment of emerging
threats.
Homeland Security University and Fellowship Programs
In this portfolio we seek to develop a broad research capability
within the Nation's universities to address scientific and
technological issues related to homeland security. The portfolio places
high priorities on developing academic programs and supporting students
in order to build learning and research environments in key areas of
Departmental interest.
In fiscal year 2004, this portfolio established the Department of
Homeland Security's first University-based Center of Excellence, for
Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events. The Center, based at
the University of Southern California, will assess the level of risk
associated with various terrorist scenarios, in particular the
potential economic consequences. A request for proposals has been
issued for the next two Centers of Excellence, which will focus on
Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease Defense and Post-Harvest Food
Protection and Defense.
Last fall, we awarded our 2003-2004 academic year DHS Scholarships
and Fellowships, and welcomed our new Scholars and Fellows with a
reception in Washington, DC. The solicitation for this program received
just under 2,500 applications for 100 Scholarships and Fellowships.
Besides making immediate contributions to homeland security-related
R&D, these students will be part of the development of a broad research
capability within the Nation's universities to address scientific and
technological issues related to homeland security.
During fiscal year 2005, another 100 Scholars and Fellows will be
supported for the academic year of 2004-2005, bringing the total of
supported students to 200. We will also continue to support the
Homeland Security University Centers of Excellence established in
fiscal year 2004, each with a different subject expertise focused on
reducing the terrorist threat on the United States. Each Center of
Excellence is awarded an initial 3-year contract whose annual cost we
account for in our planning.
Counter-MANPADS
The Counter-MANPADS program is focused on identifying, developing,
and testing a cost-effective capability to protect the Nation's
commercial aircraft against the threat of man-portable, anti-aircraft
missiles. This program also provides the science and technology base
needed to reduce the vulnerability of commercial aircraft to terrorist
attack using man-portable anti-aircraft missiles.
Over the past year, we have had a successful solicitation
announcing a program to address the potential threat of MANPADS to
commercial aircraft. White papers responding to the Counter-MANPADS
program solicitation were reviewed by technical experts from the
Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, and other
government agencies; proposals were evaluated; and awards were made to
three contractor teams to perform the first of two program phases,
which began in January, 2004. The first phase will result in a
preliminary design and a test plan to demonstrate missile
countermeasure equipment on selected commercial aircraft.
The second program phase is an 18-month effort beginning in August
2004, with the one or two contractors that produced the most promising
results in Phase One. During this phase, the commercial prototype
countermeasure equipment will be integrated on selected commercial
aircraft, and live-fire range tests will be accomplished with extensive
data collection and analysis. Results of this second phase will be
presented to the Administration and Congress to aid in formulating an
informed decision on how best to address the protection of commercial
airlines from the MANPADS threat.
SAFECOM
The SAFECOM (Wireless Public SAFEty Interoperable COMmunications)
program is the umbrella initiative to coordinate all Federal, State,
local, and Tribal users to achieve national wireless communications
interoperability. The placement of SAFECOM in the Department of
Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate allows it full
access to the scientific expertise and resources needed to help our
Nation achieve true public safety wireless communications
interoperability.
Since the Science and Technology Directorate formally assumed
responsibility for the management of the SAFECOM program barely 7
months ago:
--SAFECOM has been established as the one umbrella group in the
Federal Government for the management of public safety wireless
interoperability programs;
--Common grant guidance has been developed and incorporated in the
public safety wireless interoperability grant programs of both
the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland
Security;
--A Federal coordinating structure has, for the first time, been
created to coordinate all Federal public safety wireless
interoperability programs;
--The first catalog of national programs touching on public safety
wireless interoperability has been developed and published; and
--The ten major State and local organizations concerned with public
safety wireless interoperability--the Association of Public-
Safety Communications Officials (APCO), International
Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), International Association of
Chiefs of Police (IACP), Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCC),
National Sheriffs' Association (NSA), Major County Sheriffs'
Association (MCSA), National Association of Counties (NACO),
National League of Cities (NLC), National Public Safety
Telecommunications Council (NPSTC), and the United States
Conference of Mayors (USCM)--released a statement in support of
the SAFECOM program which declared that ``With the advent of
the SAFECOM Program . . . Public safety, State and local
government finally have both a voice in public safety
discussions at the Federal level and confidence that the
Federal Government is coordinating its resources.''
PRIORITIZATION
The Science and Technology Directorate has prioritized its research
and development efforts based on the directives, recommendations and
suggestions from many sources, including:
--Homeland Security Act of 2002;
--The fiscal year 2004 Congressional Appropriations for the
Department of Homeland Security;
--President Bush's National Strategy for Homeland Security, the
National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical
Infrastructure and Key Assets, the National Strategy to Combat
Weapons of Mass Destruction, the National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace, and the National Security Strategy;
--President Bush's nine Homeland Security Presidential Directives;
--Office of Management and Budget's 2003 Report on Combating
Terrorism;
--Current threat assessments as understood by the Intelligence
Community;
--Requirements identified by other Department components;
--Expert understanding of enemy capabilities that exist today or that
can be expected to appear in the future; and
--The report from the National Academy of Science on ``Making the
Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering
Terrorism,'' and the reports from the Gilmore, Bremer and Hart-
Rudman Committees.
Identifying and integrating the information contained in these
sources has not been a small task, but the result, coupled with expert
evaluation and judgment by our scientific staff, is the basis for
determining the research and development needed to meet our mission
requirements.
DIVISION OF EFFORT AMONG THE DHS S&T DIRECTORATE AND RESEARCH EFFORTS
AT OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
One of the accomplishments of which I am personally most proud is
the emphasis our new Directorate has put on interacting with other
Federal departments and agencies. Knowledge of other science and
technology programs and their results, appropriate collaboration
between agencies, coordination of relevant programmatic activities, and
information sharing are essential for us to best meet our mission
requirements. Science and Technology Directorate cybersecurity
personnel and those at the National Science Foundation and the National
Institute of Standards and Technology have already established
collaborative and coordinated programs to ensure no duplication of
effort. Our biological and chemical countermeasures staff have
partnered with the Department of Defense's (DOD's) Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA) to plan and execute the BioNet program and
roadmap the biological countermeasures R&D programs in both agencies to
understand capabilities and shortfalls. They work with the National
Science Foundation on pathogen sequencing. The BioWatch program,
although led by the Science and Technology Directorate, was
accomplished through collaboration with personnel from the Department
of Energy's National Laboratories, contractors, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
We work with DOD's Office of Homeland Defense to ensure the effective
transfer to the Department of relevant DOD technologies.
Our high explosives scientists are working with the interagency
Technical Support Working Group, managed by the Department of State, to
evaluate commercial off-the-shelf systems with capabilities against
suicide bombers. The Director of the Homeland Security Advanced
Research Projects Agency is a member of the TSWG Executive Committee.
Our staff are in frequent contact with the Office of Science and
Technology Policy on a range of issues, and several are members and co-
chairs of the Office of Science and Technology Policy's National
Science and Technology Council. Our Office of Research and Development
works closely with the Department of Agriculture to ensure that the
Plum Island Animal Disease Center facility is operating smoothly and
fully meeting its mission. The Office of Research and Development also
interfaces with the Department of Energy to keep the Office of Science,
as well as the National Nuclear Security Administration, apprised of
our long-term homeland security requirements.
The Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology
Directorate recognizes that many organizations are contributing to the
science and technology base needed to enhance the Nation's capabilities
to thwart terrorist acts and to fully support the conventional missions
of the operational components of the Department. Congress recognized
the importance of the research and development being conducted by
numerous Federal departments and agencies, and, in the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, directed the Under Secretary of Science and
Technology to coordinate the Federal Government's civilian efforts to
identify and develop countermeasures to current and emerging threats.
We take this responsibility very seriously.
We are now initiating the effort needed to coordinate homeland
security research and development across the entire United States
Government. It will come as no surprise to the members of this
Subcommittee that good, solid, effective research and development
relevant to homeland security is being conducted by the Departments of
Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Justice, Health and Human
Services, State, and Veteran's Affairs; within the National Science
Foundation, the Environmental Protection Agency and other Federal
agencies; and by members of the Intelligence Community.
Several interagency working groups already exist that are
addressing issues important to homeland security. The Science and
Technology Directorate has been, and continues to be, an active
participant in these working groups, and in most cases has taken a
leadership role. These fora foster an active exchange of information
and assist each participating agency in identifying related needs and
requirements, conducting research and development of mutual benefit,
and avoiding duplication of effort.
We also continue to have discussions at multiple levels of
management with Federal departments and Agencies, as well as with the
Office of Management and Budget, the Office of Science and Technology
Policy, and the Homeland Security Council. These discussions ensure
that the strongest possible links are made and the best possible
coordination occurs between our Department and those who are conducting
sector-specific research. By the autumn of 2004, all Department of
Homeland Security research and development programs will be
consolidated and all United States Government research and development
relevant to fulfilling the Department's mission will have been
identified and coordinated as appropriate. It is important to note that
this identification and relevant coordination does not imply the
Department of Homeland Security should have the responsibility and
authority for these programs within other Federal agencies; it does
recognize that science and technology advances can have many
applications, including homeland security.
OUTSIDE INPUTS TO THE S&T BUDGET
The Science and Technology Directorate's budget is built to meet
the Department's and our mission requirements. As previously discussed,
we identify and prioritize our efforts using multiple national sources
and the sharing of information relevant to homeland security among
government organizations. Our Homeland Security Science and Technology
Advisory Committee will hold its first meeting February 26-27, 2004,
and this group will also provide input to the scope, priority and level
of effort needed to meet our objectives.
METRICS DEVELOPED BY THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE
The success of the Science and Technology Directorate depends on
its ability to identify, develop and transition capabilities to end-
users that enhance the Nation's ability to protect itself. Appropriate
goals and performance measures must be identified and used to measure
our progress. The following table identifies the programmatic metrics
developed by the Science and Technology Directorate's portfolio
managers; these metrics will be used to measure our performance.
ST0001 Biological Countermeasures
Long term performance goal.--The United States will have a high-
performance and well-integrated biological threat agent warning and
characterization system that will include sustainable environmental
monitoring capability for metropolitan areas; a national special
security event system for the Nation at large; and identification of
needs for vaccines and therapeutics for people and animals. Longer term
research will support the development of biological threat warning and
characterization systems that address both current and future threats.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance measures Fiscal year 2005 target
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Capability to detect and assess biological FAR=10EE-4, Multiplex 10
threats, measured by a set of attributes: assays
increase sensitivity by decreasing false
alarm rate (FAR), and increase multiplex
samples.
Fiscal year 2005 milestones: Milestones will be achieved
Decontamination technologies and
standards for facilities and outdoor
areas. National Academy of Science study
characterizes contamination risks.
Fiscal year 2005 milestones: Establishment Milestones will be achieved
of a national capability in biodefense
analysis and agro-bioterrorism
countermeasures. Research operations
begin; phased construction continues.
BioForensics Analysis Center Hub
operational.
Improved capabilities to detect threats in Milestone will be achieved
urban areas (Urban Monitoring Program),
measured by increased sampling coverage
and frequency, and capability to detect
additional threats. Fiscal year 2005
milestone: increase coverage in top
threat cities.
Integrated field demonstrations of next- 2 Demos operational
generation solutions (Domestic
Demonstrations and Applications Program).
Validated human and agricultural bioassays 10
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0002 Chemical Countermeasures
Long term performance goal.--Develop and deploy a broad capability
to prevent and rapidly mitigate the consequences of chemical attacks.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance measures Fiscal year 2005 target
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2005 milestone: Development of Milestone will be achieved
protocols for the highest priority toxic
industrial chemicals (TICs) and toxic
industrial materials (TIMs).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0003 Chemical High Explosives
Long term performance goal.--The Chemical High Explosives portfolio
will improve explosives detection equipment and procedures for all
forms of transportation as well as fixed facilities.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance measures Fiscal year 2005 target
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2005 milestone: Pilot tests of Milestone will be achieved
standoff detection technologies.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0004 Radiological & Nuclear Countermeasures
Long term performance goal.--By fiscal year 2009, an effective
suite of countermeasures against radiological and nuclear threats will
be developed with capabilities in detection, intelligence analysis,
response, and preparedness.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance measures Fiscal year 2005 target
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal, State and local sites that are 5
integrated into an operational secondary
reachback architecture to resolve
radiological and nuclear alarms.
Performance measures associated with Test Milestone will be achieved
and Evaluation (T and E) of developmental
prototypes of Radiation Detectors.
Establish a long-range plan for T and E
capability.
Progression on planned capability Milestone will be achieved
development for Nuclear Incident
Management and Recovery. Demonstrate 2
advanced detection technologies.
Progression on pre-planned product Milestone will be achieved
improvement of deployed technologies.
Perform critical design reviews for Phase
One technology improvements for projects
awarded in fiscal year 2004.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0005 Threat and Vulnerability, Testing & Assessments
Long term performance goal.--Provide measurable advancements in
information assurance, threat detection and discovery, linkages of
threats to vulnerabilities, and capability assessments and information
analysis required by Departmental missions to anticipate, detect,
deter, avoid, mitigate and respond to threats to our homeland security.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance measures Fiscal year 2005 target
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Improvement in the national capability to Improvement in 7 categories
assess threats and vulnerabilities to
terrorist attacks: 10 categories to be
assessed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0006 Standards
Long term performance goal.--Establish an integrated infrastructure
for determining and developing standards, and test and evaluation
protocols for technology used for detecting, mitigating, and recovering
from terrorist attacks and also to support other Departmental
components' technologies. Provide consistent and verifiable measures of
effectiveness of homeland security-related technologies, operators, and
systems in terms of basic functionality, interoperability, efficiency,
and sustainability. Facilitate the development of guidelines in
conjunction with both users and developers.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance measures Fiscal year 2005 target
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Long-term implementation of SAFETY Act.... Certifications
Fiscal year 2005 milestones: Technical Milestones will be achieved
standards and test/evaluation protocols
will be established for WMD
decontamination technologies and analysis
tools. ``Consumer's report'' on radiation
and bioagent detection devices for
Federal, State, and local users will be
published.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0008 Homeland Security Fellowship Programs/University Programs
Long term performance goal.--Significantly increase the number of
U.S. students in fields relevant to homeland security including the
physical life and social sciences; and engineering.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance measures Fiscal year 2005 target
------------------------------------------------------------------------
To increase the nation's science and 200 students 3 centers
technology workforce and research
capability on issues related to homeland
security. Fiscal year 2005: students
supported/Centers of Excellence
established.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0009 Emerging Threats
Long term performance goal.--To develop effective capabilities to
characterize, assess, and counter new and emerging threats, and to
exploit technology development opportunities as they arise.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance measures Fiscal year 2005 target
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Improved capability to prevent terrorist Baseline
attacks through annual emerging threat
assessment report (percent of responding
recipients indicating the report is
valuable).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0010 Rapid Prototyping
Long term performance goal.--Support the development of innovative
solutions to enhance homeland security and work with Federal, State,
and local governments; and the private sector to implement these
solutions. In partnership with the Technical Support Working Group
(TSWG), operate an effective and efficient clearinghouse that will
develop, prototype, and commercialize innovative technologies to
support the homeland security mission.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
Performance measures 2005 target
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technologies prototyped or commercialized............... 3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0011 SAFECOM
Long term performance goal.--Provide public safety agencies with
central coordination, leadership and guidance to help them achieve
short-term interoperability and long-term compatibility of their radio
networks across jurisdictions and disciplines.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
Performance measures 2005 target
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increased interoperability across local, tribal, State, 3
and Federal public safety jurisdictions and
disciplines. Fiscal year 2005: Based on fiscal year
2004 baseline, improvements in 3 categories............
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0012 Counter Man-Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS)
Long term performance goal.--The Nation will have effective
capabilities to defeat the threat to commercial aircraft of man-
portable anti-aircraft missiles.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
Performance measures 2005 target
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Effective technology/technologies for commercial 2
aircraft to defeat man-portable anti-aircraft missiles
identified. Fiscal year 2005: Technologies identified,
and prototypes developed and tested....................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST007 Support to Department of Homeland Security Components
Long term performance goal.--Increase the capabilities of mission-
focused operational components (BTS, EP&R, Coast Guard, and Secret
Service) to secure the homeland and enhance their ability to conduct
their missions.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
Performance measures 2005 target
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Improved capability of DHS Components to secure the Baseline
homeland as measured by assessment of customer
organizations in accomplishing agreed-upon areas of
assistance.............................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
short-term and long-term research
In the 11 months that this Department has been in existence, the
Science and Technology Directorate has focused its initial efforts on
near-term development and deployment of technologies to improve our
nation's ability to detect and respond to potential terrorist acts.
However, we recognize that a sustained effort to continually add to our
knowledge base and our resource base is necessary for future
developments. Thus, we have invested a portion of our resources,
including our university programs, toward these objectives. The
following table indicates our expenditures in basic research, applied
research, and development to date, excluding construction funding.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE R&D INVESTMENTS
[In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Fiscal year
Fiscal year Fiscal year 2004 2005
(actual (estimated) (proposed)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Basic........................................................... 47 117 80
Applied......................................................... 59 56 229
Developmental................................................... 398 608 643
-----------------------------------------------
Total..................................................... 504 781 952
-----------------------------------------------
Percent basic................................................... 9.3 15.0 8.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our initial expenditures in basic research are heavily weighted by
our investments in university programs. These university programs will
not only provide new information relevant to homeland security, but
will also provide a workforce of people who are cognizant of the needs
of homeland security, especially in areas of risk analysis, animal-
related agro-terrorism, bioforensics, cybersecurity, disaster modeling,
and psychological and behavioral analysis.
We expect to gradually increase our total percentage of basic and
applied research to the level needed for sustaining our role as a
research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) organization.
RATIONALE FOR BUDGET INCREASES: BIOWATCH AND THE NATIONAL BIODEFENSE
ANALYSIS AND COUNTERMEASURES CENTER
President Bush's fiscal year 2005 budget request includes a $274
million Bio-Surveillance Program Initiative to protect the Nation
against bioterrorism and to strengthen the public health
infrastructure. Included in this request is an increase of $65 million
for the Science and Technology Directorate to enhance current
environmental monitoring activities. This requested increase is a
direct outgrowth of the recently completed joint Homeland Security
Council--National Security Council (HSC-NSC) Bio-Defense End-to-End
study which identified the need for an integrated, real-time, human-
animal-plant surveillance system as a top priority national need. The
DHS BioWatch system, which currently provides a bio-aerosol warning for
most of this nation's large metropolitan areas, figures prominently in
the integrated Biosurveillance initiative. This initiative would
entail: (1) Expanding BioWatch coverage in the top ten threat cities;
and (2) Piloting of an integrated attack warning and assessment system
known as BWICS (BioWarning and Incident Characterization System).
Currently the ``average'' BioWatch city has about 10 collectors per
city. Systems studies and city feedback provide a more needs based'
guide to the optimal number of collectors in our large, high threat
cities. The systems studies show that about 40-60 collectors provide
optimal outdoor coverage for a city, while the cities themselves have
requested additional collectors for key facilities (transit systems,
airports, stadiums). Alternate labor contracting processes, simplified
sample handling techniques, and the introduction of additional
automation in analyses will allow us to do this expansion in a cost
effective manner.
The BWICS pilot will integrate real-time bio-surveillance and
environmental monitoring data with plume hazard predictions,
epidemiological forecasts, population and critical infrastructure
databases, and other available resources in two of the highest threat
cities.
We also will accelerate R&D on next generation environmental
monitoring systems. New classes of detectors, that can identify bio-
agents in 2 minutes or less with incredibly low false alarm rates will
make it possible to do detect-to-protect for key facilities--allowing
one to reroute air flow or evacuate a facility so as to minimize
exposure and not simply begin the onset of early treatment. And
tailoring of existing and emerging detection systems to monitoring key
high volume nodes in our food processing will be critical to the
development of proposed food shields.
The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC)
provides scientific support for intelligence activities, prioritizes
biothreats, and also conducts bioforensic analyses contributing to
attribution and hence to deterrence. Specifically, the NBACC (both
facilities and programs) will support public and agricultural health,
law enforcement, and national and homeland security by providing hub
laboratory capabilities for:
--Dedicated and accredited bio-forensic analysis capabilities to
support attribution of the use of bio-threat agents (BTA) by
criminals, non-State, and State-sponsored actors
--Laboratory-based, scientific data from the analysis and assessment
of biological threats to human health and agriculture to
support a national bio-defense net assessment--fundamental to
development of national plans, risk assessment evaluations and
priorities to deter, detect, mitigate and recover from BTA
attack
--Applied models, materials, and validation processes to evaluate BTA
countermeasures
--Evidenced-based subject matter expertise to integrate, analyze and
distribute critical bio-defense and related information
assembled from multiple sources through a high security and
open clearinghouse.
TRANSFER OF R&D BUDGETS AND ACTIVITIES FROM OTHER DIRECTORATES
The Science and Technology Directorate is both a generator and a
consumer of scientific and technological advances resulting from basic
and applied research and development. We also have a responsibility for
testing and evaluating capabilities to ensure that their deployment
results in improved operational systems. Standards are needed to assist
first responders and operational components of the Department in
evaluating, procuring, and deploying new capabilities. This is a broad
range of responsibility and one we take seriously. The Department has
defined R&D activities as follows:
Activities associated with R&D efforts include the development of a
new or improved capability to the point where it is appropriate for
operational use, including test and evaluation. R&D activities include
the analytic application of scientific and engineering principles in
support of operational capabilities, concept exploration, systems
development, proof of principle demonstration and pilot deployments,
standards development, and product improvement including application
and integration of technologies. For mission (non-management) systems,
resources associated with developing technology to provide new
capabilities (including systems engineering, research, development,
testing and prototyping) are covered under the R&D category.
This definition encompasses all of the research, development, test,
and evaluation (RDT&E) efforts of the Science and Technology
Directorate. It also encompasses RDT&E efforts currently existing in
other parts of the Department of Homeland Security. The Science and
Technology Directorate has been tasked to consolidate these activities
from elsewhere within the Department into our directorate.
We have begun this coordination process by evaluating and producing
a report on the research, development, testing, and evaluation work
that was being conducted within the Department of Homeland Security but
was not already under the direct cognizance of the Science and
Technology Directorate. Where it is appropriate, the Science and
Technology Directorate will absorb these R&D functions. In other cases,
the Science and Technology Directorate will provide appropriate input,
guidance, and oversight of these R&D programs.
Research and Development activities are ongoing in fiscal year 2004
within the following departmental elements: Border and Transportation
Security (BTS), Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR), United
States Coast Guard (USCG), and United States Secret Service (USSS). The
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate
reported no fiscal year 2004 R&D activities.
The fiscal year 2005 President's Budget contains three programs
that have been identified to transfer to the Science and Technology
Directorate. They are United States Coast Guard RDT&E activities
conducted at their Groton, CT laboratory ($13.5 million); Emergency
Preparedness and Response RDT&E activities supporting the U.S. Fire
Administration ($0.65 million); and ICE-Federal Air Marshall's RDT&E
activities supporting the development of their Air-to-Ground
Communication System ($10 million).
The transfer of these three RDT &E Programs is only the start and
not the complete identification of the potential programs to review for
consideration. S&T will be working throughout the year with the
Department and with Congress to identify other existing programs and
transfer them consistent with direction.
BUDGET AND ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING CYBERSECURITY R&D
The cybersecurity program within the Science and Technology
Directorate is conducted by the Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and
Assessment portfolio. The approach of this program includes addressing
areas not currently addressed elsewhere in the Federal Government. An
example of this is developing tools and techniques for assessing and
detecting the insider threat. The cybersecurity budget request for
fiscal year 2005 is $18 million.
An important component of the cybersecurity program is coordination
with others who are performing cyber research and who are responsible
for cybersecurity. For example, our staff have engaged in a series of
meetings with staff members from the Department's Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP), both the National
Cyber Security Division and National Communications System. These
meetings provide an venue for general exchanges of information about
each organizations' respective plans for cybersecurity, as well as
specific discussions focused on IAIP technical requirements to feed
into cybersecurity R&D programs funded by the Science and Technology
Directorate.
Further, we are coordinating with the National Institute for
Standards and Technology (NIST) and the National Science Foundation
(NSF) to plan our respective roles. We are funding two projects with
NIST, Secure Domain Name System and Secure Border Gateway Protocol,
which are protocols that the Internet relies on to function. We are co-
funding two projects with the NSF: a research project to create an
experimental infrastructure network to support development and
demonstration of next generation information security technologies for
cyber defense, called Cyber Defense Technology Experimental Research
(``DETER'') Network; and a project called Evaluation Methods in
Internet Security Technology (EMIST), a testing framework that will
include attack scenarios, attack simulators, generators for topology
and background traffic, data sets derived from live traffic, and tools
to monitor and summarize results.
BASIS FOR POLICY ON THE USE OF THE NATIONAL LABORATORIES
The Science and Technology Directorate has identified separate
mechanisms to access the capability base at the DOE national
laboratories and sites to guard against organizational conflicts of
interest and inappropriate use of inside information in responding to
competitive private sector solicitations. Five national laboratories
(Livermore, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, Pacific Northwest, and Sandia) have
been identified as Intramural Laboratories. These labs will help S&T
set research goals and requirements and formulate R&D road maps. This
level of engagement would give the intramural labs unfair advantage if
they were permitted to compete for funding awarded through open
solicitations.
All other DOE laboratories and sites have been identified as
Extramural Laboratories. Because the Extramural Laboratories will not
be involved in internal DHS research planning, they are eligible to
compete in Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA)
and Systems Engineering and Development (SED) funding, such as the
Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) valued at $50 million for radiological/
nuclear technologies that was recently issued. The majority of the
Science and Technology Directorate's funding will be executed through
HSARPA and SED. These labs may also freely team with industrial
partners to seamlessly commercialize technologies they have developed.
BUDGET FOR UNIVERSITY CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE AND FELLOWS PROGRAMS
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget request of $30 million will
sustain the current scholars and fellows program and a total of three
Homeland Security Centers of Excellence. Each additional Center of
Excellence would require a sustained investment of $5 million per year.
If more than a total of three Centers of Excellence are desired without
increasing the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request, a reduction
in the scholars and fellows program would be required.
STAFFING
When the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) stood up on March 1,
2003, the Science and Technology Directorate had a total staff of about
87, including the 53 staff transferred from the Department of Energy's
Environmental Measurements Laboratory. The balance was comprised of
permanently assigned personnel, employees detailed from within and
without the Department, Intergovernmental Personnel Act assignments,
and personnel support from the National Laboratories.
By January 6, 2004, we more than doubled our staff. In January
2004, we had a total staff of 212, including 100 DHS employees, six
Public Health Service Officers, 21 Intergovernmental Personnel Act
employees, 26 individuals on assignment from other agencies, and 59
contractors.
We continue to be active in staffing our Directorate with well-
qualified individuals whose skills support the full breadth of our
responsibilities and RDT&E activities. We continue to actively seek
additional staff in accordance with our approved staffing plan.
CONCLUSION
With less than a full year under the Department's belt, the
scientists and engineers in the Science and Technology Directorate have
accomplished more than I could have expected. I am proud to have shared
with you today some of those success stories. We have appended a more
comprehensive summary of accomplishments to date for the record.
And yet, we also recognize that there is much to do, and we will be
working just as hard in fiscal year 2005.
I look forward to continuing to work with you on the Cybersecurity,
Science, and Research & Development Subcommittee; other Federal
departments and agencies; the academic community; and private industry
to continue the work begun and continually improve our ability to
protect our homeland and way of life.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd, and Members of the Subcommittee, this
concludes my prepared statement. I thank you for the opportunity to
appear before this committee and I will be happy to answer any
questions you may have.
APPENDIX
ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE
Biological and Chemical Countermeasures
Biowatch: National Urban Monitoring for Biological
Pathogens
The Biowatch program has been established and deployed to cities
across the nation. The program--developed, funded, and managed by the
Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate--is executed in cooperation
with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). It employs environmental sampling
devices to quickly detect biological pathogens, such as anthrax, in
time to distribute life-saving pharmaceuticals to affected citizens.
The S&T Directorate is now focusing its efforts on piloting the next
generation of environmental samplers, which will reduce the amount of
labor required and the response time needed for detection while keeping
the detection probability high and false alarm rates low. These devices
will take advantage of the latest advances in micro-chemistry, commonly
referred to as ``chemistry on a chip.''
PROTECT (Program for Response Options and Technology
Enhancements for Chemical Terrorism): Chemical
Defense and Response Capability for Transportation
Facility
The S&T Directorate, in collaboration with the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), completed PROTECT (Program
for Response Options and Technology Enhancements for Chemical/
Biological Terrorism). PROTECT, which is an operational chemical agent
detection and response capability, is deployed in Metro stations and
operated by the WMATA. PROTECT is a team effort that owes its success
to the scientific and engineering talent from Argonne, Sandia, and
Livermore National Laboratories and operational expertise from WMATA
and the First Responder community (the District of Columbia; Arlington,
VA; Montgomery County, MD; and others). Also contributing significantly
to the project are private industry partners, including LiveWave Inc.,
ManTech Security Technology, the detector manufacturer (name withheld
for security reasons); and Federal partners, including the Federal
Transit Administration (FTA), Department of Transportation (DOT),
National Institute of Justice (NIJ), and the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS's) Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP). The system
integrates chemical detector data and video feed and transmits the
integrated information to the Operation Control Center (OCC), where the
information is analyzed and an event confirmed. The information is then
transmitted to the first responders who access it in both their OCC and
through the use of wired jacks on the scene to facilitate response and
recovery. PROTECT also has application in other areas, including fire
and emergency response, security, and forensics. Upon completion, the
system will be totally owned and operated by WMATA and expanded to
approximately 20 stations. FTA is working with WMATA and Argonne
National Laboratory to transfer the technology nationally. The
information gleaned from PROTECT will have direct application to
facility protection and response. A related effort is being piloted in
the Boston subway system.
Joint Urban 2003: Experimental Atmospheric Transport and
Modeling
In June 2003, the S&T Directorate, in coordination with the
Department of Defense's Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Department of
Energy, and University of Oklahoma sponsored a month-long atmospheric
dispersion study in Oklahoma City, OK. Nearly 150 scientists,
engineers, and student assistants were dedicated to this study, which
tracked the air movement of safe, non-toxic tracer gases in and around
city buildings. The resulting data is being used to enhance and develop
urban-specific atmospheric dispersion computer models that will allow
emergency management, law enforcement and other personnel to train for
and respond to potential chemical, biological, and radiological
terrorist attacks.
ProACT (Protective and Response Options for Airport Counter
Terrorism): Chemical and Biological
Counterterrorism Demonstration and Application
Program
The S&T Directorate and its partners at the San Francisco
International Airport are involved in a pilot program that couples
biological and chemical detection with vulnerability analysis,
response, and restoration. This program integrates networked sensors
with the operation of ventilation systems, allowing redirection of
contaminated air and effective evacuation should an event occur.
Guidance for the airport facility operators to manage biological and
chemical crises will be finalized soon for distribution throughout the
applicable community. Protocols and concepts of operation for
restoration also are under development. This program is designed to
serve as a template for deployment of these capabilities to other
similar facilities.
LINC (Local Integration of National Atmospheric Release
Advisory Center (NARAC) with Cities): Hazard
Assessment Tool for Operational Event Management
LINC demonstrates the capability for providing local government
agencies with advanced operational atmospheric plume prediction
capabilities that can be seamlessly integrated with appropriate Federal
agency support for homeland security. LINC's approach is to integrate
NARAC capabilities with local emergency management and response
centers. In the event of a chemical or biological release, NARAC
predictions can be used by emergency managers and responders to map the
extent and effects of hazardous airborne material. Prompt predictions
are provided to guide front-line responders in determining protective
actions to be taken, critical facilities that may be at risk, and safe
locations for incident command posts. LINC provides response teams from
multiple jurisdictions with tools to effectively share information
regarding the areas and populations at risk. To date, several cities
have participated in the project. New York City used LINC to help
inform and manage an explosion and fire at a Staten Island refinery in
the Spring of 2003.
BioNet: Integrated Civilian and Military Consequence
Management
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of
Defense's Defense Threat Reduction Agency have initiated the BioNet
program to address joint civilian-military consequence management
issues for localities near military bases. Upon completion of BioNet, a
seamless consequence management plan that incorporates concepts of
operation, information products, area monitoring, population health
monitoring, and sample analysis laboratory will be developed that can
be used nationally.
Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC)
The S&T Directorate assumed responsibility for the operations of
the ``facilities and liabilities'' of PIADC in June 2003. A 60-day
review of security and operations resulted in immediate improvements
and a plan for enhancements to security and operational maintenance.
Dr. Beth Lautner has become new Center Director for PIADC. Dr. Lautner
was with the National Pork Board for 13 years, most recently serving as
the vice-president of Science and Technology. Highly respected
throughout animal agriculture for her work on numerous issues, she
pioneered the establishment of the Pork Quality Assurance (PQA) Program
and has worked extensively with the USDA and other organizations on
national agricultural security issues. In 1994, she was awarded the
prestigious Howard Dunne Memorial Award by the association. In
addition, DHS announced on December 9, 2003, the selection of Field
Support Services, Inc. (FSSI), as the new contractor for maintenance at
PIADC. FSSI is a subsidiary of Arctic Slope Regional Corporation, an
Alaskan Native corporation, headquartered in Barrow, Alaska.
TOPOFF2 Exercise
In May 2003, leadership and staff members of the Science and
Technology Directorate served as members of the Secretary's Crisis
Assessment Team (CAT) and the interagency Domestic Emergency Support
Team (DEST) and provided expert technical advice on understanding,
communicating and responding to the hypothetical radiological and
plague events during the TOPOFF2 exercise.
Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures Programs
Radiation Detection in Metropolitan Areas
The Science and Technology division formally assumed management of
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey's radiation detection
test bed on August 2003. The test bed was previously managed by the
U.S. Department of Energy. The transfer will broaden the project scope
beyond testing and evaluation of individual pieces of technology to a
systems approach including response protocols and operational concepts.
Radiation detection equipment will be installed at tunnels, bridges,
ports, and airports in the New York City metropolitan area, and all
functions associated with their operational use will be evaluated. By
judging the efficacy of fielded systems over time, the Science and
Technology division will be able to influence future decisions on
detection technology R&D investment, deployment of urban monitoring
systems, configurations best able to enhance security, and viable
solutions for protecting the Nation from radiological and nuclear
threats.
Determined Promise Exercise
In August 2003, staff members of the S&T Directorate participated
in Determined Promise, a Department of Defense (DOD) exercise held in
Las Vegas, NV. The exercise demonstrated the military's capability to
assist in the response to a natural disaster, a bioterrorism event, and
a number of other emergency situations nationwide. The exercise also
provided a forum for initiating discussions that will foster
interagency cooperation between DHS and USNORTHCOM.
Nuclear Threat Assessments
The S&T Directorate has provided eight rapid nuclear threat
assessments for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and
approximately two dozen assessments on reports of illicit trafficking
in nuclear materials for the Department of State and other customers.
The Department of Homeland Security has been leading the interagency
Nuclear Trafficking Focus Group, which regularly brings together the
operational players of all agencies involved in response to and
understanding of nuclear smuggling events.
Secondary ``Reach Back''
In August 2003, the S&T Directorate's Nuclear Assessment Program
stood up a system to provide secondary ``reach back'' support to
operational DHS entities employing radiation detection systems in the
field. Secondary reach back provides inspectors with an additional
information resource to utilize for the resolution of radiation
detection alarms that draws upon experience in the analysis of nuclear
smuggling incidents and threat analysis.
Standards
Radiation Detection
The S&T Directorate has developed a suite of four radiation
detector standards under the auspices of the American National
Standards Institute (ANSI)'s Accredited American Standards Committee on
Radiation Instrumentation. The four standards deal with radiation
pagers, hand-held dosimetry instruments, radioisotope identifiers and
radiation portal monitors. The S&T Directorate has formed three writing
groups to prepare Test and Evaluation (T&E) protocols for hand-held
radiation detectors, radionuclide identifiers and radiation portal
monitors. The writing groups have met in working sessions in San Diego,
CA (July 2003) and Las Vegas, NV (September 2003) and have prepared
draft T&E protocols. Benchmark testing against these draft protocols
has been initiated at four National Laboratories.
Biopathogen Identification
The Science and Technology Directorate has partnered with the
Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense to fund a
contract with the Association of Analytical Communities International
to develop Reference Methods and Official Methods for bulk assay of
bacillus anthracis. This work will also permit the comparison of
commercially available rapid identification methods (hand-held assays)
for B. anthracis.
SAFETY Act
On October 10, 2003, Secretary Ridge signed an interim final rule
implementing the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective
Technologies (SAFETY) Act which was a requirement of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002. The SAFETY Act is designed to encourage the
development and rapid deployment of life-saving, anti-terrorism
technologies by providing manufacturers and sellers with limited
liability risks. The Department is now accepting applications for
designation under the Act and evaluating the proposed technologies.
Interoperability of Communications
SAFECOM: E-Gov Initiative to Improve Interoperability of
Wireless Communications
The Department of Homeland Security is taking steps to boost the
ability of the approximately 44,000 local, tribal and State entities
and 100 Federal agencies engaged in public safety to communicate
effectively with one another, particularly during an emergency. SAFECOM
is a Federal umbrella program under the S&T Directorate that is
dedicated to improving public safety response through enhanced
interoperable wireless communications. The goal is to enable public
safety agencies to talk across disciplines and jurisdictions via radio
communications systems, exchanging voice or data with one another on
demand and in real time. SAFECOM is providing seed money for the
Department of Justice's Integrated Wireless Network program, which will
create interoperability among local, State and Federal public safety
agencies in 25 cities. In addition, technical guidance for
interoperable communications that was developed under SAFECOM is
included in this year's Office of Domestic Preparedness grants.
Summit on Interoperable Communications for Public Safety
In June 2003, the S&T Directorate, Project SAFECOM, the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the National Institute
of Justice hosted a Summit on Interoperable Communications for Public
Safety. The event focused on familiarizing attendees with programs that
assist public safety practitioners, including first responders, and is
the first national effort ever undertaken to convene all the players.
In addition, it provided insight on Federal resource needs, how
government can leverage existing program successes and resources in the
area of standards development, approaches, and products and services.
The Summit results provided help in formulating a coordinated approach
toward nationwide communications interoperability.
SAFECOM Vendor Demonstration Day
In August 2003, the Science and Technology Directorate held its
first SAFECOM Vendor Demonstration Day, with an overwhelmingly positive
response from technology providers. Due to the increasing number of
vendor requests to present their technologies to the SAFECOM Program,
the S&T Directorate is holding a vendor demonstration day on the last
Friday of every month. These Friday sessions will offer a chance for
SAFECOM to learn about new technologies for interoperability, provide a
clear process for managing vendor requests, and ensure that every
vendor has a fair opportunity to participate.
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Programs
Addressing Threats and Vulnerabilities in the Oil and Gas
Industries
The S&T Directorate sponsored and delivered a prototype system to
the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP)
Directorate to perform Graphical Information System (GIS) based
computer assisted threat and vulnerability mapping of the oil and gas
infrastructure in the American Southwest. S&T is also in the process of
delivering to IAIP cutting edge visualization, data searching, data
correlation, and all-source analytic aids to provide IAIP advanced
analytic capabilities integrated with vulnerability information.
Advanced Algorithms for Biodetectors
Researchers funded by the S&T Directorate's Advanced Scientific
Computing Research & Development program achieved an important
milestone in the speed acceleration of software used to develop
advanced biodetectors. Scientists have made a pair of related
algorithmic advances that will speed the creation of DNA signatures for
pathogen detection at considerably reduced cost. These discoveries will
result in cheaper, faster, and more reliable bio-detectors for homeland
security.
Threat-Vulnerability Mapper
Part of the Threat-Vulnerability Information System, the Threat-
Vulnerability Mapper (or TVM), was installed in the analysis center of
the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate in
December 2003 and is already in constant use. Developed by the S&T
Directorate, the TVM provides counterterrorism analysts with a simple,
straightforward way to not only depict the geographic distribution of
threats across the United States, but also to search the underlying
databases for information on the possible actors, agents, potential
severity of attacks, and extent of the vulnerabilities to and effects
of such attacks. A second TVIS component was delivered to IAIP in
January 2003 and should be installed and operational by the end of
February 2004.
Critical Infrastructure Protection Decision Support System
On December 24, 2003, S&T's Critical Infrastructure Protection
Decision Support System (CIP/DSS) team was asked to conduct a rapid
analysis of potential consequences following discovery of a cow in
Washington State with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), commonly
known as Mad Cow disease. An analysis was developed within hours using
available open literature, past historical data, and the results from
an early stage, Dynamic Simulation agriculture model.
Cybersecurity
Experimental Infrastructure Network for Cyber Defense
Led by the S&T Directorate, DHS is co-funding with the National
Science Foundation a $5.45 million, 3-year research project to create
an experimental infrastructure network to support development and
demonstration of next generation information security technologies for
cyber defense. This project supports national-scale experimentation on
emerging security research and advanced development technologies.
Called Cyber Defense Technology Experimental Research (``DETER'')
Network, this is a multi-university project led by the University of
California, Berkley.
Evaluation Methods in Internet Security Technology
DHS is co-funding with the National Science Foundation, a second
cyber security project called Evaluation Methods in Internet Security
Technology (EMIST). EMIST is a testing framework that can be adapted to
simulators, emulation facilities, other testbeds, and hardware testing
facilities. The framework will include attack scenarios, attack
simulators, generators for topology and background traffic, data sets
derived from live traffic, and tools to monitor and summarize results.
EMSIT is a 3-year, $5.6 million, multi-university research project that
includes Penn State; University of California, Davis; Purdue; and the
International Computer Science Institute.
United States Coast Guard
Maritime Surveillance Testbed Prototype
In September 2003, S&T's Homeland Security Advanced Research
Projects Agency and the United States Coast Guard planned and funded
the South Florida Coastal Surveillance Prototype Testbed, a port and
coastal surveillance prototype in Port Everglades, Miami, and Key West
areas. The prototype is an evolutionary testbed that:
--Provides an initial immediate coastal surveillance capability in a
high priority area
--Offers the Coast Guard and other DHS agencies the means to develop
and evaluate CONOPS (Concept of Operations) in a real world
environment
--Implements and tests interoperability among DHS and DOD systems and
networks such as the U.S. Navy/Coast Guard Joint Harbor
Operations Center (JHOC).
--Tests and evaluates systems and operational procedures
--Becomes the design standard for follow-on systems in other areas
and integration with wider area surveillance systems. The
program has two phases; an initial prototype development phase,
and an improvements and update phase. The program is expected
to begin operations in June 2004 and is funded at $2.4 million
for fiscal year 2003 and $5 million for fiscal year 2004.
Partnerships
Workshop on Scientific Computing in Support of Homeland
Security
The Science and Technology Directorate brought together experts
from academia, private industry and the national laboratories with
staff from various organizations within the Department to understand
how the S&T Directorate's advanced scientific computing (ASC)
capabilities, centered at the national laboratories, can help address
needs across the Department. This workshop, held October 8-9, 2003, has
resulted in identifying several areas of potential high payoff for the
use of these unique capabilities; two examples are advanced research in
data management and information extraction, and research and
development of computational simulation tools. The workshop will
produce a formal report identifying relevant ASC capabilities and
matching them up with identified needs within the Department of
Homeland Security for improved operational capabilities.
Infrastructure Subcommittee of the National Science and
Technology Council
Staff members of the Science and Technology Directorate had a major
role in drafting the first charter for the National Science and
Technology Council's (NSTC's) Infrastructure Subcommittee; the
Subcommittee's first Co-Chairs are from the S&T Directorate and the
Office of Science and Technology Policy. The Subcommittee serves as a
forum within the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) for
developing consensus and resolving issues associated with coordinating
R&D agendas, policy, and programs to develop and protect the nation's
infrastructure. The Subcommittee will also be the vehicle used by the
Department of Homeland Security and the White House Office of Science
and Technology Policy to develop the National R&D Plan for Critical
Infrastructure Protection.
Homeland Security Standards Panel
The S&T Directorate worked with the American National Standards
Institute (ANSI) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) to establish a Homeland Security Standards Panel (HSSP) that
would coordinate the development of consensus standards among the 280
different standards development organizations. On June 9-10, 2003, the
inaugural meeting of the ANSI Homeland Security Standards Panel was
held at NIST. Plenary session presentations were given by four S&T
Directorate staff members to outline the needs in Department for
standards. The panel selected a small list of topics to address with
focus workshops. The first of these occurred in September 2003 with a
focus on needs for standards in biometrics.
Joint DHS/USDA National Strategy for Foreign Animal Disease
At the request of the Congressional Appropriations Committees for
both DHS and the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the two departments
have coordinated a report on a national strategy for foreign animal
disease. Participants in the joint study included DHS (S&T), USDA (the
Agricultural Research Service and the Agriculture and Plant Health
Inspection Service), and stakeholder groups. The joint study has
prompted an end-to-end review of the national response strategy
following the identification of a case of foot-and-mouth disease,
including the R&D requirements and gaps for assays, diagnostics,
vaccines, and antivirals. Comprehensive roadmaps have been developed
for these research areas, in 1-, 3-, and 5-year timeframes. These
roadmaps are important elements of program planning for S&T.
National Security Council Attribution Working Group
The S&T Directorate initiated and leads the National Security
Council Attribution Working Group, which is revisiting national
capabilities to rapidly perform forensic analysis in cases of nuclear
and radiological events of any size. This effort is expected to lead to
a robust and completely coordinated forensic capability for
attribution.
Workshops on Comparative Analysis
S&T's Office of Comparative Studies has sponsored two workshops on
identifying analysis techniques and information sources crucial for
analyzing the interaction of the terrorist threat with S&T activities.
These workshops brought together participants from two DHS
directorates, other government entities, academia and private industry
and have helped to improve communication between these groups.
Important analytical techniques and sources of information were
identified and have been utilized. The workshops were also used to
establish a set of topics which the office could profitably study. A
proposal is being prepared which will solicit work on several of these
topics.
Homeland Security Institute, and Homeland Security Science and
Technology Advisory Committee
Homeland Security Institute
A formal solicitation was issued in December for the Homeland
Security Institute (HSI), and proposals were received in January 2004.
Those proposals currently are being evaluated with an expected 5-year
award by early May 2004. However, current legislation states that the
Institute's operation will terminate in November 2005; this issue is of
concern to the bidders.
The HSI was mandated by the Homeland Security Act to assist the
Secretary and the Department in addressing important homeland security
issues that require scientific, technical, and analytical expertise.
The Institute will provide a dedicated, high-quality technical and
analytical support capability for informing homeland security decision
making at all levels. This capability will consist of an extensive
program of operational assessments, systems evaluations, technical
assessments, and resource analyses comparable to the capability
developed and used for decades by the Defense establishment. The
Institute will also provide analytical and technical evaluations that
support DHS implementation of the SAFETY Act. Finally, the Institute
will create and maintain a field operations program that will help
further introduce real-world needs and experiences into homeland
security is a disciplined and rigorous way.
Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee
The Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee
(HSSTAC) was formally established in December 2003 and holds its first
meeting in February 2004. The HSSTAC was mandated by the Homeland
Security Act to be a source of independent, scientific and technical
planning advice for the Under Secretary for Science and Technology. The
committee will (1) advise the Undersecretary on the mission goals for
the future; (2) provide advice on whether the policies, actions,
management processes, and organization constructs of the Science and
Technology Directorate are optimally focused on mission objectives; (3)
provide advice on whether the research, development, test, evaluation,
and systems engineering activities are properly resourced (capital,
financial, and human) to accomplish the objectives; (4) identify
outreach activities (particularly in accessing and developing, where
necessary, the industrial base of the Nation); and (5) review the
technical quality and relevance of the Directorate's programs.
Countermeasures to Man-Portable Air Defense Systems
The S&T Directorate has selected three firms to provide analyses of
the economic, manufacturing and maintenance issues needed to support a
system to address the potential threat of MAN-Portable Air Defense
Systems (MANPADS) to commercial aircraft. The next phase of the program
will include development of prototypes using existing technology which
will be subjected to a rigorous test and evaluation process. This
initiative is not intended to develop new technology, but rather to re-
engineer existing technology from military to commercial aviation use.
University and Fellowship Programs
Fellowships and Scholarships
In September 2003, the S&T Directorate named 100 students to the
inaugural class of the Department of Homeland Security's Scholars and
Fellows Program. The program, which received more than 2,400
applications, supports United States students who choose to pursue
scientific careers and perform research in fields that are essential to
the homeland security mission. The first class consists of 50
undergraduate students and 50 graduate students who are attending
universities across the country majoring in the physical, biological,
and social and behavioral sciences including science policy,
engineering, mathematics, or computer science. The Directorate has
already issued a notice inviting applications from students for the
2004-2005 academic year. The website is http://www.orau.gov/dhsed/.
University Centers of Excellence
The Science and Technology division has created the Homeland
Security Centers Program that supports university-based centers of
excellence dedicated to fostering homeland security mission critical
research and education. The program has established the first Center of
Excellence focused on risk analysis and modeling related to the
economic consequences of terrorism at the University of Southern
California, partnering with the University of Wisconsin at Madison, New
York University and the University of California at Berkeley. A request
for proposals has been issued for the second and third Centers of
Excellence, which will focus on animal-related and post-harvest food
agro-terrorism.
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency
Near-Term Technologies
In May 2003, the Science and Technology Directorate's Homeland
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) released a Broad
Agency Announcement through the Technical Support Working Group for
near-term technologies that can be rapidly prototyped and deployed to
the field. A total of 3,344 responses as received in the following
broad categories: chemical, biological, radiation and nuclear
countermeasures; personnel protection; explosives detection;
infrastructure protection; physical security; improvised device defeat;
and investigative support and forensics. The first contract award went
to North Carolina State University for the development of the next-
generation of structural fire fighting personal protective equipment.
Detection Systems
The S&T Directorate reviewed and selected proposals for funding in
response to its Research Announcement for Detection Systems for
Biological and Chemical Countermeasures, which was published through
the Technical Support Working Group. In September 2003, the Homeland
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) held its first
Bidders Conference in Washington, DC. Approximately 420 private sector
and university representatives attended the event and over 500 white
papers were submitted. Finalists have been selected for negotiation,
and work has already begun in a number of the more important areas.
Virtual Cyber Security Center
On December 13, 2003, a Request for Proposals and Statement of Work
for technical and administrative support for the virtual Cyber R&D
Center was published to seven capable performers listed on the GSA
schedule. The deadline for response was December 15, 2003, and two
responsive proposals were received. A three million dollar technical,
management, and administrative contract was awarded to SRI
International on February 2, 2004, to support the functions of the
HSARPA Cyber R&D Center. The Cyber R&D Center will be the primary S&T
interface with the academic and industrial cyber security research
communities.
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program
Solicitation
On November 13, 2003, the Homeland Security Advanced Research
Projects Agency (HSARPA) issued a Small Business Innovation Research
(SBIR) Program Solicitation. The purpose of this solicitation was to
invite small businesses to submit innovative research proposals that
address eight high-priority DHS requirements:
--New system/technologies to detect low vapor pressure chemicals
(e.g., Toxic Industrial Chemicals)
--Chemical and biological sensors employing novel receptor scaffolds
--Advanced low cost aerosol collectors for surveillance sensors and
personnel monitoring
--Computer modeling tool for vulnerability assessment of U.S.
infrastructure
--Ship compartment inspection device
--Marine Asset Tag Tracking System
--Automatic Identification System tracking and collision avoidance
equipment for small boats
--Advanced Secure Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
and related distributed control systems.
By the December 15, 2003, deadline 374 proposals had been received.
The evaluation is complete and 66 proposers entered negotiation for
Phase I contracts beginning February 11, 2004.
SAFECOM Vendor Demonstration Day
SAFECOM held a Vendor Demonstration Day on January 30, 2004.
SAFECOM's Vendor Day allows several communications equipment and
service providers to present their products and/or technologies for
SAFECOM. Responses from the SAFECOM Request for Information in November
2003 were used to select vendors for this event. Each vendor selected
represents a different approach to solving the communications and
interoperability problems facing first responders.
International Programs
Agreement with Canada on Border and Infrastructure Security
On October 3, 2002, Secretary Tom Ridge and Canadian Deputy Prime
Minister John Manley initialed an agreement on Science and Technology
Cooperation for protecting shared critical infrastructure and enhancing
border security. The S&T Directorate is participating in a Working
Group to develop near-term deliverables and projects to protect shared
critical infrastructure such as bridges, dams, pipelines,
communications and power grids; to develop surveillance and monitoring
technologies to enhance the ability to disrupt and interdict
terrorists; and to develop technologies for detecting the illicit
transportation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
weapons.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND INCIDENT MANAGEMENT
Between March and December of 2003, the Office of Weapons of Mass
Destruction Operations and Incident Management (WMDO-IM) provided
surveillance and operational incident response to the Homeland Security
Operations Center and law enforcement officials on 24 separate
occasions. In addition, the WMDO-IM provided operational support to the
Homeland Security Operations Center during Hurricane Isabel and the
Northeast blackout.
The WMDO-IM established a scientific reach-back and rapid decision
support capability through the Scientific and Technical Analysis and
Response Teams (START). In addition to activating the START teams
during the Code Orange time period in December 2003, WMDO-IM provided
technical expert consultations on threats to the nation's water
resources and responded to concerns about impacts of solar flares.
WMDO-IM helped develop the Initial National Response Plan (INRP)
and its National Incident Management System; the INRP represents a
significant first step towards an overall goal of integrating the
current family of Federal domestic prevention, preparedness, response,
and recovery plans into a single all-discipline, all-hazards plan.
WMDO-IM provided technical support to the Homeland Security
Operations Center (HSOC), assessing vulnerabilities and actions the
HSOC can take to improve the ability to resist a chemical or biological
terrorist attack.
WMDO-IM, with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, developed curriculum for a week-long training
workshop on weapons of mass destruction for the Central Intelligence
Agency University. Also in the area of education and training, WMDO-IM
established a homeland security medical executive training course.
Senator Cochran. Thanks, Dr. McQueary.
General Libutti, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL FRANK LIBUTTI
General Libutti. Good morning, Chairman Cochran, and
Senator Byrd.
I am delighted to appear before you today to discuss the
President's fiscal year 2005 budget request for the Department
of Homeland Security's Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate. And I look forward to a meeting with
you soon to discuss the classified portion of the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection budget, specifically,
the intelligence side of business.
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection is the
focal point for intelligence, analysis, and infrastructure
protection operations and information sharing within the
Department of Homeland Security. Within a single Directorate,
IAIP merges capability to identify and assess a broad range of
intelligence and information concerning threats to the
homeland, maps the information against the Nation's
vulnerabilities, issues timely and actionable warnings, and
takes appropriate preventive and protective action to protect
our infrastructure and key assets.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE IAIP DIRECTORATE
As we mark the first anniversary of the Department, I would
like to highlight for you some of the many accomplishments of
our IAIP Directorate.
Since March 2003, IAIP has launched the Homeland Security
Information Network, a comprehensive interactive information
sharing program that expands access to and use of a joint
regional information exchange system. The roll out includes all
of our partners at the State and local levels, as well as
private sector partners.
Next, we have implemented the Homeland Security
Presidential Directive HSPD-7 which addresses critical
infrastructure identification, prioritization and protection.
And as you know this was signed by President Bush in December
of 2003.
To the National Cyber Security Division, the NCSD, we have
established the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, or
USCERT, and launched the National Cyber Alert System, America's
first coordinated cyber security system for identifying,
analyzing and prioritizing emerging vulnerabilities and
threats. This system provides the first nation-wide
infrastructure for relaying actionable computer security
updates and warning information to computer users in the
Government, the private sector, business, and home users as
well.
We've assumed the responsibility for the Homeland Security
Operation Center, which maintains and shares real-time domestic
situation awareness, coordinates security operations, detects,
prevents and deters incidents, and facilitates response and
recovery for all critical incidents and threats.
In addition, we have conducted detailed vulnerability
studies of the banking and telecommunication industries to
better understand the inter-dependencies therein, and
prioritization regarding vulnerability reduction.
We formally executed the Protected Critical Information
Infrastructure Protection Program. This is pursuant to the
provisions of the Critical Information Infrastructure
Information Act of 2002.
Even with these accomplishments there is much more work to
be done. IAIP's budget relies on the expectation of two
emerging trends. First, the nature and complexity of the
threats which will increase. And second, our national
infrastructure components which will become more complex and
more interdependent. These trends will result in more demands
on the department and IAIP to anticipate terrorist intentions,
tactics and capabilities, and to mitigate risks and
vulnerabilities for the protection of the United States of
America and its citizens.
FISCAL YEAR 2005 BUDGET REQUEST FOR IAIP
For these reasons, the President's fiscal year 2005 budget
request for IAIP is structured around the following major
programs: Threat determination and assessments; Infrastructure
vulnerabilities and risk assessments; Information warnings and
advisories; Remediation and protective actions; Outreach and
partnerships; National Communication System; Competitive
analysis and evaluation; National plans and strategies; and the
Homeland Security Operation Center.
Let me discuss several of the initiatives associated with
each of the mission areas of the fiscal year 2005 request for
$864 million.
THREAT DETERMINATION AND ASSESSMENT
First, threat determination and assessment. Funding in this
area is targeted to increase the IAIP directorate's technology
competencies by training analysts and equipping IAIP with the
most advanced technologies and tools.
The training tools and technology will be utilized to
develop a detailed understanding of terrorists' organizational
capabilities with supporting materials and conductivity to
interpret and predict threats.
Next, is to expand cooperation and fusion efforts from
Homeland Security to our internal components and out to
external customers, and increase cooperation efforts among the
intelligence community.
INFRASTRUCTURE VULNERABILITY AND RISK ASSESSMENT
Next, the infrastructure vulnerability and risk assessment
piece. This funds the development of comprehensive national
infrastructure risk analysis and profile. There we are talking
about high-value target sets, the development of analytic tools
to evaluate critical infrastructure and key assets, and the
coordination of a national threat vulnerability and asset
database to assess, integrate, collaborate and store threat
vulnerability information.
Next, information and warning advisories. In addition to
continuously operating a 24/7 Capable Operations Center, the
information and warning program will provide search capability
for our HSOC, our operation center, and for other directorates
during heightened states of alert or in response to specific
incidents.
Funding in this area supports submission of collection
requests for threat information of the intelligence community,
the law enforcement, and dissemination guidance to Homeland
Security components, developing analysis on the nature and
scope of the threat, and identifying potential terrorists'
targets within the United States.
Another priority is the need to establish threat
advisories, bulletins and warnings at different levels of
classification to relevant stakeholders. The threat
publications are detailed and disseminated in a timely fashion
portraying the nature, scope and target of the threat.
REMEDIATION AND PROTECTIVE ACTIONS
Next, remediation and protective actions. Through this
program the IAIP directorate provides a broad range of services
including on-site planning advice, technical and operational
training programs, assistance in identifying vulnerabilities
and development of sharing and best-practices. Activities in
this area also include security efforts to protect
infrastructure and key assets from cyber attacks.
Specifically, the $345.783 million for remediation and
protective actions is divided into the following five
categories: Critical infrastructure and key asset
identification; Critical infrastructure of vulnerability field
assessments; Infrastructure and key asset protection; Cyber
security; and last, protection standards and performance
matrixes.
OUTREACH AND PARTNERSHIP
The next broad category is outreach and partnership. The
fiscal year 2005 President's budget requests $40.829 million to
build and maintain a sound partnership foundation. To be
successful in information sharing, strong relationships must be
maintained with State and local governments, private sector,
academia, advisory bodies and the international community.
NATIONAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
Next, the national communication system. This allows NCS to
ensure priority use of telecommunication services during times
of national crisis, including the government emergency
telecommunication service, GETS. The funding enhances these
programs and supports the development of wireless priority
services, which provide a nationwide priority cellular service
to key national security and emergency preparedness users.
COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
Next, competitive analysis and evaluation. The competitive
analysis and evaluation program ensures that IAIP products and
services are tested and accurate based on sound assumptions and
data, and ultimately offers the highest quality, depth and
value to the IAIP customers.
NATIONAL PLANS AND STRATEGIES
Next is our national plans and strategies. Critical to
ongoing national efforts to protect and ensure the homeland,
our actions support updating, coordinating and monitoring the
implementation of national plans and strategies.
HOMELAND SECURITY OPERATION CENTER
Homeland Security Operation Center, $35 million. The HSOC
or Homeland Security Operation Center maintains and shares
domestic situational awareness, coordinates security
operations, protects, prevents and deters incidents, and
facilitates the response and recovery of all critical
incidents.
The HSOC is the focal point for sharing information across
all levels of government, the private sector and our friends at
the State and local levels as well.
PREPARED STATEMENT
In summary, the fiscal year 2005 budget request provides
the resources to enable IAIP to manage and grow in its mission
of securing the homeland. I look forward to working with you to
accomplish the goals of this department and the goals of IAIP.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd, this concludes my prepared
statement and I would be happy to answer any questions you may
have at this time. Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Frank Libutti
Introduction
Good morning Chairman Cochran, Senator Byrd and distinguished
members of the Subcommittee. I am delighted to appear before you today
to discuss the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request for the
Department of Homeland Security's Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate.
IAIP is the focal point for intelligence analysis, infrastructure
protection operations, and information sharing within the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). Within a single directorate, IAIP merges the
capability to identify and assess a broad range of intelligence and
information concerning threats to the homeland, map that information
against the nation's vulnerabilities, issue timely and actionable
warnings, and take appropriate preventive and protective action to
protect our infrastructures and key assets. IAIP is currently comprised
of three primary components: the Office of Information Analysis (IA),
the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP), and the Homeland Security
Operations Center (HSOC).
Fiscal Year 2004 Accomplishments
As we mark the first anniversary of the Department, I would like to
highlight for you some of the many accomplishments of the IAIP
Directorate, one of the newest parts of the Federal Government. The
formation of IAIP has created for the first time a unique, integrated
capability to not only map the current threat picture against the
nation's vulnerabilities, but to also assess the risk of a terrorist
attack based upon preventive and protective measures in place. That is,
IAIP is enabling us to move from a reactive posture in the homeland to
a risk management and mitigation posture. Let me give you some
examples.
Since March, 2003, IA has:
--Launched the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), a
comprehensive information sharing program that expands access
to and use of the Joint Regional Information Exchange System
(JRIES). The HSIN will provide secure real-time connectivity in
a collaborative environment with States, urban areas, counties,
tribal areas, and territories to collect and disseminate
information between Federal, State, local, and tribal agencies
involved in combating terrorism.
--Coordinated Operation Liberty Shield and the rapid enhancement of
security at more than 145 national asset sites at the outset of
the war in Iraq. Following that, IAIP transitioned the
protection of the sites from National Guard and law enforcement
to a more cost effective and permanent set of physical
protective measures.
--Enhanced protection, by assisting local communities with conducting
vulnerability assessments and implementing protective measures,
of the nation's highest risk chemical sites, thereby improving
the safety of over 13 million Americans.
--Implemented Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 7,
``Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization and
Protection,'' which was signed by President Bush in December
2003. The HSPD assigned the Department of Homeland Security
responsibility for coordinating the overall national effort to
enhance the protection of the critical infrastructure and key
resources of the United States and the development of an
integrated cyber and physical protection plan.
--Implemented Wireless Priority Service, to ensure the continuity of
cellular networks nationwide, registering over 3,000 Federal,
State, local and private users.
--Established the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) to
coordinate the implementation of the National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace and serve as the national focal point for the
public and private sectors on cybersecurity issues, and
developed a process for handling cyber incidents, successfully
managing a number of major cyber events.
--Through the NCSD, established the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness
Team (US-CERT) through an initial partnership with the Computer
Emergency Response Team Coordination Center at Carnegie Mellon
University. US-CERT is building a cyber watch operation,
launching a partnership program to build situational awareness
and cooperation, and coordinating with U.S. Government agencies
to predict, prevent, and respond to cyber attacks.
--Launched the National Cyber Alert System under the auspices of US-
CERT, America's first coordinated cyber security system for
identifying, analyzing, and prioritizing emerging
vulnerabilities and threats. This system provides the first
nationwide infrastructure for relaying actionable computer
security update and warning information to computer users in
the government, in private industry, and small business and
home users.
--Assumed responsibility for the Homeland Security Operations Center
(HSOC), which maintains and shares real time domestic
situational awareness; coordinates security operations;
detects, prevents, and deters incidents; and facilitates
response and recovery for all critical incidents and threats.
As of February 2004, 26 Federal and local law enforcement
agencies and Intelligence Community members are were
represented in the HSOC, providing reach back capability into
their home organizations to continuously inform the current
threat picture, and to provide key decision makers with real
time information.
--Conducted detailed vulnerability studies of the banking and
telecommunications industry to better understand the
interdependencies and prioritize vulnerability reduction.
--Initiated an intra-Department and interagency review and analysis
of information obtained in detainee briefings to assess
specific terrorist capabilities, work that subsequently became
the subject of several advisories disseminated to a variety of
homeland security partners regarding terrorist planning,
tactics and capabilities.
--Co-chaired with the Border and Transportation Security Directorate
(BTS) the DHS Intelligence Activities Joint Study charged with
reviewing the mission, responsibilities and resources of DHS
Intelligence component organizations. The study was chartered
for the purpose of making recommendations to the Secretary as
to the optimal utilization of the Department's analytical
resources.
--With the Homeland Security Council (HSC), initiated an ongoing
interagency review of the Homeland Security Advisory System
(HSAS), for the purpose of refining the system to make it more
efficient and more beneficial for States and localities and the
private sector.
--Formally executed the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information
(PCII) implementing regulation, pursuant to the provisions of
the Critical Infrastructure Information ACT of 2002. The
purpose of the PCII Program is to encourage private entities
and others with knowledge about our critical infrastructure to
voluntarily submit confidential, proprietary, and business
sensitive critical infrastructure information to the Department
through IAIP. Information submitted to IAIP that qualifies for
protection under the provisions of the Act and the PCII
implementing regulation will be exempted from public
disclosure, providing a significant opportunity for private
entities to assist in homeland security without exposing
potentially sensitive and proprietary information to the
public. The Department will use information that qualifies for
protection primarily to assess our vulnerabilities, secure the
nation's critical infrastructure and protected systems, issue
warnings and advisories, and assist in recovery.
Fiscal Year 2005
Even with these accomplishments, there is much more work that must
be done. The United States remains at risk, despite the continuing work
to assess and mitigate vulnerabilities. Our interdependent critical
infrastructures enable Americans to enjoy one of the highest standards
of living in the world, provide the backbone for the production of
goods and services for the world's largest economy, provide over 60
million jobs, and ensure the United States can protect its national
security interests. Infrastructure will remain one of the top priority
targets for terrorists desiring to damage the nation's economy and
incite fear in the minds of the American people.
While the possibility of large-scale attacks similar to 9/11 remain
significant, it is also possible likely that terrorists will employ
smaller scale operations such as the suicide bombings prevalent in
Israel. Terrorists understand that the cumulative effect of many small-
scale operations--that are easier to plan and conduct--can be just as
effective as large-scale attacks in their overall impact on Americans'
sense of security in their own country and, especially, at United
States facilities overseas.
IAIP's budget relies on the expectation of two emerging trends:
First, the nature and complexity of threats will increase; and, second,
our national infrastructure components will become more complex and
interdependent. These trends will result in more demands on the
Department and IAIP to anticipate terrorist intentions, tactics and
capabilities, and to mitigate risks and vulnerabilities for the
protection of the United States and its citizens.
For these reasons, the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request
for IAIP is structured around the following major program areas: Threat
Determination and Assessments, Infrastructure Vulnerabilities and Risk
Assessments, Information Warnings and Advisories, Remediation and
Protective Actions, Outreach and Partnerships, National Communications
System, Competitive Analysis and Evaluations, National Plans and
Strategies, and the Homeland Security Operations Center.
Threat Determination and Assessment ($21.943 Million)
IAIP's Threat Determination and Assessment program is designed to
detect and identify threats of terrorism against the United States
homeland; assess the nature and scope of these terrorist threats; and
understand terrorist threats in light of actual and potential
vulnerabilities within critical infrastructures and/or key assets.
Addressing these issues requires the IAIP Directorate to improve on its
existing set of threat analysts and analytical tools by hiring and
training additional highly skilled threat analysts; acquiring and
fielding new analytical tools and technologies to assist in assessing
and integrating information; and deploying secure communications
channels that allow for the rapid exchange of information and
dissemination of analytical results.
These improvements will be used for multiple purposes, including:
(1) providing analysis and assessments of the current threat picture as
it relates to critical infrastructure; (2) developing actionable
intelligence for Federal, State, and local law enforcement; (3) issuing
warnings at all levels from the Federal Government to the private
sector; and (4) supporting efforts to identify and coordinate effective
countermeasures.
The President's Budget requests $21.943 million for continued
support of on-going activities to continually form terrorist threat
situational awareness, execute the functions outlined above, and focus
on information sharing and coordination within DHS as well as in the
Intelligence Community and other external stakeholder communities.
These capabilities enhance the performance of two critical functions in
protecting the homeland. First, it offers the United States Government
the ability to integrate, synchronize, and correlate unique sources of
information relating to homeland security, emanating from traditional
and non-traditional (e.g., State and local governments, private
industry) sources. Second, the IAIP Directorate is positioned to
integrate knowledge of potential terrorist threats with an
understanding of exploitable infrastructure vulnerabilities, resulting
in a value-added profile of national risk that transcends traditional
threat and vulnerability assessments.
Funding in this area is targeted to increase the IAIP Directorate's
technical competencies by training analysts and equipping IAIP with the
most advanced technologies and tools. The training, tools and
technologies will be utilized in four primary areas:
--Model Terrorist Organization.--Developing a detailed understanding
of terrorist organization capability with supporting materials
and connectivity to interpret and predict threats.
--Develop Terrorist Capabilities Baseline.--Developing a detailed
understanding of terrorist capabilities baseline with
supporting materials and connectivity to interpret and predict
threats.
--Collaboration and Fusion.--Expanding collaboration and fusion
efforts from DHS to internal components, and out to an extended
customer base.
--Analysis Coordination.--Spearheading the effort to build a
collaborative and mutually supporting analysis coordination
schematic for DHS, and ensure that it incorporates others
(TTIC, TSC, and the Intelligence Community) into a ``community
of interest'' approach for understanding domestic terrorist
threats.
Infrastructure Vulnerability and Risk Assessment ($71.080 million)
The Homeland Security Act directs the IAIP Directorate to carry out
comprehensive assessments of the vulnerabilities of the critical
infrastructure and key assets of the United States. As such, the IAIP
Directorate serves as the focal point for coordination between the
Federal Government, critical infrastructure owners and operators, and
State and local governments for the sharing of information and the
planning for response to crisis events affecting infrastructures.
The fiscal year 2005 President's Budget requests $71.080 million to
fund the development of a comprehensive National infrastructure risk
analysis and profile (e.g., high value/high probability of success
targets); development of analytic tools to evaluate critical
infrastructure and key assets; and the coordination and development of
a National threat vulnerability and asset database to access,
integrate, correlate, and store threat and vulnerability information.
These mission areas will be enable IAIP to identify potential risks
caused by infrastructure interdependencies, and determine the potential
consequences of an infrastructure failure due to a terrorist attack.
Ultimately, the intent of these efforts is to strengthen the
capabilities of the IAIP Directorate and each critical infrastructure
to provide near real-time notification of incidents; enhance the
ability of the IAIP Directorate to assess the impact of incidents on
critical infrastructure and key assets; to assess collateral damage to
interdependent infrastructure; and create tools and processes to
enhance infrastructure modeling and risk assessment capabilities.
The fiscal year 2005 budget request for infrastructure
vulnerability and risk assessment is divided into three areas:
--National Infrastructure Risk Analysis.--Funding in this area
supports the development of comprehensive risk and
vulnerability analyses on a national scale. These analyses are
cross-sector in nature, focusing on problems affecting multiple
infrastructures, both physical and cyber-related. As assigned
in the Homeland Security Act and HSPD-7, the IAIP Directorate
will continue to leverage and develop new techniques to map
data provided by threat analyses, provide consequence analysis,
and create vulnerability assessment teams based on the nature
of the indicators or incidents. The goal is to produce timely,
actionable information that is more meaningful to industry. A
portion of this funding also supports the direct involvement of
critical infrastructure sector experts to supplement risk
analysis efforts and to gain a better understanding of the
sector's core business and operational processes. In addition,
a portion of this funding is utilized for exploration and to
pilot innovative methodologies to examine infrastructure
vulnerabilities and interdependencies.
--Analytic Tools Development and Acquisition.--The IAIP Directorate
will continue to collaborate with the Science and Technology
(S&T) Directorate to acquire the most advanced tools and
database designs available to better understand the
complexities of interdependent systems and for translating vast
amounts of diverse data into common and usable information for
decision-makers, analysts, and infrastructure operators. Such
capabilities include data-logging systems, modeling and
simulation, data mining, and information correlation. Funding
is targeted toward developing dynamic and multi-faceted tools
designed to expand access to needed information.
--National Threat/Vulnerability/Asset Databases.--The funding level
requested for this activity in the fiscal year 2005 budget is
based on the recognition of the data intensive nature, scale
and complexity of analyzing infrastructure vulnerability
issues. The intent is to develop and maintain databases that
allow the IAIP Directorate to provide its stakeholders with up-
to-date information on threats and vulnerabilities.
Specifically, the IAIP Directorate is continuing to coordinate
and direct the development of the primary database of the
Nation's critical infrastructures through a collaborative
process involving all stakeholders; maintain data on the risks
posed to specific facilities and assets (and the probability of
attack and associated consequences for homeland, national, and
economic security should an attack occur); and develop,
operate, and manage integrated data warehouses--in full
compliance with the Department's privacy policies--that contain
comprehensive all-source threat, vulnerability, and asset data.
Information and Warning Advisories ($59.807 Million)
One of the most visible aspects of the DHS mission lies in the
management and administration of the Homeland Security Advisory System,
the communications of threat condition status to the general public,
and the continuous around-the-clock monitoring of potential terrorists
threats. Specifically, there are three key information and warning
activities that help support the Homeland Security Advisory System and
other efforts to alert key Departmental leadership, national leaders
and the general public: (1) tactical indications and warning and the
associated warning advisory preparation and issuance; (2) information
requirements management; and (3) integrated physical and cyber
infrastructure monitoring and coordination.
The fiscal year 2005 President's Budget requests $59.807 million to
maintain the information and warning program. In addition to
continuously operating a 247 capability, the information and
warning program area will provide surge capabilities for the HSOC and
with other Directorates during heightened states of alert or in
response to specific incidents. The relevant fiscal year 2005 budget
request is divided into three primary areas:
--Tactical Indications and Warning Analysis/Warning Advisory
Preparation and Issuance.--Funding in this area supports
submission of collection requests for threat information to the
Intelligence Community and law enforcement, disseminating
guidance to DHS components, developing analyses on the nature
and scope of the threats, and identifying potential terrorist
targets within the United States. A program priority is the
continued to development of tools and technologies to assist
our analysts to interpret, integrate, and catalogue indicators,
warnings, and/or actual events and to provide Departmental and
national leaders situational awareness. Another priority is the
need to publish threat advisories, bulletins, and warnings at
different levels of classification prior to distribution to the
relevant stakeholders. Threat publications are detailed and
disseminated in a timely fashion, portraying the nature, scope,
and target of the threat. Ultimately, this information provides
the basis for determinations to change the threat condition.
--Information Requirements Management.--Information related to
threats and critical infrastructure vulnerabilities are
collected, stored, and protected within a diverse set of
locations and sources, spanning all levels of government
(Federal, State, and local) and including intelligence,
proprietary and public sources. Funding in this area supports
the technologies necessary to search within those diverse
databases to identify, distill, and/or acquire mission-critical
information. Program funding supports efforts to coordinate
information requests and tasks emanating from within other
parts of IAIP, other DHS Directorates, the Intelligence
Community, law enforcement, State and local governments, and
the private sector. In addition, a portion of these funds is
used to supplement the information technology structure to
accomplish these tasks efficiently and effectively through the
use of leading-edge capabilities. This effort ensures that all
information users are able to access all available and relevant
data.
--Integrated Physical and Cyber Infrastructure Monitoring and
Coordination.--Intelligence and warning staff monitoring and
coordination efforts ensure that threat and critical
infrastructure issues are adequately addressed and represented.
In addition, these efforts coordinate incident response,
mitigation, restoration, and prioritization across critical
sectors in conjunction with the other relevant DHS components
(e.g., Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate).
Remediation and Protective Actions ($345.738 Million)
The IAIP Directorate has established a national Critical
Infrastructure Protection program that leverages stakeholder input at
the Federal, State, and local level and across the private sector to
provide the best and most cost-effective protective strategies for ``at
risk'' infrastructure and facilities. Through this program, the IAIP
Directorate provides a broad range of services including on-site
planning advice, technical and operational training programs,
assistance in identifying vulnerabilities, and development and sharing
of best practices. Activities in this area also include security
efforts to protect infrastructure and assets from cyber attacks (e.g.,
malicious software, distributed denial-of-service attacks).
Specifically, the fiscal year 2005 President's Budget requests
$345.738 million, for remediation and protective actions divided into
the following five areas:
--Critical Infrastructure and Key Asset Identification.--The Homeland
Security Act directs the IAIP Directorate to recommend measures
necessary to protect the critical infrastructure of the United
States. One key step in this process is funding a national
program focused on identifying critical infrastructure and
assets and assessing potential risks of successful attacks to
those assets. By understanding the full array of critical
infrastructure facilities and assets, their interaction, and
the interdependencies across infrastructure sectors, IAIP is
able to forecast the national security, economic, and public
safety implications of terrorist attacks and prioritize
protection measures accordingly. Moreover, the process of
identifying and prioritizing assets in this manner creates a
common overarching set of metrics that consist of the
individual attributes of specific infrastructure sectors.
--Critical Infrastructure Vulnerability Field Assessments.--The
Directorate coordinates with all relevant Federal, State and
local efforts to identify system vulnerabilities and works
closely with the private sector to ensure vulnerability field
assessment methodologies are effective, easy to use, and
consistently applied across sectors. Funding is targeted at the
need to conduct and coordinate specialized vulnerability
assessments by DHS teams, in conjunction with teams from other
Federal or State agencies and private sector companies as
appropriate, for the highest priority critical infrastructures
and assets. The intent of these efforts is to catalogue
specific vulnerabilities affecting the highest priority
terrorist targets, thereby helping guide the development of
protective measures to harden a specific facility or asset. A
nationwide vulnerability field assessment program is currently
underway leveraging the expertise of the IAIP Directorate,
other agencies, and the private sector to ensure cross-sector
vulnerabilities are identified and that sound, informed
decisions will be reached regarding protective measures and
strategies.
--Infrastructure and Key Asset Protection Implementation.--Due to the
vast geographic size of the United States and diverse operating
environment for each infrastructure sector, protection
strategies must start at the local level and then be applied
nationally as needed. Priorities for protection strategies are
based on regional, State, and local needs and on the need for
cross-sector coordination and protective actions within those
geographic boundaries. The budget request reflects the need for
the IAIP Directorate to continue the development of a flexible
set of programs to assist in the implementation of protective
measures. Examples include coordinating with other Federal and
State agencies and the private sector to: (1) ensure the
detection of weapons of mass destruction material is considered
in the development of protection plans; (2) disrupt attack
planning by taking low cost actions that make information
collection and surveillance difficult for terrorists; (3)
defend the most at risk critical infrastructure facilities and
key assets throughout the country above the level of security
associated with industry best practices; and (4) develop a
nationally-integrated bombing response capability similar to
that of the United Kingdom. DHS funding in these areas focuses
on high value, high probability targets and will take the form
of ``joint ventures'' with State and local governments,
regional alliances, and the private sector.
--Cyberspace Security.--Consistent with the Homeland Security Act and
the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, a key element of
infrastructure protection, both in the public and private
sectors, is to ensure the continued healthy functioning of
cyberspace, which includes the cyber infrastructure and the
cyber dependencies in the critical infrastructure sectors. The
IAIP Directorate recognizes that cyberspace provides a
connecting linkage within and among many infrastructure sectors
and the consequences of a cyber attack could cascade within and
across multiple infrastructures. The result could be widespread
disruption of essential services, damaging our national
economy, and imperiling public safety and national security.
The budget request supports efforts to capitalize on existing
capabilities of the Directorate, and investing in new
capabilities to monitor, predict, and prevent cyber attacks and
to minimize the damage from and efficiently recover from
attacks. As the manager responsible for a national cyber
security program, the IAIP Directorate provides direct funding
to support: (1) creating a national cyberspace security threat
and vulnerability reduction program that includes a methodology
for conducting national cyber threat and vulnerability risk
assessments; (2) strengthening a national cyberspace security
readiness system to include a public-private architecture for
rapidly responding to and quickly disseminating information
about national-level cyber incidents-including the Cyber Alert
Warning System; (3) expanding and completing the warning and
information network to support crisis management during cyber
and physical events; (4) implementing a national cyberspace
security awareness and training program; (5) developing
capabilities to secure the United States Government in
cyberspace that include guidelines for improving security
requirements in government procurements; (6) strengthening the
framework for national security international cyberspace
security cooperation that focuses on strengthening
international cyber security coordination and; (7) the Global
Early Warning Information System, which monitors the worldwide
health of the Internet through use of multiple data sources,
tools, and knowledge management to provide early warning of
cyber attacks.
--Protection Standards and Performance Metrics.--Working in
collaboration with the National Institute of Standards and
Technology as appropriate, the IAIP Directorate is developing
objective data for systems protection standards and performance
measures. Several sectors currently use threat-based exercise
approaches to validate key elements of their protection
efforts. The budget request in this area will focus on
continually improving and validating sector plans and
protective programs and providing training and education
programs for public and private sector owners and operators of
critical infrastructure and/or key assets.
Outreach and Partnership ($40.829 Million)
The private sector and State and local government own and operate
more than 85 percent of the Nation's critical infrastructures and key
assets. Consequently, public-private cooperation is paramount, and
without such partnerships, many of our Nation's infrastructures and
assets could be more susceptible to terrorist attack. The IAIP
Directorate is responsible for cultivating an environment conducive for
public and private partnerships, developing strategic relationships
underlying those partnerships, and coordinating and supporting the
development of partnerships between the Directorate and State and local
government, private industry, and international communities for
national planning, outreach and awareness, information sharing, and
protective actions.
The fiscal year 2005 President's Budget requests $40.829 million to
build and maintain a sound partnership foundation. It is imperative
that the Department is familiar with the issues confronting the private
sector, State and local governments, Federal sector specific agencies
for critical infrastructure, and our international partners.
Specifically, strong relationships must be maintained with the
following communities of interest:
--State and Local Governments.--Establishing and maintaining
effective working relationships with State and local officials
is a fundamental part of the DHS mission to effectively share
information at unprecedented levels. IAIP is working with DHS'
Office of State and Local Government Coordination to assess the
information sharing and dissemination capabilities that exist
nationwide in order to leverage existing capabilities and
supplement capacity where needed.
--Private Sector.--The Private Sector is another key partner in
developing a nationwide planning, risk assessment, protective
action, and information sharing strategy. Engaging the business
community and making a business case for investment in
protective and remedial strategies is key to our success.
--Academia.--DHS will continue to develop, coordinate, and support
partnerships with academic and other educational institutions.
These partnerships will encourage and coordinate academic and
other workforce development to assure availability of quality
IT security professionals, and encourage curriculum development
to integrate critical infrastructure protection (security) as
normal elements of professional education.
--Advisory Bodies.--DHS will also provide support to Presidential
advisory bodies and cross-sector partnerships (including the
National Infrastructure Advisory Council and the Partnership
for Critical Infrastructure Security.)
--International.--This funding will also support and enhance
partnerships with the international community, working with and
through DHS Office of International Affairs and the State
Department, collaborating with the United States State
Department on infrastructure protection activities. This
includes bilateral discussions and activities on risk
assessment and protective actions, information sharing,
exercises and training. Of particular focus is the IAIP
component of the Smart Borders implementation with Canada and
Mexico. We will continue our role as the lead Federal Agency
Role for the Information and Telecommunications Sectors. The
Directorate will continue to partner with representatives from
those industries composing the Information and
Telecommunications sector and to educate members of the sector,
develop effective practices, develop and implement intra-sector
and cross-sector risk assessments, and work with other sectors
on identifying and addressing risks associated with
interdependencies.
--Cyber.--We will expand the platform established by the Cyber Alert
Warning System to include awareness and education programs for
home users of computers and computer professionals in
partnership with other Federal agencies and industry.
Additionally, within private industry, our partnership and
outreach efforts will involve the engagement of risk management
and business educational groups to implement strategies to
elevate senior management understanding of the importance of
investment in cyber security.
National Communications System ($140.754 Million)
The national telecommunications infrastructure supports multiple
mission-critical national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP)
communications for the Federal Government, State and local governments,
and the private industry. The security and availability of the
telecommunications infrastructure is essential to ensuring a strong
national, homeland, and economic security posture for the United
States. The National Communications System (NCS) is assigned NS/EP
telecommunications responsibilities through Executive Order 12472,
Assignment of National Security and Emergency Telecommunications
Functions, which include: administering the National Coordinating
Center for Telecommunications to facilitate the initiation,
coordination, restoration, and reconstitution of NS/EP
telecommunications services or facilities under all crises and
emergencies; developing and ensuring the implementation of plans and
programs that support the viability of telecommunications
infrastructure hardness, redundancy, mobility, connectivity, and
security; and serving as the focal point for joint industry-government
and interagency NS/EP telecommunications planning and partnerships.
The fiscal year 2005 President's Budget requests $140.754 million
for the capabilities and analytic tools necessary to support the
expansion of NS/EP telecommunications programs and activities. The
fiscal year 2005 funding level ensures a continuation of the NCS
mission and legacy NS/EP telecommunications programs and assets.
Specifically, the fiscal year 2005 budget request for the NCS is
divided into four areas:
--Industry-Government and Interagency Processes.--The NCS has
cultivated and expanded its relationships with the
telecommunications industry and other Federal agencies to
promote joint planning, operational activities, coordination,
and information sharing. The primary industry partnership is
the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory
Committee (NSTAC), which is comprised of 30 industry leaders
representing various elements of the telecommunications
industry. The NSTAC and its subordinate body, the Industry
Executive Subcommittee (IES), provides industry-based analyses
and perspectives on a wide range of NS/EP telecommunications
issues and provides policy recommendations to the President for
mitigating vulnerabilities in the national telecommunications
infrastructure. Paralleling this industry relationship is the
interagency process involving the NCS Committee of Principals
and its subordinate body, the Council on Representatives, which
facilitate the NS/EP telecommunications activities of the 23
Federal agencies constituting the NCS.
--Critical Infrastructure Protection Programs.--Leveraging the
industry relationships described above, the NCS manages several
network security and CIP-related programs, including: (1) the
National Communications Center (NCC), a joint industry- and
Government-staffed organization collocated within the NCS and
serves as the operational focal point for the coordination,
restoration, and reconstitution of NS/EP telecommunications
services and facilities; (2) the Telecommunications Information
Sharing and Analysis Center, which is the focal point for the
generation, compilation, and sharing of cyber warning
information among the telecommunications industry; (3) the
Government and National Security Telecommunications Advisory
Committee Network Security Information Exchanges (NSIEs), which
meet regularly and share information on the threats to,
vulnerabilities of, and incidents affecting the systems
comprising the public network; (4) the Critical Infrastructure
Warning Information Network (CWIN), which is designed to
facilitate the dissemination of information and warnings in the
event of a cyber attack; (5) Training and Exercises, which
helps ensure the readiness and availability of qualified staff
to perform the operational duties of the NCS associated with
Emergency Support Function #2--Telecommunications of the
Federal Response Plan; (6) Operational Analysis, which develops
and implements tools and capabilities to conduct analyses and
assessments of the national telecommunications infrastructure
and its impact on NS/EP services; (7) NCS also supports the
Global Early Warning Information System, which monitors the
worldwide Internet health through use of multiple data sources,
tools, and knowledge management to provide early warning of
cyber attacks, (8) Shared Resources (SHARES) High Frequency
(HF) Radio Program, developed by the NCS and in continuous
operation since being approved by the Executive Office of the
President in the NCS Directive 3-3 of January 1989. The SHARES
program makes use of the combined resources and capabilities of
existing Federal and federally affiliated HF radio stations on
a shared, interoperable basis to provide critical backup
communications during emergencies to support national security
and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) requirements.
--Priority Telecommunications Programs.--The NCS is continuing a
diverse set of mature and evolving programs designed to ensure
priority use of telecommunications services by NS/EP users
during times of national crisis. The more mature services--
including the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service
(GETS) and the Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP)--were
instrumental in the response to the September 11th attacks.
Fiscal year 2005 funding enhances these programs and supports
the development of the Wireless Priority Service (WPS) program
and upgrade to the Special Routing Arrangement Service (SRAS).
Specifically, priority service programs include: (1) GETS,
which offers nationwide priority voice and low-speed data
service during an emergency or crisis situation; (2) WPS, which
provides a nationwide priority cellular service to key NS/EP
users, including individuals from Federal, State and local
governments and the private sector; (3) TSP, which provides the
administrative and operational framework for priority
provisioning and restoration of critical NS/EP
telecommunications services; (4) SRAS, which is a variant of
GETS to support the Continuity of Government (COG) program
including the reengineering of SRAS in the AT&T network and
development of SRAS capabilities in the MCI and Sprint
networks, and; (5) the Alerting and Coordination Network (ACN)
which is an NCS program that provides dedicated communications
between selected critical government and telecommunications
industry operations centers.
--Programs to Study and Enhance Telecommunications Infrastructure
Resiliency.--The NCS administers and funds a number of programs
focusing on telecommunications network resiliency, security,
performance, and vulnerabilities, including: (1) the Network
Design and Analysis Center, which is a set of tools, data sets,
and methodologies comprising the Nation's leading commercial
communications network modeling and analysis capability that
allows the NCS to analyze the national telecommunications and
Internet infrastructures; (2) the NS/EP Standards program,
which works closely with the telecommunications industry to
incorporate NS/EP requirements in commercial standards and
participates in national and international telecommunications
standards bodies; (3) the Converged Networks Program, which
investigates vulnerabilities and mitigation approaches in
future technologies and networks (specifically Internet
Protocol-based networks); (4) the Technology and Assessment
Laboratory, which provides the ability to evaluate penetration
testing software, modeling tools, various operating systems and
protocols, hardware configurations, and network
vulnerabilities, and; (5) the Routing Diversity effort, which
is developing a communications routing diversity methodology to
analyze a facility's level of routing diversity and is
evaluating alternative technologies which can provide route
diversity, and (6) the NCS, through various associations and
other activities is involved in a variety of International
Activities (NATO, CCPC, CEPTAC, and Hotline) which provides
technical subject matter expertise, guidance, and coordination
on CIP issues affecting the telecommunications infrastructure
in numerous international forums on behalf of the United States
Government.
Competitive Analysis and Evaluation ($18.868 Million)
The Competitive Analysis and Evaluation program ensures that IAIP
products and services are tested, accurate, based on sound assumptions
and data, and ultimately, offer the highest quality, depth, and value
to IAIP customers. The fiscal year 2005 President's Budget requests
$18.868 million to provide for the unbiased, objective analyses and
evaluation of IAIP findings, assessments, and judgments through three
functional areas: Risk Assessment Validation, Evaluation, and Exercises
and Methodologies.
--Risk Assessment Validation.--Funding is used to establish and field
physical and cyber target risk analysis teams that employ ``red
team'' techniques to evaluate measures taken by other IAIP
components to protect key assets and critical infrastructure.
The red teams emulate terrorist doctrine, mindsets, and
priorities and employ non-conventional strategies to test and
evaluate IAIP planning assumptions.
--Evaluation.--Funding supports several initiatives, including the
IAIP Product and Process Evaluation, which involves conducting
independent, objective evaluations of IAIP products and
processes and to assist IAIP divisions to develop products that
offer value to IAIP customers. The second is IAIP Customer
Satisfaction, which evaluates customer satisfaction with IAIP
products and services to ensure they are responsive to current
customer needs. Funding in this area provides for electronic
and non-electronic feedback surveys, field visits, and
conferences.
--Exercises and Methodologies.--Coordinate and manage interagency
exercises and tabletops that test both DHS and IAIP policies,
processes, procedures, capabilities, and areas of
responsibilities. Participating in and conducting after action
reviews of exercises provides invaluable experience and
feedback related to capabilities, connectivity, and information
sharing during a crisis event. Investment in this area informs
the Department's decision as to where improvements are needed.
This funding also supports examining and instituting advanced
methodologies such as alternate hypotheses, gaming, modeling,
simulation, scenarios, and competitive analyses to ensure IAIP
products are accurate, sophisticated, and of the highest
quality and value to customers.
National Plans and Strategies ($3.493 Million)
Critical to ongoing national efforts to protect and secure the
homeland are updating, revisiting, coordinating the development, and
monitoring the implementation of National Plans and Strategies. The
fiscal year 2005 President's Budget requests $3.493 million to support
activities by coordinating, developing, and publishing contingency
planning documents for critical infrastructures (as called for in the
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace), monitoring progress against
those documents, and producing an annual report.
Homeland Security Operations Center ($35.0 Million)
The HSOC maintains and shares domestic situational awareness;
coordinates security operations; detects, prevents, and deters
incidents; and facilitates the response and recovery for all critical
incidents. The HSOC is the focal point for sharing information across
all levels of government and the private sector.
The HSOC facilitates the flow of all-source information and
develops products and services including: (1) the daily Homeland
Security Situation Brief for the President, (2) reports and briefs to
law enforcement, the Intelligence Community, other Federal and State
agencies and industry partners, (3) warnings and alerts to individual
responder agencies and the public as appropriate, and (4) coordinated
response when crises do occur. The HSOC concept is to draw from the
many distributed systems and centers that are currently dedicated to
different missions and optimize their contribution to homeland
security.
HSOC funding will help with the time efficiency of issuance of
information and warning advisories through increased operations
efficiency brought about by facility improvements.
New Programs
In the fiscal year 2005 IAIP budget, as a part of an interagency
effort to improve the Federal Government's capability to rapidly
identify and characterize a potential bioterrorist attack, the
President requst $11 million for a new biosurveillance iniative. This
increase provides for real-time integration of biosurveillance data
harvested through the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
and DHS Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate with terrorist threat
information analyzed at IAIP. Currently, a finding from one source of
surveillance exists in isolation from relevant surveillance from other
sectors, making it difficult to verify the significance of that finding
or to recommend appropriate steps for response. Integrating the
information in IAIP, and analyzing it against the current threat
picture will inform effective homeland security decision-making and
speed response time to events.
This interagency initiative, includes DHS's ongoing BIOWATCH
environmental biodetection program, Health and Human Services' (HHS)
proposed BIOSENSE program, HHS' and United States Department of
Agriculture's (USDA) ongoing joint separate food security surveillance
efforts, and USDA's agricultural surveillance efforts. This DHS-led
effort will promote data sharing and joint analysis among these sectors
at the local, State, and Federal levels and also will establish a
comprehensive Federal-level multi-agency integration capability to
rapidly compile these streams of data and preliminary analyses and
integrate and analyze them with threat information
Conclusion
In summary, the fiscal year 2005 budget request provides the
resources to enable the IAIP Directorate to manage and grow in its
mission of securing the homeland. I look forward to working with you to
accomplish the goals of this department and the IAIP directorate.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
have at this time.
NATIONAL BIOLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE
Senator Cochran. Thank you, General Libutti.
Now, looking at the budget request, I noticed that in the
case of the National biological-surveillance program, the
budget proposes to establish a group lead by the Department of
Homeland Security and including the Department of Health and
Human Services, and the Department of Agriculture, to create a
National biological surveillance system. Funding for this
initiative is $279 million Government-wide. The Department of
Homeland Security's request for this initiative is $129 million
for the roles carried out by these directorates that you
manage.
Secretary Libutti, how will the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate work to coordinate its
efforts with the Department of Health and Human Services and
the Department of Agriculture to integrate biological
surveillance data, and verify a chemical or biological attack?
General Libutti. Thank you, sir.
Let me start by simply highlighting the IAIP funds and
support of this inter-agency effort. And I will tell you that
my partner sitting here with me, to my right, Dr. McQueary, is
certainly a partner for me in this effort.
For us, it's about $11 million. And you touched on a
critical point. Our job in support of this major inter-agency
effort is to work as a repository to gather the data heretofore
across the Federal Government, which is not indeed gathered,
and looked at it with a view towards providing situational
awareness, and as an extension, actions that need to be taken
by the Federal Government, and by extension to partners at the
State and local level.
So the bottom line for me in terms of how we do this, is I
do it in complete support and cooperation with Dr. McQueary,
and in concert with other members of the inter-agency effort.
The bottom line is it's about gathering the information or data
in a collaborative way, and in a way that represents what is
going on across the Federal Government.
Senator Cochran. What would happen to this initiative if
funding is not provided to the Department of Agriculture or
Department of Health and Human Services? Would there be a
serious breakdown in the capabilities of our government to deal
with these threats?
General Libutti. My sense, sir, is that if there were
indeed a breakdown, it wouldn't be in the execution piece of
their mission or their responsibility. It would be more broadly
speaking, in what we have all learned is very critical in this
fight against terrorism, and that is to truly work in concert
to look at the information or databases that are available and
simply haven't been collected in a cohesive way. To look at
them and to ask, what does that mean in terms of assessing the
threat, assessing our own capability, and then taking
appropriate action.
Certainly, the mission would still be accomplished, I
simply think it would not be a wise move in terms of the
greater value added when you look at all of this data, and then
there is one person responsible for bringing it together.
ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING
Senator Cochran. Secretary McQueary, your directorate's
role in biological surveillance includes an increase of $65
million to expand environmental monitoring activities in the
cities determined to be at the highest risk of terrorist
attack. Can you give us any further details about the chemical
and biological warning activities that are in place now, and
what this increased funding will be used for if it is made
available to you by the Congress?
Dr. McQueary. The increased funding will permit us to
increase the number of sensors in high-risk urban areas, to be
able to make the biological detections using a system called
BioWatch. That system has been in place since about a year ago
in January, when we first began deploying those systems.
And of course, you know we work very closely with EPA, as
well as Health and Human Services, in being able to do that
work.
Senator Cochran. What do you think you will be able to
accomplish if you get this increased funding, in terms of new
advances or the development of new technologies or systems?
Dr. McQueary. The $65 million is to allow more deployments
of the capabilities than we currently have, thereby increasing
the number of monitoring stations in the various urban areas
where we have these systems already deployed, as well as
increasing the number of locations, city locations, if you
will, where we have them deployed.
So it fundamentally gives us a better, real--not real time-
but a better monitoring capability so that we can make a
determination should there be a biological attack of some sort.
We have approximately, I would say, an average of ten
sensors per geographical location. Now that is an estimate but
I can give you precise numbers if you need them. With the
increase we will effectively be able to double the number of
sensors where we are and provide better coverage, if you will.
COUNTERMEASURES
Senator Cochran. There is also the BioShield initiative,
which is involved in deploying countermeasures against
biological terror attacks. How is the Science and Technology
Directorate participating in the development of
countermeasures?
Dr. McQueary. Well, of course, the development of
countermeasures is in our charter, and we work in the chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-explosives areas.
So in each of those areas we have ongoing research being
managed either in the national laboratories, or in private
industry or universities, which are three components of the
country's scientific support that we call upon regularly. So,
we do have broad agency announcements that have been put out
through the HSARPA organization, for chemical, and biological
sensors, as well as in the radiological and nuclear area.
And, if I may, the primary focus in all of the sensor
development is to do things faster. Because, for example,
BioWatch, we do a sample every day, but it takes perhaps a day
to be able to do the assays on that sample, and therefore there
could be 48-hours. The ultimate system that we would someday
want to get to, and, some of our research, I think will lead in
that direction, is to be able to do the sampling at the site,
be able to do the assays, and then telemetry the information
from that site to a central command control area. They would be
working, obviously, very closely with General Libutti's people
to make a determination that something has happened, and
therefore, corrective action would be taken.
Senator Cochran. Does this budget request include research
and development of medical countermeasures across the agencies
portfolios, or does the Science and Technology Directorate
serve only in an advisory role?
Dr. McQueary. The medical countermeasures is the
responsibility of Health and Human Services. We serve in an
advisory role in that area, and have people that meet regularly
with people in Health and Human Services to discuss programs
that should be implemented.
Senator Cochran. What assessments have been carried out by
the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate of our vulnerability to biological attacks that
will guide decisions regarding the investments that should be
made to develop, produce and purchase vaccines or other
medications for the Nation's biological defense.
General Libutti. The work that we have done since I have
been on board, since late June or early July, sir, has been to
work with Dr. McQueary and his folks, conduct surveys and
visits across the country to key high-threat areas, to get as
smart as we can relative to the threats posed by the biological
and chemical threats, and to conduct appropriate analysis
including developing models to give us a strong indication of
what the impact of such an attack would be.
We have recently developed a program that we have briefed
to high officials in our government, in the Administration,
that outlines across the board threats in aviation,
transportation, and biological, and chemicals weapons. What we
have developed is still a work in progress. But it is a good
model. We've looked at the impact and consequences of various
events particularly across major urban areas.
So those are the kinds of activities that we have been
engaged in, in concert with Dr. McQueary and other members of
the inter-agencies; specifically, Health and Human Services,
CDC, and others who have a primary interest in the impact of
such an attack.
INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS AND SAFECOM
Senator Cochran. Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Ridge has laid out the department's goals, and he
stated that one of his highest priorities was interoperable
communication and equipment. And he set a deadline of December
2004, for implementing a short-term solution, that will allow
first responders to communicate with each other during a
disaster. Dr. McQueary, your directorate is in charge of
coordinating and promoting interoperable communications for
public safety.
The President's budget proposes to eliminate funding in the
Justice Department for interoperability grants. When my staff
asked the Justice Department why the funds were dropped from
the budget, my staff was told that interoperability is a
Homeland Security responsibility. Yet the President's budget
sets aside no funds for this purpose in the Department of
Homeland Security budget. So I ask, can you explain the short-
term solution and why no funds are requested to address this
problem?
Dr. McQueary. We actually do have funds requested to
support the SAFECOM program, which is the program for which the
Science and Technology Directorate has direct responsibility.
Senator Byrd. How much is the request?
Dr. McQueary. I believe, sir, $20--if I am not mistaken,
its $22 million. I'll check behind me, and make sure I give you
the correct number. But I believe it's $22 million for that
effort.
And what we expect to come out of that effort, as Secretary
Ridge had indicated, is a set of standards that State and
local, can use to acquire equipment, and to provided
interoperability on what we're referring to as the penultimate
solution, because what we will be providing is not the ultimate
solution in interoperability. I will try to be precise in what
I mean by that.
There are technical capabilities today that exist in some
companies. For example, if you think of a point electronic box,
a box that can receive signals from many different types of
radios, and that box can in effect convert signals from one
radio into a protocol or a format that would be needed by
another radio it is trying to talk to in order to permit those
two to be able to have a communication. And, similarly, you can
create conference calls, if that were the objective. Obviously,
there are limits to the number of possibilities of different
kinds that can be implemented.
The ultimate solution, I believe, will be to move into
software defined radios, and a considerable amount of research
work has gone on in that area. That would be a system in which
new radios, as they are purchased, would permit people to
communicate with one another based upon the radio itself being
able to recognize the different types of communication
protocols and accomplish that.
Senator Byrd. The SAFECOM money is not money for State and
local governments.
Dr. McQueary. That's----
Senator Byrd. SAFECOM is for standards setting. To actually
fix the problem, State and local governments need money to buy
the interoperability equipment.
Dr. McQueary. Excuse me.
Senator Byrd. Yes.
Dr. McQueary. I did not mean to imply that the $22 million
that we have in our budget is to be used to purchase equipment.
It is indeed the necessary effort to establish the standards.
Of course, the State and locals will have access to grant money
that will be provided by the Office of Domestic Preparedness.
And what we will do, and have already done in some cases, is
provide guiding standards by which we would expect them to
purchase new equipment in the expenditure of that money. We see
that as the vehicle to permit State and locals to be able to
transition into having more interoperable capability.
Senator Byrd. The President is proposing a cut of over $700
million of first responder programs in the Department, and a
cut of $1.5 billion for first responders government wide.
The interoperability problem is yet another reason why we
should not be cutting funding to first responders. How does the
Department justify cutting first responder grants when the
short term solution that the Secretary announced will cost
several million dollars to implement?
Dr. McQueary. If you're proposing that to me, sir, I was
not a participant in that, and therefore, I am not in any
position to answer the question, but I am sure that my people
will be pleased to provide an answer to the question that you
proposed.
[The information follows:]
Justification for Cutting First Responder Grants
The President's fiscal year 2005 request includes more than $3.5
billion to support ODP programs and activities. This represents a $3.3
million increase over the Fiscal year 2004 request. The fiscal year
2005 request includes funds to continue the Homeland Security Grant
Program which includes the State Homeland Security Program at $1.4
billion; the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program at $500
million; and the Citizen Corps Program at $50 million. Funds are also
provided for the continuation of the Urban Areas Security Initiative at
$1.4 billion; the Fire Act Program at $500 million; the Emergency
Management Performance Grants at $170 million; as well as for ODP's
training, exercise, and technical assistance efforts.
The continuation of these efforts, and the $3.3 million increase in
ODP's overall request, coupled with the President's request for a 10
percent increase in funding for DHS as a whole, provides ODP, and the
entire Department, with the resources we require to help secure the
Nation from acts of terrorism. The Administration and Department remain
committed to providing our Nation's emergency prevention and response
community the resources they need to continue to secure our Nation from
future acts of terrorism.
UNIVERSITY PROGRAMS
Senator Byrd. Your budget request includes a $38.8 million
reduction for Homeland Security University and Fellowship
Programs. In fiscal year 2004, this subcommittee provided $69
million for this program, $60 million more than the President
requested. The subcommittee expects the academic community to
play a major role in identifying and solving problems facing
the homeland.
The White House has criticized Congress for earmarking
funds for Science and Technology, and so this subcommittee
decided not to earmark funds last year. Instead of reinforcing
this decision, the President is proposing to cut university
research by over 50 percent. Could you tell the subcommittee
what the rationale may be for such a drastic cut to this
program in fiscal year 2005?
Dr. McQueary. This is an area in which I can assure you we
had considerable internal debate and discussion. I would have
to hasten to say, sir, that at some point we all work for
someone and it was time for me to salute and say, yes, sir, I
will try to do as much as we possibly can with the proposed
amount of budget, and that is what we will do.
Senator Byrd. Your budget justification notes that three
Homeland Centers of Excellence will be selected by the end of
fiscal year 2004. How does this funding reduction affect your
ability to select other university centers of excellence.
Dr. McQueary. First, the $30 million that's proposed is
ample funding to support three University Centers of
Excellence. We have, of course, selected one. And we plan to
select two more this fiscal year. In fact, the necessary
activity is well underway in order to accomplish that.
We fund the University Centers about $5 million each, minus
a little bit of overhead associated with managing that process.
The balance of $15 million is completely adequate to support
not only the hundred fellows and scholars that we have already
approved. But also to add another hundred to that.
In summary, $30 million supports three Centers, as well as
200 scholars and Fellows.
Senator Byrd. So you're saying, are you, that there will be
two additional centers selected at the President's funding
level?
Dr. McQueary. I am sorry, sir.
Senator Byrd. Are you saying that there will be two
additional centers selected at the President's funding level?
Dr. McQueary. Yes, sir, there will be two additional,
bringing us to a total of three. One is in animal diseases. The
other is in post-harvest food safety.
CHEMICAL DETECTORS
Senator Byrd. In your written statement you list as an
accomplishment of your directorate that you worked with the
D.C. Metro System to deploy chemical detectors in the D.C.
subway system. This is an excellent system to give Metro the
capacity to immediately determine that the subway has been
exposed to a chemical agent, so it knows how to effectively
respond to the attack.
I understand that this system is now in operation and you
view it as an accomplishment. After the attacks of 9/11, the
Senate approved $15 million for this pilot project. This
funding was included at Congress's initiative, it was not
requested by the President. In fact, the White House
specifically objected to this funding, describing it as
excessive.
Is there any funding in the President's request to either
complete the D.C. chemical detector system, or to take
advantage of the lessons learned from this pilot program to
deploy the chemical detectors in other large subway systems
around the country?
Dr. McQueary. Well, at this time we have proven the concept
of operation for that system, and it is something we are
extremely proud to have been a part of, I can assure you. So, I
compliment the Congress on appropriating the funding necessary
to get it launched.
We do have the measurement system, both chemical
measurement as well as video capability, tied into a central
control station in downtown D.C., as you probably know, I am
sure you know. We view it as a responsibility of Washington,
D.C. to carry the program forward, for example, if there is a
need or desire to expand to more stations within the
Washington, D.C. area.
MANPADS SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE COUNTER MEASURES
Senator Byrd. Your budget includes $61 million to determine
whether a viable technology exists to address the threat
shoulder-fired missiles pose to commercial aircraft. This
funding request followed $60 million approved by Congress in
fiscal year 2004. The details of this threat are well
documented. The Congressional Research Service estimates there
are as many as 700,000 of these missiles globally. Some of
which are on the black market, selling as low as $5,000 apiece.
CRS also estimates that there have been 29 instances in
which civilian planes have been hit by shoulder-fired missiles,
none of which occurred in the United States.
However, in May 2002, the FBI warned law enforcement
agencies to be alert to the potential use of surface-to-air
missiles against U.S. aircraft. If such a missile was fired at
a commercial aircraft here in the United States, it would wreak
havoc on our economy.
How soon do you believe that we can begin to outfit
commercial aircraft with a system to counter surface-to-air
missiles?
Dr. McQueary. I believe that we expect by the end of
calendar year 2005 the Administration and the Congress will be
in a position to have scientific information from which to make
a decision as to whether we should outfit planes, commercial
aircraft, in this country.
Science and Technology, as an organization, will not be
recommending one way or the other. Rather, that is a decision
for the Administration and the Congress to make, we believe.
Senator Byrd. How realistic is it to convert to existing
technology on military aircraft to our commercial fleet?
Dr. McQueary. We believe that it is in the category of,
what I would call, an engineering problem, rather than needing
a scientific breakthrough in order to do this. There are really
two or three issues that drive the commercial airline fleet. Of
course, one is that certifications necessary to get approval to
put anything on an aircraft is perhaps more stringent for
commercial aircraft.
Also anything we do to an aircraft that would add air drag
will increase fuel costs, and so there are multiple issues to
be dealt with as one decides which technology would be
appropriate. Regarding the technologies themselves, we do
believe that it is eminently feasible to put them on commercial
aircraft. And, we have three contractors that are in the early
stages of studies that will lead to a down selection of one or
two contractors to go into the development of such a system.
The other important factor is that reliability must be such
that we can afford to have them on the planes. The military can
actually carry its support system with it wherever the planes
fly. But, if you consider all of the airports into which our
planes go, just in this country alone, the idea of trying to
have a support system at each one would be extremely expensive.
So the reliability of the systems need to be greater than
what we are seeing with the military versions right now.
Senator Byrd. Do I have time for one more?
Senator Cochran. Senator Stevens has come in and we want to
include him.
Senator Byrd. I shall desist.
Senator Cochran. Senator Stevens.
TSA DETECTION SYSTEMS
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much.
I was enjoying the Senator's questions, as a matter of
fact. I, gentlemen, have spent quite a bit of time with the
aviation community trying to figure out where we're going in
terms of some of the homeland security activities. And, I am
impressed with comments that I have received from many of them
that our systems are designed to deal with metal and not with
substances. How would you answer that?
Dr. McQueary. Our systems are designed to deal with----
Senator Stevens. Metals rather than substances.
Dr. McQueary. Metals rather than . . .? I'm afraid I don't
understand the question, sir.
Senator Stevens. Well, we're looking for guns, we're
looking for knives, we're not looking for chemicals, we're not
looking for biological weapons. We're zeroing in on what was
used in 9/11 and not what the terrorists might be using in the
future. Is that correct?
Dr. McQueary. Now, I understand the question. Within the
Science and Technology Directorate we do have some research
work that we're funding this year to be able to make detections
of explosive devices at range, if you will. This is in the very
early stages, and I would not for a moment try to tell you that
I think that we have a solution to that problem.
The Israelis have, of course, worked on this in great
detail. We have had many interactions with them. It's a hard
problem, but it is an area which we think is important towards
being able to do the things necessary to make the airports,
airlines and travel safer. It is a very important area.
Senator Stevens. Well, over the past recess, I went through
major airports, and I asked to be shown the TSA systems. And, I
must say they are very impressive systems, but all of them are
designed for what I said, to locate knives, to locate metals
that might be in the baggage. Are we looking towards trying to
ascertain the presence of chemical substances, bacterial
substances, and explosive substances?
Dr. McQueary. I will tell you, the area where I do not
believe we have a satisfactory answer to in the bacterial area.
It's very complex, very difficult, to deal with what a person
can do to bring something in a handkerchief into the country.
It would be very, very difficult to detect a bacterial
substance, unless one were to get into some sort of invasive
type of measurement system. So far, we have not chosen to get
into that level. We as a country, have not chosen to go that
far.
In chemicals, there are many different types of detectors
that can indeed detect chemical components that would make up
explosive systems or any kind of liquids that you might have.
But you have to be able to get a sufficient signal, if you
will, a sufficient amount of the chemical being put forth into
the air so that it could be detected, unless we go to some kind
of invasive system. And right now, our focus is on what we
might be able to pick up from the air, if you will, the general
air surrounding a passenger in that area.
Senator Stevens. Well, Doctor what about the President's--
--
Dr. McQueary. We are not ready to--I'm sorry.
Senator Stevens. I beg your pardon.
Dr. McQueary. Please continue.
Senator Stevens. What about the presence of detonators?
We're watching daily in Iraq bombs go off by someone dialing a
cell phone.
Dr. McQueary. Right.
Senator Stevens. And alerting, you know, energizing a
detonator. Are we trying to discover the presence of detonators
in baggage?
Dr. McQueary. I can't answer the question. I don't know off
hand--I simply don't know. I should know the answer, but on
that particular question, I don't know. I will be happy to look
into it and find out exactly what we are doing for you.
[The information follows:]
Discovering Presence of Detonators in Baggage
Reliable detection of detonators in baggage is important to the
security of the transportation infrastructure. The responsibility for
this security measure currently remains with the Transportation
Security Administration. Additional information can be provided in a
classified briefing.
Senator Stevens. Alright.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CONSOLIDATION
Let me shift to the Coast Guard, if I may. Are any one of
you involved in the changes that are taking place in research
and development funding. That's in the Science and Technology
Directorate.
Dr. McQueary. That's right.
Senator Stevens. That's yours, is it Doctor?
Dr. McQueary. Yes, sir.
Senator Stevens. When we approved the transfer of the Coast
Guard to the new Homeland Security Department, it was my
understanding, and I think that it was in the basic law and in
the report, that the department was to be left as a complete
unit. I am informed now that the budget proposes to transfer
the research and development funding in units of the Coast
Guard to your directorate. Is that right?
Dr. McQueary. That is correct. But, I need to be precise on
what we mean by transfer. That unit will never lose its close
ties with its parent organization. We will assume research and
development oversight for it.
As you are probably aware, the Congress actually cut the
research and development budget for the Coast Guard laboratory
last year. So they entered this year with no money other than
support for the people that are in that laboratory. They have
had no research and development program in this fiscal year. We
do have money in our Science and Technology budget for fiscal
year 2005 to support the Coast Guard, not only the people at
the laboratory, but also a modest research and development
program.
SHIFT OF $13.5 MILLION FROM THE COAST GUARD TO THE SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE
Senator Stevens. My information was that the budget
proposes to shift $13.5 million from the Coast Guard to your
directorate. Is that wrong?
Dr. McQueary. No, that's not incorrect. The $13.5 million
is basically the operational costs for the labs that are in
Connecticut. And we're putting in another $5 million for
research and development work.
Senator Stevens. Are you taking over direction of it, and
taking it from the Coast Guard?
Dr. McQueary. That's harsher language than I would choose
to use.
Senator Stevens. The language. The legislation is very
harsh. I drew it.
Dr. McQueary. Okay. We have responsibility, we had
responsibility in the Science and Technology Directorate to
advise and direct the Coast Guard on what scientific work they
needed. However, I would say directly, that in order to
accomplish the determination of what we must do, we have Coast
Guard people on our staff, we have a Coast Guard Captain who is
in residence with my Science and Technology group. His job is
to make sure that we're representing the needs of the Coast
Guard in the scientific work that we undertake. And that's the
same thing we do for each and every one of the operational
units within the Department of Homeland Security.
We're not an independent island on research and
development. We're a service organization intended to provide
the very best science and technology to these operational units
which stand at the ready each and everyday to do the job the
Department of Homeland Security has to do.
Senator Stevens. Well, it's a technicality I imagine, but
when Congress declares war, the Coast Guard becomes a part of
the Department of Defense.
Dr. McQueary. Right.
Senator Stevens. You're familiar with that?
Dr. McQueary. Yes, sir.
Senator Stevens. The legislation we passed to authorize the
transfer of the Coast Guard to the Department of Homeland
Security was done in a fashion so that, if that transfer to the
Department of Defense was triggered, it would be a whole unit.
It appears to me that slowly but surely you're taking away
from the Coast Guard the things that make it a whole unit,
namely research and development.
Dr. McQueary. I spent my entire career in research and
development, and my experience tells me that small pockets of
research and development can never be as effective as being a
part of a larger research and development organization. We
believe that by transferring the Coast Guard's research and
development into the Science and Technology Directorate, and
giving them more day-to-day interaction with the scientific
work that is going on, that we will actually end up doing a
better job, not only for the department, but also for the Coast
Guard itself.
Senator Stevens. Are you prepared to do that for the
Department of Defense when it becomes a part of the Department
of Defense?
Dr. McQueary. I----
Senator Stevens. I don't think you get my point. You have
no authority to do that.
Dr. McQueary. We have----
Senator Stevens. I would urge you to check with your legal
department and determine what authority you have to transfer
anything from the Department of Defense, from the Coast Guard,
without our approval.
Dr. McQueary. Well, I am sure that if we don't have the
authority to do it, we do not propose to do it without your
approval, if that's the case.
Senator Stevens. Sometimes people are ignorant of the law.
Dr. McQueary. Well, that could very well be the case here,
too.
Senator Stevens. Well, I don't think.
Dr. McQueary. But I can assure you that there is no
intention----
Senator Stevens. I don't mean to be abrupt with you Doctor,
but I do believe that it is essential that if and when the
Coast Guard becomes a part of the Department of Defense, it be
a total unit.
Dr. McQueary. Yes.
Senator Stevens. An integral, operational unit that is just
transferred and not leaving portions of it somewhere else. That
was the debate that we had, and I hope that we will pursue that
and you will take a look at it for us.
Now, let me ask you----
Dr. McQueary. I will do that.
UNIVERSITY PROGRAMS/ENERGY SECURITY
Senator Stevens. One other thing if I may. Well two really.
I see that you have got these Homeland Security Centers of
Excellence, and I congratulate you. The Senator from West
Virginia was talking about one in terms of the Center for
Excellence with regard to food programs. And one, I understand,
will be combating animal related agro-terrorism, and the other
focuses on post-harvest food security.
What about energy production and energy security. Are you
focusing on that?
Dr. McQueary. For the areas of energy production and energy
security is a combination of General Libutti and myself, as
well as the Department of Energy. I believe one of the Homeland
Security Presidential Directives clearly spells out that the
Department of Energy has responsibility for energy. So the work
that we do would be to work with General Libutti from an
infrastructure protection standpoint. And, perhaps I would let
him comment rather than be presumptive about saying what he
would be doing.
Senator Stevens. General, are you pursuing that?
General Libutti. Sir, the effort that we make in the main,
in terms of our mission profile, is the risk assessment
vulnerability piece of any part, large or small, of the
national infrastructure. So in terms of chemical site security
surveys, we are working with our friends at the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, working with other members in the inter-
agency, and our job remains principally to advise relative to
the threat.
We recommend preventive actions in concert with the rest of
the community, that ought to be taken immediately or that have
a long-term proposition relative to protecting America. So,
we're about the threat, vulnerability and risk assessment piece
of all of these programs. And we share that information with my
friend, Dr. McQueary, and other members of Health and Human
Services, Center of Disease Control, the Department of
Agriculture, or the Department of Energy.
So we're a player at the table. I might add, and this is
not a marketing piece, but we are the newest members of the
National Intelligence community, and we are full players. We
have connected very well with all the major elements within the
Federal Government, as well as State and local communities that
deal with information sharing, analysis, and simply stated the
threat.
I tell you that just for a sense of what our directorate is
all about and how we interact with other members of the
intelligence community, including TTIC, CIA, and the FBI, who
principally has responsibility on the law enforcement side.
Senator Stevens. Thank you.
I will be delighted to try and understand what you just
said. For instance, in terms of our oil pipeline, do you review
that pipeline for threat?
General Libutti. We do when we gleam specific intelligence
from looking at all of the sources, which indicates that it is
a target set. We absolutely look at it in the broader
infrastructure requirements that bring us to a situation which
causes us to look at it with other members of that community.
Senator Stevens. And do you----
General Libutti. And we do that across all of the
infrastructure.
Senator Stevens. Do you review the ports through which we
import 57 percent of our oil?
General Libutti. Again, we work in concert with our friends
in the Coast Guard and in the industry, the container shipping
folks, to look very hard at the threat and the risk associated
with that threat, in a specific port, city, or State.
So the answer is, yes, sir, we do.
Senator Stevens. Okay.
ENERGY SECURITY
Well, let me give you one that I think you ought to take a
look at then. And the Department of Commerce can verify this.
By 2015, we will be importing 40 percent of our natural gas
in the form of LNG. We do not have a LNG port in the United
States. We have authorization. Years ago we passed legislation
to have off-shore ports, but none were ever built. I think that
in your department you ought to be looking at the planning for
the future, how are we going to ensure the security of that,
and how will it be relevant to the importation of oil and other
substances.
Should we separate those ports from existing ports by
having them all come into one port? Obviously, that would
increase the possibility of the threat.
But, I haven't heard anyone talk about planning for the
national security, or homeland security on the access of
natural gas in liquefied form.
General Libutti. Sir, you're absolutely right. When that is
tee-ed up as a critical issue, and I think from your
perspective we ought to be teeing it up right now, we would be
very much involved in looking at that. Not from an engineering
standpoint, or the physical lay-down standpoint, but from the
threat perspective.
And you're absolutely right, we should be involved in that,
and I will take your note back and we will take a look at it to
see what we need to do right now.
Senator Stevens. Don't put me down as an advocate, I would
just assume bringing Alaska's gas down. But it seems that other
gas is going to get here first, sir.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Stevens.
UNIVERSITY PROGRAMS
Let me follow up with a comment about a question Senator
Byrd asked on the Centers of Excellence, the university
programs that we were talking about with Dr. McQueary.
Last year, we appropriated about $69 million and it was
intended to support these programs. Just because the
Administration is requesting only half of that, $39, $30
million, doesn't mean that you shouldn't spend the $69 already
appropriated. There are provisions for deferring expenditures
or rescinding expenditures, but there is no provision for not
spending it.
So, what I am suggesting is that money is in the pipeline
and it may very well support more than three university
centers.
Dr. McQueary. If I may, it will support more than three
universities. And in fact, what we have determined already,
sir, is that we can create five universities when we reach the
limit of the money that you have authorized us in fiscal year
2004. But, when that is gone, we would be faced with having to
cut back to the three.
I have asked for a plan already as to how we would
implement a total of five, recognizing that we could be faced
with having to eliminate two of those at the end of their 3-
year period, which is what we're looking at right now.
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
NOAA WARNING ADVISORY SYSTEM
I am going to yield, again, for questions from Senator
Stevens. And then we will go back to you, sir.
Senator Stevens. If I may just ask one.
I forgot to ask a question about the NOAA Weather Radio. We
asked that the Department prepare a report by December 15, of
last year, on the use of NOAA Weather Radio as a component of a
national warning system measure to expand consumer access to
the warning systems in efforts to inform and educate the public
about national security.
Currently we rely upon the radio for the old national
warning system. We have tried to expand so that all forms of
communication would receive the warning, particularly of a
terrorist event. And all portions of the country could be
alerted to that immediately. As I said, currently, that would
only go out by radio, but it does not use NOAA Radio. NOAA
Radio hooks into almost every radio station, television, and
weather program that there is in the country. I particularly
would favor some national legislation to mandate carrying such
messages, or to include putting them into the internet
directly. But, that hasn't been done yet.
However, we did ask for the NOAA Weather Radio to be used
as a component of the warning system. Who is working on that in
your Department?
Dr. McQueary. Sir, I don't know.
General Libutti. Sir, we have the lead to look at that in
terms of how it fits into our broad responsibilities, as I
outlined in my presentation of information sharing and alert
advisory systems. So we are indeed looking at that, and that is
still a work in progress.
Senator Stevens. Well respectfully, General, we asked in
2002 for a report by December 15, 2003. When will we see your
report?
General Libutti. Sir, I will take that on board as an
action and get back to you and your staff.
[The information follows:]
NOAA Alert System Report
The congressional report has been cleared by OMB and the
Department. The report was approved for transmission to the Hill on May
28, 2004, and delivered on June 1, 2004.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Byrd.
General Libutti. If I may, sir, as a continuation, I will
get back to you as soon as I can within the next couple of
days. But a staff note to me reminds me that we were going to
come to grips with your question very, very soon. And I will
define what soon means when I respond to you.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much.
General Libutti. Yes, sir.
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Last year, General Libutti, I asked Secretary Ridge about
the role of the Federal Government in protecting chemical
facilities from terrorist attack. He said that he believes
chemical companies should be conducting their own assessments
and paying for security improvements.
At the Secretary's budget hearing last month, Senator
Murray asked Secretary Ridge about port security funding. And
the Secretary again held the view that port owners should be
responsible for security investments.
Now General Libutti, if you were the CEO of a chemical
company, your highest priority would, probably be creating a
quality product at a price that would create profits. If you
were the director of a private port, your first priority would,
in all likelihood, be that of maximizing the number of
containers or passengers that would use the port.
And so with all due respect, I have very little confidence
that chemical company CEOs or port directors would have
defending against a terrorist attack at the top of their list
of things to spend money on. Yet, the Department clearly
believes that, when it comes to protecting our critical
infrastructure the private sector should bear the financial
burden.
Can you provide the subcommittee, today, with any
benchmarks that you have established to show the private sector
is making the necessary investments to secure our critical
infrastructure and key assets?
General Libutti. Sir, I appreciate the question because,
like you, chemical site security for the Nation is a priority
for IAIP and the Department. I would tell that I believe the
right answer to how we move forward with our chemical site
partners in the private sector, the Federal Government, and my
Directorate is the key word partnership.
I think the industry overall needs to belly-up to deal with
improved security across their industry, especially in
particularly high-threat areas. As a subset of that, I would
emphasize the high-threat areas near large populated areas
across the country.
Over the last several months we have conducted site surveys
where folks from my office have visited top priority target
sets involving the chemical site areas. We have worked with
them, and we have seen them demonstrate a great spirit of
cooperation in dealing with assessing the risks of their
facilities, and taking actions to improve the readiness of
those facilities, in terms of both preventative and recovery
activities.
I cannot, sir, tell you the kind of money that they have,
as an industry, put toward this effort. I will look into that
and provide you our best estimate and judgments. But I cannot
answer that question right now.
I think what is important, I might add to share with you
sir, is that during the visits we worked to improve readiness,
we highlighted protective measures, standoff distances, buffer
zones, cameras, and command and control systems, all which they
took on in a very positive way.
We have also sent out to all sites, not just the sites that
we have visited, several different documents or what I would
call aids in improving their readiness. We have sent out the
following: characteristics and common vulnerabilities of
chemical sites/facilities; potential indicators of terrorists
attack activities for chemical facilities; and buffer zone
protection planning templates for chemical facilities.
We have really looked at this in the same way that you
have. This is a critical priority because it is a critical
target site for potential terrorist attacks.
We have looked at the highest areas of concern because of
the relative impact on the community, if indeed an event
occurred. And we have a plan over the next year to look at an
additional 360 sites or facilities across the country. I might
also add that the focus is to look at this in a realistic way
not in terms of eliminating all threats, but dealing with this
based on what I call risk management across our country. That
is to say that we have to establish priorities, and indeed, the
Federal Government in concert with our friends in the community
have to attack this thing on a single front.
I didn't mean to be so long winded, but that captures my
concerns and the actions we're taking.
Senator Byrd. Well General, could you provide the
subcommittee with any benchmarks that you have established to
show that the private sector is indeed making the necessary
investments to secure our critical infrastructure and key
assets?
In other words, Secretary Ridge says, it's up to the
private sector. So have you established any benchmarks that
show that the private sector is indeed making the necessary
investments to secure this critical infrastructure and key
asset?
General Libutti. Sir, as I indicated earlier in my first
statement of my presentation here, I don't have specifics
relative to the financial investments. If my staff has those,
I'll provide them as quickly as possible. If not, we will do
the research to get that to you.
I would say, just spinning off the Secretary's comment, and
based on my experience, since I have been on board from late
June or early July, I have seen not only a willingness and
spirit of cooperation, but an understanding on the part of the
chemical site industry and other industries, which we call key
critical industries, a willingness to move out smartly, to do
what needs to be done to protect their equities, to improve the
security to their physical sites, etcetera, etcetera.
So the attitude is there. We will continue to capitalize on
that, and I will get you the information you have asked for,
sir.
[The information follows:]
Securing Our Critical Infrastrucure and Key Assets
As part of a wide effort to facilitate rather than mandate, DHS
continues its effort to develop ``best practices'' for industry by
working with the private sector and professional associations. DHS
believes that the private sector, which controls over 85 percent of the
nation's critical infrastructure and key assets (CI/KA), must be
involved in setting national protection standards. By partnering with
associations and groups, DHS plans to create realistic, proactive
protection practices to bolster the physical hardening of the nation's
CI/KA.
One example of DHS working closely with industry is the ASME
Guidance on Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection.
This important effort is intended to demonstrate that industry can not
only provide DHS leadership with information, but can also help create
industry-based guidance for risk analysis and risk management. This
document will establish common terminology and a common basis for
reporting the results of risk studies, helping the protection community
and the private sector streamline and standardize risk analysis
reporting. Such standardization provides government agencies and
private industry a framework from which to collect, report, and respond
to potential terrorist threats.
The ASME effort highlights how DHS is working closely with the
private sector to develop baseline best practices and protective
measures. Our plan is for these guidelines to mature into sector-wide
protection standards that will be adopted industry-wide. The initial
phase of the ASME effort is to focus on Nuclear Power Plants, Spent
Nuclear Facilities, Chemical Plants, Petroleum Refineries; LNG Storage
Facilities, Subway Systems (including bridges and tunnels), Railroad
Systems (including bridges and tunnels) and Highway Systems (including
bridges and tunnels). Depending on the success of the initial effort,
it may be expanded to encompass other infrastructure categories.
Another important DHS initiative to assist private industry in the
protection of their facilities is the preparation and distribution of
analytic products such as Characteristics and Common Vulnerabilities
and Potential Indicators of Terrorist Activities reports. These
products identify those vulnerabilities and threat indicators that are
sector-specific. Such information, when used by industry, allows
intelligent investments to be made to eliminate or mitigate specific
vulnerabilities. Furthermore, DHS is in the process of fielding a
network of Protective Security Advisors and establishing regional
offices that will assist State and local governments, as well as the
private sector, in their protective planning efforts.
Senator Byrd. Alright.
As I said in my opening statement I will be asking the
General Accounting Office to conduct an independent review of
the private sector's role in securing our critical
infrastructure.
It will be essential in assessing the need for investments,
for Federal investments, to secure our critical infrastructure.
So, it will be essential for Congress to have measurable
benchmarks of private sector investments in such
infrastructure, such as investments in chemical facilities,
port security, and cyber security.
Do you agree that having this information would be useful
to determine if the private sector is meeting its obligation to
protect our critical infrastructure?
General Libutti. I can't see how it wouldn't be supportive
and an indicator of their commitment. But as I said earlier,
this is a partnership in my opinion, sir. So the Federal
Government needs to provide advice, and education, in concert
with Dr. McQueary and his folks and other members of the inter-
agency, and share with them best practices, and cutting-edge
technology. That's all part of this movement forward. So I
don't see how that could hurt.
I would be concerned if it became a weapon to be held up
against them. Again, I think as we move forward we need to
determine the right balance. But, I hear you loud and clear,
and we will do our homework and get back to you, sir.
TERRORIST THREAT INTEGRATION CENTER (TTIC)
Senator Byrd. Alright, General.
One of the most important issues affecting the public's
assessment of the Department of Homeland Security performance
involves its record of sharing Homeland Security threat
information with other Federal agencies, as well as with State
and local governments, the private sector and the public.
The Gilmore Commission, in its December 15 report, noted
that the Department of Homeland Security had ``little power and
capability to do this.'' In fact, the Commission concluded that
the Department of Homeland Security faces significant
competition from other agencies in disseminating information to
State and local authorities, the private sector and other
areas.
Part of the problem, the panel said, is that the CIA was
granted control over the Terrorist Threat Information Center,
or better known as TTIC, which opened in May as a central
repository for information from the CIA, the Department of
Defense, the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, and
other intelligence agencies.
But Congress, in writing the Homeland Security Act,
envisioned giving the Department of Homeland Security the role
of collecting, analyzing and sharing intelligence information.
Putting TTIC at the CIA, the Gilmore Commission said, has
largely sidelined the Department of Homeland Security and left
it with a paucity--that's a good word--and left it with a
paucity of competent intelligence analysts.
While intelligence professionals have been much more
willing to go to the CIA, the Department of Justice, the
Department of Defense, or the State Department, this seems to
have caused confusion at all levels of government regarding the
respective roles of the TTIC and the Department of Homeland
Security.
CONCERN REGARDING TTIC BEING UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE CIA
Could you explain please, how it came about that the CIA
was given the leadership of this intelligence function. And
second, how it is that our homeland is made more secure by
having such a confusing hierarchy of intelligence sharing
agencies?
General Libutti. Sir, as always, you ask the toughest
questions and the ones that strike at the heart of what we're
all about. And what we're all about, as I said earlier, is
information sharing and infrastructure protection.
The instrumental organization within IAIP that is charged
with the backbone, the nerve center, the communications channel
for sharing information, is the Operations Center. And then in
support of that separate calls, conferences, and meetings
attended by General Hughes who runs the IA side, and Bob
Liscouski who runs the IP side.
So, let me first say to you, we are very clear on what our
mission is. I am very clear what my customer base is, it's the
private sector, it's State and local authorities, extending
beyond that, but not involved in, the police work. That's the
FBI, and the people at the Department of Justice.
But having said that, let me now turn to TTIC, IAIP and
what you elude to as being a challenging approach towards
dealing with intelligence.
TTIC was established by the Administration and indeed by
the President. It was done to integrate intelligence from
overseas and foreign sources. It was done to incorporate
intelligence and information that is provided by those who
focus on intelligence/law enforcement within the domestic
scene.
Now, what I am saying to you, or mentioning to you,
involves the CIA, the FBI, and by extension the local police
forces across the country that have tens of thousands of great
cops, who do great things for their community and country
everyday.
Now, I am going to try to draw a wiring diagram here, and
if I miss the mark, I know that you won't hesitate to pull me
back and let me talk in straight and plain English.
You have TTIC here, which is not controlled by CIA, but by
the DCI. Now we don't need to, if I may sir, get into an
argument about the differences between George Tenet's two hats,
but he does indeed wear two hats. And the responsibility that
the DCI has is to provide supervisory overview responsibility
for TTIC. And indeed, the director at TTIC is a gentleman, who
was, or is, in the CIA.
But TTIC is an organization to integrate, fuse, analyze and
share domestic and overseas or foreign intelligence. IAIP is
both a customer and contributor at TTIC. So is the FBI. So if
you say to me, what about this TTIC group, I would say I am
part of TTIC and it is sort of like in a religious setting when
you talk about the body of Christ and the Catholic Church, that
means every Catholic across the face of the globe. We are part
of TTIC.
And indeed, on occasion, we challenge and task TTIC who
then goes out to its customer base to look at requirements and
collection efforts. I'll take a breath and try to move forward,
and try to be as organized in my expression as possible.
So TTIC is here. Members of the Department of Homeland
Security are part of TTIC. And by extension, that information
in a very simplistic diagram, is passed to IAIP. It goes to
General Pat Hughes, in the main, and to other members that are
part of TTIC. For example, in Customs and Border Patrol, or
whatever, it is shared with their parent unit as well. And that
is all part of what we're trying to do. There should be an
effort to take walls down and not put walls up.
Information comes from TTIC to IA, and IA shares it with
IP, because IP can't do the threat assessment risk analysis
piece looking at critical infrastructure unless they know what
that intelligence picture indicates. IA in the Department of
Homeland Security, my operational directorate, looks at sharing
information with other members of the customer base; private
sector leadership, and State and local authorities.
ORGANIZATION AND STANDUP OF THE TTIC AND ITS FUNCTION
I'm talking there about advisors to the Governors, the
homeland security advisors to the Governors. They get that
information as well as local authorities. What that means is
mayors and their leadership in the intelligence/counter
terrorist operations. In most cities across the country, those
are the senior police chiefs.
I don't see, Senator Byrd, a conflict in the organization
and standup of TTIC and its function. It's function is to
integrate. My function and focus is on passing information to
my customer base.
I support the FBI who is a partner in this national effort.
And they're in the law enforcement business. Fueled by and
supported by the same intelligence that's coming out of TTIC. I
don't see a conflict. We're improving the way we communicate
everyday, we're sharing databases everyday, at a very highly
classified level. And we're working more in concert with one
another than we ever have.
Leadership in the FBI, the CIA, and the leadership of my
organization get it. They understand there needs to be a
cultural metamorphosis in terms of information sharing. And
we're going to keep working on that so young people in these
organizations understand it is one team, one fight, as the Army
says. And we need to understand that in terms of information
sharing.
I don't see a problem with the current intelligence
organization. As always, I work everyday to improve it.
Senator Byrd. Well, General, I understand plain English.
But I am not sure that I understand everything that you have
said here today. And I am not embarrassed to confess it.
Let me ask a simple question.
General Libutti. Sir.
SECURITY OF THE HOMELAND
Senator Byrd. How is it that our homeland is made more
secure by having such a confusing hierarchy of intelligence
sharing agencies?
General Libutti. I think that the homeland is much more
secure. And I will talk only from my perspective in IAIP,
Senator.
We have shared over 70 advisories and alert bulletins in
concert with other members of the Homeland Security team. We
get threat information from the agency, our friends in the FBI,
and, out of TTIC. Then, we look at that, conduct competitive
and comparative analysis.
Again, our focus is on our customer base, which includes
other members of the Federal Government. So, we take that
information, and we pass it on a secure backbone to customers
that have clearances. For those who don't have clearances, we
take the information that's classified, clean it up, and create
what is called the tear line. Then, we coordinate the bulletin
or advisory with our friends in the other intelligence
agencies, and we send it out through our Homeland Security
Operations Center.
We have sent out many of those advisories. We normally
follow up with phone calls to appropriate customers. We call
industry leadership to amplify an important point. We send
executive teams to places like New York, LA, and Las Vegas, as
we did during the holiday period, to share with leadership what
we know, and make recommendations on corrective action.
I think, again, as you know, sir, I am sure your staff has
briefed you, after 30 years in the Marine Corps and a couple of
months at the Department of Defense, I spent a year and a half,
as the Commissioner for counter-terrorism in the NYPD. When I
finished that job, I came down and was proud to take this job.
If it doesn't work on the streets of our great cities and
small towns, it doesn't work for America. And I'm telling you
now, sir, we have made a difference.
Senator Byrd. Alright, let us suspend while the reporter
changes his tape.
May I ask him another question, Mr. Chairman?
Senator Cochran. Yes, sir.
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS AND SECURITY: CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
Senator Byrd. The Department of Homeland Security continues
to take a hands-off approach with regard to chemical security
by relying on the chemical plant industries. So here we go
again, to assess vulnerabilities and take protective actions.
We know that the EPA has estimated that if attacked, over 100
plants located all over the country could affect over one
million people each.
We know that the Department of Justice released a study in
April of 2000, concluding that the risk of terrorists
attempting in the foreseeable future to cause an industrial
chemical release is both real and credible.
We know that in February 2003, the National Infrastructure
Protection Center, which is now a part of the Department of
Homeland Security, issued a threat warning that Al-Qaeda
operatives also may attempt to launch conventional attacks
against the U.S. nuclear, chemical, and industrial
infrastructure to cause contamination, disruption, and terror.
When Secretary Ridge testified last year he said that the
chemical industry was better suited to assess vulnerabilities
and take appropriate security measures than the Federal
Government.
Just last week, the General Accounting Office sounded
another siren in testimony saying that, in spite of the
industry's efforts, the extent of security preparedness at U.S.
chemical facilities is unknown.
Do you maintain the position that the chemical industry is
better suited than the Federal Government to assess
vulnerabilities and take protective actions to secure chemical
plants?
General Libutti. It can't be done alone or independently,
sir. It is back to the point that I made earlier, it has to be
done in partnership. And I think the Federal Government, being
gentlemanly in their approach, from time to time, needs to be
also muscular. We need to demand standards and guidelines to be
adhered to. We need to be there, prepared to support them in
developing their security programs that reinforce their safety
programs.
I'm with you 100 percent, sir. I can only tell you that
it's a combined effort and everybody needs to pull his or her
own weight.
Senator Byrd. Does your budget request address this issue
in any way?
General Libutti. Yes, sir, it does.
Senator Byrd. It is so? You said it does. How much is in
the budget for this?
General Libutti. In terms of chemical sites security we're
talking about $35 million.
Senator Byrd. And now you're talking about hardening
security at chemical plants?
General Libutti. Sir, I'm talking about visits,
interaction, working to develop guidelines and the way ahead.
We're talking about recommendations for how they can harden
their target as we say in the military; standoff distances,
excuse me, buffer zones, security plans. We're there to advise,
educate, and help them develop their plants. As you know there
are tens of thousands of these plants, large and small across
the country. And as I said earlier, we looked at and visited
over the last few months many of the facilities that we thought
were key critical, meaning, if they were hit as centers of
gravity, they would cause potentially the greatest impact in
the surrounding area.
I am very comfortable that we're taking the right approach
on this. And we're going to look at several hundred additional
sites or facilities over the next year.
Senator Byrd. What more can you do to make sure that the
chemical industry responds with a robust program to secure
their plants?
General Libutti. We need to demand excellence across the
board. We need to be both their advocate and their coach
relative to ensuring that they adhere to standards and best
practices. We need to demand excellence in terms of security
and should not let them off the hook.
Senator Byrd. You bet. We have lots of work to do in this
area.
General Libutti. Yes, sir, we do.
RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY INFORMATION DISSEMINATION
Senator Byrd. Now, Mr. Chairman, I shall have further
questions perhaps.
Senator Inouye, who could not attend today's hearing,
requested that the attached question be asked on his behalf. I
ask that it be inserted in the record.
He is concerned that the Department of Homeland Security is
charging outside groups that wish to attend a March 8, 2-day
forum, that will provide industry with information about
homeland security research and technology requirements.
For example, small businesses would be charged $525, and
universities would be charged $425. Senator Inouye believes
this information should be provided free of charge. I ask that
his question be made part of the record.
Senator Cochran. That objective is so ordered.
Senator Byrd. And I thank both Dr. McQueary and General
Libutti.
Dr. McQueary. Thank you, Senator.
General Libutti. Thank you, Senator.
NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS CENTER (NISAC)
Senator Cochran. Senator Domenici is attending another
meeting of his committee, the Energy Committee which he chairs,
this morning. And he asked me to propound a question on his
behalf. And it is this:
The fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security Appropriations Act
had approximately $23 million for NISAC. That's the National
Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center. Would you please
give the subcommittee the status of the allocation of the
fiscal year 2004 funding? I think that's to General Libutti.
General Libutti. Yes, sir, it is.
I'll try to cut to the chase and cover the key points, sir.
As you know this responsibility transferred the Department of
Homeland Security from the Department of Energy in March 2003.
Primary contractors are the Sandia and Los Alamos labs in New
Mexico.
The Senate Appropriations Committee provided approximately
$30 million in 2003, and the House provided $20 million. Extra
dollars from the Senate were dedicated for NISAC building at
Kirkland Air Force Base in New Mexico. The joint conference
provided $27.5 million; but there was no specific language for
building. But with respect to what the Senator and your
colleague had asked for, what we have done most recently, is
that we retained sufficient funds to complete the survey and
selection process. The date of ground breaking will be
dependent upon site surveys and identification of a suitable
site for the NISAC.
So we're very attuned to the issue and concern of Senator
Inouye. I am happy to provide additional details or perhaps
visit with him to provide amplifying information.
Senator Cochran. We will submit questions in addition for
the record, and if you could respond to those.
General Libutti. I would be happy to, sir.
Senator Cochran. For the record, we would appreciate
additional detail regarding the fiscal year 2005 budget request
for NISAC and activities envisioned in the budget for that
Center.
General Libutti. I would add, sir, that our department is
preparing a letter to the Department of Defense regarding
building of a facility on the Department of Defense property,
et cetera, et cetera. So, we'll be happy to provide response
and detail.
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
MANPADS/AIR MISSILE COUNTERMEASURES
Following up on another issue that was raised by Senator
Byrd. Is it feasible to accelerate the shoulder-fired missile
defense program to make the technology available at an earlier
date? Or, is the time line you have considered the most cost
effective, or reasonable in terms of the needs for a cost
efficient method of protecting commercial aviation?
Dr. McQueary. We believe that the time line is a very
aggressive time line, and in fact, we're certainly aware that
there is great interest in the country about the very issue
that you raised. When we met with each of the three contract
winners, posed to them the following question: Would you like
to come in and recommend a shorter schedule. None of the three
agreed that they would be willing to take on, or would want to
take on, a schedule that was shorter than the one that we had
originally proposed.
So, I think it is an aggressive schedule, and I think a
careful examination of what we have to do in the alloted time
period would conclude that is the case.
Senator Cochran. Has there been any decision made or
discussion of who's actually going to pay the costs of
procuring and outfitting the airliners with this defense
system? I understand that they estimated costs could be up to
$10 billion.
Dr. McQueary. There are a number of factors that go into
that. We have not attempted to address, however, who would pay
for it. We have attempted to address how much it would cost,
though. So those decisions can be made. As I indicated earlier
in the testimony, we view our responsibility as providing the
scientific basis on which the Administration and the Congress
can decide the approach the country will take in implementing
such systems, if that is what we should do.
We put target costs in of about $1 million each, but that's
up front hardware costs. And anytime you field large systems,
operation and maintenance typically dominates the overall long
term costs of such systems. And I would expect that is the case
on this one.
CYBER SECURITY
Senator Cochran. We know that you have recently developed a
national cyber alert system to acquaint home computer users,
and business and government agencies, with ways to better
secure their computer systems from viruses. How would you rate
the performance of the new national cyber alert system's
response to the most recent computer virus outbreaks?
Dr. McQueary. That was done by General Libutti's
organization. I'll defer to him if I may.
Senator Cochran. Sure.
General Libutti. Sir, I would give you an estimate on a
scale of 1 to 10, at 8.5 or 9. And that's a relative
evaluation. Let me give you some additional information that
perhaps would help understand where we are. This roll out of
the alert system has just been done very recently.
We have over 250,000 subscribers. Those who have subscribed
to that system, are working that system across industry, home
users and government. We think, I believe, it is the first
great move to educate, inform and make people aware in a pro-
active way, of viruses that may be coming our way.
So I give it a pretty high grade, and we will continue to
monitor that as time goes by, and improve on how we communicate
with our customer base.
Senator Cochran. What's the relationship between the cyber
security division and TTIC; if any? Is there any collaboration?
General Libutti. I mean in terms of a wiring diagram, if I
may, there is no direct linkage. There is always within the
Federal Government, particularly the inter-agency, there's
linkages and pathways that permit people who work in the cyber
business to communicate with people who have that interest, or
that particular functional area of responsibility within TTIC.
That is, there are people in TTIC who not only look at
infrastructure protection from a threat perspective, but also
can consider cyber concerns. The key point that I leave with
you is, that the lead in terms of cyber security is within IAIP
at the Department of Homeland Security.
If we have issues that present themselves, then we will
orchestrate appropriate meetings. There was an initiative taken
by some of my folks in the cyber world to take a hard look at
what I call a lower level inter-agency grouping between the
communication folks, the national communication security guys,
or guys in cyber security, and the Department of Defense. They
met on a regular basis to review potential threats, and to look
globally at the kind of activity that needs, to in my words,
give us a warning and indicator that we need to do something.
So we're trying to be as pro-active as possible, and we're
trying to educate and make people aware of the threat to the
cyberspace area.
CYBER SECURITY
Senator Cochran. How is the national cyber security
division working with the private sector companies, such as
Symantec, McAfee, and Norton, that specialize in anti-virus
software and internet security.
General Libutti. I think it's safe to say they're working
very well with them. Briefings I have received have indicated
no serious problems in terms of our linkage and cooperation
with the business community overall.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Cochran. What law enforcement agency has primary
jurisdiction in enforcing cyber crimes?
General Libutti. I suspect again across law enforcement,
and that's not my area of expertise, that it is both Secret
Service and FBI.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted to the Science and Technology Directorate
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
BIOSURVEILLANCE SYSTEM
Question. Science and Technology's role in the Biosurveillance
Initiative includes an increase of $65 million to expand environmental
monitoring activities in cities determined to be at the highest risk of
a terrorist attack.
Can you give further details about the chemical and biological
warning activities currently in place in these cities?
Answer. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) BioWatch
initiative has been successfully operating in approximately 30 of the
Nation's urban centers since early 2003. BioWatch is an early warning
system that can rapidly detect trace amounts of biological materials in
the air whether they are due to intentional release or due to minute
quantities that may occur naturally in the environment. Routine air
samples are collected on a daily basis and more frequently if
necessary. To date, BioWatch has analyzed well over half a million
samples. Several hundred specialized air sampling devices, developed by
the Department, have been placed at key locations nationwide. The air
samplers are supported by the infrastructure set up by the
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Air Quality Monitoring
Network sites in partnership with State, local and tribal environmental
agencies. Additional partners in the program include the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Department of Energy (DOE)
National Laboratories. The CDC provides technical expertise through its
Laboratory Response Network on the laboratory analysis methods and
serves as the liaison for laboratory analyses with State health
departments. The DOE National Laboratories, specifically Los Alamos and
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, provide technical expertise
in biological sampling systems, laboratory analysis, and training
assistance to State and local agencies.
Question. If the requested increase in funding is provided, will
the monitoring be expanded to other cities that are currently being
monitored or just in these high-threat areas? What about other high-
threat areas designated under the Office for Domestic Preparedness
grant programs?
Answer. The current planning calls for significantly increasing the
number of air samplers in the top ten high-threat BioWatch cities only.
Given availability of funds some modest addition of other cities may be
possible in the future.
The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate coordinates with the
Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) to insure integration of
BioWatch capability with cities listed on the Urban Area Security
Initiative (UASI). The DHS S&T BioWatch Program fully funds the
installation, operation, and sustainment of the BioWatch system in each
city. The ODP grants program is complimentary to BioWatch and funds
first responder initiatives and other local high priority requirements.
Question. What promising new advances do you anticipate with the
requested increase in funding for the acceleration of research and
development on next generation environmental monitoring systems?
Answer. Accelerated research and development on next generation
detection systems fall into two categories: (1) outdoor wide area
environmental monitoring (i.e., BioWatch replacement) and (2) indoor
facility protection. Research and Development (R&D) programs for the
wide area environmental monitoring focus on autonomous networked
detectors. This is a self-contained on-site collection and analysis
system. To address indoor facility protection the R&D plan calls for
research to develop Rapid Identifiers--portable highly sensitive
bioagent detectors with very low false alarm rates.
COUNTER MAN PORTABLE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (MANPADS)
Question. The Science and Technology Directorate is currently in
the early stages of a 2-year, $120 million program to develop
countermeasures to protect against the threat of shoulder-fired
missiles on civilian commercial aviation.
What progress is being made by the three teams selected for the
Counter-MANPAD Program, and is the first phase on schedule to be
completed this summer?
Answer. In early October, 2003, the Department of Homeland
Security's Science and Technology Directorate released a solicitation
announcing a ``call for proposals'' to address this potential threat.
The solicitation is the first step in the Department's two-phase
systems development and demonstration program for anti-missile devices
for commercial aircraft.
Phase I began in January, 2004, with the selection of three
contractors--BAE Systems, Northrop Grumman, and United Airlines. Phase
I of the program will provide a detailed design and an analysis of the
economic, manufacturing, operational, and maintenance issues needed to
support a system that will be effective in the commercial aviation
environment. This phase will last approximately 6 months and will end
in the selection of one or two contractors moving on to the next phase.
The Counter-MANPADS program is on track. The DHS Special Project
Office (SPO) conducted meetings with all three contractors in late
January, 2004, and early February, 2004, to establish firm direction
and expectations. The SPO completed System Requirements Reviews with
all three contractors by March 18, 2004. An Interim Design Review will
be conducted in early May, 2004. These reviews establish a firm
baseline of requirements against which the contractors can apply their
designs.
Phase I will conclude with a Preliminary Design Review in July,
2004, at which time the DHS will select one or two of the initial three
contractors to proceed into Phase II.
Phase II will include development of prototypes, integration onto
commercial aircraft, and demonstrations of system operation and
performance. These prototypes will also be subjected to a rigorous test
and evaluation process. Phase II will last approximately 12-18 months
followed by a recommendation to the Administration and Congress.
Question. What obstacles do you face in safely applying
technologies developed for and currently in use on military aircraft
and adapting a countermeasure system to operate in the environments of
civilian aircraft?
Answer. Technologies developed for military or other specialized
purposes are currently incompatible with commercial air fleet
operations. Although underlying military technologies will be
leveraged, the systems must be adapted to meet commercial operational
conditions and environments.
Military missile countermeasures exist in various stages of
development and initial fielding. However, these technologies are
generally utilized by military and Heads-of-State aircraft that have
the operations and maintenance infrastructure to support such systems.
While it is conceivable that existing military countermeasures
units could be re-engineered for civilian aircraft use, many technical
and operational tradeoffs have not been previously performed to address
risks of such approach. For example, there is an established military
logistics infrastructure that serves airborne countermeasure equipment,
spanning functions from pilot training and routine maintenance to spare
parts and depot repair. A similar infrastructure would be costly and
time-consuming to replicate in the commercial airline industry.
It would be premature to integrate currently available military
countermeasures equipment aboard civilian aircraft due to numerous
issues concerning aircraft modification and certification, maintenance
and supportability, and operational employment. The current Counter-
MANPADS Program aims to resolve such issues and to provide alternatives
to the Administration for a decision on equipping commercial aircraft
with Counter-MANPADS capabilities.
Additional details can be provided if desired in accordance with
the appropriate security for the information.
Question. Is it feasible to accelerate the Counter-MANPAD Program
in order to make the technology available at an earlier date, or is the
timeline proposed the safest and most cost-efficient method?
