[Senate Hearing 108-303]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-303
CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FEBRUARY 12, 2003
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JACK REED, Rhode Island
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BILL NELSON, Florida
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN CORNYN, Texas MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the
february 12, 2003
Tenet, Hon. George J., Director of Central Intelligence.......... 6
Jacoby, Vice Adm. Lowell E., USN, Director, Defense Intelligence
CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2003
Committee on Armed Services,
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:43 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
Committee members present: Senators Warner, Inhofe,
Roberts, Allard, Collins, Ensign, Talent, Graham, Cornyn,
Levin, Kennedy, Byrd, Reed, Akaka, Ben Nelson, Dayton, Bayh,
Clinton, and Pryor.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
director; and Cindy Pearson, assistant chief clerk and security
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; Brian R. Green, professional staff
member; Mary Alice A. Hayward, professional staff member;
Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley,
professional staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional
staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; and
Scott W. Stucky, general counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Madelyn R. Creedon, minority
counsel; Kenneth M. Crosswait, professional staff member;
Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard W.
Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton Greene,
professional staff member; Maren R. Leed, professional staff
member; Christina D. Still, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Leah C.
Brewer, Andrew Kent, Jennifer Key, Sara R. Mareno, and Nicholas
Committee members' assistants present: Cord Sterling,
assistant to Senator Warner; John A. Bonsell, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; James Beauchamp, assistant to Senator Roberts;
Jayson Roehl, assistant to Senator Allard; James P. Dohoney,
Jr., assistant to Senator Collins; Sara Grisier, assistant to
Senator Ensign; Lindsey R. Neas, assistant to Senator Talent;
James W. Irwin, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Aleix Jarvis
and Stephen Flippin, assistants to Senator Graham; Henry J.
Steenstra, assistant to Senator Dole; Sharon L. Waxman and
Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Terrence E.
Sauvain and Erik Raven, assistants to Senator Byrd; Elizabeth
King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi and
Richard Kessler, assistants to Senator Akaka; Douglas Bush,
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to
Senator Ben Nelson; Rashid Hallaway, assistant to Senator Bayh;
Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; Terri Glaze,
assistant to Senator Pryor.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAT ROBERTS
Senator Roberts [presiding]. The committee will come to
order. Senator Warner, our distinguished chairman, is
temporarily detained. The committee meets today to receive
testimony from George Tenet, the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI), and Vice Admiral Jacoby, who is the
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), on current
and future worldwide threats to the United States and national
security. On behalf of Senator Warner, I want to welcome our
two distinguished witnesses. Their testimony is the foundation
for the committee's actions about the types of military forces
and military capabilities our Nation needs to detect and deter
and, if necessary, defeat those threats.
The chairman, in his statement, said he wanted to take a
moment to acknowledge Vice Admiral Jacoby on what is his first
appearance before our committee in his new capacity as the
Director of the DIA. The Admiral is no stranger to the
committee, having provided many briefings and updates to the
committee while he served as the J-2 on the Joint Staff for the
past 3 years. Admiral, you did a great job in that position. We
congratulate you as you fleet up, I think that is the word to
this new challenge during these very challenging times. As
chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I can say we really
appreciated your testimony yesterday and I appreciated your
courtesy when Senator DeWine and I visited the DIA and received
your briefing several weeks ago.
The circumstances of this hearing are quite compelling. Our
country was brutally attacked by terrorists 17 months ago. Our
military is engaged in an all-out global war to defeat
terrorism. The threat of war looms in Iraq. Nuclear tensions
are on the rise as testified yesterday by Mr. Tenet, also on
the Korean peninsula; and the threat of another catastrophic
attack against our Nation and our interests has recently
I am going to simply put the rest of the chairman's
statement in the record without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
The committee meets today to receive testimony from George Tenet,
Director of Central Intelligence, and Vice Admiral Jacoby, Director,
Defense Intelligence Agency, on current and future worldwide threats to
U.S. national security.
I welcome our two distinguished witnesses. Their testimony on the
wide range of threats facing our Nation is the foundation for the
committee's deliberations about the types of military forces and
military capabilities our Nation needs to detect, deter and--if
necessary--defeat those who threaten us.
I want to take a moment to acknowledge Vice Admiral Jake Jacoby in
what is his first appearance before our committee in his new capacity
as the Director of DIA. Admiral Jacoby is no stranger to the committee,
having provided many briefings and updates to the committee while he
served as the J2 on the Joint Staff for the past 3 years. You did a
great job in that position and we congratulate you as you ``fleet up''
to this new challenge, during very challenging times.
The circumstances of this hearing are quite compelling. Our country
was brutally attacked by terrorists 17 months ago; our military is
engaged in an all-out global war to defeat terrorism; the threat of war
looms in Iraq; nuclear tensions are on the rise on the Korean
peninsula; and, the threat of another catastrophic attack against our
Nation and our interests has recently increased.
For the past several years, Director Tenet has been quite prophetic
in warning us of ``greater risk'' and ``vulnerability to surprise
attack, even at home.'' Your recent assessments that al Qaeda remains a
significant risk and is planning imminent attacks on the United States
and its interests is quite sobering.
As U.S. forces pour into the Persian Gulf region, we look to both
of you for your assessments of the dangers facing these brave men and
women if conflict cannot be avoided, as well as the dangers facing the
world if the international community fails to act to disarm Saddam
In addition, although much progress has been made, Afghanistan
remains a dangerous place. We are anxious to hear your assessment of
the situation there and the prospects for the future.
The global war on terrorism is not just confined to Afghanistan and
the Middle East. Your assessment of the overall magnitude of this
threat and the progress that has been made thus far to defeat this
danger will greatly assist our understanding of the scope of this
Even though we are focused on current and potential military
conflicts, we must not lose sight of the other, non-traditional threats
that abound in this uncertain world--the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and missile technologies, information warfare, ethnic
conflict, and overall global trends. Our security demands vigilance in
these areas, as well. We look forward to your frank assessments of the
many wide ranging threats to our national security.
There has been much discussion about what went wrong on September
11. Clearly, changes need to be made in the way we process, analyze,
and disseminate intelligence to ensure the right people have the right
information at the right time. We are anxious to hear from both of you
on structural, technological, and cultural changes you believe are
required to better posture our intelligence services for future
success. We look forward to your insights and will rely greatly on your
We depend on you, gentlemen, to guide us as we make critical
decisions in the weeks and months ahead about the capabilities,
resources, and policies our Nation needs to defend itself. Success in
your respective missions is essential to our national security--both at
home and abroad--and the future readiness of our Armed Forces.
Thank you for your service to our country. We welcome your
Senator Roberts. I yield at this time to the distinguished
vice chairman, ranking member, shotgun writer, and defender of
freedom in Michigan, Senator Levin, for any comments he may
wish to make.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As we
meet today to receive testimony from the United States
intelligence community on worldwide threats to our national
security, it is no exaggeration to say that the current threats
to the United States are serious and some of them are imminent.
Osama bin Laden is still at large and the al Qaeda network,
though weakened and deprived of its safe haven in Afghanistan,
has just over the last several months attacked innocent
civilians in Bali and Tunisia and U.S. Service members and
civilians in Kuwait and Jordan. Late last month, U.S. Coalition
Forces fought the biggest battle in Afghanistan since Operation
Anaconda last spring.
Our intelligence and law enforcement agencies are working
with allied countries to thwart further attacks in the United
States and abroad, but the fact is that we remain vulnerable to
al Qaeda and other terrorists. Indeed, the United States is at
alert ``orange'' today, the second-highest level of alert in
our system. Our military forces are also at heightened force
protection levels worldwide. We remain vulnerable to attack
using conventional explosives, to say nothing of weapons of
mass destruction. Earlier this week, Federal officials even
suggested that the public should make preparations for a
terrorist attack involving chemical, biological, or
Meanwhile, North Korea, a country that possesses weapons of
mass destruction and has rejected the international nuclear
inspectors, has declared it has resumed operations at its
plutonium facilities. North Korea is on the brink of becoming
an undisputed nuclear power. By refusing to open a direct
dialogue with North Korea, even though South Korea wants us to
do just that, we are stoking North Korea's paranoia and that
could lead to additional provocative and possibly irreversible
action on their part.
Iran's admission that it has been mining uranium
underscores our concern that its nuclear energy program is
intended for nuclear weapons. Iraq continues to flout the
international community, not assisting the U.N. weapons
inspectors to find and/or account for chemical and biological
weapons programs. Disagreement over how to address the Iraqi
threat has divided the U.N. Security Council. Moreover, an
Islamist extremist terrorist group operating in northeast Iraq
beyond the control of Saddam Hussein has set up a poison
producing factory. Surely there can be little doubt that Osama
bin Laden would like to see the United States and Britain
attack Iraq. Keeping the world community together through the
U.N. Security Council is exactly what Osama bin Laden doesn't
want to see.
All of us want Saddam Hussein to be disarmed. The best way
to accomplish the goal of disarming Saddam Hussein without war
is if the United Nations speaks with one voice relative to
Iraq. I also believe that if military force is used, the best
way of reducing both short-term risks, including the risks to
the United States and Coalition Forces, and the long-term
risks, including the risk of terrorist attacks on our interests
throughout the world, is if the United Nations specifically
authorizes the use of military force.
That is the bottom line for me. The best way of increasing
any chance of disarming Saddam Hussein without war and of
minimizing casualties in future attacks on the United States if
war does ensue is if the United Nations acts together in the
Security Council relative to Iraq. Supporting U.N. inspections
is an essential step if we are going to keep the Security
Council together. We can support those U.N. inspections by
sharing the balance of our information about suspect sites, by
quickly getting U-2 aircraft in the air over Iraq, with or
without Saddam Hussein's approval, and by giving the inspectors
the time they need to do their work as long as the inspections
I disagree with those, including high officials in our
Government, who say that U.N. inspections are useless. We heard
that before the inspections began. We heard it from Dr. Rice at
the White House last week. I am astounded that some of those
high officials have gone so far as to refer in a derogatory way
to the ``so-called'' U.N. inspectors. If these inspections are
useless unless they have Iraqi assistance in pointing out where
Iraq has hidden or destroyed weapons of mass destruction, why
are we sharing any intelligence at all with the inspectors? Why
are we apparently finally implementing U-2 flights to support
the inspectors? It is one thing to be realistic about the
limitations of the U.N. inspections and not have too high hopes
about what they can produce. It is another thing to denigrate
or prejudge their value, be dismissive and disdainful about the
beliefs of others on the U.N. Security Council about their
value, and to be cavalier about the facts relative to those
Referring to being cavalier about facts brings me to my
next point, the sharing of intelligence information in our
possession with the U.N. inspectors. This is an issue that I
have followed very closely. In the last several weeks at my
request, the CIA has been providing me with classified details
of how much information we have been sharing with the U.N.
inspectors in Iraq. We just began sharing specific information
in early January, according to Secretary Powell, as quoted in
The Washington Post on January 9. While I can't go into those
classified details in an open hearing, I can say that the
information the CIA has provided me made it very clear that we
had shared information only on a small percentage of the
suspect sites in Iraq, that we had not shared information on
the majority of the suspect sites which were confirmed by CIA
staff. At yesterday's hearing of the Intelligence Committee, I
was astounded when Director Tenet repeatedly and firmly told us
that we have now shared with U.N. inspectors information about
every site where we have credible intelligence. Then last
night, in Director Tenet's presence and in the presence of
Senator Warner, his staff acknowledged that we still have
useful information that we have not shared with the inspectors,
which is the opposite of what Director Tenet told the
Intelligence Committee yesterday in open session. If we have
not shared yet all the useful information that we have with the
U.N. inspectors, that would run counter to the administration's
position that the time for inspections is over.
When President Bush addressed the U.N. General Assembly on
September 12 of last year, he said, ``We want the United
Nations to be effective and respected and successful.'' Well,
we have some responsibility to help the United Nations achieve
that. Saying to other countries, including allies, if you do
not see it our way you must have some ulterior motive, doesn't
help. While a number of heads of state and governments have
called for the U.N. Security Council to take the necessary and
appropriate action in response to Iraq's continuing threat to
international peace and security, and some have pledged to
contribute military forces to that effort, others believe that
we should give the inspections the strength and the time they
need to finish the job.
All groups agree on the necessity of disarming Iraq. Rather
than following a course that divides the United Nations and
separates us from some of our closest allies, we should at
least fairly consider courses of action that would unite the
world community against Iraq.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing more today about
the capabilities that al Qaeda, North Korea, and Iraq possess.
I hope we also hear about the risks that we might face to our
homeland and our military and the Middle East, Afghanistan, and
worldwide in taking action without U.N. authority in Iraq, in
not engaging North Korea in serious dialogue and in not
fighting al Qaeda with all our assets whenever and wherever we
find them. Thank you.
Senator Roberts. The procedure recommended by Chairman
Warner is to make available 6 minutes that will be provided to
each Senator. Each Senator can then make an opening statement
at this particular time. In the interest of time, however, we
do want to get to Director Tenet and to the Admiral. Mr. Tenet,
would you proceed, please.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE J. TENET, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
Mr. Tenet. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Last year, in the
wake of the September 11 attack on our country, I focused my
remarks on the clear and present danger posed by terrorists who
seek to destroy who we are and what we stand for. The national
security environment that exists today is significantly more
complex than that of a year ago. I can tell you that the threat
from al Qaeda remains, even though we have made important
strides in the war against terrorism. Secretary of State Powell
clearly outlined last week the continuing threats posed by
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, its efforts to deceive U.N.
inspectors, and the safe haven that Baghdad has allowed for
terrorists in Iraq. North Korea's recent admission that it has
a highly-enriched uranium program, intends to end the freeze on
its plutonium production facilities, and intends to withdraw
from the nonproliferation treaty raised serious new challenges
for the region and the world.
At the same time, we cannot lose sight of those national
security challenges that, while not occupying space on the
front pages, demand a constant level of scrutiny. Challenges
such as the world's vast stretches of ungoverned areas, lawless
zones, veritable no man's lands, like some areas along the
Afghan-Pakistani border where extremist movements find shelter
and can win breathing space to grow. Challenges such as the
numbers of societies and peoples excluded from the benefits of
an expanding global economy, where the daily lot is hunger,
disease, and displacement, and that produce large populations
of disaffected youth who are prime recruits for our extremist
As you have talked about, Mr. Chairman, yesterday and
today, the United States Government last week raised the
terrorist threat level. We did so because of threat reporting
from multiple sources with strong al Qaeda ties. The
information we have points to plots aimed at targets on two
fronts--in the United States and on the Arabian Peninsula. It
points to plots timed to occur as early as the end of the Hajj,
which occurs late this week, and it points to plots that could
include the use of a radiological dispersion device as well as
poisons and chemicals. The intelligence, as I said yesterday,
is not idle chatter on the part of terrorists and their
associates. It is the most specific we have seen and it is
consistent with both our knowledge of al Qaeda doctrine and our
knowledge of the plots this network, and particularly its
senior leadership, has been working on for years.
The intelligence community is working directly and in real
time with friendly services overseas and with our law
enforcement colleagues here at home to disrupt and capture
specific individuals who may be part of this plot. Our
information and knowledge is the result of important strides we
have made since September 11 to enhance our counterterrorism
capabilities and to share with our law enforcement colleagues,
and they with us, the results of disciplined operations,
collection, and analysis of events inside the United States and
Raising the threat level is important to our being as
disruptive as possible. The enhanced security that results from
a higher level of threat can buy us more time to operate
against the individuals who are plotting to do us harm.
Heightened vigilance generates additional information and
This latest reporting underscores the threat that al Qaeda
continues to pose to the United States. The network is
extensive and adaptable. It will take years of determined
effort to unravel this and other terrorist networks and stamp
Mr. Chairman, my statement goes on to note what I believe
are formidable successes that we have had with our law
enforcement partners over the last 14 or 15 months in
disrupting this organization. It notes the important role
Muslim counties continue to play in the war on terrorism, from
Pakistan to Jordan and Egypt, to the Saudis, to the
Indonesians, to the Malaysians. We cannot forget Afghanistan
where the support of the leadership is absolutely essential.
Mr. Chairman, al Qaeda will try to adapt to changing
circumstances as it regroups. It will seek a more secure base
so they can pause from flight and resume planning. We place no
limitations on our expectations of what the organization may do
to survive. We see disturbing signs that al Qaeda has
established a presence in both Iran and Iraq. In addition, we
are also concerned that al Qaeda continues to find refuge in
the hinterlands of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Al Qaeda is also
developing or refining relatively new means of attack including
the use of surface-to-air missiles, poisons, and air and
surface and underwater methods to attack maritime targets.
We know from the events of September 11 that we can never
again ignore a specific type of country. A country unable to
control its own borders and internal territory, lacking
capacity to govern, educate its people or provide fundamental
social services. Such countries can offer extremists a place to
congregate in relative safety.
I told you last year, Mr. Chairman, that bin Laden has a
sophisticated capability in biological weapons. In Afghanistan,
al Qaeda succeeded in acquiring both the expertise and
equipment needed to grow biological agents, including a
dedicated laboratory in an isolated compound in Kandahar. Last
year, I also discussed al Qaeda's efforts to obtain nuclear and
radiological materials as part of an ambitious nuclear agenda.
One year later, we continue to follow every lead in tracking
terrorists' efforts to obtain nuclear materials.
Mr. Chairman, with regard to Iraq, let me quickly
summarize. Last week, Secretary Powell carefully reviewed for
the U.N. Security Council the intelligence that we have on
Iraqi efforts to deceive U.N. inspectors, its programs to
develop weapons of mass destruction, and its support for
I don't plan to go into these matters in detail, but let me
summarize some key points. Iraq has in place an active effort
to deceive U.N. inspectors and deny them access. This effort is
directed by the highest levels of the Iraqi regime. Baghdad has
given clear instructions to its operational forces to hide
banned materials in their possession. Iraq's biological weapons
program includes mobile search and production facilities that
will be difficult, if not impossible, for the inspectors to
find. Baghdad began this program in the mid-1990s, during a
time when U.N. inspectors were in the country. Iraq has
established a pattern of clandestine procurements designed to
reconstitute its nuclear weapons program. These procurements
include and also go well beyond the aluminum tubes that you
have heard so much about. Iraq has tested unmanned aerial
vehicles to ranges that far exceed what it declared to the U.N.
We are concerned that Iraq's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) can
dispense chemical and biological weapons and they can deliver
such weapons to Iraq's neighbors or even transport them to
other countries, including the United States. Iraq is harboring
senior members of a terrorist network led by Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, a close associate of Osama bin Laden. We know
Zarqawi's network was behind the poison plots in Europe that I
discussed earlier as well as the assassination of a U.S. State
Department employee in Jordan.
Iraq has, in the past, provided training in document
forgery and bomb making to al Qaeda. It has also provided
training in poisons and gases to two al Qaeda associates. One
of these associates characterized the relationship he forged
with Iraqi officials as successful. Mr. Chairman, this
information is based on a solid foundation of intelligence. It
comes to us from credible and reliable sources. Much of it is
corroborated by multiple sources and it is consistent with the
pattern of denial and deception exhibited by Saddam Hussein
over the past 12 years.
With regard to proliferation, sir, I will quickly summarize
by saying we have entered a new world of proliferation. The
vanguards of this world are knowledgeable nonstate purveyors of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) materials and technology.
Such nonstate outlets are increasingly capable of providing
technology and equipment that previously could only be supplied
by countries with established capabilities.
Demand creates the market. The desire for nuclear weapons
is on the upsurge. Additional countries may seek to obtain
nuclear weapons as it becomes clear that their neighbors and
regional rivals are already doing so. The domino theory of the
21st century may well be nuclear.
With regard to North Korea, its recent behavior regarding
its longstanding nuclear weapons program makes apparent to all
the dangers Pyongyang poses to its region and to the world.
This includes developing the capability to enrich uranium,
ending the freeze on its plutonium production facilities, and
withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If, as it
seems likely, Pyongyang moves to reprocess spent fuel at the
facilities where it recently abrogated the 1994 International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)-monitored freeze, we assess it
could recover sufficient plutonium for several additional
North Korea also continues to export complete ballistic
missiles and production capabilities with related raw
materials, components, and expertise. Profits from these sales
help Pyongyang to support its missile and other weapons of mass
destruction development programs, and in turn generate new
products to offer its customers.
Indeed, Mr. Chairman, Kim Jong Il's attempt this past year
to parlay the North's nuclear weapons program into political
leverage suggests he is trying to negotiate a fundamentally
different relationship with us, one that implicitly tolerates
North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Although Kim Jong Il
presumably calculates the North's aid, trade, and investment
climate will never improve in the face of U.S. sanctions and
perceived hostility. He is equally committed to retaining and
enlarging his nuclear weapons stockpile.
Mr. Chairman, I want to talk about China. We did not talk
about that yesterday. China's chosen path to long-term regional
and global interest runs through economic growth and Chinese
integration into the global economy. Beijing calculates that as
China's economic mass increases, so too will the pull of its
political gravity. To date China's successes have been dramatic
and disconcerting to some of its neighbors. Despite China's
rapid growth, it remains vulnerable to economic fluctuations
that could threaten political and social stability. China is
increasingly dependent on its external sector to generate rapid
growth and, without rapid growth, China will fall even further
behind in job creation.
