[Senate Hearing 108-180]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-180
NATO ENLARGEMENT: QUALIFICATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS--PARTS I-IV
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HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 27, AND APRIL 1, 3 AND 8, 2003
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire Virginia
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Thursday, March 27, 2003--Part I
Page
Allen, Hon. George, U.S. Senator from Virginia, opening statement 3
Joint Baltic American National Committee, Inc., John
Bolsteins, chairman, letter/statement submitted for the
record................................................... 6
Baltic American Freedom League, Inc., Valdis V. Pavlovskis,
president, letter/statement submitted for the record..... 6
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared
statement...................................................... 28
Bradtke, Robert A., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Eurasian Affairs; accompanied by: Heather A.
Conley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Eurasian Affairs and Janet L. Bogue, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Department of
State, Washington, DC.......................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Brzezinski, Ian, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
European and NATO Affairs, Department of Defense, Washington,
DC............................................................. 15
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator
Biden...................................................... 35
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, prepared
statement...................................................... 32
Lithuanian-American Community, Inc., Regina F. Narusis, J.D.,
chairman, National Board of Directors, statement submitted for
the record..................................................... 33
Tuesday, April 1, 2003--Part II
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 45
Congress of Romanian Americans, Armand A. Scala, president,
letter/statement submitted for the record.................. 108
``NATO's New Front,'' article by Thomas J. Friedman, New York
Times, March 30, 2003...................................... 96
panel 1: ``a view from brussels''
Burns, Hon. R. Nicholas, U.S Permanent Representative to the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Brussels, Belgium.......... 50
Prepared statement........................................... 56
panel 2: ``new members and a changing alliance''
Asmus, Dr. Ronald D., senior transatlantic fellow, German
Marshall Fund, Washington, DC.................................. 87
Prepared statement........................................... 90
``We Need to Repair the Rift,'' commentary by Ronald Asmus,
Wall Street Jounal online [WSJ.com], March 31, 2003........ 93
Jackson, Bruce Pitcairn, president, Project on Transitional
Democracies, Washington, DC.................................... 78
Prepared statement........................................... 81
Thursday, April 3, 2003--Part III
Voinovich, Hon. George V., U.S. Senator from Ohio, prepared
statement...................................................... 111
Lithuanian-American Community, Inc., letter/statement on NATO
Expansion Ratification, Regina F. Narusis, J.D., chairman,
National Board of Directors................................ 121
Baltic American Freedom League, Inc., Valdis V. Pavlovskis,
president, letter/statement, recommending NATO membership
for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.......................... 123
bulgaria and romania
Bugajski, Janusz, director, Eastern Europe Project, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC............ 124
Prepared statement........................................... 127
latvia, lithuania, estonia
Larrabee, Dr. F. Stephen, senior staff member, RAND, Arlington,
VA............................................................. 114
Prepared statement........................................... 117
slovakia and slovenia
Simon, Dr. Jeff, senior research fellow, Institute for National
Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC. 131
Prepared statement........................................... 134
Tuesday, April 8, 2003--Part IV
panel 1: ``new members, new missions''
Grossman, Hon. Marc I., Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC................... 154
Prepared statement........................................... 158
panel 2: ``the future of nato''
Clark, General Wesley K., USA (Ret.), former SACEUR, Chairman and
CEO, Wesley Clark & Associates, Little Rock, AR................ 184
Prepared statement........................................... 189
Kristol, William, editor, The Weekly Standard and chairman,
Project for the New American Century, Washington, DC........... 193
Prepared statement........................................... 197
NATO ENLARGEMENT: QUALIFICATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS--PART I
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THURSDAY, MARCH 27, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:02 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Hon. George
Allen presiding.
Present: Senators Allen, Brownback, and Biden.
Senator Allen. Welcome and good afternoon to everyone. I
want to welcome Deputy Assistant Secretaries Heather Conley,
Robert Bradtke, Janet Bogue, from the State Department, and
Deputy Assistant Secretary Ian Brzezinski from the Department
of Defense to be with us. We have a number of ambassadors here
from the seven NATO-aspirant countries in attendance at the
hearing. And I would like each of them to rise as I state their
names so they can be recognized.
First from Bulgaria, the Deputy Chief of Mission, Emil
Yalnazov. Welcome.
From Estonia, Ambassador Sven Jurgenson. Around here, we
say Jurgenson, as you well know, a famous quarterback.
From Latvia, the Deputy Chief of Mission, Janis Eichmanis.
Glad to have you here.
From Lithuania, Ambassador Vygaudas Usackas.
And from Romania, Ambassador Sorin Ducaru. Welcome.
From Slovakia, Deputy Chief of Mission, Peter Kmec.
Welcome.
And from Slovenia, Ambassador Dr. Davorin Kracun. Welcome.
Welcome to you all.
The purpose of this hearing is to discuss the
qualifications and the contributions of the seven NATO-aspirant
countries, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia,
Romania, and Slovenia. It was intended to be the second of
three hearings dealing with NATO enlargement. The previous
session scheduled for earlier this week with Secretary Powell
was postponed until next Tuesday. We understand the many
pressing matters on his agenda.
There will be a followup session to this hearing to be held
next Thursday at 2:30 in the afternoon. And I am going to place
my entire statement in the record, along with letters from the
Joint Baltic-American National Committee and the Baltic-
American Freedom League. And I am going to make some remarks.
And if a counterpart on the Democrat side arrives--there are
different hearings going on and different meetings at this
point--they will make comments. Then we will hear from you. And
then members will have 7 minutes for comments and questions.
From my perspective as one who looks at history, NATO has
truly been one of the most successful multilateral military
alliances in modern history. For over 50 years, it successfully
maintained peace in Western Europe, it contained Soviet
expansionism, it helped bind the United States and Europe
together militarily and politically, and played an
indispensable role in Europe's ability to put itself back on
its feet and back together after World War II.
When I was Governor of Virginia, I was a strong advocate of
the inclusion of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into
NATO, and after leaving office as well. So I was very pleased
that in 1999 NATO took action to ensure its continued relevance
and vitality when Poland and Hungary and the Czech Republic
were welcomed into NATO.
Last November in Prague, NATO took the next step when all
seven countries were invited to begin the accession talks with
the countries that we have talked about here, and that are
represented. Each of these seven nations are unique nations.
They have their own heritage, their own culture, their own
means of governance. But they do have certain common binds. And
certainly there are criteria that they need to meet. They have
acted as de facto allies, in fact, to the United States and
have made significant contributions to the campaign in the
Balkans, in the war on terror, and in the effort that is
ongoing right now to disarm Saddam Hussein.
In addition to the military contributions they have already
made, these countries have made impressive political progress
as well. All have successfully implemented democratic reforms
and have popularly elected governments. Political and military
reforms in these countries are continuing. And they are guided
in part by NATO's Membership Action Plan process, which assists
countries in readying themselves for NATO membership. And NATO
membership, in my view, will reinforce these reforms.
Now I would like to highlight a few of the most noteworthy
qualifications and contributions of some of the seven countries
that we are discussing today. In particular, I want to mention
the impressive strides being made by the Baltic nations--
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. All have held fair and free
elections and positioned themselves for future EU membership as
well. And this is all since they regained their freedom.
They have small, but capable, armed forces and have
contributed troops to the KFOR and SFOR missions in the
Baltics. In fact, Lithuania has over 100 troops in the Balkans.
They have sent forces to Afghanistan. They are supporting the
U.S. military actions, along with the British and Australian
and the many other countries, in Iraq.
Popular support for NATO membership is well over 50 percent
in each of these Baltic countries. Bulgaria and Romania have
also made great political strides and provide significant
direct military support to NATO and to the United States. Both
countries have deployed troops to both SFOR and KFOR and are
allowing U.S. and coalition forces to use their air space and
facilities in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Slovenia has a parliamentary democracy that has held free
elections since their independence in 1991 and is poised to
join the EU in 2004. They are also providing important support
to NATO operations in the Balkans. And 66 percent of Slovenes
are in favor of joining the Alliance.
Slovakia continues its efforts at political and economic
reform. This country contributes troops to KFOR and SFOR and
has contributed to many other peacekeeping operations as well
with more than 600 troops serving in international missions
around the world. Slovakia, along with the Czech Republic, has
sent a contingent of anti-chemical weapons specialists to
Kuwait, which is clearly part of the Iraqi theater.
So in conclusion, I think that all of these seven countries
have had to overcome serious political, economic, and military
challenges to be on the way to joining the most important
political-military alliance in the world. Without a doubt, they
will all benefit greatly from being in NATO. And NATO, I think,
will also benefit from having their capabilities and also the
vitality and the love of freedom and the appreciation for
freedom that they will bring.
So I look forward to a transparent and swift consideration
of these seven countries' readiness to join the NATO Alliance.
And since there is not a Democrat colleague here to present
a statement after this, I think we will go to questions. But
first what I would like to do is allow the Democrat Senator,
whenever he or she arrives, to put a statement into the record.
But we are going to start with our testimony.
[The opening statement of Senator Allen follows:]
Opening Statement of Senator George Allen
introduction
Welcome to Deputy Assistant Secretaries Heather Conley, Robert
Bradtke, and Janet Bogue from the State Department and Deputy Assistant
Secretary Ian Brzezinski from the Department of Defense. We look
forward to their testimony and reviewing with them the qualifications
and capabilities of the seven NATO aspirant countries. I would also
like to thank the Chairman of this Committee, Senator Richard Lugar,
for giving me the opportunity to take the gavel for this important and
timely hearing.
NATO has been the most successful multi-lateral military alliance
in modem history. For over 50 years, it successfully maintained peace
in Western Europe, contained Soviet expansionism, helped bind the US
and Europe together militarily and politically, and played an
indispensable role in Europe's ability to put itself back together
after WW II.
Many have questioned NATO's relevance in the post-Cold war world
and recent events have heightened questions about the Alliance and its
future. I believe that NATO can continue to play a vital role in
ensuring European stability. However, there are certainly changes that
need to be made to NATO to allow it to more effectively deal with
threats and non-traditional missions. Some important changes are
already under way such as the ongoing efforts to develop the NATO
Response Force that will be a high readiness, deployable force able to
rapidly respond to contingencies worldwide.
In a move that I advocated as Governor of Virginia and after my
term, on March 12, 1999, NATO took another important step to ensure its
continued vitality and relevance when Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic were welcomed into NATO. These countries have already proven
themselves to be capable and contributing members of the Alliance. Last
November in Prague, NATO took the next step when it invited seven
countries to begin accession talks to join the Alliance: Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Each of
these seven nations has made significant contributions to:
The campaign in the Balkans.
The War on Terror.
The effort to disarm Saddam Hussein.
They have acted as de facto allies of the United States. For
example:
They have provided logistical support and troops in combat
or peace support missions in Western Balkans, Afghanistan, and
Iraq.
Romania and Bulgaria are currently providing bases to
support Coalition military operations against Iraq.
Slovakia and the Baltic countries have provided peacekeeping
troops, air surveillance support, as well as biochemical
specialists.
The democratic progress these countries have made since 1991, when
the communist-bloc collapsed, has been remarkable. The ``Membership
Action Plan'' process, which assists countries in readying themselves
for NATO membership, has dramatically contributed to their successful
reform efforts to date. NATO membership will reinforce the invitees
continuing reform efforts.
brief statements of qualifications and contributions of each country
Bulgaria. Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic ruled by a
democratically elected government. Bulgaria's process of reform from
communism to an open, market-oriented democracy has accelerated in
recent years. Sofia has pledged to make long-needed reforms in many
areas, including a reform of the judiciary, economic reforms to
increase foreign investment, a reduction of rampant corruption, and
measures to stop trafficking in persons and drugs. Bulgaria's armed
forces are being downsized and restructured into rapid reaction forces,
main defense forces, territorial defense forces, and reserves. Bulgaria
has deployed troops to both SFOR and KFOR and has given permission for
U.S. forces to use its airspace for the conflict with Iraq, as well as
an airbase at Sarafovo, on the Black Sea. Bulgaria plans to send 150
troops to countries neighboring Iraq to protect against possible
nuclear, chemical or biological attack.
Estonia. Estonia has held free and fair elections since regaining
independence in 1991. Estonia has met the political and economic
criteria for joining the EU; it completed membership talks at the end
of 2002 and is expected to join the EU in 2004. Public opinion polls in
Estonia have shown substantial support for NATO membership; a February
2003 survey showed 61% of respondents favoring NATO membership.
Estonia has about 7,200 troops in its regular armed forces and
about 8,300 in a volunteer reserve force. Estonia has contributed
troops to both SFOR and KFOR, sent explosives experts to Afghanistan in
July 2002 and is considering a possible deployment of a small unit of
several dozen troops to Iraq as part of a post-conflict peacekeeping
mission.
Latvia. Latvia is a parliamentary democracy that has held free and
fair elections since achieving independence in 1991. The EU has
determined that Latvia has met the political and economic criteria for
membership; Riga completed accession talks at the end of 2002 and is
expected to join the EU in 2004. A January 2003 public opinion poll put
support for NATO membership at 54.7%.
Latvia has about 6,500 men in its active-duty armed forces, and
14,400 in the reserves and plans to equip and train a light infantry
battalion that would form the core of the country's army and also be
capable of participation in NATO-led peacekeeping and other missions.
The country is also developing specialized capabilities in air
surveillance, military medics, military police, and nuclear, chemical
and biological decontamination units. Latvia has deployed soldiers to
SFOR and KFOR. In January 2003, the government approved plans for
dispatching military medics to serve in Afghanistan. On March 17,
Latvia expressed support for U.S. military action in Iraq. Latvia may
send a small contingent to support peacekeepers in post-conflict Iraq.
Lithuania. Lithuania is a parliamentary democracy, which has held
free and fair elections since achieving independence in 1991. Lithuania
has met the political and economic criteria for EU membership. It has
completed negotiations with the EU and is expected to join the Union in
2004. A December 2002 public opinion poll put support for NATO
membership at 59%.
Lithuania has active-duty armed forces totaling 12,100 men, and is
developing a Rapid Reaction Brigade of 3,800 troops, to be ready by
2006. Lithuania plans to be able to provide a battalion-sized unit that
can deploy with NATO forces overseas for combat missions and is working
to develop specialized capabilities such as air surveillance, demining,
and air transport. Lithuania has small contingents in SFOR and KFOR and
sent 40 special forces soldiers to Afghanistan last year. The
government recently expressed support for the U.S. military campaign in
Iraq. It is considering plans to deploy troops for post-conflict
peacekeeping, including medical and logistics experts. Lithuania's
specific contributions include:
Contribution in the Balkans
Contributes, for six month out of every 18, a company of 100
personnel with the Danish contingent to SFOR (similar
deployment to IFOR). Contributed 914 personnel total since
1994.
Maintains an infantry platoon pf 30 personnel with the
Polish battalion in KFOR.
Maintains a military transport aircraft with crew and
logistics personnel of 7 in support of NATO operations in the
Balkans since April 2001.
Contributed 10 medical personnel to NATO humanitarian
mission ``Allied Harbor'' in Albania in 1999.
Contributions to the war in Afghanistan (ISAF and OEF)
Offered use of Lithuanian airspace and airfields and other
support for Operation Enduring Freedom.
Deployed a medical team of 4 personnel with the Czech
contingent in ISAF Oct.-Dec. 2002. Redeploying medical team
with the German contingent in ISAF in April 2003.
Deployed Special Operations Forces unit of 37 personnel to
Afghanistan in support of OEF in Nov. 2002.
Offers of potential assistance for war with Iraq
Government has declared preparedness to contribute
politically and with other measures to the efforts of U.S. led
coalition to disarm Iraq, e.g., 10 cargo handlers, 6 medics.
Romania. Romania has held four elections, deemed free and fair by
outside observers, since the fall of communism; its political scene has
been fairly stable in the past three years. Although its economy has
performed relatively well for the past two years, Romania continues to
lag behind its neighbors; Bucharest has been urged to accelerate
economic reforms and privatize large industries. According to an
October 2002 poll, 88% of Romanians support NATO membership, and 86%
favor joining the EU.
The Romanian's have been working to reduce the size of their
military and reorganize its military structure in accordance with
western standards, and has created a rapid reaction force. Romania has
been modernizing its military equipment and adding new weapons systems,
and has also been developing NATO ``niche capabilities,'' including
airlift, minesweeping, UAVs, counter-NBC warfare, mountain combat
troops, and special forces. Romania has contributed a 122-member
contingent to SFOR, 222 personnel to KFOR, 70 police officers to UNMIK,
and has deployed an infantry battalion, military police and a C-130
transport to ISAF, the international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan.
Romania has offered the use of its territory--land, airspace and
seaports--for the U.S.-led military action against Iraq. In response to
Washington's request, Romania has dispatched non-combat troops
(engineers, medics and military police), and about 1,000 U.S. troops
have been stationed in Constanta, which is acting as an ``air bridge''
to the Gulf. Romania has deployed a biochemical unit to Iraq, and if
needed, the Romanian Government will shelter up to 1,500 war refugees
from Iraq.
Slovakia. Slovakia and the Czech Republic peacefully divided in
1993. The country suffered through a number of difficult years
politically and with regards to its international standing. However,
the new government that came to power in 2002 appears to have the
country on the right track. A March opinion poll showed 48% support for
NATO membership.
Since 1998, Slovakia has been reforming and restructuring its
military, moving toward a smaller, more flexible and fully professional
force. Bratislava aims to establish by the year 2010 a small, well-
equipped and trained armed force that is integrated into NATO military
structures and capable of operating in allied military operations.
Slovakia is training special units in alpine combat, reconnaissance,
and engineering, and is also training an immediate reaction battalion
for future use by NATO. Slovakia contributes troops to KFOR and SFOR.
Outside of the Balkans, Slovakia has contributed to many peacekeeping
operations, with more than 600 troops serving in international missions
around the world. Slovakia, along with the Czech Republic, has sent a
contingent of anti-chemical weapons specialists to Kuwait.
Slovenia. Slovenia is a parliamentary democracy that has held free
elections since independence in 1991. Slovenia has met the European
Union's political and economic criteria for membership; it has
completed membership talks and is expected to join in 2004. In a March
23, 2003 referendum, Slovene voters endorsed their country's NATO
membership, with 66% in favor of joining the Alliance.
In 2002, Slovenia decided to move rapidly toward professional armed
forces and plans to abolish conscription by 2004. Slovenia is providing
military police to SFOR, as well as a medical unit and a helicopter
unit. Slovenia has readied a motorized infantry company for deployment
to SFOR in 2003. In March 2003, Slovenia said it would decline a U.S.
request for its forces to transit Slovenia on the way to a deployment
to Iraq, unless the U.N. Security Council endorsed military action
against Baghdad.
conclusion
These seven countries have all had to overcome serious political,
economic and military challenges to get to where they are today--on the
way to joining the most important political-military alliance in the
world. Without a doubt, they will all benefit greatly from NATO
membership and NATO will benefit from the capabilities the offer and
the vitality they bring.
______
Joint Baltic American National Committee, Inc.,
400 Hurley Ave.,
Rockville, MD, 20850-3121, March 21, 2003.
Representing: Estonian American National Council, Inc., American
Latvian Association, Inc., Lithuanian American Council, Inc.
The Honorable George Allen
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510
Dear Senator Allen:
On behalf of one million Americans of Estonian, Latvian and
Lithuanian heritage, the Joint Baltic American National Committee, Inc.
(JBANC) asks for your support for NATO enlargement ratification during
upcoming Senate deliberation. We ask for your endorsement for the seven
invited aspirant countries, including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
In the twelve years following the restoration of their
independence, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have carried out impressive
economic, political and military reforms.
All three Baltic countries have actively participated in
peacekeeping missions in the Balkans and in Afghanistan and are also
committed to serving alongside the United States and its Allies in the
rebuilding of Iraq. As part of the coalition of the willing these
countries arc committed to giving not only political but moral,
material and tactical support to the United States.
We look forward to working with you in supporting the partnership
and cooperation between the United States, its NATO Allies and the
three Baltic countries as they integrate further with Western
democratic institutions. This will help cement the security and
stability so long sought after in that region.
Sincerely,
John Bolsteins, Chairman.
______
Baltic American Freedom League, Inc.,
P.O. Box 65056,
Los Angeles, CA 90065, March 26, 2003.
The Honorable George Allen, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Europe,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC 20510
Dear Senator Allen:
On behalf of the members of the Baltic American Freedom League, I
am submitting the League's statement recommending NATO membership for
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
We respectfully request that the statement be made part of the
record of the Foreign Relations Committee's hearings on amending the
Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949.
You have been a great and true friend to the Baltic American
community and the Baltic countries, and we sincerely appreciate it. The
Baltic American community believes that the Baltic countries are
qualified for membership in NATO, and we hope that you will continue to
support them in this endeavor.
Sincerely,
Valdis V. Pavlovskis, President.
Written Statement of Valdis Pavlovskis, President, Baltic American
Freedom League, Inc.
On behalf of the members of the Baltic American Freedom League, the
Board of Directors respectfully request that the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee support the membership of Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania in NATO and recommend their membership in NATO to the full
Senate.
Since the Baltic countries regained their independence, Congress
has supported the integration of the Baltic nations in western defense
structures. In support, in 1994 Congress enacted the NATO Participation
Act, in 1996 it passed the European Security Act, and in 2002, by an
overwhelming vote, the Freedom Consolidations Act. In addition, last
year the House of Representatives passed HCR 116 and HCR 468
recommending Baltic membership in NATO.
Congress has supported Baltic aspirations to join NATO by annually
providing funding through FMF and IMET for the development of Baltic
armed forces. For a decade, American military advisory teams have
served in the Baltic countries training the Baltic military, and
hundreds of Baltic soldiers of all ranks have graduated from U.S.
military schools. Baltic military forces have participated in joint
military exercises with NATO forces. Recent NATO inspection teams as
well as visits by U.S. Congressional delegations have concluded that
the Baltic countries are qualified for NATO membership.
In the short period since they regained their independence, the
Baltic countries have developed strong and responsible democratic
governments, viable free market economies and transparent and
democratic armed forces. OSCE, the U.S. Department of State, and
various international bodies have found that the Baltic countries
respect and fully comply with international standards of civil and
human rights.
The early fears that Russian opposition to Baltic membership in
NATO would give rise to Russian nationalism and have a deleterious
effect on U.S.-Russian relations have not materialized.
Today, the Baltic countries participate in the Partnership for
Peace program and Operation Enduring Freedom. Baltic troops are serving
in the Balkans and Afghanistan.
The Baltic countries were one of the first to support U.S. action
in Iraq, and they were the initiators of the Vilnius Ten declaration in
support of the U.S., in spite of retaliation threatened by their larger
neighbors France and Germany. All three Baltic countries are preparing
to assist in reconstruction of a post Saddam lraq
The Baltic countries have demonstrated their willingness and
capability to assume the responsibilities of NATO membership. They
share our values and have proved to be loyal friends of the United
States. As Americans of Baltic heritage, the Baltic American Freedom
League is proud and confident to support Baltic membership into NATO.
We hope that you will too.
We look forward to working with you to gain support for amending
the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 to include Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania.
Senator Allen. So let us begin with our witnesses. Panel
one.
You are here. OK. Well, let us do this. Deputy Assistant
Secretary Bradtke, we would like to hear from you first.
Mr. Bradtke. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Allen. Then we will have Deputy Assistant Secretary
Brzezinski.
Secretary Bradtke.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. BRADTKE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS; ACCOMPANIED BY:
HEATHER A. CONLEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS; JANET L. BOGUE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Bradtke. I want to thank you for giving me and my
colleagues the opportunity to testify today before you on the
enlargement of NATO and the qualifications and the
contributions of the seven countries that were invited to join
NATO at the Prague Summit.
At the outset, I would also like to thank Chairman Lugar
and the members of the committee for your leadership on the
issue of NATO enlargement. Your support, your encouragement,
but also the tough questions that you have asked us have helped
us to refine our approach to NATO enlargement. And I also want
to thank Senator Biden as well for his leadership of the
committee in the past. We have worked very closely with this
committee over the last 2 years.
Here before you today is the core of the interagency team
from the State Department and from the Defense Department that
has worked for the better part of the last 2 years on the
enlargement issue. It was our job to ensure that our Principals
had the information they needed to advise the President, who
made the ultimate decision on whom to invite and which
candidates to support.
This was a responsibility, Mr. Chairman, that we took very
seriously. There is no more important commitment that one
country can make to another than to pledge that its citizens
are prepared to fight for the other. And when a country is
invited to join NATO, that is what we are deciding.
The standards for NATO membership are high. But NATO
leaders have wisely recognized that there is no single set of
criteria that determines whether a country is qualified for
membership. NATO needs to be able to accommodate countries as
diverse as the United States and Luxembourg or Turkey and
Iceland.
When the last round of enlargement occurred and Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic formally joined the Alliance in
1999, NATO's leaders recognized that preparing for NATO
membership was a difficult task. They created a tool to help
aspirant countries to understand what was expected of them and
to prepare themselves for membership. They set up the
Membership Action Plan or MAP.
The MAP process has given us a strong basis by which to
measure the readiness for NATO membership of the seven
countries that were invited at Prague. But given the importance
to the United States of NATO, the administration has carried
out additional steps to evaluate each country and to encourage
the hard work of reform.
In February of last year, Ambassador Burns led a team,
including a number of us on this panel, which visited all the
aspirant countries. In July, we met again with all the leaders
of the aspirant countries in Riga on the margins of the
Vilnius-10 summit. And during the summer, we conducted what we
called a midterm review of reform implementation with each of
the embassies of the aspirant countries here in Washington.
Finally, in October, another team led by Ambassador Burns,
again including myself and others on this panel, returned to
the aspirant countries to evaluate their progress.
We have held literally hundreds of meetings and traveled
thousands of miles to learn as much as we could about the
aspirant countries and to encourage their preparations to join
NATO. By issuing the invitation at Prague to the seven
countries we are talking about today to join the Alliance,
President Bush and his fellow leaders signaled their belief
that these intensive efforts to promote and encourage reform
had been a success.
Mr. Chairman, nothing has happened since Prague that should
cause us to question their judgment. The evidence shows that
all seven invitees have made an enduring commitment to the core
values of NATO and that each is ready, both politically and
militarily, to contribute to the defense of the Alliance.