Answer. Given the challenges of migrating Department of Defense
(DOD) technology into the commercial aviation environment, the DHS
program is the most cost-efficient approach to implementing an
affordable system. The program is an aggressive 24-month analysis,
prototype demonstration and testing program. At the conclusion, the
Department of Homeland Security will provide the Administration and
Congress with a recommendation for the most viable solution to
integrate Counter-MANPADS technology into commercial air fleet
operations.
CYBER SECURITY
Question. The Science and Technology Directorate serves a role in
the Nation's cyber security efforts by addressing cyber threat
characterization, cyber threat detection, and cyber threat origination.
With the large increase provided to the Science and Technology
Directorate by Congress for cyber security research and development,
what advances can we expect during this fiscal year?
Answer. The funding increase provided by Congress is enabling the
Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate to undertake cyber security
programs that would not have been possible otherwise. As fiscal year
2004 is the first complete fiscal year of the Department of Homeland
Security's existence, funding investments this fiscal year emphasize
infrastructure and foundational needs associated with cyber security.
Because such needs are generally not associated with short-term
problems, most of these investments will not result in deployable
advances in the same year in which efforts are undertaken. However,
several key areas are being addressed and are briefly described in the
following text.
In order to address infrastructure needs identified in the National
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, the Cyber Security R&D Portfolio in the
S&T Directorate has initiated activities aimed at securing some of the
key basic communication protocols on which the Internet relies, but
which are presently vulnerable to cyber attacks. A program focused on
the domain name infrastructure is working to advance the diffusion and
use of the Secure Domain Name System (DNSSEC) protocol as a replacement
for the traditional domain name infrastructure. A second program aimed
at secure routing infrastructure is working to address vulnerabilities
in Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), the protocol associated with the
Internet's underlying routing infrastructure.
A second infrastructure need identified in the National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace involves the need for improving the security of
process control systems, such as supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) systems and digital control systems (DCS). The
Cyber Security Portfolio is coordinating planning for these areas with
the Critical Infrastructure Protection Portfolio. These portfolios
expect to initiate joint activities in this area later this fiscal
year.
The S&T Directorate is also working to provide foundations for
enhancing the capability of a variety of cyber security research
communities. The Cyber Security R&D Portfolio is co-funding two multi-
university test bed projects with the National Science Foundation
(NSF). The first is a test bed project focused on creating a large-
scale physical test bed network to support testing activities, and the
second test bed project focused on developing a testing framework and
conducting experiments on the physical test bed. These activities will
result in the ability to conduct attacks, develop an understanding of
those attacks, and test existing and new technological cyber security
concepts, all in a large-scale operational network environment that is
kept isolated from the ``public'' Internet.
A separate effort aimed at supporting cyber security research and
development communities is a program that is working to develop large-
scale data sets for cyber security testing. This will address the need
that researchers and operational users have for realistic data that can
be used to test the capabilities of current and emerging cyber security
technologies. Although the S&T Directorate does not expect to play a
role in the area of testing, evaluating, or certifying commercial
technologies, the general approach to constructing and making available
data sets for testing have the potential for secondary benefits by
catalyzing the emergence of commercial testing services provided by and
for the private sector.
Another area of emphasis is the area of economic assessment. This
activity is focused on two important priorities. The first is
developing a general model for assessing the economic impact of cyber
events and attacks. We do not believe that widely touted figures (such
as $38 billion for a single Internet worm attack) are realistic
estimates of cost associated with those attacks. Unrealistic figures do
the private sector a disservice because they do not allow people to
make reasonable assessments of their security needs and associated
investment requirements. The second area of interest is the development
of tailored business cases aimed at different types of stakeholder
communities. General awareness campaigns aimed at widespread
improvements in cyber security have not been as successful as one would
like. We believe that one of the reasons for this is that the rationale
for supporting cyber security investments needs to be tailored to
different types of stakeholder perspectives (large enterprises,
critical infrastructure sector company, small businesses, home users,
etc.). It is our hope that such tailored business cases will provide
better rationale for technology investments both among today's
commercial cyber security technologies, as well as those of the future.
The activities described above fit into a coherent plan for long
term cyber security needs. It is our hope that the test bed/testing
framework projects and the program focused on large-scale data sets
will provide insights to support the development of cyber security
metrics, although additional work in this area is expected to emerge
from NSF-funded basic research programs. In the long term, the general
areas of cyber security metrics and economic assessment models will
provide two key components in developing a foundation for cyber
security risk assessment, and risk-based decision-making in this field.
Although the emphasis of fiscal year 2004 activities is on
infrastructure and foundational needs, this is not to the exclusion of
other activities. We do have plans for a number of other focused
activities, including conducting a pilot test of new-generation
intrusion detection technology with participation from the banking and
finance sector, and holding a workshop in the area of government needs
for wireless security to gather input for future R&D activities. In
fiscal year 2005, with the infrastructure and foundational programs
already in motion, we expect to expand our activities aimed at more
specific cyber security technology R&D needs.
Question. How will the Science and Technology Directorate
coordinate its activities with the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate?
Answer. The Director of Cyber Security R&D in the S&T Directorate
is working closely with counterparts in the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate to coordinate the
Directorates' relevant activities in the important area of cyber
security. The two components of IAIP that S&T has been working with are
the National Cyber Security Division (working with the Director of the
Division and other senior staff members) and the National
Communications System (working with the Chief of the Technology and
Programs Division and other senior staff members).
Interactions between the two Directorates include an ongoing series
of meetings between senior-level technical managers to provide a bi-
directional flow of information between the organizations as well as
coordination of technical activities. These meetings are aimed at
ensuring that DHS operational requirements feed into S&T programs, and
to help identify paths for diffusion of technology back out to end
users, as outcomes of these programs begin to emerge. On a more ad hoc
basis, the S&T and IAIP Directorates exchange invitations to attend
meetings or workshops when they involve areas of common interest.
The IAIP Directorate has been developing a written document to
identify its S&T requirements, and expects to provide this document to
the S&T Directorate upon its finalization. In the longer term, a
Science and Technology Requirements Council (SRC) is being established
within DHS to provide a more formal avenue for IAIP and other DHS
components to communicate requirements to the S&T Directorate across
all of the technology portfolios.
Question. Have other agencies within the Department of Homeland
Security, such as the Secret Service, the Coast Guard, and the
Transportation Security Administration, begun to outline their cyber
security requirements?
Answer. The Director of Cyber Security R&D has been informed of
several information technology-related requirements related to the
Secret Service's mission via IAIP and via the Secret Service Portfolio
Manager in the S&T Directorate. While related to information
technology, several of these requirements have been identified as
having a law enforcement component being outside of the scope of cyber
security.
The S&T Directorate has not been approached by the Coast Guard or
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) regarding their cyber
security requirements. We have had discussions with the Federal
Aviation Administration regarding their cyber security R&D priorities,
which are focused on securing the aviation infrastructure (e.g., air
traffic control networks), in contrast to TSA's focus on passenger and
cargo security.
HOMELAND SECURITY CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE
Question. The Nation's universities have begun to join the
Department of Homeland Security to combat terrorism with the selection
in December of the first Homeland Security Center of Excellence which
will focus on the risk analysis related to the economic consequences of
terrorist threats and events. The process of selecting the next two
Homeland Security Centers of Excellence to focus on agro-terrorism is
currently in progress.
How many additional Homeland Security Centers of Excellence do you
envision with the $69 million provided for fiscal year 2004 and with
the $30 million requested in the President's budget to accompany the
three mentioned?
Answer. Fiscal year 2004 funding for University Programs will
include approximately $10 million for the DHS Scholars and Fellows
Program, with the balance dedicated to University-based Homeland
Security (HS) Centers. In addition to the risk analysis and agro-
terrorism centers referenced in your question, we anticipate two more
solicitations for University-based Homeland Security Centers this
fiscal year.
Question. How will the Science and Technology Directorate
coordinate the Homeland Security Centers of Excellence research and
findings among each participating university?
Answer. Lead universities are required to develop a management plan
that demonstrates that partners will be communicating and reporting
results and findings on a regular basis. DHS requires regular written
reports and assigns a program manager to each HS Center of Excellence.
Additionally, lead universities are required to form Science Advisory
Panels, to conduct progress meetings with their partners, and to
participate in review meetings with DHS senior managers. As new HS
Centers are added, DHS envisions a system of centers that it will
coordinate. Findings from these centers will be coordinated and
consolidated by DHS.
BIOLOGICAL COUNTERMEASURES
Question. In addition to the national biosurveillance initiative
proposed in the President's budget in the biological countermeasures
portfolio, additional funding is requested for infrastructure
improvements at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center.
How is the Department of Homeland Security currently working with
the United States Department of Agriculture to coordinate research
being carried out in regard to biological diseases?
What countermeasures are being prioritized for agro-bioterrorism?
As this committee makes recommendations to fund infrastructure
improvements at the Department's research facilities, what intentions
do you see for the long-term use of Plum Island as part of Science and
Technology's National BioDefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center?
Answer. DHS is totally committed to enhancing the Nation's
agricultural security by complementing the mission of United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), and bringing a new sense for urgency and investments to enhance
the Nation's capability to anticipate, prevent, detect, respond to, and
recover from the intentional introduction of foreign animal disease,
especially scenarios of high-consequence. As defined in Homeland
Security Presidential Directive-7 (HSPD-7) and HSPD-9, the Secretary of
Homeland Security is responsible for coordinating the overall national
effort to enhance the protection of the critical infrastructure and key
resources of the United States, including the defense of agriculture
and food.
Agriculture and food security are important priorities for DHS, as
are its working relationships and interactions with key sector-specific
agencies. DHS utilizes high-consequence reference scenarios for
strategic planning for its programs and activities on biological and
chemical countermeasures and these areas are most relevant to
protecting the agriculture and food sectors. DHS works closely with the
respective sector-specific agencies in planning and execution of its
R&D programs for each scenario. Of seven scenarios currently under
study, two of the four biological scenarios concern agriculture and
food security: foreign animal disease (with an initial focus on foot-
and-mouth disease), and bulk food contamination. We will be working
extensively with the USDA on response to those scenarios.
A Joint DHS and USDA Working Group on Agricultural Biosecurity has
developed a partnership and national strategy to provide the best
possible protection against the intentional or accidental introduction
of a foreign animal disease. The strategy builds on the strengths of
each agency to develop comprehensive preparedness and response
capabilities.
USDA's Agricultural Research Service (ARS) has traditionally
excelled in basic and fundamental science and early disease discovery
research. USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has
provided diagnostic services for a wide range of foreign animal
diseases. In the partnership strategy, USDA will continue its basic and
early discovery work in the areas of foot-and-mouth disease and other
high priority foreign and emerging diseases, diagnostic development,
and maintenance of the vaccine bank.
DHS's program at Plum Island Animal Disease Center will focus on
strengthening the Nation's ability to predict and respond to the
intentional introduction of a foreign animal disease into U.S.
agriculture. DHS is focusing its efforts on:
--Advanced development which evaluates the efficacy of vaccines and
therapeutics (antivirals) derived from ARS's discovery work and
moves them into readiness for application in the event of an
outbreak;
--Agricultural agent bioforensic analysis capability to support
attribution, working in conjunction with APHIS's diagnostic
laboratory and law enforcement agencies;
--Disease assessment capability to include risk, threat assessment,
and epidemiologic resources to augment knowledge about specific
strains of foreign animal diseases for use in decision making
and predictive disease modeling; and
--Supporting the functions of the core scientific units such as
pathology, microscopy, sequencing, animal studies, strain
repositories, and bioinformatics.
The combined programs of DHS and USDA at Plum Island Animal Disease
Center will enhance the Nation's defense by building on the strengths
of each agency to increase capacities for both research and diagnostic
technology development.
As part of DHS's extensive commitment to agricultural security, it
is also establishing two University Homeland Security Centers in this
area: one in foreign animal and zoonotic diseases and one in post-
harvest food security. These new HS Centers were awarded to Texas A&M
University and the University of Minnesota respectively. Additionally,
DHS is coordinating with USDA on a review team for high-consequence
reference scenarios for strategic planning for DHS's programs and
activities on biological and chemical countermeasures. DHS is also
conducting end-to-end system studies to help define the requirements
for detection and surveillance for agricultural outbreaks and for the
protection of critical nodes of high consequence in the food production
chain.
DEPARTMENT-WIDE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Question. Currently, Science and Technology provides mission
support for several agencies within the Department of Homeland Security
to coordinate research and development throughout the Department to
prevent redundancies and to provide overall management and oversight of
ongoing research. The President's fiscal year 2005 budget proposes
further consolidation of research and development within Science and
Technology.
How do you feel the consolidation of research and development of
nearly all agencies in the Department of Homeland Security into Science
and Technology will provide for better coordination of research and
more efficient use of the funds provided?
Answer. Consolidation of the research and development functions of
the Department's components will significantly improve the Department's
overall ability to meet its mission. With consolidation, we can ensure
that operational end-user requirements and needs are being met by the
best science and technology that can be brought to bear on the problem,
whether that expertise comes from internal or external sources. We will
enhance our ability to avoid duplication of effort in the R&D areas,
and we fully expect to find synergies develop: what is created to meet
the requirements of one component may be able to be fielded to support
the needs--stated or not yet recognized--of another.
Question. What examples can be given of different agencies
benefiting from another agency's research that can be attributed to the
centralization of these efforts?
Answer. The Department's consolidation process has truly just
begun. Our experience to date has been in supporting other components
of DHS at the portfolio level. We have staff in the S&T Directorate who
are liaisons with other DHS components; specifically the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate, the United States Coast Guard, the
Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate, the United States
Secret Service, and the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate. These liaisons bring forward the requirements
from these other components, which allows us to factor their needs into
the S&T Directorate's RDT&E planning and budgeting and they also serve
as a communication link at the portfolio level.
The consolidation of the Standards efforts earlier in DHS has
already resulted in a more effective and efficient process to identify
and implement standards relevant to the entire DHS mission. The results
to date include:
--Created initial standards guidelines, with formal standards nearing
completion, for radiation pagers, hand-held radiation dosimetry
instruments, radioisotope identifiers and radiation portal
monitors. These standards were developed under the auspices of
the American National Standards Institute's Accredited American
Standards Committee on Radiation Instrumentation.
--Adopted its first set of standards regarding personal protective
equipment developed to protect first responders against
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents. These
standards, which will assist State and local procurement
officials and manufacturers, are intended to provide emergency
personnel with the best available protective gear. These
standards result from an ongoing collaboration with the Office
of Law Enforcement Standards at the National Institute of
Standards and Technology.
--Published guidelines for interoperable communications gear. Common
grant guidance has been developed and incorporated in the
public safety wireless interoperability grant programs of both
the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland
Security;
--Launched the SAFETY Act process for evaluating anti-terrorism
technologies for potential liability limits.
Question. How does the Transportation Security Administration's
laboratory coordinate its efforts with Science and Technology, and,
more specifically, the High Explosives Countermeasures portfolio, and
do you anticipate the consolidation of the Transportation Security
Administration's research and development into Science and Technology?
Answer. For fiscal year 2004 the S&T Explosives Countermeasures
Portfolio has initiated research, development, testing and evaluation
(RDT&E) to counter the explosives threat to the general population and
to critical infrastructure posed by suicide bombers and vehicle bombs,
respectively. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
conducting RDT&E to counter the explosives threat to the transportation
sector, including land and maritime transport as well as civil
aviation. S&T and TSA keep each other aware of activities being
performed; thus, redundancy is minimized. The activities are currently
not coordinated, however, and priorities are set independently.
Information exchange between the S&T Explosives Portfolio and the TSA
laboratory is coordinated through the TSA office of the Chief
Technology Office. Each group calls upon the expertise of the other
when warranted, including participation in selected project reviews and
advisory panels It is anticipated that the RDT&E activities currently
conducted within TSA will be consolidated within Science and Technology
commencing in fiscal year 2005 following administrative actions and
agreements that are in progress. Program planning documents for the
Explosives Countermeasures Portfolio reflect an integration of current
S&T and TSA mission areas, priorities, and funding profiles.
Question. How does Science and Technology prioritize research
across all Departmental agencies?
Answer. The Science and Technology Directorate prioritizes its
research and development efforts based on the directives,
recommendations and suggestions from many sources, including:
--Homeland Security Act of 2002;
--The fiscal year 2004 Congressional Appropriations for the
Department of Homeland Security;
--President Bush's National Strategy for Homeland Security, the
National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical
Infrastructure and Key Assets, the National Strategy to Combat
Weapons of Mass Destruction, the National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace, and the National Security Strategy;
--President Bush's nine Homeland Security Presidential Directives;
--Office of Management and Budget's 2003 Report on Combating
Terrorism;
--Current threat assessments as understood by the Intelligence
Community;
--Requirements identified by other Department components;
--Expert understanding of enemy capabilities that exist today or that
can be expected to appear in the future; and
--The report from the National Academy of Science on ``Making the
Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering
Terrorism,'' and the reports from the Gilmore, Bremer and Hart-
Rudman Committees.
Identifying and integrating the information contained in these
sources has not been a small task, but the result, coupled with expert
evaluation and judgment by our scientific staff, is the basis for
determining the research and development needed to meet our mission
requirements. As consolidation continues to occur, these same sources
will be used to prioritize requirements and needs.
We will continue to improve our ability to garner customer
requirements through the newly-formed Science and Technology
Requirements Council (SRC). The SRC will vet RDT&E requirements from
the other components of the Department and has Assistant Secretary
level representation from those components.
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION OF HOMELAND SECURITY RESEARCH EFFORTS
Question. What type of coordination is occurring with other
Departments in their research and development efforts, and how do you
plan to expand this coordination in the future?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security fully recognizes that
many organizations contribute to the science and technology base needed
to enhance the nation's capabilities to thwart terrorist acts and to
fully support the conventional missions of the operational components
of the Department. Congress recognized the importance of the research
and development being conducted by numerous Federal departments and
agencies, and in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, directed the Under
Secretary of Science and Technology to coordinate the Federal
Government's civilian efforts to identify and develop countermeasures
to current and emerging threats.
We take this responsibility very seriously.
We have begun this coordination process by evaluating and producing
a report on the research, development, testing, and evaluation work
that was being conducted within the Department of Homeland Security but
was not already under the direct cognizance of the Science and
Technology Directorate. Where it is appropriate, the Science and
Technology Directorate will absorb these R&D functions. In other cases,
the Science and Technology Directorate will provide appropriate input,
guidance, and oversight of these R&D programs.
We are now working to identify gaps in homeland security programs
across all relevant Federal Departments and agencies. We are
participating in--and in some cases, leading--committees,
subcommittees, and working groups of the National Science and
Technology Council (NSTC). Through formal and informal conversations at
NSTC meetings, gaps are being identified and are starting to be
addressed.
In addition, staff from the S&T Directorate are actively involved
with the Counterproliferation Technology Coordinating Committee (CTCC).
The CTCC's role is to look across the U.S. Government to identify
counterproliferation activites, identify gaps and shortfalls, and make
recommendations to address the shortfalls. Many of the technologies
relevant to Counterprolifertion also are relevant to Homeland Security
needs. The CTCC is co-chaired by the National Security Council,
Homeland Security Council and Office of Science and Technology Policy.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) gives us budgetary
direction and develops a yearly report on Combating Terrorism. This
document is one of the sources cited above as guidance for program
prioritization. We have frequent interactions with OMB for guidance in
budgeting in accordance with identified priorities.
Question. The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) is one
of our most important connections in the Administration. Our personnel
meet with OSTP staff frequently on issues of interest to both groups.
Most importantly, OSTP runs the National Science and Technology Council
and its committees, subcommittees and working groups as mentioned
above. These groups are instrumental in helping us achieve our goals of
protecting the Nation and its infrastructure.
The Homeland Security Council, (HSC) which was stood up in October
2001, meets frequently to ensure coordination of all homeland security-
related activities among executive departments and agencies and promote
the effective development and implementation of all homeland security
policies.
Has their been any thought given to creating a multi-agency
initiative, or working group, perhaps under the auspices of the
National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), to foster better
coordination of Homeland Security Research efforts across government
agencies (e.g. DOD, NIH, NSF, DOE, Transportation, EPA, USDA, Dept. of
Justice, etc)?
Answer. As discussed above, the Science and Technology Directorate
is working with the NSTC and the CTCC to look across the entire Federal
Government at homeland security-relevant science and technology.
RAPID PROTOTYPING
Question. The Congress made $75 million available for fiscal year
2004 for the rapid prototyping and deployment of near-term technologies
for the end-user, whether it is a Customs agent or a first responder,
to have the best technology and equipment available to combat
terrorism.
How do you propose to better streamline the process of working with
industry to make technology available to the end-user in a more
expeditious manner than currently available?
Answer. The Science and Technology Directorate actively promotes a
close relationship with industry to produce the new, improved
technologies that emergency responders will purchase. Since March 1,
2003, there have been four solicitations directly to industry in 63
high tech areas related to protection, equipment, sensors, and other
gear for emergency responders, agents, detection and tracking systems.
Industry sent in more than 4,500 responses to these solicitations. Our
partner, the interagency Technology Support Working Group (TSWG) is
awarding $60 millions in contracts now in these areas. Our Office of
Systems Engineering and Development (SED) is already at work with three
industry teams on technology for commercial aircraft to counter
shoulder-fired missiles. The Homeland Security Advanced Research
Projects Agency (HSARPA) has been able to shorten the time required for
a complete, multimillion dollar competitive solicitation to just 120
days. HSARPA is also using ``industry-friendly'' Other Transactions for
Research and Prototype contracting authority permitted by the
authorizing legislation to speed award of contracts to companies that
have not done business with the government before.
Question. Of the industry response to the Department's request for
proposals, what technologies have proved to be the most beneficial to
homeland security?
Answer. DHS S&T is in the earliest stages of research and
development for almost all of these efforts and it would be premature
to judge which of these technologies will be most beneficial.
Question. What future technology solicitations do you anticipate to
better serve the end-user in protecting the homeland?
Answer. DHS S&T is actively pursuing additional technology
solicitations in several areas relevant to protecting the homeland.
Currently HSARPA has a solicitation entitled ``Detection Systems for
Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures'' which is now active and
industry is responding. Eight other solicitations planned for this
year:
--Bioinformatics and Assay Development Program
--Threat Vulnerability, Testing, and Assessment
--Automated Scene Understanding
--Advanced Container Security Device
--Bomb Interdiction for Truck and Suicide Threats
--Biological Warfare Architectures Study (Food & Agriculture)
--Biological Warfare Decontamination
--Low Vapor Pressure Chemical Detection System
Question. Of the funds provided for and the flexibility given to
Science and Technology for rapid prototyping, how much is provided for
the Technology Clearinghouse, and how much is provided for the
Technical Support Working Group?
Answer. For fiscal year 2004, the Technology Clearing House will
receive $10.5 million. For fiscal year 2004, DHS S&T provided $30.0
million to the Technology Support Working Group (TSWG) for Rapid
Prototyping projects.
STANDARDS
Question. Congress transferred the development of standards from
the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) to Science and Technology
and therefore expects all standards development in the Department to be
centralized in the Science and Technology Directorate.
How is Science and Technology coordinating with the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in developing standards
Department-wide?
Answer. The standards development work in ODP was managed by the
NIST Office of Law Enforcement Standards (OLES). There has been a
smooth transition of this program in fiscal year 2004 as NIST/OLES is
still managing the program for the Science and Technology Directorate.
The S&T Directorate is also working with NIST to coordinate development
of additional standards in other areas, such as biometrics, cyber
security and detection methods for weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Question. How are the State Homeland Security Advisors providing
input for the end-users in developing standards?
Answer. The DHS Office of State and Local will provide points of
contact for specific standards development efforts. Also, the
Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors (CRCPD) has been
involved in user requirements for the first set of radiation detector
standards.
Question. Do you anticipate Science and Technology will publish a
``Consumers Report'' on all technologies and equipment for Federal,
State, and local users, such as the report that will be published for
radiation and bioagent detection devices?
Answer. It is our intention to publish user guides to available
technologies in something like a ``Consumers Report'' format for
critical equipment for emergency responders. These guides will address
personal protective equipment as well as detectors for chemical,
biological, radiological/nuclear and high explosive agents.
THE WIRELESS PUBLIC SAFETY INTEROPERABILITY COMMUNICATIONS (SAFECOM)
PROGRAM
Question. The problem of communications interoperability for first
responders, so important since September 11th, remains a difficult nut
to crack. How much will be needed to fund the solution? When will
technical standards be completed? What should the States and locals do?
The Science and Technology Directorate plays a lead role for the
Federal Government for finding the way through all of the technical
questions. The Wireless Public Safety Interoperability Communications
Program--known as SAFECOM--is in the Science and Technology
Directorate. Yet, no funds are directly requested in the Science and
Technology Directorate budget for this very important program. All of
the funding comes either from other Federal agencies or from the
Department-wide Technology appropriations within the Department of
Homeland Security.
Answer. There is no simple solution for communications
interoperability. To ensure that our emergency responders' wireless
communications are fully interoperable will require years of hard work
on the part of the Federal Government as well as cooperation from State
and local entities. The Wireless Public Safety Interoperability
Communications Program, SAFECOM, is managed by the Department of
Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate, allowing the
program full access to the scientific expertise and resources needed to
help our Nation achieve true public safety wireless communications
interoperability.
Current estimates of total funding required for complete
interoperable wireless communications run into the billions of dollars
when procurement grants are included in these estimates. Full wireless
communications interoperability is currently estimated to be complete
by 2023.
Technical standards are critical to the development of
interoperable systems. With input from the user community, portions of
the Association of Public Safety Communications Officers (APCO) Project
25's existing, but still incomplete, suite of standards have been
developed. However, adoption has been slow, and standards completed to
date address only part of the problem.
SAFECOM will dedicate funding to the implementation of its
standards plan, calling for a common set of standards, policies, and
procedures to drive the migration of systems towards advanced,
interoperable equipment and processes in the future. SAFECOM recognizes
that the Nation cannot wait for a complete suite of standards. In the
interim, local and State agencies must make investments that improve
their communications and interoperability capabilities. To support the
practitioner community in the short term, SAFECOM will begin a number
of initiatives to better inform public safety agencies when upgrading
or replacing current communications systems.
Question. Should the funding for SAFECOM within the Department of
Homeland Security be appropriated directly to the Science and
Technology Directorate?
Should funding be provided by Science and Technology for research
being carried out for SAFECOM?
Should the funding provided by other agencies be permanently
transferred to the Department of Homeland Security?
Answer. In an effort to coordinate the various Federal initiatives,
SAFECOM was established by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
and approved by the President's Management Council (PMC) as a high
priority electronic government (E-Gov) initiative. As an e-Gov
initiative, it is appropriate for funding to be provided by the
partnering agencies that will benefit from the results of the
initiative.
Question. The progress being made on setting the technical
standards for various communications technologies seems to be
progressing very slowly. Project MESA which will govern broadband
technology is in its infancy, and Project 25 governing Land Mobile
Radios has yet to complete even half of the standards necessary. What
more can be done to ensure the speedy completion of these projects by
the private industry and public safety community stakeholders?
Answer. At a strategic planning session in December 2003, public
safety stakeholders from the local, State, and Federal levels convened
to determine the most important next steps for the improvement of
public safety communications and interoperability. These stakeholders
felt that a process to promote standards is critical. To meet this
demand, SAFECOM has developed a plan to accelerate the development of
critical standards for public safety communications and
interoperability, including the Project 25 suite of standards (P25). As
mentioned above, SAFECOM will dedicate funding to the implementation of
its standards plan, calling for a common set of standards, policies,
and procedures to drive the migration of systems towards advanced,
interoperable equipment and processes in the future. In addition,
SAFECOM will fund the testing and evaluation of interim technologies
that can assist public safety agencies in making existing legacy
equipment interoperable with other neighboring systems.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Stevens
Question. What types of research and development support will the
Science and Technology Directorate provide to the Coast Guard for its
non-homeland security missions?
Answer. The Science and Technology Directorate and United States
Coast Guard (USCG) are in the midst of preparing a formal agreement
that will detail the coordination and funding mechanisms for USCG R&D
capabilities. The foundation for that agreement will be the
consolidation of funding requested in the fiscal year 2005 budget. For
fiscal year 2005, the USCG R&D center facility, personnel and
maintenance expenses will be funded through S&T in the amount of $13.5
million. In addition, S&T and the USCG have agreed upon a base level of
additional project funding in the amount of $5 million that will be
specifically targeted toward non-security related projects including
maritime science and research. This funding will be designed to support
USCG mission-programs such as Marine Environmental Protection, Living
Marine Resources, Search and Rescue, Aids to Navigation and Marine
Safety. The specific projects in support of these mission-related
programs will be prepared annually for S&T concurrence.
In addition, the USCG will submit security-related research
requests through S&T for coordination across all portfolios and DHS
components. The Coast Guard has submitted a maritime security R&D
portfolio detailing approximately $50 million in vital maritime
security research initiatives. This portfolio has been validated by S&T
portfolio managers and will be considered in the development of future
spending priorities and commitments from S&T.
Question. Will the Department of Homeland Security develop a
Homeland Security Center dedicated to energy production security and
pipeline infrastructure protection?
Answer. The Department of Energy (DOE) is designated as the lead
agency for security issues specific to the energy sector (except for
commercial nuclear power plants, for which DHS and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission are designated as responsible lead agencies) in
the National Strategy for Physical Protection of the Critical
Infrastructure and Key Assets and in Homeland Security Presidential
Directive-7 (HSPD-7).
DHS has the lead for transportation systems security which includes
pipelines. DHS has overall homeland security responsibility and
recognizes that the energy sector is especially vital to the quality of
life and the economy of this Nation. DHS is sponsoring Critical
Infrastructure Protection research and development programs in the
energy and pipeline security area with emphasis on Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and electronic control systems. These
efforts will increase this fiscal year. In addition, DHS asked the
National Academy of Science to host a workshop to provide DHS with
advice and guidance on future University-based Homeland Security R&D
Centers. The results of that workshop did not place energy production
security and pipeline security infrastructure in the top three areas
recommended as additional areas for potential University-based Homeland
Security Centers. This result certainly does not imply these
infrastructures and their security is are not important, and, as stated
previously, work is being done to address their security. In addition,
the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP)
Directorate in DHS does work closely with DOE and with the Energy
Sector owners and operators on operational security issues and the
Border and Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate in DHS works with
the Department of Transportation to ensure that the Nation's pipelines
are safe and secure.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FUNDING
Question. Secretary Ridge, the Department of Homeland Security has
a significant research budget to develop new technologies to secure the
United States against terrorist attacks. I know that the Department has
made significant progress in setting up the mechanisms to allocate
science and technology funding to industry, universities, and national
laboratories. This is a vital mission of your Department.
I understand that the Department is still in the process of
allocating fiscal year 2003 science and technology funding. What is the
current time line for completing this allocation of funding?
Answer. The Science and Technology Directorate has ``execution
plans'', that is identified scope of work, for all remaining fiscal
year 2003 funds and fully expects to have all remaining funds allocated
by the end of fiscal year 2004.
Question. The Department is now engaged in the allocation of fiscal
year 2004 science and technology funding. How do you plan to allocate
fiscal year 2004 funding in a more timely manner?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security has existed now for
just over a year. Like the rest of the Department, the Science and
Technology Directorate has been working hard to develop effective and
efficient procedures and policies, including those necessary for
selection of performers of the work to be done and the subsequent
contractual processes and allocation of funds. As these procedures get
established, projects will be awarded and funded in a more timely
manner. I am pleased to say that in the last 3 months, the Science and
Technology Directorate has made significant progress in allocating its
available funding into the hands of those researchers who are
developing and transitioning the vital technologies and tools to make
the Nation safer. Both the Under Secretary for Science and Technology
and I will continue to monitor the status of project selection and
funding, and expect to see continued progress.
Question. I note that this year, the Department's budget submission
is improved over last year as one would expect. Although there are
security considerations, could you describe your plans to ensure
transparency in the Department of Homeland Security budget? Both the
Departments of Defense and Energy make their supporting budget
documents public. Will you follow suit?
Answer. The Science and Technology Directorate prepares its annual
Congressional Justification in an open and unclassified manner and will
continue to do so as long as programs do not move into the sensitive
realm. In addition, the Science and Technology Directorate prepares its
written testimony for the record for each of its budget-related
hearings in an unclassified document. This written testimony contains
the supporting documentation for its budget request and becomes
publicly available.
Question. One of the biggest challenges in the science and
technology area has to be coordinating the allocation of funding
between near-term and applied technology and basic, long-term R&D
funding.
What level of coordination is being provided by your office, Mr.
Secretary, to ensure an appropriate split between near-term and long-
term R&D?
Answer. I have delegated the responsibility for determining the
appropriate split between near-term and long-term research and
development to the Under Secretary for Science and Technology and he
keeps me and others informed, although the final responsibility is
mine. In the approximately 1 year that this Department has been in
existence, the Science and Technology Directorate has focused its
initial efforts on near-term development and deployment of technologies
to improve our Nation's ability to detect and respond to potential
terrorist acts. However, we recognize that a sustained effort to
continually add to our knowledge base and our resource base is
necessary for future developments. Thus, we have invested a portion of
our resources, including our university programs, toward these
objectives. The following table indicates the Science and Technology
Directorate's expenditures in basic research, applied research, and
development to date, excluding construction funding.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE R&D INVESTMENTS
[In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Fiscal year
Fiscal year Fiscal year 2004 2005
2003 (actual) (estimated) (proposed)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Basic........................................................... 47 117 80
Applied......................................................... 59 56 229
Developmental................................................... 398 608 643
-----------------------------------------------
Total..................................................... 504 781 952
-----------------------------------------------
Percent basic................................................... 9.3 15.0 8.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our initial expenditures in basic research are heavily weighted by
our investments in university programs. These university programs will
not only provide new information relevant to homeland security, but
will also provide a workforce of people who are cognizant of the needs
of homeland security, especially in areas of risk analysis, animal-
related agro-terrorism, bioforensics, cybersecurity, disaster modeling,
and psychological and behavioral analysis. In addition, the Science and
Technology Directorate is allocating a portion of its resources to
high-risk, high-payoff technologies and expects to gradually increase
its investments in long-term research and development to a level
appropriate for its mission and the Department.
Question. What do you envision as the role of the Department of
Homeland Security in investments in future R&D to meet homeland
security requirements?
Answer. At the current time, the Science and Technology Directorate
is working hard with available funds to fill critical gaps in our
Nation's ability to prevent, protect against, respond to and recover
from potential terrorist attacks; however, we are all well aware that
it is only with a strong investment in long-term research that we can
we feel confident we are maintaining a robust pipeline of homeland
security technologies to keep us safe for the decades to come.
Successful businesses reinvest 10-15 percent of their total budget in
research and development; the Science and Technology Directorate will
strive in future years to invest a similarly significant portion of its
resources into long-term research.
INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION
Question. Mr. Secretary, the Department of Homeland Security
combines the programs and personnel for many Federal agencies. Creating
a culture as one department is a real challenge, but there are
capabilities throughout the Federal Government that can assist your
Department in meeting homeland security threats.
I would encourage the Department to develop strong positive
relationships with other Federal departments and agencies where there
is opportunity for collaboration and cooperation to make your job
easier.
Is it correct that your Department has worked with both the
Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) as
it develops its programs to meet homeland security threats?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security has worked very closely
with the Department of Energy (DOE) and NNSA from the very early stages
of the development of the Science and Technology (S&T) program. The DOE
laboratories provided extensive technical expertise and advise
regarding the S&T program development.
Question. How would you characterize these interactions?
Answer. The Department's interactions with DOE and NNSA have been
very positive. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) S&T staff
has an open communication relationship with DOE senior managers as well
as with the DOE field personnel. Since some of the S&T staff came from
DOE, there are close ties and good relationships that facilitate
developing the processes of how DOE and DHS work together. When issues
arise, they are quickly elevated so that communication occurs between
the appropriate parties in both Departments and a resolution achieved.
Question. What potential do you see for future collaborations?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security fully expects to
continue and enhance its collaborations with the DOE and NNSA, as well
as other Federal agencies conducting work of relevance to homeland
security. For example, the S&T Directorate is committed to utilizing
the extensive capabilities of all DOE laboratories and to engage them
in all aspects of our research, development, testing and evaluation
(RDT&E) program. The Directorate's Office of Research and Development
is developing an enduring RDT&E capability through stewardship of the
homeland security complex. To meet the Federal stewardship goal, the
DOE laboratories will play a significant role in assisting in the
strategic planning of the threat-based programs such as radiological/
nuclear and biological countermeasures programs. The DOE laboratories
also have significant existing capabilities and facilities for
addressing terrorist threats, thus DHS will contribute support for some
existing DOE facilities and reach-back into these unique capabilities.
In addition, the DHS University Scholars and Fellows program is working
with the DOE laboratories to place students with DOE mentors.
Question. The science and technology directorate at the Department
has had discussions with the DOE national laboratories in such areas as
radiological and nuclear and bioterrorist threats. The labs have
significant capabilities to assist the Department of Homeland Security.
Do you envision these collaborations continuing? Are there any barriers
to such activities? If so, can Congress assist in addressing these
issues?
Answer. The Department's Science and Technology Directorate will
continue to utilize the DOE laboratories to address S&T requirements
including key threat areas such as radiological, nuclear and biological
countermeasures. Collaborations between DHS and DOE have been very
successful to date, and the Science and Technology Directorate plans to
continue these collaborations well into the future. There are currently
no barriers to these collaborations. If circumstances change, the
Department will bring this to the attention of Congress.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell
Question. Over the last couple of years, I have worked to provide
funding to the Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) for an in-flight
communications system. I believe that this system would provide the
FAMs with the communications they need to safeguard our airlines and
the millions of passengers who fly on them each year.
I know that you are constantly going through reorganizations over
at DHS and I have learned that the Office of Science and Technology may
be proceeding to equip only those airlines that already have seatback
phones with these communications for the FAMs.
But it is my understanding that many airlines do not have seatback
phones. How can we ask Americans to fly on these airlines if they don't
have the same level of security that is being provided to others?
Answer. Current Status. With reference to ``may be proceeding to
equip only those airlines that already have seatback phones with these
communications for the FAMS'', the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS)
currently has access to the commercially available Verizon Airfone
service, only when FAMs fly on aircraft with such a system installed.
Recent statistics indicate that this system is installed on
approximately 40 percent of the aircraft on which FAMs fly. This
limited access includes voice only, via a tethered handset and does not
provide for data, wireless, or pre-emption of service during an
emergency situation. While the FAMS will conduct tests utilizing this
technology, additional testing will be performed on other developing
technologies with other service providers.
Phase I--Commercially Available Field Evaluation
The Federal Air Marshal Service is on the verge of conducting a
field evaluation, which will focus on foundational and component
testing; as well as, evaluation of FAMS applications over a
commercially available communication system.
The foundational testing will seek to determine the most
appropriate wireless communication protocol(s) for the FAMS to use for
the Air-to-Ground Communication System (AGCS). This test will look at
IR (infra-red), RFs (radio-frequencies), 802.11x, and Bluetooth
technologies. The test will evaluate all of the technical and security
aspects of the protocols, as well as aviation related aspects such as,
compatibility with aircraft systems. General market trends and
industry's development of wireless communications protocols will also
be studied.
The component testing will seek to evaluate the transmission and
reception of voice and data across an existing commercially available
communication system, and measure the ability of the system to handle
the current FAMS applications--including the Surveillance Detection
Report and other applications.
AGCS Strategic Planning
Additionally, the FAMS has been working in concert with the
Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology, to rigorously
identify the needs, scalability, and interoperability of the future
AGCS. As a result of joint efforts of DHS S&T and the FAMS, an AGCS
strategic plan is scheduled to be completed in September 2004.
AGCS Working Group
At the request of Congress in HR 108-169, the FAMS is chairing an
AGCS Working Group to develop a technical implementation plan, as well
as, develop a business/government partnership for the implementation of
this system.
To date, the FAMS have hosted two working group meetings, which
were attended by: National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),
Glenn Research Center; Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), NEXCOM
(Next Generation Communications) and FAA GCNSS (Global Communication,
Navigation, and Surveillance System); the JPDO (Joint Planning and
Development Office); U.S. Special Operations Command; U.S. Northern
Command/NORAD/CONR; United States Air Force; Department of Homeland
Security; and others.
Milestones
January 2003.--Air to Ground Charter signed by Adm. Loy, then TSA
Administrator.
Jan-Mar 2003.--FAMs participate in multiple air to ground
demonstrations.
September 2003.--FAMS managed services provider selected, work
begun on air to ground field evaluation.
November 2003.--Managed services provider issues RFP's for AGCS
field evaluation.
December 2003.--RFPs returned, scored--recommendations made.
April 2004.--FAMS issues AGCS field evaluation final
recommendation. DHS S&T begins working with FAMS on long-term strategic
planning. NASA offers strategic alliance with FAMS.
May-August 2004.--AGCS field evaluation conducted.
July 2004.-- Aviation and communications industries invited to
review draft AGCS strategic plan and participate in AGCS Working Group
September 2004.--AGCS Strategic Plan briefed to Congress
September 2004.--AGCS Strategic Plan completed.
Goals to be achieved
--FAMS finalize contract modifications in order to move forward on
field-testing and evaluation.
--Attain FAA approval for FAMS in-flight wireless communications
protocols.
--Attain FCC approvals for same, focusing on aviation and broadband
technologies.
--Attain Airlines approval and determine investment strategy for in
cabin-aviation communication (AGCS) system(s).
--Complete FAMS AGCS strategic plan.
--Agency review of field evaluation recommendations.
Program Summary.--The FAMS is evaluating currently installed
technology for immediate application and use by operational FAMS while
continuing to pursue a long-term solution to FAMS AGCS needs, which may
include developing technologies not associated with current in-flight
communications. This long-term solution is encompassed by the AGCS
Working Group, law enforcement and aviation communities and promotes
confidence in our Nation's civil aviation system to detect, deter and
defeat hostile acts targeting U.S. air carriers, airports, passengers,
and crews.
SMALL BUSINESS CONTRACTING
Question. As I said in my statement, Colorado is home to a number
of small companies that have developed cutting edge technologies to
keep not only us safe, but law enforcement officials and first
responders safe as well.
I am just curious as to the number of small companies, those with
100 or less employees, that you are working with to provide us with
their technology?
Answer. The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program
defines a small business as one with 500 employees or less. At the time
of contract award, DHS determines if the winner is a small business
under this size criterion, as well as checking other criteria of the
program such as U.S. ownership, location in the United States,
employment of principal investigator, etc. DHS does not keep records of
actual company size under 500 employees.
The first DHS SBIR solicitation requested proposals from small
businesses in eight topic areas. Altogether, 374 responses were
received and 66 were selected to enter negotiations for contract award
in the first Phase. Three of these businesses are located in Colorado.
Question. What percentage of your procurement dollars is being
awarded to small businesses?
Answer. The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program is
funded at 2.5 percent of extramural R&D funds. This equates to $19.6
million in fiscal year 2004 for the Small Business Innovation Research
Program, all with small businesses. In addition, small businesses are
participants in our open solicitations, such as the one issued last
fall for Detection Systems for Biological and Chemical Countermeasures.
Among the 40 winning individual companies (or their teammates) in that
fully competitive, $76 million solicitation, there were 35 small
businesses.
Question. How do you define what is a small company?
Answer. DHS uses the SBIR definition of 500 employees or less.
Question. Can you discuss with me where we are with liability
protections for all contractors?
Answer. As part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law
107-296, Congress enacted the several liability protections for the
sellers of anti-terrorism technologies. The Support Anti-terrorism by
Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002 (SAFETY Act) provides
incentives for the development and deployment of anti-terrorism
technologies by creating a system of risk and liability management. The
purpose of the SAFETY Act is to ensure that the threat of liability
does not deter potential manufacturers or sellers of anti-terrorism
technologies (ATT) from developing and commercializing technologies
that could significantly reduce the risks or mitigate the effect of
large-scale terrorist events. Therefore, the SAFETY Act creates certain
liability limitations for ``claims arising out of, relating to, or
resulting from and act of terrorism'' where a qualified anti-terrorism
technology (QATT) has been deployed. The SAFETY Act does not limit
liability from harms caused by an anti-terrorism technology when no act
of terrorism has occurred.
The definition of a qualified anti-terrorism technology is very
broad and includes products, equipment, services (including support
services), devices, or technology (including information technology)
that is designed, developed, modified, or procured for the specific
purpose of detecting, identifying, preventing, or deterring act of
terrorism, or limiting the harm that such acts might otherwise cause.
Sellers of ATTs may apply for SAFETY Act protection on line at
www.safetyact.gov, or they may submit their application electronically
or in hard copy. Each application will be reviewed in accordance with
the criteria set forth in the SAFETY Act to assess its technical
capabilities and to determine if SAFETY Act protection is necessary in
order to deploy the technology more broadly. To date there are 19 full
applications in various stages of review as well as 61 pre-
applications. The pre-application process is optional and is designed
to provide early feedback to the applicant regarding whether the
technology would be considered for SAFETY Act protection.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Larry Craig
Question. I believe that you have heard from Members of Congress
from Illinois, New York, and Idaho about their concerns in excluding
DOE national laboratories in those three States from playing on the
same field as your designated ``intramural'' laboratories. I was under
the impression that DHS had understood Congress's desire in creating
your department, that DHS would approach the DOE national labs on a
level playing field. When visiting with you prior to your confirmation,
I had felt I had your assurance to that effect.
I have made clear to you my concerns about the process your office
used in establishing the intramural/extramural laboratory system. I
have concerns about the validity of this approach and its outcome for
both the country and the extramural laboratories. These concerns
include: The reduced ability of DHS to bring the best talents and
capabilities to bear on some of our most significant national security
threats. The practicality and propriety of setting up a system that not
only encourages, but requires the extramural laboratories to compete
against industry and universities in order to contribute to the
solutions of important homeland security challenges. This is of
particular concern since the work designated for HSARPA and SED is work
that your staff has already indicated can be performed without unique
capabilities that exist in the national laboratories. The thin
reasoning and basis that has been put forward by DHS as a rationale for
selecting the intramural labs just doesn't appear to hold up.
Please provide the precise criteria used for selection of
intramural and extramural labs. Also provide the explanation of why
Argonne National Lab, Brookhaven National Lab, and Idaho National
Engineering and Environmental Lab do not meet the criteria for being
intramural laboratories.
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security, through Section 309 of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, is provided access to the national
laboratories and sites managed by the Department of Energy to carry out
the missions of DHS.
The DHS Science and Technology Directorate, wishing to make the
best use of each of these laboratories and sites in consonance with
statute, regulation, and policy, asked laboratories and sites to make a
decision regarding their desired mode of interaction with the
Directorate--to participate in S&T's internal strategic planning and
program development processes, or, if otherwise permissible under
applicable law, regulation, contract, and DOE policy, to respond to
certain types of S&T solicitations open to the private sector.
On March 31, 2004, the following national laboratories and sites
communicated their decision to Under Secretary McQueary to participate
in S&T's internal strategic planning and program development processes:
Argonne National Laboratory, Bechtel Nevada, Brookhaven National
Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory,
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory,
and the Sandia National Laboratories.
A consequence communicated to the national laboratory directors in
advance of their decision is that, as a result of such participation, a
national laboratory will be ineligible to participate in open
solicitations to the private sector for a period of 3 years after it
ceases engagement in the S&T strategic planning and program development
processes.
S&T will give the laboratories access to internal DHS strategic
planning information. DHS policy is that if any non-DHS entity,
including a national laboratory, receives that kind of information, DHS
considers that entity to have an ``organizational conflict of
interest'' that makes the entity ineligible to participate in any
solicitations open to the private sector issued by S&T.
Question. Do you think that it is appropriate for national labs to
be in direct competition with universities and industries for HSARPA
work?
The Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA)
solicitations seek to the maximum extent possible to capture the best
ideas and solutions. To achieve this end, Broad Agency Announcements
(BAAs) are used. Under a BAA, teams are not in direct competition; each
team is judged on the basis of the unique ideas proposed to solve the
broadly defined technology challenge. DOE Order 481.1B provides the
guidance DOE uses for the national laboratories regarding participation
in BAAs with universities and industries.
The DHS Science and Technology Directorate, wishing to make the
best use of each of these laboratories and sites in consonance with
statute, regulation, and policy, asked laboratories and sites to make a
decision regarding their desired mode of interaction with the
Directorate--to participate in S&T's internal strategic planning and
program development processes, or, if otherwise permissible under
applicable law, regulation, contract, and DOE policy, to respond to
certain types of S&T solicitations open to the private sector.
On March 31, 2004, the following national laboratories and sites
communicated their decision to Under Secretary McQueary to participate
in S&T's internal strategic planning and program development processes:
Argonne National Laboratory, Bechtel Nevada, Brookhaven National
Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory,
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory,
and the Sandia National Laboratories.
A consequence communicated to the national laboratory directors in
advance of their decision is that, as a result of such participation, a
national laboratory will be ineligible to participate in open
solicitations to the private sector for a period of 3 years after it
ceases engagement in the S&T strategic planning and program development
processes.
Should we assume that cost will not be a primary factor in
selecting winners for HSARPA and SED contracts? If it is a primary
factor, do you expect any national laboratories to be able to compete
on a cost basis?
Answer. The Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency
(HSARPA) and the Office of Systems Engineering and Development (SED)
consider other criteria, such as technical approach, performance
improvement if successful, value to the DHS user, program management
strategy, and capabilities of researchers to perform proposed work,
more important than the total cost of the research. The S&T Directorate
looks at the total cost of the research to confirm that it is
reasonable, but it is only a deciding criterion if the costs are too
high or too low. The eventual cost of the fielded system and its
operation are frequently considered under the value to DHS user
criterion; this should differ by technical approach, but not by
category of proposer.
Costs can also enter the final evaluation of proposals in a
determination of ``best overall value to the government.'' Under best
value, all factors are simultaneously evaluated looking to create out
of the family of selected proposals the best diversified programmatic
solution for the government against the total available funding.
S&T program solicitations seek to the maximum extent possible to
capture the best ideas and solutions. To achieve this end, Broad Agency
Announcements (BAAs) are used. Under a BAA, teams are not in direct
competition; each team is judged on the basis of the unique ideas
proposed to solve the broadly defined technical challenge.
Question. Wouldn't it be reasonable to have a system where all of
your critical R&D requirements were met through competitive processes
in order to assure access to the broadest array of talent in a cost
efficient way? Do you believe that this is what Congress intended?
Answer. DHS recognizes the unique talents at each of the DOE
national laboratories, and is committed to maximizing opportunities for
all the DOE laboratories in support of homeland security. We believe
that by allowing the national laboratories to support S&T either
through programmatic partnerships or project-based work, maximum
efficiency in resource utilization may also be achieved.
S&T conducts full and open competitions for a majority of its
research, development, testing and evaluation programs through Broad
Agency Announcements. The Office of Research and Development will
continue to conduct performance-based work with the national
laboratories.
Question. Knowing that Congress debated and rejected proposals for
folding one or more national labs into DHS when it was creating the new
department, under what authority does DHS now proceed with this same
concept, but administratively instead of legislatively?
Answer. The research, development, testing and evaluation
capabilities needed to support the missions of the Department of
Homeland Security are being defined and institutionalized within the
Department. Support of those needs now and in the future requires the
establishment and support of an enduring capability that includes
scientists and engineers who are well-versed in the requirements and
technologies associated with homeland security, and dedicated to the
mission of the Department, as well as physical facilities that support
their efforts. The legislation creating the Department of Homeland
Security and the Science and Technology Directorate recognized that
many of these needed capabilities exist within the Department of
Energy's laboratories and sites and provided for access to them in
support of the Department's mission.
The existing DOE laboratories have critical mass and expertise
across multiple disciplines to perform the necessary threat assessments
and, thus, to participate in DHS's and the S&T Directorate's internal
systems and analyses, associated trade studies, and long-range planning
that will form the basis for the architectures that are ultimately
developed and deployed to secure the homeland. These scientists will be
intimately involved in assisting the S&T Directorate in setting
research goals and requirements and formulating the research and
development roadmaps.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
R&D CONSOLIDATION
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget request proposes to
consolidate R&D budgets from the Coast Guard, Emergency Preparedness
and Response Directorate, and from the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement bureau. Other research budgets, such as $154 million for
the Transportation Security Administration were not included in this
consolidation. What plans are there to consolidate all the Department's
research budgets within the Science & Technology Directorate? If so,
what is the timeline for completing the consolidation? What are the
benefits of consolidating R&D budgets under one Directorate? What
savings are anticipated by consolidating the Department's research
budgets under one roof?
Answer. We have begun the consolidation process by evaluating and
producing a report on the research, development, testing, and
evaluation work that was being conducted within the Department of
Homeland Security but was not already under the direct cognizance of
the Science and Technology Directorate. Where it is appropriate, the
Science and Technology Directorate will absorb these R&D functions. In
other cases, the Science and Technology Directorate will provide
appropriate input, guidance, and oversight of these R&D programs. We
expect to have this process completed by the end of fiscal year 2004 in
accordance with the Congressional directive.
Consolidation of the research and development functions of the
Department's components will significantly improve the Department's
overall ability to meet its mission. With consolidation, we can ensure
that operational end-user requirements and needs are being met by the
best science and technology that can be brought to bear on the problem,
whether that expertise comes from internal or external sources. We will
be able to enhance our efforts to avoid duplication of effort in the
R&D areas, and we fully expect to find synergies develop: what is
created to meet the requirements of one component may be able to be
fielded to support the needs--stated or not yet recognized--of another.
The specific cost savings expected will be identified as part of the
process of R&D consolidation.
DETECTION TECHNOLOGY
Question. When Secretary Ridge testified before the subcommittee in
February, he said that if a passenger wanted to board a plane with a
biological weapon, the Department does not currently have the capacity
to detect it. He said that acquiring such a capability is a top
priority for the science and technology directorate. How does your
budget address this issue?
Answer. The Biological Countermeasures portfolio in the S&T
Directorate is currently initiating systems studies to better define
needs and options for detection of a biological agent release aboard an
aircraft. Detection of a biological pathogen during the passenger
security screening process remains a difficult problem, but we are also
investigating potential detection options. It is possible that
modifications to current technology can provide interim capability
while the detection efforts described above can provide an improved
future capability.
UNIVERSITY CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE
Question. In fiscal year 2004, Congress appropriated $68.8 million
for University programs under the Science and Technology Directorate.
When Under Secretary McQueary testified on March 2, he said that the 3
centers would be selected in fiscal year 2004 and the fiscal year 2005
budget request would be sufficient to maintain three centers. How many
centers would be selected in fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005 if
the budget request maintained the current level of funding instead of
cutting the program by $39 million?
Answer. In addition to the risk analysis and agro-terrorism centers
already selected in fiscal year 2004, we anticipate two more
solicitations for University-based Homeland Security Centers this
fiscal year. If the fiscal year 2004 level of funding were maintained
for fiscal year 2005 and beyond, an additional five Centers could be
selected. SAFECOM
The budget request for SAFECOM is $22.105 million. The Department's
budget justification states that this program is a cost-share program
and anticipates receiving $12.5 million from within DHS and $9.55
million from other Federal departments. Please provide the specific
contributions from each DHS component and from each of the other
Departments contributing to this program.
Question. How much was anticipated for SAFECOM in fiscal years 2003
and 2004 versus the amount reimbursed from other agencies? Please
provide the specific contributions from each DHS component and from
each of the other Departments contributing to this program.
On February 23, the Secretary said that ``the Department has
identified technical specifications for a baseline interoperable
communication system.'' Please describe these technical specifications
and how it will benefit first responders. What is the timeline to
implement these specifications? What is the cost impact of these
specifications? Will the Department establish a separate funding
mechanism to assist first responders pay for this short-term solution?
Answer. The chart below outlines the funding for SAFECOM expected
for fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004, and the actual amount
collected by the program in fiscal year 2003. It is the current
expectation that all fiscal year 2004 funding provided by DHS is from
the Chief Information Officer's wireless account.
SAFECOM FUNDING
[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Actual fiscal Anticipated
year 2003 fiscal year
Agency Funds 2004 Funds
Contributed Contributed
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USDA.................................... 1.431 1.520
DOD..................................... 3.345 1.770
DOE..................................... 1.431 1.430
HHS..................................... 1.431 1.520
DHS..................................... .............. 12.520
DoI..................................... .............. 2.951
DoJ..................................... .............. 4.312
Treasury................................ 9.500 ..............
-------------------------------
Total............................. 17.138 26.023
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department will require certain minimum specifications relating
to interim interoperable solutions, such as cross-band repeaters and
patching units. These specifications will allow public safety
practitioners to clearly articulate what technical requirements must be
met by vendors of communications equipment so that purchases made in
the short term are successfully targeted at equipment that meets their
immediate needs. Since many commercial units are already capable of
meeting these requirements, the cost of these units should be
unaffected.
The Department is still exploring options for funding and will
release an implementation timeline accordingly.
GRANTS & CONTRACTS
Question. Of the funds appropriated in fiscal year 2004, provide a
table that shows the number of grants provided, the amount for each
grant, the recipient, and the purpose. Provide the same information for
contractual agreements.
Answer. See table below.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Type Amount Project Title/Purpose Performer Procurement Agent
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BAA.................................. $30,000,000 Technical Support Working Group, Rapid Prototyping..... Multiple Awards Pending................................ Naval System Management
Activity
BAA.................................. 6,045,595 Fund for RA 03-01, Detection Systems for Biological and Multiple Awards Pending................................ Ft. Detrick, USAMRAA
Chemical Countermeasures (DSBCC), TTA-3 and TTA-5.
BAA.................................. 5,710,000 Scene Understanding (NRL BAA 55-03-02 Artificial Multiple Awards Pending................................ Navy Research Lab
Intelligence Technologies & BAA 55-03-05 Advanced
Intelligence Technologies).
BAA.................................. 5,230,000 Threat Vulnerability, Intelligence and Information Multiple Awards Pending................................ Navy Research Lab
Analysis, and Warning Capabilities of DHS (BAA 04-02).
BAA.................................. 6,196,909 Detection Systems for Biological and Chemical Multiple Awards Pending................................ Ft. Detrick, USAMRAA
Countermeasures (RA 03-01 TTA-4).
BAA.................................. 2,070,000 Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) (Air Force Multiple Awards Pending................................ Air Force Research Lab
Research Lab/Information Grid System BAA 03-18-IFKA
Cyber Defensive & Offensive Operations Technology).
BAA.................................. 54,589,000 Funds for BAA 04-01 (Rad/Nuc Countermeasures Systems Multiple Awards Pending................................ U.S. Navy Space and Air
Architectures Analysis) and BAA 04-02 (Rad/Nuc Warfare Center (SPAWAR)
Detection Systems),.
BAA.................................. 2,050,000 Large Scale Network Security Test & Evaluation Datasets Multiple Awards Pending................................ DOI/NBC
Program (DOI/NBC BAA 03-05-FH).
BAA.................................. 10,000,000 Fund for RA 03-01, Detection Systems for Biological and Multiple Awards Pending................................ Ft. Detrick, USAMRAA
Chemical Countermeasures (DSBCC), TTA-5.
BAA.................................. 102,000 Evaluation Plan for BAA 04-02, Detection Systems for Oak Ridge National Laboratory.......................... DOE
Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures (DSRNC)
HSARPA Review Support.
BAA.................................. 7,000,000 Phase II B Funding for RA 03-01, Detection Systems for Multiple Awards Pending................................ Ft. Detrick, USAMRAA
Biological and Chemical Countermeasures (DSBCC) TTA-2.
BAA.................................. 896,600 Live Agent Testing Evaluation (RA 03-01 TTA 3/4/5-- Multiple Awards Pending................................ Ft. Detrick, USAMRAA
Portable High-Throughput Integrated Laboratory
Identification System, Lightweight Autonomous Chemical
Identification System, Autonomous Rapid Facility
Chemical Agent Monitor).
--------------
BAA Total...................... 129,890,104
==============
Contract............................. 6,000,000 Counter MANPADS Development and Demonstration Phase.... Awards Pending......................................... DHS
Contract............................. 60,000 Support for Model OT Agreement Analyses................ Logistics Management Institute (LMI)................... DHS
Contract............................. 4,678,601 Counter MANPADS Program Support........................ SRS Technologies....................................... Ft. Detrick, USAMRAA
Contract............................. 859,873 Operational and Support Staffing for Office of Weapons ANSER Corp............................................. DHS
of Mass Destruction (WMDO).
Contract............................. 208,750 Enhancing International Travel Security................ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.. Department of the
Interior National
Business Center/Fort
Huachuca
Contract............................. 5,058 Additional Funding for Goods Used ISO Biowatch......... VWR International...................................... CoastGuard
Contract............................. 371,440 Bio Watch Operations Support........................... Booz Allen Hamilton.................................... Department of the
Interior National
Business Center/Fort
Huachuca
Contract............................. 57,120 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Analysis Support............... SRA International...................................... Department of the
Interior National
Business Center/Fort
Huachuca
Contract............................. 90,000 ORION--GPS Integration................................. Orion Electronics (Award Pending)...................... Department of Interior,
Gov Works
Contract............................. 900,000 Support of Civil Aviation Security Systems Engineering Center for Naval Analysis Corporation (CNAC)........... DHS
Study.
Contract............................. 282,951 Programmatic and Technical Management Support to the SPARTA, Inc............................................ Ft. Detrick, USAMRAA
Director, ORD.
--------------
Contract Total................. 13,513,793
==============
Grant................................ 3,310,826 DHS Scholarship/Fellowship Program..................... Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE). DOE
Grant................................ 4,000,000 University of Southern California--University Programs University of Southern California...................... DHS/FEMA
Grant.
--------------
Grant Total.................... 7,310,826
==============
RA................................... 270,000 IDA Chemical Hazard Analysis........................... Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA)................... DOD Washington
Headquarters Service
(WHS)
RA................................... 161,998 South Florida Hawkeye Project fiscal year 2004, BTS.... Coast Guard HQ......................................... DHS/USCG
RA................................... 1,131,679 DHS Cyber Security Testbed............................. UC Berkeley, USC, UC Davis, Penn State, Purdue, ICIR.. National Science
Foundation (NSF)
RA................................... 2,300,000 South Florida Hawkeye Project fiscal year 2004, BTS.... United States Coast Guard.............................. DHS/USCG
RA................................... 230,000 Study of Emerging Threats and Evolving Technologies.... Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA)................... DOD Washington
Headquarters Service
(WHS)
RA................................... 390,750 Recognizing Emotion In Speech.......................... Columbia Univ.......................................... National Science
Foundation (NSF)
RA................................... 382,500 Automated Intent Determination (AutoID)................ Dr Mark Adkins, Univ of Arizona........................ Department of the
Interior National
Business Center/Fort
Huachuca
RA................................... 624,196 VACIS Image Processing and Projection (IPP)............ SAIC................................................... DHS
RA................................... 64,600 Perimeter Security System.............................. NAVSEA................................................. NAVSEA
RA................................... 500,000 Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Security Analysis and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). National Institute of
Evaluation of Large Scale BGP Attacks. Standards and Technology
(NIST)
RA................................... 2,500,000 Surveillance--RODS Decision Enhancements for The RODS-U of Pitt......................................... NAVSEA
BioWatch System.
RA................................... 3,000,000 Surveillance--ESSENCE Implementation of ESSENCE Johns Hopkins.......................................... NAVSEA
Biosurveillance Systems.
RA................................... 200,000 Technical Advisory Group (TAG) to HSARPA on Bioaerosol Multiple Awards Pending................................ Edgewood Chemical and
sensor testing and evaluation methodology. Biological Center
RA................................... 10,853,444 PSITEC, technology clearinghouse....................... Public Safety and Security Institute for Technology.... U.S. Navy Space and Air
Warfare Center (SPAWAR)
RA................................... 390,750 Recognizing and Understanding Emotion in Speech Navy Research Lab......................................
Columbia University.
RA................................... 382,500 Automated Intent Determination (AutoID)................ University of Arizona.................................. Navy Research Lab
RA................................... 3,450,000 Bioinformatics and Assay Development Program........... Multiple Awards Pending................................ Ft. Detrick, USAMRAA
RA................................... 6,000,000 Rapid Prototyping...................................... Multiple Awards Pending................................ Navy Research Lab
RA................................... 50,000 Provides funding for Evaluation Plan for BAA 04-02, Sandia National Laboratory............................. DOE
Detection Systems for Radiological and Nuclear
Countermeasures (DSRNC).
RA................................... 76,000 Evaluation Plan for BAA 04-02, Detection Systems for Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory................. DOE
Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures (DSRNC).
RA................................... 6,888 Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction--Computer DHS/GSA Schedule....................................... DHS
Equipment.
RA................................... 2,500,000 Evaluation of a Deployed Biosurveillance System........ Potomac Institute...................................... Department of the
Interior National
Business Center/Fort
Huachuca
RA................................... 539,720 Port Authority NY/NJ Testbed--PNNL..................... Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.................. DOE
RA................................... 500,000 Port Authority NY/NJ Testbed--SRTC..................... Savannah River Technology Center....................... DOE
RA................................... 1,000,000 Port Authority NY/NJ Testbed--EML...................... Environmental Measurements Laboratory.................. DOE
RA................................... 506,452 DHS Industry Forum..................................... Center for Technology Commercialization (CTC).......... DOJ, Office of Justice
Programs
RA................................... 412,988 Port Authority NY/NJ Test Bed PNNL: Sys Analysis....... Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.................. DOE
RA................................... 13,000,000 Radiological /Nuclear Test and Evaluation Complex...... Bechtel Nevada......................................... DOE
RA................................... 175,000 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Nuclear Camp Peary AFETA....................................... Armed Forces Experimental
Assessment Training. Training Activity
(AFETA)--Camp Peary
RA................................... 66,570 Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction--Secure Portable DHS.................................................... DHS
Phones.
RA................................... 5,000 DHS Facilities/GSA Support of S&T, letterhead, etc..... General Services Administration........................ DHS
RA................................... 250,000 Interagency Board...................................... Battelle supporting Interagency Board (IAB)............ DHS
RA................................... 13,244,400 Bio Watch Operations Support........................... Environmental Protection Agency........................ EPA
RA................................... 262,500 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Analysis of AssumptionGeneral GSA....................................................
Services Administration.
RA................................... 41,680 Second Intelligence and Security Informatics Symposium National Science Foundation (NSF)...................... National Science
(ISI 2004). Foundation (NSF)
RA................................... 2,500,000 DHS Facilities/GSA Support of S&T Relocation........... General Services Administration........................ DHS
RA................................... 8,500,000 Homeland Security Institute............................ Award Pending.......................................... Ft. Detrick, USAMRAA
RA................................... 103,079 TDY Support to Chemical Countermeasures Portfolio U.S. U.S. Army..............................................
Army Edgewood Center.
RA................................... 5,000,000 USCG Research & Development............................ U.S. Coast Guard....................................... USCG
RA................................... 80,000 Point Defense Against Aircraft Attack.................. Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA)................... DOD Washington
Headquarters Service
(WHS)
RA................................... 18,965 John Rein 90 Day Extension............................. NETC................................................... Naval Education and
Training Center
RA................................... 489,322 Strategic Planning..................................... Award Pending.......................................... Gov Works
RA................................... 170,500 Professional & Engineering Services.................... Award Pending.......................................... Department of Interior,
Gov Works
RA................................... 480,000 Support for Planning Documents......................... Touchstone Corp........................................ Department of the
Interior National
Business Center/Fort
Huachuca
RA................................... 2,601,000 Border Safe Integrated Feasibility Experiment Phase II. Corporation for National Research Initiatives (CNRI)... Department of the
Interior National
Business Center/Fort
Huachuca
RA................................... 25,000 Support of International Meeting of Biometrics Experts. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). National Institute of
Standards and Technology
(NIST)
RA................................... 100,000 Enhanced International Travel Security Support......... Asian Technology Information Program (ATIP)............ Office of Naval Research
RA................................... 100,000 DHS Canada Collaboration............................... Sandia National Laboratory............................. DOE
RA................................... 86,400 Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) Workshop........... Sandia National Laboratory............................. DOE
RA................................... 216,250 Chemical Biological National Program (CBNP) Argonne National Laboratory............................ DOE
Continuation Program--ANL.
RA................................... 5,820,000 Chemical Biological National Program (CBNP) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory................. DOE
Continuation Program--LLNL.
RA................................... 2,589,500 Chemical Biological National Program (CBNP) Los Alamos National Laboratory......................... DOE
Continuation Program--LANL.
RA................................... 2,188,750 Chemical Biological National Program (CBNP) Sandia National Laboratory............................. DOE
Continuation Program--SNL.
RA................................... 598,875 Chemical Biological National Program (CBNP) Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.................. DOE
Continuation Program--PNNL.
RA................................... 567,500 Chemical Biological National Program (CBNP) Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.................. DOE
Continuation Program--LBNL.
RA................................... 75,000 Chemical Biological National Program (CBNP) Oak Ridge National Laboratory.......................... DOE
Continuation Program--ORNL.
RA................................... 62,500 Chemical Biological National Program (CBNP) Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory DOE
Continuation Program--INEEL.
RA................................... 4,215,475 Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC)--First Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC).............. DHS
Quarter fiscal year 2004 Continuation Funding.
RA................................... 10,166,544 Plum Island Animal Disease Center O&M.................. Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC).............. DHS
RA................................... 1,060,400 Environmental Measurements Lab......................... Environmental Measurements Laboratory.................. DOE
RA................................... 6,930,000 Threat Vulnerability Integration Systems Pilot (TVIS)-- Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory................. DOE
LLNL.
RA................................... 3,870,000 Threat Vulnerability Integration Systems Pilot (TVIS)-- Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.................. DOE
PNNL.
RA................................... 1,480,050 Yarrow Behavioral Analysis Technical Support Nuclear Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory................. DOE
Assessment Program.
RA................................... 250,409 PNNL Support to Emergency Preparedness and Response Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.................. DOE
Program.
RA................................... 800,000 Weapons of Mass Destruction--Nuclear Assessment Program Los Alamos National Laboratory......................... DOE
(NAP).
RA................................... 100,000 Weapons of Mass Destruction--Nuclear Assessment Program Oak Ridge National Laboratory.......................... DOE
(NAP).
RA................................... 4,525,000 Nuclear Assessment Program, Credibility Assessment..... Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory................. DOE
RA................................... 320,000 Nuclear Assessment Program, Forensic Tech Support...... Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.................. DOE
RA................................... 1,900,000 EPR Scientific Support to FEMA......................... Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory................. DOE
RA................................... 2,229,225 ARS Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC).............. DHS
Scientific Support.
RA................................... 45,980 ARS Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) Admin PLUM/Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC)......... DHS
Support.
RA................................... 1,200,000 Developing a Critical Infrastructure Protection Los Alamos National Laboratory......................... DOE
Decision Support System (CIP/DSS).
RA................................... 1,200,000 Developing a Critical Infrastructure Protection Argonne National Laboratory............................ DOE
Decision Support System (CIP/DSS).
RA................................... 400,000 Developing a Critical Infrastructure Protection Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.................. DOE
Decision Support System (CIP/DSS).
RA................................... 1,200,000 Developing a Critical Infrastructure Protection Sandia National Laboratory............................. DOE
Decision Support System (CIP/DSS).
RA................................... 1,500,000 BioWatch--Orange Alert Expanded Sample Analysis........ Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory................. DOE
RA................................... 1,514,000 RadNuc Countermeasures--PNNL........................... Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.................. DOE
RA................................... 3,313,000 Rad-Nuc Countermeasures PEP--LANL...................... Los Alamos National Laboratory......................... DOE
RA................................... 101,900 NRC Workshop Conference................................ National Research Council (NRC)........................ DOE
RA................................... 700,000 Advanced Scientific Computing--SNL..................... Sandia National Laboratory............................. DOE
RA................................... 4,776,000 Advanced Scientific Computing--LLNL.................... Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory................. DOE
RA................................... 85,811 Advanced Scientific Computing--ORNL.................... Oak Ridge National Laboratory.......................... DOE
RA................................... 2,500,000 National & Regional Visual Analytics Centers........... Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.................. DOE
RA................................... 250,000 Environmental Measurements Laboratory Second Qtr Environmental Measurements Laboratory.................. DOE
Funding for fiscal year 2004.
RA................................... 1,298,500 CBNP fiscal year 2003 Continuation and New Start Los Alamos National Laboratory......................... DOE
Funding.
RA................................... 4,833,500 CBNP fiscal year 2003 Continuation and New Start Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory................. DOE
Funding.
RA................................... 1,500,000 Photofission-Based Nuclear Material Detection and Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory DOE
Characterization.
RA................................... 1,600,000 (Tri-Lab) Threat-Capability Assessments--LANL.......... Los Alamos National Laboratory......................... DOE
RA................................... 1,600,000 (Tri-Lab) Threat-Capability Assessments--LLNL.......... Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory................. DOE
RA................................... 1,600,000 (Tri-Lab) Threat-Capability Assessments--SNL........... Sandia National Laboratory............................. DOE
RA................................... 15,300,000 First Responder CBRNE Protective and Operational National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). DHS
Equipment Standards Development Program.
RA................................... 280,000 RADNUC Attribution Advisor............................. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory................. DHS
RA................................... 255,000 Border Safe Phase II................................... SPAWAR................................................. DHS
RA................................... 2,257,098 Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) O&M Services Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC).............. DHS
Contract--Remainder of funding.
RA................................... 1,199,370 ORISE Merit Review for HS Centers...................... Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE). DOE
--------------
RA Total....................... 186,199,518
==============
SBIR................................. 17,170,000 Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR)...... Multiple Awards Pending................................ Department of the
Interior National
Business Center/Fort
Huachuca
--------------
SBIR Total..................... 17,170,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question Submitted By Senator Daniel K. Inouye
Question. I continue to have constituent businesses contact my
office to ask for information about grant opportunities from the
Department of Homeland Security. My staff has requested a briefing from
the Science and Technology Directorate. However, the requested briefing
has so far not been provided. Upon researching on the website, my staff
came upon an invitation to attend a Department of Homeland Security
Industry Forum. Mr. Chairman, I request that a copy of this notice be
placed in the record.
I would like to quote from this announcement:
This two-day forum will provide industry the opportunity to hear,
first-hand, what technology needs and requirements DHS will have in the
coming years. DHS staff will provide detailed briefings on technology
R&D and T&E requirements for the Department, as well as, where and when
to apply for DHS funding.
A brief itinerary and list of speakers, including several members
of your staff, is attached. This sounds like a great forum that my
staff and constituents would be interested to attend. However, a list
of registration fees is also included. The fees range from $425 for
members of the government to $625 for private industry. I was surprised
to learn of the high cost to attend this government briefing. Why are
government employees required to pay $425 to learn about these funding
opportunities? Why is DHS charging other entities for this information?
Answer. Fees for this conference were maintained at levels as low
as we believed feasible. In accordance with standard government
practice, fees were set to help offset the costs of conducting a public
forum rather than supporting the conference with public funds.
______
Questions Submitted to Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
BIODEFENSE COUNTERMEASURES (BIOSHIELD)
Question. The President's budget proposes to transfer the Strategic
National Stockpile back to the Department of Health and Human Services
but not project Bioshield. IAIP's role in the project BioShield is to
make the threat assessments necessary to determine proper BioShield
investments which is the rationale for the Department of Homeland
Security having responsibility for this program.
What assessments have been carried out by Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection of our vulnerabilities to biological attacks
to guide decisions as to the investments which should be made to
develop, produce and pre-purchase vaccines or other medications from
BioShield?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security has been assigned a
role in several bioterror initiatives. One such initiative, Project
BioShield, specifies DHS work with the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) and several other Federal agencies to ensure resources
are available to combat a sudden chemical or biological attack. The
central premise for this program is the government must prepare for
such attacks by acquiring the best vaccines/drugs for pathogens such as
smallpox, anthrax and botulinum toxin. To do so, current Project
BioShield guidelines require DHS evaluate likely biological/chemical
threats and identify promising bioresearch R&D to best address such an
attack.
DHS is currently involved in an initiative designed to protect the
Nation against bioterrorism. This initiative, known as the Bio-
Surveillance Program, has been in operation since 2003. This program
not only enhances on-going surveillance in areas such as human health,
hospital preparedness, State and local preparedness, vaccine research
and procurement, animal health, food and agriculture safety and
environmental monitoring but will integrate these data streams with
intelligence data in a comprehensive fashion.
IAIP's role in the Bio-Surveillance Program is developing a real-
time system for harvesting data on the health of our population,
animals, plants, and food supply, as well integrating this information
with environmental monitoring and intelligence data. This integration
can enable better decision-making and a more rapid Federal, State, and
local response. Coordination between DHS and the Department of Health
and Human Services and the Department of Agriculture is ongoing. This
data exchange will help DHS, HHS, and other Federal agencies evaluate
potential health threats and guide bioterrorism preparedness resource
investments.
CYBER SECURITY
Question. The National Cyber Security Division, as part of the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate,
recently unveiled the National Cyber Alert System which intends to
deliver information to home computer users and technical experts in
business and government agencies to better secure their computer
systems from the latest computer viruses.
What progress has been made by the National Cyber Security Division
to prevent the spread of this computer virus as well as future virus
and worm outbreaks?
Answer. The lynch pin to preventing the spread of computer viruses
and worm outbreaks is a robust and mutually beneficial relationship
with the private sector. Cyber security is often a reactive process
because the initiative rests with hackers and malicious agents.
Developing and maintaining a partnership with the private sector is
therefore a crucial means to both responding quickly to emerging
threats and taking proactive measures to forefend against potential
threats. The DHS/US-CERT Partner Program is composed of members that
recognize their responsibility to their organizations and the Nation to
improve the current and future state of cyber security. Members
collectively and individually realize the need to take action and abide
by principles and practices that are appropriate as critical
infrastructure operators, communities of interest, vulnerability
researchers, educators, and software vendors. The Partner Program
consists of participants from various sectors of the cyber community
who must agree to meet certain criteria in order to achieve the
designation of DHS/US-CERT partner. These criteria are designed with
the aim of preventing occurrences such as the spread of computer
viruses and worms and other malicious activities.
Another important tool for the prevention of worms and viruses is
the National Cyber Alert System. Americans are exhibiting a keen
interest in the alert system. On day one of the National Cyber Alert
System launch, we had more than one million hits to the US-CERT
website. Today, more than 250,000 direct subscribers are receiving
National Cyber Alerts to enhance their cyber security. Through the
alert systems, Americans are able to receive information that is
accurate and actionable. It is our goal to inform the public about the
true nature of a given incident, what the facts are, and what steps
they can and should take to address the problem. The offerings of the
National Cyber Alert System provide that kind of information. To date,
we have issued seven security tips, six security bulletins, ten
technical alerts, and six non-technical cyber alerts in response to
cyber security incidents through the National Cyber Alert System. We
strive to make sure the information provided is understandable to all
computer users, technical and non-technical, and reflect the broad
usage of the Internet in today's society. As we increase our outreach,
the National Cyber Alert System is investigating other vehicles to
distribute information to as many Americans as possible.
Question. What is the relationship of the National Cyber Security
Division with the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (T-TIC) on
combating computer viruses by terrorists?
Answer. NCSD, in partnership with DHS/IAIP/IA works intensively
with the law enforcement and intelligence communities including the
TTIC in order to develop a comprehensive threat, risk, attribution
assessment and response capability.
Question. What law enforcement agency has primary jurisdiction in
enforcing cyber crimes?
Answer. No single law enforcement agency has primary jurisdiction
in the investigation of cyber crime. The FBI and Secret Service are the
most visible, pervasive agencies, but other organizations, such as the
IRS' Office of the Inspector General or ICE's Cyber Smuggling Division,
have specialized areas of responsibility in the areas of enforcing
cyber laws.
HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM
Question. The Homeland Security Advisory System has evolved from a
nationwide threat level status to more specific targeted areas since
the latest threat level decrease in January. While the threat level is
currently at an ``Elevated Condition'', or code yellow, specific cities
and the aviation sector remain at the ``High Condition'', or code red.
This more targeted threat level status helps focus limited resources on
the most credible threat areas and at the same time allows law
enforcement and first responders in other parts of the country to
``stand down'' while remaining vigilant. In recent testimony, Secretary
Loy testified that the Department was ``very close'' to unveiling a
system that would allow specific threat warnings to about a dozen
economic sectors.
With the improvement of intelligence that has included detailed
specific terrorist threats for certain metropolitan areas and specific
sectors of industry, what further enhancements do you envision for the
Homeland Security Advisory System?
Answer. With each raising and lowering of the Homeland Security
Advisory System (HSAS), the Department of Homeland Security learns new
lessons and improves its notification process. As the system has
evolved, it has come to reflect the need for certain metropolitan areas
and/or specific areas of industry to be notified at different times or
at different levels than others. As such, DHS has become adept at
providing information to such specific audiences as states and sectors
through Homeland Security Information Bulletins and Advisories.
Additionally, Department officials speak personally with
representatives and officials of threatened States and industries, when
the need arises. This personal communication, along with the ability of
the system to allow DHS to communicate to certain areas what their
alert level should be embody the enhancements that have been needed
this far.
Question. Are you looking to enhance or improve upon any of the
eight existing Federal warning systems that are currently being
operated nationwide?
Answer. Yes. With the $10,000,000 provided to IAIP in last year's
Homeland Security Appropriations Conference Report (108-280) we plan to
enhance and upgrade NOAA Weather Radio and the Emergency Alert System
(EAS), and possibly other systems. A few vital efforts have been
identified for immediate funding. Those include improving the coverage
and survivability of the EAS by (1) installing a satellite-based
message delivery capability and (2) by adding EAS stations to all 50
States (to include State Emergency Operations Centers) and U.S.
territories. Also, there are pilot projects planned to: (1) examine how
reverse 911 can be used to help disseminate alert and warning
information; and (2) demonstrate how new technologies such as digital
TV broadcasts/datacasting using spectrum offered by public TV can be
used to improve our ability to alert the American public. These three
projects represent a portion of the $10,000,000, but the bulk of the
funding will be allocated after completion of a study of available and
planned alert and warning systems to develop integrated, capabilities-
based architecture recommendations. This study will be completed by the
end of summer.
HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION NETWORK
Question. Another enhancement being made by the Department in the
area of information sharing is the new Homeland Security Information
Network which will be able to disseminate threat information to
Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies.
Is the Department on schedule to complete the first phase of the
network this summer, and what is the targeted deadline to complete the
flow of real-time information to all relevant end-users throughout the
country?
Answer. The Department is on schedule to meet the summer deadline.
We plan to begin expansion of HSIN to the county level, in conjunction
with the each State's individual rollout plans, by the end of year. By
the beginning of next year, we plan to be actively engaged with other
homeland security partners, such as the private sector, to support
further real time, secure collaborative information flow.
Question. How will the Homeland Security Information Network be
different from the Joint Regional Information Exchange System and
Regional Information Sharing Systems which are already in place and in
use?
Answer. The Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) is the
overarching network for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to
provide information exchange and real time collaboration between
Federal, State, and municipal authorities. Within the initial program
there will be four HSIN areas: HSIN/DM (Decision Maker-used by Federal,
State and Urban area homeland security advisors); HSIN/EOC (used
primarily by Federal, State and urban emergency operations centers);
HSIN/NG (used primarily by the NGB and the State adjutant generals);
and the HSIN/JRIES (used primarily by law enforcement and intelligence
agencies). This summer, other areas within HSIN, like the Secret and
DHSInfo areas will be activated. HSIN is the umbrella program under
which all of these virtually private networks are contained.
While there is a need to be able to disseminate intelligence
information across the full spectrum of the HSIN system, the primary
HSIN tools to be used for intelligence dissemination will be the HSIN/
JRIES (Law Enforcement and intelligence information) area and the HSIN/
Secret network (JRIES at the Secret level). This will initially run on
the National Guard (SIPRNet) backbone then migrate to the HSDN network
once the DHS classified system becomes operational.
The goal of HSIN is to have an integrated system that uses the same
tools and applications. These applications will run on separate areas
of the HSIN network defined by the user group's clearance, need to
know, and need to act as approved by DHS.
CYBER SECURITY
Question. The Department's new initiative ``Live Wire'' will test
civilian agencies' security preparedness and contingency planning by
staging cyber attack exercises to evaluate the impact of widespread
computer disruptions. Recent instances, such as the power outages in
the Northeast this past August, are an example of how an attack on our
critical infrastructures, such as a cyber attack by terrorists on our
Nation's utility industry, could cascade across a wide region if the
proper precautions are not taken immediately.
What was learned from previous simulated terrorist attacks on the
Nation's cyber infrastructure, and how will ``Live Wire'' build upon
current programs?
Answer. Strategically, Livewire demonstrated the impact of a cyber-
based attack on critical infrastructures. The exercise highlighted the
interdependencies among our critical infrastructures and underscored
the requirement for enhanced cross-sector cooperation. At the tactical
level, Livewire demonstrated the need to enhance processes for
communicating cyber protection information to the public and for two-
way information sharing with the private sector. Livewire prompted us
to enhance our vulnerability identification and reduction capabilities.
This drove us to create the Cyber Interagency Incident Management Group
(Cyber IIMG) to coordinate intergovernmental preparedness and response
operations. It also spurred us to expand the reach of emergency
communications capabilities using a technologically advanced, secure
network. In addition, we launched the National Cyber Alert System as a
dissemination mechanism to provide the broadest population of public
stakeholders with accessible, relevant, actionable alerts and
information.
Question. How do you coordinate ``Live Wire'' exercises with
private industry to test their cyber infrastructure vulnerabilities,
and what gaps in coordination have been revealed between government
agencies and the private sector?
Answer. Whereas the first responder and emergency management
communities have been exercising at national, regional, and local
levels for many years, the cyber response community has only formed
over the past decade or so. There have been very few cyber-focused
exercises at any level. Efforts to coordinate an effective cyber
response capability across State and local jurisdictions and economic
sectors are only beginning.
The Federal Government cannot by itself defend cyberspace from
current or future threats. Acknowledging this, NCSD collaborates with
industry and public-sector stakeholders across the country to define,
develop, and exercise the major elements of a national cyber-space
security response system. Its goals for the National Exercise Program
(NEP) are to:
--Sensitize a diverse constituency of private and public-sector
decision-makers to a variety of potential cyber threats
including strategic attack;
--Familiarize this constituency with DHS' concept of a national cyber
response system and the importance of their role in it;
--Practice effective collaborative response to a variety of cyber
attack scenarios, including crisis decision-making;
--Provide an environment for evaluation of inter-agency and inter-
sector business processes reliant on information
infrastructure;
--Measure the progress of ongoing United States efforts to defend
against an attack;
--Foster improved information sharing among government agencies and
between government and industry;
--Identify new technologies that could provide earlier warning of
attacks;
--Sort roles and responsibilities of government agencies and
industry.
NCSD's involvement in the NEP will be guided by two principles: (1)
Cyber is only one element of a multifaceted NEP; cyber elements must be
closely coordinated with other elements of that program to ensure
efficient use of limited resources and the most effective return on
exercise investments; (2) Cyber exercise elements must not be sidelined
or relegated to an ``afterthought'' category within the NEP.
Although the NEP is the responsibility of the Office of Domestic
Preparedness (ODP), the NCSD will retain overall responsibility for
planning and execution of adequate cyber response exercises. The NCSD
shall identify a NEP cyber exercise program manager, ensure adequate
resources are available for cyber elements of the NEP, including
personnel, define NEP cyber exercise objectives and metrics, prioritize
NEP cyber exercise events, solicit Federal agency and department
participation in cyber-focused elements of the NEP, and initiate or
approve Statements of Work for contracted cyber exercise activities.
Wherever appropriate, the NCSD will coordinate ODP on funding and
personnel issues.
The NCSD requires a set of cyber-focused exercises that build
grassroots cyber response capabilities quickly while also elevating the
concept of strategic cyber attacks and maturing a national cyberspace
security response system capable of dealing with them. Cyber-focused
exercises must include a series of regularly scheduled ``Building
Block'' exercises followed by a culminating, nationally scoped exercise
similar to Livewire, also the continuation of tabletop events hosted by
the USSS (Electronic Crimes task Forces).
We also require that cyber be included as an important element in
targeted NEP events that do not have a cyber focus. Examples are
TOPOFF, FEMA (EP&R) readiness exercises, and policy-focused seminars
for senior officials. Each of these exercise events should include
cyber scenarios and cyber responders.
NATIONAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES
Question. Recently published was the interim final rule for the
voluntary submittal of critical infrastructure information by private
industry to the Department of Homeland Security with assurances that
the proprietary data submitted would be safe from public disclosure.
What level of cooperation with private industry do you anticipate
as you gather information on the Nation's critical infrastructures?
Answer. It is difficult to forecast the extent to which private
industry will voluntarily share critical infrastructure information
with DHS. We only know that private industry has consistently stated in
the past that two barriers to sharing information with the government
were concerns that (1) the information would be released to the public
under the Freedom of Information Act and (2) the disclosure could
create a civil liability for the company sharing the information. The
Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 and the Interim Final
Rule which implements it, we believe, removes these two barriers to
information sharing with the government.
Question. How will the publishing of this rule help the Department
in its effort to safeguard the country's privately-held critical
infrastructures?
Answer. The CII Act and implementing regulations provide private
industry assurances that critical infrastructure information they
voluntarily share with the government will be protected from release to
the public and from use in civil litigation. We believe the PCII
Program will enable the Department to receive critical infrastructure
information that would not have previously been available to the
government, thereby allowing for a better understanding of threats.
Question. What incentive is there for private industry to volunteer
information to the Federal Government?
Answer. Private industry realizes they can assist in efforts to
improve homeland security by volunteering information. What was needed
was a means for them to share information that is usually considered
proprietary and shielded from competition here and abroad. With the
protection from FOIA disclosure offered by the CII Act, we believe the
private sector can now share sensitive and confidential information
that we can be analyzed to identify threats and vulnerabilities. Such
analysis will provide the basis not only for developing measures to
deter the threats and mitigate the vulnerabilities to which the
critical infrastructure is exposed, but also for improving Federal,
State, and local governments' emergency preparedness posture to respond
to any attacks more effectively.
Question. In December of last year, a Homeland Security
Presidential Directive was issued to produce a comprehensive,
integrated National Plan for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
Protection for all Federal departments and agencies to outline national
goals, objectives, milestones, and key initiatives to be completed
within 1 year.
With various departments and agencies previously conducting
assessments of their vulnerabilities, do you believe this directive can
be completed earlier than the deadline of December of this year?
Answer. The President intends that we meet the requirement to
develop the NIPP by December 2004, but, given the urgency of the need,
we will complete it earlier if possible.
Question. Has funding been requested in other departments' and
agencies' budgets outside of the Department of Homeland Security to
carry out the Presidential directive, or will the Department of
Homeland Security be requested to assist other agencies in the
assessment of critical infrastructures?
Answer. Under HSPD-7, Sector-Specific Agencies shall, among other
things, ``conduct or facilitate vulnerability assessments'' of their
respective sectors in accordance with guidance provided by the
Department of Homeland Security. Each department and agency will need
to budget for efforts to carry out their HSPD-7 responsibilities and
provide that information to the President and the Congress.
Question. The Congress made available over $343,000,000 for
Remediation and Protective Actions for fiscal year 2004 for critical
infrastructure identification, to conduct vulnerability field
assessments of critical infrastructures, and to create a database of
vulnerabilities affecting the highest priority terrorist targets in
order to develop better security measures for the protection of
facilities and national assets.
What is the timeline of your Directorate for identifying our
Nation's critical infrastructures, and what progress has been made in
field assessments of the critical infrastructures that have already
been identified?
Answer. We have built the National Asset Database (NADB). It is a
comprehensive database designed to catalogue the Nation's critical
infrastructure and key assets (CI/KA). The central purpose for
constructing this database is to identify assets that may be attractive
targets to terrorists so measures can be taken to help mitigate risk.
There are now approximately 33,000 sites listed on the NADB, and DHS
continues to receive additional nominees from States and territories.
We view the NADB as a living database, therefore sites will be added or
removed as warranted by ongoing assessments. Inputs continue to be
received and from private industry as well as Federal, State and local
governments.
In regards to field assessments of identified critical
infrastructures, over the past 6 months DHS has conducted approximately
89 Site Assistance Visits (SAVs) for the highest priority sites and
produced 25 Characteristics and Common Vulnerabilities (CCVs) reports
on vulnerabilities for specific classes of CI/KA.
We anticipate completing another 74 CCVs by the end of the fiscal
year and conduct any necessary SAVs.
Question. Who will retain the database of vulnerable critical
infrastructures, and who will have access to it?
Answer. DHS will retain the NADB. As we receives additional input
from States, territories, and other Federal agencies it will update/
maintain the NADB and share asset information with other DHS entities,
such as the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), to help prioritize
resource allocation for the implementation of protective measures to
safeguard our Nation's critical infrastructure and key assets. State-
specific information will also be shared with State Homeland Security
Advisors as appropriate both to solicit comments and to identify State
priorities. Appropriate access will be and is grant to private industry
concerning their data and assets.
Question. What type of security procedures for our Nation's
identified critical infrastructures have been implemented?
Answer. As priority assets are identified, we conduct risk analyses
and consequence of attack analyses to help determine which sites are at
greatest risk. PSD then develops plan templates and other tools to
assist owners and operators in developing Buffer Zone Protection Plans
(BZPPs) and site security protection plans. The BZPP helps develop
effective preventive measures that make it more difficult for
terrorists to conduct surveillance or launch attacks from the immediate
vicinity of a possible target.
OFFICE FOR DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS USE OF DATABASE INFORMATION
Question. In recent testimony, Secretary Ridge cited that the
``maturity and growth'' of the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate is allowing for better targeting of resources
for the Office for Domestic Preparedness in the decision-making process
for the distribution of grants to high threat areas across the country.
What improvements have been made over the past year by the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate to
assist the Office for Domestic Preparedness in making sure that Federal
funds are going to the areas where the threat of a terrorist attack is
the greatest?
Answer. IAIP assisted ODP in the identification of a set of
critical assets from the NADB that most warranted additional resources
to enhance their security for fiscal year 2004. This resulted in the
identification of approximately 1,700 assets onto a fiscal year 2004
list of assets warranting special attention for fiscal year 2004 funds.
Future development of the NADB and our efforts to identify and
prioritize national critical infrastructure and key assets will, we
believe, help us ensure the best protection of critical infrastructure
and best use of Federal resources.
Question. How will the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate work to share information catalogued in the
database of critical infrastructures with the Office for Domestic
Preparedness to target grants to the country's highest threat areas?
Answer. Similar to fiscal year 2004, an analytical framework will
be used to identify and prioritize assets on the expanded NADB, and
this information will be shared with ODP to help develop its lists of
assets that may require grant assistance in fiscal year 2005.
Intelligence capabilities 10. The President's budget proposes a
$19,300,000 decrease in funding for the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate in order to centrally fund the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (T-TIC) with other intelligence
programs and also to centrally fund the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI) Terrorist Screening Center with Department of
Justice programs.
Question. Without the contribution of funding that the Department
of Homeland Security currently makes to the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center, do you believe that the Department will have an
adequate intelligence presence in T-TIC?
Answer. Yes. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will provide
10 percent, or 30 personnel, to the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center's (TTIC's) end goal of 300 personnel. This, as well as the close
working relationship that TTIC and the DHS Office of Information
Analysis (IA) have developed ensures an initial intelligence presence
at TTIC.
Question. What will the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection's role be in the Terrorist Threat Integration Center and the
Terrorist Screening Center without providing any funding of its own?
Answer. Per the explanation above, the DHS Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate's role in both TTIC and
the Terrorist Screening Center is the physical presence of personnel at
each location. DHS analysts will inform the TTIC's work. Conversely,
TTIC analysts will inform DHS' analysis. In addition to analytical
personnel, DHS senior leadership will retain their presence at each
center.
Question. How do you prevent a duplication of intelligence
gathering and intelligence analysis with the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center?
Answer. Terrorism analysis is a complex issue. It is an area where
a certain amount of multiple analyses from different perspectives is
preferred. To ensure no vital piece of intelligence is missed, the
analysis of terrorist information is a shared responsibility.
DHS' Office of Information Analysis (IA) analytical intelligence
mission is to protect the American homeland against terrorist attack.
To do so, IAIP maps terrorist threats and capabilities against assessed
vulnerabilities. IA also communicates information to State, local,
tribal, major city, and private sector officials. TTIC's primary
responsibility is the analysis of all international terrorism threat
information whether collected domestically or abroad.
Question. Without a request for funding within the Department of
Homeland Security for the integration of the multiple terrorist
watchlists, how will the Department of Homeland Security participate in
consolidating various agencies' terrorist lists?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security is participating in the
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) through physical location of personnel
in the center.
Question. Please distinguish the functions of T-TIC from the
intelligence functions of the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate.
Answer. As a Directorate, IAIP enables, develops, and sustains the
capability to continuously identify, assess, and prioritize current and
future threats to the homeland, map those threats against
vulnerabilities, issue timely warnings, provide the basis from which to
organize protective measures to secure America, and assist in
coordinating the response and restoration of critical infrastructure
functions. Currently, IAIP is moving forward in carrying out our
statutory responsibilities which include:
--Providing the full range of intelligence support to senior DHS
leadership and component organizations and to State and local
and private sector respondents.
--Mapping terrorist threats to the homeland against assessed
vulnerabilities to drive our efforts to protect against
terrorist attacks
--Conducting independent analysis and assessments of terrorist
threats, including competitive analysis, tailored analysis, and
``red teaming''
--Assessing the vulnerabilities of key resources and critical
infrastructure of the United States
--Merging the relevant analyses and vulnerability assessments to
identify priorities for protective and support measures by the
Department, other government agencies, and the private sector
--As a full member of the Intelligence Community, the Office of
Information Analysis partnering with other IC members, TTIC,
law enforcement agencies, State and local partners, and the
private sector, as well as DHS' components to manage the
collection and processing of information involving threats to
the Homeland into usable, comprehensive, and actionable
information.
--Disseminating time sensitive warnings, alerts and advisories to
Federal, State, local, and tribal governments and private
sector infrastructure owners and operators
TTIC is an interagency joint venture of its partners. The TTIC
members include, but are not limited to, the Department of Justice/FBI,
DHS, CIA, National Security Agency, National Imagery and Mapping
Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Department of State.
Through the input and participation of these partners, TTIC merges and
analyzes terrorist threat-related information, collected domestically
and abroad, in order to form the most comprehensive possible threat
picture, and disseminate such information to appropriate Federal
Government recipients. TTIC draws on the particular expertise of its
participating members--such as DHS' focus on homeland security and
CIA's focus on terrorism information collected overseas--thereby
ensuring that the terrorist analytic product takes advantage of, and
incorporates, the specialized perspectives of relevant Federal
agencies. TTIC provides comprehensive, all-source terrorist threat
analysis and assessments to U.S. national leadership.
Currently, DHS representatives are located at TTIC, working day-in-
day-out, participating in processing and analyzing terrorist threat-
related information, developing, shaping, and disseminating TTIC
products, assessing gaps in the available information, and ensuring
that TTIC products reach appropriate DHS Headquarters elements. Through
DHS, the necessary information, including threat descriptions,
suggested protective measures, and locations of additional information,
then reaches the appropriate State, local, tribal, major city and
private sector officials. Analysts assigned to TTIC ensure that TTIC's
work directly supports DHS' unique mission to protect the homeland. The
threat information integration and analysis that is the beginning, not
the end, of DHS' protective mission, will most effectively be carried
out, as Congressional and other reviews have recommended, when all
terrorism threat-related activities of the U.S. Government work
together seamlessly.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici
NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS CENTER
Question. Mr. Libutti, the Department of Homeland Security has
taken ownership of the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis
Center, or NISAC. NISAC was developed by Sandia and Los Alamos National
Laboratories to simulate and analyze various events and the cascading
effects on critical infrastructure in the United States. Following the
September 11th terrorist attacks, NISAC took on added importance as the
Administration and Congress focused on homeland security. The fiscal
year 2004 Homeland Security Appropriations Act had approximately
$23,000,000 for NISAC. Would you please give the Subcommittee the
status of the allocation of the fiscal year 2004 funding?
Answer. The Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2004 did not
contain a specific line item for services to be provided by the
National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC).
However, the Department has set aside $20,000,000 in October 2004 for
NISAC programmatic efforts to be performed by Los Alamos National
Laboratory ($10,000,000) and Sandia National Laboratory ($10,000,000).
Some of the planned NISAC activities include chlorine industry studies,
analyses of rail system and electric power disruptions, assessments of
Hurricane Isabel impacts on infrastructure, port and inland waterway
modeling, as well as urban infrastructure modeling.
Question. How much is in the President's fiscal year 2005 budget
request to support activities by NISAC?
Answer. The fiscal year 2005 request for the NISAC is $27,000,000.
Question. What are some of the activities envisioned in the fiscal
year 2005 budget for NISAC?
Answer. NISAC fiscal year 2005 activities are expected to include
expansion of the Center's developing National and Regional Tools into
additional regions and cities of the Nation. Additionally, NISAC will
begin developing consequence analysis and decision support tools to
support the following:
--Expansion of the urban infrastructure suites models for
transportation, telecommunications, water, public health and
energy to additional high threat urban areas.
--Expansion of the dynamic simulation models to selected east and
west coast ports.
--Expansion of the interdependent energy infrastructure simulation
system.
--Expansion and testing of the waterways asset prioritization tool in
concert with the U.S. Coast Guard and Army Corps of Engineers.
--Continued expert analysis and support to short term actions for the
Department's primary missions using the Center's developing
infrastructure models.
One of the items that transferred from the Department of Energy to
the Department of Homeland Security with NISAC was an appropriation of
$7,500,000 for the construction and equipping of a NISAC facility at
Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico, which is adjacent
to Sandia National Lab. Those funds have not been released for their
intended purpose.
Question. What is the delay in moving forward on this important
facility?
Answer. IAIP continues to move forward with the plans to build the
facility, giving full consideration to the elements of the program and
our obligation to comply with NEPA and other Federal statutes
applicable to Federal construction projects.
Question. What is the status of the $7,500,000 appropriation
specifically for the NISAC facility? Are those funds being held for the
intended purpose?
Answer. IAIP continues to move forward with the plans to build the
facility, giving full consideration to the elements of the program and
our obligation to comply with NEPA and other Federal statutes
applicable to Federal construction projects.
Question. When can the Subcommittee expect the Department of
Homeland Security to break ground on the NISAC facility in New Mexico?
Answer. IAIP continues to move forward with the plans to build the
facility, giving full consideration to the elements of the program and
our obligation to comply with NEPA and other Federal statutes
applicable to Federal construction projects.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Larry Craig
Question. Gen. Libutti I would like to compliment you on your
approach to working with the national laboratories. It is clear that
your management team is committed to using the best capabilities
available in the most efficient way. In that vein, I would like to
invite you to visit the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental
Laboratory to learn more about how INEEL can contribute to your
engineering, testing, and evaluation needs. The INEEL is in the process
of standing up its national Critical Infrastructure Protection Test
Range. Your organization is now using some of the resources that exist
there. I think you will find it valuable to learn first hand the
breadth of capabilities they have to offer your organization and their
abilities to help you accelerate the implementation of many of your
programs.
In the longer term, I presume that testing and evaluating
technologies before deployment by IAIP will be an important part of
your mission.
How much value do you see in having a national critical
infrastructure protection test range available to you to accomplish
your mission?
Answer. I see great value in a facility that gives DHS the ability
to test and evaluate infrastructure protection Technologies. As you
noted, the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory
(INEEL) provides just such a Test and Evaluation (T&E) and modeling
capability to DHS to help guide the development of critical
infrastructure protection systems.
INEEL has functional electrical grids, nuclear power plants and
chemical processing facilities on its premises. INEEL engineers have
been using this facility to conduct vulnerability and risk assessments
on critical infrastructure for years. Furthermore, the test range
itself is located in a remote and isolated area, giving the INEEL staff
the freedom to conduct real world, hands-on vulnerability assessments
without placing a local population at risk.
As you may know, the Protective Security Division (PSD) of IAIP
already is working with INEEL to address the vulnerabilities of our
Nation's critical infrastructure by developing a National SCADA Testbed
and a Process Control Security and Vulnerability Reduction Center. This
new and important partnership between DHS and INEEL will help protect
the Nation's critical infrastructure systems from both inadvertent
failures and malicious attacks.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Question. The budget for remediation and protection of critical
infrastructure includes the identification of critical infrastructure
and assessing vulnerabilities in addition to implementing remediation
and protection measures. For fiscal years 2004 and 2005, please
estimate, by critical infrastructure sector, the amounts actually spent
or planned to be spent on identifying critical infrastructure and
assessing vulnerabilities versus the amount spent on remediation or
protection of critical infrastructure. For protective measures, please
distinguish between investments made for ``buffer zones'' versus
investments made to harden security ``on site.''
According to the Department, 85 percent of the critical
infrastructure is owned by the private sector. In assessing the need
for Federal investments to secure our critical infrastructure, it will
be essential for Congress to have measurable benchmarks of private
sector investments in such infrastructure, such as investments in
chemical facilities, port security, and cyber-security. Please provide
the subcommittee with any benchmarks that have been established that
show the private sector is making the necessary investments to secure
our critical infrastructure and key assets.
Please explain in detail how the $19,900,000 appropriated in fiscal
year 2004 and the $19,900,000 requested in fiscal year 2005 will be
spent for ``Protective Security Centers.'' How many centers have been
established or planned to date and where are they located? How much
funding is needed for each center? What purpose does each center serve?
Answer. As a result of a mid-year review, two Protective Security
Centers are planned for fiscal year 2004; one is linked to NYPD and
another to LAPD. These centers, at a total cost of $10 million, will
assist DHS to (a) identify critical assets in metropolitan areas for
inclusion in national databases; (b) create partnerships between the
police departments and protective security officials in the private
sector to focus on combined protective activities; (c) reinforce
Federal-State-local incident management procedures; and (d) develop
training and exercise programs focused on protection vice response.
Additional centers may be established in fiscal year 2005 and
strategically located across the country to best serve law enforcement
agencies. Funds are being used for the physical build-out and
furnishing of the Centers with required infrastructure, computers and
other necessary equipment and supplies. The respective police
departments will staff the Centers.
CHEMICAL PLANT SECURITY
Question. The General Accounting Office recently testified that
``despite the industry's voluntary efforts, the extent of security
preparedness at U.S. chemical facilities is unknown.''
Explain IAIP's role in assessing vulnerabilities and taking
protective at chemical security plants? How much of IAIP's fiscal year
2004 and fiscal year 2005 budget, respectively, is dedicated to
chemical plant security. For each fiscal year, please specify the
amount spent or planned for vulnerability assessments, the number of
chemical plants IAIP will provide vulnerability assessments for in
fiscal years 2004 and 2005, and provide the amount planned for
protective actions. Please specify, in detail, the protective actions
IAIP will take in fiscal years 2004 and 2005 to secure chemical plants.
Provide the amount of funding that is being spent to secure the area
surrounding chemical plants versus funding being spent to harden
security at the chemical plants themselves.
Due to the dynamic threat environment combined with the ongoing
effort to identify and prioritize the Nation's critical infrastructure
and key assets (CI/KA), IAIP budgets reflect efforts to reduce
vulnerabilities across all sectors to maximize flexibility in
responding to emerging threats. That said, in fiscal year 2004 over
$38.5 million of PSD's budget was dedicated to collecting, cataloging,
and analyzing vulnerability assessment information across all sectors.
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget has dedicated $38.7 million
towards these efforts, enabling us to continue to reduce the
vulnerabilities of our Nation's CI/KA.
DHS has conducted approximately 19 Site Assistance Visits (SAVs)
specifically to chemical facilities to assess their common
vulnerabilities. The data collected during these site-specific visits
is used to produce tools to help critical infrastructure owners and
operators bolster protective measures.
One such tool is the Characteristics and Common Vulnerabilities
(CCVs) report series on vulnerabilities for classes of critical
infrastructure and key assets (CI/KA). A CCV report for chemical
facilities and a separate CCV for chemical storage facilities have been
produced by PSD, and both are available to owners and operators of
these facilities.
Answer. We also are assisting State and local authorities, as well
as private industry, in developing Buffer Zone Protection Plans (BZPPs)
for areas immediately adjacent to the ``fence line'' of critical
infrastructure. The approximately 1,700 BZPPs completed by the end of
2004, included roughly 360 chemical sites warranting special attention.
For fiscal year 2004 we allocated up to $50,000 per CI/KA site for
vulnerability reduction. A data call is currently underway to support
the identification of sites for attention in fiscal year 2005 and
Protective Security Division (PSD) is excepting to complete roughly
2,000 BZPPs next year.
Building upon a program initiated in fiscal year 2004 (funded at
$3.25 million), the DHS fiscal year 2005 budget request has
approximately $10.8 million dedicated to the acquisition of web cam
monitors for the chemical sector. These monitors will be installed
adjacent to designated critical chemical sites to extend their buffer
zones and enhance protective measures. DHS' plan is to provide this
equipment to local law enforcement agencies to install on public right
of ways to monitor the security of these facilities.
DHS also has established a protection, training, and planning
program for State homeland security personnel, local law enforcement,
chemical facility operators and site security personnel. Periodic
drills among the protective community will be conducted to exercise
chemical facilities' response plans in case of a terrorist attack. PSD
will continue to work with the Office for Domestic Preparedness to
incorporate chemical plant security into national exercises.
We are also in the process of developing plans for and deploying
Protective Security Advisors (PSAs). Each PSA will have responsibility
for a specific region of the county and will maintain a close
relationship with the chemical plant owners and operations in their
specific area of responsibility. PSAs will facilitate information
sharing, organize protective security training, assist in emergency
coordination, and represent DHS in the communities in which they are
posted. Security Augmentation Teams (SATs) are also being developed.
SATs will consist of about 25 personnel who are drawn primarily from
major urban SWAT units. These SATs will focus on protecting high-value
sites, including critical chemical facilities, will develop working
relationships with the site's permanent protective security team, and
will become familiar with the site's specific vulnerabilities. The PSA
and SAT programs, still in their early stages and are being actively
pursued.
The activities described above in fiscal year 2004 and continued in
fiscal year 2005 will not only greatly increase chemical site security
and across all other sectors, but will increase our Nation's general
protective capacity.
INTEGRATED TERRORIST WATCH LIST
Question. What resources, if any, are being used in fiscal year
2004 and planned for fiscal year 2005 to integrate lists of terror
suspects held by different agencies? What is the timeline for having a
fully functional integrated watch list? What role will IAIP play in the
Terrorist Screening Center?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security is allocating
approximately $8,000,000 to the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) for
fiscal year 2004. In fiscal year 2005, DHS will not contribute funds to
the TSC, but will provide personnel detailed from DHS to the center.
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate
personnel will continue DHS' contribution to this effort by maintaining
ongoing communication and coordination with the center. The Terrorist
Screening Center (TSC) is fully operational now. On December 1, 2003
the TSC began 24/7 call center operations, coordination of the U.S.
Government response, ensuring information collected was distributed to
the appropriate entities, and established a process for addressing
outdated and erroneous terrorist records and misidentifications. The
database, TSDB, is currently limited to use at the TSC and will undergo
several enhancements between now and the end of the (calendar) year. At
that time, agencies will be able to electronically query the TSDB
directly and get a systematic response within seconds. Because the TSC
now maintains the terrorist information in the multiple systems used,
it can ensure all the information appropriate for these systems is
included.
IAIP STAFFING
Question. According to information the IAIP directorate provided to
the subcommittee, only 263 of 729 authorized positions were on board at
the end of February, 2004. IAIP projects that only 543 positions will
be filled by the end of fiscal year 2004. It would appear that IAIP
will be lapsing millions of dollars that Congress approved for
staffing. Do you intend to send the Committee a plan for reallocating
these funds? If so, provide a detailed plan for spending these excess
funds in fiscal year 2004.
Answer. A memorandum requesting reprogramming/transfer actions has
been submitted to congressional committees. This request notifies the
committees that IAIP will redirect $23,500,000 from salaries object
classes to other object classes for securing space to meet IAIP
requirements.
OBLIGATED FUNDING
Question. On March 1, the IAIP directorate provided the
subcommittee with an estimate of $426,077,292, which represented the
amount of fiscal year 2004 appropriated funds that either have been
obligated or committed. Please provide the amount obligated versus
committed. In addition, provide the amount of funding planned to be
spent via contract in fiscal years 2004 and 2005 versus in-house.
Answer. As of March 1 (February 29 accounting report), IAIP
obligations were $199,255,217. The remainder of $226,822,073 was
commitments on March 1 that are not yet signed contracts. As an update
to this answer, IAIP obligations as of March 31 were $364,419,840, and
as of April 30 were $382,475,764.
All of the IAIP Assessment and Evaluation funding of $711,085,630
will be spent via contract or intergovernmental payment. In house
salaries and expenses are in a separate Salaries and Expenses
appropriation.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Cochran. Let me thank both of you for your
cooperation with our subcommittee and your attendance at the
hearing this morning. We hope that we will continue to be able
to work closely with you as we work our way through the budget
process, and that we provide the funds you need to do your job
and carry out your mission successfully.
I don't think we have any more important responsibility in
government than what we're doing here in the Department of
Homeland Security and in this subcommittee that provides the
funding for these activities.
We will stand in recess until the next hearing of our
subcommittee when we will continue our review of the 2005
budget request. We will have a hearing on March 9, in this same
room. Our witness at that time will be the Under Secretary for
Border and Transportation Security, the Honorable Asa
Hutchinson.
Until then we stand in recess.
[Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., Tuesday, March 2, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday,
March 9.]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 9, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:09 a.m., in room SD-124, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Cochran, Stevens, Gregg, Byrd, and Leahy.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
STATEMENT OF ASA HUTCHINSON, UNDER SECRETARY, BORDER
AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY DIRECTORATE
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. The hearing will please come to order.
Today we continue our review of the President's fiscal year
2005 budget request for the Department of Homeland Security.
We're specifically considering at this hearing the programs and
activities within the Border and Transportation Security
Directorate. Our objective is to provide the resources the
Border and Transportation Security Directorate requires to
manage its responsibilities and to carry out its mission
successfully.
The President is requesting a total of $14.4 billion in
discretionary funding for programs and activities managed by
the directorate, which includes the US VISIT project, Customs
and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the
Transportation Security Administration, and the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center.
I'm pleased to welcome to this hearing the Under Secretary
for Border and Transportation Security, Mr. Asa Hutchinson.
Before calling on him, I'm happy to yield to Senator Byrd and
other senators who may wish to make opening statements. Senator
Byrd.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD
Senator Byrd. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, you are very kind to
delay the hearing until I arrived, and I say this with respect
to the other senators as well. I have a problem some mornings
in getting to my station on time. I hope that in the future you
will not delay the hearings on my account. Please go ahead, and
I will understand. You are always punctual, and I would prefer
that you not delay hearings on my account.
Welcome, Mr. Under Secretary. Last week, the Department of
Homeland Security celebrated its first anniversary. Much has
been accomplished. The integration and restructuring of the 22
agencies continues. The hard-working men and women of your
Department continue to perform their important jobs. But I
remain concerned that there are real vulnerabilities facing
this Nation that require immediate responses.
Last December, Secretary Ridge said, quote, ``The strategic
indicators, including al Qaeda's continued desire to carry out
attacks against our homeland, are greater now than at any point
since September 11th.'' So Mr. Chairman, I would think that the
Administration would want to address such a threat with a
robust front line of defense. Yet, as I review the budget, I
find numerous examples of a defense that relies more on paper,
more on studies, more on reports, rather than on the layered
defense that the President and the Secretary often describe in
their homeland security speeches.
Let me just give a few examples. More than 5.7 million
containers are brought into this country each year through our
ports. Yet, we inspect only 5 percent of these. Most American
air passengers would be shocked to learn that, while they and
their baggage are subjected to often rigorous inspections, the
vast majority of the cargo carried in the belly of the plane in
which they are flying is not inspected. The Department claims
that they have a so-called known-shipper program that is secure
for air cargo, but this is a paper process. TSA personnel
review paperwork from the shippers rather than the actual
cargo.
TSA has yet to even initiate a pilot program for air cargo
inspection. We approved funds last September to hire 100 air
cargo inspectors to carry out real inspections and yet, 6
months later, very few inspectors have been hired.
On January 5, 2004, the new visa tracking system known as
US VISIT began operations at 115 airports and 14 seaports. As
envisioned when first mandated in 1996, this system is supposed
to track the entry and exit of visa holders and other visitors
to our country. It has been declared a success by the
Department, except few realize that, while we are capturing
data on people entering this country at the 115 airports, we
are getting voluntary information on people exiting the United
States at only one airport. We need to do a better job in order
to know exactly who is exiting, as well as entering, the United
States.
At the same time, we need to ensure that sufficient funds
are provided to integrate the various existing biometric
databases. We need to make sure that the US VISIT system and
the Border Patrol IDENT system are compatible with the FBI's
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System.
Last year, pursuant to the Maritime Transportation Security
Act, U.S. ports were required to submit security plans to the
Department. But to actually make this country safer, money must
be provided to help the ports implement those plans. Instead,
the President is proposing to cut port security grant funding
by over 60 percent.
The Federal Air Marshal Service did not have sufficient
resources this year to maintain the number of air marshals on
targeted domestic and international flights, and because the
Administration has proposed no increase for next year, a bad
problem could become worse next year.
I want to make sure that this subcommittee and this
Congress provide real homeland security to the American people,
not just assurances on paper. The President has told his
agencies not to seek supplemental appropriations this year, but
I don't think that homeland security can wait. To this end I
will be sending a letter to the Secretary today urging him to
propose a reallocation of existing resources from nonessential
pay accounts to increase funding for port security grants and
for the Federal Air Marshals Program right away. I will be
discussing these issues today and I'm looking forward to
hearing from our witness on these and other issues.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Byrd. Senator Leahy.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know I've served
with both of you for well over a quarter of a century on this
committee, and I couldn't help but think at the beginning of
it, it's nice to know that there are a few of us who still show
senatorial courtesies, and both the senior senator from
Mississippi and the senior senator from West Virginia
constantly show those courtesies, and I appreciate that.
Mr. Secretary, I enjoyed chatting with you this morning
earlier. Sometimes people forget that, along with all the
serious matters, we have even more serious matters, like how
are the children, how are the grandchildren, and a lot of
things like that to catch up on. And of course, I see the Under
Secretary both in this committee and also in the Judiciary
Committee. And I told you before, you have one of the most
challenging jobs in the Department of Homeland Security, and I
am grateful for your accessibility to Congress during the
Department's first year. There were some who thought when you
formed the new department you would no longer want to be
accessible, and I think your own experience here on the Hill
does you well, because you have always been accessible.
I told you when you first took the job you were lucky
because you would be inheriting a number of fine employees in
my home State of Vermont where we have a very substantial
presence. You told me at that time you would make good use of
them, and you have kept your word. I am particularly pleased
that you and Michael Garcia, who also traveled with you to
Vermont, have recognized the tremendous value of the Law
Enforcement Support Center, LESC, in South Burlington, Vermont.
This LESC provides information to State and local police
departments throughout the Nation regarding immigration status
and identities of aliens suspected, arrested or convicted of
criminal activity, and operates 24 hours a day 7 days a week.
I was over there after a large snowfall and someone said,
what do you do in a case like this where you have close to 3
feet of snow that fell in the last 24 hours. And they said,
well, you know, what do you do about getting to work? And they
said what do you mean, this shift comes in at this time and
this shift comes in at this time. I think it took them a while
to realize that the people from out of State were asking what
do you do about the snow. Well, you shovel it and you go to
work. But, the other thing that was most interesting was that
they accept the dedication and responsibility for the country,
and I know it makes me very happy and I'm sure it does you and
the others.
I joined Mr. Garcia last August to announce expanding
capabilities in the LESC and I look forward to continue working
on this project.
I have a couple concerns and I will submit some questions
on the record. I'm concerned about the Department's response to
those who fled Haiti in recent weeks. I think Haitians
intercepted at sea receive entirely different screening. All
interdicted Cubans are individually interviewed regarding fear
of persecution. I understand that only those Haitians who
loudly protest, the so-called shout test, receive such an
interview. And when you see on the television news every night
Haitians being shot down in the street, you have to have some
concern. I understand also the Department intends to continue
regular deportation proceedings against Haitians in the United
States, notwithstanding the strife and basic lack of law and
order in Haiti. I join with Senators Kennedy and Durbin and
will have some questions on that.
Secondly, I know Congress has set an October deadline for
Nations who take part in the visa waiver program to include
biometric identifiers in their passports. It is a very helpful
thing to have but I understand that only a small handful of the
27 countries that are participating in the program are expected
to meet the deadline. As a result, visitors from these
countries will need to either obtain visas, which would
dramatically increase the workload here and abroad for our
officials and certainly would dramatically impact tourism, and
might lead to reciprocal action against American travelers. One
of my questions will be whether we should extend that deadline,
or whether you think such an extension would compromise our
security.
And lastly, I know that you're working to meet another
deadline that Congress has established, the December 31st
deadline for screening travelers in our 50 busiest land port of
entries. Many worry whether that can be done, and whatever you
want to add on to that I would appreciate.
Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned, very soon I have to go to
another committee, but again, the Under Secretary has always
been responsive in questions and so with your permission, I
will insert something for the record.
Senator Cochran. Without objection, it will be printed in
the record. We appreciate you being here and your work for this
committee.
The subcommittee has received statements from Senators
Campbell and Hollings which will be placed in the record.
[The statements follow:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell
Thank you Mr. Chairman and I'd like to thank our witnesses for
taking the time to come talk to us today.
My constituents and the entire Nation are looking to this Committee
to provide the necessary funds to protect those who travel our
country's skies, seas, rails, and roads. It is your directorate that is
responsible for making sure that law enforcement officials and first
responders have the technology they need to ensure our country's
safety.
This country is the world leader in technology development and that
is to our advantage when protecting the nation. But as I fly back to
Colorado every weekend, and wait in line at the baggage screeners and
walk through the metal detectors, I wonder if these procedures really
ensure my safety. I wonder if we are really using the best technology
available.
Colorado is the home of many small technology companies that, in my
view, have developed a number of cost-effective, time saving, and life
saving technologies that I am certain have not yet gotten into the
right hands. I have done my best to send them to meet with your
directorate, but I don't know the extent of their success. I hope that
you will elaborate on how you work with small technology firms.
I also know that with some of the technology chosen, that you are
doing your best to watch the bottom line. But when you are doing the
job of equipping those who protect us, shouldn't they have the best
technology available, not just the cheapest?
I support every dollar that Congress has given to the Department of
Homeland Security. I believe that we have made great advancements
quickly by upgrading security procedures, response plans, and better
training personnel to react and respond in times of need. But I think
that we need to pay more attention to whether this money is being put
to the best use possible.
Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing the
testimonies of our guests and I will have a number of questions to ask
at the appropriate time.
______
Prepared Statement of Senator Ernest F. Hollings
I am pleased that the Department of Homeland Security has taken
administrative control of the Federal training facility in Charleston.
As you know, a temporary overflow training facility for basic training
of Border Patrol recruits started in 1996 at the old Navy Base in
Charleston. Legislation we passed here in Congress drastically
increased the Border Patrol training needs, as it significantly
increase the number of agents deployed to protect our borders. The
Charleston facility was due to close in 2004, but through the fiscal
year 2003 Commerce, Justice and State Appropriations Bill, we
officially designated Charleston as a permanent Federal training
center.
We also secured funding--over $14 million--for the Charleston
Border Patrol Academy to improve the infrastructure for the training
center. After we committed to these improvements, the Department of
Homeland Security took ownership of the facility through the Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), which suited me.
After a year of cooperation, coordination and our support the Coast
Guard Maritime Law Enforcement Academy was officially established in
February 2004 at FLETC-Charleston by the Coast Guard Commandant. We
have been able to direct some important functions to Charleston, and
this is one of them.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Secretary, we have your prepared
statement, which we appreciate your submitting to the
committee. It will be printed in the hearing record, and we
invite you to make any remarks you think will be helpful to the
committee's understanding of this budget request. You may
proceed.
STATEMENT OF UNDER SECRETARY ASA HUTCHINSON
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senators Byrd
and Leahy, thank you for your gracious comments this morning.
We appreciate what I view as a partnership with this committee,
your counsel, advice, and admonitions from time to time are
helpful, and certainly we receive those with appreciation. I
also want to thank the committee for most recently approving
the US VISIT fiscal year 2004 spend plan that allows us to move
forward. Thank you for your prompt action on that request and
again, the admonitions that you gave.
With your support, I believe we have made some significant
progress toward meeting our congressional mandates for homeland
security and for meeting the expectations of the American
people. The $16 billion budget request for BTS marks a 10
percent increase over the 2004 budget and is a reflection of
this President's commitment to border security, transportation
security, and other areas of enforcement within my arena.
BTS, as you know, has a number of agencies within it. It
comprises the largest directorate with 110,000 employees that
are doing an outstanding job day in and day out. If you look
back over the last year, one of the major initiatives that we
have carried out would be strengthening our border security
through the one face at the border initiative--training
officers to perform three formerly separate inspection
functions. We've also expanded the container security
initiative, and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
program provides security in the global supply chain.
I believe that we have increased the safety of air travel
by increasing the effectiveness of the Federal Air Marshal
program, establishing a Federal flight deck officer program,
increasing the baggage screening efforts, developing a
comprehensive air cargo security plan, and new requirements in
that regard. We have developed new technologies such as US
VISIT and the SEVIS, or the program that identifies and tracks
foreign visitors and students. We have pursued and increased
our investigatory capabilities for identifying, apprehending
and removing those who violate our immigration laws, illegally
employ undocumented workers, and traffic in human cargo.
So, we have done a number of things through the last year,
including increasing our training capabilities through the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. If you look at the
2005 budget that the President has submitted, it continues to
build upon this foundation by increasing our efforts to secure
our borders and our transportation systems.
Under the Customs and Border Protection budget we seek an
overall increase of $223 million, including a $25 million
increase for the container security initiative that allows us
to do a more expansive job of prescreening cargo before it
reaches our shores. It provides for a $15 million increase in
the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism program. A $20
million increase for improvements in the National Targeting
Center, which has been a very effective risk assessment tool
for arriving international air passengers and shipment of goods
to our country. Our US VISIT program will continue to work to
complete the first increment of US VISIT, as well as expand its
capabilities to the 50 busiest land ports, and the budget that
has been submitted for fiscal year 2005 is consistent with the
development of that program.
To date, the program has had a significant amount of
success in increased security with 125 criminal watch list
alerts, 51 criminal apprehensions, and we have processed over 2
million visitors since January 5.
Across BTS agencies over $100 million has been requested
for detection systems between our ports of entry, including
expansion of the P-3 aircraft which provide important detection
and monitoring capabilities. We've continued to build on our
aviation security with a TSA budget that has an increase of
$892 million, which is 20 percent over the comparable 2004
level, and includes $20 million for credentialing systems such
as the transportation worker identification card, hazardous
materials transporters, and foreign student pilots. It includes
funding for the CAPP II program and very importantly, $159
million to enhance the training programs for our screener
personnel.
I'm very pleased with the submission on the ICE budget that
provides an increase of $300 million over 2004 that will allow
us to enhance our enforcement efforts, including $10 million to
support the new Visa Security Unit program that will help us
overseas to add a security perspective to the visa issuance in
working with the State Department. We've enhanced by $23
million our capability for investigations performed by special
agents devoted to immigration enforcement, including
establishing stronger work site enforcement, consistent with
the President's proposal for a temporary worker program. It
also includes $100 million for increase in detention and
removal of illegal aliens, a very important part of our
efforts.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Finally, the Department's infrastructure is supported by
the investment in the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
to support our security and training programs, not just for
homeland security agencies, but for a broader range of Federal
law enforcement agencies that utilize its services. The budget
request provides for a $5 million increase in funding for that
agency.
So with that outline, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the
discussion this morning and look forward to the continued
cooperation with this committee.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Asa Hutchinson
Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd and Members of the Subcommittee: I am
honored and pleased to appear before the Committee to present the
President's fiscal year 2005 budget for the Border and Transportation
Security (BTS) Directorate. I want to thank you for your strong support
of BTS components, especially for the resources you provided in fiscal
year 2004, and look forward to working with you in the coming months on
our fiscal year 2005 budget.
The $16 billion BTS request represents a 10 percent increase in
resources over the comparable fiscal year 2004 budget, and reflects the
Department's strong and continued commitment to the security of our
homeland. The fiscal year 2005 budget is a $1.5 billion increase over
fiscal year 2004, and it includes funding for new and expanded programs
in border and port security, transportation security, immigration
enforcement, and training.
The Border and Transportation Security Directorate made great
strides during the first year of operations. Over 110,000 employees and
a budget of $14 billion were reassembled and brought under BTS. The
Directorate was quickly established and successfully began operations
on March 1, 2003--bringing together the legacy agencies and programs
that now make up BTS--Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), and the United
States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US VISIT)
program. Customs, border, immigration, transportation security and
training activities have been rejuvenated under their new agencies,
increasing the effectiveness of our dedicated employees. BTS continues
to create new ways to enhance security by sharing information and
intelligence and by coordinating operations within the Department among
levels of governments, and horizontally across agencies and
jurisdictions. Through the hard work of our dedicated and talented
employees, America is more secure and better prepared than we were 1
year ago.
In addition to the stand-up of the Directorate, we have achieved
many results since our creation, including:
--providing fused and enhanced security coordination among our
components and other Federal, State and local security
providers and stakeholders, especially during Operation Liberty
Shield and the recent holiday season, including the
establishment of the Transportation Security Coordination
Center (TSCC) to coordinate intelligence sharing and command
and control activities for our national transportation sector;
--strengthening border security through the ``One face at the
border'' initiative, which is cross-training officers to
perform three formerly separate inspections--immigration,
customs, and agriculture--allowing us to target our resources
toward higher risk travelers;
--expanding the container security initiative (CSI) and Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) to provide improved
security to the global supply chain;
--instituting new cutting edge systems, like US VISIT, to identify
and track foreign visitors and students, recording the entry
and exit of foreign visitors to strengthen our immigration
system;
--safeguarding air travel from the terrorist threat by: increasing
the presence of Federal Air Marshals, establishing a Federal
Flight Desk Officer program, instituting 100 percent checked
baggage screening, issuing new regulations for enhanced air
cargo security, expanding the use of explosives detection
canine teams, checking names of master cockpit air crew lists,
and streamlining and training Federal passenger and baggage
screeners deployed at airports across the Nation;
--eliminating potential weaknesses in security by suspending transits
without visa (TWOV);
--negotiating an agreement with the European Union with respect to
Passenger Name Record (PNR);
--negotiating a memorandum of understanding with the Department of
State to ensure a coordinated and increasingly effective visa
issuance process; and
--establishing a visa security office to provide oversight and
guidance on Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act, including
establishing two offices in Saudi Arabia to review 100 percent
of visa applications;
--standing up a SEVIS tiger team to process foreign students during
the summer 2003 back-to-school season; and
--effecting improvements in security capabilities, capacity,
training, and infrastructure.
Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Request
The fiscal year 2005 budget for the Directorate builds upon the
significant investments and accomplishments effected and in progress.
Strengthening Border and Port Security
Securing our border and transportation systems continues to be an
enormous challenge. Ports-of-entry (POE) into the United States stretch
across 7,500 miles of land border between the United States and Mexico
and Canada, 95,000 miles of shoreline and navigable rivers, and an
exclusive economic zone of 3.4 million square miles. Each year more
than 500 million people, 130 million motor vehicles, 2.5 million
railcars, and 5.7 million cargo containers must be processed at the
border and POE.
In fiscal year 2003, CBP processed 412.8 million passengers and
pedestrians arriving in the United States--327 million at land borders,
70.8 million at international airports, and 15 million at sea ports.
The fiscal year 2005 CBP budget seeks $2.7 billion for border security
inspections and trade facilitation at ports of entry and $1.8 billion
for border security and control between ports of entry.
During fiscal year 2005, we will continue to strengthen our border
and port security. The CBP budget seeks an overall increase of $223
million to maintain and enhance border and port security activities,
including the expansion of pre-screening cargo containers in high-risk
areas and the detection of individuals attempting to enter the United
States illegally.
Specifically, the budget includes an increase of $25 million for
the Container Security Initiative (CSI) which focuses on pre-screening
cargo before it reaches our shores, and an increase of $15.2 million
for Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). C-TPAT
focuses on partnerships all along the entire supply chain, from the
factory floor, to foreign vendors, to land borders and seaports. As of
late January 2004, nearly 3,000 importers, 600 carriers, and 1,000
brokers and freight forwarders are participating in C-TPAT, surpassing
the Department's original goal of participation of the top 1,000
importers.
As well as continuing development for secure trade programs, the
budget also seeks an increase of $20.6 million to support improvements
for the National Targeting Center and for multiple targeting systems
that focus on people, cargo and conveyances. These systems use
information from diverse sources to provide automated risk assessments
for arriving international air passengers, shipments of goods to our
country, and land border passenger traffic.
The United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
(US VISIT) program's goals are to enhance the security of our citizens
and our visitors; facilitate legitimate travel and trade across our
borders; ensure the integrity of our immigration system; and respect
the privacy of our welcomed visitors. US VISIT represents a major
milestone in our efforts to reform our borders. We deployed the first
increment of US VISIT on time, on budget, and met the mandates
established by Congress, including biometric capabilities ahead of
schedule. The budget seeks a total of $340 million in fiscal year 2005,
an increase of $12 million over the fiscal year 2004 level for the
program. As of late February, over 1.5 million foreign nationals had
been processed for entry, generating 125 watch list alerts, and
resulting in 51 criminals apprehended. The 2005 funding will further
strengthen border security, and enable modernization of border
management systems and capabilities. Specifically, funding will be used
to expand the entry system to 115 land POEs, beyond the busiest 50 that
will be covered by the US VISIT program in fiscal year 2004. Funding
will also be used to expand implementation of an exit solution at our
air and seaports. Alternatives are being developed and tested, and will
be implemented at 80 airports and 14 seaports in fiscal year 2004.
Within the BTS component budgets, over $100 million is included for
detection systems, a critical element in the war on terrorism. The CBP
budget seeks an increase of $64.2 million to enhance land-based
detection and monitoring of movement between ports, and $10 million to
deploy and operate unmanned aerial vehicles. In order to protect the
homeland against radiological threats, the CBP budget seeks $50 million
for radiation detection monitors and equipment. The ICE budget request
includes an increase of $28 million to increase the flight hours of P-3
aircraft by 200 percent. In addition to providing vital detection and
monitoring capabilities in the source and transit zones containing
mountainous terrain, thick jungles and large expanses of water, the P-3
provides an important capability for domestic airspace security
missions.
Improving Aviation Security
We have made great strides in rebuilding and reinvigorating of our
aviation transportation security system. We have made significant
investments in baggage screening technology--over $2 billion to
purchase and install Explosives Detection Systems machines (EDS) and
Explosives Trace Detection machines (ETD) to the nation's airports--and
established a robust technology research and development program. We
have deployed 45,000 Federal passenger and baggage screeners at the
Nation's airports, expanded the National Explosives Detection Canine
Team program, and trained pilots to be Federal Flight Deck Officers.
The fiscal year 2005 TSA budget seeks an increase of $892 million
to enhance transportation security, a 20 percent increase over the
comparable fiscal year 2004 level. Specifically, to strengthen
interwoven, concentric layers of transportation security, the budget
requests increases of $20 million for credentialing systems (i.e.,
Transportation Worker Identification Credential, Hazardous Materials
transporters, and foreign student pilots); $25 million for operating
the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening II System; and $113
million to and improve screener performance through training and the
deployment of information technology. A substantially improved air
cargo security and screening program was implemented last year, and the
$85 million request sustains funding to continue program enhancements
and associated air cargo screening technology research and development.
We are providing another $400 million for EDS equipment to improve
airport operational efficiency.
Enhancing Immigration Security and Enforcement
The ICE budget request of $4 billion, which is an increase of $300
million over the fiscal year 2004 level, seeks to strengthen
immigration security and enforcement. Comprehensive immigration
security and enforcement extends beyond efforts at and between the
ports-of-entry into the United States. It extends overseas, to keep
unwelcome persons from arriving in our country, and removing persons
now illegally residing in the United States. Pursuant to section 428 of
the Homeland Security Act, and the Memorandum of Understanding between
the Departments of Homeland Security and State, the ICE fiscal year
2005 budget request of $14 million includes an increase of $10 million
to support a new visa security unit (VSU). The BTS personnel stationed
at overseas posts, including Saudi Arabia, will continue to work
cooperatively with U.S. Consular Officials to enhance security and the
integrity of the visa process.
As announced on January 7, 2004, the Administration is committed to
enhanced immigration integrity and border security. My Directorate will
be working to implement a program that meets those goals, while
benefiting the economy. Current ICE immigration enforcement programs
and the enhancements in the fiscal year 2005 ICE budget request support
and are consistent with a number of elements in this initiative,
particularly worksite enforcement. Specifically, the fiscal year 2005
request includes an increase of $23 million to more than double the
number of investigations currently performed by ICE--providing an
additional 200 investigators. With these resources, ICE will be able to
facilitate the implementation of the President's temporary worker
program initiative by establishing a traditional worksite enforcement
program that offers credible deterrence to the hiring of unauthorized
workers.
The request also includes nearly a $100 million increase for the
detention and removal of illegal aliens. Detention and Removal of
illegal aliens present in the United States is critical to the
enforcement of our immigration laws, and the requested funding will
expand ongoing fugitive apprehension efforts, the removal from the
United States of jailed illegal aliens, and additional detention and
removal capacity.
As part of our overall immigration enforcement strategy, ICE will
continue to analyze data generated through the Student and Exchange
Visitor Information System (SEVIS) and US VISIT program to detect
individuals who are in violation of the Nation's immigration laws and
pose a threat to homeland security. The fiscal year 2005 budget
requests $16 million to support these compliance efforts.
Immigration fraud poses a severe threat to national security and
public safety because it enables terrorists, criminals, and illegal
aliens to gain entry and remain in the United States. An aggressive,
focused, and comprehensive investigations and prosecutions program will
detect, combat and deter immigration fraud. The $25 million included in
the fiscal year 2005 budget will provide stable funding to the benefits
fraud program by replacing funding previously provided through the
Immigration Examinations Fee Account.
Building Departmental Infrastructure
The fiscal year 2005 request includes an increase of $5 million for
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center to support our security
program enhancements and capability sustainment. The FLETC not only
serves Federal client groups, but also provides training to State and
local law enforcement providers. In addition, to enhance global law
enforcement efforts, FLETC develops and offers a curriculum that
includes international applications.
Conclusion
Our homeland is safer and more secure than it was a year ago,
thanks in part to the dedicated and talented team we have in BTS which
excels at coordinating and effecting cross-component activities.
Through their efforts, and with the support of our partners in
government and the public and private sectors, we will continue to
substantially improve our nation's security. I thank the Congress for
its support, which has been critical to bringing us to this point. With
your continued support for our fiscal year 2005 budget, we will
continue to improve the security of our nation.
I am grateful to be here today to outline our efforts for a safer
and more secure America. Thank you for inviting me to appear before you
today, and I look forward to answering your questions.
US VISIT
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Last week President Bush met with President Vicente Fox of
Mexico and announced that citizens of Mexico who hold border
crossing cards and are frequent visitors will not have each
entry recorded into the US VISIT database. Can you tell us more
about how this new policy will be implemented by your
directorate?
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would emphasize
that for those who have a border crossing card, we already have
their fingerprints in our database and they have undergone a
terrorist screen or a security screen in order to be able to
receive this border crossing card. And, if they would utilize
this card for long-term visa purposes they would be enrolled in
US VISIT just like our visitors are at the airports. It will
take us a little bit longer to develop a program in which we
can record each entry and exit and we hope to utilize radio
frequency technology to pilot and to develop that capability.
Our concern, of course, would be that with over 100 million
crossings of Mexicans using this laser visa or border crossing
card, it would be difficult to enroll each one of them in US
VISIT under the current circumstances. So, that is the
consideration for not tracking them in that fashion but rather,
using it as we have at our airports and seaports, for those who
would utilize it as a regular visa to stay in our country for a
longer period of time.
Senator Cochran. The budget states that an exit capability
is expected to be deployed at up to 80 airports and 14 seaports
this year. Can you give us a report on the exit pilots that are
currently running as a part of US VISIT?
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, Mr. Chairman, and before I answer that
specifically, I want to emphasize that we have an exit
capability for all our airports and seaports through the APID
or advanced passenger information database, transmitted from
the airlines. So, we have a record of the departure of those
people who would be foreign citizens leaving our country.
Therefore, we could track whether they have overstayed their
visas or not. So we have that capability biographically. What
we are piloting in the Baltimore International Airport is an
exit capability that will also biometrically confirm their
departure from this country.
It is being piloted in Baltimore and thus far, it has been
a very successful program. I heard testimony from the airport
director there who applauds the program and the cooperation we
have had, and particularly the fact that we have personnel
there that will help a foreign visitor to utilize the system.
We are piloting other different ways to implement an exit
procedure. Those will be developed and put into place by June
of this year, so by the end of this year we hope to have a
complete evaluation of what is the best exit procedure for our
airports that would expand upon our current biographical
capability.
Senator Cochran. The US VISIT program office is reviewing
the proposals for the prime integration contract. What are the
plans to meet the deadline for deploying the entry and exit
capabilities to the 50 busiest land ports by the end of this
calendar year?
Mr. Hutchinson. We do anticipate that the integrator
contract would be awarded in the May time frame. That still
leaves us a significant amount of time to utilize their
capabilities. But in the meantime, through our US VISIT program
office we're able to continue to deploy to the 50 busiest land
ports our exit solution that would be used as secondary,
similar to what we're doing at our airports. And so a great
deal of work can be done to fulfill the mandate this year even
before the integrator is brought on board. What they will
primarily focus on would be looking at the radio frequency
technology and how that can be used to quickly track the entry
and exit without clogging those borders. We have some
preliminary ideas, but the integrator support will be very
critical in developing a final solution on that.
Senator Cochran. Senator Byrd, I'm prepared to yield to you
for any questions you have. I noticed the presence of the
distinguished senator from New Hampshire. Before proceeding, I
was wondering if you could yield to him for any opening
statement.
Senator Byrd. Yes, I would like to hear his opening
statement.
Senator Gregg. I have no opening statement, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Senator Byrd.
TSA
Senator Byrd. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, your TSA budget
proposal for 2005 requests just $143 million out of a total
request of $5 billion for non-aviation related activities. The
Aviation and Transportation Security Act requires that the TSA
protect all modes of transportation, not just aviation. Take
mass transit for an example.
On February 6, individuals opposed to policies of the
Russian government exploded a bomb deep inside a tunnel of the
Moscow subway system, killing more than 40 people. The Tokyo
subway was attacked with sarin gas in 1995. Subsequent analysis
of the attack concluded that up to 8,000 deaths could have
occurred if the attack had been executed as planned. We should
not focus all of our attention on the threats posed by the 9/11
attacks. There continues to be significant threats to the New
York City Subway System, the Washington Metro, the Chicago
Transit Authority, and other mass transit systems.
In testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee on
February 24, FBI Director Mueller stated that our
transportation systems across the country, particularly the
subways and bridges in major cities, as well as airlines, have
been a continual focus of al Qaeda targeting. Despite this
reality, there is a huge disparity between what you have
requested for aviation, compared to what you have requested for
the other modes of transportation.
You have made no proposal for mass transit security grants,
no request for bus security grants, no request for truck
security grants, and port security grants, have been reduced
from the $124 million which Congress provided to only $46
million, and the Department proposed to transfer away from TSA
that remaining grant program to an agency with no
transportation security expertise.
Now, how can you fulfill the mandate of protecting all
modes of transportation without requesting funds for this
purpose? Given what you are proposing, how do you intend to be
accountable to the American people for ensuring transportation
security?
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Senator Byrd, and we agree with
your concerns about the other modes of transportation and that
they should not be neglected. We are looking at a different
type of relationship and solution for the other modes of
transportation versus our 100 percent inspection regime, a
focus in aviation security. And so at TSA, we do have a
relationship with the different modes of transportation. We are
working on assessments and standards setting. We're working
with other directorates and other agencies to accomplish the
security that you highlighted.
For example, the subways, that is a transportation system
with a number of players in that arena, including the IAIP
directorate, or Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection directorate, and our Science and Technology
directorate, looking for some technological solutions to help
detect and prevent those type of harmful attacks. And so we are
coordinating our efforts with them, as well as working with our
TSA officials who have that standard setting responsibility. We
will continue to develop that relationship and seek additional
funding as is necessary to expand that mission.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, you haven't answered my
question. I'm concerned about the lack of funding for the
security of those other modes of transportation. I listened
very carefully, but I didn't get an answer to my question.
Mr. Hutchinson. Would you like me to proceed again, Senator
Byrd?
Senator Byrd. Yes. Would you like me to ask the question
again?
Mr. Hutchinson. I think I got the gist of the question. We
have a staff at headquarters of 120 inspectors. They are
charged with the responsibility of looking at these other modes
of transportation, working with local communities, setting
standards for them, and working with other agencies--for
example, the Department of Transportation. We are protoneuron
with the industry stakeholders as well for information sharing
with regards to threats to these different modes of
transportation. We are looking to the Science and Technology
Directorate to identify the security threat and developing the
technology that would help detect those hazardous materials
threats to our subway systems. And the same is true for the
other modes of transportation that you mentioned.
Senator Byrd. I don't think I got the answer yet. I'll ask
the question again. You may not want to answer it, and I say
this respectfully to you.
Your TSA budget proposal for fiscal year 2005 requests only
$143 million out of a total request of $5 billion for non-
aviation related activities. The Aviation and Transportation
Security Act requires the TSA to protect all modes of
transportation, not just aviation. How can you fulfill the
mandate of protecting all modes of transportation without
requesting funds for this purpose? Given what you are
proposing, how do you intend to be accountable to the American
people for ensuring transportation security?
I believe it is a mistake to weaken the non-aviation
functions of TSA. On February 25, Congressman Sabo and I wrote
to Secretary Ridge and urged him not to transfer the TSA grant
programs, port security grants, truck security grants, bus
security grants, and Operation Safe Commerce, as well as FEMA's
Emergency Management Performance grants from TSA to the offices
of State and local government coordination. The deadline for
making that transfer could be as early as March 26th, and I
want to personally make the same points to you. I urge you and
the Secretary to give serious consideration to the concerns
expressed in our letters.
Mr. Hutchinson. And Senator Byrd, I very respectfully agree
with your concerns and clearly you could look at this as a
comprehensive solution to security, we're looking at a shared
responsibility in that regard, and not exclusively that of TSA.
And we are still sorting through some of that division of
responsibility. But we believe that the budget allows
sufficient support from a headquarters level of the standard
setting, the regulations that need to be looked at, and the
partnership that we might have with the Department of
Transportation and with the Coast Guard, who has a major role
in the mission of port security.
Now, I realize that there has been some concern expressed
about the transfer of the grant programs from TSA to the State
and local administration within the Department, but I have been
assured and feel confident that we are implementing the steps
necessary to make sure that the TSA expertise on port security
is utilized for the administration of those grants.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, may I ask another question at
this point or do you wish to proceed?
Senator Cochran. Senator Byrd, we've taken up just about
between 10 and 15 minutes in this round, and I was going to
recognize Senator Gregg for any questions, and then we have a
chance for another round.
Senator Byrd. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Senator Gregg.
US VISIT
Senator Gregg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Senator Byrd, for your courtesy. Mr. Secretary, the US VISIT
program is obviously the core to your effort to try to get some
control over who's coming into the country and you have already
explained the program. As I understand the program, basically
there will be two fingerprints taken, the thumb and----
Mr. Hutchinson. Two index.
Senator Gregg. The index fingers of both hands, and that
will be electronically and digitally taken. And here's my
question. We spent in another committee, CJS, which I chair,
and it's a fabulous facility up in West Virginia, a huge amount
of money, literally hundreds of millions if not billions of
dollars on developing a fingerprint database for the Nation
called IAFIS, which is under the control of the FBI. It's my
understanding that the US VISIT fingerprints will not be
compatible with that database, that the manner in which the
fingerprints are being taken is not compatible, without a
significant amount of increased work load. In other words, the
turnaround time on an IAFIS fingerprint is very brief. If
you're fingerprinted under the IAFIS system it's almost an
instantaneous turnaround time. If you're fingerprinted under
your system it's 35 times longer, assuming you can do the
workload at all to get that fingerprint confirmation back, and
really the two systems aren't compatible, they simply aren't
compatible.
I guess my question to you is why would we set up--I can
understand that you don't want to make getting into and out of
the country too complicated and that's why you probably went to
the two-finger fingerprinting and a flat screen versus a rolled
approach, which is what the IAFIS was built on. But why did we
spend all this money to create this database if you folks
aren't going to structure a system that takes advantage of it?
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Senator Gregg. And first, I have
had numerous conversations with the FBI and the head of their
fingerprint division, and we certainly want to move in
coordination with each other. But for example, the IAFIS system
has 44 million prints in it, most of them of U.S. citizens,
many of them whose crimes have expired, and just a whole host
of reasons that they might be in there. As our US VISIT program
is developed, it is not designed for U.S. citizens but for
foreign visitors. So we take a slice of what is in the IAFIS
database and put it in our IDENT system so that it can be
checked, so there is that limited capability. Now as we expand
our program, hopefully there will be more connectivity there.
But in addition right now, to connect to IAFIS you have to
have 10 rolled prints, and we cannot have 10 rolled prints at
our ports of entry because of processing time as people come
in. As the technology develops so that we can perhaps have 10
or 8 scanned prints in a quick fashion, then we hope to be able
to gravitate to that, so we can then interconnect with the
IAFIS. But it is a problem not just for the US VISIT, but also
the State Department, because they have deployed technology
overseas for the two index fingers since that was the agreement
between the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, and the
Secretary of Homeland Security.
So it is a process issue because of the time constraints.
It is a systems issue in terms of what it takes to interact
with the IAFIS program. And it's a technology problem that we
hope technology will be able to help us with in the coming
years. In terms of the processing time, it takes us 8 seconds
for our two digital fingerprints to get a response from our
system. It would not be any different if we were connecting it
to the IAFIS system. And if there is a question where we
connect with secondary, where we can connect with IAFIS, we can
take the rolled prints as to any additional information that we
need from them.
Senator Gregg. What you're saying is that we're building
from scratch a new system which is going to be essentially
independent of IAFIS in that they won't be able to access IAFIS
directly. Yes, there are 44 million fingerprints in IAFIS,
which is one heck of a database, and obviously the vast
majority of them are American citizens who have somehow come
into a position where they would be subject to that scrutiny.
But a huge percentage, a huge number are international
fingerprints, and I just, it's going to be hard for me as a
legislator if we have an event in this country and an
individual comes into this country who went through the US
VISIT program, got fingerprinted, but didn't show up because
your program doesn't have a big enough database yet to pick the
person out. We find out after the person has done some
destructive event in this country that that person's
fingerprints are sitting there at IAFIS and we knew that he was
a bad guy.
So I understand the technology problem. I understand the
practical problem of having to roll everybody coming into the
country. And I can see where you made the decision and that you
know, you're going to have to start from scratch building a
database. But there's got to be a better answer here to getting
these two converged. If it takes dollars in order to do the
technology conversions in order to get IAFIS to a digital
capability where it can handle your type of needs, we'll do it.
Because quite honestly, your issue is a heck of lot bigger than
any other issue the FBI has today.
That fingerprint database of 44 million should be used to
protect this country against terrorism. That should be its
primary purpose today. Granted, it was created to protect us
and deal with criminal events in this Nation, but that isn't
what it should be used for. It is a huge resource sitting there
that should be used to protect us from people coming into this
country to do us harm, and it should be integrated with your
system, totally integrated.
And so, I guess your answer to me was, well, we can't
integrate because we're not there yet. My question to you is
what do we need to get there and how quickly can we get there?
Mr. Hutchinson. And that's the right approach to it,
Senator. We, first of all, are wanting to gravitate to 8
scanned prints, which would be, I believe compatible for entry
into the IAFIS system. That will take us some time because
that's something the State Department has to work on as well,
and we have to partner with them on the technology.
Senator Gregg. We can bring the State Department along.
Mr. Hutchinson. The other suggestion that I would have is
that we utilize the services of the National Institutes of
Standards, NIST, that evaluated our system, what its
capabilities were, and I think that their counsel would be
helpful in not just looking at what we need to do to make these
compatible, but who needs to make some adjustments. For
example, should IAFIS develop a system that does not just
simply have to take 10 rolled prints. Can they develop a system
that is interacting to the 8 scanned prints or the 10 scanned
prints. I hope they would look at that solution as well.
Senator Gregg. That's fine, NIST is a wonderful technical
agency and I suppose we could hold a hearing on this, we could
have CJS and maybe do a joint hearing, and bring all the
different parties to this fingerprint issue together and try to
get movement. But we shouldn't have to do that. This
administration should have a game plan which is in place and
which is signed off on by the three key parties, State,
yourself and the FBI, and which says this is the time frame,
this is the technology changes we have to make, and this is
what it's going to cost us. You should be coming to us with
that plan so that we can fund it and we can hold you
accountable to that time frame. Saying that we should call NIST
and say well, NIST, will you tell FBI to straighten out, IAFIS
is not the answer. The answer is that you folks, because you
are the administration, should be doing this. I mean, that's
what administrations do. Congresses shouldn't have to do that.
And I'm really discouraged about this. We spent so much
time getting this--database up and running and now it's being
marginalized in the most singly important thing we have to do
as a country, which is defend ourselves from people coming in
who are our enemies. It's just very hard for me to figure out
why we aren't more aggressively pursuing a resolution of those
issues, rather than you're going your way setting up your
database and saying well, we can't get into IAFIS because we
can't roll 10 prints, and the FBI is out there saying they
can't do it with digital and they aren't going to do two
prints, and they aren't going to convert their system because
it's too expensive and too complicated for them to do it. And
then we're supposed to go call NIST up and say really, who has
the answer here. You guys should have the answer and it should
be given to us.
So what I'm going to ask you for is for you to gather the
Secretaries of Homeland Security and State and the Attorney
General, and get us a statement of policy as to how you're
going to get the FBI fingerprinting databases coordinated so
that they all are integrated and can communicate with each
other in a time frame that's going to occur before we're
attacked again.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Senator. That's a fair request
and we will certainly be delighted to work and develop that
joint strategy.
Senator Gregg. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Secretary, just as a way of following
up on Senator Gregg's questions, I'm curious to know what funds
the Department intends to dedicate to this project, the
integration of the systems during fiscal year 2004 and what
account is being used to fund the project. Do you have that
information or would you like to submit that for the record?
Mr. Hutchinson. We probably will supplement the answer that
I will give now. But first, and as Secretary Ridge testified--I
believe it was before you, but it might have been the House
Appropriations subcommittee, is the existing need for
integration so that the Border Patrol agents can access IAFIS.
The funding is in place to do that and it is pledged to be
accomplished by the end of this year, and I think the Secretary
indicated that we will scrounge around if there needs to be a
few extra dollars to achieve that goal, but we're committed to
making sure the information integration with IAFIS is
accomplished.