The recent Congress of the Communist Party marked a
leadership transition to a younger political generation but
also created a potential division of authority at the top; and,
in light of China's profound policy challenges, an additional
leadership challenge. The former party chief, Jiang Zemin, who
was also scheduled to hand over the presidency to his successor
in both positions, Hu Jintao, is determined to remain in
charge. He retains the chairmanship of the party's Central
Military Commission. The next generation of leaders offer
policy continuity but the current set-up probably guarantees
tensions among leaders uncertain of their own standing and
anxious to secure their positions.
Such tensions may well play out on the issue of Taiwan, the
matter of greatest volatility in U.S.-China relations. For now,
the situation appears relatively placid, but recent history
shows this can change quickly, given the shifting perceptions
and calculations on both sides. Chinese leaders seem convinced
that all trends are moving in their favor. Taiwan is heavily
invested in the mainland, and Chinese military might is
From its perspective, Beijing remains wary of nationalist
popular sentiment on Taiwan and of our arms sales to and
military cooperation with Taipei. As for Taiwan's President
Chen, he may feel constrained by internal political and
economic problems and by Beijing's charm offensive. As he
approaches his re-election bid next year, Chen may react by
reasserting Taiwan's separate identity and expanding its
In this regard, our greatest concern is China's military
buildup. Last year marked new high points for unit training and
weapons integration, all sharply focused on the Taiwan mission,
and on increasing the costs for any who might intervene in a
regional Chinese operation. We anticipate no slowdown to this
trend in the coming year.
Mr. Chairman, my statement goes on to talk about Russia and
Iran. I will enter those into the record.
I want to talk for a minute about South Asia, where I think
our attention must remain focused. On the Pakistan-India border
the underlying cause of tension is unchanged, even though
India's recent military redeployment away from the border
reduces the danger of imminent war. The cycles of tension
between India and Pakistan are growing shorter. Pakistan
continues to support groups that resist India's presence in
Kashmir in an effort to bring Indians to the negotiating table.
Indian frustration with the continuing terrorist attacks, most
of which it attributes to Pakistan, causes New Delhi to reject
any suggestion that it can resume a dialogue with Islamabad.
Any dramatic provocation like the 2001 terrorist attack on
Indian parliament by Kashmir militants runs a very high risk of
sparking another major military deployment.
Mr. Chairman, my statement goes through a number of other
hot spots and transnational issues that I will enter into the
record with your permission.
I would note that with regard to Africa, this is a place
where we do not often pay a lot of attention or enough
attention to. Sub-Saharan Africa's chronic instability will
demand our attention. Africa's lack of democratic
institutionalization combined with pervasive ethnic rifts and
corruption render most of the 48 countries vulnerable to crisis
that can be costly in human lives and lost economic growth. The
Cote d'Ivoire is collapsing, and its collapse will be felt
throughout the region, where neighboring economies are at risk
from the fall-off in trade and from refugees fleeing violence.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tenet follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. George J. Tenet
DCI'S WORLDWIDE THREAT BRIEFING--THE WORLDWIDE THREAT IN 2003: EVOLVING
DANGERS IN A COMPLEX WORLD
Mr. Chairman, last year--in the wake of the September 11 attack on
our country--I focused my remarks on the clear and present danger posed
by terrorists who seek to destroy who we are and what we stand for. The
national security environment that exists today is significantly more
complex than that of a year ago.
I can tell you that the threat from al Qaeda remains,
even though we have made important strides in the war against
Secretary of State Powell clearly outlined last week
the continuing threats posed by Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction, its efforts to deceive U.N. inspectors, and the
safehaven that Baghdad has allowed for terrorists in Iraq.
North Korea's recent admission that it has a highly-
enriched uranium program, intends to end the freeze on its
plutonium production facilities, and has stated its intention
to withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty raised serious new
challenges for the region and the world.
At the same time we cannot lose sight of those national security
challenges that, while not occupying space on the front pages, demand a
constant level of scrutiny.
Challenges such as the world's vast stretches of
ungoverned areas--lawless zones, veritable ``no man's lands''
like some areas along the Afghan-Pakistani border--where
extremist movements find shelter and can win the breathing
space to grow.
Challenges such as the numbers of societies and
peoples excluded from the benefits of an expanding global
economy, where the daily lot is hunger, disease, and
displacement--and that produce large populations of disaffected
youth who are prime recruits for our extremist foes.
Mr. Chairman, the United States Government last week raised the
terrorist threat level. We did so because of threat reporting from
multiple sources with strong al Qaeda ties.
The information we have points to plots aimed at targets on two
fronts--in the United States and on the Arabian Peninsula. It points to
plots timed to occur as early as the end of the Hajj, which occurs late
this week. It points to plots that could include the use of a
radiological dispersion device as well as poisons and chemicals.
The intelligence is not idle chatter on the part of terrorists and
their associates. It is the most specific we have seen, and it is
consistent with both our knowledge of al Qaeda doctrine and our
knowledge of plots this network--and particularly its senior
leadership--has been working on for years.
The intelligence community is working directly, and in real time,
with friendly services overseas and with our law enforcement colleagues
here at home to disrupt and capture specific individuals who may be
part of this plot.
Our information and knowledge is the result of important strides we
have made since September 11 to enhance our counterterrorism
capabilities and to share with our law enforcement colleagues--and they
with us--the results of disciplined operations, collection, and
analysis of events inside the United States and overseas.
Raising the threat level is important to our being as disruptive as
possible. The enhanced security that results from a higher threat level
can buy us more time to operate against the individuals who are
plotting to do us harm. Heightened vigilance generates additional
information and leads.
This latest reporting underscores the threat that the al Qaeda
network continues to pose to the United States. The network is
extensive and adaptable. It will take years of determined effort to
unravel this and other terrorist networks and stamp them out.
Mr. Chairman, the intelligence and law enforcement communities
aggressively continue to prosecute the war on terrorism, and we are
having success on many fronts. More than one third of the top al Qaeda
leadership identified before the war has been killed or captured,
The operations chief for the Persian Gulf area, who
planned the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole.
A key planner who was a Muhammad Atta confidant and a
conspirator in the September 11 attacks.
A major al Qaeda leader in Yemen and other key
operatives and facilitators in the Gulf area and other regions,
including South Asia and Southeast Asia.
The number of rounded-up al Qaeda detainees has now grown to over
3,000-up from 1,000 or so when I testified last year--and the number of
countries involved in these captures has almost doubled to more than
Not everyone arrested was a terrorist. Some have been
released. But the worldwide rousting of al Qaeda has definitely
disrupted its operations. We've obtained a trove of information
we're using to prosecute the hunt still further.
The coalition against international terrorism is stronger, and we
are reaping the benefits of unprecedented international cooperation. In
particular, Muslim governments today better understand the threat al
Qaeda poses to them and day by day have been increasing their support.
Ever since Pakistan's decision to sever ties with the
Taliban--so critical to the success of Operation Enduring
Freedom--Islamabad's close cooperation in the war on terrorism
has resulted in the capture of key al Qaeda lieutenants and
significant disruption of its regional network.
Jordan and Egypt have been courageous leaders in the
war on terrorism.
A number of Gulf states like the United Arab Emirates
are denying terrorists financial safehaven, making it harder
for al Qaeda to funnel funding for operations. Others in the
Gulf are beginning to tackle the problem of charities that
front for, or fund, terrorism.
The Saudis are providing increasingly important
support to our counterterrorism efforts--from arrests to
sharing debriefing results.
Southeast Asian countries like Malaysia and Indonesia,
with majority Muslim populations, have been active in arresting
and detaining terror suspects.
We mustn't forget Afghanistan, where the support of
the new leadership is essential.
Al Qaeda's loss of Afghanistan, the death and capture of key
personnel, and its year spent mostly on the run have impaired its
capability, complicated its command and control, and disrupted its
That said, Mr. Chairman, the continuing threat remains clear. Al
Qaeda is still dedicated to striking the U.S. homeland, and much of the
information we've received in the past year revolves around that goal.
Even without an attack on the U.S. homeland, more than 600 people
were killed in acts of terror last year--and 200 in al Qaeda-related
attacks alone. Nineteen were United States citizens.
Al Qaeda or associated groups carried out a successful
attack in Tunisia and--since October 2002--attacks in Mombasa,
Bali, and Kuwait, and off Yemen against the French oil tanker
Limburg. Most of these attacks bore such al Qaeda trademarks as
intense surveillance, simultaneous strikes, and suicide-
Combined U.S. and allied efforts thwarted a number of al Qaeda-
related attacks in the past year, including the European poison plots.
We identified, monitored, and arrested Jose Padilla, an al Qaeda
operative who was allegedly planning operations in the United States
and was seeking to develop a so-called ``dirty bomb.'' Along with
Moroccan partners we disrupted al Qaeda attacks against U.S. and
British warships in the straits of Gibraltar.
Until al Qaeda finds an opportunity for the big attack, it will try
to maintain its operational tempo by striking ``softer'' targets. What
I mean by ``softer,'' Mr. Chairman, are simply those targets al Qaeda
planners may view as less well protected.
Al Qaeda has also sharpened its focus on our Allies in
Europe and on operations against Israeli and Jewish targets.
Al Qaeda will try to adapt to changing circumstances as it
regroups. It will seek a more secure base area so that it can pause
from flight and resume planning. We place no limitations on our
expectations of what al Qaeda might do to survive.
We see disturbing signs that al Qaeda has established a presence in
both Iran and Iraq. In addition, we are also concerned that al Qaeda
continues to find refuge in the hinterlands of Pakistan and
Al Qaeda is also developing or refining new means of attack,
including use of surface-to-air missiles, poisons, and air, surface,
and underwater methods to attack maritime targets.
If given the choice, al Qaeda terrorists will choose
attacks that achieve objectives--striking prominent landmarks,
inflicting mass casualties, causing economic disruption,
rallying support through shows of strength.
The bottom line here, Mr. Chairman, is that al Qaeda is living in
the expectation of resuming the offensive.
We know from the events of September 11 that we can never again
ignore a specific type of country: a country unable to control its own
borders and internal territory, lacking the capacity to govern, educate
its people, or provide fundamental social services. Such countries can,
however, offer extremists a place to congregate in relative safety.
Al Qaeda is already a presence in several regions that arouse our
concern. The Bali attack brought the threat home to Southeast Asia,
where the emergence of Jemaah Islamiya in Indonesia and elsewhere in
the region is particularly worrisome.
The Mombasa attack in East Africa highlights the
continued vulnerability of western interests and the growing
terrorist threat there.
Although state sponsors of terrorism assume a lower profile today
than a decade ago, they remain a concern. Iran and Syria continue to
support the most active Palestinian terrorist groups, HAMAS and the
Palestine Islamic Jihad. Iran also sponsors Lebanese Hizballah. I'll
talk about Iraq's support to terrorism in a moment.
Terrorism directed at U.S. interests goes beyond Middle Eastern or
religious extremist groups. In our own hemisphere, the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has shown a new willingness to inflict
casualties on U.S. nationals.
Mr. Chairman, let me briefly turn to a grave concern: the
determination of terrorists to obtain and deploy weapons of massive
destructive capability, including nuclear, radiological, chemical, and
The overwhelming disparity between U.S. forces and those of any
potential rival drives terrorist adversaries to the extremes of
warfare--toward ``the suicide bomber or the nuclear device'' as the
best ways to confront the United States. Our adversaries see us as
lacking will and determination when confronted with the prospect of
Terrorists count on the threat of demoralizing blows
to instill massive fear and rally shadowy constituencies to
We continue to receive information indicating that al Qaeda still
seeks chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. The
recently disrupted poison plots in the U.K., France, and Spain reflect
a broad, orchestrated effort by al Qaeda and associated groups to
attack several targets using toxins and explosives.
These planned attacks involved similar materials, and
the implicated operatives had links to one another.
I told you last year, Mr. Chairman, that bin Laden has a
sophisticated biological weapons capability. In Afghanistan, al Qaeda
succeeded in acquiring both the expertise and the equipment needed to
grow biological agents, including a dedicated laboratory in an isolated
compound outside of Kandahar.
Last year, I also discussed al Qaeda's efforts to obtain nuclear
and radiological materials as part of an ambitious nuclear agenda. One
year later, we continue to follow every lead in tracking terrorist
efforts to obtain nuclear materials.
In particular, we continue to follow up on information
that al Qaeda seeks to produce or purchase a radiological
dispersal device. Construction of such a device is well within
al Qaeda capabilities--if it can obtain the radiological
Before I move on to the broader world of proliferation, Mr.
Chairman, I'd like to comment on Iraq. Last week Secretary Powell
carefully reviewed for the U.N. Security Council the intelligence we
have on Iraqi efforts to deceive U.N. inspectors, its programs to
develop weapons of mass destruction, and its support for terrorism. I
do not plan to go into these matters in detail, but I would like to
summarize some of the key points.
Iraq has in place an active effort to deceive U.N.
inspectors and deny them access. This effort is directed by the
highest levels of the Iraqi regime. Baghdad has given clear
directions to its operational forces to hide banned materials
in their possession.
Iraq's biological weapons program includes mobile
research and production facilities that will be difficult, if
not impossible, for the inspectors to find. Baghdad began this
program in the mid-1990s--during a time when U.N. inspectors
were in the country.
Iraq has established a pattern of clandestine
procurements designed to reconstitute its nuclear weapons
program. These procurements include--but also go well beyond--
the aluminum tubes that you have heard so much about.
Iraq has recently flight tested missiles that violate
the U.N. range limit of 150 kilometers. It is developing
missiles with ranges beyond 1,000 kilometers. It retains--in
violation of U.N. resolutions--a small number of SCUD missiles
that it produced before the Gulf War.
Iraq has tested unmanned aerial vehicles to ranges
that far exceed both what it declared to the United Nations and
what it is permitted under U.N. resolutions. We are concerned
that Iraq's UAVs can dispense chemical and biological weapons
and that they can deliver such weapons to Iraq's neighbors or,
if transported, to other countries, including the United
Iraq is harboring senior members of a terrorist
network led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a close associate of Osama
bin Laden. We know Zarqawi's network was behind the poison
plots in Europe that I discussed earlier as well as the
assassination of a U.S. State Department employee in Jordan.
Iraq has in the past provided training in document
forgery and bomb-making to al Qaeda. It also provided training
in poisons and gasses to two al Qaeda associates; one of these
associates characterized the relationship he forged with Iraqi
officials as successful.
Mr. Chairman, this information is based on a solid foundation of
intelligence. It comes to us from credible and reliable sources. Much
of it is corroborated by multiple sources. It is consistent with the
pattern of denial and deception exhibited by Saddam Hussein over the
past 12 years.
Mr. Chairman, what I just summarized for you on Iraq's WMD programs
underscores our broader concerns about proliferation. More has changed
on nuclear proliferation over the past year than on any other issue.
For 60 years, weapon-design information and technologies for producing
fissile material--the key hurdles for nuclear weapons production--have
been the domain of only a few states. These states, though a variety of
self-regulating and treaty based regimes, generally limited the spread
of these data and technologies.
In my view, we have entered a new world of proliferation. In the
vanguard of this new world are knowledgeable non-state purveyors of WMD
materials and technology. Such non-state outlets are increasingly
capable of providing technology and equipment that previously could
only be supplied by countries with established capabilities.
This is taking place side by side with the continued weakening of
the international nonproliferation consensus. Control regimes like the
Non-Proliferation Treaty are being battered by developments such as
North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT and its open repudiation of other
The example of new nuclear states that seem able to
deter threats from more powerful states, simply by brandishing
nuclear weaponry, will resonate deeply among other countries
that want to enter the nuclear weapons club.
Demand creates the market. The desire for nuclear weapons is on the
upsurge. Additional countries may decide to seek nuclear weapons as it
becomes clear their neighbors and regional rivals are already doing so.
The ``domino theory'' of the 21st century may well be nuclear.
With the assistance of proliferators, a potentially
wider range of countries may be able to develop nuclear weapons
by ``leapfrogging'' the incremental pace of weapons programs in
Let me now briefly review, sector by sector, the range on non-
nuclear proliferation threats.
In biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW), maturing
programs in countries of concern are becoming less reliant on foreign
suppliers--which complicates our ability to monitor programs via their
acquisition activities. BW programs have become more technically
sophisticated as a result of rapid growth in the field of biotechnology
research and the wide dissemination of this knowledge. Almost anyone
with limited skills can create BW agents. The rise of such capabilities
also means we now have to be concerned about a myriad of new agents.
Countries are more and more tightly integrating both
their BW and CW production capabilities into apparently
legitimate commercial infrastructures, further concealing them
The United States and its interests remain at risk from
increasingly advanced and lethal ballistic and cruise missiles and
UAVs. In addition to the longstanding threats from Russian and Chinese
missile forces, the United States faces a near-term Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) threat from North Korea. Over the next several
years, we could face a similar threat from Iran and possibly Iraq.
Short- and medium-range missiles already pose a
significant threat to U.S. interests, military forces, and
allies as emerging missile states increase the range,
reliability, and accuracy of the missile systems in their
Several countries of concern remain interested in acquiring a land-
attack cruise missile (LACM) capability. By the end of the decade,
LACMs could pose a serious threat to not only our deployed forces, but
possibly even the U.S. mainland.
Mr. Chairman, I turn now to countries of particular concern,
beginning, as you might expect, with North Korea.
The recent behavior of North Korea regarding its longstanding
nuclear weapons program makes apparent to all the dangers Pyongyang
poses to its region and to the world. This includes developing the
capability to enrich uranium, ending the freeze on its plutonium
production facilities, and withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. If, as seems likely, Pyongyang moves to reprocess spent fuel at
the facilities where it recently abrogated the 1994 IAEA-monitored
freeze, we assess it could recover sufficient plutonium for several
North Korea also continues to export complete
ballistic missiles and production capabilities along with
related raw materials, components, and expertise. Profits from
these sales help Pyongyang to support its missile and other WMD
development programs, and in turn generate new products to
offer to its customers.
Indeed, Mr. Chairman, Kim Jong Il's attempts this past year to
parlay the North's nuclear weapons program into political leverage
suggest he is trying to negotiate a fundamentally different
relationship with Washington--one that implicitly tolerates the North's
nuclear weapons program.
Although Kim presumably calculates the North's aid,
trade, and investment climate will never improve in the face of
U.S. sanctions and perceived hostility, he is equally committed
to retaining and enlarging his nuclear weapons stockpile.
Mr. Chairman, I want to mention our renewed concern over Libya's
interest in WMD. Since the suspension of sanctions against Libya in
1999, Tripoli has been able to increase its access to dual-use nuclear
technologies. Qadhafi stated in an Aljazeera interview last year that
Arabs have ``the right'' to possess weapons of mass destruction
because, he alleges, Israel has them.
Libya clearly intends to reestablish its offensive
chemical weapons capability and has produced at least 100 tons
of chemical agents at its Rabta facility, which ostensibly
reopened as a pharmaceutical plant in 1995.
China vowed in November 2000 to refrain from assisting countries
seeking to develop nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, and last August
Beijing promulgated new missile-related export controls. Despite such
steps, Mr. Chairman, Chinese firms remain key suppliers of ballistic-
and cruise missile-related technologies to Pakistan, Iran, and several
Chinese firms may be backing away from Beijing's 1997
bilateral commitment to forego any new nuclear cooperation with
Iran. We are monitoring this closely.
We are also monitoring Russian transfers of technology and
expertise. Russian entities have cooperated on projects--many of them
dual-use--that we assess can contribute to BW, CW, nuclear, or
ballistic- and cruise-missile programs in several countries of concern,
including Iran. Moscow has, however, reexamined at least some aspects
of military-technical cooperation with some countries and has cut back
its sensitive nuclear fuel-cycle assistance to Iran.
We remain alert to the vulnerability of Russian WMD
materials and technology to theft or diversion. Russia has the
largest inventory of nuclear materials that--unless stored
securely--might be fashioned into weapons that threaten U.S.
persons, facilities, or interests.
Iran is continuing to pursue development of a nuclear fuel cycle
for civil and nuclear weapons purposes. The loss of some Russian
assistance has impeded this effort. It is also moving toward self-
sufficiency in its biological and chemical weapons programs.
Tehran is seeking to enlist foreign assistance in
building entire production plants for commercial chemicals that
would also be capable of producing nerve agents and their
As a supplier, Iran in 2002 pursued new missile-
related deals with several countries and publicly advertises
its artillery rockets, ballistic missiles, and related
I should also note, Mr. Chairman, that India and Pakistan continue
to develop and produce nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them.
I'd like to turn now from the transnational issues of terrorism and
proliferation to countries and regions of the world where the United
States has important interests, beginning with China. I have commented
for the past several years on China's great power aspirations and in
particular Beijing's efforts to maximize its influence within East Asia
relative to the U.S. This is both despite and because global strategic
shifts unfolding since September 11 have impressed upon the Chinese the
limits of their international influence.