All seven, as the chairman just mentioned, are already
acting as de facto allies by providing overflight and basing
rights and providing troops to peacekeeping operations in the
Balkans and Afghanistan or by having liaison officers with
CENTCOM in Tampa.
All of the invitees acting through the Vilnius-10 group
offered their political support to the United States on Iraq in
a statement that was issued on November 21 and again in another
statement that was issued in February of this year. All of the
invitees have committed to spending at least 2 percent of GDP
on defense. When they join the Alliance, they will bring with
them 200,000 troops and important specialized capabilities.
All of the countries, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, are
parliamentary democracies that have had free and fair
elections, that have open market economies, and that respect
the principles of free speech and free press. All have taken
steps to improve governance by bolstering judicial independence
and adopting anti-corruption measures. All have improved their
protection of human rights, including minority rights and civil
liberties. And all have taken steps to restitute property and
to deal with complex and difficult issues from the past.
The President this week submitted his report to Congress on
the enlargement of NATO. And this report goes into greater
detail on each of the countries. The President's report
documents an impressive record of contributions and
accomplishments by the seven countries. But just as no current
member is perfect, problems do remain in the invitee countries.
Issues such as corruption, gray arms sales, treatment of
minorities, protection of classified information, property
restitution, and defense reform will continue to need the close
attention of the leaders of the seven countries.
Based on the extensive dialog that we have had with them,
we are convinced of their commitment to continue their reform
efforts. And we will help them to do so with our continued
moral support, our technical assistance, and the systematic
formal review process that NATO provides.
Mr. Chairman, one might well ask why the administration is
asking the Senate, during a period of such dramatic events in
Iraq, to take the time now to consider the issue of NATO
enlargement. Part of the answer lies in the leadership that the
United States in the last two administrations has shown on the
enlargement issue. Expeditious action by the Senate will
demonstrate to our current allies and our new allies our
commitment to a larger, stronger, more capable NATO, even
during a period of Trans-Atlantic differences. It will show our
commitment to a vision of Europe, whole, free, and at peace,
that President Bush put forward in his speech in Warsaw in June
of 2002.
But there is one other reason, Mr. Chairman, which I would
like to illustrate with a brief story. Earlier this month as
the United States began to move its forces to the Bulgarian
airfield of Burgas, an Iraqi diplomat traveled there. Standing
outside the airbase, the Iraqi told a group of reporters that
if the United States took military action in Iraq, then
Bulgaria and the base at Burgas would be a target for Iraqi
military strikes.
When the Bulgarian Defense Minister was asked whether he
was concerned about this threat, he responded, and I quote,
``This is just the normal statement of an ambassador from a
terrorist state.'' And then the Minister added, ``He will not
be an ambassador when the regime in Iraq is changed.''
In this willingness of the seven invitee countries to stand
with us against such threats, in all that they are doing to
enhance our collective security already and all that they have
done to rid themselves of their totalitarian past, they have
shown their abiding faith in us and their faith in our promise
to open NATO's door to them. We need now to keep faith with
them. We need, Mr. Chairman, to recognize them as true allies.
Thank you very much for your time, Mr. Chairman. And at the
appropriate moment, we would be happy to take your questions.
Senator Allen. Thank you very much, Secretary Bradtke.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bradtke follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert A. Bradtke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for European and Eurasian Affairs
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I want to thank you for
giving me and my colleagues the opportunity to testify before you on
the enlargement of NATO and the qualifications and the contributions of
the seven countries invited to join NATO at the Prague Summit last
November.
At the outset, I would also like to thank Chairman Lugar and the
members of the committee for your leadership on this issue. Your
support and encouragement, but also the tough questions that you have
asked, have pushed us to look closely at our approach on enlargement,
and to refine and to strengthen our arguments. I also want to thank
Senator Biden for his leadership as Chairman last year when much
important work was being done. We have greatly appreciated the close
cooperation that we have had from the Committee and its staff over the
past two years.
Here before you today, is the core of the inter-agency team, from
the State Department and the Defense Department, that has worked for
the better part of two years on the enlargement issue. It was our job
to ensure that our Principals had the information they needed to advise
the President, who made the ultimate decision on which candidates to
support for membership.
I would like to assure the Committee that my colleagues and I took
our responsibilities very seriously. There is no more important
commitment that one country can make to another than to pledge that its
citizens are prepared to fight and--if necessary--to die for the other.
And when a country is invited to join NATO that is what we are
deciding. NATO is not a club; it is a collective defense organization
in which its members commit themselves, under Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty, to considering an attack on one as an attack against
all.
So, the standards for membership must be high, but NATO leaders
have wisely recognized that there is no single set of criteria, no
simple checklist that determines whether a country is qualified for
membership. NATO needs to be able to accommodate members as diverse as
the United States and Luxembourg or Turkey and Iceland.
As a result, Article 10 of the Washington Treaty states only that:
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other
European State in a position to further the principles of the
Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic
area to accede to this Treaty.
When Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic formally joined the
Alliance in 1999, NATO's leaders reflected on their experience and
recognized that preparing for NATO membership was a difficult task.
They decided to create a tool to help aspirant countries to understand
what was expected of NATO members and to prepare themselves for
membership. They set up the Membership Action Plan or MAP.
In establishing the MAP, NATO's leaders stated specifically that
the MAP ``cannot be considered as a list of criteria for membership.''
Instead, MAP is a tool to help countries prepare themselves. Each fall,
under the MAP, the aspirant countries developed an Annual National
Program (ANP) to set objectives and targets for reform. These reforms
were focused on five key areas: political and economic development;
defense and military issues; budgets; security of sensitive
information; and legal issues. NATO reviewed the Annual National
Programs, and each Ally provided comment and feedback. In the spring,
each aspirant met with the North Atlantic Council in a ``19-plus-1''
format to review its progress in achieving its reform goals.
The MAP process has given us a strong basis by which to measure the
readiness for NATO membership of the seven countries that were invited
at Prague. But, given the importance to the United States of NATO and
the Article 5 commitment, the Administration has carried out additional
steps to evaluate each country and to encourage the hard work of
reform.
In February of last year, Ambassador Burns led a team, including a
number of us on this panel, which visited all of the aspirant
countries. We met with Presidents, Prime Ministers, Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Justice, as well as with military
officers and parliamentarians. We warned our interlocutors that joining
NATO was an intrusive process, that as allies we would need to know
everything about each other. We asked difficult questions about
corruption, about property restitution and historical issues, about the
treatment of minorities, about gray arms sales, and defense spending.
We urged the leaders to adopt specific programs of reforms.
Later in 2002, in July we met again with all the leaders of all the
aspirant countries in Riga on the margins of the ``Vilnius-10'' Summit.
During the summer, we also conducted what we called a ``mid-term
review'' of reform implementation with each of the embassies of the
aspirant countries here in Washington. Finally, in October, another
team led by Ambassador Burns, again including myself and others on this
panel, returned to all of the aspirant countries to evaluate their
progress. We met with every Prime Minister and with nearly every
President, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Defense. We
again asked difficult questions and sought assurances that their reform
processes would continue well beyond the Prague Summit, if an
invitation to join NATO would be forthcoming.
As I said at the beginning of my testimony, we have taken our
responsibility seriously. We have held literally hundreds of meetings
and traveled thousands of miles to learn as much as we could about the
aspirant countries and to encourage their preparations to join NATO. By
issuing the invitation at Prague to Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to join the Alliance,
President Bush and his fellow NATO heads of state signaled their belief
that these intensive, hands-on efforts to promote and encourage reform
had been an outstanding success.
Mr. Chairman, nothing has happened since Prague that should cause
us to question their judgment. The evidence clearly shows that all
seven invitees have made an enduring commitment to the core values of
NATO and that each is ready, both politically and militarily, to
contribute to the defense of the NATO Alliance.
All seven are already acting as de facto allies by providing
overflight and basing rights and by providing troops to
peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, or by
having liaison officers with CENTCOM in Tampa.
As Senator Voinovich will recall from his participation at
the Prague Summit, all of the invitees, acting through the
``Vilnius-10'' group, offered their political support to the
U.S. on Iraq on November 21. They reiterated this support in
February in another V-10 statement which endorsed the U.S.
position that Saddam had to comply with UNSCR 1441 fully and
immediately or face the military consequences.
All of the invitees have committed to spending at least two
percent of GDP on defense and should be able to make real
contributions to NATO's defense. When these seven countries
join the Alliance, they will bring with them 200,000 troops and
important specialized capabilities, which will be further
developed in accordance with the Prague Summit Capabilities
Commitment.
All have taken steps to improve their political, economic,
legal, and military systems to overcome the burdens and
problems inherited from decades of Communist misrule. All are
parliamentary democracies with free and fair elections, open
market economies, and respect for the principles of free speech
and a free press.
All have taken steps to improve governance by bolstering
judicial independence and adopting anti-corruption measures.
All have improved their protection of human rights, including
minority rights and civil liberties. All have taken steps to
restitute property and to deal with complex and difficult
issues from the past.
While each of the seven countries invited at the Prague Summit
share these broad accomplishments, I would like to comment briefly on
the particular contributions and steps that each invitee has made to
qualify for NATO membership. I would note that the President's Report
to Congress on NATO enlargement, submitted earlier this week, contains
a more detailed analysis of each country.
Bulgaria--All segments of Bulgarian political opinion strongly
support NATO membership (including all four parties represented in
Parliament). Bulgaria has also given strong support for the disarmament
of Iraq. On November 7, the National Assembly approved the Government's
decision to support coalition action against Iraq. Bulgarian support
includes: over-flight rights and the transit of U.S. and coalition
forces; basing for up to 18 U.S. aircraft at Sarafovo Airport near
Burgas; and the deployment of Bulgarian NBC units (up to 150 personnel)
to the theater of operations. Bulgaria was an important partner of the
United States in dealing with Iraq in the United Nations Security
Council. Bulgaria also contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF),
including hosting a deployment of six US KC-135 transport aircraft and
200 support personnel at Burgas, the first stationing of foreign forces
in Bulgaria since WWII. Bulgaria has also provided personnel for SFOR
and KFOR and donated arms and ammunition to the Afghan National Army.
The Government has agreed on a minimum level of defense expenditures as
a proportion of GDP, projected at higher than 2.8% in 2003 and 2004.
Since the fall of Communism, Bulgaria has clearly demonstrated the
sustainability of its commitment to democracy by holding free and fair
elections and the peaceful transfer of power. Basic civil liberties are
guaranteed by the Constitution. Bulgarians pride themselves on
tolerance, and no extremist group enjoys significant support, either
inside or outside the political system. Bulgaria has made material
progress on the return of private and communal property. Macro-
economically, Bulgaria remains committed to the path of reforms laid
out by the IMF and EU, even in the face of growing public
dissatisfaction with low living standards.
Estonia--The Prime Minister stated publicly on March 18 that
Estonia is ready to contribute to post-conflict operations in Iraq.
Possible contributions include a light point defense platoon, an
explosive ordinance demolition team, and cargo handlers. In the
Balkans, 100 Estonian personnel are currently on a six-month rotation
as part of KFOR. Estonia also has deployed a 21-man military police
contingent with the Italian Multinational Support Unit in KFOR. Estonia
has deployed two explosive detection dog teams to Afghanistan to assist
with airport security, and offered overflight and landing rights in
support of OEF. It has also deployed an explosive ordnance destruction
(EOD) team with ISAF.
Estonia is a fully functioning democracy with a successful market-
oriented economy (GDP grew by an estimated 5.7% in 2002). The
Government has committed to spending at least 2% of GDP annually on
defense. Estonia is working actively to integrate its Russian-speaking
minority by eliminating language requirements for electoral candidates
and promoting naturalization. Estonia is also taking concrete steps to
deal with the past, completing its restitution process entirely and
emphasizing the work of its independent Historical Commission. In
January, Estonia observed its first national Day of Remembrance of the
Holocaust.
Latvia--The Latvian parliament passed a bill March 19 allowing
Latvian troops to take part in operations in Iraq. The bill authorizes
the Government to send units of its Armed Forces to Iraq on operations
``under the military command of the armed forces of the international
coalition.'' Latvia has already deployed eight military medical
personnel to ISAF, and participates in a six-month rotation every 18
months of some 100 personnel as part of KFOR (previously in SFOR). It
also maintains a medical and military police team with the British and
an SOD team with the Netherlands in KFOR. The government is committed
to spending a minimum of 2% of GDP on defense through 2008.
Latvia has also undertaken significant political and economic
reforms. Following parliamentary elections in October, 2002, a new
government was formed headed by Prime Minister Einars Repse that has
demonstrated a firm commitment to combating corruption. A newly created
Anti-Corruption Bureau is working to investigate and prosecute
corruption allegations within government. In addition, the new
government has accelerated efforts to integrate Latvia's minorities.
Since 1995, 58,145 persons have become naturalized citizens. The
Government has taken steps, such as reducing fees, to ease the
naturalization process. The property restitution process in Latvia,
which is nearly complete, is also a great success story. The Government
promotes Holocaust education and public awareness, and commemorates
Holocaust Remembrance Day on July 4.
Lithuania--On March 17, Lithuania reaffirmed the ``Vilnius-10''
group statement on Iraq of February 5, 2002. Lithuania's Parliament
passed legislation on March 24 authorizing the Government to send
logistical and military medical support to a possible effort in Iraq,
as well as humanitarian aid. 37 Special Forces soldiers support OEF;
four military physicians deployed with a Czech unit in ISAF in 2002 and
will report to Afghanistan in May. Airspace and airfields in support of
OEF are on standing offer. Contributions in the Balkans include a six-
month rotation every 18 months of 100 personnel with the Danish
contingent in KFOR (previously in SFOR) and a platoon of about 30
servicemen with the Polish-Ukrainian contingent in KFOR. The Government
is committed to spending a minimum of 2% of GDP on defense.
The Government has taken steps to strengthen its legal and
institutional framework for combating corruption. It has successfully
cracked down on corruption by customs and tax inspectors. We have seen
a genuine and exemplary commitment to address the injustices of the
past. The Government has returned hundreds of religious scrolls to
Jewish community groups, instituted a Holocaust education program,
announced plans to restore parts of the Jewish Quarter in Vilnius' Old
Town, and consistently been one of the most active members of the 15-
country International Task Force on Holocaust Education. A joint
Government-Jewish community committee is working on an amendment to the
property restitution law to allow communal property restitution.
Romania--Has demonstrated its readiness to contribute to NATO.
Public support for NATO membership is about 80%, the highest of any
invitee country. Romania is a staunch supporter of the war on terrorism
and the effort to disarm Iraq. Romania granted blanket overflight,
basing and transit rights to coalition forces for operations in both
Afghanistan and Iraq. The Black Sea port of Constanta and Mihail
Kogalniceanu airbase have accommodated U.S. troops en route to the
Persian Gulf. Romania also has offered to deploy a 75-man nuclear,
biological and chemical weapon response unit to support Iraq
operations. Romania has provided robust support of OEF, self-deploying
a 400-man infantry battalion to Kandahar, Afghanistan, and providing a
military police platoon to the ISAF mission in Kabul. The Romanian
defense budget is linked to GDP forecasts and will be based on the
Government's commitment to ensure a minimum level of defense
expenditures, representing 2.38% of GDP in the years 2003 to 2005.
The Romanian government continues efforts to strengthen democratic
foundations, improve living standards, and create a society based on
respect for the rule of law. Romania has a free press, five major
political parties, and an established record of consistently free and
fair elections. To further strengthen democracy and improve
transparency, the Government has drafted legislation to compel the
disclosure of public figures' assets, limit their ability to influence
business decisions, make political party financing more transparent,
and increase the openness of the government decision-making process.
While Romania still has much to do in the matter of restitution, it has
now drafted and passed publicly available laws to replace the former ad
hoc decrees and is adjudicating thousands of claims. Economic growth
resumed in 2000 after a three-year recession, with increases in GDP
growth of 5.3% in 2001 and 4.5% in 2002. Decreases in unemployment and
inflation represent encouraging developments.
Slovakia--Has also demonstrated its readiness and commitment to
supporting U.S. national security interests by contributing to the
global war on terrorism, operations in the Balkans/Afghanistan, and in
Iraq. Contributions include sending 100 soldiers to Kosovo, an
engineering unit to Kabul, and on February 26 a 75 person Nuclear,
Biological and Chemical weapons unit to Kuwait. Slovak military reform
is on course. Parliament is committed to joining NATO and has earmarked
2% of its budget for defense spending.
In September, Prime Minister Dzurinda's government was re-elected,
firmly cementing Slovakia's democratic reforms. Former authoritarian
Prime Minister Meciar's party HZDS has all but collapsed. Although
economic reforms have been painful, with unemployment currently at
around 18%, the Slovaks nonetheless have moved forward with
privatization and financial reform, and their efforts are beginning to
bear fruit. Slovakia has engaged actively with its Jewish community and
with U.S. NGO's to settle outstanding restitution claims. The OECD has
projected a 4% economic growth rate, the highest in the region, for FY
2003.
Slovenia--In addition to offering facilities, overflight
permission, and intelligence support to the War Against Terrorism,
Slovenia provided demining and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan,
donated arms and ammunition to the Afghan National Army Training
Program, and will help train Afghan police. Slovenia also deployed a
motorized infantry company to Bosnia in January 2003, adding to troops
and equipment already sent to SFOR and KFOR. Slovenia shows good
progress in increasing interoperability and reforming its military,
emphasizing deployable and sustainable reaction forces. It will end
conscription next year and plans to have a fully professional force by
2008. Defense spending is rising steadily; the Government has committed
to spending two percent of GDP by 2008.
Slovenia has a stable, multi-party, democratic political system,
characterized by regular elections, a free press, an independent
judiciary, and an excellent human rights record. Slovenia has a free
market economy, an impressive record of sustained, broad-based growth,
and a per capita GDP approaching 72% of the EU average. There is near-
uniform support in Parliament for NATO membership, and 66% of
participants in a referendum on March 23 voted in favor of joining
NATO.
Mr. Chairman, the record of contributions and accomplishments by
the seven countries is impressive. But just as no current member is
perfect, problems do remain in the invitee countries. Issues such as
corruption, gray arms sales, treatment of minorities, protection of
classified information, and defense reform will continue to need the
close attention of the leaders of the seven invited countries. Based on
the extensive dialogue that we have had with these countries, we are
convinced of their willingness to continue their reform efforts. As the
leaders of seven countries have told us, they are continuing reforms
not just to impress us in the hope of joining NATO, but because these
reforms are in their own long-term interest.
This permanent commitment to reform was reaffirmed yesterday, when
the Permanent Representatives of the nineteen NATO Allies signed the
Accession Protocols for the new invitees at NATO headquarters. Each of
the Foreign Ministers from the invitee countries submitted a reform
timetable for their country at the time the Protocols were signed.
These reform timetables are very detailed lists of further political,
economic, military, resource, security and legal reforms that each
country commits itself to. Each invitee designed its own timetable, in
consultation with allies.
We and our NATO Allies will ensure that they live up to these
commitments. We will also help them to do so. They will need our
continued moral support and technical assistance. The systematic and
formal review process that NATO provides will allow them to make
further progress along the reform path while simultaneously increasing
their contributions to Alliance security and values.
Mr. Chairman, one might well ask why the Administration is asking
the Senate, during a period of such dramatic events in Iraq, to take
the time now to consider the issue of NATO enlargement and give its
approval to bringing Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania into NATO. Part of the answer lies in the
leadership that the United States, in the last two Administrations, has
shown on NATO enlargement. Expeditious action by the Senate will
demonstrate to our current allies and our new allies our commitment to
a larger, stronger, more capable NATO, even during period of
transatlantic differences. It will show our commitment to the vision of
a Europe, whole, free, and at peace, that President Bush put forward in
his speech in Warsaw in June 2002.
But there is another reason, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps nothing captures
it better than a story about the head of the Iraqi embassy in Bulgaria.
Earlier this month, as the U.S. began to move its forces to the
Bulgarian airfield of Burgas, the Iraqi diplomat traveled there.
Standing outside the airbase, the Iraqi told a group of reporters that
if the United States took military action in Iraq, then Bulgaria and
the base at Burgas would be a target for Iraqi military strikes. When
the Bulgarian Minister of Defense was asked whether he was concerned
about this threat, he responded: ``This is the normal statement of an
ambassador from a terrorist state.'' And the Minister added, ``He will
not be an ambassador when the regime in Iraq is changed.''
In the willingness of the seven invitee countries to stand with us
against such threats, in all that they are doing already to enhance our
collective security, in all that they have done to rid themselves of
their totalitarian past, they have shown their abiding faith in us and
their faith in our promise to open NATO's door to them. We now need to
keep faith with them. We need to recognize them as true allies.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you very much for
permitting us this time. My colleagues and I would be happy to hear
your questions and concerns.
Senator Allen. Secretary Brzezinski.
I will say that Ms. Bogue and Ms. Conley will not be giving
statements but will be able to share with us expertise in
answering questions we may have.
Secretary Brzezinski.
STATEMENT OF IAN BRZEZINSKI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR EUROPEAN AND NATO AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Brzezinski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for this
opportunity to speak at this hearing on the enlargement. We
know well the important leadership role that you, sir, and
Senator Biden and Senator Brownback and this committee will
play in advocating NATO enlargement. And I am eager to share
with you today the Department of Defense's views of the
qualifications of the seven candidate countries and how their
membership in NATO will enhance the Alliance's security and
military capability.
Yesterday, accession protocols for Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were signed
in Brussels. This is an important milestone in this round of
enlargement. And I think it might be useful to review the
principles that serve as the foundation for this
administration's support for enlargement and more broadly our
security relationship with Europe.
The first principle is that a Europe that is whole, secure,
and at peace is in the interest of the United States. NATO
enlargement is the cornerstone of that vision. An undivided
Europe, whole and free, will be a better partner to the United
States in global affairs.
I realize, of course, that differences between the United
States and a few of our European allies regarding Iraq give
some the impression that Europe and America are not natural
partners. These differences are not to be minimized. But they
do not define the totality of the relationship between Europe
and the United States nor the strategic imperatives of the
North Atlantic Alliance. Europe and the United States need each
other. And I know that the seven invitees to NATO will stand
among those most committed to the transatlantic relationship.
The second principle is that the United States and Europe
exist in the same global security environment. Before them lie
the same opportunities, challenges, and dangers. Of the latter,
none is more urgent and lethal than the nexus of weapons of
mass destruction, terrorist organizations, and terrorist
states. Cooperation with Europe is vital to the global endeavor
under way to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations, their
leadership, their communications, and their sources of
financial and material support.
The third principle is that NATO is and will remain the
anchor of the U.S. security relationship with Europe. It is the
central framework for our military cooperation with Europe. And
NATO promotes among its members common defense policies and
doctrines and integrated force structures. This level of
military integration is found nowhere else in the world.
Finally, Europe remains essential to the maintenance of the
forward presence for the United States military. In fact, U.S.
forces forward deployed in Europe were some of the first to
take up positions in the war against Iraq.
It is with these principles in mind that we advocate an
enlargement and open door policy. Our support for the
aspirations of the seven invitees has been matched by their
enthusiasm and willingness to contribute to NATO-led operations
in the Balkans, to Operation Enduring Freedom, to the
International security Assistance Force in Kabul, and more
recently in the war against Iraq.
Sir, you listed many of the contributions they are making
in the Balkans in these conflicts and peacekeeping operations
as far as in Afghanistan. So I will not belabor those points
again. And I believe a chart was handed out to outline them in
detail.\1\
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\1\ See page 21.
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What can we draw from these experiences? First, over the
last decade, these seven invitees have been acting as de facto
allies. They have demonstrated, by risking their own blood,
that they not only understand the responsibility of NATO
membership, they embrace it.
Second, these seven invitees bring real capabilities to the
table. Indeed, combined together, the seven add to NATO
strength some 200,000 to 230,000 men in arms. They promise to
bring these capabilities that will help NATO meet shortfalls in
its current force structure.
Moreover, for their contributions to NATO operations in the
global war on terrorism, their defense establishments have
developed a better understanding of how NATO and NATO allies
conduct military operations. Clearly, there is still much work
to be done to bring their militaries up to the standards we
expect of our NATO members. My experience in working with these
countries shaping and implementing the reform programs shows
that they are making very good progress and will continue to do
so.
Mr. Chairman, in the travels that I and my colleagues
undertook to these democracies, we have looked at two
questions. Will this candidate or that candidate strengthen the
Alliance's ability to protect and promote its security, values,
and interests? And second, can we be confident that this
candidate's commitment to democracy and the Alliance's
responsibilities and values be enduring?
From my vantage point, I believe the answer to these
questions is yes for all seven. This conclusion is based on
their conduct as de facto allies. It is based on their
soundness of their defense reform programs, multi-year
endeavors that give one some insight into out-year plans and
intentions.
And it is based on the fact that these democracies still
have fresh memories of foreign domination and totalitarianism.
With that comes a special appreciation for what it takes to
protect the core values and interests of the Alliance. It
explains in part their commitment toward the responsibilities
that come with membership in an alliance that brought down the
Berlin Wall, that helped end the Soviet Union, and helped make
these countries free.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I am ready to answer any
questions you or your colleagues may have.
Senator Allen. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brzezinski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ian Brzezinski, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for European and NATO Affairs
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for this
opportunity to provide Department of Defense views on NATO enlargement
and the qualifications of the seven candidate countries that were
tapped at the NATO Prague summit for membership in the Alliance. I
would especially like to provide you with our perspective on how their
integration into NATO will enhance the Alliance's security and military
capability. I would ask that my written statement be placed in the
record.
Yesterday, accession protocols for Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were signed in Brussels. As
we pass this important milestone in this round of enlargement, it is
useful to review the principles that serve as the foundation for this
Administration' perspective on enlargement and more broadly our
security relationship with Europe.
First, a Europe that is whole, secure, and at peace is in the
interest of the United States. Both America and Europe need each other.
An undivided Europe, whole and free, and allied with the United States
is America's natural partner in global affairs.
I realize, of course, that differences between the United States
and a few of our European Allies regarding Iraq give the impression
that Europe and America are not natural partners. These differences are
not to be minimized, but they do not define the totality of the
relationship between Europe and the United States nor the strategic
importance of the North Atlantic Alliance. I am confident that the
seven invitees to NATO we will discuss today will stand with those most
committed to the Transatlantic relationship.