In reference to Senator Gregg's comments and questions,
that integration will be funded out of the $340 million in 2004
for US VISIT. That's the budget that we have to work with to
accomplish objectives of 2004, as well as moving toward any
integration, and of course, any other funding would come from
the State Department's budget and the Department of Justice.
[The information follows:]
Integration of Database Systems in Fiscal Year 2004
Therefore, to accelerate the implementation of IDENT/IAFIS
capability within the Department, we intend to reallocate $4 million of
the remaining funds provided in Public Law 107-117. The $4 million,
when combined with fiscal year 2003 funds already provided ($3.5
million obligated for IDENT/IAFIS as part of increment 1 Entry-Air/
Sea), will allow BTS to implement IDENT with 10 print capabilities in
secondary processing areas at 115 airports, 14 seaports and 50 of the
largest land border ports. In addition, this funding will support
implementation of the IAFIS/IDENT 10 print capability at 70 percent of
the Border Patrol stations. The remaining land ports of entry, 30
percent of the Border Patrol stations and major ICE locations (to be
identified) will receive this capability in 2005.
Senator Cochran. One observation is that if this project is
not receiving the support and attention required to get it to
completion, should a separate project office be set up to
implement the program?
Mr. Hutchinson. I would not suggest so. We have a very
effective project office in US VISIT that has the capability.
And I don't mean simply to recite challenges in this effort,
but you know, we had a choice this year of recognizing that we
could have an added security value by putting our fingerprint
scanners at our primary ports of entry and we did this, and
we're looking at when we change it down the road to a broader
capability, we probably lost a million dollars for those
fingerprint scanners. So for the added security value, it was a
good decision to make, but we recognized at the time that we're
going to have to gravitate to probably 8 prints at a minimum,
for a number of reasons. So we recognize the need to move to
that standard and that will be a part of the US VISIT oversight
responsibilities.
Senator Cochran. Is there a final deployment schedule to
roll out version two of the integration project to all Border
Control facilities or when can these facilities expect the
roll-out to be completed?
Mr. Hutchinson. There is, and that will be completed by the
end of this year. I believe we have IAFIS at 20 Border Patrol
stations. I think we have about another hundred that are on
schedule to be given the connectivity to IAFIS, and so that
should be completed on schedule by the end of the year.
Senator Cochran. Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. Thank you. I particularly was interested in
Senator Gregg's and your questions, and the answers.
Last month a few days after the Democratic primary, the
President went to Charleston, South Carolina, to crow a little
about his efforts to improve the security of the ports. I must
say that I found this kind of a political event to be somewhat
disingenuous. The President signed the Maritime Transportation
Security Act on November 14, 2002. That law authorized
initiatives to improve security at our ports, but I'm not
convinced that the Administration has done that much since then
to actually make our ports safer. Given the huge demand for
port security funds, why is this Administration only requesting
$46 million to actually secure our ports?
PORT SECURITY
Mr. Hutchinson. Senator Byrd, it's because we believe that
there is a shared responsibility, both in terms of the private
sector, and the port authorities, and the Federal Government
spurs that on, sets the example, funds a significant portion of
the projects, which I believe that we have done. Last year I
think there were two rounds of port security grants, so there
was a very substantial amount that was invested last year, and
it was a combination of grants to port authorities but also to
the private sector. But, we do not believe it's exclusively a
Federal Government responsibility to do all of the port
security investment, the private sector has a responsibility,
as well as the governmental port authorities.
Besides the port grants, we are also investing
substantially in port security in terms of the activities of
the Coast Guard, the Customs and Border Protection, and the
other agency responsibilities related to the ports.
Senator Byrd. Well, I know that we are going to continue to
hear that answer. We still inspect less than 5 percent of the
5.7 million containers that come into our ports each year. The
President took credit for making available $179 million this
year in funding for grants for port security. He failed to
mention that he did not request a dime of those funds. He
failed to mention that the Coast Guard port directors, who
actually have responsibility for safety, estimated that $1.25
billion would be needed in the first year and $5.4 billion
would be needed over the next 10 years to comply with the new
Federal regulations mandated by the Maritime Transportation
Security Act. He failed to mention that last year he opposed my
amendment to provide $460 million in port security grants. He
failed to mention that his budget for fiscal year 2005 proposed
to cut port security grants by 60 percent, from $124 million to
$46 million, when the last competition for grants resulted in
over $987 million in applications from ports nationwide.
Now I'm afraid something terrible is going to happen one of
these days, and then what will be said? Our ports must compete
with other ports, including ports in other countries. If these
security costs result in higher prices, assuming the costs are
going to have to be borne by industry, are you and the
President not concerned that business may go elsewhere, costing
U.S. jobs?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, I think that first of all, we've
discussed significantly the port security grants and the
philosophy behind the amount that is requested. You also raised
the question of the fact that only 5 percent of the 6 million
sea containers are inspected that come into our ports. I think
this is, again, a philosophical question as to whether you
inspect 5 percent, 10 percent, 15 percent, or 100 percent. And
I suppose if we inspected 20 percent of all the cargo, there
would be those who would argue it ought to be 100 percent, that
argument exists right now. I think it's a better decision to
try to make sure we inspect the right 5 percent or right 10
percent, or whatever that number is, and that we inspect all of
those, 100 percent of those containers that indicate a risk to
our Nation.
So that is the strategy that we're developing. We are not
underestimating your concerns and what we know as threats to
our ports. We take that very seriously, and that's why the
Coast Guard has conducted more than 36,000 port security
patrols. That's why we have imposed the regulations that
require the security plans by the vessel operators and the port
authorities, all to enhance the security, in addition to the
partnership that we have in the cash investments for port
security.
CAPPS II
Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, the fiscal year 2004
Appropriations Act included a provision requiring the General
Accounting Office to review the privacy and security of the
proposed CAPPS II airline system. The GAO recently submitted a
report to us that stated that your Department has met only one
of the eight criteria set out by Congress before you could move
ahead with deployment of the system. I understand that the
Department concurs with the GAO's findings. Where is DHS now in
testing of the CAPPS II system?
Mr. Hutchinson. Senator, we are actually months away from
actual testing data for CAPPS II. We are obviously aware of the
airlines' concern about voluntarily sharing data, so we're
looking to find a vehicle of having the data that we need to
query out the testing, and my best estimate would be that we
are still a number of months away from doing the testing to the
CAPPS II.
Senator Byrd. Now that the GAO concluded that your
Department has not met the requirements of the law, I encourage
you not to deploy the CAPPS II system until you have satisfied
for this subcommittee that the requirements of the law have
been met.
I have several questions, Mr. Chairman. I could submit
several of these for the record at your pleasure.
Last week the Department celebrated its 1-year anniversary.
To commemorate the event, Secretary Ridge released a list
touting the Department's major accomplishments in its first
year and, indeed, much has been accomplished. For instance, his
press release notes that a seal has been developed to establish
an identity for the Department. Good. You know who you are and
for whom you are working. The release also noted that employees
received a lapel pin signed by the Secretary and featuring the
new Department seal.
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
Sadly, no mention is made in the list of the Department's
accomplishments for the enhanced enforcement of our immigration
laws. At best, there is a passing reference to the new
Department's reorganization of the immigration enforcement
functions. Especially in light of the President's sweeping
amnesty proposal, I'm surprised that the Department has nothing
to report as an accomplishment in enforcing our existing
immigration laws. Many members who were opposed to the creation
of the Department, like myself, were concerned that the focus
of the Department and its personnel would shift from
traditional duties to terrorism. Why is the Department unable
to point to significant improvements and successes in
enforcement of existing immigration laws? What specifically is
your director doing to enhance immigration enforcement?
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Senator, and I'm grateful for
the opportunity to reflect on significant achievements in the
area of immigration enforcement. It is estimated, as you know,
that there are 8 million illegal workers in this country at the
present time. It's estimated that 40 percent of those are here
because of visa overstays. And so whenever you talk about what
we've done with US VISIT and being able to have a better
control of those who come into the country and overstay their
visas, that system is a significant accomplishment in
immigration control. It produces information on people who
overstay their visas and stay here in the country illegally.
We have created an office of compliance within the Bureau
of Immigration and Customs Enforcement that is responsible for
receiving the information and providing leads to the field in
order to determine who should be processed for removal from the
country. So, that is a huge step forward in immigration
enforcement.
In addition, we have successfully implemented the SEVIS
program, which tracks our foreign visitors coming into this
country, and in one fall semester, as over 200,000 students
came into our country, we apprehended over 200 that came in
here who were not properly accepted into a university. I think
our country is safer because of that effort.
We have also, of course, put 1,000 more patrol agents on
our northern border, and we have increased our resources on the
southwest border. The chief of police of Phoenix attributed
immigration enforcement in Arizona and our Operation Ice Storm
to a successful reduction of violent crime in the Phoenix area.
And so at every level, from the fugitive operations to
Operation Predator to Operation Ice Storm, I think we have done
a very, very significant amount of work in immigration
enforcement.
Senator Byrd. Do you miss being in your old job?
Mr. Hutchinson. Every once in a while I miss being up there
on the House side.
Senator Byrd. I think you did a good job. I watched you
very carefully during the impeachment procedures.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, sir.
Senator Byrd. I thought you kept a level head on your
shoulders. I thank Senator Gregg for raising the issue of
compatibility between US VISIT and the FBI databases. Chairman
Cochran and I raised the issue with Secretary Ridge almost a
year ago.
BORDER PATROL: IDENT
On a related matter, last week the Department of Justice
Inspector General released a report that examined the case of a
Mexican citizen who had been detained by the Border Patrol on
two occasions in January 2002 for illegally entering the United
States. On each occasion, Border Patrol agents returned him
voluntarily to Mexico. They did this because IDENT, the
immigration agency's automated fingerprint identification
database and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's automated
fingerprint identification database were not integrated and the
Border Patrol agents who apprehended him did not learn of his
extensive criminal record or past deportation. If his full
history had been learned, according to Border Patrol policies,
he should have been detained and subjected to prosecution.
Instead, he was returned to Mexico. Subsequently, he again
crossed the board illegally, and made his way to Oregon in
September of 2000 where he raped two nuns and killed one.
In the report, the Inspector General again found delays in
the effort to integrate the IDENT and IAFIS databases. While he
found some progress in deploying an integrated version of
IDENT-IAFIS, full integration of the two systems remains years
away. Current projections are that the two systems will not be
fully integrated until at least August 2008, almost 2 years
behind the original scheduled completion date. Both the
Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security
say they recognize that the databases need to be integrated.
However, the IG report found uncertainty as to who is
responsible for the overall management of the integration
project. It states that Justice and Homeland have yet to enter
into a memorandum of understanding delineating the specific
roles and responsibilities of each agency in the project.
Can you give us an update on your plans for developing a
memorandum of understanding with the Justice Department so that
this project can move forward?
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, sir, and that certainly points out
that there is much work that remains to be done, and I'm
grateful for the opportunity to recite some of the efforts that
we have implemented, but we are the first to acknowledge that
there is much more to be done and this is certainly a perfect
example of it. The IG is correct, to wait until 2008 would be
absolutely wrong and intolerable, so under Secretary Ridge's
leadership we are going to get it done this year. We want to
avoid this type of tragic circumstance in the future, and it
was a tragic circumstance of this particular case, and it shows
the extraordinary cost of not having all of the information
needed for our Border Patrol agents.
We have that system at 20 sites now, and we're going to add
100 this year and get them connected. And if there's a few left
after that, we'll find the money to get it done. We have
accelerated the schedule to get it done this year. We want to
look at more opportunities to give our agents in the field, and
inspectors, all the tools they need, particularly this type of
access to the FBI database.
Senator Byrd. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
TRADE ENFORCEMENT
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Byrd.
Mr. Secretary, something that your State and my State is
interested in is our domestic fish industries, catfish and
other activities relating to the production of aquaculture
resources. I was recently informed that the Customs and Border
Protection officials took 6 months to review and comment on a
request for new tariff codes for Vietnamese exports of fish
into the United States. I've written to Secretary Ridge about
this issue, but I would like to bring this to your attention
personally and receive any comment that you have about a
commitment to trade enforcement, which in my view should remain
a high priority for the Border and Transportation Security
Directorate. I hope you will look into the problems that may
exist in the Department regarding catfish dumping or trade
rules that need to be enforced aggressively by the directorate.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, and I certainly share the same
concern, coming from Arkansas, in reference to the enforcement
of our trade laws on this commodity as well as others. I don't
know the specific answer on why it took 6 months to review that
tariff code and I would be happy to provide a specific answer
to you. We have made a commitment not to reduce our resources
and commitment to trade enforcement, and we have a good
partnership with the Department of the Treasury to carry on
those trade enforcement efforts. I'm co-chairman of the Coe
Act, which is the partnership with industry in their advisory
committee on how we handle our trade rules, so we will get a
specific answer to you on that question.
[The information follows:]
Vietnamese Exports of Fish into the United States
CBP processing time for 484(f) requests varies depending on
the complexity of the request and the purpose of the request.
While most requests are processed within the 6-month period,
exceptional requests have taken longer. (As a comparison, the
484(f) committee received a request for a statistical breakout
for low-melt polyester fiber on June 30, 2000, which was not
approved until May of 2001 for implementation on July 1, 2001.
While rare, these situations do occur.) The request for these
fish breakouts was one of these exceptional requests.
The 484(f) request received by CBP was submitted in advance
of the Federal Register Notice published on August 12, 2003,
referenced in the requestor's submission, and the instructions
to CBP issued on September 12, 2003. Those documents needed to
be reviewed in conjunction with the requestor's submission
because CBP is the agency responsible for collecting the
antidumping duties under the order and identifying attempted
evasion of the order. This 484(f) request was also intended to
allow the domestic industry to monitor specific foreign
competition.
The first problem was that CBP (and the ITC, based on their
report) did not agree with the requestor as to the proper
classification of the imported species of fish and therefore,
the proposed breakouts. This is not an unusual occurrence.
Since the 484(f) committee usually tries to meet the purpose of
the request even if the committee does not technically agree
with the request, the issue for CBP was how to meet the
requestor's goals.
CBP found that the specific imported fish were more subject
to misclassification than other commodities for which breakouts
have been requested. This fact meant we needed to be able to
segregate these fish from the other fish properly classified in
the various subheadings.
CBP also had to reconcile the recent change to the FDA
labeling requirements with CBP import laws, regulations, and
policies and enforcement capabilities.
CBP needed to take into consideration our informed
compliance responsibilities to importers under the MOD ACT
followed by our enforcement capabilities. We also considered
our ability to physically identify non-compliant fish, our
ability to target shipments for sampling and maintain the
physical integrity of the perishable sample through the
laboratory analysis process, and whether other agency
requirements would be effected by any of the breakouts. We also
took into consideration concurrent work being done by the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Finally, we
applied our knowledge of certain techniques that have been used
to avoid payment of higher duties on other perishable
commodities.
All of these considerations are not routinely necessary
during our review of 484(f) requests and required information
from multiple CBP offices and time to correlate the elements
into a plan. Once the facts were finalized, CBP responded to
the other 484(f) members with our proposal.
Note that CBP met with the requestor's representatives on
February 27, 2004 and were able to come up with a new proposal
that will meet their needs for trade data and allow CBP to more
easily enforce the current antidumping order and verify trade
data. At the same time, this proposal will allow implementation
prior to the resolution of the classification issue. The
requestor will provide some additional information to CBP at
which point we will forward the proposal to the other committee
members (Census and the ITC.) We anticipate that our proposal
will be satisfactory to the other committee members and the new
breakouts will be implemented no later than July 1, 2004.
FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much. In connection with
Federal air marshals, I notice that the budget request is
essentially flat for the Air Marshals program. Is this a
concern to you? Do you think an adequate level of resources are
available under the budget request to fund pay raises and other
inflationary costs that may occur with this program?
Mr. Hutchinson. We did get hit with the pay increases that
are built into the budget that had to be absorbed. We have a
strong commitment to the Federal Air Marshals program. That's
one of the reasons we took a number of steps to add some
additional capabilities to supplement the air marshals with
other Federal agents who travel, including cross-training
additional ICE agents and a partnership with the Secret
Service. We believe that with those force multipliers out
there, and with the continued commitment to the air marshals,
that the President's budget is sufficient in that area.
We are, you know, for this year, looking at a number of
different areas to make sure that there is no any significant
diminishing of our commitment to the air marshals.
NORTHERN BORDER AIR WING
Senator Cochran. The Air and Marine Operations program has
been stretched pretty thin for the last 2 years. Long-term
repetitive details for personnel and assets are being used to
protect the northern border and the national capitol region.
The appropriations for fiscal year 2004 included resources for
the establishment of a permanent northern border air wing. Will
you tell us what the status of establishing this air wing is,
when will there be permanent employees on board, and when will
aircraft be purchased, for example. Are you going to have to
continue to rely on detailees to cover the northern border and
the national capitol region if you go forward with the
establishment of this air wing?
Mr. Hutchinson. I think it's important that we have that
air wing capability on the northern border, and we are actively
pursuing it. The assets that are deployed, you know, are from
our existing resources, but the 2005 budget does request $28
million for P-3 aircraft surveillance that will help in regard
to our interdiction efforts, and also the assets that we need
for the CAPP or the protection of our air space. So there are
some funds designated in the 2005 budget for this purpose.
As to the exact time frame on the deployment and the
establishment of the air wing for the northern border, Senator,
I will have to get back to you.
[The information follows:]
Exact Timeframe on the Deployment and Establishment of the Northern
Border Air Wing
The fiscal year 2003 War Supplemental provided $20.5 million to
launch the Bellingham Air Branch, the first of five Northern Border
Branches. Planned allocation is as follows: $2.5 million for personnel
transfers, $12.6 million \1\ for medium lift helicopter acquisition and
$6.6 million for multi-role enforcement aircraft. Staffing will be
provided through a combination of new hires and the transfer of
experienced personnel from other AMO field locations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Funds from these two appropriations were combined to purchase
one medium lift helicopter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In fiscal year 2004, AMO received $35.2 million in Operations and
Maintenance (O&M) funding to launch AMO's Northern Border Branch in
Plattsburgh, NY. Planned allocation is as follows: $10 million \1\ for
medium lift helicopter acquisition and $6.6 million for multi-role
enforcement aircraft, $9.7 million for facility and $2.7 million for
aircraft spares. An additional $5.4 million was appropriated in
Salaries and Expenses funding to cover the cost of 36 personnel.
Plattsburgh and Bellingham each will be equipped with three
aircraft, including one Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft (Pilatus PC-12
fixed-wing), one Medium Lift Helicopter and one Light Enforcement
Helicopter.
The two PC-12 Pilatus aircraft have already been purchased and
delivery is expected in May 2004/early fiscal year 2005, respectively.
Contracts have not yet been awarded for the two Medium Lift Helicopters
and Light Enforcement Helicopters required for full activation of
Bellingham and Plattsburgh. Currently, the UH-60 Black Hawk is
fulfilling the MLH role and the AS350 is fulfilling the LEH role at
other AMO branch locations.
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget includes $35.2 million to
launch the third Northern Border Branch.
AMO will continue to rely principally on detailees to execute the
ongoing National Capital Region (NCR) Airspace mission. AMO has
sustained the NCR mission by transferring funding, personnel and
equipment from other missions and requirements.
LONG-RANGE RADAR SYSTEM
Senator Cochran. We are looking forward to getting a report
from the Air and Marine Operations officials on the current
radar situation around the country. What is the total amount
that the FAA had in its budget for operating the long-range
radar system? Can you tell us how much is being requested by
other agencies across the government by agency, and is there
any particular reason that new resources are being requested in
the fiscal year 2005 budget to allow the Department to assume
this FAA responsibility, as opposed to a transfer from the FAA
budget?
Mr. Hutchinson. You're not speaking of our TARS, you're
speaking of the long-range----
Senator Cochran. The long-range radar system.
Mr. Hutchinson. I don't know the answer as to why that is
not being transferred from the FAA, but clearly that is a
priority to have that capability for the protection of our
borders.
TSA: PORT SECURITY GRANTS
Senator Cochran. The Transportation Security
Administration's budget has 54 percent of the request dedicated
for aviation passenger and baggage screeners pay, benefits,
training and human resource services. There are other grant
programs administered by the TSA dealing with trucking
security, port security grants, and operation of safe commerce
that are slated to be moved to the Office for Domestic
Preparedness under the reorganization of the Department. The
2005 budget proposes to reduce or terminate funding for these
programs. My question is, will the Transportation Security
Administration continue to have responsibility for security
over all sectors of transportation or will aviation security
continue to be the main focus of the agency?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, in terms of budget, clearly aviation
would be the main focus of the agency, but in terms of
responsibilities and partnerships, the other modes of
transportation are very important to us. I know that for
example, in reference to Amtrak, there is a close partnership
there, we have some pilot projects where we are working with
Amtrak to enhance security, and we believe that we would
exercise this through standard setting, best practices and
regulation if necessary.
In reference to the grant programs, the expertise still
resides in TSA. And even though the grant program is being
transferred to the Office for Domestic Preparedness in Homeland
Security, we will be connected in terms of evaluating those
grants, and helping to set the priorities for those in terms of
security, and that would be true for the other grants in the
transportation modes.
Senator Cochran. So there will be coordination and an
active role for the Transportation Security Administration in
coordinating with the Office for Domestic Preparedness for the
administration of those programs?
Mr. Hutchinson. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. That's essential
and that was the understanding when that transfer was made.
Senator Cochran. Is there an indication that additional
funds may be made available within the existing grant programs
for port security grants in the Office for Domestic
Preparedness?
Mr. Hutchinson. I think that the grant level is as
suggested in the 2005 budget, but I know that in 2003 there
were a number of rounds that had built up and been announced
for the port security grants. I don't know exactly the layout
planned for 2004, but as far as I know, that amount of grant
money is fixed based upon the allocation in the 2004 budget.
TSA: SCREENERS
Senator Cochran. The Aviation and Transportation Security
Act provided that the Federal Government be responsible for
screening operations for airline passengers at airports
throughout the country, and there was a pilot program
established at five airports to utilize private screeners in
place of Federal screeners. One of these is located in
Mississippi. The law provides for the ability of airports to
apply to the Department of Homeland Security to opt out of
using Federal screeners and to use qualified private screening
companies at the end of a 3-year period, and that will be
coming up in November of this year. When do you anticipate
results of the Department's study on the private screening
companies to be made available from these five airports that
have been participating in the program?
Mr. Hutchinson. I think there are two things I would
emphasize. One, it is important to get the results from those
five airports that were the subject of that pilot for private
screening. I would expect that information within the coming
months so it can be evaluated. The second part of the equation
is the criteria that we would use for determining how we
respond to those airports that might request to opt out. And, I
have asked for that plan and that program to be developed and
reported back to me for review. With both of those issues
resolved, I think in the coming months we should have an
indication as to the results and the direction we can go.
Senator Cochran. There is some indication that the funding
might not be sufficient to provide additional airports with the
funds to use private screeners. There is $119 million in this
year's appropriated account for private screening programs, but
only a $10 million increase requested for 2005. Do you
anticipate a need for additional funding if airports apply to
use private screeners?
Mr. Hutchinson. I would think the assumption is that it
would be a level costing. I don't think we would anticipate a
private screening capability or authorization to be based on an
increase in funding for that airport.
FLETC
Senator Cochran. The Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center was given responsibility for the Charleston, South
Carolina training facility in this fiscal year 2004. This
facility was previously operated and maintained by the Border
Patrol. Has the Department of Homeland Security developed the
level of funding that should be transferred to the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center to operate this location, and if
so, when will this transfer take place?
Mr. Hutchinson. The transfer has effectively taken place.
The FLETC has taken over the responsibility for that facility
and the Border Patrol operations. It is being handled out of
the regular portion of the budget. I am not aware of any
specific needs that would require increased funding.
TRANSIT WITHOUT VISA PROGRAM
Senator Cochran. Senator Stevens, I appreciate your being
able to come to the hearing. You're recognized for any
statements or questions you may have of the witness.
Senator Stevens. I'm here, Mr. Chairman, and good morning,
Senator Byrd, primarily because my staff has told me that there
is an intent of Homeland Security to implement new regulations
to replace the transit without visa program. This, I'm told
it's called the TWOV program, falls apart every time the alert
status is raised, and has led numerous carriers to bypass U.S.
airports, particularly our Anchorage airport, which is the
largest cargo landing airport in the United States today. There
is significant loss of revenues for the airports because the
foreign carriers will not respond as quickly as the changes
come about in our programs.
And we had significant capability for intelligence
gathering opportunities when those flights came through. As a
matter of fact, our people cooperated totally with the
intelligence people to make sure that we gained all the
information we possibly could get from any activity with regard
to the shipments.
But we have had one international carrier that has
suspended its stop in Anchorage three times now since 9/11.
Every time the TWOV program is raised because of risk status,
they just cancel out. We want to join with you, and with the
whole country in terms of homeland protection, but it does seem
to me that we ought to have some sort of regimen that will take
into account the necessity to maintain these flights on a
regular schedule.
Right after 9/11, as you know, many of them cancelled in
Alaska altogether and went to Canada. Those same flights left
Canada and put the burden for checking the flights on the
carriers in the interior of the midwest, rather than in the
area of Alaska where we have substantial qualified people for
that activity. Because it's such a large airport and handles so
much volume of cargo, it can get the job done quickly, much
more quickly than a smaller airport which does not have that
volume and is not used to doing the check as the first stop in
the United States. Are you familiar with this at all?
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, sir. In reference to the transit
without visa program, it was suspended because of specific
threat information that we had. It was suspended. We recognized
the adverse economic consequences that this had on the
Anchorage airport, which has a significant transit without visa
passenger load. We immediately started working with the
airlines to determine what security measures could be put into
place that would allow us to reinstitute a similar type of
program that would not have the security vulnerabilities.
We have developed an answer and a program that we could put
into place, which would reinstitute similar portions of that
type of program, and would allow the transiting of some of the
international passengers through our airports again. We are
circulating that plan in the interagency process, and we do
hope that we will be able, in the near future, to have a
resolution of that. We understand the economic consequences, we
do want to have the security measures in place before it is
reinstituted.
And you're right, Senator, it was complicated by the fact
that over the holidays we did have a specific threat to the
aviation industry, which would not have been a good time to
redeploy that program or a similar one.
Senator Stevens. These are the so-called ATP regulations?
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Stevens. Will they be promulgated in a way that
they will not change on an orange alert?
Mr. Hutchinson. That is correct. These would be designed so
that they provide the security measures that are necessary and
they would allow for a constant program. Now I can tell you
that, you know, if we have a specific threat information and we
see there is a vulnerability that we didn't even think about,
it's within the realm of possibility that we might have to take
an additional security step in orange that would impact that
program. But that is not the design, the design is that it
would have a constant flow because it has the security measures
in place.
Senator Stevens. On the last recess I went to Anchorage and
I went through the whole new wing of the airport that has been
designed in total compliance with your Department. As a matter
of fact, we have a problem because your Department requested
and received over some $40 million from the amount of money
that was put up to build the terminal. For the Homeland
Security facilities within the new addition, they had to be
finished before the terminal could be finished. And so they all
agreed, and I now have the task of getting another $40 million,
and that's another fight down the road.
But the problem is that it was designed to handle the
regulations that were in effect, and now those regulations, if
they are changed, will require an additional kind of management
of the cargo. We're not talking about a very heavy passenger
load internationally. This is primarily cargo. There are very
few passengers on those planes and in many instances none. What
we're looking at is the cargo problem. I'm told that there are
6.5 miles of tracks that are suspended from the ceiling that
carry this cargo so it has a chance to be inspected, and then
it can go back on the plane. I don't think anywhere else in the
United States has that design.
But, by the changes in this ATP, what happens is that they
go to Vancouver or go to another place, Calgary, and then they
go to land in some podunk that doesn't have any facility at
all. So we are over intensifying regulation in an area that, I
believe, has the most modern baggage and cargo inspection in
the country today, and should have with the volume of cargo we
have coming through there. I urge you to consider what the
change in regulations does to that installation. It puts cargo
into places ultimately, if it's going to continue on to the
United States, if it's destined for what we call the South 48,
it's going to completely disrupt this process and put enormous
burdens on small airports when we're prepared to take the total
burden but for the continued change in the regulations.
Mr. Hutchinson. We'll certainly look at the concern that
you raise, and recognize the investment in security that has
already been made. I think the proposed plan, that again is in
interagency circulation, looks not just at the physical
security arrangement, but addresses some other vulnerabilities
dealing with the passengers that would travel under that
program. So, there are really two parts to the security
concerns. One would be the passengers who transit themselves,
and the other part would be the physical security measures that
would be placed at the airports. Obviously there has been a
substantial investment in Anchorage and that should be taken
into consideration.
Senator Stevens. I know you must travel a lot, but have you
traveled to Alaska since this new position you've got?
Mr. Hutchinson. Senator, I have not had that privilege. I
know my brother has at your invitation, but I have not been
there, and I look forward to that opportunity.
Senator Stevens. I would hope that you would see fit to
make that trip soon because these facilities are almost
completed now and this new addition is almost completed, and I
just think it's going to be unfortunate if we have invested all
this money and then find out it will not comply because of a
change in regulations.
As a matter of fact I just might arrange, Mr. Chairman, for
a little extracurricular activities for our friend from
Homeland Security if you come up soon. The sooner the better.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Senator, for that invitation.
Senator Stevens. I do hope you will come, I'm serious.
Mr. Hutchinson. I will say that if you have any concerns
when we put these regulations out, I will then make sure I go
up there to ensure everything is taken into consideration. I
will say we don't want to have an adverse impact on what's
already been done up there.
Senator Stevens. I'd like to go with you. I'd like to show
you these things and get the people out there who designed them
in compliance with existing regulations, and see if the
regulations must change, how we can quickly meet those
regulations without taking more of the AIP money.
Mr. Hutchinson. We will be glad to work with you and your
staff to make sure that that's handled in the proper way.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Stevens. Senator Byrd,
do you have anything further?
FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS
Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, your budget request for the
Federal Air Marshals is essentially a flat line request similar
to last year's funding level. Yet, on two occasions in less
than a year, late last summer and again over the recent winter
holidays, you increased the threat level to code orange, in
large part because intelligence and other indicators led you to
believe that there were enhanced threats to the United States
via airplanes flying into or over this country.
However, based on budget briefings with my staff, I
understand that the resources directed to this program are not
sufficient to hire the number of air marshals that should be
hired to maintain a more robust presence on targeted flights.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, I wrote to
Secretary Ridge today urging him to propose to this committee a
transfer of excess salary funds to the Federal Air Marshals
Program. I urge you to make that proposal soon.
Mr. Hutchinson. Senator, we're happy to receive your
letter, evaluate it and make an appropriate response. We
recognize the importance of Federal air marshals and I know
that last year, wherever there was a concern expressed about an
adverse impact on their work force, we did find the funds to
make sure that didn't happen, and certainly this year we will
make sure that there is a robust commitment there, and we look
forward to receiving your letter.
Senator Byrd. I have further questions for the record, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Hutchinson, we appreciate very much your excellent
service in the Department of Homeland Security and your
cooperation with our subcommittee. Senators may submit written
questions, I have some that I will submit, as does Senator
Byrd, and there may be others. We ask that you respond to the
questions within a reasonable time.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Byrd. I thank Secretary Hutchinson for his
appearance, for his good work, and hope that he will come to
West Virginia on his way to Alaska.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Senator. I have been to West
Virginia.
Senator Byrd. We have a beautiful place down there called
the Greenbrier.
Mr. Hutchinson. I have enjoyed those rooms.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
U.S. VISITOR AND IMMIGRANT STATUS INDICATOR TECHNOLOGY (US VISIT)
Question. Last week, President Bush met with President Vicente Fox
of Mexico and announced that citizens of Mexico who hold border
crossing cards and are frequent crossers of the border will not have
each entry recorded into the US VISIT database. Please provide a more
detailed explanation of this policy?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security is committed to
developing a solution for the processing of Border Crossing Card (BCC)
holders.
--Most Mexican citizens who travel to and from the United States
regularly may apply for a multi-use travel document, B1/B2
Visa/BCC also known as a ``laser visa'', which serves as either
a BCC or a B1/B2 visa. Mexican citizens who use the travel
document only as a BCC will not initially be subject to US
VISIT processing during primary inspection inasmuch as their
biometric data (fingerscans and photographs) have already been
captured during the BCC issuance process. This is an interim
solution for the land border while the Department explores the
long term solution to record the entry and exit of persons
crossing our land ports of entry.
--When admitted under the BCC program, Mexican citizens may stay in
the United States for up to 72 hours and travel within the
``border zone'' (within 25 miles of the border in Texas,
California and New Mexico, and 75 miles of the border in
Arizona). Approximately 6.8 million Mexican nationals today
utilize a BCC to make approximately 104 million crossings per
year when using the card as a BCC card only.
--Prior to issuing a BCC to a Mexican citizen, the Department of
State conducts biographic and biometric checks on the
individual. The fingerscans and photograph of the Mexican
citizen are then embedded into the BCC. A holder of a BCC is
inspected to determine that he or she is the rightful bearer of
the document when crossing through a U.S. port of entry.
--As the next phase of US VISIT is implemented at southern land ports
of entry by the end of 2004, if a Mexican citizen chooses to
use the BCC as a B1/B2 visa (traveling outside the ``border
zone'' and/or staying longer than 72 hours in the United
States), he or she will undergo US VISIT processing at the land
border secondary inspection areas.
Question. Customs and Border Protection is in the process of
deploying readers for the border crossing cards. What will be the
policy as to when border crossing cards are read? Will the readers be
integrated into US VISIT eventually?
Answer. In certain circumstances, Homeland Security's Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) officers may have reason to believe the person
presenting the BCC is not the person to whom it was issued. At that
point, the individual is sent to secondary inspection to determine if
there are any problems with the BCC, which could include running the
BCC through a biometric reader or processing the person through US
VISIT.
IDENT/IAFIS INTEGRATION PROJECT
Question. The Department of Justice Office of Inspector General
issued a report on the progress made in integrating the biometric
systems of the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
Justice. While the report does not make specific recommendations to the
Department of Homeland Security, it does state that the IDENT/ENFORCE
project team reports through the US VISIT program office. Further, it
indicates that some of the delay in implementing the integration is due
to the emphasis that is being placed on the roll-out of US VISIT. Is
this project receiving enough support and attention? Should a separate
project office be set up to implement this program?
Answer. The implementation of IDENT/IAFIS is a top priority at both
DHS and DOJ, and a working group has been developed of representatives
from DOJ, FBI, CBP, ICE, USCIS and US VISIT to define plans for
completion of IDENT/IAFIS implementation at all 115 Air, 14 Sea, 165
Land Border POEs, as well as all Border Patrol Stations and specified
ICE locations.
Question. Have you finalized a deployment schedule to roll-out
Version 1.2 of the IDENT/IAFIS integration project to all Border Patrol
facilities? When will the Version 1.2 roll out be completed?
Answer. Currently a comprehensive plan to complete implementation
of Version 1.2 of the IDENT/IAFIS integration project is being
developed including components from FBI, DOJ, CBP, ICE, USCIS and US
VISIT. The implementation of 70 percent of Border Patrol Facilities is
scheduled for the end of this year, and the remaining 30 percent by the
end of next year.
Question. What consideration is being given to rolling out the Real
Time Image Quality software developed for US VISIT to other IDENT
stations in order to improve the quality of the fingerprint being
captured?
Answer. The use of the real time image quality capture inside of US
VISIT has been a significant enhancement to US VISIT. This capture
improvement has really enhanced US VISIT and expanding this to IDENT is
currently a system change request for the contractors to implement.
Question. What funds will the Department be dedicating to this
project in fiscal year 2004, and what account will fund this project?
Answer. US VISIT is working to obtain approval to utilize $4
million (which remains unexpended) from the $10.1 million received as
part of the 2002 Counter Terrorism funding (Public Law 107-117).
Question. What funds are requested for fiscal year 2005?
Answer. $3 million from base resources will be used in fiscal year
2005 to complete IDENT/IAFIS deployment.
72-HOUR RULE--SOUTHWEST BORDER
Question. As the Border and Transportation Security Directorate
moves forward with implementing the US VISIT system, what is the
Department's position on revising the 72-hour rule to allow Mexican
citizens that have been cleared to possess a border crossing card to
stay in the United States for a longer period of time?
Answer. While the Department of State adjudicates the application
for a Border Crossing Card (BCC), DHS is responsible for establishing
the policy surrounding the use and eligibility of such a visa document.
Many Mexican citizens who travel to and from the United States
regularly apply for a multi-use travel document, also known as a
``laser visa,'' which serves as either a BCC or a B1/B2 visa. Mexican
citizens who use the travel document only as a BCC will not initially
be subject to US VISIT processing during primary inspection inasmuch as
their biometric data (fingerscans and photographs) is captured during
the BCC issuance process. This is an interim solution for the land
border while the Department explores the long term solution to record
the entry and exit of persons crossing our land ports of entry. As the
next phase of US VISIT is implemented at southern land ports of entry
by the end of 2004, if a Mexican citizen chooses to use the BCC as a
B1/B2 visa (traveling outside the ``border zone'' and/or staying longer
than 72 hours in the United States), he or she will undergo US VISIT
processing at the land border secondary inspection areas. Readers for
BCC's will be deployed at the 50 busiest land ports of entry by the end
of June 2004.
Question. When does the Department plan to move forward with
revising the rule?
Answer. We hope to complete our review soon. Once the review of the
BCC document is complete, we'll be able to make a more informed
decision regarding this rule.
STAFFING OF UNDER SECRETARY'S OFFICE
Question. The Border and Transportation Security Directorate
oversees 20 percent of the entire Department's budget--with such
disparate areas as trade enforcement, airport screening, protection of
Federal facilities, and training inspectors. Not only is the
responsibility wide, but it includes arguably the organization with the
most difficult management problems. For the last year, the Under
Secretary for Border and Transportation Security's office has relied
heavily on detailees from within the Department and even from
organizations outside of the Department of Homeland Security.
Currently, 56 percent of the filled positions in the office are staffed
by detailees. Have you been able to move ahead with hiring permanent
employees? Do you expect the office to be fully staffed by permanent
employees by the end of fiscal year 2004?
Answer. We have aggressively pursued the permanent staffing for the
Office of the Under Secretary. We have entered into an interagency
agreement with the Office of Personnel Management to provide dedicated
position classification and staffing services to this office and fully
expect to have selections made for all permanent staff by the end of
fiscal year 2004.
Question. Is the Under Secretary's office staffed properly to allow
it to oversee and coordinate such a board reach of programs?
Answer. The Under Secretary's office is properly staffed to oversee
the Directorate's programs. We appreciate your recognition of the
challenges within the first year: forming the new bureaus of Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE); fielding US VISIT system requirements on time and within budget;
maturing the Transportation Security Administration; and reorienting
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center's mission focus to meet the
needs of the new Department. The Department continually assesses its
effectiveness and efficiency, and we will promptly communicate any
additional resource requirements, as necessary, to ensure we can meet
our mission requirements.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FUNDING
Question. The budget proposes to transfer additional research and
development programs out of the components within the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate to the Science and Technology
Directorate, but it does not transfer all of the programs. Have all of
these research and development programs been identified? Are there more
programs that should be transferred to the Science and Technology
Directorate, such as the Transportation Security Lab within the
Transportation Security Administration, or the Research, Evaluation and
Development Branch within the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection?
Answer. The budget proposes to transfer some Border and
Transportation Security Directorate research and development programs
to the Science and Technology Directorate to help improve the
effectiveness and efficiency for certain programs. The other programs
have synergies or considerations that require additional consideration
before change is recommended.
Question. Do you feel that good working relationships have been
established between the Border and Transportation Directorate and the
Science and Technology Directorate? Are the needs of the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate being met?
Answer. Yes. Since the start up of the Department, we have worked
hand in hand with the Science and Technology Directorate. The Science
and Technology Directorate has established a Border and Transportation
Security Portfolio Manager. We also have a joint BTS and S&T Technology
Working Group that is developing a technology roadmap for BTS to ensure
we leverage technology in the most appropriate manner.
PERFORMANCE-BASED PAY SYSTEM
Question. The Department's budget for fiscal year 2005 includes
resources to implement the performance-based pay system. Did the Border
and Transportation Security Directorate play a role in creating the
framework for this system? Will the needs of the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate be served by this new system?
Answer. The Border and Transportation Security Directorate did play
a role in creating the framework for this system which is being
designed to meet the needs of all components of the Department. In
April 2003, the Secretary and the Director of the Office of Personnel
Management established a DHS/OPM HR Systems Design Team composed of DHS
managers and employees, HR experts from DHS and OPM, and professional
staff from the agency's three largest Federal employee unions. The DHS
employees on this 48 member team represented a cross-section of the
Department including employees from the following components within the
Border and Transportation Security Directorate: the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center; the Transportation Security Administration; and the
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection.
During April and July of 2003, this team entered a research and
outreach phase, examining promising and successful practices and
conducting a series of town hall meetings and focus groups across the
country in order to inform employees about the design process and to
solicit employee's perceptions of current HR policies. These outreach
sessions included employees from across DHS, including a representative
sample of employees from the Border and Transportation Security
Directorate.
As a result of the work of the Systems Design Team, 52 options were
presented to a Senior Review Committee whose members included two top
officials from the Border and Transportation Security Directorate:
Robert Bonner, Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection; and James
Loy, then Administrator, Transportation Security Administration.
One of the roles of this Committee was to discuss the work of the
Design Team and to express views that would inform decisions to be made
subsequently by DHS Secretary Ridge and OPM Director James regarding
which systems should be implemented within DHS. The Committee members
agreed that any new HR system for DHS must be mission-focused and that
its design must facilitate mission performance and that HR options
might need to be tailored to specific parts of DHS.
The proposed regulations published in the Federal Register on
February 20, 2004, reflect the thoughtful review and consideration by
Secretary Ridge and Director James of all input received during the
process as outlined above. It was determined that the regulations, as
proposed, would best meet the needs of the Border and Transportation
Security Directorate, as well as the Department as a whole.
Question. What are the estimates for how much it will cost to
implement the new performance-based pay compensation system within the
Border and Transportation Security Directorate?
Answer. $102.5 million requested in the President's Budget for
implementation of the new HR system Department wide. BTS' share of
implementation costs is covered in this request. Costing for design and
deployment of the new HR system was identified based on independent
government cost estimates that were developed to plan for the
anticipated systems integration contract. Other agencies of similar
size and complexity, notably Treasury, were benchmarked in projecting
team size and skill levels and associated labor rates. Cost breakouts
were estimated based on detailed GSA labor category descriptions and a
skill analysis of the types and levels of contract employees that will
be needed to support this effort. Major breakdown of costs includes:
$27 million for program management, oversight and evaluation; $31
million for training and communications to support system
implementation; $42 million for detailed systems design and
implementation support (business process reengineering, compensation
expertise, etc.); and $2.5 million to fund the HQ performance pool.
As additional background for each of the major funding categories:
Centralized program management funding is required to manage
appropriate cost, schedule, and control activities at the Departmental
level, ensuring that the system investment is managed appropriately and
at a good value. Program management funding will also provide for OMB-
required earned value management, as well as risk management and
evaluative activities. A centralized program management philosophy,
rather than each component attempting to manage their own
implementation, is critical in keeping program costs down and in
ensuring consistency of deployment across the enterprise.
Training funds are absolutely essential in ensuring that the new HR
flexibilities achieve the desired results. Funding is provided to
adequately train all DHS executives, managers and supervisors on
aspects of the new system and their responsibilities as leaders in the
DHS environment. Training funding will also provide for awareness and
change management activities to ensure that all DHS employees
understand system changes. Funding will support a comprehensive HR
certification program to ensure that DHS HR professional are prepared
for system changes and new job responsibilities.
Funding for detailed systems design and implementation support is
required to provide access to experts that will assist in designing the
particulars of the new DHS performance management system, job
evaluation system (including the creation of job clusters),
compensation system (including new pay ranges and market pay
processes), linkages for pay and performance, and development of
competencies for DHS positions. This detailed expertise is required to
ensure that DHS designs a program that appropriately links pay,
competencies and performance and through that linkage DHS performance
is enhanced.
We are projecting fully loaded life cycle costs of $408.5 million
for complete system implementation. It is important to note that the
$102.5 million is requested for full implementation of the new system
(including project management, systems design, training and
communications, etc.), not just the training aspects of system
implementation. Major components of this figure include $102.5 million
for system implementation, $10 million for Coast Guard performance
pool, an estimated $165 million for other component performance pools,
and a 6-year life cycle cost of $131 million for human resources
information technology.
Question. Is there a timeline as to when each of the components of
the Border and Transportation Security Directorate will transition to
this new compensation system? If so, what is it?
Answer. Current plans provide for all components of the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate, which are covered by the proposed
regulations, to be converted to a new compensation system in January of
2006.
TETHERED AEROSTAT RADAR SYSTEM
Question. The information provided by the Tethered Aerostat Radar
System, known as TARS, is a critical component in the Department's
efforts to interdict illicit air traffickers. Do you believe that the
Department of the Defense is providing sufficient support to the TARS
program to enable the Air and Marine Program to effectively carry out
its mission?
Answer. The TARS program has declined from 14 operational sites to
8 operational sites (Lajas, Puerto Rico, is due back on-line in May).
Recent close coordination and meetings between the Department of
Homeland Security and the Deputy Assistant of Defense for Counter
Narcotics have resulted in frank and open discussions related to TARS.
The dialogue is productive and ongoing at this time, and DHS'
requirements have been acknowledged by DOD. DHS believes that this
critical system supports homeland security and provides a critical
detection and monitoring capability. That mission is a DOD
responsibility. The DHS position is that Congress properly assigned the
mission to DOD and funded TARS to meet the mission requirements.
Question. Does the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
have the necessary expertise and personnel to take over the management
and maintenance of the TARS program?
Answer. That mission is a DOD responsibility. The DHS position is
that Congress properly assigned the mission to DOD and funded TARS to
meet the mission requirements.
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY FOR ALL MODES
Question. Three major grant programs currently administered by the
Transportation Security Administration involving trucking security,
port security grants, and Operation Safe Commerce are slated to be
moved to the Office for Domestic Preparedness under the Department's
announced reorganization of grant programs. The fiscal year 2005 budget
proposes to reduce or terminate funding for these programs.
What funding will be available within the Maritime and Land
Security operations for fiscal year 2005 to increase security for
railways, roadways, and all other modes of transportation in light of
the Administration's proposal to terminate funding for intercity bus
and trucking grants?
Answer. The responsibility of securing our Nation's rail and mass
transit systems is a shared one. DHS, DOT, and other Federal agencies
are working together to enhance rail and transit security in
partnership with the public and private entities that own and operate
the Nation's rail and transit systems. The DHS grant program for
improving rail and transit security in urban areas has awarded or
allocated over $115 million since May 2003. Additionally, the
Administration has requested $24 million for TSA to advance security
efforts in the maritime and surface transportation arenas, and has
requested that $37 million of the Federal Transit Administrations Urban
Security Bus grants be available for security related projects. In
addition, DHS will conduct the following activities and initiatives to
strengthen security in surface modes:
--Implement a pilot program to test new technologies and screening
concepts to evaluate the feasibility of screening luggage and
carry-on bags for explosives at rail stations and aboard
trains;
--Develop and implement a mass transit vulnerability self-assessment
tool;
--Continue the distribution of public security awareness material
(i.e., tip cards, pamphlets, and posters) for motorcoach,
school bus, passenger rail, and commuter rail employees;
--Increase passenger, rail employee, and local law enforcement
awareness through public awareness campaigns and security
personnel training;
--Ensure compliance with safety and security standards for commuter
and rail lines and better help identify gaps in the security
system in coordination with DOT, with additional technical
assistance and training provided by TSA;
--Continue to work with industry and State and local authorities to
establish baseline security measures based on current industry
best practices and with modal administrations within the DOT as
well as governmental and industry stakeholders, to establish
best practices, develop security plans, assess security
vulnerabilities, and identify needed security enhancements; and
--Study hazardous materials (HAZMAT) security threats and identify
best practices for transport of HAZMAT.
Question. How will the Transportation Security Administration
coordinate with the Office for Domestic Preparedness on the grant
programs (trucking security, port security grants, intercity bus
grants, and Operation Safe Commerce) that will be moved pursuant to the
reorganization?
Answer. It is anticipated that TSA will continue to provide the
necessary operational expertise for the grant programs through
participation in pre-award management functions. These functions
include determination of eligibility and evaluation criteria,
solicitation and application review procedures, selection
recommendations and post award technical monitoring. TSA will also
continue to leverage existing transportation expertise by working with
industry stakeholders and DOT modal administrations to ensure that
Federal security grants facilitate the seamless integration of security
planning activities by industry stakeholders and governmental
stakeholders at the regional, State, and local levels.
Question. In addition to the $169 million made available for the
port security grant program by the Transportation Security
Administration, $75 million was made available in fiscal year 2003 by
the Office for Domestic Preparedness for the same purpose. Do you
anticipate that funds will be made available once again for port
security grants within the existing grant programs in the Office for
Domestic Preparedness?
Answer. The fiscal year 2005 President's budget requests $46
million for Port Security Grants under the Office for Domestic
Preparedness.
TSA'S ROLE WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Question. Over 54 percent of the President's budget request for the
Transportation Security Administration for fiscal year 2005 is
dedicated for aviation passenger and baggage screeners' pay, benefits,
training, and human resource services. Last year, Admiral Loy testified
that the Transportation Security Administration was developing a
National Transportation System Security Plan (NTSSP) to explain ``its'
vision to complete the important task of ensuring the security of all
modes of transportation, not just the aviation sector''.
Will the Transportation Security Administration continue to have
responsibility for security over all sectors of transportation or will
aviation security continue to be the main focus for TSA?
Answer. Ensuring that our Nation's transportation systems are
secure must be accomplished through effective partnering between
appropriate Federal, State, local and private industry entities.
Although TSA was created in the wake of the September 11 attacks and
charged with responsibility for ensuring that all modes of
transportation are secured, the Administration has consistently held
that that this responsibility must involve the coordination of
appropriate Federal, State, local and private industry partners, many
of whom were already in the business of providing security for their
particular piece of the transportation puzzle. TSA's main charge, both
under ATSA and now as part of the DHS family, is to coordinate these
efforts under the guidance of the Secretary and the Under Secretary for
Border and Transportation Security, identifying gaps and working with
appropriate partners to ensure that existing security gaps are filled.
Recognizing this, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has
requested substantial resources in fiscal year 2005 across the agencies
within the Department involved with securing transportation modes other
than aviation, including resources in the Coast Guard and Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) for ports, maritime security, and cargo
security; in Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP)
for vulnerability assessments, intelligence, and infrastructure
protection for all sectors including transportation; and in Emergency
Preparedness & Response (EP&R) for emergency response to only name a
few. In addition to working with other DHS components, TSA works
closely with our sister Federal agencies outside of DHS to ensure that
all government resources are maximized. For example, under the
leadership of BTS and DHS, TSA is coordinating key standards-setting
efforts in areas such as transit and rail security, and is working
closely with modal administrations of the Department of Transportation
to help leverage their existing resources and security efforts to
accomplish security goals.
Question. When can we expect the National Transportation System
Security Plan and what role will the Transportation Security
Administration play in securing all modes of transportation?
Answer. TSA's role in securing the transportation system begins at
the system or sector-wide level, across the individual modes, thus
ensuring consistency and consideration of inter-modal issues (such as
assets, incidents, or supply chains that straddle multiple modes, and
inter-modal exercises). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has
assigned TSA primary Sector Specific Responsibility (SSR) for the
Transportation Sector as DHS implements Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 7 (HSPD-7), which directs the establishment of ``a national
policy for Federal departments and agencies to identify and prioritize
United States critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect
them from terrorist attacks.'' In accordance with DHS's HSPD-7
implementation plan, TSA is developing the Transportation Sector
Specific Plan (SSP). A first draft of the SSP is due to DHS by early
summer, 2004 (at the same time when SSPs from the other 12 sectors of
critical infrastructure are also due). In developing the transportation
SSP, TSA is working under BTS guidance and with partners in the U.S.
Coast Guard and the Department of Transportation (DOT). The SSP will
discuss how Federal and private-sector stakeholders will communicate
and work together; how important assets in the transportation sector
will be identified, assessed, and prioritized; how protective programs
will be developed; how progress in reducing risk will be measured; and
how R&D will be prioritized in the sector. In the Transportation
Sector, the SSP will further these efforts currently underway and help
ensure that they are systematic, complete, and consistent with the
efforts in the other 12 sectors.
Prior to the issuance of HSPD-7, TSA was TSA was developing the
National Transportation System Security Plan (NTSSP). Its purpose was
to provide a systematic sector-wide approach to Transportation
Security, to pull all Federal partners into the effort together, and to
provide guidance to the writers of Modal Security Plans. Now HSPD-7 is
driving an economy-wide systematic approach to Infrastructure
Protection, including the Transportation SSP described above. The SSP
will be expanded into a ``new'' NTSSP, by adding additional chapters
(some already drafted in the ``old'' NTSSP) to complete the original
intent of the NTSSP. This includes guiding development of Modal
Security Plans, providing explicit links to other Federal plans such as
the National Response Plan (NRP) and the National Incident Management
System (NIMS), and other operational guidance. On behalf of DHS and in
conjunction with other Federal agencies, the completed NTSSP will guide
and integrate a family of security plans to prevent, mitigate, and
respond to intentional disruption of the Nation's transportation
systems while ensuring freedom of movement for people and commerce.
Parts of the draft ``old'' NTSSP are already in use, as the USCG
drafts the MTSA-mandated Maritime Transportation Security Plan, and as
other modal security plans begin development. A draft of the ``new''
NTSSP should be completed by the end of summer, 2004.
TSA's role within each sector will vary from mode to mode. In
aviation security, TSA has the operational and regulatory lead role.
TSA's efforts in non-aviation security over the past 2 years have
focused on greater information sharing between industry and all levels
of government, assessing vulnerabilities in non-aviation sectors to
develop new security measures and plans, increasing training and public
awareness campaigns, and providing greater assistance and funding for
non-aviation security activities. In partnership with other component
agencies of DHS and in coordination with DOT, State, local and private
sector partners, TSA will continue to leverage existing security
initiatives, coordinate the development of national performance-based
security standards and guidance; identify areas where regulations may
be necessary to improve the security of passengers, cargo, conveyances,
transportation facilities and infrastructures; and identify areas where
better compliance with established regulations and policies can be
achieved. TSA will work with DHS components, modal administrators
within DOT, and its government and industry stakeholders to continue
these efforts, establish best practices, develop security plans, assess
security vulnerabilities, and identify needed security enhancements.
Question. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires the
Transportation Security Administration be maintained as a distinct
entity within the Department of Homeland Security for 2 years from the
date of enactment with the sunset of the Transportation Security
Administration as a distinct entity within the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate to occur November 2004. How do you
envision the Transportation Security Administration's role within the
Department of Homeland Security if not maintained as a separate
distinct entity in the Border and Transportation Security Directorate?
Answer. The Homeland Security Act requires that TSA be maintained
as a distinct entity for 2 years after enactment. As an integral part
of the Border and Transportation Security Directorate, TSA is currently
providing a robust security framework in the aviation environment and
coordinating closely with other DHS and DOT partner agencies both to
identify security vulnerabilities in other modes of transportation and
identify appropriate mitigation strategies to reduce those
vulnerabilities. Further, TSA is coordinating Federal efforts to
develop the transportation chapter of the National Critical
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NCIP) being developed as a result of
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) number 7. At this time
there are no plans to alter TSA's status as a distinct entity within
the BTS Directorate; however, the Secretary continually reviews the
missions and programs of each DHS component to ensure that they
complement, rather than duplicate the missions of any other. In the
event that the Secretary decides, under authority conferred upon him by
Section 872 of the Homeland Security Act, to reorganize any of the
components of the Department including the TSA, appropriate
notification will be provided to relevant Congressional committees by
the President.
FEDERAL SCREENER OPT-OUT PROGRAM
Question. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act passed
shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, provided for
the ability of airports to apply to the Department of Homeland Security
to opt-out of using Federal screeners and to use qualified private
screening companies at the end of a 3-year period which occurs this
November 2004.
When do you anticipate the results of the Department's study on the
private screening companies that have been providing passenger
screening at the five airports participating in the pilot program will
be made available?
Answer. TSA hired BearingPoint to conduct an independent
performance evaluation of the private contractor screening compared to
Federal screening. The study evaluated performance in security,
compared costs, and analyzed customer/stakeholder satisfaction. It
concluded that TSA has succeeded in developing and executing a pilot
program that both meets the Congressional requirements and ensures
outstanding security. Results of the study were made public on April
22, 2004 and are available on TSA's web site at http://www.tsa.gov/
interweb/assetlibrary/Summary_Report.pdf.
Question. Do you feel that there will be a large number of airports
that will apply to use private screeners rather than continue to use
Federal screeners?
Answer. Under ATSA, individual airports may, starting on Nov 19,
2004, submit proposals to ``opt out'' of having Federal passenger and
baggage screening and to return to private companies providing those
security services under contract to and close oversight by TSA. TSA
continues to work with its key stakeholders for the development of an
application process for airports who are interested in opting out. TSA
is in the early stages of developing an efficient, understandable, and
effective procedure for opt-out applications and is currently drafting
the specific contents of the opt-out guidance. At this time, it is
still unclear how many airports will seek to opt out. Most airports are
awaiting additional details regarding the application process and
parameters of the program before making a decision. Should an airport
request to opt out, its application must be assessed and approved by
the TSA Administrator. TSA is committed to ensuring a fair, supportive
transition program that recognizes the outstanding skills of TSA's
current work force.
Question. With the opt-out date approaching rapidly, when do you
anticipate providing guidelines, application procedures, and approval
criteria for the airports that are trying to decide whether or not to
apply to use private screening companies?
Answer. TSA is currently working to develop guidelines for the opt-
out program. TSA hopes to release initial guidance in late May or early
June. This guidance will consist of an overview of issues such as,
indemnification and reimbursement to contractors, the application and
award process, and delineating clear roles and authority for TSA
headquarters, the Federal Security Directors and their staff, and the
airports and contractors, that will help airports gauge their level of
interest in the opt-out program.
Question. With $119 million provided this year for the private
screening pilot programs and only a $10 million increase requested for
fiscal year 2005, how do you anticipate providing funding for
additional airports that may apply to use private screeners?
Answer. The Administration did not request a separate funding line
item for private screening for precise reason that we cannot predict in
advance what airport interest will be in an opt-out program. All
funding requested was rolled up into one screener line, and it is
critical that the Congress provide maximum flexibility to allocate
resources. Supporting budget documents showed a level of $130 million
purely for display and comparability purposes. This amount will provide
sufficient resources to maintain contract screener operations at the
five pilot airports through the end of fiscal year 2005. Actual funding
needs for contract screening operations may be higher or lower
depending on a variety of factors such as the current evaluation of
contract screening, the program's future deployment and management
structure, the level of interest garnered from the airport community,
and the time it takes to smoothly transition airports into and/or out
of contract screening. TSA will adjust resources between Federal and
contract screeners as necessary.
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER
Question. The United States Coast Guard and the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center recently announced plans to transfer the
United States Coast Guard's Maritime Law Enforcement School to the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Charleston, South Carolina.
What impact will this proposed change have on the Department of
Homeland Security and what additional fiscal year 2005 funding will
this consolidation require?
Answer. At the U.S. Coast Guard's request, the Maritime Law
Enforcement School located at Coast Guard Training Center Yorktown, VA,
and the Boarding Team Member School located at Coast Guard Training
Center Petaluma, CA, will be merged, relocated and commissioned as the
Coast Guard Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) Academy at the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center in Charleston, SC, by October 1, 2004. Both
the Coast Guard and the entire Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
will benefit by this consolidation of law enforcement training
functions. To reflect the increase in Coast Guard mission capabilities
and training requirements, the MLE Academy will be established to
provide expanded training for their personnel in support of maritime
homeland security and law enforcement. The MLE Academy will provide for
the training of maritime law enforcement capabilities central to all
Coast Guard maritime security missions. The MLE Academy will also
provide training to local and State law enforcement personnel in
support of the Federal Boat Safety Act. It will cost approximately $4
million to relocate the Coast Guard MLE Schools to the FLETC
Charleston. This includes one new building, a personal defensive
tactics building. The FLETC will fund $2 million for construction and
renovations. The U.S. Coast Guard will fund approximately $2 million
for transportation of existing equipment, relocation of personnel,
dependents and household goods, boarding platform training aids,
installation of a simunitions lab and telecommunications
infrastructure.
The Coast Guard will move 50 positions (FTP) to Charleston, SC. The
positions come from the USCG training centers at Yorktown, VA (36) and
Petaluma, CA (14).
The Coast Guard estimates it will train 1,872 students annually.
The affiliation and co-location with of the Coast Guard with the
FLETC provides them a first step towards standardization. It will
enhance their law enforcement training and promote better coordination
among field activities with their sister agencies. Both the Coast Guard
and the entire Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will benefit by
this consolidation of law enforcement training functions. The Homeland
Security Act consolidated 22 agencies in creating the Department of
Homeland Security, and established Law Enforcement as one its core
missions. The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) directed the
integration of standards and training curriculum for ``maritime
security professionals.''
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby
Question. Over the last two funding cycles, Congress has provided
$85 million to the TSA for development, tech evaluations, pilot
programs, and rollout of a Transportation Worker Indentification Card
(TWIC). How many TWIC cards have been issued to date? What has the TSA
spent this $85 million on?
Answer. The Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, provided
$35M for the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) and
Registered Traveler (RT) programs. Of this total, $25 million was
initially assigned to TWIC, and $10 million was assigned to RT. TWIC
spent a total of $15 million on planning and executing the Technology
Evaluation Phase. TSA internally reallocated $5 million and returned
the remaining $5 million to the Treasury. The $10 million for RT was
subsequently reallocated internally. The fiscal year 2004 Appropriation
Act provided $50 million to TWIC to support planning and execution of
the Prototype Phase. Our most recent analysis indicates that $50
million is sufficient for this task. To date no operational TWIC cards
have been issued. It is estimated that up to 200,000 cards may be
issued during the Prototype Phase.
Question. When Congress tasked TSA and the Department of
Transportation with developing a plan to protect our transportation
infrastructure, Secretary Mineta moved forward with a vision for how a
transportation credential should work. Unfortunately, implementation
appears to have been hindered by poor leadership and a shifting idea of
what TWIC should be and how it should be implemented. Where is the
problem?
Answer. TWIC development continues to move forward as planned.
During the early stages of the development process, data, technical
information and lessons learned were gathered from a wide range of
sources including industry stakeholders and other Federal credentialing
projects. The RFP for the TWIC Prototype Phase will be released in the
immediate future. The proposed plan leverages the stakeholder
relationships established over the past 24 months and during the
Technology Evaluation Phase, as well as a partnership with the State of
Florida for the network of deep-water ports. The goal of the prototype
is to evaluate the full range of TWIC business processes within a
representative operational environment. The plan includes facilities
and workers from all transportation modes and is focused in three
regions, Philadelphia-Wilmington, Los Angeles-Long Beach, and the
Florida ports.
Various card production options were evaluated within the context
of system requirements. Centralized card production using existing
Federal card production facilities that meet all of the system
requirements was determined to be the most cost effective solution for
the prototype phase. Key factors in the evaluation included: physical
security and controlled access to the production process; secure supply
chains for card stock and special security features (e.g. holograms,
special inks, secret keys); standardization of training; and, economies
of scale with high capacity production machines. Centralized card
production will be further evaluated during the prototype, and the
final evaluation report will include a detailed analysis on all card
production options and a recommendation for DHS decision.
Question. According to your written testimony, you have combined
the credentialing under one program and have requested $20 million for
that line item. I am told that this request is nearly $100 million
below the level TSA needs to implement the program for only the highest
risk areas and fully $150 million below the level needed for full and
timely implementation system wide. How do you plan to make up this
shortfall?
Answer. The fiscal year 2005 President's Request includes $50
million in fee spending authority for the TWIC program. As prototype
planning continues, we have continued to explore questions surrounding
the population size, technological requirements, and methods for
achieving rapid implementation. This planning will be shared with
Congress once completed.
Question. It is my understanding that while the fiscal year 2003
bill required a thorough evaluation of all technologies, the $85
million would be adequate to evaluate and establish a basic framework
and prototype for a TWIC. Why now are you asking for more money to
complete this part of the project?
Answer. The funds that have been provided by Congress have enabled
TSA to complete the planning and technology evaluation phases and will
enable TSA to execute the Prototype Phase. In anticipation of a
successful completion of the prototype with positive results, TSA is
requesting $50 million in fiscal year 2005 to begin TWIC
implementation.
Question. Does TSA anticipate establishing a fee for the access and
administration of the TWIC? If so what will this fee fund? When can we
expect these programs to be fully underway?
Answer. The TWIC concept is a Federally-led public-private
partnership to improve security across the transportation system.
Accordingly, as authorized by Congress, TSA envisions that a fee would
be collected for each credential issued and would fund the cost of
enrollment, card production and issuance, identity management, network
infrastructure, and revocation alerts. Transportation facilities will
be responsible for access control systems and any modifications that
they choose to make in accordance with their own security plans.
The Prototype Phase is planned to be implemented over 7 months.
Upon completion of Prototype, DHS will review the data and decide how
best to implement the findings. TSA anticipates that we could begin
shortly thereafter to execute that decision.
Question. As I remember the original timetable, our ports and
greater transportation system should now be operating under a
credentialing system that will provide increased security through use
of a TWIC card and the requisite card readers and databases. The TSA
TWIC website outlines the three goals of the program as to: improve
security, enhance commerce, and protect personal privacy. Has the
lengthy process in some way increased the potential of accomplishing
these goals? What are we getting for increased costs and missed
deadlines?
Answer. The evolution of the program will result in a more robust
Prototype Phase that incorporates a process for collecting data that
will allow the exploration of multiple options for TWIC implementation,
including detailed cost-benefit analysis, assessment of feasibility of
use by facilities multiple disparate business practices, and more
inclusive, in-depth consultations with stakeholders.
Question. What have you done to ensure the security of the card?
Can you offer me assurances that the security efforts you have taken
will stand up to the test?
Answer. TWIC views security from a system perspective. TWIC is not
just a secure ID card, but it is also an identity management solution
that leverages advanced security technology and procedures to deliver
an overall chain of trust. Both the Technology Evaluation Phase and the
upcoming Prototype Phase include extensive evaluation of security
features, and security testing and evaluation will be an ongoing part
of the TWIC program.
For the card specifically, TWIC is using advanced security features
that leverage the strength of the core technology. The surface-based
technology will include special inks, security overlays and complex
visual design features that will counter attempts to forge or tamper.
The Integrated Computer Chip (ICC) is based on the NIST Government
Smart Card Specification and complies with a number of security
protocols and validations. The ICC includes encryption, secret keys,
and active defenses. TWIC will also use a biometric securely embedded
in the ICC to link the individual positively to the completed
background check and to updates to that background check.
Question. Concerns have been raised that TWIC will hinder rather
than enhance commerce. Can you provide data on what kind of delays will
occur due to TWIC access requirements?
Answer. One of TWIC's three goals is the enhancement of commerce.
The TWIC architecture was developed using extensive stakeholder inputs.
The TWIC Integrated Project Teams (IPT) have been working with regional
stakeholders to develop site level implementation plans, which will
enhance commerce at these sites. During the Technology Evaluation
Phase, access control transaction times were measured using a range of
technologies. These results were incorporated into the planning for the
Prototype Phase, which will further refine the process. The Prototype
Phase evaluation report will include extensive data on all aspects of
access control transactions, including time and impact to the
commercial process.
Question. Delays are causing problems down the line for my, and I
am sure many other senators, constituents. Recently, I was asked by one
of my constituents whether they should move forward with their own
credentialing system upgrades. I was remiss to inform him that it did
not appear TWIC would be available for use in the foreseeable future.
My constituent informed me that because of these delays he would be
forced to move forward with upgrades of his own that may or may not
work within the TWIC system. It seems ridiculous to force constituents
committed to security to invest in multiple technologies. Mr.
Secretary, that does not appear to enhance commerce to me, does it to
you? Are we supposed to have a seamless system?
Answer. TSA shares your determination to maximize the benefits of
TWIC while minimizing financial or technological burdens on
stakeholders. Consequently, a guiding principle in the design of TWIC
is that the credential be interoperable with existing security systems.
TWIC envisions a secure identity management tool that can be used in
existing access control systems. TSA is communicating with stakeholders
in order to update them on the direction of our work and thereby assist
them to make informed decisions about security investments.
Question. In addition, I am always concerned about the privacy of
individuals. Many have raised concerns about the TWIC and its
relationship to a national ID system. How will you protect the
information? How will you guarantee the security of the personal
information required to attain the TWIC?
Answer. Protection of personal privacy is one of the program's key
goals, having been seamlessly integrated in planning from the initial
system design. The DOT lead privacy advocate was a member of the
original design team. The TWIC team has and will continue to work with
the DHS and TSA Privacy Officers to ensure that TWIC remains faithful
to our stated goals.
TWIC recognizes that acceptance of the credential is inexorably
linked to the holder's confidence that his or her privacy will be
respected. TWIC is designed to operate on the minimum amount of
personal information, which will be securely stored and encrypted.
Access to personal information will be controlled and auditable. All
information that will be gathered is subject to a formal privacy impact
assessment.
Question. The focus of TSA and the Directorates funding is towards
Airline Security. As I understand it, the TWIC will increase security
across the transportation system as a whole. In fact, at some point
Admiral Loy characterized TWIC as a ``Flagship Program''. If this is a
``Flagship Program'', what is the delay in implementation? What are you
doing to fix this problem?
Answer. TWIC remains an important initiative for DHS and TSA. The
longer timeline is indicative of the need to explore different options
on how best to implement an identity management system for
transportation workers across multiple facilities, consultation with
stakeholders, and to incorporate learning into the development process.
Question. Mr. Secretary, what have you done to ensure that
evaluation of TWIC moves forward in a manner that does provide the tax
payer with a safe and secure transportation system, while improving the
flow of commerce and constantly ensuring our citizens privacy?
Answer. We recognize the urgency of the advancing this program. The
Prototype Phase is scheduled to begin in the summer of 2004 and last 8
months. We are committed to a fast track process for review of the
results of the Prototype Phase and making final decisions on
implementation.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
CAPPS II--AIRLINE PASSENGER INFORMATION SYSTEM
Question. Mr. Secretary, the fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security
Appropriations Act included a provision requiring the General
Accounting Office (GAO) to review the privacy and security of the
proposed CAPPS II airline passenger pre-screening system. Last month,
the GAO submitted a report to us that stated that your Department has
met only one of the eight criteria that we set out before you could
move ahead with deployment of the system.
I understand that the Department concurs with GAO's findings. Where
is DHS now in testing of the CAPPS II system? What is your timeframe?
How long do you expect to test the system?
Answer. Seven of the eight areas identified by the Congress could
not be certified by the GAO as having been completed, as they are
contingent on testing of CAPPSII. System testing can only begin once
TSA obtains a significant quantity of PNR data from airlines or from
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) under the terms of an
agreement DHS reached with the European Commission for CBP's use of
such data. However, the agreement has not yet been ratified by the
European Parliament. Once PNR data is received for testing purposes, 30
days is required for evaluation of the data. Testing will then be
conducted for 30 days, followed by 30 days for analysis of the test
results. Once testing is complete, the seven remaining areas of
interest to the Congress can be certified by the GAO.
CAPPS II--TESTING
Question. One of the concerns about the testing of the proposed
CAPPS II system has been the lack of access to actual traveler data to
test the system. Airlines have been reluctant to voluntarily provide
data because of the very real concerns of privacy groups about how that
data will be used. Some have stated that this lack of data for testing
is one of the reasons why some of the specific criteria laid out in the
Appropriations Act have not been met. There is some speculation that
the Department is planning to issue regulations to compel airlines to
provide data for the purposes of testing.
Can you confirm for the Subcommittee whether the Department is
planning to compel airlines to provide data on travelers for the
purposes of testing CAPPS II? Will you provide this Subcommittee notice
of your plans prior to making any public notice? Also, of the funds
requested for this program in the fiscal year 2005 budget request, what
is requested solely for additional testing of the program--as opposed
to implementation and operation of the system?
Answer. TSA plans to use the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)
vehicle to seek public comment on the collection of Passenger Name
Record (PNR) data for the operation of the CAPPS II program, and would
likely issue an order compelling the collection of historical PNR data
for testing purposes simultaneously with publication of that NPRM. Each
of these documents would require regulated parties to take reasonable
steps to ensure that passengers are provided notice of the purpose for
which the information is collected, the authority under which it is
collected, and any consequences associated with a passenger's failure
to provide the information.
As mentioned above, system testing can only begin once TSA obtains
a significant quantity of PNR data from airlines or from U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) under the terms of an agreement DHS reached
with the European Commission for CBP's use of such data. However, the
agreement has not yet been ratified by the European Parliament.
There are two components to the plan for CAPPS II testing: testing
with historical PNR data and full system testing that would take place
once connectivity is established with an airline to test with live
data. TSA estimates the cost associated with completing system and
performance testing at $5 million. This involves testing to the system
``end to end'' to validate the ability of the system to receive all of
the different types of records from the airlines and post the results
of the risk assessment to the boarding pass. Once system testing has
been completed, performance testing is required to verify that the time
required to complete each end-to-end transaction meets the system
performance standards.
FINGERPRINT DATABASE INTEGRATION: VASTLY DELAYED AND DANGEROUS
Question. Last week, Department of Justice Inspector General Glenn
A. Fine released a report that examined the case of a Mexican citizen,
Victor Manual Batres, who had been detained by the Border Patrol on two
occasions in January 2002 for illegally entering the United States.
Both the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security
say they recognize that the databases need to be integrated, however
the IG report found uncertainty as to who is responsible for the
overall management of the integration project. It states that Justice
and Homeland have yet to enter into a memorandum of understanding
delineating the specific roles and responsibilities of each agency in
the project. It also finds that the integration project recently has
been slowed by the attention placed by Homeland on other technology
projects, such as US VISIT. You may recall that I raised this issue
with Secretary Ridge last year when he met with Senator Cochran and me
to discuss fingerprint database integration as it related to US VISIT.
Last week, Secretary Ridge acknowledged this problem and pledged to
find $4 million this year to begin to ``fix'' it. From which sources
will you find these funds and when can we expect to receive a
reprogramming or transfer proposal?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security is committed to
accelerating implementation of IDENT/IAFIS 10 fingerprint capability
for enforcement processing at ports of entry, and at Border Patrol
locations and Immigration and Customs Enforcement offices.
While we begin planning our implementation plan, we plan on using
$4 million of the remaining funds provided in Public Law 107-117
(fiscal year 2002 counter-terrorism funding) for IDENT/IAFIS
implementation. The $4 million, when combined with fiscal year 2003
funds already provided ($3.5 million obligated for IDENT/IAFIS), will
allow BTS to implement IDENT with 10 print capabilities in secondary
inspection at 115 airports, 14 seaports and 50 of the largest land
border ports. In addition, this funding will support implementation of
the IAFIS/IDENT 10 print capability at 70 percent of the Border Patrol
stations. The remaining land ports of entry, 30 percent of the Border
Patrol stations and major ICE locations (to be determined) will receive
this capability early in calendar year 2005. Funding for fielding these
capabilities is estimated to be approximately $3 million, including the
implementation of IDENT/IAFIS at Border Patrol stations will provide
the capability to biometrically identify and/or perform status
verifications on individuals suspected of illegally crossing the
border. Implementation at ICE offices will support investigation of
individuals apprehended for overstays and/or watch list hits.
Question. The IG report made a series of recommendations to
expedite integration of IDENT/IAFIS. Does this mean that your
Department will take the lead responsibility in merging these data
bases so that similar tragedies can be prevented in the future? How
long will a full integration take and how much is it likely to cost?
Answer. Yes, the Department of Homeland Security will work with the
Department of Justice to accelerate our integration into the FBI's
IAFIS (10 print, criminal history) and the legacy INS IDENT (2-print,
immigration) systems. An integrated workstation has already been
developed. It has been deployed to a limited number of sites. DHS
intends to complete deployment of this capability in 2005. The total
cost for fielding the capability is expected to be $7 million and will
be funded within existing resources.
FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS: STAFFING
Question. Your budget request for the Federal Air Marshals is
essentially a flat-line request similar to last year's funding level.
Yet on two occasions in less than a year--late last summer and again
over the recent winter holidays--you increased the threat level to Code
Orange--in large part because intelligence and other indicators lead
you to believe there were enhanced threats to the United States via
airplanes flying into or over this country.
However, based on budget briefings with my staff, I understand that
the resources directed to this program are not sufficient to hire the
number of Air Marshals that should be hired to maintain a more robust
presence on targeted flights. If that is indeed accurate, why are you
not requesting more funding for hiring additional air marshals,
expanding their training, and increasing the tools at their disposal
for protection of airplanes and their passengers?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continues to view
the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) as a fundamental component of
our national security plan and overall counter-terrorism efforts. The
services provided by the FAMS are integral to our efforts to instill
and sustain public confidence in our civil aviation system and for
providing an expanded law enforcement capability in our skies that
previously did not exist. In fact, within the span of roughly two and a
half years the FAMS has fielded a trained work force of literally
thousands of Federal Air Marshals to protect America's citizens and
interests in our commercial air transportation system.
In this same time, DHS has also worked with the Congress to invest
in, develop and implement a layered security plan that encompasses the
coordinated efforts of an entire spectrum of Federal, State and local
agencies. These agencies are working together to provide an array of
intelligence, enforcement and protection services to our civil aviation
system, our borders and to other areas vital to the Nation. Under this
strategy, we have established mechanisms and programs designed
specifically to complement one another within the limited resources
afforded to the Department. For example, DHS has invested in cutting
edge technology to airport and baggage screening activities; we have
hardened cockpit doors; we have established a Federal flight deck
officer training program; and we are continuously working to apply the
latest intelligence information in shaping our decision-making and
response to terrorist threats.
The Department has also evaluated how to best use Federal Air
Marshals to expand their effectiveness and overall impact. The FAMS was
recently transferred from the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). This
fusion of the FAMS into ICE not only establishes an integrated
enforcement presence in the aviation sector; it enhances ICE's overall
capabilities and resources to enforce its mission, which is to detect
and prevent vulnerabilities or violations that threaten the Nation's
homeland security. Furthermore, this realignment has made possible
other initiatives such as the Mission Surge Program, which will pair
Federal Air Marshals with ICE agents during peak threat periods, such
as the Code Orange alerts or other such events.
In addition to Mission Surge, the Department is also evaluating
ways to capitalize on the presence of thousands of Federal law
enforcement personnel using the civil aviation system to travel on a
daily basis. Although these personnel cannot replace a Federal Air
Marshal, they are armed and capable of providing a level of security in
the case of an in-flight event. This initiative, known as the Force
Multiplier Program, is in its infancy.
Through this layered approach, the Department continues to make
significant progress in our counter-terrorism efforts and capabilities.
The Department will continue to work with you and other members of the
Congress towards addressing your concerns and best meeting the Nation's
homeland security requirements.
US VISIT: FULL DISCLOSURE
Question. Last year Secretary Ridge took the old visa tracking
system known as ``entry-exit'' and as one of his first acts he gave it
a snazzy new name befitting the new Department--US VISIT--or the United
States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology. He also
committed that US VISIT would be operational at all of our Nation's
international airports and seaports by January 1, 2004. After some
lobbying by the airlines, who were concerned about possible problems
standing up the system--and leery of the prospect of long lines of
weary holiday travelers, he pushed back the operational day to January
5. By all accounts, the system worked, there were few technical
glitches and, as you noted in your testimony, some bad actors have been
caught by the new system. That is all to the good--as we want to know
who is entering and existing our country. Indeed, Congress first
started calling for an ``entry-exit'' system back in 1996.
But there seems to be a disconnect. There seems to be a bit of
over-selling of this program by the Secretary and the Department and
the Administration. It is true that we are capturing information and
checking fingerprints and photos with visa holders who are entering our
country at 115 airports and 14 seaports--but do not pop the champagne
just yet. At how many airports are we currently capturing information
to verify who is exiting the country? One. At only one airport out of
115 are we learning who is exiting our country. The same holds true of
exit information at our seaports--one out of 14.
Secretary Hutchinson, this troubles me. I am troubled that an
extremely important security program--and one that I support--is being
inaccurately represented. It is being presented as more than it truly
is. And I am concerned that if the Secretary and the Department can
make the claim that they met the deadline to get this program started--
when only half of the job is done for this first phase, how can we and
the American people know that the next deadline is truly met? And, if
you cannot meet your own self-imposed deadline for a relatively-easy
system in a controlled environment (people waiting to board a plane),
how can we be certain that you will meet your next deadline which we
understand is verifying the entry and exit of visa holders at our 50
largest land border ports-of-entry?
Answer. As stated in the record, the first Congressional mandate
for an electronic entry and exit system was in 1996. In 2000, the
Immigration and Naturalization Data Management Improvement Act (DMIA)
fully amended and replaced section 110 of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Under the provisions
of the DMIA, the Administration is required to integrate all authorized
or required alien arrival and departure data that are in electronic
format in existing systems maintained (at that time) by the Department
of Justice and the Department of State. The DMIA also set forth
timelines for this integration and deployment effort.
On January 5, 2004, the deployment of the newly integrated systems
containing alien entry and departure data was successfully launched to
all of our Nation's international airports of entry, as well as to 14
of the Nation's largest sea ports at which international travelers
arrive. Although, not required by statute, the Secretary sought to
improve on the mandate and requested that all non-immigrants with non-
immigrant visas entering at these locations should also have their
fingerprints scanned so that checks of additional databases containing
information on aliens could also be made. We are also piloting the
capture of biometric data at the point of departure. The collection of
data from the pilot sites is expected to continue until early in fiscal
year 2005, with plans to initiate exit installation in fiscal year 2005
based upon the solutions identified.
Building upon these successes, US VISIT functionality will be
deployed to the top 50 land border ports of entry in accordance with
the timelines set forth in DMIA. US VISIT will work with the to-be-
awarded prime contractor to develop the processes, infrastructure and
technology required to capture similar data upon entry and exit at the
land borders in a way that will minimize any deleterious effect on the
flow of goods and peoples across our borders.
TERRORIST WATCHLIST INTEGRATION
Question. One of the most important items on the Department's list
of unfinished business is the integration of terrorist watchlists.
Earlier this year, Secretary Ridge said the list would be fully
functional ``by mid-May.'' Because many of the agencies you oversee--
such as the Transportation Security Administration, Customs and Border
Protection, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement--rely daily on
accurate information about the potential threats to this country posed
by individuals on these lists, I would imagine that the integration of
this information would be a priority.
What is the status of the watch list integration and what are you
doing to ensure that rapid progress is being made on this important
national security project?
Answer. Integration of terrorist watchlists is proceeding. The
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) has been established with its own
consolidated database comprising information from the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center (TTIC). TTIC is collecting information from all the
agencies holding watchlists to verify the information and add names and
data to TSC's list.
INTEROPERABILITY GRANTS
Question. According to ``A Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire
Service'', a report conducted by FEMA in conjunction with the National
Fire Protection Administration, only one-fourth of all fire departments
can communicate with all of their rescue partners. The Council on
Foreign Relations' June, 2003 study on Homeland Security Needs
estimated that the need for interoperable communications equipment
funding was $6.8 billion over the next 5 years. The February 2003
National Task Force on Interoperability report entitled ``Why Can't We
Talk'' found that ``in many jurisdictions radio communications
infrastructure and equipment can be 20-40 years old. Different
jurisdictions use different equipment and different radio frequencies
that cannot communicate with each other. There are limited uniform
standards for technology and equipment.''
Last year, the Administration proposed and Congress agreed to drop
homeland security funding specifically for interoperability grants.
Once again, the President has proposed no specific funding for
interoperable grants and the $85 million Department of Justice program
for law enforcement interoperable grants is proposed for elimination.
The Secretary recently announced a very modest interim solution to the
interoperable problem. Yet, the Administration assumes that State and
local governments will use their first responder grants for this
purpose and requests no specific funding for the estimated $50 million
cost for the interim solution.
The President is proposing to reduce first responder grants by over
$700 million and government-wide by $1.5 billion. With these cuts, why
do you believe States will be able address both the interoperable
communication problem as well as the funding shortfall in first
responder requirements?
Answer. The President's fiscal year 2005 budget request provides
significant support for the mission and programs administered by the
Office for Domestic Preparedness. As you know, The Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) designated ODP as the principal
Federal agency responsible for the preparedness of the United States
for acts of terrorism, including coordinating preparedness efforts at
the Federal level, and working with all State, local, tribal, parish,
and private sector emergency response providers on all matters
pertaining to combating terrorism, including training, exercises, and
equipment support.
The President's request includes $3.561 million, which is a $3.3
million increase from the fiscal year 2004 request. With these
resources, ODP will be able to maintain its role in enhancing the
security of our Nation. The two primary means through which ODP
provides funds to States and the Nation's emergency prevention and
response community are the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) and
the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI). The President's fiscal year
2005 budget request includes $750 million for HSGP and more than $1.4
billion for UASI. With these funds, states, urban areas, and other
units of local government can undertake a wide range of domestic
preparedness activities, including the purchase of specialized
equipment. Interoperable communications equipment is an allowable
expense and falls within the HSGP and USAI funding requirements. In
fact, to facilitate communications interoperability, ODP strongly
encourages all new or upgraded radio systems and new radio equipment
purchased with these funds be compatible with a suite of standards
called ANSI/TIA/EIAA-102 Phase 1 (Project 25). These standards have
been developed to allow for backward compatibility with existing
digital and analog systems and provide for interoperability in future
systems.
Overall, though, I think it is important to remember that we are
operating in a fiscal and security environment where we must ensure
maximum security benefits are derived from every security dollar. To do
that, we must be able to take a new look at the way in which we
allocate resources. Additionally, given the Department's improved
ability to analyze risks, threats, and vulnerabilities, the Department
is better able to provided targeted funds to increase the security of
the Nation. The Department will continue to work with the States and
territories to provide the resources they need--equipment acquisition
funds, training and exercise support, and technical assistance--to
deter, prevent, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism.
GRANT CONSOLIDATION WITHIN ODP
Question. On January 26, your Department exercised authority
granted to you under Sec. 872 of the Homeland Security Act which
permits the movement and consolidation of functions without
congressional approval. Your proposal would consolidate the
administration of 24 grant programs into a single office. During
briefings for my staff, your aides justified this move as a way to
address a strong interest by the States in a ``one-stop shopping''
center for all grants. I have serious concerns about the decision to
transfer ALL Transportation Security Administration grant programs from
TSA to the Office of Domestic Preparedness.
Many of us in Congress have been concerned that while we passed
legislation creating the Transportation Security Administration--this
Administration has treated it as the Aviation Security Administration.
TSA was created to focus on securing ALL modes of transportation--
buses, and trucking, and seaports--not just aviation. Aviation security
is a primary concern, of course, but it cannot be the only concern. We
on this Committee have had to cajole and wheedle and scrape together
what few precious resources we could find to fund grant programs to
address port security, and bus security, and trucking security and the
safe flow of commerce traveling by sea. Now, you are shifting those
programs to another agency with little expertise in transportation
issues and proposing to eliminate funding for several of the programs.
If these TSA grant funds are moved out of TSA's budget and away from
its operational control, the President might just as well abolish the
agency. Change the agency's name to the Only Aviation Security
Administration.
Why do you want to move these TSA grant funds to the ``one-stop
shop''? Are you not concerned that TSA will lose its ``all
transportation'' focus if its grant funds are removed from its budget?
Answer. The move to create a one stop shop for grants is based upon
input from the user or grantee community and is designed to enhance
coordination of the multitude of preparedness and security grants
currently administered by the Department (ODP, FEMA and TSA). The one-
stop shop consolidation will allow DHS to gain a global perspective on
all of the grants to ensure that redundancies are minimized, funds are
directed to the highest best use and DHS can proactively make
recommendations to States, localities and other recipients on mutual
aid and dual use opportunities.
Moving the TSA grants to SLGCP will provide DHS with concrete
benefits. First, it will allow the substantial bulk of the TSA
personnel who are not impacted by the consolidation to focus on their
core mission of transportation security. Next, it creates internal (to
DHS) and external (to recipients) improved efficiencies because only
one DHS team (SLGCP) will interact with grant recipients rather than
two separate teams (one at SLGCP and one at TSA) and, more importantly,
recipients who apply for more than one type of grant (e.g. a UASI and a
TSA grant) will only need to deal with one DHS team (SLGCP).
Final policy responsibility for grant guidance and grant
distribution will reside with the Office of State and Local Government
Coordination & Preparedness. However, overall hazards and
transportation security policy input will remain with FEMA, TSA, as
well as the Coast Guard, and MARAD. And, to ensure the continuing
involvement of TSA in the grant process, ODP will create a distinct
office dedicated specifically to transportation related grants. This
office will work closely with TSA in developing transportation security
grant policy.
STATE FORMULA GRANTS
Question. Mr. Secretary, State formula grants have been the largest
source of homeland security money for State and local governments. In
fiscal year 2003, Congress provided $2.1 billion for State formula
grants, and in fiscal year 2004 provided nearly $2.2 billion for this
purpose.
Your 2005 budget request drastically changes the scope of State
formula grants. You request only $1.2 billion for the program, choosing
instead to invest $1.4 billion into the urban areas security
initiative, which targets specific cities. Your request also changes
the way in which State formula grants are distributed. Your budget does
not distribute funds according to the PATRIOT ACT requirement that all
States get a portion of funds, but rather according to ``terrorism risk
factors.'' I am sympathetic to your proposal to shift money from the
State grant program to grants to high threat urban areas. Most of the
funds should be targeted to the areas where the risk is highest.
However, for the funds that remain in the State grant program, I
believe the PATRIOT ACT formula should be retained. Will you keep the
small State minimum for State grants as required by the PATRIOT ACT?
This proposal effectively turns the State homeland security grants
into an extension of the Urban Areas Security Initiative. I agree that
it is important to target resources to areas at greatest risk, but it
is equally important that we ensure that every State has they resources
needed to build up a basic homeland security infrastructure. This
budget does not achieve both goals.
Answer. I strongly support the idea that homeland security is a
national responsibility shared by all States, regardless of size. That
is why I firmly believe that there should be a minimum level of
preparedness across the county and that every State should receive some
level of assistance from the Department of Homeland Security.
Further, I strongly support the President's fiscal year 2005 budget
request that provides for additional factors to be considered when
making determinations on how to distribute homeland security funds to
States and localities. While I support the concept behind the PATRIOT
Act--that every State should receive minimum levels of support--I
firmly believe that funding allocations decisions should be based on a
number of other factors not included in the PATRIOT Act formula,
including the presence of critical infrastructure and other significant
risk factors. With the input that the Department is receiving from the
States through their updated homeland security strategies, and with the
more robust intelligence analysis and data collection capabilities
within the Department, the Department will be better able to prioritize
support for your efforts to prevent, prepare for, and respond to
terrorist incidents. The President's fiscal year 2005 request
recognizes this enhanced ability, and provides the Secretary of
Homeland Security the latitude and discretion to determine appropriate
funding levels to the States.
GRANT APPLICATIONS
Question. Please provide the Subcommittee with a list of the number
of applications (and the total amount requested) for port security, bus
security, truck security, Operation Safe Commerce, hazmat security and
fire grants per grant-making round and the amounts awarded on State by
State basis.
Answer. The following table provides the number of applications
received and the total amount requested for port security, bus
security, truck security and Operation Safe Commerce per grant round:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of
Applications/ Total Amount
Grant Program Proposals Requested
Received
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Port Security Round 1................... 856 $696,957,362
Port Security Round 2................... 1,112 995,905,305
Port Security Round 3................... 1,042 987,282,230
Intercity Bus Security.................. 84 45,611,455
Truck Security.......................... 16 70,984,782
Operation Safe Commerce................. 33 97,966,809
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following table provides the dollar amount of grants awarded by
State:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ODP Port Truck Security--
State Name Port Security Port Security Port Security Security Intercity Bus Highway Watch Operation Safe
Round 1 Total Round 2 Total Round 3 Total Grants Total Security Total Total Commerce Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ALABAMA.............................. $0 $948,000 $1,098,571 $0 $0 $0 $0
ALASKA............................... 1,344,929 4,086,255 758,569 250,000 0 0 0
AMERICAN SAMOA....................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ARIZONA.............................. 0 0 0 0 99,950 0 0
ARKANSAS............................. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CALIFORNIA........................... 17,152,573 28,017,757 33,704,614 9,076,700 177,116 0 13,697,053
COLORADO............................. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CONNECTICUT.......................... 296,636 2,201,337 3,825,565 0 0 0 0
DELAWARE/PENNSYLVANIA................ 1,925,000 5,512,369 1,830,700 3,730,555 342,765 0 0
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA................. 0 27,356 0 0 773,614 0 0
FED. STATES OF MICRONESIA............ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FLORIDA.............................. 19,572,606 17,654,425 7,625,747 10,947,378 141,580 0 0
GEORGIA.............................. 2,305,400 2,629,643 4,237,611 0 265,003 0 0
GUAM................................. 0 0 518,900 0 0 0 0
HAWAII............................... 802,523 7,005,561 4,247,966 0 0 0 0
IDAHO................................ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ILLINOIS............................. 0 872,250 7,025,300 0 51,278 0 0
INDIANA.............................. 0 68,800 353,760 0 113,813 0 0
IOWA................................. 0 0 51,600 0 226,272 0 0
KANSAS............................... 0 0 221,540 0 0 0 0
KENTUCKY............................. 0 55,136 1,439,578 0 0 0 0
LOUISIANA............................ 4,968,207 19,991,897 23,552,896 6,650,200 0 0 0
MAINE................................ 175,000 2,054,000 621,200 0 0 0 0
MARSHALL ISLANDS..................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MARYLAND............................. 3,764,000 4,518,532 5,586,150 0 338,482 0 0
MASSACHUSETTS........................ 3,789,669 4,333,651 3,005,829 0 1,173,875 0 0
MICHIGAN............................. 135,000 409,000 897,263 0 0 0 0
MINNESOTA............................ 0 0 813,100 0 335,102 0 0
MISSISSIPPI.......................... 555,132 705,444 2,245,740 0 0 0 0
MISSOURI............................. 0 125,000 50,000 0 0 0 0
MONTANA.............................. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NEBRASKA............................. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NEVADA............................... 0 0 0 0 320,791 0 0
NEW HAMPSHIRE........................ 200,000 80,000 1,570,203 0 73,182 0 0
NEW JERSEY........................... 0 5,493,067 5,129,950 7,613,106 2,454,220 0 0
NEW MEXICO........................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NEW YORK............................. 8,013,360 9,847,792 6,699,713 4,477,768 172,130 0 13,818,770
NORTH CAROLINA....................... 250,000 4,870,000 3,224,114 0 566,591 0 0
NORTH DAKOTA......................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS............. 0 0 1,379,577 0 0 0 0
OHIO................................. 550,622 777,000 3,100,127 0 44,408 0 0
OKLAHOMA............................. 0 725,000 0 0 0 0 0
OREGON............................... 623,000 1,185,000 1,024,970 0 9,900 0 0
PALAU................................ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PUERTO RICO.......................... 3,000,000 637,000 3,585,870 23,490 0 0 0
RHODE ISLAND......................... 261,500 435,000 1,498,563 0 0 0 0
SOUTH CAROLINA....................... 1,819,072 1,845,389 5,225,019 5,124,554 35,263 0 0
SOUTH DAKOTA......................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TENNESSEE............................ 198,052 639,655 768,285 0 123,375 0 0
TEXAS................................ 8,345,366 18,814,061 31,960,813 12,158,057 10,755,138 0 0
UTAH................................. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
VERMONT.............................. 0 0 0 0 217,542 0 0
VIRGIN ISLANDS....................... 0 1,873,245 869,275 1,582,468 0 0 0
VIRGINIA............................. 6,044,618 5,068,358 1,681,280 6,600,000 841,330 19,300,000 0
WASHINGTON........................... 5,179,974 14,895,156 7,030,942 6,765,724 26,407 0 27,528,219
WEST VIRGINIA........................ 750,000 522,000 565,000 0 0 0 0
WISCONSIN............................ 0 0 0 0 120,873 0 0
WYOMING.............................. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GRAND TOTALS................... 92,022,239 168,924,136 179,025,900 75,000,000 19,800,000 19,300,000 55,044,042
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AIR CARGO: PILOT PROGRAM
Question. I understand that the bulk of air cargo carried on
narrow-body aircraft is broken down--as opposed to being containerized
in larger containers. What percentage of U.S. flights carrying air
cargo are made on narrow-body aircraft? Has TSA started physically
screening these broken-down forms of air cargo using explosive
detection devices--even if only in a pilot program as strongly urged by
the Congress in the fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security Act? If not, why
not? When do you intend to initiate such a program--given that the bill
was signed into law on October 1, 2003--over 5 months ago?
Answer. TSA does not compile statistics regarding the percentage of
U.S. flights carrying air cargo utilizing narrow-body aircraft. Last
November, TSA instituted mandatory cargo screening requirements for air
carriers. The screening requirements apply to cargo transported on both
wide body and narrow body aircraft--including ``break bulk'' shipments
transported on narrow body aircraft. TSA is finalizing a protocol,
which will allow the air carriers to utilize Explosive Trace Detection
equipment to screen cargo. TSA is also currently conducting a pilot
program of Explosive Detection Systems ability to screen cargo for
explosives. As TSA's cargo screening requirements continue to evolve
TSA will continue to test and analyze the feasibility of using
additional explosive detection capabilities for cargo.
FLETC BUDGET: CHARLESTON
Question. For many years, the FLETC has used facilities at the
former Navy base in Charleston, SC as a satellite training location for
training law enforcement personnel from the Border Patrol and other
agencies because it was unable to accommodate them at its two main
training facilities. Last year, prior to the creation of the Department
of Homeland Security and the consolidation and reorganization of
numerous agencies, Congress appropriated and the President signed into
law approximately $14 million for the Border Patrol Academy at
Charleston. I understand that FLETC proposes to move all Border Patrol
training to its main facility at Glynco, GA and use the Charleston
location for training for other agencies. However, that move is not
likely to occur for nearly 2 more years. There is considerable
confusion over the use of the funds provided by Congress for
construction activities at Charleston. It is clear that the Congress
intended for these funds to be used in Charleston. Will you commit that
these funds will be spent in Charleston as directed by Congress and
provide the Subcommittee with a plan for allocating those funds?
Answer. The FLETC will use the funds in the amount of
$13,896,000.00 for projects in Charleston. The Core of Engineers spent
approximately $104,000 for design prior to the administrative transfer
of Charleston to the FLETC. A summary of the projects are:
--Construction of Tactical Training Mat Rooms for defensive tactics
training for the USCG Marine Law Enforcement Academy;
--Renovation of new wing in Building 654 for administrative space for
the USCG Marine Law Enforcement Academy;
--Renovation of four classrooms in building 61 for classroom space
for the USCG Marine Law Enforcement Academy;
--Renovation of old wing in Building 654 for administrative,
conferencing and training space for the FLETC and Partner
Organizations' training management and operations staffs;
--Construction of Indoor Firing Range to provide training and re-
qualifying students in firearms proficiency; and
--Construction of Security/Communications system that will allow the
FLETC Charleston to provide efficient and cost effective
training while utilizing the latest state of the art
technologies.
FLETC BUDGET: FACILITIES OPERATING FUNDS
Question. I am a strong supporter of consolidated Federal law
enforcement training--in part because of the budgetary savings which
can be achieved. During site visits by my staff to the FLETC facilities
in SC and GA, they were told that the Border Patrol's training budget
for activities at Charleston was $34 million in fiscal year 2004 and is
proposed to be $42 million in fiscal year 2005. Is that correct? If so,
where will these funds come from? Are the agencies going to transfer
funds to FLETC or will FLETC bill them for training? Without clear
indications of funding streams to pay for the operation of the facility
in Charleston being placed in the FLETC budget--or in the budgets of
the agencies attendant at these facilities--how can you ensure that
consolidated training will work efficiently and that these facilities
will operate robustly and effectively?
Answer. The Border Patrol has been providing the funding to operate
the Charleston facility since the late nineties. The amounts provided
by the Border Patrol included resources for TDY of agents that are not
applicable to the operations of Charleston by the FLETC. The final
amount has not been determined but the current estimate is
approximately $21 million to operate Charleston. In addition, 25 FTE
will be necessary to operate the facility and the source of those FTEs
are being determined. A transfer of funds from the Border Patrol to the
FLETC will be necessary to align responsibilities with Federal
appropriations. The FLETC is currently evaluating the resources
required for the additional basic training programs to be conducted in
Charleston for three new Partner Organizations. These new agencies are
United States Coast Guard Marine Law Enforcement Academy, The
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and the Defense Logistics
Agency. The FLETC will not be able to operate the Charleston training
site without these resources.
FLETC: CAPITOL POLICE TRAINING COSTS
Question. What are the costs FLETC has borne for non-basic training
conducted at the Cheltenham facility for the United States Capitol
Police for fiscal years 2002-2004 and what are the anticipated costs
for the same training for fiscal year 2005? What are the annual basic
training costs?
Answer. The Capitol Police have historically provided some follow-
on basic training for their officers at locations in the Washington DC
area. This training was not done at a FLETC location, was never paid
for by the FLETC, and therefore is not in the FLETC's base funding.
This is consistent with other Partner Organizations such as the United
States Secret Service which provides its follow-on basic training at
their Beltsville location. Now that the Capitol Police is conducting
agency specific basic training at a FLETC location, namely Cheltenham,
for consistency purposes, this funding could be included as part of
FLETC's annual workload projections. The precise amount of funding
would need to be negotiated with the U.S. Capitol Police.
U.S. CAPITOL POLICE OPERATIONAL EXPENSES AT FLETC'S CHELTENHAM FACILITY
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Building 3 Building 31 Buildings 31,
Service Fiscal year Fiscal year 231, 40 Fiscal
2003 2003 year 2004
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Electricity..................................................... $5,554 $49,365 $52,364
Fuel Oil........................................................ 5,361 21,259 25,516
Security........................................................ 1,908 16,960 17,990
Telephone Service............................................... 10,106 .............. ..............
Telephone Service............................................... .............. 11,731 ..............
Telephone Service............................................... .............. .............. 10,169
Telephone Lease................................................. .............. 84,844 84,844
Refuse Disposal................................................. 600 900 900
Water/Sewer..................................................... 1,636 14,537 15,420
General Janitorial.............................................. 7,326 65,113 69,069
Additional Trash Pulls (Daily).................................. .............. 5,172 5,172
-----------------------------------------------
Total..................................................... 32,491 269,880 \1\ 281,445
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Estimate.
FLETC: OTHER ISSUES
Question. Approximately 60 percent of the FLETC workforce is
comprised of contract employees. From perimeter security guards and
role players used in training scenarios to food service workers and the
maid service, these employees word hard and perform much needed
services. Given the exceedingly high percentage of contract employees,
does the Department expect FLETC to conduct further efforts to contract
out yet even more work?
Answer. The FLETC has developed a plan for competitive sourcing to
be in compliance with the A-76 circular. At this time, the positions
planned for study include 13 Automotive Mechanics in fiscal year 2005;
21 Media Support positions and 30 Facilities Management positions in
fiscal year 2006; 4 Critical Incident Stress Management positions and 9
Property Management positions in fiscal year 2007; and 20 Human
Resources positions and 36 IT/Training Devices/AV positions in fiscal
year 2008.
Question. The horrific events of 9/11 resulted in a massive
increase in hiring of Federal law enforcement personnel. These new
hires required training and Congress provided temporary authority to
re-hire retired Federal annuitants to assist in training activities. I
am told that these annuitants are providing FLETC and the Department
excellent and valuable service based on their years of skill and real
life experience. However, this authority will soon expire and I
understand that a significant portion of FLETC's training would be
negatively affected if it lost this authority. Do you plan to request
that Congress extend this authority either permanently or for another 5
years?
Answer. The FLETC intends to recommend to the Administration an
extension to its rehired annuitant hiring authorization and waiver to
dual compensation. Historically, it has been very challenging for FLETC
to recruit highly qualified law enforcement instructors with a Federal
criminal investigative, GS-1811, background because the FLETC has no
authority to pay law enforcement availability (LEAP) compensation. Any
current Federal criminal investigator interested in an instructor
position at the FLETC must be willing to take a 25 percent cut in his/
her annual salary when accepting a FLETC position. In addition,
retaining their law enforcement ``6c'' retirement status sometimes
becomes an issue, and they also lose their privileges to use government
vehicles for response necessities.
Prior to the tragic events of 9/11, the FLETC had been working
vigorously with its former department, Department of the Treasury, and
Office of Personnel Management officials to gain approval to implement
the rehired annuitant hiring flexibilities contained within the Federal
personnel management system. As mentioned above, the FLETC had been
seeking this approval in order to overcome the recruitment and
retention challenges associated with staffing Law Enforcement
Specialist (Instructor), GS-1801, positions with applicants possessing
extensive Federal criminal investigative backgrounds. Furthermore, the
FLETC intended to maximize the provisions of the program by recruiting
recent 1811 retirees who could share the latest law enforcement
techniques and practices being utilized in the field.
The need for the majority of FLETC instructors to possess a
criminal investigative background has been and continues to be
validated through management studies and student feedback surveys.
Instructors having this background gain instant credibility with their
students because they are able to share real world experiences and
demonstrate the application of skills and information being taught. In
addition, the FLETC's mission has continued to expand post 9/11 into
areas such as counterterrorism, antiterrorism and transportation
security training which require attracting even more specialized
expertise in a highly competitive market. Therefore, it is essential
that the FLETC continue to take advantage of this proven hiring
flexibility in its efforts to maintain a highly qualified law
enforcement training instructor workforce. Reverting back to
traditional instructor recruiting and staffing practices would
adversely impact and unduly hamper this effort.
TSA: SLOW MOVEMENT OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS
Question. In the fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security Appropriations
Act, Congress provided $7 million for hazardous materials security and
the truck tracking program, $10 million for intercity bus security
grants, and $22 million for the trucking industry security program.
That bill was signed into law in October. Nearly 6 months later those
funds have not yet been released. Since security for these other modes
of transportation are so important, why has TSA been sitting on these
funds?
Answer. In the coming months, TSA plans to request proposals for
funding or announce awards for a number of programs. These include:
--TSA anticipates issuing a Request for Applications (RFA) for both
the fourth round of Port Security Grants Program ($50 million
remaining from fiscal year 2004) and Intercity Bus Security
grants by late spring, 2004, with final awarding of grants
expected in late summer.
--A fourth quarter fiscal year 2004 release of the RFA is anticipated
for both the Highway Watch Program and Operation Safe Commerce,
with final award anticipated in the fall.
--TSA intends to announce Request for Proposals for the Truck
Tracking Project in early summer. Final award is anticipated in
early fall, 2004.
--Award for Nuclear Detection and Monitoring is anticipated by mid-
summer, 2004.
PORT SECURITY
Question.The deputy assistant director of the FBI's
counterterrorism office stated in January that our Nation's seaports
remain vulnerable targets for attack. ``The intelligence we have
certainly points to ports as a key vulnerability. I can't be more
specific about the threats of attacks. We have received information
that indicates there is an interest.''
If there is an ``interest'' in attacking our ports, why does the
Administration continue to refuse to give our seaports the resources
they require to secure our ports? Why is only $46 million requested for
port security grants when the port directors tell us that $1.125
billion will be needed in the first year and $5.4 billion will be
needed over the next 10 years to comply with the new Federal
regulations mandated by the Maritime Transportation Security Act.
Additionally, during the most recent port security grant
competition (December 2003), over half of the funding for port security
grants was awarded to private companies. A tremendous need for port
security funding also exists for port authorities and State and local
agencies. What approach are you taking to allocate the funding between
these different entities? Additionally, what type of checks and
balances do you have in place to ensure that private companies are not
receiving a disproportionate share of this port security funding?
Answer. In Port Security Grants Round 3, consistent with provisions
of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, the Transportation
Security Administration, U. S. Coast Guard and the Maritime
Administration determined that regulated facilities should receive
preference. The vast majority of regulated facilities are private
companies. However, public entities were well represented with awards
totaling 45.3 percent of the available funds.
In general, port security grant funds are dispersed through a
competitive grant process. The multi-level, interagency review ensures
that these funds go to the highest national security needs.
--Eligible grant applicants are limited to critical national seaports
as stipulated in the fiscal year 2002 DOD Supplemental
Appropriations (Public Law 107-117) and referred to in
subsequent appropriations. This designation included:
--Controlled ports--Ports which have access controls for vessels
from certain countries due to national security issues
--Strategic ports, as designated by a Maritime Administration port
planning order
--A nationally important economic port or terminal responsible for
a large volume of cargo movement or movement of products
that are vital to U.S. economic interests as required for
national security
--Ports, terminals, and U.S. passenger vessels responsible for
movement of a high number of passengers
--Ports or terminals responsible for the movement of hazardous
cargo.
--All grant applicants must have a completed security assessment and
tie the vulnerabilities identified in the assessment to the
mitigation strategies requested in the application.
--Subject matter experts from the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the
Maritime Administration (MARAD), and TSA conduct a multi-level
review of all port security grant applications.
--Field level review is conducted by the USCG Captain of the Port
and MARAD Regional Director to validate applicant
eligibility and prioritize all proposals within their zone,
utilizing the CG Port Security Risk Assessment Tool
(PSRAT).
--National level review is conducted by representatives from the
USCG, MARAD, and TSA based upon published evaluation
criteria. All eligible proposals from the field level
review are prioritized on a national level.
--Executive level review board of agency representatives examines the
recommended proposals from an overarching national
perspective.
--Senior level selection board (currently TSA Administrator or his
representative, USCG Commandant or his representative,
MARAD Administrator) provides the final approval of the
proposed grantees/projects.
INTEGRATED FINGERPRINT SYSTEMS
Question. Mr. Secretary, Senator Cochran and I met last year in the
Capitol to discuss our concerns about the plans for obtaining only two
fingerprints of visitors to the United States as a means to fulfill the
biometric component portion of the entry-exit visa tracking system you
have named US VISIT. I suggested that I was concerned that capturing
only two fingerprints might make it more difficult to compare these two
new prints with more extensive existing fingerprint databases such as
the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System
(IAFIS). In fact your own Department's Inspector General report dated
December 31, 2003 noted that the Department of Justice has worked for
several years to integrate your Department's two-print system--known as
the automated biometric identification system, or IDENT--with the FBI's
IAFIS system.
The IG states that, ``This integration is critical to identifying
illegally entering aliens on lookout lists or with criminal histories,
but progress has been slow.''
What is the status of the integration of these systems? Can you
give the Committee a progress report on the integration of these
systems?
Answer. Prior to the establishment of the Department on Homeland
Security, DOJ, working with the FBI and INS, began work on a project to
integrate the FBI's IAFIS (10 print, criminal history) and the INS'
IDENT (2-print, immigration) systems.
Since that time, an integrated IDENT/IAFIS workstation has been
developed. DHS intends to accelerate deployment in 2004 and complete
deployment by the end of calendar year 2005. To accelerate the
implementation of IDENT/IAFIS capability within the Department, we
intend to seek a reallocation of $4 million of the remaining funds
provided in Public Law 107-117. The $4 million, when combined with
fiscal year 2003 funds already provided ($3.5 million obligated for
IDENT/IAFIS), will allow BTS VISIT to implement IDENT with 10 print
capabilities in secondary processing areas at 115 airports, 14 seaports
and 50 of the largest land border ports. In addition, this funding will
support implementation of the IAFIS/IDENT 10 print capability at 70
percent of the Border Patrol stations. The remaining land ports of
entry, 30 percent of the Border Patrol stations and major ICE locations
(to be identified) will receive this capability in 2005. The
implementation of IDENT/IAFIS at Border Patrol stations will provide
the capability to biometrically identify and/or perform status
verifications on individuals suspected of illegally crossing the
border. Implementation at ICE offices will support investigation of
individuals apprehended for overstays and/or watch list hits.
IMMIGRATION
Question. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act
requires all immigration databases to be made interoperable and,
eventually, combined into the Chimera data system, which is to include
all known immigration, law enforcement, and intelligence data on
aliens. What progress has been made thus far on creating the Chimera
data system?
Answer. On the 28th of October 2002, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service published an informational document regarding a
comprehensive information technology planning and infrastructure
modernization program called ``Atlas''. That document was entitled the
``Atlas Business Case'' and provided a concise high-level view that
demonstrated the INS' confidence in Atlas' strategic, technical, and
financial merits. The business case reflected investment principles,
emulation of industry best practices, and compliance with the Clinger-
Cohen Act of 1996, as well as with other related legislative and
government guidance.
Consistent with the urgencies of the Government's post-September 11
security agenda, the Atlas Business Case was subsequently socialized
and promoted within the Department of Justice and sent to the Hill for
budgetary consideration. It was understood that the Atlas Program would
be the fundamental IT infrastructure foundation on which INS business
applications would operate. In its business case, the INS illustrated
that the successful Atlas transformation strategy would hinge upon a
robust IT infrastructure containing a secure, scalable backbone that
would support all INS business processes. Atlas, it was shown, would
also provide database interoperability at the infrastructure level and
support data sharing at the applications level. From the beginning, the
Atlas design strategy also supported emerging Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) requirements. Unlike the previous environment, Atlas was
proposed to reside within an integrated Enterprise Architecture (EA)
that would harmonize the following:
--System hardware, including mainframes and servers
--Data services, including data and voice circuits
--Data communication equipment, including servers, switches, local
area networks (LAN), wide area networks (WAN), routers, and
cabling
--Computer security, information assurance activities and enterprise
information. This, specifically, is the area that would later
come to be identified as the focus area for the suggested
Chimera project.
--Workstations, including personal computers and laptops and
enterprise-wide software (i.e., office automation, e-mail,
operating system, etc.)
--Operational support to maintain and operate the modernized IT
infrastructure
Perhaps in contemplation of partitioning and re-tasking of the INS
and its resources, or perhaps in calculating the initial complexity and
cost of implementing Atlas, a counter-suggestion was made in committee
and transmitted back to the Department of Justice and the INS that
certain specific information security and assurance attributes of Atlas
could be separately expedited and put into action under a new
initiative tentatively labeled ``Chimera''.
However, other program initiatives under way at INS and the new
Department of Homeland Security were also addressing the same security
concerns. In particular, the ``US VISIT'' program had pursued the same
set of concerns and an active, high-precision approach for addressing
critical information security and assurance requirements.
Because of the US VISIT Program's ongoing and comprehensive
approach to information security and assurance requirements within the
DHS sphere of immigration-related operations, Chimera has been
suspended and is being revisited to determine its potential as a
duplicative effort.
Question. As part of the 1990 Immigration Act, Congress authorized
general arrest authority for all immigration law enforcement officers.
INS never developed regulations to implement this authority. Has DHS
developed such regulations?
Answer. Yes, ICE issued a memo implementing general arrest
authority for the ICE Office of Investigations and Detention and
Removal in November 2003.
Question. Representatives of the Department of Homeland Security
Council (union of legacy INS employees) reported at a press conference
on March 3 that no more than 5 percent of Immigration and Customs
enforcement personnel have received cross-training. When does DHS
expect to complete cross-training of all existing personnel? What
percentage of all needed cross-training is funded in the President's
budget proposal?
Answer. OI conducted a manual survey the last week of March 2004.
At that time 830 Special Agents had completed the cross-training. This
accounts for 19 percent of the OI workforce of 4,463 which is targeted
for cross-training in this fiscal year. The Automated Class Management
System is expected to be on-line by the end of April, 2004. At that
time, training statistics will be more readily available.
OI has established a target to complete the cross-training for all
non-supervisory Special Agents GS-05 through GS-13 by the end of fiscal
year 2004. This cross-training will be accomplished using a train-the-
trainer format with initial training being conducted at the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center.
Cross-training beyond this priority group and into fiscal year 2005
will be funded out of base appropriations.
Question. A pay disparity of a full grade exists between
Immigration Special Agents (GS-12) and Customs Special Agents (GS-13).
It appears that the new regulations proposed by the Administration
would hide this disparity within a pay scale, rather than addressing it
directly. Is this correct and, if so, what impact is this disparity
having on morale within ICE
Answer. On April 13, 2004, Mr. Garcia announced that new Criminal
Investigator (CI) position descriptions had been classified and all ICE
GS-1811 series employees would be assigned to them by May 2004. The new
journey-level position, which is established at the GS-13 level, will
be applied at that time to all qualifying criminal investigators. As a
result, the approximately 1,200 former Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) personnel affected by this pay gap will be eligible for
immediate promotion to GS-1811-13 on May 2, 2004.
OTHER ISSUES
Question. Does the fiscal year 2005 budget assume the
reauthorization of COBRA which is set to expire on March 31, 2005?
Answer. Public Law 108-121 reauthorized COBRA through March 1,
2005. The fiscal year 2005 budget assumes that COBRA will be
reauthorized beyond the March 1st expiration date.
Question. What is the net increase in discretionary funding
(excluding supplemental appropriations) for the Department of Homeland
Security Bureau of Customs and Border Protection Salaries & Expenses
between fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005? Looking at the fiscal
year 2005 budget it appears that the increase is just over 4 percent
barely enough to cover for inflation.
Answer. There is a $210 million net increase in discretionary
funding for CBP's Salaries and Expenses between fiscal year 2004 and
fiscal year 2005. This net increase includes $185 million in program
increases and $350 in increases for annualizations of prior year pay
raises and other inflation related costs. These increases are offset by
a $23.7 million decrease for a DHS-wide savings initiative, termination
of one-time costs associated with fiscal year 2004 program increases
and the fiscal year 2004 rescission.
Question. What is the Department doing to correct the problem of
the Department not paying legacy Customs Inspectors and new CBP
officers for their required work on the 60 day of basic training at the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)?
Answer. We do pay employees covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) overtime while engaged in training at FLETC for 6-day weeks. The
Government Employee and Training Act (GETA) prohibits us from paying
non- FLSA employees under FLSA provision. Our COPRA covered front-line
personnel are not subject to FLSA. COPRA was specifically designed for
Customs Officers and is the exclusive pay act for our Customs legacy
personnel. Our agency position on this matter was recently sustained in
an arbitration decision.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Inouye
Question. Recently, a week-long convention of Asian life insurance
providers and sales representatives scheduled to convene in Honolulu
this August was cancelled. The convention was expected to produce more
than $17 million in visitor spending, $1.41 million in State taxes, and
rent 6,500 hotel room nights. The cancellation was not due to lack of
interest by prospective attendees, but instead was due to the problems
caused by the extended visa issuance process. Your Department has been
working with the State Department to enhance security and the integrity
of the visa process. Your budget requests an increase of $10 million to
support a new visa security unit. How will this unit help to ensure
that visas are processed quickly to ensure that Hawaii will be able to
host similar conventions in the future?
Answer. BTS is working with the State Department to assure that the
provisions of the law known as Section 428 are implemented. The ICE VSU
will be deploying Visa Security Officers to selected foreign posts;
will be working to enhance State Department Consular officer training;
will be working to improve the Visa Security Advisory Opinion (SAO)
process; and develop with the State Department the appropriate employee
performance plan oversight of Consular Officers by DHS. All of these
efforts will improve the integrity of the visa issuance process and
assure that visa applicants receive the appropriate level of review.
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) visa security
operations are located exclusively in Saudi Arabia at this time. Since
beginning our operations in Saudi Arabia, thousands of visas
applications have been reviewed by DHS officers. From over 3,500
applications, approximately 27 have been delayed for reasons of
security. Most visa applications in Saudi Arabia are acted upon within
48 hours. This is in compliance with congressional language as to 100
percent review of visa applications in Saudi Arabia.
It is anticipated, DHS will dedicate staff to the SAO process,
which in turn will further aid to expedite requests and ensure timely
security screening on behalf of our officers in the field.
Question. The budget justifications for the US VISIT program
discuss the deployment plan for the full program. In furtherance of
complete implementation, a Request for Proposals was published last
November with bids due this January. How many proposals were received?
In light of the proposals you received, is the budget request
sufficient for full implementation of the program, including the
meeting of your statutory deadlines for deployment to the 165
identified points of entry?
Answer. We received three bids for the Prime integrator contract.
With the resources in the fiscal year 2004 appropriation, and
provided approval of the fiscal year 2005 President's request, US VISIT
will have the resources necessary to the meet the statutory deadline
(US VISIT functionality in secondary) for the 50 largest land border
ports by December 31, 2004 and the 115 remaining land sites by December
31, 2005.
Question. The budget request includes an increase of $23 million
for Immigration and Customs Enforcement. This increase is intended to
more than double the number of investigators and facilitate the
implementation of the President's proposal for a temporary worker
program. According to your testimony, in furtherance of the President's
proposal, you would establish a traditional worksite enforcement
program to deter the hiring of unauthorized workers. What efforts are
currently being undertaken to detect, deter, and punish employers who
hire undocumented workers?
Answer. Enforcement efforts targeting companies that break the law
and hire illegal workers will need to increase in order to ensure the
integrity of the temporary worker system. The President's Immigration
proposal provides for an enhanced worksite enforcement program, and the
$23 million requested for fiscal year 2005 will allow ICE to enhance
its worksite enforcement efforts and provide credible deterrence to the
hiring of unauthorized workers. ICE worksite enforcement investigations
generally involve a review of company employment records to verify the
immigration status of workers and to determine if the employer has
committed any violations. ICE agents also conduct extensive outreach
initiatives to educate employers about their legal responsibilities.
Additionally, the Basic Pilot Program, an automated system
administered by USCIS, enables employers to verify the immigration
status of newly hired workers. It is currently available in six states,
but is planned for availability to employers in all 50 states by the
end of this year. This is a voluntary program and is provided at no
cost to employers. Information on the Basic Pilot Program is available
to the public on the USCIS website.
Question. The Visa Waiver Program is a critical element of the
Hawaii tourism industry as it allows citizens of 27 countries to enter
for non-immigrant purposes without a visa. However, by October 26, all
Visa Waiver countries must certify that the new passports they are
issuing contain biometric identifiers. How many of the 27 countries are
currently expected to meet this deadline? Would you support extending
the biometric passport deadline in order to avoid major disruptions in
travel to the United States from key tourism markets in Europe and
Asia? What is the Directorate doing to work with the foreign
governments in the visa waiver program to encourage compliance?
Answer. Due to a variety of factors, the Departments of Homeland
Security and State have requested a 2-year extension for the October
26, 2004 deadline for machine readable, biometric passports. The
problem is not lack of will or commitment, but challenging scientific
and technical issues. Due to technical challenges that include the
durability of chip technology and the feasibility of facial recognition
technology in an operational environment, few, if any, of the 27
countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) will be able
to meet the October 26, 2004 deadline. In fact, the standards have not
yet been set. Therefore, a 2-year extension is being requested to make
it possible for countries to comply with this mandate.
The Department of Homeland Security has been working very closely
with foreign governments to develop the optimum solution that enhances
security for all without impeding legitimate travel and tourism. All
citizens traveling under the Visa Waiver Program will be enrolled in US
VISIT upon entry through an air or sea port after/on September 30,
2004.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Ernest F. Hollings
SEAPORT SECURITY IMPLEMENTATION COSTS
Question. Commissioner Bonner announced with much fanfare, that we
would sign agreements with major foreign ports, under the ``Container
Security Initiative'', so that we could inspect containers in foreign
seaports. It is my understanding, that while this sounds quite smart,
there are a lot of practical problems. For instance, foreign nations
use their own security equipment for security to protect their own
ports, and they have not been all that forthcoming in providing their
security equipment for our use.
Can you tell me, how many marine containers underwent physical
inspection, in foreign ports as a result of the ``Container Security
Initiative''? What does this represent as a portion of the total that
was physically inspected?
What is the budget for the implementation of non-intrusive
inspection equipment at U.S. ports, and how does it compare with the
budget for the ``Container Security Initiative''?
Answer. All cargo moving through a CSI port is screened by CBP
using our multilayered targeting and risk analysis systems. All high-
risk cargo is inspected for weapons of mass destruction before being
laden on a vessel bound for the United States in a CSI port. Physical
inspection statistics for containers will be provided by the General
Accounting Office in the forthcoming review of the CSI program.
As of April 23, 2004, U.S. Customs and Border Protection has
deployed approximately $73.9 million worth of large-scale, non-
intrusive inspection systems and radiation portal monitors to U.S.
seaports. The Container Security Initiative (CSI) was appropriated
$61.7 million in the President's 04 budget, of which approximately $12
million has been allocated for non-intrusive inspection equipment for
the CSI overseas ports.
Question. The budget for FTE's for full time positions was set at
220 for the Transportation Security Administration's Maritime and Land
Division, yet it is my understanding that to date, this Division is
only operating with 160.
You have a number of responsibilities, such as conducting criminal
background investigations, that are languishing. What is taking so long
in hiring the remaining 60 Full Time Employee positions that, I
understand are budgeted for the Transportation Security
Administration's Maritime and Land Division but not yet hired?
Answer. The Office of Maritime and Land Security (MLS) within the
Transportation Security Administration currently has 169 full-time
employees on board. We do not anticipate at this time hiring additional
FTE.
With reference to criminal background check responsibility, since
security threat assessments of certain individuals within the
transportation system are a critical component of our mission, TSA
created a Credentialing Program Office (CPO) to consolidate TSA
background check activity across all modes of transportation. The CPO
has established processes for conducting background checks,
adjudicating results and for follow-on coordination with the law
enforcement and intelligence communities. TSA is already required to
conduct criminal history records checks on airport security screening
personnel, individuals with unescorted access to secure areas of
airports, and other security personnel--pursuant to Section 114(f)(12)
of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Public Law No. 107-71,
115 Stat. 587 and 49 USC 44936 (a)(1)(A). In addition to the
extensive background checks that TSA currently undertakes in aviation
security, TSA has been delegated responsibility for conducting security
threat assessments on commercial drivers seeking hazardous material
endorsements for transporting hazardous materials in commerce pursuant
Section 1012 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA
PATRIOT) Act, Public Law 107-56, October 25, 2001, 115 Stat. 272.
Implementing the Alien Flight Student Program will be consistent with
work already underway by TSA through the CPO.
ARMING PILOTS
Questions. Last week, Denver news stations were reporting that
commercial airline pilots that have been armed with semi-automatic
pistols through the Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) program were
misplacing or losing weapons at an alarming rate. According to Channel
9 News, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Airline
Pilots Security Alliance were the source of information indicating that
in the last 60 days approximately 300 weapons had been misplaced by
FFDOs.
My understanding is that a Southwest Airline Pilot lost his weapon
while it was being transported in the lockbox system that is designed
to protect it while traveling, and that most of the guns reported as
``misplaced'' came under similar circumstances.
Are the reports of misplaced and lost weapons by FFDOs accurate? Do
you believe the current procedures for FFDO firearm transport are
proper? How many FFDOs have actually lost or misplaced their weapons
since the program began? What steps need to be taken to responsibly
ensure that armed pilots do not lose or misplace their guns?
Answer. TSA takes seriously its obligation to ensure that FFDO
firearms and lockboxes do not fall into the hands of individuals not
authorized to handle such items. The FFDO program office works closely
with carriers to ensure that training is provided to crewmembers and
baggage handlers to ensure proper handling and storage of lockboxes. In
some instances, lockboxes have been identified as not placed in the
precise location expected, but with the exception of the one reported
incident, the lockbox has always been quickly retrieved without
endangering the traveling public.
There has only been one incident involving an FFDO firearm that was
lost and not recovered. TSA takes this incident very seriously and is
pursuing an investigation. It must be considered in light of the
thousands of FFDO missions flown every week and the number of incidents
where weapons are lost or stolen in law enforcement activities.
COCKPIT DOORS
Questions. For 2 years, I was repeatedly told that it was not
possible to devise an affordable system that would properly allow a
pilot to leave the flight deck without also potentially allowing a
terrorist to have access to the cockpit. Now, United Airlines has come
forward and announced a ``Secondary Barrier Project'' that they have
committed to install fleet-wide.
United Airlines has committed to install--fleet-wide--barriers that
have already been certified to help prevent a potential terrorist
access to the cockpit. They will be cheap (under $10,000) and quick to
install (overnight). I believe they will provide a much greater degree
of security, and apparently it was shown to the TSA with great
enthusiasm.
Are you aware of United's effort? Do you believe the installation
of second doors or barriers improve the security on commercial
airliners? Has TSA considered requiring all commercial airlines to
install similar devices? Would their installation allow TSA to change
other security directives and perhaps lower the cost of aviation
security?
Answer. TSA is aware of and applauds United's initiative in this
effort. TSA will work closely with the air carriers to better
understand the security effectiveness, structural feasibility, and
costs associated with installing similar devices throughout the
commercial aviation fleet. Once a thorough examination in these areas
has been completed, TSA will assess the appropriateness of requiring
installation of secondary cockpit doors relative to existing security
measures and determine what, if any, alterations should be made to the
overall aviation security program.
RAIL SECURITY
Question. Border and Transportation Security Directorate is charged
with, ``securing our Nation's transportation systems.'' How much
funding is planned in your Directorate's fiscal year 2005 budget for
rail security?
Answer. The responsibility of securing our Nation's rail and mass
transit systems is a shared one. DHS, DOT, and other Federal agencies
are working together to enhance rail and transit security in
partnership with the public and private entities that own and operate
the Nation's rail and transit systems. The DHS Urban Area Security
Grant program has awarded or allocated over $115 million to improve
security for mass transit and rail systems since May 2003.
Additionally, the Administration has requested $24 million for TSA to
advance security efforts in the maritime and surface transportation
arenas, and has requested that $37 million of the Federal Transit
Administrations Urban Security Bus grants be available for security
related projects. In addition, DHS will conduct the following
activities and initiatives to strengthen security in surface modes:
--Implement a pilot program to test the new technologies and
screening concepts to evaluate the feasibility of screening
luggage and carry-on bags for explosives at rail stations and
aboard trains;
--Develop and implement a mass transit vulnerability self-assessment
tool;
--Continue the distribution of public security awareness material
(i.e., tip cards, pamphlets, and posters) for motorcoach,
school bus, passenger rail, and commuter rail employees;
--Increase passenger, rail employee, and local law enforcement
awareness through public awareness campaigns and security
personnel training;
--Ensure compliance with safety and security standards for commuter
and rail lines and better help identify gaps in the security
system in coordination with DOT, with additional technical
assistance and training provided by TSA;
--Continue to work with industry and State and local authorities to
establish baseline security measures based on current industry
best practices and with modal administrations within the DOT as
well as governmental and industry stakeholders, to establish
best practices, develop security plans, assess security
vulnerabilities, and identify needed security enhancements; and
--Study hazardous materials (HAZMAT) security threats and identify
best practices for transport of HAZMAT.
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER
Question. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)
established a temporary overflow training facility for basic training
of Border Patrol recruits in 1996 at the old Navy Base. Border Patrol
training needs drastically increased due to legislation passed by
Congress to significantly increase the number of agents deployed.
The facility was due to close in 2004, however Congress included a
provision in the fiscal year 2003 Commerce, Justice and State
Appropriations Bill which officially designated Charleston as a
permanent Federal training center absolving the end date of the
Charleston site as a temporary facility. Congress also secured $14
million in the fiscal year 2003 Commerce, Justice and State
Appropriations Bill for the Charleston Border Patrol Academy to improve
the infrastructure for the training center.
Since the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) has taken
administrative control of the site in Charleston, how much of the $14
million has being transferred from Customs and Border Protection to
FLETC for use in Charleston?
Answer. A Reimbursable Agreement (RA) between the FLETC and
Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE) has been prepared in the
amount of $13,896,000. The FLETC has signed the agreement with a
statement of work attached and forwarded to ICE for approval. The Core
of Engineers spent approximately $104,000 for design prior to the
administrative transfer of Charleston to the FLETC. A summary of the
Charleston projects are:
--Construction of Tactical Training Mat Rooms for defensive tactics
training;
--Renovation of new wing in Building 654 for administrative space for
the USCG Marine Law Enforcement Academy;
--Renovation of four classrooms in building 61 for classroom space
for the USCG Marine Law Enforcement Academy;
--Renovation of old wing in Building 654 for administrative,
conferencing and training space for the FLETC and Partner
Organizations' training management and operations staffs;
--Construction of Indoor Firing Range to provide training and re-
qualifying students in firearms proficiency; and
--Construction of Security/Communications system that will allow
FLETC Charleston to provide efficient and cost effective
training while utilizing the latest state of the art
technologies.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
TSA
Question. I am very concerned about numerous reports of
mismanagement I have heard with TSA Human Resources and its
contractors, currently Accenture. I am aware of one Burlington,
Vermont, Screener Manager and as many as 80 Screener Managers at Dulles
who were promoted to their positions on February 9, 2003, yet they have
still not received the full back pay for their promotions.
I have been waiting since November 6, 2003, for a written
explanation as to why the Burlington, Vermont, employee has not
received any back pay. Apparently, the Office of Chief Counsel is still
reviewing the matter.
The best explanation I have heard so far--just informal, nothing in
writing--was that the airports were not authorized to make all of the
promotions on February 9, 2003, but went ahead and made them anyway. At
best, this sounds to me like a big communications problem between TSA,
its HR contractor, and the airports. At worst, this sounds like the
employees were misled. Unfortunately, it is the people who have been
performing the work who are getting the raw end of the deal.
Could you please update me on this situation and explain what is
being done to remedy the back pay issue?
Answer. A reply to your letter regarding the constituent in
Burlington was sent to you in March 2004. A copy of the letter, dated
March 19, 2004, was faxed to your office on April 21, 2004. To
summarize what TSA stated in the letter, we could not backdate your
constituent's promotion because TSA policy stipulates that promotions
do not become effective until they receive final approval by the
necessary TSA officials. This policy is based in part on a U.S.
Comptroller General precedent.
Taking care of our employees is a very high priority for TSA. It is
very important to TSA that its employees receive the compensation for
the jobs that they are performing and that those who were promoted to
the Lead and Supervisory Screener positions were promoted
appropriately. At Dulles, all appropriate promotions were made, and all
one-time awards were paid. TSA believes that all of these issues at
Dulles have now been fully resolved.
The issues involving lead and supervisory positions at Dulles
resulted when screeners were offered promotions inappropriately. At the
time this situation occurred, TSA was transitioning from its initial
human resources service contractor to the current contractors and was
building a fully functioning human resources organization, including
program management of the contractors. Dulles posted job announcements
internally for the positions of Lead Screeners and Supervisory
Screeners with a closing date of December 20, 2002. Unfortunately, at
that time, the FSD organization at airports did not have delegated
authority to conduct recruitment and assessment processes, which
includes the authority to promote existing employees at the airport.
TSA's Office of Human Resources did not become aware of the issue
until May, 2003. TSA worked expeditiously to develop a solution whereby
all individuals who were inappropriately promoted at Dulles were
provided compensation with a one-time monetary award, consisting of the
difference between their screener salary and the salary that they would
have received for the period they were ``promoted.'' Additionally, TSA
``re-announced'' the supervisory screener positions, and screeners who
were inappropriately promoted were afforded full and fair opportunity
to compete for the positions. TSA provided affected screeners the one-
time award regardless of whether they succeeded or not in being
promoted under the valid procedure.
HAITI
Question. I am concerned by the Department's response to those who
have fled Haiti in recent weeks. Haitians intercepted at sea have
received entirely inadequate screening for asylum. For example, while
all interdicted Cubans are individually interviewed regarding their
fear of persecution, only those Haitians who loudly protest their
return--the so-called ``shout test''--receive such an interview. I
joined with Senators Kennedy and Durbin in writing to the President
last week to protest and seek changes in this and other policies. (A)
Will you provide individual interviews to all Haitians interdicted at
sea? (B) Will you suspend deportations against Haitians currently in
the United States until the political situation in Haiti improves?
Answer. Haitians manifesting a fear of return are and will continue
to be interviewed by a USCIS Asylum Pre-Screening Officer (APSO). In
accordance with Department of State direction, DHS will continue to
conduct non-criminal Haitian removals.
DATABASE INTEGRATION
Question. The Washington Post yesterday editorialized about a
report Inspector General Fine issued last week on the slow pace of the
integration of IDENT and IAFIS, the fingerprint identification
databases of the former INS and the FBI. The report examined the case
of Victor Manual Batres, a Mexican national with a criminal history who
was twice simply returned to Mexico by Border Patrol agents whose
database did not identify him as a wanted man. Batres eventually
entered the country illegally, and then raped two nuns in Oregon,
killing one. The Inspector General reported that the integration that
would give Border Patrol agents access to the FBI database was 2 years
behind schedule, and was not expected to be completed until 2008. Last
week's report is the third OIG report in the last 4 years to highlight
various aspects of this problem. (A) Why has progress on this issue
been so slow? (B) When can we expect that Border Patrol agents will
have access to the immigration and criminal histories in one database?
(C) When will DHS enter into an MOU with DOJ about how this integration
will happen?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security is committed to
accelerating implementation of IDENT/IAFIS 10 fingerprint capability
for enforcement processing at ports of entry, Border Patrol locations,
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement offices.
While we begin planning our implementation plan, we plan on using
$4 million of the remaining funds provided in Public Law 107-117
(fiscal year 2002 counter-terrorism funding) for potential use for
IDENT/IAFIS implementation. The $4 million, when combined with fiscal
year 2003 funds already provided ($3.5 million obligated for IDENT/),
will allow BTS to implement IDENT with 10 print capabilities in
secondary processing areas at 115 airports, 14 seaports and 50 of the
largest land border ports. In addition, this funding will support
implementation of the IAFIS/IDENT 10 print capability at 70 percent of
the Border Patrol stations. The remaining land ports of entry, 30
percent of the Border Patrol stations and major ICE locations (to be
determined) will receive this capability early in calendar year 2005.
Funding for fielding these capabilities is estimated to be
approximately $3 million, but a clearer estimate will be provided as
the planning and implementations proceed. Completing the implementation
of IDENT/IAFIS at Border Patrol stations will provide the capability to
biometrically identify and/or perform status verifications on
individuals suspected of illegally crossing the border. Implementation
at ICE offices will support investigation of individuals apprehended
for overstays and/or watch list hits.
The Department of Homeland Security will work with the Department
of Justice to accelerate our integration into the FBI's IAFIS (10
print, criminal history) and the legacy INS IDENT (2-print,
immigration) systems. An integrated workstation has already been
developed. It has been deployed to a limited number of sites. DHS
intends to complete deployment of this capability in 2005.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Patty Murray
Question. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
I'm pleased to join you, Senator Byrd, and the rest of our
colleagues in welcoming Mr. Hutchinson today.
He has been handed a tough task in a very difficult time. I know he
is committed to keeping our country safe, and I thank him for his
leadership.
Mr. Hutchinson, the Federal Government--and specifically your
Department--has done an admirable job of providing resources and
training to help secure the threats to our Northern Border. As a result
of increased activity on the border, more individuals are being
apprehended for crimes at or near the border but handed over to local
law enforcement.
However, the prosecution, defense, court and detention costs are
very high. And, our local governments have been left with the
responsibility for providing law enforcement services to most areas at
and near the international border.
One example from Washington State is Whatcom County and the City of
Blaine--the areas that rests on the Northern Border of Washington State
on Interstate 5. This community is responsible for 112 miles of border,
including 89-miles of a shared land border with Canada and a 23-mile
coastal border.
As you know, the Department of Homeland Security operates five land
points-of-entry within the county. Additionally, there are three
international airports and several marine ports of entry within Whatcom
County's jurisdiction.
Mr. Hutchinson, terrorists, armed drug and weapons smugglers, and
wanted fugitives regularly traverse residential neighborhoods at or
near the border, creating huge threats to public safety and demands on
local law enforcement.
In Whatcom County, more than 85 percent of all criminal
apprehensions made by Federal law enforcement agents at or near our
border are turned over to the county. In fact, last year Whatcom County
spent approximately $3 million on Federal deferred cases, and this year
they estimate their costs will rise to $4 million.
In these difficult fiscal times for local communities these extra
burdens are having serious impacts on their budgets. But unlike the
communities of Buffalo and Detroit, my small, rural county is
staggering under the increased pressure on its budget.
Mr. Hutchinson, the Southwest Border Initiative provides financial
support to communities along the southern border who are experiencing
this very problem. However, Whatcom County, which is the least
populated northern border county with a major crossing has seen no such
relief.
I can't stress to you enough the impact $4 million has on a
community of this size.
I believe a similar program should be established for Northern
Border States, particularly those State that have high traffic volumes,
such as Washington State.
Mr. Hutchinson, are you aware of this inequity between southern and
northern border communities, and how is your Department prepared to
help?
Answer. Senator Murray, thank you for bringing this important issue
to my attention. As you know, some of the initiatives undertaken to
improve homeland security have produced unintended consequences.
Tighter border security should lead to more interdictions and arrests.
But, while the National Strategy for Homeland Security specifies that
costs and performance are to be a shared responsibility, we certainly
are not advocating that local jurisdictions take on a disproportionate
share of the burden in that regard. Therefore we welcome your reports
that outline these potential inequities. I understand that the U.S.
Attorney and our ICE officers have met with your county officials to
find a more balanced approach to performing this important workload,
including the prospects that the arrestee's initial appearance occur in
the Bellingham Magistrate's Court. While those potential solutions may
not lead to the full relief sought, they are a step in the right
direction while the Federal budget addresses this increased workload.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Cochran. Our next hearing of the subcommittee on
the budget request for the Department of Homeland Security will
be held on Tuesday, March 23 in this same room. At that time
the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, Admiral Thomas
Collins, and the Acting Administrator of the Transportation
Security Administration, Mr. David Stone, will be here to
discuss the budget request for the programs under their
jurisdictions.
Until then this subcommittee will stand in recess.
[Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., Tuesday, March 9, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday,
March 23.]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 23, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., in room SD-124, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Cochran, Stevens, Domenici, Byrd, Inouye,
and Murray.
Also present: Senator Reid.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
STATEMENTS OF:
HON. ADMIRAL THOMAS H. COLLINS, COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES COAST
GUARD
ADMIRAL DAVID M. STONE, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. The committee hearing will please come to
order.
Today, we continue our review of the President's fiscal
year 2005 budget request for the Department of Homeland
Security, specifically, the programs and activities of the
United States Coast Guard and the Transportation Security
Administration. I am pleased to welcome to the hearing the
Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, Admiral Thomas
Collins, and the Acting Administrator of the Transportation
Security Administration, Admiral David Stone.
We appreciate you submitting copies of your statements in
advance of the hearing. They will be made a part of the record,
and we invite you to make any comments you think would be
helpful to the Committee's understanding of the budget request.
I am happy to yield to Senator Inouye and other Senators
who may wish to make any opening statements.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I look forward to the hearing today. I represent a state
that relies more than any other state on the two agencies
represented this morning. As an island state, we have a unique
relationship with the Coast Guard. We enjoy the ocean year-
round for recreation and commercial fishing, and rely on it for
transportation of more than 90 percent of our goods. And in
Hawaii, we have a great appreciation for the search and rescue,
navigation, fisheries management, and the environmental
protection mission of the Coast Guard.
Aviation is also a lifeline for my state. Our tourism-based
economy is dependent on reliable and safe transportation of
passengers to and from our shores. So I am so committed to
working with both of these agencies to ensure that there are
resources necessary to improve upon their performance, and help
keep our traveling public and our transportation system safe,
so I welcome the testimony of these two gentlemen.
Senator Cochran. Admiral Collins, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL THOMAS H. COLLINS
Admiral Collins. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Inouye. It is a privilege to be with you. Thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the fiscal year 2005 budget request and
the impact on the essential services we provide to the American
public.
The 2005 budget proposes a budget authority of $7.46
billion, a 9 percent increase over fiscal year 2004. I am
pleased to note that from fiscal years 2003 to 2005, our
operating expense budget has grown over 51 percent. This growth
supports the President's National Security Strategy for
Homeland Security, and it supports the full range of Coast
Guard missions.
HIGHLIGHTS OF SERVICE TO THE NATION OVER THE PAST MONTH
From my perspective, this budget growth is more than
justified. We continue to apply our budget both effectively and
efficiently, and often achieve extraordinary operational
outcomes for the American people. I have been a part of the
Coast Guard for 40 years now, and I continue to be amazed at
the performance of our men and women every day. In fact, our
operations just over the past month paint a clear and vivid
picture of the scope and the national importance of the
services we provide to the American public.
We responded to the distress calls from the burning and
sinking ship/tanker, Bow Mariner, just this month, 50 miles off
shore. Our rescue swimmer deployed in 44-degree, oil-covered
water to save six crewmen.
Our search and rescue response capability was sustained,
even though eighteen cutters, eight aircraft, and almost
fourteen-hundred personnel deployed between the coast of Haiti
and South Florida this month. And as conditions deteriorated in
Haiti, Coast Guard cutters intercepted over a thousand
Haitians, and safely repatriated them, thus fulfilling our
President's mandate to repatriate Haitian migrants and present
a deterrent to mass migration.
This week, the Coast Guard cutter, Midget, on patrol in the
Eastern Pacific, returning home to Puget Sound after this month
seizing over 27,000 pounds of cocaine in three boardings,
setting a record for the most cocaine seized by a cutter on a
single patrol.
Today, four 1410-foot cutters, two port security units, and
477 people are currently providing critical support to
operations in Iraq. And today, we have two polar ice breakers
returning home after the most successful resupply of McMurdo
Station in recent years. We were successful in implementing the
requirements for the Maritime Transportation Security Act of
2002 and will be ready to commence aggressive compliance
oversight on July 1.
These are just the highlights of our service to the Nation
over this past month. The 2005 budget request provides the
resources necessary for the Coast Guard to continue this high
level of service to the American public. We have four
priorities embedded in this budget.
FOUR PRIORITIES EMBEDDED IN THE BUDGET REQUEST
First, is to recapitalize our operational assets. Our
greatest threat to mission performance continues to be that our
aircraft, our boats, and cutters are aging, technologically
obsolete, and require replacement and modernization. The
integrated Deepwater system, or Deepwater, is the answer to
these concerns.
My second priority is to ensure consistent performance
across all missions by ensuring the right force structure and
the right set of capabilities. The 2005 budget adds capability
and capacity to enable across-the-board mission performance,
including operational funding for additional eleven patrol
boats, these 87-foot patrol boats, and the transfer of five
179-foot PC patrol boats from the Navy, and overall, adding
over 1,300 people to our workforce in 2005.
My third priority is to aggressively implement the
comprehensive requirements of the Maritime Transportation
Security Act of 2002. Over $100 million and 791 new personnel
support this critical security initiative.
My fourth priority reflected in the 2005 budget is to
expand what we have been calling Maritime Domain Awareness.
Expanding awareness of activities occurring in the maritime
domain is critical to enhancing our performance across all
mission areas. And we must identify and understand threats,
disseminate timely information to our operational commanders
and our homeland security partners in order to respond to
terrorist attacks, drug smuggling, illegal migration, and so
forth.
Of course, the Coast Guard people make our operational
excellence possible, and the successful operational tempo
demonstrated over the last month is testimony to the skill and
commitment of our personnel. They routinely put service to our
Nation above all else, and they are my highest priority. And
this budget request improves the quality of life of Coast Guard
men and women, by providing a pay raise, and improving basic
allowance for housing.
Most importantly, through Deepwater, through Rescue 21, and
other modernization efforts, our Coast Guard people will be
provided with the quality equipment they deserve to do their
job.
prepared statement
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify
today, and I will be pleased to answer any questions that you
may have.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Admiral Collins.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral Thomas H. Collins
Introduction Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members
of the Subcommittee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to
discuss the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2005 budget request, and its
critical importance in your Coast Guard being able to deliver essential
daily services to the American public.
The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2005 budget proposes budget authority
of $7.46 billion, a 9 percent increase over fiscal year 2004, and
continues our effort to enhance capability and competencies to perform
both safety and security missions. It supports the goals of the
President's National Strategy for Homeland Security to prevent
terrorist attacks, reduce our vulnerabilities, and minimize damage from
attacks that do occur.
Before I discuss our fiscal year 2005 budget, I would like to take
a few moments to discuss some of our accomplishments during the past
year. You deserve a quick report on how we have used the resources this
Subcommittee has provided us in the past and I am proud of the results
that Coast Guard men and women continue to deliver for the country.
During fiscal year 2003, the Coast Guard:
--Interdicted over 6,000 undocumented migrants attempting to
illegally enter the country by sea.
--Prevented more than 136,800 pounds of cocaine, over 14,000 pounds
of marijuana and more than 800 pounds of hashish from reaching
U.S. shores.
--Aggressively conducted more than 36,000 port security patrols,
including 3,600 air patrols, 8,000 security boardings and over
7,000 vessel escorts.
--Deployed the largest contingent of Coast Guard personnel overseas
since the Vietnam War to support Operation Iraqi Freedom,
including 11 cutters, two shoreside support units, and over
1,200 personnel.
--Saved the lives of nearly 5,100 mariners in distress and responded
to more than 31,500 calls for assistance.
--Boarded more than 3,400 fishing vessels to enforce safety,
environmental and economic laws.
--Mobilized 64 percent of our reserve force to enhance protection of
our ports, waterways and critical infrastructure during
heightened states of alert, and to support the Combatant
Commanders.
--Kept critical shipping channels clear of ice in the Great Lakes and
New England ensuring the availability of critical energy
products.
--Maintained more than 50,000 Federal aids to navigation along 25,000
miles of maritime transportation highways.
--Responded to over 19,000 reports of water pollution or hazardous
material releases.
--Completed the most difficult re-supply of McMurdo Station
(Antarctica) during Operation Deep Freeze in 40 years. USCGC
Polar Sea and USCGC Healy smashed through 50 miles of ice more
than 13-feet thick to enable U.S. scientists to continue their
studies of the Earth's climate.
In addition, we have become a proud member of the Department of
Homeland Security that consolidated 22 agencies and nearly 180,000
employees. We are committed to working with our partner agencies as one
team engaged in one fight, and I truly believe having one Department
responsible for homeland security has made America more secure today.
An example of this one team-one fight motto is very evident in the
developing events in Haiti. Under the direction of the Secretary of
Homeland Security, the Homeland Security Task Force--Southeast was
stood-up as part of OPERATION ABLE SENTRY. Led by Coast Guard Rear
Admiral Harvey Johnson, the task force is comprised of many agencies
chartered to plan, prepare, and conduct migrant interdiction operations
in the vicinity of Haiti due to the escalation of violence in that
country and the threat of a mass exodus of undocumented migrants. In
the first days of interdiction operations, the task force demonstrated
impressive agility and synergy:
--Coast Guard cutters, with Citizenship and Immigration Service (CIS)
asylum pre screening officers and interpreters aboard,
interdicted seven Haitian vessels with 1,076 undocumented
migrants,
--Coast Guard and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) aircraft
patrolled the skies throughout the operating area,
--Coast Guard, ICE, and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) boats
conducted coordinated patrols off the Florida coast,
--Coast Guard and ICE conducted a coordinated boarding of a boat
suspected of being highjacked off the coast of Miami,
--Coast Guard, CBP, ICE, and the Transportation Security
Administration command center, public affairs, and intelligence
staffs fully engaged,
--Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) deployed three
Information and Planning Specialists to the task force in
support of contingency planning.
In addition, we have begun aggressively implementing the Maritime
Transportation Security Act thanks in large part to a herculean inter-
agency effort. Final Rules were published in October 2003 and security
plans from approximately 9,000 vessels and 3,200 facilities were due on
December 31, 2003. To date, approximately 97 percent have been
received. We will continue to aggressively pursue 100 percent
compliance, and have instituted a phased implementation of penalties to
ensure that all regulated facilities have implemented approved security
plans by the 1 July 2004 deadline. We completed eleven port security
assessments, and have established 43 Area Maritime Security Committees
to provide enhanced planning, communication and response for our
nation's ports. We have met with nearly sixty countries representing
the vast majority of all shippers to the United States., reinforcing a
commitment to the International Ship and Port Facilities Security
(ISPS) code. We have commissioned additional Maritime Safety and
Security Teams (MSSTs) and plan to have 13 teams by the end of CY 2004.
We are installing an Automatic Identification System (AIS) network in
nine coastal locations that have Vessel Traffic Services improving our
awareness of the maritime domain, and are simultaneously designing a
nationwide system.
The Need to Sustain Growth in fiscal year 2005
Despite these accomplishments, there is still much to do. The last
few weeks paint a clear and vivid picture of the breadth, scope and
national importance of all Coast Guard missions. Rescue personnel from
our mid-Atlantic units responded to the distress call from the burning
and sinking Singaporean tanker Bow Mariner, and six crewmen were saved
from 44-degree water. A Coast Guard cutter seized the entire catch from
a fishing vessel off the New England coast for having twice the legal
limit of lobster on board and more importantly having female egg
bearing lobsters that a biologist indicated had been scrubbed of eggs.
Our search and rescue and living marine resource response capability
was sustained even as 15 cutters, 6 aircraft, and approximately 1,550
personnel deployed south positioning from the coast of Haiti to the
approaches to South Florida as part of Homeland Security Task Force-
Southeast, and interdicted 1,075 Haitian migrants. Simultaneously, we
have four Patrol Boats, two Port Security Units, and 377 personnel
deployed in support of operations in Iraq. As you can see, demand for
Coast Guard resources continue to expand, while our ships and aircraft
continue to age. The Coast Guard is the nation's lead Federal agency
for maritime homeland security and marine safety. Critical new
resources are required to establish a new level of maritime security
while continuing to perform the full range of Coast Guard missions.
The budget requests resources that are necessary for the Coast
Guard to fulfill its responsibilities to the American public. For
fiscal year 2005, my priorities are:
--Recapitalize operational assets;
--Enhance performance across all missions by leveraging Coast Guard
authorities, capabilities, competencies and partnerships;
--Aggressively implement the comprehensive requirements of MTSA; and
--Expand awareness of activities occurring in the maritime domain.
Recapitalize Operational Assets
The Coast Guard's greatest threat to mission performance continues
to be that our aircraft, boats and cutters are aging, technologically
obsolete, and require replacement and modernization. The majority of
these assets will reach the end of their service life by 2008, and have
increasing operating and maintenance costs, which results in lost
mission performance, mission effectiveness, unnecessary risks, and wear
and tear on people. These assets are failing at an alarming rate.
Recent asset failures and their subsequent impact on operational
readiness exemplify the downward readiness spiral created by
increasingly aging capital assets coupled with a more demanding
operational tempo. Frankly, the existing system is failing in numerous
areas and I am concerned that we are reaching a ``declining readiness
spiral'' phenomenon. Deferred modernization results in reduced patrols
and readiness, corresponding increased maintenance needs and higher
total ownership costs. Recapitalization funds are then needed to keep
old assets operating, which only defers modernization starting this
declining cycle over again. The Coast Guard is faced with trading asset
modernization funding toward legacy asset maintenance and capability to
address immediate safety and reliability concerns. Some examples of why
I am so concerned:
--HH-65 Helicopter engine system casualties.--In-flight engine
partial power losses occurred at a rate of 63 per 100,000
flight hours in fiscal year 2003, and is significantly higher
so far in fiscal year 2004. This rate far exceeds the FAA
standard of one per 100,000 hours and the U.S. Navy Safety
Center guidelines of no more than 10 mishaps per 100,000 flight
hours. HH-65 helicopters are critical to Coast Guard operations
including ongoing efforts off the coast of Haiti.