Despite Beijing's continuing skepticism of U.S. intentions in
Central and South Asia and its concern that the United States is
gaining regional influence at China's expense, Beijing is emphasizing
developing a ``constructive relationship'' with us. Both before and
since President Jiang's visit to Crawford last fall, Chinese leaders
have been actively seeking a degree of engagement in areas of mutual
interest, such as counterterrorism and regional security issues like
China's chosen path to long-term regional and global influence runs
through economic growth and Chinese integration into the global
economy. Beijing calculates that, as China's economic mass increases,
so too will the pull of its political gravity. To date, China's
successes have been dramatic--and disconcerting to its neighbors.
Despite China's rapid growth, it remains vulnerable to economic
fluctuations that could threaten political and social stability. China
is increasingly dependent on its external sector to generate GDP
growth. Without rapid growth, China will fall even further behind in
The recent Congress of the Chinese Communist Party marked a
leadership transition to a younger political generation but also
created a potential division of authority at the top--and, in light of
China's profound policy challenges, an additional leadership challenge.
The former party chief, Jiang Zemin, who is also
scheduled to hand over the presidency to his successor in both
positions, Hu Jintao, is determined to remain in charge. He
retains the chairmanship of the party's Central Military
Commission. The new leadership contains many Jiang loyalists
The ``next generation'' leaders offers policy
continuity, but the current setup probably guarantees tensions
among leaders uncertain of their own standing and anxious to
secure their positions.
Such tensions may well play out on the issue of Taiwan, the matter
of greatest volatility in U.S.-China relations. For now the situation
appears relatively placid, but recent history shows this can change
quickly, given the shifting perceptions and calculations on both sides.
Chinese leaders seem convinced that all trends are
moving in their favor--Taiwan is heavily invested in the
mainland and Chinese military might is growing.
From its perspective, Beijing remains wary of
nationalist popular sentiment on Taiwan and of our arms sales
to and military cooperation with Taipei.
As for Taiwan President Chen's part, he may feel constrained by
internal political and economic problems and by Beijing's charm
offensive. As he approaches his reelection bid next year, Chen may
react by reasserting Taiwan's separate identity and expanding its
In this regard, our greatest concern is China's military buildup.
Last year marked new high points for unit training and weapons
integration--all sharply focused on the Taiwan mission and on
increasing the costs for any who might intervene in a regional Chinese
operation. We anticipate no slowdown in the coming year.
Moving on to Russia, Mr. Chairman, I noted last year that well
before September 11, President Putin had moved toward deeper engagement
with the United States. I also observed that the depth of domestic
support for his foreign policy was unclear and that issues such as NATO
enlargement and U.S. missile defense policies would test his resolve.
Since then, Putin has reacted pragmatically to foreign policy
challenges and has shown leadership in seeking common ground with the
United States while still asserting Russia's national interests.
This was apparent in Russia's low-key reaction to the
decision to invite the Baltics into NATO and in its serious
attitude toward the new NATO-Russia Council, and in
reconsidering some of it military-technical cooperation with
proliferation states of concern.
Moscow eventually supported U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1441 on Iraq and has been a reliable partner in the
war on terrorism.
International terrorist groups' presence and activities in and
around Russia are influencing Russia's policies, sometimes in ways that
complicate Moscow's relations with neighboring states. For example, the
presence in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge of Chechen fighters and some of
their foreign Mujahideen backers have generated new tensions in
Russian-Georgian relations. These tensions were highlighted on the 1-
year anniversary of the September 11 attacks, when Putin threatened
unilateral force against Georgia because he was not satisfied Tbilisi
had, in his words, taken action to prevent Georgian-based terrorists
from entering Russia.
Similarly, the war in Chechnya is complicated by the continued
influence of radical Chechen and foreign Islamists--some of whom have
ties to al Qaeda. The takeover of the Moscow theater in October proved
counterproductive to the terrorists' aim of forcing Russia to withdraw
from Chechnya. Indeed, the Kremlin has turned this to its advantage by
tying the Chechen opposition to international terrorism.
Meanwhile, over the past year the war in Chechnya
entered a new, brutal phase. Russian security service units
have targeted suspected guerrillas and their supporters and
punished their families. Chechen guerrillas, for their part,
continued to kill pro-Moscow officials and their families.
Putin has no clear domestic rivals for power as he enters an
election season that culminates in parliamentary elections in December
and presidential elections in March 2004.
Putin has sought to recentralize power in Moscow. He exercises
considerable influence over both houses of parliament and the national
electronic news media.
While Putin has reined in some powerful political
figures--a few of the governors and so-called ``oligarchs''--in
many cases he has negotiated a balance of interests.
Putin still hopes to transform Russia over the long term into a
power of global prominence, but his comments since late 2001 have
contained more emphasis on raising the country's economic
competitiveness. To this end, his government has set out a goal of
narrowing the huge gap in living standards between Russians and
Europeans and seeks to advance an ambitious structural reform program.
Over the past 3 years, the Russian Government has made
real progress on reform objectives by cutting tax and tariff
rates, legalizing land sales, and strengthening efforts to
fight money laundering.
Moscow has used its largely oil-driven revenue growth
to pay down the country's external public sector debt to a
moderate level of 40 percent of GDP, half the level of only a
few years ago.
Such reforms are promising, but success ultimately hinges upon the
sustained implementation of reform legislation. A risk exists that the
government will delay critical reforms of state-owned monopolies and
the bloated, corrupt bureaucracy--which Putin himself has highlighted
as a major impediment--to avoid clashes with key interest groups before
the March 2004 Presidential election. Moreover, Russia's economy
remains heavily dependent on commodity exports, which account for 80
percent of all Russian exports and leaves future growth vulnerable to
external price shocks.
We watch unfolding events in Iran with considerable interest, Mr.
Chairman, because despite its antagonism to the United States,
developments there hold some promise as well. Iranian reformers seeking
to implement change have become increasingly frustrated by
conservatives' efforts to block all innovation. We see the dueling
factions as heading for a showdown that seems likely to determine the
pace and direction of political change in Iran. Within the next several
weeks a key test will come as reformers try to advance two pieces of
legislation--bills that would reform the electoral process and
significantly expand presidential powers--they claim will benchmark
their ability to achieve evolutionary change within the system.
Some reformist legislators have threatened to resign
from government if conservatives block the legislation. Others
have argued for holding a referendum on reform if opponents
kill the bills.
Comments from the hardline camp show little
flexibility--and indeed some opponents of reform are pressing
hard to dismantle the parties that advocate political change.
As feuding among political elites continues, demographic and
societal pressures continue to mount. Iran's overwhelmingly young
population--65 percent of Iran's population is under 30 years old--is
coming of age and facing bleak economic prospects and limited social
and political freedoms. Strikes and other peaceful labor unrest are
increasingly common. These problems--and the establishment's
inflexibility in responding to them--drive widespread frustration with
Weary of strife and cowed by the security forces,
Iranians show little eagerness to take to the streets in
support of change. The student protests last fall drew only
5,000 students out of a student population of more than 1
But more and more courageous voices in Iran are
publicly challenging the right of the political clergy to
suppress the popular will--and they are gaining an audience.
Given these developments, we take the prospect of sudden, regime
threatening unrest seriously and continue to watch events in Iran with
that in mind. For now, our bottom line analysis is that the Iranian
regime is secure, but increasingly fragile. The reluctance of reformist
leaders to take their demands for change to the street, coupled with
the willingness of conservatives to repress dissent, keeps the
population disengaged and maintains stability.
We are currently unable to identify a leader,
organization, or issue capable of uniting the widespread desire
for change into a coherent political movement that could
challenge the regime.
In addition, we see little indication of a loss of
nerve among the opponents of reform, who have publicly argued
in favor of using deadly force if necessary to crush the
popular demand for greater freedom.
Although a crisis for the regime might come about if reformers were
to abandon the government or hardliners were to initiate a broad
suppression on leading advocates of change, the resulting disorder
would do little to alleviate U.S. concern over Iran's international
behavior. Conservatives already control the more aggressive aspects of
Iranian foreign policy, such as sponsoring violent opposition to Middle
No Iranian Government, regardless of its ideological
leanings, is likely to willingly abandon WMD programs that are
seen as guaranteeing Iran's security.
On the Pakistan-India border, the underlying cause of tension is
unchanged, even though India's recent military redeployment away from
the border reduced the danger of imminent war. The cycles of tension
between India and Pakistan are growing shorter. Pakistan continues to
support groups that resist India's presence in Kashmir in an effort to
bring India to the negotiating table. Indian frustration with continued
terrorist attacks--most of which it attributes to Pakistan--causes New
Delhi to reject any suggestion that it resume a dialogue with
Without progress on resolving Indian-Pakistani
differences, any dramatic provocation--like 2001's terrorist
attack on the Indian parliament by Kashmir militants--runs a
high risk of sparking another major military deployment.
I also told you last year, Mr. Chairman, that the military campaign
in Afghanistan had made great progress but that the road ahead was full
of challenges. This is no less true today. Given what Afghanistan was
up against at this time last year, its advances are noteworthy, with
impressive gains on the security, political, and reconstruction fronts.
Milestones include establishing the Afghan Interim
Authority, holding the Emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002 to
elect a President and decide on the composition of the Afghan
Transitional Authority (ATA), and establishing judicial,
constitutional, and human rights commissions.
The country is relatively stable, and Kabul is a safer
place today than a year ago. The presence of Coalition Forces
has provided security sufficient for aid organizations and non-
governmental organization's (NGO) to operate. Six battalions of
what will be the Afghan National Army have been trained by the
U.S. and coalition partners to date.
The Afghan Government also has made great strides in
the reconstruction of the beleaguered economy. More than $1
billion in foreign aid has helped repatriate Afghan refugees,
re-opened schools, and repaired roads. The ATA introduced a new
currency, and instituted trade and investment protocols.
That said, daunting, complex challenges lie ahead that include
building institutional barriers against sliding back into anarchy.
Opposition elements, such as Taliban remnants and Hezbi-Islami and al
Qaeda fighters, remain a threat to the Afghan Government and to
Coalition Forces in the eastern provinces. At the same time, criminal
activity, such as banditry and periodic factional fighting continue to
undermine security. Sustained U.S. and international focus is essential
to continue the progress we and the Afghans have made.
The Afghans will also have to decide politically
contentious issues such as how the new constitution will
address the role of Islam, the role sharia law will play in the
legal system, and the structure of the next Afghan Government.
Other major hurdles include bringing local and regional tribal
leaders into the national power structure.
Several Bonn Agreement deadlines are looming,
including the concerning of a constitutional Loya Jirga by
December 2003 (within 18 months of the establishment of the
ATA) and holding free and fair elections of a representative
national government no later than June 2004.
Much effort is needed to improve the living standards
of Afghan families, many of whom have no steady source of
income and lack access to clean drinking water, health care
facilities, and schools.
What must be avoided at all costs is allowing Afghanistan to return
to the internecine fighting and lawlessness of the early 1990s, which
would recreate conditions for the rise of another fanatical movement.
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to address now a range of key transnational
issues that have an immediate bearing on America's national security
and material well-being. They are complex, evolving, and have far-
Globalization--while a net plus for the global economy--is a
profoundly disruptive force for governments to manage. China and India,
for example, have substantially embraced it and retooled sectors to
harness it to national ends, although in other countries it is an
unsought reality that simply imposes itself on society. For example,
many of the politically and economically rigid Arab countries are
feeling many of globalization's stresses--especially on the cultural
front--without reaping the economic benefits.
Latin America's rising populism exemplifies the
growing backlash against globalization in countries that are
falling behind. Last year Brazil's President, ``Lula'' da
Silva, campaigned and won on an expressly anti-globalization
U.N. figures point out that unemployment is
particularly problematic in the Middle East and Africa, where
50 to 80 percent of those unemployed are younger than 25. Some
of the world's poorest and often most politically unstable
countries--including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Haiti, Iraq, Yemen,
and several nations in Sub-Saharan Africa--are among the
countries with the youngest populations in the world through
Among the most unfortunate worldwide are those infected with HIV.
The HIV/AIDS pandemic continues unabated, and last year more than 3
million people died of AIDS-related causes. More than 40 million people
are infected now, and Southern Africa has the greatest concentration of
That said, the intelligence community recently
projected that by 2010, we may see as many as 100 million HIV-
infected people outside Africa. China will have about 15
million cases and India will have 20 to 25 million--higher than
estimated for any country in the world.
The national security dimension of the virus is plain:
it can undermine economic growth, exacerbate social tensions,
diminish military preparedness, create huge social welfare
costs, and further weaken already beleaguered states. The virus
respects no border.
But the global threat of infectious disease is broader than AIDS.
In Sub-Saharan Africa the leading cause of death among the HIV-positive
is tuberculosis. One-third of the globe has the tuberculosis bacillus.
At least 300 million cases of malaria occur each year, with more than a
million deaths. About 90 percent of these are in Sub-Saharan Africa--
and include an annual 5 percent of African children under the age of 5.
Mr. Chairman, the world community is at risk in a number of other
The 35 million refugees and internally displaced
persons in need of humanitarian assistance are straining
limited resources. Substantial aid requirements in southern
Africa, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, and North Korea, plus
expected needs this year in Iraq, Cote d'Ivoire, and elsewhere
in Africa will add up to an unprecedented demand for food and
other humanitarian assistance. Worldwide emergency assistance
needs are likely to surpass the record $8 to $10 billion donors
provided last year for humanitarian emergencies.
Food aid requirements this year will rise more sharply
than other categories of humanitarian assistance, particularly
in Sub-Saharan Africa, because of drought, instability, HIV/
AIDS, and poor governance. Preliminary estimates put the total
food aid needed to meet emergency appeals and long-term food
aid commitments at about 12 million metric tons, 4 million tons
greater than estimated aid supplies.
Mr. Chairman, Sub-Saharan Africa's chronic instability will demand
U.S. attention. Africa's lack of democratic institutionalization
combined with its pervasive ethnic rifts and deep corruption render
most of the 48 countries vulnerable to crises that can be costly in
human lives and lost economic growth. In particular, the potential is
high for Nigeria and Kenya to suffer setbacks in the next year.
Growing ethnic and religious strife, rampant
corruption, and a weak economy will test Nigeria's democracy
before and after the April 2003 election. Its offshore oil
areas provide 9 percent of U.S. crude oil imports and are
insulated from most unrest, but relations with Washington could
rupture if yet another military regime assumes power in Nigeria
during a domestic upheaval.
After 24 years of President Moi's rule, the new
president and ruling coalition in Kenya face many challenges,
including preserving their shaky alliance while overhauling the
constitution. Kenyans' severe economic woes and sky-high
expectations for change do not bode well for the coalition's
stability this year.
In addition, other failed or failing African states may lead to
calls for the United States and other major aid donors to stabilize a
range of desperate situations. In Zimbabwe, President Mugabe's
mismanagement of the economy and clampdown on all political opposition
may touch off serious unrest and refugee flows in coming months.
Cote d'Ivoire is collapsing, and its crash will be
felt throughout the region, where neighboring economies are at
risk from the fall-off in trade and from refugees fleeing
Regarding Latin America, Mr. Chairman, Colombian President Uribe is
off to a good start but will need to show continued improvements in
security to maintain public support and attract investment. He is
implementing his broad national security strategy and moving
aggressively on the counterdrug front--with increased aerial
eradication and close cooperation on extradition. The Armed Forces are
gradually performing better against the FARC. Meanwhile, the
legislature approved nearly all Uribe's measures to modernize the
government and stabilize its finances.
Although Uribe's public support is strong, satisfying
high popular expectations for peace and prosperity will be
challenging. Security and socioeconomic improvements are
complex and expensive. The drug trade will continue to thrive
until Bogota can exert control over its vast countryside.
FARC insurgents are well-financed by drugs and
kidnappings, and they are increasingly using terrorism against
civilians and economic targets--as they demonstrated last
weekend in a lethal urban attack--to wear away the new national
will to fight back.
Venezuela--the third largest supplier of petroleum to the United
States--remains in mid-crisis. The standoff between Hugo Chavez and the
political opposition appears headed toward increased political violence
despite the end of the general strike, which is still being honored by
Because many oil workers have returned to work, the
government is gradually bringing some of the oil sector back on
line. Nevertheless, a return to full pre-strike production
levels remains months. Oil production through March will
probably average less than 2 million barrels per day--1 million
barrels per day below pre-strike levels.
Meanwhile, Chavez, focused on crippling longtime
enemies in the opposition, states he will never resign and has
balked at requests for early elections.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, after several years of modest progress
toward normalization in the Balkans, the situation is beginning to
deteriorate. Although we are unlikely to see a revival of large-scale
fighting or ethnic cleansing, the development of democratic government
and market economies in the region has slowed. Moreover, crime and
corruption remain as major problems that are holding back progress.
International peacekeeping forces led by NATO exert a
stabilizing influence, but the levels of support provided by
the international community are declining.
The real danger, Mr. Chairman, is that the
international community will lose interest in the Balkans. If
so, the situation will deteriorate even further.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome any questions you and the
members of the committee may have for me.
Mr. Tenet. Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude and
respond to Senator Levin's comments about data and inspectors.
I'd like to be quite formal about this.
Chairman Warner. I want you to have that opportunity and
what I'd like to do is give it to you immediately following the
Admiral's statement. You will be given time to reply and I will
STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. LOWELL E. JACOBY, USN, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
Admiral Jacoby. Defense intelligence today is at war on a
global scale. We are committed in support of our military
forces fighting in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. We
provide warning and intelligence support for force protection
of our military deployed worldwide, even as they increasingly
are targeted by terrorists. Detailed intelligence is essential
long before forces are deployed. This detailed effort, termed
intelligence preparation of the battlespace, has been ongoing
for many months to support potential force deployment in Iraq.
Other defense intelligence resources are committed to
careful assessment of the dangerous situation on the Korean
peninsula. Defense intelligence is also providing global
awareness, meaning we are watching for developments that might
require U.S. military employment. These situations range from
internal instability and threats of coups that could require
evacuation of American citizens to interdiction of shipments of
materials associated with WMD. We recognize that we are
expected to know something about everything and it is a
daunting task for those already at war on a global scale.
Beginning with global terrorists, despite our significant
successes to date, terrorism remains the most immediate threat
to U.S. interests at home and abroad. A number of terrorists
groups, including the FARC in Colombia, various Palestinian
organizations and Lebanese Hizbollah, have the capability to do
us harm. I am most concerned about the al Qaeda network. It has
a considerable amount of seasoned operatives and draws support
from an array of legitimate and illegitimate entities. The
network is adaptable, flexible, and extremely agile.
At this point, sir, I defer to Director Tenet's comments
about the al Qaeda network. We are certainly in agreement with
his conclusions. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein seems determined to
retain his WMD programs and become the dominant regional power.
He recognizes the seriousness of the current situation but may
think that he can outwit the international community by
feigning cooperation with U.N. weapons inspectors, hiding
proscribed weapons and activities, playing on regional and
global anti-American sentiments, and aligning himself with the
Palestinian cause. Saddam's penchant for brinksmanship and
miscalculation increases the likelihood that he will continue
to defy international will and relinquish his WMD and related
In North Korea, Pyongyang's open pursuit of additional
nuclear weapons is the most serious challenge to the U.S. and
Northeast Asia in a generation. The outcome of this situation
will shape relations in that region for years to come. While
North Korea's new hard-line approach is designed to drawn
concessions from the United States, Pyongyang's desire for
nuclear weapons reflects a long-term strategic goal that will
not be easily abandoned.
In the global situational awareness arena, while terrorism
and Iraq have our immediate attention, we also must assess
global developments to provide strategic warning on a wide
spectrum of global threats. We continue to generate requisite
intelligence to give our leaders opportunity to preclude,
dissuade, deter or defeat dissuade emerging threats.
Mr. Chairman, there are a number of other of issues that
include weapons of mass destruction, international crime,
instability in several key states and regions, and assessments
with respect to Russia, China, South Korea, parts of Europe,
Latin America, and the Middle East. These are all important.
They are all included in my written testimony. But in the
interest of time, I end my opening remarks here and defer these
issues to the question and answer session. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Jacoby follows:]
Prepared Statement by Vice Adm. Lowell E. Jacoby, USN
Defense Intelligence today is at war on a global scale. We are
committed in support of military forces fighting the war on terrorism
in Afghanistan and other locations where war might take us. We provide
warning and intelligence for force protection of our military deployed
worldwide even as they increasingly are targeted by terrorists.
Detailed intelligence is essential long before forces are deployed.
This detailed effort, termed Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlespace, has been ongoing for many months to support potential
force employment in Iraq. Other Defense Intelligence resources are
committed to careful assessment of the dangerous situation on the
Korean Peninsula. Defense Intelligence is also providing global
awareness, meaning we're watching for developments that might require
U.S. military employment. These situations range from internal
instability and threat of coups that could require evacuation of
American citizens, to interdiction of shipments of materials associated
with weapons of mass destruction. We recognize that we're called upon
to ``know something about everything'' and it's a daunting task for
those already at war on a global scale. Our sustained level of crisis
and operational commitment is straining personnel, equipment, and
resources, and reducing time for ``sustaining'' activities such as
training, education, data base maintenance, and longer-term research
and analysis. I am increasingly concerned that our Defense Intelligence
capability is being stretched too thin and that we are being forced to
sacrifice longer-term capabilities in order to respond to today's
NEAR TERM PRIORITIES
Within the broader global context, my most important current
priorities are supporting the global war on terrorism, retaining our
readiness to support any military missions that may be assigned, Iraq,
monitoring the North Korea situation, and maintaining the global
situational awareness required to warn decision-makers of emerging
Despite our significant successes to date, terrorism remains the
most immediate threat to U.S. interests at home and abroad. A number of
terrorist groups--including the FARC in Colombia, various Palestinian
organizations, and Lebanese Hizballah--have the capability to do us
harm. But I am most concerned about the al Qaeda network.