Second, the United States and Europe are both confronted by the
same threats, and they both have the same opportunities in the changing
global security environment. The nexus of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), terrorist organizations, and terrorist states present an urgent
and lethal danger to North America and Europe. Cooperation with Europe
is vital to our efforts to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations,
their leadership, communications, and sources of financial and material
support.
Third, NATO is and will remain the anchor of the U.S. security
relationship with Europe. It is the central framework for our military
cooperation with Europe. NATO promotes among its members common defense
policies and doctrines and integrated force structures. This level of
integration is found nowhere else in the world. Moreover, Europe
remains essential to the maintenance of a forward presence for United
States military forces. U.S. forces forward deployed in Europe were
among the first to take up positions in the war against Iraq, ensuring
not only America's security, but Europe's as well.
Throughout its history, NATO has repeatedly adapted to changes in
the international security environment. By continuing to meet the
challenges of the day, NATO has ensured its ongoing relevance and
vitality. An example is the historic decision NATO took last year to
support German and Dutch forces leading the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF III) in Afghanistan. With this decision, NATO
took on not only a new mission, the support of a ``coalition of the
willing,'' but one well beyond its traditional geographic domain. For
the Alliance, ``Out of area or out of business'' is no longer an issue.
In this spirit, Allied Heads of State and Government made important
and far-reaching decisions at the Prague Summit last November,
continuing Alliance efforts to adjust to the profound changes in
Europe's strategic landscape and the global security environment. They
approved an agenda featuring a new focused capabilities initiative, a
streamlined command structure and the extension of NATO membership to
seven Central European democracies. Permit me, Mr. Chairman, to touch
on some of these initiatives briefly before turning to enlargement.
nato response force
The decision at the Prague Summit to establish a NATO Response
Force (NRF) promises to provide the Alliance the ability to quickly
deploy a force capable of executing the full range of missions NATO may
be called upon to undertake. If implemented to the standards proposed
by the U.S., the NRF will be lethal, technically superior to any
envisioned threat, and readily deployable on short notice. Our goal for
the NRF is an initial operational capability for training by October
2004, and full operational capability by October 2006. We expect the
NRF to become the focal point of NATO transformation efforts to meet
the new threats that the Alliance faces.
prague capabilities commitment
That said, the future success of the NRF depends on the willingness
of our Allies to meet their agreed-upon NATO defense obligations. As
you know, many have consistently failed to do so. At the Prague Summit,
Heads of State and Government approved the Prague Capabilities
Commitment (PCC) to overcome longstanding shortfalls in such areas as
strategic lift, communications, NBC defense equipment, and precision
guided munitions (PGMs). Allied contributions to NRF rotations must
possess many of the critical military capabilities targeted by the
Prague Capabilities Commitment in order to be effective. Allied
contributions to NRF rotations must possess the critical military
capabilities targeted by the Prague Capabilities Commitment if the NRF
is to evolve from a paper concept to a fighting force.
streamlining nato's command structure
At Prague, Heads of State and Government also approved the broad
outline of a streamlined NATO command structure. Operational commands
will be reduced from 23 to 16 commands. This will ensure the more
efficient use of financial and manpower resources. More importantly, it
will provide NATO commanders headquarters that are more mobile, joint,
and interoperable--critical requirements in the 21st Century. And the
establishment of a new functional command, Allied Command
Transformation in Norfolk Virginia, will provide a new and needed
engine to drive military transformation across the entire Alliance.
Let me now turn to enlargement and a discussion of the seven
candidates: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia.
nato enlargement
Our support for the aspirations of the seven invitees has been
matched by, if not superceded by, their enthusiasm and willingness to
contribute to NATO-led operations in the Balkans, Operation Enduring
Freedom, and ISAF. More recently, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, and Slovakia joined our coalition in the war against Iraq.
In short over the last decade, these seven invitees have been
acting as de facto Allies. They understand the responsibility of
membership and embrace it. There is still much work to be done to
further the defense reforms these nations have undertaken to make their
militaries interoperable with those of the Allies. Based on our
experience at helping these countries with these reforms, we believe
these nations are making good progress. We will continue to work
closely with the invitees throughout the accession process and beyond
to help them accomplish military reform goals and to develop niche
capabilities that these nations can bring to the Alliance today to help
meet capability requirements needed by NATO.
The ability of the invitees to operate alongside U.S. and Allied
forces in the Balkans or in the fight against terrorism is no accident.
The U.S. and NATO have been working closely with the invitees through
the Partnership for Peace and the Membership Action Plan (MAP) that
NATO established after the 1999 round of enlargement. The MAP's primary
goal is to aid the preparations of those nations seeking to join the
Alliance. Their participation in the MAP and in the Planning and Review
Process (PARP) within NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) has enabled
them to make significant strides in reforming their militaries and in
enhancing the interoperability of their armed forces with NATO.
Mr. Chairman, let me provide the Committee with a few remarks about
each invitee.
Bulgaria
Bulgaria's defense plans are based on a force structure review that
incorporated substantial U.S. and Allied input. Much progress has been
achieved in the fundamental reform of the Bulgarian military that
should help them develop force structures compatible with those of
Allied countries. Sofia is concentrating its resources and military
training on developing such niche capabilities as: special forces
units; engineer units; logistic support units; and NBC Defense units.
The Bulgarian government has agreed on a minimum level of defense
expenditures, projected at 2.84 percent of GPD in 2003 and 2004.
Bulgaria also hosted U.S. tanker and transport aircraft in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and is hosting U.S. aircraft in
support of the war with Iraq, as well as deploying a Bulgarian NBC unit
as part of coalition forces.
The illicit Terem arms-dealing scandal, which involved the
attempted sale of dual use military equipment to Syria in the fall of
2002, is of great concern of the United States. The Government of
Bulgaria cooperated with the U.S. government in investigating this
case. Sofia continues to work on reforms that will preclude a repeat of
this case. The U.S. Government does not consider the Terem case to be
closed and will continue to monitor closely the Terem investigation
with the expectation that all individuals involved will be held fully
accountable.
Estonia
Estonia has worked hard to make the most of its defense resources,
focusing its efforts on one brigade with a deployable battalion plus
supporting units. It is also working to develop specialized
capabilities for the Alliance, including Explosive Ordnance Disposal
(EOD) teams and military police. Like the U.S., Estonia is outsourcing
some of its logistics requirements through commercial contracts.
Estonia has committed a minimum of 2 percent of GDP towards defense
spending, and will focus efforts to improve the capability of its
deployable units while reducing the amount of resources spent on
territorial defense. Along with Latvia and Lithuania, Estonia has
participated in many cooperative Baltic defense projects. These Baltic
efforts include BALTBAT (the Baltic Battalion), BALTNET (the Baltic air
surveillance network), BALTRON (the Baltic mine countermeasure
squadron), and the Baltic Defense College. An Estonian EOD team
deployed to Afghanistan in support of OEF and another is deploying
there in support of ISAF.
Latvia
Latvia's National Security Plan, based on it's new National
Security Concept, was approved by the government in July 2002. Latvia
is moving defense resources away from territorial defenses and toward a
brigade that will include deployable units. It is also developing
specialized formations, including divers, EOD, military police, medical
units, and Special Operations Forces. Formation of a Special Operations
Command is also underway. Latvia's Parliament is legally committed to a
minimum of 2 percent of GDP towards defense spending through 2008.
Along with Estonia and Lithuania, Latvia participates in the
cooperative Baltic defense projects described above. Two Latvian
medical teams have deployed to Afghanistan to support ISAF.
Lithuania
Lithuania has examined its force structure in light of NATO
initiatives agreed upon at the Prague Summit. Lithuania's defense
modernization plans focus on a brigade with rapidly deployable units
and specialized ``niche'' capabilities such as: engineers, medics and
special forces. Lithuania's defense budget plans for 2002-2007 appear
sound and affordable; all 12 major political parties are committed to
defense spending of 2 percent of GDP. Along with Estonia and Latvia,
Lithuania has partaken in the cooperative Baltic defense projects
described above. Lithuania also has a special military relationship
with Poland featuring a joint battalion, and a Lithuanian platoon is
embedded in the Polish-Ukrainian battalion operating in Kosovo. A
Lithuanian Special Operations Forces unit is deployed in Afghanistan to
support OEF and a medical team is deployed with ISAF.
Romania
Romania has placed a high priority on development of specialized
``niche'' forces in preparation for NATO membership: mountain brigades,
military police and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Its land force
units are to be trained to meet NATO-compatibility requirements by the
end of 2003, leading to an increase in the number of interoperational
Romanian units. Romania is committed to defense expenditures of at
least 2 percent of GDP. Romania has deployed--and transported with its
own airlift--an infantry battalion and military police to Afghanistan
in support of OEF and granted overflight, transit and basing rights for
Afghanistan and Iraq operations. For the war on Iraq, Romania has
provided an NBC unit, has offered peacekeepers for post-conflict Iraq
and is providing basing for U.S. forces.
Slovakia
Slovakia's current defense reforms are solid and follow the ``Force
2010'' Long Term Plan, which is the product of a comprehensive defense
review created with U.S. assistance. Slovakia's specialized ``niche''
capabilities include: dedicated nuclear-chemical-biological (NBC)
reconnaissance and decontamination capability; mobile analysis labs
with modern detection and marking systems; and engineering and special
operations capabilities. Slovakia's Parliament approved 2 percent of
GDP as the minimum for defense outlays, starting in 2003. Slovakia
deployed an engineering unit to Kabul and an NBC unit to support the
war with Iraq.
Slovenia
Slovenia's defense reform is based upon the ``General Long-Term
Development and Equipping Program of the Slovenian Armed Forces, 2002
to 2007.'' This will encompass a new force structure concept aimed at
creating more mobile, capable, and deployable reaction forces, while
reducing and modernizing the main defense and reserve forces. Slovenia
plans to end conscription in 2004 and implement a fully professional
force, based on regular active duty personnel and a voluntary reserve,
by 2008. Specialized ``niche'' capabilities and assets that can be
offered to the Alliance include: mountain warfare, special operations
forces, military police units, and military field medicine. Its new
force structure emphasizes deployability and sustainability. Slovenia
is committed to increase defense spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2008.
(It is currently 1.6 percent).
nato's open door
For those aspirants not invited at the Prague Summit, the door to
NATO membership remains open. The three current NATO aspirants--
Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia--are continuing to participate in the
MAP and to prepare themselves for the responsibilities of NATO
membership. Through NATO programs and bilateral efforts, we will work
with Kiev on the goal of Ukraine's integration into Europe--an
integration that will not be complete as long as Ukraine remains
outside of Europe's key political, economic, and security institutions.
Mr. Chairman, we believe the candidates selected by Heads of State
and Government at the Prague summit hold great promise as Allies, not
only because of a common set of values that helped see them through the
dark days of totalitarianism and communism, but also because of their
eagerness to prove themselves as good Allies. We need to have their
energy and enthusiasm at the table in the councils of NATO and we need
their ideas and their capability too as we grapple with the issues and
challenges yet to come.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am ready to answer any questions you
or the Committee may have.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Secretary Brzezinski. I know you
are very comfortable. We do want to welcome you back here to
this committee. And both your statement and that of Secretary
Bradtke, if you do not mind, we would like to make that a part
of the permanent record of this hearing.
Mr. Bradtke. Thank you very much, because I had summarized
my statement.
Senator Allen. I know you did. And I was just thinking that
while you did not want to be repetitive, we appreciate that.
But it is important that it is part of the record. We have your
assessment of each and every one of these aspirant countries.
We will have 7-minute rounds. With the indulgence of my
colleague, I will start and then go over to you. And if others
come in, we will go that way.
The first question, and Secretary Bradtke brought this up,
on the gray arms, and both of you alluded to it. And in
particular, while we are all in favor of these aspirant
countries joining NATO, in this love and happiness it is also
important to recognize that there are problems and concerns,
let us say, that still remain. In particular, in the area of
gray arms, and in particular the country of Bulgaria. There
have been reports that senior defense officials in Bulgaria may
have been involved in a scheme to export dual-use military
equipment to Iraq. Could any of you all share with us some of
the efforts that have been made by these countries to combat
such corruption? Are the measures working? What steps are these
countries taking to deal with this gray arms sales issue? And
how are we helping them improve their export controls?
Whoever wants to take that----
Mr. Bradtke. Mr. Chairman, if I may just introduce as an
answer to that question say that a number of these countries
did inherit from their days in the Warsaw Pact arms industries,
which were involved in export to countries that we would have
concerns about. And we have worked very intensively with all
those countries to try to strengthen the systems of export
control in those countries, to provide technical advice to
them, to share intelligence with them, to shut off such sales.
Now you raised the specific case of Bulgaria. And that is
where I would like to ask my colleague, Janet Bogue, to respond
in a little greater detail.
Ms. Bogue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The question of gray
arms is an extremely serious issue, and one which we take with
the utmost seriousness. And it is one of those challenges you
referred to, Mr. Chairman, that the countries, the aspirant
countries, have had to overcome from their past.
In the case of Bulgaria, I think Bulgaria's democratically
elected government is tackling this issue of gray arms. And it
is tackling it on the basis of recommendations we have made to
the government for systemic and structural fixes to the system
of export controls in the country, as well as the defense
industry itself. And we are working very well, closely, and
cooperatively with Bulgaria on those systemic changes.
The case to which you alluded, Mr. Chairman, the so-called
Teem case, I think, has been a wake-up call for Bulgaria. There
is an ongoing investigation of the case in Bulgaria. I think it
would be inappropriate for us to comment at this stage on the
outcome of that investigation, which still proceeds.
I would say that the U.S. Government, we have urged the
government of Bulgaria to pursue that investigation to wherever
it leads. And at the same time, as I mentioned, we are working
closely with them to make fixes that will help prevent any kind
of repetition of such a case.
Thank you.
Senator Allen. Thank you. I realize some of this is
sensitive information that we would not want to make public.
Secretary Brzezinski, do you have anything to add?
Mr. Brzezinski. Sir, I guess I would just emphasize four
points. First, the Terem case involved the sale of dual use
materials that, according to some reports, could have ended up
in Iraq. And that is----
Senator Allen. Would you say that again? I did not
understand. Could have ended up in Iraq?
Mr. Brzezinski. Could have. Could have ended up in Iraq.
And that is, of course, at a time when we are at war with Iraq,
a grave concern.
Second point is that cooperation with the Bulgarians has
been very good. Now they have cooperated in the investigation
with us in this. And that has been solid.
Two, the case is still open. And we expect the case to
yield to a result that will ensure all parties involved were
held fully accountable.
Senator Allen. Those are three points. What is the fourth?
Could have gotten to Iraq, they are cooperating, case is still
open.
Mr. Brzezinski. And accountability is key.
Senator Allen. That is at the end of the case. OK. Because
I like to--when we come back months from now, I will just
remember these key components.
Let me ask you all another question here with my remaining
time. You know, after the NATO aspirant countries here issued
the Vilnius-10 declaration, which was in support of the United
States action in Iraq, there were assertions by France and by
Germany, they were kind of hinting, hinting that they may
oppose EU membership for the Vilnius-10 countries. What is the
European position today on the Baltic membership in NATO? And
will Germany veto their membership because of the Vilnius-10
declaration? And what would the U.S. position be if that were
the case?
Mr. Bradtke. I am more comfortable talking about what the
American position is than what the European Union position is,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Allen. All right. Well, you all have some
intelligence. We----
Mr. Bradtke. What I will say is that among the seven
countries invited to join NATO, five of them are also on track
to become members of the European Union in 2004. Bulgaria and
Romania are on a somewhat longer track for EU membership. We
have supported the EU's efforts to bring in new numbers. We
think this strengthens the European Union. It strengthens the
Trans-Atlantic relationship. It helps solidify and consolidate
democracy and reform in these countries. So we have been
supportive of this process.
Frankly, it does distress us to read statements or hear
reports that some EU countries are suggesting that because
these countries have been supportive of the United States, that
this might be a problem for their membership. As we look around
the European Union, there are plenty of other current European
Union members, including the United Kingdom with Tony Blair, of
course, just here today, that are also supporting the United
States' policy on Iraq.
So again, we would not want to see their candidacy for the
European Union in some way being jeopardized or endangered or
threatened because they have decided that on this issue they
are closer to the position of the United States. And this is a
point we have made to the European Union and our European
colleagues.
Again, having said that, we are not looking here for these
countries to be forced to make a choice between NATO or the
United States and the European Union. We think this is
compatible, membership in both organizations. And it
strengthens the transatlantic relationship.
Senator Allen. Does Secretary Brzezinski or any other have
any comments, insight? So have you followed up? Have they made
such assertions? Most of those that I am referencing were made
publicly. And they were more of hints as opposed to real
threats. Have you heard any further comments on that?
Mr. Bradtke. I would just say that this has been an issue,
that we have talked to both officials of the European Union and
Commission on Brussels about from the commission. And it is
also an issue that we have had as a part of our bilateral
conversations with a number of European Union countries.
Senator Allen. Well, have the French or the Germans said
anything to you? Let me be direct here. Have you heard any
noises, hints, assertions, assignations?
Mr. Bradtke. We have had a variety of things said. Some of
them have been said directly to the countries involved. And we
have had conversations with those countries about those
assertions. A number of the things have been said in public.
And in response to those public comments and the comments we
have heard privately, we have gone back to our European friends
and said that we do not think this is an appropriate approach.
Senator Allen. Well, if I may. What about--it does not just
have to be the United States. What about the Dutch or Italians
or Spanish or British, have they also said that they were not
going to make this sort of an issue as far as the EU is
concerned?
Mr. Bradtke. I have not--I am not aware of what they are--
--
Senator Allen. No. I know they are with us in Iraq. But it
is not just our responsibility to talk to the French and the
Germans or the Belgians.
Mr. Bradtke. You make a very good point. This would
undoubtedly be a matter of concern, not just to us----
Senator Allen. Right.
Mr. Bradtke [continuing]. But to those members of the
European Union that have a different position on the Iraq
issue. I cannot say that I am aware of anything specific where
the UK or the Netherlands or some other country has brought
this to the attention of the governments of France or Germany.
That may have happened. I am just not aware of how internal EU
discussions have gone on this point.
Senator Allen. Fair enough.
Now I would like to turn it over to the ranking member
here, a man who is still our chairman and leader in so many
ways, Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you. Ian, which side is easier? Is it
easier to be over there in the Defense Department, you know,
doing it all or over here critiquing it? I mean, which do you
like better?
You do not have to answer that question. It may prejudice
you in some way.
It seems to me that NATO membership is going to serve as a
powerful stimulus to an ongoing process of democratization and
free market economic development in the seven aspirant
countries. And it is precisely this process that I think is
going to move the zone of stability to the east more than
anything they add to the military prowess of NATO, although
they will add, I hope.
This committee, as some of you know, takes this advice and
consent responsibility very seriously. And today's hearing is,
to state the obvious, devoted exclusively to detailed
examination by all of you of the qualifications for NATO
membership for each of these candidate countries. And there is
not any doubt that the future of these countries, in my view,
is in NATO. Each country has effectively utilized the MAP
process to move closer toward its goal of joining the Alliance.
But the MAP, however, is not a universal checklist, nor is
completion of the MAP process a guarantee of NATO membership.
Ultimately, the current members of NATO have to consider
whether these seven countries invited in Prague are ``willing
and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of
membership.'' This requires a fair review of the military and
nonmilitary qualifications. And there is a lot to cover.
To the extent possible in our limited time, I would welcome
your views on some or all of the following military issues: The
level and priorities of each country's military spending; the
extent of the civilian control over the military, the command
structure, and the sophistication of the defense planning
process; the interoperability of each country's forces with
NATO, as well as how these forces are being restructured to
better address modern security challenges; the specialty or
niche capabilities of these invited countries, to the extent
they have one; the collective training regimes in place and the
development of English language competencies; and, very
importantly, the counterintelligence capabilities and secure
communications in each country, and the overall ability to
safeguard NATO's classified information.
There are also nonmilitary concerns that have to be raised.
I will not raise them now. I would ask unanimous consent that
the entirety of my statement be placed in the record, Mr.
Chairman, at this time.
Senator Allen. No objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Welcome. We are pleased to have such a talented panel with us here
today.
The reason for this hearing, as you know, is to begin our
Constitutionally-mandated process of advice and consent, specifically
to consider an amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949
to enlarge the membership of NATO.
At the Prague Summit last November, the Alliance voted to extend
invitations to final discussions on membership to seven countries:
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
Five years ago, I had the privilege of being the floor manager for
the Ratification of the admission to NATO of Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic.
The fundamental rationale for their admittance--extending the zone
of security into Central and Eastern Europe--remains, in my opinion,
persuasive today.
Few would argue that the militaries of most of the seven candidate
countries will greatly enhance the war-fighting ability of the
Alliance, at least in the short-term.
But, it seems to me, NATO membership will serve as a powerful
stimulus to the ongoing processes of democratization and free-market
economic development in the seven countries. And it is precisely these
processes that will move the zone of stability in Europe farther
eastward.
This Committee takes the Senate's advice and consent responsibility
very seriously.
Today's hearing will be devoted exclusively to a detailed
examination by Administration witnesses of the qualifications for NATO
membership of each of the candidate countries.
The outstanding team assembled today understands the importance of
a serious examination of these issues. Each of you has visited some or
all of the invited countries several times. I look forward to hearing
your assessments.
I am pleased to welcome you to the Foreign Relations Committee.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Biden. And I would like to move to a question I
never thought I would ask when we were talking about NATO
enlargement. And as Ian knows from working up here, because we
worked closely with Senator Roth and we had the honor of sort
of leading the effort to expand NATO last time, I am a staunch
supporter of expanding NATO. But I have been a Senator for a
fair amount of time now, or since 1973, and I have attended, I
do not know, Lord knows, how many conferences on whither NATO.
But this is the first time in my career, I think, there is a
real question, not about expanding, about the relevancy of
NATO, period.
I will go into this next week. But I am told--and I do not
have this for certain--but Belgium has called for a meeting in
three or four weeks, where they disinvited the Brits and the
Americans, to discuss what it seems to me, Ian, to be not ESDI,
but ESDI at large, a totally separate, independent of NATO,
European entity. And Prodi of the European Commission
immediately thought that was a good idea. We have the
confluence--and I am not making a judgment--of if there was
ever oil and water, it is Cheney, Rumsfeld, Chirac, and
Schroeder, if I have ever seen it anywhere.
So my first question--and I am not being facetious about
this--particularly from the Defense Department position, how
committed is the administration to NATO? Because I have read
all the neo-con stuff for the last 10 years about how NATO is a
drain, how we are over-extending, the extent of our commitment
to NATO exceeds its capacity, how the gap is so wide in
capability that it is never going to be narrowed, because
clearly not now or in your careers or mine--I will speak for
myself, in my career--most of you are much younger, so you have
a longer time--is it likely that France or Germany is going to
step up to the plate and make the commitment that they need to
make to reduce that gap in capabilities?
So I have an urgent concern to expand NATO because I think
it is the only thing that gives us any sort of footing to say
that indirectly we plan on remaining a European power, in spite
of all the rhetoric I hear coming out of primarily the Defense
Department folks, not the uniformed military, the civilian
military.
And so I am not being a wise guy when I asked the
question--if you would rather not answer it, I understand. I
mean, because it, in a sense, is a phrase that--you remember,
Ian, you were here--that got me in trouble with a guy who came
and testified during the Clinton era, who was a U.N. inspector.
What was that fellow's name?
Staff. Scott Ritter.
Senator Biden. Scott Ritter. And I said that his judgments
were above his pay grade. And every right-wing guy in America
attacked me. Where are they now with old Scott Ritter? But at
any rate, this is, in a sense, above my pay grade here. And it
may be above--not above my pay grade, frankly. It may be above
your pay grade to answer the question.
But really and truly, how vital is NATO in the eyes of this
administration's defense establishment? For real. That is not a
question that I am--it is not a rhetorical question. I am
genuinely interested, if you could speak to that.
Mr. Brzezinski. Yes, sir. And I will try and stay within my
pay grade.
Senator Biden. I just do not want to get you in trouble.
Mr. Brzezinski. First, I think if you look at the Prague
summit agenda and you look how aggressive it is and how
historic it is, it would erase any doubts you may have of the
administration or the Department of Defense's commitment to
NATO. What we are committed to is a fundamental rejuvenation of
NATO. We are committed to a vision where NATO plays an even
more important role, taking on contemporary challenges and
future challenges that we expect to face.
At the Prague summit, we not only extended our commitments
and some security guarantees to seven new democracies. We also
undertook a certain amount of controversy within the Alliance
itself. That is, we were pushing an agenda, an agenda that
featured a NATO response force, an ability to give NATO the
capability to respond on short notice, on a day's notice, to
any contingency anywhere in the globe with a force capable of
conducting the full spectrum of high end, high intensity
military operations.
We initiated the Prague Capabilities Commitment Initiative,
another effort to help the allies fill gaps and shortfalls so
that the Alliance can continue to play a relevant role to our
common security. We have initiated a complex, politically
difficult command structure reform. We are fundamentally
redoing NATO's command structure. That is a thankless task. But
we are doing it because we are committed to NATO. And we
envision NATO playing an important role in the future.
I would add, after September 11, that should erase any
doubt in anybody's mind about the relevance of NATO in the
administration, out of the administration, in the United States
and in Europe.
Senator Biden. Why?
Mr. Brzezinski. Why? Because they responded effectively to
an attack on the United States.
Senator Biden. But then we responded effectively to say:
Germany, keep your troops in Germany. Do not send them to
Afghanistan. France, we do not need your help. Senator Lugar
and I made a call to the White House. We wanted to go down to
see the President right away and say: For God's sake, accept
the offer. You do not need them, but accept the offer.
Mr. Brzezinski. Sir, we have a number of allies working
with us, including the Germans and the Danes and the French.
Senator Biden. Where?
Mr. Brzezinski. In Afghanistan today through ISAF and under
Task Force 180.
Senator Biden. All right.
Mr. Brzezinski. And we have NATO playing an important role
in supporting the German-Dutch lead of ISAF.
Senator Biden. But that came after the fact, after we
stiffed them on that vote of confidence by one vote.
Mr. Brzezinski. I do not know if we stiffed anybody.
Senator Biden. What would you call it?
Mr. Brzezinski. I am not sure that NATO immediately after
September 11 would have rushed into Afghanistan.