--110-foot Patrol Boats.--To date, 20 hull breaches requiring
emergency dry docks. One cutter required emergency dry dock for
hull breach only 14 weeks after a 10-month hull renewal project
that had cost $2 million. The 110-foot fleet is the high-speed
workhorse during migrant interdiction operations such as the
ongoing events in the vicinity of Haiti, and has repatriated
927 Haitian migrants thus far.
--378-foot High Endurance Cutter.--3 out of total class of 12 ships
have recently missed operations due to unscheduled maintenance
to failing sub-systems. A 378-foot cutter is currently serving
as the on-scene command ship for Haitian operations.
All three of these asset classes (HH-65, 110, 378) are currently
supporting the Coast Guard missions such as migrant and drug
interdiction operations, ports waterways and coastal security,
fisheries enforcement, and search and rescue, and the Coast Guard
continues to be successful in spite of casualties and readiness levels.
This success comes through the extraordinary efforts of Coast Guard
personnel, and I'm concerned about our ability to continue this
performance in the future. Cocaine seizures to date in fiscal year 2004
total 38.9 metric tons, nearly double last year's pace which yielded
the second highest seizure total ever (62.1 metric tons). The threat of
a mass migration from Haiti, coupled with the flow of illegal drugs and
undocumented migrants from other countries towards the United States,
highlights the value that the U.S. Coast Guard provides our nation.
The Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) is the answer to these
concerns and entails far more than the progressive replacement of our
aging inventory. IDS is an integrated systems approach to upgrading
existing legacy assets through a completely integrated and
interoperable system. All of Deepwater's highly capable assets will be
linked with modern command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture.
The ability to link and network disparate platforms seamlessly over
vast distances is an essential aspect to providing the Coast Guard the
capability to detect and interdict potential threats prior to reaching
our shores and ports. Deepwater assets are America's first line of
defense to counter threats in the maritime domain, and thwart
catastrophes to vulnerable infrastructure (oil rigs, deepwater
channels, shipping). Funding for the Deepwater program is a critical
investment in homeland safety and security and means a more secure
United States of America.
The Coast Guard's deepwater assets are not the only capital assets
that desperately need replacement. The fiscal year 2005 budget also
requests resources for:
--Rescue 21 project, which will be the primary command and control
system to perform the functional tasks of detection,
classification, and command and control in the inland and
coastal zones for Search and Rescue. The existing National
Distress System is inadequate to meet the safety requirements
of growing marine traffic, and is not capable of meeting the
requirements of the International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS) treaty. Rescue 21 will expand existing
capability through greater area coverage, and improved
direction finding capability to enhance Coast Guard emergency
response;
--Great Lakes Icebreaker, which is scheduled to replace USCGC
MACKINAW in 2006 after 57 years of continuous service;
--Response Boat--Medium, which will replace the aging 41-foot Utility
Boat, and will meet mission requirements for search and rescue,
and emerging homeland security missions.
Enhance Mission Performance
To enhance mission performance the Coast Guard must optimize its
unique authorities, capability, competency, and partnerships; while
gaining the capacity in each to complete our full range of missions.
Due to the Coast Guard's multi-mission nature, resources provided will
assist in the performance of all missions. New assets will be used to
conduct fishery patrols and search and rescue cases as well as protect
the Nation against terrorist attacks.
Fiscal year 2005 budget initiatives that add capacity to enable
mission performance include:
--Operational funding for eleven 87-foot Coastal Patrol boats built
in 2004;
--Operational funding for five 179-foot Patrol Coastals being
transferred to the Coast Guard from the Navy;
--Safety configuration changes to the 47-foot Motor Life Boat, which
will allow crews to safely conduct missions in deteriorating
weather conditions.
Aggressively Implement the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002
During the past year, the Coast Guard led the international
maritime community in adopting a new international security regime
requiring vessels and port facilities to develop security plans. This
effort paralleled the requirements this committee helped establish
through enactment of the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of
2002. These regulations require that United States ports, vessels, and
facilities each have a plan to protect against terrorist attacks.
Aggressive implementation of MTSA is essential if we are to maintain
the security of our ports and waterways at acceptable levels. To
implement and enforce these regulations, the Coast Guard has a
recurring requirement to develop, review, approve, and ensure vessels
and facilities are sustaining their own security responsibilities for
all aspects of maritime security. Approximately 97 percent of required
vessel and facilities have turned in security plans to date. We are
issuing notices of violation to the 10 percent that missed the
deadline, are starting the process of approving security plans, and
have commenced training of Coast Guard personnel to complete on-site
verification. Providing the Coast Guard with the resources necessary to
undertake this implementation and enforcement effort is a key step
toward enhanced port, vessel and facility security.
Maritime Domain Awareness
Expanding awareness of activities occurring in the maritime domain
is critical to enhancing Coast Guard performance in all mission areas.
The U.S maritime jurisdiction is enormous, covering some 3.5 million
square miles of ocean and 95,000 miles of coastline. In addition, the
Coast Guard projects a defense-in-depth presence in other areas such as
the Caribbean and eastern Pacific to deter, detect, and interdict drug
and migrant smugglers. The Coast Guard operates at times and in places
no United States forces operate. The ongoing events off the coast of
Haiti highlight the need for a robust maritime domain awareness
capability. The Coast Guard has minimal capability to monitor the
activities occurring within this maritime zone without the presence of
a cutter or aircraft. We must identify and understand threats, and
disseminate timely information to our operational commanders and our
homeland security partners in order to respond to emerging threats such
as terrorist attacks, drug smuggling, illegal migration, location of
distressed boaters, or illegal fishing before they reach our borders.
An intelligence and warning system that detects indicators of potential
terrorist activity before an attack occurs is necessary to take
preemptive and protective action. We are currently installing Automatic
Identification System (AIS) in our Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) ports,
and are formalizing the operational requirements to award a contract
for installation of a nationwide AIS network. $4 million is requested
in fiscal year 2005 to continue this important project. This budget
submission also includes 35 people to integrate all of our projects
that provide maritime domain awareness (MDA), including AIS, Deepwater
and Rescue 21, and these people will partner with the other Department
of Homeland Security agencies, the Navy, and other entities to unite
our joint efforts.
Conclusion
Thank you for your support in the fiscal year 2004 Emergency
Supplemental. Funding is ensuring Coast Guard forces remaining in Iraq
are properly resourced for the rest of fiscal year 2004.
None of what the Coast Guard has accomplished or is striving to
achieve is possible without our people--the bedrock of our service.
They routinely put their service above all else and I am convinced of
their unwavering dedication to the security of this Nation and the
safety of its citizens. They are our highest priority and most valuable
resource.
The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2005 budget request improves the
quality of life for Coast Guard men and women and their families by
providing a pay raise, and continuing improvements in Basic Allowance
for Housing (BAH) reducing out-of-pocket expenses from 3.5 percent to
zero, and gives them the equipment and assets that will allow them to
best contribute their time and talents to the safety and security of
our nation.
I have asked every member of the Coast Guard to continue to focus
intently and act boldly on the three elements of my direction: improve
Readiness; practice good Stewardship; and enhance the growth,
development and well being of our People. With this diligence we will
fulfill our operational commitment to America and maintain our high
standards of excellence.
I look forward to working with you to that end.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I will
be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Cochran. Admiral Stone, you may proceed with your
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL DAVID M. STONE
Admiral Stone. Thank you, sir.
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd, and members of
the Subcommittee. I am honored to appear before you this
morning to discuss the President's fiscal year 2005 budget
request for the Transportation Security Administration.
First, I would like to take a moment to comment on the
tragic bombings in Madrid and Moscow. We are closely examining
these events so we may deter and prevent similar attacks in the
United States. Over the last 2 years, the Department of
Homeland Security has worked with Federal and State
counterparts to bolster the security of rail and mass transit
systems, conducting criticality assessments, coordinating
information sharing, and improving training.
Building on this foundation, yesterday, Secretary Ridge
announced additional measures to further strengthen our rail
and transit systems. We will develop a rapid-deployment mass
transit canine program and continue to partner with local
authorities to provide additional training and assistance for
local canine teams.
TSA will implement a pilot program to test the feasibility
of screening luggage and carry-on bags to detect explosives at
rail stations and aboard trains. Working with the Department,
we will engage industry, and State and local partners to
establish baseline security measures based on best practices,
and we will expand security education and awareness programs.
Security technologies will be examined for their potential
application in the intermodal environment.
FISCAL YEAR 2005 BUDGET REQUEST
Turning to the President's budget proposal for fiscal year
2005, the $5.3 billion that is requested for TSA is $892
million more than the fiscal year 2004 level. The significant
portion of this funding would support and improve passenger and
baggage screening operations at the Nation's airports,
including $145 million to fully implement screening and
training programs, and $86 million to provide technological
support at passenger checkpoints.
TSA is right sizing and stabilizing screening operations,
investing more hiring authority with our Federal Security
Directors to provide more flexibility in addressing staffing
needs. Local hiring, local testing, and local training will be
the keys to our future.
We are assessing the expansion of contract screening; and
to help us make these decisions, a thorough evaluation of the
five private pilot programs is currently under way, with the
results expected in April of this year.
TSA's Federal Flight Deck Officer Program adds another
important layer to our rings of aviation security. We are
seeking $25 million to support and expand training for pilots
who are volunteering to carry firearms to defend aircraft
flight decks. In January, TSA began doubling the number of FFDO
classes, and we plan to provide initial training and
qualifications for thousands of FFDOs by the end of this fiscal
year. We expect to conduct our first cargo FFDO prototype
program next month.
A total of $60 million is requested for the second-
generation Computer-Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System,
CAPPS II, in fiscal year 2005. Developed with the utmost
concern for individual privacy rights, there is a pressing need
to move forward with testing of CAPPS II. The current passenger
pre-screening system operated by air carriers is clearly not
adequate to address the asymmetric threats that confront us on
a daily basis.
To deny targets the opportunity to exploit our thriving air
cargo system, TSA has developed an air cargo strategic plan
within the $85 million requested for air cargo screening in
fiscal year 2005. TSA is requesting $55 million for an
aggressive R&D program to investigate technologies that will
improve our ability to screen high-risk air cargo.
prepared statement
In closing, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
your support, and that of the Subcommittee members. I look
forward to answering your questions today.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Admiral Stone.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of David M. Stone
I am pleased to testify before the Subcommittee on the President's
fiscal year 2005 budget request for the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA). TSA's mission, to protect the Nation's
transportation systems to ensure the freedom of movement for people and
commerce, is completely aligned with the mission of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), and our objectives fully support the
Department's strategic goals.
The tragic bombings of March 11 in Madrid, Spain, are a great
concern to us all. Before I discuss the President's fiscal year 2005
budget request for TSA, I want to assure the Subcommittee that DHS is
supporting the investigation into the attacks with our international
partners and monitoring the investigation to learn more about how these
terrible attacks transpired. Although we have no specific indicators
that terrorist groups are planning such attacks in the United States,
DHS has reached out to state and local security, law enforcement, and
transit and rail officials to ensure vigilance in light of these
incidents.
I want to assure you that DHS is devoting significant attention and
resources on rail security across the Federal Government. Between
fiscal year 2003 and this year, DHS will have provided $115 million to
high-risk transit systems through the Urban Area Security Initiative
(UASI) in the Office for Domestic Preparedness. The Budget proposes to
double our total commitment to UASI, to $1.4 billion in fiscal year
2005. Our partners in the Department of Transportation (DOT) stepped up
inspection of rail lines and security requirements, and DOT is also
assisting Amtrak implement improved security measures. Under the
Budget, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) will award nearly $4
billion in grants to transit agencies, resources that can be used for
security improvements.
TSA is providing strong leadership in this effort and has the
resources it needs under the request to do its part. Over the last 2
years, DHS and DOT have worked with transit and rail operators to
significantly improve security. TSA has worked with the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate and DOT's Federal
Railroad Administration and FTA to conduct criticality assessments of
rail and transit networks operating in high-density urban areas. As a
result, we have better information to focus current and future security
resources and transit systems are producing robust security and
emergency preparedness plans. In addition, DHS is coordinating
information and threat sharing through the Surface Transportation
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) managed by the
Association of American Railroads, including deploying TSA personnel to
the ISAC and hosting ISAC representatives at TSA's Transportation
Security Coordination Center (TSCC) in Virginia. We have held numerous
security exercises to bring together rail carriers, Federal and local
first responders, and security experts, and have addressed potential
gaps in antiterrorism training among rail personnel.
I hope to work with the Subcommittee to continue to determine how
best to strengthen rail and transit security within the resources
levels of our request.
The President's fiscal year 2005 Budget Request for TSA
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget request will support key
initiatives to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of TSA's
efforts to secure our Nation's transportation system. TSA's top
priorities in fiscal year 2005 include:
--Strengthening aviation security.--We will stabilize and enhance our
system-ofsystems approach to aviation security, measure and
improve screening performance, develop advanced screening
technology, and expand the Federal Flight Deck Officer program.
--Upgrading access and inspection security.--TSA will continue to
develop and implement credentialing and background check
programs, continue to support local law enforcement at
airports, strengthen inspection, and enforce agency security
regulations.
--Improving air cargo security.--In partnership with air carriers and
other stakeholders, TSA will continue to implement the range of
initiatives encompassed in its Air Cargo Strategic Plan.
--Enhancing surface transportation security through intelligence,
stakeholder outreach, and integration.--TSA will work with our
colleagues in DHS and in the Department of Transportation to
assess the risk of terrorist attacks to all surface modes of
transportation and develop and implement security strategies to
thwart attacks while minimizing the impact on the flow of cargo
and mobility of passengers.
The President's fiscal year 2005 Budget Request of $5.296 billion
for TSA is dedicated to stabilizing and strengthening TSA's essential
mission. This request is $892 million more than the adjusted enacted
level for fiscal year 2004.
Strengthening Aviation Security
The majority of TSA funding in fiscal year 2005 is requested to
support and improve passenger and baggage screening operations at the
Nation's airports, an essential layer in TSA's rings of aviation
security. Today TSA is right-sizing and stabilizing screening
operations based on security requirements and opportunities for
increasing efficiencies in business processes so that at the end of
fiscal year 2004 an appropriate mix of full-time and part-time
personnel will represent no more than 45,000 full-time equivalents.
Supporting and enhancing the effectiveness of screening operations
requires a broad range of services and activities, from training and
supplies to performance management systems, from management and
headquarters support to human resources services and equipment
maintenance. As part of our long-term plan for stabilizing our
workforce, we are evolving to a business model that vests more hiring
authority at the local level with our Federal Security Directors
(FSDs). The original methods we used in centralizing recruitment,
assessment, hiring, and training of screeners were necessary in the
fastpaced environment to meet the original statutory deadlines. This
centralized model is not the right fit for sustaining an existing
workforce. This is a high priority item for TSA.
Information and data on TSA performance are critical to our ability
to make strategic decisions. TSA is implementing measures to assess
performance, including TSA's Passenger Screening Effectiveness Index,
Cost Per Passenger, Cost Per Bag, and Customer Service Index elements
of the Screening Performance Indices. This information will be used to
assess the impact of higher passenger volume on the effectiveness of
our security operations and the public's level of satisfaction. TSA's
Customer Satisfaction Index is based on feedback from passenger surveys
at airports, polls, and traveler comments. TSA's score for all airports
is 80 percent, indicating that overall, passengers are ``more than
satisfied'' with their experience at passenger security checkpoints.
Over 1.7 million passengers and 2 million bags are processed through
airport checkpoints on a daily basis, yet average wait times are still
low.
For fiscal year 2005, the President's budget requests $2.424
billion for 45,000 screener FTE and 1,210 terminal screening managers.
At the requested level, funding will support screener salaries and
management at all commercial airports. The screener workforce will be
cross-trained to perform duties both as passenger and baggage
screeners. Included in the requested level is $130 million for contract
screening airports. This funding is based on an estimate of resources
necessary to maintain the current five pilot project airports. However,
actual funding needs for contract screening operations may vary
depending on the current evaluation of contract screening, the
program's future deployment and management structure, and other
contract screening transitions at airports.
A total of $145 million is requested in fiscal year 2005 to fully
implement the passenger and baggage screening training programs
critical to maintaining high skill levels in our screener workforce.
This will support training for replacement screeners as well as support
recurrent and advanced training to the entire screener workforce to
meet and maintain proficiency and qualification standards. All
passenger screeners must meet annual recertification standards, passing
a Standard Operating Procedures Job Knowledge Test, an Image
Certification Test, and a Practical Skills Demonstration, and achieve a
fully successful performance rating. Recertification for 2003-2004
began on October 1, 2003, and will be completed this month.
As reported to this Subcommittee last fall, TSA recognizes that we
must continually work to maintain and sharpen screener capabilities.
TSA has made significant progress in implementing the Short-Term
Screening Improvement Plan, a series of integrated interventions that
include enhanced training and technology deployment, policy and process
reengineering, increased support to the field, and increased covert
testing.
TSA uses its Special Operations Program to provide ongoing and
immediate feedback to screeners, their supervisors, and TSA leadership
on screener performance. The Special Operations Program's overall
objectives are to test the security systems at the airports and to
introduce difficult, real-life threat items to the screener workforce.
Once covert testing is completed at a checkpoint, Special Operations
teams conduct post-test reviews with available screeners to reenact the
test and provide training.
As part of the Short-Term Screening Improvement Plan, Special
Operations teams have tested 68 airports between October 1, 2003, and
February 1, 2004. Testing between October 1 and December 31, 2003,
focused on increasing the number of airports tested for the first time,
to establish a performance baseline. In January 2004, Special
Operations teams began retesting airports to determine whether
performance improved once the screening performance initiatives had
been deployed. In January 2004, Special Operations teams retested 15
airports, with 11 airports improving overall checkpoint performance an
average of 21 percent.
These overall covert checkpoint tests are also showing improvement
in individual screener performance. Between September 2002 and February
1, 2004, TSA conducted 1,227 checkpoint tests at 171 airports.
Checkpoint test results have improved nearly 14 percent. During January
2004 testing, the pass rate for two of the checkpoint tests was nearly
90 percent or better.
To maintain high levels of screener proficiency, TSA's screener
improvement plan places a strong emphasis on recurrent screener
training and supervisory training. Over 700 inert Modular Bomb Set (MBS
II) and weapons training kits have been deployed to every airport in
the country as an integral part of TSA's recurrent training for
screeners, enabling them to see and touch the components of improvised
explosive devices and weapons. TSA is also developing protocols to help
FSDs conduct their own airport level screening testing. To blend
nationally and locally developed training, TSA has established the
``Excellence in Screener Performance'' video training series. The first
two videos, ``Hand Held Metal Detector/Pat Down Search'' and ``X-ray
Operator'' have been delivered to the field. Training videos on
physical bag search and screening persons with disabilities are now in
production. The third part of our recurrent training program is a
series of web-based and computer-based screener training. Eight
training products are in production, with the first due to the field in
March 2004. From the standpoint of training delivery, our most
significant accomplishment is the launching of our learning management
system, the TSA Online Learning Center (OLC). The OLC makes available
over 350 general training and development courses in addition to TSA
specific training.
Recognizing the need to provide our front line supervisors with the
tools they need to manage effectively the screener workforce, we have
sent more than 2,500 supervisors to introductory leadership training at
the Graduate School, United States Department of Agriculture. We will
continue to offer 10 sessions each week until all screening supervisors
have received this training. We are currently adding a customized
module to this training that includes airport-specific examples of
leadership issues they might encounter.
TSA also has begun training some of its senior screeners to
recognize patterns of unusual or suspicious behavior. This additional
skill set will further enhance aviation security.
TSA promptly investigates significant security incidents as they
are disclosed. Using teams of security specialists and investigators
who recreate the security breach, vulnerabilities in the system are
revealed, and TSA can immediately take corrective action. TSA has also
forged a working relationship with other Federal law enforcement
agencies and task forces when incidents require coordinated
investigative activities.
TSA's 158 FSDs form the backbone of security management and
leadership at the Nation's airports. Our budget requests $284 million
in fiscal year 2005 to support our FSDs and other airport security
management and staff positions nationwide. In order to streamline the
administrative operations at airports, larger airports have been
designated as hubs, providing security direction, administrative
support, and staff resources to smaller airports.
In fiscal year 2005, TSA will continue the deployment of electronic
explosive detection equipment at the Nation's airports and look for
efficiencies to improve passenger and baggage screening. The total
fiscal year 2005 discretionary funding request for explosives detection
systems (EDS) and explosives trace detection (ETD) equipment purchase
and installation is $150 million, with $250 million through the
Aviation Security Capital Fund, for a total resource level of $400
million. Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (Vision
100), Public Law 108-176, established the Aviation Security Capital
Fund. The first $250 million of passenger fees authorized by the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Public Law 107-71, will be
deposited into this fund. Fund resources can be spent on projects to
replace baggage conveyer systems related to aviation security, to
reconfigure terminal baggage areas as needed to install EDS, to deploy
EDS in airport terminals, and for other airport security capital
improvement projects.
TSA's EDS/ETD equipment purchase and installation program is the
key to compliance with statutory requirements for full electronic
screening of checked baggage. TSA purchases and installs this equipment
through a variety of mechanisms, including congressionally authorized
Letters of Intent (LOIs), which provide a partial reimbursement to
airports for facility modifications required to install in-line EDS
solutions. TSA has issued eight airport LOIs, covering 9 airports. TSA
is also using resources to purchase and install EDS and ETD machines at
airports outside the LOI process.
The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes proposed language to
maintain policies which guide the current program cost share and
distribution of funding for LOIs, keeping the cost share at 75 percent
for large airports and 90 percent for all other airports and overriding
allocation formulas. TSA believes the current cost share is fair and
equitable and that revised allocation formulas could potentially
disrupt current LOI commitments and be detrimental to long-term
security effectiveness.
TSA is also requesting approximately $86 million to provide
technological support at passenger checkpoints. This funding would
support reconfiguration at a portion of the 34 remaining airports that
would benefit from reconfiguration and provide $30 million for purchase
of advanced checkpoint equipment. This funding also supports TSA's
continuing implementation of the Threat Image Projection (TIP) program,
an essential element of TSA's screening improvement program. TIP
superimposes threat images on X-ray screens during actual operations
and records whether or not screeners identify the threat object.
Through a tremendous example of private-public partnership, a
significantly enhanced 2,400-image Threat Image Projection (TIP)
library was uploaded to every TIP Ready X-Ray (TRX) in the country
during the height of winter holiday travel season without interrupting
service. This new TIP image library replaces the much smaller 200-image
library developed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) with
images that will continuously provide screeners exposure to the most
current threats, including improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Now 100
percent of checkpoint security lanes are equipped with TRXs with the
2,400-image TIP library, providing real-time data on screener
performance. Data is available quickly at the local level and reported
to headquarters for aggregated analysis and monitoring. Through this
combination of increased deployment of TRX machines and activation of
the expanded TIP image library, we are able to collect and analyze
significant amounts of performance data that has not been previously
available. TIP is an excellent tool for evaluating the skills of each
individual screener so that we can focus directly on areas needing
skill improvement. By regularly exposing screeners to a variety of
threat object images, TIP provides continuous on-the-job training and
immediate feedback and remediation.
TSA uses a wide range of interconnected information technology
solutions to maximize its security efforts. In the past, collecting TIP
data for analysis and reporting was a cumbersome task. Network
connectivity to checkpoints will be the ultimate answer to efficient
collection, analysis, and reporting of TIP data. This effort will
provide the capability for continuous training, including real-time
training on current threats; greater capacity for monitoring TIP
performance; connectivity with checked baggage areas; and a foundation
for planned implementations of additional administrative, surveillance,
CAPPS II, and other security enhancements. TSA is requesting
approximately $294 million in fiscal year 2005 to support its
Information Technology Core, which will provide the telecommunications
infrastructure support and services necessary for TSA to fully utilize
TIP capabilities.
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget includes a request for $49
million for TSA applied Research and development (R&D) and $50 million
for Next Generation EDS. Working closely with the DHS Science and
Technology (S&T) Directorate, we have established an ambitious program
to develop and deploy new security technologies and use technology to
enhance human performance. Technology can help us make our screening
operations more effective, more efficient, less time-consuming, and
less costly. TSA operates a state-of-the-art research laboratory, the
Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL), in Atlantic City, New Jersey.
Several screening and other security technologies are under development
at the TSL, including an explosives detection portal to determine if
explosives are being carried on a passenger's person, document scanners
to detect trace amounts of explosive materials on items such as
boarding passes, and scanners for better screening of casts and
prosthetic devices. We are also developing EDS for carry-on baggage and
improving explosives detection technology for screening liquids.
We are continuing work on the Next Generation of EDS for checked
baggage screening to increase throughput capacity, improve detection
capabilities, and lower false positive alarm rates. Simultaneously, we
are collaborating with new and existing vendors to develop technologies
that will enable us to detect explosives in smaller amounts than are
currently established in our certification standard and that will
occupy a smaller footprint at airports. We have piloted an on-screen
alarm resolution protocol and will soon start the training that will
enable our screeners to more closely examine an image without opening a
traveler's luggage, resulting in clearing more false positive alarm
images without a drop in detection proficiency. Within the Next
Generation program, we are also looking at new applications of X-ray,
electro-magnetic, and nuclear technologies to probe sealed containers
for materials that pose a threat to aviation security.
We are planning fiscal year 2005 R&D efforts to combine expanded
technological capabilities in conjunction with sensor fusion
development. Unfortunately, the restricted space at airports and other
transportation facilities will not support continuing additions to the
footprints of our screening areas. Therefore, we must design systems
that will address multiple threats within very confined spaces. The
challenge of moving new technology from the laboratory to the real
world is significant.
TSA's R&D program also focuses on developing standards for
biometric systems through ongoing pilot programs and laboratory
efforts. TSA's efforts in this arena are being coordinated with the US
VISIT program office. Research in biometrics technologies continues to
be applicable and useful in supporting several TSA initiatives such as
the Transportation Workers Identification Credential (TWIC) program,
the Registered Traveler program, infrastructure access control
programs, and employee screening.
TSA's Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) program has now been in
place for more than 1 year, adding another important layer to our rings
of aviation security. The fiscal year 2005 budget proposes $25 million
to support and continue expansion of FFDO training for pilots at the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Artesia, New Mexico. TSA
developed and implemented this program in close cooperation with
organizations representing airline pilots, such as the Air Line Pilots
Association and the Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations. Pilots
provided valuable insights to TSA during the formation of the FFDO
program and many of their suggestions are reflected today in the
initial qualifications, training, and standard operating procedures for
FFDOs; and training location and support facilities. In January 2004,
TSA began doubling the number of FFDO classes, and we plan to provide
initial training and qualification for thousands of FFDOs by the end of
this fiscal year. TSA has streamlined the process for pilots to become
FFDOs. The selection process consists of an on-line application, an
hour-long computerized assessment, an interview, and a background
check. FFDO assessments are administered at over 200 locations
throughout the United States, and more are being added. Classes are
available continuously except during certain holidays.
Pilots also must attend re-qualification sessions twice a year to
ensure that they maintain a high level of proficiency and familiarity
with program requirements. Ten private, state, and local government
sites are available for self-scheduling of re-qualification training.
Sites were selected in geographically diverse locations that would be
convenient to pilots. As the numbers of FFDOs grows, TSA will expand
the number of recurrent training sites to meet their needs.
With the enactment of Vision 100, the FFDO program has been
expanded to include cargo pilots and other flight deck crewmembers. TSA
is examining modifications to the current FFDO curriculum and operating
procedures to reflect the different environment in which cargo pilots
operate. TSA initiated the on-line application process for cargo and
other flight deck crewmembers in February 2004 and expects to conduct
its first cargo FFDO prototype program this April.
A total of $60 million is requested for fiscal year 2005 for the
second generation Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System
(CAPPS II). CAPPS II is a limited, automated prescreening system
authorized by Congress that will become a critical element in TSA's
system-of-systems approach to security. Developed with the utmost
concern for individual privacy rights, CAPPS II will modernize the
prescreening system currently implemented by the airlines. It will seek
to authenticate travelers' identities and perform risk assessments to
detect individuals who may pose a terrorist-related threat or who have
outstanding Federal or state warrants for crimes of violence.
Under CAPPS II, airlines will ask passengers for a slightly
expanded amount of reservation information, including full name, date
of birth, home address, and home telephone number. With this expanded
information, the system will quickly verify the identity of the
passenger using commercially available data and conduct a risk
assessment leveraging current intelligence information. The overall
process will result in a recommended screening level, categorized as no
risk, unknown or elevated risk, or high risk. The commercially
available data will not be viewed by government employees, and
intelligence information will remain behind the government firewall.
The entire prescreening process is expected to take as little as five
seconds to complete.
TSA is carefully reviewing the recent report on CAPPS II issued by
the General Accounting Office (GAO) and working diligently to resolve
all concerns. GAO generally concluded that in most areas that Congress
asked them to review, our work on CAPPS II is not yet complete. DHS has
generally concurred in GAO's findings, which in our view validates the
fact that CAPPS II is a program still under development. As we resolve
issues of access to data needed for testing CAPPS II, and the testing
phase moves forward and results in a more mature system, we are
confident of our ability to satisfy all of the questions that Congress
posed.
Vision 100 transferred the Alien Pilot Security Assessment Program
from the Department of Justice to the Department of Homeland Security.
The law requires that DHS conduct background checks on aliens seeking
flight training at U.S. flight schools, stipulating that checks must be
completed within 30 days. TSA is currently working with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation to implement this program, and we estimate that
as many as 70,000 background checks will be required each year. TSA is
requesting funding for fiscal year 2005 at a level of $4.6 million,
which we estimate could be recovered in fees.
Upgrading Access and Inspection Security
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget requests $91.6 million in
overall funding to strengthen security credential programs, with an
estimated recovery of costs of $71.6 million in credential fees. This
requested funding would support activities to develop the Registered
Traveler program at a level of $15 million. TSA is analyzing whether a
Registered Traveler program can effectively reduce the ``hassle
factor'' in passenger and baggage screening without compromising
aviation security. TSA envisions that a fully implemented Registered
Traveler program would be voluntary in nature and could offer qualified
participants an expedited travel experience. A comprehensive risk
assessment would be conducted on Registered Traveler program applicants
to determine their eligibility. TSA is working on a proposed strategy
for implementing small-scale Registered Traveler pilot programs in
fiscal year 2004, and requests $15 million to expand contract support
and technology resources for the Registered Traveler program in fiscal
year 2005. TSA will analyze the results of the pilot programs to
determine the program's effects on security and customer service. TSA
is also exploring technology solutions associated with non-intrusive
positive identity verification at the passenger security checkpoint,
such as biometrics, that would further expedite security clearance for
registered travelers.
In addition to the Registered Traveler program, requested funding
for credential programs would support the Alien Pilot Security
Assessment Program discussed above, the TWIC at a level of $50 million,
the HAZMAT Driver License Endorsement Program at a level of $17
million, and Credentialing Enterprise Start-up at $5 million. Because
all Credentialing Enterprise programs involve the use of specific law
enforcement and antiterrorist databases, TSA is developing a common
platform of technology and contractor support to conduct appropriate
background checks. Although each credentialing program may involve
special requirements and adjudication, this common platform will
realize economies of scale through shared resources such as systems
equipment, database connectivity, contractor support space, and other
start-up costs that will not be recovered through fees.
We are developing a TWIC prototype and supporting measures to
mitigate the threat of insider attacks to transportation
infrastructure. During prototype, this credential will test the
feasibility of bringing uniformity and consistency to the process of
granting access to transportation workers entrusted to work in the most
sensitive and secure areas of our national transportation system. The
President's fiscal year 2005 request includes spending authority to
begin implementing the TWIC concept within parameters that will be
defined by the Administration after completion of the prototype
assessment.
TSA is requesting $120 million to support its contingent of
regulatory compliance inspectors in fiscal year 2005. These inspectors
ensure that airports, air carriers, and other regulated entities within
the airport property are in compliance with all Federal security
regulations. An additional $90 million will support reimbursements to
state and local agencies providing law enforcement support for airport
security checkpoints. An estimated 300 reimbursable agreements with
state and local law enforcement agencies are necessary to provide the
law enforcement support at levels deemed appropriate by TSA FSDs.
The President's budget requests $17 million in fiscal year 2005 to
support 354 K-9 units under the National Explosives Detection Canine
Team program. TSA-certified canine teams perform a critical role in
aviation security, performing multiple tasks throughout the entire
airport environment, such as screening checked baggage, searching
unattended bags, searching vehicles approaching terminals during
increased threat levels, screening cargo on a limited basis, screening
mail at certain pilot project locations, and responding to bomb
threats. TSA helps local law enforcement agencies by procuring and
training selected canines, training selected law enforcement officers,
and by partially reimbursing agencies for costs.
Improving Air Cargo Security
Each year, U.S. air carriers transport approximately 12.5 million
tons of cargo. To deny terrorists the opportunity to exploit our
thriving air cargo system, TSA has developed an Air Cargo Strategic
Plan that calls for the focused deployment of tools, resources, and
infrastructure that are available today, as well as creating a
foundation for future improvements as technology and resources become
available. For fiscal year 2005, a total of $85 million is requested
for TSA's aviation cargo screening program.
TSA has prohibited all ``unknown shipper'' cargo from flying aboard
passenger carriers since September 11, 2001, thereby limiting cargo to
packages from identifiable shippers under the TSA Known Shipper
program. TSA is rolling out an automated Known Shipper database that
will allow air carriers and indirect air carriers to verify immediately
the status of a specific shipper.
Under the Air Cargo Strategic Plan, TSA will establish a Cargo Pre-
Screening system that identifies which cargo should be considered
``high-risk,'' and work with industry and other Federal agencies to
ensure that 100 percent of high-risk cargo is inspected. We are also
partnering with stakeholders to implement enhanced background checks on
persons with access to cargo and new procedures for securing aircraft
while they are on the ground. A Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is in
development for enhanced screening of cargo on passenger aircraft,
along with stronger security measures for Indirect Air Carriers and the
establishment of a mandatory security program for all-cargo carriers.
TSA and U.S. Customs and Border Protection are working together on air
cargo initiatives through four established work groups, making plans
for future collaboration, leveraging of existing programs, and sharing
resources and technologies.
Within the $85 million requested for air cargo screening in fiscal
year 2005, TSA is requesting $55 million for an aggressive R&D program
to investigate technologies that will improve our ability to screen
physically high-risk air cargo. TSA will look at new technologies for
screening large cargo, including pallets and containerized cargo. In
January 2004, TSA issued a market survey requesting submissions and
participation of vendors of commercial off-the-shelf explosives
detection technology to support cargo inspection. A number of vendors
have been tentatively selected for laboratory evaluation of their
products against the current EDS certification criteria. We have issued
a request for proposals (RFP) for potential inventors of explosives
detection technology for the screening of containerized cargo and U.S.
Mail to be transported on passenger aircraft. This RFP will lead to the
award of R&D grants to assist in the development of promising
technologies. At TSL, we are conducting a cargo characterization study
to determine the feasibility of using currently deployed explosives
detection technology (EDS and ETD) to screen cargo while new systems
are under development.
Enhancing Surface Transportation Security Through Intelligence,
Stakeholder Outreach, and Integration
For modes of transportation other than aviation, TSA is developing
policies and programs to ensure proper coordination, integration, and
information exchange among our Federal, state, and local partners in
non-aviation modes of transportation and to unite disparate
transportation systems under a single security strategy. Our goal in
this regard is to ensure that efforts to provide security in non-
aviation modes are consistent, coordinated, and effective. As part of
this effort, DHS will issue a National Transportation System Security
Plan as part of its overall Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan,
which is currently under development. We are providing Departmental
leadership and guidance in this area, particularly with respect to
modal security plans, to ensure that they are integrated into an
effective concept of operations for management of the transportation
sector's security. TSA's fiscal year 2005 request includes $24 million
for personnel and operational resources dedicated to security in non-
aviation transportation modes and $17 million to support TSA's around-
the-clock TSCC, the same funding level as this year. The complex,
interdependent land transportation environment is especially
challenging. TSA will continue to assess the risk of terrorist attacks
on non-aviation transportation modes, assess the need for standards and
procedures to address those risks, and ensure compliance with
established regulations and policies.
This completes our highlights of key programs and initiatives for
fiscal year 2005.
TSA has achieved an unqualified audit opinion for fiscal year 2003,
its third consecutive clean audit. In fiscal year 2004, TSA is striving
to maintain its clean audit record and correct any internal control
weaknesses noted in audit reports. With passenger and baggage screening
rollouts complete and the transition to DHS behind us, TSA is well
poised to continue implementing more efficient and effective financial
management processes across the organization.
In closing, I want to convey how proud I am of TSA's security
screening workforce. They have carried out their responsibilities with
diligence and professionalism in a dynamic environment. The reality of
TSA's mission is that we must constantly be prepared to provide the
best level of security we can within the resources we have been
provided. The increased variety and sophistication of weapons and
communication tools available to modern terrorists presents a
significant challenge. We have seen all too vividly that successful
terrorist attacks can disrupt the United States and global economies.
With security strengthened and economic recovery underway, it is
imperative that TSA accommodate expected growth in air travel in the
years ahead. With preventive measures in place, the risk of terrorism
is reduced, not eliminated. TSA will continue to identify and
reevaluate threats and vulnerabilities and make decisions that both
facilitate transportation and improve its security.
I will be pleased to answer your questions.
Senator Cochran. Before proceeding to questions, I am happy
to yield to other Senators for any other opening statements
they may have.
Senator Byrd. Senator Murray.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD
Senator Byrd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join in
welcoming our two witnesses today. Two weeks ago, when
Undersecretary Hutchinson testified before this Subcommittee, I
stressed my concern that too many of the Department's efforts
to secure the homeland rely on paper exercises, such as studies
and certifications, rather than on the layered defense that the
President and the Secretary often describe in their homeland
security speeches.
Both the Coast Guard and the Transportation Security
Administration are on the front line of homeland defense, and I
commend both of your organizations for your dedication to your
missions. Regrettably, the President does not seek sufficient
resources for either the Coast Guard or the Transportation
Security Administration.
According to your own testimony, Admiral Collins, Coast
Guard assets, the ships, the planes, the helicopters that you
rely on to protect Americans are failing at an alarming rate.
In fact, you indicate that the Coast Guard assets are in a
``declining readiness spiral'', and yet, according to the
President's budget, the Coast Guard Deepwater program for
upgrading and replacing those assets will take 22 years to
complete. Twenty-two years. This is 2 years slower than the
capital improvement program envisioned when Deepwater was
conceived prior to the tragic events of September 11.
I am also concerned that while you have increased mission
hours for homeland security by 113 percent since 9/11, an
increase that I fully support, your non-homeland security
efforts, such as search and rescue, and fisheries enforcement
have fallen by 26 percent.
Admiral Stone, when Undersecretary Hutchinson testified
before this Subcommittee, I said to him that I was concerned
with the level of funding dedicated to non-aviation modes of
transportation, such as rail security, bus security, port
security. I questioned why the President was seeking no funding
for securing our mass transit systems and was proposing a 62
percent cut in port security grants.
I stressed my objections to the Department's plan to shift
responsibility for these programs out of TSA. I questioned why
it was that the President's budget for the Transportation
Security Administration was 97.3 percent for aviation security
and 2.7 percent for security for other modes of transportation,
such as rail security.
I questioned the wisdom of putting too much of a focus on
responding to the last terrorist attack and not preparing for a
different kind of attack in the future, a future that may not
be far away.
Since that hearing, terrorists have struck again. This
time, the terrorists killed over 200 innocent passengers on a
commuter train in Madrid, Spain. Following the attack in
Madrid, according to The Washington Post, the Department
released a law enforcement advisory warning about the terrorist
threat to our rail system here in America. It is saddening that
it took another terrorist attack for the Administration to wake
up to this threat.
In January of 2003, I offered an amendment to provide $300
million to State and local governments for securing mass
transit systems. The White House opposed the amendment, and it
was defeated. In April of 2003, I offered an amendment to add
$50 million for this purpose. Once again, it was defeated.
Being a persistent kind of fellow who comes from the mud
hills and the clay hills of southern West Virginia, I offered
another amendment for $57 million last July. Once again, the
White House called the amendment wasteful spending, and the
amendment was defeated.
Over 14 million people travel by rail every day in this
country, many more than travel by air. This is a glaring
vulnerability. While I am not suggesting that we should
establish a rail passenger screening system like the system we
have at our airports, we clearly can do more to help our rail
systems install chemical sensors, increase law enforcement
presence, and improve public awareness.
Frankly, Admiral Stone, Secretary Ridge's statement
yesterday that we will use existing resources to do more long-
term research on technological solutions, share information,
and distribute information on best practices just does not make
the grade with me.
The President is proposing to cut law enforcement grant
programs by $732 million, including elimination of the COP's
hiring program, and is also proposing to cut first responder
funding by $733 million. He is proposing to cut Amtrak by $318
million. Where, where, oh, where are State and local
governments and Amtrak supposed to get the money to actually
increase law enforcement at our train stations and on our
trains?
By any definition, the threat to U.S. citizens using our
rail systems is imminent. Imminent. Not 10 years away. Not 25
years away, but now. We need a clear plan that takes immediate
steps to make our people safer. The approach announced by
Secretary Ridge yesterday might make rail passengers safer in
2024, just about the time that the Coast Guard finishes buying
their ships and planes. Our citizens have a right to expect
their government to respond when they are threatened. We should
do more. We should do more. We should do more, and we should do
it now. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Senator Murray.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATTY MURRAY
Senator Murray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Collins and Admiral Stone, I want to join my
colleagues in welcoming you. Today, you have a tremendous task
before you, and I really want to thank you for your service.
Both of your organizations have done a tremendous job, with
limited resources, and what I believe is a lack of support from
the White House in terms of securing our Nation's ports and
cargo terminals. You should both be applauded for your efforts
in addressing the security issues facing our country today.
However, I remain concerned that the President's budget
request does not go far enough to provide you with the funding
and the tools necessary to get the job done. I often question
whether we are giving you the resources to help you work
smarter, or simply asking you to work harder. We need a
coordinated plan for a nationwide port security regime, but it
seems that despite your best efforts, securing our Nation's
ports and cargo terminals is a back burner issue, something
that, according to Secretary Ridge, the private sector should
figure out.
I am really concerned that the President's budget request,
which would place 90 percent of the Administration's so-called
Port Security Program under the Coast Guard, will take even
more attention away from the Coast Guard's other missions.
Admiral Collins, I am interested to hear how the Deepwater
and the response boat programs, the programs that provide our
men and women of the Coast Guard with the platforms they need,
would progress within the President's budget numbers. And I am
particularly interested in the status of the response boat
small contract, which has already been awarded, as well as the
status of the response boat medium contract, which is supposed
to be awarded this year.
We need to make sure that the Coast Guard has the ability
to modernize its vessel and aircraft fleet, and I look forward
to working with Admiral Collins and the rest of my colleagues
to ensure that we fund these priorities responsibly.
Admiral Stone, I'm interested in your perspective on the
relationship between TSA, Customs, and the Coast Guard, more
specifically, how this budget would help provide you with the
tools to achieve a truly coordinated approach to protect our
port facilities.
I am concerned with reports about the lack of coordination
within the Department of Homeland Security. It seems that TSA
and Customs are merely coexisting within the cargo security
area. Last week, I participated in an event celebrating the
arrival of the first operations safe commerce container into
the United States, and that is a TSA program. Unfortunately,
instead of actively participating in this program, designed to
test technologies, and prove best practices for private sector
supply chain security, Customs is moving forward with RFPs for
container security devices, without regard for the work already
in progress in the TSA.
So as I said earlier, we need to help you work smarter, not
just harder. We need a coordinated port security regime to
ensure the safe, efficient transport of cargo into the United
States, as well as protecting people who live and work near our
ports. It has to be a priority for this government.
So Mr. Chairman, I will have more specific questions for
our witnesses during the question and answer period. I thank
both of you for being here today.
Senator Reid. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. The Senator from Nevada, Mr. Reid.
Senator Reid. I am not a member of the Subcommittee, but I
am, of course--I have a very short statement, and I would ask
permission of the Chair to be allowed to----
Senator Cochran. You may proceed, Senator.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR HARRY REID
Senator Reid. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Chairman, and especially members of the Subcommittee, Admiral,
I have appreciated very much working with you. As you are
aware, McCarran International Airport is the second, only to
the Los Angeles International Airport, in the number of
passengers that come through its security checkpoints. Only LA
International has more people coming. You can go to Atlanta,
and there are more people in the airport, but they are not
leaving the airport, while in Las Vegas, they get out and then
come back.
This arises, of course, as I have indicated, because
McCarran is a destination airport, unlike other large airports
that serve as hubs, where passengers simply connect to another
flight. I have been concerned, as you know, about the delays in
TSA's screening of passengers at McCarran, which may cause harm
to the economy in the Las Vegas region. But also we are
concerned for what it does to not only Las Vegas, but points
north, west, south, and east of there.
This frustrates passengers, makes Las Vegas, by some, a
less attractive choice for discretionary travel. These delays
arise because of the lack of an adequate number of screening
lanes at McCarran, as well as TSA security rules and procedures
that were not optimized for McCarran Airport.
To address these delays, there are more screening lanes
being built into McCarran, and I think we can count on TSA to
adequately staff them. In addition, and I appreciate this very
much, TSA instituted a pilot program at McCarran to optimize
screening rules and regulations during periods of heavy
passenger flow, while maintaining the highest levels of
passenger security and safety.
It is my understanding that delays at McCarran have been
reduced to 30 minutes, on average, in recent weeks, and that is
good, because it was up to 3 hours on some occasions. Credit
does go to TSA and your able Federal security director in Las
Vegas, Jim Blair, who is always available to answer questions
and be most helpful in many regards.
So I want to thank you personally for your efforts. And I
would like to ask how you think this pilot program is working
from a TSA perspective and whether you have plans to expand its
application to other airports. You do not need to answer that
now. You can do that in writing to me, if you would, please.
AVIATION SECURITY CAPITAL FUND
There is another issue that I would like to touch on. The
FAA bill passed by Congress last year mandates that 90 percent
of the cost of in-line screening systems at large airports were
to be paid by the Federal Government through the Aviation
Security Capital Fund. The language was definitely retroactive
to large airports that had already received letters of intent
for in-line screening systems. This was an increase from 75
percent to 90 percent, and for McCarran, represents almost $19
million. I note in TSA's fiscal year 2005 budget request for a
Federal share of only 75 percent of these projects. This
clearly was not the intent of Congress.
So, again, I would ask, with the permission of the
Chairman, that you respond to this in writing to all the
committee at your earliest possible date. Is the Federal share
cost 75 percent or 90 percent? By law, it is 90 percent. We
want to make sure that you live by that.
I would also ask, Chairman Cochran, if you would allow me
to submit a question in writing and ask the panelists to
respond to this at their earliest possible date.
Senator Cochran. The Senator has that right, and we will be
glad to make that a part of the hearing record.
Senator Reid. Thank you very much.
Senator Cochran. We would request the witnesses to respond
in a timely fashion.
IMPACT OF DETERIORATING SHIPS, COAST GUARD CUTTERS, HELICOPTERS AND
OTHER ASSETS ON COAST GUARD'S ABILITY TO CARRYOUT ITS MISSIONS
Senator Cochran. Admiral Collins, I notice that you start
off in your statement talking about the concerns you have about
the deterioration of your ships, Coast Guard cutters,
helicopters, and other assets that you need to carry out your
missions and fulfill your responsibilities as part of the
Department of Homeland Security, and also contributing to our
Nation's defense. I know you have forces that have been
deployed to the Persian Gulf region, and you also recently were
called upon to deploy assets to Haiti, to the area, and to the
approaches to South Florida, because of the activities in
Haiti.
Could you tell us to what extent this puts strain on the
overall responsibility you have for other activities in
maritime homeland security and marine safety? Were you able to
maintain your vigilance here in the homeland area to carry out
these missions as well?
Admiral Collins. Mr. Chairman, I will be glad to answer
that. I know that is clearly a concern of Senator Murray's as
well, based on her opening comments and previous hearings, is
how we balance across our missions when we have these surge
operations.
The good story is, we have the capacity to serve in the
national interests for high-risk events on a temporary basis
and surge back to normal lay-down of resources. I think that is
a strength that we as a Service have because of our multi-
mission character and our flexibility. So that is a good-news
story.
The question is: How do we continue to service all those
other missions as we surge to an orange alert condition, or a
Haiti, and so forth? I think there are a couple of answers to
that. One is we seek growth of our asset base where warranted.
And as I mentioned in my opening statement, we have realized a
51 percent increase in our operating expense budget, and we
have added additional capacity to our force structure.
If you look a the total number of hours available for
boats, cutters, and so forth, in 2003, they increased over 39
percent; and through 2005, there will be a net 68 percent
increase in the total number of boats, aircraft, and ship hours
available. And that is because additional resources have been
added. So that is the good story.
We still have OPTEMPO challenges and shortfalls and gaps to
meet everything, to be 100 percent everywhere at one time, and
we are not there yet.
But I would have to note that our performance goals
continue to be met across our missions. Let me just give you a
couple of data points. Despite some pressures in the past year,
orange alert and other conditions, we still maintain our SAR
readiness posture, and met all our search and rescue standards.
We saved 87.7 percent of mariners in distress, and our
performance goal is 85 percent.
We achieved a 97.1 percent compliance rate with fisheries
enforcement. Our goal is 97 percent. We have reduced the 5 year
average of collisions and groundings to a little over 1,500.
Our goal is a little over 2,100, and so forth. The point I am
making is that we have ensured we are meeting the highest risk
and attending to our performance goals, even despite these
pressures.
Senator Cochran. I want to commend you for the service you
are providing, and I think the evidence that you gave us in
your statement about the seizure of cocaine on the West Coast
is an example of your capability to continue to function at a
high level of readiness and competence to help protect us from
the ravages of the drug trade.
INTERDICTION AND SEIZURE OF ASSETS OF DRUG SMUGGLERS ON THE HIGH SEAS
OFF THE COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
To what extent is the Coast Guard deploying assets in the
region where the cocaine coming from? Are you able to interdict
and seize assets of the drug smugglers on the high seas off the
coast of South America or in the Caribbean?
Admiral Collins. That is where most of our assets are
provided to, or are deployed to Joint Interagency Task Force
South, out of Key West, which is a DOD joint command capably
lead by a Coast Guard flag officer, I might add. But a joint
command that targets and deploys a multiplicity of assets,
Coast Guard and others, puts metal on target, if you will,
based on Intel.
Most of the assets, all the CD assets almost exclusively,
that we field, are allocated to Joint Interagency Task Force
South for further deployment. And when we actually make the
interdiction, then we take Operation Control back and do the
boarding, do the arrest, and the seizure, and so forth. But we
are primarily down in the deep Caribbean. That is where the
greatest success is, off the West Coast of Colombia, off the
north coast of Colombia, as far west and south as the Galupa
Coast, and all the way up to the Gulf of Tijuanapeck, coming
into the Mexico-Guatemalan border. And that is where we have
had a lot of very, very good success, based on ever-increasing
use of Intel, Intel-queued actions. And that is why the Midget
was successful with 27,000 pounds of cocaine in three seizures
coming back this week.
So I think the interagency and the lay-down of forces has
been getting better and better as we have learned more about
this risk, about this threat.
Senator Cochran. But it seems strong evidence of the
success of interagency cooperation and another reason why the
Department of Homeland Security was a step in the right
direction to help protect the security and safety of the
citizens of the United States from drugs, as well as from other
acts of terror.
SCHEDULE OF NEEDS FOR DEEPWATER AND REFURBISHING OF HELICOPTERS
What can you tell us about the schedule that you would like
to see us fund, as far as your Deepwater modernization effort
and the refurbishing of helicopters that you say are now
dangerous to operate and have caused safety problems out in the
fleet?
Admiral Collins. Clearly, the 2005 budget gives us a
healthy funding profile, consistent with the plus-up that this
subcommittee, and others in Congress provided last year, in
2004. So we have a $678 million level, and that continues to
pursue the larger components of the Deepwater. So I think in
2005, the President's request will keep us on that momentum. It
is about a 22-year time frame. My biggest concern is how we
deal in the out-years, the total length of this project, as I
am faced with deteriorating readiness, and that is the issue,
Mr. Chairman.
We are running our assets hard in the national interest.
They are failing. They are failing at a sharper rate than we
first projected when the project was shaped and designed. And
so over the next several years, I am forced to make a tradeoff
between fixing the existing system versus putting that same
money into the replacement of those systems, and to keep
current readiness, today's readiness live and well. I have no
choice. I have to invest in those legacy systems to keep them
going; and as we push out the modernization, it complicates
that equation.
So that is that downward spiral phenomena; and as you
mentioned, it is particularly problematic, for the engine
system and the HH-65 are key assets for us. And we have had to
aggressively make decisions about re-engineering that platform
and invest in the legacy systems to keep that readiness where
it should be.
Senator Cochran. Well, I am confident this committee is
going to respond and provide the funds you need to move
aggressively to restore the capability of these assets and
build new systems for the future. We are just going to have to
do it. I do not think we have any choice.
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SCREENING PROCESS
Admiral Stone, I know we are all concerned about the
effectiveness of the screening processes we have in trying to
help ensure the protection of the traveling public here in our
homeland. The airports and airlines have received the greatest
amount of attention. To what extent are you confident that the
procedures you have in place and the systems that you have
developed and are using now to protect the flying public, those
using our airlines and airports, are succeeding?
Admiral Stone. Senator, I am very confident that the layers
of security that we have in place today are continuously
improving, whether it is the growing size of our flight deck
officer cadre of personnel that we have that we train each
week, and graduate out of Artesia. In addition, our screening
covert testing results indicate continuous improvement. And in
a classified forum, we are keen to share that data, because we
see progress being made as a result of our investment in
training.
We also have online now what is called TIP, the Threat
Image Projection system, which is a file of about 2,400 images.
And we can now go and see each individual screener, how they
are doing. They have to punch in their pass code when they go
up to the X-ray machine, and so we can pull up now, San
Francisco-LAX, see what images in that file that are missed the
most.
So it also gives us an idea of where to refocus the
training. It gives us a percentage of hits that the screener
got on the image that came up. So this Threat Image Projection
really allows us to now measure the individual screener
performance, which is a very significant capability for us, and
when combined with the covert testing results, allows us to
better get our arms around the performance of our screener and
gives us metrics in which to judge not only the screener but
then the airport, and then trends throughout the country.
So we are very excited about now having TIP online, about
the improved scores on covert testing, and about the additional
FFDOs going out each week out into the field. And so across the
board on these layers, we see continuous improvement.
LEVEL OF ATTENTION TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF THREATS TO OTHER MODES OF
TRANSPORTATION
Senator Cochran. There are, of course, other threats that
we are aware. To the extent to which your intelligence shows
the likelihood of threats to other modes of transportation, how
would you assess that in terms of threat level? Are there other
modes of transportation that you consider likely targets of
terrorists that have your acute attention?
Admiral Stone. Yes, sir. In December, we started intermodal
operations Intel briefings. So each day now for an hour and a
half, we spend our time, the senior leadership is, on
intelligence and operations. I will just note that I have been
tracking to find where we are spending our time at the TSA
headquarters, in terms of meetings.
And over half of our time is spent on operations,
intermodal operations and intelligence, which is very pleasing
to me, because I want the focus of our headquarter's effort to
be on operations and Intel and connecting the dots in an
intermodal setting, so at that morning operations intelligence
briefing, we look at a whole range of threats, whether they be
the input that we get from the Coast Guard, from the maritime
perspective; or whether it be from our stakeholders in the land
area.
I will note that in December, one of the first people that
I was introduced to and a briefing was set up with, was Mr. Ed
Hamburger, the President of the American Association of
Railroads; followed by Bill Milar, for public transit
authorities; and Richard White, from the Washington Metro.
These individuals I was able to meet in December, because of
the importance, that right off the bat, I have an opportunity
to understand from their perspective what their challenges
were.
So this operations Intel assessment that we have each day
in which we review the intelligence for all intermodal
operations, I think is reflective of our focus and a sense of
urgency that we understand and are communicating with the field
in all of these areas.
I would say after the aviation threat, which our
intelligence indicates the Al Qaeda interest in being able to
use an aircraft as a weapon remains very high, that we are well
aware that whether it be at our ports or at various land
targets, that we have an intermodal responsibility at TSA to
monitor those threats and then take appropriate action in
coordination with other agencies.
Senator Cochran. Before recognizing other senators for
questions, I have noticed the presence of the distinguished
Chairman of the full committee, Senator Stevens. Do you have
any opening statement, Senator? We would be happy to have you
do that.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR TED STEVENS
Senator Stevens. As a matter of fact, Senator, I wish you
would just enter my questions for the record and let me make
one short comment.
Admiral Collins, Admiral Stone, I do want to thank you for
your recognition of the problems of Alaska. I note that we have
an increase in the budget for $102 million for the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002. Of that amount, with half
the coastline of the United States, $152,000 is going to be
spent in Alaska to implement the Maritime Transportation
Security Act of 2002.
I am conscious of what you are doing, and I want to thank
you for what you are doing, testing the Predator A at King
Salmon and Predator B at Shimya. If those are capable
technologies, they could probably be substituted for vessels
and save the taxpayers of the United States a great deal of
money, but at the same time have knowledge of what is going on
along that enormous ocean border of ours.
You have agreed to work with our people on maritime safety
education. I thank you for that, because we are still losing a
considerable number of our vessels, despite everything we have
tried. And the cold water immersion education and the outreach
to the people who are out there without any chance of rescue
really is very important.
I thank you also for transferring the cutter, Long Island,
to Valdez, for its homeland security missions. We have come a
long way, and I know you have a tremendous job. I am pleased to
see that there is an increase for the Coast Guard's budget, a
total of $7.5 billion, an increase of $490 million this year.
And I want to join all of you gentlemen in supporting that. I
wish it was more. Thank you very much.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Byrd.
PROPOSED MOVEMENT OF GRANT MONEY FROM TSAT-ODP
Senator Byrd. On January 26th, Secretary Ridge announced
his intention to consolidate a number of grant programs within
the Offices of State and Local Government, Coordination and
Preparedness. On February 25, Representative Sabo and I wrote,
detailing our objections to moving TSA grants, such as port,
rail, and bus security from TSA, as well as the emergency
management grants from FEMA. House Homeland Security
Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Rogers sent a similar
letter expressing his concern about moving the TSA grants.
I reiterated my objections during our hearings with
Secretary Ridge and Undersecretary Hutchinson, and I remain
strongly concerned that moving the funds from TSA will result
in a reduction of focus from your agency and the Department on
non-aviation modes of transportation.
That would be in direct contravention of the intent of
Congress when it passed the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act in November of 2001. That Act gives TSA the
responsibility for security over all modes of transportation.
Clearly, the Madrid train bombing should be a wake-up call to
the need for TSA to focus on non-aviation security risks.
Just 10 days ago, The Washington Post quoted from the
Homeland Security Advisory, saying, ``Trains and rail stations
remain potential targets for terrorist groups due to their
reduced security in comparison to airports.'' That is a very
significant statement. Let me read it again, this excerpt from
The Washington Post, just 10 days ago, ``Trains and rail
stations,'' that would include Amtrak, that would include MARC,
``Trains and rail stations remain potential targets for
terrorist groups due to their reduced security in comparison to
airports.''
America is clearly at risk of a terrorist attack to our
rail and mass transit systems, our seaports, and other non-
aviation modes of transportation.
Now, given the existing threat and the strong concerns that
have been raised by members of Congress, are you reconsidering
the proposed movement of these grants from TSA?
Admiral Stone. Senator Byrd, I fully share and understand
the sobering impact of Madrid and Moscow and what that means in
terms of us being required to have a true sense of urgency
about how we address these issues. The decision to move those
responsibilities, in terms of the funding being consolidated at
ODP, has been made very clear to us by the Department that the
subject matter experts, of which TSA relies heavily on to
ensure how the assessments are done and where that money goes,
and our ability, therefore, to impact those decisions, will be
maintained and that the subject matter experts will be part of
the TSA workforce and that we will then be able to interface
with ODP to ensure the proper decisions are made.
Senator Byrd. I am trying to understand as to whether or
not my question was answered. Are you saying you are
reconsidering, or you are not?
Admiral Stone. No, sir, we have received information from
the Department that the subject matter experts that make those
decisions on those monies will remain at the TSA; however,
those monies will go to ODP, along with some staff that will
administer those accounts. But that the decision to ensure that
the people that are transferred to the ODP do not impact on our
critical ability to be able to manage and assess those areas
that those grants apply to.
UNOBLIGATED GRANTS FUNDING
Senator Byrd. The fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security Act
was signed into law on October 1, 2003; yet, in the intervening
6 months, TSA has yet to obligate the $22 million that Congress
appropriated for trucking industry grants, the $17 million
Congress provided for Operation Safe Commerce, the $10 million
Congress provided for bus security grants, the $7 million
Congress provided for hazardous material grants, the $4 million
Congress provided for nuclear detection and monitoring.
Additionally, $50 million still remains unobligated from the
funds Congress provided for port security grants.
We are halfway through the fiscal year. Congress acted
expeditiously to provide the Department with the funds and the
flexibility to address real and pressing homeland security
requirements. We have been at Code Orange 2 times since August.
You work for the Department of Homeland Security. Explain
why this business-as-usual and go-slow approach to your job is
satisfactory.
Admiral Stone. Senator, the approach of the Department with
regard to the threat that we face has been, I believe, one that
is reflective of a sense of understanding of the threat and an
urgent need to ensure that operationally we are responding to
that. The actual particulars on those individuals' monies and
the time lines for how those are being distributed, I would
like to get back to you, sir, for the record on that.
Senator Byrd. Well now, what do you mean by what you just
said, that you would like to get back for the record. What does
that mean?
Admiral Stone. I would like to make sure that I give you an
answer on those each individual monies and what the time line
is for them to be going out to the field.
Senator Byrd. Very well. Now, you will do that for the
record?
Admiral Stone. Yes, sir.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, what does that mean for us?
Will we see the record on that before we mark up?
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, I am happy to join you in
the request that the witness submit an answer to you directly,
and we will also have a copy that will be printed in the record
of the Committee's proceedings.
CAPPS II SYSTEM
Senator Byrd. Very well. One of the concerns about the
testing of the proposed CAPPS II system has been the lack of
access to actual traveler data to test the system. Airlines
have been reluctant to voluntarily provide data because of the
very real concerns of privacy groups about how that data will
be used. There is some speculation that the Department is
planning to issue regulations to compel airlines to provide
data for the purposes of testing.
Can you confirm for the Subcommittee whether the Department
is planning to compel airlines to provide data on travelers for
the purposes of testing CAPPS II?
Admiral Stone. Our plan right now, Senator, is to ensure
that we meet all of the requirements that have been identified
both by us and by other entities, such as the GAO, regarding
privacy, oversight, and redress, and that currently is the
focus of our effort. We have recently hired this past week a
privacy officer for TSA. We have had a TSA nationwide privacy
education week in order to ensure that the core beliefs of our
agency are, indeed, shared throughout all of our employees.
Our intent is to ensure that once the privacy redress and
oversight measures are taken that we then work with the
Department on ensuring that a notice of proposed rule-making is
drafted and sent to the Department for review. And then
following that would be our recommendation, our intent, once
that notification goes out, so that the airlines and passengers
know what would be forthcoming, then to move forward with a
security directive for testing. So that would be the TSA
intent, that sort of a process, through the Department.
Senator Byrd. Of the funds requested for this program in
the fiscal year 2005 budget request, what is requested solely
for additional testing of the program, as opposed to
implementation and operation of the system?
Admiral Stone. For the funds that are proposed for fiscal
year 2005 for the $60 million, the actual breakdown of what is
for testing and what is for the actual operation of those
airlines that have actually transitioned to the operational
CAPPS II program, I would have to get that number exactly for
you, sir, and I will do so.
REWARDING OF DEEPWATER PRIME CONTRACTOR
Senator Byrd. Very well. Admiral Collins, the Coast Guard's
Deepwater program is a multi-billion dollar effort to modernize
and replace its aging ships, aircraft, and communications
systems. According to a recent report by the GAO, the Coast
Guard does not have the capability to assess the performance of
the program, and yet the Coast Guard awarded the prime
contractors with a $4 million bonus for work accomplished in
the first year of the contract.
I am concerned that the Coast Guard is rewarding the prime
contractor without first knowing if they are doing a good job.
For instance, the very first Deepwater asset to be delivered,
the 123-foot cutter, was delayed by 4 months. GAO reports that
the schedule for the maritime patrol aircraft has slipped as
well. Should we be rewarding this kind of performance with
bonuses to the contractor?
Admiral Collins. Currently, Senator, the GAO reviewed a lot
of our management processes and procedures, and clearly, the
focus on how we do award fees and how we deal with the systems
integrated was part of that review, how we assess their
performance and recognize their performance. We welcome those
comments, obviously, from the GAO, and we are interested in
continuing to refine our processes.
We are addressing the processes for evaluating the
contractor's performance. We did, in fact, evaluate five
specific areas of performance during the first term. We
followed very, very strict adherence to the Federal Acquisition
Regulations. It was an overriding principle in this review.
The contractor award fee score is, I would submit, much
lower than typical industry and integrator's averages, if you
look at averages for other type of contracts. We are confident
that the award fee level was fair and represented an accurate
assessment of the contractor's performance.
Is there room for enhanced performance of both us and the
contractor on this very, very complex project? Absolutely. We
are working very, very hard to improve that performance, but I
think in this particular case, it was done based upon a set of
criteria. It was done fairly. It was done accurately. We had
objective measures that were introduced into this awards fee
process. We have a performance measurement plan. We have a
balanced scorecard and all the other mechanisms that you use in
this kind of thing. And we will continue to refine it, review
it, assess it, and make it better as we go forward.
Senator Byrd. Well, that is all well and good, but I think
we--as you said, you can do better, and we should do better. I
think we ought to take the GAO report seriously. This is an arm
of the Congress. We are going to believe our agency, and we are
going to expect better from you. So please be aware of this,
and let us do better than this. This is the people's money.
Your money. My money.
Admiral Collins. Yes, sir.
Senator Byrd. Their money. So try to do better. I have
further questions. I will await my turn in the next round.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Inouye.
Senator Inouye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
INCREASED REQUIREMENT FOR AIRLIFT CAPACITY SINCE 9/11
The mission of the Coast Guard has expanded immensely since
9/11. And since that time, thirteen maritime safety and
security teams and eight port security units have been
deployed. With these changes, has there been an increased
requirement for airlift capacity?
Admiral Collins. Yes, Senator, there is, and as you know,
the Deepwater solution that was initially designed. And, of
course, that is a 1998 requirement that the contractor's design
to and bid on, in post-9/11. I think there is a re-evaluation
needed to the strategic lift aspect that is embedded in our
Deepwater solution.
And we currently have a team looking at a revised baseline,
performance baseline, for our fixed-wing fleet mix to service
the lift requirement, because what is different in post-9/11 is
that we have these maritime safety and security teams that you
noted that require a strategic lift capability. We also need a
move our use-of-force helicopters when we need to. We moved one
up, incidentally, into Valdez in the last orange condition,
from Jacksonville. We are moving our strike teams as well, so
we see strategic lift as a very, very important part of the
overall aviation and functionality embedded in the Coast Guard
and for the Department, I might add.
So we are going to be reviewing that operational baseline,
Senator, and my expectations are that the C-130 aircraft, in
particular, will figure materially in the ultimate re-
baselining of the requirement.
HC-130JS COMPARED TO THE HC-130HS
Senator Inouye. Speaking of the HC-130J, pursuant to the
fiscal year 2001 allotment, you received six HC-130Js. Now, how
do they compare with the 130Hs?
Admiral Collins. They are a wonderful piece of technology,
Senator. They fly faster. They fly higher. They climb higher.
They have digitized cockpits. It is the latest technology,
versus the older technology. We have accepted all six, and we
had some funding appropriated last year, $60 million, to do the
engineering development and the missionization of those
aircraft. By that I mean putting Coast Guard-peculiar sensor
packages in so that they become true maritime patrol aircraft.
Right now, they are strategic lift and not maritime patrol
aircraft. So we are starting that process to put that
capability in those C-130Js, utilizing that $60 million
increment as a start.
MAKING PACIFIC FLEET ALL 130JS
Senator Inouye. Would it make sense to make your Pacific
Fleet all 130Js?
Admiral Collins. That clearly is in consideration, sir.
Hopefully, we will have greater clarity on that within a matter
of a couple of months. Later in the early summer, we will have
a redefined Fleet mix baseline for Deepwater. And it is going
to have to look at strategic lift. You know the Pacific better
than anyone, and you know the long sortie times that are
required to do our business all through the Western Pacific and
into the Bering Sea, and in the Southern Pacific, and in all of
those places.
So we have to take a very, very hard look at this Fleet mix
and clearly how we deal with the C-130 Fleet, whether
modernizing the H models or recommending additional J models
will be part of that decision process, Senator.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much. I have several other
questions, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit to the Coast
Guard, if I may.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Inouye.
BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE PURCHASE AND INSTALLATION OF AN EXPLOSIVE
DETECTION SYSTEM
Senator Inouye. If I may now ask Admiral Stone: The budget
includes $400 million for the purchase and installation of an
explosive detection system, the EDS machines. Letters of intent
have been signed with eight airports, but it is my
understanding that the $250 million requested for installation
would only cover continued payment of existing LOIs. How many
airports are on the list for installation, and under the
current approach, how long would it take to install in-line EDS
machines in the remaining airports on your list?
Admiral Stone. Currently, sir, we have eight LOIs issued to
cover nine airports, and for fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year
2005, that is $800 million that has been apportioned for those
nine airports in support of those eight LOIs. We have another
list that we have gathered of airports that have requested
Letters of Intent to cover their capacity and growth needs.
That list is approximately 30 airports long.
We are currently meeting with the AAAE and the ACI to find
out if in fact that list is reflective of indeed those with the
greatest need. So that list is being refined of outstanding
airports that require LOIs to ensure it really encompasses the
airports around the Nation that have the requirement, rather
than have just those that have submitted the request.
For instance, Chicago O'Hare is not on the list of airports
that have an LOI pending. They have not submitted one, so we
are reaching out with the AAAE and ACI to get that list
corrected so that it reflects really the needs of the Nation,
rather than just those who have submitted the LOI request.
The $1.2 billion that we have in fiscal year 2004 and
fiscal year 2005, of which $800 million covers the LOI process,
leaves us about the $400 million to cover those airports that
need EDSs installed in order to just remain 100 percent
electronically capable. Thus, the 75/25 split allows us to keep
those airports at 100 percent electronic. If in fact it was a
90/10 split, then we have an issue that we will need to address
regarding retaining compliance in fiscal year 2005.
[The information follows:]
We are currently assessing the structure and criteria of a long
term program, and therefore do not have a cost estimate. Implementing
EDS in-line systems at all airports is extremely costly and must be
considered in light of all the other transportation security needs.
While this multi-year effort progresses, TSA continues to use its LOI
criteria, based on achieving and maintaining compliance with the 100
percent electronic screening requirement at all airports, to determine
where resources will be allocated. TSA is working with airports that
will not be able to maintain compliance with the 100 percent electronic
screening requirement because of increased passenger loads, increased
and/or additional air carrier service, and/or airport terminal
modifications and expansions. TSA also continues to evaluate situations
where an in-line solution makes sense from the standpoint of security,
efficiency, and reduced staffing needs.
Senator Inouye. If you have to accelerate your program in
the next 4 years, how much would it cost to cover all the
airports on your list?
Admiral Stone. I will have to get you a more concise
number, but I would say it has been estimated to be somewhere
in the area of $4 billion to $6 billion to meet the needs of
those other airports across the Nation that have the LOI
requirements.
LIMIT ON FULL-TIME EQUIPMENT, BAGGAGE AND PERSONNEL
Senator Inouye. At the present time, your agency operates
on a limit of 45,000 full-time equipment, baggage, and
personnel, but is this limitation a realistic one?
Admiral Stone. Currently, we are once again partnering with
the airports themselves on the issue of capacity, their
projected capacity for next year and the year after. We have
reached an agreement with the airports, as well as with the
ATA, under the United States Civil Aviation Partnership, in
which we will use a Boeing model. And the ATA, AAAE, ACI, and
TSA have all agreed to use this model to look at our Nation's
airports and come up with a figure that we think reflects the
screening total requirements.
Under the 45,000 cap that we are currently operating at
right now, we do not have a clear picture of what that means at
our Nation's airports because we still have not shaped
ourselves properly. We still have some airports that are
smaller airports with too many screeners there, and larger ones
that have too few. So we need, internally at TSA, to make that
adjustment here in the coming months to get a real view for
what 45,000 FTE looks like.
We are currently hiring screeners at those airports in
particular that need screeners in order to meet compliance for
100 percent electronic. We are currently at 43,600 FTE at TSA
for our screening force. We are hiring up to 45,000, with the
priority being those airports that need screeners to ensure
compliance with congressional mandates.
Senator Inouye. You have been hiring part-time employees
and screeners. How are they working out?
Admiral Stone. Currently, approximately 90 percent of our
screening force is full time, and 10 percent are part-time
screeners. However, because of our imbalance currently between
small airports and larger airports, and the fact that we have
not internally shaped ourselves correctly, what we have found
out that those part-time screeners are having to work more
hours than they signed up for. So we are pursuing this as a
high-priority item to ensure that we get the right numbers at
the right airports so we can have that efficiency and
effectiveness that the airports, the airlines, and TSA all
want.
Senator Inouye. As you know, I travel quite a bit, going
back and forth to Hawaii, and I must commend you and your team
for a good job.
Admiral Stone. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I have other questions I would like to----
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator. We expect you to be
able to be able to respond to those in a timely fashion
directly to the Senator----
Admiral Stone. Yes, sir.
Senator Cochran [continuing]. And to this committee.
Senator Murray.
IMBALANCE IN COAST GUARD SINCE 9/11
Senator Murray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Collins, I understand that given the circumstances
you believe the Coast Guard's mission is balanced responsibly.
But according to the recent analysis, the Coast Guard mission
hour analysis, it appears that since September 11th, the Coast
Guard is spending about 50 percent less time on drug
interdiction, environmental protection, and marine safety. And
there have also been drastic reductions in the hours spent on
search and rescue, aid to navigation, and enforcement of
fisheries laws and treaties. At the same time, I see on our
analysis that hours for homeland security has more than
doubled. I think it is at 1,130 percent.
I am really concerned that this additional budget pressure
on you to focus on homeland security just asks the men and
women under your charge to work harder in other areas. When do
you see this trend subsiding?
Admiral Collins. Obviously, if we go to an orange alert and
there is additional pressure on. If there is an expeditionary
war effort that is underway and we have additional pressures on
our ports as we did in Liberty Shield last spring, then that is
the priority of the Nation, to deal with that high-profile
risk.
So those are the kind of surges we have to deal with, and
we are prepared to deal with them as an organization and still
maintain an adequate profile to service the key issues, and
meet the minimum standards across the board.
I am very pleased that we have met all our search and
rescue standards. We have met all our search and rescue
performance goals.
Senator Murray. I have. I realize that we did well last
year, but I am really concerned--I want to ask you
specifically, does this budget request allow you to return to
your previous emphasis on the non-homeland security missions
and at the same time do homeland security?
Admiral Collins. By the end of 2005, compared to pre-9/11
levels, we will have increased our total aircraft, cutter, and
boat hours cumulatively by 68 percent from those previous
levels. That is a growth in those resource hours----
Senator Murray. That is our homeland security, correct?
Admiral Collins. That is across--that is the total for
all----
Senator Murray. Does that include fisheries, search and
rescue----
Admiral Collins. That is everything. The total available,
the total boat hours, the total aircraft hours, the total ship
hours available, as compared to pre-9/11 averages, will go up
by 68 percent. That is a very positive growth. That is
reflective, as I mentioned earlier, in that our operation
expense base went up 51 percent. That gives us greater capacity
to deal with these surges.
I do not know what is the normal any more, in terms of what
is the fixed level. I would rather look at whether we are
attaining performance, meeting the highest risks, meeting all
our service responsibilities, and search and rescue standards,
in particular.
Here is a case in point: Counter-drugs. Counter-drugs, we
were, last year, just a little bit, a scotch away, it is a
technical term a scotch away from setting a record on the
cocaine seized in the maritime, with fewer assets. Although we
had a surge, the Liberty Shield, orange, and whatever, the
seizure rate is up. Why? We are getting better about using
Intel.
We are partnering with coalition partners. We are using
technology better, and we are coordinating interagency better.
And all of those mean enhanced productivity. So there are ways
to try to accommodate a particular operation tempo, pressures
that we have, still get the performance the Nation needs.
I would predict this year, I will go out on a limb, that we
will seize over a hundred tons of cocaine this year, with less
resources, because of the effectiveness of our partnering, and
the use of Intel.
Senator Murray. And I congratulate you on that, but I am
particularly concerned about search and rescue, and marine
safety, and some of the other areas that are out there. And we
will be watching that very closely.
RESPONSE BOAT PROGRAM
You have already been asked about some of the Deepwater
programs and your ability to accelerate it. I am really
concerned about the aging fleet of cutters and aircraft, as
well as the status of the responsible program, and I appreciate
your previous response. But could you provide the committee
with an update regarding the response boat program and tell us
whether we are on target to receive the 700 RBS vessels that we
have previously contracted for and what the status of the RBS
contract is?
Admiral Collins. I will provide you with the response
boats, small, if I could provide you a direct response, and I
will give you a little matrix. It will show the flow of the
acquisition, the dollars allocated, how many we are buying each
year. But the short answer is, we are on schedule with it, and
I will give you a complete breakdown year by year on it.
Senator Murray. Okay. If you could submit that----
Admiral Collins. It is a tremendous asset, by the way, and
we are very, very pleased with that. Safe Boat is being a
terrific contractor.
The other issue, the response boat medium, as you know, we
have three vessels that were designed and built and delivered
to us. We are running them through their paces, through an
evaluation process. And we will be prepared to make a down
select and an award for a low-rate initial production, that is,
the second quarter fiscal year 2005.
Senator Murray. So a year from now.
Admiral Collins. We will be ready to make an award and
execute those funds that are in the 2005 request.
Senator Murray. Okay.
Admiral Collins. It will be six low-rate, initial
production, boats that we will fund. We are very pleased, by
the way, with all three candidates that we have. The good story
is that all three have provided us with high-quality boats, so
we will have great competition, as a good thing----
Senator Murray. Good. We will look forward to that.
Admiral Collins [continuing]. And we will have some good
products to choose from.
PORT SECURITY
Senator Murray. Okay. Good. Admiral Stone, as I mentioned
in my opening statement, port security is really important. For
me, it is a top priority, and it appears that we still have a
lot of work to do when it comes to coordinating the Federal
Government's efforts in this area. Can you help us understand
how the various port security programs within the Department of
Homeland Security interact and complement each other, and how
this budget will help in that effort?
Admiral Stone. Certainly. The Border and Transportation
Security, under Under Secretary Hutchinson, both Commissioner
Bonner and myself, and Admiral Collins' team worked very
closely with BTS to ensure that we have a coordinated and
integrated effort.
For instance, the best practices that will be gleaned from
Operation Safe Commerce with regard to locks, sensors, GPS
systems, when they are gathered up, will be coordinated very
closely with CBP, Commissioner Bonner's team, and also with the
Coast Guard, to ensure that that sort of integrated approach,
rather than a stove-piped one, in which those items are just
taken and then put out as new policies. I think is critical to
emphasize that we fully intend to take those best practices and
have that sort of a process.
Additionally, TSA, in partnership with the Coast Guard and
CBP, with regard to port security, regularly coordinates the
results of what the port captain has assessed down at the port
as being those areas of vulnerabilities and risk to ensure that
the port grant process reflects those needs. And then those
monies are then apportioned as a result, in large part due to
that coordinated effort of what the port captain on the scene
has evaluated are his needs.
[The information follows:]
Response Boat Program
The RB-S represents a significant improvement in the Coast
Guard's operational capability. Multi-Mission Stations, Marine
Safety Offices, and Maritime Safety and Security Teams use the
RB-S for a variety of missions. The boat is capable of 45 knots
and can be armed with two machine guns, making it an ideal port
security asset. However, its enclosed cabin and excellent sea-
keeping and maneuverability also lend it to being used on a
full-range of Coast Guard missions.
The first RB-S was delivered by Safe Boats International of
Port Orchard, Washington in May 2002, specifically intended for
homeland security use. By the end of fiscal year 2004, a total
of 285 boats will be ordered to enhance the Coast Guard's
homeland security capability and to recapitalize the Utility
Boat-Light fleet. To date, 155 boats have been delivered. The
Coast Guard is also analyzing how many of the 700 boats
authorized under contract are operationally required for future
purchases. The following table provides the number of boats
ordered by fiscal year and the associated funding:
[Million of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Funding for Number of
Fiscal year boats boats ordered
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 \1\................................ $8.2 40
2004.................................... 27.0 139
2003.................................... 15.2 84
2002.................................... 10.9 62
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Based on fiscal year 2005 Budget Request.
Admiral Stone. The TSA approach on the integrated
intermodal information system, which is a system that we
believe from point of shipment to point of destination provides
visibility on an intermodal level for us to, therefore,
coordinate with every partner that has to do with the security
of cargo. And how, wherever that originates in the world and
wherever it ends up in the United States, is another reflection
of our intent to ensure that from a transportation sector point
of view, all of our activities and how we monitor that are an
integrated effort, fully partnered with the CBP, Coast Guard,
and other organizations that are involved in monitoring those
shipments as they enter the United States.
So across the board, from an intermodal perspective, TSA,
and I know that it is BPS's view, that that has to be the way
to head if we are going to really be efficient and effective.
Senator Murray. Well, as you know, Operation Safe Commerce
is going to have a report by the end of this fiscal year that
will detail some of the private sector methodology, best
practices, and technology solutions. And I will be following
that closely to make sure that the agencies use that
information, because I think they have done a really good job
of putting that together. So I will be working with you on
that.
CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR THE FLOW OR COMMERCE DURING AN INCIDENT AT ONE OF
OUR PORTS
Let me ask you one other question, Admiral Stone, because
after September 11th, everyone knows we grounded all of our
aircraft for a number of days and saw devastating impacts on
the air transportation industry. My state was impacted,
obviously, with Boeing. All states were. But the shutdown of
the West Coast ports last summer during the strike offered us
kind of a glimpse of what would happen if we saw a similar
shutdown at any of our seaports. That could cost our economy as
much as a billion dollars a week.
I would like to know from you what kind of contingency
planning is happening within the Administration, and
specifically, who is in charge of an incident and who is in
charge of making sure the flow of commerce is not impeded
should we have some kind of incident at one of our ports.
Admiral Stone. TSA is charged with developing sector-
specific plans. And then in the area of maritime, for a port
scenario that you mentioned, the Coast Guard would be lead in
coordinating that effort from a maritime port point of view.
But it is TSA's responsibility for the transportation sector to
develop those plans. That is an ongoing effort with TSA and an
item of priority as well as the daily coordination with the
Coast Guard and other----
Senator Murray. Are those contingency plans developed now,
should something occur in one of our ports?
Admiral Stone. The sector-specific plans are still a work
in progress, and so the real-world events would be coordinated
by TSA, much like we did during the last threat level orange
when we had flights of interest, our coordination with the
Department of Transportation on that was daily and immediate,
via real-time communications on flights of interest. It would
be our intent to do similarly in a real-world operation with
the Coast Guard.
Senator Murray. Admiral Collins.
Admiral Collins. As you know, Senator, there is a family of
planes that is required to be built as part of the MTSA.
Senator Murray. Right.
Admiral Collins. We are reviewing thousands, literally
thousands of those for vessels and facilities, and those
vessels and facilities. And there are overarching port security
plans for each port, so over 40 of these. They are done
collaboratively with the Area Maritime Security Committee.
We are all major stakeholders in the port to provide an
overarching plan to respond to contingencies and deal with
security issues, not unlike the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
requirement for area contingency plans for oil pollution
response. The same thing is going to be done on the security
basis.
Those will be vetted in the other feeder, the government
document is the port security assessment that has been done for
each port. That is really the customer, that is, these
committees and the captain of the port, so they can take those
vulnerability assessments, along with threat assessments, and
develop the appropriate plans and the contingency plans. And
they will be embedded in each one of these captain of the port
area plans, all to be completed, by the way, by the end of
April, reviewed and approved, and in place by July 1 of this
year.
Senator Murray. That is all well and good, and I think you
have done a marvelous job. The ports have done a really good
job in responding to this. Mr. Chairman, what I am concerned
about is the budget request. Admiral Collins testified, when
was it, in the House last year that we would need $1.3 billion
this year, and we have a $100 million budget request. So we are
asking our ports to have these plans to be ready to go, and we
are not funding them. I will have more conversations about
this, Mr. Chairman, but I am deeply concerned about that.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Murray. Senator
Domenici.
FUNDING REAL NEEDS AND NOT WANTS
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First,
I apologize for being late. I apologize to the witnesses.
I would like to make a couple of observations and ask you
to respond. It is not necessarily totally your problem, but I
am unimpressed with the notion that everybody and every
community of any size that makes noise will get help from the
Department of Homeland Security.
I would like to suggest to you that I do not believe we
could ever afford to fund everybody that thinks they need a
fire engine, everybody that thinks they need some
transportation protection. But rather we have to conclude in
some reasonable way, what is at risk and then help secure what
is at risk.
I do not know if you know. I am not sure that the committee
members know, that well before this incident, Senators Lugar,
Nunn, and Domenici put an amendment on the floor of the Senate,
which passed overwhelmingly. It cost a lot of money, but it
picked 120 cities, from experts, that needed first responder
training. It did not pick 6,000. It picked 120.
Now, might I ask first, Admiral Stone, because it is more
relevant to you, and then with each hearing, I will ask all the
way to the top, ``What do you do to evaluate people's concerns,
versus the reality that we cannot do everything?'' There ought
to be some way to cover real risks--strike that word--the most
significant risks, rather than things that people think they
need.
Admiral Stone. Sir, I believe strongly, and we have this
discussion almost every morning when an issue comes up at our
operations and intelligence briefings, to look at an issue from
a risk-based decision point of view, looking at three things:
What is the threat? What is the criticality? And what is the
vulnerability?
Senator Domenici. What does ``criticality'' mean?
Admiral Stone. The criticality? For instance, when the
issue has come up about general aviation at Reagan Airport.
Senator Domenici. Okay.
Admiral Stone. What are the criticality of the assets
involved in that particular decision? What is the
vulnerability? There is a reduced reaction time. And then what
is the threat? Do we believe that Al Qaeda has an interest, and
terrorist organizations, in that particular modus operandi, to
do us harm. So whether it has to do with general aviation at
Reagan, that threat criticality and vulnerability, and then
making a risk-based decision, I think, is key.
Senator Domenici. So even though you are not the head of
the whole department, you are telling me and this committee
that you know enough to say to us, we are evaluating requests
versus risk----
Admiral Stone. Yes, sir.
Senator Domenici [continuing]. All the time.
Admiral Stone. Yes, sir.
Senator Domenici. I might just say, fellow Senators, I have
been observing and then trying to inquire when I see it, how
groups rally and seek to impose, through political force, the
needs of their organizations on the government. I do not think
you ought to yield to that. I note the other day, and I love
them, but the fire fighters had a big meeting. They wanted more
things. I asked them the kinds of things they wanted, it became
more obvious to me that there was a lot of the demand and the
requests that just had to do with the fact that they wanted new
equipment, not that they were at risk and needed new equipment.
I see a difference. I do not see how we can fund the first, but
we can the latter.
If we are going to fund the first, we need a new program to
say we are going to pay for the needs of the police and firemen
of America. But that would not be related to this, it would
seem to me. I could be wrong, and the Senate could say, yes, it
does, because we do not know what is at risk, so we will cover
everybody. But as of now, it is risk-oriented in terms of
granting and assessing needs, and then funding them.
Admiral Stone. Yes, sir, risk-based decision making is at
the core of that decision process.
FLETC FACILITY AT ARTESIA, NEW MEXICO
Senator Domenici. Okay. I thank you for that. I just have
one parochial question, Mr. Chairman. I do not know if you
know, Mr. Stone, some senators know, because I have been
somewhat of an open advocate for a secondary FLETC facility
that is now 12 years old in Artesia, New Mexico. You trained
your air marshals there until 18 months ago, and then you got
into an argument and you went to New Jersey.
See, I do not win them all, Mr. Chairman, but I did not
think it was a very good idea, and I still do not. I have
talked to a lot of marshals, and it is interesting enough,
though, the idea not to put it there, it was just too far away.
The marshals that went there loved it. So I think it is a
pretty good training facility.
But now you have a new program, FFDO.
Admiral Stone. Yes, sir.
Senator Domenici. That is, Senator, if pilots want to carry
arms, they ask, and they become volunteers to become trained so
they can carry arms. Surprisingly, there are a lot of them,
well, you might say a lot of them do not want to, but
surprisingly, a lot of them do. We do not let them carry
firearms just because they used to be deputy sheriff and know
how to shoot a gun. They have to go through some pretty good
training.
Now, as I understand it, for the FFDO program the trainees
are being trained at FLETC, Artesia----
Admiral Stone. Yes, sir.
Senator Domenici [continuing]. Is that correct?
Admiral Stone. Yes, sir. The Federal Flight Deck Officer
Program is the trainees at Artesia.
Senator Domenici. Now, let me ask you, is the program
effective and efficient, and what do you think about it?
Admiral Stone. Extremely so. We are really proud of that
program. The pilots themselves give us tremendously good
feedback on the quality of the training in Artesia. Every week,
we are graduating. We have a queue of folks that are in line to
fill out all the quotas through the rest of this fiscal year.
So we could not be more pleased with the quality of the
training we see, the feedback from the pilots, and the extra
level of security that that gives us today.
Senator Domenici. From the standpoint of the Department, is
this seen as something good, to go ahead and grant these pilots
this permission and train them if that is what they want?
Admiral Stone. It is my understanding, yes, sir. When I
briefed this program up the chain into the Department, it is
very well received as an additional layer that we are quite
proud of.
Senator Domenici. Could I ask, if you know this, what kind
of feedback are you getting from the pilots with reference to
this program in the event they have volunteered?
Admiral Stone. The feedback on the critique sheets has all
been superb training in Artesia, much better than I had
thought, based on historical data for what they thought the
course would be, now to come here and find out that it is top-
shelf training. So all of those critiques that we get back from
the FFDO pilots have been very complimentary of the process.
FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS PROGRAM
Senator Domenici. Let me shift gears now. A sister
function, which is bigger in numbers and better known, is the
marshal program, air marshals. Could you tell me, is that
program working? Do you know what the morale is of those who
are in that program? Are you having a significant and sustained
mainstream or stream of applicants who want to do this?
Admiral Stone. Sir, I am partnered with ICE, Mike Garcia,
and his team, that now own the FAMs. However, since December,
ICE and the Federal Air Marshal Program have sent one of their
top people to sit in on every ops Intel brief, which we hold
every day at TSA, so that connectivity and teamwork and
partnership is reflected in everything that we do in aviation
now. I think that is a real success story for us.
From all the indications that I see, that program is being
run very well. And it is very flexible when we get threat
indications or we see things that come up, that we immediately
want to reprogram a FAM to a particular flight. That happens
instantaneously as a result of that operational focus that we
have with the FAM, so I would give it high scores as well.
Senator Domenici. Well, I understand they are paid well.
There is no question that they make very good money, and they
can thus afford the flexibility of sometimes working different
hours and being shipped around when they were not expecting to.
From talking to them, they understand that, but I have also
been told that there are more quitting than one would expect
for such a highly paid program. Is that true, and if so, do you
know why?
Admiral Stone. Sir, I do not have any visibility on that
particular issue.
Senator Domenici. Could you check that in some reasonable
way and relate it to some comparable program with high pay like
that, in terms of the staying power of the program and filling
the vacancies. And also, are you at full capacity, and if not,
why?
Admiral Stone. Yes, sir, I will be happy to look into that.
Senator Domenici. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Domenici. Admiral
Collins, I noticed in the statement you submitted, in the part
where you are talking about the need to recapitalize our
operational assets, you point out that in your 110-foot patrol
boats there have been 20 hull bridges requiring emergency dry
docks.
AVAILABLE NEW TECHNOLOGIES THAT COULD BE USED FOR REPLACEMENT COAST
GUARD VESSELS
I am wondering to what extent are new technologies
available that could be used for replacement Coast Guard
vessels that offer greater efficiencies or other benefits?
Admiral Collins. Sir, first, let me give you a graphic
example of one of those bridges. This is an out-plating from
one of our recent 110s. You can see the corrosion, internal
corrosion, and a fairly substantial hole. This is typical of a
number of 110-foot cutters where failures were experienced.
That, obviously, gives a sense of urgency about getting on with
this patrol boat program.
Of the technologies that we are attracted to, one is the
composite technology. We are working with the Deepwater
contractor on the surface side of the program. Northrup Grumman
is exploring the use of a composite technology hull in
particular for this fast-response cutter, which is this 110-
foot cutter replacement.
It is attractive from two or three dimensions. Number one,
lower life-cycle costs. The maintenance and the haul-out cycle
are much more reduced. The life of the hull is much longer than
a comparable steel or aluminum hull. So we are looking at it
very, very eagerly and discussing with Northrup Grumman way
ahead if, in fact, we do choose to pursue composite technology.
Senator Cochran. Are there any existing ships that you know
of that have this technology now and have demonstrated its
capability?
Admiral Collins. Yes, sir. One of the leading shipyards in
the world in this technology is Kockums Shipyards, Karlskrona,
Sweden. Northrup Grumman is partnering with Kockums Shipyards
as their technical advisor, if you will, on moving ahead with
this composite technology. They have built a number of
minesweepers very successfully, and current frigate, the Visby
class, which I had the opportunity to go aboard 6 or 7 months
ago, to sort of kick the tires on this technology, if you will,
very, very impressive technology. And because of Northrup
Grumman partnering with one of the world's specialists and the
use of this technology, it appears to be a very potent team,
Senator.
AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM
Senator Cochran. There is also an indication in your
statement, in the section dealing with maritime domain
awareness, where you say, ``An intelligence and warning system
that detects indicators of potential terrorist activity before
an attack occurs is necessary to take preemptive and protective
action.'' You then go on to say you are currently installing an
automatic identification system in your vessel traffic service
ports and formalizing requirements to award a contract of a
nationwide AIS network, the Automatic Identification System.
Exactly how is that going to work? Is this a new technology
that is envisioned, or is it something that you feel
comfortable about moving forward? I notice you are requesting
$4 million to continue this project. How is that money going to
be spent?
Admiral Collins. One approach is to embed AIS technology
and all our nine VTSs around the country so there will be AID,
or Automatic Identification System-based vessel traffic
systems. That will all be completed by the end of this calendar
year for all those systems. So we will have AIS-based.
Also, another requirement for AIS is as a result of our
initiatives with the International Maritime Organization,
where, as you know, we pushed through an international standard
for shipping successfully, the international ship and port
security code, and also SOLAS, Safety of Life At Sea
amendments, that require AIS on all in-bound commercial ships
over 300 gross tons no later than 1 December 2004. These are
transponders that identify position and location and other
information. These AIS-equipped VTSs can take that signal.
We also need to be able to receive those VHFM-communicated
signals in other places beyond those ports. And we are looking
at all kinds of different options to put AIS equipment on off-
shore platforms. As you well know, in the Mississippi, there
are over 3,000 off-shore platforms. They could be a great
location for those systems, so we have the coverage. It is a
coverage issue. There is also the Rescue-21, which is the VHF
high-sites that we are putting around the country, is to hang
AIS systems off of those as well.
So we are looking at all that infrastructure, trying to
minimize the infrastructure burden by using existing locations
and infrastructure in order to get the coverage we want. So we
think it is a great way to go. We are optimistic about it.
The other dimension of AIS is long-range tracking, the idea
of how do you get long-range tracking, because this one is a
short range. How do you get like over 2,000 miles type of range
and reporting requirements? This is another program and
initiative that we are running through IMO to establish it as a
worldwide standard. We are looking at various options for long
range.
It gets complicated real quickly, Mr. Chairman, because it
has a lot of moving parts, but we are taking a very
comprehensive look at all of the pieces.
RESCUE 21
Senator Cochran. One other modernization effort, I
understand, is having some kind of identification system that
shows the location so that you will not have to guess where the
ship is.
Admiral Collins. That is our Rescue 21 project, Senator,
that is a fairly substantial feature of our capital request in
2005. It has been in previous years. We are focused to build
that system out by the 2006 time frame. That is the one that
establishes high towers around the country and monitors VHF,
FM, and other distress calls from emergencies at sea. It has
digital recording capability, and direction-finding capability
so we can hone in on the signal, fix the position, and take the
search out of search and rescue. It is a very, very, very, I
think, positive addition to our capability.
CAPPS II DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT
Senator Cochran. Thank you. Admiral Stone, we noticed that
your request is $892 million more than the adjusted and enacted
level for fiscal year 2004. And one of the additional requests
this year that you are making is for a second-generation,
computer-assisted passenger pre-screening system, the so-called
CAPPS II.
I know you envision this as a modern--more modern pre-
screening system than the one that is currently in use by the
airlines. How soon do you think the TSA will be able to develop
and deploy this system?
Admiral Stone. We are confident that we will be able to get
in place the privacy, redress, and oversight measures that we
know are key to ensuring that we have the trust and confidence
of the American people to put forth such a system that we think
significantly enhances security. The time line for that is we
hope to have in the spring, the NPRM, the Notice of Proposed
Rule-making out, and approved within the Department, as well as
the security directive that we need. So we are looking at being
able to have the oversight, redress, and privacy pieces, and
then forwarded to the Department this spring, the NPRM and the
SD. At that point, the Department will review it and make the
decision concerning forwarding for testing purposes.
Once we have the approval to conduct testing, we envision
that that process will be one in which we are going to want to
test historical data. So we are going to want to give the
airlines a couple of months to review the NPRM and the SD, and
then we will go back and look at a historical month. This is
our testing approach. So we are hopeful this summer that we
would be able at some point to be able to conduct that sort of
a test.
EXPEDITED REGISTERED TRAVEL PROGRAM
Senator Cochran. I was encouraged to know that you are
concerned about reducing the hassle factor in airports for
passengers and baggage screening, and that you are considering
a registered travel program to help accomplish this. Can you
tell us when you think you might have an expedited program in
place?
Admiral Stone. We are very excited about getting a pilot
going. That first step of actually doing a pilot and having a
voluntary program where we are looking at groups of individuals
that have volunteered, and then pairing that up with a
biometric so that we can then verify that individual and be
able to have a tailored process, either a dedicated lane,
depending on the airport, so that we can facilitate the
registered travelers through the checkpoint in a quicker
manner. Our goal is in June, to be able to start that pilot and
run it for about 90 days, and then glean the lessons from it
with an eye towards continuing into 2005 with a more advanced
program so that we can get on with the issue of registered
traveler.
UNQUALIFIED AUDIT OPINION
Senator Cochran. Finally, I think I should congratulate you
for achieving an unqualified audit opinion for the last fiscal
year. This is your third consecutive clean audit, I am advised,
and you are maintaining a clean audit record and correcting
control weaknesses that were noted in the audit reports. So I
congratulate you for that.
Admiral Stone. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Cochran. Senator Byrd.
NON-INTRUSIVE SCREENING OF PASSENGERS FOR EXPLOSIVES
Senator Byrd. Admiral Stone, in December 2001, Richard Reed
was prevented from exploding his improvised shoe bomb due to
quick action on the part of the passengers and crew of an
American Airline flight from Paris to Miami. In the intervening
2 years, we appear to have increased the screening of checked
baggage for explosives, but there appears to be little effort
being made to enhance the screening of passengers themselves
for hidden explosives.
The technology and equipment exists to non-intrusively
screen passengers for explosives. What is TSA doing to address
this potential threat?
Admiral Stone. Senator, I just stopped at our Atlantic City
laboratory to review the explosive trace portal that is
undergoing testing and certification. We firmly believe at TSA
that we need to transform our checkpoints. The checkpoints that
we have today, in the wake of 9/11, got the job done for us.
The EDS systems that we have today, as well, were out there
to ensure that we had an extra measure of protection. But now,
in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security S&T
Division, we started to review the entire aviation security
role of TSA. Does the equipment match the threat, whether it be
sheet explosives or any other potential threat? We are keen to
ensure that we are investing and transforming our checkpoints
to reflect the threats that we see coming down the road and
experiencing today, rather than the box cutters that caused and
the scenarios that caused 9/11.
So our intent is to get that equipment certified, tested at
Atlantic City, and then expedited out into our checkpoints to
give us that explosive detection capability at our passenger
checkpoints that you mentioned.
Senator Byrd. How much of your fiscal year 2005 budget
request is devoted to enhanced screening of passengers for
explosives.
Admiral Stone. We have, for our checkpoint modification, I
think it is $44 million, or somewhere at $44 million or $46
million for checkpoint enhancements, of which allows us to
introduce to our checkpoints additional technologies.
SECURITY PLANS REQUIRED UNDER THE MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT
Senator Byrd. To meet the requirements of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act, vessel owners and port facility
owners were required to submit security plans to the Coast
Guard for review and approval by December 31, 2003. It was
reported earlier this year that only one-half of all vessels
and less than one-third of port facilities met the December 31
deadline.
According to your testimony, Admiral Collins, those numbers
have improved dramatically. How many penalties have you levied
against non-compliant companies?
Admiral Collins. Senator, we have had about 97 percent of
all the plans in, so we have really made some progress here
over the past several months. Total number of notices of
violations that were issued for the facility side of the plans
were 63 notices of violation, and for the vessels, were 89 that
have notices of violations for not meeting submittal
requirements, Senator.
But again, we have over 97 percent submitted this date. So
we are confident that we are going to get all of them in and
all of them reviewed and all of them approved, as appropriate,
or adjusted as we go back and work with the submitter to ensure
that they meet all the requirements of the rule and the law.
Senator Byrd. Have there been corresponding penalties
levied against non-compliant companies?
Admiral Collins. I do not have the exact figures on that,
Senator, with me today, but I will be glad to give you a prompt
response on exactly the adjudication of those notices of
violation.
Senator Byrd. Very well. If you will, please. How many
plans have you sent back for revisions? Would you supply that
information also?
Admiral Collins. I will provide you with that as well, sir,
yes.
[The information follows:]
Security Plans Required Under the Maritime Transportation Security Act
As of April 7, 2004, we have issued Notices of Violations (NOVs) to
95 vessels and 66 facilities. Each of those violations was for failing
to submit a completed security assessment and has a $10,000 civil
penalty associated with it. Subsequently, we have issued civil
penalties in the amount of $25,000 to four of these facilities for
failing to submit a completed security plan (for a total fine of
$35,000). These penalties were based on violations of 33 CFR Section
104.410 for vessels and 33 CFR Section 105.410 for facilities.
The security plan review and approval process consists of several
distinct stages.
For vessels there are two stages. Stage I review determines if a
plan contains all critical elements outlined in the regulations, and
Stage II review ensures that security measures specified in the plan
adequately address the vulnerabilities which are identified in the
security assessment. Vessel security plans receive final approval
(Stage 2) from the Coast Guard Marine Safety Center in Washington, DC.
For facilities there are three stages. Stage I and II review is
parallel with the vessel Stage I and II, which are completed at the
National Facility Plan Review Center in Kansas City, KS. Stage III
consists of a final review that is completed and approved by the local
Captain of the Port.
All vessel and facility security plans through Stage II and Stage
III have been completed.
The Coast Guard has also issued a total of 157 Notices of Violation
and civil penalties for failure to submit required security plans.
Senator Byrd. What are you learning about the security
needs of vessels and port facilities based on the plans that
have been submitted?
Admiral Collins. What we are learning is from the port
security assessments in terms of vulnerabilities. As required,
we are doing port security assessments for 55 of our major
ports around the country. We will complete them all by the end
of this calendar year, a lot of which is classified, by the
way.
But there are a lot of things that are coming out in that
in terms of vulnerabilities. Generally, I will state, for
example, underwater threats and how we are vulnerable in our
ports for underwater threats is just an example of some of the
things that we are finding in some of these assessments.
These port security assessments will provide a lot of the
solid information that we will use to craft these port-wide
security plans that are also to be completed this spring. But
all these assessments are sort of source documents to get a
hold of the vulnerability end of the risk equation that Admiral
Stone talked about and then match them up with a threat
assessment as well and to have a complete picture of what gaps
we need to fill.
The other interesting thing, Senator, the purpose these
serve is that when we do evaluate grant applications, that come
in for port. We are sort of one of the expert witnesses that
review those applications at the local level. We use all the
vulnerability assessment we have done as a yardstick against
which to measure this application as to whether it addresses a
number of the gaps that have been identified in these
assessments.
So I think it is a good system that we have, and a
comprehensive approach. And we are going to distill down the
results of these port security assessments into a geographic
information system display that is available for each one of
our port security committees around the country so a ready file
of information, very practical information that can be used by
the port security including all the stakeholders in the port to
make the right decisions about which risks and which gap to
address first, second, and third.
PORT SECURITY FUNDING
Senator Byrd. The Coast Guard estimates that $1.125 billion
is needed in the first year and $5.4 billion over the next 10
years for ports to comply with the Federal regulations that
have been mandated by the Maritime Transportation Security Act.
Until fiscal year 2005, the president never requested funding
to help ports implement security improvements, as outlined in
the MTSA, and his budget request for fiscal year 2005 is 62
percent lower than the amount Congress provided last year.
When Secretary Ridge testified before this subcommittee in
February, he said that he believes port facility owners should
bear most of the financial burden to harden security at our
seaports. What evidence do you have that these owners are
stepping up to the plate and investing their own resources in
port security?
Admiral Collins. Many of them have. Many of them have
security plans already in place. Some of them are exercising
those. They are aggressively pursuing grants, and use of grants
to meet the terms and conditions of the new standards. Over
$500 million, thanks, obviously, to the support of Congress in
making those funds available. But over $500 million has been
distributed to ports and port facilities to undertake some of
this hardening, as you put it. There is $46 million within the
2005 budget for additional source of grants for ports, and
ports have the ability to also apply through ODP.
The applications are reviewed by TSA, the Coast Guard, and
other expert witnesses to also apply for higher levels of
funding. There is over $3 billion worth of grant money that is
included in the overall Department of Homeland Security budget.
So there is $46 million dedicated and another ability to apply
for that larger pot, a general pot of grant money as well.
Senator Byrd. But the Administration is proposing to cut
those grants by 62 percent. Why?
Admiral Collins. I do not know exactly the way that final
pot was determined, Senator. It is about $3.4 billion, as it
stands now, submitted in the President's budget. Again, we do
not administer the overall money. But as I recall, $8 billion
overall has been given out in grant money by the Department of
Homeland Security. I might look at Admiral Stone to confirm
that number, but I believe it is $8 billion overall in the past
2 years. And this represents another $3.5 billion, so a
substantial amount of money, by anyone's accounting, that has
been distributed to first responders and other requirements
throughout the Department, including those port facilities.
Senator Byrd. I am advised that that $8 billion is for
first responders, not for port security.
Admiral Collins. Again, over $500 million was allocated for
ports and port facilities.
Admiral Stone. Yes, sir, and with regard--Senator, may----
Senator Byrd. Admiral Stone.
Admiral Stone [continuing]. I help on that, or----
Senator Byrd. Yes.
PORT SECURITY GRANT FUNDING
Admiral Stone. The comment on the $46 million for fiscal
year 2005 for port security grants is indeed reflective of the
Department's view that the private sector needs to step up to
the plate with regard to the security at our Nation's ports.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, I hope there is some way we can
get our arms around this question as to whether or not port
facility owners are stepping up to the plate and investing
their own resources in port security, as the secretary
continues to advise as being the best way to solve this
problem.
We cannot seem to come to grips with it. The secretary says
port facility owners need to provide this security, rather than
the Federal Government, and yet we cannot seem to find out what
port facility owners are doing.
I have one more question. Do I have time to ask it, Mr.
Chairman?
Senator Cochran. Yes, sir, as long as Senator Inouye is not
inconvenienced.
Senator Byrd. Why do not I turn to Senator Inouye and let
him ask----
Senator Inouye. I have no questions.
Senator Byrd If I have time, I will ask another. Thank you.
DEEPWATER BUDGET REQUEST
The budget includes $678 million for Deepwater, the Coast
Guard's program to modernize and replace its aging ships,
aircraft, and communication systems. While this is a slight
increase over the $668 million provided in fiscal year 2004, we
believe that a significantly larger amount is needed to keep
pace with the Coast Guard's homeland security mission
requirements. It was conceived as a 20-year program, but the
President's request only keeps the program on a 22-year
schedule.
Deepwater was conceived prior to the 9/11 attacks. The
intention was to ensure that the Coast Guard had the assets to
maintain its overall capabilities. Following September 11th,
the Coast Guard's role in protecting the homeland increased
dramatically, but the Deepwater program has not been adjusted.
You state in your testimony that the Coast Guard's greatest
threat to mission performance continues to be aging assets that
are technologically obsolete. Why then are you only requesting
enough funding to keep the Coast Guard on pace to complete
Deepwater in 22 years when the majority of these assets will
reach the end of their service life by 2008? Admiral Collins,
please.
Admiral Collins. Clearly, we are pleased with the continued
support that we are getting from the Administration and from
Congress on Deepwater. Obviously, it is a major initiative for
us. We feel very, very important. The 2005 budget does keep
most of the major pieces on track for Deepwater, and I think
how fast we do Deepwater at this point probably falls in the
out-year category to continue to consider the flow of assets.
One year, of course, of funding does not continue the total
flow. It is how you program these assets over time to get on
the right time line.
Again, as the operational commander, I am confronted with
the dilemma to try to balance this number and try to balance it
between legacy systems, or those old systems that are wearing
out, and the new systems that have to replace them. And it is a
dynamic process that we are going to have to collectively deal
with.
My apprehension, Senator, is that it is going in the wrong
direction, that the readiness part, that downward spiral
phenomena is something that concerns me as an operational
commander, and the ability to deliver the services. So this is
a tough question that we have to continue to address.
Senator Byrd. Admiral, you have been a good soldier. You
have been a good soldier. You are sticking to the
Administration's request, but the Coast Guard submitted a
budget request for over $1 billion to OMB for fiscal year 2005.
You support the President's request, but I understand that you
requested $1.1 billion to OMB for approval. What would the
program time line be if your fiscal year 2005 Deepwater budget
were $1.1 billion?
Admiral Collins. That glide slope, Senator, of course, it
is more than 1 year a program makes, but that glide slope, if
it was funded at that kind of rate, would be basically a 15-
year program. And that is what that number, consistently
applied, plus or minus a bit each year customized to the year
over time, it would lead to a 15-year program.
Homeland Security Act required the Department and the Coast
Guard to submit a report to Congress on the feasibility of
accelerating Deepwater. That report was sent last year. It was
one of the first reports from the Department that identified
the feasibility of accelerating.
The requirement in the Act was to report on the feasibility
and desirability of accelerating to a 10-year program and so
forth.
So that particular report is a matter of record. It has
been sent to the House and the Senate, and it describes this
particular course of action as well, Senator.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Senator Inouye, and thank you, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you, Admiral Collins. Thank you, Admiral Stone.
You are both good soldiers.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted to the United States Coast Guard
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
integrated deepwater system (``deepwater'')
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes an increase
of approximately $10 million, for a total of $678 million, for the
Integrated Deepwater System initiative. Will the requested level of
funding for fiscal year 2005 put the Deepwater program back on track to
be completed within the original 20 year time-frame? If not, what level
of funding would be necessary to achieve this goal?
Answer. The fiscal year 2005 budget request does not put the
Deepwater Program on track to be completed within a 20-year time frame.
To complete the acquisition in 20 years, the Coast Guard estimates the
Deepwater Program would require $795 million for fiscal year 2005, and
assumes continued funding at this level adjusted for inflation.
Question. The Coast Guard is revising the Deepwater program's
Mission Needs Statement (MNS) to coincide with a post September 11th
environment. What is the time line for the Department of Homeland
Security to approve the revised MNS and what impact will the revised
MNS have on Deepwater program costs and acquisition schedule?
Answer. The Deepwater MNS has been revised and is under final
review by Coast Guard leadership. Once complete, the MNS will be
forwarded to the Department of Homeland Security for review and
validation. A formal briefing before the Department's Joint
Requirements Council (JRC) is scheduled for May 25, 2004.
As approved by DHS, the Coast Guard will engage our Deepwater
system integrator to determine the most economical implementation plan
for those new requirements identified in the updated MNS. Some new
requirements, particularly those that emphasize DHS and DOD
interoperability, will potentially lead the system's integrator to
select alternate sub-systems or components in order to achieve any new
requirements.
The Integrated Deepwater Systems acquisition strategy and solution
remain sound. However, increased mission demands, legacy asset
capability obsolescence, and deterioration in legacy asset materiel
condition since 1998 have created a performance gap in both capability
and capacity. The updated MNS is projected to help close this gap. The
cost and schedule implications have not yet been determined. When new
requirements are approved, total owner cost estimates and the out-year
acquisition schedule will be modified as required.
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget request for the Maritime
Patrol Aircraft (MPA) is $5.3 million, a decrease of approximately
$19.6 million from the fiscal year 2004 enacted level. Why is there
such a decrease for a program that was significantly funded in fiscal
year 2004, for which there is a contract to purchase at least four
aircraft? What impact will this proposed decrease have on the MPA
program? Will decreased funding for the MPA program delay the delivery
of these aircraft? What impact does this have on the Deepwater program
in general?
Answer. The Coast Guard is currently acquiring the CASA CN235-300M
as the Deepwater medium range Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA). The Coast
Guard does not have a contract to purchase four aircraft. The Coast
Guard funded the acquisition of two MPA in fiscal year 2003 and a third
in fiscal year 2004. The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2005 budget request
funds the missionization of the third CASA aircraft. This
missionization includes the logistic complement required for Full
Operating Capability and partial spare parts used for the logistics
system start up. Delivery of the first two MPAs is scheduled for 2006,
with full operational capability in late 2006 or early 2007.
The Coast Guard is working to align the Deepwater Program with the
strategic goals and objectives of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). The DHS Joint Requirements Council (JRC) reviewed DHS Aviation
Requirements in January 2004 at their first meeting. DHS decisions on
future aviation requirements will determine the exact mix of aircraft
in the Deepwater plan, at which time the funding and delivery schedule
will be adjusted, if necessary.
Question. The fiscal year 2005 funding request for the Vertical
Unmanned Air Vehicle (VUAV) is $43 million, to continue work that was
funded in fiscal year 2004 on two VUAV's; however, the requested
funding level is not sufficient to bring either of the two VUAV's into
full operational capability. What level of funding would be necessary
to make one, or both, of these VUAV's fully operational? If funding is
limited, would it not be better to provide the funds required to bring
one VUAV into full operation rather than to partially fund two VUAV's,
as proposed in the budget?
Answer. The $50 million in fiscal year 2004 provides for detailed
design of the VUAV and culminates in VUAV critical design review. The
$43 million in fiscal year 2005 is for production of 2 VUAVs and
associated ground control stations including developmental and
operational testing. However, the fiscal year 2004 & fiscal year 2005
funding of $93 million gets the Coast Guard VUAVs that are at Initial
Operating Capability (IOC). These VUAVs will not have the necessary
equipment for air space de-confliction and secure data link, which is
required for Full Operating Capability (FOC). The funding necessary to
bring both VUAVs to FOC (includes equipment for air space de-
confliction and secure data link, associated Non-Recurring Engineering
(NRE), and testing) is approximately $30 million. Bringing one VUAV to
FOC is not cost efficient, as the cost drivers are the design work, NRE
and testing, and not the production of the aircraft itself.
Additionally, two aircraft are needed for IOC testing.
Question. Re-engining of the HH-65 helicopter was initiated with
funds appropriated in fiscal year 2004 for other aircraft programs
within Deepwater. From which program lines have fiscal year 2004 funds
been moved to address the re-engining of the HH-65? How much funding
from each line has been reprogrammed? What impact does this shifting of
funds have on those programs in fiscal year 2004? Are changes to the
fiscal year 2005 budget request necessary to address the shortfalls in
fiscal year 2004 funding for the programs from which funds were shifted
for the HH-65 re-engining?
Answer. The fiscal year 2004 Deepwater Appropriation has a $67.7
million Program Planned Activities (PPA Line Item) for ``Air Other
Contracts/Legacy Sustainment.'' The HH-65 re-engining is an aviation
legacy asset sustainment project, so it was appropriately funded from
the Air Other Contracts/Legacy Sustainment PPA and no reprogramming
from other PPA line items occurred.
Since the re-engining was not a planned sustainment project for
fiscal year 2004, the following legacy asset sustainment projects
previously planned for execution under the fiscal year 2004 Air Other
Contracts/Legacy Sustainment PPA were deferred in order to fund the
fiscal year 2004 portion of the HH-65 re-engining. These deferred
projects include: HH-65 Landing Gear Replacement, HH-65 Integrated
Radar/FLIR Upgrade, HH-65 Tail Rotor Recapitalization, HH-60 Integrated
Radar/FLIR Upgrade, HH-60 Service Life Extension, C-130 APS-137 Search
Radar Replacement, and C-130 Weather Radar Replacement. Additionally,
HH-60 Avionics upgrade projects was funded at a level lower than
planned due to the HH-65 re-engining.
The aviation legacy sustainment projects deferred in fiscal year
2004 will not require changes to the fiscal year 2005 budget to meet
shortfalls. Because it is a safety and reliability concern, HH-65 re-
engining remains the highest aviation legacy priority in the fiscal
year 2005 President's Budget. The aviation legacy asset projects
deferred in fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005 are necessary and
will need to be funded in the future to ensure the sustainment of those
aviation legacy assets until replaced by new IDS assets but do not have
the immediacy of HH-65 re-engining.
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget request for the HH-65 re-
engining includes $75 million for approximately 25 aircraft. Will this
complete the re-engining effort? If not, what level of funding is
necessary to complete the re-engining of the Coast Guard's HH-65 fleet?
What is the projected time-frame for completing this re-engining
project?
Answer. The $75 million in the fiscal year 2005 budget request will
not complete the re-engining effort. Although the exact acquisition
costs of the HH-65 re-engining will not be known until receipt of ICGS'
proposal, the budgetary estimate is approximately $3 million per
aircraft for a total estimated project cost of $288 million. The 25
aircraft re-engined with fiscal year 2005 funds will bring the total
number of re-engined aircraft to 41, with 52 remaining to be re-
engined. The required funding for the remaining 52 aircraft is
approximately $156 million.
By June 2004, the Coast Guard plans to issue a Delivery Task Order
(DTO) for the identified solution. The planned implementation schedule
will be included as part of the final DTO. The Coast Guard estimates
the re-engining of the HH-65 fleet to take approximately 24 months.
Question. Once the Coast Guard has modified the HH-65 helicopters
and added more power to them, will all the safety and reliability
problems be resolved and will you be able to take the restrictions off?
If not, why not?
Answer. The HH-65 re-engining project was designed to address the
safety and reliability crisis arising from accelerating frequency of
power loss circumstances and restore the HH-65's operational
capability. The selected solution, the TurboMeca Ariel 2C2 is expected
to provide the safety and reliability required for the HH-65's multi-
mission roles. Once the solution is fully implemented, the Coast Guard
will be able to lift current operational restrictions.
Question. What is the Coast Guard's logic in using the Integrated
Coast Guard Systems for the replacement project? GAO reports that it
might have been faster and cheaper had the Coast Guard conducted the
acquisition. Could the Coast Guard have completed this project itself?
Answer. The Coast Guard directed Integrated Coast Guard Systems
(ICGS) to immediately re-engine the HH-65 after careful consideration
of other procurement options for the following reasons:
--The HH-65 is a Deepwater legacy asset. The Coast Guard hired ICGS
for the Deepwater project.
--Part of the re-engining requirement for safety and reliability of
this Deepwater asset included maximizing operational
effectiveness of Integrated Deepwater systems while minimizing
total ownership cost impacts. ICGS was best suited to make that
determination.
--The ICGS proposal was evaluated based upon cost, schedule and
performance.
--The Coast Guard has the advantage of utilizing Deepwater's existing
management and measurement systems to track cost, schedule and
performance. The safety and reliability crisis dictated that
the Coast Guard employ the best method to execute the re-
engining project. ICGS' corporate approach brings many talents
to the acquisition process (e.g. ability to negotiate volume
purchase or offer premiums to more expeditiously acquire
required stock of engines).
While the Coast Guard is capable of completing the project, the
risk associated with removing the HH-65 re-engining project from the
existing contract with ICGS to effect the MCH conversion was deemed to
be unacceptably high.
Question. What is the relationship between the HH-65 replacement
project and Deepwater? Can you provide us assurances that it won't be
necessary to re-engine the HH-65 a third time?
Answer. The Coast Guard has directed that a re-engining project be
immediately initiated to restore the HH-65 to unrestricted safe and
reliable operations. The project is designed to address the HH-65
engine system, the engine and engine control systems, to remedy this
safety and reliability crisis, and restore the HH-65's operational
capability.
The HH-65 re-engining project is a separate and distinct effort
from the Deepwater Multi-mission Cutter Helicopter (MCH). In the long-
term, the Deepwater plan is still to convert the HH-65 to the Multi-
mission Cutter Helicopter (MCH). While power increases were not the
focus of this acquisition, the engine chosen, while addressing the
safety and reliability concerns, also has sufficient power margins to
allow for that engine to be used in the continuation of the MCH. As
such, another re-engining should not be necessary.
Question. What appropriations are being used for the HH-65
replacement project, and how will this spending affect future spending
on helicopters for the Coast Guard?
Answer. The fiscal year 2004 appropriation being used for the HH-65
engine replacement project is the ``Air Other Contracts/Legacy
Sustainment'' Program Project and Activities (PPA) line item. This PPA
line item is also projected to fund re-engining in the fiscal year 2005
President's budget request. The effect on future helicopter spending is
that the price of the Multi-mission Cutter Helicopter (MCH) should
decrease to reflect the fact that engine replacement will no longer be
required when the HH-65 is converted to an MCH.
Question. What is the relationship between the HH-65 replacement
project, the future Multi-mission Cutter Helicopter acquisition, and
Hitron?
Answer. The HH-65 re-engining project is an effort to correct a
safety and reliability concern that is separate and distinct from both
the Deepwater Multi-mission Cutter Helicopter (MCH) conversion project
and HITRON.
The Coast Guard directed the Deepwater acquisition program's
systems integrator, Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS), a
partnership of Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, to take immediate
and definitive action to re-engine the HH-65 fleet to ensure safe and
reliable operations. In the long-term, the Deepwater plan is still to
convert the HH-65 to the Multi-mission Cutter Helicopter (MCH). While
power increases were not the focus of this acquisition, the engine
chosen, while addressing the safety and reliability concerns, also has
sufficient power margins to be used with the MCH. The HITRON Airborne
use of force mission is currently not a Deepwater requirement. There
is, however, the potential to include this requirement under future
contract modifications. The Turbomeca engine meets the anticipated
airborne use of force power requirements should these become part of
the future MCH mission profile.
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes $15 million
for capability enhancements for HH-60 avionics for one aircraft. How
many HH-60 aircraft are in the Coast Guard fleet? Does the Coast Guard
intend to provide these capability enhancements for each HH-60? Is the
anticipated cost $15 million per aircraft, or will this funding level
decrease after the first avionics upgrade is completed?
Answer. There are 42 HH-60 aircraft in the Coast Guard fleet, and
the Coast Guard intends to provide these capability enhancements to the
avionics suite of each HH-60. The $15 million request in fiscal year
2005 is for Non-Recurring Engineering (NRE) work associated with the
avionics upgrades and does not upgrade any aircraft. The total project
cost to upgrade all 42 aircraft is estimated at $121 million. This
amount includes: long lead material, NRE, production, and operational
test and evaluation. The HH-65 re-engining project is the highest
priority aviation legacy asset sustainment project. The HH-60 avionics
upgrade may be deferred if these funds are required to meet an
accelerated re-engining solution.
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes $9 million
for capability enhancements for HC-130 aircraft radar in one aircraft.
How many HC-130 aircraft are in the Coast Guard fleet? Does the Coast
Guard intend to provide these capability enhancements for each HC-130?
Is the anticipated cost $9 million per aircraft, or will this funding
level decrease after the first radar upgrade is completed?
Answer. The Coast Guard currently has 27 total HC-130 ``Hercules''
aircraft, 22 of which are operational while 5 are storage or support
aircraft. In addition, the Coast Guard recently acquired six HC-130J
aircraft, which are not fully missionized. The $9 million in fiscal
year 2005 will upgrade the radar on one HC-130H and will also pay for
the Non-recurring Engineering and Operational Test and Evaluation of
the first upgraded aircraft. Coast Guard does intend to provide these
capability enhancements for each HC-130, once funding is available. The
average unit cost is approximately $3 million.
Question. Was the fiscal year 2004 funding for the National
Security Cutter (NSC) sufficient to complete the first NSC, or will a
portion of the fiscal year 2005 requested funding be needed for its
completion? The fiscal year 2005 budget request for the NSC is $274.5
million. Is this funding level sufficient to complete the first and
second NSC? If not, what additional funding may be necessary for
completion?
Answer. The funding for the National Security Cutter (NSC) in
fiscal years 2002 through 2004 is sufficient to achieve initial
operating capability for the lead ship. The Coast Guard anticipates
requesting additional funding in fiscal year 2006 to attain full
operating capability. Based on current cost projections, the fiscal
year 2005 budget of $274.5 million for the NSC will complete the second
NSC through full operating capability.
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes $5 million
for the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC). Is this sufficient funding to
complete the design for the OPC? If not, how much funding is needed for
completion of the design phase? How much is needed to begin
construction? When does the Coast Guard anticipate completion of the
design, beginning construction, and delivery of the first OPC?
Answer. The $5 million requested in fiscal year 2005 will be
combined with the $20 million appropriated in fiscal year 2004 to
continue the requirements analysis, risk assessment and composite
component analysis associated with the design and development of the
Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC). Based on a current projected cost for the
OPC lead ship of $330 million, completion of the design would require
an additional $59 million and construction would require an additional
$246 million. The originally proposed implementation plan included
acquisition of the first OPC in 2012, but the Coast Guard accelerated
the design of the OPC to mitigate the risk of the deteriorating
condition of the Medium Endurance Cutter fleet. Once the design is
complete and the projected costs are refined, a business case analysis
will be conducted to determine the optimal time to start the OPC
construction, factoring in the latest information on the deteriorating
condition of the Medium Endurance Cutter fleet.
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes $60 million
for the 110-123 foot conversions and the Fast Response Cutter, but the
request does not specify how much funding is needed for each activity.
How many 110-123 foot conversions does the Coast Guard expect to
achieve in fiscal year 2005? How much funding is needed per vessel to
complete a conversion?
Answer. The Deepwater Program is conducting an analysis to
determine the appropriate number of 123-foot patrol boat conversions to
complete prior to switching to the Fast Response Cutter. A decision is
expected this fiscal year (2004), and the Business Case Analysis will
be provided at that time. The unit cost for the 110-foot to 123-foot
Patrol Boat conversion is approximately $8.2 million per asset.
Question. The design phase of the Fast Response Cutter (FRC) was
started in fiscal year 2003. Does the Coast Guard anticipate completion
of the FRC design in fiscal year 2005? How much funding is necessary to
complete the design of the FRC? What is the anticipated completion date
for the design? When does the design phase end and construction begin?
Answer. The Coast Guard anticipates completion of the Fast Response
Cutter (FRC) design in fiscal year 2005. The Deepwater Program is
conducting an analysis to determine the appropriate number of 123-foot
patrol boat conversions to complete prior to switching to the FRC. A
decision is expected in fiscal year 2004, and the Business Case
Analysis (BCA) for accelerating the FRC and the number of 123
conversions will be provided at that time. Construction could begin as
soon as fiscal year 2006 if supported by the BCA.
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes
approximately $2.3 million for one Long Rand Interceptor (LRI) and
three Short Range Prosecutor (SRP) small boats, but does not specify
how much funding is needed for each. How much funding is necessary for
one Long Range Interceptor? How much funding is necessary for three
Short Range Prosecutors?
Answer. In fiscal year 2005, approximately $1.37 million will
acquire the three Short Range Prosecutor small boats, and $0.92 million
will acquire the Long Range Interceptor lead boat.
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes $12.5
million for the surface capability sustainment and enhancement of the
medium endurance cutter class. This request is an increase of
approximately $5.5 million over the fiscal year 2004 funding level.
Please explain this increase.
Answer. This increase can be explained by the continuing
deterioration of the legacy surface fleet and the subsequent need to
recapitalize major subsystems to sustain their operability as projected
within the Integrated Deepwater System. The $12.5 million for Surface
Capability Sustainment/Enhancements in the fiscal year 2005 budget
request will fund a Mission Effectiveness Project (MEP) for the Medium
Endurance Cutter (WMEC) fleet. The equipment and machinery slated to be
replaced (e.g., evaporator replacement; propulsion control system
upgrade; oily water separator replacement; waste heat cooling system
modifications; and renewal of auxiliary pumps) is geared towards
extending the service life approximately 5-10 years and ensuring the
WMECs will remain serviceable until they are retired.
Question. Funding to begin the development and design phase of
command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance (C4ISR), increment 2, was provided in fiscal year
2004. Will the funding request for fiscal year 2005 complete the
development and design of C4ISR, increment 2? If not, how much
additional funding would be required to complete this phase of
development and design?
Answer. The two C4ISR increments have two design phases. The first
design phase is concept and preliminary design; the second design phase
is detailed design and development. The funding provided in fiscal year
2004 was for the detailed design and development for C4ISR Increment 1
(the second of the two design phases for Increment 1). The funding
requested in fiscal year 2005 is for concept and preliminary design for
C4ISR Increment 2. In order to complete Increment 2, the detailed
design and development portion must also be funded at approximately $30
million.
Questions. What is the division of program management
responsibility between the Coast Guard and Integrated Coast Guard
Systems (ICGS)? Is the Federal Government providing management funds to
ICGS? How much of the total management cost does ICGS provide? What
exactly is the fiscal year 2005 budget request of $45 million for
systems engineering and integration? Are program management funds
included within each Deepwater line item? If so, how is the Coast Guard
certain that there are not any duplications in payment to ICGS?
Answers. The Coast Guard is responsible for all Program Management
including oversight of the contract with the prime contractor, which is
the systems integrator in the Integrated Deepwater System (IDS)
Program. The systems integrator, Integrated Coast Guard Systems, LC
(ICGS) has the responsibility for Contract Management including the
subcontractors that execute the contract.
The Federal Government is providing Contract Management funds to
ICGS, just as it does on all major acquisitions where a systems
integrator is engaged to coordinate various subcontracted elements.
Contract Management funds are provided to ICGS through the Systems
Engineering and Integration delivery task order. The Coast Guard
receives Program Management funding through the Government Program
Management budget category. The division of the $83 million requested
for these two budget items is approximately 54 percent for ICGS and 46
percent for the Coast Guard. The $45 million budget request for Systems
Engineering and Integration represents approximately 8 percent of the
total contract value in fiscal year 2005, and approximately 6.6 percent
of the Total Capital Acquisition. It must be emphasized that the
Government Program Management and ICGS Contract Management are not the
same thing.
The fiscal year 2005 budget request for Systems Engineering and
Integration provides for the following activities:
--System of Systems Engineering including System Architecture
development, Operational Effectiveness analysis, Total
Ownership Cost management, and Enterprise level requirements
management.
--Enterprise level System Integration
--Enterprise level System Integrator Program Management
--Quality Assurance
--Integrated Product and Process Development
--Integrated Master Schedule maintenance and management
--Aviation, Surface Vessel, C4ISR, and Logistics System Integration
at the Enterprise level
--Contract Management
Delivery orders for each Deepwater asset include appropriate funds
to execute the delivery order, just as in any other government
acquisition. These funds would not typically be classified as Program
Management.
The Coast Guard ensures there is no duplication of payment by using
detailed statements of work at both enterprise and individual asset
levels to clearly distinguish between activities. Furthermore, ICGS'
first tier subcontractors maintain and report via timekeeping and
billing systems that are under the constant oversight of defense
auditing agencies.
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes $38 million
for government program management. Does this request fully fund all
program management costs? Are additional program management costs
contained within other Deepwater line items? How many people does this
funding request support? Is this enough to support all of the necessary
personnel to manage the program properly?
Answer. The $38 million for government program management combined
with the government personnel (201 military and civilian positions)
supporting the program (funded from the AC&I Personnel line item) meets
the Deepwater government program management requirement in fiscal year
2005. None of the other line items support government program
management. Fifty percent, or $19 million, of the $38 million in
government program management provides funding for the equivalent of
approximately 124 contracted support personnel. The remaining 55
percent provides funding for such items as modeling and simulation,
operational test and evaluation, travel, training, studies, phones and
other administrative support materials. The funding provided in the
government program management line item and the Deepwater portion of
the AC&I personnel line item will support the necessary personnel to
properly manage the program at the requested funding level.
GAO DEEPWATER PROGRAM MANAGEMENT REPORT
Question. In 2001, GAO reported on risks facing the Coast Guard as
it went forward on Deepwater. Just this month, GAO again reported on
these same risks, in particular that key components the Coast Guard
needs to effectively manage the program and provide adequate contractor
oversight were either missing or not fully developed. What is the Coast
Guard's response to these criticisms?
Answer. The Coast Guard is dedicated to the continuous improvement
of Deepwater, welcomes GAO's expertise and guidance, and has responded
to these management concerns by developing a Plan of Action &
Milestones (POAM) to correct deficiencies. As part of our
``partnership'' with GAO we will regularly report back on the status of
this POAM and seek their feedback.
The specific quote in this month's GAO Report that references their
audit of 2001 states, ``Concerns about the Coast Guard's ability to
rely on competition as a means to control future costs contributed to
GAO's description of the Deepwater program in 2001 as `risky.' Three
years later, the Coast Guard has neither measured the extent of
competition among suppliers of Deepwater assets nor held the system
integrator accountable for taking steps to achieve competition.''
The Coast Guard has placed particular emphasis on the ability to
measure performance within the scope of the program. Over twenty
measurement items have been defined and measured in the approximate 20
months that ICGS has been under contract. Additional measures are in
the process of being defined and measured. This effort continues to
evolve as the program identifies measures and data sources and as the
system components mature from design to production, fielding, and
disposal.
All of the Integrated Deepwater System items in the first 5 years
of the contract were fully competed as part of the competition between
the three industry consortiums led by Litton/Avondale Industries,
Science Applications International Corporation, and Lockheed Martin
Naval Electronics and Surveillance Systems. Going forward from contract
award, the Deepwater Program has included Competition as a factor for
determining if the contract should be approved for another term and how
long that term should be. The measures for Competition being proposed
for adoption include:
--Percentage of awards competed;
--Minimizing the number of teaming agreements;
--Number of advertisements publicizing supplier registration;
--Number of vendor outreach programs; and
--Percentage of first tier subcontracts that incorporate the intent
of the Federal Acquisition Regulation clause 52-244.5
``Competition in Subcontracting.''
The Coast Guard's systems integrator, ICGS, has also adopted the
Open Business Model, initially a Lockheed Martin philosophy, as an
official policy for ensuring competition. The process ensures full,
continuous, and open analysis of supplier alternatives throughout the
program's execution.
--This approach entails obtaining proposals/quotes from two or more
qualified suppliers, and then balancing the cost, quality and
delivery of the components after the qualified suppliers have
been identified to provide the required components. This model
provides the flexibility to capture commercial technology when
needed, and it is projected to provide better performance at
equal or lower cost.
--The Open Business Model has been approved by the ICGS Board of
Directors and is applicable to all Deepwater transactions.
--To enforce these regulations, ICGS has appointed a Competition
Advocate and Ombudsman tasked to draft implementation
procedures for regular reporting to ICGS.
--Visits by the ICGS Competition Advocate are also planned with
Deepwater's industry partners to examine ``make/buy'' decisions
and competition practices.
In addition to the issue of competition, the Coast Guard is
diligently incorporating GAO's recommendations, as well as other best-
business practices, into its operating procedures. The Coast Guard is
actively addressing those management practices not in place, and is
improving and maturing processes for those that are already in
existence. The following is a summary of recommendations by GAO for
executive action and the Coast Guard's mitigation strategies:
--Improve Deepwater program management--take the necessary steps to
make Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) effective; ensure adequate
staffing is addressed as outlined in the human capital plan
(HCP), and ensure operators and maintenance personnel are
prepared for the transition to new Deepwater assets.
--We have clarified IPT roles and responsibilities over the past 20
months and are improving processes to attain full
competency for each IPT.
--The personnel funding account did not allow for additional
personnel in fiscal year 2004. Several key military billets
have been civilianized and military personnel have been
brought onboard out of cycle.
--The HCP will be updated and necessary training billets will be
budgeted in sync with the fiscal year 2006 budget cycle.
--ICGS has recently added representatives at the key maintenance
and logistics sites to act as the POC for all maintenance
coordination issues.
--Improve contractor accountability by improving award fee criteria,
award fee assessments, system integrator accountability for IPT
effectiveness in award fee determinations, Total Ownership Cost
(TOC) baseline measuring cost, and criteria for TOC baseline
adjustments.
--We are addressing our processes for evaluating the contractor's
performance. Five specific areas of performance were
evaluated during the first term. Strict adherence to
Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) was an overriding
principle in all accounts.
--The contractor award fee score is much lower than typical
industry averages. We are confident that the Award Fee
level was fair and represented an accurate assessment of
contractor performance.
--Objective measures are being introduced into the award fee
process.
--The Performance Measurement Plan, and in particular the Balanced
Scorecard (BSC) Strategy Map clearly articulate how the
objectives of the program's BSC identify input, process,
and output measures that provide leading indicators of
Operational Effectiveness, Total Ownership Cost, and
customer satisfaction. BSC metrics continually measure the
status of the program and allow for early course
corrections if required. Deepwater, as the largest
Performance-based acquisition in the Federal government is
firmly anchored to metrics and can demonstrate its value to
the taxpayer while meeting our customer's requirements.
--The program has taken a proactive approach to contractor
assessment to ensure that course corrections and
adjustments can be made before the Award Term assessment in
year four, prior to the end of the first term. An 18-month
performance assessment was completed on February 23, and
approved on March 4.
--Facilitate cost control through competition with system integrator
accountability for competition among second tier suppliers.
--For subcontracts over $5 million, notification to the Coast Guard
is required, to include an evaluation of the alternatives
considered, if ICGS subcontracts out to Lockheed Martin
and/or Northrop Grumman.
--The Open Business Model, initially a Lockheed Martin philosophy,
is now official ICGS policy and is applicable to all
Deepwater transactions. To ensure compliance, ICGS has
appointed a Competition Advocate and Ombudsman, who is
drafting implementation procedures for regular reporting to
ICGS and will examine Make/Buy and competition practices.
--The program will put additional processes in place to ensure
competitive forces are being used to manage costs. An
annual independent third party review of transactions will
be conducted. The Agency Acquisition Executive will review
any subcontract over $5 million awarded to Lockheed Martin
or Northrop Grumman.
--A review of ICGS' application of their Open Business Model vis a
vis accountability for ensuring competition will be
included in the Award Term Evaluation and measured
diligently as discussed earlier.
Question. Similarly, GAO has reported that while competition is
critical to controlling Deepwater program costs, the Coast Guard does
not have a system to measure the extent of competition among suppliers
of Deepwater assets nor has it held the system integrator responsible
for taking steps to achieve competition. What is the Coast Guard's
response to these criticisms?
Answer. All of the Integrated Deepwater System nominated items in
the first 5 years of the contract were fully competed as part of the
competition between the three industry consortiums led by Litton/
Avondale Industries, Science Applications International Corporation,
and Lockheed Martin Naval Electronics and Surveillance Systems. The
Coast Guard, the DOT, and the Office of Federal Procurement Policy
through review and approval of the Request for Proposal indicated that
this was appropriate competition for the first award term.
In the current phase of the Deepwater contract the Deepwater
Program, based on GAO's recommendations, has now included competition
as a factor for determining if the contract should be approved for
another term and how long that term should be. The measures for
competition being proposed for adoption include:
--Percentage of awards competed;
--Minimizing the number of teaming agreements;
--Number of advertisements publicizing supplier registration;
--Number of vendor outreach programs; and
--Percentage of first tier subcontracts that incorporate the intent
of the Federal Acquisition Regulation clause 52-244.5
``Competition in Subcontracting.''
The Coast Guard's systems integrator, ICGS, has also adopted the
Open Business Model, initially a Lockheed Martin philosophy, as an
official policy for ensuring competition. The process ensures full,
continuous, and open analysis of supplier alternatives throughout the
program's execution.
--This approach entails obtaining proposals/quotes from two or more
qualified suppliers, and then balancing the cost, quality and
delivery of the components after the qualified suppliers have
been identified to provide the required components. This model
provides the flexibility to capture commercial technology when
needed and it is projected to provide better performance at
equal or lower cost.
--The Open Business Model has been approved by the ICGS Board of
Directors and is applicable to all Deepwater transactions.
--To enforce these regulations, ICGS has appointed a Competition
Advocate and Ombudsman tasked to draft implementation
procedures for regular reporting to ICGS.
--Visits by the ICGS Competition Advocate are also planned with
Deepwater's industry partners to examine ``make/buy'' decisions
and competition practices.
SMALL BOAT STATIONS
Question. What challenges are small boat stations facing in
balancing search and rescue requirements with new homeland security
requirements?
Answer. Broadly, the Coast Guard will continue seeking the
appropriate balance among all its mission-programs while relentlessly
pursuing our stated performance goals. In so doing, the Coast Guard
will continue to focus not only on activity levels (hours), but also on
achieving the desired outcomes for each Coast Guard mission. Our
ability to achieve desired outcomes and performance goals have been
significantly enhanced through improved technology, tactics and
procedures making our activities that much more effective. Risk-based
decision-making by local commanders will continue to be the primary
driving factor behind the specific activity levels (hours) accrued in
the course of Coast Guard operations.
At the Station level, the biggest challenges in balancing search
and rescue (SAR) and homeland security (HLS) requirements are training
and maintaining the 68-hour workweek standard. There are two primary
factors that will improve training while maintaining the 68-hour
workweek standard at Stations: formal training programs and experienced
command cadre. In fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004, the President
and Congress provided funding for the Coast Guard to improve both
areas.
Formal Training.--The Coast Guard's goal is to increase Boatswain
Mate ``A'' school throughput by 50 percent over the next 4 years. We
have also increased recurring proficiency requirements giving qualified
boat crewmembers more opportunities to practice necessary skills. In
addition, we have increased the throughput at our resident training
centers for Small Boat Coxswains, Heavy Weather Coxswains, and Surfmen
removing some of the training burden from the field units.
These formal training opportunities provide a strong basic
foundation for junior personnel. This strong foundation allows the
command cadre to spend less time teaching basic fundamentals and more
time teaching job specific tasks.
Experienced Command Cadre.--The Coast Guard used many of the new
billets provided by the President and Congress to upgrade senior
command cadre billets. Additional support billets were also provided at
both Stations and Groups to relieve the command cadre of administrative
burdens. These actions were focused on improving management and
leadership, and providing more time for the command cadre to conduct
training. Once all of the new billets are filled this year and
personnel are qualified in their assignments, we anticipate improved
training and reductions in the average workweek.
Question. What impact have the additional homeland security
requirements had on the small boat stations' ability to meet other
mission requirements, such as drug interdiction and fisheries
enforcement?
Answer. Immediately following 9/11, the Coast Guard surged
resources for homeland security activities. Over the past 2 years, the
President and Congress have funded the Coast Guard with additional
resources to address homeland security and all other mission
requirements.
As required by Congress, some of these initiatives supported
Station-level staffing, training, boat standardization, and readiness
for all missions. Other initiatives were geared specifically toward the
search and rescue program. The Coast Guard will continue to monitor the
operating tempo and workload at Stations, and we will work within the
Administration if additional resources are necessary. We will also use
all of the resources as intended by the Congress.
Fishery Enforcement.--Stations continue to contribute significantly
to the Coast Guard fishery enforcement mission. In fiscal year 2002,
Stations conducted 974 fisheries enforcement boardings. In fiscal year
2003, Stations conducted 1,313 fisheries enforcement boardings, a 35
percent increase over fiscal year 2002 levels. These boardings
contribute the Coast Guard's domestic fishery program goals.
Counter-Drug Operations.--The Coast Guard's overall counter-drug
strategy is to interdict drugs offshore, far from the U.S. border.
Coast Guard Cutters and Aircraft are primarily used for conducting
these offshore patrols, however, Stations continue to respond to both
counter-drug and migrant incidents when necessary.
Question. Given the increased operating tempo of small boat
stations following September 11th, do stations have the resources--i.e.
staff and boats--they need to fulfill all their mission needs? What
additional resources, if any, are most needed?
Answer. In fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004, the President and
Congress provided funding for Stations to maintain a high level of
service in a busy operating environment. Funding was provided for the
Coast Guard to add or upgrade over 900 billets at Stations and the
training and support facilities that serve them. Additionally, over
$5.5 million of Personal Protective Equipment was provided for Station
personnel with earmark and supplemental funding. Over 200 Response
Boat--Smalls were also funded increasing operational capability. As
required by Congress, these initiatives supported Station-level
staffing, training, and readiness for all mission areas.
The President and Congress have also provided substantial funding
since 9/11 specifically for homeland security. The Coast Guard has used
some of this funding to purchase seventeen additional 87 foot Coastal
Patrol boats, 13 Maritime Safety and Security Teams, and over 100 Sea
Marshals. These new assets have helped reduce the high operating tempo
observed at Stations immediately following 9/11. The President's fiscal
year 2005 budget requests operating funds for five 179-foot Patrol
Coastals providing additional resources to the Coast Guard.
The Coast Guard will continue to monitor the operating tempo and
workload at Stations, and we will work with the Administration if
additional resources are necessary.
Question. Inspector General reports have raised concerns about the
lack of senior personnel available at boat stations in recent years to
train new, or more junior personnel. As Coast Guard increases the
number of new personnel assigned to stations in fiscal year 2004, what
impact will this have on stations operations, including the ability of
senior personnel to train less experienced staff?
Answer. In fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004, the Coast Guard
addressed the impact of senior personnel having to train less
experienced staff by upgrading many senior command cadre positions,
providing additional administrative support to Stations, and assigning
additional staff to Groups.
These actions are focused on improving management and leadership,
and reducing the administrative burden on the command cadre. In
addition, we have increased the throughput at our resident training
centers to remove some of the training burden from the field units. The
Coast Guard continues assessing the impact of these changes to
determine what actions, if any, are needed in the future.
The following highlights specific training efforts discussed above:
--Established one Ready Boat-Small Standardization (STAN)/Training
Team to improve training, professionalism and performance.
--Added a dedicated course developer/writer/instructor to Training
Center Yorktown Coxswain ``C'' School.
--Added Surfman Apprentices to the National Motor Life Boat School
(NMLBS) to reduce the training burden at surf stations and
increase the number of qualified Surfmen.
--Added 41 FTP for Boatswain Mate (BM) `A' School throughput
increases.
--Added 18 FTP for NMLB School Training throughput increases.
Question. What steps has the Coast Guard taken to address the issue
of its aging 41-foot utility boat fleet, which is reaching the end of
its service life?
Answer. The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2005 funding request includes
$12 million to begin a limited production of six Response Boats-Medium
(RB-M). The RB-M is the replacement for the aging 41-foot utility boat
fleet. After initial limited production, the Coast Guard currently
projects $140 million in additional funding needs for RB-M in the Five
Year Capital Investment Plan, which accompanied the President's fiscal
year 2005 Budget request for Coast Guard.
Question. What progress has the Coast Guard made in standardizing
its non-standard boat fleet?
Answer. Since fiscal year 2002, the Coast Guard has ordered 255
Response Boat--Smalls. A large majority of these boats were purchased
to enhance the Coast Guard's maritime homeland security capability in
critical ports; however, some have been purchased to replace non-
standard boats. By the end of fiscal year 2004, approximately 100 of
the 350 total Non-Standard Boats will be replaced. We expect to replace
approximately 12 percent per year thereafter until full replacement in
fiscal year 2010.
PORT SECURITY ASSESSMENTS
Question. Is the Coast Guard on track to complete the Port Security
Assessments of the 55 most critical ports in the United States by the
end of this calendar year? Are additional funds necessary to complete
these assessments?
Answer. The Coast Guard has conducted PSAs at 16 of the 55 top
economically and militarily strategic U.S. ports. The remaining 39 port
assessments are on schedule, funded and scheduled for completion in
calendar year 2004.
research, development, test and evaluation
Question. Please explain the approximately $1.4 million decrease in
requested funding for the Coast Guard's research, development, test and
evaluation account?
Answer. Prior year CG Research & Development (R&D) appropriations
included project funds in addition to operating costs of the CG R&D
Center at Avery Point, CT. The $13.5 million requested in the fiscal
year 2005 Science and Technology (S&T) budget does not include any
project funds; the request is intended to fund only facility and
personnel (support and technical) costs at the CG R&D Center. This
level is consistent with prior year costs and does not represent a
decrease given its intent.
The fiscal year 2004 enacted level of $14.9 million was a
significant reduction from the fiscal year 2004 request of $22 million
and prior year appropriations causing a fiscal year 2004 imbalance
between support costs (facility and personnel) and project funding with
only approximately $2 million available for fiscal year 2004 project
support. The CG is working with S&T to restore a proper funding balance
in fiscal year 2005 and beyond and to develop a project portfolio that
supports the many maritime security needs as well as the CG's
``traditional'' non-security mission-programs. Additional project
funding will be critical to properly support mission needs and regain
the R&D momentum lost in fiscal year 2004, particularly in areas such
as Aquatic Nuisance Species and ballast water research. S&T and the CG
have already agreed upon a base level of additional project funding in
the amount of $5 million (for a total of $18.5 million) that will be
targeted toward non-security related projects including maritime
science and research.
Question. Will this line item for Coast Guard research and
development continue to be decreased in subsequent fiscal years until
there is one lump-sum research and development account within Science
and Technology for all of the agencies at the Department of Homeland
Security?
Answer. No. The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and Coast
Guard (CG) are preparing a formal agreement that will detail the
coordination and funding mechanisms for future CG Research &
Development (R&D) capabilities. The foundation for that agreement is
the consolidation of funding requested in the fiscal year 2005 budget
($13.5 million). S&T and the CG have further agreed upon a base level
of additional project funding in the amount of $5 million that will be
specifically targeted toward non-security related projects including
maritime science and research. This funding will support CG mission-
programs such as Marine Environmental Protection, Living Marine
Resources, Search and Rescue, Aids to Navigation and Marine Safety. The
specific projects in support of these mission-programs will be prepared
annually for S&T concurrence.
In addition to this $18.5 million in funding, the Coast Guard will
submit security-related research requests through S&T for coordination
across all portfolios and DHS components. The Coast Guard has submitted
a maritime security R&D portfolio detailing approximately $50 million
in vital maritime security research initiatives. This portfolio has
been validated by S&T portfolio managers and will be considered in the
development of future spending priorities and commitments from S&T.
Project funding levels for CG and other DHS component requests will
depend on the risk and cost associated with the project, effect on
agency missions, linkage to S&T strategic objectives, and
executability.
Question. How will consolidating the research and development
account into the Science and Technology Directorate affect the Coast
Guard in general, in terms of control over research projects of
particular interest to the Coast Guard and access to all ongoing
research at the Department?
Answer. Through its portfolio manager at S&T, the CG will have
direct access to, and visibility of, all S&T research and initiatives.
While funding will be provided through S&T, the CG will retain control
of the projects in support of its non-Security mission programs. The
integration of funding and effort will go far to minimize redundancy
and maximize the effectiveness of Coast Guard R&D while ensuring that
all Coast Guard mission requirements remain a key part of S&T planning
and resource decisions.
Question. How will this consolidation directly affect the Coast
Guard Research and Development Center in Groton, Connecticut?
Answer. Unrelated to the funding consolidation, the CG is working
through the GSA to relocate its Research and Development Center from
Groton to a nearby, although not yet identified, location in
southeastern Connecticut. The lease for the current facility expires in
fiscal year 2006 and cannot be renewed. Even if the current lease could
be renewed, the existing facility is unsatisfactory (e.g. not meeting
OSHA code requirements) for a variety of reasons and would not be
renewed.
Science & Technology (S&T) has no current plans to make other
changes to the location or personnel staffing levels of the CG Research
& Development (R&D) Center.
ALTERATION OF BRIDGES
Question. Since the fiscal year 2004 funding did not complete the
ongoing bridge projects, how does the Coast Guard intend to continue
and begin to complete certain bridge projects without additional funds
in fiscal year 2005?
Answer. The Coast Guard's Alteration of Bridges request is zero in
fiscal year 2005, because the three bridges currently under
construction: the Florida Avenue Bridge in New Orleans, Louisiana; the
Sidney Lanier Bridge in Brunswick, Georgia; and, the Limehouse Bridge,
in Charleston County, South Carolina, are highway or combination
highway/railroad bridges, and are eligible for funding from the Federal
Highway Administration's Federal-Aid Highway program. Additionally,
there are five bridge projects with completed designs for alteration:
the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Bridge in Burlington, Iowa; the
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Bridge in Fort Madison, Iowa; the Chelsea
Street Bridge in Boston, Massachusetts; the EJ&E Bridge in Divine,
Illinois; and, the CSXT (14 Mile) Bridge in Mobile, Alabama. These
projects will not proceed to construction until approximately 75
percent of the total estimated cost to alter the bridge is available.
Question. If no additional funding is provided in fiscal year 2005
for the Alteration of Bridges, what will happen to the ongoing bridge
projects?
Answer. Depending on construction progress and the rate at which
billings are made against the projects, the funding for any one of
three bridges currently under construction: the Florida Avenue Bridge
in New Orleans, Louisiana; the Sidney Lanier Bridge in Brunswick,
Georgia; and, the Limehouse Bridge, in Charleston County, South
Carolina, may be depleted. At least 30 days prior to depletion of
funds, the Coast Guard would give written notice to the bridge owner of
such exhaustion of funds, consistent with the ``Order of Apportionment
of Cost''. After receipt of such notice, the owner may continue the
work with the understanding that no payment for such work will be made
by the Coast Guard until additional Federal funds become available. If
the owner elects not to bear the costs, the project would likely have
to come to a halt, resulting in contract disruption, increased
contractual costs, and the bridge potentially remaining a hazard to
navigation.
In addition, the remaining 11 bridges, for which an Order to Alter
has been issued, will not proceed to the next phase of development. The
following table provides a summary of the status of all active Truman-
Hobbs bridge alteration projects.
Question. Could the Coast Guard be forced, by a court of law, to
complete bridge projects which had been started because the bridges
were deemed to be an obstruction to navigable waters by law?