Al Qaeda retains a presence on six continents, with key senior
leaders still at large. It has a corps of seasoned operatives and draws
support from an array of legitimate and illegitimate entities. The
network is adaptive, flexible, and arguably, more agile than we are.
Eager to prove its capabilities in the wake of significant network
losses, al Qaeda had its most active year in 2002--killing hundreds in
Bali, striking a French oil tanker off the coast of Yemen, attacking
marines and civilians in Kuwait, murdering a U.S. diplomat in Jordan,
bombing a hotel popular with foreign tourists in Mombassa, attacking a
synagogue in Tunisia, and attempting to down an Israeli airliner.
Al Qaeda remains focused on attacking the U.S., but I expect
increasing attacks against our allies--particularly in Europe--as the
group attempts to widen its campaign of violence and undermine
coalition resolve. I'm also very concerned about the potential for more
attacks using portable surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) with civilian
airliners as the key target. Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups are
seeking to acquire chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
capabilities, and we are working to prevent their use of WMD.
Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) or ``dirty bombs,'' pose a
particular problem. An RDD is simple to make, consisting of
conventional explosives and radiological materials widely available
from legitimate medical, academic, and industrial activities.
Saddam Hussein appears determined to retain his WMD and missile
programs, reassert his authority over all of Iraq, and become the
dominant regional power. He recognizes the seriousness of the current
situation, but may think he can ``outwit'' the international community
by feigning cooperation with U.N. weapons inspectors, hiding proscribed
weapons and activities, playing on regional and global ``anti-
American'' sentiments, and aligning himself with the ``Palestinian
cause.'' Saddam's penchant for brinksmanship and miscalculation
increases the likelihood that he will continue to defy international
will and refuse to relinquish his WMD and related programs. Should
military action become necessary to disarm Saddam, he will likely
employ a host of desperate measures.
Saddam's conventional military options and
capabilities are limited, but I expect him to preemptively
attack the Kurds in the north and conduct missile and terrorist
attacks against Israel and U.S. regional or worldwide
interests--perhaps using WMD and the regime's links with al
He will certainly attempt to energize ``the Arab
street,'' calling for attacks against U.S. and allied targets
and encouraging actions against Arab governments that support
If hostilities begin, Saddam is likely to employ a
``scorched-earth'' strategy, destroying food, transportation,
energy, and other infrastructures, attempting to create a
humanitarian disaster significant enough to stop a military
advance. We should expect him to use WMD on his own people, to
exacerbate humanitarian conditions, complicate allied
operations, and shift world opinion away from his own
transgressions by blaming us.
Pyongyang's open pursuit of additional nuclear weapons is the most
serious challenge to U.S. regional interests in a generation. The
outcome of this current crisis will shape relations in Northeast Asia
for years to come. While the North's ``new'' hard-line approach is
designed to draw concessions from the United States, Pyongyang's desire
for nuclear weapons reflects a long term strategic goal that will not
be easily abandoned. Three factors complicate the issue.
North Korea's chronic proliferation activities are
troubling in their own right today, and an indication that the
North would be willing to market nuclear weapons in the future.
Development of the Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2) missile, which
could target parts of the U.S. with a nuclear weapon-sized
payload in the two-stage configuration, and has the range to
target all of North America if a third stage were used.
Pyongyang's significant military capabilities,
composed of large, forward deployed infantry, armor, and
artillery forces, a full range of WMD (including perhaps two
nuclear weapons), and hundreds of short- and medium-range
missiles, capable of striking all of South Korea and Japan. War
on the peninsula would be violent, destructive, and could occur
with very little warning.
Pyongyang will continue its hard-line rhetoric, while moving
forward with ``start-up'' and reprocessing activities at the Yongbyon
nuclear facility. Kim Jong Il has a number of options for ratcheting-up
the pressure, to include: increasing efforts to drive a wedge between
the U.S. and other regional states; provocative actions along the
Demilitarized Zone; increasing military training and readiness; and
conducting large-scale military exercises or demonstrations, including
a missile launch or nuclear weapons test.
Global Situational Awareness
While terrorism, Iraq, and North Korea have our immediate
attention, they are not the only challenges we face. We must assess
global developments to provide strategic warning on a wide spectrum of
potential threats. We continue to generate the requisite intelligence
to give our leaders the opportunity to preclude, dissuade, deter, or
defeat emerging threats.
enduring global realities
The situations outlined above, and others we have to contend with,
have their basis in a number of ``fundamental realities'' at work in
the world. These are enduring--no power, circumstance, or condition is
likely to emerge in the next decade capable of overcoming them and
creating a less turbulent global environment. Collectively, they create
the conditions from which threats and challenges emerge, and they
define the context in which U.S. strategy, interests, and forces
Reactions to U.S. Dominance
Much of the world is increasingly apprehensive about U.S. power and
influence. Many are concerned about the expansion, consolidation, and
dominance of American values, ideals, culture, and institutions.
Reactions to this sensitivity to growing ``Americanization'' can range
from mild `chafing' on the part of our friends and allies, to fear and
violent rejection on the part of our adversaries. We should consider
that these perceptions, mixed with angst over perceived ``U.S.
unilateralism'' will give rise to significant anti-American behavior.
The increasing global flow of money, goods, services, people,
information, technology, and ideas remains an important influence.
Under the right conditions, globalization can be a very positive force,
providing the political, economic, and social context for sustained
progress. But in those areas unable to exploit these advantages, it can
leave large numbers of people seemingly worse off, exacerbate local and
regional tensions, increase the prospects and capabilities for
conflict, and empower those who would do us harm. Our greatest
challenge may be encouraging and consolidating the positive aspects of
globalization, while managing and containing its ``downsides.''
Uneven Economic and Demographic Growth
The world will add another billion people over the next 10 to 15
years, with 95 percent of that increase occurring in developing
nations. Rapid urbanization continues--some 20-30 million of the
world's poorest people migrate to urban areas each year. Economic
progress in many parts of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin
America will not keep pace with population increases. These conditions
strain the leadership, resources, and infrastructures of developing
states. Corrupt and ineffective governments particularly are unable to
cope. Their actions marginalize large numbers of people, foster
instability, spawn ethnic, religious, and cultural conflict, create
lawless safe-havens, and increase the power of dangerous non-state
entities. In some areas, particularly in the Middle East, rising
unemployment among expanding youth populations, stagnant or falling
living standards, ineffective governments, and decaying infrastructures
create environments conducive to extremist messages.
General Technology Proliferation
Advances in information processing, biotechnology, communications,
materials, micro-manufacturing, and weapons development are having a
significant impact on the way people live, think, work, organize, and
fight. New vulnerabilities, interdependencies, and capabilities are
being created in both advanced and less developed states. The
globalization of ``R&D intensive'' technologies is according smaller
countries, groups, and individuals access to capabilities previously
limited to major powers. The integration of various advancements, and
unanticipated applications of emerging technologies, makes it extremely
difficult to predict the technological future. Surprises will result.
Some aspects of our technological advantage are likely to erode.
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Proliferation
The long-term trends with respect to WMD and missile proliferation
are bleak. States seek these capabilities for regional purposes, or to
provide a hedge to deter or offset U.S. military superiority.
Terrorists seek greater physical and psychological impacts. The
perceived ``need to acquire'' is intense and, unfortunately,
globalization provides a more amenable proliferation environment. Much
of the technology and many of the raw materials are readily available.
New alliances have formed, pooling resources for developing these
capabilities, while technological advances and global economic
conditions make it easier to transfer materiel and expertise. The basic
sciences are widely understood, although the complex engineering tasks
required to produce an effective weapons capability are not achieved
Some 25 countries possess or are actively pursuing WMD or missile
programs. The threat to U.S. and allied interests will grow during the
Chemical and biological weapons. These are generally
easier to develop, hide, and deploy than nuclear weapons and
are more readily available. Over a dozen states have biological
or chemical warfare programs, including stockpiles of lethal
agents. The associated technologies are relatively inexpensive,
and have ``legitimate'' uses in the medical, pharmaceutical,
and agricultural industries. Detection and counter
proliferation are very difficult. I expect these weapons will
be used in a regional conflict and by a terrorist group.
Nuclear weapons. Iran and Iraq have active nuclear
programs and could have nuclear weapons within the decade.
North Korea is seeking additional fissile material to increase
its nuclear stockpile and its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty--the first state ever to do so--may prompt
other nations to rethink their positions on nuclear weapons.
India and Pakistan will increase their inventories and seek to
improve associated delivery systems.
Ballistic and cruise missiles. In addition to existing
Russian and Chinese capabilities, by 2015 the U.S. will likely
face new ICBM threats from North Korea, Iran, and possibly
Iraq. Meanwhile, the proliferation of theater-range ballistic
and cruise missiles, and associated technologies, is a growing
challenge. The numbers, ranges, accuracies, mobility, and
destructive power of these systems will increase significantly,
providing many states capabilities to strike targets within and
beyond their region.
Proliferation. Russia, China, and North Korea are the
suppliers of primary concern, but I expect an increase in
Pakistani and Iranian proliferation. Russia remains involved in
ballistic missile and nuclear programs in Iran. China has
provided missile assistance to Iran and Pakistan, and may be
connected to nuclear efforts in both states. North Korea is the
world's primary source of ballistic missiles and related
components and materials. Finally, I worry about the prospect
of secondary proliferation--today's technology importers
becoming tomorrow's exporters. Iran is beginning to provide
missile production technologies to Syria. Over time, Iran, like
North Korea today, may have the capability to export complete
missile systems. It is also critical for governments that are
not involved in proliferation to strengthen export control laws
and enforcement to prevent entities from proliferating
Declining global defense spending. Global defense
spending has dropped 50 percent during the past decade and,
with the exception of some parts of Asia, is likely to remain
limited. This trend will have multiple impacts. First, both
adversaries and allies will not keep pace with the U.S.
military. This drives foes toward ``asymmetric options,''
widens the capability gap between U.S. and allied forces, and
increases the demand on unique U.S. force capabilities.
Additional, longer-term impacts on global defense technology
development and on U.S.-allied defense industrial cooperation
and technological competitiveness are likely. Finally, defense
resource constraints, declining arms markets, and globalization
are leading to a more competitive global armaments industry. In
this environment, technology transfer restrictions and arms
embargoes will be more difficult to maintain, monitor, and
International crime. Criminal groups in Western
Europe, China, Colombia, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, and
Russia are broadening their global activities and are
increasingly involved in narcotics trafficking, alien
smuggling, and illicit transfers of arms and other military
technologies. My major concern is over the growing link between
terrorism and organized crime, especially the prospect that
organized criminal groups will use their established networks
to traffic in nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and to
facilitate movement of terrorist operatives.
Increasing numbers of people in need. A host of
factors--some outlined above--have combined to increase the
numbers of people facing deepening economic stagnation,
political instability, and cultural alienation. These
conditions provide fertile ground for extremism. Their
frustration is increasingly directed at the U.S. and the west.
Other Regional Issues
There are a number of other regional situations we must monitor
because of their potential to develop into more serious challenges.
The prolonged Israeli-Palestinian conflict is furthering anti-
American sentiment, increasing the likelihood of terrorism directed at
U.S. interests, increasing the pressure on moderate Middle East
regimes, and carries with it the potential for wider regional conflict.
With each side determined to break the other's will, I see no end to
the current violence.
Tension Between India and Pakistan
After last year's military standoff along the Line-of-Control
(LOC), both Islamabad and Delhi took steps to defuse tensions. But with
the Kashmir situation still unresolved and with continued cross border
infiltration from Pakistan, the potential for miscalculation remains
high, especially in the wake of some violent `triggering' event such as
another spectacular terrorist attack or political assassination. Both
sides retain large forces close to the tense LOC and continue to
develop their WMD and missile programs. Recent elections have hardened
India's resolve and constrain Musharraf's ability to offer additional
Pressures in the Muslim World
The Islamic would is sorting through competing visions of what it
means to be a Muslim state in the modern era. Unfavorable demographic
and economic conditions and efforts to strike a balance between
modernization and respect for traditional values are exacerbated by the
global war on terrorism, continued Israeli-Palestinian violence, and
the Iraqi situation. This fosters resentment toward the west and makes
it difficult to define the vision of a modern Islamic state. These
pressures will be most acute in states important to the U.S., including
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Even
in countries where Muslim populations are a minority, such as the
Philippines, there are threats from the extremist fringe bent on the
violent overthrow of democratic rule.
Pakistan. While Pakistan is making progress in its
return to a functioning democracy, President Musharraf faces
significant political and economic challenges and continued
opposition. Musharraf claims little influence over the Kashmiri
militants and other religious extremists, and Pakistan does not
completely control areas in the northwest where concentrations
of al Qaeda and Taliban remain. Popular hostility to the United
States is growing, driven in part by cooperation between
Washington and Islamabad against terrorism. Islamist opponents
of the current government, or religious extremists, could try
to instigate a political crisis through violent means. Coup or
assassination could result in an extremist Pakistan.
Afghanistan. President Karzai is making progress in
stabilizing the political situation, but continues to face
challenges from some local and regional leaders, criminals, and
remnant al Qaeda and Taliban elements. Assassination of
President Karzai would fundamentally undermine Afghan
Indonesia. President Megawati is attempting to deal
with serious social and economic problems and to confront
Islamic extremists, without undermining her support from
moderate Muslims. Her failure would increase the popular appeal
of radical elements.
Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia. The leadership in all
three countries is subject to increased pressure, but each
probably has the capacity to contain serious unrest. However,
in a worst-case scenario of mass protests that threatened
regime control, their support for U.S. basing, overflights, and
the war on terrorism would likely be withdrawn.
OTHER MAJOR REGIONAL ACTORS
As the recent protests in Tehran attest, Iran is a country with
growing internal tensions. Most Iranians want an end to the clerical
rule of the Ayatollahs. Mohammed Khatami, Iran's president, received
the bulk of his now-waning support from minorities, youths, and women
when he first won the elections. He is also vulnerable to being forced
aside by the religious conservatives who have held power since 1979.
Iran's conservatives remain in control and continue to view the U.S.
with hostility. Iran remains the leading state-sponsor of terrorism.
For instance, it has provided safe-haven to al Qaeda and remains the
principal source of military supplies and financial support for
Hizballah. For these reasons, I remain concerned with Tehran's
deliberate military buildup.
Iran is pursuing the fissile material and technology
required to develop nuclear weapons. It uses its contract with
Russia for the civilian Bushehr nuclear reactor to obtain
sensitive dual-use technologies that directly support its
weapons program. If successful, Tehran will have a nuclear
weapon within the decade.
Iran has a biological warfare program and continues to
pursue dual-use biotechnology equipment and expertise from
Russian and other sources. It maintains a stockpile of chemical
warfare agents and may have weaponized some of them into
artillery shells, mortars, rockets, and aerial bombs.
Teheran has a relatively large ballistic missile
force--hundreds of Chinese CSS-8s, SCUD Bs and SCUD Cs--and is
likely assembling additional SCUDs in country. It is also
developing longer-range missiles and continues to test the
Shahab-3 (1,300 km range). Iran is pursing the technology to
develop an ICBM/space launch vehicle and could flight test that
capability before the end of the decade. Cooperation with
Russian, North Korean, and Chinese entities is critical to
Tehran's ultimate success.
Iran's navy is the most capable in the region and
could stem the flow of oil from the Gulf for brief periods by
employing a layered force of diesel-powered KILO submarines,
missile patrol boats, naval mines, and sea and shore-based
anti-ship cruise missiles. Aided by China, Iran is developing
potent anti-ship cruise missile capabilities and is working to
acquire more sophisticated naval capabilities.
Moscow's muted reaction to NATO enlargement and the U.S. withdrawal
from the ABM Treaty, its cooperation in the war on terrorism, and its
acceptance of a U.S. military presence in Central Asia emphasize
President Putin's commitment to closer integration with the west. I am
hopeful the current cooperative atmosphere can be built upon to form a
more positive and lasting security relationship. That said, there are
no easy solutions to the tremendous challenges confronting Russia. I
remain concerned about Russian proliferation of advanced military and
WMD technologies, the security of its nuclear materials and weapons,
the expanding global impact of Russian criminal syndicates, and
unfavorable demographic trends.
Meanwhile, the Russian Armed Forces continue in crisis. Moscow's
defense expenditures are inadequate to overcome the problems associated
with a decade of military neglect, much less fund Russia's plans for
military reform, restructuring, and modernization. Even priority
strategic systems have not been immune to the problems affecting the
Russian military. The deployment of the SS-27 ICBM is now several years
behind schedule. Overall system aging, chronic underfunding, and arms
control agreements ensure that Russian strategic warhead totals will
continue to decline--from approximately 4,500 operational today to a
level near 1,500 by 2010. For at least the next several years, the
military will continue to experience shortfalls in pay, housing,
procurement, and training. These factors, the war in Chechnya, and
inconsistent leadership, will undermine morale and readiness.
In November 2002, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held its 16th
Congress. Vice President Hu Jintao was selected as CCP General
Secretary and Jiang Zemin was re-appointed Chairman of the Central
Military Commission. Beijing is stressing stability during this period
of transition and I expect few changes to China's national priorities,
including military modernization.
China's total military spending will continue growing
at about the same rate as the economy. Beijing spent between
$40 and $65 billion on defense last year (about 5 percent of
GDP) and is content with that rate of investment.
Strategic force modernization is a continuing
priority. China is becoming less reliant on the vulnerable,
silo-based CSS-4 ICBM by transitioning to a mix of more
survivable, mobile, and solid propellant ICBMs. Three new
strategic missiles will likely be fielded: the road-mobile DF-
31, an extended range DF-31 variant, and a new submarine
launched ballistic missile, which will deploy on a new
ballistic missile submarine.
The People's Liberation Army (PLA) will sustain its
focus on acquiring high-technology arms--especially air, air
defense, anti-submarine, anti-surface ship, reconnaissance, and
battle management capabilities--and will continue to emphasize
the professionalization of the officer corps. These elements
are essential to Beijing's force design concept--pursing the
capability to operate against a `high-technology' opponent
employing long-range precision strike capabilities--in other
words, the United States. China also is rapidly expanding its
conventionally-armed theater missile force, some of which can
target U.S. bases in the region, to provide increased leverage
against Taiwan and, to a lesser extent, other U.S. Asian
COPING WITH U.S. POWER
Our opponents understand they cannot match our political, economic,
and military power. Accordingly, they seek to avoid decisive
engagements and act indirectly, hoping to extract a price we are
unwilling to pay, or to present us with capabilities and situations we
cannot react to in a timely manner. They want to fundamentally change
the way others view the United States. This could include: undermining
our political, economic, and social infrastructures, thwarting U.S.
global leadership, undermining our will to remain globally engaged, and
curtailing the global appeal of our ideas, institutions, and culture.
Threats to the Homeland
Many adversaries believe the best way to avoid, deter, or offset
U.S. power is to develop a capability to threaten the U.S. homeland. In
addition to the traditional threat from strategic nuclear missiles, our
national infrastructure is vulnerable to physical and computer attack.
The interdependent nature of the infrastructure creates more
vulnerability, because attacks against one sector--the electric power
grid for instance--would impact other sectors as well. Many defense-
related critical infrastructures are vulnerable to a wide range of
attacks, especially those that rely on commercial sector elements with
multiple, single points of failure. Foreign states have the greatest
attack potential (in terms of resources and capabilities), but the most
immediate and serious threat today is from terrorists carrying out
well-coordinated strikes against selected critical nodes. Al Qaeda has
spoken openly of targeting the U.S. economy as a way of undermining our
global power and uses publicly available Internet web sites to
reconnoiter American infrastructure, utilities, and critical
The Intelligence Threat
We continue to face extensive intelligence threats targeted against
our national security policy-making apparatus, national infrastructure,
military, and critical technologies. The open nature of our society,
and the ease with which money, technology, information, and people move
around the globe, make counterintelligence and security difficult.
Sensitive business information and advanced technologies are
increasingly at risk as both adversaries and allies conduct espionage
against the private sector. They seek technological, financial, and
commercial information that will provide a competitive edge in the
global economy. Several countries continue to pose a serious challenge,
prioritizing collection against U.S. military and technological
developments, and diplomatic initiatives. The threat from these
countries is sophisticated and increasing. They target our political,
economic, military, and scientific information, and their intelligence
services have demonstrated exceptional patience and persistence in
pursuing priority targets.
Adversaries recognize our reliance on advanced information systems
and understand that information superiority provides the U.S. unique
advantages. Accordingly, numerous potential foes are pursuing
information operations capabilities as a means to undermine domestic
and international support for U.S. actions, attack key parts of the
U.S. national infrastructure, and preclude our information superiority.