Senator Biden. Well, the Germans actually took a vote, did
they not, in their parliament? They took a vote, by one vote,
to have troops out of the theater, to participate----
Mr. Brzezinski. And they are. And they are standing by.
Senator Biden. But we said no. After the fact, we got ISAF
in. OK. Well, I hope you are right. I hope you are right.
Because I think that--and I will end with this, Mr. Chairman. I
think the entirety of America's ability to conduct its foreign
policy globally depends in larger part upon the stability of
Europe and us remaining a European power at its base, at our
base, as any other single undertaking we have in the world. And
I think we are--I hope we can turn this expansion into
something more than it was intended to do in the first place.
I hope we cannot merely expand. I hope we can remedy. I
hope we can heal. Because it is, as you know, all of you know--
I doubt--well, I do not want to put words in your mouth. But
let me put it this way: I would be surprised if any one of you
in your trips to Europe in the last 8 months have met with as
much skepticism or hostility as you have been in your entire
careers.
It may be passing. But I am worried that as we sort of
engage mutually, particularly the French and the Germans, in
the sort of name calling, you know, the comments that we each
make about one another, I think is corrosive. And I hope we can
use the expansion of NATO as an opportunity in Prague to begin
to heal. Hopefully, it is temporary, a temporary divide here in
the Alliance, because I really believe the Alliance's
importance and consequence exceeds its military capability.
But that is enough of my editorial comment. You all do not
need that.
Mr. Chairman, I have about a dozen questions specifically
directed to our witnesses that I would like to submit to them,
rather than have them go through them now, submit to them and
ask if they would respond in writing. They are not going to
make a lot of work. I mean, tomes are not required in response.
But they are direct questions. With your permission, may I do
that, Mr. Chairman?
Senator Allen. Yes. You have my permission. And I am sure
that all of our witnesses will work on answering those
questions forthwith.
Senator Biden. And I want to thank you, the four of you,
for your professionalism, for the seriousness with which you
have undertaken this effort, for both the scholarship and the
political acumen that you possess. This is a difficult time in
the Alliance. And I think we all have an obligation to try to
repair. It may not be broke. As Ronald Reagan used to say, ``If
it ain't broke, don't fix it.'' It may not be broke, but it
could use a little fixing. It could use a little fixing right
now. And I am glad you all are trying, because I know you are
devoted to it. And I appreciate it.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Senator Biden. Indeed, the
questions that you ask are very pertinent questions, some of
which I would have followed up on.
And I think all the members of the committee, while
everyone is scattered in a variety of areas, they are all very
probative questions. And your answers, some of them were
addressed in your statements, others in this committee will
care to read very closely.
I have no further questions. I want to thank you all for
appearing, for your assistance, for your insight and your
commentary here today and in the weeks to come. I am hopeful
that this committee will vote very quickly on this matter, as
decisions are being made. I do want to say, as did Senator
Biden, my agreement with him on the concerns that we have had
and the importance of the transatlantic alliance for military--
and as I said in my opening statement, I would like to see this
ascension to NATO of the seven aspirant countries be able to
revitalize NATO and also maybe renew the commitment that we all
have to the shared values of individual rights and to our
common goals.
And I want to thank the Ambassadors Jurgenson, Usackas,
Ducaru, and Kracun for being with us, and the Chiefs of
Missions Yalnazov, Eichmanis, and Kmec for being here. I think
that you all can report back to your countries that it appears
that there was bipartisan support on the Foreign Relations
Committee for you to join our team. And indeed, we celebrate in
the freedoms and the liberties that you all are exercising so
responsibly. And we look forward to working with you in the
years to come.
Thank you all. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:51 p.m., the committee adjourned, to
reconvene at 9:30 a.m., April 1, 2003.]
----------
Additional Statements Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold
I thank the chairman and the ranking member for holding this
hearing, and I thank all of the witnesses for being here today.
Not long ago, the very suggestion that Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia would be joining NATO would
have been unlikely. Too often, we are blase about the changes that have
taken deep root in Europe in such a short time. It is important to take
a moment to marvel at how far we have come, and at how many positive
changes we have witnessed in our world, especially at this tumultuous
and difficult time in world affairs. The inclusion of Europe's new
democracies in NATO is proof that positive change is possible on a
grand international scale--and a reminder that it takes hard work and
vision to facilitate such change.
As NATO continues to define its role in the post-Cold War world, I
believe that it will benefit from the membership of a whole and free
Europe, and a strong NATO remains firmly in America's national
interest. Of course, it is also in America's interest to ensure that
decisions to expand NATO are responsible and provide for all NATO
member states participate in burden sharing and to contribute
meaningfully to the organization as a whole. Today's hearing is a
valuable opportunity for exploring these important issues.
______
Prepared Statement of Regina F. Narusis, J.D., Chair of the National
Board, Lithuanian-American Community, Inc.--NATO Position
Lithuanian-American Community, Inc. supports:
1. United States continued involvement and commitment to NATO
and security in Europe.
2. The revitalization of the NATO Alliance.
3. The admission of all seven nations invited to join the
NATO Alliance at Prague in 2002.
north atlantic treaty organization
NATO has been since its formation in 1949 the most effective
defensive alliance uniting North America and Europe. It was
instrumental in winning the Cold War, in encouraging European nations
to foster democracy, rule of law, free market economies and in
preserving peace and stability. Pre-World War II non-engagement or
isolationism has proven to be costly to us militarily, financially and
in loss of life. History has taught us that the United States has been
drawn into European conflicts of the 20th century because our vital
interests are ultimately engaged there.
The world has changed both technologically and geopolitically since
the end of the Cold War. Distances and oceans are no longer barriers to
danger. Established democracies have grown stronger and more assertive,
such as France and Germany. New democracies have emerged and are
seeking their rightful place in world affairs. Our involvement becomes
more crucial as does transatlantic cohesion to prevent conflict among
its key members.
The Soviet Union no longer exists, but new threats have emerged. We
have gone from the risk of nuclear exchange to multiple threats of
global insecurity. The United States will not be able to sort out alone
every international threat that now faces us, without depleting
ourselves physically, mentally and financially. We need allies.
The countries that share our values and history are the NATO
countries. The United Nations is an organization of nations that do not
have the same common values and thus, as recently evidenced, are able
to debate but not solve problems, much less act to correct them.
NATO has survived the test of time. It unanimously and for the
first time in its history, invoked its founding principle of collective
defense on behalf of the United States following the September 11th
attacks. It did at first stumble when Turkey requested assistance in
the event of an Iraqi attack, but it found a means to meet the Turkish
request within the Alliance. The Alliance assisted Russia, the former
adversary, to come to grips with reality. Moscow did sign a new
cooperation pact with the Alliance in May of 2002 in Rome reaffirming
the right of every nation to choose its own allies and alliances.
NATO is reorienting itself, but if it revitalizes itself by means
of further expansion and restructuring of its military forces and
establishing a new NATO Rapid Response Force that can be staffed and
shared by all members, it will become only stronger and better.
nato expansion
The admission of the Czech Republic, Hungry and Poland was a
success. The bulk of the actual costs of enlargement have been borne by
the new countries. Their relationship with Russia has improved, rather
than become a threat. These new members have been true allies. They
have contributed to NATO operations: in NATO peacekeeping missions,
sent specialized chemical warfare troops to the Gulf and hosted the
Iraqi exiles for training to support United States forces. The largest
NATO exercise involving 5,000 troops, ``Victory Strike'', was in
Poland. These new members have given united support to the bond between
United States and Europe.
In 2002 in Prague the artificial Cold War division of Europe
finally came to an end. NATO leaders approved the Alliance's largest
expansion in its 53 year history. The expansion encompasses Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
NATO accession of these seven nations will change the way we
perceive the region. With the support of the United States, these
nations will take their rightful and equal place in a Europe whole and
free. They will not let the Franco-German domination take root or the
Russians exploit the effort to eliminate United States influence in
Europe. These are the nations that understand the true meaning of
freedom and democracy. Because of their enslavement and long struggle
for freedom, their approach to foreign policy is different from those
in Western Europe. They know that appeasement does not work and that
dictators must be dealt with.
These nations have a relationship with the United States that has
stood the test of time. In great part, thanks to the United States,
Europe rid itself of three forms of tyranny--Nazism, Communism and
Fascism. They see America as the only real guarantor of their security.
History has taught them, that neither France nor Germany can be trusted
to put European interests ahead of their own. The supportive letter
from the Vilnius 10 members proves their loyalty to NATO. These nations
are dynamic, full of new energy and most of all are becoming
increasingly assertive. These countries are also entering the European
Union and will change that organization from within. We all need a
united Europe, not a Western Europe (so called ``old Europe'') or
Central and Eastern Europe (``new Europe''), but a Europe where all
nations are equal and are so treated. Continued United States
involvement can help bring this about. The countries of Central and
Eastern Europe want NATO to be strong and to keep a United States
presence. The American influence through the process of enlargement
will only grow. Through enlargement of NATO all of Europe will be more
balanced and reinvigorated. Enlargement makes strategic sense for the
United States and will prove to be the greatest strategic and political
gain for the Alliance.
Though not yet members of the Alliance, the seven invitees to NATO,
have already contributed to NATO, thus have proven their commitment and
worth. They all have sent troops to preserve peace in the Balkans, they
all have supported the United States in the war against terrorism and
made their airspace and bases available to the U.S.-led coalition. They
have joined the Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and are
contributing highly skilled troops. These countries have issued a joint
statement early on supporting the United States efforts to disarm the
Iraq regime. Their governments have declared preparedness to contribute
politically and with other means to the efforts of the United States
led coalition against Iraq. Slovenia is contributing mountain units.
Slovakia is contributing chemical and biological expertise. Romania
sent a battalion of troops to the war zone. Bulgaria is sending
chemical warfare specialists to the Gulf. The Baltic nations are
contributing special units as well as cargo handling and medical teams.
Lithuania alone has sent 914 military personnel, maintained an
infantry platoon with the Polish battalion in KFOR, provided An-26
transport aircraft with crew and logistics personnel and contributed
medical personnel to preserve peace in the Balkans. To the war in
Afghanistan, Lithuania has offered use of its airspace and airfields,
support for ``Operation Enduring Freedom'', deployed medical teams with
the Czech contingent in ISAF in 2002 and German contingent in 2003 and
deployed Special Operations Forces unit in support of OEF. To the war
in Iraq, Lithuania has sent its liaison officer to CENTCOM, signed the
V-10 statement compelling Iraq to disarm, offered overflight and
transit rights to United States and coalition forces and offered cargo
handlers and medics.
foreign policy is and should not be a partisan matter
In l993 the Clinton Administration made the decision to invite new
members. The l994 ``Republican Contract with America'' supported NATO
enlargement. On April 30, 1998 United States Senate ratified the last
NATO expansion by a 80 to l9 vote.
The Democratic and Republican Party Platforms of 2000 supported
NATO enlargement, as did both presidential candidates.
On April 5, 2001 seventeen United States Senators, both Republican
and Democrat leaders, wrote a letter to President Bush urging the Bush
administration to ``ensure'' that NATO invites qualified European
democracies to begin accession negotiations at the 2002 Summit in
Prague.
NATO enlargement and ratification is and should remain a non-
partisan issue.
For all the reasons aforesaid, NATO enlargement will support and
increase the security and international interests of the United States.
----------
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Responses of Ian Brzezinski, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
European and NATO Affairs, to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
bulgaria
Question 1. The level and priorities of military spending:
Answer. The Government of Bulgaria (GOB) has decided to spend no
less than 2.84% of GDP on defense in 2003 and 2004. Priorities for
Bulgaria's defense spending have focused on funding defense reform
efforts, infrastructure upgrades and strategic command and control.
Question 2. The extent of its civilian control over its military,
the efficiency of its command structure, and the sophistication of the
defense planning process:
Answer. Bulgaria exercises civilian control over the military,
although it is experiencing difficulties (like many nations) building a
Ministry of Defense with professional civilian staff. Recent reform and
reorganization has greatly streamlined the Bulgarian command and force
structure (based on a force structure review incorporating substantial
U.S. and Allied input). However, while improved over the past few
years, Bulgaria still has problems in command and control due to the
lack of interoperable communications equipment. Elimination of excess
Warsaw Pact era equipment and ongoing upgrades of command and control
systems will likely further streamline the command structure. In 1997,
with U.S. assistance, the Ministry of Defense put into place a
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). As the Bulgarians
become more experienced with the process it should make more effective,
efficient and rational the allocation and control of defense
expenditures and ensure that plans are more closely linked to available
resources in the future.
Question 3. The interoperability of Bulgaria's forces with NATO, as
well as how these forces are being restructured to better address
modern security challenges.
Answer. Current interoperability with NATO remains low, but should
improve as Bulgaria moves to a completely professional force by 2010.
Though burdened by a large excess of Warsaw Pact era heavy equipment,
Bulgaria is attempting to develop a smaller, lighter and more mobile
force structure (Bulgaria has downsized its force structure
approximately 50% since 1997). Its reform program emphasizes the
creation of a rapid reaction force based in the center of Bulgaria able
to respond to a deployment order within 30 days. Bulgaria has
demonstrated gains in interoperability with Allied forces as shown by
its participation in SFOR, KFOR and ISAF. Bulgaria's focus on the
development of specialized niche categories such as special operations,
engineer, and NBC Defense are indicative of its effort both to address
the challenges of a changing security environment and to help NATO
reverse existing capability shortfalls.
Question 4. Any specialty or ``niche'' capabilities it has, or is
developing.
Answer. Bulgaria will concentrate its resources and military
training on providing the following capabilities to NATO:
special operations forces
engineers
NBC Defense
helicopter and transport aviation
Question 5. The collective training regimes it has in place and the
development of its military's English-language competencies.
Answer. Bulgaria actively participates in several annual NATO
Partnership for Peace (PfP) training exercises. Given limited training
funds, priority of resources tends to support a small, select number of
units declared ready for PfP or which will be declared ready in the
near future. Battalion/brigade level operations have suffered from the
lack of resources and training time in the past three years but
Bulgaria plans to focus more on collective training. The Bulgarian Air
Force and Navy require substantially more flight hours/at sea days.
Overall, Bulgaria's English language training program is progressing
well but requires continued emphasis. A relatively small but growing
number of officers are proficient in English. English language training
for NCOs remains a shortfall and will remain a priority.
estonia
Question 1. Level and priorities of military spending.
Answer. The Estonian defense budget in 2002 was 1.9% of the
country's GDP and is projected at 2% in 2003. As with other Baltic
militaries, spending has focused on developing basic infrastructure and
training of these recently established armed forces, with acquisition
of more sophisticated weapons taking place over time. NATO's 2004 Force
Goals process and an ongoing Estonian Force Structure Review will
further shape priorities.
Question 2. Extent of civilian control over the military,
efficiency of its command structure, and the sophistication of its
defense planning.
Answer. Estonia exercises full civilian control over the military
and is steadily developing a cadre of civilian professionals. The
current command structure is a result of a 2001 Force Structure Review
that had considerable U.S. and Allied input. It provides for a Joint
Operational Command to direct land, maritime and air components,
including wartime augmentations such as the Border Guard. The
capabilities of this joint organization are being developed as the
service components themselves flesh out their force structure. The
invitation to join NATO has resulted in the initiation of another Force
Structure Review to be finished in early 2004. Estonia has been
refining its Planning, Programming and Budgeting System since 1998.
Question 3. The interoperability of forces with NATO, as well as
how these forces are being restructured to better address modern
security challenges.
Answer. Estonia, as the other Baltic states, has been developing
its military from scratch. The Membership Action Plan (MAP) process has
been invaluable in shaping the formation of the new units in ways that
promote maximum interoperability with NATO forces. NATO standards shape
the way the Estonian navy and air force air surveillance units train.
Estonia's contribution to SFOR, KFOR and ISAF demonstrate that
Estonian units have reached a level of proficiency that allows them to
work with Allied forces in the field. These deployments also accelerate
Estonia's interoperability efforts through the provision of real
experience. Estonia has contributed a company on a rotation basis (six
months out of every 18) to SFOR and KFOR. It also maintains a military
police platoon with the Italian Multinational Support Unit in KFOR.
Estonia has also deployed an EOD team with Germany as part of ISAF.
Initially, Estonia's military was built around a mobilization
structure suited for territorial defense. The post-Prague Summit Force
Structure Review now underway will shift priority to deployable,
sustainable forces that can more effectively contribute to the full
spectrum of Alliance missions.
Question 4. Specialty capabilities being developed.
Answer. Specialty or ``niche'' capabilities being developed for
NATO use include:
Military Police
EOD
Mine Countermeasures.
Question 5. Collective Training Regime and Development of English
Language Competencies.
Answer. Shaped by U.S. and Allied bilateral assitance as well as
advice from NATO defense planners, Estonia's collective training regime
is being tailored to reflect a regime more appropriate for the current
size and level of development of its armed forces. Its first battalion-
level exercise, using composite units, will be held this May.
Nevertheless, the training needs to be improved for its deployable
units. Estonian English-language training is proceeding apace.
latvia
Question 1. Level and priorities of military spending.
Answer. The Latvian defense budget in 2002 was 1.8% of the
country's GDP. Parliament has passed legislation mandating spending of
2% of GDP during 2003-8. As with other Baltic militaries, spending has
focused on the basic infrastructure and training of Latvia's newly-
developed armed forces, with more sophisticated weapon acquisition
taking place over time. NATO's 2004 Force Goals process and an ongoing
Latvian Force Structure Review will further shape priorities.
Question 2. Extent of civilian control over the military,
efficiency of its command structure, and the sophistication of its
defense planning.
Latvia exercises full civilian control over the military and
continues to develop its cadre of civilian professionals. The current
command structure is a result of a 2001 Force Structure Review having
considerable U.S. and Allied input. It provides for a Joint Operational
Command to direct land, maritime, air and Special Operations components
that includes wartime augmentations such as the Border Guard. The
capabilities of this joint organization are being developed as the
service components themselves flesh out their force structure. Latvia
has also established a National Crisis Management Center and is
developing a National Military Command Center in order to respond more
quickly to emergency situations (both foreign and domestic) and more
effectively employ military forces if required.
The invitation to join NATO has resulted in the initiation of
another Force Structure Review to be finished in late 2003. Latvian
planning has proven adaptable to changing circumstances, assisted by a
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System it has used since 2001.
Question 3. Interoperability of forces with NATO, as well as how
these forces are being restructured to better address modern security
challenges.
Answer. Latvia, as the other Baltic states, has developed its
military structure from scratch. The MAP process has been invaluable in
shaping the formation of the new units in ways that promote maximum
interoperability with NATO forces.
Latvia's contribution to SFOR, KFOR and ISAF demonstrate that
Latvia's units have reached a level of proficiency that allows them to
work with Allied forces in the field. These deployments also accelerate
Latvia's interoperability efforts through the provision of real
experience. A Latvian company is embedded with Danish SFOR forces for
six months out of every 18, military police and medical teams are
attached to the UK contingent in KFOR and an EOD team works with a
Norwegain contingent in KFOR. Latvia will also deploy two medical teams
with the Dutch contingent in ISAF.
NATO standards set the pace for the training of Latvian navy and
air force air surveillance units. Latvia's previous force structure was
primarily a mobilization structure suited for territorial defense, but
the post-Prague Force Structure Review now underway should shift
priorities to deployable, sustainable forces that can more effectively
contribute to the full spectrum of Alliance missions.
Question 4. Specialty Capabilities being developed.
Answer. For its size, Latvia is developing a wide range of
specialties comprising:
Military Police
EOD
Medical
Special Operations Forces
Divers
Mine Countermeasures.
Question 5. Collective training regime and development of English
language competencies.
Answer. Latvia's collective training regime is developing into one
that is appropriate for the current size and mission of its armed
forces. The full professionalization of its national infantry battalion
will further increase the proficiency of this unit. Nevertheless,
training needs to be improved for its deployable units. Its English-
language training is proceeding well, being in the forefront of Baltic
efforts.
lithuania
Question 1. Level and Priorities of military spending.
Answer. The Lithuanian defense budget in 2002 was 2% of the
country's GDP, and Lithuania has committed itself to remain at this
level at least through 2004. As with other Baltic militaries, spending
was initially focused on the basic infrastructure and training of these
newly-developed armed forces, with more sophisticated weapon
acquisition taking place over time. NATO's 2004 Force Goals process and
an ongoing Lithuanian Force Structure Review will further shape
priorities.
Question 2. Extent of civilian control over the military,
efficiency of its command structure, and the sophistication of its
defense planning.
Answer. Lithuania exercises full civilian control over the
military, with a Ministry of Defense and a small cadre of civilian
defense officials. The current command structure is a result of a 2001
Force Structure Review that had considerable U.S. and Allied input. A
new National Security Strategy was approved in 2002 and a new Military
Defense Strategy has been drafted. The effectiveness of the Lithuanian
command structure will be increased by the creation of a streamlined
Homeland Security Command and a Special Operations Command. The
invitation to join NATO resulted in the initiation of another Force
Structure Review, to be finished in late 2003. Lithuania has been
refining its Planning, Programming and Budgeting System since 1998.
Question 3. Interoperability of forces with NATO, as well as how
these forces are being restructured to better address modern security
challenges.
Answer. Lithuania, as the other Baltic states, has developed its
military structure from scratch. The MAP process has been invaluable in
assisting Lithuania's military structure to become fully interoperable
with NATO forces.
Lithuania's contribution to KFOR, SFOR, ISAF, OEF and OIF
demonstrate that Lithuanian units have reached a level of proficiency
that allows them to work with Allied forces in the field. These
deployments also accelerate Lithuania's interoperability efforts
through the provision of real experience. A Lithuanian company is
deployed with a Danish SFOR contingent for six months out of every 18,
an infantry platoon is deployed with a Polish-Ukrainian Battalion in
KFOR, and Lithuania also maintains AN-26 transport aircraft with crew
and maintenance personnel in support of NATO operations. For ISAF,
Lithuania deployed a medical team with the Czech and then the German
ISAF contingents. Special Operations Forces were also deployed to
Afghanistan and are working with U.S. troops in support of OEF.
Finally, the Lithuanian Parliament voted in March to deploy cargo
handlers and medical personnel to support Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Training for the Lithuanian navy and for its air force air surveillance
units are also shaped by NATO standards. Much of the Lithuanian reform
efforts have focused on those units dedicated to participating in NATO-
led operations, especially its ``Iron Wolf'' Brigade. Lithuania's
previous force structure was heavily focused on territorial defense,
but priority is now shifting to more effective, deployable, sustainable
forces that can contribute to the full spectrum of Alliance missions.
Question 4. Specialty capabilities being developed.
Answer. Lithuania is developing the following special or ``niche''
capabilities for NATO use:
EOD
Medical
Engineer
Special Operations Forces
Mine Countermeasures.
Question 5. Collective training regime and development of English
language competencies.
Answer. The U.S. and other Allies, as well as NATO defense
planners, have emphasized the importance of developing a collective
training regime that is appropriate for the size and level of
development of its armed forces. Its national battalion was certified
as operational in fall 2002 by a joint Danish-Lithuanian team.
Lithuania is making progress in this area, but training still needs to
be improved for its deployable units. Its English-language training is
proceeding apace.
romania
Question 1. The level and priorities of military spending:
Answer. The Government of Romania remains committed to defense
expenditures at a level of at least 2% of GDP in the years 2003-2005.
Priorities for Romania's defense spending have focused on funding
defense reform efforts, increasing operational capabilities and
readiness, and increasing NATO interoperability.
Question 2. The extent of its civilian control over its military,
the efficiency of its command structure, and the sophistication of the
defense planning process.
Answer. Romania exercises strong civilian control over its
military, aided by a well-regarded National Defense College which has
trained a robust cadre of civilan defense experts. As an example of
civilian control of the military, the President of Romania relieved an
acting Chief of the General Staff as a result of the General's
statements and activities honoring the memory of World War Il-era
dictator Ion Antonescu.
Romanian defense plans are based in large part on a force structure
review that incorporated substantial U.S. and Allied input. Subsequent
reform and reorganization has resulted in a greatly reduced and
streamlined command and force structure that has increased efficiency
and permitted a corresponding increase in readiness of select units.
(For example, the Romanians are working hard to complete the
development of a deployable Brigade HQ).
In previous years, Romania has experienced a considerable gap
between the demands of military requirements and the resources
allocated. However, following successful introduction of a Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System in 2001, the allocation and control
of defense expenditures now seems to be more effective and more closely
linked to available resources.
Question 3. The interoperability of Romania's forces with NATO, as
well as how these forces are being restructured to better address
modern security challenges.
Answer. Currently, Romania's overall interoperability with NATO is
low, though some key land force units have attained a sufficient level
of interoperability to participate in NATO-led operations. For example,
several infantry units have performed exceptionally in NATO
peacekeeping missions such as SFOR or in combat missions with the U.S.
in Afghanistan. Training is currently underway to help Romania's land
force units meet NATO-compatibility requirements; this should increase
the number of interoperable Romanian units within the next five years.
Romania has undertaken a restructuring program to move from a large,
heavy Warsaw Pact era force structure towards a smaller, lighter and
more mobile capability. For example, they are demonstrating
deployablity by using their C-130s to deploy Romanian combat troops to
Afghanistan for OEF. Romania's focus on development of special
operations, reconnaissance and airlift capabilities are indicative of
Romania's effort to address the challenges of a changing security
environment and to help NATO meet capability shortfalls.
Question 4. Any specialty or ``niche'' capabilities it has, or is
developing.
Answer. Romania is placing a high priority on development of
specialized ``niche'' forces in preparation for NATO membership,
especially:
airlift
military police
unmanned aerial vehicles.
Question 5. The collective training regimes it has in place and the
development of its military's English-language competencies.
Answer. Romania actively participates in several annual NATO PfP
training exercises. Given limited training funds, priority of resources
tends to support those active units declared ready for PfP or will be
declared ready in the near future. Individual soldier skills are quite
good; in fact, Romanian forces fighting alongside U.S. forces in
Afghanistan were recognized both by the Secretary of Defense and by
comrades in the 82nd Airborne for their skills. Battalion/brigade level
operations have suffered from the lack of training time in the past
three years but Romania is striving to address this shortfall. The
Romanian Air Force and Navy require substantially more flight hours/at
sea days. Overall, Romania's English language training program is well
managed and supported with instructors who are fluent in English. A
large number of officers and professional NCOs are proficient in
English.
slovakia
Question 1. Level and Priority of Military Spending.