Answer. Although litigation is a possibility, the Coast Guard does
not have authority to fund bridge alteration absent a specific
appropriation from Congress. Therefore, the Coast Guard does not
believe a court could force it to complete a bridge project, absent an
appropriation. Also, the bridge owner cannot claim to have relied on
the Coast Guard funding any amount of the project above the amount
specified in the Order of Apportionment of Cost. The Order of
Apportionment of Cost further states: ``Should it become apparent that
appropriated funds will be exhausted before additional funds are made
available, the Coast Guard will give at least 30 days written notice to
the bridge owner of such exhaustion of funds.'' After receipt of such
notice, the owner may continue with the work with the understanding
that no payment for such work will be made by the Coast Guard until
additional Federal funds become available. Since Congress placed the
program under the Coast Guard's control in 1967, no bridge owner has
filed a lawsuit to compel the Coast Guard to complete a bridge
alteration project, because no project has been halted for lack of
funding.
OIL PLATFORMS
Question. How much does the Coast Guard spend each year conducting
emergency medical evacuations of personnel from oil platforms located
in the Gulf of Mexico? Does the energy industry share any of this cost?
If not, at what point should the energy industry bear some of the cost
and personnel burden to perform the medical evacuations of their
employees?
Answer. The Coast Guard is unable to determine how much it spends
each year conducting emergency evacuations to oil platform employees.
Many of the medical evacuations from oil platforms are persons injured
aboard vessels and brought to nearby platforms for evacuation. The
Coast Guard proposes this action when practicable, as it is often safer
to land on the platform to load the patient for transport than it is to
hoist the individual from a vessel, especially in poor sea conditions.
The Coast Guard does not record medical evacuation information
distinguishing between oil platform employees and persons injured at
sea who were brought to the platform.
Industry normally shares the cost when an injury occurs on an oil
platform and an industry supported or procured commercial helicopter at
the platform, or at a nearby platform, provides transportation to
medical facilities ashore. If a commercial helicopter is not available,
or is unable to fly due to poor weather conditions, the Coast Guard
generally provides the medical evacuation.
Medical evacuations from oil platforms make up a small percentage
of cases in this region. In the past 12 months, the Coast Guard has
conducted a total of 200 medical evacuations in that region, 13 of
which were from oil platforms. A medical evacuation at sea is
considered search and rescue, a traditional Coast Guard mission. The
Coast Guard does not charge or accept charges for search and rescue.
Lastly, on a purely voluntary basis, the oil platforms have allowed
Coast Guard helicopter to refuel at their platforms, which greatly
extends the range of the HH-65. This ``good Samaritan'' refueling
ability pays huge dividends, making Coast Guard operations possible at
much greater distance from shore.
Question. Are any critical Coast Guard missions set-aside or
overlooked in favor of medical evacuations from the oil platforms in
the Gulf of Mexico? How many man hours are devoted to this task?
Answer. No, there are no missions that are set-aside or overlooked
in favor of medical evacuations from oil platforms. The Coast Guard
performs a small number of medical evacuations from oil platforms. In
the past year, only 13 of the 200 medical evacuations that occurred in
this region were from oil platforms.
In most cases, when an injury occurs on an oil platform an industry
supported or procured commercial helicopter at either the platform or
at a nearby platform provides the transportation to medical facilities
ashore. However, in the event a commercial helicopter is not available,
or poor weather conditions preclude the use of commercial helicopters,
the Coast Guard will be contacted and will dispatch a resource to
provide the medical evacuation depending upon the seriousness of the
injury. A medical evacuation at sea is considered SAR and is a critical
Coast Guard mission.
The Coast Guard is unable to determine the man-hours devoted to
evacuating oil platform employees. Many of the medical evacuations are
persons injured aboard vessels and brought to nearby platforms for
evacuation. The Coast Guard proposes this action when practicable, as
it is often safer to land on the platform to load the patient for
transport than it is to hoist the individual from a vessel, especially
in poor sea conditions. The Coast Guard does note record medical
evacuation information distinguishing between oil platform employees
and persons injured at sea who were brought to the platform.
Lastly, on a purely voluntary basis, the oil platforms have allowed
Coast Guard helicopter to refuel at their platforms, which greatly
extends the range of the HH-65. This ``good Samaritan'' refueling
ability pays huge dividends, making Coast Guard operations possible at
much greater distance from shore.
gulf coast maritime domain awareness initiative
Question. There is a concern in the Gulf of Mexico with Maritime
Domain Awareness, as well as the need for developing a Common Operating
Picture for offshore energy facility security and protection of key
port and critical infrastructure. What are the Coast Guard's plans to
help address this concern?
Answer. The Coast Guard will install Automatic Identification
System (AIS) sensors on platforms that span the Gulf of Mexico from
Port Isabel to Mobile, AL. Partnerships will be created with the
platform owners to begin collecting AIS data by the end of fiscal year
2004. Plans for the second phase of this project include adding radar
and ancillary sensors. All sensor data will be integrated into the
Common Operational Picture (COP) that will be displayed at the Eighth
District Command Center in New Orleans, the Joint Harbor Operations
Centers, and Sector Command Centers along the Gulf Coast.
Further technological enhancements already planned to improve
interoperability and coordination include Rescue 21, implementation of
the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS), and the Ship
Security Alert System.
Partnerships and teaming efforts are in place to create a community
of stakeholders with resources to help prevent security incidents in
ports and around platforms. Working through the Area Maritime Security
Committee (AMSC), a part of the Gulf Security Committee, we are
improving communication among offshore platform operators and the Coast
Guard. Outreach efforts with Homeland Security and Homeland Defense
partners to create coordinated response procedures are being devised.
Question. Does the Coast Guard support using existing technologies,
such as the Navy's Littoral Surveillance System, to demonstrate
potential dual use Homeland Security applications to help support the
mission?
Answer. The Coast Guard fully supports using existing technologies
to expand Maritime Domain Awareness where appropriate. We are
evaluating several existing technologies to expand MDA, including the
Littoral Surveillance System (LSS). Other systems under review include
Network Centric Collaborative Targeting (NCCT) and Global Network-
Centric Surveillance and Targeting (GNCST).
Part of the Coast Guard's MDA effort includes the development and
fielding of a Common Operational Picture (COP). The COP operates with
the Global Command and Control System--Joint architecture. Any systems
adopted for homeland security, must be interoperable and compatible
with this architecture.
Overall, the LSS provides limited capability when compared to other
systems and it is not currently compatible with the Global Command and
Control System-Joint Architecture. There are other systems that provide
greater capability, such as, the planned Gulf of Mexico project (which
includes a NCCT component) and the Hawkeye system that provide port
surveillance and tracking functionality. The Coast Guard is partnering
with the Office of Naval Research to work on these initiatives.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Stevens
Question. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline System provides 20 percent of
the Nation's domestic crude oil and 48 percent of the West Coast fuel
supply through the Port of Valdez. Does the Coast Guard have adequate
armed helicopter surveillance to protect the vessels moving through the
Prince William Sound? If the Coast Guard is intends to arm MH-60
helicopters with M-240 machine guns and sniper rifles, how will this be
achieved without negatively impacting the missions that these assets
are performing?
Answer. The Coast Guard does not currently have armed helicopter
surveillance of vessels moving through Prince William Sound. The Coast
Guard conducted a surge operation, during a period of increased
national threat (orange) to the Homeland, to protect tankers moving
thru Prince William Sound (PWS) and in and out of Valdez, AK. The Coast
Guard deployed a MH-68 Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron
(HITRON) helicopter to CG Air Facility Cordova. This short-term
deployment was in response to validated intelligence and not to an
increase in the national threat level.
The Coast Guard is also taking additional measures to protect
vessels transiting Price William Sound. Since 9/11/01, three response
boats have been located to Valdez. In August of 2003, the cutter LONG
ISLAND was relocated from San Diego, CA to Valdez, AK. Additionally, a
Marine Safety and Security Team will be established in Anchorage later
this year.
The Coast Guard's long-term plan is to add Airborne Use of Force
(AUF) capability to all organic helicopters. Arming HH-60 helicopters
doesn't detract from their ability to conduct all USCG missions.
Rather, it provides Coast Guard operational Commanders an additional
capability to counter imminent homeland security threats that currently
does not exist in the service's main-stream helicopter fleet.
Question. Alaska is slated to receive a Maritime Safety and
Security Team (MSST) by the end of fiscal year 2004. Will this team
require armed helicopter support for its missions?
Answer. Currently there are no plans for mandating that the
Maritime Safety and Security Team (MSST) have dedicated armed
helicopter support to perform their missions. The Coast Guard
recognizes the inherent advantage of Airborne Use of Force (AUF) and is
exploring this in conjunction with the development of enhanced law
enforcement counter terrorism capabilities. The Coast Guard requests
$1.8 million for armed helicopters in fiscal year 2005 to begin
prototyping AUF aboard the HH60J helicopters in Cape Cod, MA. The
intent is to arm all Coast Guard helicopters in the future. The HH65
helicopter will require upgraded engine power to accommodate the
increased weigh of AUF weapons and armor, which should be accomplished
coincident to a safety and reliability upgrade of the powertrain over
the next 18-24 months. The HH-60J has sufficient power margins to
execute the AUF mission now. HH60J units are located strategically
throughout the United States, including Kodiak and Sitka, Alaska.
Question. What steps is the Coast Guard taking to ensure that
necessary support facilities are available for the forward deployment
of C-130s to Shemya, Galena, or Cold Bay during the high threat season
along the MBL?
Answer. The Coast Guard regularly deploys C-130 aircraft to Shemya
and Galena for Maritime Boundary Line (MBL) and High Seas Drift Net
(HSDN) enforcement patrols. Similarly, HH-60 aircraft deploy to Cold
Bay for Bering Sea Crab for Search and Rescue (SAR) standby. These
airfields are also used periodically outside these deployments. All
three airfields are vital to mission performance.
The Coast Guard has found the facilities to be adequate over the
last several years. During regular deployments to these airfields,
Coast Guard aircrews evaluate the support facilities and work with the
air facility directly to address these issues. Prior to deploying,
facility assessments are conducted ensuring all requirements are met
for the upcoming deployment.
Question. The City of Valdez is currently in the process of
completing a feasibility study for constructing a new harbor basin.
Does the Coast Guard have shore side infrastructure needs that should
be incorporated into the City of Valdez's plan?
Answer. The Coast Guard has shore side and waterfront
infrastructure needs in Valdez for small boat forces and the USCGC LONG
ISLAND; a 110-foot patrol boat. The Coast Guard is currently evaluating
shore infrastructure alternatives at Valdez to meet current and
projected needs including construction on existing Coast Guard
property, as well as possible integration into the City of Valdez
Harbor Basin Project should the City of Valdez decide that a new harbor
basin is feasible. The Coast Guard will consider the timeliness and
overall cost of the various alternatives and related impacts to current
and projected Coast Guard missions prior to deciding on a preferred
alternative.
Question. The fiscal year 2005 Homeland Security budget request
provides $152,000 to begin implementation of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) in Alaska. Will the Coast
Guard's implementation of the MTSA require commercial fishing vessels
and other vessels over 65 feet to purchase Automatic Identification
System equipment?
Answer. Yes. Automatic Identification System (AIS) equipment will
eventually be required onboard commercial vessels greater than 65 feet
in length with the exception of passenger vessels certified to carry
less than 151 passengers-for-hire (they will not be required to carry
AIS). AIS will also be required onboard towing vessels of 26 feet or
more in length and more than 600 horsepower, in commercial service,
while navigating in a Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) area. With the
exception of fishing vessels greater than 65-feet in length, the above
vessels will be required to have AIS equipment not later than December
31, 2004. Fishing vessels greater than 65 feet in length will not be
required to carry the AIS equipment until December 31, 2005.
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget for Homeland Security
transfers the Coast Guard's research and development funding to the
Science and Technology Directorate. The fiscal year 2005 budget
proposes to reduce Coast Guard RDT&E to $13,500,000, a reduction of
$1,400,000 from fiscal year 2004 enacted levels. What impact will this
reduction and transfer have on the Coast Guard's ability to develop new
technologies to help maintain traditional missions in accordance with
Section 888 of the Homeland Security Act?
Answer. The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and CG are
preparing a formal agreement that will detail the coordination and
funding mechanisms for CG R&D capabilities in fiscal year 2005 and
beyond. The foundation for that agreement will be the consolidation of
funding requested in the fiscal year 2005 budget. For fiscal year 2005,
the CG R&D center facility, personnel and maintenance expenses will be
funded through S&T in the amount of $13.5 million. In addition, S&T and
the CG have agreed upon a base level of additional project funding in
the amount of $5 million that will be specifically targeted to support
``traditional'' CG mission-programs such as Marine Environmental
Protection, Living Marine Resources, Search and Rescue, Aids to
Navigation and Marine Safety. The specific projects in support of these
mission-programs will be prepared annually for S&T concurrence.
In addition to this $18.5 million in funding, the Coast Guard will
submit security-related research requests through S&T for coordination
across all portfolios and DHS components. The Coast Guard has submitted
a maritime security R&D portfolio detailing approximately $50 million
in vital maritime security research initiatives. S&T portfolio managers
have validated this portfolio. While not yet funded, it will be
considered in the development of future spending priorities and
commitments from S&T.
Provided that CG mission requirements totaling $18.5 million are
adequately addressed and funded, the integration of funding and effort
within S&T will go far to minimize redundancy and maximize the
effectiveness of CG R&D while ensuring that all CG mission
requirements, as outlined in Section 888 of the Homeland Security Act,
remain a key part of S&T planning and resource decisions.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
MISSION HOURS
Question. Based on the most recent quarterly report on mission
hours, the Coast Guard continues to dedicate less time to traditional
missions compared to pre-September 11, 2001 levels. However, the Coast
Guard continues to meet or exceed performance goals in those areas.
What are the reasons for maintaining or exceeding performance standards
in non-homeland security mission areas when mission hours dedicated to
those areas have decreased since September 11, 2001? Please include
specific technology that has improved performance, improved
intelligence mechanisms, and efforts to partner with other Federal,
State and local partners that have improved performance.
Answer. Based on measurements in fiscal year 2003, the Coast Guard
met its performance goals in each non-homeland security program area.
In many mission program areas the Coast Guard is leveraging emerging
technology, intelligence, and partnerships with other Federal, State
and local governments to increase or maintain specific performance with
fewer dedicated resource hours than historical standards. Specific
examples include:
Emerging Technologies.--Night Vision Goggles used by cutter,
aircraft and maritime safety and security team personnel allow for safe
operations and enhanced ability to detect objects in the water during
nighttime Search and Rescue operations. Self Locating Datum Marker
Buoys used in the search and rescue program provide up to date data
that can be used to better determine where to begin a search. The Coast
Guard intends for this technology to improve both search effectiveness
and efficiency. Boarding officers and marine inspectors are using
Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) to conduct and record their work.
The Coast Guard expects that using PDAs will reduce redundant paperwork
and facilitate electronic database entries.
Intelligence Improvements.--The placement of Field Intelligence
Support Teams to provide tactical intelligence support to Coast Guard
operational commanders by collecting and reporting suspicious or
criminal activity, communicating with other agencies at the local
level, and rapidly disseminating intelligence to the Captain of the
Port other local commanders and the Coast Guard intelligence program.
New Intelligence Centers were created in 2003; two Maritime
Intelligence Fusion Centers have been sited in Atlantic and Pacific
Areas. These centers increase collection and analytical capabilities
enhancing the Coast Guard's ability to fuse intelligence from various
sources and improve the timeliness and quality of theater-level
intelligence support to Coat Guard operational forces. In 2001 the
Coast Guard joined the United States Intelligence Community (IC), a
federation of executive branch agencies and organizations that work
separately and together in intelligence-gathering activities.
Partnerships.--Interagency Flight Schedules--In Miami, the Coast
Guard and the Immigration and Customs Enforcement office have developed
a combined flight schedule to integrate patrol schedules and assets,
which has led to less overlap in response efforts, saving time and
resources for both agencies. This not only provides efficiencies to
security patrols but also frees up Coast Guard assets for non-homeland
security missions. Partnerships with organizations such as the U.S.
Power Squadron and Boat United States enable the Coast Guard to
distribute information on safe boating practices to the recreational
boating public. These efforts also advocate for public boating
education, which has been shown to lead to improved boating safety. The
National Marine Fisheries Service is providing the Coast Guard access
to their National Vessel Monitoring System (N-VMS) data, enabling the
Coast Guard to better maintain surveillance of fishing fleets and
respond to illegal activity. This partnership is allowing the Coast
Guard to allocate enforcement resources more effectively.
Question. The Commandant testified that with the budget increases
received since fiscal year 2003 and with the increase included in the
fiscal year 2005 request, the Coast Guard will be close to levels in
place before September 11, 2001 in its traditional mission areas. Since
the Coast Guard is already meeting or exceeding performance goals in
traditional mission areas with less hours dedicated to those missions,
is the Coast Guard adjusting performance goals upward to accommodate
for the additional hours that will be dedicated to those areas? If so,
please be specific. If not, why?
Answer. The Coast Guard will continue to seek the appropriate
balance among all its mission-programs and relentlessly pursue our
stated performance goals. The Coast Guard will continue to focus not
only on activity levels (hours) but also on achieving the desired
outcomes for each Coast Guard mission. Our ability to achieve desired
outcomes and performance goals can be significantly enhanced through
improved technology, tactics and procedures making our activities that
much more effective. Risk-based decision-making by local commanders
will continue to be the primary driving factor behind the specific
activity levels (hours) accrued in the course of Coast Guard
operations.
The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2005-2009 budget request highlights
improvements in performance targets for most of the Coast Guard's non-
homeland security missions, again driven by desired outcomes and not
solely resource hours. For example:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SAR (percent)................... 86 87 87 87 88
Marine Environmental Protection. 40 40 38 37 35
Aton............................ 1,831 1,748 1,664 1,600 1,535
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SAR--Percent of mariners whose lives are in distress that are saved.
Marine Environmental Protection--Number of spills (>100 gallons) per 100 million.
Tons of Oils and Chemicals shipped.
Aton--5-year average number of collision, groundings, and allisions (striking a fixed object).
OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE
Question. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S.
military has been providing domestic air support for homeland defense
purposes. In public discussions, NORTHCOM General Ralph Eberhart said
that the Department of Defense was reviewing whether there should be a
similar function in place to support Coast Guard efforts in U.S.
waters. Is such a plan being discussed with the Coast Guard and what
benefits would be gained from U.S. military support?
Answer. Collaboration continues to grow in the area of Maritime
Domain Awareness. Several steps have been taken toward establishing a
cohesive national strategy to achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, such
as establishing a Navy-Coast Guard steering group and the co-sponsoring
of an Assistant Secretary of Defense of Homeland Defense--DHS National
Maritime Domain Awareness Summit scheduled for May 7, 2004. Maritime
Domain Awareness is a mutual effort of the DHS, the DOD, and the entire
Intelligence Community. Inherent to our increased awareness will be
efforts to improve our national ability to respond to all threats in
the maritime environment. Much work has been done to streamline the
process of providing DOD assets to the Coast Guard when the situation
warrants. These efforts are ongoing and have not yet been fully
implemented. Also, an agreement that will allow Coast Guard forces to
execute defense missions quickly is close to implementation. Both of
these initiatives contribute to a growing integration of effort between
the DHS and DOD. Together, NORTHCOM, the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Coast
Guard, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Boarder
Protection, and Transportation Security Administration are working
collaboratively to fashion a more secure maritime environment for the
nation.
SUPPORTING EFFORTS IN IRAQ
Questions. The fiscal year 2004 supplemental appropriations act
provided $80 million to the Coast Guard for continued operations in
Iraq. The Coast Guard currently maintains four 110 foot patrol boats, a
port security unit, and other support personnel for operations in Iraq.
There are approximately 375 personnel dedicated to Operation Iraqi
Freedom.
What is the monthly cost to support and operate these assets? When
will the $80 million provided in the fiscal year 2004 supplemental be
depleted? The Secretary testified earlier this year that there will not
be a supplemental spending request this year for the Department. Will
the Coast Guard be able to cover operational expenses related to assets
dedicated to Operation Iraqi Freedom in fiscal year 2004? If Coast
Guard assets are needed to maintain support for Operation Iraqi Freedom
in fiscal year 2005, what will the total cost be to operate and support
those assets?
Answer. The average monthly cost to support and operate Coast Guard
Assets funded via the 2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriation
supporting the Global War on Terrorism is approximately $6.7 million
per month.
The $80 million provided to the Coast Guard in the fiscal year 2004
Emergency Supplemental, via transfer from the Navy, will be completely
obligated by September 30, 2004.
The Coast Guard will be able to cover current operational expenses
related to missions, assets and personnel dedicated to the Global War
on Terrorism (including Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring
Freedom) in fiscal year 2004.
At the current level of Coast Guard participation in term of assets
and personnel requirements, the Coast Guard estimates it will cost
between $95 million to $105 million to operate and support the Global
War on Terrorism (including Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM) in fiscal year 2005. The Coast Guard is continuing to
work with the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland
Security to further refine fiscal year 2005 mission tasking in support
of the Global War on Terrorism and the overall resources required to
support these operations.
DEEPWATER AWARDS TO PRIME CONTRACTORS
Questions. According to a recent report by the General Accounting
Office, the Coast Guard does not have the capability to assess the
performance of the Deepwater program. Yet, the Coast Guard awarded the
prime contractors with a $4.0 million bonus for work accomplished in
the first year of the contract based on an 87 percent rating. The ICGS
received this rating despite schedule delays, such as the delivery of
the 123 foot cutter, which was delayed by 4 months. The schedule for
the Maritime Patrol Aircraft has slipped as well.
The Department of Defense recently renegotiated the contract for
the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower so that the prime contractor will receive
its bonus only if the project is completed on time and meets specified
targets. (1) Would the Coast Guard be willing to consider this approach
for the Deepwater contract? (2) What benefits do the taxpayers receive
by awarding bonuses to the contractor before the work is completed and
when specific targets have not been met? (3) What benefits do the
taxpayers receive if the contractor receives performance bonuses only
if the project is completed on time and meets specified targets?
Answers. Would the Coast Guard be willing to consider this approach
for the Deepwater Contract?
Yes--in fact, Deepwater has adopted part of this approach already
in the structure of the Award Term incentive. ICGS is only able to earn
additional award term periods if deliveries are timely. For instance,
in order to earn an additional 5 award term, they must receive a
performance rating of ``excellent.'' Under the award term plan an
``excellent'' rating is defined as: The Contractor's overall
performance record strongly supports its ability to manage risks and
actually deliver as planned.
At this time, the award fee that is tied to certain Delivery Task
Orders is being revised to focus more on schedule as compared to the
earlier award fee criteria. One feature of this incentive for an award
fee early in the contract to help reinforce the partnership approach,
which has been identified as a ``Best Practice.'' To wait until the
contract delivered a product before providing an incentive was judged
as not keeping with the intent to build a partnership early on between
industry and the government. The targets for the award fee that was
cited in the GAO report was an annual award fee for System Engineering
and Integration.
(2) What benefit does the taxpayer receive by awarding bonuses to
the contractor before the work is completed and when specific targets
have not been met?
Incentives for contractors serve many purposes. One purpose of
incentives is to motivate the contractor to focus on contractor
performance/behavior at critical times in the contract. One dimension
of the IDS contract incentive approach is to focus on partnership
between the Coast Guard and ICGS.
(3) What benefit does the Taxpayer receive if the contractor
receives performance bonuses only if the project is completed on time
and meets specified targets?
The benefit that the taxpayer receives is that the contactor
receives incentives only if the project is completed on time and meets
specified targets, is the best-case scenario. However, in a different
scenario where the contractor is behind on schedule and cannot make up
the time, this creates a situation where there is no additional
incentive for the contractor to try to make the delay as short as
possible. In this scenario, the contractor will, at the time, be
working only to the exact letter of the contract specifications, not to
the spirit of a partnership to reach mutually agreeable results. At
that time, any situation in which the government has even partial
responsibility will be seized on by the contractor to initiate a
contract claim; a claim that could have potentially been avoided if an
incentive was still in place. This is the reason that the IDS contract
strategy contains two types of incentives:
--Specific Short-Term Award Fee.--Results in a short-term (usually 1-
year period) award fee. This provides a dollar amount award fee
based on an Award Fee Determination is usually targeted at very
specific performance for the period.
--Long-Term Award Term.--Results in a longer term evaluation and in
the case of IDS, the term evaluation period is for the first 5
years and is determined during the last year. This incentive,
which if awarded, is for another award term from 1 to 5 years
allowing the contractor to keep performing under the contract
for the period of time awarded. The following four factors are
included in the Award Term Assessment:
--Operational Effectiveness
--Total Ownership Cost
--Customer Satisfaction
--Competition
If deliveries occur late, that performance will be reflected in
Total Ownership Coast and Customer Satisfaction. If specific targets
are not met, then Operational Effectiveness and Customer Satisfaction
will reflect that Performance.
If there is a continuation of late deliveries, the Deepwater
Program, which is measuring the schedule, will reflect that in it's
Award Term Assessment and the Award Term could be adjusted accordingly;
from zero to five additional years under the contract. Again, if ICGS
complete all other assets on time and meets all required targets, the
Award Term Assessment would reflect this overall performance and
balance the achievement of the rest of the deliverables with these
start up delays.
By continuing both short and long-term incentives, along with
robust performance measuring, Deepwater has the tools and methodology
in place to appropriately manage this Performance Based Acquisition,
yet respond to any changes in DHS priorities and changes in funding.
With respect to GAO's comments, the following is provided:
--GAO states the Coast Guard does not have the capability to assess
the performance of the Deepwater Program. The Coast Guard does
have the capability to assess performance. As stated in the GAO
report, the Coast Guard assessed the performance for the first
year to be 87 percent; since then we have documented and
evaluated ICGS' logistics system at 79 percent and their
service in providing HITRON at 90.6 percent. The process for
assessment does need improvement and more objectivity, which
the Coast Guard is currently implementing.
--The award fee that was cited was for the first year's System
Engineering and Integration and was not for the 123-foot cutter
or the Maritime Patrol Aircraft.
--Delaying any incentive until an approximate 20-year program is
complete would not allow the government to recoup the benefit
of having incentives consistently provided at smaller intervals
of time.
DEEPWATER MANAGEMENT
Question. As GAO states in its recent report on the management of
the Deepwater program, the two first tier subcontractors have sole
responsibility for determining whether to hold competitions for
Deepwater assets or to provide these assets themselves. The GAO said
that the Coast Guard does not have the mechanism in place to hold the
contractor accountable. What is the Coast Guard doing to ensure that
future contract decisions are made on a competitive basis?
Answer. The Deepwater Program, working with GAO, is now including
additional competition factors for determining if the contract should
be approved for another term and the length of a subsequent term. The
measures for competition being proposed for adoption include:
--Percentage of awards competed;
--Minimizing the number of teaming agreements;
--Number of advertisements publicizing supplier registration;
--Number of vendor outreach programs; and
--Percentage of first tier subcontracts that incorporate the intent
of the Federal Acquisition Regulation clause 52-244.5
``Competition in Subcontracting.''
The Coast Guard's systems integrator, ICGS, has also adopted the
Open Business Model, initially a Lockheed Martin philosophy, as an
official policy for ensuring competition. The process ensures full,
continuous, and open analysis of supplier alternatives throughout the
program's execution.
--This approach entails obtaining proposals/quotes from two or more
qualified suppliers, and then balancing the cost, quality and
delivery of the components after the qualified suppliers have
been identified to provide the required components. This model
provides the flexibility to capture commercial technology when
needed, and it is projected to provide better performance at
equal or lower cost.
--The Open Business Model has been approved by the ICGS Board of
Directors and is applicable to all Deepwater transactions.
--To enforce these regulations, ICGS has appointed a Competition
Advocate and Ombudsman tasked to draft implementation
procedures for regular reporting to ICGS
--Visits by the ICGS Competition Advocate are also planned with
Deepwater's industry partners to examine ``make/buy'' decisions
and competition practices.
DEEPWATER ESTIMATES
Question. How much would be required in fiscal year 2005 to put the
Deepwater program on track for completion in 20 years as originally
planned? Please provide the outyear costs to meet a 20 year schedule.
Provide estimates for completion in 15 years and 10 years as well.
Answer. This is a complex, multi-variable equation, and as such
developing comprehensive systems-wide analysis on various levels is
challenging. The table below is based on an approximate total
acquisition cost of the IDS project scoped out prior to 9/11 at
approximately $12 billion (in 1998 dollars).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Est. fiscal year 2005 funding level............................. $1,892 $1,105 $795
Est. number of years............................................ 10 15 20
Est. completion date............................................ 2011 2016 2021
Notes:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The estimated number of years to complete represents a rough order of magnitude estimation. These estimates will
be impacted by the materiel condition of legacy assets, deterioration trends, evolving Coast Guard missions/
demands within DHS and fluctuation in funding over the life of the project.
The estimated completion date assumes funding begins in 2002 and ends in year depicted. Actual full
implementation is approximately 2 years after end of procurement.
The estimated funding level for 20 and 15 years are in 2005 dollars and assume continued funding at this level
adjusted for inflation.
The estimated funding level for 10 years is in 2005 dollars and assumes the cash flows as provided in the March
07, 2003 Report to Congress on the feasibility of accelerating IDS.
Question. For each asset planned to complete the Deepwater program,
provide the total cost for each asset a functional description of the
use of each asset, and the number of each asset the Coast Guard
currently plans to acquire.
Answer. A table is shown below which includes the number and
projected unit cost for each major asset the Coast Guard plans to
acquire through the Integrated Deepwater System acquisition program.
[Dollars in millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Average
Assets Lead Asset(s) Lead Asset(s) Projected Follow- Follow-on Qty
Projected Cost Qty on Cost
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
National Security Cutter (NSC) \1\.......... $475 1 $265 7
Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) \1\............ 330 1 175 24
Fast Response Cutter (FRC) \1\.............. 78 1 40 57
123 (110 to 123 Conversion)................. 16.5 1 8.2 \2\ 48
Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA).............. 145 2 33 33
Vertical Take-off & Landing Unmanned Air 138 2 5.3 66
Vehicle (VUAV).............................
Multi-mission Cutter Helo (MCH)............. 82 1 6.2 92
Vertical Take-off & Landing Recovery & 110 2 15.0 32
Surveillance Aircraft (VRS)................
High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Air Vehicle
(HAE-UAV).................................. In accordance with the original IDS implementation plan, the HAE-
UAV will be leased starting in fiscal year 2016 using Operating
Expense Funding based on the ICGS Implementation Plan. The lease
will provide approximately 16,100 hours of surveillance per year
at an approximate cost of $4,000 per hour in fiscal year 2002
dollars. The average annual cost per year is approximately $64.5
million in fiscal year 2002 dollars.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Includes DHS Capability for CBR (Chemical, Biological and Radiological) capability, interoperability with
DHS and other Government Agencies (OGAs), selected counter measures and protection from certain terrorist
weapons.
\2\ The number of 123 conversions will be decided based on the Business Case Analysis (BCA) currently underway
on when to shift to the Fast Response Cutter (FRC).
At full implementation, the Integrated Deepwater System comprises
three classes of new cutters and their associated small boats, a
combination of new and upgraded fixed-wing manned aircraft, a
combination of new and upgraded helicopters, and both cutter-based and
land-based unmanned air vehicles (UAVs). All of these highly capable
assets will be linked with state-of-the-art Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems, and will be supported by an integrated
logistics regime. The following are functional descriptions of each
asset listed above.
Upon departure for patrol, each NSC and OPC will be outfitted with
the small boat package and aviation detachment most appropriate for
that particular patrol. These cutters will have the capability to
deploy with two MCHs or four VTOL Unmanned Air Vehicles (VUAVs) or a
combination of these. Additionally, the NSC and OPC will be able to
land, launch, hangar, service, and replenish the VTOL Recovery and
Surveillance (VRS) helicopter.
Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) can be deployed independently in
support of law enforcement, port security, search and rescue, and
defense operations missions. Typical missions include near-shore
fisheries, choke point interdiction, barrier patrols, and providing a
show of presence in areas of concern.
The 123-foot Patrol Boat is a modification of the 110-foot Island-
Class Patrol Boat. The renovation extends the length 13 feet to allow
for the installation of a stern boat launch--enhancing small boat
launch and recovery. The renovation includes a new superstructure and
pilothouse, including a 360-degree bridge for increased visibility and
a large increase in available deck space. The renovation also includes
upgrades to the C4ISR suite to provide for increased capabilities in
communications, detection and prosecution.
The Multi-Mission Cutter Helicopter (MCH) is an upgraded version of
the legacy short-range recovery helicopter, the HH-65. The HH-65 will
undergo a Service Life Extension Plan (SLEP) that will yield a like-new
aircraft. The MCH will assist in the missions of search and rescue,
enforcement of laws and treaties, as well as maritime homeland security
missions.
The CASA CN 235-300M (Maritime Patrol Aircraft) is a transport and
surveillance, fixed-wing aircraft that will be used to perform search
and rescue missions, enforce laws and treaties including illegal drug
interdiction, marine environmental protection, military readiness, and
International Ice Patrol missions, as well as cargo and personnel
transport. It can perform aerial delivery of search and rescue
equipment such as rafts, pumps, and flares, and it can be used as an On
Scene Commander platform.
The AB-139 VRS (Vertical Take-off and Landing Recovery and
Surveillance Aircraft) is proposed as the Integrated Deepwater System
medium-range recovery aircraft, and would begin introduction in 2014.
These helicopters will be used as medium range responders for offshore
operations, and can provide shore-based aviation surveillance
capability.
The Bell HV-911 ``Eagle Eye'' Vertical Takeoff and Landing Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (VUAV) is a low maintenance shipboard deployable
unmanned aircraft. The VUAV will allow the Coast Guard to extend the
surveillance, classification and identification capability of its major
cutters through its speed, range, and endurance. This asset will be
used for maritime homeland security, search and rescue missions,
enforcement of laws and treaties including illegal drug interdiction,
marine environmental protection, and military preparedness.
The proposed High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Air Vehicle (HAE-
UAV), Northrop Grumman's RQ-4A Global Hawk, will bring even further
capability to the Coast Guard aviation solution. Providing an air
solution that is built on speed and endurance, the HAE-UAV can get on-
site quickly with an air speed up to 400 knots. With its 12,500
nautical mile range and 38 hour endurance combined with satellite and
line-of-sight communication links to other air and surface platforms
and operations centers ashore, the Global Hawk from a height of 65,000
feet can use its high-resolution sensors to conduct surveillance and
monitoring operations in adverse weather conditions, day or night, over
an area about the size of Illinois in 24 hours. HAE-UAVs will possess
the ability to transmit data and other imagery to shore-based Command
and Control (C2) centers as part of the Common Operational Picture
(COP).
Question. Provide the total cost that will be required for prime
contractor program management in fiscal year 2005 and over the life of
the Deepwater contract.
Answer. The table below provides enacted appropriation history for
the Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) from fiscal year 2002 through
fiscal year 2004, including Total Capital Acquisition and Systems
Engineering and Integration (prime contractor program management). The
table also provides the funding at the President's Budget for fiscal
year 2005, and projections for the outyears until the acquisition is
built out.
[In Millions of Dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
System
Fiscal year Total capital engineering &
acquisition integration
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002.................................... 320.2 53.9
2003.................................... 474.9 43.4
2004.................................... 664.3 41.9
2005.................................... 678.0 45.0
2006.................................... \1\ 688.8 \3\ 41.8
2007.................................... \1\ 700.6 \4\ 40.4
2008.................................... \1\ 713.2 \4\ 38.7
2009.................................... \1\ 726.0 \4\ 37.4
2010.................................... \2\ 739.8 \4\ 37.0
2011.................................... \2\ 753.9 \4\ 38.0
2012.................................... \2\ 768.2 \4\ 38.4
2013.................................... \2\ 782.8 \4\ 37.0
2014.................................... \2\ 797.7 \5\ 36.9
2015.................................... \2\ 812.8 \5\ 38.2
2016.................................... \2\ 828.2 \5\ 38.9
2017.................................... \2\ 844.0 \5\ 40.1
2018.................................... \2\ 860.0 \5\ 39.7
2019.................................... \2\ 876.4 \5\ 39.6
2020.................................... \2\ 893.0 \5\ 40.0
2021.................................... \2\ 910.0 \5\ 40.7
2022.................................... \2\ 927.3 \5\ 41.6
2023.................................... \2\ 944.9 \5\ 39.3
-------------------------------
Total............................. .............. 887.9
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Then Year Dollars provided in the Coast Guard's Capital Investment
Plan.
\2\ Then Year Dollars, based on the final year of Capital Investment
Plan, inflated using a 1.9 percent inflation factor.
\3\ Systems Engineering & Integration amount based on proposal prices
provided in June 2002.
\4\ Then Year Dollars based on Systems Engineering & Integration amount
proposal prices provided in June 2002 and then inflated using OMB/USCG
Non-pay Inflation.
\5\ Then Year Dollars based on Systems Engineering & Integration amount
proposal prices provided in June 2002 and then inflated using a 1.9
percent inflation factor from 2014 through 2023.
DEEPWATER PATROL BOATS
Question. The Deepwater contract with the Integrated Coast Guard
Systems (ICGS) calls for the modification and conversion of 49 110 foot
patrol boats to 123 foot patrol boats. According to the Coast Guard,
the number of 123 foot conversions may change based on an ongoing
Business Case Analysis on when to shift to the Fast Response Cutter
(FRC).
What is the timeline to complete this analysis and how will it
affect resources appropriated to date and requested in fiscal year
2005?
Answer. The Business Case Analysis on accelerating the acquisition
of the Fast Response Cutter (FRC) is expected in fiscal year 2004. The
results of the Business Case Analysis will not affect resources
appropriated to date or requested for fiscal year 2005. The Coast Guard
will use this analysis to assist in determining the appropriate number
of 123-foot patrol boat conversions, while accelerating the FRC as
appropriated in the IDS Patrol Boat Line item.
SECURITY PLANS FOR VESSELS AND PORT FACILITIES
Question. To meet the requirements of the Maritime Transportation
and Security Act (MTSA), vessel owners and port facility owners were
required to submit security plans to the Coast Guard for review and
approval by December 31, 2003.
How many vessel and port facility owners failed to submit a
security plan? How many penalties have you levied against non-compliant
companies? How many plans have you sent back for revisions? Based on
the plans that have been submitted to the Coast Guard, what is being
learned about the security needs of vessels and port facilities?
Answer. As of April 7, 2004, the Coast Guard has issued Notices of
Violation to 95 vessels and 66 facilities. Each of those violations was
for failing to submit a completed security assessment and has a $10,000
civil penalty associated with it. Subsequently, the Coast Guard has
issued civil penalties in the amount of $25,000 (additional) to four of
these facilities for failing to submit a completed security plan. These
penalties were based on violations of 33 CFR Section 104.410 for
vessels and 33 CFR Section 105.410 for facilities.
The Coast Guard is following a three-step process to review and
approve facility security plans. The first-step is a broad overview,
the second-step is a detailed review, and the third-step is an on-site
inspection. On-site inspections have just recently commenced. Plans may
require revision during any stage of review or inspection.
The Coast Guard is following a two-step process to review and
approve vessel security plans. The two stages are similar to the first
two stages used for facility plans, but there is no on-site inspection
required. Also like facilities, vessel security plans may require
revision during either stage of review.
As of April 7, 2004, the Coast Guard had received 9,250 vessel
security plans. Of the total vessel security plans received, 1,884 are
being revised. The Coast Guard Marine Safety Center is currently
engaging these vessel owner/operators to ensure these vessels meet the
July 1, 2004 deadline.
As of the same date, the National Plan Review Center had received
3,181 facility security plans. Of the total facility security plans
received, 383 are being revised. The Coast Guard National Plan Review
Center is currently engaging these facility owners and/or operators to
ensure these facilities meet the July 1, 2004, deadline.
The Coast Guard has two concerns as plans are being reviewed: (1)
Assessment Reports required to go forward with the plans are often too
abbreviated and may require the COTP to read the entire assessment
prior to going forward with approval; and (2) regulations do not
require a layout of the facility which would help the plan reviewers.
The latter issue can be worked around with overhead images and prior
submissions from the facility that have layouts.
Question. When Secretary Ridge testified before this subcommittee
in February, he said that he believes port facility owners should bear
most of the financial burden to harden security at our seaports. What
evidence do you have that these owners are stepping up to the plate and
investing their own resources in port security?
Answer. The Federal Government is bearing most of the financial
burden to harden security at our seaports. Department of Homeland
Security spending on port security increases by $224 million (13
percent) in the President's Budget, from $1,661 million in 2004 to
$1,885 million in 2005. Within the 2005 total is $1,675 million for
Coast Guard port, waterway, and coastal security activities, including
over $100 million to implement the Maritime Transportation Security Act
(MTSA). The DHS port security total also includes $164 million in U.S.
Customs and Border Protection for the Container Security Initiative and
the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, and $46 million in the
Office for Domestic Preparedness for port security grants.
Port facility owners must also do their share. The owners/operators
of these regulated facilities realize that they must be fully compliant
with approved facility security plans by July 1, 2004 or face
suspension of operations. All indicators are that they are working hard
in preparation to meet the enforcement date. As of March 23, 2004,
3,205 facilities have submitted security plans to the National Plan
Review Center in Kansas City, KS. This represents approximately 99
percent of the facilities required to submit plans. In addition to
preparing their plans, facility owner/operators are purchasing and
installing physical security equipment and providing training to their
personnel. Coast Guard inspectors are observing improved access control
and personnel monitoring, fencing, security patrols, and signage during
facility security spot checks conducted in conjunction with other
required visits.
AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM
Question. The Maritime Transportation Security Act, which President
Bush signed on November 25, 2002, requires vessels entering U.S. ports
to have an automatic identification system (AIS) on board by the end of
2003 that will identify the ship, the size of the ship and the type of
cargo on the ship when they arrive at U.S. ports. Congress appropriated
$24 million in fiscal year 2004 to install towers at selected ports and
to initiate a plan to create a nationwide system for all major
seaports. Your fiscal year 2005 request includes only $4 million to
continue this effort. The Coast Guard indicates that by the end of
fiscal year 2004, only 9 seaports will be able to receive AIS signals
from vessels entering our ports. Of the 9 seaports, how many will have
full AIS coverage?
Answer. By December 31, 2004, all nine ports will have full AIS
capability installed as part of their Vessel Traffic Service (VTS)
system:
--New York
--Houston/Galveston
--San Francisco
--Puget Sound (Seattle-Tacoma)
--Prince William Sound (Valdez)
--St. Marys River (Sault Ste. Marie, MI)
--Berwick Bay (Louisiana)
--Lower Mississippi River (New Orleans)
--Los Angeles-Long Beach
In addition, the Coast Guard is already operating basic (primarily
receive-only) AIS installations in the following locations:
--Miami and Florida Keys
--Long Island Sound (Groton, CT)
--Hampton Roads (Norfolk, VA)
By the end of CY 2004, the Coast Guard intends to have established
additional AIS capability (primarily receive-only, but possibly more
robust) at additional locations nationwide. These sites will be
determined based on a variety of criteria, including the expected
density of AIS-equipped vessels in the area, existing command and
control capability to put the data to use, compatibility and support
for the more extensive and capable system currently in the planning
stages, and coordination with other needs and assessments. These sites
will include use of offshore NOAA and other buoys and may include some
non-recurring investment in satellite capability. A more detailed plan
will be available by June 2004.
Question. The Coast Guard indicated that a contract award to
implement a nation-wide system would be made by the end of fiscal year
2004 or early fiscal year 2005. Is that information still accurate? If
the $4 million requested in fiscal year 2005 were approved, how many
additional ports would be outfitted with AIS technology?
Answer. The Coast Guard is currently developing a nationwide
implementation plan for AIS consistent with Coast Guard and Department
of Homeland Security requirements associated with major systems
acquisitions. We anticipate awarding a contract for this initiative in
late fiscal year 2004 or early fiscal year 2005. In the meantime, we
intend to deploy interim AIS capability in several ports during fiscal
year 2004. By December 31, 2004, the following ports will have full AIS
capability installed as part of their Vessel Traffic Service (VTS)
system:
--New York
--Houston/Galveston
--San Francisco
--Puget Sound (Seattle-Tacoma)
--Prince William Sound (Valdez)
--St. Mary's River (Sault Ste. Marie, MI)
--Berwick Bay (Louisiana)
--Lower Mississippi River (New Orleans)
--Los Angeles-Long Beach
In addition, the Coast Guard is already operating basic (primarily
receive-only) AIS installations in the following locations:
--Miami and Florida Keys
--Long Island Sound (Groton, CT)
--Hampton Roads (Norfolk, VA)
Interim sites will include use of offshore NOAA and other buoys and
may include some non-recurring investment in satellite capability. A
more detailed plan will be available by June 2004.
The $4 million requested in fiscal year 2005 will be used to
continue building out the nationwide AIS system. Once the Acquisition
Project Baseline is developed, a total project cost estimate will be
known and we will be able to provide an estimate of the number of
additional ports that will be outfitted with AIS technology. It is
important to note that each port will have unique requirements so there
will be no standard AIS cost per port.
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
Question. Section 307 of the Homeland Security Act requires a joint
agreement between the Under Secretary of the Science & Technology
directorate and the Commandant on R&D spending for the Coast Guard. The
Homeland Security Act specifies 10 percent of funding for the Homeland
Security Advanced Research Projects be spent on Coast Guard related
mission areas. Last year, the Committee was notified that the ``Coast
Guard is working with DHS to develop processes and policy for
compliance with Section 307 of the Homeland Security Act.'' Has a
policy been developed to comply with Section 307 of the Act?
Answer. No. Subsequent to the Coast Guard reply cited, DHS and CG
legal counsel advised that without a specific (Homeland Security
Advanced Research Project Agency) HSARPA appropriation, no funds are
statutorily designated to be set aside for CG related mission areas as
outlined in Section 307. Although the Homeland Security Act provides
authorization to do so (Figure 1), there have been no funds
appropriated specifically for HSARPA since enactment of the Homeland
Security Act. HSARPA is not a line item in the S&T budget. Rather,
funds have been appropriated toward a number of specific portfolios
organized generally by threat. It has evolved into an execution means
by which S&T will award competitive, merit-reviewed grants, cooperative
agreements or contracts to public or private entities to meet S&T
requirements.
Nonetheless, the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and CG
will develop a formal agreement that will detail the coordination and
funding mechanisms for CG R&D capabilities in fiscal year 2005 and
beyond. This agreement will not be limited to HSARPA but rather the
interaction of the Coast Guard/Maritime portfolio with all the
executing arms of S&T (e.g. HSARPA, Office of Research and Development
(ORD), etc).
----------------------------------------------------------------
``(2) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated $500,000,000 to the Fund for fiscal year 2003 and such
sums as may be necessary thereafter.
``(3) Coast Guard.--Of the funds authorized to be appropriated
under paragraph (2), not less than 10 percent of such funds for each
fiscal year through fiscal year 2005 shall be authorized only for the
Under Secretary, through joint agreement with the Commandant of the
Coast Guard, to carry out research and development of improved ports,
waterways and coastal security surveillance and perimeter protection
capabilities for the purpose of minimizing the possibility that Coast
Guard cutters aircraft, helicopters and personnel will be diverted from
non-homeland security missions to the ports, waterways and coastal
security mission.''
----------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 1.--Excerpt from Section 307 of Homeland Security Act
Question. For fiscal year 2005, the Department proposes to move
funding for Coast Guard R&D to the Science & Technology (S&T)
directorate. The S&T request includes $13.5 million to operate the
Coast Guard's R&D Center in Groton, CT and an additional $5 million for
R&D activities for a total of $18.5 million. In addition to this
funding, how will the Coast Guard benefit from S&T research? What
specific technologies are being explored to support the Coast Guard's
mission?
Answer. Through its portfolio manager at S&T, the CG will have
direct access to, and visibility of, all S&T research and initiatives.
The integration of funding and effort will go far to minimize
redundancy and maximize the effectiveness of Coast Guard R&D while
ensuring that all Coast Guard mission requirements remain a key part of
S&T planning and resource decisions. For example, S&T has provided $7.1
million of fiscal year 2003/2004 funds for support of a project in
South Florida exploring communications, sensors, data fusion concepts,
and modeling and simulation (Project Hawkeye). The integration of these
technologies provides improved maritime security for Miami and Port
Everglades while providing a rapid prototyping prelude to potential
Coast Guard-wide installations.
As stated, S&T has also agreed upon a base level of project funding
of $5 million that will be specifically targeted toward non-security
related projects including maritime science and research. This funding
will be designed to support CG mission-programs such as Marine
Environmental Protection, Living Marine Resources, Search and Rescue,
Aids to Navigation and Marine Safety. The specific projects in support
of these mission-programs will be prepared annually for S&T
concurrence.
In addition to the $18.5 million in funding cited, the Coast Guard
will submit security-related research requests through S&T for
coordination across all portfolios and DHS components. The Coast Guard
has submitted a maritime security R&D portfolio detailing approximately
$50 million in vital maritime security research initiatives. While not
yet funded, this portfolio has been validated by S&T portfolio managers
and will be considered in the development of future spending priorities
and commitments from S&T. As the lead Federal agency for maritime
security, the CG is being afforded an important role within S&T to
construct and help prioritize research and development needs in the
maritime domain.
HH-65 HELICOPTER
Question. The Coast Guard is currently in the process of purchasing
LTS-101-850 engines for the HH-65 to address safety, reliability, and
engine power issues. This approach is intended to provide an interim
solution to documented power failures. How many of the LTS-101-850
engines have been purchased? How many of the LTS-101-850 engines are
needed to provide the interim solution for the HH-65 before full
reengineering is completed and what is the associated cost?
Answer. To date, the Coast Guard has purchased 61 LTS-101-850
engines at a cost of $5.9 million.
The only reason to purchase additional 850 engines (38 at $4
million) would be to provide an interim safety and reliability
enhancement throughout the approximate 24-month duration of Integrated
Coast Guard System's (ICGS) Turbomeca re-engining project. The LTS-101-
850 engine, while not equipped with electronic fuel controls, offers an
additional margin of safety in an emergency situation. We owe our
aircrews nothing less until the fleet is re-engined. Based upon current
schedule projections, there is a 10-14 month ``underlap'' where the
Coast Guard would directly benefit from the additional engines.
These engines require long-lead time component purchases that must
be accounted for in the procurement decision process. The Coast Guard,
however, will wait until the completion of the current field evaluation
and subsequent inspection of the LTS-101-850 engines that are installed
on two Coast Guard Air Station Miami Helicopters. One helicopter has
completed the initial 150 hour evaluation and is currently being
inspected, while the second aircraft still has 36 hours of evaluation
remaining prior to inspection. After completion of testing and
inspection, the Coast Guard intends to re-evaluate the need for
additional engines based upon the results and both LTS-101-850 and
Turbomeca installation schedule updates
Below is the latest draft installation schedule based on
information from the new engine system selected manufacturer,
Turbomeca. This schedule is not final. The Coast Guard is hopeful that
the new engine installations move further to the ``left.''
Question. At the same time, the Coast Guard recently announced the
selection of Turbomecca to re-engine the HH-65. The Coast Guard
estimates that this re-engining will cost $250 million over a 24 month
period. Will this engine be compatible with the Deepwater Multi-Mission
Cutter Helicopter or will another engine replacement be required?
Answer. The Coast Guard has directed that a re-engining project be
immediately initiated to restore the HH-65 to unrestricted safe and
reliable operations. The project is designed to address the HH-65
engine system, the engine and engine control systems, to remedy this
safety and reliability crisis, and restore the HH-65's operational
capability.
The HH-65 re-engining project is a separate and distinct effort
from the Deepwater Multi-mission Cutter Helicopter (MCH). In the long-
term, the Deepwater plan is still to convert the HH-65 to the Multi-
mission Cutter Helicopter (MCH). While power increases were not the
focus of this acquisition, the engine chosen, while addressing the
safety and reliability concerns, also has sufficient power margins to
allow for that engine to be used in the continuation of the MCH.
HIGH INTEREST VESSEL BOARDINGS
Question. U.S. Customs and Border Protection use an automated
targeting system to identify shipments that pose a potential terrorist
risk. It is unclear if this information is shared with the U.S. Coast
Guard, which could be useful in identifying high interest vessels. Is
this information being shared with the Coast Guard? If not, would this
information be a useful tool for the Coast Guard to use?
Answer. Yes, Automated Targeting System information is shared
through an exchange of liaisons between the Coast Guard and the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection's National Targeting Center (NTC). The
Coast Guard's Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC) and the NTC have
exchanged full-time liaisons to pass information each center develops
about suspect ships, people, and cargoes. This has been a highly
effective partnership and has given each center much greater visibility
into specific maritime cases and concerns as they arise, resulting in
better coordination of information flow and operational planning. ICC's
COASTWATCH program (a partnership with the U.S. Navy's Office of Naval
Intelligence) uses data collected via the ICC/NTC partnership, coupled
with the information received through our 96-hour Advanced Notice of
Arrival (ANOA) rules, intelligence, and other appropriate law
enforcement information, to identify Vessels of Interest, providing
crew, cargo, and vessel screening prior to a vessel's arrival in U.S.
ports.
At the local level, Vessels of Interest are factored into the
decision making process to determine which vessels should be designated
and or boarded as High Interest Vessels (HIVs). Additionally, because
of the U.S. Coast Guard's solid working relationship with Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), input provided by CBP at the local level is
also considered when determining which vessels should be boarded as
HIVs.
The Coast Guard is incorporating an option into our 96-hour vessel
ANOA requirements to permit the electronic submission of information
(e-NOA). The Coast Guard and CBP have been working together to
incorporate CBP's reporting requirements into the e-NOA system. This
consolidated e-NOA system will include the capability to capture crew,
passenger, cargo, and vessel arrival information for both agencies. It
is anticipated that e-NOA will be operational by the summer of 2004. By
allowing industry to submit Coast Guard and CBP reporting requirements
together, DHS will enhance its information sharing capabilities,
thereby significantly enhancing the processing and identification of
security and safety risks posed by vessels entering U.S. ports.
SHORE FACILITIES
Question. The Coast Guard's request for shore facility projects is
$5 million in fiscal year 2005. According to the Coast Guard, $146
million is needed on an annual basis for recapitalization needs to
support shore facility assets valued at $7.2 billion. With such
valuable assets, why does the Coast Guard continue to neglect shore
facilities? Does the Coast Guard have a plan in place to address the
needs of its shore infrastructure? Provide a list of projects in need
of shore facility funding in priority order.
Answer. The Coast Guard is deeply concerned about its entire
infrastructure, including shore facilities. However, funding priority
must be placed on recapitalization efforts of operational first
response platforms such as Deepwater and Rescue 21. Shore facility
sustainment will be managed by targeted maintenance practices,
increased use of leased facilities, and ensuring shore infrastructure
costs are included in major AC&I projects, such as Deepwater and the
Great Lakes Icebreaker replacement. Increases in the Basic Allowance
for Housing also help and reduce the need for Coast Guard owned housing
projects. Additionally, the Coast Guard is pursuing Public-Private
Venture housing opportunities authorized in the Maritime Transportation
Security Act of 2002. Other Coast Guard initiatives currently being
developed that will assist in being good stewards of shore facilities
include enhanced real property authorities, such as the ability to
sublease and outlease property, exchange and sell property, and dispose
of excess property with sale proceeds being reinvested in the capital
plant. The Coast Guard is on budget in fiscal year 2005 for $151
million recurring OE shore facility maintenance costs and an additional
$5 million for shore AC&I projects.
Provided below is the budgeted Shore Facilities Requirements List
(SFRL) for fiscal year 2005, followed by a backlog of listing of fiscal
year 2005 unfunded projects. While the Coast Guard planning process
addresses projects that require funding beyond fiscal year 2005, these
projects have not been prioritized and are not included in the fiscal
year 2005 SFRL attached.
FUNDED SHORE FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS LIST (SFRL)--FISCAL YEAR 2005
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BENEFITTING UNIT PROJECT DESCRIPTION EST (000)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MAJOR AC&I: ISC Honolulu Small Arms Range.... $1,600
SURVEY AND DESIGN: Various Shore Operational & 1,000
Support Projects.
MINOR AC&I: Various Minor Construction 1,600
Projects.
WATERWAYS AND AIDS TO NAVIGATION: Various Locations... 800
Various
---------------
TOTAL....................... .................... 5,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
UNFUNDED SHORE FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS LIST (SFRL)--FISCAL YEAR 2005
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BENEFITTING UNIT PROJECT DESCRIPTION EST (000)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MAJOR AC&I:
ISC Kodiak, AK................ Consolidate Support $8,500
Facilities.
AR&SC Elizabeth City, NC...... Consolidate 6,300
Facilities Phase I.
Base Galveston, TX............ Rebuild Station/ 6,400
Waterfront.
Group Woods Hole, MA.......... Replace ANT and 3,750
Admin Building
Phase I.
SURVEY AND DESIGN: Various Shore Operational & 4,000
Support Projects.
MINOR AC&I: Various Minor Construction 2,750
Projects.
WATERWAYS AND AIDS TO NAVIGATION: Various Locations... 4,200
Various
COAST GUARD HOUSING:
Cordova, AK................... Replace Cordova 4,000
Housing, Phase I.
USCGA, New London, CT......... Chase Hall Barracks 15,000
Renovation Phase I.
---------------
TOTAL....................... .................... 54,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT (MTSA) IMPLEMENTATION
Question. The budget request includes $101.7 million for the
implementation of the MTSA. What follow-on costs are necessary to meet
the requirements of the MTSA (specify by fiscal year)?
Answer. The fiscal year 2005 budget request is designed to bring
MTSA implementation close to the annual recurring steady state for
personnel, associated support funds, and contract resources. These
resources will be used to address the permanent increase in workload
associated with MTSA. This workload includes continued verification of
domestic vessel and facility security requirements, a robust Port State
Control program to ensure compliance with international security
requirements, continuous updates and improvements to the National and
Area Maritime Security plans, and the assessment of domestic and
foreign ports for compliance. Additional follow-on costs of MTSA
initiatives are $12.9 million in fiscal year 2006.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Inouye
NON-SECURITY MISSIONS
Question. When the Coast Guard was moved to the Department of
Homeland Security, Congress included a provision in the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 to ensure that the Coast Guard continued to carry
out its non-security missions. Section 888 of the Act states that the
Secretary, ``may not substantially or significantly reduce the missions
of the Coast Guard or the Coast Guard's capability to perform those
missions, except as specified in subsequent Acts.''
However, concern has been raised about the Coast Guard's ability to
maintain its non-security missions as the hours ships and aircraft are
used for these missions have not reached pre-September 11 levels. I was
concerned by a report to the Congress that several of the districts,
including Honolulu, have ``insufficient personnel'' for its search and
rescue missions.
It is my understanding that your performance measures were enhanced
through the assistance of other agencies. In addition, certain
performance goals are not reflective of the success of the maintenance
of your effort. I do not find it helpful that the performance measure
for compliance with domestic fisheries regulations is how many
fisherman, of those reviewed, were found to be in compliance. If the
Coast Guard interviewed one fisherman who was in compliance, the Coast
Guard would have 100 percent performance on this measure.
Can you tell me what you are doing to ensure that the non-security
missions that are so critical to my state are being met and that the
performance measures are a true reflection of your efforts?
Answer. Based on all measurements completed to date, the Coast
Guard met its performance goal in each non-homeland security mission-
program area including our goal for Search and Rescue for fiscal year
2003. Program performance is the most important element of the Coast
Guard Performance Management System. Program managers establish
measures to accurately portray organizational performance. The measures
are data-driven, fully documented, meaningful, and focus on outcomes.
Using the performance measures, and with an emphasis toward improving
effectiveness, the Coast Guard Commandant establishes long-term
performance outcome targets that are linked to the strategic intent of
the organization, including maintaining the balance between homeland
security and non-homeland security missions. While the Coast Guard has
been lauded in the past for its performance measurement efforts, it has
recognized and acknowledged that limitations in these measures
sometimes exist. The Coast Guard has been working with GAO through the
recent audit examining the relationship between resources and results,
and OMB through the Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) reviews,
and other independent evaluation efforts to continually review and
improve program measures' clarity and objectivity. Examples of measures
that have recently been revised or are currently under review include:
Several years ago, the Search and Rescue program was measured by
the percent of persons in U.S. jurisdictional waters in distress that
were saved, after the Coast Guard was notified. This measure was
changed to include the percentage all persons in U.S. jurisdictional
waters in distress, with no restriction on Coast Guard notification.
This change occurred as program managers realized that communication
improvements and other non-Search and Rescue safety programs were
inputs to the measure of safety as well as that of a simple Search and
Rescue response measure.
Two years ago, the Short Range Aids to Navigation (AtoN) program
was measured by the statistic of Short Range Aid availability. While
this measure provided information on the percent of Coast Guard Aids to
Navigation that were working properly and on-station, there was little
connection to performance of these aids and benefit to the public. When
this was brought to the Coast Guard's attention through an Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART)
review, a change was made to measure the AtoN program by the number of
Collisions, Allisions and Groundings that occur in U.S. waterways.
The illegal drug interdiction measure was recently refined to
include not only cocaine seized by the Coast Guard but also to account
for cocaine thrown overboard or destroyed by smugglers. This refined
measure, which encompasses both the cocaine lost to the smuggler as
Coast Guard assets draw near, causing the smugger to jettison, burn,
and otherwise destroy their product, as well as the cocaine actually
seized by the Coast Guard, will more accurately reflect counter-drug
efforts and results.
With regard to the concern expressed in the question regarding the
domestic fisheries performance measure of a compliance rate; both the
Coast Guard and OMB, through its PART review, believe this rate to be a
sound measure. The observed compliance rate measure is the total number
of Coast Guard domestic fishing vessel boardings minus the boardings
that had significant violations divided by the total number of Coast
Guard fishing vessel boardings. Only boardings that have a significant
violation--a living marine resource violation that results in
significant damage or impact to the fisheries resource, significant
monetary advantage to the violator, or has high regional or national
interest--are counted.
Historically, domestic compliance rates, which are based on over
3,000 boardings (post 9/11 statistic) annually, have been within the
95-98 percent range and movement within this range is expected and
mostly beyond CG control as economic and social factors other than
enforcement presence motivates individuals to violate the law. As a
result, a floor has been established at 97 percent observed compliance
to evaluate if CG levels of enforcement are sufficient to ensure wide-
scale compliance with regulations.
Historical data illustrates Coast Guard enforcement presence does
in fact affect observed compliance rates and also that there is a delay
between enforcement presence/absence and fisheries compliance rates.
Although observed compliance rate will not perfectly indicate the
actual industry-wide compliance rate, it should serve as a reasonable
indicator of the actual compliance rate when enforcement resource
effort is sufficient to make performance tracking possible.
In regard to the comment concerning ``insufficient resources'' in
Honolulu, the Coast Guard is careful to distinguish between mission
performance measures and internal program standards put in place to
ensure the long-term maintenance of our resources, including our most
valuable asset, our people. As stated above the Coast Guard has
successfully met all mission performance goals for the search and
rescue mission. The Coast Guard has adequate resources to meet
performance and on-scene response standards for search and rescue in
Hawaii. However, the Coast Guard has recently adopted an internal
program standard, driven by requirements set forth in MTSA 2002,
requiring command center watchstanders responsible for search and
rescue to limit their watch length to 12 hours in duration, except in
emergency or unforeseen circumstances.
The Coast Guard measures and reports quarterly to Congress on our
ability to meet this standard. The Coast Guard has demonstrated
incremental improvement in achieving this standard, however, routine
personnel transfers and substantial training requirements for newly
assigned personnel continue to challenge the Coast Guard's ability to
meet the 12-hour standard at all times. The Coast Guard is reviewing
the staffing standards for our command centers, and is developing
recommendations to ensure our ability to meet and maintain a year-round
capability to meet the 12-hour watch requirement.
PORT SECURITY
Question. As part of the Maritime Transportation Security Act,
9,000 vessels and 3,500 facilities were supposed to have filed security
plans by December 31, 2004. It is my understanding that you have
received 97 percent of the security plans and that more than half of
them are in the second stage of review. Area security and contingency
response plans must be completed by July 1, do you anticipate a similar
compliance rate? How does the cost of implementation affect the
adequacy of the security plans submitted? On December 30, 2002, the
Coast Guard estimated the total cost of implementing security in our
seaports at $7.2 billion over the next 10 years. Is that estimate still
accurate and how much has been spent toward that total to date? The
President's budget requests $46 million for Port Security Grants. Will
that be sufficient to bring our vessels and facilities into compliance
with the security plans?
Answer. Each Federal Maritime Security Coordinator submitted an
Area Maritime Security (AMS) Plan to the respective Coast Guard
District Commander for initial review on April 1, 2004. In order to
meet the entry-into-force date of the new International Ship and Port
Facility Security (ISPS) Code and Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)
amendments, the Coast Guard must review and approve all AMS plans by
June 30, 2004 and communicate U.S. port compliance with the ISPS Code
to the International Maritime Organization.
In the final MTSA regulations, the Coast Guard estimated the
industry cost for implementing Section 102 of the MTSA security
requirements as approximately $1.5 billion in the first year, and $7.3
billion over the next 10 years. The port security grants to date have
provided approximately $500 million.
The Coast Guard does not believe the cost of implementation
affected the adequacy of the facility and vessel security plans
submitted for review. The MTSA security regulations were specifically
developed to be performance based in order to provide owners/operators
the latitude to implement the most cost-effective security controls to
meet their specific circumstances.
The fiscal year 2005 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) budget
proposes a significant increase for port security activities. Grants to
facilities are a small part of DHS's total investment in port security.
Department of Homeland Security spending on port security increases by
$224 million (13 percent) in the President's Budget, from $1,661
million in 2004 to $1,885 million in 2005. Within the 2005 total is
$1,675 million for Coast Guard port, waterway, and coastal security
activities, including over $100 million to implement MTSA. The DHS port
security total also includes $164 million in U.S. Customs and Border
Protection for the Container Security Initiative and the Customs Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism, and $46 million in the Office for
Domestic Preparedness for port security grants.
HC-130J
Question. The Coast Guard has expanded its mission since September
11, 2001 and has been transferred from the Department of Transportation
to the Department of Homeland Security. Thirteen Maritime Safety and
Security Teams and eight Port Security Units have been deployed. With
these changes, has there been an increased requirement for airlift
capacity?
Answer. Yes. Since 9/11, the Coast Guard has redefined and expanded
organic lift requirements. The Coast Guard must be capable of providing
organic aviation transport of National Strike Force personnel and
equipment within 6 hours and must be capable of providing aviation
transport of MSSTs within 12 hours of notification. Ongoing efforts to
expand the Deepwater contract to reflect post-9/11 mission requirements
and DHS Aviation Council study efforts will shape our aviation heavy
lift and transport capability.
Question. Pursuant to funding provided in the fiscal year 2001
Military Construction bill, the Coast Guard recently received delivery
of the first of six HC-130J Super Hercules aircraft. Could you discuss
with us those aircraft, the benefits to DHS, and the advantages of the
new 130Js over the 130Hs currently in service? In your opinion, is the
HC-130J, the best aircraft available to replace your aging air fleet?
Answer. The HC-130J provides the USCG and DHS a modern long-range
patrol and heavy lift aircraft that will remain in the DHS inventory
well into the future. This capability will provide DHS the ability to
provide heavy-lift through a variety of mission profiles, and will
enable the Department to remain in the forefront of disaster response
and Homeland Security missions. The HC-130J is a completely new
aircraft enabling a substantially better level of performance. Even in
their current unmissionized state, the C-130J provides a substantially
greater heavy lift capability than the aging HC-130H. Missionization to
full capability as maritime patrol aircraft is scheduled to begin in
fiscal year 2004. The missionization suite was designed to reflect post
9/11 mission requirements, and will be fully interoperable with DHS,
DOD, and the Deepwater systems. Fully digitized and equipped with a
contemporary electronics suite, the missionized HC-130J will fly faster
and have greater range with a smaller crew. The legacy asset HC-130H is
increasingly more expensive to maintain and will be costly to modernize
to homeland security and Deepwater mission requirements. At Full
Operational Capability (FOC), the HC-130J will meet all current DHS/
USCG long range maritime patrol and heavy airlift requirements.
Question. The first six HC-130Js are planned to be based at the Air
Station in Kodiak, Alaska. This would leave the Coast Guard with a mix
of HC-130Js and Hs in your Pacific Fleet. What are the benefits of an
all HC-130J Pacific Fleet?
Answer. In the Pacific Area, C130s operate over some of the world's
largest expanses of water in the most arduous weather conditions. In
addition to the performance increases and modern replacement benefits,
an all C-130J fleet in the Pacific Area would allow the Coast Guard to
more rapidly grow an experienced operator cadre/community to operate
and maintain this aircraft. Additionally, the service would benefit
from reduced training costs, as some members would transfer from one C-
130J unit to another, eliminating qualification costs. Economies of
scale would produce parts and logistics support savings as well.
Question. What are your funding requirements to fully deploy and
maintain the first six HC-130Js? Is that request contained in the
President's budget?
Answer. Total additional funding required to missionize and achieve
Full Operational Capability (FOC) of HC-130Js by the end of fiscal year
2007 is $187 million. A funding request for missionization and full
system acquisition is not included in the President's budget.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Ernest F. Hollings
OVERALL COAST GUARD BUDGET REQUEST ONLY 6 PERCENT INCREASE
Question. The Commandant of the Coast Guard testified that the
Coast Guard was on track to restore resources and performance of non-
security missions, such as search and rescue of stranded mariners, to
pre-9/11 levels. However, a draft GAO report (non-public until mid-
March) finds that the resource hours dedicated to the search and rescue
mission search & rescue is down 22 percent from pre 9/11 levels. The
resource hours dedicated to many other non-security missions, such as
fisheries enforcement, living marine resources, and drug interdiction,
are all down as well.
Does this budget really fund the Coast Guard at sufficient levels?
The request is really only a 6 percent increase over what we enacted
last year, if you include the supplementals. Why is Coast Guard getting
so little of the increase when it has so many responsibilities related
to security and non-security missions?
Answer. Yes, the fiscal year 2005 budget request is sufficient to
fund Coast Guard operations. A 6 percent increase is not a fair
comparison since the fiscal year 2004 Coast Guard budget includes
supplemental funding provided for Iraqi Freedom and Hurricane Isabel.
Supplemental appropriations are for specific purposes and are non-
recurring. Therefore, the fiscal year 2005 Coast Guard budget would not
reflect this funding.
While the draft GAO report referenced in this question noted that
that the resource hours for non-homeland security programs decreased,
the report also had the following conclusion: ``The Coast Guard's
performance results--measures used to track each program's annual
progress--generally did not mirror the trends in resource use. Instead,
results for programs GAO reviewed were generally stable or improved
regardless of the resources applied, and nearly all of the programs
that GAO reviewed met their performance targets.'' (Draft GAO-04-043,
March 2004).
Search and Rescue (SAR) is a demand driven mission. While resource
hours for SAR are down, it is due to less distress calls than from lack
of resource hours. Also from the GAO report: ``the search and rescue
program's target for fiscal year 2003 was to save 85 percent of
mariners in distress and the program achieved this goal by saving over
87 percent of them.''
While resource hours are an important measure, the Coast Guard
relies on the judgment of the operation commander to apply available
resources based on the risks in the relevant area of operations. This
flexibility is critical to apply Coast Guard resources to the numerous
missions mandated in Section 888 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
Question. I am hearing reports that the Coast Guard's resource
hours for most non-security missions are still down below pre 9/11
levels. For example, I've heard that the search and rescue mission is
down 22 percent from pre 9/11 levels. What can you tell me about that?
Answer. The Coast Guard will continue seeking the appropriate
balance among all its mission-programs while relentlessly pursuing our
stated performance goals. In so doing, the Coast Guard will continue to
focus not only on activity levels (hours), but also on achieving the
desired outcomes from those levels. Our ability to achieve desired
outcomes and performance goals have been significantly enhanced through
improved technology, tactics and procedures making our activities that
much more effective. Risk-based decision-making by local commanders
will continue to be the primary driving factor behind the specific
activity levels (hours) accrued in the course of Coast Guard
operations.
The number of resource hours utilized for search and rescue (SAR)
decreased by 22 percent in fiscal year 2003 from a pre-9/11 average
level. However, this decrease in resource hours was not indicative of a
decrease in service or performance. SAR is a demand driven mission, and
the Coast Guard continues to respond to all mariners in distress. In
fiscal year 2003, the Coast Guard met its 85 percent SAR performance
goal by saving 87 percent of all mariners in distress.
The Coast Guard's SAR program is a system with a variety of
components. Aircraft, cutters, and boats play a large role in the
response system, but overall SAR performance is not based on resource
hours alone. For example, maritime safety and prevention programs,
technology advancements for the boating public, enhanced communication
and tracking systems, and improved safety equipment are just a few of
the initiatives that factor into the Coast Guard's SAR program.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
Questions. The U.S. Coast Guard awarded General Dynamics Decision
Systems a $611 million contract to replace its outdated communications
system in a project titled Rescue 21. This is a massive Federal
investment in our maritime communications infrastructure. The Rescue 21
section of the Coast Guard's website, however, has not been updated
since May 9, 2003, so it is very difficult for the American public to
keep updated on the project's implementation process and schedule.
Could you please give me a status update on the project? I understand
there may be some questions about deficiencies in the design phase of
the project. Does the Coast Guard have adequate oversight of the
contractor and are financial controls in place to ensure that the
public investment is protected? When does the Coast Guard plan to
implement Rescue 21 on Lake Champlain and Lake Memphremagog to cover
these important border entry points into the United States? The Coast
Guard's mission on Lake Champlain can lead to simultaneous rescue calls
at opposite ends of the lake. First responders often have to rely on
either a Coast Guard helicopter from southern New England or a Vermont
Army National Guard helicopter to support them on search and rescue
missions. Both options take precious hours to implement and cut short
the window of opportunity for a successful rescue. With the Coast Guard
seeking a 9 percent increase in their budget this year, are there any
plans to post a Coast Guard helicopter on Lake Champlain?
Answers.
Status Update
While conducting Formal Qualification Testing (FQT) in January
2004, several significant software (SW) defects were discovered in
functional areas such as archive/restore, fault management, channel
performance, Group Command Centers/Station operations, vessels and
voice quality that required performance fixes and retesting. An
additional FQT test event was scheduled for March/April to retest
defects discovered in January 2004.
While conducting preliminary FQT testing in early March to prove
that previous issues had been resolved, GDDS discovered a new defect
that has a severe impact on the asset tracking functionality of the
system. This defect was hidden by an earlier problem and revealed by
the latest software fixes. GDDS is currently working with the equipment
manufacturer to analyze the defect and identify appropriate corrective
action. Until GDDS can fix this asset-tracking problem, the FQT
regression testing is necessarily on hold.
Consequently, Initial Operating Capability (IOC) and Full Operating
Capability (FOC) schedules will be impacted by the technical issues and
testing activities discussed. IOC will be delayed by approximately 1
year (to Sep 2004), and the Coast Guard anticipates the project being
45 percent complete by the end of 2005. Achieving FOC in 2006 is at
risk and is still being evaluated. The Coast Guard and GDDS have formed
a joint deployment team to streamline the regional deployment process
and identify tasks that can be performed concurrently or more
efficiently to complete the maximum number of regions by the end of
2006. The deployment team is using the experience of the first 6
regions to redefine processes and align activities to accelerate
deployment. Future deployment dates of Rescue 21 will depend upon
GDDS's ability to accelerate their work, deploy innovations and do
parallel deployments as the system is built out.
The Rescue 21 section of the Coast Guard's website was recently
updated on April 9, 2004. IOC and Low Rate Initial Program (LRIP)
region schedules were updated. Group schedule updates still pending.
Oversight
The Coast Guard has 54 staff members dedicated to the Rescue 21
project. Several of these staff members are dispersed throughout the
United States to ensure appropriate oversight of the nationwide
deployment.
Additionally, the Coast Guard has agreements in place with the
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, San Diego and U.S. Department
of Commerce National Telecommunication Information Administration
(NTIA)/ITS Institute for Telecommunication Sciences for technical/
quality assurance support and Booz Allen Hamilton for project
management and administrative support.
Finally, the Coast Guard has leveraged existing GSA contracts to
award blanket purchase agreements to a public relations firm to assist
with community/public outreach, an environmental consulting firm to
ensure compliance with applicable environmental laws and regulations,
and an information technology firm to ensure contractor performance
metrics are properly developed, monitored and archived.
Financial Controls
Approximately 80 percent of the costs associated with the Rescue 21
deployment will be paid using fixed price delivery orders. These costs
were established during the proposal evaluation phase of the project
and are not expected to change. The remaining 20 percent of the work
will be paid for using cost plus incentive fee delivery orders for
which target prices were also established during the proposal
evaluation phase. Incentive fee contract structures provide motivation
for the contractor to remain within cost goals.
Lakes Champlain and Memphremagog
Lake Champlain will receive Rescue 21 as part of the Activities New
York deployment currently scheduled for 2005. Lake Memphremagog was not
identified as part of the Rescue 21 operational requirement, and is not
scheduled to receive Rescue 21.
Coast Guard Mission on Lake Champlain
Coast Guard Station Burlington, located at Burlington, VT conducts
search and rescue (SAR) on Lake Champlain and responds to approximately
200-300 cases annually, mostly during a the peak season for
recreational boaters between June through August. Lake Champlain's
shoreline includes portions of Vermont, New York and Canada, and
measures approximately 100 nautical miles (north and south) by eight
nautical miles (east and west). The Coast Guard's small boat response
station has 25 persons assigned for Coast Guard missions including
search and rescue, and also maintains aids to navigation on the lake.
Coast Guard aircraft from Air Station Cape Cod are capable of
responding to search and rescue cases on Lake Champlain within the
Coast Guard's SAR program standards. However, they do not normally do
so because of the other resources nearby which can provide a quicker
response. Considering the narrow characteristics of the lake and that
there are a large number of local responders, including local police
and fire departments in the cities surrounding the lake, and that
helicopters from the New York State Police, the Air National Guard, and
U.S. Customs & Border Protection agency provide search assistance, the
Coast Guard does not presently have any plans to post an aircraft at
Lake Champlain.
______
Questions Submitted to Transportation Security Administration
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
FLIGHT CANCELLATIONS
Question. The Department requested a number of international
flights to be cancelled at the end of December and again in January due
to intelligence of possible terrorist activity. The cancellations
caused inconvenience and financial losses for airlines and passengers
alike and some aviation organizations have publicly questioned the need
to cancel flights without being made aware of what specific
intelligence was uncovered.
Do you feel the Department was justified in the cancellation of
these flights based on intelligence indicating that commercial
airliners continue to be at risk of highjackings?
Answer. The decision to cancel flights was made by the foreign
carriers and governments upon specific intelligence that warranted such
action. DHS shared information with our foreign counterparts and
foreign air carriers, which led to their decisions to cancel flights
and/or implement enhanced security measures.
Question. How would you describe the cooperation of commercial
airliners in the request to cancel these flights?
Answer. During the holiday period, DHS received specific
information and shared it appropriately with French and British allies,
resulting in their decisions to cancel these flights. DHS and our
European allies continue to work in close collaboration to share best
practices and enhance aviation security.
Question. Are passenger manifests being provided in a timely
fashion by the airlines to the Department of Homeland Security?
Answer. Air carriers as a general rule are fully compliant with
existing CBP requirements for advanced passenger information system
(APIS) transmissions, which must be submitted after takeoff. However,
to vet flights of interest over the holiday threat period, TSA required
that, upon request, airlines provide DHS with passenger manifests a
specified time in advance of departure. All such requests were
generally accommodated, and DHS continues to work closely with both the
State Department and foreign carriers to ensure that additional
requests are accommodated appropriately.
Question. With intelligence showing that terrorists have considered
a dirty bomb or a chemical or biological weapon release on airliners,
what precautions are in place at our Nation's airports to prevent a
possible radiological, nuclear, chemical or biological attack on an
aircraft?
Answer. TSA believes that existing operating procedures and current
technology in the area of explosives detection would enable TSA to
detect and interdict such a threat. In addition, the Department of
Homeland Security continues to fund an aggressive program to improve
the technology capable of detecting and mitigating such threats. As you
are aware, TSA is also working to replace its passenger prescreening
system to improve our ability to detect and stop any terrorist
attempting to board an aircraft, including one possessing
unconventional weapons.
Question. Secretary Ridge testified before this Committee that the
Executive amendment which directed the airlines to place Federal air
marshals on international flights should have more appropriately been
sent through diplomatic channels first. What new protocols or
procedures have since been implemented by the Transportation Security
Administration to communicate through diplomatic channels in the event
that future flights are determined to be at high risk of terrorist
attack?
Answer. The regulatory instrument that allows TSA to require
additional security of foreign air carriers is an emergency amendment
to the security program of the affected foreign air carrier. It is the
regulated party, (i.e. the air carrier) which must be the recipient of
that instrument. However, we are aware that issuance of emergency
amendments alone does not provide enough information to the foreign
authority (which may differ from country to country) responsible for
air marshals or other security functions involved in an emergency
amendment. To remedy this, TSA, under DHS leadership, will use
diplomatic channels, particularly in cases requiring immediate action
by foreign air carriers, to inform affected air carriers and the
foreign authority of their respective government concurrently. TSA will
work through the Department of State and the affected U.S. Embassies,
which will, in turn, reach out to the appropriate foreign authority to
ensure that the requirements of the emergency amendment are conveyed.
RAIL SECURITY
Question. Under Secretary Hutchinson testified before this
Committee previous to the terrorist train bombings in Madrid that the
Transportation Security Administration is working with other Federal
Departments and agencies within the Department of Homeland Security to
secure various transportation sectors including rail. The Department of
Homeland Security recently announced additional security initiatives to
further reduce vulnerabilities to transit and rail systems.
In light of the attacks that took place on light-rail, passenger
trains in Spain recently can you further elaborate on the luggage
screening pilot program announced recently to be carried out by the
Department of Homeland Security and coordinated with Amtrack and the
Federal Railroad Administration?
Answer. TSA, AMTRAK, and Federal Railroad Administration have
combined efforts to institute a passenger and carry-on baggage
screening prototype for explosives in a rail environment known as the
Transit and Rail Inspection Program (TRIP). Under this project, TSA
will seek to determine the feasibility of screening in a passenger rail
environment. TSA hopes that such a project will help identify measures
that would permit an appropriate level of screening that reflects the
individual characteristics of each type of passenger rail traffic. The
pilot project leverages present and prototype technologies and will
evaluate their feasibility in a rail environment. As the primary
stakeholder, AMTRAK is immersed in the review and implementation of
this project. This program is expected to commence by early May 2004.
Question. What new technologies and screening concepts will be
implemented?
Will explosive detection systems and/or explosive trace detection
which are used to screen luggage placed on airliners be used to screen
luggage placed on trains?
Answers. The pilot program will assess different types of screening
equipment already in use or being tested today.
Question. Will additional funding be requested by the
Transportation Security Administration for the additional rail security
measures announced yesterday either by a supplemental funding request
or by budget amendment?
Answer. TSA will fund the additional rail security initiatives that
were recently announced from within its fiscal year 2004 appropriation
for Maritime and Land Security. For fiscal year 2005, there are no
plans to seek additional funding for rail security above what is
included in the fiscal year 2005 President's Request.
Question. Can you provide further detail on how the Transportation
Security Administration is using the expertise of Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) and Science and Technology (S&T)
assistance to prevent a terrorist attack on our railways and also on
our subway systems?
Answer. TSA staff and its parent directorate, the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate, work closely and collaborate on a
daily basis with both S&T and the Information Analysis (IA) and the
Infrastructure Protection (IP) Divisions of the IAIP Directorate, on
issues related to rail and transit security. IA shares intelligence and
threat analysis daily with all DHS entities and other relevant
stakeholders. Since the Madrid bombings, DHS stood up a working group
to develop operational Courses of Action (COAs). Members of this
working group include representatives from BTS, TSA, IA, IP and the
Department of Transportation.
TSA has partnered with IP on several important issues in
safeguarding our nation's critical infrastructure including working
together to conduct vulnerability assessments and security reviews.
Moreover, IP has invited TSA to participate in site assistance visits
(SAV) to determine a baseline level of security for select elements of
the nation's critical infrastructure. One current example involves a
joint assessment of subway system ventilation shafts to determine
vulnerability to chemical or biological attack. Additionally, TSA, in
coordination with FRA, IP and industry representatives, is currently
conducting an in-depth assessment of the District of Columbia rail
corridor.
TSA has been communicating its operational requirements to the
Science and Technology (S&T) directorate. TSA has engaged S&T in an
effort to help meet the more immediate R&D needs of screening
passengers and their baggage in the rail and transit environment with
relevant technologies sensitive to the operational concerns of
throughput and high levels of detection.
TSA works closely with IA and S&T to better understand and prevent
terrorist attacks on our Nation's railroads. Our warning and
information products are vetted with IA and S&T representatives to
provide the best informed assessments possible. Additionally, vetting
and strong analyst-to-analyst coordination ensure strong positive
information sharing across the Department.
Question. Have vulnerability assessments been completed by
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection on high-density
urban areas to target resources toward the railways greatest weaknesses
or are these assessments still taking place?
Answer. On May 14, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security
awarded $65 million in Mass Transit Grants to help secure the 20
highest risk transit systems in the United States based on ridership.
The money may be used for the following: (1) the installation of
physical barricades; (2) area monitoring systems such as video
surveillance, motion detectors, thermal/IR imagery and chemical/
radiological material detections systems; (3) integrated communications
systems; (4) prevention planning, training and exercises; and/or (5)
operations activities conducted during ORANGE alert from January 2003
through April 2003. New York City Transit received $26.7 million, 41
percent of the $65 million. The Chicago Transit Authority, the second
largest transit agency by ridership, received $5.1 million.
On November 13, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security awarded
another $53 million to the top 30 transit agencies with heavy rail,
subway and commuter rail systems. A weighted average factoring both
ridership and system route miles was used to determine the amounts
received. Each qualifying system received no less than $800,000. Due to
the previous allocation of funds to New York City Transit, the MTA
subway system was capped at $10 Million, allowing for the allocation of
more funds to other properties.
The grants were administered by DHS's Office for Domestic
Preparedness (ODP). TSA provided modal expertise to ODP on the
allotment of this grant money to the mass transit industry.
TSA is currently conducting an assessment of critical mass transit
assets. The results will be used to identify locations for enhanced,
facilitated assessments. To-date, TSA has performed an assessment on
approximately 65 percent of critical subway assets. Approximately 30
percent of light rail critical assets have been assessed. The
criticality assessment of mass transit assets is scheduled for
completion by July 2004.
DHS has conducted Site Assist Visits (SAVs) of several rail
stations in high-density urban areas, including New York's Penn Station
and Grand Central Station and Washington D.C.'s Union Station. Teams of
security experts, along with the owner/operator of the site, identifies
vulnerabilities and suggest remediation actions. Thanks to these and
other visits to rail facilities, we have compiled Common
Characteristics and Vulnerability reports and Potential Indicators for
Terrorist Attack reports (CV/PI) for railroad yards and railroad
bridges and disseminated them to owners/operators, security planners,
and law enforcement agencies. The Department has also funded a study of
possible protective measures that can be applied to railcars
transporting chemicals and recommendations are expected shortly. In
addition we have received dozens of other rail and subway vulnerability
assessments, including those for the 30 largest systems in the country
and have included them in our database. We have also completed an
assessment of a 15 mile DC corridor for HAZMAT rail shipment and are
considering additional assessments in other major urban areas.
AIR CARGO
Question. Congress provided $85 million for fiscal year 2004 for
the Transportation Security Administration to hire additional screeners
to inspect air cargo and for research and development of explosive
detection systems in order to screen for explosives in air cargo, both
the larger palletized cargo and the individual pallets, or individual
boxes known as ``break bulk''.
With the increase in air cargo security funding provided for fiscal
year 2004, how many additional screeners have been hired to inspect air
cargo to date, and when do you expect to be fully staffed?
Answer. As of March 23, 2004, the funding provided in the
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004 (Public Law
108-90) enabled TSA to hire 100 new cargo inspectors. All 100 cargo
inspector positions have been selected, and paperwork is being
processed by TSA Human Resources. We anticipate extending job offers to
these applicants and bringing them on board within the next 2 months.
Question. What is the status of laboratory testing of commercial
off-the-shelf explosive detection systems on air cargo?
How has the current technology performed on break bulk cargo?
When do you expect to issue a request for proposal for this
technology, and when will a pilot program begin at selected airports?
Answer. TSA, working with the air carriers, has screened cargo
using Explosives Detection System (EDS) technology currently deployed
at airports for checked baggage screening. TSA also issued a Market
Survey for vendors of currently available explosives detection
technology for break bulk cargo screening and is in the process of
conducting a lab evaluation and pilot test for the equipment that has
been offered by vendors for evaluation. The controlled study of
suitability of use of the currently available EDS technology is
scheduled to begin in June and will be completed by September 30. Once
that study is completed, TSA will determine to what extent the
technology is a feasible solution for some categories of cargo
screening. TSA is planning on issuing an RFP in the third quarter of
fiscal year 2004 to solicit additional vendors to participate in lab
evaluations and airport pilots for break-bulk cargo screening.
TSA has also issued an RFP for technology to screen containerized
cargo and U.S. mail. TSA is currently evaluating the proposals
submitted under that RFP and anticipates awarding grants for technology
development in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2004.
Question. Can the Committee expect to receive by April 1, 2004, the
report directing TSA to provide options to inspect air cargo, the
associated costs, and timetable for pursuing technological solutions to
allow for the most efficient and targeted inspections of cargo being
carried on passenger aircraft?
Answer. TSA has prepared the report to Congress covering potential
technology solutions for cargo screening. Once review and coordination
is completed through DHS, the report will be delivered to Congress.
Question. What enhancements are being made to the current Known
Shipper program to guarantee the safety of air cargo?
Answer. Since 9/11, significant enhancements have been made to the
Known Shipper program. The requirements for new shippers applying for
Known Shipper status have been strengthened. In addition, methods for
confirming the authenticity of established Known Shippers have been
improved. In order to substantiate the legitimacy of known shippers
further, air carriers have been required to conduct site visits of
known shippers' facilities. Additionally, TSA is close to completing an
automated Known Shipper Database, which will allow TSA to vet
applicants to the program more thoroughly for legitimacy by comparing
data submitted by applicants against terrorist watch lists, other
government databases, and other publicly available information.
Eventually, TSA's Known Shipper Database will be one part of a larger
freight assessment database intended to target high risk cargo
shipments for additional screening.
Question. Would it currently be feasible to inspect 100 percent of
all air cargo being placed on aircrafts, as proposed by some in
Congress, and, in your opinion, how do you feel the flow of commerce
would be affected if air cargo was restricted from being placed on
aircraft unless 100 percent inspection of air cargo took place?
Answer. It is neither feasible nor optimal to physically inspect
100 percent of air cargo. The sheer volume of air cargo transported in
the United States and limitations on available technology render the
inspection of all air cargo infeasible without a significant negative
impact on the operating capabilities of the transportation
infrastructure of the United States and the national economy.
Limitations of technology and infrastructure make physical screening of
100 percent of air cargo impractical in terms of the flow-of-commerce.
This would also be an ineffective use of homeland resources.
TSA's goal is to ensure that all cargo is screened to determine
risk and that 100 percent of high-risk cargo is inspected. TSA is
aggressively pursuing next-generation technological solutions.
Meanwhile, TSA is taking steps to implement measures outlined in the
Air Cargo Strategic Plan and is doing everything possible to ensure
that cargo going on planes is secure, including requiring random
inspections of passenger air cargo, prohibiting the transport of cargo
on passenger aircraft by unknown shippers, and increasing the number of
TSA air cargo compliance inspectors.
Question. To date, what has been learned of the pilot program
conducted by the Transportation Security Administration, the United
States Postal Service, and air carriers to assess the feasibility of
using canine teams to screen certain classes of priority mail?
Answer. In early 2002, TSA, the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) and the
aviation industry agreed that additional security screening measures
needed to be identified and developed before resuming transport of mail
on passenger aircraft. We agreed that explosives detection
effectiveness, throughput capacity, and costs associated with the
screening were paramount considerations in identifying additional
measures. Protecting the privacy of mail was also a critical factor in
determining the least intrusive method to be used.
In June 2002, TSA conducted operational tests and evaluations
(OT&E) at six major airports with assistance from the USPS and airline
industry. The purpose of these tests was to determine and demonstrate
the ability of TSA-certified explosives detection canines to detect
explosives in packages that simulated Express Mail and Priority Mail
products and which were independently introduced into actual mail. We
also wanted to compare the throughput capabilities of both X-Ray and
canine resources under actual airline operational conditions.
The results were successful. In November 2002, TSA established
eleven major airport canine screening operations for priority mail
exceeding a certain threshold through partnership agreements with the
USPS and the airline industry. To date, over 17 billion packages have
been successfully screened by TSA-certified explosives detection canine
teams. Currently we are expanding our TSA Canine Pilot screening
efforts into various cargo and mail equipment configurations. TSA is
proceeding with OT&E in two phases:
--Phase I tested various explosive targets/distracters that were
introduced into multiple cargo configurations at six major
airports. All testing was conducted under actual cargo
operations and various weather conditions. The OT&E is complete
and the preliminary results are promising. The final report is
due at the end of April 2004.
--Phase II is tentatively scheduled to begin in May 2004 and to be
completed in July 2004. The tests will be conducted at six
major airports where we will expand explosives detection
investigation using multiple cargo airline containers, airline
ground support equipment and USPS rolling stock equipment
configurations under actual cargo/mail operations and
environments. Test results will be analyzed and recommendations
will be proposed to expand and streamline screening of cargo
and mail exceeding a certain threshold at other major airports
using TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams along
with other technologies for mail and cargo being transported on
passenger aircraft.
computer assisted passenger pre-screening system (capps ii)
Question. The President's fiscal year 2005 budget requests a $25
million increase for the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-screening
System (CAPPS II) currently being tested by the Transportation Security
Administration. However, CAPPS II has been slow in developing because
of delays in obtaining passenger data needed for testing due to privacy
concerns by air carriers.
How is the Department working with the airlines to alleviate
privacy concerns in light of recent disclosures that air carriers have
shared passenger records with other government agencies and private
contractors without the passengers knowledge?
Answer. Comprehensive privacy training--in-person, online, and via
video, for all employees is underway and on track towards completion by
the end of calendar year 2004. TSA has already completed an initial
``privacy education week'' for all 55,000 employees that included live
and video privacy training. Many other components of DHS already have
systematic privacy education for employees--both upon hiring and
annually thereafter. The DHS Chief Privacy Officer, assisted by a
privacy compliance officer, has undertaken a DHS-wide review of
internal education programs to ensure that all employees are aware of
and tested on privacy practices and principles. The Privacy Office will
report on the progress of this program in its annual report to Congress
later this spring, and annually thereafter. Further, the DHS Chief
Privacy Officer proposed the implementation of rules in the public and
the private sector governing the use of private-sector data. The DHS
Privacy Office has already begun work with numerous private-sector
industry groups to facilitate that work. Organizations such as the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, the Council for Excellence in Government, the Air
Transport Association, the Markle Foundation, and others, are all
considering the evolution of public-private information partnerships.
Further, the Department is reviewing the need for a department-wide
Privacy Statement that would include principles for the use of private-
sector data. Again, many DHS components already have their own privacy
statements. We look forward to publishing a DHS Privacy Statement later
this summer.
Question. When will the Department issue a security directive to
mandate airlines to turn over passenger information to test the CAPPS
II system?
Answer. A timeframe for collection of passenger data for testing is
still under review.
Question. How can assurances be made to prevent identity theft by a
potential terrorist intent on using legitimate individuals information
to get around the CAPPS II background checks?
Answer. While no system can be 100 percent effective in preventing
identity theft, we believe that the CAPPS II system will represent a
quantum leap forward in efforts to defeat this growing problem. CAPPS
II will rely on an improved version of the best practices used by the
banking and credit industries to combat identity theft and fraud.
Where a legitimate identity is stolen, there is any number of
indicia, including errors or inconsistencies in the information as
transmitted by the thief, which could reveal the theft. Further, CAPPS
II will make use of a database containing up-to-date information about
stolen identities, which will further protect against terrorists who
use this means to conceal themselves.
Again, no system can be 100 percent effective, which is why CAPPS
II will be part of a layered ``system of systems'' involving physical
scrutiny, identity-based risk assessment, and other security
precautions on aircraft and at airports.
Question. Do you feel that such a funding increase is warranted for
CAPPS II with the delays that have been faced to date?
Answer. Yes, because we expect a new system to be put in place
during fiscal year 2005, which will require an increase in resources.
Question. The system currently operated by commercial airlines
since 1996, CAPPS I, continues to have problems with ``false
positives'' where passengers are erroneously delayed or prohibited from
boarding their scheduled flights due to having a similar name with
individuals that have been flagged by airlines as being a potential
terrorist.
With the problems faced in the current CAPPS I system, what method
of redress will be implemented with CAPPS II to resolve complaints of
passengers who believe they are erroneously selected for additional
security?
Answer. First, it is important to note that the ID authentication
portion of the CAPPS II program under development is expected to reduce
dramatically the percentage of individuals mistakenly flagged for
automatic additional security screening. In the instances where
individuals believe they have been mistakenly flagged under CAPPS II,
TSA is committed to providing a fair, comprehensive, and customer-
friendly redress process. As part of the development of the CAPPS II
system, we are designing a redress process to resolve complaints by
passengers who assert that they have been incorrectly prescreened or
consistently selected for enhanced screening. An essential part of the
redress process is the establishment of the CAPPS II Passenger
Advocate. The Passenger Advocate will act as a surrogate for passengers
who, for security classification reasons, will not have access to all
the information used by CAPPS II. When a passenger submits a complaint
and provides the Government with permission to observe and monitor the
results of the risk assessment during the complainant's future flights,
TSA will work with other government agencies and commercial data
providers to determine if the complaint is related to prescreening or
due to another part of the screening process (e.g., random selection),
and determine if selection by CAPPS II is related to data that may be
appropriately corrected. Passengers will be afforded the opportunity to
appeal these results to the TSA Privacy or Civil Rights Office and
then, if warranted, to the DHS Privacy or Civil Rights Office. The
redress program will be published and widely publicized before CAPPS II
is implemented.
Question. How does a passenger clear one's name if he or she
continues to be flagged as a flight risk?
Answer. Under the current system passengers may be required to
undergo secondary screening or be subject to other additional security
procedures due to random selection, CAPPS I selection, or the TSA-
administered No-Fly List. In addition, airlines may have their own
criteria for singling out travelers distinct and independent of the
current system. Since CAPPS I is administered by the airlines, TSA is
only in a position to address passengers flagged as a flight risk based
on the No-Fly List.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) currently has
established procedures within the Office of the Ombudsman to receive
and resolve complaints by any passenger denied boarding because the
individual's name appears on the No-Fly List. A traveler who contacts
TSA regarding possible discrepancies within the current system is asked
a series of questions to ascertain whether the issue is related to the
No-Fly List. If it is related to the No-Fly List, the traveler submits
a written description of the problems encountered and proof of
identity. Upon receipt, TSA will determine whether there is any threat
to aviation or national security that would prohibit the individual
from flying. TSA may conduct a background check in making this
determination. If the traveler is cleared to fly, air carriers and
other appropriate parties will be notified. The TSA Office of the
Ombudsman will forward a letter to notify the individual of the
results.
CAPPS II, if implemented, will improve this system considerably.
CAPPS II will reduce the number of persons requiring additional
screening by ending the use of outdated information and rules resident
in the CAPPS I system. Further, by using risk analysis and identity
authentication tools, CAPPS II should substantially reduce the number
of travelers automatically selected for secondary screening.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Question. The Congress made $154 million available for the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to conduct research and
development activities in an effort to improve current transportation
sector security technology. Of the funds provided for fiscal year 2004,
the Transportation Security Administration will target detection of
chemical, biological, or similar threats and devices that could be
released on or within an aircraft. With the testimony of Secretary
Ridge before this Committee last month that the Department does not
currently have the capability to screen for biological weapons that may
be carried on board a commercial airliner, significant concern is
warranted.
Will the Transportation Security Laboratory conduct separate
research on methods to detect chemical or biological weapons or will
this research be coordinated with the Science and Technology (S&T)
Directorate and the work carried out currently within that
directorate's Biological Countermeasures Portfolio?
Answer. TSA will be working closely with the S&T Directorate to
identify technological solutions for screening to detect chemical and
biological weapons. The TSA's Transportation Security Laboratory will
play a critical role in identifying TSA's needs and specific
operational considerations that must be taken into account as potential
technologies are developed.
Question. The Transportation Security Laboratory previously focused
solely on the threat to civil aviation but has begun research and
development on threats against cars and trucks by explosives.
How will the Transportation Security Laboratory coordinate its
research on transportation targets with the Science and Technology
Directorate's High Explosives Portfolio?
Answer. TSA has a strong working relationship with the S&T
Directorate. We continue to meet with S&T personnel on a regular basis
to discuss ongoing projects to ensure no duplication of efforts and to
ensure projects undertaken are consistent with the overall goals of
DHS.
Question. Of the funds provided for fiscal year 2004, $45 million
has been made available to develop next-generation Explosive Detection
Systems (EDS) for the detection of explosive materials in passengers
checked baggage.
How has the research and development progressed to date to enhance
the performance of existing Explosive Detection Systems that are
currently deployed at airports and also with manufacturers of new
technologies and when will these new technologies be ready for
deployment in our nation's airports?
Answer. Advances including reductions in false alarms, improved
machine reliability, and reductions in operational expenditures have
sufficiently matured where they will begin to be deployed by no later
than next year based on currently-planned equipment deployments.
capability, increased throughput, and reduce the size of EDS solutions.
Some equipment will be best suited for smaller airports or checkpoints,
while other equipment is being designed for in-line deployment.
New technologies will be developed under TSA's Manhattan II
project. TSA will be posting a request for information in the third
quarter of fiscal year 2004. While TSA will explore the potential of
all relevant technologies, we expect promising technologies to include
the demonstration of novel x-ray sources, different geometry, and the
development of multi-spectral detector arrays. Combined technologies
may play a role, and nanotechnology may provide new elements for
detection strategies.
Question. Are there any new threat analyses that warrant a need to
expand the criteria for certifying Explosive Detection Systems that are
not currently included in the screening of passenger baggage?
Answer. TSA continually evaluates its certification criteria for
explosives detection technology to ensure both the types and amounts of
explosives that the technology can identify are reflective of the
threat. TSA has efforts underway to expand the types of explosives that
can be identified, while also reducing the amount of explosives that
would automatically trigger detection.
Question. The Presidents fiscal year 2005 budget proposes to
consolidate all research department-wide into the Science and
Technology Directorate, except for the research carried out by the
Transportation Security Administration's Laboratory. With the concern
of carrying out research in a parallel manner do you believe it would
best serve the Department if the Transportation Security Administration
research and development activities were consolidated with the Science
and Technology Directorate research activities?
Answer. TSA believes that the constant demand for improved
technology performance and the very specific detection capabilities
needed to support TSA's mission requires that TSA have a highly
specialized applied R&D program. As new weapons are developed, TSA must
be able to meet its immediate operational needs by refining and
enhancing current technologies to counter those threats and by
identifying gaps to ensure R&D is well focused on continually improving
capabilities. TSA must also be able to leverage its human factors
efforts to identify methodologies, training and operational tools, and
develop technology that will foster improved performance. TSA will
continue to coordinate closely with the S&T to ensure that we can adapt
to and address changing threats without duplicating S&T's efforts.
Question. In the search for new technology to detect and prevent
weapons and explosives from being carried onto airliners, the
Transportation Security Administration is evaluating technologies to
make the screening process more effective and less time-consuming. How
has the research and piloting of new passenger checkpoint technologies,
such as passenger body scanners and explosive trace detection portals,
made promising advances in detecting explosives and/or biological or
chemical weapons from being carried onto commercial airliners and when
do you believe the piloting of these new technologies at airports will
take place?
Answer. TSA has developed a roadmap for the operational testing and
evaluation of checkpoint technologies to improve TSA's ability to
detect explosives being carried on persons and in carry-on baggage.
Highlights from our Roadmap are as follows:
--Explosives Detection Portals.--Continued development and pilot
deployment in the 3rd quarter of fiscal year 2004;
--Document Scanners.--Continued development and pilot deployment in
the 2nd or 3rd quarter of fiscal year 2004;
--Cast & Prosthetic Device Scanners.--Continued deployment and pilot
deployment in the 2nd quarter of fiscal year 2004;
--Explosives Detection Systems (EDS) for carry-on baggage.--Define
performance metrics and solicit vendor participation 2nd or 3rd
quarter of fiscal year 2004;
--Explosives Detection Technology for screening liquids.--Establish
the performance metrics for this technology and solicit vendors
of existing technologies to participate in an evaluation
against this qualification standard.
LETTERS OF INTENT (LOI) FOR EXPLOSIVE DETECTION SYSTEM (EDS)
INSTALLATION
Question. The Congress has made available over $1.5 billion for the
installation of explosive detection systems and the Letter of Intent
(LOI) program to safeguard commercial airliners from a terrorist attack
by explosives.
What savings can be achieved on an airport-by-airport basis in
personnel costs by installing Explosive Detection Systems ``in-line''
as opposed to terminal lobby protocols?
Answer. The degree of costs vs. benefits will vary from airport to
airport because of differing airport configurations. TSA is in the
process of refining its return on investment analysis model at the same
time that it is revising its staffing model. TSA will continue to
assess the extent to which in-line systems benefit operational
efficiency.
Question. With the current cost share in place (90/10) and the
President's budget request of $250 million, how many Letters of Intent
does TSA intend on signing in fiscal year 2005?
Answer. TSA currently expects that all resources will be utilized
for currently-signed LOIs as well as other EDS integration activities.
However, TSA will assess the need for additional in-line integration
and resource availability on an ongoing basis.
Question. How much of the $1.5 billion made available by Congress
remains available for terminal modifications and what is the cost
estimate to meet the necessary terminal modifications required at all
commercial service airports across the country?
Answer. The $1.488 billion appropriated in fiscal years 2002, 2003
and 2004 has been used for the following requirements:
--$828 million to cover facility modification and equipment
installation costs to meet the Congressional mandate to provide
for and conduct 100 percent screening of all checked baggage
for explosives at over 440 airports,
--$259.4 million in support of the first eight completed Letters of
Intent (LOIs), including the 2 LOIs issued on February 15,
2004,
--$20 million for contract support to complete various tasks
associated with the installation of explosives detection
systems (EDS) and explosives trace detection (ETD) equipment,
including site acceptance testing of EDS and ETD equipment at
the time of delivery from the vendors and once installed at an
airport, engineering and installation services from equipment
vendors, and administrative and technical support work,
--$30 million to individual airports for completion of projects
associated with EDS/ETD equipment installation, including HVAC
installation, demolition work, and electrical work,
--The remaining $350 million of the fiscal year 2004 installation
funding will be allocated for direct contracts between TSA and
individual airports for in-line EDS installations, with a
portion to be carried over into fiscal year 2005 to use along
with fiscal year 2005 funding to make fiscal year 2005 LOI
reimbursement payments for the 8 existing LOIs.
Question. Will the agency fund terminal modifications at airports
outside of the LOI process?
Answer. At the current funding level, and applying the 75/25 cost
share formula, TSA can support the following:
--Reimbursement payments for the 8 existing LOIs;
--Installation and multiplexing of EDS technology at the LOI
airports; and
--EDS and ETD non-LOI installation work needed at 12 airports to
provide equipment capacity. The airports selected in this
category have a need for increased equipment capacity because
of increased passenger loads and airport terminal expansion
projects to support increases to air carrier service.
Question. With so many needs and limited resources, how is the
agency prioritizing on an airport-by-airport basis?
Answer. TSA continues to use its prioritization factors to
determine where limited resources will be allocated. TSA's first
priority is to achieve compliance with the 100 percent electronic
screening requirement at all airports. Simultaneously, TSA is working
with airports that will not be able to maintain compliance with the 100
percent electronic screening requirement because of increased passenger
loads, increased and/or additional air carrier service, and/or airport
terminal modifications and expansions.
PASSENGER AND BAGGAGE SCREENERS
Question. In a report issued last month reviewing the
Transportation Security Administration's process for conducting
background checks on Federal passenger and baggage screeners, the
Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security made a list of
twelve recommendations to the Administrator of the Transportation
Security Administration to improve its management of the background
check process for screeners. What procedures have been put into place
to guarantee all passenger and baggage screeners that are currently
employed and also individuals that are applying for a screening
position have a full background check?
Answer. TSA is aggressively implementing the Inspector General's
(OIG) twelve recommendations. A significant part of our actions have
been focused on ensuring that all screeners have had the necessary
background checks and that all screener candidates receive a background
check before they are hired.
Processes are in place to ensure that all screener candidates are
subject to a fingerprint based criminal history check that is
successfully adjudicated BEFORE they are hired. In addition, prior to
hiring, all screener candidates undergo a commercially conducted pre-
screen investigation that checks criminal history (based on an FBI
fingerprint check and a check of local criminal histories), credit
history and specific watch lists (TSA's No Fly and Selectee Lists).
Successful adjudication of both the fingerprint check and the
commercially conducted pre-screen investigation are absolute
requirements before hiring takes place. After hiring, all new screeners
undergo an Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Access National Agency
Check and Inquiries (ANACI) investigation.
This combination of background checks, both before and after
hiring, provides the best available process to ensure security while
maintaining a fully staffed screener workforce. The pre-employment
checks (the fingerprint check and the commercially conducted pre-screen
background check) take approximately 2-3 weeks to complete, thus
allowing timely hiring of screeners. The OPM-conducted ANACI is more
thorough but takes several months to complete; the ANACI provides a
more in-depth review of a person's background which further mitigates
security risk. TSA undertook a major effort in Q3/Q4 of fiscal year
2003 to complete and adjudicate the required background checks
(fingerprint, pre-employment and OPM ANACI) on all currently employed
TSA screeners. Since then, all newly hired screeners have been subject
to the processes and checks described above for screener candidates.
Question. The Transportation Security Administration is currently
in the process of an annual recertification of airport screeners to be
completed by the end of this month.
Can you explain the testing standards of the recertification
process and what contractor oversight TSA is performing to ensure
adequate testing the screeners for recertification is being carried
out?
Answer. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)
requires that TSA shall conduct an annual proficiency review of each
individual assigned screening duties.
TSA completed the 2003/2004 re-certification process in March 2004
for both Federal and private contract screeners. TSA is meeting this
requirement through a national re-certification program for
Transportation Security Screeners, Leads, and Supervisors. For the
2003/2004 re-certification cycle (October 2003 through March 2004), the
program consisted of a series of certification modules for either the
Passenger/Dual Function (Passenger and Checked Baggage) or Checked
Baggage screening function. The modules used were:
Passenger/Dual Function Screeners:
--Module 1.--Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) Job Knowledge Test,
(Screener and Supervisor versions)
--Module 2.--X-Ray Image Interpretation Test, and
--Module 3.--Practical Skills Demonstration
Checked Baggage Screeners:
--Module 1.--SOP Job Knowledge Test (Screener and Supervisor
versions) and
--Module 3.--Practical Skills Demonstration
In addition, a screener must have a ``meets standards'' for his/her
annual Performance Rating by the FSD at his/her airport to be re-
certified.
The national re-certification program's objective is to ensure that
screeners demonstrated proficiency in the knowledge and skills that are
critical to a screener's ability to provide world class security and
world class service. As part of the development of this program, TSA
employed a rigorous technical process to develop the assessment content
and set proficiency requirements (i.e., passing scores) for each
module. TSA implemented a valid and fair assessment process with the
appropriate standards in place to certify that its screener workforce
is proficient and capable of providing the security and service
expected.
Modules 1 and 2 were administered by local FSD staff (in most cases
the airport Training Coordinator). Our training contractor, Lockheed
Martin, administered Module 3. TSA government employees conducted
quality assurance audits of the contractor throughout the re-
certification process and observed approximately 16 percent of the
airports re-certification practical demonstrations.
Question. Are the screeners being tested on TSA standard operating
procedures and what is the pass/fail rate of the screeners that have
been tested so far?
Answer. Yes, screeners were tested on the standard operating
procedures in Modules 1 (SOP knowledge test) and Module 3 (Practical
skills demonstration). Less than 1 percent of the screeners failed
fiscal year 2003-04 re-certification testing.
Question. Congress limited the number of screeners employed by TSA
to 45,000 full time-equivalents (FTE). Currently TSA is under that
threshold and intends on hiring more screeners to comply with the
45,000 cap. Do you believe that the 45,000 FTE limitation gives TSA an
adequate number of screeners to carry out passenger and baggage
screening?
Answer. TSA is managing to keep the workforce under the 45,000 FTE
level by creating a more flexible workforce. TSA is better coordinating
airline schedules and passenger load with staffing needs, is increasing
the proportion of part-time to full-time screeners, and is
strategically using its mobile national screener force to meet seasonal
fluctuations in workload. TSA expects to have a part-time screener
workforce of close to 20 percent by the end of the current fiscal year.
Part-time screeners create additional operational flexibility when
scheduling screeners to satisfy varying levels of demand. As a result
of reducing excess capacity at periods of lower demand, TSA is seeking
to make more FTEs available to the system as a whole during peak
periods.
Question. Is the 10 minute passenger screening standard wait-time
still in place or have new standards been implemented?
Answer. TSA is committed to providing world-class customer service
while ensuring freedom of movement for people and commerce by keeping
our nation's transportation systems secure. We have done research,
including focus groups, on customer satisfaction and devised a more
robust methodology to assess the passenger experience, focusing not
just on wait times, but on the totality of customers' interactions with
the full range of screening processes. We have found that wait time is
not a significant driver of the public's satisfaction with and
confidence in TSA. In fact, most respondents in focus groups said that
they would rather wait longer in line if security was better, and it is
more important that the security process be thorough, attentive, and
efficient than merely fast.
In light of feedback from our research, TSA has developed a
Customer Satisfaction Index for Aviation Operations (CSI-A). The CSI-A
is comprised of results from passenger surveys conducted at airports,
along with national poll results and complaints and compliments
received by TSA. Passenger survey results display a high level of
customer satisfaction, as 92 percent of the more than 15,000
respondents indicated they were satisfied'' or ``very satisfied'' with
their overall experience. National polls conducted by the Bureau of
Transportation Statistics bi-monthly support these findings of customer
satisfaction. Finally, airports show a downward trend in complaints
relative to compliments.
Nonetheless, TSA is committed to measuring wait time information at
Federalized passenger checkpoints. In 2002, initial wait time data was
collected at all 82 Category X and I airports (covering approximately
95 percent of annual originating enplanements). Wait times at the
remaining airports are predicted to be minimal, so we collect data from
a sampling of Category II, III and IV airports in order to identify
trends. We have found that most airports do meet the 10-minute standard
most of the time. TSA will continue to collect wait time data at all
major and a sampling of smaller airports to establish a good
understanding of wait times, as well as how our service and staffing
models impact wait times. We will continue to monitor wait times
system-wide--by collecting data at all major airports for a 2-week
period 3 times per year--to ensure that the same patterns hold over
time.
REGISTERED TRAVELER PROGRAM
Question. Congress provided $5 million for fiscal year 2004 for the
Registered Traveler program to conduct a pilot program at selected
domestic airports to expedite the security screening and check-in of
passengers that voluntarily submit their personal data for a background
check in order to be enrolled into a passenger registration and
identity verification system.
What has been accomplished to date on the Registered Traveler
program with the funds provided by Congress? What do you intend to
accomplish in the pilot program by the end of fiscal year 2004, and
what enhancements do you propose with the requested increase of $10
million for fiscal year 2005?
Answer. Over the past year, TSA, in coordination with both internal
and external stakeholders has developed a strategy for conducting a
limited number of Registered Traveler (RT) Pilots in 2004 that will
allow the Department to evaluate the merits of the program without
disrupting airport operations or compromising security.
TSA intends to conduct RT Pilots at a limited number of airports
beginning in June 2004. The Pilot programs will assess improvements in
security and enhancements in customer service for passengers. The
pilots will last approximately 90 days. Results of these pilots will be
analyzed beginning in October 2004 to determine the program's effect on
security and service.
Upon conclusion of the pilots, a determination will be made
regarding best practices and necessary enhancements required for a
larger implementation of the program. The fiscal year 2005 budget
request includes $15 million for additional start-up costs, such as IT
infrastructure and staffing for this program. TSA anticipates that
future operational program costs for the Registered Traveler Program
would be covered by fees incurred by participants. Thus, the Registered
Traveler Program would be self-funded.
Question. Will biometrics be the cornerstone of the Registered
Traveler program or will is it be just one component being considered
as the pilot program takes place?
Answer. During the RT Pilot, TSA will assess biometric technology
solutions to enhance identity verification capabilities at the
passenger security checkpoint. These biometric tools will be tested in
conjunction with business processes, including potential
reconfiguration of lines and lanes, to develop a secure and expedited
travel experience.
Question. Do you see Registered Traveler as a precursory test for
CAPPS II?
Answer. The Registered Traveler Pilot Program is purely voluntary
and will offer a secure and expedited travel experience for those who
wish to participate. In addition to submitting personal data, RT
participants will also be requested to submit biometrics (fingerprint
and iris scan) that will not be components of the CAPPS II program.
However, depending on the nature and structure of any deployable RT and
CAPPS II program, there may be clear functional synergies and
overlapping capability. TSA will work to ensure that these are
identified and assessed.
Question. In what airports will the pilot programs take place and
how will travelers voluntarily sign up?
Answer. Final decisions regarding specific locations for the
Registered Traveler Pilot have not yet been made. TSA envisions that
voluntary enrollment for the RT Pilot will likely take place at the
designated airport locations.
transportation security administration fiscal year 2004 shortfall
Question. Does TSA have adequate funding for fiscal year 2004 or is
it facing funding shortfalls in certain programs and activities?
Answer. The fiscal year Homeland Security Appropriations Act was
signed into law on October 1, 2003. In addition to these new
appropriations, TSA has carryover funding from fiscal year 2003 that is
available to be spent in fiscal year 2004. A spend plan has been
developed for fiscal year 2004 that allows TSA to meet its requirements
within available funding.
Question. What specific funding shortfalls do you anticipate for
fiscal year 2004?
Answer. TSA anticipates that it will meet its fiscal year 2004
requirements within available funding.
Question. How do you intend to address the funding shortfall
problems (better management and fiscal controls, a proposed
reprogramming of TSA funds, or other funds provided to the Department
from other programs and activities)?
Answer. TSA has been working to improve its fiscal controls and
management of the agency as it transforms itself from a start-up agency
to a maturing organization. In fiscal year 2004, TSA is requesting
$154.6 million in funding to be shifted among programs to meet emerging
requirements.
Question. If a reprogramming of funds will be necessary, when can
we expect that proposal to be submitted to the Committee?
Answer. The reprogramming was transmitted to Congress on April 23,
2004.
Question. Will an amendment to the fiscal year 2005 budget request,
as submitted, be required in light of these shortfalls?
Answer. The Administration does not intend to submit a fiscal year
2005 budget amendment for TSA.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
TSA: SECURITY CONTRACT
Question. We recently received notification of a security contract
for TSA facilities in Northern Virginia that totals a minimum of $5.3
million a year for 5 years. That appears to be an extremely large
amount of money to provide staff and equipment to screen people and
their belongings as they enter the two facilities.
Please justify for the record the number of security employees and
types of equipment that your agency will be obtaining under this
contract. If the response needs to be classified, please provide the
subcommittee with an appropriately classified response.
Answer. The contract security guard force at TSA Headquarters at
Pentagon City and the Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC)
(formerly TSCC) in Chantilly, Virginia is responsible for protection of
the facilities and for processing the entry of employees and visitors
to both locations. The decision was made pursuant to guidance received
from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and also to comply with
the guidelines established by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 1995,
entitled ``Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities.'' Security
surveys and risk/threat assessments for both facilities confirmed the
level of security required. Both facilities house Sensitive
Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF) within their space, as well
as other sensitive critical assets. Director of Central Intelligence
Directive (DCID) 6/9, effective 18 November 2002, requires an immediate
security response to an alarm in this facility. (DCID 6/9; 3.1.2.1)
Additional factors, including the fact that both facilities are
operational 24 hours a day, 7 days per week and the ongoing threat
environment, impacted the decision.
The TSA Protective Security contract was solicited on a competitive
basis among eight vendors. This acquisition was awarded utilizing those
contractors from the General Service Administration's Federal Supply
Schedule 98 (Law Enforcement--Security Facilities Management). Under
these guidelines, a 5-year firm-fixed labor hour Blanket Purchase
Agreement (BPA) was awarded. Each year, funded individual task orders
will be written and ordered against the BPA. After conducting market
research on the per hour cost for Security Guards in the DC Metro area,
it was determined that a single contract with one security guard
company managed by TSA would be the most cost effective. Among the
eight vendors bidding for the contract, the one chosen was the less
expensive of the two most qualified vendors, and the cost was well
within the Washington area average.
Under this contract, the security guard company will be providing
personnel with weapons and uniforms, obtaining clearances for the
guards, supplying associated security equipment and training for its
personnel, and providing on-site supervision. Security personnel
employed by the contractor to protect TSA's facilities are U.S.
citizens, and many of them are armed or possess Secret Security
Clearance, or both. The total man-hours worked by the Security Guard
personnel at both TSA Headquarters and TSCC is approximately 4,000
hours per week. Besides the screening of visitors and their belongings
prior to entering TSA facilities, duties include providing escort for
contractors, security for VIP visits, responding to alarms, patrolling
the grounds and staffing the control center at both locations for 24
hours, 7 days a week.
EXPLOSIVES DETECTION FOR PASSENGERS
Question. In December, 2001, Richard Reid was prevented from
exploding his improvised ``shoe bomb'' due to quick action on the part
of the passengers and crew of an American Airlines flight from Paris to
Miami. In the intervening 2 years, we appear to have increased the
screening of checked baggage for explosives, but there appears to be
little effort being made to enhance the screening of passengers
themselves for hidden explosives.
The technology and equipment exist to non-intrusively screen
passengers for explosives. What is TSA doing to address this potential
threat? How much of your fiscal year 2005 budget request is devoted to
enhanced screening of passengers for explosives? Of the requested
funds, how much are estimated to be used to procure the latest proven
explosive detection portals?
Answer. TSA has developed a roadmap for the operational testing and
evaluation of checkpoint passenger screening technologies to improve
TSA's ability to detect explosives being carried on persons and in
carry-on baggage. Below is a list of the technologies to be pilot
tested at airports and the timeframe in which that testing will be
accomplished:
--Explosives Detection Portals--continue development and pilot
deployment in the 3rd quarter of fiscal year 2004;
--Document Scanners--continue development and pilot deployment in the
2nd or 3rd quarter of fiscal year 2004;
--Cast & Prosthetic Device Scanners--continue development and pilot
deployment in the 2nd quarter of fiscal year 2004;
--Explosives detection systems (EDS) for carry-on baggage--define
performance metrics and solicit vendor participation 2nd or 3rd
quarter of fiscal year 2004; and
--Explosives detection technology for screening liquids--establish
the performance metrics for this technology and solicit vendors
of existing technologies to participate in an evaluation
against this qualification standard.
AIRPORT FUNDING FORMULA CHANGES
Question. President Bush signed the FAA Reauthorization bill into
law in December, 2003. That law mandates that the Federal government,
through the TSA, cover 90 percent of the costs associated with airport
security improvements including the installation of explosive detection
devices. Less than two months later, however, the President submitted a
budget to the Congress that would increase the burden on airports for
meeting Federal security mandates. He proposes to change the amount of
the Federally-covered expenses from 90 percent to only 75 percent. This
appears to be yet another example of this Administration passing the
security buck to someone else. In this case it is the airports and
local taxpayer-funded airports. In other cases it is seaports or some
other transportation entity.
How can the Administration justify agreeing to fund 90 percent of
airport security costs in December and then provide funding for only 75
percent of the costs in February?
Answer. The 75 percent Federal funding level has been a long
established cost share formula with the aviation industry. Because
industry shares security responsibilities with the Federal Government,
and because airports and airlines receive efficiency benefits from in-
line systems, it is fair that they also share financial
responsibilities at this level for installation of systems that will
ease passenger flow and provide increased security levels at airports.
Additionally at the 75 percent cost share related, TSA can use it
allocated funding to support current LOI airports as well as those
airports that have not received LOI but were additional equipment
capacity is needed to accommodate increased passenger loads.
CARGO AND CONTAINER SECURITY
Question. Two years ago, Congress created and funded Operation Safe
Commerce. Late last year, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
announced a ``smart container'' initiative. And just 2 weeks ago, the
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency issued a
solicitation for inexpensive container security technologies and
offered up to $2 million towards that effort. It appears to me that
there are too many cooks in this particular homeland security kitchen.
Who is in charge of the security of shipping containers? Which agency
is setting the standards and which one or ones is responsible for
implementing them?
Similarly, in regard to Operation Safe Commerce, what is TSA doing
to set shipping security standards and how is TSA working with CBP in
this effort? Once the various OSC shipping tests are completed and the
reports submitted, who will be in charge of implementing the ``lessons
learned'' and ensuring that they are implemented? Do you envision the
establishment of national standards in this regard?
Answer. Secretary Ridge delegated authority and responsibility for
implementing the Maritime Transportation Security Act's Secure Systems
of Transportation (SST) and performance standard sections to BTS.
In order to ensure that international and domestic approaches to
cargo security are coordinated and policies are consistent, under BTS
leadership, a working group consisting of TSA, CBP, USCG and S&T
personnel has been meeting regularly, and is conducting a gap analysis
on existing cargo security and intelligence programs, coordinate
existing containerized cargo security programs and R&D efforts to
identify synergies and coordinate existing DHS component activities in
the containerized cargo security environment.
The goal of this effort is to ensure effective cargo security from
point of origin to final destination. We will achieve this goal by
leveraging existing legacy programs like CSI and CTPAT, adding
enhancements, and setting minimum performance standards to close
identified vulnerabilities. We will also apply lessons learned from
Operation Safe Commerce and the SST interagency working group with CBP
and USCG.
AIRLINE PASSENGER SCREENING: WAIT TIMES
Question. Last summer, my staff asked TSA personnel for information
regarding wait times experienced by airline passengers at various
airports. We are concerned that the cap on passenger screeners might be
resulting in an increase in the time spent by passengers waiting in
lines to be screened. My staff has renewed that request at regular
intervals, and yet no information has been provided to them.
Last week, my staff went to Seattle on subcommittee business and
had meetings with TSA personnel at the Seattle-Tacoma Airport. They
were informed that records are kept every half hour of wait times at
the various checkpoints at SeaTac and that average wait time
information is submitted to TSA headquarters. Why have your
representatives been unable to provide my staff with the requested
information? When can we expect to receive this information?
Answer. Each month, TSA instructs approximately 26 U.S. airports to
conduct a wait time study covering two consecutive weeks. These
airports are selected according to geographical and size categories in
order to allow TSA to extrapolate across the full range of airport
diversity. All Category X and I airports--as well as select Category
II, III and IV airports--will be chosen to collect data at least three
times each over the course of the year. The monthly airport selections
are balanced in order to provide consistent data for headquarters
analysis.
In March, the average wait time for the sample of 26 airports was
3.1 minutes, with an average of 10.4 minutes at peak time. At Seattle,
average wait time was 4.2 minutes and the average at peak time was 16.5
minutes.
RAIL SECURITY
Question. Current events such as the subway and rail bombings in
Moscow and Madrid prove the point that we need an agency solely focused
on protecting all modes of transportation. Congress created the
Transportation Security Administration for just that purpose. In light
of the Madrid bombings, has TSA developed a broader-based plan that
would address the known threat to mass transit and rail security? Did
TSA request additional fiscal year 2004 funds from the Department to
assist in implementing this plan?
Answer. In the months preceding the Madrid and Moscow incidents,
DHS, in close coordination with our partners at the Department of
Transportation (DOT), State and local governments, and transit and rail
operators, took a number of steps to address vulnerabilities in the
rail and transit systems to improve our security posture against such
attacks. These efforts spanned the spectrum of security, from
information sharing and awareness through prevention, response and
recovery to a potential terrorist rail attack in the United States.
On March 22, 2004, Secretary Ridge announced additional measures to
strengthen security for our rail and transit systems. Most of these
measures were low or no-cost items and procedures funded out of
existing agency resources. DHS will build on many of the security
measures recommended during the past 2 years for implementation to mass
transit and passenger rail authorities by DHS, the Federal Transit
Administration and the Federal Railroad Administration.
Based on assessments from law enforcement and intelligence
agencies, specific threat assessments and analysis, and the use of risk
management principles, TSA continually evaluates, prioritizes and
targets the use of available funds to reduce or eliminate the security
threat.
Question. What is TSA doing to more systemically address these
threats rather than just reacting to them? Is TSA coordinating efforts
in this regard with other agencies in the Department of Homeland
Security?
Answer. Ensuring that our nation's transportation systems are
secure must be accomplished through effective partnering between
appropriate Federal, State, local and private industry entities. We
have consistently held that that this responsibility must involve the
coordination of appropriate Federal, State, local and private industry
partners, many of whom were already in the business of providing
security for their particular piece of the transportation puzzle. TSA's
main charge, both under ATSA and now as part of the DHS family, is to
help coordinate these efforts under the guidance of the Secretary and
the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security, identifying
gaps and working with appropriate partners to ensure that existing
security gaps are filled. However, other entities within both the
Department and other agencies in the Federal Government have devoted
considerable resources to securing modes of transportation other than
aviation, including the Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border
Protection for port, maritime and cargo security, the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate for critical
infrastructures; the Office of Domestic Preparedness in transit
security grants; DOT modal administrations; and State, local and
private sector partners.
TSA's efforts in non-aviation security over the past 2 years have
focused on greater information sharing between industry and all levels
of government, assessing vulnerabilities in non-aviation sectors to
develop new security measures and plans, increasing training and public
awareness campaigns, and providing greater assistance and funding for
non-aviation security activities. In partnership with other component
agencies of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and in
coordination with the Department of Transportation (DOT), State, local
and private sector partners, TSA will continue to leverage existing
security initiatives, coordinate the development of national
performance-based security standards and guidance; identify areas where
regulations may be necessary to improve the security of passengers,
cargo, conveyances, transportation facilities and infrastructures; and
identify areas where better compliance with established regulations and
policies can be achieved. TSA will work with DHS components, modal
administrators within DOT, and its government and industry stakeholders
to continue these efforts, establish best practices, develop security
plans, assess security vulnerabilities, and identify needed security
enhancements.
CANINE TEAMS
Question. You mention in your testimony that you request $17
million in fiscal year 2005 to support 354 canine teams. Your prepared
statement on this funding seems solely focused on aviation security as
it relates to K-9 teams. Yesterday, as part of his rail and transit
security initiative, Secretary Ridge said that the Department will
develop a rapid deployment Mass Transit K-9 program by using existing
Homeland Security explosive K-9 resources.
Once again, it appears that the Department is robbing Peter to pay
Paul. It appears that you will be pulling K-9 teams away from airports
and the protection of Federal buildings and using them for mass
transit, thus degrading security in one transportation mode to begin
beefing up security in another mode. By refusing to seek additional
funds to address this very real threat it truly calls into question the
seriousness of this Administration in its effort to secure the
homeland.
Does the initiative announced yesterday mean that you will be
pulling existing K-9 teams away from protecting airports and Federal
buildings to use them for rail and mass transit security? Did TSA
request funds for the creation of new teams this fiscal year to address
the threat to mass transit? Do you anticipate receiving any new
resources this year for the creation of canine teams dedicated,
trained, and certified for the rail environment? If the Department
plans on waiting until the fiscal year 2005 Homeland Security
appropriations bill is signed into law, I would caution that
intelligence indicates the threat is imminent and the Department's
track record on obligating grant funding is spotty at best.
Answer. DHS will establish Rapid Response Teams (i.e., K-9 units)
for rail and mass transit security through the Federal Protective
Service (FPS). FPS will utilize dog team reasources from across the
government. TSA will not be pulling canine units out of the airports
unless, potentially, this is part of an action to respond to specific
incidents or intelligence which warrants use of a Rapid Response Team.
TSA will use its existing resources to provide dog team training
assistance to transit operators
THE THREAT FROM HAMAS
Question. On March 22, the so-called spiritual leader of Hamas,
Sheik Ahmed Yassin, was assassinated in an attack authorized by Israeli
Prime Minister Sharon. It was an attack about which the U.S. government
apparently had no advance knowledge. However, as a result of the
attack, Hamas has stated that it blames the United States and there are
some reports that it plans to bring its reign of terror to U.S. shores.
Not only was Sheik Yassin a spiritual leader, he was also known as
the ``father of the suicide bomber''. I am deeply troubled that the
``eye for an eye'' tactics of daily life in the Middle East may soon
arrive here at home. We have already witnessed backpacks exploding and
killing over 200 in Madrid. Based on the Secretary's statement of March
22 and the threat advisories we have seen, I fear that it will not be
long before suicide bombers begin detonating themselves in our public
places, our sidewalk cafes, our buses, or our subways.
What is the Department doing to prevent these types of suicide
attacks in this country? Are there plans prepared to address this
looming threat? Or does the Department just plan to wait for the
inevitable attack and then respond?
Answer. Suicide bombers usually look for crowded public locations
(shops, restaurants, clubs, etc.) to detonate themselves for the sole
purpose of killing and injuring as many people as possible. Public
transportation targets in other parts of the world have been subjected
to suicide bomber attacks, especially busses. Stopping suicide bombers
intent on detonating themselves on or near a bus, ferry or other mass
transit venue or terminal requires at minimum a multi-pronged approach
that includes: (1) good intelligence and law enforcement response; (2)
training operators to recognize the behavior patterns and mannerisms of
suicide bombers; (3) and educating passengers to do the same. We also
should explore physical inspection alternatives, as we are doing on a
test basis in New Carrollton, Maryland. It is not clear, however, if
this alternative is viable or effective.
TWIC
Question. The MTSA requires the creation of a national
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC). Truck drivers,
airport employees and all other individuals requiring access to secure
transportation areas in the performance of their duties will be
required to carry this credential. Please provide the Administration's
views on the wisdom of using a centralized and existing card production
facility for the production of the TWIC cards, including an evaluation
of the associated costs and benefits. What is the status of the
prototype project?
Answer. During the development process, data, technical information
and lessons learned were gathered from a wide range of sources
including industry stakeholders and other Federal credentialing
projects. The RFP for the TWIC Prototype Phase will be released in the
immediate future. The proposed plan leverages the stakeholder
relationships established over the past 24 months and during the
Technology Evaluation Phase, as well as a partnership with the State of
Florida for the network of deep-water ports. The goal of the prototype
is to evaluate the full range of TWIC business processes within a
representative operational environment. The plan includes facilities
and workers from all transportation modes and is focused in three
regions, Philadelphia-Wilmington, Los Angeles-Long Beach, and the
Florida ports.
Various card production options were evaluated within the context
of system requirements. Centralized card production using existing
Federal card production facilities that meet all of the system
requirements was determined to be the most cost effective solution for
the prototype phase. Key factors in the evaluation included: physical
security and controlled access to the production process; secure supply
chains for card stock and special security features (e.g. holograms,
special inks, secret keys); standardization of training; and, economies
of scale with high capacity production machines. Centralized card
production will be further evaluated during the prototype, and the
final evaluation report will include a detailed analysis on all card
production options and a recommendation for DHS decision.
REGISTERED TRAVELER
Question. Last week TSA announced its plan to begin a registered
traveler program in which frequent airline travelers would pay a fee
and be provided expedited processing at airport security checkpoints.
Your budget request includes $15 million to ``expand contract support
and technology resources''. Please describe the planned registration
fee and the estimates of the total cost of the program. How much would
the fee need to be increased to cover the proposed $15 million proposed
expansion. How can the full cost of the program be recovered from
business travelers and others who voluntarily join the program as
opposed to passing on some of the costs associated with the program to
all taxpayers?
Answer. TSA intends to conduct RT pilots projects at a limited
number of U.S. airports beginning in June 2004. The pilot programs will
assess improvements in security and enhancements in customer service
for participating passengers. The pilots will last approximately 90
days. Results of these pilots will be analyzed beginning in October
2004 to determine the program's effect on security and service.
During the RT pilot, TSA will test technology in the form of
biometric tools to enhance identity verification at the passenger
screening checkpoint, in conjunction with business processes, including
potential reconfiguration of select checkpoint lines and lanes. TSA
will be testing a range of technology and operational variables. The RT
pilots will monitor and assess possibilities for a secure and expedited
travel experience for those who volunteer to participate in the
program. The number of participants in the RT pilots will be capped at
10,000 spread across a small number of airport locations. It is
anticipated that this small RT pilot test will not have a detrimental
effect on either those who do not volunteer or on the screener
workforce. Upon conclusion of the pilots, determinations will be made
regarding best practices and necessary enhancements required for a
larger implementation of the program.
The cost of the RT pilot programs will be funded by $5 million
earmarked for the Registered Traveler program in the Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2004 (Public Law 108-90). Contrary to what was
reported in the media, TSA is not planning to charge a fee to
passengers who participate in the 90-day RT pilots.
TSA will await the results of the pilot program prior to making any
decisions regarding the implementation of a Registered Traveler program
in fiscal year 2005, including what costs would be incurred by those
passengers who wish to participate in the voluntary program. TSA
anticipates that future operational program costs for the Registered
Traveler Program would be covered by fees incurred by participants.
Thus, the Registered Traveler Program would become self-funded.
HOLLYWOOD JOB
Question. I understand that TSA is looking to hire an individual to
serve as a liaison to the Hollywood film and television industry and
that the person would be paid at the GS-15 level. How many TSA
screeners could be hired with the $136,000 that the GS-15 Hollywood
liaison will be paid?
Answer. Public Affairs utilized an open, funded position from one
of its bureau offices to create the Director of Entertainment Liaison
position to represent the entire Department. By taking an FTE from an
office where reorganization had created efficiencies in workload, the
position utilized those efficiencies to create a position with value
added to the Department.
The Entertainment Liaison Office is a necessary addition to the
Office of Public Affairs. This person will work with television and
movie producers to ensure that they do not take ``editorial license''
with Homeland Security matters that could provide the public with false
impressions or inaccurate information. We spend a great deal of effort
to educate people to help them to be better prepared for any possible
disaster--natural or manmade. Millions of Americans get information
through the entertainment industry. This position will help to ensure
that these people get an accurate portrayal of the department's
mission, policies, and activities, while proactively working to help
the American public better identify DHS functions. The Entertainment
Liaison office will guide the direction of documentaries and law
enforcement ``reality'' shows to provide real information about how the
country is better prepared today.
This is not a unique position in government. Many other Federal
agencies already utilize a liaison with the entertainment industry. The
CIA has a Hollywood liaison, and the Department of Defense houses a
large staff to serve the same function.
This position hired at a salary level of $136,000 (GS-15) would be
comparable to hiring approximately 3 TSA screeners (see breakout
below.)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Base salary............................................. $23,600
Locality pay (assumed Los Angeles area)................. +4,732
Benefits................................................ +8,260
Dual position training.................................. +3,130
---------------
Total............................................. 39,722
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$136,000/39,722=3.4 screeners.
MARITIME AND LAND: A LACK OF FOCUS
Question. I remain strongly concerned that moving the funds from
TSA will result in a diminishment of focus from your agency--and the
Department--on non-aviation modes of transportation. That would be in
direct contravention of the intent of Congress when it passed the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act in November 2001. That Act
gives TSA the responsibility for ``security in all modes of
transportation.''
During the hearing, you indicated that upon further reflection in
regard to the movement of TSA's grant funds to ODP, the Department had
determined that TSA's ``subject matter specialists/expertise'' would
remain at TSA. Please confirm for the record that this statement is
accurate. If this is not the case, please explain why and please tell
the subcommittee when you learned that this would not be the case and
from whom. Also, please provide the Subcommittee with the number of
subject matter specialists TSA employs as of March 19, 2004, in the
areas of mass transit, seaports, rail, trucking, and buses.
Answer. It is anticipated that the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) will continue to provide operational expertise on
the grant programs through participation in pre-award management
functions. These include determination of eligibility and evaluation
criteria, solicitation and application review procedures, selection
recommendations and post award technical monitoring.
As of April 21, 2004, the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) surface transportation (i.e., maritime and land) had 120,
including 23 for rail and mass transit, and 14 for the maritime
environment TSA is reorienting its subject matter expertise as roles
and missions are better defined between itself and other DHS
components. As TSA expands its activities on in rail and mass transit
security, for example, we would expect to have additional subject
matter experts and few in other areas where such experts exist in other
DHS components.
CAPPS II--TESTING
Question. Also, of the funds requested for this program in the
fiscal year 2005 budget request, what is requested solely for
additional testing of the program--as opposed to implementation and
operation of the system?
Answer. There are two components to the plan for CAPPS II testing:
testing with historical PNR data and full system testing that will take
place once connectivity is established with an airline to test with
live data. TSA estimates the cost associated with completing system and
performance testing at $5 million. This involves testing the system
``end to end'' to validate the ability of the system to receive all of
the different types of records from the airlines and post the results
of the risk assessment on the boarding pass. Once system testing has
been completed, performance testing is required to verify that the time
required to complete each end-to-end transaction meets the system
performance standards.
AIR CARGO SECURITY
Question. On December 24th, 2003 six flights between Paris and Los
Angeles were cancelled due to security concerns. In the week following
the cancellation, U.S. officials ``significantly increased'' inspection
of air cargo on foreign flights--a source of widespread concern as a
potential mode of attack for terrorist.
The vast majority of cargo carried on passenger aircraft still is
not screened for potentially deadly threats. Their checked bags and
carry-on luggage are screened--even their persons are submitted to
oftentimes humiliating searches, but other forms of cargo carried in
the belly of the plane are not. In fact, according to a September 2003
report issued by the Congressional Research Service less than 5 percent
of cargo placed on passenger airplanes is screened.
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act requires that the
agency ``provide for the screening of all passengers and property,
including United States mail, cargo, carry-on and checked baggage, and
other articles that will be carried aboard a passenger aircraft,'' yet
TSA is primarily relying on an administrative process called the
``known shipper program'' to meet this requirement instead of
physically screening the cargo.
Sadly--even after this Committee and this Congress added funds in
last year's budget to enhance research and test methods of inspection
for air cargo--your budget fails to provide increased funds to address
this very real threat. Mr. Secretary, why have no funds above the $85
million Congress provided in fiscal year 2004 been requested for fiscal
year 2005? Does the Bush Administration believe that the threat to air
cargo is not real?
Answer. DHS is committed to a strong air cargo screening program
and its request bears this out. The Administration's fiscal year 2005
budget request represents a significant increase over the fiscal year
2004 request, and is consistent with the additional funds appropriated
last year by Congress in excess of the fiscal year 2004 request, which
are being used to accelerate TSA's air cargo security program. TSA has
already taken a number of significant steps to reduce vulnerabilities
in this arena, including prohibiting cargo from unknown shippers,
significantly increasing the number of physical inspections of air
cargo on passenger and all cargo aircraft, increasing its air cargo
inspections workforce, strengthening the criteria for consideration as
a known shipper, automating the validation of known shippers and
indirect air carriers, and expediting research and development efforts
to identify potential new technological solutions for the inspection of
air cargo on passenger aircraft. TSA is also working closely with CBP
to develop a targeting tool which will permit effective identification
of high risk cargo with the ultimate goal of requiring the inspection
of all such high risk cargo.
TSA is committed to a threat-based, risk-managed approach to air
cargo security. The Air Cargo Strategic Plan outlines a layered
security strategy that does not rely on any single solution, but
rather, includes measures that secure critical elements of the entire
air cargo supply chain, with the ultimate goal of assessing the
relative risk of air cargo and then focus existing resources on
inspecting 100 percent of cargo that is determined to be of higher
risk. Among the layers within the cargo security system are the Known
Shipper program, Indirect Air Carrier certification system, procedures
to secure cargo during transport to the airport, training of air
carrier and Indirect Air Carrier personnel, and screening directives
established in November 2003. TSA has expanded the Known Shipper
database by involving more companies and collecting more information. A
key change to the Known Shipper program will be the full deployment of
TSA's pilot Known Shipper Automated Database. TSA has already begun to
implement this automated database and expects full deployment by the
end of the calendar year. TSA is committed to advancing evolving ideas
and concepts that can be analyzed and implemented to make the cargo
security system even more secure. TSA is also aggressively pursuing
next generation technological solutions that will allow us to enhance
security for the entire air cargo supply chain.
Question. The fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security Appropriations Act
called for the hiring of 100 new inspectors to begin a more rigorous
focus on air cargo security. We are now halfway into the fiscal year,
but I understand that TSA has only offered positions to five people.
Why has TSA made so little progress on this important program over the
last 5 months? Is hiring air cargo security inspectors not a high
priority for TSA?
Answer. The funding provided in the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2004 (Public Law 108-90) enabled TSA to hire 100
new cargo inspectors. All 100 cargo inspector positions have been
selected, and paperwork is being processed by TSA Human Resources. We
anticipate extending job offers to these applicants and bringing them
on board within the next 2 months.
TSA: SLOW MOVEMENT OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS
Question. The fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security Act was signed
into law on October 1, 2003. Yet in the intervening six months, TSA has
yet to obligate the $22 million Congress appropriated for trucking
industry grants, the $17 million we provided for Operation Safe
Commerce, the $10 million we provided for bus security grants, the $7
million we provided for hazardous material grants, nor the $4 million
we provided for nuclear detection and monitoring. Additionally, $50
million still remains unobligated from the funds Congress provided for
port security grants.
Please respond for the record on when we can expect these funds to
be obligated. The threat to these transportation modes is real and the
delay in getting these funds out to the intended recipients does not
lay with the Congress.
Answer. In the coming months, TSA plans to request proposals for
funding or announce awards for a number of programs. These include:
--TSA anticipates issuing a Request for Applications (RFA) for both
the fourth round of Port Security Grants Program ($50 million
remaining from fiscal year 2004) and Intercity Bus Security
grants by late spring, 2004, with final awarding of grants
expected in late summer.
--A fourth quarter fiscal year 2004 release of the RFA is anticipated
for both the Highway Watch Program and Operation Safe Commerce,
with final award anticipated in the fall.
--TSA intends to announce Request for Proposals for the Truck
Tracking Project in early summer. Final award is anticipated in
early fall, 2004.
--Award for Nuclear Detection and Monitoring is anticipated by mid-
summer, 2004.
TSA FUNDING: ADEQUACY OF FEES
Question. Your budget request for fiscal year 2005 assumes that you
will receive $750 million in air carrier fees. The Congressional Budget
Office estimates that only a total of $350 million of these fees is
expected to be collected during the fiscal year. If that is correct,
your budget request is already short by nearly $400 million. I
understand that you have the authority administratively to require the
collection of the total amount of $750 million of these fees. Do you
intend to use that authority?
If you do not intend to exercise your authority, this Committee
certainly does not have the resources to fill that kind of a gap in
funding. Will you be submitting a budget amendment to seek the
additional $400 million? If you do intend to exercise this authority,
please provide this Subcommittee with your schedule for announcing this
change.
Answer. The air carrier fee was established by Congress as a means
to allow the Federal Government to offset some of the costs it assumed
from the airlines when the responsibility for passenger and property
screening shifted from those airlines to the Transportation Security
Administration. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act set the
maximum level of this fee at the cost that the airlines incurred for
providing security screening in 2000.
To assist TSA with determining what the airlines had spent on
security screening prior to TSA assuming those functions, the agency
required airlines to complete an extensive cost questionnaire on the
costs the carriers incurred in 2000. Industry memorandums and
Congressional testimony both pre and post 9/11 indicated that the
airlines spent as much as $1 billion on security screening. Based on
that information, TSA conservatively estimated that the industry's
costs would be $750 million. However, the total reported by the airline
industry through the cost questionnaires was around $350 million.
Independent audits also could not validate the completeness of the
industry's reported costs. As the air carrier fees are currently being
paid based on the airline cost submissions, there is an approximately
$400 million difference between fees being paid and costs originally
reported by the industry.
TSA is continuing to review the results of the audits and is
working with the airlines to validate their cost data. Should the data
be substantiated, TSA will consider the use of its administrative
authority to allocate and obtain these fees. Other alternatives under
consideration are the resubmission of the legislation proposed by the
Administration early in the current Congress, as well as technical
adjustments to TSA appropriations language that would mandate fee
collections.
INSUFFICIENT USE OF SCREENING EQUIPMENT--GAO TESTIMONY
Question. On February 12, GAO's Director for Homeland Security and
Justice, Cathleen Berrick, testified before the House Subcommittee on
Aviation. In her testimony, she observed that while the TSA has made
progress in its checked baggage processes, ``it continues to face
challenges in attaining 100 percent screening using explosive detection
systems 100 percent of the time.'' She notes that, ``Of the airports
reporting that they were not screening 100 percent of checked baggage
the number of consecutive days that they were not conducting this
screening ranged between 1 to 371 days.''
Rear Admiral Stone, what steps are you taking to remedy the
deficiencies noted by the General Accounting Office? Is it the result
of a lack of screeners, a lack of equipment, or a lack of sufficient
funds to place the right number of screeners with the right equipment
in the right locations?
Answer. TSA is aggressively working to resolve both the equipment
and staffing issues to ensure that we are able to conduct screening of
100 percent of passengers' checked baggage for explosives at all U.S.
airports. To that end, we are deploying additional equipment at five
major airports and adding more than 1,400 baggage screeners to those
airports where some baggage is screened through alternative methods
allowed by law.
During the next several months, TSA will also complete the
development and deployment of a state-of-the-art modeling process that
will define the staffing requirements, including those associated with
baggage screening equipment, for each airport, as well as for the
Agency as a whole.
TSA: INJURY AND ILLNESS
Question. According to a Department of Labor study, workers at the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) suffered from more
injuries and illnesses than employees at any other agency in the
Federal Government last year. The TSA suffered more than 5 times as
many job related injury and illness events as did their counterparts at
other agencies. Nearly 20 percent of the 65,250 TSA employees at the
time were hurt or sickened in the workplace last year, compared with
only 3.7 percent of workers in the rest of the Federal Government. TSA
employees were only 3.3 percent of the Federal workforce at the end of
fiscal 2003. But their injuries and illnesses, 12,632 during that
period, comprise more than 15 percent of all such incidents among
government workers, according to the report.
What are you doing to modify your screener training program to
ensure that employees are protected from injuries in the work place?
What thought, if any, has been given to using different equipment that
might assist workers in screening baggage without the chance of serious
injury?
Answer. The Department of Labor reported that TSA had the highest
injury and illness rate among Federal agencies in fiscal year 2003,
measured by the number of employees injured filing claims with the
Office of Worker's Compensation.
About 70 percent of TSA's claims were related to baggage handling,
which is very different than the work undertaken by most Federal
agencies. TSA has compared its injury and illness rate with the rates
found in private sector companies performing closely related
activities, such as baggage and parcel handling, and found that the
rates for that type of work were similar to TSA's experience.
The high injury rate is partially attributable to the necessarily
short time frame in which TSA was required to become operational. TSA's
new baggage screening equipment had to be placed in airport space that
was not designed to accommodate the equipment. Some operations must be
performed in ergonomically unsuitable areas where there is insufficient
space to perform safely repetitive baggage handling work. Eighty
percent of claims related to baggage handling involved sprains and
strains primarily to the back, but also to shoulders, knees and wrists.
TSA is currently working to develop and promulgate a series of
safety related training topics as part of the screener recurrent
training program. A course on safe lifting techniques has already been
fielded. Training media will include video and Web-based training.
Specific courses in development include Bloodborne Pathogens Awareness,
Hazard Communications, Materials Handling and Lock-out/Tag-out, General
Safety, and Slips, Trips, and Falls. Safety Action Teams are being
established at every airport and programs are underway to identify and
train collateral duty safety and health representatives across the
agency. Finally, TSA has initiated a program to conduct hazard
assessments at all of its airports in order to identify additional
areas where accident prevention actions are necessary.
With the installation at some airports of new integrated baggage
conveyor, in-line explosives detection systems, that greatly reduce
manual baggage handling, some injury rates are already beginning to
fall. In time, TSA anticipates that its efforts to field a
comprehensive occupational safety and health program, establish a
safety culture, train supervisors and employees, and make baggage
handling system changes to minimize lifting, will result in significant
improvement in TSA's injury rates.
LETTERS OF INTENT
Question. In response to a question during the hearing, you
indicated that upwards of 30 airports are seeking letters of intent
(LOIs) with you. You also indicated that the Office of Management and
Budget had limited the number of LOIs that you are able to enter into
to eight. If your analysis of the 30 airports proves the validity of
these requests, how much additional funding would be required to fund
them?
Answer. While numerous airports have expressed interest in LOI
security funding TSA continues to use its LOI criteria, based on
achieving and maintaining compliance with the 100 percent electronic
screening requirement at all airports, to determine the allocation of
resources. TSA is working with airports that will not be able to
maintain compliance with the 100 percent electronic screening
requirement because of increased passenger loads, increased and/or
additional air carrier service, and/or airport terminal modifications
and expansions. The President's Budget for fiscal year 2005 supports
previously issued 8 LOIs for 9 airports, and assumes a 75/25 cost share
formula as set forth in the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution,
2003. TSA also supports airports that have not received an LOI, but
where additional funding for equipment is needed to accommodate
increased passenger loads and new air carrier service. TSA continues to
evaluate situations where an in-line solution makes sense from the
standpoint of security, efficiency, and reduced staffing needs.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Inouye
Question. The budget request includes $400 million for the purchase
and installation of Explosive Detection System (EDS) machines. Letters
of Intent (LOI) have been signed with eight airports for the
reimbursement of construction costs associated with the integration of
the new EDS machines for in-line baggage screening. It is my
understanding that the $250 million requested for installation would
only cover continued payment of the existing LOIs.
How many airports are on your list for installation, and under the
current approach how long would it take to install in-line EDS machines
at the remaining airports on your list? What would it cost over the
next 4 years to accelerate the program and install in-line EDS machines
at all the airports on your list?
Answer. TSA continues to use its LOI criteria, based on achieving
and maintaining compliance with the 100 percent electronic screening
requirement at all airports, to determine where resources will be
allocated. TSA is working with airports that will not be able to
maintain compliance with the 100 percent electronic screening
requirement because of increased passenger loads, increased and/or
additional air carrier service, and/or airport terminal modifications
and expansions. The President's Budget for fiscal year 2005 supports
previously issued LOIs for 9 airports, and assumes a 75/25 cost share
formula as set forth in the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution,
2003. TSA also continues to evaluate situations where an in-line
solution makes sense from the standpoint of security, efficiency, and
reduced staffing needs.
Question. TSA currently operates under a statutory limit of 45,000
full-time equivalent baggage and personnel screening employees. How has
this limitation affected your ability to serve the flying public and
ensure short wait times? TSA is required by this limitation to hire
significant numbers of part-time employees. Has it been difficult to
hire and retain part-time employees for these screening positions?
Answer. TSA is managing to keep the workforce under the 45,000 FTE
level by creating a more flexible workforce. TSA is better coordinating
airline schedules and passenger load with staffing needs, is increasing
the proportion of part-time to full-time screeners, and is
strategically using its mobile national screener force to meet seasonal
fluctuations in workload. TSA now has in excess of 15 percent of its
screener workforce as part-time screeners, and TSA expects to have a
part-time screener workforce of close to 20 percent by the end of the
current fiscal year. Part-time screeners create additional operational
flexibility when scheduling screeners to satisfy varying levels of
demand. As a result of reducing excess capacity at periods of lower
demand, TSA is seeking to make more FTEs available to the system as a
whole during peak periods.