Information operations can involve psychological operations, physical
attacks against key information nodes, and computer network attacks.
These methods are relatively inexpensive, can have a disproportionate
impact on a target, and offer some degree of anonymity. I expect this
threat to grow significantly over the next several years.
For at least the next decade, adversaries who contemplate engaging
the U.S. military will struggle to find ways to deal with overwhelming
U.S. force advantages. They will take the time to understand how we
operate, will attempt to identify our strengths and vulnerabilities,
and will pursue operational and technological initiatives to counter
key aspects of the ``American Way of War.'' They will focus extensively
on the transformation goals that will drive U.S. military developments,
and will pursue programs that promise affordable ``counter-
transformational'' capabilities. Accordingly, I expect our potential
enemies will continue to emphasize the following:
WMD and precision weapons delivery capabilities that
allow effective targeting of critical theater bases of
operation, personnel concentrations, and key logistics
facilities and nodes, from the earliest stages of a campaign.
My expectation is that during the next decade, a number of
states will develop precision attack capabilities roughly
equivalent to what the U.S. fielded in the mid-1990s. These
will increasingly put our regional bases and facilities at
Counter-access capabilities designed to deny access to
key theaters, ports, bases, and facilities, and critical air,
land, and sea approaches. I am especially concerned about the
global availability of affordable and effective anti-surface
ship systems (cruise missiles, submarines, torpedoes, naval
mines), and a number of other long-range interdiction and area
denial technologies. Our adversaries will attempt to exploit
political, social, and military conditions in a number of host-
nations to complicate the future overseas basing environment
for the U.S.
Counter-precision engagement capabilities focused on
defeating our precision intelligence and attack systems. This
includes the growing availability of global positioning system
jammers, the increased use of denial and deception (including
decoys, camouflage, and underground facilities), the
proliferation of advanced air defense systems, more mobile and
survivable adversary strike platforms (especially missiles),
and improved efforts to complicate our targeting process by
using ``human shields,'' or by locating other high-value assets
in ``no-strike areas'' (urban centers, or near hospitals,
schools, religious facilities, etc.).
Space and space-denial capabilities. Adversaries
recognize the importance of space and will attempt to improve
their access to space platforms, either indigenous or
commercial. Worldwide, the availability of space products and
services is accelerating, fueled by the proliferation of
advanced satellite technologies and increased cooperation among
states. While generally positive, these developments provide
unprecedented communications, reconnaissance, and targeting
capabilities to our adversaries.
A number of potential foes are also developing capabilities to
threaten U.S. space assets. Some countries already have systems, such
as satellite laser range-finding devices and nuclear-armed ballistic
missiles, with inherent anti-satellite capabilities. A few countries
have programs that could result in improved space object tracking,
electronic warfare or jamming, and kinetic or directed energy weapons.
But these techniques are expensive and won't be widely available in the
next 10 years. Other states and non-state entities are pursuing more
limited, though potentially effective, approaches that don't require
large resources or a high-tech industrial base. These tactics include
denial and deception, signal jamming, and ground segment attack.
As I have noted above, a wide array of threats exists today and
others are developing over time. Collectively, these challenges present
a formidable barrier to our vision of a secure and prosperous
Against this backdrop, the old defense intelligence threat
paradigm, which focused primarily on the military capabilities of a
small set of potential adversary states, no longer addresses the entire
threat spectrum. More importantly, the emerging threats cannot be
dismissed as ``lesser included cases.'' In this environment,
traditional concepts of security, threat, deterrence, intelligence,
warning, and military superiority are not adequate. We must adapt and
respond to these new conditions just as our enemies pursue new ways to
diminish our overwhelming power.
While the challenges facing us are daunting, I am enthusiastic
about the unique opportunity we have to transform our capabilities,
personnel, and processes to better address the changing security
environment. The intelligence transformation process--intended to
improve our capability to provide strategic warning, better facilitate
effects-based campaigns, provide greater insights into adversaries'
intentions, improve preparation of the intelligence and operational
battlespace, and more effectively support homeland defense--will be the
centerpiece of my tenure as Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.
The Defense Intelligence community--composed of DIA, the Service
Intelligence Centers, and the Combatant Command Intelligence Centers--
is working hard to develop the processes, techniques, and capabilities
necessary to handle the current threat as well as new and emerging
security challenges. As I said at the outset, we are at war on a global
scale and the task is daunting. With your continued support, I am
confident we will be able to provide our decisionmakers with the
intelligence they need.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. I want to discuss my
perspective on the observations made by my colleague this
morning, the ranking member. Then Director Tenet, we will
listen to you further.
The meeting that we had with the President last Wednesday,
the senior members of the House and Senate, was followed by a
brief meeting with Condoleeza Rice, myself, Senator Levin, and
possibly one other, at which time Senator Levin raised these
concerns that he has expressed this morning. It was my clear
impression, listening to the National Security Advisor to the
President, that all of the material that we deemed helpful to
the inspectors had been or was in the process of being given to
Hans Blix and to the Security Council.
Yesterday we had the opportunity to resume that
conversation with the director, Mr. Foley, Senator Levin, and
myself. The four of us had a meeting for about a half hour, at
which time the discussion resumed. Now, I do not wish to get
into the questions of numbers and so forth, but again, it is
clear to this Senator that while there have been comments by
members of the administration as to their concern about the
likelihood of the inspection process succeeding, Hans Blix
himself has clearly said that Iraq has not been cooperative. It
is that lack of cooperation that has been the basic predicate
that the administration has expressed concern about, and that
has been made eminently clear publicly.
Now, I find two things. One, I am satisfied that this
administration has in a conscientious way, in a timely way,
transmitted this important information to the inspectors in the
hopes that their task could have been more fruitful. Second, I
find absolutely no evidence to indicate that any member of this
administration would have used this process of submitting
evidence to Blix in any other manner than to help and foster
success by the inspectors. So at this time, Director Tenet, I
think it is opportune for you to reply to me.
Mr. Tenet. I think Senator Levin has raised a very
important question, and we have spent a great deal of time
assembling all the facts; and let me walk you through where we
are. We, the American intelligence community, have had
intelligence exchanged with the United Nations on Iraq and WMD
in sensitive sites for over 10 years. That is an important
point to make. There is therefore a very strong common
understanding of sites of potential interest to inspectors,
whether they were U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors
or U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission
(UNMOVIC) inspectors or IAEA inspectors.
When the inspections began, we drew up a list of suspect
sites which we believe may have a continuing association with
Iraq's WMD programs. The list is dynamic. It changes according
to available intelligence or other information we receive. Of
this set number of suspect sites, we identified a specific
number as being highest interest, highest value or moderate
value, because of recent activities suggesting ongoing WMD
association or other intelligence information that we received.
As I said yesterday, we have briefed all of these high
value and moderate value sites to UNMOVIC and the IAEA. Of the
remaining sites, of lower interest on this suspect site list, I
had my analysts review all of them last night to see what we
have shared with UNSCOM, with UNMOVIC, and with IAEA. We
identified a handful, one handful of sites which may not have
been known to the UNSCOM inspectors that we will pass to them.
Now, the important thing to also note is that in addition
we continue to provide additional site information to UNSCOM
either in response to their questions on a daily basis, because
they have their own site lists, they receive data from other
countries, or as we continue to receive new information.
It is important to note that our support to UNMOVIC and the
IAEA goes well beyond the provision of information on just
sites. We have briefed them on the Iraqi declaration. We have
briefed them on missiles. We have briefed them on the nuclear
program. We briefed them on biological weapons, on mobile
biological weapons, on a whole range of subjects. Our analysts
are in daily contact with their analysts. We take this
seriously and professionally and that is the record as we put
it together, sir, to try to put this in some context. Questions
Chairman Warner. Fine. Do you agree with my observation,
having listened and carefully observed and participated in
these meetings, that we as a Nation have conscientiously given
them everything as we have received it--as you say, it is
continuing to come in--in such a way as to foster the ability
of the inspectors to do their work?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, my direction to our community and our
people was to ``flood the zone,'' to work with these people on
a daily basis to do everything that we can to assist their
inspection process, and that is what we are trying to do each
and every day.
Chairman Warner. I find no basis by your agency or anyone
else in this administration to impede that flow in such a way
as to contribute to their inability to discover the evidence
that we know as a Nation is somewhere hidden in that country.
Am I correct in that?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I can tell you, I can just repeat my
statement about what we are doing each and every day. I will
just tell you what our motivation is, what we are trying to do,
and that the men and women that work for us are trying to do it
each and every day.
Chairman Warner. Now the question is going to be
forthcoming here with regard to whether or not in the Security
Council there will be some suggestions to the effect that we
double, quadruple, whatever number may be put down on the
table, the number of inspectors in the hopes that they can have
a greater degree of success. Do you see any evidence that this
would lead to a more fruitful process of inspections?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, let me say that the burden here is not on
the inspectors. The burden here is on Iraq. Everything that
Iraq has done since its initial date of declaration, which was
wholly inadequate, everything that they have done to clean up
sites before the inspectors arrive, to have Iraqi intelligence
officers pose as scientists at sites that would be visited, to
provide incomplete lists of scientists to be interviewed--you
heard Secretary Powell's speech. They have done nothing here to
live up to their obligations to facilitate an inspection
process. The burden on the Iraqi side is as yet, to my
professional judgment, unmet, so that is all I can say at this
moment, sir. I haven't seen specific proposals about numbers of
people, how long it will go, but you take the history, you take
the fact that this is a country that essentially built a WMD
capability while inspections were going on inside this country,
and you take behavior that we have seen. It is frustrating, but
the burden has to be placed where the burden belongs, on him,
to do what he is required to do.
Chairman Warner. If this option is pursued by which you
quadruple the inspectors, and indeed perhaps get some U-2
surveillance and other things, what are the risks associated
with added time being given, and I mean significant added time,
to the inspection process?
Mr. Tenet. Well sir, it is my judgment that if you have a
process perceived under the circumstances that I have just
talked to you about, with no compliance with what is expected,
the expectation on our part is his capabilities will continue
to grow. His clandestine procurement networks will continue to
operate. He will continue to hide and deceive. So I am not very
sanguine about where we are, in terms of how he has calculated
he can wait us out and the games that he has been playing in
this regard. So that would be my judgment today.
Chairman Warner. There is also the option for Iraq to allow
quantities of the weapons of mass destruction with biological
and chemical weapons to find their way to the international
terrorists, am I not correct, and transported elsewhere in the
Mr. Tenet. Sir, those are always possibilities. We have
been very careful about the case we have made and what we have
talked about, this poisonous network that may be operating out
of no man's land. Certainly an individual who has been in
Baghdad, who is supported by a group of individuals who remain
in Baghdad and facilitate not only this network, of which there
has been a large number of arrests in European countries, but
also these individuals in Baghdad have their own that they may
be pursuing, so I want to be religious and careful about the
evidence that we have and what our concerns are. Certainly how
chemical and biological weapons may find their way into other
people's hands, to terrorist groups is an ongoing concern that
we are watching very carefully.
Chairman Warner. Yesterday the Intelligence Committee met,
and as a member of that committee, I put a question to you and
you gave me an answer, but I think it is important that that
same question and answer be put in today's record. There have
been allegations by some world leaders that they do not think
Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction. In the event, and
there is no decision yet, that force must be used by this
Nation and other nations willing to work with us, and in the
aftermath of the battle when the world press can go in and
examine the sites and so forth, is it your professional
judgment that there will be clearly found caches of weapons of
mass destruction to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I believe that we will. I think that when
you listen to Secretary Powell's statement at the United
Nations, he noted a specific intercept that told operational
units to ensure that the word nerve agents never appeared in
any communications. So we know that weapons have been
subordinated to units and I believe that we will find research
and development (R&D). We will find stockpiles of things he has
not declared and weapons he has not declared.
Chairman Warner. Those pictures that showed trucks moving,
presumably, that material to other sites, those sites could be
Mr. Tenet. Well, that is a part of this, sir, of course. It
is a big country and the advantage is always to the hider but
we will do everything we can if that is where we are to find
Chairman Warner. Admiral Jacoby, in the event that force is
used, what do we know now about the risk of Saddam Hussein
deploying weapons of mass destruction against forces trying to
remove that regime?
Admiral Jacoby. Mr. Chairman, we do not know Saddam
Hussein's doctrine for WMD usage. We assess, however, based on
his past patterns and availability of weapons in his inventory,
is that he will employ them when he makes a decision that the
regime is in jeopardy. Now, the real hard part about that is to
identify when he might make that judgment and of course, that
resides with one individual, his perceptions, the information
available to him to make such a call.
Chairman Warner. Those risks have been made known not only
to the general public but most specifically to the men and
women of the Armed Forces in our Nation and such other nations
that are courageous enough to undertake the risk, should force
be necessary. Senator Levin?
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You agree, Mr.
Tenet, with what Admiral Jacoby just said?
Mr. Tenet. Yes.
Senator Levin. I think that is a critically important
intelligence finding as to what we expect, and your
intelligence estimate is, Admiral, that when Saddam determines
that his regime is in jeopardy, that is the point when he would
utilize the weapons of mass destruction many people believe he
still has. I want to go back to inspections, Mr. Tenet.
You have read the letters which your agency sent me
indicating the number of significant sites that had not yet
been shared in terms of information with the United Nations
inspection inspectors, is that correct?
Mr. Tenet. Probably not all of them, sir.
Senator Levin. The key ones?
Mr. Tenet. I read the key one last night, I believe.
Senator Levin. What you are indicating this morning is that
that was in error?
Mr. Tenet. I do not know if it was in error. I could look
at the language.
Senator Levin. The numbers were dramatically different than
a handful. Will you agree to that?
Mr. Tenet. Yes, sir. I went back last night and reviewed
all of these numbers, reviewed all of our data, and potentially
we made some mistakes in some of our transmissions. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. What is very important, it seems to me, is
that we give full cooperation to the U.N. inspectors. Would you
agree with that?
Mr. Tenet. I agree, sir.
Senator Levin. Even though you agree they are not useful
unless Saddam cooperates, is that correct? Is it still useful
to cooperate with the inspectors?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I think we have to do everything we can do
to support them, even though they are getting no support from
the person who is supposed to provide support.
Senator Levin. Because even though the burden is on Saddam,
they still might prove useful, is that correct?
Mr. Tenet. Potentially, sir.
Senator Levin. I just want to put that on the record,
because of your testimony today which I welcome, and your
testimony yesterday which was so astounding to me. I would want
to put Mr. Tenet's testimony from yesterday in the record.
Mr. Tenet. Sir, can I just make one comment? My assertion
yesterday about the high value site was absolutely right and I
make the same----
Senator Levin. High-moderate value, yes, sir.
Mr. Tenet. My knowledge yesterday was incomplete with
regard to the rest of these sites. We took advantage of the
line of questioning in our meeting to go back and get our
people to go do all the work so I can complete that statement.
But what I said yesterday was absolutely accurate with regard
to high value and moderate value targets.
Senator Levin. Without pressing this any further because
you have acknowledged that the data which was submitted to me
was incorrect, and we will go into that in classified session
as to whether or not it was indeed incorrect, but nonetheless,
I want yesterday's testimony to be put in the record.
Chairman Warner. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Levin. I ask for that testimony because of the
clear difference between what was stated yesterday and what has
been acknowledged today.
I want to talk to you about the value of U-2 flights. Do we
support giving the inspectors what they have asked for in terms
of U-2 flights?
Mr. Tenet. Yes, sir, I believe we do.
Senator Levin. Even though Saddam isn't cooperating?
Mr. Tenet. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. He has not agreed to those U-2 flights at
least until a couple of days ago and we have acquiesced in
that. The United Nations, including us, has never adopted the
resolution that Senator Clinton and I have suggested to Mr.
Powell that the U.N. tell Saddam, it is not up to you whether
we have useful U-2 flights. That is up to us, the United
Nations. We are flying. You attack those U-2s and you are
attacking the United Nations. Why shouldn't we do that?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I think there is an important question here
about whether you are going to fly a U-2 and put a pilot at
risk in an environment that is not permissive and that he has
not agreed to and I don't think that is an insignificant
Senator Levin. It is a very significant issue. The
underlying issue is much more significant. We are going to put
hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops at risk if we attack
Saddam with some huge long-term consequences as well as the
short term ones that Admiral Jacoby has outlined. That would be
done, according to the administration, even without a U.N.
authorized use of force. What we are suggesting is that the U-2
flights be authorized by the U.N. When you talk to Mr. Blix, as
I have done, he believes the chance that Saddam Hussein will
attack a U-2 if he knows that by doing so he is attacking the
United Nations is so slim, compared to the risks involved in
war. For us to focus on the risk of a U-2 flight without
Saddam's agreement rather than the importance of imposing the
U.N.'s will on Saddam Hussein--it is incredible to me that we
have acquiesced in Saddam Hussein's veto of U-2 flights, which
you acknowledge will be helpful or could be helpful to the
inspectors, based on the risk of a U-2 flight. I find that
In any event, Senator Clinton and I wrote a long letter to
Secretary Powell about this issue. It may not be necessary
anymore to have a U.N. resolution, but if so, I would hope that
this administration will introduce and support a U.N.
resolution imposing the U-2 flights which will provide critical
information, particularly about vehicles which move around on
Secretary Powell pointed out that there are suspect
vehicles on the ground. The way to track those suspect vehicles
is with U-2 flights. You cannot do it with satellites and yet
this administration is saying there is risk to U-2 pilots. As a
reason not to impose the will of the world as requested by its
inspectors on Saddam Hussein, I find that incredible. I find it
to be a lack of support for the inspectors who have asked for
the U-2 flights. I will give you a chance--my time is up, but
you should have a chance to respond.
Mr. Tenet. Sir, we are out of my realm a bit, but let me
just say the following. When we passed Resolution 1441 there
were a series of stipulations and obligations that dealt with
surveillance and information flow and all these other kinds of
things. Again, I find it from my perspective interesting that
the burden shifts in the other direction constantly.
Senator Levin. You misunderstand my point. I am not saying
the burden shifts. I want to impose our will on Saddam.
Mr. Tenet. All I am saying to you, sir, is that this is
something that should have been acquiesced to immediately when
we passed the resolution. It never was. I understand your
Senator Levin. I must finish this. Of course, the
resolution says that he is supposed to comply and he is not
supposed to interfere with overflights, but we have
specifically suggested a resolution identifying the
consequences. That is not in 1441. U.N. Resolution 1441 says he
may not interfere with inspections and with overflights, but
what 1441 doesn't do, which the resolution we have proposed
would do, is to say the consequence specifically of attacking a
U-2 would be that you are attacking the United Nations. That is
the addition to what 1441 specifically provides.
Mr. Tenet. I understand, sir.
Chairman Warner. I think at this point we should put in the
record exactly what 1441 says and I quote it: ``UNMOVIC and the
IAEA shall have free, unrestricted use and landing of fixed and
rotary wing aircraft, including manned and unmanned
reconnaissance vehicles.'' Now what could be more explicit?
That is just one of a series of enumerations of what 1441 says
Iraq must do, and it is but one of a series that he has
steadfastly refused to do.
Senator Levin. We have not done what we should do, which is
to tell him: Attack a U-2, attack the world. It is important
that we not let him veto and that we keep the world together.
The world will be together on the U-2s. The world will be
together. Why are we not working to keep the world together
against Saddam Hussein?
Chairman Warner. I think efforts are being made by this
President and the Prime Minister of Great Britain and others to
keep the world together but this is just one of a long litany
of things that he is not doing, and what is the consequence?
Senator Roberts. I got so caught up in listening to this
talk of putting the tail U.N. insignia on a U-2, what would
happen in terms of the safety of the pilot, that I am not quite
ready here. If I may, let me see if I can get organized.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We had a very productive hearing
yesterday in the Intelligence Committee. I thank the witnesses
for returning today to appear before the Committee on Armed
Services. I am also the Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Emerging Threats and Capabilities and I look forward to any
guidance that you can continue to provide us on the appropriate
Department of Defense (DOD) policy and planning response to the
threats America faces.
Yesterday I listened very carefully to these two very
dedicated witnesses describe a world in which, and I am
quoting, ``economic and political instability and proliferation
and extremism combine to produce new and difficult requirements
for America's military.'' Now, some would say that that is
certainly not a very good situation, but I would like to stress
this. It is good news in regards to the threat warning analysis
and the better analytical ability that we have in all of the 13
agencies that represent the intelligence community, in my
personal opinion, and I have visited 6 and I will visit the
remaining 7 along with Vice Chairman Rockefeller. I think
through the tremendous, unequalled assets that we have and the
dedicated work by those in these agencies, the structural
reforms that are taking place--and we will have hearings in the
Intelligence Committee to make sure that those happen and to
monitor those--we have right now better real-time analysis to
produce a better threat warning procedure to safeguard the
American people. Now, that doesn't mean, of course, that the
threat goes away or that we have other things that we cannot
I would like to ask you, Director Tenet, to assess the tape
yesterday played for all America and the world by Osama bin
Laden, more particularly, in regards to his relationship with
Iraq. The one thing that I would like to point out is that he
closed that tape with a prayer which is really a lament
indicating that his challenges are much more difficult because
two-thirds of his operation has either been destroyed or
captured. In some ways I think that is good, but could you
assess that tape in regards to the situation between al Qaeda
and Osama bin Laden?