Answer. In 2003, defense spending in Slovakia is expected to be
approximately 2.0% of GDP, a level the Government of Slovakia is
committed to keeping through 2006. Defense spending priorities are in
the following areas: Modernization (to include upgraded C31 systems and
aircraft modernization programs); Restructuring (to reflect a smaller
structure based on battalions); and Interoperability (with an emphasis
on English language training and secure communications).
Question 2. The extent of civilian control over the military,
efficiency of command structure and sophistication of Defense Planning.
Answer. Civilian control over the Slovak military is well
established, to include a strong Ministry of Defense and subordinate
General Staff. The Slovak military command structure is being
streamlined and strengthened under the Force 2010 reform plan. Force
2010 was developed using U.S. assistance and is assessed to be a solid
defense plan. Implementation of a Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System is improving the allocation and control of defense expenditures
which now seems to be more effective and more closely linked to
available resources.
Question 3. The interoperability of Slovakia's forces with NATO, as
well as how these forces are being restructured to better address
modern security challenges.
Answer. Slovak interoperability is hindered by obsolete equipment
and weakness in English language training. Slovakia is working
aggressively to overcome these hindrances, using U.S. bilateral
assistance such as FMF and IMET. Participation in PfP exercises and
international peacekeeping and coalition operations have helped, as
have prudent use of their FMF and IMET budgets. The participation of
Slovak units in SFOR and KFOR, as well as the deployment of a chem-bio
unit in Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrates progress in
interoperability is being made. A centerpiece of Slovak reform is the
immediate reaction brigade (5th Special Forces), which is already
dedicated to participating in NATO-led operations.
Question 4. Any specialty or ``niche'' capabilities it has, or is
developing.
Answer. Slovakia possesses niche capabilities useful to NATO, to
include:
Chemical, Radiological and Nuclear (CRN) Defense
Special Operations Forces
Combat Engineering
Question 5. The collective training regimes it has in place and the
development of its military's English-language competencies.
Answer. Slovakia is receiving help from NATO member neighbors in
bolstering its collective training regime to NATO standards. Top
leadership is typically well trained, but overall training levels vary.
Conscription is being phased out, with the last conscripts leaving by
2006. The transition to a professional military will result in better
trained Slovak soldiers at all levels. Slovakia has a good English
language training program being made better through use of IMET and FMF
funds.
slovenia
Question 1. Level and priority of military spending.
Answer. Today, defense spending in Slovenia is approximately 1.6%
of GDP; however, Slovenia intends to raise defense spending
incrementally to 2% of GDP by 2008. Defense spending priorities
include: modernization (especially aircraft upgrades and communications
equipment); restructuring (to create smaller, lighter units); and,
interoperability (English language training).
Question 2. The extent of civilian control over the military,
efficiency of command structure and sophistication of Defense Planning.
Answer. Civil control of the military is firmly established in
Slovenia. In 2002, Freedom House examined 27 Central and Eastern
European nations in transition and ranked Slovenia #2 (behind Poland)
in terms of rule of law. The Slovene command structure has been
reformed to closely mirror NATO command structures. It is efficient,
but improvements continue, especially efforts to reduce a top-heavy
officer corps. Defense planning is improving, assisted greatly by
Slovenia's aggressive participation in MAP and PARP. Slovenia's
military reform plan extends through 2007.
Question 3. The interoperability of Slovenian forces with NATO, as
well as how these forces are being restructured to better address
modern security challenges.
Answer. Like many of the candidate nations, Slovenia has much work
ahead to shape its force structure to become better interoperable with
NATO forces. Slovene interoperability is improving, aided by
participation in PfP exercises, funding to purchase modem equipment and
the achievement of high levels of English proficiency. Implementation
by Slovenia of a Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System is
improving the allocation and control of defense expenditures, making
them more effective and more closely linked to real resources.
Slovenia's participation in SFOR (motorized infantry company) and KFOR
demonstrate that Slovene forces have achieved a useful degree of
interoperability with NATO forces. These contributions will also help
accelerate, through Allied interaction, improvements in
interoperability. The focus for much of the Slovene reform effort is
the 10th Battalion, which is the unit Slovenia has dedicated to
participating in NATO-led operations.
Question 4. Any specialty or ``niche'' capabilities it has, or is
developing.
Answer. Slovenia possesses useful niche capabilities that they can
bring to NATO upon accession, to include:
special operations forces
CBRN defense
military police.
Question 5. The collective training regimes it has in place and the
development of its military's English-language competencies.
Answer. Slovenia is transitioning to a fully professional military
force. As it does so, it is revamping its military training program to
build up the competence and professionalism of its soldiers and aid in
retention by offering opportunities for career soldiers. The English
language training program in Slovenia is particularly strong, helped
greatly by IMET and FMF funds. In addition to Slovene military
personnel, Slovenia also trains personnel from PfP countries in English
and other NATO languages.
qualifications of invitees
Question 1. Did the introduction in 1999 of the MAP and DCI
effectively raise the bar for NATO membership? If each of the seven
candidates is measured rigorously against its own MAP criteria, do all
of them pass muster? Is there a hierarchy of qualifications, i.e. are
some weighted more heavily than others? How would you assess the
qualifications of these candidates compared to Poland, the Czech
Republic, and Hungary?
Answer. The Membership Action Plan (MAP) did not raise the bar for
NATO membership, but rather it created an intensive program of
preparation at NATO in which the Alliance worked with the aspirants to
encourage political, economic, and military reforms.
All seven invitees have reformed and modernized their defense
establishments with the intent to strengthen NATO's collective defense
capabilities. All have demonstrated a firm commitment to NATO's
community of values. They are addressing such issues as corruption,
minority rights, regional relations, trafficking in persons, the legacy
of the Holocaust, property restitution, and good governance. All have
responded positively and constructively to a very intrusive U.S.
examination of their efforts, often beyond the rigors of NATO's
Membership Action Plan. None of the qualifications are weighted more
heavily than others.
We are confident that the accession of these seven invitees will
strengthen NATO in the same way that membership of Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic strengthened the Alliance. Moreover, these seven
democracies bring to the table experience with U.S. and NATO operations
attained through their contributions to NATO peacekeeping missions in
the Balkans and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan--missions
that occurred after Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined the
Alliance.
Concerning input of DCI into NATO membership, Allies decided that
Partners should not participate in DCI; therefore, DCI goals did not
play in assessing candidates for membership.
Question 3. Would the accession of each of these seven countries to
NATO constitute a net increase in the ``security of the North Atlantic
area'' as Article 10 specifies?
Answer. Yes, each of these seven countries are ``in a position to
further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security
of the North Atlantic area'' as specified in Article 10 of the North
Atlantic Treaty. This positive assessment is based on our involvement
in the development of each invitee's defense reform plans and our
expectation that each invitee will be able to contribute niche
capabilities to reinforce the Prague Capabilities Commitment. More
importantly, the contributions these seven countries have already
provided to SFOR, KFOR, Operation Enduring Freedom, the International
Security Assistance Force in Kabul, and Operation Iraqi Freedom have
concretely demonstrated that they can contribute to the security of the
North Atlantic area and beyond. They have, for several years, been
acting as de facto Allies.
continuation of reform
Question 5. Do you believe that the candidate states will continue
reforming their armed forces after membership? How soon will they be
able to provide mobile, quickly deployable troops that will be useful
during a conflict as well as for post-conflict peacekeeping? Will the
``niche'' capabilities the candidate states are developing provide a
meaningful contribution to NATO's military effectiveness?
Answer. Yes, we expect that the candidate states will continue to
reform their armed forces after acceding to the Alliance. This
assessment is based on our experience assisting their Defense
Ministries develop and implement multiyear defense reform plans. Prior
to the signing of the accession protocols on March 26th each of the
Invitees submitted to NATO Timetables for the Completion of Reforms
committing themselves to specific reform measures that will improve the
mobility and lethality of their forces as well as their
interoperability with Allied militaries.
The NATO invitees have already demonstrated a strong degree of
ally-like behavior by providing military units in support of Coalition
and NATO-led operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. Examples
include:
Bulgaria is providing mechanized infantry and engineers for
KFOR.
Estonia, Romania and Slovakia are also providing company
level or larger units, and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are
rotating a company-level unit.
Slovenia is providing a mechanized infantry company for
SFOR.
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia are also providing units.
Romania deployed an infantry battalion, MPs and C-130
transport aircraft to Afghanistan.
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia have also
provided forces.
Slovakia and Romania deployed NBC units in support of OIF.
Bulgaria has also deployed forces, Lithuania has deployed
logistical and military medical personnel, and other invitees
are offering overflight and other assistance.
Among the niche capabilities that these countries are developing
that provide real capabilities to the Alliance are NBC defense units,
Military police, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), and Special
Operations Forces (SOF).
NATO ENLARGEMENT--PART II
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 1, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G.
Lugar (chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Enzi,
Voinovich, Alexander, Coleman, Sununu, Biden, Bill Nelson, and
Corzine.
The Chairman. The meeting of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations is called to order.
We are especially fortunate to have a distinguished set of
witnesses with us today. I am pleased to welcome Ambassador
Nicholas Burns, the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO;
Bruce Jackson, president of the Project on Transitional
Democracies; and Ronald Asmus, senior fellow at the German
Marshall Fund.
Mr. Ambassador, given the heightened responsibility
required of you and your staff in Brussels during the ongoing
campaign in Iraq, we especially appreciate your willingness to
come and participate in our hearing today.
As our thoughts and prayers continue to be with our troops
in Iraq, we in Congress must examine the broader context of the
fight against terror and weapons of mass destruction. The
subject we take up today is important to our men and women in
the military and to the well-being of our country. The Atlantic
alliance is a key component of the fight against terrorism and
we must attempt to maximize the utility of NATO in prosecuting
that war.
This hearing will examine the future of the Atlantic
alliance, plans for NATO enlargement, and how we can work with
our European allies to establish greater security in an era of
global terrorism. The debate over Iraq exposed a division
within NATO over the best methods to combat terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction. This has strained some of our
traditional alliances, but it has not broken them. The United
States has more at stake and more in common with Europe than
any other part of the world. These common interests and shared
values will sustain the alliance if governments realize the
incredible resource that NATO represents. When President Bush
made his first trip to Europe in June 2001, he articulated his
vision of the united Europe at peace, and he threw his full
weight behind NATO enlargement, from the Baltic Sea to the
Black Sea. As the leader of NATO, we have no intention of
shirking our commitments to Europe.
Fifty years ago, NATO's founders made a political decision
that the United States and Europe needed a common strategy to
meet common threats. That need has not dissipated. As President
Bush told the German Parliament this year, ``NATO's defining
purpose, our collective defense, is as urgent as ever. America
and Europe need each other to fight and win the war against
global terror.''
At the Washington summit in 1999, NATO heads of state
declared that they wanted the alliance to be as relevant to the
threats of the next 50 years as it was to the threats of the
past 50. Part of their vision was realized that day, when NATO
officially welcomed Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
into the alliance. At that moment, NATO was engaged in a
successful military campaign in Kosovo, which demonstrated that
the alliance could operate in a complex combat situation. Two
years later, less than 24 hours after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time
in its history. This article declares that an attack on one
member is an attack on all. And the United States remains
grateful for that swift and unquestioning expression of
solidarity.
But the September 11 attacks and the ensuing war on
terrorism have led to a debate on NATO's post-cold war role
that has forced heads of state to reevaluate NATO's mission in
the 21st century. When NATO was founded in 1949, its purpose
was to defend Western democracies against the Soviet Union. But
the demise of the Soviet Union diminished the significance of
NATO's mission, and we began to debate where NATO should go and
what NATO should do. In early 1993, I delivered a speech
calling for NATO not only to enlarge, but to prepare to go out
of area. And at that time, many people were skeptical about
enlarging NATO's size and mission. Those of us who believed in
NATO's enlargement prevailed in that debate. I believe that
events have proven us right. But NATO requires constant
maintenance and adjustment. No one should expect an effortless
Atlantic alliance, devoid of disagreement.
This is the second of four hearings that the Foreign
Relations Committee will hold on NATO. The immediate goal of
these hearings is to determine which of the seven candidate
countries should be invited into the alliance. As we consider
this new enlargement, it is clear that the last round has been
highly beneficial. Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic are
among the most dynamic countries in Europe. They are deeply
interested in alliance matters, and they have sought to
maximize their contribution to collective security. The
prospect of NATO membership gave these countries the incentive
to accelerate reforms, settle disputes, and cooperate with
their neighbors. And their success in turn has been a strong
incentive for democratization and peace among Europe's other
aspiring countries.
I believe that the candidate countries, Latvia, Lithuania,
Estonia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, are ready
to assume full membership responsibilities and contribute to
European stability and security. I am fully confident that
these countries have made an enduring commitment to the core
values of NATO and they will stand with those most committed to
the transatlantic relationship. The candidates have worked hard
to improve their military capability. They have taken steps
ranging from developing a peacekeeping capacity to acquiring
the equipment and skills necessary for high-intensity conflict.
All seven have been supportive of coalition military efforts in
Iraq. I will urge the Senate to vote in favor of bringing the
seven candidate nations into NATO.
As we consider new members, we must simultaneously
reconsider NATO's purposes. In my view, the major security
challenge we face today is the intersection of terrorism with
weapons of mass destruction. NATO enlargement should be pursued
as part of a broader strategic dialog aimed at establishing
common transatlantic approaches to meet this challenge around
the globe.
Although NATO's mission no longer centers on Russia, the
debate over NATO enlargement must include a discussion of
Russia. Since September 11, 2001, Russian opposition to NATO
enlargement, particularly Baltic membership, has eased. The
Russians have recognized that enlargement is not directed
against them. Stabilizing democracy in Eastern Europe does not
threaten democracy in Russia. In fact, a stable and peaceful
Europe will benefit the entire continent, including Russia. I
fully supported the establishment of the NATO-Russian Council
at the Rome summit last spring, which opened a new cooperative
chapter in NATO-Russian relations.
NATO is a remarkable institution bound by military strength
and a common vision. But NATO will be reduced to a housekeeping
role in Europe if it does not tackle the most pressing security
threats to our countries today. We must complement NATO
expansion with a plan to transform the alliance into an
important force in the war on terrorism.
[The opening statement of Senator Lugar follows:]
Opening Statement of Senator Richard G. Lugar
We are fortunate to have an especially distinguished set of
witnesses with us today. I am pleased to welcome Ambassador Nicholas
Burns, the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO; Bruce Jackson,
President of the Project on Transitional Democracies; and Ronald Asmus,
senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund. Mr. Ambassador, given the
heightened responsibility required of you and your staff in Brussels
during the ongoing campaign in Iraq, we especially appreciate your
willingness to come before us today.
As our thoughts and prayers continue to be with our troops in Iraq,
we in Congress must examine the broader context of the fight against
terror and weapons of mass destruction. The subject that we take up
today is important to our men and women in the military and to the well
being of our country. The Atlantic Alliance is a key component of the
fight against terrorism, and we must attempt to maximize the utility of
NATO in prosecuting that war.
This hearing will examine the future of the Atlantic alliance,
plans for NATO enlargement, and how we can work with our European
Allies to establish greater security in an era of global terrorism. The
debate over Iraq exposed a division within NATO over the best methods
to combat terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. This has strained
some of our traditional alliances, but it has not broken them. The
United States has more at stake and more in common with Europe than
with any other part of the world. These common interests and shared
values will sustain the Alliance if governments realize the incredible
resource that NATO represents. When President Bush made his first trip
to Europe in June of 2001, he articulated his vision of a united Europe
at peace, and he threw his full weight behind NATO enlargement, from
the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. As the leader of NATO, we have no
intention of shirking our commitment to Europe.
Fifty years ago, NATO's founders made a political decision that the
United States and Europe needed a common strategy to meet common
threats. That need has not dissipated. As President Bush told the
German parliament last year, ``NATO's defining purpose--our collective
defense--is as urgent as ever. America and Europe need each other to
fight and win the war against global terror.''
At the Washington Summit in 1999, NATO heads of state declared that
they wanted the Alliance to be as relevant to the threats of the next
fifty years as it was to the threats of the past fifty. Part of their
vision was realized that day, when NATO officially welcomed Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the Alliance. At that moment, NATO
was engaged in a successful military campaign in Kosovo, which
demonstrated that the Alliance could operate in a complex combat
situation. Two years later--less than 24 hours after the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001--NATO invoked Article 5 for the first
time in its history. This Article declares that an attack on one member
is an attack on all. The United States remains grateful for that swift
and unquestioning expression of solidarity.
But the September 11th attacks and the ensuing war on terrorism
have led to a debate on NATO's post-cold war role that has forced heads
of state to reevaluate NATO's mission in the 21st century. When NATO
was founded in 1949, its purpose was to defend Western democracies
against the Soviet Union. But the demise of the Soviet Union diminished
the significance of NATO's mission. We began to debate where NATO
should go and what NATO should do. In early 1993, I delivered a speech
calling for NATO not only to enlarge, but also to prepare to go ``out
of area.'' At that time, many people were skeptical about enlarging
NATO's size and mission. Those of us who believed in NATO enlargement
prevailed in the debate. I believe that events have proven us right.
But NATO requires constant maintenance and adjustment. No one should
expect an effortless Atlantic Alliance, devoid of disagreement.
This is the second of four hearings that the Foreign Relations
Committee will hold on NATO. The immediate goal of these hearings is to
determine which of the seven candidate countries should be invited into
the Alliance. As we consider this new enlargement, it is clear that the
last round has been highly beneficial. Hungary, Poland, and the Czech
Republic are among the most dynamic countries in Europe. They are
deeply interested in Alliance matters, and they have sought to maximize
their contribution to collective security. The prospect of NATO
membership gave these countries the incentive to accelerate reforms,
settle disputes, and cooperate with their neighbors. Their success, in
turn, has been a strong incentive for democratization and peace among
Europe's other aspiring countries.
I believe that the candidate countries--Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia,
Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria--are ready to assume full
membership responsibilities and contribute to European stability and
security. I am fully confident that these countries have made an
enduring commitment to the core values of NATO and that they will stand
with those most committed to the Transatlantic relationship. The
candidates have worked hard to improve their military capabilities.
They have taken steps ranging from developing a peace-keeping capacity
to acquiring the equipment and skills necessary for high-intensity
conflict. All seven have been supportive of Coalition military efforts
in Iraq. I will urge the Senate to vote in favor of bringing the seven
candidate nations into NATO.
As we consider new members, we must simultaneously reconsider
NATO's purposes. In my view, the major security challenge we face today
is the intersection of terrorism with weapons of mass destruction. NATO
enlargement should be pursued as part of a broader strategic dialog
aimed at establishing common transatlantic approaches to meet this
challenge around the globe.
Although NATO's mission no longer centers on Russia, the debate
over NATO enlargement must include a discussion of Russia. Since
September 11, 2001, Russian opposition to NATO enlargement--
particularly Baltic membership--has eased. The Russians have recognized
that enlargement is not directed against them. Stabilizing democracy in
Eastern Europe does not threaten democracy in Russia--in fact, a stable
and peaceful Europe will benefit the entire continent, including
Russia. I fully supported the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council
at the Rome Summit last spring, which opened a new cooperative chapter
in NATO-Russia relations.
NATO is a remarkable institution bound by military strength and a
common vision. But NATO will be reduced to a housekeeping role in
Europe if it does not tackle the most pressing security threat to our
countries today. We must compliment NATO expansion with a plan to
transform the Alliance into an important force in the war on terrorism.
Ambassador Burns, Mr. Jackson, and Dr. Asmus, we look forward to your
insights on these issues.
The Chairman. Ambassador Burns, Mr. Jackson, and Dr. Asmus,
we look forward to your insights on these issues. And before I
ask you for those insights, I want to recognize the
distinguished ranking member, Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much. Mr. Ambassador,
welcome. It is an honor to have you here. Thanks for making the
trip. Welcome home. And Ron and Bruce will be following you. We
indeed have a distinguished group of witnesses this morning.
As all of you know better than most of us, this Friday
marks the 54th anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization treaty. In the alliance's 54 years, 30 of
which I have been sitting here in the Senate, I do not believe
I have seen such--I want to choose my adjectives correctly--
such a concern, in some quarters rancor, dissension.
I have attended so many conferences on whither NATO. Most
of them I have brushed off over the years as part of the
necessary national inclinations of each of the countries
responding to their political needs of the moment. But I think
this is different.
To illustrate this turn of events and their consequences, I
want to recall a few important facts.
During several weeks in January and February, France,
Germany, and Belgium blocked consensus in the North Atlantic
Council for providing assistance to fellow member Turkey which
requested help under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty
because it feared an attack by Iraq in the event of a war.
Commenting on that bit of theater, just last week the head
of an important French think tank made the following statement,
``that NATO was unable to meet the challenges of the age came
as no great surprise to close observers of the organization. In
the Kosovo war, its military structure was shown to be too
American-dominated to satisfy European needs. And while its
political side could be used by the Europeans to constrain U.S.
power, that made NATO too multilateral for the Americans. Its
future as an effective and viable body has been very much in
doubt ever since.''
Next month the leaders of France, Germany, Belgium, and
other European countries, but not the United Kingdom, which was
not invited, will meet to assess the prospects for an EU-based
military alliance outside of NATO. The President of the
Commission of the European Union, Mr. Prodi, praised this
initiative calling it ``timely and good,'' and with regard to
transatlantic relations, he added, ``it is evident the Iraq
crisis has brought us to a new crossroads. We must choose a
different path.''
Prodi said that a non-NATO military alliance would give
Europeans more clout on the international stage and prevent
them from being, ``left out from the management of world
affairs.''
Now, I am well aware that there is a ``yes, but'' response
to each of these events.
First, thanks largely to the skillful work of you, Mr.
Ambassador, the question of the Article 4 assistance to Turkey
was moved from the NAC to NATO's Defense Planning Committee
where France is not a member. And the alliance, at least
temporarily, survived this crisis.
Second, commentators, however articulate and provocative
they may be, are just that, commentators, not people who have
to make the tough decisions.
And third, I met last year with Mr. Prodi, and I have
tremendous respect for him, but he is not a political military
strategist. Moreover, he may be President of the Commission of
the European Union, but he does not speak for the entire EU, as
the governments of the U.K., The Netherlands, Italy, Spain,
Denmark, and perhaps others will attest. Moreover, to put it
somewhat crudely, talk is cheap.
The idea that the Parliaments of all EU members states
would suddenly have a security epiphany and appropriate the
considerable sums of money necessary to bring their militaries
into the 21st century at a level with those of the United
States is, I would submit, not something you would like to bet
your mortgage on.
Nonetheless, these events and many others over the last
several months do point, in my view--and I hesitate to use this
phrase, it has been so overused over the years--to a crisis in
NATO that is unlike anything I have experienced since I have
been here.
We are faced with a quandary and a quantitatively new
decision and a new situation in which the very fundamentals of
the alliance I think are being questioned unlike any time
before, and I think we had better figure out how to respond to
it. We are going to reach an immediate crisis, God willing,
with a swift victory in Iraq. We are going to face this crisis
fairly quickly about how and if we internationalize the
responsibility for Iraq after Saddam is gone.
It is within this context, it seems to me that, we have to
assess the strategic benefits of further enlarging the
alliance, which I support. At our last hearing, we heard from
administration witnesses on the qualifications and
contributions of each of the seven candidate countries, and we
will continue our examination in another hearing on Thursday.
And I agree with the chairman. I will join him on the floor in
moving for the accession of the candidate countries.
But today I'd like to address the more fundamental question
on the nature and the direction of the alliance that these
seven countries will soon be joining, hopefully.
Mr. Ambassador, you are deeply engaged on a daily basis in
what I believe are critical debates about the evolution of
NATO. I would welcome your views on some or all of the
following questions. And you may think I am being provocative
with the first one, but I mean it sincerely.
Is the Bush administration truly committed to NATO? For
many who have top positions in the administration have for the
previous 6 to 8 years been talking about how we are
overextended in Europe, how it is not the most critical
responsibility we have, and that NATO does not have the utility
it once had.
I would also like to know if the political structures of
the alliance have become too multilateral for us as is asserted
by our French colleagues.
Will we bypass NATO structures in the future in favor of
coalitions of the willing if future political discussions
become too difficult for us?
Would we support changes in the decisionmaking process of
the NAC to facilitate action?
Five years ago, I, and I think the chairman as well--I do
not want to tar him with the same brush--opposed successfully
an amendment to the Resolution of Ratification calling for the
creation of a dispute resolution mechanism in the NAC. I still
see this approach as a cure worse than the disease, but I would
ask you, Mr. Ambassador, from your experience in Brussels, how
do you anticipate the accession of seven countries invited at
Prague would affect decisionmaking in the NAC and discussions
on the various NATO committees?
Finally, Mr. Ambassador, I invite you to share with us some
of the strategic thinking currently going on among our allies.
Are they engaged in similar debates on how to improve the
alliance structures and capabilities?
I am also very pleased that both Ron Asmus and Bruce
Jackson, who have been here many times and on whom we have
relied over the years, are here to join us to contribute to
this important discussion. Both Ron and Bruce have personally
played key roles in the conception and implementation of the
last two rounds of NATO enlargement. They are two of the most
astute observers of the alliance in my view, and I am eager to
hear their views on a broad range of questions regarding the
possible directions NATO will take in the future.
Once again, let me say, Mr. Ambassador, how delighted I am
to welcome you. My questions are not--I hope you know me well
enough to know are not meant to be confrontational. I mean them
sincerely. I think that without--let me put it another way, and
I will conclude with this, Mr. Chairman, right after I saw our
good friend, the Senator from Nebraska, outside the Foreign
Relations Committee room over outside the Senate yesterday, I
walked upstairs, Chuck, and was greeted by two of our
colleagues who are both very bright, enlightened guys. And they
immediately started on me about what are we going to do to
teach the French a lesson and what are we going to do to teach
the Germans a lesson and, by the way, Turkey. And it dawned on
me that these were not people who do not think a lot about
this. This was not just a knee-gut reaction coming from a guy
on the street who is angry because of what is going on.
All I could think to say was--I said, let me ask you a
rhetorical question. How secure and well-off do you think we
will be if 10 years from now we do not have close relations
with Germany, France, and Turkey? And they looked at me like
why in the devil would I ask that question. That is unfair.