While TSA is highly conscious of customer service concerns, the
security of the nation's transportation system will always be our top
priority. Staffing standards, accordingly, should be determined based
on the goal of achieving the appropriate balance between world class
security and world class customer service in operating environments
unique at each airport. Throughout the workforce transformation
process, our screeners have continued to meet world class standards for
effectiveness and customer service. They have kept wait time consistent
with previous performance across the system, while providing a level of
courtesy that received an 86-percent approval rating according to the
most recent survey. TSA is proud of the professionalism and dedication
that its screeners demonstrate every day in the performance of their
duties.
Question. Section 1012 of the USA PATRIOT Act requires a background
investigation of holders of Commercial Driver's Licenses (CDL) who seek
to carry hazardous materials (hazmat). States must provide biographical
and criminal history information and fingerprints to TSA on CDL holders
seeking a state hazmat endorsement. The deadline for states to comply
has been moved from November 3, 2003 to April 1, 2004, and again to
December 1. However, to date, the TSA has not provided the states with
sufficient guidance, including technical standards for the collection
of fingerprints, to implement fingerprint-based background checks. In
addition, no funding has been made available to the states to implement
this program.
What steps has TSA taken to implement the requirements of Section
1012 and what is TSA's timeline to provide guidance to the states on
the process and standards for fingerprint collection and transmittal of
fingerprints to TSA by the states and notification of qualification by
TSA back to the states?
Answer. TSA has been working with the FBI to establish the
technical standards and processes for the collection and transmission
of driver fingerprints. Once these processes are finalized, they will
be transmitted to the States. We estimate that these standards and
processes will be provided to the States over the course of the next
month.
On April 1, 2004, Secretary Ridge sent a letter to each Governor
outlining the current status of the Hazmat Truck Driver Program. In
that letter, Secretary Ridge asked each Governor to provide TSA a State
Point of Contact (POC) for this Program to facilitate communications
between TSA and other organizations involved in this process. All
fingerprint standards and processes will be provided to the States
through their respective POCs.
TSA has also been working with the American Association of Motor
Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) to develop a system for the transmission
of biographical data to TSA for use in the security threat assessment
process, and the subsequent results notification to the appropriate
State and Federal authorities. Initial information related to this
initiative has already been provided to the States. Additional
information related to this aspect of the program will be provided to
the States through their POC.
Question. Is funding included in your budget request, or the
request of any other agency to help states defray the cost of complying
with Section 1012?
Answer. TSA has identified limited funding in fiscal year 2004 to
support some of the necessary infrastructure to support the Hazmat
Truck Driver Program. However, an effective partnership between the
Federal Government, the States and industry is both necessary and is
currently being forged to develop and fund start-up solutions on a
State-by-State basis. Longer term, the Hazmat Truck Driver Program will
be fee based and TSA envisions that fees will support the program in
its entirety. We anticipate working with the States and industry to
develop the details of a fee rule, which will be published later in CY
2004.
Question. When will TSA be ready to accept and process State
submitted fingerprints of commercial drivers seeking a hazmat
endorsement?
Answer. TSA will be ready to accept and process State submitted
fingerprints no later than January 31, 2005 in accordance with the
existing final rule. However, we do anticipate a limited number of
pilot States beginning to submit fingerprints beginning in fiscal year
2005. Working with these pilot States will allow TSA to apply ``lessons
learned'' during the pilot to systems and processes associated with the
submission of fingerprints. We anticipate that this technique will
facilitate a much smoother start-up for the vast majority of States.
Question. The budget justification submitted by TSA includes
detailed information about the numbers and types of items confiscated
by TSA employees at airport security checkpoints. In the last year, TSA
has intercepted more than 2.8 million prohibited items and arrested 700
people. Can you help me put that in context and tell me how many how
many passenger screenings were performed last year? Also, of the 700
arrests, how many convictions have there been?
Answer. TSA performed approximately 500 million passenger
screenings last year. TSA's records in the period February, 2002-
February, 2004, show that 2,678 individuals were arrested for
possessing a prohibited item that was discovered at a passenger
screening checkpoint. The majority of arrests were made by State or
local law enforcement agencies; only a small number were performed by
Federal law enforcement authorities. The Department of Justice, along
with State and local prosecuting authorities, are in a better position
to ascertain the exact number of convictions.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Ernest F. Hollings
Question. The budget for FTE's for full time positions was set at
220 for the Transportation Security Administration's Maritime and Land
Division, yet it is my understanding that to date, this Division is
only operating with 160.
You have a number of responsibilities, such as conducting criminal
background checks, that are languishing. What is taking so long in
hiring the remaining 60 Full Time Employee positions that, I understand
are budgeted for the Transportation Security Administration's Maritime
and Land Division but not yet hired?
Answer. TSA is hiring to the level proposed in the fiscal year 2005
President's Budget.
Question. Right now, TSA has absolutely no staffing standards at
airports. Wait times vary from nothing to hours, depending upon the
airport. On March 9, 2004 the Washington Post said small airport
security is no good and that you do not meet the 100 percent screening
requirements of the law--yet, classified submissions by TSA continue to
tell us that only a handful of airports have problems.
You continue to support a cap on screeners, dooming the process to
fail. When will you put in staffing standards that make senses (e.g., a
maximum 10 minute wait that Secretary Mineta promised us)?
Answer. TSA is managing to keep the workforce under the 45,000 FTE
level by creating a more flexible workforce. TSA is working with air
carries and airports to improve coordination of airline schedules and
passenger loads with staffing needs, is increasing the proportion of
part-time to full-time screeners, and is strategically using its mobile
national screener force to meet seasonal fluctuations in workload. TSA
expects to have a part-time screener workforce of close to 20 percent
by the end of the current fiscal year. Part-time screeners create
additional operational flexibility when scheduling screeners to satisfy
varying levels of demand. As a result of reducing excess capacity at
periods of lower demand, TSA is seeking to make more FTEs available to
the system as a whole during peak periods.
Throughout the workforce transformation process, our screeners have
continued to meet world class standards for effectiveness and customer
service. They have kept wait time consistent with previous performance
across the system, while providing a level of courtesy that received an
86-percent approval rating according to the most recent survey. Despite
the dynamics in the workload, even during the holiday rush season and
the recent Orange Threat Level period, our screeners have provided
world class security and world class service for effectiveness,
efficiency, and customer satisfaction. TSA is proud of the
professionalism and dedication that its screeners demonstrate every day
in the performance of their duties.
Question. You also committed to putting in explosive detection
systems--automated systems in line--when will that job be completed?
Answer. TSA's top priority is security, and consequently, TSA will
focus its available funds for EDS at those airports that require
additional funding in order to comply with the requirement to conduct
screening of all checked baggage using electronic means. Changes to
passenger throughputs, terminal modifications, and airport expansions
make fulfilling TSA's goal of 100 percent electronic baggage screening
a constantly moving target. TSA balances many competing priorities for
available funds and will continue to review its priorities to maximize
the utilization of the funds available.
Question. Airports are seeking long term letters of intent (LOI)
from you to fund reconstruction for security projects. You gave out
LOI's to 8 or 10 airports, but there are another 20 or so waiting. How
much money do you need to get the job done this year? Miami, for
example, is rebuilding the entire airport--a $4.8 billion project, that
needs $200 million for security systems, but there is no money in your
budget to meet that need.
Answer. TSA continues to use its LOI criteria, based on achieving
and maintaining compliance with the 100 percent electronic screening
requirement at all airports, to determine where resources will be
allocated. TSA is working with airports that will not be able to
maintain compliance with the 100 percent electronic screening
requirement because of increased passenger loads, increased and/or
additional air carrier service, and/or airport terminal modifications
and expansions. The President's Budget for fiscal year 2005 supports
previously issued LOIs for 9 airports, and assumes a 75/25 cost share
formula as set forth in the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution,
2003. TSA also continues to evaluate situations where an in-line
solution makes sense from the standpoint of security, efficiency, and
reduced staffing needs.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
Question. A recent GAO study concluded that the Computer-Assisted
Passenger Prescreening System, or CAPPS II, is not ready for prime
time. According to the report: ``The system as it currently exists
offers only limited functionality in a simulated environment.'' I am
concerned that the program's weaknesses may limit its effectiveness and
it lacks sufficient protections for the civil liberties of ordinary,
law-abiding travelers. I am also concerned by reports that the
administration plans to force the airlines to hand over passenger data.
Since I understand TSA plans to launch CAPPS II later this year and
has requested a total of $60 million in fiscal year 2005 for further
development of CAPPS II, I would like to know the following:
How much has been spent by TSA on CAPPS II development in each
fiscal year so far?
Answer. Commitments/obligations on CAPPS II development to date
(April 26, 2004) are as follows:
[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2002 & 2003................................. 58.4
Fiscal year 2004 (to date).............................. 28.1
---------------
TOTAL............................................. 86.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. How exactly does TSA plan to spend the additional $60
million in the fiscal year 2005 budget request should it be
appropriated by Congress?
Answer. TSA intends to spend the $60 million in the following
manner:
[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Facilities leases, Utilities and Maintenance............ 3.3
IT and Telecommunication................................ 5.2
Infrastructure support (security, FTEs, etc.)........... 10.8
CAPPS II Development and Operations..................... 40.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. What is TSA doing to address the shortcomings and
vulnerabilities of CAPPS II as described in the GAO study and outlined
in the January 14, 2004, letter Senator Feingold and I sent to
Secretary Ridge and copied you?
Answer. As indicated in the GAO report itself, the primary problem
faced by CAPPS II at the present time is the fact that we have not yet
been able to begin testing with actual data. The absence of this data
has hindered our ability to answer each of the answers sufficiently for
GAO, which uses strict auditing review procedures standards, to certify
that program development in those areas is complete. We are confident
that each of the points raised in the GAO report will be answered to
your satisfaction prior to implementation of the system.
Question. According to recent reports, the airline industry has
indicated a willingness to participate in CAPPS II, provided that TSA
complies with seven privacy principles. Has TSA agreed to these privacy
principles? If not, please explain.
Answer. TSA has no disagreement with the seven Passenger Privacy
Principles recently released by the Air Transport Association (ATA).
The principles are consistent with the Fair Information Principles that
TSA used to develop its privacy management program for CAPPS II and the
building block for the agency's privacy policies and practices.
Question. Presidential Directive 63 called for the creation of
private sector Information Sharing and Analysis Centers to protect our
critical infrastructures from terrorist attack. At the request of the
U.S. Department of Transportation, the Surface Transportation
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ST-ISAC) was formed. The ST-
ISAC collects, analyzes, and distributes critical security and threat
information from worldwide resources to protect its members' vital
information and information technology systems from attack.
Right now this valuable information is only available to paying
members of the ST-ISAC. With the TSA seeking an $892 million funding
increase for fiscal year 2005, why was funding not included in the TSA
request to make the ST-ISAC information available to all public transit
operators across the country--especially since most cannot afford new
equipment and operators much less afford to subscribe to the ST-ISAC?
Answer. DHS and TSA utilize numerous avenues for distributing and
receiving information for the various transportation sectors. TSA's
Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC) receives information
from ISACs as well as from multiple other sources. We provide
information to the ISACs for distribution to their members since they
have established communication methods with their members.
Additionally, TSA is committed to establishing effective lines of
communication to all stakeholders regardless of their membership with
any particular ISAC. TSA is developing contacts lists for all of the
non-ISAC stakeholders. As envisioned, all stakeholders would have
access to general information. Specific persons would have access to
sensitive information, provided they have signed non-disclosure
agreements.
Question. It has been reported that the Federal Government is
spending $4.5 billion on aviation security this year but only $65
million on rail security--even though 5 times more people take trains
everyday than planes. The catastrophic Madrid bombings reflect that
this reality is fraught with severe risks.
Senator Hollings introduced a bill last week to allot $515 million
for risk assessments and security improvements for our Nation's rail
system. Unfortunately, he has introduced the bill twice before and it
has gone nowhere.
Last year a survey of transit agencies by the American Public
Transportation Association (APTA) identified some $6 billion in unmet
security needs that remain today.
What is TSA's position on the $6 billion in unmet security needs
described by APTA? And what does TSA expect to do to address those
needs?
Answer. Ensuring that our nation's transportation systems are
secure must be accomplished through effective partnering between
appropriate Federal, State, local and private industry entities. DHS is
charged with responsibility for working to protect all modes of
transportation, but it has consistently held that that this
responsibility must be shared with Federal, State, local and private
industry partners, many of whom were already in the business of
providing security for their particular piece of the transportation
puzzle. TSA's main charge, both under ATSA and now as part of the DHS
family, is to help coordinate these efforts under the guidance of the
Secretary and the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation
Security, identifying gaps and working with appropriate partners to
ensure that existing security gaps are filled.
Recognizing this, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has
requested substantial resources in fiscal year 2005 across the agencies
within the Department involved with securing transportation modes other
than aviation, including resources in the Coast Guard and CBP for ports
and maritime security; in Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for cargo
security; in Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP)
for vulnerability assessments, intelligence, and infrastructure
protection for all sectors including transportation; and in Emergency
Preparedness & Response (EP&R) for emergency response to only name a
few. In addition to working with other DHS components, TSA works
closely with our sister Federal agencies outside of DHS to ensure that
all government resources are maximized. For example, under the
leadership of BTS and DHS, TSA is coordinating key standards-setting
efforts in areas such as transit and rail security, and is working
closely with modal administrations of the Department of Transportation
to help leverage their existing resources and security efforts to
accomplish security goals.
Specifically, funds provided for transit and rail security in
fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 total $215 million--$115 for
transit security grants under the Urban Area Security Program, and $100
million for upgrades to rail tunnels in the Northeast Corridor.
Question. As you may know, law enforcement officials from New
England and New York have been national leaders in establishing an
initiative for cargo container security called Operation Safe Commerce
Northeast (OSC Northeast.) OSC Northeast represents a comprehensive
coalition of Federal agencies, State governments, and private sector
businesses committed to the concept of enhancing border and
international transportation security without impeding free trade and
international commerce.
The economy will face a grave disruption should a catastrophic
event occur related to international trade corridors. We are very
vulnerable along our Northern Border, and the OSC Northeast group would
enhance the safety of cargo entering the United States through New
England and Canadian ports. Therefore, I believe the TSA should better
engage and utilize the resources of OSC Northeast.
In light of administration's budget proposal to cut in half the $58
million Operation Safe Commerce program--citing $28 million in unspent
funds already approved by Congress for the program that may be
redirected to overspending in other areas of TSA:
Will TSA use some of these funds to expand the program to OSC
Northeast since there are no restrictions on aiding just three ports in
the second round of appropriations?
Answer. First, it is important to note that TSA's final spend plan
submission for fiscal year 2003 included all $58 million earmarked for
Operation Safe Commerce. OSC Northeast was eligible to apply for OSC
fiscal year 2002-03 funding through any of the three Load Centers,
including the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, but did not do
so. OSC Northeast did apply for a port security grant, but its
application was not selected. The OSC program is nearing completion. We
expect to assess results starting this summer.
Question. What steps are TSA taking to incorporate the efforts of
OSC Northeast into our national port security strategy?
Answer. The OSC Executive Steering Committee carefully reviewed the
OSC Northeast report of November 2002. The review had a significant
impact in guiding the current OSC efforts, including examination of
security throughout entire supply chains, use of a systematic approach
to container security (including multimodal activities), coordination
with related initiatives, examination of costs and benefits of the
selected solutions and the need for solutions to work for all modes of
transportation.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Harry Reid
HAZARDOUS MATERIAL TRANSPORTATION FUNDING
Question. Admiral Stone, the fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security
appropriations law included $7 million for a hazardous material truck
tracking program. The University of Nevada, Las Vegas is working with a
national leader in truck tracking to establish a national center to
track commercial trucks carrying hazardous material and has submitted a
proposal to use a portion of this funding. When can we expect to hear
about the allocation of the $7 million?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) expects to
solicit proposals on a competitive basis for the truck tracking
initiative in the summer of 2004. All interested parties will be
invited to submit proposals in response to this announcement.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Cochran. Admiral Collins and Admiral Stone, we
appreciate very much your cooperation with our subcommittee.
Our next hearing on the budget request for the Department of
Homeland Security will be held on Tuesday, March 30, in this
room, SD-124. At that time, the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection, Robert Bonner; the Assistant
Secretary of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Michael Garcia; and the Director of the Bureau of Citizenship
and Immigration Services, Eduardo Aguirre, will be here to
discuss the budget for the programs and activities under their
jurisdiction. Until then, the subcommittee stands in recess.
[Whereupon, at 12 noon, Tuesday, March 23, the subcommittee
was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday, March 30.]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 30, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., in room SD-124, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Cochran, Stevens, Shelby, Byrd, Leahy,
and Murray.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
STATEMENTS OF:
EDUARDO AGUIRRE, JR., DIRECTOR, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES
ROBERT C. BONNER, COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION
MICHAEL J. GARCIA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION
AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. The hearing will please come to order.
Today we continue our review of the President's fiscal year
2005 budget request for the Department of Homeland Security. We
will specifically consider the request for programs and
activities of three of the department's agencies: Citizenship
and Immigration Services, Customs and Border Protection, and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
I am pleased to welcome the Director of Citizenship and
Immigration Services, Mr. Eduardo Aguirre; the Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, Mr. Robert Bonner;
and the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Mr. Michael Garcia. We thank you for
submitting copies of your statements in advance of the hearing.
These will be made a part of the record. And we invite you each
to make any comments you think would be helpful to the
committee's understanding of the budget request.
Before asking the witnesses to proceed, however, I am happy
to yield to Senator Byrd and other Senators who may wish to
make opening statements.
Senator Byrd.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, comrades on the
committee. You see, I am ahead of everybody else on the Hill.
Fifty-one years on the Hill entitles me to call my friends here
``comrades.''
Welcome to our distinguished witnesses. The men and women
under your direction have a great impact on the safety of
American citizens, as well as visitors to our country.
Secretary Ridge has promoted the concept of one face at the
border. And I support that concept. However, I remain concerned
that there are real vulnerabilities facing us Nation that
require immediate response.
Last December, Secretary Ridge said, ``The strategic
indicators, including al-Qaeda's continued desire to carry out
attacks against our homeland, are perhaps greater now than at
any point since September 11.'' On March 11, terrorists armed
with backpacks filled with explosives coordinated an attack
that resulted in the deaths of nearly 200 people in Madrid. I
would expect that the administration would anticipate these
kinds of threats and address such threats with a robust
defense.
REVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET
Yet, as I review the administration's budget, America's
defense is far too reliant on paper, on studies, and on
reports, rather than on the layered defense that the President
and the Secretary often describe in their homeland security
speeches. Let me just give a few examples.
Nearly 9 million commercial containers are brought into
this country each year through our ports. Yet, only 5 percent
of them are inspected. We have all heard these figures time and
time again.
On January 5, 2004, the new visa tracking system, known as
US VISIT, began operation at 115 airports and 14 seaports.
Customs and Border Protection inspectors are collecting data on
visitors entering our country, but the Bush Administration
still has no clear plan for confirming who is exiting the
United States. We have no way of knowing whether aliens, who
are supposed to have left the country, have in fact left the
country.
At the same time, we need to ensure that sufficient funds
are provided to integrate the various existing biometric
databases. We need to make sure that the US VISIT system and
the Border Patrol IDENT system are compatible with the FBI's
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System. At our
March 9 hearing, Secretary Hutchinson attempted to address this
issue, but I believe that he fell short in his response.
NEED FOR INTEGRATED SYSTEMS
We need to have integrated systems that can talk to each
other. We must know whether an alien trying to come into this
country, or already in this country, has a criminal history. By
integrating these systems, CBP would know if an alien is a
security risk and could refuse him entry into the country, or
remove him from the country, or imprison him. We simply cannot
be satisfied with the incompatible systems that result in
murderers and other criminals walking through holes in our
border security.
SHORTCOMINGS IN BUDGET REQUEST
The Federal Air Marshal Service does not have sufficient
resources this year to maintain the number of air marshals on
targeted domestic and international flights. And because the
Administration has proposed no increase for next year, a bad
problem could become even worse next year.
The President has proposed a sweeping amnesty for people
already residing illegally in this country. Yet, the
President's budget request includes only modest increases for
programs that attempt to cope with our growing illegal alien
population, and provides insufficient funds to robustly enforce
our existing immigration laws. When I inquired of Secretary
Ridge just how he would pay to implement the President's
amnesty program, he could not provide an answer.
I want to make sure that this subcommittee and this
Congress provide real homeland security to the American people,
not just assurances on paper. The President stubbornly has told
this agency not to seek supplemental appropriations this year.
Just last week we learned that, more than a year after setting
up the new department, there still is not a complete accounting
of the funds which have been made available for the operation
of your agencies.
HIRING FREEZES
The department has imposed hiring freezes so that the
department's accounts, along with its OMB overseers, can audit
the books. Air marshals are not being hired. Inspectors at our
ports of entry and criminal investigators are not being hired.
We are 6 months into the fiscal year. I simply do not
understand why the Administration has not proposed a solution
to this problem. Homeland security cannot wait.
THE NATION IS VULNERABLE
I have never claimed to be the Oracle at Delphi, but there
are many times these days when I feel like Diogenes. I am
looking for an honest man. I am seeking someone who can tell
this President that this Nation is vulnerable and that this
President leaves us vulnerable for another year.
Time and again, my colleagues and I have tried to provide
this department with the additional resources we believe it
needs to surely provide security to the homeland. And time and
again, this Administration has stiff-armed our efforts,
labeling amendments for border security, port security, air
cargo security, and rail security as wasteful spending.
ALLEGED BUDGET SHORTFALL
I hope we can get to the bottom of this alleged budget
shortfall for the department quickly. It is a problem not of
Congress's making. I will be discussing many of these issues. I
appreciate the fine work of our witnesses and the courageous
men and women who work for you. I look forward to hearing from
you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Senator Leahy.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I could not help
but think as I listened to both your statement and to Senator
Byrd's statement, that the witnesses before us this morning all
bear great responsibility for keeping our Nation secure. All
three of you do. And we all thank you for your service.
HIRING FREEZES FOR ICE AND CBP
But when we come together here today, I am concerned about
the hiring freeze that is in place in part or in all of your
agencies. I understand that the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, ICE, the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection, CBP, are facing a budget shortfall of more than 12
percent. It is really inexcusable to hear about a hiring freeze
in critical national security agencies, especially after the
administration has so stridently opposed efforts by Senator
Byrd and others, many others, in Congress to make homeland
security the priority that it needs in the national budget.
We know full well that the administration budget's
priorities ultimately is the White House prerogative and not
yours. My criticism is not directed at you. But this morning
the American people need to hear an explanation how this could
have happened and what this freeze will mean to the missions of
your agencies and what is being done in the meantime to protect
the security of the American people.
We ask these questions because, as Senator Byrd has pointed
out so many times, under the Constitution the question of
spending starts here in the Congress, not on the other end of
Pennsylvania Avenue. We hold the purse strings.
LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER IN WILLISTON, VERMONT
Now I am glad that ICE is making increased use of the Law
Enforcement Support Center, LESC, in Williston, Vermont. For
years the LESC has done an excellent job of providing
information to State and local police departments throughout
the Nation regarding the immigration status and identities of
aliens suspected, arrested, or convicted of criminal activity.
I had the pleasure of joining Mr. Garcia there last summer.
I recall at one point during the discussion we were talking
to somebody about that it is open 24 hours, 7 days a week. What
happened earlier that winter, one time we had a 3-foot snowfall
overnight. And this got kind of puzzled looks. Well, everybody
came to work, of course. I mean, what else would they do? It
was only 3 feet. It kind of screwed up the parking lot, but
everybody got to work.
But I think that when it is done, including this work at
ICE, Operation Predator, designed to catch sex offenders, I
think that is extremely important. But I am also concerned that
LESC may not receive the resources its needs to accomplish its
additional workload. I hope that will be addressed today.
TRIPS AROUND THE COUNTRY TO VARIOUS OFFICES
Incidentally, I know all of you make trips around the
country to the various departments. Those are meaningful. I
mentioned to Mr. Garcia earlier this morning, when I was coming
out of mass on Sunday, somebody came up to me and said that
they were there when he came through and was delighted that he
actually took time and asked them what they do and how they do
it, what is involved in their job. I am sure there were a whole
lot of other people he asked. But this particular person
remembered this. It was almost a year later.
CIS BUDGET REQUEST CONCERNS
Now turning to Mr. Aguirre's agency, I am concerned about
the President's proposed budget for Citizenship and Immigration
Services, CIS.. The budget calls for a 40-percent cut in the
amount of directly appropriated funds for CIS from the nearly
$235 million appropriated for the current year. They are
cutting it, Mr. Chairman, to $140 million for fiscal year 2005.
Now this cut comes at a time where we are way, way, way far
from fulfilling the President's own promise to reduce the
average wait time for applicants for immigration benefits to 6
months by 2006. It was a great speech. It was a great promise.
I agree with the President entirely. But after making the
speech, he did not cut the funds to make sure the promise could
be realized.
It also comes at a time when the President has proposed a
worker program that would significantly increase the CIS
workload. Yet another great speech, a large Hispanic
population. But I guess it proved unpopular with some in the
President's party, so we have not heard more about it. But we
know it is still floating out there.
In fact, I wrote to the President in January. I asked him
to submit a legislative proposal to Congress for implementing
his plan. He announced it with great fanfare. And I was curious
just how it is going to be done. We only have a few real
working days left in the Congress this year, and we have yet to
receive a response.
INCREASE CAP FOR THE H2B VISA PROGRAM
I would like to raise one other policy issue while Mr.
Aguirre is here. I hope the CIS and the administration as a
whole will support bipartisan efforts in Congress to increase
the cap for the H2B visa program. Your department recently
announced that the statutory cap for this program has already
been reached, if I am correct. It is causing tourism-dependent
businesses across the country to fear they will be unable to
serve their customers this summer.
prepared statement
I am enjoying with at least 13 of my colleagues, including
Senator Stevens, the chairman of the full committee, to
introduce S. 2252, the Save Summer Act of 2004. It would
increase the cap for the current fiscal year by 40,000. I would
urge the administration to support it.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony. I thank you
for your usual courtesy and giving me a chance to make a
comment.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Patrick J. Leahy
The witnesses before us this morning all bear great responsibility
for keeping our Nation secure, and we thank you for your service. Yet
as we come together today, there is a hiring freeze in place at all or
part of each of your agencies.
I understand that the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) are facing
a budget shortfall of more than 12 percent. It is outrageous to hear
about a hiring freeze in critical national security agencies after the
Bush Administration has so stridently opposed attempts by the Ranking
Member and many, many others in Congress to make homeland security the
priority that it needs to be in the national budget. We know full well
that setting the Administration's budget priorities ultimately is the
White House's prerogative, and not yours. But this morning the American
people need to hear an explanation of how this could have happened,
what this freeze will mean to the missions of your agencies, and what
is being done in the meantime to protect the security of the American
people.
Meanwhile, I am glad that ICE is making increased use of the Law
Enforcement Support Center (LESC), in Williston, Vermont. For years,
the LESC has done an excellent job of providing information to state
and local police departments throughout the nation, regarding the
immigration status and identities of aliens suspected, arrested, or
convicted of criminal activity. I had the pleasure of joining Mr.
Garcia last summer at the LESC to announce an expansion of its role,
including its work in ICE's Operation Predator, designed to catch sex
offenders. At the same time, I am concerned that the LESC may not
receive the resources it needs to accomplish its additional workload. I
hope that Mr. Garcia will address those concerns today.
Turning to Mr. Aguirre's agency, I am concerned about the
President's proposed budget for Citizenship and Immigration Services
(CIS). The budget calls for a 40 percent cut in the amount of directly
appropriated funds for CIS, from the nearly $235 million appropriated
for the current year, to $140 million for fiscal year 2005. This cut
comes at a time when we are still far from fulfilling the President's
promise to reduce the average wait time for applicants for immigration
benefits to 6 months by 2006. It also comes at a time when the
President has proposed a guest worker program that would significantly
increase the CIS workload. Of course, the guest worker program may have
simply fallen off the President's radar screen now that it has proven
unpopular with some in his party. I wrote to the President in January
and asked him to submit a legislative proposal to Congress for
implementing his plan. Despite the ever-shrinking legislative year
ahead of us, I have still not received a response.
I would like to raise one other policy issue with Mr. Aguirre while
he is here. I hope that CIS and the Administration as a whole will
support bipartisan efforts in Congress to increase the cap for the H-2B
visa program. Your department recently announced that the statutory cap
for this program had already been reached, causing tourism-dependent
businesses across the country to fear they will be unable to serve
their customers this summer. I have joined with at least 13 of my
colleagues--including the Chairman of the full committee--to introduce
S. 2252, the Save Summer Act of 2004. This bill would increase the cap
for the current fiscal year by 40,000. It is a necessary response to a
critical and unexpected problem, and I urge the Administration to
support it.
I look forward to hearing your testimony.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Shelby.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, Mr. Secretary, let me thank you for the bureau's
efforts to stop the exploitation of children. I have worked
with you and your predecessors for many years to ensure that
the people that would take advantage of and seek to prosper
from the exploitation of children are prosecuted to the fullest
extent of the law. I remain committed to working with you to
eliminate the threat to our children.
In addition, I know you have been working with our partners
at the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. Let
me encourage you to maintain that partnership. I think it has
been very valuable and it works. The center is an invaluable
asset, I think, in our quest to protect our children in
America.
OPERATION PREDATOR
I understand that Operation Predator is underway. And
Senator Leahy alluded to that. I am interested in its progress
and what the funding requirements are to maintain this
important program in 2005. I am also interested in learning of
any additional programs that are dedicated to eliminating
crimes against children, I would appreciate it if you would
take the time to go over some of these in your testimony or
questions.
NUMBER OF ILLEGAL ALIENS RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES
Among your many goals here is the charge to secure our
borders, Mr. Director, and to control illegal immigration. I am
told that the most current estimates place the number of
illegal aliens in our country at over 8 million. I believe it
is much more than that.
Gentlemen, what is your best estimate on the number of
illegal aliens currently residing in this country? How many new
illegal aliens entered the country last year? Is that an
increase or a decrease from the previous year? I fear that it
is an increase. If we are so uncertain about the numbers, does
that not seem to indicate that we are not doing enough to
secure our borders and our homeland?
OVERSTAYS
Another major problem with our immigration system is the
fact that many of these people currently counted as illegals
actually entered the country legally, but have overstayed their
visas. Do you have any recent numbers on visa overstays, given
that this makes up a large part of our illegal population?
Next, what is your agency doing right now, and what are you
planning to do in the future, to ensure that this does not
continue to be a problem? That is, they get a visa, they come
in, they do not go back, and you do not know where they are.
There must be a way to keep track of these folks.
STEMMING THE FLOW OF ILLEGAL ALIENS INTO THE UNITED STATES
I spent this past week conducting county meetings all over
the State of Alabama, my State. Without fail, at every meeting
I was asked what the Federal Government was doing to stem the
flow of illegal aliens into the United States. Unfortunately,
my answer to them was, ``obviously not enough.''
What is the directorate doing to make our borders more
secure and eliminate the influx of illegal aliens in this
country? How many aliens have been detained and deported in the
last year? I am asking these questions, and I hope you will
touch on all of them.
If a Mexican citizen looking for work can pay a fee to a
coyote to traverse our border, what is to keep terrorists that
will do us harm from doing the same thing? I have been told
many times, and I believe it, that rewarding bad behavior only
encourages more bad behavior. We learn that as children.
Currently, if you break the law entering the United States, you
get a job. Now that is not what the law provides, but it sure
seems to be what is happening.
I have serious concerns about the ramification of proposals
that sound a lot like the amnesty of 1986. If the current
proposals are put into effect, the criminal would not only get
a job, but social security and welfare benefits as well. I have
been told that the rate of illegal immigration actually
increased after the 1986 amnesty. Is there any truth to that
statement? Would you agree that we spend too much time and
money on the vetting process for those following the paths to
legal immigration, and not enough trying to catch those people
who are willing to break the law and pay $50 to be at work in
the States in a couple of days. What are we going to do, or
what are you going to do, to rectify the problem?
I know I have posed a number of questions here in a short
time. And I hope you will address them.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Murray.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATTY MURRAY
Senator Murray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join all
of my colleagues in welcoming our witnesses today. You have a
tremendous task before you. And I want to thank you for your
service.
$1.2 BILLION SHORTFALL CAUSE OF HIRING FREEZE
I became increasingly concerned about the level of the
President's budget request when I read that, according to the
Wall Street Journal, a $1.2 billion shortfall has caused a
hiring freeze within your agency. So I hope your testimony will
clear up whether that is actually a computer glitch or an
accounting error resulting from combing budgets from legal
agencies or a real budget shortfall that this subcommittee will
need to deal with.
SECURING LAND AND SEAPORTS-OF-ENTRY
Mr. Chairman, my questions today will focus on the
administration's plan for securing our ports of entry, both on
land and our seaports. As we all know, many experts in the
security arena, including some in your own department, have
said that securing cargo coming into this country should be one
of our Nation's highest priorities. I could not agree more. We
absolutely need a coordinated plan for a nationwide cargo
security regime.
TURF BATTLES
However, I have been very disappointed with the turf
battles that have been going on between Customs, TSA, and the
Coast Guard as to who is in charge of cargo security. So I will
want to explore with Commissioner Bonner how he plans on
working under Secretary Hutchinson to implement each of the
Department of Homeland Security's port and security programs
into one coordinate regime.
CUSTOMS OFFICERS
I am also interested to hear how our Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) officers are being received overseas and the
level of cooperation foreign customs agents are provided within
programs like CSI and C-TPAT. I will also have questions about
the implementation of security technology, such as radiation
portal monitors at our ports of entry.
Mr. Chairman, as always, I look forward to an informative
hearing. I will have more specific topics to discuss with our
witnesses during the question and answer period.
Thank you very much.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Stevens.
Senator Stevens. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I have
come to hear the testimony. No questions.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Senator.
We are now ready to proceed. Mr. Aguirre, we will be glad
to hear from you any opening statement that you have or
comments in explanation of the President's budget request for
your agency.
STATEMENT OF EDUARDO AGUIRRE, JR.
Mr. Aguirre. Good morning, Chairman Cochran and Ranking
Member Byrd and members of the subcommittee. My name is Eduardo
Aguirre. And I have the honor of serving as the first Director
of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services within the
Department of Homeland Security.
In previous congressional testimony, I have shared my story
of having arrived to the United States as a 15-year-old
unaccompanied minor from Cuba. My parents sent me here to
escape a repressive regime and to experience the freedoms and
opportunities found only in America. I became a product of the
legal immigration track, the very system that I am now charged
with fundamentally transforming.
We are a welcoming . And hard work and patriotism of our
immigrants has made our Nation prosperous. We seek to continue
to improve the administration of immigration benefits for the
more than 6 million applicants who legally petition USCIS every
year. Last year, upon creation of the USCIS, a team of 15,000
and I embraced a simple but imperative mission, making certain
that the right applicant receives the right benefit in the
right amount of time or preventing the wrong individuals from
obtaining our benefits.
THREE PRIORITIES
We established three priorities that guide every aspect of
our work: Eliminating the immigration benefit application
backlog, improving customer service, while enhancing national
security. As we mark our institutional 1-year anniversary, I am
particularly pleased with the progress we have made and the
professionalism exhibited by our employees day in and day out,
while mitigating security threats that we know to be real and
relentless.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS TO DATE
To date, we have initiated online options for two
application types, as well as case status updates. And we will
be adding six more applications in May, which will account for
over 50 percent of our work. We have established the Office of
Citizenship. We have eliminated lines at some of our highest
volume offices, and much more.
USCIS is one of the largest fee-funded agencies in the
Federal Government, charging fees from a variety of benefits
from individuals seeking to enter, reside, or work in the
United States. Therefore, the actual cash flow for our business
operations vary from year to year with the number of
immigration benefit applications received.
BACKLOG REDUCTION
Mr. Chairman, as you know too well, backlogs from
immigration benefit applications began to grow during the
1990s, seeing an overall 77-percent increase from fiscal year
1993 to fiscal year 2001. Beginning with fiscal year 2002,
President Bush pledged and the Congress supported a multi-year
$500 million initiative to attain the universal 6-month
processing time standard by fiscal year 2006 for all
immigration benefit applications while providing quality
service to all customers.
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget request seeks an
additional $60 million in appropriated funds to boost the total
dedicated to backlog reduction efforts to $160 million. The
overall budget request for USCIS is $1.711 billion, which is
$140 million in discretionary appropriated funds and $1.571
billion in fees.
The old INS developed a comprehensive backlog elimination
plan prior to September 11, 2001, to achieve this goal. And we
initially realized significant improvements in fiscal year
2002. Processing times for applications averaged by type
between 3 and 72 months. By the end of the year, these same
averages were reduced to between 1 and 26 months. However, as
we all know, September 11, 2001, profoundly affected our
business operations, employees, and stakeholders. New guidance
was issued. Security background checks were enhanced. And new
processes were implemented. Already, many applications were
subject to fingerprint and background checks. The enhanced
checks instituted in July 2002 represents an additional set of
name checks against a variety of workout databases housed in
the Interagency Border Inspection System, which is also called
IBIS.
SECURITY CHECKS
Approximately 35 million security checks were performed
last year by our agency. This change in the way we process
immigration benefit applications has meant higher processing
costs for USCIS. We make no apologies for our commitment to the
integrity of the immigration system. And we will not cut a
single corner or compromise security to process an application
more quickly. We are making America safer against security and
criminal threats one background check at a time.
SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS
To ensure that our backlog does not increase further, we
are currently seeking to adjust our fee schedule through the
regulatory process by recovering costs associated with
comprehensive security enhancements instituted after September
11, 2001. The cost of these security enhancements is about $140
million annually or $21 per application.
NEW PRIORITIES
The fee adjustments will also support new priorities, such
as establishing a refugee corps and establishing the new Office
of Citizenship. In addition, USCIS will develop study materials
and teaching guides to ensure that the process of preparing for
naturalization is more meaningful, as well as developing
standardized testing procedures.
We fully realize that increased funding along will not
enable us to realize our goals. We are taking a hard look at
the way we currently conduct our business. We are aggressively
working to modernize our systems and increase our capacity
through the reengineering of processes to include developing
mechanisms to interact with customers in a more forward-
reaching manner.
NEW BACKLOG ELIMINATION PLAN
We are now in the process of finalizing a new backlog
elimination plan that will outline changes to our business
processes and which will set forth our revitalized mission of
delivering immigration service in the future.
TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAM
On January 7, as has been mentioned here before, President
Bush courageously confronted a broken system, one that has been
ignored for too long. From the East Room of the White House, he
called for Congress to deliver true reform and a new temporary
worker program that facilitates economic growth, enhances
national security, and promotes compassion. Many have asked how
USCIS would implement its part of the President's temporary
worker program should Congress pass the legislation.
One of the principles of the President's proposed program
is that it should be simple and user friendly, thus one that
can be effectively administered. The President's proposal calls
for aliens present in the United States as of January 7, 2004,
to pay a processing fee upon enrolling in the program. USCIS
anticipates recovering the cost of processing the applications
through collections of a processing fee, as it is done
currently with most immigration applications. The processing
fee will be set based on a full cost recovery.
prepared statement
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. Thank you
for your invitation to testify before this committee. And I
look forward to your questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Eduardo Aguirre, Jr.,
Good afternoon Chairman Cochran, Ranking Member Byrd and Members of
the Subcommittee. My name is Eduardo Aguirre and I have the honor of
serving as the first Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, within the Department of Homeland Security.
We are a welcoming Nation, and the hard work and patriotism of our
immigrants has made our Nation prosperous. We seek to continue to
improve the administration of immigration benefits for the more than
six million applicants who petition USCIS on an annual basis.
We continue to commit ourselves to building and maintaining an
immigration services system that provides information and benefits in a
timely, accurate, consistent, courteous, and professional manner; while
preventing ineligible individuals from receiving benefits. Put more
simply, it is our job to make certain that the right applicant receives
the right benefit in the right amount of time, while preventing the
wrong individuals from obtaining our benefits.
USCIS is one of the largest fee-funded agencies in the Federal
government--charging fees for a variety of benefits from individuals
seeking to enter, reside, or work in the United States. Therefore, the
actual cash flow for our business operations, including a network of
250 local offices, Application Support Centers, Service Centers, Asylum
Offices, National Customer Service Call (NCSC) Centers, Forms Centers,
and Internet portals, varies from year to year with the number of
immigration benefit applications received.
In any typical work day, our workforce of 15,500 (one-third of whom
are contractors) will:
--Process 140,000 national security background checks;
--Receive 100,000 web hits;
--Take 50,000 calls at our Customer Service Centers;
--Adjudicate 30,000 applications for immigration benefits;
--See 25,000 visitors at 92 field offices;
--Issue 20,000 green cards; and
--Capture 8,000 sets of fingerprints and digital photos at 130
Application Support Centers.
USCIS has established three priorities: (1) eliminating the
immigration benefit application backlog, (2) improving customer
service, while (3) enhancing national security. In our first year of
operation we have: initiated on-line options for a few application
filings and case status updates; established the Office of Citizenship;
eliminated lines at some of our highest volume offices; introduced a
toll-free customer service help line; streamlined the Certificate of
Citizenship process for internationally adopted children; developed a
more secure travel document for permanent residents; and fleshed out
our leadership team.
Backlogs of immigration benefit applications began to grow during
the 1990s. Overall, there was a 77 percent increase from fiscal year
1993 to fiscal year 2001. The primary factors contributing to the
backlogs were a dramatic increase in the number of applications and
petitions received, delays in securing funding and positions to process
this increasing number of applications, the lengthy 2 amount of time it
takes to recruit, hire and train adjudicators, and the lack of a
comprehensive approach to monitoring, supporting and maintaining timely
processing.
Beginning in fiscal year 2002, the President pledged, and the
Congress supported, a multi-year $500 million initiative to attain a
universal 6-month processing time standard for all immigration benefit
applications while providing quality service to all customers. We
developed a comprehensive Backlog Elimination Plan prior to September
11, 2001 to achieve this goal. The Plan called for improvements to
processes and expanded quality assurance efforts designed to achieve a
high level of performance. We initially realized significant
improvements. In fiscal year 2002, processing times for applications
averaged, by type, between 3 and 72 months. By the end of the year,
these same averages were reduced to between one and 26 months.
However, September 11, 2001 profoundly affected our business
operations, employees, and stakeholders. New guidance was issued,
security background checks were enhanced, and new processes were
implemented, including conducting interviews for the National Security
Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS) Program.\1\ Additionally, since
July 2002, we formally enhanced our security background checks on the
processing of all immigration benefit applications to ensure that those
who receive immigration benefits have come to join the people of the
United States in building a better society and not to do us harm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Program transferred to BTS in November of 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The process of performing enhanced security checks has been
designed to compare information on applicants, and other beneficiaries
as appropriate, who apply for an immigration benefit against various
Federal lookout systems. The enhanced check instituted in July 2002
represents an additional set of name checks against a variety of
lookout databases housed in the Interagency Border Inspection System
(IBIS). Already, many applications were subject to fingerprint and
background checks.
The purpose of conducting security checks is to help law
enforcement agencies identify risks to the community and/or to national
security and to prevent ineligible individuals from obtaining
immigration benefits. On the vast majority of applications, we perform
two checks; one when the application is initially received, and one at
the time of adjudication. Approximately 35 million security checks are
performed annually.
In most of these cases (some 97 percent), the checks take only a
few minutes. In the event of a ``hit'', however, we must hold that
application without resolution until the security issue at hand is
resolved. Last fiscal year, we processed a little over six million
immigration benefit applications. Approximately 7 percent of the
applications processed resulted in an initial security hit, and after
further scrutiny, 2 percent resulted in confirmed security or criminal
threat matches.
This change in the way we process immigration benefit applications
has meant higher processing costs for USCIS because the costs of
performing these checks were not factored into the existing fee
schedule. As a result, existing resources have been diverted to perform
the additional security checks until the fees could be adjusted to
cover these costs. Although the security enhancements have meant longer
processing times in some categories and a significant growth in the
application backlog, USCIS has taken the position that security
absolutely will not be sacrificed in our search for increased
efficiency. USCIS will continue to coordinate and identify suspected
benefit fraud cases and refer them to ICE for enforcement action.
Our intra-government coordination demonstrates that our approach
realizes the intended results. By way of example, within the last month
our background check procedures identified individuals wanted for
murder in Portland and sexual assault in Miami. We are making America
safer against security and criminal threats, one background check at a
time.
I believe that the President's fiscal year 2005 budget will set us
on the right path toward enhancing immigration services. The budget
includes a total for USCIS of $1.711 billion, $140 million in
discretionary appropriated funds and $1.571 billion in fees, and seeks
an additional $60 million to boost the total dedicated to backlog
reduction efforts to $160 million. Our overall goal is to achieve a 6-
month processing time standard for all immigration benefit applications
by fiscal year 2006.
To ensure that our backlog does not increase further, we are
currently seeking to adjust our fee schedule through the regulatory
process by recovering costs associated with comprehensive security
enhancements instituted after September 11, 2001. The annual cost of
these security enhancements are about $140 million or about $21 per
application.
The fee adjustments will also support new activities such as
establishing a refugee corps to improve the quality of refugee
adjudications and establishing the new Office of Citizenship \2\ to
promote instruction and training on citizenship responsibilities to
both immigrants and U.S. citizens. The Office of Citizenship is
developing initiatives to target immigrants at two critical points on
their journey toward citizenship: when they obtain permanent resident
status and as they begin the formal naturalization process. In the
past, the Federal government provided few orientation materials for new
immigrants. In contrast, CIS will reach out to new immigrants at the
earliest opportunity to provide them with information and tools they
need to begin the process of civic integration. In addition, CIS will
develop study materials and teaching guides to ensure that the process
of preparing for naturalization is meaningful, so that immigrants who
choose to become U.S. citizens have a real understanding of the
commitment they are making when they take the Oath of Allegiance to the
United States. The establishment of a Refugee Corps will provide a
strong and effective overseas refugee processing program able to
fulfill the U.S. Refugee Program's humanitarian objectives and more
efficiently identify inadmissible persons and those who are of national
security interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ As required by the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We fully realize that increased funding alone will not enable us to
realize our goals. We are taking a hard look at the way we currently
conduct our business. We are aggressively working to modernize our
systems and increase our capacity through the reengineering of
processes, the development and implementation of new information
technology systems, and the development of mechanisms to interact with
customers in a more forward-reaching manner. For example, USCIS has
recently eliminated the backlog of applications for the Certificate of
Citizenship on Behalf of an Adopted Child with a program that
proactively provides parents the certificate.
We are now in the process of finalizing a new Backlog Elimination
Plan that will outline changes to our business processes, and which
will set forth our revitalized vision of delivering immigration
services in the future.
Additionally, we are examining the standard of knowledge in the
current citizenship test to ensure that prospective and new citizens
know not only the facts of our Nation's history, but also the ideals
that have shaped that history.
The project management team for this initiative recently met with
over a dozen historians, civics experts, and adult educators to discuss
the redesign of the U.S. history portion of the naturalization test
with the goal of making the test more meaningful, substantive, and
fair. This group is examining the meaning of significant events that
occurred in our Nation's history, and is exploring ways in which
naturalization candidates may better retain the significance of these
events. Recognizing that many Americans have strong beliefs about what
our new citizens should know about our country, we plan to publish the
proposed test content in the Federal Register and ask for public
comment. We believe that many Americans would like to have a say in
what we are asking our new citizens to learn, and we are eager to hear
from them. We look forward to briefing you and other Members of
Congress on our proposed new citizenship test content and receiving
your feedback, as well.
In a related effort, this same team is working to redesign the
current citizenship testing methodology in an effort to ensure more
uniform results. Currently, a candidate in Los Angeles is, in all
likelihood, not tested the same way or asked the same questions as a
candidate taking the same exam on the same day in Boston. Therefore, we
are developing standardized testing procedures so that applicants can
be assured that they are experiencing an equitable testing process.
We do not want to make the test more difficult. We do not want to
make it less difficult. We want to make it more meaningful in a way
that does not have an adverse impact on any particular group of
applicants. Therefore, we will carefully pilot test the revised
English, history, and government tests before implementing them. And,
we will continue to consult with our stakeholders to solicit their
input.
Our plan is to implement the new test and testing process in 2006.
Given the importance of the ultimate benefit for those tested--U.S.
citizenship--this process is not one that can or should be rushed. We
are committed to improving the current process and to improving it in
the right way.
As we celebrate our institutional 1-year anniversary, USCIS has
stood up an organization of which we are very proud. We have
established a leadership team, improved many of our operational
processes, and continue to strive to make further improvements. The
funding requested in the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request is
an important factor in continuing to improve the service we can offer
our customers.
This concludes my prepared remarks. I thank you for the invitation
to testify before this committee and I would be happy to answer any
questions.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Mr. Aguirre.
Mr. Bonner, we will be glad to hear from you now.
STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER ROBERT C. BONNER
Mr. Bonner. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Senator Byrd,
other members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here to
discuss the Customs and Border Protection, or CBP, 2005 budget
request. Let me just make a couple of observations. First of
all, one of the most important ideas of the reorganization into
the Department of Homeland Security was to do, as Secretary
Ridge put it, create one face at the border, one agency for our
borders to manage and secure the borders of our country. And
that started on March 1, 2003, just over a year ago.
When all of the immigration inspectors of the former INS,
all the agriculture border inspectors from the Department of
Agriculture, all of the border patrol agents merged with the
bulk of the U.S. Customs Service to form the Bureau of Customs
and Border Protection, an agency within the Department of
Homeland Security, responsible for managing and securing our
Nation's borders.
CBP is the largest and perhaps one of the most profound
actual mergers of people and functions taking place as a result
of the Department of Homeland Security reorganization. The
number of employees in CBP equals about one-fourth of all the
employees of the Department of Homeland Security. And that is
not particularly surprising when one considers the importance
of the security of our borders to the security of our homeland.
By unifying the border agencies we are, and we will be,
more effective and more efficient than we were when border
responsibilities were literally fragmented among four different
entities or agencies of our government, reporting to three
different departments of our government, which is the way we
were organized before March 1, 2003, before the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security.
And I will also report to this subcommittee that we have
made great progress towards successfully completing this
historic merger.
In the last year alone, I have selected one port director
for each and every one of the 300 plus ports of entry to the
United States. We no longer have two or three different port
directors for agriculture, immigration, and customs. We have
one port director at all ports-of-entry into this country.
CBP INSPECTORS
We have provided antiterrorism training for all CBP
inspectors and equipped all front line inspectors with
radiation detection devices. We have implemented unified
primary inspections at our international airports. So for the
first time, we are performing a primary inspection, not just
for immigration, but for all purposes, immigration, customs,
and agriculture purposes. No more running the gauntlet of three
different agencies when you enter the United States at one of
our international airports.
INTEGRATION OF PASSENGER ANALYSIS UNITS AND CONSOLIDATED ANTITERRORISM
SECONDARY EXAMINATIONS
We have integrated our passenger analysis units and
consolidated our anti-terrorism secondary examinations, so that
all of our customs and immigration expertise and authorities
are brought to bear, and are used in identification,
questioning, and searching of potential terrorists arriving at
our borders.
NEW CBP UNIFORM FOR ALL CBP INSPECTORS AND CREATED AN OFFICE OF THE
BORDER PATROL
We have rolled out a new CBP uniform for all of CBP
inspectors at our ports of entry. All 19,000 CBP inspectors
will be in this new uniform by July of this year. And many of
them already are. And we have integrated the border patrol in
CBP by creating an Office of the Border Patrol. We have revised
the border patrol's national strategy to reflect the priority
mission of CBP and the Department of Homeland Security. And we
have implemented portions of that by stationing now over 1,000
border patrol agents at our northern border sectors.
PRIORITY MISSION OF CBP
The priority mission of CBP is preventing terrorists and
terrorist weapons from entering our country, but we recognize
that to do that mission we need to carry it out without
stifling the flow of legitimate trade and travel that is so
vital to our country's economy and to our way of life. Those do
not have to be mutually exclusive and we are pursuing smart
border initiatives to make them mutually reinforcing.
For example, rather than physically inspecting the
approximately 23 million containers that arrive by sea, rail,
and truck into the United States yearly, which would be
tantamount to closing our borders down and shutting down our
economy, we have taken measures to identify the high-risk
containers and inspect them rapidly, using state-of-the-art
technology when they arrive at our seaports or our land
borders.
We are obtaining electronic data on virtually all shipments
that are coming to the United States. And we are using that
data in our automated targeting system to identify all
potentially high-risk containers, particularly for the
terrorist threat. And we are inspecting all high-risk
containers for terrorist weapons using our non-intrusive
inspection technology and our radiation detection technology.
CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE
We are also, though, employing a layer defense which is an
extended border strategy. And that is through the Container
Security Initiative. We are pushing our zone of security beyond
our physical borders by placing our personnel overseas to work
with other governments to target, identify, and inspect their
high-risk containers destined for the United States, and
destined for our seaports before they are loaded aboard vessels
at foreign seaports.
I am not going to discuss this chart I put up here but that
chart indicates in a nutshell that already countries, 38
foreign ports, have agreed with us to deploy and implement the
Container Security Initiative. And we have already moved out
rapidly and have implemented, by stationing our personnel
overseas as CSI targeters at 18 foreign seaports. And, of
course, we are not stopping there. We are going to continue to
expand the container security initiative.
CUSTOMS TRADE PARTNERSHIP AGAINST TERRORISM
We also, under the Customs Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism, we are working with the private sector to increase
the security of their supply chains, literally from the foreign
loading docks to our ports of entry into the United States.
FISCAL YEAR 2005 BUDGET REQUEST
Our budget request, Mr. Chairman, for 2005 for program
increase is $190 million. That includes funding for the
container security initiative to continue its expansion,
funding to expand the Customs Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism. There is some significant funding for radiation
detection equipment to further expand our portal radiation
monitors and other detection equipment at our ports of entry
into the United States to better detect against radiological
and even nuclear weapons.
PREPARED STATEMENT
There is funding for the enhancements of our automated
targeting system, as well as for surveillance and sensoring
technology for the border patrol, and some funding for UAVs to
deploy and operate Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to better detect
illegal crossings at our borders.
So I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of this
committee, for the support you have given already to Customs
and Border Protection. And in working together, I am confident
that we will succeed in better securing our borders against the
terrorist threat.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. And I will
answer any questions at the appropriate time that you or this
subcommittee may have.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert C. Bonner
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Chairman Cochran, Ranking Member Byrd, Members of the Subcommittee,
it is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today to discuss
Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) fiscal year 2005 budget request.
I want to begin by expressing my gratitude to the Committee on
Appropriations for the support it provided for important initiatives
implemented by CBP last year. That support enabled CBP to make
significant progress in protecting our country against the terrorist
threat. I also want to thank Congress for the support it provided in
creating the new Department of Homeland Security, and the new Customs
and Border Protection agency within that Department. As the head of
CBP, I look forward to working with you to build on these successes.
The priority mission of CBP is to prevent terrorists and terrorist
weapons from entering the United States. That extraordinarily important
priority mission means improving security at our physical borders and
ports of entry, but it also means extending our zone of security beyond
our physical borders--so that American borders are not the first line
of defense.
And we must do this while continuing to perform our traditional
missions well. These missions include apprehending individuals
attempting to enter the United States illegally, stemming the flow of
illegal drugs and other contraband, protecting our agricultural and
economic interests from harmful pests and diseases, protecting American
businesses from theft of their intellectual property, regulating and
facilitating international trade, collecting import duties, and
enforcing U.S. trade laws. In fiscal year 2003, CBP processed 26.1
million trade entries, collected $24.7 billion in import duties, seized
2.2 million pounds of narcotics, and processed 412.8 million
pedestrians and passengers and 132.2 million conveyances.
We must perform all of this important security and border-related
work without stifling the flow of legitimate trade and travel that is
so important to our nation's economy. In other words, we have ``twin
goals'': Building more secure and more efficient borders.
Our total program increase request for fiscal year 2005 is $223
million. These funds will help CBP fulfill its priority mission of
preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United
States. As Commissioner, I will also devote needed funds to support the
automation and information technology programs that will improve
overall operations of the agency, and I will devote funds to support
the traditional missions for which CBP is responsible.
Mr. Chairman, although I will touch on each of these areas in my
statement, and outline the actions CBP has taken or is planning to take
in each, I want to point out that in many cases, funds spent in one
area have a direct and positive impact on other areas. For example,
funds spent on automation and information technology provide invaluable
assistance to our priority mission of preventing terrorists and
terrorist weapons from entering the United States. Also, funds spent on
our priority mission often result in improvements in our effectiveness
and efficiency in carrying out our traditional missions, such as
interdicting narcotics, and vice versa.
By way of summary of the fiscal year 2005 budget for CBP, I can
tell you that the program increases we are requesting include:
--$25 million for the Container Security Initiative, which will
support the continued expansion of the program, including the
stationing of CBP personnel in additional key international
seaports to examine high-risk cargo before it is placed on
ships bound for the United States;
--$15 million for the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism to
increase supply chain security and expedite the clearance of
legitimate trade;
--$50 million for Radiation Detection and Non-Intrusive Inspection
Technology to detect weapons of mass destruction;
--$21 million for Targeting Systems Enhancements to identify high-
risk travelers and goods for inspection while allowing the vast
majority of law abiding travelers and commerce to continue
unimpeded;
--$64 million for Border Patrol Surveillance and Sensor Technology
for the expansion of the remote video system along the southern
and northern borders to detect illegal crossings and to
increase the effectiveness of agents responding to such
crossings;
--$10 million for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to develop, procure,
deploy, and operate a system of unmanned aerial vehicles to
support the Border Patrol by detecting and monitoring illegal
border crossings; and
--$5 million to support the International Trade Data System (ITDS) to
revolutionize the way international trade data is collected,
disseminated, and used.
In my statement, I will discuss these programs and others that CBP
has been working on during the past year. I would like to begin,
though, with a brief update for the Subcommittee on the status of CBP
after 1 year.
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION AT 1 YEAR
On March 1st, the Department of Homeland Security celebrated its 1
year anniversary as a Department. The anniversary marked the successful
transfer of approximately 42,000 employees from the U.S. Customs
Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to the new Customs and Border
Protection agency in the Department of Homeland Security. CBP is the
largest actual merger of people and functions within the Department of
Homeland Security. Indeed, about one-fourth of the personnel of DHS are
housed within CBP. That is not surprising considering how important the
security of our borders is to the security of our homeland.
One Face at the Border
To create CBP, on March 1, we took a substantial portion of U.S.
Customs and merged that with all of the immigration inspectors and
Border Patrol from the former INS, and inspectors from the Department
of Agriculture's APHIS. This means that for the first time in our
country's history, all agencies of the United States Government with
significant border responsibilities have been integrated and unified
into a single Federal agency responsible for managing, controlling and
securing our Nation's borders.
At CBP, we are creating, as Secretary Ridge has called it, ``One
Face at the Border''--one border agency for our country. In the year
following its creation, CBP has made significant strides toward
unification. And America is safer and its border are more secure than
they were when border responsibilities were fragmented in three
different departments of government, as they were before March 1,
2003--before the creation of the Department of Homeland Security.
On March 1, 2003, CBP designated one Port Director at each port of
entry and put in place a single, unified chain of command. This was the
first time there has ever been one person at each of our nation's ports
of entry in charge of all Federal Inspection Services. And in terms of
an immediate increase in antiterrorism security, on Day One, all
frontline, primary inspectors at all ports of entry into the United
States were equipped with radiation detection devices. Since March 1,
2003, all inspectors have also received antiterrorism training.
Last year, we began rolling out unified CBP primary inspections at
international airports around the country, starting with U.S. citizens
and Lawful Permanent Residents. Unified primary means that the CBP
inspector in the booth will conduct the primary inspection for all
purposes--immigration, customs, and agriculture. Launched at Dulles,
Houston, JFK, Newark, LAX, Atlanta, Miami, San Francisco, unified
primary is now operational at all major international airports. This is
a major step forward in eliminating the process of travelers
potentially having to ``run the gauntlet'' through three separate
inspection agencies. Although legacy customs and immigration inspectors
have assumed interchangeable roles at the land border ports of entry
for years, this is the first time unified primary has been done on a
national scale at our country's airports.
Along with unified primary, we have also developed and are
implementing combined anti-terrorism secondary which leverages the
expertise and authorities of both legacy customs and immigration to
conduct a joint secondary inspection of passengers deemed high-risk for
terrorism. CBP has also begun to coordinate and consolidate our
passenger analytical units--the units that identify potential high-risk
travelers for inspection. Again, this brings together the customs and
immigration experience and authority to more effectively and
efficiently identify and interdict individuals who pose a possible
terrorist risk.
Unifying Symbols and the CBP Officer Position
Since July 2003, we have begun rolling out a new CBP uniform and
patch for all CBP inspectors at our Nation's ports of entry. It will
replace the three different customs, agriculture, and immigration
inspectional uniforms and patches. The new uniform and patch represent
our most visible unifying symbols to the American public. The new
uniform is being implemented in four phases. In the first phase,
completed as of October 1, 2003, all CBP managers and supervisors
converted to the new uniform. Other CBP uniformed personnel will be
phased in at various points with implementation scheduled to be
complete by July of this year.
All of these actions are helping us unify and become more effective
as an agency. Perhaps our most significant step toward achieving ``One
Face at the Border,'' though, was announced by Secretary Ridge on
September 2, 2003: the rollout of the new ``CBP Officer'' position. As
of October, 2003, we stopped hiring and training legacy ``immigration''
or ``customs'' inspectors and began hiring and training a new group of
``CBP Officers,'' who will be equipped to handle all CBP primary and
many of the secondary inspection functions, in both the passenger and
cargo environments. We are also deploying CBP Agriculture Specialists
to perform more specialized agricultural inspection functions in both
these environments.
Integrated Training
Training is a very important component to the roll out of the CBP
Officer. We have created a new 14 week, 71-day basic course that
provides the training necessary to conduct primary processing and to be
familiar with secondary processing of passengers, merchandise, and
conveyances in all modes of transport--air, sea, and land. The new CBP
Officer course was built from the 53-day basic Customs inspector course
and the 57-day basic Immigration inspector course, with redundancies
removed, and with additions to address anti-terrorism and CBP's role in
agriculture inspection. The training also supports the traditional
missions of the legacy agencies integrated in CBP. Our first CBP
Officers were hired on September 22, 2003, and they immediately started
training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC).
Enhanced Security Between Ports of Entry
We have also worked very hard to integrate the Border Patrol into
CBP and simultaneously to improve the security of our country between
the ports of entry. We have revised and refocused the Border Patrol's
National Strategy, which had previously been focused on preventing the
flow of illegal aliens and drugs between ports of entry on our border
with Mexico. It now includes an aggressive strategy for protecting
against terrorist penetration, at both our northern and southern
borders.
And we have started implementing this Strategy. On 9-11, there were
only 368 authorized positions for Border Patrol agents for the entire
northern border. In the last year, we have added almost 500 agents to
the northern border, giving us more than 1,000 total--exceeding the
goal I set soon after March 1, 2003. This staffing increase will better
secure our border against terrorist penetration.
But we are doing more than just adding staffing. We are adding
sensors and other technology that assist in detecting illegal crossings
along both our northern and southern borders, including Remote Video
Surveillance (RVS) systems. These RVS systems are real-time remotely
controlled force enhancement camera systems, which provide coverage
along the northern and southern land borders of the United States, 24
hours per day, 7 days a week. The RVS system significantly enhances the
Border Patrol's ability to detect, identify, and respond to border
intrusions, and it has a deterrent value as well.
And we have seen gains in security by integrating the Border Patrol
into CBP. For example, the Office of Field Operations and the Office of
the Border Patrol are now able to quickly and easily share equipment
and information to support one another, and have done so on many
occasions, whether it be the use of radiation detection equipment at
higher threat conditions, or the use of truck imaging equipment to
detect and deter human smuggling.
meeting our twin goals: building more secure and more efficient borders
As the single, unified border agency of the United States, CBP's
mission is vitally important to the protection of America and the
American people. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September
11th, we have developed numerous initiatives to meet our twin goals of
improving security and facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and
travel. Funds from the fiscal year 2005 budget will help us expand
those initiatives and to begin new ones to ensure further protection of
both the American people and the American economy. Our strategy in
implementing these initiatives involves a number of factors, including:
(A) constantly improving and expanding our targeting systems to better
screen more people and goods entering and departing the United States;
(B) pushing our ``zone of security outward'' by partnering with other
countries; (C) pushing our ``zone of security outward'' by partnering
with the private sector; (D) deploying advanced inspection technology
and equipment at our ports of entry to detect weapons of mass
destruction; and (E) deploying advanced detection and monitoring
equipment between our ports of entry to detect illegal crossings.
Enhancing our ability to identify high-risk people and cargo
Information is one of the most important keys to our ability to
increase security without stifling legitimate trade and travel. Good
information enables us to more accurately identify--or target--what is
``high risk,'' defined as a potential threat, and what is low risk or
absolutely no risk whatsoever. The separation of high risk from no risk
is critical because searching 100 percent of the cargo and people that
enter the United States would unnecessarily cripple the flow of
legitimate trade and travel to the United States. What is necessary and
advisable is searching 100 percent of the highrisk cargo and people
that enter our country. To do this, we need to be able to identify what
is high risk, and do so as early in the process as possible. CBP has
several programs and initiatives that help us accomplish that task.
Advance Electronic Information
Since September 11th, CBP has taken numerous steps to ensure that
it has the information it needs, at the right time, to identify all
high-risk people and shipments destined for the United States. As a
result of these efforts, and the strong support of the Congress, CBP
now has, among other authorities, the statutory authority to require
Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data on all
people flying into and out of the United States, as well as advanced,
electronic manifest data on cargo destined for or departing the United
States. CBP has worked aggressively to promulgate and implement
regulations pursuant to these enabling statutes. For example, we are
currently implementing regulations requiring advance, electronic
manifest (or similar) data on virtually all cargo coming into the
United States by any mode (rail, truck, aircraft, vessel), whereas this
data was previously provided on a voluntary, and very limited basis.
These requirements should be fully implemented by early fiscal year
2005.
National Targeting Center (NTC)
The NTC began around the clock operations on November 10, 2001,
with a priority mission of providing tactical targeting and analytical
research support for Customs' anti-terrorism efforts. As personnel from
Customs, the INS, and the USDA came together on March 1, 2003, under
the umbrella of CBP, the NTC mission broadened commensurately with the
CBP role in support of Homeland Security.
The NTC is primarily staffed by CBP Officers and analysts that are
experts in passenger and cargo targeting for air, sea, and land
operations in the inbound and outbound environments. The NTC develops
tactical targets--potentially high-risk people and shipments that
should be subject to a CBP inspection--from raw intelligence, trade,
travel, and law enforcement data. NTC also supports CBP field elements,
including Container Security Initiative (CSI) personnel stationed in
countries throughout the world, with additional research assets for
passenger and cargo examinations.
In January 2003, the NTC staff relocated to a state-of-the-art
facility. The new facility is designed to accommodate representatives
from all CBP disciplines, including representatives from the Office of
Border Patrol, the Office of Intelligence, and the Office of
Information and Technology, as well as liaison staff from the law
enforcement and intelligence communities. The NTC has developed liaison
with the Office of Naval Intelligence and the U.S. Coast Guard via an
exchange of personnel with the National Marine Intelligence Center. NTC
has also exchanged personnel with the Transportation Security
Administration, the Department of Energy, and provided targeting
expertise to the DHS Operations Center.
The funding sought in fiscal year 2005 will enable the NTC to
continue to expand its infrastructure and personnel to meet the needs
of CBP as we see continued increases in passengers and commercial
shipments coming to the United States. It will also enable the NTC to
continue to play a central role in interagency activities related to
identifying highrisk people and cargo.
Automated Targeting System
The Automated Targeting System (ATS), which is used by NTC and
field targeting units in the United States and overseas, is essential
to our ability to target high-risk cargo and passengers entering the
United States. ATS is the system through which we process advance
manifest and passenger information to pick up anomalies and ``red
flags'' and determine what cargo is ``high risk,'' and therefore will
be scrutinized at the port of entry or, in some cases, overseas.
The funding increases sought for ATS in the fiscal year 2005 budget
will allow for the continued improvement of the system as well as
provide it with the capacity to process the electronic data related to
the ever-increasing number of people and goods entering the United
States. For example, the funding will allow us to develop and implement
a version of ATS that, for the first time, will be able to identify
potentially high-risk travelers in passenger vehicles. It will also be
used to upgrade our passenger targeting system by improving the amount
of government data that the system can access and analyze as well as
provide us with the capacity to train more people on the use of the
system. On the cargo side, the funding will permit ATS to increase its
capacity and upgrade its capabilities by utilizing cutting edge
information analysis technologies developed by CBP and the private
sector.
Pushing our Zone of Security Outward--Partnering with Other Countries
Container Security Initiative (CSI)
To meet our priority mission of preventing terrorists and terrorist
weapons from entering the United States, I believe CBP must ``push our
zone of security outward''--so that our borders are not the first line
of defense to keep terrorists and terrorist weapons out of the United
States. We have done this by partnering with other countries on our
Container Security Initiative (CSI), one of the most significant and
successful homeland security initiatives developed and implemented
after 9-11.
Almost 9 million cargo containers arrive at U.S. seaports annually.
Because of the sheer volume of sea container traffic and the
opportunities it presents for terrorists, containerized shipping is
uniquely vulnerable to terrorist attack. Under CSI, which is the first
program of its kind, we are partnering with foreign governments to
identify and inspect high-risk cargo containers at foreign ports,
before they are shipped to our ports and pose a threat to the United
States and to global trade.
The four core elements of CSI are:
--First, identifying ``high-risk'' containers, using ATS and the 24-
hour rule, before they set sail for the United States.
--Second, pre-screening the ``high-risk'' containers at the foreign
CSI port before they are shipped to the United States.
--Third, using technology to pre-screen the high-risk containers,
including both radiation detectors and large-scale imaging
machines to detect potential terrorist weapons.
--Fourth, using smarter, ``tamper-evident'' containers--containers
that indicate to CBP officers at the port of arrival whether
they have been tampered with after the security screening.
CSI continues to generate exceptional participation and support.
The goal for the first phase of CSI was to implement the program at as
many of the top 20 foreign container ports--in terms of volume of cargo
containers shipped to United States seaports--as possible. Those ports
account for nearly 70 percent of all cargo containers arriving at U.S.
seaports. Today, the governments representing 19 of the top 20 ports
have agreed to implement CSI, and I am confident that we will reach
agreement with the 20th port very soon.
We announced the second phase of CSI in June 2003. Under CSI Phase
II, we will implement CSI at other foreign ports that ship a
significant volume of cargo to the United States, and that have the
infrastructure and technology in place to support the program. We have
already signed CSI agreements with Malaysia, Sweden, South Africa, and
Sri Lanka. Once we have Phase II implemented, we anticipate that CSI
will cover approximately 80 percent of the containers coming to the
United States.
Right now, CSI is operational in the following locations:
Rotterdam, the Netherlands; Le Havre, France; Bremerhaven and Hamburg,
Germany; Antwerp, Belgium; Singapore; Yokohama, Japan; Hong Kong;
Gothenburg, Sweden; Felixstowe, United Kingdom; Genoa and La Spezia,
Italy; Busan, Korea; Durban, South Africa; and Port Kelang, Malaysia.
These locations account for nearly 70 percent of all cargo containers
destined for the United States.
I want to express my gratitude to the Committee members for their
support of CSI in fiscal year 2004. With the $25 million increase in
funding that we are requesting for CSI in fiscal year 2005, we will
have CSI in place and operational at as many as 40 seaports around the
world.
Immigration Control Officers (ICOs)
Over the last few years, we have also started applying the concept
underlying CSI, i.e., pushing our zone of security beyond our borders,
to the movement of people. This effort originated with the INS and its
Immigration Control Officer (ICO) program. Through CBP, this effort is
continuing, and being refined to better address the terrorist threat.
The roles and responsibilities of the ICOs are to: (1) seek to
prevent the onward movement of people positively identified as
presenting a security threat to the carrier or passengers on
international flights destined to the United States; (2) disrupt and
deter the smuggling of special interest aliens, or fraudulently
documented and otherwise inadmissible aliens destined to the United
States; (3) provide advance notice of passengers on onward transit
airports and destination airports whose true identity and purposes
warrant closer inspection; (4) collect law enforcement intelligence on
known and suspected smugglers and smuggling facilitators; (5) seek,
through cooperation with host government law enforcement agencies and
U.S. law enforcement agencies, the apprehension and prosecution of
smugglers, facilitators and other identified criminal aliens; and (6)
provide training in fraudulent detection, migration trends, passenger
assessment and related topics to United States and host government law
enforcement, immigration and carrier personnel. The ICOs carry out
their responsibilities in accordance with the Code of Conduct for
Immigration Liaison Officers of the International Air Transport
Association.
Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have ICOs
stationed around the world. In concert with our international partners,
the INS launched Operation Global Shield in October 2002 with the
deployment of officers to more than a dozen locations, including major
transit hubs in Central and South America, Europe and the Far East.
This was a very successful effort. Operation Global Shield resulted in
2,971 interceptions in a 5 month period.
CBP is now building on the lessons learned from Operation Global
Shield as well as the experiences of our international partners to
refine the ICO concept to better respond to the threat of international
terrorism. The United States currently has over 70 legacy immigration
personnel overseas, many of whom are engaged in ICO activities, but not
on a full time basis. At CBP, we will be working with these personnel
to refine their ICO work to ensure that we prevent potential terrorists
from boarding aircraft destined for the United States. We will also be
putting in place a new, refined ICO program in Warsaw, Poland in the
near term to test and refine our antiterrorist measures before
expanding the program to other locations.
Pushing our Zone of Security Outward--Partnering with the Trade
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)
The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is a
voluntary partnership between CBP and industry to secure international
supply chains from end to-end. Through C-TPAT, participants develop and
maintain secure supply chains from the foreign factory floor to the
ultimate destination in the U.S. CBP, in return, offers C-TPAT
shipments expedited processing and provides C-TPAT participants with
other benefits.
The program is rigorous. In order to join C-TPAT, a company must
conduct a self-assessment of its current supply chain security
procedures using C-TPAT security guidelines developed in partnership
with logistics and security experts from the trade. A participant must
also commit to increasing its supply chain security by addressing any
vulnerabilities that exist. Perhaps most importantly, participants also
make a commitment to work with their business partners and customers
throughout their supply chains to ensure that those businesses also
increase their supply chain security. By leveraging the influence of
importers and others on different participants in the supply chain, C-
TPAT is able to increase security of U.S. bound goods at the time of
container stuffing. This reach--to the foreign loading dock--is
critical to the goal of increasing supply chain security.
Although C-TPAT is a partnership, we are not simply taking the
participants at their word when it comes to their supply chain
security. As a former President once said: ``Trust, but verify.''
Applying this lesson, we have created a cadre of specially trained
supply chain security specialists to validate the commitments made by
C-TPAT participants--to ensure that they are increasing supply chain
security as they have promised CBP. These specialists meet with
personnel from C-TPAT participants and their business partners and
observe the security of their supply chains, including security at
overseas loading docks and manufacturing plants. Through this process,
we work with C-TPAT participants to identify ways that they can further
increase their supply chain security and we ensure that companies that
are not honoring their commitments lose their C-TPAT privileges.
C-TPAT is currently open to all importers, cross-border air, sea,
truck, and rail carriers, brokers, freight forwarders, consolidators,
non-vessel operating common carriers (NVOCCs), and U.S. Marine and
Terminal operators. We are currently enrolling certain foreign
manufacturers in the C-TPAT program as well, and we will continue to
develop ways to include this important element of the supply chain in
the program. The intent is to construct a supply chain characterized by
active C-TPAT links at each point in the logistics process.
As of March 12, 2004, the C-TPAT participation and validation
numbers are as follows:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oldest
Security Certified Insufficient Responses Security Validations Validations
Partners Profile Partners Security Sent Profile Not Initiated Completed
Received Profiles Reviewed
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Importers...................................... 3,519 2,434 1,580 277 1,857 41 305 65
Carriers....................................... 998 803 519 90 609 34 183 40
Brokers/Forwarders............................. 1,205 934 759 109 868 31 208 106
Foreign Manufacturers.......................... 118 58 45 1 46 21 0 0
Marine Port Auth. & Terminal Op................ 41 32 23 4 27 36 22 10
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.................................... 5,881 4,261 2,926 481 3,407 N/A 718 221
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Free and Secure Trade (FAST)
Building on C-TPAT, we have created the Free and Secure Trade
(FAST) program with Canada and Mexico. This program increases the
supply chain security of goods moving across our land borders and also
facilitates the movement of legitimate commerce by aligning customs
processes on both sides of the border and offering the most expedited
customs processing available on the land border. To be eligible for
FAST processing, importers, carriers, and manufacturers (on the
southern border) must participate in C-TPAT and must use a FAST-
registered driver. Because each participant must meet C-TPAT supply
chain criteria and the driver must be vetted by CBP (including
exhaustive database checks and a personal interview), the FAST program
substantially increases the security of supply chains across our
northern and southern borders. And because FAST relies on advanced
electronic data transmissions and transponder technology, CBP can offer
FAST shipments the most expedited clearance procedures available today.
With these procedures in place, CBP can focus its security efforts and
inspections where they are needed most--on high-risk commerce.
FAST is currently operational at 11 major northern border crossings
and 2 major southern border crossings. The program will expand to
additional locations in fiscal year 2005.
I would like to thank the Committee for its consistently strong
support for C-TPAT and FAST. The $15 million funding increase we have
sought for C-TPAT in fiscal year 2005 will enable us to continue to
expand both programs by enrolling additional participants. It will also
allow us to add a substantial number of supply chain security
specialists to our ranks, thereby ensuring that as the program grows,
we will be able to conduct an appropriate number of validations. As a
result, we will substantially increase the security of our
international supply chains.
Using Technology to Detect Weapons of Mass Destruction at our Ports of
Entry
As trade increases, CBP's reliance on Non-Intrusive Inspection
(NII) technology to secure the borders becomes more and more critical.
Only by using NII technology to speed the inspections process for
weapons of mass destruction and contraband can CBP meet its twin goals
of increasing security and at the same time facilitating trade.
CBP uses various technologies in different combinations to
substantially increase the likelihood that a nuclear or radiological
weapon or weapons grade material will be detected. In addition, CBP
uses NII technology to detect and interdict narcotics, currency and
other contraband secreted in large containers and commercial shipments.
Technologies deployed to our nation's land, sea and air ports of entry
include largescale X-ray and gamma-imaging systems--systems that can
image the contents of an entire container in seconds. These systems
include the Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS), Mobile VACIS,
Truck X-ray, Mobile Truck X-ray, Rail VACIS, Mobile Sea Container
Examinations Systems and the Pallet Gamma-ray System. In September
1996, our first large-scale NII system, a Truck X-ray, became
operational in Otay Mesa, California. Today, we have 145 large-scale
NII systems deployed.
In addition, we have developed and begun implementing a national
radiation detection strategy. Pursuant to that Strategy, we are
deploying nuclear and radiological detection equipment to include
personal radiation detectors (PRDs), radiation portal monitors (RPMs)
and next generation radiation isotope identifier devices (RIIDs). In
combination with our layered enforcement strategy--working overseas to
prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials and to detect them
before they are shipped to the United States--and our use of multiple
inspection technologies, these tools currently provide CBP with
significant capacity to detect nuclear or radiological materials. Our
fiscal year 2005 request for $50 million would provide CBP with the
funding to continue to purchase and deploy the technologies needed to
implement its national radiation detection strategy.
Using Technology to Detect and Monitor Illegal Crossings Between our
Ports of Entry
Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS)
ISIS is a critical part of CBP's strategy to build smarter borders.
By using remotely monitored night-day camera and sensing systems, the
Border Patrol can better detect, monitor, and respond to illegal
crossings. This, in turn, is critical to the Border Patrol's ability to
increase its apprehension capabilities, particularly along our northern
border. As a result, the deployment of ISIS is a critical component of
the Border Patrol's revised National Strategy to prevent terrorists
from entering the United States and to gain control of our nation's
borders.
ISIS consists of three independent components: (1) the remote video
surveillance (RVS) camera system; (2) sensors; (3) the Integrated
Computer Assisted Detection (ICAD) database. The RVS system integrates
multiple color, thermal and infrared cameras, which are mounted on
various structures, into a single remote controlled system. The network
of sensors consists of seismic, magnetic and thermal devices used to
detect and track intrusions. ICAD software components assist in the
coordination and data collection of agent deployment in response to
sensor alarms.
The $64.1 million in ISIS funding sought in 2005 would enable CBP
to broaden substantially its ISIS coverage of the northern and southern
borders--to deploy the system where no ISIS coverage currently exists.
This is important because Border Patrol experience has shown that in
locations where ISIS is deployed, fewer agents can do a better job of
securing the border. ISIS acts as an important force-multiplier that
allows Border Patrol agents to remotely monitor the border and respond
to specific illegal border crossings rather than having to exhaustively
patrol an area adjacent to the border. By contrast, Border Patrol
operations without ISIS support are not only less effective, they are
more resource-intensive and less safe for Agents.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
Like ISIS, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are both an important
part of the smarter border strategy and an essential element of the
Border Patrol's revised National Strategy. UAVs equipped with
sophisticated on-board sensors have the potential to provide
unparalleled surveillance capability. UAVs provide long-range
surveillance. As a result, they are especially effective force-
multipliers because they have the capacity to remain on station much
longer than other airborne assets, and are particularly useful for
monitoring remote land border areas where patrols cannot easily travel
and infrastructure is difficult or impossible to build.
UAVs will perform missions involving gathering intelligence on
border activities was well as conducting surveillance over open water
along the Gulf Coast, the Florida peninsula and the Great Lakes region
on the northern border. The high endurance of the larger classes of
UAVs permits uninterrupted overnight or around-the-clock coverage, and
the size and operating altitudes can make UAVs effectively undetectable
by unaided human senses. UAVs will also contribute to enforcement
effectiveness and officer safety by providing communications links for
coordinating multiple units on the ground is important in remote border
operating areas.
The $10 million in funding sought for UAVs will enable CBP to
capitalize more fully on the UAV research that has taken place in a
military context, and to apply UAVs in support of the Homeland Security
mission. The funding would allow CBP to deploy and operate a system of
unmanned aerial vehicles in support of the Border Patrol and other
components of Customs and Border Protection. The use of UAVs will
complement the other intrusion detection and intelligence gathering
components of the border surveillance network to meet the mission of
stopping the illegal entry of terrorists, smugglers and others into the
United States.
AUTOMATION/INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Mr. Chairman, no discussion of a successful strategy to protect the
American people and the American economy in the 21st century would be
complete without consideration of the central importance of automation
and information technology to CBP's mission.
Automated Commercial Environment
The Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) is an important project
for CBP, for the business community, for our country, and for the
future of global trade. If done properly, it will reform the way we do
business with the trade community. It will also greatly assist CBP in
the advance collection of information for targeting high-risk cargo to
better address the terrorist threat. And in doing so, it will help us
expedite the vast majority of low-risk trade.
The successful implementation of ACE has been and continues to be
one of my top priorities as Commissioner. Increasing support from
Congress and the Administration for ACE has been essential to the
development of the new system. Funding of $319 million in fiscal year
2004 has enabled us to continue development and begin to deliver on the
first installment of ACE benefits to the trade community. Indeed, since
my testimony last year, I can tell you that the development of ACE and
the efforts to put its capabilities to work on America's borders have
continued full throttle while CBP works with the Homeland Security
Investment Review Group to analyze the existing IT systems being used
by DHS agencies, identify redundant technology investments, and plan
for the DHS's IT architecture. Among many other accomplishments, this
past year brought ACE release to the public for the first time.
Currently, 50 importer accounts and related CBP personnel have access
to the ACE Secure Data Portal to conduct their CBP business
transactions on-line. This portal provides reliable, secure, highspeed
access to critical information. When fully deployed, this will be the
basic tool by which all users within the trade community and government
access ACE.
I want to thank Congress again for its past support of ACE. The
continued support of ACE with $322 million in funding for fiscal year
2005 will enable us to keep pace with our schedule for ACE releases in
2004 and 2005. Those include:
--Summer 2004.--Release 3 (Account Revenue: Periodic Statements and
Payments): Initial account revenue will be enabled, allowing
accounts to centralize payment processing and utilize periodic
statement and payment capabilities as well as ACH Credit and
Debit.
--Winter 2005.--Release 4 (Truck Manifest and e-Release): Cargo
Processing will be introduced with the implementation of
Automated Truck Manifest and Preferred & eRelease for trucks.
This will allow for quicker entry for pre-filed and pre-
approved cargo.
International Trade Data System (ITDS)
One important, fully integrated component of ACE is the
International Trade Data System (ITDS). The ITDS initiative is an e-
Government strategy being designed developed, and deployed jointly with
ACE that will implement an integrated, government-wide system for the
electronic collection, use, and dissemination of the international
trade transaction data required by the various trade-related Federal
agencies.
ITDS will simplify and streamline the regulation, promotion, and
analysis of international trade. It will also assist importers,
exporters, carriers, and brokers in complying with Federal trade,
transportation, and other regulations by streamlining business
processes. ITDS is customer focused and will serve as the government's
``single window'' into international trade data collection and
distribution.
In conjunction with ACE, ITDS will also improve risk assessment. By
centralizing and integrating the collection and analysis of
information, ACE will enhance CBP's ability to target cargo, persons,
and conveyances. The trade data will allow for advanced inter-agency
assessment of risks and threats to determine which goods and people
must be scrutinized. In addition, Through ACE, the ITDS will be capable
of linking the government's law enforcement and other databases into
one large-scale relational database that tracks all commerce crossing
our borders. ITDS thus extends the functionality of ACE by bringing
together critical security, public health, public safety, and
environmental protection agencies under a common platform.
The $5 million increase we are requesting in the fiscal year 2005
budget for ITDS will allow us to ensure integration of ITDS with key
Federal agencies, and keep us on schedule to have full functionality
rolled out by winter 2006-2007.
OTHER TRADITIONAL MISSIONS
Although CBP's priority mission is preventing terrorists and
terrorist weapons from entering the United States, we know that we
must--and will--accomplish that priority mission while continuing to
perform our traditional missions well. Included among those missions
are our responsibilities for interdicting drugs, apprehending 16
individuals who enter the United States illegally, regulating and
facilitating international trade, and protecting U.S. agricultural and
economic interests from harmful pests and diseases.
Drug Interdiction
Our counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions are not mutually
exclusive, and one does not necessarily come at the expense of the
other. The initiatives we have put in place to prevent terrorists and
terrorist weapons from entering the United States have enabled us to be
more effective in seizing other illegal contraband, including illegal
drugs. Indeed, one of the first results we saw after implementing ATS
for commercial trucks on the land border was a large narcotics seizure
from a targeted shipment. And, it is worth noting that the lessons we
have learned in our battle against international drug trafficking will
help us in the fight against international terrorism.
It would be a grave mistake for drug traffickers and other
criminals to misinterpret our focus on terrorism as a weakening of
resolve on other fronts. If anything, we have made life even more
miserable for drug smugglers as we have intensified our overall
presence along America's borders. Our heightened state of security
along America's borders has strengthened, not weakened, our
counternarcotics mission. As we have added staffing for both inspectors
at the ports of entry and Border Patrol Agents between the ports of
entry, acquired more inspection technology, conducted more questioning
of travelers, and carried out more inspections of passengers and goods
in response to the terrorist threat, we have seized greater amounts of
narcotics. In fiscal year 2003, for example, we seized more than 2.2
million pounds of illegal drugs, and made some of the largest
individual seizures ever recorded by officers safeguarding our borders.
Effective coordination between inspectors at the ports of entry and
agents who carry out investigative activities is essential to the
success of our counternarcotics mission. For that reason, CBP will
continue to cooperate closely with special agents from U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement to carry out this mission.
Apprehending individuals entering illegally between the ports of entry
The Office of the Border Patrol is specifically responsible for
patrolling the 6,000 miles of Mexican and Canadian international land
borders and 2,000 miles of coastal waters surrounding the Florida
Peninsula and the island of Puerto Rico. Its primary task is securing
America's borders between official ports of entry by preventing the
illegal entry of people, goods, and contraband across our borders.
The Border Patrol relies on agents, enforcement equipment (such as
a fleet of specialized aircraft and vehicles of various types),
technology (such as sensors and night vision cameras), tactical
infrastructure (such as roads and vehicle barriers), and intelligence
to carry out its mission. Applied in the correct combination, these
resources can effectively deter, detect, monitor, and respond to
illegal border crossings, as we have seen in locations such as the San
Diego Sector and during operations such as Desert Safeguard.
In fiscal year 2003, the Border Patrol played a key role in
safeguarding the United States from the entry of terrorists, criminals,
and illegal immigrants. Among the 931,557 people apprehended by the
Border Patrol in fiscal year 2003 were:
--Two Indian aliens illegally in the United States who were wanted in
Canada for attempted murder after they allegedly tied-up,
tortured, doused in gasoline, and lit a person on fire;
--One of the ten most wanted criminals in Texas;
--An Iranian citizen illegally in the United States with an extensive
criminal history and who may have been involved in bomb making
and other serious illegal activity at the time of his arrest at
the San Clemente checkpoint;
--A Turkish citizen illegally in the United States who may have been
involved in serious illegal activity at the time of his arrest
at McAllen International Airport; and
--An alleged resident of the United Arab Emirates illegally in the
United States who may have been involved in serious illegal
activity at the time of his arrest in Louisiana.
Building on these gains, and drawing on the lessons we learned
during Desert Safeguard, CBP is working with other agencies and the
Mexican Government to implement the Arizona Border Control Initiative
this year. Under this initiative, CBP will substantially reduce the
number of illegal entries that occur in Arizona this year and, as a
result, will reduce the number of deaths that occur as aliens try to
cross the Arizona desert during the warmest months of the year.
Preventing individuals from entering illegally at the ports of entry
With respect to preventing individuals from entering the country
illegally at the ports of entry, CBP continues to stop hundreds of
thousands of people a year who are inadmissible into the United States
for a variety of reasons, including prior immigration violations,
criminal history, or the possession of false or fraudulent documents.
We are helped in this effort by our close work with the Department
of State to ensure CBP inspectors have the tools they need to verify
the identity of visa holders and the authenticity of visas issued by
the Department of State. Data on holders of immigrant visas is
transferred electronically to ports of entry. When the electronic
record is updated to reflect an immigrant's admission at a port of
entry, that data is transferred electronically to the Bureau of
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) for production of a
permanent resident card and creation of the immigrant file.
More importantly, with the successful implementation of US VISIT at
our international airports earlier this year, CBP officers now have
access to photographs and data transmitted electronically by the
Department of State relating to holders of nonimmigrant visas. This
permits officers on the primary line to review visa application data
and verify the identity of the holder. This has virtually eliminated
the possibility that a traveler could use a false or fraudulent visa to
enter the United States.
Regulating and facilitating international trade
CBP maintains responsibility for regulating and facilitating
legitimate international trade. As I mentioned earlier, many of the
initiatives CBP implements serve the twin goals of increasing security
and facilitating trade. With the right level of industry partnership
and the right combination of resources, we can succeed not only in
protecting legitimate trade from being used by terrorists, we can
actually build a better, faster, more productive system of trade
facilitation for the U.S. economy.
We have continued to work with the trade on these matters over the
past year, and we will continue to do so in the year ahead. For
example, we worked with all segments of the maritime trade to make
changes to the 24-hour rule and our computer systems to better
facilitate the movement of sea containers in our domestic seaports and
to inland destinations. We also worked very closely with the trade to
craft and implement our Trade Act regulations, and we will continue
this process during the rest of this year. Finally, we have partnered
with the trade and technology companies to design and test a smarter,
more secure sea container. More importantly, members of the trade are
using this container. Through C-TPAT, we have partnered with several
large importers to begin using these containers, and we expect to see
their use rise substantially in the months ahead.
Protecting U.S. agricultural and economic interests and the food supply
CBP now overseas the enforcement of the laws and regulations
pertaining to the safe importation and entry of agricultural food
commodities into the United States. The traditional goals of the
Agriculture Inspections (AI) program have been to reduce the risk of
introduction of invasive species into the United States, protect U.S.
agricultural resources, maintain the marketability of agricultural
products, and facilitate the movement of lawabiding people and
commodities across the borders. Accordingly, inspecting potentially
high-risk travelers and cargo is critical to keeping the prohibited
items out of the United States, monitoring for significant agricultural
health threats, encouraging compliance with regulations, and educating
the public and importers about agricultural quarantine regulations.
With the creation of CBP, the AI program has expanded its focus to
include a new priority mission of preventing potential terrorist
threats involving agriculture. Indeed, the threat of intentional
introductions of pests or pathogens as a means of biological warfare or
terrorism is an emerging concern. To address this threat and to enhance
its traditional AI missions, CBP has already begun using the Automated
Targeting System, and its collective expertise regarding terrorism and
agriculture, to strengthen our ability to identify shipments that may
pose a potential risk to our agricultural interests.
In addition, CBP has worked closely with the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to implement the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 to guard against
threats to the food supply. In the last several months, we have
modified our electronic data collection systems to collect data from
the trade required under the Bioterrorism Act, implemented a joint
risk-management system for food shipments with FDA that builds off or
Automated Targeting System, and commissioned CBP officers to utilize
FDA authorities in certain circumstances at the ports of entry. These
efforts have built on our priority and traditional missions to make the
food supply more secure, and will be supported in part by the targeting
funding sought in the fiscal year 2005 budget.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I have outlined a broad
array of initiatives today that, with your assistance, will help CBP
continue to protect America from the terrorist threat while fulfilling
our other traditional missions. Because of your support, and because of
the creation of DHS and CBP, we are far safer today than we were on
September 11th. But our work is not complete. With the continued
support of the President, DHS, and the Congress, CBP will succeed in
meeting the challenges posed by the ongoing terrorist threat and the
need to facilitate ever-increasing numbers of legitimate shipments and
travelers.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I would be happy
to answer any of your questions.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Mr. Bonner.
Mr. Garcia, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. GARCIA
Mr. Garcia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. Good
morning, Senator Byrd, distinguished members of the
subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be with you today to discuss
the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request for the
Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement. The request of just over $4 billion reflects the
vital role ICE plays in the Department's overall mission of
ensuring the security of the American people.
A little more than 1 year ago, ICE was formed by combining
the investigative and intelligence arms of the former INS and
the U.S. Customs Service, including Air and Marine operations,
as well as the Federal Protective Service and more recently the
Federal Air Marshal Service. By integrating these once-
fragmented resources, the Department of Homeland Security not
only created the second largest investigative agency in the
Federal Government, but it also created a dynamic and
innovative new law enforcement organization focused on homeland
security, specifically border security, air security, and
economic security.
Senator Byrd mentioned that we are looking at the
vulnerabilities facing this. And the primary mission of ICE and
the Department of Homeland Security is to detect and address
those vulnerabilities in our national security, whether those
vulnerabilities expose our financial systems to exploitation or
our borders to infiltration.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS WITHIN THE PAST YEAR
Earlier this month, the dedicated men and women of ICE
joined me in celebrating our 1-year anniversary and our many
accomplishments within the past year. I will highlight only a
few.
ICE is protecting U.S. economic security. And since last
March, ICE financial investigations have yielded more than
1,300 arrests and seized more than $150 million in assets.
In July, ICE launched Cornerstone, a comprehensive
initiative that forms a new partnership with the financial,
commercial, and trade sectors to identify and mitigate U.S.
economic vulnerabilities.
Last fall, ICE launched Ice Storm, a comprehensive
initiative to combat violent human smuggling organizations
along the southwest border, with particular focus on Arizona.
Ice Storm has resulted in more than 2,000 administrative and
criminal arrests, 170 indictments, and the seizure of more than
80 weapons and $2 million. Local police credit Ice Storm with
the more than 30-percent drop in homicides in the Phoenix area
in the last quarter of 2003 compared to the same period of a
year ago.
OPERATION PREDATOR
Senator Shelby mentioned Operation Predator. That is an
operation we launched last July with the secretary. We targeted
child sex predators worldwide under this operation, which fuses
the authorities and resources of virtually every ICE component
into a comprehensive campaign against child sex predators. To
date, Operation Predator has produced unprecedented results
with the arrest of more than 2,000 child sex predators
nationwide.
FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS SERVICE
The ICE Federal Air Marshals Service became a distinct ICE
division in November of 2003. ICE agents are being cross-
trained as Federal air marshals, giving ICE FAMS a cadre of
trained agents for use when needed. Since September 11, ICE
FAMS have provided security on hundreds of thousands of
flights, protected millions of passengers, flown millions of
miles. Their efforts have helped keep the U.S. civil aviation
sector free of terrorism since September 11, 2001.
FISCAL YEAR 2005 BUDGET REQUEST
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget will continue to
strengthen ICE's efforts to protect the homeland through the
unique investigative and enforcement tools of this agency. The
proposed 2005 budget and plan to enhance the department's
commitment to securing the homeland is designed to build upon
the strong foundation I have just described. The President's
2005 budget request seeks over $4 billion for ICE, $320 million
more than 2004, an increase of 8 percent.
The requested increases include $186 million for ICE to
fund improvements in immigration enforcement both domestically
and overseas, including the more than doubling of current
worksite enforcement efforts, increased resources to combat
benefits fraud and investigate violations of the SEVIS and US
VISIT systems, and approximately $100 million increase for the
detention and removal of illegal aliens. Detention or removal
illegal aliens present in the United States is critical to the
enforcement of our immigration laws. And the requested funding
will expand ongoing fugitive apprehension efforts, the removal
from the United States of jailed illegal aliens, and additional
detention and removal capacity.
Critical to the removal process is ICE's ability to
effectively litigate cases before the immigration court. The
budget includes our request for $6 million enhancement to
provide additional attorneys to keep pace with an increasing
caseload. Our budget also seeks $14 million to support our
international enforcement efforts related to immigration,
including enabling ICE to provide visa security by working
cooperatively with U.S. consular offices to review these
applications.
The budget request also seeks $40 million in total
enhancement for Air and Marine operations, for long-range
radar, and increased P-3 flight hours.
RECONCILIATION OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET
Many challenges lie ahead, including reconciliation of the
2004 budget, as was mentioned earlier today, and the mapping
issues that go with that. These are serious issues, and this is
a serious undertaking. I very much appreciate the support of
the subcommittee members. It is a great responsibility. We are
committed to protecting the homeland with new approaches to old
problems and new approaches to the new challenges we face after
September 11.
PREPARED STATEMENT
We are committed to managing the transition, as
Commissioner Bonner mentioned, of the INS distribution of
assets, as well as the Customs breakup. This is a very complex
reorganization. And in it we are also committed to being
fiscally responsible.
I look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman and
members of this subcommittee. This concludes my prepared
statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you might
have at this time.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Mr. Garcia.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael J. Garcia
Introduction
Good morning Chairman Cochran, Senator Byrd, and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be with you today to
discuss the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request for the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE). This $4.011 billion request reflects the vital role
ICE plays in the Department's overall mission of ensuring the security
of the American people and our way of life.
A little more than one year ago ICE was formed by combining the
investigative and intelligence arms of the former Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) and the U.S. Customs Service, including
Air and Marine Operations, as well as the Federal Protective Service
and the Federal Air Marshal Service. By integrating these once
fragmented resources, the Department of Homeland Security not only
created the second largest investigative agency in the Federal
government, but it also created a dynamic and innovative new law
enforcement organization uniquely and exclusively focused on homeland
security--specifically border security, air security, and economic
security.
The primary mission of ICE and the Department of Homeland Security
is to detect and address vulnerabilities in our national security--
whether those vulnerabilities expose our financial systems to
exploitation or our borders to infiltration. With its enhanced ability
to investigate immigration and customs violation--for example our
ability to target human smuggling alongside of narcotics, weapons, and
other forms of smuggling and follow the illicit money trail wherever it
may lead--ICE is in a unique position to enforce our homeland security
missions in ways never before possible.
Earlier this month the dedicated men and women of ICE joined me in
celebration of our one-year anniversary and our many accomplishments
within the past year. This, of course, could not have been accomplished
without the support of Congress and the fiscal year 2004
Appropriations. Our accomplishments this year are many but I will only
highlight a few:
Targeting Child Sex Predators Worldwide.--Operation Predator fuses
the authorities and resources of virtually every ICE component into a
comprehensive campaign against child sex offenders. To date, Operation
Predator has produced unprecedented results with the arrest of more
than 2,057 child sex predators nationwide.
Protecting U.S. Economic Security.--Since last March, ICE financial
investigations have yielded more than 1,330 arrests and seized $154
million in assets. In July, ICE launched Cornerstone, a comprehensive
initiative that forms a new partnership with the financial, commercial
and trade sectors to identify and mitigate U.S. economic
vulnerabilities.
Tracking down Arms, Money, and Artifacts in Iraq.--ICE deployed the
first-ever civilian team of agents to Iraq in support of Operation
Iraqi Freedom. The agents secured 75 silkworm missiles in Iraq that
could have been used against coalition forces. They recovered $32
million in cash withdrawn by Saddam Hussein's son just before the war
and recovered 39,400 manuscripts and more than 1,000 treasures looted
from the Iraqi National Museum.
Dismantling Violent Human Smuggling Organizations.--Last fall, we
launched ICE Storm, a comprehensive initiative to combat violent human
smuggling organizations along the Southwest border--with a particular
focus on Arizona. In its first 180 days, ICE Storm resulted in more
than 700 criminal and administrative arrests, 90 indictments and the
seizure of 46 assault weapons and nearly $2 million. Local police
credited ICE Storm with a more than 30 percent drop in homicides in the
Phoenix area in the last quarter of 2003, compared to the same period
the previous year.
Enhancing Civil Aviation Security.--The ICE Federal Air Marshal
Service (FAMS) became a distinct ICE division in November 2003. ICE
agents are being crosstrained as air marshals, giving ICE FAMS a cadre
of trained agents in times of need. ICE also signed an agreement with
the U.S. Secret Service that increases flight coverage. Since 9/11, ICE
FAMS have provided security on hundreds of thousands of flights,
protected millions of passengers and flown millions of miles. Their
efforts have helped keep the U.S. civil aviation sector free of
terrorism since 9/11.
Apprehending and Removing Criminal Aliens from the United States.--
Since March 1, 2003, ICE's Detention and Removal Office (DRO) has
removed more than 52,684 criminal aliens and 40,802 non-criminal
aliens. DRO detains more than 230,000 aliens each year. ICE's DRO has
more than 18 fugitive absconder teams across the Nation and created a
``Most Wanted'' list of the most dangerous criminal aliens. In the
first 2 weeks, ICE captured or confirmed the removal of all 10 of the
original 10 ``Most Wanted.''
Improving Security at U.S. Federal Facilities.--The transfer of the
Federal Protective Service to ICE has provided FPS with access to
information never before at its disposal, enabling it to perform its
mission more effectively. ICE FPS secures more than 8,800 federally
owned and leased facilities. In fiscal year 2003, ICE FPS seized or
stopped the entry of more than 108,800 weapons and other items. During
the same period, ICE FPS officers made more than 2,800 arrests and
covered more than 2,100 demonstrations.
Securing Critical Airspace in the U.S., While Protecting Land and
Sea Borders.--ICE's Air and Marine Operations (AMO) division has
dramatically increased its role in homeland security missions while
maintaining its traditional drug interdiction and law enforcement
efforts. AMO created a permanent National Capital Region branch that
provides 24/7 airspace security coverage over the Washington, DC area.
AMO provided airspace security coverage during ``Orange Alert'' threats
and events like the State of the Union address and Super Bowl. All the
while, AMO assets were involved in drug and alien smuggling operations
that seized more than 76,000 pounds of cocaine, 335,000 pounds of
marijuana, and arrested more than 980 individuals.
Harnessing Intelligence to Further Enforcement Efforts.--ICE's
Intelligence Division integrated the intelligence components of the
former Immigration and Naturalization Service and the U.S. Customs
Service into a robust force that supports the enforcement needs of all
ICE operational divisions. ICE Intelligence vetted roughly 60,000
commercial airline passengers and crewmembers through a multi-stage
process during the ``Orange Alert'' terror threat level during December
2003 and January 2004 period.
ICE continues to pursue its homeland security mission by building
upon the traditional missions, resources, authorities and expertise of
the legacy agencies it inherited. ICE is bringing new approaches to
traditional areas of law enforcement and creating enforcement programs
in response to its homeland security mission. The President's fiscal
year 2005 Budget will continue to strengthen ICE's efforts to protect
the homeland through its unique investigative and enforcement tools.
Budget Request for fiscal year 2005
The proposed fiscal year 2005 budget--a plan to enhance the
Department's commitment to securing the homeland--is designed to build
upon the strong foundation I have described. The President's fiscal
year 2005 Budget request seeks $4.011 billion for ICE, $302 million
more than fiscal year 2004, which represents an increase of 8 percent.
This request for ICE includes resources to support border, air and
economic security activities. These funds will also reduce
infrastructure vulnerability, promoting safe and secure Federal
properties for both employees and visitors. The remaining budget
discussion will cover the major program areas: Investigations,
Detention and Removal Operations, Air and Marine Operations, Federal
Protective Service and the Federal Air Marshal Service, as well as our
requested fiscal year 2005 budget enhancements.
The Office of Investigations.--Budget request includes $1.046
billion for the investigations and intelligence programs. These
resources will advance national security and homeland defense against
terrorist cells and their supporters in the United States through
enhanced cooperation and integration with other Federal law enforcement
agencies and the intelligence community. The Investigations program
protects our homeland by, among other things, dismantling terrorist
financing networks, by identifying and remediating vulnerabilities in
the financial system that could be exploited by terrorist
organizations, preventing the importation of weapons of mass
destruction and other instruments of terror into the United States,
disrupting narcotics smuggling and money laundering organizations,
enforcing embargoes, trade agreements, and sanctions imposed by the
U.S. government against foreign countries, and safeguarding children
against exploitation through crimes involving pornography, sex tourism,
and forced child labor.
The President's fiscal year 2005 Budget request seeks $78 million
in total enhancements for the Investigations Program. This includes:
--$23 million/200 FTE for Worksite Enforcement. Consistent with the
goals of the President's proposed new temporary worker program
to match willing foreign working workers with willing U.S.
employers, enforcement of immigration laws against companies
that break the law and hire illegal workers will increase. This
increase will more than double the level of resources devoted
to traditional worksite enforcement.
--$16 million/65 FTE for Compliance Teams. As part of its overall
immigration enforcement strategy, ICE will continue to analyze
data generated through the Student and Exchange Visitor
Information System and US VISIT program in an effort to detect
individuals who are in violation of the Nation's immigration
laws. This enhancement will increase funding for ICE's SEVIS
and US VISIT compliance efforts by over 150 percent.
--$14 million/90 FTE for International Affairs. Pursuant to Section
428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Memorandum of
Understanding between the Departments of Homeland Security and
State, ICE's fiscal year 2005 budget includes an increase of
$10 million to support a new Visa Security Unit (VSU). The VSU
and DHS staff stationed at overseas posts, including Saudi
Arabia, will work cooperatively with U.S. Consular Officials to
promote homeland security in the Visa process. In addition, an
increase of $4 million is requested to replace funding
previously provided through the Immigration Examinations Fee
Account.
--$25 million to support Benefit Fraud. Immigration fraud poses a
threat to national security and public safety because it
enables terrorists, criminals, and illegal aliens to gain entry
and remain in the United States and diverts resources and
benefits from legitimate claimants. In cooperation with the
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), ICE's goal is
to detect, combat, and deter immigration fraud through
aggressive, focused, and comprehensive investigations. This
enhancement will provide stable funding to ICE's benefits fraud
program by replacing funding previously provided through the
Immigration Examinations Fee Account.
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget requests $1.209 billion for
detention and removal activities, which represents an increase of $125
million from fiscal year 2004. Although this is an increase for the
detention and removal program, we project a decrease in revenue
collected in the Breached Bond/Detention Fund. Consistent with ICE's
10-year Detention and Removal Strategic Plan, these resources will be
used to enhance public safety and national security by ensuring the
departure from the United States of removable aliens.
The funding will also help ICE meet its detention needs. Since
1994, the average daily population of detainees has grown to more than
20,000, from less than 6,000. This rapid growth was a result of
expanded enforcement capabilities and changes in detention requirements
resulting from the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996. The fiscal year 2005 budget request will
support the use of state and local detention facilities, the eight
Service Processing Centers, the seven contract detention facilities,
and joint DHS/Bureau of Prison facilities to detain those aliens
subject to removal.
Our overall objective, however, is the removal of aliens unlawfully
present in the United States, not their detention. In fiscal year 2003,
ICE removed more than 140,000 individuals including 76,000 criminal
aliens.
ICE is also committed to aggressively tracking, apprehending, and
removing fugitive aliens, those who have violated U.S. immigration law,
been ordered deported by an immigration judge, then fled before the
order could be carried out. This budget request will allow ICE to
continue its efforts to fulfill that commitment through the Fugitive
Operations Initiative.
The President's fiscal year 2005 Budget request seeks $108.2
million in total enhancements for the Detention and Removals Program.
This includes:
--$30 million/140 FTE for the Institutional Removal Program (IRP).
The IRP is designed to ensure that aliens convicted of crimes
in the United States are identified, processed, and, where
possible, removed prior to their release from a correctional
institution. This enhancement will further ICE's plans to
expand the program nationally to all Federal, State, and local
institutions that house criminal aliens, while ensuring more
efficient processing and case management.
--$50 million/118 FTE for Fugitive Operations. The resources
requested are to continue the implementation of the National
Fugitive Operations Program (NFOP), established in 2002, which
seeks to eliminate the existing backlog and growth of the
fugitive alien population over the next six years.
--$11 million/30 FTE for Alternatives to Detention. This initiative
provides the resources to establish additional non-traditional
family and female detention settings and establish community
supervision operations. This will provide effective supervision
of persons released into the community during immigration
proceedings or while awaiting removal in certain circumstances
while reducing costs and ensuring compliance.
--$5 million/14 FTE for detention bed space. An increase in bed space
to accommodate the higher volume of apprehended criminal
aliens. With this additional funding, ICE will enhance its
ability to remove illegal alien--particularly those convicted
of crimes while in the United States.
--$6.2 million for Caribbean Region Interdiction. Pursuant to
Executive Order, the Department of Defense, Homeland Security
and State share responsibility for responding to the migration
of undocumented aliens in this region. The resources requested
will support the Department's share of the cost of housing
migrants as they await determination of any immigration claims.
--$6 million/40 FTE for the Legal Program Backlog Elimination. During
fiscal year 2001 and fiscal year 2002, the Legal Program saw an
average increase of 19,200 cases in the backlog of matters in
Immigration Court. To keep pace with the increased number of
cases, additional attorneys and support staff are required.
This enhancement will provide a funding increase of more than
20 percent to ICE's backlog elimination program.
The fiscal year 2005 President's budget also seeks $373 million in
Air and Marine Operations (AMO) appropriations. AMO maintains a fleet
of 133 aircraft and 82 vessels to protect the Nation and the American
people against the terrorist threat and the smuggling of narcotics and
other contraband. Aircraft are also used in support of ICE's combined
investigation work.
An essential element of these deployments is the work carried out
by the Air and Marine Operation Center (AMOC), located in Riverside,
California. This state-of-the-art center is linked to a wide array of
civilian and military radar sites, aerostats, airborne reconnaissance
aircraft and other detection assets, which provide 24-hour, seamless
radar surveillance throughout the continental United States, Puerto
Rico, the Caribbean, and beyond. AMOC allows ICE to identify, track,
and support the interdiction and apprehension of those who attempt to
enter U.S. airspace with illegal drugs or terrorist objectives.
The President's fiscal year 2005 Budget request seeks $40.5 million
in total enhancements for Air and Marine Operations. This includes:
--$28 million for Increased P-3 Flight Hours. P-3 aircraft are
critical to interdiction operations in the source and transit
zones as they provide vital radar coverage in regions where
mountainous terrain, expansive jungles and large bodies of
water limit the effectiveness of ground-based radar. This
request will increase P-3 flight hours from 200 to 600 per
month.
--$12.5 million for Long Range Radar. Primary Long Range Radar
provides position information (geographic/altitude) of airborne
objects and flight data information to civil aviation, defense,
and law enforcement agencies. ICE uses the radar to receive
data for drug interdiction efforts along the southern border.
The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes $478 million in
reimbursable authority for the activities of the Federal Protective
Service (FPS). The FPS provides for the security and related law-
enforcement functions at more than 8,800 Federal facilities/buildings
across the Nation. These funds will support several initiatives
designed to protect Federal facilities from terrorist attacks,
including a nationwide K-9 bomb detection program and another aimed at
improving our capability to respond to weapons of mass destruction. FPS
will also be able to improve its communication capabilities and enhance
its intelligence sharing processes.
The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes $613 million in
Federal Air Marshals Service appropriations.\1\ The FAMS transferred
from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to ICE in
November 2003. This movement of the FAMS to ICE will significantly
increase the number of Federal law enforcement agents to deploy during
times of increased threats to aircraft ultimately providing a surge
capacity during increased threat periods or in the event of terrorist
attack. To date, 176 ICE agents have gone through FAMS training and we
anticipate training up to 800 by the end of the fiscal year. This
cross-training creates a ``surge capacity'' to effectively deal with
specific threats related to aviation security. And, on February 25,
2004, ICE and the U.S. Secret Service entered into an agreement that
will bolster U.S. aviation security by providing a ``force multiplier''
to ICE's FAMS. Under the terms of the agreement, the Secret Service
will provide the ICE FAMS with travel information for armed personnel
traveling on U.S. commercial flights during their normal course of
business and will enable the ICE FAMS the flexibility to deploy their
Federal Air Marshals to a wider range of flights, while providing
greater flexibility to conduct FAMS missions at maximum levels based on
its concept of operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The President's Budget reflects a transfer of $10 million from
the Federal Air Marshals Service (FAMS) program to Science and
Technology (S&T) for research and development. This consolidation of
research and development funding in S&T will provide for greater
oversight of research and development activities in the Department and
enhance service to FAMS. This funding will be devoted to FAMS air-to-
ground Communications project.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion
The fiscal year 2005 budget request for the ICE supports the
President's National Strategy for Homeland Security, the framework for
accomplishing our complex mission to protect the homeland, and ICE's
mission to enforce immigration and customs law, locate and remove
aliens unlawfully present in the United States, protect jobs for those
who are legally eligible to work, maintain a nationwide anti-smuggling
program, enforce laws against money-laundering and child pornography,
and protect Federal property and air security.
While many challenges lie ahead, we continue to build and foster a
premier law enforcement agency from the powerful tools and authorities
we have been given. The men and women of ICE stand ready to continue to
build a successful organization for the present and future. The fiscal
year 2005 budget request provides the resources to enable ICE to manage
its responsibilities and continue its work to secure the homeland to
protect and serve the American people.
I look forward to continuing to work with you to accomplish these
objectives while continuing to manage a world class law enforcement
organization to protect this Nation against anyone who would do it
harm. We are committed to preventing terrorist attacks and reducing
systemic vulnerabilities that threaten the security of the country.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
have at this time.
SHORTFALL IN FUNDING
Senator Cochran. I hope that during the first round of
questions we will be able to limit our time to 5 minutes each.
And that will give us all an opportunity to ask a second round
of questions, if that is the wish and pleasure of the senators
on the subcommittee.
Let me start by bringing up this issue of the shortfall in
funding. In the Congressional Quarterly yesterday, Monday,
March 29, there is an article that discusses this and carries
some quotations from administration officials, a spokesman from
the Border and Transportation Security Directorate, which
suggested that there is not an actual shortfall in the funding.
And the official, Dennis Murphy, is quoted as saying, ``We're
projecting that the spending rate may need to be slowed down.
And we just need to take the foot off the accelerator a bit.''
My question is: Is that an appropriate assessment in the
judgment of this panel? I notice that it may be that not all of
your agencies are affected by this. But I think Mr. Bonner's
and Mr. Garcia's are.
Mr. Bonner, what is your reaction to that?
Mr. Bonner. First of all, I do not want to parse words
here, but, I mean, there is not an actual shortfall, but there
is a potential shortfall. Let me just say from the----
Senator Cochran. Press the button on your mike.
Mr. Bonner. Maybe it is just not close enough, Senator. Is
that better?
Senator Cochran. Yes.
Mr. Bonner. Okay. I was just saying that without trying to
parse words too carefully here, I think it is more appropriate
to characterize this as a potential shortfall, not an actual
shortfall. And the reason I say that is, I am going to speak
just from the perspective of Customs and Border Protection
here. And that is that as part of what I do as a manager of the
agency every year is to, at the end of the first quarter, I
take stock, I get a report from my budget office as to where we
stand. And I was concerned after the end of the first quarter
review that with the rate of spending as to whether or not we
were going to be within budget at the end of the year and not
be deficient.
And secondly, the possible impact of the reconciliation of
budget allocations between, potentially between, CBP and ICE,
which is something, by the way, I believe that will be
completed by the Department in the next several weeks. But I
was concerned about that. And as a prudent manager of Customs
and Border Protection, I directed that we curtail
nonoperational travel, that we curtail nonoperational overtime,
not overtime that is related to mission performance here. And I
also believe that we should have a temporary suspension of
hiring, except for Border Patrol agents at Customs and Border
Protection, so we could get a clear picture of our spending
rate and our budget.
And when I say temporary, I mean temporary. And that is
that we would suspend--and we are just starting this. It would
be a short suspension that could literally be several weeks.
And then I would be hopeful that we would be able to resume
hiring. I do not know. I mean, this will depend upon what our
budget picture looks like when we take stock in 3 or 4 weeks.
But on the positive side, I do want to tell this
Subcommittee that we did move out at the beginning of the year
aggressively in terms of hiring new employees at Customs and
Border Protection. And we have already hired, so any suspension
here does not affect what we have already hired. We have
already hired 2,700 employees. And these include 1,500
Inspectors, CBP Inspectors, 800 Border Patrol agents, and some
other personnel.
And we are also looking very closely at the attrition rate
here in terms of--right now, that looks pretty encouraging in
terms of both the Border Patrol agents and CBP Inspectors. The
attrition rates right now, if this holds up, are lower than
projected. They are as low, by the way, this year as 5.5
percent right now for Border Patrol agents. And I think some of
you know that the attrition at the Border Patrol was close to
20 percent just 2 years ago, when it was part of the INS.
So again, all that we are doing here is we are looking at
this very, very closely. And we are making some temporary
adjustments. And we will then have to make some decisions as to
whether or not we can resume hiring or whether we have to
suspend it further. But that would be my overall assessment,
Mr. Chairman.
ICE RESPONSE
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
Mr. Garcia, what about the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement that you are responsible for? What is the
effect of this on your agency?
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Mr. Chairman. A similar effect to what
Commissioner Bonner was describing. We have imposed a temporary
hiring freeze. There is no category within ICE that is exempt
from that at the moment. We have been hiring up to the point of
the end of the first quarter and imposed this, again looking
down the road, looking at the spending rate.
But from the perspective of my agency, we are very much
concerned with mapping issues, distribution issues,
particularly in the IT context, services being provided, and
mapping funding to the provision of those services are very
complicated issues, if you look at the size of the legacy
agencies that were involved, the services that were provided,
and the split that we have accomplished very successfully. You
can appreciate the complexity of those issues.
We are very much watching that process, optimistic that we
will, working together, have firmer numbers within the next
several weeks, that we can then reassess, as Commissioner
Bonner said, again look at spending rates, look at the harder
numbers, and see what are the steps that we need to take to be
fiscally responsible, which may not, and we all hope will not,
include a hiring freeze.
POSTPONING OR DEFERRING OF ANY PROGRAM INITIATIVES
Senator Cochran. Have either one of you had to postpone or
defer any program initiatives, any activities that would defer
initiatives that you had already planned or put in place? Have
you postponed doing anything that you intended to do?
Mr. Bonner. We have not at CBP. And I hope we do not have
to. But we have not at this point.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Garcia, what about you?
Mr. Garcia. None of the new programs or operations. We have
not gone forward with the 2004 enhancements as of yet.
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
Senator Byrd. Our immigration system is underfunded and
understaffed. The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
has just over 13,000 criminal investigators to locate and
remove 8 million to 11 million illegal aliens. This is one
among many responsibilities. Following the passage of the 1986
amnesty for 2.7 million illegal aliens, the INS had to open
temporary offices, hire new workers, and divert resources from
enforcement areas in order to process amnesty applicants. The
result was chaos that produced rampant fraud.
The backlog of immigrant applications is larger today, 6
million and rising. The President's amnesty proposal would dump
another 8 million immigrant applications onto an already
beleaguered immigration system. It took only 19 temporary visa
holders to slip through the system to unleash the horror of the
September 11 attacks. The President's amnesty would shove 8
million illegal aliens through our security system, many of
whom have never gone through any background check.
If there are no new resources in the budget to implement
the President's amnesty proposal, implementation of the reform
proposal would create incredible stresses on an already
stressed border security system. It is a recipe for disaster.
FUNDING FOR ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES
While I note that your budget has several modest proposals
to deal with the existing enforcement shortcomings, would you
inform the subcommittee how much additional money is included
in the President's budget to implement your enforcement
activities in support of the President's amnesty proposal?
This question is for Mr. Garcia.
Mr. Garcia. Thank you, Senator Byrd. As a starting point,
looking at the 2005 enhancements, we do have $23 million for
worksite enforcement related to the possibility of a temporary
worker program. But I think there is a much more complex
approach to whatever legislation, if any, is ultimately passed,
which would be, one, we have split the INS apart and now have a
mission focus on enforcement both at the border and in the
interior, and a separate services bureau focused on providing
that service.
We have made tremendous strides in that reorganization,
focusing a very powerful enforcement tool on the enforcement
mission within ICE and within CBP. We have reorganized within
ICE. We have moved, are in the process of moving, excuse me,
the Institutional Removal Program out of investigations and
into Detention and Removal, which will free up additional
investigative resources within that division.
All of these pieces moving forward look at how do we place
integrity within our immigration system? How do we enforce visa
security, US VISIT, our compliance enforcement operation, which
we have again asked for an enhancement for in 2005. This is a
complex, comprehensive approach to the shortcomings that you
have described, Senator. So I cannot point to you one place in
our budget where we would address any proposed legislation or
where we would address specific shortcomings of the past. We
are taking a comprehensive approach to those problems.
I would also add that we are very much alert to the
possibility of fraud within the immigration system. I have
taken steps to address that already. And we will very much look
to participate in the process of crafting legislation that can
ensure that whatever benefits or whatever program is designed
gets to the people it was intended to get to.
I was a prosecutor in the Nineties. I prosecuted cases
involving benefits fraud in some very unfortunate context. I
know the risks firsthand. And I would very much feel the
responsibility to participate in that process, to look at how
that program is crafted and what steps we can build into it to
make it less susceptible to fraud.
Mr. Aguirre. Senator, may I tag along to that, if I could?
Senator Byrd. Please.
BACKLOG
Mr. Aguirre. Just a couple of comments. One, the backlog,
Senator, is not 6 million. We have 6 million pending cases. But
of those, 3.6 are backlog. In other words, they are behind our
normal processing time. Now, that is plenty, but it is not 6
million.
TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAM
You mentioned the President's proposal as an amnesty. I do
not consider it so. In fact, I think it is not an amnesty. I
think it is a temporary worker program that would identify
these 8 million individuals and would put them within a legal
program where we would be allowed to do background checks.
Indeed, these individuals are not within our radar scope today,
but would be once they apply.
And there is mention about the fact that there is no
provision in our Bureau for the President's proposal. Of
course, there is not, because we are waiting for the Congress
to flesh out, if you will, the details of the proposed
legislation so that we can then put a fee that would be matched
against the cost of processing these applicants. So in other
words, once the Congress acts, and we certainly hope the action
will come forth, we will match whatever work is required behind
that legislation to charge the applicants for the cost of
processing that application.
Senator Byrd. I appreciate your comments. I am of the
opinion that the President's new alien amnesty program is quite
ill-advised. If you are requesting any new resources, how much
extra would be needed to implement this sweeping amnesty?
Mr. Aguirre. Senator, are you finished with your question?
Senator Byrd. Yes. Anyone.
Mr. Aguirre. I am sorry. I did not want to interrupt.
We are requesting additional resources, but not in relation
to the President's initiative on the temporary worker program.
The temporary worker program awaits congressional action. And
until such time as the Congress tells us exactly what the
Congress wants us to do, we really cannot build a program to
suit it. Once that program is identified, we will cost it out.
And there will be a fee associated with that. I expect that the
fee will be 100 percent covering the cost of the program.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Garcia.
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Senator Byrd. As I mentioned earlier, we
have asked for $23 million in worksite enforcement really to
position ourselves, one, in an important area of enforcement
for us, but to also set the stage, so to speak, for working
with Congress on whatever legislation is passed and looking at,
again, that integrity of the system, the counter-fraud efforts,
that will match up with an effective temporary worker program,
whatever the scope of that program is ultimately decided upon.
Senator Byrd. My time is up.
Senator Cochran. Yes, sir.
Senator Leahy.
LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT CENTER BUDGET
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Garcia, to go back to the Law Enforcement Support
Center, and as I said, I am very happy with those areas,
especially Operation Predator among others, when I heard from
law enforcement agencies and others around the country of the
support they have gotten from that and how helpful it is to
them, I want to keep it helpful. Having begun my public career
in law enforcement, I am very sensitive to what their needs
are.
The President's budget proposal did not include a specific
budget for the LESC. I would assume that the base budget from
this year will be continued the upcoming year. But the demand
increases all the time. How do you make sure that--I mean, the
demand--the more--the LESC, success breeds success. The more
they accomplish, they more they are heard about from other law
enforcement, the more they get called upon, I think--I do not
have the exact figures here, but I know you would find that the
requirements and the requests continue to go up.
How are you going to do that? How are you--if the budget is
the same, how are you going to keep up with the requests?
Mr. Garcia. Thank you, Senator Leahy. A number of points.
First, the obvious point is the LESC really is the crown jewel
of our State and local cooperation efforts, tremendous
facility, has seen an increase in responsibility, increase in
workload, and an increase in the incredibly important
information it puts out to the field.
You mentioned an increase in inquiries. They were up about
175,000 this year over the year before, an incredible number
showing, I think, the realization on the part particularly of
State and local officials of what a service the LESC can
provide. We are committed to continuing to provide that service
and enhancing our capability to do that.
You are right, the LESC budget is built into the base
budget for the Office of Investigations. We have also set aside
money, and I believe we have briefed some of your staff members
on enhancements for the facility itself of up to, I believe, $5
million for enhancements to that facility. We are also putting
new programs within LESC. We recently moved the Central States
Command Center from Chicago to Vermont, recognizing how
efficient it is to have that all under one roof.
As we move programs, we move money with them. We mentioned
Predator. We have set up the 800 hotline there in Vermont,
incredibly successful. And I will give one example. We got a
call into that hotline in Vermont, a citizen call, saying they
believed that somebody was abusing minors in a house and that
that person may have had AIDS. We responded with the local
officials--it was in Massachusetts--out of Vermont to the local
officials with our ICA agents, arrested the individual, charged
him with sexual offenses against minors. And we launched an
immigration detainer, because in fact he was an illegal alien.
An example of the capability of the LESC, the response
capability, and then the actual public safety benefit of that
response. We are committed to expanding upon that capability.
And I think the LESC is going to grow in importance.
And as you mentioned, Senator, as it does, we will look at
the OI budget, we will look at resources we have allocated for
these programs, and we will look at our ability to do that out
of the LESC in more effective ways.
The example I give of the LESC benefit all the time is, a
State trooper pulls somebody down, flags someone down on the
side of a road. He is by himself. He is approaching that car.
That trooper can call the LESC 24 hours a day, 7 days a week,
and find out if that person in the car is a reentering felon.
Is that not information that trooper would want to know as they
approach a car in the middle of the night on the side of a
highway?
That is the type of service the LESC can provide. And
again, Senator, we are committed to working with you, with
Congress, to ensure that that center maintains a central role
in supporting our colleagues and in supporting those new
programs like Operation Predator.
Senator Leahy. Well, I appreciate that. It is a sad story
you tell of the situation in Massachusetts. Unfortunately, as
you know and I know, it occurs in too many places. We all wish
it did not occur at all. But to the extent it occurs, let us be
thankful we can move quickly to stop it from continuing.
GUEST WORKER PROGRAM CONCERNS
Mr. Aguirre, I heard your answer to the question--I am
still a little bit concerned--on this guest worker program of
the President. You said if we passed this, we will assume that
there will then be a request for funds to do it. But it is--I
think we are getting kind of the cart before the horse. We are
still waiting for the President's proposal. I mean, it is the
President's proposal. It is not a congressional proposal. The
President is the one who made the speech. It was done with a
great deal of fanfare.
Are we going to get a proposal from the White House? I
mean, I and others have asked for this for several months now.
Are we going to get a request for a proposed legislation, or
has the White House shelved this proposal?
Mr. Aguirre. Well, no, Senator, I think the White House has
not shelved this proposal. I think the White House was very
serious on January 7, when the President issued his call to the
Congress to act. Subsequent to that, during the State of the
Union and probably at least a dozen times that I can count, the
President has mentioned again and again that he expects the
Congress to act on his initiative.
Now the way I understand government, of course, I am coming
from the private sector only 3 years ago, I see the Congress as
enacting the legislation and I see the Administration as
administering the legislative----
Senator Leahy. Well, usually when the President has a
proposal, especially one that they announce with such great
fanfare, they actually send it up here. Other than the speech
and the press releases and the handouts at selected fund
raisers, we have not seen any legislation. Are we going to get
legislation?
Mr. Aguirre. Well, Senator, the legislation that I have
seen has been a number of bills that have been introduced by
various members of the Congress. My understanding is that the
legislation was expected to come from within the Congress, not
from the White House. But the point is, Senator, I guess if you
are looking to the substance----
BACKLOG REDUCTION ISSUE
Senator Leahy. If that is the case and the President has
also promised to reduce the average wait time for applicants
for immigration benefits to 6 months, if you have these two
goals, I mean, this is an enormous, enormous increase in work.
Why is there not any money being requested for either one of
these things, either to get rid of the backlog or for this
guest worker program of the President's?
Mr. Aguirre. Well, yes, Senator. If I may take them one at
a time, I think the backlog is one that we have finally begun
to get some traction on it. There will be a backlog reduction/
elimination plan that will be coming to the Congress in the
coming weeks. We expect to fulfill the President's commitment
that I have inherited to eliminate the backlog by September of
2006.
As you very well know, after 9/11, that took a serious
setback. And we are correcting that. And with the reallocation
or repatriation, if you will, of many of the adjudicators that
were sent on to do something else, I think we are going to get
some traction here. We have already found some of our district
offices meeting the backlog reduction. And we are continuing on
as well.
I separate the backlog reduction initiative from the
President's temporary worker proposal because I think they are
apples and apples. I think we will be able to implement the
program based on the Congress legislation that will be
innovative, that will be technologically efficient, that will
allow us to process people----
Senator Leahy. But you need more funds.
Mr. Aguirre. I think we will need more funds through the
fees that will be joining the application.
Senator Cochran. Senator, your time has expired.
Senator Leahy. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Senator Shelby.
Senator Leahy. I have some other questions for the next
round.
Senator Cochran. Absolutely. Sure.
Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
NUMBER OF ILLEGAL ALIENS RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES
Secretary Garcia and gentlemen, I asked this other in my
opening statement. What is your best estimate, Mr. Secretary,
of the number of illegal aliens currently residing in the
United States of America?
Mr. Garcia. Senator, you mentioned some of the numbers
earlier. The number, I think, that is posted on the website is
7 million. I have the 8 million number as well. I think it
again reinforces----
Senator Shelby. You do not really know, do you, honestly?
Mr. Garcia. I think, Senator, it again reinforces your
point that it is a very difficult number to identify because of
what you are trying to quantify.
Senator Shelby. Is that an increase or a decrease, say,
from the previous year?
Mr. Garcia. I could not give you that answer, Senator. I do
not mean to be evasive. I do not know. I think it would be
difficult to answer.
Senator Shelby. Mr. Bonner, do you have a judgment on that?
Mr. Bonner. My judgment is that the numbers of illegal
aliens that are successfully entering the United States has
marginally decreased.
Senator Shelby. And what do you base that on?
Mr. Bonner. I base that on the fact that the Border Patrol
apprehensions--most, of course, the illegal migration, the
spigot, if you will, is the southern border. The Border Patrol
apprehensions last year were 931,000 illegal aliens
apprehended. The vast, vast majority of that was at our border
with Mexico. I believe that that number is to some extent a
surrogate for the number of people that have successfully and
illegally crossed our border. And that apprehension number, has
been steadily declining for several years.
Now by the way----
Senator Shelby. How do you get to the high number of 7, 8,
perhaps 10 million? You know, we do not know the exact number.
Mr. Bonner. Yes. It is estimated between----
Senator Shelby. If you are stopping everybody at the
border, how are they getting in?
Mr. Bonner. We are certainly not stopping everybody at the
border.
Senator Shelby. I know that.
Mr. Bonner. No question about it. I mean, right now we have
the Arizona border, which is substantially where there is mass
migration taking place virtually every day. That is why we have
instituted the Arizona Border Control Initiative, to get
control of that.
But I would say this. If you look over the past number of
years, we have, through Border Patrol increases, Border Patrol
sensoring technology, I believe with the adding of UAVs and
some sensoring technology in this budget, we are getting
marginally better control over our border in terms of illegal
migration. Now does that mean nobody is getting through?
Senator Shelby. You used the word ``marginally.''
Mr. Bonner. Well, we need to do a lot better.
Senator Shelby. Okay.
Mr. Bonner. And it is very difficult to estimate the
numbers of illegal aliens that have gotten through and that are
adding to that base of illegal aliens that are residing
illegally in the United States. But I would say that there is
some reason to believe that we have gotten somewhat better
control of the border. And I say this anecdotally.
Senator Shelby. Sure, you do.
Mr. Bonner. Let me just tell you that I know that if you
take significant parts, of the California border and the Texas
border, where there have been substantial increases in Border
Patrol staffing, improvements in the sensoring and technology
that is being used to detect illegal crossings, that we have
better control over a lot of the segments of our southern
borders than we did going back, say, 5 to 10 years ago.
We have to, by the way, we have to get better. I do not
mean to say this nirvana here.
Senator Shelby. I know that. I know that.
Mr. Bonner. So it is very hard to say. Probably 60 percent,
by the way, is the estimate of the----
ADEQUACY OF RESOURCES
Senator Shelby. Do you have enough resources? This was
asked by Senator Byrd and others. Do you have enough resources
to do the job to protect our borders considering that there are
probably 7 to 10 million illegal aliens in this country?
Mr. Bonner. If we cannot--do we have enough resources? We
have, by the way, through this subcommittee and through the
Congress and the President's request, we have been adding
resources. We have a request here for a very significant amount
of funding for better sensoring technology to control better
parts of our border.
I am very sanguine about the prospects through the use of
unmanned aerial vehicles. For the first time, the Border Patrol
is pioneering the use of UAVs. We will start that later this
year, I believe, at the Southwest border. But it will give us
much better detection capability against illegal migration
across our Southern border. Potentially, as you know, because
of the terrorist threat, we also need to be concerned about the
Northern border, as well.
Senator Shelby. Absolutely both.
IS THE CHALLENGE TOO GREAT?
Mr. Bonner. So we are moving in the right direction. But it
is an extremely difficult thing. I actually think, by the way,
if I could add, I think the President's temporary worker----
Senator Shelby. It is the challenge. I respect all three of
you. And I know you are dedicated here.
Mr. Bonner. Yes, sir.
Senator Shelby. But is the challenge too great to win?
Mr. Bonner. No.
Senator Shelby. In other words, we are losing. We are
losing the war on illegal aliens now, if there are 7 to 10
million people here illegally that never had a background
check, you do not know anything about them. And they are coming
here. They are staying here. They are working here. And what
does that say to the people who come here legally and go
through the hoops?
Mr. Bonner. Well, I think----
Senator Shelby. Like you did, sir.
Mr. Bonner. Well, perhaps Dr. Aguirre can respond to that.
But I just want to say, Senator, that we can do this. We are, I
believe, getting greater control over the border. We need to do
that. If we cannot cut off the spigot for illegal migration
coming in, well, we cannot ever address this problem seriously.
Then we have to figure out what to do with the 7, 8, or 10
million illegals that are here in this country and figure out
what is the best, from a point of view of practicality,
realism, and policy, what is the best approach to that problem.
OVERSTAYS ON VISAS
Senator Shelby. And what about--before my time expires,
maybe you can answer afterward. What about the overstay on
visas? People come here legally, millions of people come to
this country legally. What do you do to track those people once
they are here? How do you know they have gone back unless there
is a central system checking?
Mr. Bonner. Customs and Border Protection is to prevent
them from entering. And ICE has the responsibility----
Senator Shelby. Mr. Garcia.
Mr. Bonner [continuing]. To remove them, if we have failed.
Mr. Garcia. Thank you, Senator. We have the enforcement
side of US VISIT that has been mentioned earlier. Last year,
when we stood up ICE, we created a compliance enforcement unit,
basically to put that integrity in the system. It looks at US
VISIT. It looks at SEVIS, where we have had problems with
students coming in, students not going to school, not
attending, dropping out.
Senator Shelby. Sure.
Mr. Garcia. We have made tremendous progress on that.
Senator Shelby. That is how a lot of the terrorists got
here. They came here legally, did they not?
Mr. Garcia. One of the Trade Center----
Senator Shelby. Some of them overstayed their visas.
Mr. Garcia. The driver of the World Trade Center bombing of
the van in 1993 was a student who had come here on a student
visa, had never gone to school. We take that very seriously. We
have prioritized the leads using intelligence, using other
information. We vet those at Headquarters, and we send those
out into the field. We have been doing that for some time now.
We are seeking additional funding in 2005 for that program.
Asa Hutchinson and I both believe that it is incredibly
important in maintaining that integrity in the system, in
addition to its national security implications.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Senator Murray.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM OPERATION SAFE COMMERCE
Senator Murray. Mr. Bonner, at the 2002 Western Cargo
Conference, you said, and I quote, ``The American people on the
global trading system are more secure, if we screen cargo
containers that present a high risk for terrorism as early as
possible and certainly before they reach U.S. shores.''
I really agree with that. And I am pleased that the two
most prominent cargo security programs within Customs, C-TPAT
and CSI, seek to push out our borders to foreign ports. Those
programs will eventually help expand our various cargo security
programs into a standard system for sending goods throughout
the world. But they are not going to get the job done alone. We
have now spent $58 million on a program called Operation Safe
Commerce, which is working to test the security of 19 different
supply chains running through 5 different ports, which
compromise the 3 largest load centers in the country. In fact,
more than 80 percent of our cargo goes through those ports.
I think it is really imperative that we are able to learn
from all of our port security programs. And we need to tie them
together and rapidly instituted a large-scale operationally
cargo security program in the United States.
Commissioner Bonner, would you tell the committee how you
are planning to implement the lessons that we have learned from
Operation Safe Commerce into an overall cargo security
standard?
Mr. Bonner. I would be happy to do that, Senator. You and I
have worked a lot on this issue. But first of all, Operation
Safe Commerce has been a very valuable test bed for different
kinds of technologies that would be useful in better securing
the movement of particularly ocean-going cargo containers from
various places in the world to the United States. And as you
indicated I think earlier, 8 to 9 million ocean-going cargo
containers arrive at our U.S. seaports annually, including some
of our major ports on the West Coast like Seattle and Tacoma.
But the approaches to take the lessons there to develop and
essentially to improve even more the supply chain security
regimen. And there are two key elements to that. One is, and I
believe we can do this through the Customs Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism, leveraging U.S. importers and foreign
suppliers to increase essentially the point of loading security
to meet best practices and standards at the point that the
containers are actually loaded at foreign manufacturers'
facilities, whether that is in Asia or Europe or elsewhere.
And secondly, using the lessons from Operation Safe
Commerce to develop best practices and minimal standards, if
you will, for a smarter, more secure container to be used in
terms of the movement of those goods to the U.S. seaports. And
when I say a smarter container, I mean one that, at the
minimum, can be read by U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Inspectors either upon arrival or at the CSI ports, as we
expand those to more and more ports overseas, to determine
whether it has been tampered with enroute.
So those are at least a couple of the things that we are
looking at to see if we cannot implement to improve the overall
security of global trade and movement of cargo to the United
States.
REPORT DUE AT THE END OF THE FISCAL YEAR
Senator Murray. So we expect a report from them by the end
of this fiscal year. And you are going to be using the
information that they have learned from that to get to some
kind of security standard.
Mr. Bonner. It is still being evaluated. But I certainly
intend to. I believe, based upon the preliminary reports I have
obtained, that there are some very useful things that have been
done that are going to inform us and help guide us to an
improved security of the movement of cargo.
Senator Murray. Okay. Well, I do want to work with you on
that. There is still $17 million to go out. They have spent a
great deal of time, our taxpayers dollars and money on this.
And I think we can learn a lot from them. We want to make sure
it is used and used wisely.
INSTALLATION OF RADIATION PORTAL DEVICES AT PORTS OF ENTRY
Commissioner, let me also ask you, Customs is beginning the
process of installing these radiation portal devices at ports
of entry throughout the Nation. It seems to me it is a little
bit late to check for radiation. Both the ports of Seattle and
Tacoma are located right next to our downtown businesses and
residential areas. And a ship bound for these ports travels
through the Puget Sound before they get there. They pass by a
major refinery compound, three Navy bases that each home port
nuclear powered vessels, and a major petroleum tank farm.
Why have you decided, at least initially, not to push out
the borders when it comes to this kind of technology? And can
you tell us if you plan on deploying these monitors to foreign
ports that are participating in C-TPAT?
Mr. Bonner. I think our objective and our intention is to
do both. In other words, we are talking about a layered defense
in-depth strategy. But we do want to do everything we can,
particularly given the catastrophic consequences of
radiological weapons, to improve our ability to detect them
when they are arriving at our borders. And this is, of course,
our land borders. We have already deployed now almost 250
radiation portal monitors, very sensitive radiation detection
equipment, along many places on our land border, particularly
Canada. We are now expanding to seaports and so forth.
But at the same time, we want to make sure that containers,
through the Container Security Initiative, as part of the
security screening of those containers that are identified as
posing potential risk for terrorist threat; and that is,
potentially risk that a terrorist organization like the al-
Qaeda could have concealed a weapon in those containers, that
they are not only run through the large-scale X-ray scanning
equipment, which is important to detect weapons, and
potentially weapons of mass destruction, but they are also run
through radiation detection. And that is part of CSI.
Now, part of radiation detection is radiation isotope
identifiers, handheld devices, and the like. We have at one
foreign port, working with the Department of Energy, we are
doing what I call ``CSI plus'', which is to deploy radiation
portal detection systems that have the capacity for being not
only very sensitive, but detecting potentially every container
moving into that foreign port, including all containers that
are ultimately outbound to the United States. And we have done
that, working with the Department of Energy. And I give the
Department of Energy much credit here but working in tandem
with our U.S. Department of Energy, we have done that at the
first CSI port, which is the Port of Rotterdam.
And I do not know that that has been implemented yet, but I
expect that it is going to be implemented within the next month
or so. And so we do see that is what we want to do. If we can
get these foreign seaports to install more sophisticated
radiation detection equipment, it is something we want to do.
We have started that. We have a long way to go.
PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORY
Senator Murray. Okay. As you know, the Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory is the contracting authority for installing
those devices. Can you give us a quick update of their
performance and how the project is progressing?
Mr. Bonner. Well, my assessment is that they have been
very, very helpful to us in terms of helping Customs and Border
Protection select the most appropriate and best radiation
detection equipment that makes sense for a port environment. In
the port environments, there are several port environments.
There is the land border port environment and there is the
seaport and the like.
So, they have been very helpful with us in terms of
assisting us in terms of the testing and the selection and the
actual installation of this equipment to make sure that we have
the kinds of protocols that resolve when you do get a radiation
hit. And we do get hits on these things, that we can determine
quickly whether it is an innocent radiation-emitting source or
whether it is something that we need to be concerned about.
Senator Murray. Well, that goes to another question I had.
Senator Cochran. Senator, your time has expired.
PORTS
Senator Murray. Could I just follow up on his last comment?
Because we have heard from a number of people in the ports that
they want to know what happens when there is a positive reading
from these devices and what the protocol is, you know, whether
the facilities shut down and who is in charge of making those
decisions. And if you could share with us what that is?
Mr. Bonner. There is a protocol and I will make sure that
all of our CBP port directors make sure they have had that
discussion within the context of the port security committees
that exist at each port with the Coast Guard.
Senator Murray. Good. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
REQUEST FOR DETENTION AND REMOVAL
Mr. Garcia, one of the largest increases requested by your
bureau is for detention and removal of people who are illegally
in the country. It is an increase of $108 million, just about
10 percent for this activity. Could you tell us what the
specific needs are here and how you will use those additional
funds?
Mr. Garcia. Certainly, Senator. Detention and Removal is a
very important program, a very important tool in enforcing
immigration laws and maintaining the integrity of that
immigration system that we were talking about earlier. A number
of programs, I believe, were neglected in the past,
particularly the Institutional Removal Program and the Alien
Absconder Program.
If you look at the funding enhancements for 2005, that is
about $80 million of the dollar amount that you were speaking
about. Institutional removal goes into the prison facilities,
Federal, State, and also local facilities, and makes sure that
we process illegal aliens or aliens subject to removal who are
in those facilities. They could be very violent inmates,
inmates with a history of violent criminal activity, predators,
child sex predators.
We have done a good job in the past of reaching the Federal
facilities, according to a GAO report, a fairly good job at the
State level, and a not very good job, and one we need to make
much improvement on, on a local level. We are looking to
transfer that program out of Investigations into the Detention
and Removal Division, where I strongly believe it belongs, and
increase our capability to place those inmates into the system
at an earlier time period so that we streamline the process and
make it more efficient, so we are holding those inmates for
less time before they are ultimately removed from the United
States.
In fiscal year 2003, ICE removed 140,000 people from the
United States. That is a very large number. It is a very large
system. It needs improvement. The money in this request for
enhancements will go towards that and making it more efficient.
Fugitive Operations. The number of fugitives estimated in
the country range up to 400,000. Those are people with final
orders of deportation who have not complied. A subset of that,
about 40,000, again an estimate, criminal aliens who have not
complied with final orders of removal.
We are very aggressively using fugitive alien teams to go
after those absconders. We are prioritizing again, looking at
the public safety value, going after those with a criminal
record. Again, the biggest public safety value, we have a top
ten list. We have been very successful advertising.
This money will go to increasing those Fugitive Operations
Teams, we call them, 30 additional teams across the United
States. So it is really again that comprehensive approach to
looking at integrity of the system and recognizing that an
important part of that is the detention removal system.
COOPERATION OF LOCAL AND STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS
Senator Cochran. Are you successful in getting the
cooperation of local and State law enforcement officials in
helping you achieve your goals?
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Senator. Again, you have to look at the
are. And there is a wide range of options available. At one
side of the spectrum is States that want to actively
participate in enforcement. And there is a provision, 287G it
is called, for doing that, where we provide training to local
officials. And we did it in Senator Shelby's State most
recently.
The LESC that I spoke about earlier provides another
opportunity for cooperation. Anti-gang work, we have been very
successful working in Chicago, L.A., Charlotte in anti-gang
work, working with State and local officials. So there is a
very wide spectrum to that cooperation.
I believe that the Institutional Removal context is an area
where we can do more working with the States. It is a benefit
to both. It makes our work more efficient, where the States
will flag or bring to our attention inmates who should be in
our system. And we can remove those criminal aliens from
probation or parole systems that cost the State money in terms
of supervisory dollars. So I think that is an area where we are
going to move much more aggressively in the State and local
cooperation area.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF HARD WORK AND SUCCESS
Senator Cochran. Well, I want to commend you for the hard
work and the good job you are doing, your bureau is doing. I
think we have seen a lot of new initiatives developed and a lot
of success stories that have not gotten the attention they
probably should have.
Mr. Garcia. Thank you, Senator.
UPDATING CITIZENSHIP PROCESSES AND LOOKING AT THE TEST THAT IS GIVEN TO
THOSE SEEKING CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES
Senator Cochran. Mr. Aguirre, I know that you are in the
process of updating citizenship processes and looking at the
test that is given those who are seeking to obtain citizenship
in our country. Could you tell us a little about what you are
doing in that area and whether there are any additional funds
requested to support those activities?
Mr. Aguirre. Well, yes, Senator. Thank you. As mandated by
Congress, we have instituted an Office of Citizenship, which is
actually responsible for the citizenship aspect of immigration
or, if you will, the naturalization aspect of immigration. That
office is looking at various aspects. One, we are trying to
make the test of citizenship a better process. It is a good
process now, but I think it can be improved.
We have gone through a pilot project last year to look at
better ways to deal with the English portion of the test and
see how we can have a more meaningful process. That pilot is
now back. We have had some very good reports from some of the
NGOs. And we are trying to fine tune and see how we can make it
better.
Additionally, there is a provision for history and civics,
which is also part of the test that an applicant must go
through before they are granted naturalization. We are looking
at ways to see if we can make it a more meaningful approach
where the questions are not the end, but the end is the
learning and the question is part of the component. And to that
end, sir, we are working with academicians. We are working with
historians. We are working with the Department of Education to
see how we can do the learning a more meaningful aspect,
particularly since many of these applicants are slow in their
English knowledge. We want to see how we can improve their
understanding of what it is to be an American, not only from an
historical standpoint, but also the civic responsibilities that
one assumes when they become a citizen. That is all part of the
element. And yes, sir, we do have an inclusion in our budget to
accommodate that.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much.
REQUEST FOR THE CUSTOMS TRADE PARTNERSHIP AGAINST TERRORISM
Mr. Bonner, there is a request for an additional $15
million to expand the Customs Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism. Could you tell us how these resources are going to
be used and what the purpose of that program is?
Mr. Bonner. Yes, Senator, Mr. Chairman. It is essentially
twofold. One is to be able to expand the validation of the C-
TPAT partners. In other words, they enter into a commitment
with U.S. Customs and Border Protection to take certain mission
measures, best practices, to improve their supply chain
security literally from their foreign vendors to our ports of
entry. And we want to, as the old saying of some former
President was ``trust, but verify.'' So we are expanding our
validation capability, so we are doing more validation.
And as we validate, more people understand that this is not
window dressing. This is serious stuff. If you are going to get
expedited treatment upon arrival, you need to take these
measures that you have committed to take. So part of it is for
that. Part of it is to further expand the base of C-TPAT
partners. We already have 5,900 companies, including many of
the major U.S. importers that are part of C-TPAT. In fact, the
importers alone are about 3,500. These are major importers that
account for over 40 percent or more of the all of the incoming
cargo coming into the United States. So it also will be funding
to expand and administer the program.
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that this will
complete our series of hearings, will it not?
KUDOS FOR CHAIRMAN COCHRAN
I want to thank you Mr. Chairman for conducting these
hearings as you have. It should also be noted that the chairman
always calls on the other members of the committee to ask
questions, and then he allows a second go-around. He does not
ask his questions until the other members have asked their
questions, and sometimes it is 2 hours before he asks his
questions. So, that courtesy should not be overlooked. I have
observed it, and I thank the chairman for the courtesies that
he continually extends to the other members of the committee.
He is a good chairman. He is not only fair to his colleagues on
the committee, but he is also very fair and considerate of the
witnesses.
IS THERE MONEY IN THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET TO IMPLEMENT THE PRESIDENT'S
AMNESTY PROPOSAL?
Earlier, Senator Shelby asked whether there is money in the
President's budget to implement the President's amnesty
proposal. I do not believe that we got a complete answer, and
this is nobody's fault. Mr. Aguirre said that immigration
services would be paid for with the new fees. I accept that.
But we did not hear, I do not believe, from Mr. Garcia or Mr.
Bonner.
Certainly there would be higher costs for security
background checks, for guest worker enforcement, for removal of
aliens, for workplace enforcement, and for increased travel
across the borders. The modest increases in the budget will
barely keep up with current needs. What will the increased
costs be, if the President's amnesty program is approved? And
why are these funds not in the budget?
Mr. Bonner, do you want to take a shot at that question?
Mr. Bonner. Well, first of all, you are right, Senator
Byrd. There are no funds, per se, in the CBP budget for the
Temporary Worker Program that has been proposed. And I would
make the comment that from a CBP perspective, and as the
President has indicated, that if there were to be a Temporary
Worker Program enacted, it would have to have a very strong
border enforcement for a security aspect to it.
And right now, we, of course, have a sizable Border Patrol.
I discussed with Senator Shelby that we have a ways to go here.
But I do think one thing that has been lost is that in the
Temporary Worker Program proposal, that it does hold the
promise, I think, as outlined, if you had a Temporary Worker
Program, it potentially could relieve some of the pressure at
the border in terms of illegal migration and give us a better
ability to control the border, Senator Byrd. And that has
always been important as a national objective of the United
States.
But let me tell you right now it is absolutely essential,
because we need to reduce the flow of mass migrations at our
Southern border in order to increase our prospects for
identifying and apprehending terrorists who may be attempting
to illegally enter our country. So I do think that there is a
policy aspect to this that could help us get a better and
firmer control of the border, which we need for homeland
security purposes.
But once if there were a bill that took final shape,
obviously I would like to have an opportunity to discuss
initially within the Administration what I think would be
needed to better control the intake spigot, because we ought
not to have a Temporary Worker Program and still have, whatever
it is, 300,000 or 400,000 illegal aliens entering our country
to both seek jobs or for other purposes.
Senator Byrd. Are you in a position at this moment to
submit an estimate as to the resources that would be needed?
Mr. Bonner. I certainly do not have it at my fingertips,
but I would certainly, if you requested it, I would take under
advisement as to how we might be able to get that information
to you.
Senator Byrd. Would you do that for the subcommittee?
Mr. Bonner. I will make every effort to do it. Obviously,
Senator, I will also have to work this through the Department
and through the Administration. But I will make every effort to
get you that information.
Senator Byrd. Very well. If you would, please.
ICE RESPONSE
Mr. Garcia, would you make an effort along those lines?
Mr. Garcia. Just to clarify, Senator, looking for a number
in terms of enforcement on the President's Temporary Worker
proposal? I would echo what Director Aguirre said in terms of
without the outline and without the participation and
structuring how that is enacted and how it rolls out, it would
be very difficult to speculate as to the resources needed to
enforce it. I think the most productive area to go here, again,
is to lend our expertise to the process.
And again, looking at the lessons learned, and I think you
mentioned a few in your earlier remarks, of other legislation
in the past to see how we can build in provisions that will
limit the amount of fraud, anti-fraud work investment we need
to make, and then again to look at what is the scope of the
legislation, how will that affect the population that is in the
United States in our ongoing enforcement efforts, and then to
calculate what do we need to ensure the integrity of the system
that we have all been talking about.