Mr. Tenet. Senator, our linguists and experts are going
through all the Arabic. They were working on it last night. I
want to be precise when I come back and talk to you about that.
Obviously he talked about the crusaders. He tried to work
around the Iraqi aspect. Let me take this for the record and
when we go through the Arabic and allusions and symbols he may
raise I will come back to the committee with a very precise
answer in that regard.
Senator Roberts. I have another one you can come back to.
We are hearing a lot from the Security Council, including
France, Russia, and China, how they claim to have not been
persuaded by Secretary Powell's presentation. They want to
refrain from attacking Iraq and, as has been indicated, try to
let the inspectors continue about their business, and I am not
opposed to inspectors with the exception that inspectors are
not finders, they are inspectors, and what they are allowed to
find in regards to Saddam Hussein I think is important. I'd
like for you to get back to us, I am not sure that you can say
so in a public setting, but please tell us how many of the
countries that are currently on the U.N. Security Council have
at one point provided or permitted nationals to provide arms or
nuclear or biological technology to Saddam Hussein's government
in Iraq. I'd like to know how many of the members of the
Security Council supported easing the economics sanctions
against Saddam Hussein since 1998. I'd like to know how many of
them also participated in sanctions busting activities such as
the commercial airline flights to Baghdad. I'd like to know how
many of the governments that currently insist we engage in
bilateral negotiations in North Korea were also the governments
that insisted the only way to deal with the U.S. and Iraq was
also through the United Nations. If you could give me that
information in writing, I would appreciate it.
Mr. Tenet. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Tenet did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
Senator Roberts. Finally, Pyongyang. The chance that there
could be an uprising on the part of the poor people is between
slim and none, and slim left town. I asked yesterday in the
public setting what pressure point we could put on North Korea
in regards to direct engagement to make Kim Jong Il change his
mind about cooperation with China, Japan, and South Korea. It
has ominous portents in regards to Japan getting back into the
business of remilitarizing. That goes back to 1952 and the days
It has ominous portents for our relations with China, so I
talked with the Chinese ambassador. He said he will be a good,
strong global partner. I have yet to see much evidence of that,
and I am very worried about South Korea and the generation of
people who have forgotten the aggression by North Korea. What
pressure points could you suggest with negotiations with Kim
Jong Il? He has to play the nuclear card, in my assessment. Any
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I will have to come back to you. We are
sitting down with our policymakers and reviewing that. Let me
come back to you, in fairness.
[The information referred to follows:]
Mr. Tenet did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
Senator Roberts. If he has another test, sends another
mission, he gets attention and this is the only attention
getter he can play, similar to Pakistan or in relation to
Pakistan, but would you think that is mainly his purpose?
Mr. Tenet. It is one of his purposes, sir, and I indicated
in my testimony that he is trying to draw attention in any way
he can. He has a number of routes at his disposal to try and
Senator Roberts. My time has expired.
Chairman Warner. Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I would
ask that my opening statement be made a part of the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Kennedy follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
Last February, CIA Director Tenet told Congress that al Qaeda is
``the most immediate and serious threat'' to our country, ``despite the
progress we have made in Afghanistan.'' Yet, this year, the CIA
Director tells us only that ``the threat from al Qaeda remains.''
Then, as now, Osama bin Laden was still at large and al Qaeda is
determined to strike America again. There have been deadly new al Qaeda
attacks worldwide. A French tanker was attacked in Yemen, a nightclub
was bombed in Indonesia, a hotel was destroyed in Kenya, and
missionaries murdered in Yemen. Of more than 600 people killed in acts
of terrorism last year, 200 were in al Qaeda-related attacks, including
19 U.S. citizens. Our Nation has just gone on new and higher alert
because of the increased overall threat from al Qaeda. A new tape from
Osama bin Laden has been aired. We are told that a terrorist attack
could come very soon.
The administration maintains that there are links between al Qaeda
and Iraq that justify war. But al Qaeda activists are present in more
than 60 countries, including Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Even
within the administration, there are skeptics about the links with
Iraq. Intelligence analysts are concerned that intelligence is being
politicized to justify war.
The administration refuses to call the situation on the Korean
Peninsula what it is--a genuine crisis. It refuses to directly engage
the North Koreans in talks to persuade North Korea to end its nuclear
program. By ignoring the North Korean crisis in order to keep the focus
on Iraq, many of us are deeply concerned that the administration has
kept its eye on the wrong place.
North Korea can quickly produce a significant amount of nuclear
materials and even nuclear weapons for its own use or for terrorists to
attack America and our allies. North Korea is only months away from
producing weapons-grade plutonium and nuclear weapons. Desperate and
strapped for cash, North Korea is the country most likely to use
weapons-grade plutonium as its ``cash cow.'' It has already provided
missile to nations like Iran, Syria, and Libya that support terrorists.
Plutonium could be sold in small amounts and traded among terrorist
groups. In the future, it could be used in nuclear weapons against us.
If that is not a crisis, I don't know what is. Clearly, the
administration owes us a more convincing explanation of its priorities.
Senator Kennedy. Mr. Tenet, we have seen Americans called
to great concern over these past days. They are being urged to
collect 3 days' worth of water, 3 days of food, plastic
sheeting, and duct tape. That is happening all over the
Now, let us be cold and frank about it. Is that because of
the danger of Iraq or is that because of the danger of al
Mr. Tenet. This threat is directly related to al Qaeda and
Osama bin Laden at this moment. That is what the predicate of
raising the threat level was, specific intelligence.
Senator Kennedy. That is the threat, I think, at least for
Americans today. Now, when Americans ask me, given that al
Qaeda is the threat they are being called to action for, why
isn't the administration giving a fraction of the attention to
the dangers that al Qaeda is presenting here at home that is
giving to organizing a war against Iraq? How do we answer that?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I would not agree with that at all. I think
Senator Kennedy. You think the American people--let me just
ask you the question, then. Do you think the average American
believes that this government is as focused on what the danger
is here at home as it is on the efforts that it is making to
mobilize the international community and the military in order
to engage in a war in Iraq?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I can only answer that from where I sit and
what I see and do every day. I can tell you that there is on
our part and the people we support an enormous amount of
attention being paid to al Qaeda and this threat, every day, in
a very considered and considerable manner.
Senator Kennedy. Yesterday Mr. Muller reported that the al
Qaeda network will remain for the foreseeable future the most
imminent and serious threat facing this country. The
organization maintains the intent to inflict significant
casualties in the United States with little warning. Al Qaeda
has developed a support infrastructure inside the United States
that will allow it to mount another terrorist attack on U.S.
soil, multiple-scale attacks against soft targets, banks,
shopping centers, supermarkets, apartment buildings, schools,
universities, poisoning water and water supplies. Then al Qaeda
will probably continue to favor spectacular facts that meet
several criteria, high symbolic value, mass casualties, severe
damage to the U.S. economy, the maximum psychological trauma.
Then it finally gets into Baghdad's capability and will to use
biological, chemical, and radiological weapons against U.S.
domestic targets in the event of a U.S. invasion. In the event
of a U.S. invasion.
Then it continues along: Our particular concern--this is
the head of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI)--is that
Saddam Hussein may supply al Qaeda with biological, chemical,
or radiological material before or during a war with the U.S.
to avenge the fall of his regime.
The best testimony that we have from the head of the FBI
says that the greatest risk to American servicemen will come
either before or during a war with Iraq or the fall of the
regime, and Baghdad has the capability to provide biological
and chemical weapons for use against U.S. domestic targets in
the event of a U.S. invasion.
Let me get back to you. You were very clear about what you
thought was the most imminent threat to the United States. The
President said the biggest threat is Iraq in the State of Union
a year ago. I think most Americans believe, particularly after
what they have heard in the very recent times, that this is
where the administration is focused. Your reaction?
Mr. Tenet. Senator, let me just take a few minutes because
you raised a number of important points. Let me put this
poisons and gas thing in some context. There are 116 people in
jail in France, in Spain, in Italy, and in Great Britain who
received training and guidance out of a network run by an
individual who is sitting in Baghdad today and supported by two
dozen of his associates. Now, that is something important for
the American people to understand. Iraq has provided a safe
haven and a permissive environment for these people to operate
The other thing that is very telling to us, sir, just so I
can close the loop on this issue, is we also know from very
reliable information that there has been some transfer of
training in chemical and biologicals from the Iraqis to al
Qaeda. So we are already in this mix in a way that is very
important for us to worry about. How far it goes, how deep it
is is a subject that we will continue to entertain.
Senator Kennedy. Just on that point, here we have North
Korea that has provided technology and weapons to countries
that are directly supporting terrorism. North Korea has
provided items to Iran, Syria, and other countries. They may
very well have two nuclear weapons. We do not have to get into
that, but there is no question that they are going to be
producing weapons-grade plutonium which can be made into
nuclear weapons within the next few weeks.
They have provided the weapons to nations which have
supported terrorism. We do not need another review. We do not
need another study. We know that they have done that. Why is
that not a crisis? You refuse to call it a crisis. Why is that
not a crisis? Can you give the assurance to the American people
that it is getting as much focus and attention as the
mobilization in terms of the military for----
Mr. Tenet. Sir, if I can answer. It is a very serious
problem. Admiral Jacoby yesterday called it a crisis. I called
it a serious problem. Let us split the difference. North Korean
behavior, their proliferation activities, their ballistic
missile capabilities are all very serious issues. They also
must be dealt with. Policymakers are trying to figure out an
approach that deals with the Russians, Chinese, Japanese, and
South Koreans. This is a very important issue.
We are unfortunately in an environment where we have three
or four tough things to do simultaneously. Each approach, each
subject will be different for the policymakers. You yourself
highlighted something that must be dealt with and that we are
paying attention to and have to move on because it has serious
consequences as well, sir.
Chairman Warner. Did you have adequate time to reply to
that in your judgment?
Mr. Tenet. Yes, I believe I did.
Chairman Warner. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Tenet,
your testimony was that more than a third of the top al Qaeda
leadership identified before the war has been either captured
or killed. Obviously and unfortunately, that does not include
Osama bin Laden. But do you believe that Osama bin Laden is
still in active command of the al Qaeda network, or have we
been sufficiently successful that we have disrupted his ability
to control the network?
Mr. Tenet. Ma'am, I'd like to talk about all of that in
closed session with you.
Senator Collins. You had mentioned that your analysts are
just beginning their study of the tape that was relayed
yesterday. Are there any preliminary indications that the tape
was intended as a trigger or a signal to cells to attack?
Mr. Tenet. Ma'am, I think I would say the following to you.
You noted the previous two instances when he made tapes. On
October 6, I said remarks were made shortly before the French
oil tanker was attacked, Limburg, the murder of the U.S. marine
in Kuwait and the Bali bombing. His 12 November statement was
11 days before the bombing in the hotel in Kenya, so one of the
things we are looking at is that he is obviously raising the
confidence of his people. He is obviously exhorting them to do
more. Whether this is a signal of impending attack or not is
something we are looking at.
I can only tell you what the history is. What he has said
has often been followed by attacks which I think corroborates
everything that we are seeing while raising the threat warning
in terms of the specific information that we had at our
disposal last week.
Senator Collins. Yesterday there were media reports that
our intelligence has detected the movement of Iraqi SCUD
launcher equipment next to mosques, that Saddam Hussein has
moved explosives to Southern Iraq near the oilfields, and that
he has positioned some of his military forces among civilian
areas. Do those developments suggest that if war comes that
Saddam is going to pursue a scorched earth strategy? Do you
believe that those developments are substantiated? If the Vice
Admiral would like to respond, that would be fine, too.
Admiral Jacoby. Senator, there is a pattern over a
considerable number of years and it is being played out today.
Saddam intermingles combatants and civilian population. It is
part of the strategy to blend and to use the term human shields
as part of his approaches, and that continues.
The parts of the question having to do with current
disposition of forces, I'd like to take on in closed session if
I could. That way I can give you some specifics about where he
is on some of the issues that are being presented.
Senator Collins. That would be fine. Director Tenet, I am
also troubled by press reports this week that the Iranian
government intends to develop uranium mines in the southern
part of its country. While Iranian officials have contended
that this step has been undertaken to address civilian energy
needs, I am concerned about the implications for Iran's nuclear
arms program. Could you please comment on that?
Mr. Tenet. Yes, ma'am. We are concerned as well. We are
going to follow up on all of that reporting. We have some very
specific data for the classified session about specifically
where the uranium nuclear program is today. People who were
supplying it may not be supplying it, due to some improvements
in Russian behavior in this regard, but all of this is a piece
and it comes back to my serious concern about how many
countries are pursuing nuclear weapons, how many countries are
developing an indigenous capability to do so, and the amount of
foreign assistance that is available from foreign states and
networks that really make this a formidable challenge when you
lash it up to ballistic missile proliferation, whether medium-
Senator Collins. Has Iran been the impediment to the
establishment of the new government in Afghanistan?
Mr. Tenet. Well, I think you know that in the diplomatic
part of this when they went to Bonn and set this government up,
I think the record is the Iranians were helpful diplomatically
in creating this government. I think every country on the
border of Afghanistan naturally has its own agenda. We
initially, in the conflict, were concerned about Iranian
assistance for safe haven or conflict with the Taliban and al
Qaeda remnants. So remember, you have two governments, you are
really dealing with two faces in a country like Iran--spiritual
leader and President Hatami--in control of different services.
This also creates different pictures of this government's
activity inside Afghanistan. But regarding your specific
question, they were very cooperative in Bonn as far as I can
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. The Senator from West Virginia.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Director, a
transcript of the Osama bin Laden tape has been available for
at least 24 hours. Secretary of State Powell mentioned it
yesterday morning. This Nation is at a heightened level of
terrorist threat. We do not have the luxury of time to analyze
the Osama bin Laden tape to death. Surely, you have completed
at least a preliminary analysis of the tape. What conclusions
have you drawn thus far? Please be as brief as you can because
my time is short.
Mr. Tenet. Sir, as I said, I believe the tape represents an
exhortation to his followers. I believe he is trying to raise
their confidence, and we know that previous tapes occurred
roughly prior to attacks that have recently occurred. So the
surface is very concerning to us, and whether there is any
other operational signal in this tape or something we can glean
from it, we will work on and get back to you, sir.
Senator Byrd. Are the reports that the tape is evidence of
a connection between Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein--let me
repeat that. Are the reports that the tape is evidence of a
present and/or past connection between Osama bin Laden and
Saddam Hussein credible?
Mr. Tenet. Well, sir, what he says in the tape is
unprecedented in terms of the way he expresses solidarity with
Baghdad. He talks about fighting alongside Iraqi socialists,
who he has generally considered un-Islamic, to defeat the
crusaders. The Israelis would be the crusaders, so I am trying
to get underneath all of that to understand what the allusion
and symbolism is. But on the surface, and that is why I want to
be precise when I come back to you, on the surface he appears
to be making some kind of a linkage, perhaps for his own
purposes. Whether he is aligning himself with the Iraqi
government or he is speaking to the Iraqi people, I just want
to be very precise when I comment on this. But it is a bit
alarming that he did it this way.
Senator Byrd. How do you feel about the reference to the
word Infidel applied to the Iraqis?
Mr. Tenet. Well, it goes back, I think, sir to historical
allusions that he has made about who's pure and who's not pure.
Iraq has been a secular society. It is a distinction that
people have tried to make, particularly in the terrorism world,
which I don't make much of. I think these distinctions get
blurred easily. Again I need a little bit more time to do work
Senator Byrd. How much more time do you need?
Mr. Tenet. A day or two, sir.
Senator Byrd. Who is the greatest threat in your judgment,
Mr. Director, to the United States today? Who is the greatest
threat looking at the situation, if you can, 2 years from now,
3 years from now, 5 years from now? Saddam Hussein, Osama bin
Laden, or Kim Jong Il?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I hope that 2 or 5 years from now al Qaeda
is a diminished threat for this country. Obviously today we are
worrying deeply about al Qaeda and what threat it poses to this
country. In 2 to 5 years' time, someone like a Saddam Hussein
may have acquired a nuclear weapon and all of his capabilities
would be enhanced and his relationship with these terrorist
networks would continue to develop, so they cause us concern.
Kim Jong Il is a present threat with his ballistic missile
and weapons capability and weapons potential. So how you rack
them and stack them is difficult. How you deal with them in
terms of emerging layers is difficult and of great concern to
the intelligence community.
Senator Byrd. Does this concern with respect to al Qaeda
permeate the highest echelons of the current administration in
Mr. Tenet. Sir, it does.
Senator Byrd. I wonder then out loud why this
administration did not support amendments that I offered with
respect to the omnibus appropriation bill that was recently
passed by the Senate, amendments that would increase by on the
order of $5 billion appropriations to deal with al Qaeda and
homeland defense. I am wondering out loud. Do you have anything
you might wonder out loud with me about why the administration
did not support that $5 billion?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I rarely wonder but I really do not know.
Senator Byrd. Now it came back to $3 billion. I got the
same support from this administration with respect to homeland
security. $3 billion. The administration did not support those
Mr. Tenet. Sir, can I give you my observation? The
administration has been supportive as has the Appropriations
Committee on what we are doing in providing dollars for the
overseas intelligence community and the FBI. I do not know
about the domestic side, sir.
Senator Byrd. I did not ask you about the other.
Mr. Tenet. Yes, sir, I understand that.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Director, in regard to Kim Jong Il, it
seems to me that he is a threat that is as imminent, or perhaps
more so, directly to the United States than is Iraq. So if we
say to our friends in this world, if you are not with us, you
are against us, I wonder if we are not sowing dragon seeds as
we look down the road past the immediacy of Iraq. When we think
about the nuclear threat that is posed by North Korea, we say
to our friends in the United Nations, if you are not with us,
you are against us. I wonder as we get down the road how we are
going to bring about better cooperation and better union with
respect to efforts in the United Nations as we face a more
determined and more imminent and more powerful aggressor in the
form of North Korea.
I wonder if we might look at France and those others who
are posing opposition to us today with respect to what we are
trying to do in Iraq, if we are not going to need them down the
road. So how can we say you are not with us, you are against
us? It seems to me we are being somewhat careless and self-
righteous as we look ahead.
Mr. Chairman, my time is up. To be limited to 6 minutes,
that is not necessarily your fault, but it is not like the old
days when we were able to follow a thread of thought to the
end. Thank you, Mr. Director.
Mr. Tenet. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Warner. I say to Mr. Byrd, I take note that we
almost have 100 percent attendance here this morning. Now that
will conclude the first round here and at the completion of all
recognitions we will go into the closed session. I share your
views, Senator, but we are doing the very best we can.
Senator Byrd. I know you are doing that.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. The Senator from Texas.
Senator Cornyn. In the interest of time, I will reserve any
questions I have for the closed session.
Chairman Warner. All right.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Director Tenet and Admiral Jacoby. I just returned last weekend
from Munich and talked to the German officials and other NATO
officials, and one of the stumbling blocks for a more concerted
effort with respect to confronting Iran is a dispute about
whether or not there would be substantial links between Baghdad
and terror groups. Yesterday, in your testimony, Mr. Director,
you cited Zarqawi's presence in Baghdad, but also the press
said he is not under their control, words to that effect, is he
an independent envoy?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, he is a senior al Qaeda associate who has
met with Osama bin Laden, who has received money from al Qaeda
leadership, and is on my list of the top 30 individuals that
are required to decapitate and denigrate this organization. Mr.
Zarqawi is on that list. The fact is that he is a contractor,
he does things on his own, but he has an intimate relationship
with Osama bin Laden and we have classified him as a senior al
Senator Reed. The issue is--and I want to be clear. I
understand your response. The issue is his relationship to
Saddam Hussein, to Baghdad, if he is operating in concert
explicitly with Saddam Hussein or is there for his own
convenience and safety----
Mr. Tenet. The argument, the specific line in evidence and
argument we have made is they are providing safe haven to him,
and we know this because a foreign government approached the
Iraqis twice about Zarqawi's presence in Baghdad and he
disappeared. The second troubling piece of this, sir, is, as I
mentioned yesterday, the two dozen other associates and two
senior Egyptian Islamic Jihad associates are indistinguishable
from al Qaeda because they merged. The third piece I would say
to you is Baghdad is not Geneva. It is inconceivable that these
people are sitting there without the Iraqi intelligence
service's knowledge of the fact that there is a safe haven
being provided by people, to people who believe it is fairly
comfortable to operate there. That is as far as I can take the
Senator Reed. Following up, the presence of all of these
individuals you have cited are in Baghdad based on your
Mr. Tenet. Yes.
Senator Reed. Do you have any information, beyond providing
the safe haven, as you see it, clear evidence that the Iraqi
regime is facilitating their operations?
Mr. Tenet. That is what we are trying to understand more
of, sir. I will talk about this in closed session.