But there is a feeling here, a feeling that worries me. And
I would like to get some sense from you whether that feeling is
felt in Brussels among our NATO allies, that we may, as my dear
mother, God bless her--she is alive and well and strong at 85
years old, has an expression that she has reminded me of. I
guess it is the Irish in me. From the time I was a kid when I
would get angry, she would say, Joey, don't bite your nose off
to spite your face. To be purely colloquial, I think we may be
close to biting our nose off to spite our face here if we do
not get this straight.
So you have got a tough job, Mr. Ambassador.
I apologize, Mr. Chairman, for going longer than I should
have, but I cannot think of anyone who is more appropriate or
more knowledgeable to have here this morning to discuss some of
these topics with us than Ambassador Burns. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.
Let me mention, for information of the committee, that it
would be my hope that when 10 of us around the committee table
are present, that at some point we could break into the
discussion of NATO to consider the Joint Convention on the
Safety of Spent Fuel Management. This is a request of Senator
Abraham, and this assent is needed for the United States to
participate in a very important conference on April 6. We have
6 members now, and hopefully we will have 10 at some point.
But I ask if members are not acquainted with the spent fuel
treaty, please ask your staffs to put the memo in front of you
so that you will be up to speed when we come to that point.
Now, second, I just recognize in the audience the friendly
faces of many distinguished ambassadors who are good friends of
the committee. I do not want to embarrass any of you, but I am
going to anyway, by asking you to identify yourselves as I go
through the roll of the aspirant countries to see who is here.
The Ambassador from Latvia.
Voice. I am afraid the Ambassador is not here. I am the
DCM.
The Chairman. Excellent. I am pleased that you are here,
and other members of the staff likewise are recognized and
welcomed today.
Lithuania. The distinguished Ambassador from Lithuania.
Estonia. Excellent.
The Ambassador from Slovenia. Good to have you here, sir.
And I see the Ambassador from Slovakia, and likewise from
Romania, and the distinguished lady from Bulgaria. We are
delighted. Thank you so much for coming today for this
important discussion.
Finally, we look forward to hearing from you, Ambassador
Burns, after indulging the preliminaries, but as you can tell,
Senator Biden and I are deeply committed, as is this committee,
to the future of NATO. I agree with Senator Biden. There is
nobody better able to articulate from hands-on experience,
which you have had as our distinguished Ambassador.
I appreciated especially your hospitality a year ago
January at the workshop meeting which you invited me to meet
with the working members there. It was an educational
experience for me. It was very important. And I have
appreciated your returning to the United States frequently to
infuse us with enthusiasm as well as information.
The floor is yours. We look forward to your testimony, and
the entirety of your statement will be made a part of the
record. If you wish to go through that, fine, or summarize, it
would be fine likewise.
STATEMENT OF HON. R. NICHOLAS BURNS, U.S. PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION,
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM
Ambassador Burns. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
inviting me here today. It is a pleasure to be with all of you,
all the members of this committee and of the Senate.
I did submit a statement for the record and I will not read
that so that we can get to questions sooner. I do have a very
brief statement I thought I should make to summarize the views
that our administration would like to put forward.
First, Mr. Chairman, let me thank you for your leadership
on this issue of the U.S. commitment to NATO for your entire
career in the Senate. I do remember very well the trip that you
made to Brussels a year and a half ago. It was important for us
and we appreciated the guidance you gave us. All of us in the
United States Foreign Service appreciate the commitment you
have given and the very sensible advice you have given many
administrations on this issue.
I would like to say to Senator Biden, thank you very much
for your chairmanship of this committee last year and your
commitment that you gave to us before the Prague summit as we
tried to think through how we would restructure the alliance
and as we began to debate the issue of NATO enlargement as
well. And I appreciate the participation this morning of all
the members of this committee.
Senator, I just wanted to say to begin that I am very happy
to take the questions that Senator Biden has given me. I list
six and perhaps when we get to the question and answer period,
if there are some that you would like me to answer especially
this morning, I am happy to do that because I take them in the
best possible way and I think they are the questions that we
need to think about, about the future of this alliance. It is
an alliance in transformation and it does require us to be
willing to seek changes when they are necessary.
Mr. Chairman, we are meeting at a time of momentous
challenges for the United States overseas. America's soldiers
and our coalition soldiers are in harm's way in Iraq and they
are attempting to undertake by force what Saddam Hussein has
refused to do peacefully for the last 12 years and that is to
disarm.
As Senator Biden mentioned and as you mentioned, we also
have a number of differences with our longstanding allies over
how to deal with the grave threat posed by Saddam Hussein, and
that has put a serious strain on the transatlantic
relationship. Just as we are going to have to rebuild Iraq, we
are going to have to bring NATO back to the consensus and unity
that marked the Prague summit 4 months ago when we agreed that
NATO should take in new members and seek new military
capabilities and build those new relationships, Senator, that
you talked about with Russia, Ukraine, with the states of
Central Asia and the Caucasus that are so important to us as we
try to meet the threats of the 21st century.
Last week on March 26 in Brussels, I had the honor of
signing on behalf of the United States the Protocols of
Accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. I certainly
strongly encourage the U.S. Senate to provide its advice and
consent to the ratification of those Accession Protocols. I am
convinced that bringing these seven nations into the alliance
will make NATO a stronger collective defense organization and I
am convinced they will help us to increase the security of the
United States.
When President Bush and the NATO leaders invited the seven
countries to begin accession talks with the alliance at the
Prague summit, it was a historic step forward because the
greatest strategic goal of the United States and all of our
European allies since the fall of the Berlin Wall and since the
fall of communism in the late eighties and early nineties has
been the construction of a Europe that would be whole, free,
peaceful, and secure. That is what President George H.W. Bush
believed when he worked with Chancellor Kohl and President
Mitterand and Prime Minister Thatcher. It is what President
Clinton believed in the 8 years of his administration, and it
has certainly been the hallmark of President Bush's European
policy over the last 2 years.
I think that this enlargement of NATO, coupled with the
simultaneous enlargement of the European Union, will move
Europe beyond the divisions and instability that made the 20th
century one of the bloodiest in human history. And this is a
very profound achievement for the United States and for our
European allies. And it is the transatlantic relationship
encapsulized that we need to preserve for the future.
We have pushed the seven countries very hard to be ready
for the requirements of membership. Since the end of the cold
war, but particularly since they announced their candidacy, the
seven nations have joined Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic in consolidating democracy and free markets in that
half of Europe, which was closed behind the Iron Curtain during
the cold war. And the prospect of bringing these countries in
has helped to erase old dividing lines and it has had the
benefit of shifting Europe's center of gravity and NATO's
center of gravity eastward, thereby broadening security on the
continent.
Twice last year, Mr. Chairman, in February and again in
October, I led a U.S. interagency team to these seven
countries, along with Albania and Macedonia. We tried to assess
their readiness for membership in anticipation of sending the
adapted treaty to the Senate, and we had over 100 meetings with
the Presidents and the Prime Ministers and the Foreign and
Defense Ministers of these countries during that time, and we
urged them to press ahead with the reforms that they and we
felt were important to make them candidates for NATO.
Based on those meetings and based on all the other contacts
that we have had, I believe that these countries are ready for
NATO membership. All of them have reformed. All of them have
modernized their defense establishments. That will add to the
collective defense capability of the alliance. All have
demonstrated a very firm commitment to NATO's values. They have
addressed issues as diverse as corruption, minority rights,
trafficking in women and children, the legacy of the Holocaust,
and good governance, and they have all responded positively and
constructively to the concerns we have put before them.
I think most notably for this committee all seven of these
countries have served with us in Bosnia and in Kosovo. All
seven have been in Afghanistan to help us with that very
difficult problem since September 2001, and all seven have
spoken up publicly in support of the coalition in Iraq. And six
of the seven countries are members of the current coalition in
Iraq. So I think that they have been de facto allies and have
shown in deed, as well as in word, that they are ready to join
our alliance.
When I first took up my assignment a year and a half ago,
the conventional wisdom in the summer of 2001 was that perhaps
one to four of these countries might be ready for membership at
the Prague summit. Certainly you did not find many people,
perhaps present company excluded, Senator, who believed that
all seven were ready for membership. It was President Bush's
vision, which he articulated in the speech you referred to, the
Warsaw speech of June 2001, that we should try to create an
alliance from the Baltics to the Black Sea that began to shift
thinking in the alliance in favor of robust enlargement. And I
think it is fair to say that from the very beginning, it has
been the United States--and that is the Clinton administration,
as well as the Bush administration--that has championed the
idea of an expansive enlargement, a fact that has not been lost
on the invited countries themselves. They know that if it were
not for the leadership of the last two American Presidents and
the leadership of many Members of the Senate, NATO membership
might not have been possible for them in 2002 and 2003. So I
think they can thank President Bush and his predecessors, but
also members of this committee and of the Senate for that
distinction.
We think these countries will value their NATO membership.
They will never take it for granted. And I believe, as I sit
around the conference table with our 19 allies many times per
week, that when these seven countries, Senate willing, take
their place in May 2004, they will become immediately among our
strongest allies when they become members of the alliance.
Mr. Chairman, some European leaders have said that these
seven countries should be seen and not heard, and the United
States differs with that view. We believe these nations deserve
our respect and our support for everything they have done to
reassert their independence and their sovereignty over the last
12 years. They know the meaning of democracy because it was
denied to them for a very, very long time. And so they do not
just bring military capabilities to the table, they bring a
strong sense of political will which, combined with ours, we
think will keep NATO strong.
We think in this sense that we ought to look at NATO
enlargement not as how many countries we are obligated to
defend, which of course was a pertinent question that we had to
ask and that Senators had to ask in decades past during the
cold war, but rather how many countries can we count on to
stand with us when the going gets tough as it was in
Afghanistan and as it currently is in Iraq. In this sense, the
size of a country, the geography and population count for less
than the political will to defend our principles and our
collective security.
These seven countries, as you said, Mr. Chairman,
understand they are joining an alliance in transformation and
in transition. They understand the threats to us are different
than in times past, and we think that they understand one of
the principal lessons of September 11 and that is that NATO's
future is not just in the defense of Europe, but NATO's future
has to be to defend us from threats wherever they arise. NATO
has to go wherever it is needed, and as you said very famously,
Mr. Chairman, NATO is either going to be out of area or out of
business. You said that a very long time ago, but it was
prescient because that is exactly the decision that our Foreign
Ministers made at the Reykjavik meeting last year and the
primary sentiment that is now fueling the future of this
alliance.
If NATO's past was centered in countering the Soviet threat
to western Europe, its future must be devoted to meeting the
greatest security challenge of this generation and that is the
toxic mix of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction far from
Europe's shores. NATO needs to pivot from an inward focus on
Europe, which was necessary and appropriate during the cold
war, to an outward focus on the arc of countries where most of
the threats are today, in the Middle East and Central Asia and
in South Asia. And that is why the United States believes that
NATO should play a larger role in Afghanistan as we begin to
think about the next iteration of the peacekeeping force there,
and it is why we believe that NATO ought to be playing a role
in Iraq after that conflict is over on weapons of mass
destruction, on reconstruction, and in peacekeeping. These are
some of the issues that Secretary Powell will address when he
arrives at NATO tomorrow night for his meetings with NATO
leaders on Thursday in Brussels.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, we are asking our European
allies to spend more on defense, to fill NATO's shortfalls in
areas such as heavy air- and sea-lift, air-to-air refueling,
precision-guided munitions, and advanced communications, and
these are precisely the military capabilities that are so much
in need and so evident in our own application of force in Iraq.
We have launched a wholesale transformation of our alliance
military structure with the NATO Response Force, with a new
command structure.
Mr. Chairman, you and Senator Biden mentioned the divisions
within the alliance over the last couple of months,
particularly in the debate that we had in January and February
on the defense of Turkey and Article 4, and I thought I should
give you my views on why that happened and what it means for
the alliance.
First let me say I think we need to keep divisions with our
European allies in some historical perspective. If we remember
Suez in 1956 and the debates we had with the Europeans, the
debates over Vietnam with our European allies, the debates
about the introduction of Pershing missiles in the 1980s, the
debates over Bosnia in the early nineties, Kosovo in the late
nineties, these were all issues that divided in one way or
another the United States from its European allies. I think
that we will survive this present transatlantic debate and we
will be the stronger for it.
Having said that, it is also important to remember that
when we debated the defense of Turkey last month, the great
majority of the allies were with the United States. There were
16 of us who felt it was a fundamental obligation of the
alliance, in essence, a matter of principle, that we should
come to Turkey's aid. The actions of France, Germany, and
Belgium led to a crisis of credibility within the NATO alliance
because their narrow efforts violated the core fabric of NATO,
which is that all of us come to each other's assistance in time
of need.
In the end, Germany and Belgium did the right thing and
NATO did meet its commitment under Article 4 of the Washington
Treaty, and we have deployed AWACs and Patriot missile systems,
and chemical and biological teams as an alliance to Turkey, and
the presence of those forces has helped to deter and defend
Turkey at a very critical time in the midst of the war in Iraq.
But our final success in breaking the impasse was only made
possible by the decision that our administration made to meet
in NATO's Defense Planning Committee at 18, which is without
France.
One of the bright spots, in an otherwise very, very
frustrating month for me and for my colleagues at NATO, was
when the Ambassadors of the seven invited nations visited me in
my office to tell me that they were with us, that they would
have supported aid to Turkey had they been part of our
deliberations, and I certainly would have liked to have had
them at the table with us that week, and I look forward to the
day when they will be with us at that table.
Senator Biden mentioned some of the issues that have arisen
since that debate. Can NATO make decisions effectively if we
grow from 19 members to 26 members? Does the consensus way of
decisionmaking still make sense for NATO? And I would be very
happy to address that question, Senator, and from any other
Senator during the question and answer time.
Senator, let me just conclude by saying that, as we look to
the future, I think we do have some major challenges ahead of
us, and I would count six priorities for us.
First, we need to strengthen NATO's role in meeting threats
outside of Europe, thus our wish that NATO play a larger role,
as I have said, in Afghanistan and in Iraq post-conflict.
Second, we need to complete the transformation of the
military side of the alliance that we began at Prague--and
Senator Voinovich was there with us at the Prague summit--a new
command structure, NATO Response Force, asking the European
allies to do more, to spend more and to spend more wisely to
create a better and stronger military capability.
Third, we will need to integrate these allies into the
alliance if the Senate gives its advice and consent, and we
need to keep our door open to future enlargement in the years
ahead as other European countries seek membership and are
capable of meeting the obligations.
Fourth, Senator Lugar, you mentioned Russia. Russia,
Ukraine, and the countries of Central Asia are on the front
lines of the war against terrorism. We have new NATO
relationships with them and we have to give them our full
support.
Fifth, Senator Biden mentioned the issue of NATO and the
European Union. We have had some success. We now have a new
NATO-EU arrangement which allowed the EU to take over yesterday
NATO's peacekeeping mission in Macedonia, which is a step
forward, and we would like to see the European Union continue
to cooperate with us, use NATO resources, not to build their
own on their own missions.
Senator Biden also mentioned the fact that on April 29 it
has been announced that Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg
will have a summit to discuss the possibility of building a
separate European military command. You mentioned President
Prodi of the EU. I was with him last week and I gave him my
advice that we thought that any meeting that would discuss a
European command separate from NATO would be a mistake and
would be dangerous to the fabric of the transatlantic
relationship and of NATO itself. One of the Europeans present
said, well, Mr. Ambassador, the problem is we need a strong
European defense. I said, you have it and it is called NATO and
you have had it for 54 years. And we cannot give up on that.
Our sixth priority should be to maintain our commitments
that we have got in Bosnia and in Kosovo. They are still
commitments we have to meet and there is still a transition
that has not been completed.
Senator, let me just finish and say that we need to remain
engaged with our allies through NATO. We need to remember that
NATO has been there with us and for us for 54 years. I am
firmly of the view that the United States should not operate
alone in the world, that we need friends and allies, that we
need a permanent alliance, and that we need to build that
relationship and rebuild it after the strains of the last
several months. NATO is vital because it is America's only
permanent bridge to Europe. It is the expression of our
commitment to their defense and of them to ours. It is a
vehicle through which we continue to provide the nuclear and
conventional defense of Europe and by which we must now address
threats outside of Europe in places like Afghanistan and Iraq.
And as we reaffirm and rebuild our sometimes troubled
transatlantic ties from the debates of the past few months,
NATO has to be one of our key instruments. We should continue
to depend on NATO and to believe in it as a guidepost for our
policies in Europe.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senators, for
listening to me. I am very happy now to respond to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Burns follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns, United States
Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
Brussels, Belgium
introduction
Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me here today. I am honored to
appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss the
future of NATO, our most important Alliance and a central pillar of
U.S. foreign and defense policy. America needs a permanent Alliance
willing and able to take on the dangers posed by terrorism, weapons of
mass destruction and other new threats. The Administration's policies
are designed to ensure that NATO can continue to meet this challenge.
Before I begin, Mr. Chairman, I want to acknowledge your leadership
in defining a sensible American policy on NATO. I very much appreciate
the advice and guidance that my team received from you when you visited
us in Brussels last year. Your commitment to NATO throughout your
Senate career has been steadfast and very much appreciated by all of us
in the United States Foreign Service.
I would like to thank Senator Biden for his leadership of this
Committee last year, when the Senate supported both NATO's
transformation and NATO enlargement in preparation for the Prague
Summit.
Let me also say that I greatly appreciate the participation of the
Congress in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. We are proud that
Congressman Doug Bereuter now serves as President of this important
forum.
Mr. Chairman, we are meeting at a moment when the United States
faces momentous challenges overseas. American and coalition soldiers
are in harm's way in Iraq, undertaking by force what Saddam Hussein
refused to do peacefully--to disarm as demanded by the international
community for over 12 years.
Differences with a number of our long-standing Allies over how to
deal with the grave threat posed by Saddam have put a serious strain on
Trans-Atlantic ties. Just as we will have to rebuild Iraq, we will have
to bring NATO back to the consensus and unity that marked the Prague
Summit just four months ago, when we agreed that NATO needs new
members, new capabilities and new relationships to meet the threats of
the 21st century.
Today I would like to give you a view from Brussels on where NATO
is right now, where we want it to go, and how we believe the seven
invited nations will help us get there. I will try to make the case
today that the seven invited nations are ready to become full NATO
members, and that their accession is in the best interests of the
United States. I will also tell you why I believe NATO remains our most
important Alliance, and how we seek to transform it to meet the new
threats so evident after September 11, 2001. Finally, Mr. Chairman, I
will give you my thoughts on the key challenges that NATO faces in the
period ahead.
the u.s. enlargement strategy
Mr. Chairman, last week, on March 26, I had the honor of signing on
behalf of the United States in Brussels the Protocols on the Accession
to the North Atlantic Treaty of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. I strongly encourage the U.S. Senate to
provide its advice and consent to the ratification of these protocols.
I am convinced that bringing these seven nations into the Alliance will
make NATO a stronger collective defense organization and will increase
the security of the United States.
When President Bush and NATO leaders invited the seven countries to
begin accession talks with the Alliance at last November's Prague
Summit, it was truly a historic step forward. Since the fall of the
Berlin Wall and communism more than a decade ago, the U.S. and our
Allies have pursued the strategic aim of creating a Europe whole, free,
secure and at peace. This has been President George Bush's objective as
it was of President Clinton and of President George Herbert Walker
Bush, with wide bipartisan support--to firmly anchor the nations of
Central and Eastern Europe in both NATO and the European Union.
NATO's enlargement, coupled with enlargement of the EU, will move
Europe beyond the divisions and instability that made the 20th century
one of history's bloodiest. This is a profound achievement for the
United States and our European Allies.
We have pushed these countries hard to be ready for NATO
membership. Since the end of the Cold War, and particularly since
becoming candidates for NATO membership, the seven invited nations have
joined Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in consolidating
democracy and free markets in that half of Europe closed behind the
Iron Curtain during the Cold War. The prospect of Alliance membership
has helped to erase old dividing lines and shift Europe and NATO's
center of gravity eastward, broadening security and stability on a
continent that has seen too little of both.
Mr. Chairman, my recommendation of ratification is based on months
and years of work by our government with the invited countries. Twice
last year, in February and in October, I led a U.S. interagency team to
the seven invited nations--as well as to Albania and the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia--to assess their readiness for NATO
membership. During these visits, as well as in Brussels and at the
Vilnius-10 Summit in Riga last July, our team met with every President,
Prime Minister, Foreign and Defense Minister of the seven nations--in
well over one hundred separate meetings. Our goal was to learn as much
as we could about these countries' readiness for NATO membership, and
to encourage them to press ahead with their historic reform efforts.
Based on these meetings and visits, and on our wide-ranging
contacts with these nations at all levels of the U.S. Government, I
believe that all of the invited nations meet NATO's high standards for
membership. All seven are reforming and modernizing their defense
establishments to add strength to NATO's collective defense
capabilities. All have demonstrated a firm commitment to NATO's
community of values by addressing such issues as corruption, minority
rights, regional relations, trafficking in persons, the legacy of the
Holocaust, property restitution, and good governance. All have
responded positively and constructively to a very intrusive U.S.
examination of their efforts, often beyond the rigors of NATO's
Membership Action Plan that all of the invited nations have endured
since 1999.
This is not to say that the invited nations have solved all their
problems. Despite the remarkable progress we have seen, each of them
remains a society in transition from communism to an open democratic
and market-oriented system. Their levels of progress differ, and many
challenges remain. Together with our Allies, we will need to continue
to encourage and support their reform efforts in the years ahead.
The invited nations are the first to recognize that the job is not
done. They are committed to reform. Their efforts have not slowed, but
rather accelerated, in the months since NATO's historic decisions in
Prague. Each of the Invitees has made new commitments in writing, at
the highest level, to specific reform measures on a range of issues.
These individual Timetables for the Completion of Reforms were
submitted to NATO prior to the signing of Accession Protocols on March
26. They constitute important political commitments that will guide
their efforts throughout the accession period and beyond--and will help
inform Allied parliaments about the status of these nations'
preparations for membership.
Take a look at Romania's reform timetable and you will find
budgetary commitments to enable its anti-corruption office to do its
work. Read Bulgaria's and you will see specific steps that the
government is taking to curb illicit arms sales and safeguard NATO
secrets. The timetables of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania outline their
strategies for educating their children about the Holocaust and
restituting communal property. Read Slovenia's timetable and you will
find a specific commitment to increase defense spending to 2 percent of
GDP by 2008. See Slovakia's for a detailed description of the
government's efforts to improve the situation of its Roma minority.
the invitees
Mr. Chairman, the President's report to Congress on NATO
enlargement, which was submitted last week, contains a detailed
analysis of each of the invited nations. Rather than review all the
findings of that report, let me try to give you a brief snapshot of
these seven countries, each of which brings a different set of
strengths to the NATO table. Their participation in the MAP and in the
Partnership for Peace ``PfP'' program has enabled them to make
significant strides in reforming their militaries and in enhancing the
interoperability of their armed forces with NATO. Furthermore, each of
these countries has also made important political and military
contributions to the security challenges we face--in the Balkans, in
Afghanistan, in Iraq, and in some cases in all three theaters.
Romania, the largest of the invited nations, self-deployed over 400
combat troops to Afghanistan and now has a 70-strong nuclear/
biological/chemical defense team on the ground in Kuwait in support of
the coalition, with more personnel en route. Again and again, Romania
has demonstrated the ambition, and the means, to play a major role in
NATO as a close Ally of the U.S. The government is also showing a clear
commitment to tackling its remaining reform challenges, including
corruption and cementing the rule of law, where much work remains to be
done.
Like Romania, Bulgaria has been with us every step of the way on
Iraq--despite calls from some other parts of Europe to remain on the
sidelines. Bulgaria has played a key role in UN Security Council
deliberations, joined our Coalition, and contributed a nuclear/
biological/chemical defense team to the Iraqi theater of operations as
well as airfields for our movements to and from Afghanistan. Bringing
Bulgaria and Romania into NATO would further extend stability into
Europe's most troubled region--southeast Europe. Bulgaria's government
has taken numerous painful steps on defense reform, including
destroying its SS-23 and SCUD missiles and reducing the size of its
armed forces by the thousands. Moreover, Bulgaria is working closely
with us to tighten export controls and protect NATO classified
information. These are tough challenges, but I am confident that the
government will succeed on both counts.
Like Bulgaria and Romania, Slovakia has faced the challenge of
reducing a large, antiquated military machine inherited from its Warsaw
Pact past--and is accomplishing this task with success. Slovakia's
military is capable of making a significant contribution to Alliance
defense, including through its mechanized infantry battalion for NATO-
led operations and its nuclear/biological/chemical defense team now on
the ground in Kuwait in support of the coalition. Slovakia is also on a
very positive political and economic trajectory, having put the
autocrat Vladimir Meciar out to pasture in last September's elections,
and is making good progress on remaining problems such as integration
of the Roma and fighting corruption.
One week ago, Slovenia surprised many by winning its referendum on
NATO membership by a two-to-one margin, a tribute to the efforts of its
government and--I believe--to the wisdom of its people. The mandate
that the government has received bodes very well for Slovenia's future
contributions to the Alliance. With its model democracy and strong
economy, we can expect Slovenia to continue to serve as a leader in the
Balkans, in areas like de-mining and mountain warfare training. We
welcome the government's commitment to raise defense spending every
year from now until it reaches 2 percent of GDP by 2008.
Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are well prepared to take up the
responsibilities of NATO membership. Though small, they have worked
hard for a decade to develop niche military capabilities to fill
Alliance shortfalls, and we can expect continuing staunch support from
them for U.S. objectives. All three have contributed troops to NATO-led
operations in the Balkans and all three are on the ground with us in
Afghanistan. All three have joined the coalition to disarm Saddam
Hussein, and all are taking steps to deploy military personnel to the
theater for purposes of peacekeeping and reconstruction. The Senate and
successive U.S. Administrations deserve credit for having been true and
loyal friends of the Baltic States. The U.S. never recognized their
illegal annexation by the Soviet Union and stood by them as they built
their new democracies. These are truly admirable countries, freed
forever from totalitarianism, and ready to enjoy the benefits of
freedom and security that they surely deserve.
a more atlanticist alliance
Mr. Chairman, I think it is important to consider not only the
objective qualifications of the seven invited nations, but also the
factors that have led them to seek membership in NATO, what kind of
Alliance they are interested in joining, and how this affects more
broadly U.S. national security interests.