I think without concrete provisions or at least an outline
of where that legislation is going when enacted, it would be a
very difficult exercise to calculate the amount of money we
would need on the enforcement side.
Senator Byrd. Well, it sounds to me as if the President was
just posturing when he proposed an amnesty program. Nobody
seems to have in mind a figure as to what this is going to
cost. Certainly Congress is going to need to know more than you
are able to tell us. You do not seem to have the slightest idea
as to what this is going to cost. We are going to need to know
these things.
BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS
All right. The budget request for the Federal Air Marshals
is essentially a flat-line request similar to last year's
funding level. Yet, on two occasions in less than a year, late
last summer and again over the recent winter holidays, the
threat level was raised to Code Orange, in large part because
intelligence and other indicators led the department to believe
that there were enhanced threats to the United States via
airplanes flying into or over this country.
However, based on budget briefings with my staff, I
understand that the resources directed to this program are not
sufficient to hire the number of air marshals needed to
maintain a more robust presence on targeted flights. On March
9, I wrote to Secretary Ridge expressing my concerns about the
potential that we may not have sufficient personnel to cover a
significant percentage of targeted flights this year, and that
this problem will only be compounded given the inadequate
funding requested in the fiscal year 2005 budget.
While we are unable to talk in specifics, I am concerned
about the inability of your agency to, at a minimum, replace
retiring air marshals. Are you aware, Mr. Garcia, of my letter
to Secretary Ridge?
Mr. Garcia. I became aware of it in preparation for this
hearing, Senator.
Senator Byrd. Do you know when I will get a response to my
letter, ensuring me that the Department will maintain a robust
staffing level of air marshals?
Mr. Garcia. I will follow up with that, Senator, and get
back to you. Obviously, you share, as the Department, your
concern, the importance you place on the air marshal program.
Senator Byrd. If my understanding of the Air Marshal budget
and the status of the Air Marshal program is even close to
being accurate, why are you not requesting more funding for
hiring additional Air Marshals, ensuring that they receive
advanced training, and increasing the tools at their disposal
for the protection of airplanes and their passengers?
Mr. Garcia. Senator, I think, as I mentioned earlier, the
Air Marshals are our newest division within ICE. They came to
ICE, I believe, in early November this past year. We are in the
process of looking at the Federal Air Marshal Service as a law
enforcement division within ICE, seeing how we can support
their mission and how they support the broader ICE goals.
We are looking at a number of different things. You
mentioned code orange. During the most recent threat level, the
raising of the threat level most recently, we in fact were able
to deploy ICE agents who had been trained as Air Marshals to
fly, I believe, more than 300 missions with the Air Marshals
and increase their capacity. So we are looking at a number of
different things.
One of the things we are looking at very closely, as you
know, and I believe you have been briefed, are our budget
issues and our future looking down the road at the FAMS and
what their capabilities are. That is an incredibly important
mission, as I mentioned earlier, in ensuring civil aviation
security. I look forward to working with this Subcommittee on
the very important issues facing the Air Marshals and
continuing to support that vital mission.
Senator Byrd. How is my time running?
Senator Cochran. Your time has expired.
Senator Byrd. All right. Thank you. I am glad I didn't ask
the question earlier.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Shelby.
VISA OVERSTAYS
Senator Shelby. Thank you. I want to go back on the visa
overstays. How many people come into this country legally each
year? That is, as a student, business, vacationing, so forth.
It has to be in the millions.
Mr. Bonner. Tens of millions.
Senator Shelby. Tens of millions. So they get a visa to
come to this country most of the time, do they not?
Mr. Bonner. Yes, Senator. They get a visa unless they are
traveling into the United States from a visa waiver country, in
which case they would not require a visa.
Senator Shelby. And how many countries do we have visa
waiver agreements with?
Mr. Bonner. The last time I checked it was about 16 or 17.
Do not hold me to the exact number, but in that ballpark.
Senator Shelby. Do any of those countries come out of the
Middle East?
Mr. Bonner. No, I do not believe there are any countries on
the Middle East that are visa waiver countries anymore.
Senator Shelby. Okay. Now how many--how do you keep up
with--let us say there are tens of millions. Is ten million too
few people?
Mr. Bonner. Oh, on an annual basis, there are more than
that that come in under visa----
Senator Shelby. Twenty million? Twenty-five million? Just
give your best shot.
Mr. Bonner. I think it is probably around 30 million.
Senator Shelby. Thirty million people.
Mr. Bonner. Let me do it this way: It is 30 million through
our international airports, more or less.
Senator Shelby. Thirty million people.
Mr. Bonner. When you talk about our land borders, you are
talking about even more gigantic numbers of people that are
coming in with temporary worker cards or with visas.
Senator Shelby. Okay. Now how do you keep up with this huge
number of people? Do you have the resources, one, to keep up
with it? Let us say I came in, and had a visa. How would you
keep up with me? And let us say I came from a country that did
not require a visa, and I come in and they stamp my passport.
How do you know if I ever leave, is what I am getting at.
Mr. Bonner. One of the great accomplishments of the
Department of Homeland Security has been that at our
international airports we have instituted the US VISIT program
and technology. And so we know everybody that is coming in with
a visa at the time they are presenting themselves to a CBP
inspector at our international airports. One, whether they have
been issued a visa. We actually have on the screen the visa
with their photographs. We take a biometric, which are the two
fingerprint scans. And we can determine with virtual certainty
that the person presenting themselves to us is the person who
was issued the visa in the first instance by the State
Department.
Now we did not have that capability before.
Senator Shelby. Sure. I know.
Mr. Bonner. By the way, we also have a 994 form, that has
some information in it that is not fully automated about the
person.
Senator Shelby. You are talking about tools. You are
getting better tools, I understand, to deal with.
Mr. Bonner. Yes, sir.
Senator Shelby. And that is good. And you are probably
going to need more. But my real thrust here is, if you have and
I will just use 30 million people coming to the United States,
and you have an entry stamp for them, you know that they come
in, do you have a correlation to when they leave? And is that
closed, in other words?
Mr. Bonner. Well, we have some correlation there, because
if they----
WHO IS IN THE COUNTRY LEGALLY AND OVERSTAYED?
Senator Shelby. You see what I am getting at. In other
words, do you really know who is in this country legally, that
come legally and over stay?
Mr. Bonner. Well, the answer to that one is that we do not
know everybody that has overstayed visas that has come into the
United States, because there is not a fully perfected automated
exit system at this point.
Senator Shelby. Sure.
Mr. Bonner. We are starting the prototype of that through
the Border and Transportation Security Directorate of the
Department by trying to model that at airports. And then to
have a complete system, we will obviously have to include the
land borders. So the answer is--you know, by the way,
ultimately----
Senator Shelby. The answer is no, you do not have it.
Mr. Bonner [continuing]. If they get into the country----
Senator Shelby. Is that fair?
Mr. Bonner. If they get into the country----
Senator Shelby. Mr. Bonner.
Mr. Bonner. Yes. Yes, sir.
Senator Shelby. Is the answer, as we speak today, as you
speak today, the answer is no, you do not have the system in
place to really keep up with it.
Mr. Bonner. Not a foolproof system. We have a system.
Senator Shelby. Sure. We know you have a system.
Mr. Bonner. But it is not a system that tells us that
everybody that has entered on a visa for a period of time has
not overstayed that visa. And if they have overstayed, then we
have issues of identifying who they are, where they are. And
then, as Assistant Secretary Garcia was saying, ICE then has
the responsibility for essentially locating and removing. And
there are huge numbers we are talking about.
Senator Shelby. And how many? Let us assume of the 30
million that come in, that there are a lot of people that do
not go back. I do not know how many, but it has to be heavy.
Mr. Bonner. That overstay their visa.
Senator Shelby. Sure, overstaying their visa. What do you
do about it? And how many have you found and deported that have
overstayed their visa?
Mr. Bonner. I will give you a way of looking at that. And
that is and again, these are estimates.
Senator Shelby. No. I do not want to just look at it. We
want to know. Go ahead.
Mr. Bonner. Yes. But let us start with what are some
estimates.
Senator Shelby. Sure.
Mr. Bonner. And that is, if you estimate that there are 8
million people that are illegally residing in the United
States, and the figure might be higher, but if it is 8 million,
the estimates are that about 40 percent of those are visa
overstays.
Senator Shelby. Okay.
Mr. Bonner. So 3 million plus. And then the question is,
well, how do you prioritize that, particularly in light of the
terrorist threat, criminal aliens and the like, to devote
resources to go after them. And I do not think the resources
are necessarily sufficient to do that. But ICE is the one that
has the resources and the responsibility. And I do not mean to
pass the buck here in any sense, but it is an issue then as
to----
Senator Byrd. We do need to talk about the bucks. That is
what the senator is trying to find out.
Senator Shelby. We are trying to get to the bottom of this.
What are the real numbers? What are you doing about it? And if
you are not doing a lot about it, and obviously you are not
doing what you could, what do you need? Do you need resources
to do it?
Senator Cochran. Do you want to answer that?
ICE RESPONSE TO OVERSTAY QUESTION
Mr. Garcia. Yes. Thank you, Senator. To pick up, I guess,
where Rob left me, since the initiation of NCR or SEVIS, a
tremendous amount of information has been generated. You hit on
it, Senator, when you say our exit controls. And Commissioner
Bonner was talking about it. We get these leads in. We have had
20,000 NCR US VISIT now, SEVIS leads, resolved at headquarters.
Out of that group, we have sent 1,200 leads out into the field
to be resolved in our field offices.
We have to take the indications of overstay and violations.
And then we have to check the systems. We have to look at the
exit data. And we have to do follow-up. And we have to
prioritize.
Senator Shelby. Excuse me. If it is 40 percent of the
illegal aliens, just use that for an example, of 8 million,
that is 3 million, a little more than 3 million, if it was 8
million, 40 percent of that, 3 million overstays. It seems that
you are just overwhelmed. If there are 3 million illegal aliens
here because they overstayed their visas and you do not know
where they are--maybe you know who they are, because there is
no exit, or maybe you do not know that.
I am not here to call you down on it, because I know you
are sincere and you are competent. But I think you have a
tremendous problem, or we do in this country.
Mr. Garcia. A long time to get to that population, looking
at the past and the future. I had one particularly egregious
case last week where someone was in overstay from 1986,
committed a horrendous act against a 3-year-old child in
Maryland. So that shows you the scope of how far back we are
looking.
Going forward, which is a little bit different conversation
that we have been talking about here with the new US VISIT, the
new SEVIS system--I know, Senator, you are familiar with the
old systems and how much of an improvement this has been. We
are working with that prospectively to look at these 20,000
leads and the 1,200 we have sent out to put deterrence into the
system, which was not there before, I believe.
Then you look at the past. And you say: How do we
prioritize that child sex predator that has been here since
1986 and the other ones that pose a public safety risk? How do
we work with whatever legislations? How do we address that all
in a meaningful way? And I think that is what we are all
working towards here at the table.
DOES ICE HAVE ENOUGH RESOURCES TO HANDLE OVERSTAY?
Senator Shelby. But my real question, do you have enough
resources to do that?
Mr. Garcia. Yes, in where we are going. And if you look at
the initiatives we have asked for, there is compliance
enforcement enhancement there. We have been doing that,
building that out of base up till now. We are asking for $16
million coming here to look at processing more leads and
building a targeting system that is even more meaningful.
Because again, enforcement is partly deterrence. And we have to
send that message out.
Senator Shelby. Thank you for your indulgence, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Senator, thank you.
I have two final questions and other senators may have
other questions. We are going to have a vote, I think, at about
12:15 on the Senate floor. So we are about through, if that is
any consolation to you.
$64 MILLION REQUEST FOR SENSOR AND SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY
I notice in the budget request there is $64 million being
requested for sensor and surveillance technology. There is
technology currently deployed between the land ports of entry,
but you are developing a project plan for the $64 million
request, as I understand it. Do you have any idea what the
total cost of finishing the installation of sensor technology
is going to be? Mr. Bonner, I guess that is a question you
should answer.
Mr. Bonner. It is, because this is sensoring technology for
the Border Patrol to better control and detect against illegal
crossings by illegal migrants, drug smugglers, potential
terrorists. And the $64 million is going to help us immensely
in terms of expanding the things like the remote video system
and the ISIS system and the ground sensors that we use at
strategic places along the Southwest border. And of course,
unfortunately since 9/11, we have had to give more attention to
our Northern border with Canada, too, in terms of understanding
who and what may be crossing that border, so that the Border
Patrol is then able to respond and apprehend those that
illegally cross our borders.
But you are asking me what the total is. I do not have the
number. I mean, the goal is to have sensoring technology, which
could include ground sensors, the sophisticated camera
sensoring systems, plus UAVs, and we have funding for that. To
give us a more comprehensive picture, that is the goal, of
illegal penetration of our borders at the most vulnerable
areas. I mean, there are some areas of our border that are, for
example, I mean, in the Rocky Mountains on the Canadian border
during the winter it is virtually impassable. So we are looking
at it in terms of where the vulnerabilities are. The goal is to
expand the sensoring system to give us sufficient visibility
that we have substantial control over and detection
capabilities for people moving across the border.
Mr. Chairman, what the total number is, I do not have it
right now. It would be more than the $64 million that is being
requested in the 2005 budget request.
$10 MILLION REQUEST FOR UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
Senator Cochran. There is also an indication that you need
funding up to $10 million to develop a system of unmanned
aerial vehicles to support the Border Patrol and other
components of Customs and Border Protection. Are you proceeding
now to use funds from other sources under your control in order
to get moving on this program in connection with the Arizona
Border Control Initiative, for example?
Mr. Bonner. Yes, we are. And even in 2004 we are proceeding
to develop and actually deploy an unmanned aerial vehicle in
support of the Arizona Border Control Initiative to better
control the Arizona border. And I believe that we are going to
be able to do that sometime by the May/June time frame,
actually deploy a UAV that will cover and detect along a
significant portion of the Arizona border. The funding for this
is not in our budget. But we have identified funding through
Under Secretary Hutchinson and the Department of Homeland
Security through the Science and Technology area to essentially
pilot and determine how effective a UAV is in terms of
detecting. So that in 2005, we should be able to have a good
understanding of what we need to actually deploy on a more
permanent basis on the Southwest border at particular critical
segments, as well as on our Northern border with Canada.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Garcia, I think the Coast Guard and
Air Marine Program within your bureau have tested the concept
of unmanned aerial vehicles in their operations. Is your
experience going to be shared, or will this be communicated to
the other agencies so they will have the benefit of your
understanding and your experience?
Mr. Garcia. Absolutely, as far as the Air and Marine goes.
We are working down in Arizona. And I am working very closely
with Commissioner Bonner.
Senator Cochran. Senator Byrd, those are my last two
questions.
Senator Byrd. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. I yield to you for whatever time you need.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will submit most
of my remaining questions for the record. I do have two that I
will ask at this time. Then we will go to the floor for our
vote.
CONTINUED DUMPING AND SUBSIDY OFFSET ACT TRADEOFF
On March 19, Commissioner Bonner, CBP issued its annual
report for 2003 on the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act
Trade law. This is a law that I helped to enact that allows
Customs and Border Protection to reimburse U.S. companies that
have been injured by unfair trade practices with funds that are
collected as import duties on unfairly traded imports. CBP's
report states that, while CBP should have distributed at least
$320 million in collected duties to eligible U.S. companies and
workers in 2003, it was able to distribute only $190 million.
CBP failed to collect $130 million from unfair traders.
Most of the uncollected $130 million consists of import duties
not collected by CBP on goods from China in particular. While
part of the problem is that Chinese companies are refusing to
pay these duties, it also appears that CBP is failing to
enforce the U.S. trade laws, because it is not diligently
pursuing the parties who are refusing to pay these duties. Why
is CBP not collecting millions of dollars in duties on unfairly
traded imports as required by U.S. law?
Mr. Bonner. First of all, we take very seriously at Customs
and Border Protection, Senator Byrd, our responsibilities under
the Byrd amendment. And I believe that the answer to that lies
in essentially three factors, most of which are beyond the
control of Customs and Border Protection. The first factor is
that when there is a preliminary proceeding against a Chinese
company, and these are mainly agricultural products, and it is
the then Commerce Department that determines what the
preliminary antidumping duty rate is going to be. And in many
instances, as I think you know, it has turned out that when
there is a final order, the antidumping duty rate is much
higher than the Commerce Department originally set.
So that means that the bonds, the Custom bonds, that were
to secure the payment of the antidumping and/or countervailing
duties in many instances were not adequate.
Secondly, the Chinese companies in many instances have
essentially not come in and defended the antidumping charges.
And therefore, that has resulted in punitive antidumping duties
being levied at a much higher rate.
The second factor is that once the antidumping duty final
order is entered by the Commerce Department, we have found that
the companies that were in China that were shipping the garlic,
the mushrooms, or the other agriculture products, those
companies simply fade into the woodwork and new companies
appear. So they are changing, essentially, new shippers. And
under the Commerce Department rules, unless you can show that
the new shipping company is, in fact, an alter ego of, owned or
controlled by the shipping companies that are subject to the
antidumping duty, they are not viewed as having to pay the
antidumping duty.
And the third thing, unbelievably, is that for the
inability to collect this $130 million more or less that you
have talked about is the fact that surety companies that have
been approved by Treasury Department, a number of them,
including one large one in Los Angeles, have essentially
defaulted. In other words, they were standing behind bonding
these shipments. And they are not in a position to pay.
So the long and short of it is, we clearly need to do
better. We are engaged with the Commerce Department to address
those two issues, and with the Treasury Department to address
the issue of the adequacy of the surety, to have a better
chance of recovering more of the antidumping duties.
That said, by the way, I still think, given the system, no
matter how hard we try to approach this issue, it is very
difficult for me to sit here and say that we are going to be
able to collect 100 percent of anti-dumping duties that are
ultimately assessed in final orders by the Commerce Department.
We are going to do our best, and we are doing our best to do
that.
WHY IS CHINA MORE OF A PROBLEM?
Senator Byrd. Why does the problem seem to involve more
imports from China than from any other country?
Mr. Bonner. Well, first of all, I mean in one sense,
leaving aside Canada, more goods are imported from China than
any other country of the world to the United States. China went
into second place behind Canada in terms of volume of imports
into the United States last year, according to Customs and
Border Protection data. It surpassed Mexico, which had
surpassed Japan. So more of our imports are coming from China.
Secondly, we are concerned from an enforcement point of
view that, particularly in this area that you are describing,
at least some companies, particularly with agriculture
products--and we have also seen illegal trans-shipments of
textiles and that sort of thing through essentially other
countries from China. We are concerned that it probably is the
number one enforcement issues for both antidumping duties and
for evasion of U.S. trade laws that relate to textiles.
But part of it is, they are a major exporter. And part of
it is that we need to enforce the antidumping duty laws, which
ultimately under the Byrd amendment result in funds to the
injured U.S. industry. So we are committed to working on this.
And we clearly have some work to do to make sure that our rate
of recovery is higher than it is right now of the antidumping
duties.
Senator Byrd. All right. I hope that you will carry out
that commitment vigorously.
Mr. Bonner. Yes, sir.
INTEGRATED FINGERPRINT DATA BASES
Senator Byrd. I have one final question now, Mr. Chairman.
During our March 9 hearing with Secretary Hutchinson, the
issue of integrating fingerprint databases was raised by
subcommittee members of both parties. The ability of illegal
aliens and criminals to slip through our inspection and
investigation webs and do harm to U.S. citizens has been amply
documented. It is of the greatest concern to me and should be
one of the department's primary goals.
At one point, Secretary Hutchinson stated that the
fingerprint databases would be integrated by the end of the
year. At another point, he said that the department would find
the necessary $4 million or so to ensure that border patrol
agents had access to this information at all of the sites.
I want to make sure that what he said would be done can
actually be done. Earlier this year, the Department of
Justice's Inspector General said it would take several years to
achieve the goal of fully integrating the Justice Department's
two-fingerprint system, known as the Automated Biometric
Identification System, or IDENT, with the FBI's IAFIS
fingerprint database. But, Secretary Hutchinson said that it
was a priority and would be done in a matter of months.
Now who is right?
Mr. Bonner. Well, I think Under Secretary Hutchinson is
right here, if I understand what the issue is. And I believe
the issue is whether and how long it will take us to integrate
the IDENT and IAFIS system for at least our front line, which
is our border line, and at least at some of our ports of entry
for inspectors. And in that regard, Senator Byrd, there is an
integrated system that essentially permits the integration of
both IDENT and IAFIS. And that system allows, for example, at a
Border Patrol station, allows the ten prints that are taken to
be run against both the IDENT and the IAFIS system.
The IAFIS, of course, as you know, is the FBI's master
criminal fingerprint system in Clarksburg, West Virginia. And
also at the same time run against the IDENT database. So the
question is a deployment issue for CBP. And I am not talking
about State and local law enforcement here. I am just talking
about Customs and Border Protection.
And I believe right now, we have deployed some of these
integrated systems to Border Patrol stations. We have deployed
about 96 integrated systems to 31 border patrol stations. The
plan is to deploy 255 of these integrated systems, which would
be to all of the Border Patrol stations by the end of the year.
Now that might not be this fiscal year but it may be the end of
the calendar year.
And then secondly, we have had IAFIS systems at 48 of the
major ports of entry. Of those 48, 27 can do both, run against
the IDENT and the IAFIS system. And we plan to have the
integrated system, if you will, at all 48 of those ports also
by the end of the year. So we do have an integrated system.
Now the only thing I can tell you about the Justice
Department, is that it may be that for purposes of State and
local law enforcement having the capability of running prints
through both IAFIS and IDENT, it may be that that is going to
take longer. I do not know the answer to that. But perhaps that
is going to take several years.
But I know for CBP, which is the front line agency of the
U.S. Government at our borders, we are making excellent
progress in terms of rolling out that integrated system. With
the right procedures in place, it will give you a better means
of protecting against criminal aliens being able to get into
the United States.
Senator Byrd. I fully support the statement of the IG and
the Justice Department when he states as follows, ``This
integration is critical to identifying illegally entering
aliens on lookout lists or with criminal histories. But
progress has been slow.''
Mr. Chairman, I raised my concerns with Secretary Ridge
about fingerprint database integration in relation to his plan
for deploying the US VISIT system. I cannot stress enough the
importance of moving forward on this effort as expeditiously as
possible. The lives of our citizens are at stake.
The FBI tells us that the Hutchinson proposal does not
provide access for State and locals. This is a weakness that
must be met.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Byrd.
Thank you, all of our witnesses, for your cooperation with
our subcommittee. As you know, written questions may be
submitted to you for the record. And we ask you respond to them
within a reasonable time.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
ARIZONA BORDER CONTROL INITIATIVE
Question. Under Secretary Hutchinson recently announced the Arizona
Border Control Initiative. The announcement mentioned 260 Border Patrol
agents, assigning 4 additional helicopters, $1 million for new sensor
technology, $2 million to house additional apprehended illegal aliens,
and other unspecified resources for detention. How are CBP and ICE
paying for the Arizona Border Control Initiative?
Answer. CBP has identified funding within the fiscal year 2004
appropriations for the placement of the 260 agents, new sensors
technology and the additional helicopters for the initiative. ICE is
funding its efforts associated with the Arizona Border Control
Initiative from within its fiscal year 2004 appropriations.
Question. Where are the funds coming from to pay for the permanent
transfer of 200 border patrol agents?
Answer. CBP and the Border Patrol will request approval of the
appropriations committees to use supplemental funds which remain
unspent after the completion of the relocation of the 400 agents to the
northern border in fiscal year 2004. CBP has met the mandate to triple
the number of agents on the northern border. Approximately $2.5 million
is required to move the 200 agents into the Arizona border area.
Question. What impact will these actions have on initiatives funded
by the fiscal year 2004 Appropriations Act and on base programs and
staffing needs?
Answer. The Arizona Border Control Initiative is a high priority
border enforcement operation to control illegal entry in these areas.
The impact of ABC on lower priority base programs will be minimal and
no changes in current border operations are anticipated. In addition,
there will be little or no staffing impacts along the other border
sectors due to the Arizona Border Control Initiative other than the
relocation of the 200 agents.
Question. Which border patrol sectors are losing agents and
helicopters to Tucson?
Answer. Four helicopters were transferred to Tucson from the San
Diego Sector. The transfer of 200 agents is pending receipt of a
selection list of qualified applicants. Applicants will in all
likelihood come from across the entire United States.
Question. Will this initiative need to be pulled back in light of
the funding problems within CBP and ICE which have initiated a hiring
freeze and other actions to slow down or stop spending? If not, why?
Answer. Securing our Nation's borders is a top priority of CBP. The
current emphasis of our enforcement strategy is gaining control of the
illegal traffic entering through the State of Arizona. It is
anticipated the ABC Initiative will continue as planned. This
initiative will not be affected by the temporary suspension of hiring
or by other steps being undertaken to address the budget issues to
which you refer. This initiative is a high-priority for the Department,
CBP, and ICE.
OVERSEAS STAFFING
Question. CIS, CBP and ICE each have overseas responsibilities,
some inherited from legacy agencies and some stemming from new
initiatives. The President's budget requests increased resources for
overseas staffing for CBP and ICE, while CIS has plans for a formal
Refugee Corps overseas. How will your organizations cooperate overseas?
Answer. The Office of the Secretary is conducting a detailed review
of the role of DHS overseas, including the management structure that
best advances the full range of the international liaison, enforcement,
inspection and services missions of the Department.
Question. Will each organization have separate overseas management
structures? If not, how will these resources be managed?
Answer. The Office of the Secretary is conducting a detailed review
of the role of DHS overseas, including the management structure that
best advances the full range of the international liaison, enforcement,
inspection and services missions of the Department.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)
BACKLOG REDUCTION PLAN
Question. What is the current size of the application backlog?
Answer. Information on the current backlog and USCIS plans to
eliminate it will be provided to Congress in the coming months in a
revised Backlog Elimination Plan.
Question. How does CIS define and determine the size of the backlog
of applications?
Answer. In developing the revised Backlog Elimination Plan, USCIS
is reviewing how it defines and thus quantifies the backlog.
Information on the current backlog and USCIS plans to eliminate it will
be provided to Congress in the coming months in a revised Backlog
Elimination Plan.
Question. What impact is the reduction in fee receipts currently
being experienced by CIS having on your ability to reduce the
application processing backlog? Answer. While it is true that overall
fee revenues are lower so far this fiscal year, this is due to a
decrease in new applications received. Thus, even though fee revenue
thus far this year is lower, it is important to note that workload is
lower, too--thus enabling us to better focus on backlog cases.
Question. Last week the Department announced the settlement of the
Catholic Social Services and Newman Legalization cases. What is the
estimate of the potential number of applications that will be filed as
a result of these settlements, and will those applications have any
impact on CIS's ability to reduce the backlog?
Answer. There is no way of predicting exactly how many people will
be able to apply during this new application period. However, many of
the possibly impacted individuals were also eligible to apply for two
previous programs set up by the legacy INS--the Questionnaire Program
and the LIFE Legalization program.
It is expected that many applicants who may be eligible to apply
for this new proposed settlement program did actually apply under the
other programs and may have applications already being processed.
So, since the total number who applied under those two programs
COMBINED is approximately 70,000--there is a good possibility that the
number of applicants who come forward with this latest program will be
less than 70,000.
GUEST WORKER PROGRAM
Question. While it is difficult to answer this question so early in
the process: how long do you anticipate it will take CIS to have a
Guest Worker program up and running after legislation is passed and
signed into law?
Answer. You are correct. It is difficult to answer this question.
The complexity of the final legislation that Congress passes will, in
turn, determine the complexity of implementing the program and any
subsequent regulations and field guidance that will need to be written
to support the plan. However, the key to processing temporary worker
petitions quickly and efficiently will be simplicity in the design of
the legislation.
Question. What impact will the addition of a Guest Worker Program
have on CIS's ability to reduce the application backlog? Answer. We
will meet the President's backlog reduction goals by 2006. As stated
above, the key to processing temporary worker petitions quickly and
efficiently is simplicity in the design. Based upon the legislation
that Congress passes, we will use fees to support applicant processing
and documentation.
REFUGEE SERVICES
Question. Since fiscal year 2001, we have seen a dramatic decrease
in the number of refugee admissions. In fiscal year 2001, the U.S.
Government admitted over 69,000 refugees from around the world, while
last fiscal year, only 28,000 refugees were admitted to the United
States. The ceiling was 70,000 admissions for fiscal year 2003. It is
very important that we ensure that the employees involved with Refugee
screening are kept safe, and that we are diligently screening those
refugees that are eligible for admission. What is CIS doing to ensure
that all qualified refugees are being screened and admitted to the
United States?
Answer. USCIS is committed to steadfast resettlement of refugees in
need. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 prompted significant
and more time-consuming changes in U.S. Refugee Program (USRP)
processing procedures. Increased attention is now being given to more
carefully screening applicants and more closely scrutinizing overseas
refugee processing sites to ensure the safety and security of our
officers. These procedural changes have enhanced the U.S. Government's
ability to prevent terrorists and other undesirable persons from using
the USRP to gain entry into the United States. However, they have also
slowed the pace of overseas processing and, in turn, contributed to the
reduction in refugee admissions. To address this, the USCIS is working
to improve and streamline refugee screening, security checks and
interview methods. USCIS is also working with the other implementing
partners to expand access to the USRP by identifying new groups
eligible for resettlement consideration. Consequently, from a low point
of 27,113 total admissions in fiscal year 2002, the Department of State
projects that admissions in fiscal year 2004 will significantly surpass
this figure.
Finally, USCIS has recently received resources through the revised
fee schedule to establish a Refugee Corps in fiscal year 2004. This
cadre of refugee-dedicated adjudicators will divide their time between
Headquarters and the various overseas processing sites. This will
result in a stronger and more effective overseas refugee-processing
program without compromising the USRP's humanitarian objectives. A
Refugee Corps will also help ensure more timely and satisfactory DHS
responsiveness to USRP commitments and admissions goals.
Question. The submitted testimony for CIS mentioned plans for the
formal establishment of a Refugee Corps. Please explain when you plan
to have this accomplished, what the expected annual costs will be, how
many people will be assigned to this Corps, and what goals and
objectives the program will have.
Answer. The establishment of a dedicated refugee corps is funded
through the recently announced fee adjustments. These fee adjustments
took effect on April 30, 2004. Implementation of the refugee corps will
take place shortly thereafter. This new structural and functional
arrangement will greatly improve the quality of refugee adjudications
and oversight, provide cost-effective immigration services, and
significantly improve the Nation's ability to secure our borders
without compromising humanitarian objectives. USCIS anticipates fee
revenues will fund 109 positions at an annual cost of $18.5 million.
Question. How will the Refugee Corps work with the ICE's Overseas
Visa Security Units and U.S. Consulates?
Answer. The refugee-dedicated resources of the Refugee Corps, as
supported and deployed by USCIS will work closely with Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) overseas offices and U.S. Consulates on a
variety of refugee application fraud and security matters. For example,
the overseas ICE offices will assist deployed Refugee Corps
adjudicators in developing and implementing various refugee fraud
detection and deterrence methods. While at overseas refugee processing
locations, the Refugee Corps will, in turn, refer emergent fraudulent
refugee cases and cases having national security interest to ICE for
advice and possible investigation, as appropriate. The Corps will also
coordinate security check results such as Consular Lookout and Support
System (CLASS) and Security Advisory Opinions (SAOs) with ICE offices
and U.S. Consulates, as needed; and engage in mutual information-
sharing regarding refugee applicant civil registry documents and other
documentation to insure their validity and legality. Finally, the
Refugee Corps will work with ICE overseas offices and other U.S.
Embassy components to investigate and approve overseas refugee
processing sites thereby helping ensure the safety, security and health
of Refugee Corps adjudicators.
BENEFIT FRAUD
Question. The President's Budget proposes to replace the funds
provided to ICE for benefit fraud from the Examinations Fee Account,
with appropriated dollars. What resources does CIS plan to devote to
benefit fraud in fiscal year 2005?
Answer. USCIS is currently reviewing all of its business processes
as a part of the revised backlog elimination plan. Therefore, the
funding to support benefit fraud responsibilities in 2005 is under
review.
Question. What will CIS use the $25 million in Examinations Fee
Account funds for that it will retain in fiscal year 2005?
Answer. USCIS is currently reviewing all of its business processes
as a part of the revised backlog elimination plan. Therefore, the
funding to support benefit fraud responsibilities in 2005 is under
review.
Question. How many benefit fraud cases were investigated and
prosecuted in each of fiscal years 1998-2003? How many defendants were
involved in each of the cases in each year?
Answer: Statistical Response:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cases
Fiscal year -------------------------------- Principals Aliens Defendants
Opened Completed Involved Involved Prosecuted
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003............................ 2,522 2,031 932 1,885 213
2002............................ 1,932 1,919 258 383 994
2001............................ 2,613 2,662 655 927 185
2000............................ 3,140 2,965 532 3,009 189
1999............................ 5,315 3,648 706 1,705 252
1998............................ 4,311 3,802 639 944 283
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The table above reflects the best available benefit fraud
statistics historically collected by the former INS. Some of the
statistics reflecting closed cases relate to cases opened in a previous
year.
Question. Of the applications that you receive annually, what is
the total estimated size of the fraud problem, by type of fraud?
Answer. GAO's January 2002 report on immigration benefit fraud
States that, ``Although the extent of the benefit fraud problem is not
known, internal and external reports indicate that the problem is
pervasive and significant.'' There is no current estimate of the fraud
problem.
CITIZENSHIP
Question. Please give the Committee a fuller understanding of why
today there is not uniformity across the country in the administration
of the current citizenship test.
Answer. The lack of uniformity actually dates back to 1790, when
the first Congress entrusted naturalization to the courts and let them
prescribe their own rules. From 1926-1990, the courts and INS shared
responsibility for naturalization processing. In 1936, INS directed
examiners to use uniform procedures and to determine applicants'
character and attitude towards the United States rather than testing
ability to memorize facts and phrases. The Immigration Act of 1990 gave
INS full responsibility for naturalization adjudication.
In 2000, INS issued a policy memorandum to its field offices to
standardize certain aspects of the testing process, such as which
sources officers should use when selecting test questions, the length
of the test, and passing scores. In 2001, INS awarded a contract to a
testing development company to assist it in the overall redesign of the
testing process. This project includes defining appropriate assessment
content and standards for the speaking, reading, writing, and U.S.
history and government tests; and developing a revised test process,
including test specifications/item content, item formats, equivalent
forms, appropriate delivery systems, scoring rules, and administration
procedures. It's important to not rush standardization at the expense
of creating a reliable, valid and fair test.
We are moving forward on all of these related goals. We completed a
pilot test of revised English test items (reading, writing and
speaking) in 2003. This year, we plan to finalize revised U.S. history
and government content; conduct studies including test format, and test
administration mode; and begin a pilot test of the complete revised
English, U.S. history and government test. We also have asked the
National Academies of Science to provide us with advice concerning the
reliability, validity and fairness of the proposed changes to the test.
These steps are all vital to ensuring that our revised test will meet
these requirements.
Question. Please provide a more detailed explanation of what the
Office of Citizenship is working on.
Answer. Established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the
Office of Citizenship is responsible for promoting public awareness of
the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. Specifically, the
mandate of this office is to promote civic integration of immigrants
through training and development of educational materials.
The Office of Citizenship is targeting immigrants at two critical
points on their journey toward citizenship: upon arrival in the United
States and as they begin the formal naturalization process. The office
is in the process of developing a ``New Immigrant Orientation Guide''
which will be presented to the approximately one million immigrants
welcomed to permanent residence every year. In addition to the guide,
and in close coordination with community and faith-based based
organizations, the office will also host new immigrant orientation
sessions in communities across the country.
In the citizenship preparation arena, the office will develop new
educational materials that include study and teacher guides that
promote a deeper understanding of American history and civics. The
American history and civics content will be closely coordinated with
the Department of Education and the ``We the People'' initiative of the
National Endowment for the Humanities.
Our office is currently conducting focus groups in key cities
across the country in order to proactively identify the strengths and
gaps associated with their immigrant integration and citizenship
preparation initiatives. Finally, we plan to publish a report of our
findings in September when we host our first national civic integration
conference on the theme ``Celebrate Citizenship, Celebrate America.''
Question. How many people do you plan to have on the staff of the
Office of Citizenship? Will they all be located in DC or placed around
the country?
Answer. The Office of Citizenship is currently staffed by the Chief
of the Office, two Deputy Chiefs responsible for Program Development
and Outreach; eight senior Policy Analysts and Outreach Specialists
working in its DC Headquarters; and 18 Community Liaison Officers in
the following regional and field offices: Arlington, Atlanta,
Burlington, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles,
Laguna Niguel, Miami, New Orleans, New York, Phoenix, Portland, San
Antonio, San Diego and San Francisco.
Question. Will the Office of Citizenship work with organizations
outside of the Department to carry out its mission?
Answer. In order to fully realize its mandate, the Office of
Citizenship will work in partnership with Federal, State and local
agencies, community and faith-based groups and private organizations
that share an interest in civic engagement and involvement. Community
Liaison Officers in regional and field offices are primarily
responsible for establishing this important outreach portfolio and have
conducted hundreds of community meetings and forums in an effort to
build robust coalitions and long-term commitments around civic
integration initiatives. We are currently researching statutory and
legislative authorities to enhance our ability to partner with the
private sector.
ON-LINE FILING OF APPLICATIONS
Question. When is the next expansion of the on-line filing of
benefit applications planned?
Answer. The next group of forms that will be automated for on-line
filing is scheduled to complete testing on April 30, 2004 and is
planned to be available to the public during the first week of May
2004.
Question. Which applications do you plan to add next?
Answer. The group of forms that is planned to be available to the
public by the first week of May 2004 are:
Form I-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker
Form I-131, Application for Travel Document
Form I-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker
Form I-539, Application to Extend/Change Nonimmigrant Status
Form I-821, Application for Temporary Protected Status
Form I-907, Request for Premium Processing
Question. What impact has on-line filing of applications had on the
processing time of applications?
Answer. Because receiving the data comprises only a small part of
the adjudicative process and e-filing is still in its infancy at USCIS,
e-filing has not yet resulted in significant processing time savings.
Results will improve as e-filing opportunities are expanded, processes
are changed to maximize the benefits of e-filing, and USCIS develops an
IT infrastructure capable of moving complete files electronically. At
present, e-filing is a customer service initiative with potential for
significant efficiency gains.
Question. Has on-line filing helped you to reduce the backlog of
applications?
Answer. As indicated above, e-filing, at this time, is primarily a
customer service initiative that provides our applicants with an
alternative to filing by mail or filing in person. It allows customers
to pay their fee on-line via credit card or transfer of funds; and
provides the applicant with instant evidence of their filing.
Electronic filing does not decrease the amount of effort or time
necessary to review an application or render a decision. In the future,
e-filing will be both a customer service program, as well as an
efficiency program when USCIS deploys an IT infrastructure capable of
moving complete files electronically.
RELATIONSHIP WITH IMMIGRATION OMBUDSMAN
Question. In July of 2003, Secretary Tom Ridge appointed Prakash I.
Khatri to serve as the first Citizenship and Immigration Services
Ombudsman for the Department of Homeland Security. What is the working
relationship between CIS and the Ombudsman's office?
Answer. The Director of USCIS meets periodically in common cause
with the Ombudsman to discuss issues, his recommendations, and their
feasibility. The Director established an Office of Customer Management
Relations (OCRM) led by a career senior executive who reports directly
to the Director, to provide counsel, access to USCIS operations,
facilitate the sharing of information, and coordinate responses to
issues raised by the Ombudsman's Office.
In addition, numerous field visits have been arranged for the
Ombudsman in gaining knowledge of operational challenges and in
collecting ideas from field staff. A collegial relationship is ongoing
between the two Offices.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
CONTAINER SECURITY
Question. What achievements has the Department made in increasing
cargo security? When will the new three-pronged strategy be completely
implemented?
Answer. The Department has made significant strides in improving
cargo security through programs such as the Container Security
Initiative (CSI), the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT), Free and Secure Trade (FAST), the National Targeting Center, the
deployment of non-intrusive inspection technology and radiological
detection cargo screening technology at our ports of entry. In
addition, implementation of the 24-hour rule for the transmission of
cargo manifests has all contributed to improved security in the cargo
environment.
Implementation of the three pronged strategy: pushing our borders
outward; advanced targeting and analysis of cargo and passengers before
arrival at our borders; and intensive inspection of cargo and
passengers at our borders is a process. Implementation of this process
continues through the fiscal year 2005 President's initiatives for the
Container Security Initiative, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism, Systems for Targeting, and Radiation and Nuclear Screening
Technology. Initiatives like these can be expected in the future in
accord with the level of threat.
Question. The budget requests over $105 million in enhancements to
improve the ability of inspectors to target, inspect, and screen
passengers and cargo at land, air, and sea ports. Having radiation
monitors and increasing our ability to use computers to target and
screen cargo and passengers is critical. Are there a sufficient number
of inspectors on the front lines to handle physical inspections of
cargo and passengers?
Answer. With the additional resources provided for in the fiscal
year 2002 Emergency Supplemental, the fiscal year 2003 appropriation
and Wartime Supplemental, and the fiscal year 2004 appropriation, as
well as the joining of the three agencies to form CBP, we believe we
have adequate staffing to handle physical inspections of current levels
of cargo and passengers.
Question. Are there any plans to extend a Container Security
Initiative-like project to bulk and break-bulk shipments?
Answer. At this time, CBP is not planning to extend a CSI-like
project to prescreen bulk and break-bulk shipments. CBP will continue
to collaborate with the U.S. Coast Guard on vessels of interest and
certain dangerous cargos at both a national and field level, and
conduct joint boardings when warranted.
CUSTOMS-TRADE PARTNERSHIP AGAINST TERRORISM
Question. The budget requests an additional $15 million to expand
the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). These new
resources will allow Customs and Border Protection to increase the
validation process within C-TPAT. According to the submitted testimony,
221 validations have been completed on 2,926 certified partners. How
many more validations will CBP be able to complete each year with the
new resources?
Answer. To date, over 700 validations have been initiated with over
240 completed. Our goal for the current calendar year is to have
completed a total of 400 validations. C-TPAT will continue to increase
the number of validations performed for calendar year 2005. The
increase will be guided by several factors including but not limited to
membership levels, number of supply chain specialists on board, and
threat level.
Question. How often does CBP plan to validate each of the
participants in the program?
Answer. A C-TPAT participant is selected for validation based on
risk management principles. Validations may be initiated based on
import volume, security related anomalies, strategic threat posed by
geographic regions, participation in expedited release programs, a
relative sampling of industry sectors (e.g. carriers, brokers,
forwarders, importers), and/or other risk related information.
Alternatively, a validation may be performed as a matter of routine
program oversight.
Question. None of the 188 initiated validations have been on any of
the 45 certified foreign manufacturers enrolled. When does CBP plan to
begin reviewing foreign manufacturers?
Answer. Foreign manufacturers will be included in the next group of
C-TPAT validations to be initiated in calendar year 2004.
Question. What performance measures have been developed to gauge
the success of the C-TPAT program?
Answer. Internal measures include program marketing and acceptance,
which is measured by the number of C-TPAT partners enrolled and
certified by CBP. The impact of enrollment is measured by identifying
the percentage of trade controlled by those C-TPAT companies. Another
internal measure is examination risk management, which involves
quantifying and measuring the impact C-TPAT has on cargo inspections
performed on ``known risk'' C-TPAT partners, compared to shipments
where the risk is unknown or targeted as high.
External measures include the C-TPAT validation process, which is
used to verify the participant's supply chain security processes. C-
TPAT Supply Chain Specialists identify strengths and weaknesses found
during the validation and recommend action items in the validation
report. The results of all validations are captured to measure the
overall performance of validated companies.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
Question. The President's budget includes a request for $10 million
to develop, procure, deploy, and operate a system of unmanned aerial
vehicles to support the Border Patrol and other components of Customs
and Border Protection. According to the information we have been given
regarding the Arizona Border Control Initiative, this project will
begin in June with funding from the Science and Technology Directorate.
Are any of CBP's direct funds going to support this effort this fiscal
year?
Answer. No. All funding supplied for this effort has been provided
by the DHS Office of Science and Technology.
Question. Both the Coast Guard and the Air and Marine program
within ICE have tested the concept of using unmanned aerial vehicles in
their operations. Will CBP be working cooperatively with these
organizations during fiscal year 2005 on this test?
Answer. BTS and the Science and Technology Directorate co-chair the
DHS UAV Working Group which meets regularly and consists of BTS
component and U.S. Coast Guard managers responsible for aviation
assets. The working group provides a forum for collaboration and with
the DHS UAV Executive Steering Committee it will ensure that the needs
of CBP, ICE, TSA and the U.S. Coast Guard are addressed and deployments
and concepts of operations are coordinated within the DHS.
Question. What are the long-range plans for the use of UAVs along
the land border? Will this be a joint program with ICE's Air and Marine
Office?
Answer. DHS is exploring new technology to meet aerial border
security mission requirements. UAVs hold promise in some applications.
This mission will be supported through a variety of systems. Sensors
such as TARS, UAVs, rotary and fixed wing aircraft, and ground-based
equipment and personnel to operate and maintain these systems must be
coordinated by DHS and Department of Defense components, and aligned
against the highest critical vulnerabilities and threats. ICE AMO is an
integral part of the team that is developing and fielding this
capability.
SENSOR AND SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY
Question. Staff from CBP have informed us that they are currently
working on a complete review of the sensor and surveillance technology
currently deployed between the land ports of entry and are developing
the project plan for the $64 million requested for this effort for
fiscal year 2005. When will the plan for the fiscal year 2005 resources
for Sensor and Surveillance Technology be made available to the
Committee?
Answer. The appropriations staff will receive a comprehensive
briefing on our plans for this system and its operational goals that
reflect the new anti-terrorism mission in the near future.
Question. When can we expect to have all of the Northern and
Southern border comprehensively covered by these systems? In fiscal
year 2006, or beyond that?
Answer. The appropriations staff will receive a comprehensive
briefing on our plans for this system and its operational goals that
reflect the new anti-terrorism mission in the near future.
Question. What is the total cost of finishing the installation of
all sensor technology?
Answer. At this time we are formulating a new strategic plan based
on the new anti-terrorism priority. More comprehensive information on
future program direction and requirements will be provided in the near
future.
Question. The request for enhanced surveillance technology in this
budget does not include any resources for additional law enforcement
communications assistants. If the number of remote video surveillance
systems is increasing, won't there be a need for more personnel to
monitor the cameras?
Answer. The ISIS program does not anticipate a need for additional
law enforcement communications assistants; we expect that the
successful integration of proven technologies will provide this real-
time intelligence directly to the agents in the field. This will reduce
the need for law enforcement communications assistants to process this
information.
AUTOMATED COMMERCIAL ENVIRONMENT
Question. CBP has been working on modernizing the information
technology systems that it uses for some time. The most significant
project is the Automated Commercial Environment, known as ACE. CBP has
been working closely to resolve problems with the prime integrator on
ACE for the last year. Is the project back on track?
Will the project be completed on time, or does the overall project
timeline need to be revised and extended?
Is the project maintaining its projected budget? Is the project
continuing to experience cost overruns?
Answer. CBP continues to aggressively work to put ACE capabilities
to work on America's borders. The first deployment of ACE, completed in
the winter 2003, focused on the technical infrastructure. It provided
the foundation for a secure, reliable, high-speed access to critical
CBP information. The second release of ACE, deployed in summer 2003,
included an Enterprise Web portal that provides CBP Account Managers
and selected importers controlled access to information such as the
account's trade activity, and facilitates collaboration and
communication among the various groups.
Subsequent ACE capabilities will be fielded between June 2004 and
the end of ACE development, which includes; Periodic Payment (Release
3), e-Manifest Trucks (Release 4), ACE Selectivity Releases, End-to-End
e-Processing (Release 6), and ACE Wrap-Up (Release 7).
During the past year, U.S. Customs and Border Protection has worked
very closely with the e-Customs Partnership (eCP) to address
performance issues. This includes extensive analysis of the program to
incorporate process, planning, and organizational enhancements to help
contain costs and minimize schedule delays. The CBP efforts have also
included frequent meetings and dialogue with senior executives from
IBM, the leading eCP partner, to reinforce CBP high standards and
expectations. The response from IBM leadership has been positive, and
they have clearly indicated their commitment to the Automated
Commercial Environment (ACE) project. Meetings with IBM executives
continue monthly.
Based on intensified CBP oversight, the current estimated cost
variance for ACE is within 10 percent of the program baseline. Based on
benchmarks for similarly complex programs, the program variances are
within expected boundaries. The CBP continues to conduct cost
containment activities and have made great strides in improving our
ability to better forecast variances through Earned Value Management.
We have incorporated lessons learned into ACE development, including
improving the requirements definition process, and conducting more
comprehensive system development gate reviews based on refined
criteria.
Though CBP is developing schedule scenarios that result in ACE
completion dates ranging from 2009 to 2012, no formal change has been
made to the project schedule. A revised project schedule will be
published in the June 2004 update of the ACE Program Plan and in the
fiscal year 2006 OMB Exhibit 300 for ACE after the results of the
ongoing Global Business Blueprint (defining future CBP business
processes and the technology requirements) are known.
AGRICULTURAL INSPECTIONS
Question. How has CBP's ``Officer for the Future'' Plan been
developed to include additional training for the Agriculture Quarantine
Inspection function?
Answer. Consistent with the Homeland Security Act and subsequent
Memorandum of Agreement between USDA and DHS, it was agreed by both DHS
and USDA that USDA would supervise and provide educational support and
systems to ensure that DHS employees receive the training necessary to
carry out the USDA functions transferred to DHS. As a result, USDA has
linked with DHS in defining training module content specific to the
agriculture quarantine inspection mission. More specifically:
--The new hire CBP Officer will receive 12 hours of instruction in a
course titled Threat to Agriculture covering agriculture
fundamentals during the basic academy. This course is taught by
USDA instructors and covers: the importance of U.S.
agriculture; the impact of introduced pests; the agriculture
mission; statutory authorities; agricultural bioterrorism;
safeguarding; and agriculture secondary inspection referrals.
This training is mandatory.
--Current CBP Inspectors will receive a CD-ROM version of the same
course, titled Agriculture Fundamentals, covering the same
material. This training is mandatory for CBP Inspectors and
when issued to the field, will be completed within 120 days.
--A second component of mandatory agriculture quarantine inspection
training, titled Agriculture Procedures, will be developed over
the next few months by USDA and DHS. This mandatory course will
be taken by both the new hire CBP Officer and current CBP
Inspectors. USDA will direct course content and course delivery
will be conducted by DHS.
Question. What specific actions are being taken to train Customs
and Border Protection officers to detect potential illegal contraband
that may pose a risk of introducing a foreign animal disease into the
United States? Do you believe that this training is sufficient to
inform officers about the threats and potential damage, economic and
otherwise, to a huge sector of the U.S. economy that foreign animal
diseases pose?
Answer. All new hire CBP Officers are required to receive the USDA-
instructed course, Threats to Agriculture, while at the CBP Academy.
Current CBP Inspectors are required to take the same course, in a CD-
ROM format. The course was designed by USDA and includes an overview of
foreign animal diseases, including vectors, fomites, and impacts of the
diseases. The next phase of training, yet to be developed by USDA and
DHS, is the Agriculture Procedures course, which will provide more
specific training in the Agriculture Quarantine Inspection arena,
including additional training on foreign animal diseases.
Question. How many CBP Officers have completed the 12 to 16 hours
of Agriculture Quarantine Inspection training required to be a fully
certified CBP officer?
Answer. The number of hours of required (mandatory) training for
the CBP Officers is still not determined as the second component of
training, Agriculture Procedures, is not yet developed. The new hire
CBP Officers receive a total of 12 hours of training conducted by USDA
at the CBP Academy during their basic training. Current CBP Inspectors
will receive the same course as the new hire, but it will be delivered
in an electronic, CD-ROM format. All CBP Inspectors will be required to
take this course within 120 days of field delivery. The intent of this
training is to have the CBP non-agriculture workforce begin their
agriculture curricula from the same starting point. From October 2003
through April 13, 2004, a total of 823 CBP Officers have completed the
12-hour portion at the CBP Academy.
Question. What is the status of the former U.S. Department of
Agriculture Inspectors that were transferred to the Department of
Homeland Security in the middle of last year?
Answer. The former USDA Agriculture Inspectors have been placed
into a newly defined position description, the CBP Agriculture
Specialist. This position is in the 401 series with a full performance
level at the GS-11 level. The full performance level for the PPQ
Officer was a GS-9. The new duties incorporated in that position
description include:
--serving as an expert and technical consultant in the areas of
inspection, intelligence, analysis, examination, and law
enforcement activities related to the importation of
agricultural/commercial commodities and conveyances;
--applying a wide range of laws and regulations determining the
admissibility of agriculture commodities while preventing the
introduction of harmful pests, diseases, and potential agro-
terrorism into the United States;
--participating in special enforcement, targeting, or analysis teams
charged with collecting and analyzing information and
identifying high-risk targets;
--conducting visual and physical inspections of cargo, conveyances,
or passenger baggage;
--planning, conducting, and supervising remedial actions;
--participating in pre-arrival risk analysis; and
--serving as a training officer.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT
Question. Please provide a chart with the total resources, FTE and
dollars, devoted to worksite enforcement for each of fiscal years 1998-
2003.
Answer. The worksite enforcement budget has always been part of the
base budget and has not been separately tracked. The FTE are provided
in the chart below.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FTE Source: PAS................. 278 202 134 152 105
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VISA SECURITY UNIT
Question. The President's budget requests an increase of $10
million to support the Visa Security Unit. According to the budget,
this unit was established in fiscal year 2003, but is receiving its
current year funding from outside of ICE. Where is the funding for the
Visa Security Unit coming from for fiscal year 2004?
Answer. The Visa Security Program for fiscal year 2004 was an
unfunded mandate and ICE resources were used for the current TDY
deployment to Saudi Arabia of Visa Security Officers. The BTS
Directorate will be seeking reprogramming authority to address funding
requirements for sustainment of the Saudi deployment and expansion to
four other countries in fiscal year 2004. Financial support for this
Presidential priority will be from ICE and CBP operational funding.
Question. How many personnel have been hired for this program to
date?
Answer. No staff have been hired for this program to date. The
program has been operating with detailees at headquarters and in Saudi
Arabia.
Question. What is the expected staffing level for end of fiscal
year 2004?
Answer. The Saudi deployment would be 6 officers and ICE
Headquarters would have 10 at the end of fiscal year 2004.
Question. How many of the personnel in this program will be
stationed overseas?
Answer. As of April 30, 2004, there are 4 Visa Security Officers in
Saudi Arabia. New rotations are planned for the departing officers.
Question. What performance measures have been developed to gauge
the success of this program?
Answer. One of the key issues in the development of the Visa
Security Program is assuring that measures can be identified that
properly attribute the added value of DHS in the visa process. Measures
include the following: number of visa applications reviewed by DHS
officers; number referred for investigation and further analysis; and
numbers approved and denied in consultation with the Department of
State.
REDIRECTING THE BASE--OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS
Question. The President's Budget proposes important changes to the
funding of the Office of Investigations within ICE. The budget proposes
to replace $25 million in funding from the Examinations Fee Account
that currently funds benefit fraud with appropriated dollars. The
budget also proposes moving the responsibility for the Institutional
Removal Program from the Office of Investigations to the Detention and
Removals Program, but leaves the base funding within the Office of
Investigations. Why should appropriated dollars replace mandatory
dollars for benefit fraud?
Answer. The appropriated funds are requested for benefit fraud
investigations. The shift will allow the examinations fee to be used
solely for immigration services and provide appropriated resources for
enforcement activities. With respect to the institutional removal
program, the demands for Detention and Removal have increased
substantially and been met by investigators, which has had a negative
impact on the investigation program. The request provides less
expensive and more appropriate personnel resources to the Detention and
Removal Program, while at the same time preserving the original intent
and capacity requirements for the Office of Investigations.
Question. Will this shift increase the total resources devoted to
benefit fraud?
Answer. The approval of $25 million in appropriated funds would not
increase the resources devoted to benefits fraud but simply replace
funds previously provided from the Examinations Fee. These funds
provide the resources for approximately 140 existing ICE positions and
operational expenses. These resources enable ICE to maintain its
investigations of benefit fraud organizations and egregious fraud
violators.
Question. Under the budget proposal, the base funding for the
Institutional Removal Program remains within the Office of
Investigations. What investigative priorities will these resources be
redirected to?
Answer. The fiscal year 2005 request is a result of a planned
realignment of the Institutional Removal Program (IRP) from OI to DRO.
Managing and executing the program in one office will prove more
effective and productive than in its current bifurcated state. Special
Agents within OI that will be freed up from IRP work they currently
perform will be able to dedicate much-needed investigative hours to
public safety and national security cases. There are renewed demands
for investigation of non-incarcerated criminal aliens and violent gang
enforcement.
LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT CENTER
Question. What are the base resources, FTE and dollars, for the Law
Enforcement Support Center (LESC) for fiscal year 2004? What are the
requested resources for the LESC for fiscal year 2005?
Answer. General expense funding for fiscal year 2004 is budgeted at
$1.9 million, which includes $869,000 from the War Supplemental. In
fiscal year 2004, there are 287 positions authorized, of which 9 are
currently vacant. No increases are anticipated for fiscal year 2005.
Question. It is the Committee's understanding that there are
approximately $5 million in facility improvements that are needed at
the LESC. Is this accurate? If, yes please provide the Committee with
an itemized list for the $5 million.
Answer. Due to increased law enforcement inquiry workload and the
projected growth in the NCIC program, the LESC submitted an out-of-
cycle space request for 80,309 additional sq. ft of expanded facility
space at the LESC's present location in January 2002. That request was
subsequently approved and the one-time costs of $3.7 million associated
with expansion were approved and transferred to GSA.
Since the submission of the space request in January 2002, the
LESC's core workload has grown from 240,000 queries to a projected
744,000 queries per year in 2004. Additionally since establishment of
DHS and ICE, the LESC has taken on new, critical law enforcement tasks.
This growth combined with new tasks exceeded the projected growth that
was the basis of the original space request. Additionally, once the
80,000-sq. ft. expansion is completed, the current LESC site would not
allow for any additional facility expansion. The constraints of the
current site would eventually drive the LESC into a multi-site
operation to continue to expand workload and mission. For these and
other reasons, including physical security concerns, it was determined
not to proceed with the 80,000 sq. ft. addition, but instead pursue a
larger, more secure site that would not limit future expansion or the
LESC mission and ability to perform its important law enforcement work.
The $3.7 million transferred to GSA to fund the one-time costs
associated with the addition is on account with GSA for 5 years and can
be used at another LESC site or facility. That amount is in addition to
approximately $1.5 million that was previously on account with GSA for
internal reconfigurations at the current site for a total of
approximately $5.2 million that is available for LESC facility
expansion and improvement.
The LESC has completed necessary improvements at the current site.
Planning for a larger facility that will meet all of the current and
future physical infrastructure needs of the LESC's expanding workload
and mission is ongoing.
DETENTION AND REMOVALS
Question. The budget requests $5 million for additional detention
bedspace. What percentage increase in additional bedspace will this
provide?
Answer. Approximately 150 beds or less than 1 percent of current
bed space.
Question. Given the increased level of resources that the budget
proposes to devote to enforcement, as well as the increased vigilance
that US VISIT allows at ports of entry, are enough resources being put
towards detention?
Answer. DRO is currently funded for approximately 20,000 beds.
Question. Will ICE be working with the U.S. Department of Justice,
Detention Trustee, where appropriate, in the management of the
detention program? Has a Memorandum of Understanding been signed with
the Department of Justice?
Answer. Yes, DRO is working with DOJ, Office of the Federal
Detention Trustee (OFDT) in the management of the detention program. A
memorandum of understanding was signed with the Justice Department on
1/28/2004.
Question. How is the relationship with the Department of Justice
structured? Who will be responsible for procurement and contracting?
Answer. ICE and the OFDT signed an Inter-Agency Agreement on 1/28/
2004. The agreement establishes OFDT as a procurement service provider
to ICE for non-Federal detention requirements. Since establishment of
the agreement, ICE and OFDT have made substantial progress toward fully
implementing the service provider relationship. ICE has identified 5
non-Federal secure detention requirements for procurement action by
OFDT and both entities are cooperating to establish a schedule for the
transition of ICE inter-governmental service agreements and
administration of the non-Federal detention inspection program to OFDT.
FUGITIVE OPERATIONS
Question. The President's budget requests an increase of $50
million to create an additional 30 fugitive operations teams. It is
estimated that each of these teams will be able to apprehend and remove
up to 500 fugitive aliens a year. Of the approximately 400,000
absconders, how are you prioritizing which fugitives you pursue first?
Answer. National Security and criminal cases are the highest
priority, then cases that have a higher probability of removal, and
other non-criminal aliens. There are several initiatives being
implemented to help identify and locate our absconder population. ICE
has implemented an interface between ICE and CBP systems that
identifies fugitives when they return to the United States. Inspectors
will now be alerted when an ``absconder'' is identified at a port of
entry.
DRO entered into an agreement with Citizenship and Immigration
Services whereby DRO is notified when an alien applies for benefits and
is identified as an absconder. In these cases, CIS provides us with the
most current information such as home address.
Question. Based on the information provided in the budget, once
additional fugitive operations teams are fully deployed, ICE will be
able to locate and remove 23,000 aliens a year. Your testimony states
that the national Fugitive Operations program strategy calls for
eliminating the backlog of absconders in 6 years. Removal of 23,000
aliens a year for 6 years does not quite add up to 400,000. How will
ICE accomplish this goal?
Answer. Our strategic plan ``Endgame'' calls for the elimination of
the fugitive backlog within 10 years based on significant increases in
the fugitive program. This will require 300 teams over that time
period.
We are also implementing new initiatives targeting data integrity.
Through data dumps and systems analysis we are removing cases that are
incorrectly identified as fugitives (Self Deport, Benefits granted,
etc.)
ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION
Question. What are the results so far of the Alternatives to
Detention program?
Answer. DRO began utilizing alternatives to detention, or community
based programs, in August 2002, with the opening of a community based
residential program for 250 non-criminal females that were previously
held in a local jail in South Florida.
DRO began testing the applicability of electronic monitoring
devices (EMDs) in May 2003 in six Field Offices (Anchorage, Miami,
Detroit, Portland, Seattle, & Chicago). Traditional EMDs have been
utilized with just over 100 illegal aliens as an alternative to secure
detention. Supervision of these cases was initially conducted as a
collateral duty and was found to be very staff intensive. Efforts are
underway to integrate the traditional EMD house arrest program into the
Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (see below). Telephonic or
administrative reporting technology has been utilized as an automated
reporting device for just over 500 aliens that are living in the
community on Orders of Supervision. This technology has the potential
to assist DRO in effective case management. A summary report on the use
of these two technologies will be completed after 1 year of the pilot.
Additionally, DRO and the Federal Protective Service (FPS) are
exploring the possibility of utilizing FPS for monitoring of the EMD
program technology, currently being provided through a contract with an
EMD provider.
Pursuant to the Zadvydas v. Davis Supreme Court decision, there are
presently a significant number of Post Order Custody Review (POCR)
cases that are eligible for release, but are in need of rehabilitation
programs for substance abuse, mental health, anger management, sex
offender, etc. In September 2003, as an Alternative to Detention
initiative, a Condition of Release Program for POCR cases was developed
through our existing reimbursement agreement with the Division of
Immigration Health Services (DIHS). Through this Program, DIHS will
review POCR cases, and identify rehabilitative programs. As of March
2004, 53 POCR cases have been forwarded to DIHS for review and program
placement.
DRO recently announced the contract award selection of Behavioral
Interventions, Inc. (BI) of Boulder Colorado for the provision of
community-based supervision of 200 aliens in each of the following
eight Field Offices: Baltimore, Philadelphia, Miami, St. Paul, Denver,
Kansas City, San Francisco, and Portland. The program is designed to
supervise aliens that can be released into the community to ensure
their attendance at Immigration Court hearings and compliance with
Court orders.
The contractor will provide Intensive Supervision Appearance
Programs (ISAP) services for 200 aliens in the initial eight sites
during fiscal year 2005. ICE plans to expand the initial capacity to
400, and to add one additional site with a capacity of 200.
Question. What is necessary, besides just more funding, to see a
larger scale implementation of this alternatives program?
Answer. While community based sanctions has been utilized for over
30 years by the criminal justice system with proven results, there has
been very little application or research on these types of services for
illegal aliens. Staff, program research and development resources are
necessary to determine if these pilot programs would be effective with
illegal aliens and to develop replication models for expansion.
FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS
Question. The budget request for the Federal Air Marshal Program
(FAMS) does not include any funds to provide pay raises, within-grade
increases, or any other adjustments to base in fiscal year 2005. What
resources are necessary to provide the FAMS with the same adjustments
to base as the other components within ICE as well as the Department of
Homeland Security? Please provide an itemized list of the necessary
adjustments to base for the FAMS.
Answer. The FAMS and DHS are working to determine how best to
manage FAMS' resources. FAMS is developing performance-based measures
that will determine the optimal number of Federal air marshals and
resources to provide the necessary aviation security.
Question. What impact will the fiscal year 2005 President's budget
request have on staffing within FAMS as compared to fiscal year 2004?
Answer. The FAMS will adjust its staffing as necessary to meet its
highest priority missions with available resources. In doing so, the
FAMS will consider other enhancements within the aviation security
system.
Question. Previously, there has been a problem with retention of
FAMS. What is the current attrition rate as compared to that in
previous years?
Answer. Since the start of the fiscal year 2004, Federal Air
Marshal attrition has been roughly 9.4 employees per pay period. This
attrition rate is down significantly from the fiscal year 2003 level,
when the Service's attrition averaged approximately 33 per month. In
turn, the fiscal year 2003 rate was well below the roughly 58 Federal
Air Marshals lost per month during the last quarter of fiscal year
2002. Although the FAMS' attrition rate remains in flux, the reduced
number of employees leaving the program is attributed to the progress
made towards completing the FAMS' stand up, stabilizing the workforce,
implementing quality of work life initiatives, and otherwise working to
improve procedures and management systems to encourage employee
retention.
AIR AND MARINE OPERATIONS--NORTHERN BORDER AIRWING
Question. The Air and Marine Operations program has been stretched
very thin for the last 2 years. Long-term repetitive details of
personnel and assets are being used to protect the Northern Border and
the National Capital Region. The appropriation for fiscal year 2004
includes resources for the establishment of a permanent Northern Border
Airwing. What is the status of establishing the permanent Northern
Border airwing funded for fiscal year 2004?
Answer. The fiscal year 2003 War Supplemental provided $20.5
million to launch the Bellingham Air Branch, the first of five Northern
Border Branches. Planned allocation is as follows: $2.5 million for
personnel transfers, $12.6 million for medium lift helicopter
acquisition and $6.6 million for multi-role enforcement aircraft.
Staffing will be provided through a combination of new hires and the
transfer of experienced personnel from other AMO field locations.
In fiscal year 2004, AMO received $35.2 million in Operations and
Maintenance (O&M) funding to launch AMO's Northern Border Branch in
Plattsburgh, NY. Planned allocation is as follows: $10 million for
medium lift helicopter acquisition and $6.6 million for multi-role
enforcement aircraft, $9.7 million for facility and $2.7 million for
aircraft spares. An additional $5.4 million was appropriated in
Salaries and Expenses funding to cover the cost of 36 personnel.
Plattsburgh and Bellingham each will be equipped with three
aircraft, including one Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft (Pilatus PC-12
fixed-wing), one Medium Lift Helicopter and one Light Enforcement
Helicopter.
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget includes $35.2 million to
launch the third Northern Border Branch.
--The funds from these two appropriations were combined to purchase
one medium lift helicopter.
Question. How has the recently announced hiring freeze affected the
Northern Border airwing?
Answer. The recently announced hiring freeze did not affect our
build-up of the Northern Border air wing.
Question. When will the aircraft and other equipment be procured?
Answer. The procurement process has already begun for the aircraft
and other equipment. The four AS-350 A-Star helicopters are scheduled
to be delivered during the June-December 2004 timeframe. Taking into
consideration the 120-day communication and sensor installation
process, the first operational helicopter will be delivered in October
2004 with follow-on delivery of the remaining 3 helicopters at 1 every
60 days.
The first PC-12 (Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft) is scheduled for
delivery during May 2004. The second aircraft is scheduled for delivery
October 2004. Both aircraft will be configured with the Wescam
Integrated Situation Awareness Display System (ISADS) electro optic/
infrared.
Question. Even with the establishment of this airwing, to what
extent will ICE still have to rely on detailees to cover the Northern
Border and the National Capital Region?
Answer. The Northern Border will have to rely on detailee
augmentation during surge operations or designated heightened alert
postures.
We are currently maintaining the NCR Branch primarily through the
use of rotational detailee assignments. We are requiring aviation
personnel to travel on a temporary duty status, as well as, the
redeployment of aircraft from southern border locations to the
Washington, D.C. area in order to provide on-going mission critical
support. All costs for that operation have been covered using Air and
Marine Operations fiscal year 2004 Operations and Maintenance funding.
LONG-RANGE RADAR
Question. What is the total amount that the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) has in its fiscal year 2004 budget for operating
the Long-Range radar system?
Answer. Questions regarding FAA's distinct budget line items should
be addressed to the FAA.
Question. How much is being requested by other agencies for fiscal
year 2005 for the Long-Range radar system?
Answer. The Long-Range Radar (LRR) funding, a new fiscal year 2005
line item to help fund the FAA radar system that feeds information to
the AMOC, is a $12.5 million increase to the AMO base, ``other
services'' line item.
Question. Why are new resources being requested in the fiscal year
2005 budget to allow the Department to pay the FAA for this service, as
opposed to a transfer from the FAA budget?
Answer. FAA has indicated recently that to continue to maintain and
operate this system as mandated in past Federal legislation, it would
need to start charging user agencies for the data.
TETHERED AEROSTAT RADAR SYSTEM
Question. The information provided by the Tethered Aerostat Radar
System (TARS), known as TARS, is a critical component in the
Department's efforts to interdict illicit air traffickers. Do you
believe that the Department of the Defense is providing sufficient
support to the TARS program to enable the Air and Marine Program to
effectively carry out its mission?
Answer. The TARS program has declined from 14 operational sites to
8 operational sites (Lajas, Puerto Rico, is due back on-line in May
2004). Questions regarding costs for operating these sites should be
addressed to DOD, which maintains and operates the system. AMO is an
end user of the data provided by these valuable national assets.
Question. Is the Department of Homeland Security working with the
Department of Defense to ensure proper maintenance and upgrades of
TARS?
Answer. AMO is currently working closely with all the agencies
involved in the counter-narcotics and border security missions,
including USIC, ONDCP, DOD, and DHS to communicate the requirements for
the continued use of the TARS. Recent close coordination and meetings
between the Department of Homeland Security and the Deputy Assistant of
Defense for Counter Narcotics have resulted in frank and open
discussions related to TARS. The dialogue is productive and ongoing at
this time, and DHS' requirements have been acknowledged by DOD.
Question. Does ICE have the necessary expertise and personnel to
take over the management and maintenance of the TARS program?
Answer. TARS is now under the purview of DOD and should be operated
in line with DHS operational needs.
Question. What is the estimated funding needed for ICE to assume
management of the TARS program?
Answer. TARS is now under the purview of DOD and should be operated
in line with DHS operational needs.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
Citizenship and Immigration Services
IMPACT OF THE PRESIDENT'S REFORM PLAN
Question. How many new petitions do you expect the President's
Immigration Reform Plan to generate?
Answer. This information will be available once Congress has
drafted the legislation and the specifics are known.
MACHINE-READABLE PASSPORT DEADLINE
Background: The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act
of 2002, which President Bush signed into law on May 14, 2002,
established October 26, 2004, as the deadline by which the 27 existing
``visa waiver'' countries must have machine readable visas in order for
their citizens to enter the United States. Last week, Secretaries Ridge
and Powell sent a letter to various Congressional leaders urging that
the October 26, 2004 deadline be pushed back to December, 2006. The
countries which would be affected by this law have had nearly 2 years
to comply with this requirement. This is not something new which we
just pulled out of thin air.
I understand that certain lobbying organizations, such as the
Travel Industry Association of America, have praised this proposed
delay in the deadline. However, I predicted this outcome when the
Enhanced Border Security Act was on the Senate floor.
We know that terrorists have attempted to gain entry to the United
States through the visa waiver program. The December 2001 ``shoe
bomber'', Richard Reid, benefited from attempting to come to the United
States from a ``visa waiver'' country. We know that tens of thousands
of passports from visa waiver countries have been stolen in recent
years and sold on the black market. We know that machine-readable
passports can help to filter potential terrorists who try to enter the
United States through the visa waiver program. I do not want to
discourage legitimate tourists and other travelers from coming to visit
our country, but border security must remain one of the Department's
paramount priorities. The law was passed nearly 2 years ago. There has
been ample time for the Administration to work with the visa waiver
countries in meeting this deadline. The Administration's job was to get
these countries to meet the requirements of the law.
Question. How is it in the interest of our domestic security to
push back even further the deadline requiring machine-readable
passports from visa waiver countries? What steps did the Administration
take over the last 2 years to ensure that visa waiver countries would
be able to meet the deadline?
Answer: The EBSVERA requires that beginning on October 26, 2004,
Visa Waiver Program (VWP) countries must certify that they have a
program in place to issue their nationals machine-readable passports
that are tamper-resistant and incorporate biometric and document
authentication identifiers that comply with International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards in order to continue to
participate in the VWP. The law also requires that visitors coming to
the United States under the VWP present machine-readable, tamper-
resistant passports that incorporate biometric and document
authentication identifiers, if the passports is issued on or after
October 26, 2004.
While most, if not all, VWP countries will be able to certify that
they have a program in place to issue biometric passports by the
October deadline, very few, if any, VWP countries will actually be able
to begin issuing biometric passports by that date. The issue is not
lack of will or commitment to achieving the standard by these
countries, but rather challenging scientific and technical issues. For
the same challenging technical reasons, DHS is also not currently in a
position to acquire and deploy equipment and software to biometrically
compare and authenticate these documents. It is not in any country's
interest, including our domestic security interest, to produce or
accept biometric passports with questionable standards and an immature
biometric technology.
DHS is encouraged by the progress that has been made by VWP
countries to meet the emerging ICAO standards. We believe that by the
fall of 2006, the technology required to implement successfully a
security system based on the ICAO standards will be much more settled
and allow DHS to derive the security benefits envisioned when the
original EBSVERA was enacted.
As you know, changing the deadlines requires Congressional action,
and a memorandum concerning this issue was forwarded to Congress signed
by Secretaries Ridge and Powell requesting an extension of the
deadlines until November 30, 2006. The Secretaries also testified
before Congress on this issue on April 21, 2004.
IMMIGRATION PROCESSING FEES AND THE BACKLOG (CIS)
Question. The number of immigrants awaiting decisions from CIS--
including citizenship and permanent resident status--increased 59
percent in the past 3 years. Despite $160 million appropriated in the
past 2 years to remedy the logjam, nearly 6.2 million applications were
pending at the end of September, according to a General Accounting
Office report. The GAO probe revealed that fees charged by Citizenship
and Immigrations Services are insufficient to cover the cost of
processing applications--in part due to expanding security costs.
According to the GAO, ``CIS knows neither the cost to process new
applications nor the cost to complete pending applications,'' the
report said.
In anticipation of President Bush's immigration overhaul, the GAO
recommended that Homeland Security Secretary Ridge direct CIS to study
the fees and determine how much money will be needed to remedy the
backlog. In an August interview with Government Executive magazine,
Director Aguirre, you vowed to significantly reduce wait times and
application backlogs for immigration benefits by increasing the
agency's efficiency through new information technology investments.
Based on the funding proposed by the President, how much of the
backlog will CIS be able to eliminate in 2005?
Answer. Information on the current backlog and USCIS plans to
eliminate it will be provided to Congress in the coming months in a
revised Backlog Elimination Plan. USCIS will meet the President's goals
of eliminating the backlog and achieving a 6-month processing standard
for all immigration applications by 2006.
Question. I understand that in order to meet the President's
backlog reduction goal by fiscal year 2006, your agency must achieve a
42 percent increase in productivity. Two questions--First, what
specific steps are you taking to produce 42 percent increase in
productivity? Second, it is essential that you ensure that security
background checks are done correctly. If a 42 percent productivity
improvement is not accomplished, what will the impact be on making sure
that security background checks are completed?
Answer. Information on the current backlog and USCIS plans to
eliminate it will be provided to Congress in the coming months in a
revised Backlog Elimination Plan. USCIS will meet the President's goals
of eliminating the backlog and achieving a 6-month processing standard
for all immigration applications by 2006.
USCIS will continue to explore ways of improving the efficiency of
our national security check processes, but will not place backlog
elimination requirements above national security requirements. Backlog
elimination will be achieved through efficiency efforts, through
development of information technology programs that automate manual
processes, and from reengineering processes to reduce adjudication time
without sacrificing the integrity of the adjudicative process.
PRESIDENT'S IMMIGRATION PROPOSAL
Question. What impact would the President's immigration proposal,
if enacted, have on the immigration application backlog and on efforts
to reduce the backlog? Would the temporary work permits envisioned in
the President's plan be issued before or after the benefits sought by
the 6.2 million applications in the backlog? What is the plan for
insuring that the backlog reduction program does not increase benefits
fraud by encouraging the rubber-stamping of applications?
Answer. USCIS will need to review specific legislative proposals
before it can comment on the potential impact on USCIS' capabilities.
Citizenship and Immigration Services and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement
BENEFITS FRAUD
Question. Who is responsible for investigating benefits fraud? Both
CIS and ICE have asked for funding to investigate benefits fraud, but
neither seems to know which is actually responsible.
Answer. A January 2002 General Accounting Office (GAO) Report-02-66
entitled ``Immigration Benefit Fraud--Focused Approach is Needed to
Address Problems'' raised concerns about identifying immigration fraud.
As a part of the USCIS efforts to reengineer its business processes and
eliminate the backlog, the agency is also looking closely at ways to
identify and decrease benefits fraud. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement will continue to play a vital role in investigating
suspicious cases and/or prosecuting the participants in a scheme in
conjunction with Federal, state, and local prosecutors.
ICE will continue to perform those enforcement duties enumerated in
the OPM classification standards for an 1811 occupational series
criminal investigator.
IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT (ICRA)
Question. What lessons from the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control
Act (IRCA) legalization programs have been applied to the President's
Immigration Reform Plan?
Answer. The IRCA planning teams developed a strategy that enabled
the Service to quickly expand its adjudicative capacity through the
establishment of temporary regional processing centers and local
interview offices. Temporary employees were hired and trained
specifically to adjudicate that workload. INS reassigned experienced
executives and managers at all levels to oversee operations, but relied
heavily on the skills or retired executives and managers (reemployed
annuitants). This strategy enabled the Service to continue its efforts
to process the normal casework plus handle the surge in workload caused
by the passage of IRCA.
Key components of IRCA were: the development of the regional
processing center concept, development of a modular office plan for
field interviewing sites, automated data systems to record
transactions, and receipt of authority from Congress to expedite
certain leasing and contracting requirements. In addition, INS received
authority to reemploy annuitants without salary offset. The reemployed
annuitant program was absolutely critical to the overall success of the
program.
INS worked closely with Congress prior to the passage of IRCA, and
that cooperation was also instrumental in INS being able to meet the
requirements for the legalization provisions of IRCA.
Question. What were the total costs of IRCA's two legalization
programs (please break down by main components) and how much revenue
was generated in total by the fees charged to process IRCA
applications?
Answer. The IRCA program was totally fee-funded. Therefore, the
number of applications filed and their respective fees determine the
total cost of the program. Our analysis to date of the program has
determined a total application workload of approximately 2.7 million,
with costs/fee revenues totaling $245 million. The breakdown of this
program is as follows: (1) Application for Permanent Residency (2.68
million applications/$241 million), and (2) Application for Status as a
Temporary Resident (6,700 applications/$3.7 million).
Question. How much will the President's Immigration Reform Plan
cost, and what components comprise the total cost?
Answer. It is expected that costs associated with the USCIS
workload would be covered with fees like all other application and
petition processing.
Question. How many full-time equivalent (FTE) personnel will be
necessary to implement the President's Immigration Reform Plan? What
level of fees or additional appropriations would be necessary to hire
those additional FTEs without further increasing the deficit?
Answer. This information will be available once Congress has
drafted the legislation and the specifics are known.
DATA BETWEEN 1996-2003
Question. Please provide a comparison of the size of the fugitive
alien population from 1996-2003. Please also provide the same
information regarding the backlog, as well as the backlog of matters
pending in the Immigration Court for the same period.
Answer. Below are the estimates of the number of fugitive aliens
based on the year that they received their order of removal, based on
information in the Deportable Alien Control System (DACS).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Absconders
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1996.................................................... 130,296
1997.................................................... 157,220
1998.................................................... 186,944
1999.................................................... 214,580
2000.................................................... 239,656
2001.................................................... 265,427
2002.................................................... 295,336
2003.................................................... 320,364
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICE defers to the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) to
respond to your question regarding the number of backlogs of matters
pending in the Immigration Court for the same period of time.
Customs and Border Protection
TERRORIST WATCH LIST INTEGRATION
Question. One of the most important items on the Department's list
of unfinished business is the integration of terrorist watch lists.
Earlier this year, Secretary Ridge said the list would be fully
functional ``by mid-May.'' Because the agencies you oversee--Customs
and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement--rely
daily on accurate information about the potential threats to this
country posed by individuals on these lists, I would expect that the
integration of this information would be a priority.
It is not clear to me whether the integration of the watch lists is
an FBI responsibility or that of the Department. Is it a DHS
responsibility or an FBI responsibility to integrate the watch lists
and when do you expect the integration to be complete?
Answer. Terrorist Watch Lists are the responsibility of the
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), and the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center (TTIC). CBP submits names for watch listing to the TTIC through
CBP's Office of Intelligence. Since the CIA, FBI and DHS have joint
responsibility for the TTIC (TSC is a subsidiary of the TTIC), the
responsibility lies with the TTIC as a whole. Currently, the Director
of the CIA oversees that operation of the TTIC.
CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE
Question. An additional $25 million is requested for fiscal year
2005 to expand the Container Security Initiative. This innovative
program has placed CBP inspectors at numerous overseas seaports to work
with their host country counterparts at targeting potentially dangerous
containers for enhanced inspection prior to being loaded on U.S.-bound
ships.
In December, Subcommittee staff were able to see this program in
action in Asia. They spoke with the inspectors, discussed their working
relationships with the host country inspectors, and witnessed both the
physical inspection of individual containers. The U.S. inspectors were
quite enthusiastic about performing their duties. But both they and the
foreign counterparts expressed concern that our personnel were being
rotated through the countries on a temporary basis, as opposed to being
in country for extended tours of duty. In part because of cultural
differences in various countries, they stressed the importance of
remaining overseas to strengthen working relationships with the foreign
customs officials rather than starting from scratch with each new team
of U.S. inspectors.
Does your budget request provide for longer tours of duty for CSI
team members? Are you actively making CSI tours a career ``enhancer''
for your personnel--most of whom are not oriented to working overseas?
Are your people receiving the necessary support from U.S. ambassadors
in establishing and expanding the CSI presence overseas? Also, what
would be costs of fully funding all Phase II CSI ports?
Answer. Our budget includes funding for permanent overseas
positions. We are currently using TDY (temporary duty) personnel
overseas but have initiated the process for obtaining State Department
approval for the permanent positions. The embassy is providing the
necessary support to enable CSI to establish and expand its presence
overseas. That is evidenced by the State Dept's willingness to approve
NSDD 38's to establish permanent positions in the respective countries.
The NSDD38 (National Security Decision Directive) requests are
currently being processed at DHS and will be forwarded to Department of
State for final approval. We have also developed a comprehensive
training program for the permanent employees, which include
operational, administrative and cultural training. We are working
closely with the overseas posts to transition our temporary staff to
permanent staff.
Costs for funding the future ports are impacted by the opening date
of the port, infrastructure requirement, staffing and equipment, etc.
Our projected budget for fiscal year 2005 is sufficient to cover the
costs of our expansion ports that will open in fiscal year 2005.
OVERSEAS AIRLINE PASSENGER INSPECTION
Question. There have been press reports that your agency is
considering placing CBP inspectors at certain targeted overseas
airports to pre-screen passengers before they board flights to the
United States. I understand that the goal is to prevent potential
terrorists from boarding a plane and either hijacking it or blowing it
up. That is certainly a goal we all share.
However, because they screen passengers who board U.S.-originated
flights, is this not more properly a Transportation Security
Administration role? Will you be screening all passengers or only those
holding foreign passports?
If you are accessing passenger databases, which databases are they
and what privacy protections are you planning on implementing? Also,
when will Congress be notified of this program? We've only see reports
on it in the media.
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Officers will be
deployed overseas to perform a tactical function, the goal of which is
to prevent the onward movement of people identified as national
security threats. This program will replace the legacy INS Immigration
Control Officer (ICO) Program. The Immigration Security Initiative
(ISI) will also disrupt or deter the transportation of inadmissible
aliens and the proliferation of fraudulent documents. In the course of
these duties, the ISI will provide information to host countries, or
appropriate authorities regarding travelers of interest.
Although these efforts can result in the development of
intelligence information, the primary function of the ISI is to use
current targeting and passenger analysis information provided by the
National Targeting Center (NTC) and the Forensic Document Lab (FDL) to
focus on high-risk persons. These efforts may lead to the apprehension
and prosecution of criminals and persons of national security interest
by host countries, the disruption of attempts to smuggle aliens and
contraband, and the disruption of attempts to enter the United States
with fraudulent documents.
When an ISI Officer identifies a traveler that should be prevented
from boarding a flight to the United States, the ISI will work with the
host country's immigration and/or customs control authority and the air
carrier who will take the appropriate action to prevent the person from
boarding the flight. The ISI will not have any authority in the host
country to take such action. Information provided to the host country
on these types of individuals will be vetted through the appropriate
authorities before any information is released to the host country.
Both TSA and CBP perform important functions in ensuring the safety
and security of the United States. However, TSA does not have the
authority CBP holds to perform the particular targeting function of ISI
in another country. ISI is the tool that we propose to use in deterring
individuals that may pose a threat to the safety and security of the
United States from boarding U.S.-bound flights, not U.S.-originated
flights.
In fiscal year 2004, CBP will initiate a pilot of the ISI program
in Warsaw, Poland. We estimate the cost to be approximately $500K for
each ISI site. Once the pilot is evaluated we'll have better
information regarding the future of the initiative.
ISIS BORDER COVERAGE
Question. How much of the northern border and how much of the
southern border is covered by ISIS?
Answer: Currently the ISIS program covers the following:
--Northern land border: 99 miles
--Southern land border: 290.5 miles
--Total: 389.5 miles
BORDER PATROL STAFFING
Question. Have the USA Patriot Act's requirements for Border Patrol
staffing on the Northern Border been met? If so, when was this goal
achieved? Was this achieved through the transfer, on either a temporary
or permanent basis, of personnel from the Southwest Border or
elsewhere? If so, does your budget request provide sufficient funds to
restore staffing at those locations to their authorized levels? If not,
what additional funds and FTEs are required to reach that goal?
Answer. The number of agents on the northern border had been
increased to 1,006 as of the end of December 2003. This is triple the
number of agents that were assigned along the northern border prior to
9/11 and meets the Patriot Act's requirement for staffing on the
Northern border. The number of agents currently assigned to the
northern border remains at 1,006.
The agent increase was accomplished through the permanent
relocation of experienced agents from across the nine southern border
sector areas. The CBP budget has sufficient funds to backfill the agent
vacancies through a combination of new agent hires and the relocation
of agents among the southern border areas. Additional funds and FTEs
will not be required to restore the staffing levels at the southern
border
ALTERNATIVES TO VACIS
Question. My staff is aware of the existence of non-intrusive
inspection technology (such as back-scatter gamma ray devices) that
provides a higher degree of resolution when inspecting shipping
containers and other closed containers. In fact, they saw some of these
devices in use at a seaport in Asia late last year. Is CBP considering
the procurement of next-generation devices which provide enhanced
resolution either when replacing existing, aging systems or for
deployment at new locations? If so, what are the approximate costs of
the systems under consideration versus the costs of the existing
systems? Do these newer systems provide a significant improvement for
inspectors over existing systems? Conversely, if you are not
considering procuring new systems, why not? Is it due to cost, other
considerations, or both?
Answer. ``Back-scatter'' technology, which is associated with X-ray
systems and not gamma ray systems, was developed by American Science
and Engineering (AS&E) in the 1980's. For many years now, Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) has operated a large number of devices, which
have this capability, including large-scale truck/container imaging
systems. Back-scatter images can indeed provide information, which is
not available from a transmission X-ray or gamma ray image. Like any
technology though, it has its limitations--the amount of penetration
into vehicles or containers, and the resulting image, depends in large
part on the type and amount of commodity being scanned. CBP operates a
variety of X-ray and gamma ray imaging systems.
The costs of the back-scatter technology will vary depending on the
configuration of the system. There are back-scatter-only systems which
cost less than gamma ray imaging systems and there are transmission/
back-scatter X-ray systems which cost significantly more than gamma ray
systems. The requirements, which define what type of system is needed
to meet operational demands, are much broader than just this single
technical criteria. CBP recently purchased a new AS&E product, the ZBV
(back-scatter only) X-ray van, which is now being tested in Arizona. We
are preparing to field two new high (>6 MeV) energy, mobile sea
container X-ray systems later this summer to U.S. seaports. CBP also
recently upgraded an existing 2.5 MeV mobile X-ray system to 3.8 MeV,
and is now testing it at the Port of Baltimore. CBP continually
evaluates promising new technologies, which have the potential to
enhance or replace existing systems.
ENHANCING BORDER PATROL INTEGRATION INTO CBP
Question. During briefings with my staff it appears that
coordination and integration of certain Border Patrol activities,
programs, and systems has not gone as smoothly as it might otherwise be
expected. Sometimes it appears that inquiries made by staff come as a
surprise to Border Patrol and the CBP staff. For instance, we asked
questions about the procurement of high-endurance vehicles for the
Border Patrol only to learn that the CBP vehicle management team was
working on a longer-term vehicle management plan of which Border Patrol
was not a part. I understand there are growing pains and learning
curves when creating a new Department, but issues such as development
of a unified inventory of goods and activities seems rather basic. What
concrete steps have CBP and Border Patrol taken to ensure that each
entity knows what the other is doing?
Answer. With the merger of the U.S. Border Patrol into U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP), the integration of border patrol
activities was established as one of our highest priorities. The Border
Patrol was established as an Office reporting directly to the
Commissioner with the Chief of the Border Patrol having equal status to
our Assistant Commissioners. Border Patrol Sector Chiefs participate in
all CBP Executive Leadership meetings. Representatives from the U.S.
Border Patrol have been included in all transition management
activities and in some instances have actually served as the leaders of
groups addressing integration and merger issues. The issues addressed
not only operation mission responsibilities, but mission support
operations as well.
Knowing that the Border Patrol's functions and responsibilities are
key to the security of our homeland, the following are examples of
integration activities in which the Border Patrol has been, and will
continue to be actively involved:
--Immediate participation in the CBP ``around the clock'' Situation
Room.
--Integration of border patrol agents into CBP's intelligence
structure.
--Identification of resources, staffing, and property transfers and
modifications to information systems necessary to stand up CBP
on October 1, 2003.
--Analysis of vehicle fleet requirements as part of CBP's replacement
and upgrade strategy.
--Participation in a procurement ``War Room'' to train and certify
border patrol employees in CBP contract and procurement
processes and reduce an inherited backlog of outstanding
procurement actions.
--Determining the process and infrastructure to consolidate the
tactical communications program in order to create more unified
communications structure and assure officer safety through
interoperability.
--Migration of and training for all border patrol employees to CBP's
administrative systems for processing travel, payroll,
procurement, and human resources.
--Identifying technologies to share and to use as force multipliers
to increase CBP's enforcement capacity.
--Designing a process for incident reporting to ensure clear
reporting for rapid notification to senior management of
significant incidents.
--Developing a strategy, policies and procedures for integrating the
processing of seizures, forfeitures, fines and penalties into a
consolidated process for all of CBP to assure property and
fiscal accountability.
--Proposing an integration plan for unifying operational policies,
resource management and best practices for the CBP Canine
program.
--Cross training Border Patrol agents in anti-terrorism concepts and
techniques.
BORDER PATROL VEHICLES
Question. What is the status of the review of the need for high-
endurance vehicles for the Border Patrol? What performance measures are
you using for determining the need to procure additional or different
high-endurance vehicles? Are there funds in the fiscal year 2005 budget
request to procure additional high-endurance vehicles?
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) recently entered
into a contract with Nevada Automotive Transportation Center to conduct
a terrain mapping study. This is a joint effort between the Office of
Finance and the Office of Border Patrol Information Technology Unit.
Information obtained from the study will be used to evaluate the
terrain and recommend the type of high-endurance vehicles needed to
meet mission requirements and provide for Agent safety.
CBP will determine the correct vehicle to be procured based on life
cycle studies, performance measures and the out come of the terrain
mapping study. The performance measures will include, mission
requirements, life cycle costs, durability and downtime of vehicles.
Currently, there are no funds designated in the fiscal year 2005
budget to procure additional or replacement high-endurance vehicles.
LAND BORDER ``EXIT'' CONTROL OF US VISIT
Question. What impact will the ``exit'' component of US VISIT have
on the land borders? Do you anticipate that additional outbound
inspection lanes or other facilities modifications will have to be
created in the coming years? If so, when can we expect to receive an
estimated plan of those construction and other requirements? Is CBP an
active participant with the US VISIT program office?
Answer. The impact of the US VISIT exit program on land border
facilities, outbound lanes, and possibly staffing will depend on the
process/solution that is deployed. It will also depend upon the timing
of the rollout of the exit strategies.
After US VISIT awards a contract to their prime integrator for the
land border entry/exit system, expected in mid-fiscal year 2004, and
the integrator offers a more comprehensive solution, CBP will better
understand the extent of the impact to our operations. CBP will
continue to work closely with US VISIT to develop an exit solution. .
COBRA EXTENSION
Question. What is CBP currently doing to fix the COBRA overtime cap
issue which has caused Customs Inspectors and new CBP officers to lose
the ability to contribute $2,500 towards their base pay for calculating
their retirement annuity? The current overtime earning cap has been
reduced from $30,000 to $25,000 due to a legislative language drafting
issue in the fiscal year 2004 DHS Appropriations bill. Does your budget
request provide a legislative fix to this unintentional drafting error?
Answer. This unintentional oversight is being addressed through
various channels. The Department of Homeland Security is working on a
legislative change to equalize the overtime caps for all U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) employees, while CBP is investigating the
possibility of cap waivers that would allow officers to exceed the
$25,000 cap in fiscal year 2004.
Question. Does the fiscal year 2005 Budget assume the merging of
Customs/INS/Agriculture user fees? In addition, what does the fiscal
year 2005 budget estimate will be received in COBRA user fees for
fiscal year 2004?
Answer. The fiscal year 2005 Budget does not assume that the
Customs/INS/Agriculture user fees will be merged. CBP is projecting
that $303 million will be received in COBRA user fees in fiscal year
2004.
Question. Does the fiscal year 2005 budget assume the
reauthorization of COBRA which is set to expire on March 31, 2005?
Answer. Public Law 108-121 reauthorized COBRA through March 1,
2005. The fiscal year 2005 budget assumes that COBRA will be
reauthorized beyond the March 1st expiration date.
SIXTH DAY OF FLETC TRAINING
Question. What is the Department doing to correct the problem of
the Department not paying legacy Customs Inspectors and new CBP
officers for their required work on the sixth day of basic training at
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)?
Answer. We do pay employees covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) overtime while engaged in training at FLETC for 6 day weeks. The
Government Employee and Training Act (GETA) prohibits us from paying
non-FLSA employees under FLSA provision. Our COPRA covered front-line
personnel are not subject to FLSA. COPRA was specifically designed for
Customs Officers and is the exclusive pay act for our Customs legacy
personnel. Our agency position on this matter was recently sustained in
an arbitration decision.
CROSS-TRAINING
Questions: What amount of training dollars per officer (i.e.,
``modular costs'') is currently being spent for customs training vs.
immigration training?
Is CBP requiring both legacy Customs and legacy INS/Border Patrol
personnel to attend cross-training programs? What percentage of legacy
Customs vs. INS/Border Patrol personnel has actually completed such
training? Does CBP intend that all enforcement personnel will undergo
such cross-training, and if so, when is that training expected to be
completed?
Legacy immigration inspectors have said that compact discs (CDs)
are being used for training legacy Customs personnel in immigration
law, while legacy INS/Border Patrol personnel must attend in-person
training in Customs law. How does CBP ensure that the material on the
CDs is being learned? What evidence does CBP have that training at-home
training with a CD is as effective as in-person training?
Answer. The CBP Officer Training Modules are being developed by CBP
under one initiative using field subject matter experts with experience
in customs, immigration and agriculture for the determination of course
content. Each individual will receive the training needed to achieve
full competency as a CBP Officer. Costs are not allocated on a per-
officer basis as each officer receives a training package tailored to
meet their individual need.
CBP will require both legacy Customs and legacy INS inspectors to
attend cross training programs. There are many different audiences for
the different modules:
--New CBP Officers
--CBP Customs Inspectors
--CBP Immigration Inspectors
--CBP Agriculture Specialists
--New CBP Agriculture Specialists
Because of the differences in roles and geographic areas served,
Border Patrol personnel were not integrated into the CBP Officer
position and are not required to participate in the cross-training
initiatives.
Of the 21 training modules that have been developed to support CBP
Officer training priorities, 15 have been identified as cross-training
programs for legacy Customs inspectors, INS inspectors, or both.
Integrated training modules will be rolled-out and delivered over the
next 12-months.
Integrated training will be delivered in the field locations. There
are different delivery methods for the modules, ranging from classroom,
to computer-based, to video, to on-the-job. And, there is different
timing for delivery of the modules; for example, some will be taken by
new CBP Officers as soon as possible after their return from the
Academy. The integrated training for other CBP Officers will be
mandatory, and will be based on the operational needs of a given port.
Inspectors who are converted to the CBP Officer position will not be
expected to perform new functions until they have demonstrated the
knowledge and skills required for that function.
Compact Discs (CDs) are being used solely as a prerequisite to
classroom training. The CDs are a 6-hour course in Fundamentals of
Immigration, and a 10-hour course in Immigration Law. All CD self-study
training includes rigorous tests that are administered to ensure
students are prepared for the 5 days of intensive classroom training
that provides additional study and application of the law.
The classroom portion is followed by an extensive on-the-job
training requirement. Finally, additional classroom instruction will be
provided to prepare the Officers for more advanced tasks. Approximately
80 hours of instruction will be delivered to each Officer. The same
method of training is being developed for customs law.
Currently customs law is being delivered as a course at the CBP
Academy to new Officers.
Due to the complexity and immediate need to get this training to
the intended users, CBP determined that the best method for delivering
immigration law training to legacy Customs personnel was by Compact
Disc (CD). By using CD's, the officers could complete the training as
required and have a consistent, convenient, available, ready-reference
information to use. The completion of the CDs takes place during the
CBP Officers regular duty assignments; the CBP Officers do not complete
these CD's at home.
The Officer is evaluated by an examination at the end of each
module. If successful, the officer receives a certificate of completion
for that specific module of training. If unsuccessful, the Officer
receives feedback and information as to what areas of the training
requires more study. The Officer is required to repeat that module and
re-take the examination until the modules are completed at the required
knowledge level.
CONTINUED DUMPING AND SUBSIDY ACT
Question. Please provide an update on CBP efforts to implement last
year's Treasury IG recommendations on how to improve administration of
the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act.
Answer. CBP has completed three fiscal year cycles under the CDSOA.
To date, CBP has disbursed over $750 million to affected domestic
producers. An additional $50 million in fiscal year 2003 duties is
currently being withheld pending the outcome of a court case. Total
number of claims processed to date is over 4,000. As a result of a
recent IG investigation into this program, CBP has added resources,
improved process controls, and transferred responsibility for the
program to the CBP Chief Financial Officer. CBP is currently in the
planning stages for the fiscal year 2004 disbursement process. We will
be publishing a Federal Register Notice in June or July, announcing our
Intent to Disburse fiscal year 2004 funds and inviting affected
domestic producers to file their certifications in a timely manner.
Under the existing statute, we are required to disburse the fiscal year
2004 funds no later than 60 days after the end of the fiscal year, or
November 29, 2004.
Question. How much was spent in fiscal year 2002-2004 to administer
the program? What is the estimated cost for fiscal year 2005?
Answer. From fiscal year 2002-2005, the estimated annual expenses
incurred by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to administer this
program are approximately 18 FTE and $1.9 million.
Question. On March 19, 2004, CBP issued its Annual Report (2003) on
the ``Byrd Amendment'' trade law. This is a law I helped enact that
allows CBP to reimburse U.S. companies that have been injured by unfair
trade with funds that are collected as import duties on unfairly traded
imports. The CBP report states that, while CBP should have distributed
at least $320 million in collected duties to eligible U.S. companies
and workers in 2003, it was able to distribute only $190 million
because CBP failed to collect $130 million from unfair traders. Most of
the uncollected $130 million consists of import duties not collected by
CBP on goods from China, in particular. While part of the problem is
that Chinese companies are refusing to pay these duties, it also
appears that CBP is failing to enforce the U.S. trade laws because it
is not diligently pursuing the parties who are refusing to pay these
duties.
Why is CBP not collecting millions of dollars in duties on unfairly
traded imports as required by U.S. law?
Answer. CBP is correctly assessing duties on all imports into the
United States as required by U.S. law. CBP charges importers for post
entry changes to this assessment. CBP vigorously pursues collection of
all outstanding debt liabilities.
Question. If the duties are not now being paid, what does CBP plan
to do to make certain that the duties are paid and collected in the
future?
Answer. CBP has developed a national trade strategy that
specifically addresses the high priority issues and risks in trade.
Anti dumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) and revenue collection
are two priorities within the strategy. Action plans have been
developed to address specific risks to these issues. Included in the
plans are innovative approaches to establishing bonding limits,
specifically for anti-dumping imports, that are commensurate with the
financial risks of the transaction.
Question. Why, in your view, does the problem seem to involve more
imports from China than from any other country?
Answer. There are a number of possible factors. There are currently
more anti-dumping and countervailing duty orders in place for China
(54) than for any other country. In addition, China has been named in
half of the 16 petitions filed with the International Trade Commission
(ITC) in the last 7 months.
There is also volatility in the deposit rates issued by the
Department of Commerce (DOC) and administered and enforced by CBP for
dumping cases concerning China. DOC adopts the presumption that the PRC
is a nonmarket economy during their investigations. The success or
failure of a particular exporter/producer to satisfy DOC that they are
independent from the PRC government affects the rate they are subject
to. It is possible for deposit rates to fluctuate significantly during
the course of the DOC investigation as well as in the final rate
depending on their ability to respond to DOC.
Question. How does CBP specifically plan to address the fact that
the bulk of the problem concerns imports from China?
Answer. CBP currently has in place trade strategies that focus
specifically on anti-dumping/countervailing duty and revenue. Each of
these plans has a multi-office working group responsible for the
development, oversight and evaluation of the plans. These plans have
already developed and implemented a number of actions that address
dumping as a whole and by inclusion, China. These actions include
identification and clean up of outstanding dumping entries, increased
operational oversight of the dumping process, development of improved
mechanisms to ensure and monitor adequate bonding of dumping entries,
and improved communication with DOC.
Question. Some believe that, if it were not for the Byrd Amendment,
CBP would have no way of knowing that these millions of dollars in
duties were not being collected. If this is true, do you believe that
CBP should adopt additional ways to determine whether import duties are
being paid by importers and collected by the United States Government?
Answer. While CBP does have adequate controls in place to ensure
that collectible debt is collected, we are working to strengthen these
controls to help us identify potential uncollectible debt earlier in
the process.
CBP has standard reports that list all unpaid and overdue bills,
including those for unpaid anti-dumping and countervailing duties. Some
anti-dumping and countervailing duties have not been and will not be
collected when importers go out of business or go bankrupt, and bond
coverage is insufficient. As a part of the normal business process,
those amounts would not have been collected and deposited into general
fund receipts. Until the Byrd Amendment, these uncollected amounts were
not directly related to the injured parties involved with anti-dumping
and countervailing duty cases. The relationship that injured parties
now have regarding the anti-dumping and countervailing duty amounts
uncollected, as direct beneficiaries, makes this issue now especially
significant.
Question. In your response to my questions at today's hearing
regarding why Customs has been unable to collect duties on unfairly
traded imports--particularly from China--you indicated that there is a
need to address systemic problems at both the U.S. Department of
Commerce and the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Could you please
advise me of the specific actions, including regulatory reform, that
CBP is and will be asking these other agencies to undertake to better
enable CBP to collect duties on unfairly traded imports?
Answer. CBP and DOC have working groups which meet together on a
regular basis to identify the systematic problems and to develop action
plans to address these problems. CBP has also undertaken a national
bond review program which is increasing the monitoring of bond
sufficiency to ensure that sufficient bonds are in place at all times
to protect the revenue. Legislative proposals are also being considered
which would reinforce CBP's ability to require sufficient bonds.
Questions. CBP's Annual Report on the Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Offset Act (``CDSOA'') for fiscal year 2003 showed that CBP was unable
to collect over $130 million in antidumping duties in 2003. Of these
uncollected duties, over $100 million relate to Chinese imports. There
have been reports that these uncollected duties reflect active efforts
by Chinese parties and their U.S. affiliates to avoid paying U.S.
antidumping duties by, among other things, quickly importing large
amounts of goods, then filing for bankruptcy to avoid liability for
duties and engaging in other fraudulent conduct.
Answer. We don't know if these were fraudulent situations. However,
in these situations it is important to determine timely that an anti-
dumping or countervailing duty case is a factor in the importation.
When it is, adequate bond coverage should be required based on the
findings that anti-dumping and countervailing duties are warranted. In
addition, the bond amount should not be limited to the preliminary
determination rate, but at least set at 100 percent of the value of the
commodity involved on an entry by entry basis. This would resolve under
collection situations in the major portion of cases where preliminary
determination rates were understated and bond amounts were set
accordingly. In the event that an importer goes out of business or
bankrupt, then the bond amount would be sufficient in most cases (at
least where the final determination rate by DOC is not greater than 100
percent of the value of the imported merchandise).
Question. Has CBP seen evidence of such conduct with respect to
importations from China of goods subject to antidumping duty orders?
Answer. On a case-by-case basis, there appears to be instances
where importers of Chinese merchandise bring in a large volume subject
to anti-dumping duties and file bankruptcy prior to CBP's collection of
the full assessment of these duties.
Question. Is there evidence of an organized effort by China,
Chinese parties, affiliated U.S. parties and/or their representatives
to avoid these duties? Could you provide such evidence?
Answer. No, CBP has no evidence of a Chinese conspiracy in this
area.
Question. Please explain the various means by which these parties
are avoiding the payment of import duties. Please quantify the extent
to which these means contribute to CBP's inability to collect duties in
specific Chinese antidumping duty cases.
Answer. We know that bills have been issued to some importers who
filed for bankruptcy, therefore forcing us to collect outstanding debt
from the surety. This has caused financial problems for some surety
companies, which have then been forced into bankruptcy. Part of the
work being done within CBP includes the identification of the areas of
concern and then the quantification of these areas to prioritize them.
Question. To what extent does the ability of importers to post
bonds on imports by ``new shippers'' from China contribute to the
ability of Chinese parties and their U.S. affiliates to avoid paying
antidumping duties?
Answer. The ``new shipper'' designation allows for a deferral of
payment of potential AD/CVD if the party is indeed a new shipper.
Question. Does CBP have evidence that these parties are
fraudulently obtaining new shipper bonds? Please explain.
Answer. CBP has no evidence that these parties are fraudulently
obtaining ``new shipper bonds''. There is no ``new shipper bond'', just
the Customs Bond. ``New shipper'' is a status that certain parties can
claim, which is issued by Commerce.
Question. Are there steps that CBP has taken or can take to alert
bonding companies to the potential financial risks posed by Chinese
``new shippers'' and their U.S. affiliates?
Answer. No. Companies are granted bonding authority by the
Department of Treasury. The normal business process involving
importation has sureties bonding the importer of a record's entry
transactions based on possible duties, taxes and fees involved, and
other regulatory reasons that require an entry bond. When a preliminary
determination is published in the Federal Register, the public is
advised, and bond coverage is administered accordingly by CBP. This
public information and other information that a surety can require
(including the financial ability of the importer of record to pay their
duties, taxes and fees) should be sufficient.
Question. Current law permits importers of goods from ``new
shippers'' to pay deposits of estimated dumping duties by posting
bonds, rather than making cash deposits, as occurs in most other cases.
A longstanding agreement between the Department of Commerce and CBP
requires that such bonds be in the form of single entry bonds
(``SEBs''). In recent years there have been frequent reports that,
notwithstanding its agreement with the Department of Commerce, CBP has
not been obtaining SEBs for ``new shipper'' imports and in other
required instances.
To what extent does the amount of uncollected duties shown in the
2003 CDSOA report reflect CBP's failure to obtain required SEBs? For
each antidumping duty case for which there were uncollected duties in
fiscal year 2003, please quantify the extent to which CBP's inability
to collect duties was attributable to a lack of requisite SEBs or other
deficiencies in bonding.
Answer. Extensive research will be required to provide a response
to this question in consultation with the Committee.
Question. The CDSOA report for 2003 reports that there is over $283
million in antidumping duty-related bonds in individual antidumping
duty clearing accounts for unliquidated entries. To what extent are
these bonds the required SEBs as opposed to standard continuous bonds?
To the extent that these bonds are not the required SEBs, what, if
anything, can CBP do to require SEBs for these amounts?
Answer. CBP cannot determine which amounts are covered by SEB vs.
continuous bonds. CBP lacks authority to obtain retroactive SEBs.
Question. Please detail the steps being undertaken by CBP and the
Department of Commerce to require SEBs on all import entries for which
they are required? Please confirm that SEBs are being obtained in all
cases in which they are required and explain how CBP has verified this
conclusion. If SEBs are not being obtained in all required cases,
please explain why not and explain what CBP is doing to address the
problem.
Answer. DOC may also allow bonding in AD/CVD cases other than new
shipper reviews. In accordance with T.D. 85-145, CBP requires single-
entry bonds in instances where bonding is permitted and the deposit
rate is 5 percent or greater. Policy reminders have been issued to all
field locations and importers of their responsibility to secure a
single-entry bond in these instances to cover AD/CVD duties.
ACS (Automated Commercial System) has the capability to track the
existence of only one type of bond. The majority of importers have
continuous bonds to cover normal imports. CBP instituted a policy in
October 2003 that requires additional bond reporting requirements to
track single-entry bonds electronically. CBP monitors this requirement
on a monthly basis.
Question. Please explain how domestic producers can confirm that
imports of competing goods subject to antidumping duty orders are
secured by required cash deposits or SEBs. Who are the points of
contact at CBP on this issue?
Answer. Domestic producers cannot confirm this information. This
information is contained on CBP entry documents. CBP has long
considered information on entry documents exempt from disclosure
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4). Furthermore, the Trade Secrets Act (18
U.S.C. 1904) prohibits Federal employees from disclosing such
information and imposes personal sanctions on employees who do so.
Question. Is there any way of advising when bonds are issued and
how they can be tracked from the point of issuance? What percent of
bonds are collectable? Why is it that in cases involving critical
circumstances, a very small portion is collectible? Is the problem one
of administration between the Commerce Department and Customs? Could an
importer be held liable if the exporter refuses to pay?
Answer. There is no way of advising when bonds are issued and
tracking them from the point of issuance. Data is not currently
available to determine what percent of bonds are collectable. In the
cases involving critical circumstances, a very small portion is
collectible because the bonds are issued at the time the goods are
released, based on the amount of duties/taxes/fees assessed when the
goods are released. CBP does not have the legal authority to demand an
increase in a bond retroactively (after the release of the goods),
which, in critical circumstances is when CBP becomes aware of the fact
that a higher bond amount is needed. CBP is working on legislative
initiatives, which may include a statutory change that would allow us
to demand a higher bond retroactively. The importer is always held
liable for payment of duties/taxes/fees.
Question. Finally, if there is a serious problem in cases where
bonds are permitted, wouldn't a logical solution be simply to require
cash deposits--at least in all new shipper reviews?
Answer. The Department of Commerce has jurisdiction in this matter
and can best address it.
Question. Explain and quantify the budgetary, manpower, technical
and other impacts on CBP of administering the bonding option for
imports from new shippers under antidumping duty orders.
Answer. While CBP is unable to quantify the manpower impact of
administering the bonding option for imports from new shippers under
anti-dumping orders, our inability to require the bonds post release
hinders our collection efforts drastically. If a party claims new
shipper status, then the determination is made at a later date that the
party actually was not eligible for new shipper status. CBP has no
legal authority to retroactively require a bond for those entries that
were released (and bonded) under the benefits of new shipper status.
Question. On December 4, 2003, the White House Office of
Communications issued ``The President's Determination on Steel,'' which
stated that President Bush ``is committed to America's steel workers
and to the health of our steel industry.'' It also stated that,
``[s]teel import licensing, established when the safeguard measures
were imposed, will continue to provide WTO-consistent data collection
and monitoring of steel imports. This will enable the Administration to
quickly respond to future import surges that could unfairly damage the
industry.''
The President's Proclamation of the same date similarly stated that
``the licensing and monitoring of imports of certain steel products
remains in effect and shall not terminate until the earlier of March
21, 2005, or such time as the Secretary of Commerce establishes a
replacement program.''
Secretary Evans made several comments to the media on December 4,
2003, regarding the Administration's commitment to the U.S. steel
import monitoring and licensing system and indicated that it would be
expanded to include steel products that were not subject to 201 tariffs
and quotas. I want to be certain that the Administration remains fully
committed to this effort.
Could you please advise me as to whether the Administration has a
plan to expedite the adoption of the new, expanded program?
Answer. In the President's Proclamation, the President stated that
``the licensing and monitoring of imports of certain steel products
remains in effect and shall not terminate until the earlier of March
21, 2005, or such time as the Secretary of Commerce establishes a
replacement program.'' The President has clearly assigned the authority
to establish a replacement program with the Secretary of Commerce and
therefore Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is not in a position to
offer comments on the Secretary's plans to expedite the adoption of the
new, expanded program. As the licensing system was established in March
2003, CBP's role in the system consists solely of the collection of the
licenses that have been issued by the Department of Commerce. All other
implementation and monitoring responsibilities lie with the Department
of Commerce.
Question. Could you also please advise me of when the
Administration intends to request public comment with respect to its
new import monitoring and licensing system?
Answer. The responsibility of the licensing system lies with the
Department of Commerce; CBP is not in a position to respond as to when
the Department of Commerce intends to request public comment with
respect to its new import monitoring and licensing system.
Question. When would you estimate that it will be up and running?
Answer. CBP is not in a position to estimate when the Department of
Commerce will implement the new import monitoring and licensing system.
CBP is committed to taking the necessary steps to implement programming
and operational changes needed to successfully enforce the licensing
program once the Department of Commerce has established it.
Question. What assurances can you provide that the system will be
operational by that date?
Answer. CBP will defer to the Secretary of Commerce on the
timelines for implementation of the new licensing and monitoring
system.
Question. The U.S. domestic steel industry and CBP have maintained
a mutually beneficial partnership since the mid-1960's. The keystone of
the Customs-Steel Partnership is a program of seminars and meetings
where experts from the U.S. steel industry train Customs officials in
the important aspects of steel identification, classification, trade
law, and commercial issues. The program also provides steel mill tours,
reference books, videos, sample kits, and other work tools for Customs
officials. Customs brokers, invited to the meetings at Customs'
request, serve as the link between importers. Customs also derives
significant benefits from the seminars.
When the President ended the Section 201 remedies for steel more
than a year before originally scheduled, he promised to continue to
focus on steel licensing, import monitoring, and the enforcement of our
trade laws. The Customs training program provides significant
enforcement education to this end. Congress appropriated $1.25 million
to fund the Customs Steel Partnership training programs in fiscal year
2003 and fiscal year 2004. We would like to see the same level of
effort in Customs training during the coming fiscal year and want to
work with the Administration to secure an appropriation of $500,000 for
fiscal year 2005.
Will the Administration support the continuation of funding for
this vital program as part of the Homeland Security appropriation in
the amount of $500,000 for fiscal year 2005?
Answer. The funding is provided as part of the Homeland Security
appropriations for fiscal year 2003 to enhance CBP's ability to train
and enforce steel trade laws was a key component in the agency's
ability to administer and enforce the Steel 201 Proclamation. The
President's fiscal year 2005 Budget for CBP addresses the
organization's highest priorities.
Question. Can CBP confirm the view expressed by many Customs
officials involved in the Customs Steel Partnership, that its benefits
are considerable? So much so that it and the Customs Steel Partnership
Training Program in particular serve as a model for the establishment
of other Industry/Customs Partnerships?
Answer. CBP can confirm that the Customs Steel Partnership Training
Program provided benefits to CBP as well as the importing community.
The training sessions continue to include Customs Brokers, importers
and exporters. While the Customs Steel Partnership has allowed CBP to
expand the size of the audience to be trained, there may perhaps be a
more efficient manner in which to fund and/or administer the funding
for said Customs Steel Partnership Training Program. Due to the
complicated procurement and budget procedures under which CBP operates,
it may be more beneficial for all parties involved if there is direct
funding provided by the Steel Industry. CBP could continue the
partnership with the Steel Industry, as we have since the mid-1960's,
but perhaps there is a more mutually beneficial avenue in which to
continue and enhance said partnership.
Question. Concerns exist about the adequacy of existing practices
surrounding the enforcement of the U.S. antidumping duty law against
imports from non-market economies, but particularly China. With the
extraordinary trade deficit that the United States is running with
China, can you provide details of what changes in the enforcement of
the U.S. dumping law are being considered for non-market economy cases
and when the agency will be implementing such changes?
Answer. This would be best addressed by the Department of Commerce.
Question. Last year, the Department of the Treasury's Office of the
Inspector General completed an audit of CBP compliance with the
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA). The OIG's report,
which was issued in August 2003, by the DHS IG, found a number of areas
in which CBP could improve its management of this program.
Specifically, it noted the need to (1) properly establish special
accounts, and (2) pay claimants within 60 days after the end of the
fiscal year. In addition, the OIG stated that CBP had not instituted
standard operating procedures and adequate internal controls for the
management of the CDSOA program. CBP said it had established a CDSOA
working group to address both the recommendations and management
considerations identified by the OIG.
What has the working group done to address the recommendations and
management considerations identified by the OIG? Has it established
special accounts? Are claimants paid within 60 days of the end of the
year? Are checks sent to proper addresses? Who is responsible for
preparing and sending the checks on time?
Answer. The working group recommended, and the Deputy Commissioner
approved, the consolidation of responsibility for most of the program
with the Office of Finance, National Finance Center (NFC). Once this
was done, procedures and controls could be strengthened. This included
the establishment of crosschecks to identify problems such as the
overpayments reported by the OIG.
Timely liquidation of entries and validation of claimants' costs
and production were not transferred to OF-NFC.
Special accounts were established at the beginning of the program
and remain in place and properly utilized. However, due to current
system limitations, CBP must make manual adjustments to the balances in
these accounts to determine the actual amounts available for
disbursement. This limitation will exist until full implementation of
the new Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) system.
Question. How much was spent in fiscal years 2002-2004 to
administer the program? What is the estimated cost for fiscal year
2005?
Answer. All disbursements for 2003, which were not restricted by
pending litigation, were processed within the allotted time. We expect
to meet the time requirements for 2004 and future years.
Checks are sent to the addresses on the claims submitted to us. If
the claimants or their attorney inadvertently include the wrong
address, we have no way of knowing that.
The Office of Finance, National Finance Center processes the
disbursements. The actual checks are issued by Treasury's Financial
Management Service based on NFC certifications.
Actual costs for administering the program were not separately
collected for fiscal year 2002-2004, but are estimated to have
increased from approximately $500,000 in the first year to
approximately $1.2 million for 2004, and to an estimated $1.8 million
for 2005. The increase year by year is due to the increased complexity
and size of the program.
Question. What mechanisms are being used currently to ensure that,
when Commerce issues liquidation instructions to Customs, the
liquidations are timely made? There have been reports of numerous cases
recently involving Customs' failure to liquidate timely and, as a
result, the agency fails to collect duties lawfully owed.
Answer. CBP meets biweekly with Commerce concerning operational
issues related to dumping. These meetings address issues that include
the mechanisms and procedures by which liquidation instructions are
transmitted by Commerce to CBP.
An inventory of all unliquidated entries is created on a regular
basis and these entries are compared to liquidation instructions that
CBP has received from Commerce. Instances identified by CBP where
entries are being held but for which specific liquidation instructions
do not appear to have been issued are provided to Commerce for their
research and action.
Question. What mechanisms are being used currently to ensure that,
when bills are sent to importers, they are paid? The trade community
hears, unfortunately, that in many instances there is little or no
follow-up by Customs on outstanding bills. Even if single entry bonds
are required by Customs and proper proof of their existence is received
by Customs, it is still important that the bills be collected because
it is the importers who are required to pay, and if Customs merely
expects to collect from bonding companies, two things result: (a) the
amount of duties collected may be severely less than what is actually
due and (b) the bonding companies may themselves be unable to pay if
their exposure goes beyond their risk planning.
Answer. CBP takes the following actions to collect delinquent bills
from importers:
--Monthly bills are issued and interest is assessed against an
importer of record on unpaid billed amounts;
--Refunds scheduled for payment to an importer of record are offset
against open delinquent bills owed by that importer;
--Sanctions are administered against an importer of record, that
require payment of duties on merchandise currently being
imported before the release of merchandise into the commerce of
the U.S. permitted;
--Formal demand for payment notices are issued and collection
litigation actions are taken against any surety with a bond
contract covering respective delinquent duty liability amounts;
and
--Litigation actions are taken against delinquent importers of record
on any amounts remaining unpaid.
NOTICE AND PROTEST PROCESS
Bills issued to importers of record are not delinquent until
protest period authorized by law has expired or an applicable protest
has been denied. Throughout the collection process, monthly bills are
issued to the importer of record and in addition a formal office of any
billed amount covered by surety bonds that remain unpaid are issued to
the applicable surety. The importer of record can legally challenge
their bill, thus aggressive collection efforts do not commence at this
stage of the process until at least 90 days from the respective entry
liquidation date has passed (19 USC 1541). If protest is filed, no
aggressive collection action is taken until a final resolution of the
protest. A surety may also file protest. On average, 45 percent of duty
bills issued are protested. Interest charges are assessed throughout
the billing process.
AGGRESSIVE COLLECTION AGAINST DELINQUENT ACCOUNTS
When protest is filed, in addition to regular monthly billing
notices, dunning letters are sent to the importer of record demanding
payment. When a protest is not filed or denied, additional dunning
letters are sent to the applicable surety with appropriate background
documents (CF 7501 (formal entry), liquidation worksheets, etc.) as a
follow up to the monthly Formal Demand on Surety for Payment of
Delinquent Bills (612 Report). During any period of delinquency,
refunds payable to an importer of record are used to offset the
delinquent debt they owe. Importers with delinquent bills are
sanctioned, and accordingly must pay duties owed on current imports
before the release of merchandise into the commerce of the United
States is permitted. A surety bond serves as an additional security in
the event that an importer goes out of business, files for bankruptcy
or otherwise fails to timely a pay delinquent amount owed.
Joint Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement
OVERSEAS OPERATIONS INTEGRATION
Question. I have heard various reports of how the division of labor
of formerly independent components now merged into DHS is working.
While the melding of functions is proceeding apace stateside, the same
personnel have no clear guidance as to how they are to operate
overseas. Who is in charge of your agencies overseas? Does it vary from
country to country? Does it make sense to have international affairs
offices in both agencies? Do the operational and informational
stovepipes, currently being eliminated here at home, still exist
overseas? If so, what steps are each of you taking to eliminate them?
Answer. The Office of the Secretary has initiated a detailed review
of the role of DHS overseas, including the management structure that
best advances the full range of the international liaison, enforcement,
inspection and services missions of DHS.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
Question. The CBP budget includes a request of $10 million for
testing and development of a UAV program. At the same time, I
understand that ICE has been using its own funds to test the possible
deployment of a series of UAVs along the Northern and Southern Borders
to provide real time intelligence to inspectors and agents in the
performance of their duties. What are the unique needs of each agency
that would necessitate the need for development of two separate UAV
programs?
Answer. The Coast Guard operates primarily in the maritime domain
along the coast and well offshore; the Border Patrol operates close to
the border, between the ports of entry both in the maritime and
terrestrial domain, but primarily in the terrestrial domain; and AMO
operates in both areas but has additional requirements (e.g., airspace
security) within internal airspace. Some overlap in geographical and
mission requirements exits, and DHS is working to minimize those. All
operations that support border security require a detection capability,
and because of the operating environment, the platforms that provide
that detection capability may need to be different in order to best
meet the mission requirements. Therefore it makes sense that each
component, as well as Science and Technology, be involved in the
testing of UAVs.
Question. How do these programs relate to one another and would not
the Department's interests be best served by a joint program or one
program which would meet the needs of both agencies (as well as
potentially other DHS entities)?
Answer. BTS and the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorates co-
chair the working group that coordinate each components plans regarding
use and testing of UAVs. Through the Joint Requirements Council (JRC)
the Aviation Management Council, and the UAV Executive Steering
Committee in conjunction with the UAV working group, the Department
will ensure that UAVs will be tested, deployed and eventually procured
in a way that meets the needs of the Department jointly. The UAV
working group is currently participating in an analysis of alternatives
(AoA) for aerial surveillance needs within BTS. Once this report is
complete we will begin a process to establish a DHS-wide concept of
operations (CONOP). The CONOP will identify unique needs and ensure
that redundancy and overlaps are minimal and that systems procured and
deployed on behalf of the DHS are interoperable. At the conclusion of
the AoA, DHS will also determine the need for UAVs as a permanent asset
for its components. It is likely that UAVs could support other current
and emerging sensing technologies to monitor the U.S. borders between
ports of entry, and their acquisition will be considered and evaluated
in terms of cost and performance in view of all the other alternative
contemplated.
The data and results obtained in the component-specific deployments
and feasibility studies will be shared within BTS, and the U.S. Coast
Guard. The evaluations and tests already conducted by ICE/AMO the U.S.
Coast Guard have been shared within the context of the working groups.
Question. If not, please explain in detail how the Department can
justify development of separate programs given limited resources.
Answer. A coordinated effort for UAV development and testing is
being addressed within the Department of Homeland Security.
TETHERED AEROSTATS
Question. What is the value of the aerostat system to the DHS
interdiction and border security mandate?
Answer. At the lower altitudes in which many suspect aircraft
operate, the Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) is the main source
of data, which the AMO uses to sort targets and determine operational
responses. The Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) for Border and
Transportation Security (BTS) is a critical component in the
interdiction of illicit air traffickers as well as our border security
system. It is the only fixed system that provides low-level radar
coverage (100-500 feet above ground level) of air targets with
altitude, speed, heading, and Identifier Friend or Foe (electronic
transponder) capability. The system also provides a platform for radio
relay equipment. Without TARS, radar coverage along the southern border
of the United States and Puerto Rico is severely diminished. Also,
modified TARS are able to provide surveillance of maritime targets in
coastal regions and limited land targets. The sea and land capabilities
of the system are not being employed.
Today, nearly all of our joint air interdiction efforts in Northern
Mexico are directly attributable to TARS. When TARS coverage is not
available, BTS (ICE AMO) must rely upon scarce and much more expensive
systems in an attempt to fill the resultant surveillance gaps.
Currently, the alternative is to use our airborne early warning (AEW)
aircraft (low density/high demand and high cost assets). AEW costs can
be 6-14 times higher than the cost per hour of TARS coverage and their
availability is limited since they are tasked with missions in the
source and transit zones, in addition to other homeland security
flights.
Question. Has there been an impact from the non-operational status
of the Lajas, PR TARS? If so, what are the impacts from the loss of
Lajas TARS?
Answer. Prior to the shutting down of the Lajas, PR, TARS site, the
vast majority of suspect air tracks avoided approaching or attempting
to land or over fly the land mass of Puerto Rico, opting instead to
transit to Hispaniola to the west and the Virgin Islands to the east.
Since Lajas was the primary tracking sensor for this area, the
impact of the loss of its information is difficult to assess. However,
until the site returns to operational status, AMO will continue to
monitor the changing threat picture through the use of limited tracking
information from FAA radar, intelligence assessments, and post-seizure
analysis of interdictions.
Question. Should this TARS remain in non-operational status, what
are the prospects for future drug interdiction efforts in Puerto Rico
and the Caribbean? Are there other locations where the aerostats had
existed and were removed (i.e. The Bahamas)? What was the impact to
drug interdiction resulting from the removal of those assets?
Answer. The system's greatest potential would be achieved as a
series of TARS sites linked to form a continuous radar detection
blanket that reaches 150 miles beyond the U.S. border. Maintaining a
complete ``radar fence'' is imperative for several reasons.
--An effective surveillance system of this type serves multiple
national objectives including:
--Homeland Security--counter illicit traffickers (air, land and
sea) and unauthorized border incursions
--Air sovereignty/Advanced Airborne Early Warning
--Air Traffic Control, flight safety
--The U.S. Interdiction Coordinator reports:
--Suspicious air tracks in the CENTAM corridor increased from 50 to
200 in 2003
--Air seizures increased ten-fold in 2003 over the 10-year average
--Maritime successes have forced drug traffickers to alter their
methods to air routes.
--The illicit trafficking and unauthorized border incursion threat
vectors continually change. Therefore, we need a system that is
effective against all threat vectors.
Question. There has been some discussion regarding the possible
transfer of the aerostat systems from the Defense to Homeland Security
departments. Though DOD is the owner of these assets, I understand that
DHS is the primary consumer of the intelligence they collect. Do you
feel that the Defense Department has adequately considered the needs of
DHS, or consulted with you, regarding the continued operation of these
aerostats? What is the Department's position on such a future transfer
of responsibility of these TARS systems?
Answer. DHS believes that this critical system supports homeland
security and provides a critical detection and monitoring capability.
That mission is a DOD responsibility. Operation of TARS should remain
in DOD.
CROSS-TRAINING
Question. Representatives of the Department of Homeland Security
Council (the union comprised of legacy INS employees) reported at a
press conference on March 3 that no more than 5 percent of Immigration
and Customs enforcement personnel have received cross-training. When
does DHS expect to complete cross-training of all existing personnel?
What percentage of all needed cross-training is funded in the
President's fiscal year 2005 budget proposal?
Answer. OI conducted a manual survey the last week of March 2004.
At that time 830 Special Agents had completed the cross-training. This
accounts for 19 percent of the 4,463 agents targeted for cross-training
in this fiscal year. The Automated Class Management System is expected
to be on-line shortly. At that time, training statistics will be more
readily available.
OI has established a target to complete the cross-training for all
non-supervisory Special Agents GS-05 through GS-13 by the end of fiscal
year 2004. This cross-training will be accomplished using a train-the-
trainer format with initial training being conducted at the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center (FLETC).
Cross-training beyond this priority group will be completed in
fiscal year 2005 and will be funded out of base dollars.
PAY DISPARITY
Question. A pay disparity of a full grade exists between
Immigration Special Agents (GS-12) and Customs Special Agents (GS-13).
It appears that the new regulations proposed by the Administration
would hide this disparity within a pay scale, rather than addressing it
directly. Is this correct? If so, what impact is this disparity having
on morale within ICE
Answer. Issues regarding ICE Criminal Investigator pay parity have
been resolved. Over the last year, we gave careful thought to the many
variables involved in this matter prior to integrating the new duties
of the national security and counter-terrorism mission with the legacy
Customs and INS duties. During this time, we submitted proposals to
resolve the issues related to this integration to a sample of the CI
population and higher level ICE and DHS management to give this
sensitive matter the care and consideration it deserved, all of which
took time. All ICE CIs will be assigned to the new position
descriptions. Employees will be either reassigned at their current
grade level or promoted if all eligibility requirements are met with an
effective date of May 2, 2004. We believe this action will enhance
ICE's ability to fulfill its mission, which in turn can improve morale,
productivity and, ultimately, performance of crucial work in national
security and terrorism investigations. Based upon this action, all ICE
CIs will be similarly situated once the new HR system is finalized and
implemented.
ASSET FORFEITURE FUND
Question. Many of the programs now under the purview of ICE were
enhanced by a productive working relationship with the Treasury
Forfeiture Fund. This working relationship still exists today.
Typically, the agencies that contributed to the fund were able to draw
on the same funds to increase mission capabilities in many areas. This
process worked well.
I understand, however, that there are plans to cede control of this
Fund to the Department of Justice. Are you concerned about losing
access to the asset forfeiture fund? What impact would it have on your
investigations if your agency were not able to have access to the
resources that you have, in fact, contributed to the Fund?
Answer. As you note, the Administration has proposed to
consolidation of the Government's Asset Forfeiture Funds within the
Department of Justice. Consolidating operation of these funds offers
enormous opportunities for efficiency gains and reductions to overhead
costs.
If the consolidation proposal is approved by the Congress, DHS will
work with the Department of Justice to ensure that its proceeds from
the fund are maintained and disbursed appropriately. The Department
does not expect the proposed consolidation of the funds and their
administration to affect the availability of fund balances or its
future proceeds.
Question. Is consideration being given to creating a separate/new
Department of Homeland Security Asset Forfeiture Fund to which all DHS
components would contribute and have access?
Answer. The Administration has proposed to consolidate the
government's Asset Forfeiture Funds at the Department of Justice. There
is no current Administration proposal to establish a Department of
Homeland Security Asset Forfeiture Fund.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT
Question. In its 1997 Executive Summary, the U.S. Commission on
Immigration Reform found that ``reducing the employment magnet is the
lynchpin of a comprehensive strategy to deter unlawful migration.''
Despite this fact, worksite enforcement has been last on the list of
enforcement priorities. According to a Jan. 11, 2004 article published
in the San Diego Union-Tribune, arrests of illegal aliens at worksites
have dropped from 8,027 in 1992 to 1,254 in 2002, and the number of
Notices of Intent to Fine has dropped from 1,063 to 13. The explanation
for this drop in enforcement, according to Joe Greene, deputy assistant
director of ICE, is that employer sanctions don't work and that they
``didn't seem to be making a dent in changing the practices of
employers.'' Does Mr. Greene's statement represent the official policy
of the Bush Administration?
Answer. Since September 11, 2001, ICE's worksite enforcement role
has gone beyond that of merely reducing the job magnet. It has become a
matter of national security. As a measure of its role in national
security, the ICE Headquarters Worksite Enforcement Unit (now called
the Critical Infrastructure Protection unit) has been aligned under the
National Security Division. In the interest of national security, ICE
is increasing its worksite enforcement efforts and has instructed its
field offices to focus their worksite enforcement investigations on
Businesses of National Interest (BNI). ICE defines a BNI as a private
or public entity that provides goods or services vital to our national
security and economy, or whose infiltration would pose a serious threat
to our domestic security.
Question. Your proposed $23 million increase is just a drop in the
bucket. Do you believe that the failure to make worksite enforcement a
more important priority is one of the reasons that there are between 8
and 11 million aliens illegally present in the United States today?
Please provide a list of the number of worksite enforcement actions
undertaken each year between 1999-2003.
Answer. There are numerous overlapping factors contributing to the
Nation's illegal immigration problem. Worksite enforcement is just one
of the immigration enforcement programs that ICE administers.
Statistics show that ICE initiated more worksite enforcement/critical
infrastructure protection cases during fiscal years 2002 and 2003 than
there were in fiscal years 1999 and 2000.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
--------------------------------------------
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cases initiated.................................................... 2,834 1,766 856 3,428 1,547
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BENCHMARKS
Question. The ICE budget requests increases for the detention and
removal and institutional removal programs. What benchmarks does the
agency use to determine the specific benefits which will be achieved
through these increases? What performance measures are used to
determine the effectiveness of these programs?
Answer. DRO is currently developing a new performance measure to
demonstrate the expected outcome of improved IRP management. This
measure shows the percentage of IRP removals that had received a final
order of removal prior to the completion of the criminal sentences and
prior to release into DRO custody. In numerical terms it will be
expressed as: number of cases with pre-release final orders/total
number of IRP removals.
Reaching 100 percent on this measure would mean that DRO does not
have to expend detention resources on IRP cases that are still awaiting
a decision from an immigration judge. All IRP cases would already have
a removal order when they complete their criminal sentence, and they
would only need to be detained by DRO for the time that it would take
to arrange and conduct the removal. This would mean a much more
efficient use of resources. Because this measure has not been used
before, it will be baselined at the end of fiscal year 2004.
Canine Teams Last week, as part of his rail and transit security
initiative, Secretary Ridge said that the Department will develop a
rapid deployment Mass Transit K-9 program by using existing Homeland
Security explosive K-9 resources, including those of the Federal
Protective Service.
Once again, it appears that the Department is robbing Peter to pay
Paul. It appears that the Department will be pulling K-9 teams away
from airports and the protection of Federal buildings and using them
for mass transit, thus degrading security in one transportation mode to
begin beefing up security in another mode. By refusing to seek
additional funds to address this very real threat it truly calls into
question the seriousness of this Administration in its effort to secure
the homeland.
Question. Does the initiative announced last week mean that you
will be pulling existing K-9 teams away from protecting Federal
buildings or from airports to use them for rail and mass transit
security?
Answer. In support of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) efforts
to strengthen rail and transit security, the Federal Protective Service
was tasked to develop a plan for ensuring the availability of Explosive
Detector Dog (EDD) support, if and when required. The intent of the
initiative is to be ready to surge EDDs to an area needing heightened
security if that becomes necessary. The law enforcement elements of the
DHS have established EDD capability in support of their primary
missions. Most of these elements maintain existing cooperative
relationships with the state, local, and transit authorities within
their local jurisdictions whereby they participate in joint training
exercises, share information, and respond to requests for support and
assistance on an ad hoc basis. The plan for the EDD-RDF builds upon
these existing relationships and expands it to ensure that DHS EDD
support is available to all jurisdictions across the Nation. The
mission of the EDD-RDF will be to provide expanded capability to mass-
transit systems within the United States by assisting State, local, and
transit authorities in the event of an increased threat situation. The
EDD-RDF is designed to enhance security and explosive detection
capabilities, as well as to provide a strong psychological deterrence
to terrorist activities. The RDF consists of existing DHS EDD assets,
and will be available 24-hours a day, 7-days a week. The EDD teams
should be able to deploy to any location within the United States
within 24 hours. Deployments will be based on specific intelligence
developed within the DHS, response to specific requests for
augmentation, or actual incidents.
LIMITED IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES
Question. Your budget request for fiscal year 2005 represents a
more than 9 percent increase over the funding level provided by
Congress for this year. While this is a step in the right direction,
the fact remains that limited budget resources constrain you in the
various types of activities your personnel can take to enforce existing
immigration laws--much less implement a sweeping alien amnesty law such
as the President has suggested. It calls into question the importance
the Administration places on immigration enforcement.
I realize that your budget requests incremental increases in
programs such as institutional removal, fugitive operations,
alternatives to detention, worksite enforcement, compliance teams, and
benefit fraud operations. But these increases are not sufficient.
I do not know what the budget resolution's topline discretionary
spending level will be, nor do I know what allocation this Subcommittee
will receive. However, if we were able to find additional resources for
immigration enforcement, where would you suggest we provide additional
funds?
Answer. The President's fiscal year 2005 Budget provides sufficient
resources for immigration enforcement by more than doubling the number
of worksite investigations currently performed by ICE.
CHIMERA
Question. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act
requires all immigration databases to be made interoperable and,
eventually, combined into the Chimera data system, which is to include
all known immigration, law enforcement, and intelligence data on
aliens. What progress has been made thus far on creating the Chimera
data system? What roles are ICE and DHS playing in this process? Which
agency has the lead in ensuring that the Chimera system is created?
Answer. On the 28th of October 2002 the former Immigration and
Naturalization Service published an informational document regarding a
comprehensive information technology planning and infrastructure
modernization program called ``Atlas''. That document was entitled the
``Atlas Business Case'' and provided a concise high-level view that
demonstrated the INS' confidence in Atlas' strategic, technical, and
financial merits. The business case reflected investment principles,
emulation of industry best practices, and compliance with the Clinger-
Cohen Act of 1996, as well as with other related legislative and
government guidance.
Consistent with the urgencies of the Government's post-September 11
security agenda, the Atlas Business Case was subsequently socialized
and promoted within the Department of Justice and sent to the Hill for
budgetary consideration. It was understood that the Atlas Program would
be the fundamental IT infrastructure foundation on which INS business
applications would operate. In its business case, the former INS
illustrated that the successful Atlas transformation strategy would
hinge upon a robust IT infrastructure containing a secure, scalable
backbone that would support all INS business processes. Atlas, it was
shown, would also provide database interoperability at the
infrastructure level and support data sharing at the applications
level. From the beginning, the Atlas design strategy also supported
emerging Department of Homeland Security (DHS) requirements. Unlike the
previous environment, Atlas was proposed to reside within an integrated
Enterprise Architecture (EA) that would harmonize the following:
--System hardware, including mainframes and servers
--Data services, including data and voice circuits
--Data communication equipment, including servers, switches, local
area networks (LAN), wide area networks (WAN), routers, and
cabling
--Computer security, information assurance activities and enterprise
information. This, specifically, is the area that would later
come to be identified as the focus area for the suggested
Chimera project.
--Workstations, including personal computers and laptops and
enterprise-wide software (i.e., office automation, e-mail,
operating system, etc.)
--Operational support to maintain and operate the modernized IT
infrastructure
Perhaps in contemplation of partitioning and re-tasking of the
former INS and its resources, or perhaps in calculating the initial
complexity and cost of implementing Atlas, a counter-suggestion was
made in committee and transmitted back to the Department of Justice and
the former INS that certain specific information security and assurance
attributes of Atlas could be separately expedited and put into action
under a new initiative tentatively labeled ``Chimera''.
However, other program initiatives under way at former INS and the
new Department of Homeland Security were also addressing the same
security concerns. In particular, the ``US VISIT'' program had pursued
the same set of concerns and an active, high-precision approach for
addressing critical information security and assurance requirements.
Because of the US VISIT Program's ongoing and comprehensive
approach to information security and assurance requirements within the
DHS sphere of immigration-related operations, Chimera has been
suspended and is being revisited to determine its potential as a
duplicative effort.
ALIEN REMOVALS
Question. Please compare criminal and non-criminal alien removals
from 1990-2003.
Answer:
Removals: Criminal and Non-criminal
The following data were collected in the Deportable Alien Control
System (DACS). These data include expedited removals. The criteria for
categorizing criminal/non-criminal and the data system used to capture
the data have been consistent since fiscal year 1993. Prior to fiscal
year 1993 the criteria were slightly different. In addition, multiple
data systems were used to collect the data and not all those data
systems supported the 1993+ criteria (see separate table below).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Criminal Non-criminal
Fiscal year Total removals removals removals
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1993............................................................ 42,542 29,458 13,084
1994............................................................ 45,674 32,512 13,162
1995............................................................ 50,924 33,842 17,082
1996............................................................ 69,680 38,015 31,665
1997............................................................ 114,432 53,214 61,218
1998............................................................ 173,146 60,965 112,181
1999............................................................ 180,948 70,417 110,531
2000............................................................ 186,056 72,114 113,942
2001............................................................ 177,818 72,434 105,384
2002............................................................ 150,237 71,636 78,601
2003............................................................ 188,292 80,355 107,937
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRE-FISCAL YEAR 1993 STATISTICS ON CRIMINAL/NON-CRIMINAL REMOVALS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Criminal Non-criminal
Fiscal year Total removals removals removals
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990............................................................ 30,039 8,971 21,068
1991............................................................ 33,189 14,475 18,714
1992............................................................ 43,671 20,098 23,573
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ARREST AUTHORITY
Question. As part of the 1990 Immigration Act, Congress authorized
general arrest authority for all immigration law enforcement officers.
INS never developed regulations to implement this authority. Has DHS
developed such regulations?
Answer. Yes, ICE issued a memo implementing general arrest
authority for the ICE Office of Investigations and Detention and
Removal in November 2003.
WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT
Question. The President's budget proposal would increase funding
for worksite enforcement by $23 million. It also proposes the addition
of 150 ``work certification'' positions--a position that does not
currently exist. Does the inclusion of this additional funding mean
that worksite enforcement will become a higher priority for ICE? What
priority will DHS give the nationwide expansion of the workplace
verification pilot programs, as passed by Congress late last year?
Answer. Enforcement efforts targeting companies that break the law
and hire illegal workers will need to increase in order to ensure the
integrity of the temporary worker system. President Bush's Fair and
Secure Immigration Reform proposal provides for an enhanced worksite
enforcement program, and the $23 million requested for fiscal year 2005
for worksite enforcement will allow ICE to enhance its worksite
enforcement program and provide credible deterrence to the hiring of
unauthorized workers. ICE worksite enforcement investigations generally
involve a review of company employment records to verify the
immigration status of workers and to determine if the employer has
committed any violations. ICE special agents also conduct extensive
outreach initiatives to educate employers as to their legal
responsibilities.
Additionally, the Basic Pilot Program, an automated system
administered by USCIS, enables employers to verify the immigration
status of newly hired workers. It is currently available in six States
but, we understand, will be available to employers in all 50 States by
the end of this year. This is a voluntary program and is currently
provided at no cost to employers. Information on the Basic Pilot
Program is available to the public on the USCIS website.
Question. Does the President's budget proposal include sufficient
funding to meet the December deadline for nationwide expansion of the
pilots? Will the new ``work certification'' agents work exclusively to
enforce employer sanctions? What increase in ``Notices of Intent to
Fine'' can be expected from these 150 positions and the doubling of
funding?
Answer. If the new special agent positions are funded and
designated for the worksite enforcement program, it is anticipated that
they will be used in that capacity. It is difficult at this point to
project the increase in Notices of Intent to Fine that will be
accomplished by the enhancements due to factors such as the rate at
which the new personnel can be hired, trained and deployed. The budget
enhancement will enable ICE to place additional emphasis on a
traditional worksite enforcement program that offers credible
deterrence to the hiring of unauthorized workers while retaining its
focus on a Critical Infrastructure Protection program that has produced
national initiatives such as Operation Tarmac and Operation Glowworm.
Question. In May 1998, the Commissioner of the INS announced a new
internal policy on workplace enforcement efforts. This policy required
approval of a written ``operation plan'' by a District Director, a
Regional Director, the Public Affairs Office, and the Community
Relations Office before any worksite enforcement operation to arrest
``one or more unauthorized aliens'' could be undertaken. This policy
was reiterated in a memo to field agents at least as recently as Feb.
13, 2002.
Is this policy still in place?
If so, isn't it unlikely that there will be any increase in
worksite enforcement, considering the obstacles set up by this policy?
If not, what is the current policy?
Answer. No, the old policy is no longer in place. Current policy,
which went into effect on July 24, 2003, states that a Special Agent in
Charge (SAC) may approve a Worksite Enforcement Operation Plan that
targets a Business of National Interest (BNI). A SAC may, at his or her
discretion, delegate this authority to an Associate Special Agent in
Charge, or Acting. The Chief of the Headquarters Critical
Infrastructure Protection unit must approve any worksite enforcement
investigation or enforcement operation that targets an employer or
entity that is not a BNI.
Question. Has someone within DHS been tasked with the job of
reviewing all old policies and recommending changes to those that
actually deter enforcement?
Answer. Old policies are reviewed to assure they contribute to
enhancing enforcement rather than hindering it
Question. The State Criminal Alien Assistance Program provides
reimbursement to States for the costs of incarcerating alien murderers,
rapists, child molesters, drug smugglers and other criminal aliens. The
President's budget proposal eliminates all funding for SCAAP.
Is DHS proposing an alternative to States incarcerating these
criminal aliens or does it expect the costs of incarcerating criminal
aliens to drop dramatically in the next year? And if so, on what basis?
Answer. For fiscal year 2005, the Administration proposes
significant investments in border control and immigration enforcement
efforts. For U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the President
proposes in enhance Border Patrol Surveillance and Sensor Technology by
$64 million for the continued expansion of the Remote Video System
along the southern and northern borders thereby increasing the
effectiveness of Border Patrol Agents. The expanded system will provide
for significantly enhanced detection and monitoring capability between
the ports of entry and increase officer safety. In addition, the fiscal
year 2005 Budget seeks $10 million to develop, procure, deploy, and
operate a system of unmanned aerial vehicles to support the Border
Patrol and other components of CBP.
In addition, the fiscal year 2005 President's Budget proposes
enhancements for numerous immigration enforcement efforts of the U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Funds sought will support enhanced
compliance teams, detention and removal efforts, and international
enforcement efforts related to immigration and visa security. These
efforts will enhance our border security and bolster our ability to
enforce our Nation's immigration laws.
INVESTIGATIVE EMPHASIS
Question. One area of concern that legacy immigration personnel
have is whether Customs personnel and issues are dominating the
immigration side of the equation in the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, so that enforcement of immigration laws is given
lower priority than enforcement of customs laws.
What is the number of ICE Special Agents in Charge who are ``legacy
Customs'' personnel? What is the number of ICE Special Agents in Charge
who are ``legacy INS'' personnel?
Answer. As of April 27, 2004, there are 27 SAC offices. Assignments
are as follows:
--16 have ``legacy Customs'' personnel permanently assigned as SACs.
--3 have ``legacy INS'' personnel permanently assigned as SACs.
--Of the 8 remaining, the acting supervisors are: 7 ``legacy
Customs'' and 1 ``legacy INS''.
--Permanent selections in progress: 2 have ``legacy Customs''
selectees and 1 has a ``legacy INS'' selectee.
Question. What is the number of ICE Senior Executive Service (SES)
positions in the Investigations program occupied/encumbered by ``legacy
Customs'' personnel? What is the number of ICE Senior Executive Service
(SES) positions in the Investigations program occupied/encumbered by
``legacy INS'' personnel?
Answer. There are 22 SES positions in the Office of Investigations.
Seventeen (17) are filled with ``legacy Customs'' personnel and 5 are
filled with ``legacy INS'' personnel.
Question. What is the number of ICE GS-15 supervisory positions in
the Investigations program occupied/encumbered by ``legacy Customs?''
What is the number of ICE GS-15 supervisory positions in the
Investigations program occupied/encumbered by ``legacy INS?''
Answer. As of April 27, 2004, there were 68 GS-1811-15s in the
Office of Investigations, 52 of which are ``legacy Customs'' and 16 are
``legacy INS''.
Question. What is the number of ICE HQ component or division chief
positions in the Investigations program occupied/encumbered by ``legacy
Customs?'' What is the number of ICE HQ component or division chief
positions in the Investigations program occupied/encumbered by ``legacy
INS?''
Answer. There are 5 divisions at Headquarters in the Office of
Investigations. Three of those divisions are headed by ``legacy
Customs'' personnel and 2 are headed by ``legacy INS'' personnel.
Question. Some have indicated that ``legacy Customs'' personnel,
particularly in managerial positions, have not diligently attended to
their duty to enforce immigration provisions now under the ICE mandate,
essentially treating customs as more important than immigration
enforcement. What steps are being taken to ensure that former Customs
personnel do not neglect their duty to enforce immigration laws?
Answer. In ICE, legacy INS and Customs investigators are being
cross-trained to maximize law enforcement authorities and capabilities.
This force multiplier is intended to expand the capability of our newly
shared authorities in the area of investigations and intelligence. Each
individual ICE agent has a responsibility to utilize all of the tools
in his/her collective INS and Customs enforcement arsenal to identify,
investigate, prevent and deter criminals or terrorists from exploiting
vulnerabilities as a means of harming our country.
Question. What is the number of 1801-series Detention & Removal
Officers in ICE? Whereas the 1801s are responsible for carrying out the
administrative enforcement and removal provisions of the immigration
code, how are they distributed nationwide? How are they empowered to do
their duty more effectively and efficiently using technology and in
coordination and cooperation with State and local law enforcement?
Answer:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Immigration
District Deportation Enforcement
Officer Agent
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Anchorage............................... 5 4
Atlanta................................. 25 35
Baltimore............................... 21 23
Boston.................................. 32 45
Buffalo................................. 21 113
Chicago................................. 37 42
Cleveland............................... 4 3
Dallas.................................. 29 46
Denver.................................. 21 56
Detroit................................. 9 8
HQ...................................... 86 0
El Centro............................... 0 11
El Paso................................. 35 133
Helena.................................. 6 12
Honolulu................................ 8 9
Harlingen............................... 31 130
Houston................................. 41 50
Kansas City............................. 13 28
Los Angeles............................. 84 145
Miami................................... 57 178
Newark.................................. 42 43
New Orleans............................. 40 88
New York City........................... 59 158
Omaha................................... 7 23
Philadelphia............................ 35 42
Phoenix................................. 51 162
Portland, ME............................ 2 4
Portland, OR............................ 8 21
San Juan................................ 11 42
Seattle................................. 23 36
San Francisco........................... 44 85
San Antonio............................. 24 79
San Diego............................... 60 222
St. Paul................................ 9 16
Washington, DC.......................... 18 14
-------------------------------
Total............................. 998 2,106
===============================
Grand Total....................... 3,104
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DRO is directly involved with State and local law enforcement
agencies in the search and apprehension of fugitives. DRO continues to
expand the use of technology in an effort to apprehend fugitive aliens.
A recent example is providing the officers of the Miami Fugitive
Operations Team with Blackberry devices. A Blackberry device will
eventually enable Officers to search names in NCIC (criminal history)
and the Division of Motor Vehicles. In addition, we are entering into
an agreement with the United States Marshals Service to expand our
databases. The agreement will allow DRO and the USMS to compare
databases on warrants and select and search for fugitives of joint
interest. DRO is also planning to purchase laptop computers with
wireless modems so Officers can conduct field inquires. DRO is
expanding the use of commercial databases containing biographical
information on a person, such as last known address, in an effort to
locate and apprehend fugitives.
Question. What is the number of 1811-series Special Agent/Criminal
Investigator personnel in ICE? How are they distributed geographically?
Whereas 1811s are the ``detectives'' responsible for complex,
protracted investigative casework largely dealing with the criminal
provisions of the immigration code, how do they coordinate and
cooperate with both 1801s and with State and local law enforcement,
especially pursuant to cases where State or local officers encounter an
alien lawbreaker?