Senator Reed. With respect to Osama bin Laden's statement
yesterday, and I know you have responded to Senator Byrd in
terms of your desire to look at it more closely, but some of
the language I think deserves to be enclosed here with respect
to the supposed collaboration and affiliation between al Qaeda
and Baghdad. This is the text I have: ``On the threshold of
this war, the war on the infidels and disbelievers which is led
by America and its agents . . . First, the sincerity of the
intent for the fight should be for the sake of Allah only, not
for the victory of national minorities or for aid of the
infidel regimes in all Arab countries, including Iraq,'' which
seems to be a statement not of unconditional support for
Baghdad by Saddam Hussein for his regime. In fact, he is lumped
into the same category as we are, as an infidel.
Mr. Tenet. Sir, you are talking about an individual who is
a master at deception, an individual that understands all
linkages being made all over the world about this. Let us be
careful about placing a lot of credence on distinctions that he
is making here. I'd like the opportunity to just be careful
about it and look at it, but the kind of language and
solidarity he talks about with Baghdad is something we want to
look at more carefully inside the text.
Senator Reed. I encourage you to do that but I think you
have to confront this language and put it in a logical context.
I urge you to do that. Admiral Jacoby, you are in an
interesting position where you have access to collaboration
with the Central Intelligence Agency and yet you provide
specific support to the war fighters in examining targets in
Iraq. This whole issue of how much information and what type of
information has been disclosed to the defectors, and I asked
you to generally comment. If we put the target list between
developing attack issues, weapons of mass destruction sites,
and we laid next to that the information that we are providing
to the inspectors, would that be essentially the same list?
Admiral Jacoby. Senator, I haven't tried to do a side by
side comparison, but we are working from the same shared
information on trying to develop that list so I would expect
Senator Reed. Has anybody done that side by side comparison
to essentially check the judgment of the intelligence authority
and judgment of the military authorities for planning this
Admiral Jacoby. I am not sure whether it has been laid down
that way or not, sir.
Senator Reed. Mr. Tenet, are you aware of anybody doing
that side by side?
Mr. Tenet. No, sir.
Senator Reed. Turning to North Korea, it seems increasingly
clear that if we do nothing during the next several weeks or
months, they will have sufficient plutonium, marketable
quantities, and that is a shuddering concept. Are we reasonably
confident we are beginning to identify the possible links to
terror groups that might attempt to acquire this material, Mr.
Mr. Tenet. I do not have any specific links that I have
developed to terror groups out of the North Korean context at
Senator Reed. Are we looking hard?
Mr. Tenet. We always do worry. We have this kind of
Senator Reed. I agree with you that the frightening
potential of nuclear power is emerging. You mentioned they were
nonstate actors in many cases. You are identifying those and is
the presumption that our policy will be preemption of nonstate
Mr. Tenet. I am not making a policy prescription but we are
working hard to identify companies, people, things that do not
look like states. We see a number of these popping up around
the world. That causes us concern. The policy towards Baghdad
would be not ours, but our job first and foremost is to gather
as much information as possible to lay down before the
policymakers so they can make determinations.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. The Senator from
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to start
out by asking Vice Admiral Jacoby about conventional forces in
North Korea, artillery, tanks, as well as missiles. What is
your assessment of their capability to sustain that force in
Admiral Jacoby. Senator, they have the capability to
sustain for a considerable period of time what is basically a
very large but also not a high-tech kind of force in being. So
armaments, weapons, ammunition, and so forth have been stored
for considerable periods of time and they have had that kind of
force capability for many decades.
Senator Allard. I am going to change the questioning to
Russia and their intercontinental ballistic missile force. Vice
Admiral, we are aware that that force continues to age and in
your prepared testimony, you mentioned that the SS-27 is
several years behind schedule. Do you see a decline in the size
of Russia's missile force in the next 10 years? Then also could
you elaborate on how the Moscow Treaty affects the tough
decisions that Russia may have to make in the future?
Admiral Jacoby. Sir, our assessment is that their force
level will decline, and the SS-27 fielding is a problem they
are having. Sir, I need to take the treaty question for the
record and get back to you. I am not specific on the details
and the applications against our assessment.
Senator Allard. If you would provide a response to me, I'd
[The information referred to follows:]
The Moscow Treaty gives both parties the flexibility to structure
their strategic offensive forces as they see fit, and leaves each side
to carry out reductions--or to modernize its forces--essentially under
its own terms, within the treaty's stated limits (1,700-2,200
operationally deployed strategic warheads).
Prior to the Moscow Treaty, Russia had begun to move away from its
traditional emphasis on land-based missiles (ICBMs) and shift resources
to the naval leg of its strategic triad, which under START II could
have continued to deploy MIRVed sealaunched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).
However, since START II--which would have banned land-based MIRVs--did
not go into effect, the Russians may now hold on to older MIRVed ICBMs,
such as the SS-18s and SS-19s. As a result, Russia has reemphasized the
role of land-based systems within the triad. However, we believe that
over the next decade, the retention of aging land-based systems will
likely come at the expense of modernization, constraining the
production and deployment of new ICBMs such as the SS-27. In fact, the
commander of Russia's ICBM force has publicly noted the negative impact
that the retention of older systems will have on modernization efforts.
We believe that for practical reasons the Russian strategic nuclear
forces will decline over the next decade regardless of whether there
were arms control constraints or not to a level probably below the
treaty's warhead limits. Therefore, it is more likely that Russia is
looking to the Moscow Treaty as a means of constraining U.S. strategic
forces, rather than as a planning tool for its own force development.
Mr. Tenet, a number of weeks back, Condoleezza Rice said we
are expecting compliance with eliminating weapons of mass
destruction. I think she cited three countries. Most
frequently, it says South Africa opened their country up for
inspection. Ukraine and Kazakhstan are also mentioned. I got
the impression from her comments that all three of those
countries were markedly different than what we are facing in
I was wondering if you could lay out for the committee the
differences between what you saw happening in those three
countries and what has happened in Iraq in some fairly explicit
Mr. Tenet. I apologize, Senator, but I do not have the
explicit details of those places right on the tip of my tongue.
I will come back with a piece of paper.
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Mr. Tenet did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
Senator Allard. I did not mean to broadside you on that.
Mr. Tenet. That is all right.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I have questions for closed
session so I will yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Warner. Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Tenet, in your written testimony, you
mentioned that Libya is developing weapons of mass destruction
and that since 1999, Libya has increased, and I quote, ``its
access to dual-use nuclear technologies.'' My question to you
is do you have any assessment about how long it will be before
Libya has a nuclear weapon, and can you share that assessment
with us now?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, we can do that in closed session.
Senator Akaka. Director Tenet, I have heard about recent
public diplomatic differences with European allies. Have these
differences with European allies had an effect on their
cooperation with us or us with them in efforts to fight
terrorism? Specifically, are we withholding useful intelligence
from them or vice versa, or other types of cooperation?
Mr. Tenet. No, sir. In fact, in the war on terror, our
European allies have been extremely supportive of what we are
doing. We work hand in glove with them. This whole network that
I alluded to is something that we have worked very closely on
with them, so the level of intelligence services, military
services, law enforcement relationships, they are all very
good. I know there are other issues, but it has not impacted
our work on terrorism with them one bit. In fact, all of that
is quite enhanced.
Senator Akaka. Admiral Jacoby stated, Director Tenet, that
he expects an increase in Pakistani and Iranian proliferation.
Do you share that concern and can you indicate at all in public
session the direction of Pakistani and Iranian proliferation
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I apologize but we should talk about this
in closed session. I apologize for that answer. It is more
Senator Akaka. Admiral Jacoby, yesterday the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee held an open hearing on the post-war
situation in Iraq. I have pursued a post-war Iraqi plan that I
feel we should have. My question to you is what is your
assessment concerning the attitude the post-war Iraqi military
would have towards Israel?
Admiral Jacoby. Sir, I think what we are going to find, and
now I mean particularly in the assessment, I think what we are
going to find is that the Iraqi military is separated from the
regime's positions and policies. We might find that they feel
very differently about the situations in the region than the
present regime. But sir, that is something to be discovered
down the road, I think.
Senator Akaka. Do you envision that the United States would
be able to construct an Iraqi military capable of meeting
Iraq's legitimate defense needs, which will not still harbor
Admiral Jacoby. Our assessment is that we will be able to
work to construct an Iraqi military sufficient to meet their
defensive needs. On the political orientation, sir, I think
that is still something to be determined as we work through
Senator Akaka. In reading your statement, I share your
concern about general technology proliferation and I want to
commend the work done by DIA's futures division. I know that
getting ahead of the curve is becoming harder and yet more
critical. As you mentioned in your testimony, our technological
advantage is going to erode and the long-term trends concerning
WMD and missile proliferation are bleak. It is important that
senior policymakers, especially those involved in formulating
our strategies for military transformation, utilize assessments
by groups like DIA's futures division. Is there a process to
ensure that this takes place? Has Secretary Rumsfeld been
briefed by the futures division?
Admiral Jacoby. Yes, sir. Our futures division work gets to
him regularly. My promise to you, sir, is even in this period
of challenges between the stresses of the current situations
and the need for predictive assessments in the future, we have
fenced off the futures divisions and I am making every effort
to strengthen that effort, which is predictive. It is future
threat, warning, avoidance of surprise is an area where we need
to increase investment. We are very aware of that, sir, and it
is a focused area for me.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your response.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Talent. I think I am going to reserve for the
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
thank the directors for being here today. My first question for
Director Tenet is one that perhaps you will want to address
during the closed and classified session. I understand that the
IAEA will issue a report later this month on the nuclear
program for Iran. Do you have an opinion based on the
information that is available now on how long it would take
Iran to develop a nuclear program on a par with, let us say,
North Korea's nuclear program? I ask you first if you have an
opinion on that. If you do, you probably want to express it in
the closed session.
Mr. Tenet. Yes, sir. It is incorporated into my classified
Senator Ben Nelson. Inspectors from the IAEA were expelled
from North Korea last fall as we all know and shortly
thereafter, North Korea withdrew from the NPT. Assuming that
these inspectors are not expelled from Iran, for example, we
would still have some international monitoring of Iran's
nuclear program as a signatory of the NPT, but as we have
learned from the North Korean case, monitoring requires a
permissive environment. In North Korea's case they did not want
to fully reveal the extent of their nuclear program. This
committee, of course, as well as the Intelligence Committee,
has discussed with you and others in the administration the
importance of human intelligence but also the importance of
proper funding for satellite and other technological
With the proliferation of nuclear technology and the number
of nuclear powers or would-be powers and want-to-be powers
growing every day, it is important that decision makers have
reliable intelligence. Are you satisfied with the level of
funding provided in the fiscal year 2004 budget for this
Mr. Tenet. Sir, going back to last year when the President
submitted the 5-year defense program and the intelligence fund,
we have experienced very important growth to sustain our
collection capabilities. I think Admiral Jacoby and I would
tell you we are carefully discussing how to enhance these
capabilities with the Secretary of Defense. We talked about
this a bit yesterday in the Intelligence Committee, the issue
of global coverage and the coverage of all the things people
would expect us to have knowledge about or information about is
a daunting challenge for us. But nevertheless, the Secretary
and I are working through this very carefully, and we are very
pleased with the level of resources we have been provided going
We may come back for more, but we want to do that in a
considered way so that when we talk to you about this there is
some programmatic content to it.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you. Vice Admiral Jacoby, I met
yesterday with Defense Minister Ramirez from Colombia to
discuss the war on terrorism and other transnational threats,
specifically drug trafficking, that we are continuing to
encounter. You mention in your written testimony that terrorism
in general and principally the threat posed by al Qaeda is the
most important priority of the DIA.
My question concerns the FARC and Colombia. The Colombian
government maintains that the Irish Republican Army and the
Basque separatist groups from Spain have ties to the FARC and
argues therefore that their internal conflict has wider
ramifications for the war on terrorism. What intelligence do
you have through the DIA that would link these terrorist groups
together, if you can speak about it in open session?
Admiral Jacoby. I can speak to it in closed session, sir. I
would add that the concern with the FARC is a very real one for
us with the official U.S. presence in Colombia. Obviously we
have a responsibility for information flow to the State
Department and our Marine guards and so forth as part of the
diplomatic presence, too. The worrisome part for us was that
for many years, the FARC excluded the U.S. from their target
list. Recently they have changed their statements, although
they have not yet executed attacks specifically directed
against U.S. official presence here. That is a concern for us.
So we are worried about a changing situation in Colombia
and it is getting attention from us at the appropriate level.
Senator Ben Nelson. Do you have the access to the kind of
information you need to help us be informed on the basis of
intelligence that is reliable, credible, and helpful?
Admiral Jacoby. We have insights. Do we have access that
makes me comfortable that we have the situation well assessed
in the land? No, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. That is probably not because of any
reluctance to share, it is because of the ability to access it.
Admiral Jacoby. It is certainly not a problem with sharing
it. It is the level of detailed specificity, time and place
kind of threat information for a country that is as large as
Colombia that is a major issue for them.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Dayton. I want to thank both of you for your
extraordinary service to our country at this critical time.
Director Tenet, I would agree with your testimony that the
burden of proof is entirely on Saddam Hussein and I believe as
you said that we would find if we were able to make a complete
inspection that those caches of chemical and biological
materials the President outlined in his State of the Union
Address are largely still there; and those constitute
violations of the U.N. sanctions, as the Secretary of State
evidenced last week with what has been detected to date.
The United States has confronted dangerous dictators with
weapons of mass destruction for 55 years since World War II and
the essence of the critique you made today against Saddam
Hussein could be applied to Nikita Khrushchev and other leaders
of the former Soviet Union in years past, making linkages with
anti-U.S. and anti-west operatives around the world, and to
Chinese leaders in decades past and even North Korea today.
Vice Admiral, you have stated the most serious threat to the
U.S. regional interests in a generation but the United States
has not launched preemptive strikes to eliminate those threats.
Those threats remain serious and ongoing, even increasing.
Those countries have leaders which we distrusted, yet no
democratic President acted to remove them or disarm them, and
the primary reason I believe was that doctrine of mutually-
assured destruction, that an attack by the United States would
result in an assured destruction of our cities, our
countryside, our social networks, and civilian casualties that
would be unforeseeable in number.
So when I read reports of the last week that our threat
level has been increased and read what Director Muller
predicted yesterday, that a U.S. attack would result in
retaliatory attacks against the United States within our
borders, I ask myself why would we expect otherwise? Why
wouldn't we expect that Saddam Hussein would retaliate, as we
would if we were attacked those years past by the Soviet Union
or some other enemy, and with as much destruction in this
country, within our borders as possible?
To what extent do you assess that as an ongoing threat and
is it factored in to the decision to proceed militarily against
Iraq? Why is Iraq different? If we do proceed with military
action against Iraq, why is Iraq different from North Korea
today, from all the threats in the years past?
Mr. Tenet. You are asking intelligence and policy
questions. I will give you my view in any event. The
interesting thing about Iraq, of course, is that Iraq, even
though its army is a third of the size it was 10 or 11 years
ago, it is still larger than all the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) countries and Arab nations combined. The difference with
Iraq, one difference you have to remember is that in the last
15 years he has crossed two borders twice. Of concern to us
just from an intelligence persuasion----
Senator Dayton. When did those occur?
Mr. Tenet. You had Kuwait, the Iran-Iraq war----
Senator Dayton. In the last 12 years?
Mr. Tenet. 15 years.
Senator Dayton. In the last 12 years?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I will provide it for the record. I had 15
years in my mind.
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The other thing is that he is going to get a nuclear weapon
sooner or later. Our estimate is that with fissile material he
could have it within a year or 2. He will enhance his ballistic
missile capability with that material; and his biological
weapons capability is far bigger than it was at the time of the
Gulf War and he has chemical weapons capability that he hasn't
declared. So you put that in the context of a region that is a
little bit different from what you look at in North Korea,
because you go to South Korea with a large diplomatic presence
and the Chinese and South Korea that are different in terms of
their strength and overall stature than the countries he faces
in this region.
At the end of the day, you have to make a determination
about how to best deal with this problem. At the end of the
day, you have to ask yourself whether, after 10 or 12 years of
dealing with process, he has fundamentally complied with it.
Whether you wake up in 3 or 4 years and face the prospect of
the issues that I walked through. Those are valid and important
issues for people to debate. All we can do is lay down the
facts of what the concerns are.
Senator Dayton. My time is limited so let me just go on.
Today's Washington Post reported on your remarks yesterday,
your testimony as ``signaling that the Bush administration has
concluded that without enforcement the era in which countries
were encouraged by treaties and self-regulation to avoid
developing nuclear weapons may be coming to an end. Such a
conclusion would buttress the new national security doctrine
which suggests strikes against nuclear powers and nuclear
defenses.'' Is that, in your view, the policy we are entering
into, preemptive strikes against potential nuclear powers?
Mr. Tenet. When I wrote the statement, I had no policy in
mind other than to attempt to say to you--I did not talk about
policies yesterday. I basically said that my concern was that
the Nonproliferation Treaty regime was being battered in a way
that continues to undermine a foundation that we have used for
many years. Given my concern that proliferation will loom
larger, do we have the right regime in place? What should it be
replaced with? How active should we become?
Those are policy questions I would have to answer but I was
reflecting on my look at the world and the concerns I have.
Senator Dayton. One last question, please. Regarding the
Iraq-al Qaeda connection. I would agree with what I understood
your assertion being, that the evidence of a linkage you have
presented here has increased, but it seems to have increased
since the administration announced that it intended to go to
war. Prior to last October, the reports I have received--and I
have sat in quite a number of briefings--those connections were
far more tenuous than the one that you presented today, that
the enemy of my enemy is my friend. It doesn't surprise me that
Saddam Hussein has been reaching out in the last months to as
many prospective allies as he could possibly find in the face
of possible U.S. invasion, and it is not surprising that Osama
bin Laden would seize on this crisis to exploit it to advance
his anti-U.S. and anti-Israel agenda.
That is the reality we have today based on your reports,
whether we like it or not. It seems to increase the specter or
likelihood that an attack is going to be portrayed as an attack
against Arab nations, and as you said, that we are going to see
the kind of retaliations that we saw on September 11, as part
of their effort to foment this rebellion against what they view
as the infidel.
Mr. Tenet. Let me just comment on one of your points. This
is an iterative business and very dynamic from the way it
changes. If you go back and look at my testimony to this
committee, I think in October, when we talked about WMD, when
you look at the classified terrorism section, it mentioned
Zarqawi, it mentioned Egyptian Islamic Jihad operatives. What
has happened is an explosion in our knowledge and understanding
and depth, additional sources, people we have at our disposal
working with our European allies.
This thing moves every day. It is very dynamic. But you
said something that I have to push back on, because we do not
cook the case for anybody to make a policy. We never do that.
We would never do that. We would never allow it. I would never
Senator Dayton. I wasn't implying that, sir. What I
understood it to be was the amount of contacts, the degree of
connection between those two entities, it has increased in the
last few months compared to what they were prior to, say,
October of last year.
Mr. Tenet. We have provided some interesting papers to the
committee about contacts that go back to the Sudanese time
period in the mid-1990s and an extensive paper on all of this.
It is a tough issue that you are constantly trying to connect
the dots on, and in the terrorism environment remember,
everybody can connect the dots. There are lots of dots here
that people have to be careful to connect in the right way and
be quite dispassionate about how you portray it. But this is a
serious issue and we have to be very mindful of it.
Senator Dayton. I credit you, in both these appearances and
those classified briefings, for being as forthright, candid,
and giving up the information and knowledge you say that is a
constantly shifting set of information.
Chairman Warner. Thank you Senator.
Senator Bayh. Gentlemen, I have 6 minutes and six questions
so I am going to move expeditiously. If I could ask you to do
the same, I would appreciate it. Admiral, I hope you won't take
it personally that most of my inquiries are for the Director.
My first question, Director, is I know we have finite resources
and there is debate today about how many crises we can handle
well simultaneously. My direct question to you is, is there
anything that we could do to combat al Qaeda or to apprehend or
kill Osama bin Laden that we are not doing because of the
current focus on Iraq?
Mr. Tenet. No, sir.
Senator Bayh. I want to follow up on a question that was
asked, I think by Senator Akaka, with regard to cooperation
from Germany, France, Belgium, or some of the countries that we
have a difference of opinion with Iraq. I understood your
answer to be that there has been no undermining of the
intelligence cooperation with those countries and that that has
not undermined our efforts to combat terrorism. Is that
Mr. Tenet. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Bayh. With regard to Iraq and the potential action,
there have been concerns expressed that this action will lead
to additional recruits for al Qaeda or other potential
terrorist organizations. Obviously that is a concern. You never
want to do anything to create a more fertile field for the
creation of extremists who might turn against the United
States. My understanding has been that a lack of manpower has
not been their problem, that there has been no shortage of
operatives to carry out attacks. There have been other things
that have constrained their attacks on the United States. Is
that a correct view?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, they train thousands of people in their
camps in Afghanistan. Manpower isn't the issue. Brain power,
money, lots of foot soldiers willing to volunteer, tens of
thousands of people who are trained in those camps. So it is
not a manpower question as much as the other issues.
Senator Bayh. That is not an element that leads to few or
potential attacks to the country, the lack of manpower?
Mr. Tenet. No, sir.