In the thousands of miles that my colleagues and I have traveled,
and in the hundreds of meetings that we have held--not only with
government officials but with members of the opposition, public opinion
leaders, and civil society as well--we have heard time and again how
grateful the invited nations are for the leadership that the U.S. has
shown on enlargement and in strengthening security in the Euro-Atlantic
area.
When I first took up my assignment in Brussels in the summer of
2001, the conventional wisdom at NATO was that somewhere between one
and four nations might receive Prague Summit invitations--certainly not
seven. It was President Bush's vision--first articulated in Warsaw
earlier the same year of an Alliance stretching ``from the Baltics to
the Black Sea''--that shifted the balance at NATO in favor of a robust
enlargement. The horrible events of September 11, 2001 further
convinced many at NATO that the Alliance should expand its ranks with
those countries willing to take risks to win the war on terrorism.
From the very beginning, it was the U.S. that championed the most
robust possible enlargement--a fact that has not been lost on the
invitees. They know that if not for U.S. leadership, NATO membership
might not have happened for them. They can thank President Bush and his
predecessors as well as the Senate for this achievement.
Let there be no doubt--these are nations that understand the value
of NATO membership and they will never take it for granted. They will
be among our most committed Allies when they walk through NATO's doors
as full members. Senator Voinovich of this committee, who attended the
Prague Summit, will recall the remarkably eloquent words of Latvian
President Vike-Freiberga at the North Atlantic Council meeting
following her country's invitation to join the Alliance. She said,
Our people have been tested in the fires of history, they
have been tempered by suffering and injustice. They know the
meaning and the value of liberty. They know that it is worth
every effort to support it, to maintain it, to stand for it and
to fight for it. We make a solemn pledge and a commitment here
today, on this historic and solemn occasion, that we will
strive to our utmost to do our part to contribute not just to
the strength of the Alliance but to do whatever needs to be
done to create a world where justice and liberty are available
to all.
Hearing those words again, it is easy to understand why President
Bush said at Prague that he expects the invited nations to ``refresh
the spirit'' of NATO itself.
Some say these nations should be seen and not heard. The U.S.
believes these nations deserve our respect for all they have done to
reassert their own independence and freedom. Theirs is one of the most
dramatic and hopeful stories of our time. We need to hear their views
on the issues of the day, including on NATO's future. These nations
know the meaning of democracy, having been denied it for so long. They
know the value of freedom, having had theirs crushed by Soviet
communism and totalitarianism. They don't just bring new capabilities
to the table; they also bring strong political will to defend our way
of life.
Mr. Chairman, in this new century, we should look at NATO
enlargement not as how many countries we are obligated to defend, but
rather how many countries we can count on to stand with us when the
going gets tough. Size and geography and population count less than the
political will to defend our principles and collective security.
new threats/new capabilities
Mr. Chairman, the seven nations that received invitations at the
Prague Summit understand that the threats we face today are
fundamentally different from those of the last century--that the
threats of today come not from strong states within Europe, but from
unstable failed states and terrorist organizations far from Europe's
borders.
As NATO Secretary General George Robertson has said in his
inimitable fashion, ``geography will no longer act as our shield,''
because the current and future security environment ``does not afford
us the luxury of fighting theoretical battles about what is `in' and
what is `out of area.' '' In other words, as you famously said, Mr.
Chairman, NATO is either ``out of area or out of business.''
This was the lesson the United States derived from the tragic
events of September 11--that the gravest threats to our security can
come from anywhere on the globe. NATO's future is thus the defense of
peace not just in Europe but wherever threats arise to all of us in the
Euro-Atlantic community. In fact, NATO is already operating well beyond
the borders of our member states, and that is where NATO belongs. The
old ``out-of-area'' debate is indeed dead.
Today in Afghanistan, troops from fourteen NATO, and fourteen NATO
Partner, countries make up the vast majority of the 4,500 strong
International Stabilization and Assistance Force (ISAF). In addition,
NATO itself has assisted current ISAF lead nations Germany and the
Netherlands with force generation, planning, intelligence, coordination
and information sharing, and communications.
If NATO's past was centered in countering the Soviet threat to
Western Europe, its future must be devoted to meeting the greatest
security challenge this generation faces--the toxic mix of terrorism,
states that sponsor terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction far from
Europe's shores. NATO needs to pivot from its inward focus on Europe--
which was necessary and appropriate during the Cold War--to an outward
focus on the arc of countries where most of the threats are today--in
Central and South Asia, and in the Middle East.
Mr. Chairman, our transformation agenda for NATO is an ambitious
one, and there are many challenges to overcome. But at the Prague
Summit last November, President Bush and his fellow Heads of State and
Government took historic decisions to set this process in motion.
The Prague vision was both simple and far-reaching--to launch a
wholesale transformation of the Alliance for the 21st century. The old
NATO served us well, but because the threats to our common security had
changed, Allies agreed that NATO had to change with them.
At the Summit, Allies agreed to a three-part reform effort--to
build new military capabilities to fight terrorism and the spread of
Weapons of Mass Destruction and to keep the peace; to take in new
members to broaden NATO's reach; and to nurture new relationship with
Russia, Ukraine, our Mediterranean Dialogue Partners, and our partners
in the Partnership for Peace, particularly with the states of Central
Asia and the Caucasus to extend security across Eurasia.
NATO's goal of new military capabilities was expressed in the
Prague Capabilities Commitment, through which our European Allies
committed to fill NATO shortfalls in areas such as heavy air and
sealift, air-to-air refueling, precision guided munitions, and advanced
communications. In recent months, Allies have begun implementing the
Prague decisions, pooling their resources by establishing a number of
multinational consortiums aimed at acquiring these capabilities.
Our challenge between now and the next NATO Summit in mid-2004 is
to ensure that our Allies follow through on these commitments in a
tight budget climate. At NATO, we are keeping the heat on--both through
bilateral pressure and peer group pressure within the North Atlantic
Council. Our most effective lobbying tactic is through leadership and
example. As demonstrated so vividly again in Iraq, Congress has funded
the strongest military in the world. Allies know what they have to do
to catch up.
In Prague, our Allies also agreed to a U.S. proposal to establish a
NATO Response Force to allow us to move more quickly and flexibly
wherever needed. This will be a rotational force that is
technologically advanced, lethal, and has trained and exercised
together as a combined and joint force. The NATO Response Force was
Prague's capability headline; it will also be the most visible
determinant of our success on this front.
This cutting-edge NATO force needs to be matched by similar
streamlining in the NATO command structure, with new technologies and
military doctrines designed to address 21st century threats. We are
making good progress in transforming NATO's structure and should be
able to agree on the key elements by the June Defense Ministerial.
defense of turkey impasse
Mr. Chairman, earlier in my remarks I mentioned the very difficult
debate that we had in Brussels several weeks ago regarding the defense
of Turkey. I know that this is an issue of concern to this committee so
I think it is important that I address it.
This was not the first time that NATO members have disagreed
vocally, and publicly, on a difficult issue. The Suez Crisis and
Vietnam were bitter, as was President DeGaulle's decision in 1966 to
withdraw from NATO's integrated military structure. NATO debate leading
up to the 1979 Two-Track Pershing Missile decision that eventually led
to the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons in Europe was
coupled with public demonstrations that rivaled those we have seen
during the last month.
My point, Mr. Chairman, in providing this historical perspective,
is that NATO has survived crises in the past, and NATO will survive
this latest episode.
Mr. Chairman, we should also remember that in this latest
disagreement, only three of our Allies opposed the wish of the majority
to respond immediately and positively to Turkey's request for
contingency measures to assist in its defense. Sixteen Allies supported
the proposal, and the divisions were as deep within Europe as they were
across the Atlantic.
For the 15 Allies who stood with Turkey, it was a fundamental
obligation of the Alliance--a matter of principle--to come to Turkey's
aid. The actions of France, Germany and Belgium led to a crisis of
credibility in the Alliance because their narrow efforts violated the
core fabric of NATO--that we come to each other's assistance in times
of need.
In the end, Germany and Belgium did the right thing, and NATO met
its commitment under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty by deploying
AWAC surveillance aircraft, Patriot missile systems, and biological and
chemical response units to Turkey in order to deter and defend against
Iraqi aggression. Our final success in breaking the impasse was only
made possible by the decision to meet in NATO's Defense Policy
Committee and decide to help Turkey ``at 18''--that is, without France,
which withdrew from NATO's integrated military structure in 1966.
One of the bright spots in that otherwise frustrating week was when
the Ambassadors of the seven invited nations visited me in my office to
tell me they were with us and would have supported aid to Turkey if
they had been part of the deliberations. I would have liked to have had
them at the table with us that week, and I look forward to the day when
they will be. The seven invited nations are expecting to join NATO as
equal members on an equal footing, and to have their voices heard and
respected when we differ.
Privately, a few of these Ambassadors told me that their publics
back home were wondering whether NATO's collective defense commitment
was still reliable. I assured them that the U.S. would always insist
that NATO live up to its core responsibility and meet its commitment to
its members--as we will for them once they become members.
An Alliance that keeps its word is the kind of Alliance that the
seven invited nations want to join. It is the kind of Alliance that
they are dedicated to preserving. These are countries that understand
the value of freedom and see NATO as the way to maintain that freedom.
Some commentators have suggested that enlarging the Alliance by
seven will make decision-making more cumbersome and difficult. I agree
that this will be a challenge but one that we can manage well. Gaining
consensus did not become more difficult with the accession of the
trans-Atlantic minded Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary in 1999. On
the contrary, NATO's newest members have shown themselves to be the
least likely to block consensus and among the most likely to seek it.
The issue is not the number of nations at the table, but rather the
will to act collectively and decisively in our common interest.
six challenges
In summing up, Mr. Chairman, as we look toward the next NATO Summit
in mid-2004, we hope the Senate and NATO's other eighteen National
Parliaments will ratify the Accession Protocols so that we can
strengthen NATO with seven new members. We need these nations with us
as we pursue a NATO agenda that is both clear and complex. Here are the
six main challenges for NATO as I see them:
Our first order of business should be to strengthen NATO's role in
meeting threats outside of Europe. In Afghanistan, NATO is already
providing support to German and other Allies participating in the
International Stabilization and Assistance Force. We are prepared to
favorably consider having NATO provide additional support should
participating Allies request this. Lord Robertson and some of our
Allies would like to see NATO take a larger role in ISAF. This makes
sense to me.
We believe that NATO should also consider a role in rebuilding
Iraq, including WMD destruction, civil-military reconstruction and
contributions to peacekeeping. Rebuilding Iraq will require a broad
coalition and NATO should play its part--ideally as a collective
contributor, but at least as a facilitator of individual Allied
contributions.
NATO's second challenge is to complete the military and defense
transformation of the Alliance that we started at Prague, including
implementing the Prague Capabilities Commitment, establishing a NATO
Response Force, and streamlining our command structure, to create a
more nimble, expeditionary Alliance capable of addressing the new
threats we face today.
Our third challenge is to integrate the seven new members into the
Alliance, provided the Senate and NATO's other parliaments give their
advice and consent to the Accession Protocols. We intend to work
closely with our new members to ensure that they strengthen Alliance
defense capabilities and are on the cutting edge of NATO's
transformation. At the same time, we will continue to emphasize that
NATO's door remains open, including for Albania, Macedonia, Croatia and
others who may apply for membership in the future, as we pursue our
strategic aim of building a unified and peaceful Europe.
Our fourth challenge is to lift the quality of NATO's relations
with Partner nations, to realize the full potential of the NATO-Russia
Council and to further support reform in Ukraine. We also want to make
a major push this year to jumpstart NATO's interaction with Partners in
Central Asia and the Caucasus on the front lines of the war against
terrorism. In addition, we should do more with Middle Eastern countries
through NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue.
Our fifth challenge is to work more effectively with the European
Union. The recent NATO-EU breakthrough on Berlin-plus arrangements sets
the stage for greatly enhanced strategic security cooperation. We now
have the opportunity for a cooperative--not competitive--relationship.
Just yesterday, Mr. Chairman, NATO handed over its peacekeeping
operation in Macedonia to the EU, on the basis of these arrangements.
We should seize this opportunity while recognizing that NATO will
remain Europe's preeminent security organization. We must preserve and
protect NATO's interests as we move ahead with the EU.
Sixth, we should be true to NATO's commitments in Bosnia and
Kosovo. The recent tragic assassination of Serbian Prime Minister
Djindjic reminds us of the risks that reformers take each day to secure
a better future for their nations. We must continue to support their
efforts. At the same time, we should look for additional opportunities
to integrate the nations of this troubled region into the Euro-Atlantic
community. This should eventually include the transformation of the
Alliance's role in Bosnia and Kosovo to civilian authorities.
preserving the trans-atlantic link
Mr. Chairman, let me close with just a few words about why I
believe the United States should stay engaged with our Allies through
NATO.
While it may sometimes be necessary to go it alone in the world, it
is always preferable to act with our Allies and friends. As Churchill
said, ``the only thing worse than fighting with Allies is fighting
without them.''
For more than a half-century, NATO has been our most important
Alliance and the strongest bridge across the Atlantic, linking North
America and Europe in a community of shared democratic traditions and
values. We should continue to ask NATO to play this role, and to adapt
to help us meet the new threats of the 21st century.
Mr. Chairman, we will continue to rely on our Allies to share the
risks with us in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, and
to work with them in the war against terrorism. Their contributions
make us a stronger nation, and will give us a more secure and peaceful
world.
I do not underestimate the challenges that lie ahead, but I am
confident that we are on the right path and that the seven invited
countries will strengthen the Alliance, refresh its spirit and infuse
it with a stronger political will.
Amid all that has happened since September 11, 2001, many have
asked if NATO still has a future and is still relevant to the U.S. and
its Allies. Mr. Chairman, I am firmly of the view that NATO will remain
central to American national interests and to those of our European
Allies for as far into the future that we can see. NATO is vital
because it is America's only permanent bridge to Europe; it is the
expression of our commitment to each other's defense; it is the vehicle
through which we continue to maintain the peace in Europe and by which
we must now address threats outside of Europe. As we reaffirm and
rebuild our sometimes troubled Trans-Atlantic ties from the debates of
the past few months over Iraq, NATO is one of our key instruments. We
should continue to depend on NATO and to believe in it as a guidepost
for our future in Europe and beyond.
Mr. Chairman distinguished Members of this Committee, thank you
very much for inviting me here. I will be happy to respond to any
questions or comments that you have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Ambassador Burns, for
your testimony.
We have a good attendance and we have a distinguished panel
following, so I am going to suggest we have on the first round
5 minutes for questions of members. I will start and ask really
two questions to give you the maximum amount of time,
Ambassador Burns, to explore these questions.
What is the status of progress on the Prague Capabilities
Commitment [PCC] and the NATO Response Force [NRF]? Does our
administration expect candidate states, if they join the
alliance, to participate in the PCC and the NRF, and are they
capable of giving a militarily significant contribution to
each?
Now, second, to what extent are we moving toward a division
of labor in NATO between states able to undertake combat
missions and those able to undertake only peacekeeping
missions? And how does that gibe with our expectations with
regard to candidate states joining the PCC and the NATO
Response Force?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, thank you very much. On your
first question, as you remember, at the Prague summit, the
centerpiece of that summit was the reconstruction of NATO's
military capabilities because for many decades we had an
alliance that was facing a Soviet conventional and nuclear
threat in Europe, and we were structured and equipped to
counter that threat. The new threats, of course, are threats
that take place far from Europe's shores and America's. They
are in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. So we need to have an
expeditionary quality to our NATO defense doctrine. We need to
have airlift that will bring forces to the area, precision-
guided munitions that we have used so effectively over the last
2 weeks in Iraq, air-to-air refueling, secure communications.
And these are deficiencies that are present in most of our
allied forces.
Just to give you a sense of the context of this problem,
the Congress has appropriated close to $380 billion for
America's national defense this year. Our European allies and
Canada will spend roughly $140 billion on their defense. That
is 18 allies versus $376 billion. So we are outspending our
allies by a very long margin.
We are getting more from our $376 billion, I would wager,
than most of our allies are getting from their $140 billion,
because we have made the investments in military technology. We
spend a greater percentage of our budget on R&D and on
technology and less on keeping up, maintaining the force in
terms of the personnel costs. So in Prague what we said to the
allies, what President Bush said was we have got a big gap that
is separating the United States from all of its allies
militarily. We want to see that gap narrowed.
So we have asked the allies to see if by June of this year,
when our Defense Ministers meet--and Secretary Rumsfeld will be
at that meeting in Brussels--can we make some real progress.
Can a consortium of our allies agree to lease or to purchase
strategic airlift for the future? You have seen what the C-17s
have been able to do in Iraq in ferrying our forces and
equipment there. The European allies have exactly four C-17s
available to them across the European continent, and we have
several hundred. You have seen what the PGMs can do. And so we
have created these separate groups of allies that are working
for progress in each of these critical areas, Senator, and we
hope that there can be progress.
What we have said to the smaller nations, including the
seven nations that are at issue today, the invited nations, is
that in the future, smaller nations need not feel that they
have to have fully fledged and fully constructed armies,
navies, and air forces, that they might want to concentrate on
niche military capabilities. So, for example, the Czech
Republic has specialized in chemical and biological weapons
decontamination units, and they are in Kuwait serving the
coalition right now. And that is a specialty that is a
shortcoming in the NATO alliance and that we need more of.
Norway is specializing in special forces. So we think that some
of the smaller allies ought to focus on niche capabilities and
they ought to pool their resources, four or five or six of
them, to purchase some of these military capabilities that they
could not on their own.
In terms of your second question, a division of labor in
NATO, we do not want to see it develop. We do not want to see a
two-tiered alliance where the United States is uniquely capable
of projecting force, of doing the fighting, and our European
allies cannot be with us. Certainly the United Kingdom and
France have the kind of military capabilities that make them
expeditionary, but most of our allies do not. So that is why
the emphasis on spending more money, for our European allies
spending more wisely, arriving at niche capabilities is the
focus of our efforts.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
Nick, I know I gave you a whole bunch of questions there. I
hope I get a chance maybe to get you alone and talk about some
of this. I do not expect you to be able to do that now,
especially since we have so many members anxious to speak.
I would like to focus on, in the brief 5 minutes we have,
on two points. But I would like to make a point to you as well.
I hope the administration is prepared to support some of us
who want to push back on this $150 million slush fund at the
Defense Department with no oversight by State or Congress.
Second, this new office in the White House to receive and
distribute most of the supplemental moneys that we are now
giving directly to State and USAID. I want to talk to you about
that later. That is just a little red flag going up here. We
pushed back on it twice, and I hope we succeed in doing it
again. But we are going to need some inside help on this one.
Let me go to my two questions. I could not agree with you
more about how prescient my chairman was and is, as well as the
need for a wider role for NATO in Afghanistan and Iraq. But,
Nick, I am not sure how to get from here to there. I do not
think you would find much disagreement among us up here that
that is needed.
I recall, as the chairman said in his opening statement,
when immediately after 9/11, Article 5 was invoked, the first
time in NATO's history, when headlines of Le Monde said we are
all Americans, when Schroeder literally risked his government
by a vote of confidence to send, I think it was, 1,000 crack
German troops. I forget the number now. Was it 1,000, Michael?
I think it was 1,000 to Afghanistan out of country. He won by
one vote. And then we immediately stiff-armed him and said we
do not need you.
The French also committed forces. I do not want to get my
chairman in trouble, but I think we had a discussion and we
both made it clear to the administration we thought whether or
not we needed those troops, politically we needed those troops.
And it was very important. We made a plea to the President, at
least I did, and I think the chairman did. Saying please accept
their help for God's sake. NATO--this matters. Pride matters.
Humiliation is not a real good tool to use, even if it is
unintended, in foreign policy.
So how the heck do we get from here to there? Initially the
State Department supported an expanded ISAF with NATO
components in it. Now, I know you are not talking about the
same precise thing. You are not talking about ISAF necessarily
being expanded. Quite frankly, I am not sure what you are
talking about other than an expanded role for NATO. But how do
we get there, Nick?
What is the chemistry that makes the Germans and the French
and a number of our NATO allies who were--skeptical is not the
word--hostile to our actions in Iraq--how do we get them in the
deal in Iraq, which I think is critical, without engaging them
in a way where they have some say, impact, input in what this
transition government will look like? Because there is an
intense debate we hear about--I will speak for myself--I hear
about--between the--my phrase, no one else's--the Cheney-
Rumsfeld axis and the uniform military-State Department axis
that says that on the one side, we do not want anybody, we will
take care of security, which I understand. And by the way, we
are going to make sure of the transition. We are going to pick
the transition government. We are going to pick the makeup. We
are not going to have NATO or anyone else involved. And last,
we are not going to have anybody, especially the French, engage
in any of this reconstruction effort.
Tell me, what elements do you have to have available to you
to convince your colleagues that NATO should be engaged
militarily in Afghanistan and in Iraq, larger in Afghanistan
initially and for as long as it take in Iraq?
Ambassador Burns. Thank you, Senator. First, let me say I
would be very happy to sit down, whenever it is convenient to
you, to address the questions you asked before at the beginning
of the hearing.
I would just like to say one word on your first question. I
am absolutely convinced of the commitment of this
administration to NATO. I think we have obviously gone through
a lot in trying to think through how to adapt a cold war
institution to be effective in a very changed world where the
strategic threats are different and the requirements are
different. And President Bush's participation in the Prague
summit was the culmination of that where we essentially wrote
and decided on a new foundation for the alliance militarily as
well as politically. So I think that the United States has
shown the right leadership in rebuilding the alliance.
What we need now are two things. We need the Europeans to
have greater military capabilities, but we also need--and this
gets to your specific question on Afghanistan and Iraq--we need
a common sense of political will that we have got to go out and
meet these threats of this nexus of weapons of mass destruction
and terrorism.
On Afghanistan, there really is no debate in NATO about
whether or not NATO should be present. We are present. As you
know, the U.K. was the first lead of the peacekeeping force;
Turkey, the second. And now Germany and The Netherlands are co-
leads of the third iteration of ISAF. NATO is playing a support
role already to Germany and The Netherlands with planning and
logistics and with special military advice. The question for
us, as we look toward the summer, is should NATO continue to
play a support role to individual country leads in ISAF or
should NATO become the peacekeeping mission itself and take it
on as we took on Bosnia and Kosovo so successfully. The United
States believes that we have got to now engage in a debate on
that issue and make a decision in the next month or two, and we
are open to either option. We could certainly support either
option.
Senator Biden. What is in it for our NATO allies? I
apologize, Mr. Chairman. What thinking process do they have
that said this makes sense for the alliance to take on a more
formal role, which I strongly support? What ingredient? I mean,
what is the thought process? What do you have to convince them
that that makes sense or for them to conclude that? That is
what I am trying to get at.
Ambassador Burns. Seventeen of our 18 NATO allies made it
to Afghanistan after October 2001 when we initiated military
action in Afghanistan. Thirteen remain there. Some of them are
in Operation Enduring Freedom in the combat force, and some are
in ISAF.
I think what binds us together with them in Afghanistan is
they see the same threat that we do. What threatens Germany and
France and Belgium, just to choose three NATO members with whom
we have had a disagreement over the last couple of months, in
Afghanistan is this threat of weapons of mass destruction and
terrorism that they know could hit them, as it hit us on
September 11, 2001. So we have never had any kind of
divisiveness in the alliance about whether we should be in
Afghanistan.
The issue now is should NATO go all the way and take the
lead, take over the peacekeeping force. There are some
countries that say, well, NATO should not be that much out of
area or are we ready for that kind of commitment. Other
countries say only NATO can do it, to establish a command with
SACEUR's authority and the political control of the North
Atlantic Council and the ability to draw upon the 2 million
troops that our 19 nations bring to the table. So I think it is
common and shared interests, Senator, that binds us together
with our allies.
The discussion on Iraq is quite different than Afghanistan,
very different. When Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
came to NATO 3 months ago, he suggested to all the allies that
NATO think of a role for itself in Iraq post-conflict. It
obviously was not going to be possible for the alliance to be
part of the coalition because Germany and France and the other
countries had made it clear they would not participate in
offensive military action. So Paul Wolfowitz suggested how
about a role for NATO once the fighting stops. We will need
many, many troops for peacekeeping, for reconstruction, for
humanitarian assistance. We have to locate where the chemical
and biological weapons are. We have to take custody of them and
then begin to destroy them. So those options are still on the
table and the United States is prepared to discuss with our
allies whether or not they would like to come into Iraq after
the conflict has ended.
Most of the allies are telling us that they will need some
kind of legitimizing U.N. Security Council resolution so they
can go to their Parliaments, as all democratic governments need
to do, to where the power is and say, this is why we should be
in Iraq because the international community has decided these
are legitimate functions.
Senator Biden. Godspeed, Nick.
I have taken too much time.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.
Temporarily the hearing will be suspended and the committee
will move into a business session.
[Whereupon, at 10:33 a.m., the committee was recessed to
proceed in a business session, and reconvened at 10:36 a.m.]
The Chairman. Senator Hagel, you are recognized for your
questions.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Ambassador Burns, welcome. We appreciate your good work and
leadership at a difficult time.
I particularly appreciated your presenting some perspective
in your testimony as to the differences over the years that we
have seen within NATO. They are very relevant I think to our
discussion today and what will continue as very important
discussion as to the role of NATO, the role of individual
members, the collective responsibilities of NATO, in particular
as we look to bring in seven new members. So thank you for
that.
Some of the more interesting parts of your testimony, in my
opinion, focused on what is going on in the world today.
Senator Biden has just discussed some of that with you,
particularly Afghanistan and Iraq. I would like to followup on
a couple of points.
In your testimony you reference what you and Senator Biden
have been discussing, a role for NATO in Afghanistan, quoting
Lord Robertson, and this is from your testimony. ``Lord
Robertson and some of our allies would like to see NATO take a
larger role in ISAF.'' Then you add, ``That makes sense to
me.'' Are you speaking for the administration when you say that
or for Ambassador Burns?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, I am speaking for the
administration obviously.
Senator Hagel. Does that include then our consideration of
U.S. troops in ISAF if we broadened that responsibility?
Ambassador Burns. Yes, sir. As you know, we have troops in
Operation Enduring Freedom. One of the questions that we would
have to face if we did decide that NATO should take on full
responsibility for ISAF would be, how many troops could you
raise and could you raise from NATO 2 million and from which
countries?