Answer. As of April 27, 2004, there were 5,464 special agents
assigned to the Office of Investigations, as follows.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Organizational Component On Board
------------------------------------------------------------------------
HQ--Office of Investigations............................ 289
SAC Atlanta, GA......................................... 181
SAC Baltimore, MD....................................... 78
SAC Boston, MA.......................................... 155
SAC Buffalo, NY......................................... 109
SAC San Juan, PR........................................ 128
SAC Chicago, IL......................................... 312
SAC Dallas, TX.......................................... 139
SAC Denver, CO.......................................... 109
SAC Detroit, MI......................................... 175
SAC El Paso, TX......................................... 220
SAC Houston, TX......................................... 206
SAC Los Angeles, CA..................................... 389
SAC Miami, FL........................................... 335
SAC Newark, NJ.......................................... 143
SAC New Orleans, LA..................................... 221
SAC New York, NY........................................ 382
SAC St Paul, MN......................................... 96
SAC San Antonio, TX..................................... 315
SAC San Diego, CA....................................... 330
SAC San Francisco, CA................................... 260
SAC Seattle, WA......................................... 216
SAC Tampa, FL........................................... 177
SAC Tucson, AZ.......................................... 143
SAC Phoenix, AZ......................................... 95
SAC Washington, DC...................................... 108
SAC Philadelphia, PA.................................... 107
SAC Honolulu, HI........................................ 46
---------------
TOTAL............................................. 5,464
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A key objective of DHS and ICE is to share information with our
State and local partners in law enforcement that contributes directly
to the security and safety of the United States and the American
people. The Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) in Vermont is the
vital DHS and ICE point of contact with the entire law enforcement
community and is on the cutting edge of the Federal effort to share
critical enforcement information with state, county, local and even
international law enforcement officers. It is a national, single point
of contact, law enforcement center that provides timely immigration
status and identity information and real-time assistance to local,
state and Federal law enforcement agencies on aliens suspected,
arrested or convicted of criminal activity. The primary user of the
LESC continues to be State and local law enforcement officers seeking
information about an alien encountered in the course of their daily
duties.
Question. Is ICE requiring both legacy Customs and legacy INS
enforcement personnel to attend cross-training programs? What
percentage of legacy Customs vs. INS personnel has actually completed
such training? Does ICE intend that all enforcement personnel will
undergo such cross-training, and if so, when is it expected to be
completed?
Answer. Yes, all OI Special Agents will be cross-trained in both
legal and investigative blocks of instruction.
OI conducted a manual survey the last week of March 2004. At that
time 830 Special Agents had completed the cross-training. This accounts
for 19 percent of the 4,463 agents targeted for cross-training in this
fiscal year. Of the 830 who have completed the cross-training, 57
percent are legacy immigration agents and 43 percent are legacy customs
agents. The Automated Class Management System is expected to be on-line
shortly. At that time, training statistics will be more readily
available.
OI has established a target to complete the cross-training for all
non-supervisory Special Agents GS-05 through GS-13 by the end of fiscal
year 2004. This cross-training will be accomplished using a train-the-
trainer format with initial training being conducted at the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center (FLETC).
Cross-training beyond this priority group will be completed in
fiscal year 2005.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
Question. Mr. Bonner, Mr. Garcia, there is now a hiring freeze in
place at both your agencies, as well as at Mr. Aguirre's agency, and I
understand you are facing a budget shortfall of more than 12 percent.
It is outrageous to hear about a hiring freeze in critical national
security agencies after the Bush Administration has strongly opposed
attempts by the Ranking Member and many many others in Congress to
increase funding for DHS. How could this have happened, and what
funding does Congress need to provide so you can at least replace law
enforcement agents who resign from your agencies?
Answer. The budgets for our agencies have increased substantially
since fiscal year 2001 and we are not facing a budget shortfall. As a
result of budget reviews of our agencies and the Department, we
supported a hiring freeze as a prudent measure in the face of
uncertainties in budget allocation and adjustments in fee collection
forecasts.
The Department established a review team composed of staff from the
CFO's Office, BTS, CIS, and the Coast Guard to assess the situation.
The review team engaged in a detailed budget reconciliation effort
among the three Bureaus. The team examined the allocation of resources
and services throughout the three Bureaus, and this effort resulted in
an immediate internal realignment of $212 million. A subsequent
internal realignment of approximately $270 million is possible, pending
additional discussions and coordination of the final documentation and
billing.
The Congress has recognized that funds may need to be realigned
between ICE, CBP, and CIS. In the Joint Explanatory Statement (H. Rpt.
108-280) accompanying the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2004 (Public Law 108-90), the Congress recognized
that the budgetary resources may need to be realigned. Specifically,
the Congress noted: ``The conferees are aware that the Department is
conducting a comprehensive review of administrative and other mission
responsibilities, particularly as they affect ICE and other agencies
that have inherited multiple legacy missions. While funding provided by
this conference agreement is based on the best possible information
available, the conferees understand there may be a need to adjust
funding to conform to the decisions resulting from the review.'' A
similar statement was included under the heading discussing CBP.
Over the past year, these three Bureaus have undergone major,
successful reorganizations by incorporating programs, staff, and
resources from legacy programs at the Immigration and Naturalization
Service and the Customs Service (as well as the General Services
Administration and the Department of Agriculture) and a realignment of
functions to strengthen the security of the Nation. Through this
process, which included successful reassignment of over 50,000
employees from the legacy agencies, robust hiring continued to ensure
adequate staffing to accomplish mission objectives. However, the
transformation effort has not been without challenges and each Bureau
continues to integrate everything from budgets to uniforms to Standard
Operating Procedures in virtually every area. We have made great
progress to date.
During a review of the status of execution of the fiscal year 2004
budget, the ICE and CBP determined that implementation of hiring
restrictions was a prudent managerial measure not just to stay within
2004 appropriations, but for mission-related objectives. CIS had
already instituted hiring restrictions since the beginning of the year
due to lower than anticipated fee projections. Additional focus was,
and is required to work through funding realignments related to the
establishment of the three new Bureaus. This work recognized the
tremendous effort of the Administration and the Congress to establish
the Department but also acknowledged that some of the finer details on
funding and provision of support services required negotiations and
reconciliation between the three Bureaus. The work has been on-going,
but agreements have been recently reached to realign funds to cover
costs of services incurred by the Bureaus. Formal memoranda of
agreement will be implemented between the three Bureaus, which will
help ensure that funding is aligned with services rendered.
The Department is committed to the security of the Nation and we
will continue to work towards successful establishment of the three
Bureaus, CBP, CIS, and ICE. To that end, we will continue to work with
the Congress, in particular through the appropriations process, to
ensure that funds are aligned to mission objectives consistent with
Congressional intent.
Question. Mr. Garcia, I am pleased that you and other components of
the Executive Branch are making such good use of the Law Enforcement
Support Center, located in my home State of Vermont--including its role
in Operation Predator. The LESC provides information to State and local
police departments throughout the Nation, regarding the immigration
status and identities of aliens suspected, arrested, or convicted of
criminal activity. You joined me in Vermont last August to announce
expanded capabilities at the LESC. I look forward to continuing to work
with you to ensure that the LESC is as helpful as possible to law
enforcement officers throughout our Nation.
At the same time, I want to ensure that adequate funding is
available for the LESC to perform its various functions. The
President's proposal did not include a specific budget for the LESC,
leaving me only to assume that the base budget from this year will be
continued in the upcoming fiscal year. Considering the increased
demands on the LESC and their expanded capabilities, how will you
ensure that the LESC has the resources it needs to perform its vital
role of supporting Federal, State and local law enforcement?
Answer. All of the new or increased activity levels at the LESC
that are contributing significantly to national security and public
safety have been accomplished within existing resources. ICE has
clearly recognized the value of the LESC as demonstrated by the steps
taken to increase productivity and is determined to expand the role of
the LESC not only within the broader law enforcement community, but
also within DHS and ICE.
In order to ensure the LESC is properly positioned to address its
expanding workloads and roles within the law enforcement community, ICE
conducted a detailed analysis of current and projected operational
requirements and the resources that would be necessary to assure their
continuation and expansion. That analysis, which included examination
of staffing, facility and other resource needs, resulted in a
comprehensive, strategic document. Some of the recommendations have
already been implemented or are in the planning or implementation
process.
Question. Mr. Aguirre, the President's budget proposes a 40 percent
cut in the amount of directly appropriated funds for the Bureau of
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), from the nearly $235
million appropriated for the current year to $140 million for fiscal
year 2005. At the same time, the President has proposed a guest worker
program that would significant increase the CIS workload.
Why is the President proposing a 40 percent cut in an agency whose
workload he wants to increase dramatically?
Answer. The President's fiscal year 2005 Budget is not proposing a
cut in the USCIS budget. In fact, the President's budget includes a
$300 million increase over last years levels, including an additional
$60 million in discretionary funding towards backlog reduction efforts
aimed at achieving a 6-month processing time for all immigration
benefit applications by fiscal year 2006.
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget reflects the recent changes
by USCIS to adjust its fee schedule. This fee adjustment includes
amounts for administrative support services ($155 million) previously
funded through appropriated funds (tax dollars). Thus, this proposal
has no impact on the USCIS budget except for the fact that the funding
source for these services will be by way of fees versus tax dollars.
With the exception of the $140 million in appropriated backlog
reduction funds, USCIS will be a wholly fee-funded agency in fiscal
year 2005.
Beginning in fiscal year 2002, USCIS has been receiving a total of
$100 million in funds for backlog reduction to achieve the 6-month
processing time. The $100 million is made up of $80 million in
appropriated funds and $20 million in premium processing fees. The
President is proposing a 60 percent increase for backlog reduction
efforts in fiscal year 2005, bringing the total backlog reduction funds
from $100 million to $160 million ($140 million in appropriated funds
and $20 million from the premium processing fees).
Question. Speaking of the guest worker program, I wrote to the
President in January and asked him to submit a legislative proposal to
Congress that would implement his plan. As you know, we have a short
legislative year ahead of us, but I have still not received a response.
Are the media reports suggesting the President has shelved his guest
worker program accurate? If not, why has he not submitted proposed
legislation? Will he do so?
Answer. On January 7, 2004, the President announced principles in
creating a new temporary worker program that would match willing
foreign workers with willing U.S. employers when no Americans can be
found to fill the jobs. We look forward to working with Congress to
develop legislation that incorporates the best ideas for the American
worker and our foreign visitors. Through the principles outlined by the
President, the best course to the end goal of opportunity, security,
safety, compassion, jobs and growth can be achieved.
Question. President Bush has promised to reduce the average wait
time for applicants for immigration benefits to 6 months by 2006. In
light of that goal, and the increased burden the President would place
on the CIS through the guest worker program, why did the President's
not seek increased funds for backlog reduction?
Answer. As stated above, the President is proposing a 60 percent
increase for backlog reduction efforts in fiscal year 2005, bringing
the total backlog reduction funds from $100 million to $160 million
($140 million in appropriated funds and $20 million from the premium
processing fees).
Question. Mr. Aguirre, I have joined with many other Senators in
writing to Secretary Ridge and opposing the potential outsourcing of
1100 Immigration Information Officers (IIOs). My colleagues and I
believe that these IIOs perform important work--including background
checks on applicants for immigration benefits--that we should not be
delegating to the private sector, especially at a time of continuing
threats of terrorism. (A) As the supervisor of these IIOs, do you
believe they are performing their jobs well? (B) Do you believe they
should be replaced by private contractors?
Answer. Many IIOs individually do an excellent job. But we have a
very significant customer challenge that we have yet to meet. INS was
known for long lines, and lengthy waits at its local offices, and was
not considered particularly responsive to written correspondence.
Clearly we need to make some changes. USCIS has already started the
process with expansions of our toll-free call center services, case
status on-line, InfoPass appointments, and initiatives to reduce lines
and improve customer service. Introducing an element of competition
through the A-76 process should further stimulate innovation and
improvements, with the current workforce being one of the competitors
in this process.
Question. Mr. Garcia, I have supported and helped to obtain funding
for Legal Orientation Proceedings for immigration detainees, with the
view that the immigration system works better for all parties when
detained aliens are informed as to whether they have a legitimate legal
case to stay in the United States. Congress appropriated $1 million for
orientation proceedings in fiscal year 2003, but DHS has still not
transferred that money to the Executive Office for Immigration Review
so the proceedings can take place. Can you tell me when that money will
be transferred, and why it has taken so long?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the
attention and funding Congress has appropriated annually to fund the
Legal Orientation Program for Immigration Detainees. As you know, the
former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was abolished on
February 28, 2003, shortly after the fiscal year 2003 Appropriations
was signed into law on February 20, 2003. One of its successor
agencies, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), began to
manage the funding appropriated for the Legal Orientation Program. Late
in fiscal year 2002, the former INS transferred $1 million to the
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) for the Legal
Orientation Program. However, this transfer was not made in fiscal year
2003. Also, throughout fiscal year 2003, EOIR had fiscal year 2002
funding available to use for their Legal Orientation Program. In fiscal
year 2004, ICE has transferred $1 million to EOIR for the Legal
Orientation Program, under a reimbursable agreement that was signed on
February 2, 2004.
CONCLUSION OF HEARINGS
Senator Cochran. This concludes our scheduled hearings on
the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request for the
Department of Homeland Security. I appreciate the cooperation
and assistance of all members of the subcommittee, especially
the distinguished Senator of West Virginia, my friend, Senator
Byrd, as well as the dedicated hard work of the staff of this
subcommittee.
The hearing is recessed.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., Tuesday, March 30, the hearings
were concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene
subject to the call of the Chair.]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
----------
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES
[The following testimonies were received by the
Subcommittee on Homeland Security for inclusion in the record.
The submitted materials relate to the fiscal year 2005 budget
request for programs within the subcommittee's jurisdiction.]
Prepared Statement of the Association of American Universities
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to have
this opportunity to present the views of the Association of American
Universities (AAU) concerning the fiscal year 2005 budget proposal for
the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology (S&T)
Directorate. AAU is an organization of 62 leading public and private
research universities.
Let me begin by thanking Chairman Cochran, Ranking Member Byrd, and
members of the subcommittee for their efforts last year in helping the
new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) get up and running. I would
especially like to thank them for their recognition of the role that
universities can play in helping the Department fulfill its mission and
for your strong support of the university programs within the DHS S&T
Directorate. You all have done the nation a great service, and your
work to ensure the security of our homeland is very much appreciated.
AAU Urges Strong Support of Homeland Security S&T
AAU supports the $1.039 billion proposed in the President's fiscal
year 2005 budget request for the DHS S&T Directorate. The primary
interest of the university community continues to be with DHS
University Programs, which support the DHS scholarship, fellowship, and
university center programs. AAU requests $70 million for DHS university
programs in fiscal year 2005, the same level approved by Congress in
fiscal year 2004. This is $40 million more than the President's fiscal
year 2005 request.
AAU recommends that this additional $40 million be used to support
new DHS university-based centers and other innovative university-based
research programs. This is consistent with AAU's view that DHS S&T
programs should focus not only on the development of technologies with
near-term applications but also on helping generate the fundamental
knowledge, cutting-edge science, and human infrastructure needed to
meet the nation's future homeland security needs. AAU also supports
funding for S&T staffing and administration at a level that allows the
directorate to ensure that S&T funds are awarded to projects fairly and
competitively, based on scientific and technical merit.
The Role of Universities in Homeland Security
There are several reasons why AAU believes that continued strong
support for university research and training is needed and can greatly
assist the Department of Homeland Security. Let me briefly highlight
three of them:
Long-Term University-Based Research is Critical to Homeland
Defense.--Science and engineering research conducted on university
campuses is the foundation for many of the technologies now being
deployed to prevent, detect, and treat victims of chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear and conventional terrorist attacks. As with
university-based basic and applied defense research programs,
fundamental knowledge and research generated at universities will serve
as the ``seed corn'' from which future homeland security technologies
will grow.
Universities Are an Important Resource in the Domestic War on
Terror.--University medical facilities and personnel were critical in
providing medical care and emergency response services after the
September 11, 2001, attacks in New York City and Washington D.C. When
the anthrax attacks occurred on Capitol Hill, university researchers
were called on to help Americans better understand the threat posed by
biological agents and to provide critical information that enabled
federal agencies and Congress to respond effectively.
University researchers are actively exploring new methods to
safeguard the nation, including detection of, and response to, domestic
biological, chemical, nuclear, and radiological attacks; risk
assessment; cybersecurity; protection of critical infrastructure; and
developing a better understanding of the behaviors and motivations of
those who engage in terrorist activities.
Universities Are Leading Homeland Security Training and
Coordination.--Universities continue to work with government officials
at all levels, industry and non-profit leaders, and first-responders to
develop coherent, effective homeland security strategies. Colleges and
universities are also developing new programs to train first responders
and educate students to address current and future homeland security
challenges.
Conclusion
Let me conclude by saying that in addition to being able to assist
the Department of Homeland Security in fulfilling its science and
technology and training objectives, AAU and its member universities are
working to ensure safety and security on university campuses. This
includes compliance with the new biological and select agent
regulations and efforts to help ensure that new systems to track
foreign students--as required by law--are in place. AAU urges that in
addition to providing funding for homeland security S&T, Congress and
the Administration provide adequate funding to support university
efforts to respond to these new requirements for campus-based homeland
security. With your support, and working together, the nation's
research universities will be able to continue to help fight terrorism
and ensure domestic security.
Again, I appreciate your ongoing work in support of homeland
security. Thank you for the opportunity to submit testimony. Please let
me know should you have any questions.
______
Prepared Statement of the American Public Transportation Association
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to submit written
testimony on the security and safety of public transportation systems.
We appreciate your interest in transportation security, and we look
forward to working with you as you develop the fiscal year 2005
appropriations bill for the Department of Homeland Security.
ABOUT APTA
The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) is a
nonprofit international association of over 1,500 public and private
member organizations including transit systems and commuter rail
operators; planning, design, construction, and finance firms; product
and service providers; academic institutions; transit associations and
State departments of transportation. APTA members serve the public
interest by providing safe, efficient, and economical transit services
and products. Over ninety percent of persons using public
transportation in the United States and Canada are served by APTA
member systems.
OVERVIEW
Mr. Chairman, public transportation is one of our Nation's critical
infrastructures. We cannot over emphasize the importance of our
industry to the economic vitality of this country. Over 9.5 billion
transit trips are taken annually on all modes of transit service.
People use public transportation vehicles over 32 million times each
weekday. This is more than 16 times the number of daily travelers
aboard the Nation's airlines, and 450 times the number of travelers on
Amtrak.
The American people rightfully expect that they can travel to work,
school, and any destination on public transit without fearing for their
safety and security. Our industry is fully engaged in meeting this
responsibility. However, the American people, and we also require the
full support of the Federal Government to effectively address this
challenge.
America's public transportation services are by design and
necessity an open environment. Safety and security are thus the top
priority of the public transportation industry. Transit systems took
many steps to improve security prior to the horrific terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, and have significantly increased efforts since
then by spending approximately $1.7 billion on security and emergency
preparedness programs and technology. These expenditures have been made
from local transit agency's own budgets with minimal Federal funding.
Recent terrorist attacks in Madrid only highlight the need to
strengthen security on public transit systems and to do so without
delay.
In a recent APTA survey transit systems identified both capital and
operating actions that would enhance transit security; transit agencies
around the country have identified in excess of $6 billion in transit
security needs. State and local governments and transit agencies are
doing what they can to improve security, but it is important that the
Federal Government be a full partner in the effort to ensure the
security of the Nation's tens of millions of transit users.
We urge the Congress to act decisively on this issue. In light of
the documented needs, we respectfully request Congress to provide $2
billion in the fiscal year 2005 Homeland Security Appropriations bill
for transit security. Of that amount, we suggest that $1.2 billion be
provided for capital needs such as improved inter-operable radio
communications, strengthening access control to facilities, and
establishing emergency operations control centers, and that $800
million be provided for security related operating costs, including
threat assessments, planning, public awareness, training, and drills.
We further request that the existing process for distributing
Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) Federal grant funding be modified
so that funds are distributed directly to transit agencies as was done
in fiscal year 2003, rather than through State Administrating Agencies
(SAA) as was done in fiscal year 2004.
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
Mr. Chairman, transit employees are on the front line in our
Nation's effort against terrorism. They are the first responder
evacuation teams who will assist in getting the public out of critical
incident areas and our cities in the event of a terrorist attack. This
was evident on September 11, 2001, when public transportation systems
in New York City, New Jersey and Washington D.C. helped safely evacuate
citizens from center cities. Indeed, this same story was true around
the country as transit systems quickly and efficiently evacuated people
from closed airports and downtown areas. We remember that the
interstate highway program was begun by President Eisenhower as a
national defense interstate highway program. It is clear now that
public transportation too has a significant national defense component
and is a fundamental element in responding to terrorist attacks and
other community disasters and emergencies.
In that connection, APTA has played a critical role in
transportation security and works closely with a number of Federal
agencies in this regard, notably the Federal Transit Administration
(FTA) and the Federal Railroad Administration of the U.S. Department of
Transportation, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA),
the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP), and the Directorate of
Information Analysis & Infrastructure Protection of the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security. At the program level, APTA works closely with
these agencies to administer an industry audit program that oversees a
system safety and security management plan for transit systems around
the country. Our safety audit program for commuter rail, bus, and rail
transit operations has been in place for many years and includes
elements specific to security planning and emergency preparedness.
Separately, in connection with Presidential Decision Directive Number
63, we are pleased to have been designated a Public Transportation
Sector Coordinator by the Department of Transportation, and as my
testimony notes below, we have established a Transit Information
Sharing Analysis Center (ISAC) that provides a secure two-way reporting
and analysis structure for the transmission of critical alerts and
advisories to transit agencies around the country. This ISAC is also a
mechanism for transit agencies to provide information to the DHS.
Since the events of 9/11, State and local public transit agencies,
like all State and local entities, have spent significant sums on
police overtime, enhanced planning and training exercises, and capital
improvements related to security. As mentioned in the overview, a 2004
APTA survey of transit agencies around the country has identified in
excess of $6 billion in added transit security needs. These include
both one-time capital investments and recurring operating expenses
related to security. It is important to note that these costs are above
and beyond the capital infrastructure needs we have identified under
the TEA 21 reauthorization effort.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Chairman, prior to and following September 11, 2001, the date
of the most devastating terrorist attack in U.S. history, American
public transportation agencies have taken significant measures to
emphasize their security and emergency preparedness to adjust to
society's new State of concern. Although agencies had a wide range of
security initiatives in place at the time of the World Trade Center and
Pentagon attacks and already had developed emergency response plans,
the September 11 incidents caused the agencies to focus, strengthen,
and prioritize additional security efforts.
Transit agencies have had an excellent safety record and have
worked for years to enhance their system security and employee security
training, partly responding to government standards, APTA guidelines,
and by learning through the attacks on transit agencies abroad. For
example, the 1995 sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system caused
U.S. transit properties managing tunnels and underground transit
stations to go on high alert. The San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit
District, for instance, responded to the possible threat of chemical
weapons attacks by sending a police team to Fort McClellan, Alabama, to
learn response tactics from U.S. Army chemical weapons experts.
In the months following the September 11 terrorist attacks, transit
agencies of all sizes worked to identify where they might be vulnerable
to attacks and increased their security spending for both operations
and capital costs. The agencies subsequently upgraded and strengthened
their emergency response and security plans and procedures, taking
steps to protect transit infrastructure and patrons and increase
transit security presence while giving riders a sense of security.
Some initiatives around the country include:
--Increased surveillance via closed circuit TV
--Increased training for employees
--Hired more police, K-9 units added
--Chemical detection systems being tested
--Infrastructure design to eliminate hiding places
--Drills are routinely held with first responders
--Encouraging riders to be vigilant for suspicious activities or
items.
After September 11, many transit organizations worked to prevent
unauthorized entry into transit facilities. The need for employees and
passengers to stay alert and report suspicious occurrences became a key
goal of many agencies. These efforts are paying off. But while many
transit agencies are more secure than prior to September 11, more needs
to be done.
Since the attacks, APTA and the Federal Transit Administration have
emphasized the need for effective transit security and emergency
preparedness. FTA has sent security resources toolkits to transit
agencies; completed security-vulnerability assessments of the Nation's
largest transit systems; and provided technical support and grants of
up to $50,000 to fund agency emergency drills.
FTA continues to provide emergency preparedness and security forums
nationwide. In emphasizing the importance of enhancing transit
security, FTA Administrator Jennifer L. Dorn noted that thousands of
lives were spared on September 11 in New York City and Washington
``because of the quick action of first responders and transit
workers.''
APTA has launched additional efforts to further transit industry
security and preparedness, collaborating with FTA in developing
emergency preparedness forums, and sponsoring and organizing security-
related conferences and workshops. Moreover, APTA developed a list of
critical safety and security needs faced by the transit industry, which
it has provided to the Department of Transportation and the U.S.
Congress.
public transportation information sharing analysis center (isac)
Presidential Decision Directive Number 63 authorizes and encourages
national critical infrastructures to develop and maintain ISACs as a
means of strengthening security and protection against cyber and
operations attacks. APTA is pleased to have been designated a Public
Transportation Sector Coordinator by the U.S. Department of
Transportation, and in that capacity has received a $1.2 million grant
from the Federal Transit Administration to establish a transit ISAC.
APTA recently formalized an agreement with a private company to
implement the ISAC and make it available to public transit systems
around the country.
This ISAC for public transit provides a secure two-way reporting
and analysis structure for the transmission of critical alerts and
advisories as well as the collection, analysis and dissemination of
security information from transit agencies. The public transit ISAC
also provides a critical linkage between the transit industry, the U.S.
Department of Transportation, the Transportation Security
Administration, and the Office of Homeland Security. A request for
funding to continue this ISAC has been submitted to the Department of
Homeland Security's Directorate of Information Analysis &
Infrastructure Protection.
ONGOING TRANSIT SECURITY PROGRAMS
Mr. Chairman, while transit agencies have moved to a heightened
level of security alertness, the leadership of APTA has been actively
working with its strategic partners to develop a practical plan to
address our industry's security and emergency preparedness needs.
Shortly after the September 11 events, the APTA Executive Committee
established a Security Task Force under the leadership of Washington
Metro's CEO, Richard A. White. The APTA Security Task Force has
established a security strategic plan that prioritizes direction for
our initiatives. Among those initiatives, the Task Force serves as the
steering group for determining security projects that are being
implemented through over $2 million in Transit Cooperative Research
funding through the Transportation Research Board.
Through this funding, APTA held four transit security workshop
forums for the larger transit systems with potentially greater risk
exposure. These workshops provided confidential settings to enable
sharing of security practices and applying methodologies to various
scenarios. The outcomes from these workshops were made available in a
controlled and confidential format to other transit agencies unable to
attend the workshops. The workshops were held in New York, San
Francisco, Atlanta, and Chicago.
In partnerships with the Transportation Research Board, the APTA
Security Task Force has also established two TCRP Panels that
identified and initiated specific projects developed to address
Preparedness/Detection/Response to Incidents and Prevention and
Mitigation. The Security Task Force emphasized the importance for the
research projects to be operationally practical.
In addition to the TCRP funded efforts, a generic Checklist For
Transit Agency Review Of Emergency Response Planning And System Review
has been developed by APTA as a resource tool and is available on the
APTA website. Also through the direction of the Security Task Force,
APTA has reached out to other organizations and international
transportation associations to formally engage in sharing information
on our respective security programs and directions and to continually
work towards raising the bar of safety and security effectiveness.
Within this concept of partnership and outreach, APTA also
continues in its ongoing collaboration with the Federal Transit
Administration to help in guiding and developing FTA programs. Among
these are regional Emergency Preparedness and Security Planning
Workshops that are currently being delivered through the Volpe Center
and have been provided in numerous regions throughout the United
States. The primary focus of such workshops has been to assist
particularly smaller transit systems in building effective emergency
response plans with first responders and their regional offices of
emergency management. Also within this partnership, APTA has assisted
the FTA and the National Transit Institute in the design of a new
program ``Security Awareness Training for Frontline Employees and
Supervisors.'' This program is now being provided by NTI to transit
agencies throughout the Nation.
Collaborative efforts between APTA, FTA, Volpe Center, and the
National Transit Institute are also underway to establish a joint
website that will specifically gather and disseminate effective transit
practices with initial emphasis on safety and security.
As you may be aware, APTA has a long-established Safety Audit
Program for Commuter Rail, Bus, and Rail Transit Operations. Within the
scope of these programs are specific elements pertaining to Emergency
Response Planning and Training as well as Security Planning. In keeping
with our industry's increased emphasis on these areas, the APTA Safety
Audit Programs have similarly been modified to place added attention to
these critical elements.
APTA's Committee on Public Safety continues to provide a most
critical forum for transit security professionals to meet and share
information, experiences and programs and to also provide valuable
input to programs being developed by the FTA.
SECURITY INVESTMENT NEEDS
Mr. Chairman, after the awful events of 9/11, the transit industry
invested some $1.7 billion in enhanced security measures building on
the industry's considerable efforts already in place. At the same time,
our industry undertook a comprehensive review to determine how we could
build upon our existing industry security practices. This included a
range of activities, some of which I discussed earlier in my testimony,
including research, best practices, education, information sharing in
the industry, surveys and the like. As a result of those efforts we are
now at a phase where we know what we can most effectively do in terms
of creating a more secure environment for our riders and have
accordingly identified critical security investment needs.
Our latest survey of public transportation security identified
needs of at least $5.2 billion in additional capital funding to
maintain, modernize, and expand transit system security functions to
meet increased security demands. Over $800 million annually for
increased operating costs for security personnel, training, technical
support, and research and development have been identified, bringing
total additional transit security funding needs to more than $6
billion.
Responding transit agencies were asked to prioritize the uses for
which they required additional Federal investment for security needs.
Priority examples of operational needs include:
--Funding current and additional transit agency and local law
enforcement personnel
--Funding for over-time costs and extra security personnel during
heightened alert levels
--Training for security personnel
--Joint transit/law enforcement training
--Security planning activities
--Security training for other transit personnel
Priority examples of security capital investment needs include:
--Radio communications systems, including operational control center
redundancy
--Security cameras on-board transit vehicles and in transit stations
--Controlling access to transit facilities and secure areas
--Automated vehicle locator systems
--Security fencing around facilities
Transit agencies with large rail operations also reported a
priority need for Federal capital funding for intrusion detection
devices.
To date the DHS has allocated some $115 million for public
transportation security through its Office of Domestic Preparedness.
While we appreciate this support from the Department, we must build on
those initial investments and begin to address the $6 billion in
critical needs the transit industry has identified. We believe that a
funding level of $2 billion in the fiscal year 2005 Homeland Security
Appropriations bill would effectively begin the process of funding
those needs. Of that amount, we suggest that $1.2 billion be provided
for transit capital needs, and that $800 million be provided for
transit agencies for operating costs.
The Administration's fiscal year 2005 budget, however, does not
specifically call for investment in public transportation security. We
think it should. Currently ODP grants for transit systems are made
available through the States, which means that our transit systems do
not have a direct relationship with DHS, and which also means that the
process of getting the funds to the local transit systems can be
lengthy. Mr. Chairman, our Nation's transit systems have a direct and
cooperative working relationship with DOT's Federal Transit
Administration which allocates Federal capital investment directly to
them, and we believe this is an excellent model that we would like to
see developed with the DHS. We stand ready to help in any way we can in
that regard.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, in light of our Nation's heightened security concerns
post 9/11, and the bombings in Madrid, tens of millions of Americans
relying on public transportation expect the services they use to be
made more secure. Increased Federal investment in public transportation
security by the Congress and DHS is critical. The public transportation
industry has made great strides in transit security improvements since
9/11 but much more needs to be done. We look forward to building on our
cooperative working relationship with Congress and the Department of
Homeland Security to begin to address these needs. We again thank you
and the Committee for allowing us to submit testimony on these critical
issues and look forward to working with you on safety and security
issues.
______
Prepared Statement of the Association of State Dam Safety Officials
Dear Chairman Cochran and Members of the Subcommittee: The
Association of State Dam Safety Officials (ASDSO) is pleased to offer
testimony on the President's proposed fiscal year 2005 budget for the
Department of Homeland Security.
The Association of State Dam Safety Officials respectfully requests
that the Subcommittee increase the Administration's proposed budget of
$5.9 million to $8.6 million to fully fund the National Dam Safety
Program at its authorized level for fiscal year 2005. The Association
further requests that these funds be earmarked for the sole purpose of
carrying out mandates authorized in the National Dam Safety and
Security Act of 2002.
The Association of State Dam Safety Officials is a national
organization of more than 2,200 state, Federal and local dam safety
professionals and private sector individuals dedicated to improving dam
safety through research, education and technology transfer. ASDSO
represents the 50 state dam safety programs, as the state dam safety
officials are the governing body of the Association. Our goal is simply
to save lives, prevent property damage and to maintain the many
benefits of dams by preventing dam failures.
During the 1970s this country suffered devastating dam failures
that caused tragic loss of life and enormous property damage; and
focused national attention on the catastrophic consequences of dam
failures. Those historic failures and recent dam failures serve as a
constant reminder that dams must always be properly constructed,
properly designed and properly operated and maintained to provide vital
benefits and prevent failures.
Today our focus in not only on the safety of dams related to
maintenance issues but on security as the Nation faces a significant
challenge to protect our infrastructure from terrorist attacks.
Protection of U.S. dams is a major concern and focus of national
strategic planning efforts within the Department of Homeland Security.
National Dam Safety Program
The National Dam Safety Program Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-303)
created the first national program that focused on improving the safety
of the Nation's dams. Congress reauthorized the program through the Dam
Safety and Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-310) and made modest
increases in the authorized funds. This small, yet critical program
provides much needed assistance to the state dam safety programs in the
form of grant assistance, training and research; and through
facilitating the exchange of technical information between Federal dam
safety partners and the states. The program provides $6 million in
grant assistance to states based on the relative number of dams in each
state. The grants may be utilized to best suit the individual state's
needs. In addition, the National Dam Safety Program provides $500,000
each year to be used for training of state dam safety engineers and
$1.5 million annually for research. These research funds are used to
identify more effective methods of evaluating the safety of dams and
more efficient techniques to repair dams. And now, these research funds
can be used to develop better methods to assess and improve the
security of dams.
There are over 79,000 dams in the United States, but the
responsibility of assuring their safety falls on the shoulders of the
states, as they regulate 95 percent of the country's dams. Because of
limited staff and limited funding, most states are overwhelmed by that
challenge. Table 1 attached to this testimony provides state-by-state
data on the number of dams, the number of staff, the state budget and
the number of dams that are considered ``unsafe.'' Unsafe means that
they have identified deficiencies that make the dam more susceptible to
failure, which may be triggered by a large storm event, an earthquake
or simply through inadequate maintenance. Currently states have
identified over 3,300 dams as being deficient, or unsafe. In Kentucky
the state lists 88 unsafe dams including 36 that are classified as high
hazard potential. In Pennsylvania there are 531 unsafe dams and 98 of
these are classified as high hazard potential.
There are over 10,000 dams classified as high hazard potential
meaning that the consequences of the dam's failure will likely include
loss of human life and significant downstream property damage. Every
member of this Subcommittee has high hazard dams in their home state.
There are 217 high hazard potential dams in Kentucky, 861 high hazard
potential dams in Texas and 1,027 high hazard potential dams in North
Carolina. According to the National Inventory of Dams more than 53
percent of the high hazard potential dams have not been inspected in
the last ten years. High hazard potential dams should be inspected
every year.
The task for state dam safety programs is staggering; in Iowa where
there are over 3,300 dams there are only 1.25 full time employees
assigned to the dam safety program. Texas has over 8,000 dams with only
5 engineers in their dam safety program; and Minnesota, which has
almost 1,000 dams, only has a staff of 2.1 full time employees
The American Society of Civil Engineers' 2003 Progress Report for
America's Infrastructure listed a downward trend line indicating that
the condition of the Nation's dams continues to decline. The dams
across the United States are aging as 85 percent of the dams will be 50
years or older by the year 2020.
Downstream development within the dam failure flood zone places
more people at risk. When homes are built in the dam failure flood zone
below a low hazard dam, (low hazard: failure is not expected to cause
loss of life or significant property damage) the dam no longer meets
dam safety criteria as the potential consequences of a failure now
include loss of life.
Federal Leadership Role
There is a clear need for continued Federal leadership to provide
assistance in support of dam safety. This country suffered several
large and tragic dam failures in the 1970s that focused attention on
dams and prompted Congress to pass national dam safety legislation. In
1972, the Buffalo Creek Dam in West Virginia failed and killed 125
individuals; in 1976 the Teton Dam failure in Idaho caused $1 billion
in damages and 14 deaths; the Kelly Barnes Dam in Toccao Falls, Georgia
failed in 1977 killing 39 Bible college students; also in 1977 40
people died from the failure of the Laurel Run Dam in Pennsylvania; and
in 1996 the 38 foot tall Meadow Pond Dam in Alton, New Hampshire failed
killing one woman and causing $8 million in damage.
However, the recent failure of the Silver Lake Dam in Michigan in
May 2003 again demonstrated the enormous potential damages that dam
failures can produce. This dam failure caused more than $100 million in
damages including $10 million in damages to utilities, $4 million to
the environment, $3 million to roads and bridges and flooded 20 homes
and businesses. In addition, the Silver Lake Dam failure flooded a
major power plant, which in turn caused the closure of two iron mines,
putting 1,100 miners temporarily out of work.
Just last month on March 12, 2004, the Big Bay Lake Dam in
Mississippi failed destroying 48 homes, damaging 53 homes, 2 churches,
three businesses and a fire station and washing out a bridge. This dam,
which cost $2.5 million to construct, has caused many millions in
damages, will require downstream homeowners and businesses to rebuild,
caused significant loss of property values around the lake and has
resulted in $100 million lawsuit filed against the dam owner on behalf
of the homeowners.
Dam failures do not respect state boundaries, as a dam failure in
one state may cause loss of life and property damage in an adjacent
state. The Federal Government funds the recovery costs from the
President's disaster relief fund and through the Flood Insurance
Program, but the cost of one small dam failure can easily exceed the
annual costs of the National Dam Safety Program. Full funding of the
National Dam Safety Program is an investment in public safety that will
be repaid many times over in fewer dam failures, reduced Federal
expenditures for dam failure recovery and, most importantly, fewer
lives lost.
Benefits of the National Dam Safety Program
The National Dam Safety Program has been very successful in
assisting the state programs. The training program is created is one
aspect of this success ($500,000). This training provides access to
technical courses and workshops that states engineers could not
otherwise attend. Examples include Dambreak Analysis, Concrete
Rehabilitation of Dams, Slope Stability of Dams, Earthquake Analysis,
Emergency Action Planning and many others including recent training in
Dam Site Security. Training courses are also offered through FEMA's
training facility at their Emergency Management Institute in Maryland
where state dam safety inspectors receive training at no cost to the
states.
The Research Program is an important program to all within the dam
safety community. Its funds have been used to identify future research
needs such as inspections using ground penetrating radar or risk
analysis. In addition, these funds have been used to create a national
library and database of dam failures and dam statistics at the National
Performance of Dams Program at Stanford University as well as a
national clearinghouse and library of dam safety bibliographic data at
ASDSO.
Research funds are currently being used to provide security
training, security assessment tools and best management practices for
states to utilize in addressing potential terrorists actions against
the 75,000 non-Federal dams. The small increase ($500,000) in the
funding levels authorized by the 2002 act was intended to address dam
site security. Dam site security is now an urgent area of concern for
state dam safety officials both in training needs and in research to
better understand and respond to potential threats to dams.
The most valuable benefit to the state programs comes from the
State Grant Assistance Program. The grants are based on the number of
dams in each of the participating states and are used as an incentive
to encourage states to improve their program by meeting basic criteria
such as:
--State statutory authority to conduct inspections of dams;
--State authority to require repairs to unsafe dams; or
--State policies that address dam site security at non-Federal dams.
Use of these grants is left up to the state's discretion as each
state has its own unique challenges. States have utilized grant funds
to perform dam failure and dam stability analyses, to hire additional
staff to conduct inspections and to conduct owner education workshops.
In addition, grant funds have enabled states to provide additional
staff training, and to purchase equipment such as computers, field
survey equipment and software, and remote operated cameras for internal
inspections.
As we begin to realize the benefits of the grant assistance
program, dam safety inspections have increased and so has the number of
Emergency Action Plans, used to notify and evacuate downstream
populations in the event of a failure, it is disappointing to see that
appropriations over the past 2 years are well below the authorized
levels. They have remained at the previous level of $5.9 million.
Despite the increase in funding approved by Congress in the Dam Safety
and Security Act of 2002 to $8.6 million, the states have not realized
any increase in assistance. Moreover, budget reductions at have further
reduced the state grant assistance funds by almost 22 percent.
Table 2, attached to this testimony, provides information on the
amount of state grant assistance received for each state, the potential
grant funding if fully funded at authorized levels and the grant amount
each state will lose as a result of the reduced funding. The lost
grants come at a difficult time when development below dams creates
more high hazard potential dams, dams continue to age and, now,
security issues must be addressed by the states.
Dam Security of Non-Federal Dams
The horrific events of September 11, 2001 have focused
unprecedented attention on the security of our Nation's critical
infrastructure, including dams. Dams, in fact, have been identified by
intelligence and law enforcement agencies in specific threat alerts.
Federal agencies that own dams, such as the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation, have been conducting
vulnerability assessments and security improvements on these Federally
owned dams. However, little has been provided by the Federal Government
in leadership or assistance to the states who have similar and equally
urgent dam security demands.
Security experts advise that it is very difficult to make a site
completely safe from intentional acts of terror. They offer that their
goal is to enhance security and effectively deter a potential attack at
a site so that the terrorist will seek another site with less security.
The improved security at federally owned dams makes non-Federal dams
more attractive targets. There are clearly thousands of non-Federal
dams that are potential targets based on type of construction, size,
purpose (water supply, hydro power, flood control); and on the
population and infrastructure at risk below the dam. Federal leadership
is urgently needed to provide technical and financial assistance to
states for training, for conducting vulnerability assessments and for
identifying and implementing security improvements on dams determined
to have an inadequate security program.
Conclusion
Dams are a vital part of our aging national infrastructure that
provide many vital benefits, but that also pose a threat to life and
property if they fail. The National Dam Safety Program is a valuable
program that offers assistance to states as an investment in public
safety. One dam failure alone, as evidenced by the Silver Lake Dam
failure in 2003, can easily exceed the $8.6 million authorized for this
program. The National Dam Safety Program, administered by FEMA, is a
modest and prudent investment protecting public safety.
Therefore, the Association of State Dam Safety Officials
respectfully requests that this Subcommittee increase the
Administration's proposed funding for the National Dam Safety Program
from $5.9 million to the full authorized level of $8.6 million; and
further earmark these funds to be used only for the National Dam Safety
Program in the Department of Homeland Security.
Thank you Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee for this
opportunity offer this testimony. The Association looks forward to
working with you and the Subcommittee staff on this important issue of
safe dams.
TABLE 1.--ASSOCIATION OF STATE DAM SAFETY OFFICIALS--STATE-BY-STATE STATISTICS ON DAMS AND STATE SAFETY REGULATION--2004
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Dams in Dams Under State Regulation State-Determined Deficient Dams \3\ State Dam Safety State Staff Dedicated to Dam
National \2\ ------------------------------------------------ Budget ( thousand) ----------------------------------
(2002 NID) Total HH Total HH SH Total FTEs Dams Per FTE
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alabama \4\................................ 2,102 0 171 NA .............. .............. $0 0 NA
Alaska..................................... 104 82 16 NR .............. .............. 105.5 1 82
Arizona.................................... 328 251 85 58 44 14 570.0 8 31
Arkansas................................... 1,225 407 102 24 22 1 331.0 4.6 88
California................................. 1,471 1,225 335 57 2 26 7,800.0 61 20
Colorado................................... 1,684 1,879 327 220 35 52 1,400.0 12 157
Connecticut \4\............................ 720 2,000 236 12 NR NR 472.0 4.3 465
Delaware \4\............................... 61 98 9 NR .............. .............. NR NR NR
Florida.................................... 724 \4\ 778 \4\ 100 >20 NR NR NR NR NR
Georgia \4\................................ 4,470 3,412 399 105 NR NR 682.0 10 341
Hawaii \4\................................. 122 129 56 0 0 0 135.0 2 65
Idaho \4\.................................. 393 439 106 NR .............. .............. 350.0 7.5 59
Illinois................................... 1,456 1,326 173 >22 13 9 345.0 5.5 241
Indiana.................................... 1,069 1,129 238 NR .............. .............. 340.0 5 226
Iowa....................................... 3,249 3,303 74 16 8 7 55.0 1.25 2,642
Kansas..................................... 5,634 5,890 192 23 13 10 271.0 7.58 777
Kentucky................................... 1,051 1,002 175 88 36 35 1,600.0 14 72
Louisiana.................................. 357 465 13 17 1 3 NR 9 52
Maine...................................... 641 843 \4\ 26 68 7 35 \4\ 46.0 1.5 562
Maryland................................... 291 355 63 10 1 5 416.6 5.5 65
Massachusetts.............................. 1,490 2,917 333 40 22 18 500.0 4 729
Michigan................................... 943 1,039 80 18 3 7 NR 4.8 216
Minnesota.................................. 986 1,442 40 250 2 20 250.0 2.1 687
Mississippi................................ 3,315 3,594 282 NR .............. .............. 137.8 4.5 799
Missouri................................... 4,854 640 445 15 11 4 192.9 4 160
Montana.................................... 2,885 2,874 101 >11 11 NR 330.0 5.25 547
Nebraska................................... 2,179 2,173 113 130 7 48 289.0 5.67 383
Nevada..................................... 469 599 128 >29 5 4 NR 2.25 266
New Hampshire.............................. 645 838 86 590 63 159 612.0 7 120
New Jersey................................. 792 1,680 194 567 50 317 1,251.0 18 93
New Mexico................................. 375 390 156 61 38 14 450.0 6 65
New York \4\............................... 1964 5,021 380 >54 NR NR 746.0 6.3 797
North Carolina............................. 2723 4,638 1,027 >61 NR NR 902.0 17 273
North Dakota............................... 685 1,758 20 19 5 11 200.0 4.5 391
Ohio....................................... 1,325 1,727 462 NR .............. .............. 1,020.0 11 157
Oklahoma................................... 4,610 4,485 184 5 3 1 185.0 1.8 2,492
Oregon \4\................................. 820 3,733 122 0 0 0 255.0 3.1 1,204
Pennsylvania............................... 1,442 3,044 770 531 98 23 2,039.0 24 127
Puerto Rico................................ 34 36 34 0 0 0 600.0 8 5
Rhode Island............................... 185 565 16 0 0 0 99.6 1.2 471
South Carolina............................. 2,447 2,312 153 3 NR NR NR 4.5 514
South Dakota............................... 2,377 2,328 47 >3 3 NR NR 2.5 931
Tennessee.................................. 1,051 638 148 5 3 1 275.0 7 91
Texas...................................... 7,025 8,133 861 NR .............. .............. 300.0 5 1,627
Utah....................................... 752 649 192 82 82 NR 460.0 7 93
Vermont.................................... 354 538 55 NR .............. .............. 215.0 2.2 245
Virginia................................... 1,586 521 112 54 31 13 475.6 7 74
Washington................................. 832 933 135 32 13 14 550.0 6.5 144
West Virginia.............................. 543 362 266 38 35 3 454.5 6 60
Wisconsin.................................. 1,097 3,748 243 NR .............. .............. 487.0 6.25 600
Wyoming.................................... 1,335 1,374 76 3 0 1 142.1 5.09 270
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL................................ 79,272 89,742 10,157 >3,341 645 837 28,337.6 359.24 20,576
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Includes dams of any size that are likely to pose a significant threat to human life or property in case of failure, and all other Federal and non-Federal dams > 25 high that impound > 15
acre feet; and dams > 6 high that impound > 50 acre-feet.
\2\ Estimated number of all dams under state regulatory control.
\3\ Dams with identified deficiencies by state definition (varies state to state) derived from state inventory in column 2.
\4\ 2003 data
NR-Not Reporting. Some states do not keep data on these categories.
Prepared Statement of the Association of State Floodplain Managers,
Inc.
The Association of State Floodplain Managers, Inc. (ASFPM) is
pleased to share comments on four specific aspects of the fiscal year
2005 budget proposal for the Department of Homeland Security, Emergency
Preparedness and Response Directorate (FEMA):
--Restoration of 15 percent formula for Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program funding;
--Protection of NFIP funds from transfer for other purposes;
--Support for continued funding for modernization of flood maps;
--Urge increase in NFIP Community Assistance Program funds for state
technical assistance;
--Urge appropriation of funds to address the NFIP's repetitive loss
problem, given imminently pending authorizing legislation; and
--Continue to retain a separate account for the Flood Mitigation
Assistance Program.
--Monitor how the Department of Homeland Security addresses natural
hazards and mitigation.
The Association of State Floodplain Managers, Inc. and its 19 state
chapters represent over 6,500 State, local, and private sector
officials as well as other professionals who are engaged in all aspects
of floodplain management and hazard mitigation. All are concerned with
reducing our Nation's flood-related losses and reducing the costs of
flooding.
RESTORATION OF 15 PERCENT FORMULA FOR HAZARD MITIGATION GRANT PROGRAM
ASFPM urges restoration of the 15 percent formula used to determine
amounts made available post-disaster for the Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program (HMGP) authorized by the Stafford Act as Section 404. States
across the country have evidence that the most effective time to garner
support for mitigation projects is in the aftermath of disasters. While
mitigation planning is a vital activity to identify hazards and
potential risks, only actual damaging events generate significant
public interest and State and local financial support. The fact is that
most cities, counties and towns across the country have many immediate
and pressing financial needs. Regardless of the statistical evidence of
the likelihood of future disaster occurrence, communities will not
place mitigation higher than today's demands for education, social
programs, local first responders, and the like. This is especially true
in smaller communities where financial resources are always tight.
On the proverbial ``sunny day,'' flooding is a low priority for the
millions of homeowners and business owners in the Nation's flood hazard
areas--regardless of the mounting evidence that future floods will
occur. Homeowners and business owners view offers for buyouts,
elevations, and retrofit floodproofing very differently when they are
shoveling mud, coping with toxic mold, or faced with collapsed
foundations. Restoring HMGP to the 15 percent formula will provide
resources to those who have just experienced damage and are most
receptive to change.
Pre-disaster funding should be directed to community-based planning
in order to prepare communities to undertake mitigation projects when
the disaster strikes. It would also be reasonable to make pre-disaster
mitigation funds available to support public projects that address at-
risk State and community buildings and public infrastructure--among the
more costly categories of public disaster assistance. These projects,
which do not require direct and voluntary participation of property
owners, can readily be designed and implemented in the pre-disaster
context and provide broad public benefits.
--ASFPM urges the Subcommittee to restore the Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program formula to 15 percent of certain Federal disaster
expenditures. The Disaster Mitigation Assistance Act of 2000
calls for communities to have pre-disaster local mitigation
plans in order to access HMGP. One result of this requirement
is that communities will be better prepared to identify
eligible activities after the next declared disaster, thus
further shortening the time needed to obligate and expend the
HMGP funds.
--ASFPM recommends that the Subcommittee fully investigate the
implications of the nationwide pre-disaster program funded in
fiscal year 2003. Initiated in 2002 as a pilot program, the
pre-disaster mitigation program was not, as originally
intended, evaluated prior to authorization of PDM in the
Disaster Mitigation Action of 2000. Particular attention should
be paid to citizen, community and State receptivity to
mitigation offers and how the ability to provide the non-
Federal cost share differs in the pre- and post-disaster
periods. Another critical aspect to attend to is whether and
how FEMA balanced different hazards, different geographic
areas, and communities of different sizes and capabilities.
protect nfip funds from transfer for other purposes
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) collects premiums and
policy service fees from just 4.4 million flood insurance
policyholders. These funds are authorized for specific purposes
directly related to administration of the NFIP. Certain Federal
employees are supported by these funds, as are such activities as the
Flood Mitigation Assistance grant program, grants to States to provide
technical assistance to local governments, and flood mapping. Because
these funds are not general taxpayer funds, it is vital that they are
used only for the specific purposes for which they are collected.
--ASFPM urges the Subcommittee to require DHS to disclose funds
collected from NFIP policyholders that have been transferred
for other purposes. We further urge the Subcommittee to
prohibit the transfer of NFIP funds, and funds authorized and
appropriated for the Map Modernization Initiative, for other
purposes by DHS.
--ASFPM urges the Subcommittee to require DHS to report on the use of
certain NFIP funds to support Federal employees, specifically,
the number of such positions, where they are located, how many
are vacant and for what period of time, and how those specific
positions directly support the NFIP.
CONTINUE SUPPORT FOR FLOOD MAP MODERNIZATION
Good flood maps play a major role in disaster cost reduction
through wise floodplain management and are use for many purposes beyond
the immediate needs of the National Flood Insurance Program. FEMA
estimates that local regulation of flood hazard areas, using the flood
maps, avoids property losses of over $1 billion each year. FEMA's
estimate does not count the benefits associated with using the maps to
guide development to less hazard-prone areas. Flood maps yield benefits
at all levels of government, including reducing the need for Federal
disaster assistance when people build elsewhere or build to minimize
damage.
Initiated with the fiscal year 2003 appropriation of $200 million
for the multi-year Flood Map Modernization effort, FEMA and States will
use current technologies to expedite cost-effective collection of
mapping data and to develop the models to identify flood-prone areas.
This will yield digitized map products that will be accessible on the
Internet and reduce future costs associated with ongoing map revisions
and updates.
--ASFPM strongly endorses the Administration's request for $200
million and urges the Subcommittee to request that FEMA report
on technical partnerships that are forming with States and
communities, incentives offered to foster those partnerships,
and to revisit the time and cost estimates for completion of
the initiative.
--ASFPM urges the Subcommittee to express its expectation that FEMA
will address State-identified priorities and that quality data
and quality maps are the objective--rather than focus only on
the quantity or the average age of maps. High quality products
also serve as incentives and justification for investment of
State and local funds.
INCREASE NFIP COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FUNDS FOR STATE TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE
The Community Assistance Program (CAP), funded by 4.4 million NFIP
flood insurance policyholders, provides small, cost-shared grants that
provide partial support of State floodplain programs that, in turn,
provide technical assistance to nearly 20,000 local jurisdictions that
administer the NFIP's minimum floodplain management regulations. CAP is
critical because the best way to limit increases in future flood damage
is to build State capability to work with and train local officials to
ensure that developers comply with the rules and post-flood recovery is
undertaken properly. FEMA's staff is too small to provide this vital
assistance to nearly every community in the country, thus the
partnership with States was established. In 1995, CAP was funded at
$4.2 million which, even then, was insufficient to establish adequate
capacity in every State.
Currently, CAP stands at $7 million. Although the increased funding
has improved state capacity and capability to meet the demand, the
increased workload of state floodplain management offices has far
outstripped the increased funding. The increased state workload is due
to the following factors: more demand for technical assistance and
training of local officials; nationwide emphasis on pre- and post-
disaster planning and coordination; more communities participating in
the NFIP; significant increases in the number of properties insured by
the NFIP; and decreases in FEMA staff, which shifts even more
programmatic responsibilities to the States. Importantly, the FEMA Map
Modernization program is generating extreme demands for assistance and
coordination (implementation is expected to last at least 7 years). It
is reasonable to predict that Map Modernization program alone will
necessitate at least one additional full time employee in each State
floodplain management office, which would require approximately $3.75
million.
--ASFPM urges increasing CAP funding to $10 million in order to
increase the technical assistance and training the states
provide to the 20,000 communities in the NFIP as FEMA's
partners, and to successfully implement the Map Modernization
Program.
EXPECT AUTHORIZATION TO ADDRESS THE NFIP'S REPETITIVE LOSS PROBLEM
The National Flood Insurance Program's authorization is due to
expire on June 30, 2004. On November 20, 2003, the House of
Representatives passed the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2003 (HR 253)
and the Senate Subcommittee on Economic Policy recently marked up the
companion bill (S. 2238). FEMA has characterized the disproportionate
amount of claims paid on a very small percentage of NFIP-insured
properties as the most significant factor that drives increases in the
cost of flood insurance. Having more flood-prone homes and businesses
insured by the NFIP is an effective way to reduce the Federal burden of
disaster assistance.
Both the House and Senate bills authorize augmentation of the
existing Flood Mitigation Assistance grant programs to focus on
repetitive loss problem, and both bills authorize the transfer of funds
from the National Flood Insurance Fund (generated by premium and fee
income). The Flood Mitigation Assistance program is mature, with
virtually all states currently active to some degree, therefore new
funds can be used immediately. Because the NFIP must be reauthorized
and extended before June 30, 2004, action on the bills is expected
before work on appropriations is completed.
--ASFPM requests that the Subcommittee monitor progress on the Flood
Insurance Reform Act of 2004. If the S. 2238 passes prior to
final action on the fiscal year 2005 budget, ASFPM urges the
Subcommittee to include in the fiscal year 2005 budget the
authorized transfer of funds from the National Flood Insurance
Fund to the National Flood Mitigation Fund.
--Continue to Retain A Separate Account for the Flood Mitigation
Assistance Program
The ASFPM appreciates direction in the fiscal year 2004
appropriations that FEMA maintain the Flood Mitigation Assistance
Program (FMA) funds separate from other mitigation funds. FMA was
authorized by the National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994, which
also created the National Flood Mitigation Fund as a separate account.
FMA is not supported with general funds, but is funded entirely by a
portion of the service fee collected from the 4.4 million flood
insurance policies. Therefore, the ASFPM is concerned with the
Administration's proposal to combine FMA funds with other mitigation
funds, even to achieve accounting efficiencies. To ensure
accountability to the policyholders and to ensure that these funds are
used only for the explicit purposes authorized, the FMA funds are best
kept separate. In particular, how FMA is administered must not be
changed. FMA is specifically intended to support cost containment for
the NFIP, in part by addressing the problem characterized as repetitive
losses, but also to mitigate against severe flood damage and imminent
threats due to coastal erosion.
--ASFPM urges the Subcommittee to clarify--again--that Flood
Mitigation Assistance Program funds in the National Flood
Mitigation Fund are not to be co-mingled with pre-disaster
mitigation funds.
MONITOR HOW THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY ADDRESSES NATURAL
HAZARDS AND MITIGATION
Millions of Americans are at risk--every day--of experiencing
floods, tornados, earthquakes, hurricanes, wildfires, severe winter
storms, and other natural hazards. From a broad perspective, ASFPM is
disturbed that the Department of Homeland Security has deliberately
diminished focus on natural hazards. Despite continued verbal
assertions of commitment to FEMA's all-hazards mission, DHS has reduced
cohesiveness of programs and reduced staff who deal with hazards and
mitigation. The following are specific concerns: transferring FEMA
funds to areas of DHS that are not under the jurisdiction of the Under
Secretary for Emergency Preparedness & Response; detailing FEMA staff
out of that directorate; and reducing support for the vital network of
State and local public safety and disaster mitigation officials.
--ASFPM urges the Subcommittee to monitor DHS proposals and actions
that affect FEMA programs and staff to prevent unwise and
unnecessary reduction in FEMA's effectiveness, which in turn
will jeopardize State and local efforts to deal with natural
hazards and mitigation.
______
Prepared Statement of the International Association of Emergency
Managers
Chairman Cochran, Ranking Member Byrd, and distinguished members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to provide a statement
for the record regarding the fiscal year 2005 budget proposal for the
Department of Homeland Security.
My name is Daryl Lee Spiewak, and I am the emergency programs
manager for the Brazos River Authority in Waco, Texas. I am a certified
emergency manager, a certified Texas emergency manager, and a Texas
certified floodplain manager. I currently serve as the President of the
International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM). Our over 2,000
members include emergency management professionals at the State and
local government levels, the military, private business and the
nonprofit sector in the United States and in other countries. Most of
our members are city and county emergency managers who perform the
crucial function of coordinating and integrating the efforts at the
local level to prepare for, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and
recover from all types of disasters including terrorist attacks.
We respectfully submit suggestions on two particular issues
relating to the Department of Homeland Security budget for 2005.
Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG)
--Reject administration request to cap at 25 percent amount which can
be used for personnel.
--Request that the funding cut be rejected and the amount increased.
--Request the program retain all hazards emphasis, including
terrorism.
--Urge that funding be specifically designated in the Appropriations
Bill and maintained as a separate account.
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP)
--Urge the Committee to return the funding level to 15 percent of
certain eligible disaster costs.
In addition, we would like to offer our support for the
Administration's request for $200 million to continue the Map
Modernization program and for the $150 million request to continue the
PreDisaster Mitigation program.
Emergency Management Performance Grants
The Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG) are pass-through
funds to State and local emergency management offices to provide a
foundation for basic emergency preparedness and response capabilities.
Congressional report language has referred to the program as ``the
backbone of the Nation's emergency management system.'' This funding
has existed in the past under several different names such as the
Emergency Management Assistance Program and State and Local Assistance
Program which were actually more appropriate names. This program is
different from most grants, in that it is a continuing program with
deliverables and requirements which must be met in order to receive
funding the following year.
We very much appreciated the support of the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees for EMPG in the fiscal year 2004 Department
of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill. Congress specifically
designated funds in a separate account, increased the amount from the
fiscal year 2002 level to $179 million; specifically indicated the
funds could continue to be used for personnel costs and supported the
all hazards approach. The House Report recognized that ``State and
local emergency managers rely on these funds for a variety of expenses,
but predominately for personnel who plan, train, coordinate, and
conduct exercises and other functions essential to effective
preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery efforts.''
Reject Cap on Expenditures for Personnel.--Since the purpose of the
program is to provide support for State and local emergency management
personnel, the Administration's request to cap the amount of funds
which can be used for personnel at 25 percent of each grant is
puzzling. Since the functions of emergency management are almost 100
percent personnel driven, such as planning, coordinating, exercise
design, training, and public education, the effect of the 25 percent
cap would be devastating. States have estimated that this cap would
result in potential losses of up to 60 percent of their emergency
management staff. In some localities it would result in the elimination
of whole programs. We would be cutting capacity at the very time we
need to be building capacity.
Perhaps to put this proposed cap in perspective one could consider
the effect on the functioning of a Congressional office or a
Congressional Committee if directions were given to only spend 25
percent of the funds received for running the offices on personnel and
administrative costs.
Reject Funding Cut and Increase Funding.--Historically, funding for
EMPG has been inadequate. The program was intended to be 50 percent
Federal and 50 percent State or local funding. Currently many
jurisdictions receive 20 percent or less. Some jurisdictions do not
receive any EMPG monies due to inadequate funding levels. State and
local emergency management programs are in desperate need of financial
support if they are to continue to meet the requirements of all hazard
planning and coordination as well as implement the President's homeland
security strategy in States, counties, cities and neighborhoods across
America. The new security concerns arising from the current world
situation make the coordination and unifying role served by emergency
managers more important than ever. Given continued support and funding,
emergency managers have the skills, the expertise, and the willingness
to rise to the planning and coordinating challenges presented by the
full range of hazards affecting their communities.
We respectfully request that the $9 million reduction in the
President's request be rejected and that the funding be increased. A
2004 study by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA)
indicates that at the 50-50 shared cost level there is a $245 million
shortfall.
Maintain the All Hazards Approach.--Legislative language is
included in the Administration's 2005 request giving ``priority to
homeland security activities.'' The simple fact is that almost all
emergency management activity creates a generic capacity to deal with
crises. For nearly 50 years, the Federal Government has provided
funding assistance to State and local governments to support a
comprehensive national emergency management system. During that time,
the Federal emphasis has shifted on numerous occasions and our members
have adjusted programs accordingly. There is no doubt that ``homeland
security'' (currently, although we believe, incorrectly, defined as
terrorism) has priority today, but the proposed language certainly has
the potential to limit the ability of the emergency management system
to adjust to changes in the future and is therefore problematic.
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
Restore Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) to 15 percent. The
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program in the Emergency Preparedness and
Response Directorate provides post disaster mitigation funding. The
program is authorized in Section 404 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Public Law 93-288) and the monies
are provided from the President's Disaster Relief Fund. We appreciate
the House and Senate Appropriations Committees retaining the program
rather than terminating it as requested in the Administration's Budget
requests in fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004. However, the fiscal
year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations bill changed the formula used to
determine hazard mitigation funding from 15 percent to 7.5 percent of
eligible disaster costs. In order to reduce future disaster costs,
commitments must be made to both pre-disaster and post disaster
mitigation. Citizens and elected officials are most receptive to
undertaking projects and initiatives that reduce the impacts of future
disasters immediately after a disaster has occurred. Without the HMGP
funding, those opportunities will be missed.
The House unanimously passed H.R. 3181 in November of 2003 which
would have restored the funding to 15 percent. This bill is pending in
the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee and at this time it
is not known if action will be completed given the limited time left in
this legislative session. We, therefore, urge that the HMGP program be
restored to 15 percent.
Flood map Modernization and PreDisaster Mitigation
IAEM supports the Administration's request for $200 million for
flood map modernization. Flood maps play a key role in disaster
reduction, mitigation, and community planning and development
activities. Many of the flood maps in place are 15 to 30 years old and
do not reflect recent development and may contain inaccurate
information about the floodplains as a result. FEMA estimated the cost
of a multi-year map modernization plan at $750 million over a 7-year
period. We support this multi-year effort.
IAEM supports the Administration's request for $150 million for
predisaster mitigation. We believe that both predisaster and post
disaster funds are important for reducing future disaster costs. We
support administrative funds being available to FEMA to administer the
program and urge that FEMA review and streamline the application
process.
Thank you for giving us the opportunity to provide this testimony.
We would welcome the opportunity to provide additional information to
the Subcommittee.
______
Prepared Statement of the National Emergency Management Association
Introduction
Thank you Chairman Cochran, Ranking Member Byrd, and distinguished
members of the Committee for allowing me the opportunity to provide you
with a statement for the record on the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) fiscal year 2005 budget. I am Edward F. Jacoby, Jr., President of
the National Emergency Management Association and Director of the New
York State Emergency Management Office. In my statement, I am
representing the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA),
whose members are the state emergency management directors in the 50
States and the U.S. territories. NEMA's members are responsible to
their governors for emergency preparedness, homeland security,
mitigation, response, and recovery activities for natural, man-made,
and terrorist caused disasters.
At this time, the Department of Homeland Security has been in place
for over a year and the state of emergency management in our Nation is
of grave concern. Each day, State and local governments are responding
to natural and man-made disasters, the threat of terrorism remains
elevated while fortunately, actual terrorism incidents remain sporadic
on U.S. soil. The multi-hazards emergency system continues to be the
means to practice and exercise for devastating acts of terrorism, while
at the same time preparing the Nation for hurricanes, tornadoes,
hazardous materials spills, and floods. Yet, all-hazards preparedness
may be a thing of the past as more focus is being placed on terrorism.
We must ensure that our capability to deal with many hazards, including
terrorism remains intact and that we do not shift our focus to
preparedness for a single peril.
The capability to coordinate an effective response to an event does
not change by the type of disaster. The all-hazards approach relies
upon the maintenance of plans, trained personnel to carry them out, and
supporting infrastructure in the form of emergency operations
facilities with inter-operable communications. We must continue this
approach in practicing and exercising for devastating acts of
terrorism, as well as day-to-day emergencies. We cannot afford to lose
the system we have in place to deal with all disasters in order to
build new infrastructure for homeland security's sake.
The Department of Homeland Security budget provides critical
support to State and local emergency management programs through actual
dollars, grants, and program support. This year, NEMA would like to
address three main issues with the proposed Federal budget for
Department of Homeland Security.
--Extreme concern for the 25 percent cap on personnel use and the cut
to the Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) program;
--Support for continuing and enhancing the Homeland Security Grants,
which must be coordinated and managed through the States; and
--Concern about the reduced formula for the post-disaster Hazard
Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP).
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING
The Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) is the single
all-hazards emergency preparedness grant program in support of capacity
building at the State and local level. While the State and local
government partnership with the Federal Government to ensure
preparedness dates back to the civil defense era, increased
responsibilities over the last decade have fallen on State and local
governments. With the recent expanded focus on terrorism and the
increased demands of the Federal Government to assist in the National
Strategy for Homeland Security, EMPG is the vital source of funding to
assist State and local governments in ensuring that the infrastructure
is in place to address all of the traditional hazards that threaten
communities--including terrorism.
More than any other intergovernmental program, emergency management
and disaster response are a joint and shared responsibility among all
levels of government. The increase or decrease in resources for one
level has a direct impact on the other partners. For example, a
decrease in the capability of local governments to respond to any
disaster automatically passes the burden of cost and long-term
redevelopment activities to the State, and then to the Federal
Government. Unfortunately, the consequences of such policies are much
more significant in terms of the effects of disasters on our citizens
and communities. The inability to respond to life-threatening
emergencies by the local government cannot be replaced by efforts at
the State and Federal levels. Likewise, the basic elements of
comprehensive emergency preparedness cannot be replaced by narrow
program funding for homeland security efforts.
The President's budget proposal will have a devastating impact on
the Nation's emergency management system at the same time that
responsibilities are increasing for new and emerging hazards. The
proposal decreases funding for the EMPG program by $9 million,
increases the focus on terrorism, and most destructively, the proposal
imposes a 25 percent cap on personnel uses of the EMPG grants. Over the
last 2 years, Congress has affirmed the importance of EMPG in
appropriations bills in language addressing the significance of the
program and increased the levels of funding for the program twice.
Prior to these increases in fiscal year 2003 and 2004, the program had
been straight lined for over a decade. NEMA is appreciative of
Congress' recognition of the EMPG program, but this year we
respectfully ask that Congress not only address the programs
shortfalls, but maintain the EMPG multi-hazard approach and the
program's flexibility to be used for personnel without arbitrary
constraints.
EMPG is the only all-hazards program that State and local
governments can use to build their emergency management capacity. The
grants can be used for personnel, planning, training, exercises,
warning systems, emergency operations centers, public outreach, and
interagency coordination. EMPG is a flexible program that allows State
and local governments to tailor funds to address the specific risks and
needs of their jurisdiction. While it is called a grant, EMPG is really
a cost-share system which ties together the emergency management system
of local, State, and Federal Governments. EMPG's modest Federal
increases in 2003 and 2004 helped the program grow, but the program
continues to be funded at greater levels by State and local
governments. States are continuing to increase their out of pocket
costs in order to ensure there is adequate funding for local programs.
In fact, a 2004 NEMA study found that there is approximately a $245.9
million shortfall in EMPG for all 50 States. This means that many
communities that would like to implement a full-time, professional
emergency management capability cannot do so because of shortfalls in
Federal funding. Further, EMPG is primarily used as a pass-through
program for local governments, so the shortfall affects our smallest
localities that are often those most in need of emergency preparedness
planning.
Changing the focus of the program to terrorism could severely
hamper the ability of State and local government capabilities to
respond to a wide range of events with a higher likelihood of occurring
such as natural disasters, non-traditional disasters like the Columbia
Space Shuttle explosion, Mad Cow disease, West Nile virus, civil
unrest, and hazardous material incidents. An increased homeland
security focus must be viewed as an enhancement to our basic emergency
management capacity. Success in building vigorous and robust
capabilities for homeland security will be sabotaged by taking away the
basic building blocks of the emergency management system. While
terrorism is a major focus at this time, we must balance preparedness
efforts by integrating terrorism as one of the many threats facing our
Nation, rather than the current approach of making all other
preparedness efforts a subset of terrorism. Further, Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 8 States that, ``to the extent permitted by law,
Federal preparedness assistance will be predicated on the adoption of
statewide comprehensive all-hazards preparedness strategies.'' The all-
hazards approach cannot be dismissed based upon the assumption that one
threat is greater and more significant than the other. After all, no
one really has a crystal ball to predict what the next disaster or
emergency may be. However, last year there were no terrorism disaster
declarations and 56 major disaster declarations, 19 emergency
declarations, and 46 fire suppressions declarations. Our system for
day-to-day public safety and homeland security must be mutually
supportive and nimble enough to address any hazard.
The most significant attack on the way that emergency management
functions in this country is the proposal to cap personnel costs for
EMPG at 25 percent. The cap will result in immediate, near-term and
long-term degradations in the Nation's ability to effectively address
emergencies and disasters. Citizens and communities that handled
emergencies locally may no longer be able to do so and the
responsibility and costs will be passed to the next higher level of
government. But the costs will be greater, more frequent, and more
dramatic. A 2003 NEMA survey on EMPG found that 1,565.5 or 42.9 percent
of state level full time positions are supported in part by EMPG funds.
Eighty-three part-time state emergency management personnel are funded
in part or entirely with EMPG funds. At the local level, 2,172 full-
time positions and 1,184 part-time positions are supported by EMPG.
States are reporting to NEMA potential losses of up to 60 percent of
their emergency management personnel should this arbitrary cap be
imposed. A snap-shot of the impact in Mississippi shows that 75 percent
of state emergency management personnel and 95 percent of local
emergency management personnel are funded by the program and both
programs would have to sustain significant cuts under the proposal. In
West Virginia, the cap could cost the State 18 full-time employees from
emergency management and 38 full-time employees in local positions for
emergency management. While the Administration explains that this
measure would allow for more training and exercises, we find it hard to
understand how extra training and exercises could be accomplished with
less man-power. Emergency management personnel, particularly at the
local level, provide the coordination function for all disaster and
emergency response. How can we expect the response to terrorism to be
effective and efficient without proper coordination among responders?
The Federal Government must continue the commitment to ensuring
national security though all-hazard preparedness. Without adequate
numbers of State and local personnel to operate the all-hazards
emergency management system, the infrastructure used to prevent,
prepare for, respond to, and recover from all disasters will collapse.
Congress must affirm the intent of the program and also ensure
predictable funding levels for the program.
HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM
Congress has made significant attempts to ensure that the Homeland
Security Grant Program is streamlined and provides greater flexibility.
We appreciate the attention and funding that the Congress has given to
ensuring emergency responders are adequately prepared for domestic
terrorism threats. Emergency responders are better prepared today to
face the various threats associated with terrorism because of the
Federal commitment to address the war on terrorism that is being played
out in our States, cities, and towns. States continue to take an all-
hazards approach to disaster preparedness as we have integrated our
domestic preparedness efforts into the proven systems we already use
for dealing with both man-made and natural disasters.
Funding Levels
This year, we are concerned about the President's budget proposal
for homeland security that would cut over $600 million in funding that
has been dedicated to improving emergency responder preparedness for
homeland security. The Federal Government must maintain its commitment
to ensure that homeland security preparedness continues and the
Constitutional responsibility to maintain a national defense is not
compromised. Continuity of effort can only be maintained by State and
local governments with adequate Federal support, especially when it
deals with the front line emergency responders. Reductions in funding
will immediately be translated into reductions in prevention,
protection, and preparedness activities. We cannot afford to lose the
strides that we have already made in protecting our country by limiting
funding, where more is still necessary to achieve the objectives in the
National Strategy for Homeland Security. The funding level must be
appropriately increased to address areas where shortfalls exist.
Further, continued or increased funding should not take away from
traditional all-hazards capacity building programs for public safety,
public health, and emergency management.
One Stop Shop for Grants Information
The Congressionally created and appointed Advisory Panel to Assess
Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass
Destruction (known as the Gilmore Commission) initially said a
``Federal focal point and clearinghouse for related preparedness
information and for directing State and local entities to appropriate
Federal agencies is needed,'' in their first report to Congress on
December 15, 1999. NEMA affirmed the notion of a single visible point
of contact and coordination of information for State and local
governments in the August 25, 2000 Resolution on States' Principles for
a National Domestic Preparedness Strategy.
Congressional Legislation to Simplify the Grants Process
As Congress considers legislation to address and reform the
Homeland Security Grants, we ask that you take NEMA's suggestions into
consideration. The suggestions include the following:
--All efforts to increase emergency management capacity must be
coordinated through the states to ensure harmonization with the
state emergency operations plan, ensure equitable distribution
of resources, and to synthesize resources for intra-state and
inter-state mutual aid. Also, the Stafford Act, which governs
the way disaster assistance is allocated, successfully uses
States and Governors as the managers of Federal disaster relief
funds for local governments, which can become overwhelmed and
in need of assistance when disasters occur.
--States understand the need to get funding quickly to the first
responders and have long coordinated statewide and regionally
to ensure adequate state assistance to local governments for
emergency preparedness and response;
--Each State must have a base minimum level of funding to ensure the
capacity to respond to any event. Such capacity is necessary
for homeland security because of the changing nature of the
threat and also because of the importance our emergency system
places on mutual aid to respond to events;
--Traditional emergency management capacity building programs like
EMPG must be continued as separate and distinct from the
homeland security grants programs;
--Duplicative requirements in the grants process must be eliminated
and flexibility in the use of the grants must be enhanced; and
--Federal streamlining is necessary to consolidate the Federal grant
application process for homeland security funds in order to
ensure that funding can be provided faster to first responders.
The current application submission, review, and approval
process is lengthy and should be reviewed for efficiency.
Fiscal Conditions and Match Requirements
Further, because the war on terrorism is a national emergency and
States and local governments continue to be in the toughest fiscal
situations since the deep recession in the early 1980s, we must be wary
of programs that would require significant matches. In fact, for local
governments to meet the match would be even more difficult given their
fiscal constraints. If a significant match is required, the application
of this initiative will only go to those agencies and governments that
can fiscally afford the match and not necessarily where the need is
greatest. If a match is necessary, we would suggest that the match be
non-fiscal or in the form of a deliverable as opposed to soft or hard
dollars. We also recommend continuation of the current match
requirements for Emergency Operations Centers enhancements of 75
percent Federal and 25 percent State and local. Waivers may be a way
for the Federal Government to also address the lack of capital for a
match when State and local governments are experiencing fiscal
distress.
Flexibility for Personnel to Manage the Program
Greater flexibility to use some of the first responder grants for
personnel both at the State and local level to manage the programs is
critical to completing the preparedness mission. As an existing funding
stream, EMPG is used in part to fund State and local staff to manage
critical programs including the homeland security grants. The First
Responder Grants should recognize that personnel are necessary to
manage these programs, particularly when rigid deadlines are set for
obligating millions of dollars and accountability is paramount. State
and local government, emergency management, and responder organizations
are already working at a maximum capacity within existing resources and
need Federal support for more than the purchase of equipment.
Flexibility based on strategic approaches should be the norm, not
single-issue, narrowly focused grants.
Standards and Strategy
NEMA has long supported the development of standards to ensure
interoperability of equipment, communications, and training across
State, regional, and local jurisdictions. In terms of establishing
voluntary minimum standards for the terrorism preparedness programs of
State and local governments, NEMA offers itself as a resource in this
area. Our organization, along with other stakeholder groups such as the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, International Association of
Emergency Managers, National Governors' Association, National
Association of Counties, International Association of Fire Chiefs, and
others, has developed and implemented the Emergency Management
Accreditation Program (EMAP). EMAP is a voluntary standards and
accreditation program for State and local emergency management that is
based on NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) 1,600 ``Standard
for Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Operations''
(an ANSI or American National Standards Institute approved standard)
and FEMA's Capability Assessment of Readiness (CAR). EMAP is currently
conducting baseline capability assessments of all states, some of which
are pursuing accreditation in conjunction with this initial assessment.
The State of Florida and the District of Columbia were granted
accreditation through the program. NEMA suggests that these standards
already being collaboratively developed through EMAP be considered in
the development of minimum standards for training, exercises and
equipment. The EMAP baseline capability assessment process should also
be considered as a model when considering changes or refinements to
other assessment processes conducted by the Department of Homeland
Security.
Further, NEMA has called for a long-term strategy for our Nation's
homeland security that becomes the ``roadmap'' for the future of our
Nation on homeland security. Such an effort must define the ``new
normalcy'' and also address what State and local governments must
accomplish in order to be prepared for a homeland security event. NEMA
sees a role for the Gilmore Commission or a similar body to undertake
the development of such a National Long-Term Strategy for Homeland
Security. Such an effort must include input from State and local
stakeholders.
HAZARD MITIGATION GRANT PROGRAM & PREDISASTER MITIGATION
NEMA supports efforts by the Congress and the Administration to
continue both pre- and post-disaster mitigation activities. The two-
pronged effort can help to address Federal costs towards disasters,
because both programs can help to lower overall disaster costs. NEMA
calls on Congress to reauthorize the predisaster mitigation program
before December 31, 2004 and to also restore the post-disaster Hazard
Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) formula to 15 percent.
Effective February 20, 2003, Congress changed the formula for post-
disaster mitigation grants from 15 percent to 7.5 percent. This change
limits the availability of funds for post-disaster mitigation and
prevents the lessons learned from disasters from being immediately
incorporated into mitigation projects to prevent losses of life and
destruction of property. As a result, State governments no longer can
offer property buy-outs or other mitigation measures to as many
disaster victims. The months immediately following disasters provide
unique opportunities to efficiently incorporate risk reduction measures
in a very cost-effective manner, in many cases lowering the overall
cost of the project by leveraging other funding sources including
insurance settlements. We ask that you restore the formula to 15
percent this year in order to address mitigation needs.
Some of the most vivid examples of projects that were not funded in
fiscal year 2003 because of the formula reduction include HMGP projects
from recent disasters. These properties and projects will remain
vulnerable with continued risk in future disasters. Some of these
include:
--3 acquisitions, 7 elevations, and 7 flood proofing projects for
properties flooded during Hurricane Isabel and Tropical Storm
Henri in Delaware;
--3 outdoor warning siren proposals, one acquisition project for 18
structures, and one stormwater handling system improvement
project as a result of a flood declaration in Kentucky;
--over 88 families who were flood victims remain untouched by post-
disaster mitigation in West Virginia because of the formula
change; and
--over $18.5 million in projects resulting from Hurricane Isabel will
remain unfunded in Maryland as a result of the lack of post-
disaster funds.
The HMGP has proven to be a highly effective tool in steering
communities toward risk reduction measures, in many cases breaking
repetitive loss cycles that have cost other Federal disaster relief
programs multiple times. Cost-benefit analysis is currently a
requirement for predisaster mitigation programs. We must not lose these
opportunities to initiate projects to enhance our communities and
reduce future disaster costs.
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTERS
In fiscal year 2002, $56 million was appropriated to the Federal
Emergency Management Agency to address Emergency Operations Centers
(EOCs) improvements. EOCs are the coordination point for State and
local government in the response and recovery of any disaster or
incident. After September 11, 2001, NEMA's members saw an implicit and
urgent need to upgrade the Nation's emergency infrastructure and to
make it more redundant. After all, the New York City EOC was destroyed
on that very day as it stood within the World Trade Center 7 Complex.
The coordinated response effort of the NY State Emergency Management
Office and the NY Office of Emergency Management was later moved to
Pier 92 in New York City as a temporary EOC. However, losing the NYC
EOC provided a valuable lesson to be learned by all States and
localities on redundancy. The $56 million was allocated to states to
begin the planning process to assess necessary infrastructure and
security improvements and security measures to be taken. Since then no
dedicated Federal funding has been provided for the implementation of
these plans. Many State and local facilities are out of date; do not
have the interoperable technology to coordinate with the Federal
Government or among State and local levels; and lack adequate security
features. Federal assistance is necessary to match State and local
commitments to upgrade their EOCs as an integral part of the Nation's
emergency response system. According to a 2003 NEMA survey, it is
projected more tan $1.6 billion will be needed to construct and
maintain State and local primary and alternate EOCS over the next 2 to
5 years. This includes the costs to consistently upgrade equipment and
software, train personnel, and conduct operations during emergency and
non-emergency situations.
CONCLUSION
As we continue to build national preparedness efforts through the
Department of Homeland Security, we must not forget about the multi-
hazard approach to incident management and the role it plays in
preventing the loss of life and devastation to our communities on a
daily basis. We must be prudent and thoughtful in addressing homeland
security enhancements to our exisiting emergency preparedness and
response system. In this year's appropriations process Congress will
make critical decisions that shape the future of emergency management
in this country. As you begin your consideration, we ask you to
recognize the importance of the EMPG program in building capacity
through people at the State and local level. I thank you for the
opportunity to testify on behalf of NEMA and appreciate your
partnership.
______
Prepared Statement of the National Flood Determination Association
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, The National Flood
Determination Association (NFDA) strongly supports the $200 million
requested in the President's most recent fiscal year 2005 budget for
map modernization. NFDA is a national nonprofit organization comprised
of flood determination companies, their vendors, re-sellers and other
industry associates involved in the making, distributing and reselling
of flood zone determinations.
The flood zone determination industry is a key stakeholder in the
map modernization initiative. By producing flood zone determinations
for the lending industry to assist them with the compliance
requirements of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and the
National Flood Insurance Reform Act, NFDA recognizes accurate flood
maps are an important part of compliance with requirements of the NFIP.
Today, FEMA paper flood maps are the maps of record for compliance, and
the flood zone determination industry is the single largest extensive
user of the maps. In 2001 and 2002, our industry completed 24,507,632
and 30,211,047 flood zone determinations respectively, related to newly
originated loans for the mortgage industry. In addition, we completed
another 5,472,532 and 4,906,743 determinations for the same years for
loans we were tracking on behalf of lenders that were affected by map
revisions.
Map modernization is a positive initiative, not only for the flood
zone determination industry, but for State and local communities as
well. By employing state-of-the-art technology, such as Geographic
Information Systems (GIS) and Geographic Positioning Systems (GPS),
communities can map their flood risk digitally. As a result, the
updated maps will be easier and more cost-efficient to update as
conditions change. In addition, digital flood maps are dynamic visual
tools for State and local officials, land-use planners, private
businesses, environmental protection organizations and emergency
management personnel to recognize and chart areas for future
development and plan for public safety.
NFDA has been given the opportunity to provide feedback on the
current FEMA maps, most of which are greater than 10 years old, in an
effort to improve the quality of the existing maps as well as create
some standards for the new maps to be published. These technical
mapping meetings provide a communication forum that enables the end
users of the maps, FEMA, and its contractors to identify practical
solutions to the daunting challenge of maintaining and enhancing the
accuracy and quality of the FEMA maps.
As a result of the success from the technical mapping meetings,
NFDA strongly encourages map modernization representatives to establish
an advisory committee comprised of stakeholders and FEMA and contractor
representatives as a means of ensuring regular, consistent
communication takes place regarding this initiative. In order for the
new maps to be truly effective, it is critical to emphasize quality
over quantity. The use of new flood studies to develop quality data
rather than re-use of possibly out-of-date data is key to achieving
truly accurate flood maps. Development of consistent mapping standards
for all communities is also important. An advisory committee modeled on
the technical mapping advisory council established for 5 years by the
Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994 would be able to review the metrics
used for establishing standards, as well as make recommendations for
enforcement of those standards in order to create and retain a quality
product.
As strong supporters of FEMA, the National Flood Determination
Association also strongly supports reauthorizing the National Flood
Insurance Program for 3 more years. Multi-year reauthorization is
important to the prevention of a program lapse similar to the one that
occurred in January of 2003 when the NFIP was unauthorized for 13 days.
Additionally, NFDA asks that important programs such as the natural
disaster programs remain within FEMA's jurisdiction. Removing such
programs is a threat to FEMA's effectiveness, and it is important that
FEMA is allowed to maintain its management without interruption.
In closing, our association has been an avid supporter of FEMA and
its map modernization initiative since its inception, and is pleased to
offer our continued support in the future. As a part of that support,
we ask that the Committee appropriate the $200 million requested for
map modernization and reauthorize the NFIP for 3 more years.
______
Prepared Statement of the National Treasury Employees Union
Chairman Cochran, Ranking Member Byrd, distinguished members of the
Subcommittee; I would like to thank the Subcommittee for the
opportunity to comment on the fiscal year 2005 budget for the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and specifically its impact on
the DHS Bureau of Customs and Border Security (CBP).
As President of the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), I
have the honor of leading a union that represents over 13,000 Customs
and Border Protection employees who are stationed at 307 ports-of-entry
across the United States. Customs and Border Protection officers,
canine enforcement officers, and import specialists make up our
Nation's first line of defense in the wars on terrorism and drugs as
well as the facilitation of lawful trade into the United States. In
addition, legacy Customs personnel are responsible for ensuring
compliance with import laws and regulations for over 40 Federal
agencies, as well as stemming the flow of illegal contraband such as
child pornography, illegal arms, weapons of mass destruction and
laundered money.
In 2003, legacy Customs Service employees seized over 2.2 million
pounds of cocaine, heroin, marijuana and other illegal narcotics.
Customs and Border Protection Officers also processed over 412 million
travelers last year, including over 1 million cars and trucks. These
numbers continue to grow annually. Over the last decade trade has
increased by 137 percent. Legacy U.S. Customs Service personnel
facilitate more trade, and interdict more drugs than any other agency
within the Customs and Border Protection Bureau. The legacy Customs
Service collects over $20 billion in revenue on over 26 million entries
involving over $1.2 trillion in international trade every year. The
legacy Customs Service also provides the Federal Government with its
second largest source of revenue. Last year, the legacy Customs Service
deposited over $24.7 billion into the U.S. Treasury.
FISCAL YEAR 2005 BUDGET
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget requests a funding level of
$40.2 billion for the Department of Homeland Security and from that
total $6.2 billion is requested for the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection (CBP). The CBP includes the legacy inspection and border
security personnel of the Customs Service, INS, Border Patrol and
APHIS. The focus of the CBP is security at and in-between ports-of-
entry.
Unfortunately, the President's request for the CBP represents a
token increase from last year's appropriations for all of the agencies
transferred into the CBP. NTEU believes that this recommendation is
simply inadequate to meet the needs of Customs and other border
security personnel, especially in light of their additional homeland
security missions such as the Customs Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism (C-TPAT), the Container Security Initiative (CSI), U.S. VISIT
and the 24-Hour Rule that requires advanced transmission of accurate
cargo manifest information to the CBP.
In addition to annual appropriations, Customs also receives funds
from a user fee account known as the COBRA account. This user fee
account funds all inspectors' and canine enforcement officers' overtime
pay as well as approximately 1,200 Customs positions across the
country. The COBRA account is funded with user fees collected from air
and sea passengers entering the United States (except from the
Caribbean and Mexico), commercial vehicles, commercial vessels/barges
and rail cars. The COBRA fund was recently reauthorized and now will
expire on March 31, 2005. However, the President's fiscal year 2005
budget does not address the future reauthorization of COBRA or the
possible integration of the COBRA fees with other CBP user fees. The
COBRA fund must continue to be reauthorized or Congress must
appropriate additional funds to make up for the loss of the user fees
in the future.
Despite the increased threats of terrorism, the dramatic increases
in trade resulting from NAFTA, and new drug smuggling challenges, CBP
personnel has confronted its rapidly increasing trade workload and
homeland security missions with relatively static staffing levels and
resources. While staffing was increased in last year's supplemental and
fiscal year 2004 appropriations, in the last 10 years, there simply
have not been adequate increases in staffing and resource levels for
inspectional personnel and import specialists to successfully conduct
their missions. The events of September 11 brought attention to the
fact that the Northern border, and especially the Nations' seaports,
and the Southwest border are still in urgent need of additional
personnel and resources.
In fact, Customs' recent internal review of staffing, known as the
Resource Allocation Model or R.A.M., shows that the Customs Service
alone needed over 14,776 new hires just to fulfill its basic mission
and that was before September 11. In addition, in 2001 the Patriot Act
called for a tripling of the number of Northern Border personnel from
the roughly 2,300 personnel who were on the border in the fall of 2001
to 6,900 by the end of 2004, a number that DHS is far short of
reaching. According to the testimony of Commissioner Robert Bonner
before the 9/11 commission on January 28, 2004, the CBP currently has
approximately 3,900 CBP personnel on the northern border.
Traffic volume at U.S. land ports-of-entry has steadily increased
as our shared borders with Mexico and Canada have become more open as a
result of the NAFTA and other trade initiatives. The steady increase of
commercial and non-commercial traffic has led to increased wait times
at many land ports-of-entry, particularly those along the Southwest
border. Wait times along the Southwest border can often extend to 45
minutes or more during peak hours. Such lengthy delays can be both
irritating and costly to businesses and the traveling public.
The lack of resources at ports-of-entry is also a problem along the
Northern Border and at seaports. Port security, largely overlooked in
the Homeland Security Act, must also be a priority of this committee.
The fiscal year 2005 budget provides only $50 million for port security
grants as part of the Transportation Security Administration
appropriation, a reduction of almost $100 million in grant money for
ports from the President's fiscal year 2004 budget. Each year more than
16 million containers arrive in the United States by ship, truck and
rail. In the last 5 years alone, Customs has witnessed a 60 percent
increase in trade entries processed, and this rate is expected to grow
an average of 8 to 10 percent a year. Port security must remain a high
priority for the Department of Homeland Security.
With increased funding for resources, modern technologies, such as
Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems (VACIS), which send gamma rays
through the aluminum walls of shipping containers and vehicles to
enable Customs inspectors to check for illegal drugs or weapons of mass
destruction, as well as decreasing the amount of time shipping
containers are out of the supply chain, could be acquired. Other
technologies, such as portable contraband detectors (a.k.a. Busters),
optical fiber scopes and laser range finders can be invaluable to
Customs personnel protecting our borders from terrorists and illegal
drugs. However, adequate and consistent funding for personnel to
operate these technologies has not been forthcoming. On a daily basis,
CBP officers are being tasked with additional anti-terrorism, trade,
immigration, agriculture and drug smuggling initiatives with little
increase in across the board staffing, leaving many ports of entry with
too few personnel to successfully carry out all of the DHS mission
priorities.
CBP PERSONNEL ISSUES
CBP Personnel Overtime Cap
An aspect of the consolidation of legacy Customs, INS and APHIS
inspectors into a single front-line border security position that needs
to be addressed immediately by this subcommittee is the correction of
the overtime cap language for all CBP employees. When legacy Customs
employees joined together last March to form the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection, the Department and Congressional appropriators
realized the differences in overtime systems between the various border
agencies. Unfortunately, the fiscal year 2004 DHS Appropriations bill
included a provision that, while intending to provide greater
consistency in overtime earnings among the front line CBP workforce,
has instead created additional problems for the CBP workforce, more
specifically, legacy Customs personnel and the new CBP officers.
Specifically, the fiscal year 2004 DHS Appropriations bill states
that all CBP employees are subject to a $30,000 annual overtime cap
(legacy Customs, INS, APHIS, & new CBP officers). However, the fiscal
year 2004 appropriations language does not address COPRA (Customs
Officer Pay Reform Act) overtime earnings for legacy Customs personnel
and new CBP officers. The original language of the COPRA law included a
$25,000 cap. However, for the past several years, the annual
appropriations bills specifically amended COPRA to provide for an
increase to $30,000 as an overtime cap. Unfortunately, this year's
(fiscal year 2004) appropriation does not contain this amendment and
has had the unintended effect of re-instituting a $25,000 cap for only
those employees covered by COPRA (legacy Customs personnel and the new
CBP officers).
Commissioner Bonner is well aware of this problem, as he indicated
in a November 2003 Commissioner's message to all CBP employees stating
that, ``we believe that this disparity was not intentional and we have
begun to take all necessary steps to correct it through the proper
channels. At my direction, the CBP Office of Congressional Affairs is
now working with the Department to address this inconsistency through a
legislative correction.'' NTEU hopes that the Commissioner, working
closely with the members of this subcommittee, can fix this situation
both retroactively for legacy Customs employees this year and
prospectively in the fiscal year 2005 DHS Appropriations bill.
FLETC 6 Day Training Issues
On January 1, 2002, at the request of the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center (FLETC), the legacy U.S. Customs Service implemented a
6-day a week training schedule for all basic training courses for
Customs officers in order to accommodate the higher volume of employees
being sent to FLETC as a result of the events of September 11.
Unfortunately, as a result of the 6-day a week basic training
schedule, the legacy U.S Customs Service, and now the Bureau of Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) have refused to compensate legacy customs
officers and the new CBP officers for their sixth day of basic training
at FLETC. Legacy Customs officers and the new CBP officers receive no
pay, either ``straight time'' or overtime pay for their work on the
sixth day of basic training. While there may be disagreement as to what
overtime system may be appropriate, it is outrageous that these
employees are required to work 1 day a week for no pay at all.
This inequity has become even more egregious for legacy Customs
inspectors due to a recent decision of the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (BICE), that authorized the retroactive payment of
FLSA overtime to legacy immigration inspectors who, like legacy Customs
officers had been assigned to a 6-day workweek while attending their
basic training at FLETC since January 1, 2002. Again, by forcing
hundreds of newly trained legacy Customs inspectors and new CBP
officers to work a sixth day without any compensation while their
legacy INS counterparts receive FLSA overtime is certain to hinder the
esprit-de-corps and development of the Department of Homeland
Security's ``One Face at the Border Initiative'' which has merged the
legacy Customs and INS inspectional workforces into one border security
position within DHS. The committee needs to work closely with DHS and
the CBP bureau to immediately correct this training pay inequity for
legacy Customs employees and the new CBP officers.
One Face at the Border
As the subcommittee is aware, on September 2, 2003, Secretary Tom
Ridge announced the creation of a new CBP officer position and the
``One Face at the Border'' initiative. Under this plan, a new position,
the Customs and Border Protection Officer (CBPO) would combine the
duties of legacy inspectors from Customs, INS and APHIS into a single
front-line border security position at the 307 official ports-of-entry
across the United States.
NTEU believes that combining the border protection responsibilities
that were held by three highly-skilled specialists into a ``super
inspector'' raises some serious concerns. Each of the job
responsibilities from the three legacy inspection agencies is highly
specialized and distinct. By utilizing one employee to perform all
three primary and secondary inspection functions, will the agency lose
the expertise that has made the United States border inspection
personnel second to none?
NTEU believes that the CBP officer position was created with the
assumption that the basic skill sets for legacy Customs and INS
inspectors are similar and NTEU would have to agree with this statement
as far a primary inspection is concerned. However, it is in secondary
inspections where expertise is needed. It is in secondary inspections
where legacy Customs and INS experts ``drill down'' to seek the facts
they have been trained to find.
CBP Officer Training
Prior to the creation of the CBP officer position, legacy Customs
inspectors received 9 to 12 weeks of intensive basic training on
Customs Service rules and regulations alone. Now, the new CBP officer
will receive only 14 weeks of training for all Customs, INS, and APHIS
rules and regulations. Under the new CBP officer training guidelines,
legacy inspectors currently on the border will be transitioning into
the new position in the spring of this year by way of classroom
training, CD-ROM computer teaching and on-the-job training. While the
new training will lead to a broader knowledge of the INS, Customs and
APHIS rules and regulations of entry for passengers and goods entering
the United States, there is a concern as to whether it will provide the
specialized expertise necessary to ensure the successful accomplishment
of the critical missions of the Department of Homeland Security.
Another aspect of the ``One Face at the Border'' initiative that
needs more thorough scrutiny is the lack of details with regard to the
secondary inspection process at ports of entry. Currently, legacy
Customs and INS inspectors are ``cross-trained'' as to the most basic
Customs and INS procedures for entry into the United States for
passengers and goods. However, if a legacy Customs inspector is faced
with a complicated visa entry situation at an airport or land border
primary inspection station they have the ability to send the passenger
to a more intensive secondary inspection where an experienced legacy
INS inspector can make a determination as to the validity of a
particular visa. It is unclear whether experts in visa issues or other
specific Customs and INS border protection matters will continue to be
readily available for secondary inspection. This issue is even more
urgent in light of the fact that on January 5, 2004, DHS rolled out its
new entry/exit visa processing system known as U.S. VISIT. Operating at
115 airports and 14 seaports across the country, and eventually
expanding to the 50 largest land border ports of entry by the end of
2004, U.S. VISIT is currently being manned by only legacy INS
inspectors because legacy Customs inspectors do not have the on the job
experience to thoroughly determine the validity of a particular visa or
passport. NTEU feels strongly that if border initiatives such as U.S.
VISIT are to be successful, specific expertise must be maintained among
the CBP officer ranks as it relates to Customs and INS regulations.
Law Enforcement Officer Status
In addition, legislative action that would help to ensure the
retention of Customs and other CBP personnel could include granting law
enforcement status for legacy Customs Inspectors, Canine Enforcement
Officers and other border security personnel in the CBP. For example,
legacy Customs Service Inspectors and Canine Enforcement Officers
continue to be the Nation's first line of defense against terrorism and
the smuggling of illegal drugs and contraband at our borders and in our
ports. Legacy Customs Service Inspectors have the authority to
apprehend and detain those engaged in terrorism, drug smuggling and
violations of other civil and criminal laws. Canine Enforcement
Officers and Inspectors carry weapons, and at least 3 times a year they
must qualify and maintain proficiency on a firearm range. Yet, they do
not have law enforcement officer status. They are being denied the
benefits given to other Federal employees who they have been working
beside to keep our country safe. Legacy Customs employees face real
dangers on a daily basis, granting them law enforcement officer status
would be an appropriate and long overdue step in recognizing and
retaining the Customs personnel who continue to protect our borders
from terrorism and drugs. There currently is a bill before the House HR
2442, which would grant law enforcement status to CBP personnel.
Representative Filner introduced this bill and it currently has 101
cosponsors. I would ask the members of this subcommittee to cosponsor
this very important legislation.
DHS Proposed Personnel Regulations
As the committee is aware, the Homeland Security Act of 2002
authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of OPM
to develop new human resources (HR) systems for Federal employees in
the Department of Homeland Security in the areas of pay, performance
management, job classification, labor-management relations, and
disciplinary matters. As part of the creation of the new DHS HR system,
a design team composed of DHS managers and employees, HR experts from
DHS and OPM, and representatives from the agency's three largest
unions, including NTEU, were assembled to develop a wide range of HR
options for consideration by Secretary Tom Ridge and OPM Director Kay
Coles James who will develop the new DHS HR system.
To support the effort to create the new DHS personnel system, the
President's fiscal year 2005 budget provides the department with $102.5
million to develop and implement a new performance-based pay system for
DHS personnel including funding for a pay for performance pilot program
within the Coast Guard. NTEU is strongly opposed to the $102.5 million
requested in the President's budget to fund the implementation of this
ill-conceived program and believes that this funding would be better
spent by this committee on additional staffing and equipment to protect
or borders from terrorism.
As a member of the DHS Human Resources Design Team NTEU has always
strongly advocated that in designing pay, classification and
performance management systems for DHS, that the principles of
credibility, transparency and accountability must be honored and
applied to the DHS HR options that were introduced by Secretary Ridge
and Director James in February. Unfortunately, the proposed DHS
personnel regulations neither honored nor applied the principles that
employees in the department deserve.
As the Committee is aware, the public comment period on the
proposed DHS personnel regulations, closed on March 22, 2004. It is our
understanding that DHS received over 2,000 comments during the past
month from DHS employees, Members of Congress, employee representatives
and the general public. From an initial review of the submitted
comments, it can be safely said that the vast majority of the comments
oppose the proposed pay and job classification system for DHS
personnel.
The proposed DHS personnel regulations propose to implement a
radical change to pay and job classification systems for DHS employees,
and to increase the linkage between pay and performance. However, no
reliable information exists to show that this system will enhance the
efficiency of DHS operations and promote homeland security. Indeed,
most of the key components of the system are not clearly determined in
the proposed regulations. The proposed regulations consist only of
broad statements concerning the creation of occupation clusters of
related positions in the department and the ability of DHS/OPM to
create a number of ``pay bands'' for each cluster that relates to skill
level. The ``pay band'' ranges will be set by an extremely complicated
formula of mission requirements, local labor market conditions,
availability of funds, and pay adjustments received by other Federal
employees.
The proposed pay system lacks the transparency and objectivity of
the General Schedule. Critical decisions on pay rates for each band,
annual adjustments to these bands and locality pay supplements and
adjustments will no longer be made in public forums like the U.S.
Congress or the Federal Salary Council, where employees can watch the
process and have the opportunity to influence its outcome. Rather,
these decisions would now be made behind closed doors by a group of DHS
managers (sometimes in coordination with OPM) and their consultants.
If the proposed system is implemented, employees will have no basis
to accurately predict their salaries from year to year. They will have
no way of knowing how much of an annual increase they will receive, or
whether they will receive any annual increase at all, despite having
met or exceeded all performance expectations identified by the
Department. The ``pay-for-performance'' element of the proposal will
pit employees against each other for performance-based increases.
Making DHS employees compete against each other for pay increases will
undermine the spirit of cooperation and teamwork needed to keep our
country safe from terrorists, smugglers, and others who wish to do
America harm.
One thing is clear. The proposed pay system will be extremely
complex and costly to administer. A new bureaucracy will have to be
created, and it will be dedicated to making the myriad, and yet-to-be
identified, pay-related decisions that the new system would require.
In the area of labor relations, NTEU is extremely disappointed by
the proposed DHS personnel system. Despite the congressional mandate to
protect an employee's right to collectively bargain, the proposed DHS
personnel regulations are drafted as such to minimize the influence of
collective bargaining so as to undermine the statutory right of
employees to organize and bargain collectively. When Congress included
provisions in the Homeland Security Act to protect employees'
collective bargaining rights, Congress could not have intended those
rights to be gutted as they are in the proposed regulations.
For example, the proposed regulations eliminate bargaining over
otherwise negotiable matters that do not significantly affect a
substantial portion of the bargaining unit, they eliminate a union's
right to participate in formal discussions between bargaining unit
employees and managers, and they drastically restrict the situations
during which an employee may request the presence of a union
representative during an investigatory examination. In addition, the
proposed regulations set and change conditions of employment and void
collectively bargained provisions through the issuance of non-
negotiable departmental regulations, assign authority for resolving
many labor-management disputes to the Homeland Security Labor Relations
Board, composed exclusively of members appointed by the Secretary, and
grant broad new authority to establish an entirely new pay system, and
to determine each employee's base pay and locality pay, and each
employee's annual increase in pay, without requiring any bargaining
with employee representatives.
The Homeland Security Act required any new human resources system
for DHS employee ``contemporary.'' Unfortunately, the labor relations
and performance management proposals are, however, remarkably
regressive. By proposing to silence front-line employees and the unions
that represent them, DHS/OPM appear to have decided that employees and
their representatives can make no contribution to the accomplishment of
the essential mission of protecting the homeland. This backwards-
thinking approach is at odds with contemporary concepts of labor
relations.
In the area of due process for DHS employees the proposed personnel
regulations make drastic changes. Included in the proposed regulations
are provisions that bar the Merit Systems Protection Board from
reducing or otherwise modifying any penalty selected by DHS, which
would deprive employees of a chance to challenge excessive or
unreasonable penalties, the proposed regulations eliminate the right of
a union to submit serious adverse actions imposed against bargaining
unit employees to an arbitrator, and they reduce an agency's burden of
proof in adverse actions cases to a standard that would require DHS's
decisions to be upheld even if they are more likely than not to have
been improper.
In addition, the proposed DHS regulations would allow the Secretary
of Homeland Security to determine an unlimited number of mandatory
removal offenses or ``deadly sins'' that require mandatory termination
for DHS personnel, without access to any independent review of the
charges; the only review would be by an in-house entity. These proposed
DHS ``deadly sins'' are even more Draconian that the IRS' deadly sins,
which are subject to independent review and are set by statute, not
subject to the whim of the current or future DHS Secretaries.
It is important to note that President Bush supports repealing the
mandatory termination provisions currently in effect at the IRS and
legislation drafted by the Administration to do this (H.R. 1528) has
passed the House with strong bipartisan Congressional, as well as,
Administration support. The Administration believes that the IRS needs
more flexibility in this area. Since flexibility has been the primary
goal of personnel changes at DHS, it is totally inconsistent to
introduce procedures that take away all discretion by requiring
mandatory penalties.
When Congress mandated that DHS employees be treated fairly and
afforded the protections of due process, and authorized only limited
changes to current appellate processes, Congress could not have
envisioned the drastic reductions in employee rights that are in the
proposed DHS personnel regulations. No evidence shows that current
employee due process protections or the decisions of an arbitrator or
the MSPB jeopardize homeland security. While there was support
expressed in Town Hall meetings and focus groups for speeding up the
adverse action and appeals process, there was no support for
drastically altering the process in favor of management or otherwise
reducing the likelihood of fair and accurate decisions.
Ideally, a new DHS human resource management system should promote
esprit-de-corps so as to enhance the effectiveness of the workforce.
Unfortunately, these proposals fall far short of that ideal. Instead,
they will result in a demoralized workforce composed of Federal
employees who feel as if they have been relegated to second-class
citizenship. This system will encourage experienced employees to seek
employment elsewhere and will deter qualified candidates from
considering a career in DHS.
Thank you for the opportunity to share NTEU's thoughts on a number
of extremely important issues concerning the Department of Homeland
Security, its fiscal year 2005 Budget and its front line employees.
______
Prepared Statement of the University of Miami
Chairman Cochran, Ranking Member Byrd, and distinguished members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to provide
testimony on the Disaster Resistant University initiative and to
request continued funding in the fiscal year 2005 appropriations bill
of your Subcommittee.
We very much appreciate the interest of Members of Congress in this
program. It is a modest program with great benefits.
Request for fiscal year 2005
We respectfully request the following language in the fiscal year
2005 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill Emergency
Preparedness and Response section of the bill under the Predisaster
Mitigation section.
The Committee directs Emergency Preparedness and Response (FEMA) to
continue the Disaster Resistant University Program by providing
continued support to the pilot universities and those selected in
fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 to implement mitigation efforts
to reduce their vulnerabilities and improve protection of their
students, employees, and the Federal investment in vital research.
Program Background
The FEMA Disaster Resistant University (DRU) Initiative was created
to reduce the potential for large loss of life and hundreds of millions
of dollars in key Federal research and billions of dollars in damage
from natural disasters. The University of California at Berkeley was
the prototype and founding member of the program. In October 2000, FEMA
selected five additional universities to join Berkeley in the pilot
phase of the program: the University of Alaska at Fairbanks, University
of Miami, University of North Carolina at Wilmington, Tulane
University, and the University of Washington at Seattle. The selected
universities have two elements in common: a vulnerability to disasters
and a commitment to improve protection of students, faculty and staff,
and one of our most valuable assets, intellectual property. The pilot
program was funded with $700,000 in grants from predisaster mitigation
funds and the U.S. Fire Administration.
Purpose of the Program
The purpose of the program is to help the Nation's colleges and
universities facing the threat of natural disasters and acts of
terrorism to assess their vulnerabilities and find ways to protect the
lives of their students, faculty, and staff; their research; and their
facilities. It will provide a framework and process for other
universities to do the same.
The intent of the program was to assist universities by first
providing a small grant for them to assess their vulnerabilities,
devise appropriate plans, and set priorities and then to provide grants
in following years of approximately $500,000 each for the universities
to take steps to reduce those vulnerabilities.
Need for the Program
The Federal Government funds $19.4 billion annually in university
research, according to the National Science Foundation statistics in
2001, the latest year available. This Federal investment in the vital
intellectual property of the Nation should be protected.
In addition, universities are critical to the economic health of
their surrounding communities. Their ability to resume operations
quickly following a disaster greatly speeds the recovery of the entire
community. For example, the University of Miami is the 3rd largest
employer in Miami-Dade County and has a $1.9 billion a year impact on
the community; the University of Washington is the 3rd largest employer
in the State of Washington and has a $3.4 billion impact; the
University of North Carolina at Wilmington is the 3rd largest employer
in the area and is a $400 million annual benefit to an eight county
area; the University of California at Berkeley is the 3th largest
employer in the Bay area and generates $1.4 billion annually in the Bay
area; Tulane University is the largest employer in Orleans Parish and
the 5th largest in Louisiana with a $1.5 billion gross impact on New
Orleans; and the University of Alaska at Fairbanks is the largest
civilian employer in the Tanana Valley. In addition, many universities
operate medical schools which provide essential clinical services to
the residents of their communities and adjacent areas.
Many recent events underscore the need for the program: the loss of
many years of research at the Texas Medical Center as result of
flooding from Tropical Storm Allison, the earthquake damage to the
University of California at Northridge and the University of California
at Los Angeles, the facility damage and loss of life at the University
of Maryland as result of a tornado, hurricane damage to the University
of North Carolina at Wilmington, the earthquake damage to the
University of Washington at Seattle, and the declaration by the FBI
that our universities are ``soft'' targets for terrorists.
Status of the Program
On December 31, 2003, FEMA published a Notice of Funds Availability
(NOFA) for grant applications. As directed by Congress, $500,000 is to
be available to the six existing DRUs and $100,000 each is to be
available for six new ones to start the process. The funds are from the
PreDisaster Mitigation Fund.
The applications were due to FEMA regions on March 1, 2004. The
FEMA regions have completed preliminary reviews and forwarded the
applications to FEMA headquarters. Panels will be reviewing the
applications in late April and awards are expected in early June.
Forty-four universities and four consortia applied. Applications
were received from six Historic Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU)
and one tribal school. Applications were received from universities
located in nine of the ten FEMA regions.
Although no additional funding has been made available since the
original small grants in 2000, great progress has been made by the
universities with the modest Federal investment. Participation in the
DRU brought high level commitment and a framework for disaster planning
and mitigation activities that helped universities focus and enhance
efforts to protect their students, faculty, staff, vital research, and
facilities.
Each university has made significant improvements in developing
awareness campaigns on campus; assessing their risks, vulnerabilities,
and mitigation options, prioritizing and implementing some of the
mitigation options; updating emergency operations plans; and developing
and implementing plans for business continuity. The universities have
improved disaster resistant design specifications for buildings and
their contents, incorporated disaster resistance into campus master
planning, and partnered more closely with governmental and private
entities.
These six pilot universities are making strong efforts to protect
their over 120,000 students, over 60,000 employees, 1,550 buildings
valued at over $11,820,458,000, and $1,600,710,000 in annual research.
The six participating Disaster Resistant Universities look forward
to continuing their progress and to mentoring the six new universities
which FEMA will be selecting soon.
Included in the applications from the six pilots for the fiscal
year 2003 funding were projects such as protecting windows, tying down
rooftop mechanical equipment, structural bracing for hurricane damage
protection for buildings housing major research projects; seismic
retrofit of the university police Department 9-1-1 dispatch center and
emergency operations center; developing emergency plans for campus
special needs populations; seismic evaluation of the power plant vital
for research facilities; and improving nonstructural hazard mitigation
in university laboratories, increasing data backup, and expanding
business resumption planning into departments and research units.
Streamlining the Process
We are grateful that the process of getting out the fiscal year
2003 funding is underway; however, the new application process for the
fiscal year 2003 funds was very time consuming. Some of the information
required seemed much more appropriate for communities than a
university. One pilot university estimated it took 200 hours of staff
time to prepare the application and several spent more than 150 hours.
One of the universities applying as a new selection for a $100,000
grant devoted 150 hours of staff time. In addition the process is time
consuming for State and local emergency management officials. We would
like to work with FEMA on suggestions for streamlining the process
while still maintaining high quality applications.
Summary of Congressional Interest
We very much appreciate the support Congress has given this
program.
Fiscal year 2002
The Conference Report on the VA, HUD and Independent Agencies
Appropriations bill for 2002 (House Report 107-272 ) contained the
following language:
The conferees believe that many of the Nation's universities are
vulnerable to disaster and urge FEMA to continue its Disaster Resistant
University program and expand the scope to include safe-guarding
university assets from acts of terrorism.
Fiscal year 2003
The Conference Report on the fiscal year 2003 Omnibus bill in the
FEMA section of the VA, HUD and Independent Agencies stated the
following:
The conferees are in agreement that FEMA should continue the
Disaster Resistant University program and direct FEMA to carry out the
direction contained in House Report 107-740.
House Report 107-740 stated the following:
Finally, the Committee notes that in September of 2000 FEMA
selected five universities to join the University of California at
Berkeley in the pilot phase of the Disaster Resistant University
program: University of Alaska/Fairbanks, University of Miami,
University of North Carolina/Wilmington, Tulane University, and
University of Washington/Seattle. The purpose of the program is to help
the Nation's colleges and universities facing the threat of natural
disasters to assess their vulnerabilities and find ways to protect
their research, facilities and the lives of students, faculty and
staff. The Committee directs FEMA to continue the Disaster Resistant
University Program with grants of $500,000 to each of the six pilot
Disaster Resistant Universities and $100,000 each to at least six
additional universities, including at least one HBCU, to join the
program.
Fiscal year 2004
The Senate Report on the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations bill (S. Report 108-86) included the following language
under the National Pre-Disaster Mitigation Fund which was funded at
$150,000,000.
The Committee encourages the Department to continue the existing
Disaster Resistant University program at the fiscal year 2003 level.
The House receded to the Senate in the conference agreement.
We again thank you for the opportunity to provide written comment
on the need for continued funding of this important program. We would
welcome the opportunity to provide additional information or to discuss
the program further with your staff.
______
Prepared Statement of the Upper Mississippi River Basin Association
The Upper Mississippi River Basin Association (UMRBA) is the
organization created in 1981 by the Governors of Illinois, Iowa,
Minnesota, Missouri, and Wisconsin to serve as a forum for coordinating
the five States' river-related programs and policies and for
collaborating with Federal agencies on regional water resource issues.
As such, the UMRBA has an interest in the budgets for the U.S. Coast
Guard and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
Both the Coast Guard and the FEMA have vital functions specifically
related to homeland security that must be adequately funded. But both
also have other traditional missions that are equally important to
public health and safety, economic well-being, and environmental
protection. For the Coast Guard, these include activities such as aids
to navigation, vessel and facility inspections, emergency response, and
mariner licensing. For FEMA, key traditional missions include the
National Flood Insurance Program, flood map modernization, hazard
mitigation, and response to floods and other natural disasters. Nowhere
are these services more important than on the Upper Mississippi River
System, which supports a vital link in the inland waterway
transportation system, some of the Nation's most productive
agricultural land, population centers ranging from small towns to major
metropolitan areas, and a nationally significant ecosystem.
COAST GUARD
Operating Expenses
A continuing priority for the UMRBA is the Coast Guard's Operating
Expenses account. The President's fiscal year 2005 budget proposal
includes $5.173 billion for this account, an increase of almost 10
percent from the fiscal year 2004 enacted level. However, this net
increase of $455 million for Operating Expenses is more than fully
consumed by specific increases tied to implementation of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA); increased personnel costs; and
operating costs for new vessels, aircraft, and facilities related to
the Coast Guard's saltwater responsibilities. These initiatives are
important in their own right and will benefit a range of Coast Guard
missions. However, it is also true that the Coast Guard's non-security
missions will be under continued strain as the inflation-adjusted
resources for these missions remain static or shrink.
When the Department of Homeland Security was formed, the UMRBA
strongly supported the Coast Guard's stated objective of sustaining
traditional missions near their pre-9/11 levels. These traditional
missions are critical to the safe, efficient operation of the Upper
Mississippi River and the rest of the inland river system. Under these
mission areas, the Coast Guard maintains navigation channel markers,
regulates a wide range of commercial vessels in the interest of crew
and public safety, and responds to spills and other incidents. The
beneficiaries include not only commercial vessel operators, but also
recreational boaters; farmers and others who ship materials by barge;
and the region's citizens, who benefit enormously from the river as a
nationally significant economic and environmental resource.
Even prior to September 11, recent years had brought a number of
changes to the way the Coast Guard operates on the inland river system,
including elimination of the Second District; closure of the Director
of Western Rivers Office; decommissioning the Sumac, which was the
largest buoy tender on the Upper Mississippi River; and staff
reductions. While the States understand the need for efficiency, the
cumulative impacts of these changes must be carefully monitored,
particularly in light of the increased demands that we are now placing
on the personnel and assets that remain in the region. The UMRBA is
quite concerned that staff reductions and resource constraints have
combined to impair the Coast Guard's ability to serve as an effective,
proactive partner.
Specifically, increased security demands have reduced the staff
assigned to vessel inspections and limited the Coast Guard's
investigation of reported spills. Sending a single person to conduct
vessel inspections reduces the rigor of those inspections, and, in a
worst case scenario, potentially puts the inspector at risk. Similarly,
electing not to respond to reports of small spills means some of these
spills will go uninvestigated and puts increased demands on local
officials, who do not have the Coast Guard's expertise or resources.
Moreover, it could result in costly delays should a spill turn out to
be larger than first reported, an all-too-common occurrence. Temporary
adjustments initially made to accommodate immediate security needs are
now evolving into long term standard operating procedures. While
everyone recognizes the need to adjust to our new security environment,
it is essential for the Coast Guard to retain the capacity to perform
its traditional missions on the Upper Mississippi River. Toward that
end, the UMRBA supports the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request
for the Coast Guard's Operating Expenses account, but urges Congress to
ensure that sufficient resources from within this account are allocated
to the Coast Guard's inland river work.
Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation
Through its Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E)
program, the Coast Guard conducts cutting edge research in several
critical areas, including oil spill prevention and response, risk
assessment, and mariner safety. Of particular note, researchers at the
Coast Guard's Groton, Connecticut Research and Development Center have
made invaluable contributions to state-of-the-art fast water spill
response, in situ burning, and human error reduction. However, the
President is now proposing to shift the Coast Guard's RDT&E funding to
the Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology (S&T)
Directorate. This proposal represents precisely the kind of diminution
of the Coast Guard's non-security missions with which the UMRBA and
others have repeatedly expressed concern. Research on innovative oil
spill recovery equipment or new methods for combating crew fatigue will
simply be lost in the department-wide S&T Directorate, with its
overwhelming focus on homeland security issues. Moreover, the
President's proposal appears to be inconsistent with Section 888 of the
Homeland Security Act, which calls for ``the authorities, functions,
and capabilities of the Coast Guard to perform its missions . . . [to]
be maintained intact.'' The UMRBA urges Congress to provide adequate
and direct funding to the Coast Guard's multi-mission RDT&E program in
fiscal year 2005.
Reserve Training
The President is requesting $117 million for Coast Guard Reserve
Training in fiscal year 2005. The UMRBA States are keenly aware of the
importance of the reserve forces. During major flood events on the
inland rivers, reservists have consistently provided exemplary service,
augmenting the Coast Guard's capabilities and helping to protect public
health and safety. More recently, many reservists have been called to
active duty, enabling the Coast Guard to meet many new security-related
demands. On the inland rivers, this has included increased patrols near
critical facilities and development of security plans for key inland
ports. The UMRBA urges Congress to fund Reserve Training at $117
million in fiscal year 2005, thereby helping to maintain a Coast Guard
reserve that can effectively execute both homeland security- and
natural disaster-related missions.
Boating Safety Grants
The Coast Guard's boating safety grants to the States have a proven
record of success. The Upper Mississippi is a river where all types of
recreational craft routinely operate in the vicinity of 15-barge tows,
making boating safety all the more important. As levels of both
recreational and commercial traffic continue to grow, so too does the
potential for user conflicts. This is particularly true with major
events like the Grand Excursion 2004, during which flotillas of boaters
will retrace President Millard Fillmore's 1854 steamboat journey from
Rock Island, Illinois to the Twin Cities.
Boat safety training and law enforcement are key elements of
prevention. However, the future of this successful grants program is
uncertain. Following the pattern of recent years, the President has
requested $59 million in fiscal year 2005 funding for boating safety
grants to the States. This is the amount historically authorized
without annual appropriation from the Boat Safety Account, which is
funded by a tax on fuel for recreational motor boats. Successive
Administrations have not typically exercised their option to request an
additional $13 million in annual appropriations for the grants.
However, the authority for the funding from the Boat Safety Account has
expired and must be extended if the program is to continue in fiscal
year 2005. Such a provision is currently being considered as part of
the pending Highway Bill. The UMRBA urges prompt reauthorization of the
Boating Safety Program, and funding of this important work at $72
million annually.
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND
RESPONSE DIRECTORATE)
Hazard Mitigation
UMRBA is particularly interested in FEMA programs that help
mitigate future flood hazards. Mitigation, which is the ongoing effort
to reduce or eliminate the impact of disasters like floods, can include
measures such as relocating homes or community facilities off the
floodplain, elevating structures, and practicing sound land use
planning. Mitigation planning and projects are essential to reducing
the Nation's future disaster assistance costs. Given the importance of
mitigation, UMRBA supports the Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) grant
program, which was created in fiscal year 2003 and for which the
President is requesting $150 million in fiscal year 2005. While the PDM
grant program is still relatively new, it holds promise for enhancing
communities' ability to prevent future damages, particularly in areas
that have not experienced a major disaster and thus have not had access
to post-disaster mitigation assistance through the Disaster Relief
Fund. In addition, pre-disaster mitigation assistance is an effective
means of meeting the ongoing need in all communities to plan for future
floods and reduce their vulnerability before the next flood disaster.
FEMA is still in the process of awarding fiscal year 2003 grant
funds, and fiscal year 2004 grant guidance has not yet been released.
In fiscal year 2003, each State in the country was provided $248,375
for planning grants. The balance of the $150 million appropriated in
fiscal year 2003 is being allocated nationally as competitive grants,
in three phases. While fiscal year 2003 competitive grants have not yet
been awarded, the review process has concluded. A total of nearly $6
million in PDM competitive grants will likely be awarded, from fiscal
year 2003 funds, to communities throughout the five States of the Upper
Mississippi River Basin. Although the PDM grant program has gotten off
to a slow start, it holds promise. Thus, UMRBA supports the President's
fiscal year 2005 funding request of $150 million for the PDM program.
Flood Map Modernization
Flood maps are not only used to determine risk-based National Flood
Insurance Program premium rates, but also provide the basis for local
regulation of flood hazard areas and for State and local disaster
response planning. However, most flood maps are over 15 years old and
are rapidly becoming obsolete. Many flood maps are outdated by the
effects of land use changes in the watersheds. When outdated maps
underestimate flood depths, it can often lead to floodplain development
in high risk areas. It is therefore important that flood maps be
updated on an ongoing basis and in a timely way.
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget proposes $200 million for
FEMA's Flood Map Modernization program. While funding for flood maps
has increased substantially since the Map Modernization initiative
began in fiscal year 2003, there are growing concerns about the
adequacy of the original time and cost estimates. For instance,
producing updated and accurate maps often requires that new studies be
conducted. However, the existing map modernization budget is only
sufficient to fund actual mapping costs and will not adequately cover
the costs of necessary associated tasks, such as new flood elevation
studies or levee certifications. In fiscal year 2004, FEMA Region 5 was
allocated $12 million for map modernization and Region 7 was allocated
$7.28 million. Given such constrained funding and the fact that mapping
needs are being prioritized based on population, rather than flood risk
or need, it is not clear when relatively sparsely populated counties
along the Mississippi River will be mapped. Ironically, the Federal
Government, through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, recently spent
approximately $17 million to develop new flood profiles for the Upper
Mississippi and Lower Missouri Rivers. Unfortunately this updated
information cannot be fully utilized until sufficient funding is made
available to modernize and digitize the flood maps for river
communities. Thus, the UMRBA urges Congress to provide adequate funding
for map modernization, including sufficient funding to develop new maps
for the Upper Mississippi and Lower Missouri Rivers based on the new
flood profiles.
LIST OF WITNESSES, COMMUNICATIONS, AND PREPARED STATEMENTS
----------
Page
Aguirre, Eduardo Jr., Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, Department of Homeland Security...................... 465
Prepared Statement of........................................ 476
Statement of................................................. 473
American Public Transportation Association, Prepared Statement of 572
Association of:
American Universities, Prepared Statement of................. 571
State Dam Safety Officials, Prepared Statement of............ 576
State Floodplain Managers, Inc., Prepared Statement of....... 582
Bonner, Robert C., Commissioner, Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection, Department of Homeland Security.................... 465
Prepared Statement of........................................ 481
Statement of................................................. 478
Brown, Michael D., Under Secretary, Emergency Preparedness and
Response Directorate, Office of the Under Secretary for
Emergency Preparedness and Response, Department of Homeland
Security....................................................... 141
Prepared Statement of........................................ 147
Statement of................................................. 145
Byrd, Senator Robert C., U.S. Senator From West Virginia:
Questions Submitted by........97, 172, 274, 291, 335, 419, 448, 541
Statements of.................................2, 142, 295, 372, 466
Campbell, Senator Ben Nighthorse, U.S. Senator From Colorado:
Prepared Statement of........................................ 298
Questions Submitted by....................................... 269
Cochran, Senator Thad, U.S. Senator From Mississippi:
Opening Statements of.........................1, 189, 295, 357, 465
Prepared Statement of........................................ 142
Questions Submitted by...............60, 163 256, 324 403, 437, 527
Collins, Hon. Admiral Thomas H., Commandant, United States Coast
Guard, Department of Homeland Security......................... 357
Prepared Statement of........................................ 359
Questions Submitted by.................................96, 271, 290
Statement of................................................. 358
Domenici, Senator Pete V., Senator From New Mexico, Questions
Submitted by.............................................81, 267, 289
Garcia, Michael J., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security....... 465
Prepared Statement of........................................ 496
Statement of................................................. 493
Gregg, Senator Judd, U.S. Senator From New Hampshire:
Questions Submitted by....................................... 95
Statement of................................................. 4
Harkin, Senator Tom, U.S. Senator From Iowa:
Prepared Statement of........................................ 8
Questions Submitted by....................................... 132
Statement of................................................. 7
Hollings, Senator Ernest F., U.S. Senator From South Carolina:
Prepared Statement of........................................ 299
Questions Submitted by...........................125, 351, 434, 459
Hutchinson, Asa, Under Secretary, Border and Transportation
Security Directorate, Department of Homeland Security.......... 295
Prepared Statement of........................................ 301
Statement of................................................. 299
Inouye, Senator Daniel K., U.S. Senator From Hawaii:
Prepared Statement of........................................ 6
Questions Submitted by...........................282, 350, 431, 458
Statements of................................................5, 357
International Association of Emergency Managers, Prepared
Statement of................................................... 585
Kohl, Senator Herb, U.S. Senator From Wisconsin, Questions
Submitted by.................................................133, 186
Leahy, Senator Patrick J., U.S. Senator From Vermont:
Prepared Statements of......................................43, 470
Questions Submitted by.................128, 184, 354, 435, 460, 566
Statements of..............................................297, 468
Libutti, Frank, Lieutenant General, Under Secretary, Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, Department of Homeland
Security....................................................... 189
Prepared Statement of........................................ 223
Statement of................................................. 219
McQueary, Dr. Charles E., Under Secretary, Science and Technology
Directorate, Department of Homeland Security................... 189
Prepared Statement of........................................ 193
Statement of................................................. 191
Mikulski, Senator Barbara A., U.S. Senator From Maryland:
Prepared Statement of........................................ 9
Statement of................................................. 9
Murkowski, Frank H., Letter From................................. 29
Murray, Senator Patty, U.S. Senator From Washington:
Prepared Statement of........................................ 13
Questions Submitted by.....................................137, 355
Statements of.....................................12, 144, 374, 472
National:
Emergency Management Association, Prepared Statement of...... 587
Flood Determination Association, Prepared Statement of....... 592
Treasury Employees Union, Prepared Statement of.............. 593
Reid, Senator Harry, U.S. Senator From Nevada:
Question Submitted by........................................ 463
Statement of................................................. 375
Ridge, Hon. Tom, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security...... 1
Prepared Statement of........................................ 15
Statement of................................................. 14
Shelby, Senator Richard C., U.S. Senator From Alabama, Questions
Submitted by.............................................88, 333, 470
Specter, Senator Arlen, U.S. Senator From Pennsylvania, Opening
Statement of................................................... 141
Stevens, Senator Ted, U.S. Senator From Alaska:
Questions Submitted by................................172, 266, 417
Statements of................................................6, 380
Stone, Admiral David M., Acting Administrator, Transportation
Security Administration, Department of Homeland Security....... 357
Prepared Statement of........................................ 365
Statement of................................................. 364
University of Miami, Prepared Statement of....................... 598
Upper Mississippi River Basin Association, Prepared Statement of. 601
SUBJECT INDEX
----------
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Page
Accomplishments:
Achieved by the Department of Homeland Security.............. 15
Of the:
IAIP Directorate......................................... 220
Science and Technology Directorate....................... 211
To Date...................................................... 474
Within the Past Year......................................... 494
Acknowledgement of Hard Work and Success......................... 514
Additional Committee Questions........................60, 256, 324, 527
Adequacy of Resources............................................ 508
Aggressive Collection Against Delinquent Accounts................ 556
Agricultural Inspections......................................... 535
Agro-terrorism................................................... 8
Concerns..................................................... 28
Air:
And Marine Operations--Northern Border Airwing............... 539
Cargo........................................................ 439
Marshal Training............................................. 111
Pilot Program................................................ 344
Screening: Leveraging DOD Research........................... 109
Security..................................................... 454
Service to Artesia, New Mexico............................... 34
Airline Passenger Screening: Wait Times.......................... 450
Airport:
Funding Formula Changes...................................... 449
Security..................................................... 5
Al Qaeda......................................................... 25
Alaska-Canada Border Security.................................... 80
Alert Level Change............................................... 2
Alien Removals................................................... 561
All-State Minimum................................................ 128
Alleged Budget Shortfall......................................... 467
Alteration of Bridges.......................................53, 54, 414
Alternatives to:
Detention.................................................... 538
VACIS........................................................ 546
Amnesty for Illegal Aliens....................................... 54
Anthrax Vaccine.................................................. 67
Appendix......................................................... 211
Arizona Border Control Initiative................................ 527
Arming Pilots.................................................... 352
Arrest Authority................................................. 562
Asset Forfeiture Fund............................................ 558
Automated Commercial Environment................................. 534
Automatic Identification System................................396, 426
Automation/Information Technology................................ 490
Available New Technologies That Could be Used for Replacement
Coast Guard Vessels............................................ 395
Aviation Security................................................ 21
Capital Fund................................................. 376
Backlog.......................................................... 503
Issue........................................................ 506
Reduction.................................................... 474
Plan..................................................... 528
Basic State Grant Program........................................ 71
Basis for Policy on the Use of the National Laboratories......... 210
Benchmarks....................................................... 559
Benefit Fraud..................................................530, 543
Biodefense Countermeasures (BioShield)........................... 282
Biological Countermeasures....................................... 260
BioShield........................................................ 66
Biosurveillance System..........................................62, 256
Border Patrol:
IDENT........................................................ 315
Staffing..................................................... 546
Vehicles..................................................... 547
Budget:
And Activities Supporting Cybersecurity R&D.................. 210
For University Centers of Excellence and Fellows Programs.... 211
Request for the:
Federal Air Marshals..................................... 518
Purchase and Installation of an Explosive Detection
System................................................. 386
Campaign Labor Costs............................................. 114
Cancelled International Flights.................................. 48
Canine Teams..................................................... 451
Diversion from Current Missions.............................. 111
CAPPS II.....................................................4, 55, 313
Airline Passenger Information System......................... 335
Development and Deployment................................... 397
System....................................................... 383
Testing....................................................335, 454
Cargo and Container Security..................................... 450
CBP Inspectors................................................... 479
Charter Flights to Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in
Artesia, New Mexico............................................ 83
Chemical:
Detectors.................................................... 238
Plant Security..............................................97, 291
Chief of Staff's Office.......................................... 103
Chimera.......................................................... 560
CIS Budget Request Concerns...................................... 469
Citizenship...................................................... 530
And Immigration Services...................................528, 541
And Immigration and Customs Enforcement.................. 543
Coast Guard......................................................13, 80
Offshore Patrol Cutters...................................... 53
COBRA Extension.................................................. 548
Cockpit Doors.................................................... 352
Competitive Analysis and Evaluation.............................. 222
Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-screening System (CAPPS II)...... 441
Concern Regarding TTIC Being Under the Leadership of the CIA..... 249
Consolidation of Grant Programs Into the Office for State and
Local Coordination and Preparedness............................ 31
Construction of NISAC Facility at Kirtland Air Force Base........ 35
Container Security............................................... 532
Initiative.................................................480, 544
Contingency Plan for the Flow or Commerce During an Incident at
One of Our Ports............................................... 391
Continuation of Operation Safe Commerce.......................... 38
Continued Dumping and Subsidy:
Act.......................................................... 549
Offset Act Tradeoff.......................................... 524
Contracting Out.................................................. 108
Cooperation of Local and State Law Enforcement Officials......... 514
Cooperative Law Enforcement With Local Accountable Law
Enforcement.................................................... 52
Counter Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS)............... 257
Counterfeiting and Financial Crimes.............................. 68
Countermeasures.................................................. 234
Counterterrorism Communication................................... 5
Critical Infrastructure.......................................... 132
Protection............................................190, 246, 291
Cross-training.................................................548, 558
Customs and Border Protection..................................532, 544
At 1 Year.................................................... 482
Customs:
Officers..................................................... 473
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism........................480, 532
Cuts in Grant:
Funding...................................................... 13
To States to Upgrade Their Public Health Systems............. 27
Cyber Security..............................61, 255, 256, 258, 283, 285
Data:
Between 1996-2003............................................ 544
Integrity Issues............................................. 139
Database Integration............................................. 355
Deepwater:
Awards to Prime Contractors.................................. 421
Budget Request............................................... 402
Estimates.................................................... 423
Management................................................... 422
Patrol Boats................................................. 425
Delivery of State and Local Dollars.............................. 32
Department of Homeland Security Headquarters..................... 78
Department-wide Research and Development......................... 262
Departmental:
Comparisons.................................................. 103
Management................................................... 99
Detection:
And Removals................................................. 538
Technology................................................... 274
DHS:
Hiring Freeze................................................ 99
Personnel Regulations........................................ 102
Disaster:
Medical Assistance Teams..................................... 133
Relief....................................................... 114
Discovering Presence of Detonators in Baggage.................... 241
Discrimination Complaints by TSA Screeners....................... 110
Division of Effort Among the DHS S&T Directorate and Research
Efforts at Other Government Agencies........................... 204
Does ICE have Enough Resources to Handle Overstay?............... 522
Effectiveness of the Screening Process........................... 379
Effort to Improve Cargo Security Through Operation Safe Commerce. 36
Emergency:
Management Performance Grants................................ 136
Preparedness and Response...................................66, 112
Energy Security.................................................. 244
Enhancing:
Biodefense................................................... 17
Border Patrol Integration into CBP........................... 547
Flight Service/Transportation for Trainees to FLETC.......... 34
Immigration Security and Enforcement......................... 18
Entry-exit....................................................... 5
Environmental Monitoring......................................... 233
Exact Timeframe on the Deployment and Establishment of the
Northern Border Air Wing....................................... 318
Expedited Registered Travel Program.............................. 398
Explosives Detection for Passengers.............................. 449
Federal Air Marshals......................................317, 323, 539
On International Flights..................................... 21
Program...................................................... 395
Service...................................................... 494
Staffing..................................................... 337
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center........................332, 353
In Artesia, New Mexico....................................... 33
Federal Screener Opt-Out Program................................. 331
FEMA--Cerro Grande Fire.......................................... 87
Fingerprint Database Integration: Vastly Delayed and Dangerous... 336
Fire Services.................................................... 130
First Responder:
Funding...................................................... 47
Responders..............................................58, 84, 130
Fiscal Year 2005 Budget:
Increase..................................................... 2
Plans........................................................ 193
Request.......................................15, 16, 364, 480, 495
For IAIP................................................. 221
FLETC............................................................ 320
Budget:
Charleston............................................... 344
Facilities Operating Funds............................... 344
Capitol Police Training Costs................................ 345
Facility at Artesia, New Mexico.............................. 394
Other Issues................................................. 345
Flexibility in Authority to Distribute Funds to High-risk Areas.. 41
Flight Cancellations...........................................136, 437
``Force Multiplier'' to Federal Air Marshals..................... 115
Four Priorities Embedded in the Budget Request................... 359
Fraudulent Documents............................................. 50
Fugitive Operations.............................................. 538
Funding:
Federal Air Marshals and Port Security Grants................ 108
For:
Enforcement Activities................................... 503
Fire Departments......................................... 58
First Responders......................................... 3
Implementation of the Maritime Transportation Security
Act.................................................... 38
Real Needs and Not Wants..................................... 392
Transfers/Legislative Proposals.............................. 77
GAO Deepwater Program Management Report.......................... 409
Grant:
Applications................................................. 341
Consolidation...........................................11, 70, 107
Within ODP................................................... 340
Guest Worker Program............................................. 528
And Contracts................................................ 275
Concerns..................................................... 506
Funding for the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children................................................... 54
Gulf Coast Maritime Domain Awareness Initiative.................. 416
HAITI............................................................ 355
Hazardous Material Transportation Funding........................ 463
HC-130J.......................................................... 433
HC-130JS Compared to the HC-130HS................................ 385
HH-65 Helicopter................................................. 429
High:
Interest Vessel Boardings.................................... 430
Threat:
High Density Urban Area Security Grants.................. 120
Urban Area Grants........................................ 75
Highlights of:
Accomplishments.............................................. 191
Service to the Nation Over the Past Month.................... 358
Hiring Freezes................................................... 467
For ICE and CBP.............................................. 468
Hiring Priorities................................................ 108
Hollywood Job.................................................... 453
Homeland Security:
Advisory System.............................................60, 283
Centers of Excellence........................................ 260
Information Network.......................................... 284
Operation Center............................................. 222
How:
IAIP Funds are Being Spent................................... 190
Threat Determinations are Made............................... 41
IAIP Staffing..................................................190, 292
ICE Response...................................................501, 517
To Overstay Question......................................... 521
IDENT/IAFIS Integration Project.................................. 325
Imbalance in Coast Guard Since 9/11.............................. 388
Immigration................................................98, 131, 348
And Border Security.......................................... 51
And Customs Enforcement....................................536, 559
And Citizenship and Immigration Services................. 115
Enforcement.................................................. 314
Processing Fees and the Backlog (CIS)........................ 542
Reform and Control Act (ICRA)................................ 543
Related Casework--Assistance to Congressional Offices........ 115
System....................................................... 502
Impact of:
Deteriorating Ships, Coast Guard Cutters, Helicopters and
Other Assets on Coast Guard's Ability to Carryout its
Missions................................................... 376
President's Amnesty Proposal................................. 22
The President's Reform Plan.................................. 541
Transfer of Grant Programs from FEMA......................... 32
Impact on Rural States........................................... 45
Implementation of Air Cargo Strategic Plan....................... 108
Improving Aviation Security...................................... 18
Increase Cap for the H2B Visa Program............................ 469
Increased:
Burdens on First Responders.................................. 7
Requirement for Airlift Capacity Since 9/11.................. 384
Increasing Preparedness and Response Capability.................. 19
Information:
Analysis..................................................... 190
And Infrastructure Protection............................ 60
Questions Submitted to................................. 282
Infrastructure Vulnerability and Risk Assessment................. 221
Installation of Radiation Portal Devices at Ports of Entry....... 511
Insufficient Use of Screening Equipment--GAO Testimony........... 456
Integrated:
Deepwater System (``Deepwater'')............................. 403
Fingerprint:
Data Bases............................................... 525
Systems.................................................. 347
Terrorist Watch List......................................... 292
Integration of:
Database Systems in Fiscal Year 2004......................... 311
Information Technology Systems............................... 76
Passenger Analysis Units and Consolidated Antiterrorism
Secondary Examinations..................................... 479
Intelligence:
Analysis..................................................... 135
Dissemination................................................ 126
Interagency Collaboration.......................................87, 268
Of Homeland Security Research Efforts........................ 263
Interdiction and Seizure of Assets of Drug Smugglers on the High
Seas off the Coast of South America and the Caribbean.......... 377
International Flight Cancellations............................... 20
Interoperability Grants.......................................... 339
Interoperable Communications and SAFECOM......................... 235
Investigative Emphasis........................................... 563
Investing in Human Capital and Building Departmental
Infrastructure................................................. 19
Invitation to Secretary Ridge to Make a Statement................ 14
Is the Challenge Too Great?...................................... 509
Is There Money in the President's Budget to Implement the
President's Amnesty Proposal?.................................. 516
ISIS Border Coverage............................................. 546
Joint Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement.................................................... 556
Justification for Cutting First Responder Grants................. 237
Kudos for Chairman Cochran....................................... 516
Land Border ``Exit'' Control of US VISIT......................... 548
Law Enforcement:
Budget....................................................... 504
Support Center............................................... 537
Training Center in Williston, Vermont........................ 468
Legacy INS Program Funding....................................... 23
Lessons Learned From Operation Safe Commerce..................... 510
Letters of Intent................................................ 457
For Explosive Detection System (EDS) Installation............ 444
Level of Attention to the Likelihood of Threats to Other Modes of
Transportation................................................. 379
Limit on Full-time Equipment, Baggage and Personnel.............. 387
Limited Immigration Enforcement Resources........................ 560
Long-Range Radar................................................. 540
System....................................................... 318
Machine-Readable Passport Deadline............................... 541
Making Pacific Fleet All 130JS................................... 385
Manpads Surface to Air Missile Counter Measures.................. 238
MANPADS/Air Missile Countermeasures.............................. 254
Maritime:........................................................
And Land: A Lack of Focus.................................... 454
Transportation:
Act...................................................... 12
Security Act (MTSA) Implementation....................... 431
Meeting Our Twin Goals: Building More Secure and More Efficient
Borders........................................................ 484
Metrics Developed by the Science and Technology Directorate...... 205
Metropolitan Medical Response System............................. 116
Mission Hours.................................................... 419
Nation is Vulnerable............................................. 467
National:
Alert System................................................. 6, 81
Biological Surveillance...................................... 232
Center for Missing and Exploited Children.................... 54
Communication System......................................... 222
Critical Infrastructures..................................... 286
Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center..........81, 254, 289
Plans and Strategies......................................... 222
Nebraska Avenue Complex.......................................... 107
Need for Integrated Systems...................................... 466
New:
Backlog Elimination Plan..................................... 475
CBP Uniform for All CBP Inspectors and Created an Office of
the Border Patrol.......................................... 479
DHS Regulations Supplemental Funding Requirements............ 29
Priorities................................................... 475
NOAA:
Alert System Report.......................................... 246
Warning Advisory System...................................... 245
Non-intrusive Screening of Passengers for Explosives............. 398
Non-Security Missions............................................ 431
Northern Border Air Wing......................................... 317
Notice and Protest Process....................................... 555
Number of Illegal Aliens Residing in the United States.........471, 507
Obligated Funding................................................ 293
Obligations...................................................... 118
Office:
For Domestic Preparedness...................................70, 116
Use of Database Information.............................. 287
Office of:
Legislative Affairs.......................................... 106
Public Affairs............................................... 104
Oil Platforms.................................................... 416
$1.2 Billion Shortfall Cause of Hiring Freeze.................... 472
On-Line Filing of Applications................................... 531
Operation:
Noble Eagle.................................................. 420
Predator...................................................471, 494
Safe Commerce................................................ 12
Organization and Standup of the TTIC and ITS Function............ 251
Other:
Issues....................................................... 349
Traditional Missions......................................... 491
Outreach and Partnership......................................... 222
Outside Inputs to the S&T Budget................................. 205
Overall Coast Guard Budget Request Only 6 Percent Increase.....126, 434
Overdue Congressional Reports.................................... 56
Overseas:
Airline Passenger Inspection................................. 545
Operations Integration....................................... 556
Staffing..................................................... 528
Overstays........................................................ 471
On Visas..................................................... 509
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory............................ 512
Passenger:
And Baggage Screeners........................................ 445
Screening & Checkpoint Issues................................ 128
Pay Disparity.................................................... 558
Performance Based Pay System....................................77, 327
Plan for Adjournment............................................. 57
Port Security................................11, 12, 312, 346, 390, 433
Assessments.................................................. 413
Funding...................................................... 401
Grant Funding................................................ 402
Ports............................................................ 513
Postponing or Deferring of Any Program Initiatives............... 502
President's Immigration Proposal................................. 543
Primary Threat, Target, and Delivery Systems..................... 25
Prioritization................................................... 204
Of Research and Development Efforts.......................... 192
Priority Mission of CBP.......................................... 480
Private Sector Share of Port Security............................ 39
Process for Raising Threat Level................................. 42
Procurement Policy Issues........................................ 59
Project Bioshield................................................ 112
Proposal to Drop the All-State Minimum Formula for Allocating
State Homeland Security Grant Funds............................ 45
Proposed Movement of Grant Money From TSAT-ODP................... 381
R&D Consolidation................................................ 274
Rail Security.............................................353, 438, 450
Rapid Prototyping................................................ 264
Rationale for Budget Increases: BioWatch and the National
Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center................. 208
Reconciliation of the Fiscal Year 2004 Budget.................... 495
Redirecting the Base--Office of Investigations................... 536
Reducing Vulnerability to Terrorist Attacks...................... 26
Refugee Services................................................. 529
Regional Office and Impact on Existing FEMA Regional Structure... 113
Registered Traveler............................................111, 453
Program...................................................... 447
Relationship with Immigration Ombudsman.......................... 532
Remediation and Protective Actions............................... 222
Report Due at the End of the Fiscal Year......................... 511
Request for:
Detention and Removal........................................ 513
Fugitive Operations Teams.................................... 23
The Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism.............. 515
Worksite Enforcement......................................... 24
Rescue 21........................................................ 397
Research:
And Development...........................................427, 0443
Consolidation............................................ 241
Funding.................................................. 326
And Technology Information Dissemination..................... 253
Development, Test and Evaluation............................. 413
Resources Required to Implement the President's Amnesty Program.. 24
Response Boat Program..........................................389, 390
Results from Current Research and Development (R&D) Spending and
Fiscal Year 2005 Plans: Portfolio Details...................... 196
Review of the President's Budget................................. 466
Rewarding of Deepwater Prime Contractor.......................... 383
Schedule of Needs for Deepwater and Refurbishing of Helicopters.. 378
Science and Technology:
Budget....................................................... 190
Directorate Organization..................................... 194
Funding.....................................................85, 267
Science and Technology Directorate, Questions Submitted to....... 256
Screening for Biological Weapons................................. 49
Seaport Security Implementation Costs..........................125, 351
Securing:
Land and Seaports-of-entry................................... 472
Our Critical Infrastrucure and Key Assets.................... 248
Security:
Checks....................................................... 474
Enhancements................................................. 475
In the Agriculture Sector.................................... 134
Of the Homeland.............................................. 251
Plans:
For Vessels and Port Facilities.......................... 425
Required Under the Maritime Transportation Security Act399, 400
Sensor and Surveillance Technology............................... 534
72-Hour Rule--Southwest Border................................... 325
Shift of $13.5 Million From the Coast Guard to the Science and
Technology Directorate......................................... 241
Shore Facilities................................................. 430
Short-Term and Long-Term Research................................ 208
Shortcomings in Budget Request................................... 467
Shortfall in Funding............................................. 500
Sixth Day of FLETC Training...................................... 548
$64 Million Request for Sensor and Surveillance Technology....... 522
Small:
Boat Stations................................................ 411
Business Contracting......................................... 271
Source of Most Significant Threat to the United States........... 25
Staffing......................................................... 211
Of Under Secretary's Office.................................. 326
Standards........................................................ 265
State:
Formula Grants............................................... 340
Grants (Including Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention
Grants).................................................... 120
Plans........................................................ 124
Status of:
Obligation of Funds Appropriated for Operation Safe Commerce. 36
Ricin Incident Investigation................................. 20
Stemming the Flow of Illegal Aliens Into the United States....... 471
Stockpile........................................................ 113
Strengthening Border and Port Security........................... 16
Support of Funding to Restore the Three-Quarters of 1 Percent
Minimum to the State Formula Grants Program.................... 46
Supporting:
Efforts in Iraq.............................................. 420
State and Local First Responders............................. 19
Task Force....................................................... 119
Technology of Detection.......................................... 49
Temporary Worker Program.......................................475, 504
$10 Million Request for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles................. 523
Terrorist Threat Integration Center.............................21, 249
Terrorist Watch List............................................. 62
Integration................................................338, 544
Tethered Aerostats............................................... 557
Radar System...............................................328, 541
Threat:
Based Distribution........................................... 4
Determination and Assessment................................. 221
From Hamas................................................... 452
Three Priorities................................................. 473
Timeline for Obligating the Last $17 Million Appropriated for
Operation Safe Commerce........................................ 37
Trade Enforcement................................................ 316
Training......................................................... 119
Transfer of R&D Budgets and Activities From Other Directorates... 209
Transit Without Visa Program..................................... 321
Transportation Security:
Administration..............................................63, 108
Fiscal Year 2004 Shortfall............................... 448
Questions Submitted to................................... 437
For all Modes................................................ 328
Trips Around the Country to Various Offices...................... 469
TSA............................................................306, 354
Detection Systems............................................ 239
Funding: Adequacy of Fees.................................... 456
Reprogramming Proposal....................................... 100
Role within the Department of Homeland Security.............. 329
Injury and Illness........................................... 457
Port Security Grants......................................... 319
Screeners.................................................... 320
Security Contract............................................ 448
Slow Movement of Appropriated Funds........................346, 455
Turf Battles..................................................... 472
TWIC............................................................. 452
U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US VISIT75, 324
Underfunded and Understaffed Immigration System.................. 22
Undocumented Workers............................................. 51
United States:
Coast Guard.................................................. 79
Questions Submitted to................................... 403
Secret Service..............................................68, 114
University:
Centers of Excellence........................................ 274
Programs...................................................237, 245
Energy Security.......................................... 243
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles...................................82, 533, 556
Unobligated Grants Funding....................................... 382
Unqualified Audit Opinion........................................ 398
Updating Citizenship Processes and Looking at the Test That is
Given to Those Seeking Citizenship in the United States........ 514
Urgency to Get Funds to First Responders......................... 59
US VISIT.......................................................304, 308
Full Disclosure.............................................. 338
Utilization of Department of Energy National Labs................ 96
Vietnamese Exports of Fish Into the United States................ 316
Visa:
Overstays.................................................... 519
Security Unit................................................ 536
Vulnerability Assessments and Security: Chemical Industry........ 252
Wait Times at Airports........................................... 109
Way to Reconfigure the Calculation for High-risk Areas to Include
the Tom Ridge Airport and Erie, Pennsylvania................... 40
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Incident Management.............. 219
White House Mail Processing...................................... 68
Who is in the Country Legally and Overstayed?.................... 520
Why is China More of a Problem?.................................. 525
Wireless Public SAFEty Interoperability COMmunications (SAFECOM)
Program........................................................ 265
Worksite Enforcement......................................536, 559, 562
Office of the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response
Additional Committee Questions................................... 162
All-Hazards Emergency Planning................................... 142
Anthrax Vaccine.................................................. 163
Basic Firefighting Equipment..................................... 175
Bioshield......................................................159, 163
Communications................................................... 175
Cuts to Emergency Management Performance Grants.................. 157
Disaster Relief Fund............................................. 154
Emergency:
Food and Shelter Program..................................... 169
Management Performance Grants..........................156, 165 186
EMS.............................................................. 175
Rescue....................................................... 175
Fire Grant Program............................................... 155
First Responder Funding.......................................... 145
Fiscal Year:
2003 Accomplishments......................................... 146
2004 Plans................................................... 146
2005 Budget Request.......................................... 146
Flood Map Modernization.......................................... 169
Hazardous Materials (Hazmat)..................................... 175
Investigation.................................................... 176
Metropolitan Medical Response System............................. 164
National:
Disaster Medical System...................................... 158
Incident Management System................................... 162
Office of National Security Coordination......................... 147
Other PPE........................................................ 176
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) List......................... 176
Pre-disaster Mitigation.......................................... 160
Preparedness, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery................. 165
Proposal to Limit the Amount of Emergency Management Funds That
Can Be Spent On Salaries....................................... 144
Proposed Cuts to Fire Grants Funding...........................143, 161
Putting the Strategic National Stockpile Back Under the
Department of Health and Human Services........................ 158
Respiratory...................................................... 176
Specialized...................................................... 176
Strategic National Stockpile...................................153, 164
Structural....................................................... 176
Terrorist Attack Concerns........................................ 144
Training Program Titles List..................................... 176
Transfer of Several All-Hazards Programs From FEMA Into a New
Office of State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness................................................... 143
Urban Search and Rescue.......................................... 167
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)................................ 176
Wildland......................................................... 176