Senator Bayh. With regard to Iraq and al Qaeda--you might
not be able to answer this in open session. There have been
press reports to the effect that there have been al Qaeda
sympathizers in our country. There have been press reports to
the effect that there have been Iraqi operatives in our
country. I won't ask you about all that. I am just curious, as
Senator Byrd and others have mentioned, about the alarm in the
country today. What level of assurance do we have? Have you
identified all these folks? What is the probability that there
are some out there, we just do not know they are here?
Mr. Tenet. In terms of terrorists?
Senator Bayh. Iraqi agents or al Qaeda operatives.
Mr. Tenet. I can't give you a guarantee that Bob Muller and
I have identified everybody in this country who may be
affiliated with a terrorist organization. All I can give you is
my certain knowledge that over the last 14 months we are better
off than we were in terms of our knowledge and operations and
sharing of data. So I can't give you that assurance, sir.
Senator Bayh. I appreciate your giving it the best shot
that you can.
Chairman Warner. Senator, we will provide the transcript
for you of yesterday's intelligence hearing, at which time the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations addressed that
Senator Bayh. Two final questions. Again, this one I
understand might be more appropriate for the closed hearing,
but there have been a lot of public reports to the effect that
North Korea probably has a nuclear device already. What kind of
probability do you think exists that they currently have a
Mr. Tenet. I think we have unclassified the fact that they
probably have one or two plutonium-based devices today.
Senator Bayh. Probably. Between 50 and 100? Where would you
Mr. Tenet. I think one or two is a very good judgment.
Senator Bayh. How about if they fired missiles over Japan?
What is the likelihood they have a missile currently capable of
hitting the United States?
Mr. Tenet. I think the declassified answer is yes, they
could do that.
Senator Bayh. They have the ability to deliver nuclear
warheads to the west coast of the United States. Obviously that
is very troubling.
My final question is an attempt to look beyond the horizon
a little bit at other threats. It was raised by Senator Nelson.
That is the issue of the FARC.
There have been troubling things recently--the bombing in
downtown Bogota. Our increased involvement there is not just
against the war on drugs. It is to battle the insurgency.
People move from Colombia into and out of the United States
very frequently. I was at a conference on Colombia in December
where an individual indicated he had met with FARC officials
who had U.S. passports. So you combine urban bombings, the fact
that they are beginning to focus on us as a direct adversary,
and a significant flow back and forth between the United States
and FARC operatives in this country. Am I justified in being
worried about this threat, thinking that looking down the road
this is something that could come home here to the heartland in
a very direct way?
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I actually asked that question this morning
because we had a discussion about Colombia. There is an
excellent question about whether you extend that to here. The
question was regarding specific targeting at specific
facilities. The FARC is taking it to the urban environment.
Obviously you see the health club, that they really touched a
Senator Bayh. I am concerned about what could happen down
the road, if you game this out this could come home.
Mr. Tenet. Let me come back to you with an answer.
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Mr. Tenet did not respond in time for printing. When received,
answer will be retained in committee files.
Chairman Warner. Director Tenet, do you wish to refine your
reply to that very important question regarding the North
Korean delivery system and probability of a warhead, whether
those systems are capable? I think it is an important statement
for the record.
Mr. Tenet. Sir, let me let it stand where it is until we--
yes, sir. Let me leave it stand where it is. I do not want to
give classified information.
Chairman Warner. Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you. I want to thank you for the
hard work that your teams are doing. I just have several
questions that have not been addressed yet. In his State of the
Union, President Bush proposed a Terrorist Threat Integration
Center, a central location, as I understand it, where all
foreign and domestically generated terrorist threat information
and intelligence would be gathered, assessed, and coordinated.
As I further understand it, it would include elements from the
CIA, the FBI, the new Department of Homeland Security, and the
Department of Defense, but that the director would report to
the Director of Central Intelligence. So far, is that a correct
Mr. Tenet. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Clinton. One of the difficulties that I still see
us struggling with is the coordination between national
agencies and sources of information with State and local law
enforcement officials. I am particularly concerned not only
about what goes down but what comes up. The fact is that our
front line defenders with respect to any terrorist attacks here
on our own shores are local law enforcement personnel. What
steps are being taken as you design this department to ensure
first that our local law enforcement officials will receive the
information they need in a both timely and thorough enough
manner; and second, that you will be receiving information?
As I just think about it, this is an overwhelming task, and
I have to say clearly here in this committee that we are
focused on the external and international emerging threats and
their connections with what goes on here at home, but I really
do believe we have not given adequate support to our local law
enforcement first responders. We must have an intelligence and
information gathering system that works far better than it ever
used to in the past. Frankly, there were lots of conflicts as
to what information would or would not be shared. So where are
we in planning that, Mr. Tenet?
Mr. Tenet. It would be good if Director Muller were here
but I will tell you what I know.
Senator Clinton. You will be the overall director?
Mr. Tenet. This is an analytical component and essentially
what we want to do is get all the threat information together,
much as we did this morning, that has law enforcement and
intelligence feeds so it is all seamless to make sure we have
the right terrorist tracking database in one place that is
available to State and local governments, to police forces.
What we collect overseas, what we can hand over. The other
thing that we think we have to do a heck of a lot more, if you
put your finger on something, is give State and local police
departments texture and understanding of what they look for,
how they use their intelligence divisions, how they use the
officer on the beat.
This is a daunting challenge. This is something that the
Director of the FBI is taking on because of his rather direct
relationship to what we are trying to do in creating this kind
of integrated analytical center. There are lots of things that
we can pass. For example, we have an excellent relationship
with the New York City Police Department and the Washington
police. Obviously New York and Washington are special places,
but we need to be able to pass to Milwaukee and Seattle and
every place else in this country texture, understanding,
context. You do not have to give up sources and methods for
this human operator, but you need to give those men and women
the opportunity to find out what we are looking for when we go
There is an enormous amount of data we have started to push
out the door about chemical and biological attacks, what to
look for and how to protect Americans from them. One of our
objectives is to have a place where we can push this out to law
enforcement. The FBI can be at the proper front end, where we
can have officials understand what the threat is without
developing very much.
Senator Clinton. This is an issue that concerns me greatly
and I look forward to continuing to receive updates on how this
is occurring. Second, last month the British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC) reported that British officials believe al
Qaeda successfully built a crude radiological device, commonly
referred to as a dirty bomb, in Afghanistan. What intelligence
do we have regarding the veracity of this report from British
intelligence? Admiral Jacoby, if you have additional insight
into this I would appreciate hearing it.
Mr. Tenet. I would say that BBC and British intelligence
may be two separate entities. We know they had a keen interest
in developing a radiological device, and our whole thought
process analytically and operationally is to prove the
negative, that you did not get one or you did not get a nuclear
weapon. I have never seen any reporting that suggests they
successfully tested a radiological device from any source, our
own, or British, I have never seen our reporting. I can check
but I have never seen it, Senator.
Senator Clinton. You agree with that, Admiral Jacoby?
Admiral Jacoby. Yes. We have found nothing in our
investigations of Afghanistan.
Senator Clinton. The leader of Hamas, who has carried out
numerous bombings in Israel, released an open letter that said
Muslims should threaten western interests and strike them
anywhere. This is a very new development as I understand the
history of Hamas, which has primarily been focused on fighting
the Israeli government and the Israeli people. To what extent
does Hamas pose a direct threat now to Americans both here and
Mr. Tenet. Well, you are quite correct about where their
targeting has been focused on but I would have to go back and
talk to Bob Muller about what he perceives this threat to be
here. The way you are isolating it is exactly right. All of
these groups, a group like Hamas in particular operates in a
constrained geographic region where they have comparative
advantages but obviously the concern would be how they migrate
those here. I will come back to that.
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Chairman Warner. Senator Pryor.
Senator Pryor. I have just a couple of quick questions
about al Qaeda and Director Tenet, I would like to direct those
to you if possible. My first is a follow-up on Senator Bayh's
very good questioning about al Qaeda and their capabilities and
the manpower that they have. You mentioned that there were two
facts. One is that we have disabled, if I could use that term,
a lot of their leadership, and also, second, that they trained
potentially thousands of troops, if you can call them that, or
thousands of foot soldiers or believers, whatever you want to
say, in Afghanistan and other places around the world.
Is al Qaeda at the present time growing?
Mr. Tenet. Well, I think that the most important point I
would make is because you have taken the sanctuary away and the
ability to train an unlimited capability and unlimited resource
for impunity, you hurt the ability of the organization to grow.
There is no doubt about that, to train and deploy people.
Whether people are motivated by the message and are comfortable
with them or--is a different category, but I would say once we
took the sanctuary away and we put them on the run and put them
at greater risk, we jeopardized their ability to grow with
Senator Pryor. Do they have a new sanctuary?
Mr. Tenet. Nothing that rivals what we once saw in
Afghanistan. None. What we are trying to do is find where they
may migrate to in the same kind of mass and scope.
Senator Pryor. Is it your perception that as some
leadership is removed from the picture, other leadership is
Mr. Tenet. Well, that is--I'd like to talk about that in
closed session, Senator.
Senator Pryor. The last thing I have on al Qaeda is we hear
a lot about it. For years, really, but certainly after
September 11, there is not an American today that doesn't know
a little something about it, and I assume that in your view, it
would be categorized as the most dangerous terrorist
organization with regard to America's national security.
Mr. Tenet. It is the most dangerous terrorist organization
that has attacked the United States but I will tell you that
Hezbollah is an organization of capability, of worldwide
presence, that is an equal if not far more capable
organization, if you can believe that. It is a very capable
Senator Pryor. That was my question. What is number two?
Mr. Tenet. I would say Hezbollah. I actually think they are
a notch above in terms of the relationship with the Iranians.
The training they received puts them in a state-sponsor
supported category with a potential for lethality that is quite
Senator Pryor. I assume they are organized a little
differently than al Qaeda but it sounds like they are also kind
of a loose-knit organization out there. Do they have a safe
Admiral Jacoby. Actually, Hezbollah is much tighter, much
more structured, much more organized in sort of a traditional
sense, whereas al Qaeda is a loose network and I might add that
one of the things, in your first question about numbers, we
certainly learned in the U.S.S. Cole attack was that there were
a few al Qaeda operatives that ran the operation but they drew
from this larger group of Mujaheddin who they had fought with
previously, who are not sworn to al Qaeda, who did not have
allegiance. So when we get into discussions about relative
numbers, the training camps are gone but the people who would
share beliefs and join up for a specific operation are yet
another aspect of this whole problem.
Senator Pryor. Does Hezbollah have a primary training
facility, or training region, or safe haven, as we talked about
Mr. Tenet. Southern Lebanon is a place of great concern
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, Senator Pryor has a little of
his 6 minutes left.
Chairman Warner. Senator, if you ask for a minute or 2,
Senator Levin and I are prepared to grant that.
Senator Byrd. I'd like to reserve on that. He is asking
about training of al Qaeda.
Chairman Warner. If you wish to follow up.
Senator Byrd. I wonder if al Qaeda has any training camp or
camps in this country? I seem to remember--and I do not have
today's newspaper report in front of me--something that is
attributed to you to the extent that there are al Qaeda
training camps in this country. Am I right or wrong?
Mr. Tenet. No, sir. I don't believe you are correct. Not
attributed to me. No, sir. I don't believe the Director of the
FBI would say we have ever found anything like that in this
Senator Byrd. So there is nothing that you know about?
Mr. Tenet. Nothing that I know about, sir.
Chairman Warner. Senator Byrd, do you wish to conclude?
Then we will go to our executive session in SH-219.
Senator Byrd. I take this opportunity to align myself with
a high-ranking member in his remarks. I think I subscribe to
those remarks 100 percent. The Director has said more than once
that the burden is upon Iraq and not on the inspectors. This
response has come in answer to a question as to the efficacy of
having more inspectors in Iraq. There are some nations that are
advocating that we increase the number of inspectors and I
believe I heard the Director say that in response to that
proposal that the burden is not on the inspectors but on Iraq.
Am I correct in having heard you say that?
Mr. Tenet. Yes, sir, I believe I said that.
Senator Byrd. Is it not true, Mr. Director, that if the
inspectors are increased this would increase the problems for
Saddam Hussein in his attempts to deceive the inspectors and
deceive the United Nations? Would it not also provide
additional information to the people of the world and to the
people of this country who are about to send their sons and
daughters into Iraq? Would it not serve some good purposes,
even though somewhat of the burden may be, if we use a
political answer and a rhetorical answer, yes the burden is on
Saddam Hussein, not on the inspectors? But would it not provide
some additional information to the people? Would it not make it
more difficult for Saddam Hussein to continue in his course of
Mr. Tenet. Sir, I doubt it. I would respectfully disagree.
I think that his practices and the way he has organized
himself, the very elaborate regime that he has in place, I am
doubtful that it would make much of a difference.
Senator Byrd. It seems to me that common sense reasoning,
and I don't claim to have all of the common sense on my side,
but it seems to me that common sense reasoning would indicate
that the more inspectors that are put in, it is going to
increase the burden upon Saddam Hussein.
But aside from that, I think we also have a burden. I think
there is not only a burden on the inspectors and on Saddam
Hussein, but I think this country has a burden, a burden to
attempt to do whatever it possibly can do, particularly at this
junction, to avoid war. Wars kill people. It seems to me we
have a burden. This country has a burden to bend over backwards
and it has done some of that already, but it seems to me more
so, I think when we talk about the burden being not on the
inspector but on Iraq, we should see our own burden that we
bear before the country and the judgment of history. We need to
do everything we possibly can to avoid war.
Now, having said that, let me congratulate you, Mr.
Director, on your work. I read the book Bush at War by Bob
Woodward, and as I read that book, I came to believe that you
were virtually the central hero.
Mr. Tenet. Do not believe everything you read, Senator.
Senator Byrd. I don't, not everything I hear either in
response to questioning. But you performed admirably in that
book, if I may say. With respect to the defeat of the Taliban,
and whatever is true about that book, I want to compliment you
I only have one other question, Mr. Chairman. Let me just
ask it this way. The Director has on more than one occasion
this morning said that he has not had time to analyze the
recent information that has come to light on Osama bin Laden
and he has indicated he might need another day or so. Might we
have another hearing when the Director has had time to analyze
this information? Might we have another hearing? I think the
American people are entitled to know what his responses to
those questions are.
Chairman Warner. Our colleague makes another point. May I
suggest we take the interim step of analyzing the submissions
from the Director of Intelligence and then in consultation with
our ranking member and yourself and others, we will take that
Senator Byrd. Fair enough. I thank my chairman. He is so
accommodating and responsive. I think we have a burden to
inform the American people and it is not any fault of the
chairman or the ranking member, but I think we have been
delinquent in our duty as a Congress to ask questions and to
inform the American people as we are about to take this very
critical step we see looming just ahead. I think this committee
has a responsibility to do everything that it can. So does our
I do not think we as a Congress have fully fulfilled our
responsibility to the American people.
Chairman Warner. I think our distinguished colleague would
recognize just in the past few days a number of hearings have
been held one at the Foreign Relations Committee yesterday, and
Senator Levin and I participated with members of the
Intelligence Committee today. I think the consultation between
the administration and Congress, and I have urged to reach the
highest obtainable highwater mark of any President; I believe
we are reaching that.
Senator Levin, you had a comment that you wished to make.
Senator Levin. A very quick question and comment. It
relates to this issue of where the Director said we are not
worried about the number of foot soldiers out there in the
terrorist movement. Let me tell you, I am and Admiral Jacoby
Mr. Tenet. I did not mean to imply it, Senator. Let me
correct the record then.
Senator Levin. I want to read you what Admiral Jacoby said
and let me see if you agree with that. This is in today's
written testimony, and it says so much. I wish you would have
time to read this paragraph. ``Much of the world is
increasingly apprehensive about U.S. power and influence. Many
are concerned about the expansion, consolidation, and dominance
of American values, ideals, culture, and institutions.
Reactions to this sensitivity to growing `Americanization' can
range from mild `chafing' on the part of our friends and allies
to fear and violent rejection on the part of our adversaries.
We should consider that these perceptions, mixed with angst
over perceived U.S. unilateralism, will give rise to
significant anti-American behavior.'' Do you agree with the
Mr. Tenet. I'd like to think about it.
Senator Levin. I would like to put in the record, Mr.
Chairman, an article from The Washington Post of Friday,
February 7. There are two quotes in particular. One, ``Senior
U.S. officials said that, although the Iraqi government is
aware of Zarqawi's group's activity it does not operate,
control, or sponsor it.'' Second, the paragraph which says,
``Senior administration officials said that, although Zarqawi
has ties to Osama bin Laden's group, he is not under al Qaeda
control or direction. `They have common goals,' one
intelligence analyst said, but he [Zarqawi] is outside Osama
bin Laden's circle. He is not sworn al Qaeda.''
Because the time has run today and because the Director did
comment on both of those yesterday at the Intelligence
Committee, I would ask that in addition to these quotes from
this article being made part of the record, that the testimony
of the Director commenting on those quotes from yesterday's
Intelligence Committee hearing also be made part of the record.
Chairman Warner. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
Chairman Warner. We will now reconvene in SH-219 in
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
1. Senator Bill Nelson. Director Tenet, Captain Scott Speicher's
status is of great concern to me. I want to ensure that as events
unfold in Iraq that he is not forgotten and that the U.S. intelligence
community is doing all it can to find out more information about his
location and his condition. I appreciate your past assistance on this
matter and look forward to continuing to work with you in the future.
Is there new information on the status of Captain Scott Speicher?
Director Tenet. We defer to DIA on the status of the investigation
of Captain Speicher.
2. Senator Bill Nelson. Director Tenet, are regional intelligence
agencies in the Middle East cooperating with U.S. efforts to resolve
Captain Speicher's status?
Director Tenet. We defer to DIA on the status of the investigation
of Captain Speicher.
AL QAEDA ELEMENTS IN PAKISTAN
3. Senator Bill Nelson. Director Tenet, I am greatly concerned with
escalating combat operations in Afghanistan by U.S. troops. I am
especially concerned with the fact that al Qaeda and Taliban elements
may be using Western Pakistan as a staging area or safe haven for
operations against U.S. forces and the Karzai government. Are elements
of Pakistan's security or defense forces allowing (or tolerating) al
Qaeda or the Taliban to use Western Pakistan as a ``safe haven'' from
which to launch operations against American forces in Afghanistan?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
AL QAEDA ELEMENTS IN IRAQ
4. Senator Bill Nelson. Director Tenet, a portion of Secretary
Powell's presentation to the U.N. dealt with the ties between Iraq and
al Qaeda. One particular training camp was identified in northeastern
Iraq. In addition, officials of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
say that they informed U.S. officials of an al Qaeda presence in
September 2001. Where exactly is this camp located, Saddam-controlled
territory, Kurd-controlled territory, or perhaps some other ambiguous
location like a no-fly zone?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
5. Senator Bill Nelson. Director Tenet, how many such camps exist
in the region? Do they not pose a threat to U.S. security?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
6. Senator Bill Nelson. Director Tenet, how long has the
administration been aware of this presence in northeastern Iraq? Why
haven't we taken direct military action against that group?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
CHINESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION
7. Senator Bill Nelson. Vice Admiral Jacoby, press reports indicate
that China has increased its defense budget significantly in the last 2
years. They are on a glide path to significant modernization that may
threaten U.S. military superiority in the not too distant future. How
would you assess the impact of Chinese military modernization,
especially their naval, air defense, and anti-ship missile
modernization, on regional stability and future U.S. relations?
Admiral Jacoby. China has underway an ambitious military
modernization program aimed at improving key elements of both its
conventional and its strategic forces. Its primary focus is on
improving the ability of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to fight
short-duration, high-intensity conflicts along or near China's
periphery. This modernization program also is aimed at deterring or
countering U.S. military intervention in the Asia-Pacific region. To
this end, the PLA is acquiring modern surface combatants and
submarines, surface-to-air missile systems, fourth-generation fighters,
supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles and naval air defense systems, and
a new generation of ground force equipment. As a result, within the
decade, China's overall capacity to threaten other countries in the
region, as well as U.S. military forces in the region, will increase.
China has begun to deploy indigenous SONG and Russian-
built KILO diesel attack submarines and is developing a new
nuclear-powered submarine class.
China is improving significantly its passive air and
China is procuring and developing cruise missiles
capable of being launched from aircraft and land, as well as
submarines and surface ships.
These programs and other enhancements to the PLA's overall fighting
capability potentially could contribute to instability in the Asia-
Pacific region and challenge Sino-Americans relations, should Beijing
opt to use military force to resolve its numerous disputed territorial
claims or to achieve regional preeminence, one of China's strategic
8. Senator Bill Nelson. Director Tenet, I am concerned with the
growing level of violence in Colombia and the potential for instability
there to spread to other nations in the region. What are the threats to
stability and democratization posed by the spread of both narcotics
production and insurgency in the South America?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
9. Senator Bill Nelson. Director Tenet, specifically, how is the
threat of terrorism evolving in Colombia in light of the recent Bogota
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
10. Senator Bill Nelson. Director Tenet, do you expect the FARC or
other groups to begin directly targeting American citizens in Colombia
or elsewhere in South America?
Director Tenet. [Deleted.]
[Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the committee adjourned.]