But let me just say that when Lord Robertson visited
Washington in February, this issue was discussed in the White
House. It was discussed with the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Defense, and the administration believes that NATO
should play a larger role. That is our policy.
Senator Hagel. Including ISAF. And the policy of our
government would be to be part of that, would be enlarging our
efforts in Afghanistan with American troops in an ISAF force.
Ambassador Burns. Well, we have not addressed that question
specifically. The question before us--and I think this will
obviously be an issue that will come up when Secretary Powell
visits on Thursday with the NATO allies in Brussels, and we
have got to have a good debate on this over the next month or
two and make an early decision because the German-Dutch lead
expires in August of this year.
The question is, can we find a NATO country or countries
that would provide most of the forces and NATO would provide
then support to that? Or should NATO--the second option, as I
said to Senator Biden--assume full responsibility? In the
latter case, then each country would have to make a decision as
to whether or not they were willing to contribute their own
national forces. As to what the United States would do, we
would certainly support either option, but in terms of
committing troops, that is a decision that only the President
and the Secretary of Defense can make.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Moving to Iraq--and you pursued this a bit in your
testimony as well as your exchange with Chairman Lugar and
Senator Biden. NATO's participation in a post-Saddam Hussein
Iraq. First, are you involved in any of this discussion within
our government, the U.S. Government, as our representative to
NATO?
Ambassador Burns. That would be the discussion over the
shape that the post-conflict international----
Senator Hagel. The reconstruction effort. General Garner, I
understand, reporting to the Defense Department, that is where
it resides, my understanding is. Have you been asked to
participate as reflecting on where NATO might be in this?
Ambassador Burns. I have not been centrally involved in
those discussions. They have taken place back here in
Washington, Senator. I have been out in Brussels for the last
few months.
But I have been involved in one slice of it, and that is,
could NATO be part of the piece of the puzzle of putting
together an international presence in Iraq post-conflict. As I
mentioned, that debate started when Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz
came to NATO on December 4, 2002. He put these ideas on the
table to the 18 NATO allies.
We have had a lot of discussions at NATO since then.
Senator Hagel. But actually you have not been a part of
that. As you know, there is a rather significant debate going
on, at least if I understand this correctly, between the State
Department, Defense, and other elements of the administration
over agreeing and disagreeing. There is a story in the
Washington Post this morning supposedly that the Secretary of
Defense dismissed the eight nominees from the State Department
to be part of that effort. I do not expect you to know all
that.
But again, you have had no involvement there in any of that
discussion or that debate.
Ambassador Burns. That is correct, Senator. I have not been
involved in that particular debate.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Following up on Senator Hagel's comment,
some of the information that we have gotten incorrectly about
the amount of resistance that we would expect in Iraq has come
from Iraqi exiles, of which we have sought their opinion, and
that has turned out to be inaccurate information. So when you
project that into a post-war Iraq and who is going to be
running the country, you wonder about the capability of some of
the exiles being brought back in at a time when we are going to
be struggling transitioning from a military to a civilian type
of structure there to run the country.
So thank you very much for your comments.
I am concerned about our relationship with Turkey. The
Turks have hurt us by not allowing us to bring in that heavy
division so that we could be moving in a pincer movement from
the north to the south right now. And American lives are going
to be lost as a result of us not having that ability to come at
Baghdad from the north.
And the relationship with Turkey has been a longstanding
one of half a century, and it has been very good and now it is
not very good. I would like your comments.
Ambassador Burns. Senator, thank you very much. You will
appreciate the fact that I am not Ambassador to Turkey and I
am, of course, working with the Turkish Government at NATO
every day. I have that perspective.
Secretary Powell is now en route to Turkey today. He is
flying in tonight. He will be meeting with the leadership
tonight and tomorrow. So I would not want to say anything that
would prejudice his trip.
But let me just say that we think that we did the right
thing at NATO in mid-February by responding to Turkey's request
for Article 4 assistance with the Patriot missile systems and
the AWACs and the chemical and biological units. We showed
Turkey that we are a nation that meets our commitments. We went
the extra mile by effectively getting around the French problem
by electing to go to the Defense Planning Committee, which we
believe was the right decision, and we would do that again if
necessary. If we were in a position where NATO was 18 countries
wanting to go ahead and France did not, we would use the
Defense Planning Committee to make sure that NATO can act
because NATO always has to act.
As a number of the administration leaders have said, we
were very disappointed in the fact that the Turkish Parliament
did not vote positively to allow the 4th Division and the other
U.S. forces to be present on Turkish soil and to use it to be
able to cross the border into northern Iraq. So we would agree
with you, Senator, in that great disappointment that the
administration felt.
Senator Nelson. Well, what do you pick up when you talk to
your Turkish representatives in NATO about the impression that
they were dealt with in too much of a bullying manner? Do you
get that sense?
Ambassador Burns. I have not gotten that sense from the
Turks with whom I work at NATO headquarters. The Turkish
Ambassador and members of his delegation have not made that
charge. What they have said and what others have said is that,
of course, this was a democratic vote of the Turkish
Parliament. It is a new government. The government did take the
proposition to the Parliament and seek to have it approved. It
did not do that.
I guess if you are looking for a silver lining in what
admittedly is a cloud--and I agree with you that it would have
been far preferable if we had had the ability to have a second
offensive from Turkey in northern Iraq--is that Turkey is a
democracy. NATO is not the Warsaw Pact. We are a collection of
democracies and sometimes our individual members go in
directions that we would not care for them to go. But we have
to respect that democratic vote, and I think now we continue to
build the strongest possible relationship with Turkey that we
can. That is one of the reasons, obviously, for Secretary
Powell's trip there today and tomorrow.
Senator Nelson. Let me shift to Bosnia. We still do not
have those two main war criminals in the former Yugoslavia.
Tell us about that.
Ambassador Burns. Well, we believe that Radovan Karadzic,
leader of the Bosnian Serbs, and Ratko Mladic, the leader of
the Bosnian Serb military, are war criminals. Between July 11
and July 18, 1995, they ordered the extermination, the massacre
of 8,500 men and boys at Srebrenica, and we believe that they
ought to be extradited to The Hague. They ought to face trial
as Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Milutinovic have faced trials. This
ought to be a priority for all NATO countries to pressure them,
to pressure the Bosnian Government, to see that these two
leaders are brought to trial.
Senator Nelson. Well, undoubtedly that is our policy and
that is what we believe. Why do we not have them?
Ambassador Burns. They are two different cases. In the case
of General Mladic, from my understanding, he is someone who--I
should, let me just go back and correct the record. I believe,
pressure the Bosnian Government. We want to pressure Serb
Government. That was a slip of the tongue.
In the case of General Mladic, he has been seen in Serb
military hospitals in Belgrade. He has been seen in
restaurants. We believe he has enjoyed the protection of
certain elements of the Serb military. And we have made it a
point in talking with that government very recently of saying
that before we can have a full normalization of Serbia's
relationship with NATO--Serbia is seeking membership in the
Partnership for Peace. Serbia would like one day even to apply
for NATO membership. But this issue of General Mladic has to be
resolved and he has to be sent to The Hague.
Mr. Karadzic is more elusive. We are not quite sure always
where he is. NATO forces are trying to track him down. There is
a very large effort being made to do so. Obviously, we have
been unsuccessful for a number of years. We want to be
successful, and we will not rest until these two people are
brought to justice.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Ambassador. Chairman Lugar, in his opening
statement, talked about Russia and he said although NATO's
mission no longer centers on Russia, the debate over NATO
enlargement must include a discussion of Russia. I am curious
as to the relationship at present between NATO and Russia and
their views toward this expansion of these seven new countries.
Ambassador Burns. Thank you, Senator.
Russia's attitude in general has been far different for
this round of enlargement than in the last round in the late
1990s. President Putin went to Brussels in October 2001 and
essentially said that NATO enlargement was NATO's business. We
have not seen any kind of demonstrable attempt by the Russian
Federation to stand in the way of these seven countries
becoming members. I cannot say the Russians are pleased about
it. They are clearly not pleased about it. They are
particularly sensitive, of course, to the three Baltic
countries whom we strongly support for membership. But Russia
has not mounted any type of campaign to stop it, and I think
Russia understands that it is the right of the NATO allies to
make this decision under Article 10 of the North Atlantic
Treaty.
I should also say, Senator, that we have worked very, very
hard in the last two administrations, beginning with President
Clinton and now with President Bush, to make sure that we have
a good NATO-Russia relationship. We have a new NATO-Russia
Council which we inaugurated under President Bush's leadership
last May. It is working well. I sit in it. Every month we have
a meeting of the 20 Ambassadors, the 19 NATO Ambassadors and
the Russian Ambassador. We have been working on theater missile
defense to see if there are synergies between us that would
lead us to cooperate in theater missile defense in Europe. We
have worked on WMD proliferation, on the counter-terrorist
threat. We have worked in trying to help protect our civilian
populations from chemical and biological attacks. So these are
real projects. We think the NATO-Russia Council is off to a
good start and we think in general the NATO-Russia relationship
is very healthy right now.
Senator Chafee. You mentioned their hesitancy about the
three Baltic countries. Why is that?
Ambassador Burns. Among the seven countries that are
seeking membership in the alliance, the three Baltic countries
were illegally occupied by the Soviet Union between May 1940
and September 1991. So some Russians tend to be either wrongly
nostalgic for that period or they are sensitive because these
three countries are contiguous to western Russia.
It is our very firm belief that these are three of the
strongest candidates for membership, that they are superbly
well qualified, and obviously, given their democratic
dispositions, the democratic base of all three countries, they
represent no threat whatsoever to the Russian Federation, and I
think the lack of a Russian campaign here to try to derail NATO
enlargement, either before the Prague summit or during this
period of ratification, is testimony to the fact that the
Russians do understand that these countries can be friends and
partners of Russia in the future.
Senator Chafee. Thank you. So you 20 Ambassadors meet
monthly. Is that right? Is that what you said? Monthly?
Ambassador Burns. Yes, sir, we do. Under the new NATO-
Russia Council, we meet monthly, and actually we have meetings
every day at various levels at NATO among Russian and NATO
diplomats on all the issues that I mentioned.
Senator Chafee. I would like to switch course a little bit.
In your opening statement, you said just as we will have to
rebuild Iraq, we will have to bring NATO back to the consensus
and unity that marked the Prague summit just 4 months ago,
obviously alluding to the fractures that exist in the last few
months. How bad are those fractures?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, I think that the deliberations
that we had over the defense of Turkey were very damaging to
the alliance. As Secretary General Robertson said in his
inimitable fashion, NATO took a hit, but it was above the water
line not below the water line. But we took a hit and there is
still smoke coming from that hit.
Because the essence of NATO, of course, is Article 4 and
Article 5. When our allies are in trouble, we come to their
assistance. We do not debate it for 2 months. We do not say,
well, we will do it next time. We do not say we will do it
later. We come to their assistance, and that is what the United
States felt, that we had a question of principle here. We were
very strongly opposed to the view of France and Germany and
Belgium. We thought that the fact that they held out and they
blocked the discussions, we thought that was dangerous and
obstructionist.
I think now we have got to repair that frayed fabric that
has held NATO together for 54 years. This is one of the reasons
why Secretary Powell will be going to Brussels tomorrow night
and Thursday to begin a discussion to try to bind up these
fissures and to try to make sure that we are all going off
united to tackle the very important problems that a number of
the Senators and that you have mentioned as well. We think that
can be done.
But France, in particular, has got to decide how it can
show us that it wants to be part of the future of the alliance,
that it wants to work with us, that it wants to be part of the
solution, a country that can say yes at NATO, not just a
country that can say no. I think that is an obligation that
France has now. We have had these discussions with the French
Government and we think we will be stronger if the French
Government would play a full role in NATO, if we can operate at
19. But we are prepared to operate at 18, should that be
necessary.
Senator Chafee. Thank you. I see my time has run out. Thank
you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
I want to recognize now Senator Allen. Perhaps as you now
know, Ambassador, Senator Allen, as the chairman of our
Subcommittee on European Affairs, has already been working
through the hearings on European matters. So I appreciate that
and wanted to sound that note in recognizing him this morning.
Senator Allen. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. We did have a
very good hearing on the 27th of March. It is good to see
Ambassadors Jurgenson, Usackas, Ducaru, and Kracun with us, as
well as the DCMs Kmec, Eichmanis, and Yalnazov here.
Voice. And the Ambassador is here. I am here.
Senator Allen. And the Ambassador is here this time as
well.
The seven aspirant countries and their Ambassadors and DCMs
are very much like associate members of this committee as we
discuss the issues of NATO expansion.
I look on our second panel, Bruce Jackson here--and I
mentioned this in the last hearing that when I was Governor of
Virginia, I worked with Bruce and after my term, in advocacy of
the expansion of NATO to Poland, the Czech Republic, and
Hungary. As Senator Biden was ranking member at that hearing,
we have all looked at that as very positive for our country.
And the seven aspirant countries have met all their criteria.
In fact, reading through Bruce Jackson's remarks, they are
pretty much my extended remarks from the previous hearing. So
we are still in agreement.
The State Department and the Defense people who testified
all recognize the value politically and militarily of NATO with
the expansion of these seven aspirant countries and how they
are already, de facto members and how they are helping
politically in the war on terrorism, some sending actual troops
and capabilities into Afghanistan or into the Balkan area.
This country, and I think in particular with you, Mr.
Ambassador, listening to you with your steadiness, with your
knowledge, and your articulate diplomacy, is very, very well
served. Your patience with some of these difficult issues on
this bridge, this Atlantic Brucke, our German friends might
call it, cannot be frayed. We are doing what we think is right
to serve and protect the security of our country, and it is
important to note that the vast majority of European countries
and NATO countries are on our side helping us out.
Now, what I would like for you to share with us--and I
think it was in response to Senator Hagel is expound on the
scenario of the likelihood of NATO's involvement in the
rebuilding of Iraq. What will be the issues in making the
decision, and what role would they take? When we talk about
just the problems we ran into in the decision to eventually
defend Turkey, regardless I think this is going to be a much
more difficult situation. What would you foresee as the issues,
the decisionmaking process?
And once the military action is concluded, it is not going
to be a situation where the consensus building can drag on for
weeks and months. Action is going to need to be taken quickly.
So if you could share with us a scenario whereby and the issues
that will arise in making a decision by NATO to actually
participate in the reconstruction or rebuilding of Iraq.
Ambassador Burns. Senator, thank you very much. Let me just
say first, as I answer that question, that six of the seven
invited countries are a part of our coalition in Iraq, and all
seven were signatories of a letter of the Vilnius-10. You
remember that letter from February supporting the position of
the United States during the United Nations debate. So we very
much value what they have done.
A number of the countries that are at issue today for
membership in the alliance have also taken decisions in their
Parliaments that when the conflict ends, they will be present.
And we would think that that would be an opportunity for them,
if NATO does go in, for them to be present with NATO. So we
very much would like these countries to be with us, and I think
the results are good so far.
Of the 18 NATO allies of the United States, 12 are members
of the coalition, and that is no coincidence because we train
together. We are interoperable, but we have a common political
vision. We have suggested that once the conflict ends, NATO
should be present in Iraq because there will be a long-term
commitment that all of us in the international community will
have to make to that country.
Think of the requirements. We will certainly need
peacekeeping. We will need, as I said before, to think about
reconstruction of the country and delivery of humanitarian
supplies to the people of the country. There will be a need to
find and secure and dispose of the weapons of mass destruction.
No one is suggesting from our government that NATO can take
on this responsibility in totality. Obviously, the United
States and our coalition partners are going to have a major
responsibility for what happens in Iraq after the conflict has
ended. President Bush has spoken--he did in the Azores summit--
about the need for U.N. Security Council resolutions. Most of
our NATO allies are telling us that they would need to see and
to have some kind of umbrella U.N. Security Council resolution
that would, in essence, allow them to make the decision to be
part of any effort.
But, Senator, I must tell you it has been interesting.
Since Paul Wolfowitz put these ideas on the table at NATO in
December 2002, some of our allies have been reluctant to even
bring it to discussion, and that is because the French and the
Germans and the Belgians and some others were linking what was
happening in the U.N. Security Council in January, February and
March to what was happening at NATO, and they did not even want
us to begin a discussion because they thought that would hurt
what they were trying to accomplish, we felt wrongly, in the
U.N. Security Council.
So now that that debate is past and that the coalition is
taking action, and that we soon have to face our
responsibilities to help the Iraqi people recover from a Saddam
regime and from the war, we would like NATO to get to that
debate as soon as possible.
As to whether or not we can be successful, I frankly do not
know. I think it will be up to some of those countries that
have resisted the conversation until now to decide if they want
to use NATO in part as one of the international participants in
the reconstruction of Iraq. We hope that they will be willing
to do that because we think the alliance is always stronger
when we work together. But that is a question really for them,
and we look forward to discussing this with them I think quite
intensively in the weeks ahead.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Allen.
I recognize now Senator Voinovich who, as you have already
acknowledged, has been present at the Prague summit, and who
was a very active participant even prior to his coming onto
this committee. We are grateful that he is with us now, and I
recognize him for his questions.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
welcome you, Mr. Ambassador. I recall what a wonderful meeting
we had in May of last year when I visited Brussels after
visiting Slovakia and Slovenia and being at the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly meeting in Bulgaria.
I also appreciate your giving me an opportunity when the
chairman spoke to the NATO Ambassadors that you brought here to
Washington last June, if you recall, I kind of was like a Dutch
uncle and suggested to them that they needed to step up to the
table and fulfill their commitments to NATO, that we were doing
our fair share, but some of them were not fulfilling their
obligations to NATO.
I think at the Prague summit, there was a consensus that
the DCI did not work; and they came back with some
recommendations called the Prague Capabilities Commitment. At
that meeting, the heads of state said NATO must be able to
field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed
upon decision by the North Atlantic Council, to sustain
operations over distance and time, including an environment
where they might be faced with nuclear, biological, and
chemical threats, and to achieve their objectives.
In discussing NATO's future contributions, how does the
NATO Response Force factor into that? Really, what I would like
you to comment on is, has NATO defined the responsibilities of
the member countries and the aspirants and identified what the
commitments will be? Has that been worked out yet, or are we
kind of doing it on an ad hoc basis? I know the aspirants are
participating. They have helped out with Afghanistan and they
hopefully will be helping with Iraq. But the real issue is, are
we doing this by just responding to situations and developing
capabilities as we move along? Or has anybody sat down and
looked at the big picture and said, here is what respective
countries can participate in? Do the aspirant countries have
any idea at all about what niche they would play in this new
NATO capability?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, thank you very much. I remember
very well your visit to NATO, and we appreciated the fact that
you took the time to come to Brussels and spend time with us
and give us your advice. We hope you come again.
On Prague Capabilities Commitments, that was the
centerpiece in many ways of the Prague summit on the military
side because we recognize that NATO as a whole does not now
have the right mix of military capabilities to take on these
expeditionary missions to places like Afghanistan in the
future.
So what we have done is, we have built four consortia.
There is an airlift consortium headed by Germany, which is
seeking to purchase or release airlift for the future. There is
a sealift consortium headed by Norway and Denmark. There is a
precision-guided munitions consortium headed by the Dutch, and
they have already made a lot of progress in replenishing NATO
countries' stocks of precision-guided munitions. You have seen
how important they are to the United States and to the United
Kingdom in Iraq. And there is a consortium on air-to-air
refueling headed by Spain.
We have focused on these four core military capabilities as
the key capabilities that are currently missing from NATO's
collective arsenal and that are critical for the new missions
that we anticipate will be the core of what NATO does, out-of-
area missions, far from European garrisons in Europe itself in
places like Central and South Asia, in the Middle East. We do
not want to have an alliance develop where only the United
States, the United Kingdom, and France and a couple of other
countries have these full-scale capabilities. As I said before,
we hope that when our Defense Ministers meet on the 12th and
13th of June in Brussels, that we will see some progress there.
We are involving the seven invited nations into our
deliberations. They have been fully briefed on what we decided
at Prague. I meet with the seven Ambassadors in Brussels every
2 weeks.
Senator Voinovich. So generally, you have discussed what
their capabilities are and how they might ultimately fit into
the overall picture. One of the things that I was worried about
is that some of the countries were making decisions in terms of
their own military forces and spending money and wondered
whether or not those decisions would be in accord with what
they might be asked to do in terms of their NATO
responsibilities.
Ambassador Burns. Senator, we have tried to integrate them
fully into this effort. So to give you an example, we have
obviously counseled some of the smaller nations, the three
Baltic nations, for instance, that if they can find a
specialization, a niche military capability, that can be part
of these multinational efforts, that will be the best addition
they can make to NATO. And they have done that. As you know,
they have formed the Baltic battalion that has been present
both in the Balkans as well as Afghanistan, and we very much
appreciate their willingness to think strategically in this
fashion.
The Romanians have an unusual capability. They were able to
use their own airlift to send a mechanized battalion to
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan last July. Romania
did what few current allies could do.
So we think the invited nations are on the right track.
They are integrating into the military side of the alliance so
that if the Senate gives its advice and consent, they will hit
the ground running in May 2004 when they become members.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.
Senator Biden, do you have additional questions?
Senator Biden. I do not.
The Chairman. Senator Hagel?
Senator Hagel. No.
Senator Biden. Actually, I have one, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Very well.
Senator Biden. Has France considered, in order to have
greater influence, as they say, joining up fully with NATO,
totally integrating in order to be able to impact on some of
the decisions? If they had, you would not have been able to
deftly move discussion of support for Turkey, as you did. I
mean, is there any talk about that?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, there has been very little talk
about France reintegrating in NATO's integrated military
structure. It would be our hope that France would make that
decision. It was de Gaulle's decision in March 1966 to bring
them out, and there has been in that sense kind of an
ambivalence, if you will, about France's role in NATO ever
since.
Our view is that NATO is always stronger at 19 and
hopefully at 26 in the future. We would like France to come
back and to make that decision, but it is clearly a decision
that the French Government has to make. We cannot make it for
them. But following these events in February, we very much hope
that the French will support some of the issues that your
colleagues have been asking about, NATO Response Force, a new
command structure, new military capabilities, and new missions
in Afghanistan and Iraq. We hope France will be part of the
solution on all those issues.
Senator Voinovich. Mr. Chairman, could I just ask one
question?
The Chairman. Yes, of course, Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. When I talked to the Ambassador last
May, one of the issues I talked about was organized crime. I
know that the OSCE is working in that area, that SECI is
involved in that area, that the EU is involved. Is NATO
involved at all in this consortium of groups that are coming
together to deal with this problem that is very, very prevalent
in that part of the world and really demands that there be some
organized effort to respond to it?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, NATO has been involved in the
Balkans very much in trying to help the local authorities
combat organized crime because of our long-term presence in
Macedonia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. So we have been active there. It
is not the kind of issue where NATO would naturally take the
lead because we are essentially a military alliance, but when
we have a long-term presence, obviously we have got to be
involved in all sorts of issues to try to be helpful.
What we have done with the seven invited nations is to
review this issue very carefully with each of them, as well as
the issue of corruption. I met with the seven Foreign Ministers
last Wednesday in Brussels when they were there for the signing
of the Accession Protocols. I raised this issue of corruption
and organized crime with each of the Foreign Ministers of the
seven invited countries. All of them acknowledged that there
are problems in their countries. That is no surprise to us. We
have some of the same problems sometimes even in our own
countries among the NATO members. And all of them assured us
that they are dedicated to working on this and to working with
us to try to reduce it as far as that is possible.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.
Ambassador Burns, we thank you again for your testimony. I
would just extend the appreciation of all of our members for
your articulate ability really to define what is occurring in
each country, both those who are members of NATO, as well as
the aspirants, and the particular contributions and ways that
you personally in behalf of our government have been working
with those countries, both old and new. It is a very impressive
set of facts and your testimony has been remarkable, as always.
We appreciate your coming.
Ambassador Burns. Senator, thank you for inviting me today.
Thank you for all the questions. I am obviously available to
you and to all the members, should that be necessary, by phone
or fax or visit.
If I could just conclude on one point. I have very much
appreciated, when I was Ambassador to Greece, but now
Ambassador to NATO, the visits by Members of the Congress. It
helps us to do our job and it helps us to receive the guidance
and support that you have. I have seen each of you in those
places, and I look forward to future visits as well.
The Chairman. We thank you for that invitation.
It is now the pleasure of the chair to call forward Mr.
Bruce Jackson, president of the Project on Transitional
Democracies in Washington, DC, and Dr. Ronald D. Asmus, senior
transatlantic fellow, the German Marshall Fund, Washington, DC.
Gentlemen, I will ask you to testify in the order that I
introduced you. As was the case with the previous witness, your
full statements will be made a part of the record, and you may
proceed in ways that you wish. Mr. Jackson.
STATEMENT OF BRUCE PITCAIRN JACKSON, PRESIDENT, PROJECT ON
TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACIES, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For someone who has
been a student of the leadership of this committee for 8 years,
it is a great privilege to have an opportunity to testify
before you today.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Jackson. In the interest of time, I will just summarize
the main elements and get to some of the points Senator Biden
correctly raised in his questions to Ambassador Burns.
With regard to the candidates themselves, I would just like
to state we are confronting a political decision, and the body
of what I have written out makes two arguments. One, that these
democracies have matured at different rates, but basically they
have reached a point where we have all concluded they do, in
fact, share our values and the basic principles of the
Washington alliance.
As you look through them, they have defined their
democracies in different ways.
Lithuania has been exceptional in its treatment of its past
and Holocaust rissues.
Latvia has been extraordinary in the way it has reached out
to Russian minorities and basically defined a whole new
enlightened look at how we handle minority issues in Europe.
Estonia's commitment to market reforms has really led the
way toward the European Union and created a model for how we
work with Russia, the new relationship with Russia, which in a
way answers Senator Chafee's questions, that were it not for
the Baltics, we would not have the new relationship with Russia
today.
In Slovakia, its triumph over the forces of Meciar and
extremism has been profound, and what they have done in the
last 5 years is extraordinary. And they are now the first
center-right reformist government in Europe to be returned by
an overwhelming mandate, which is a confirmation of the
maturity of this democracy.
Slovenia was the first country to tell us that they could
actually resist tyranny themselves alone in 1990 and 1991.
Frankly, they have done the most to educate their populace
about the responsibilities of NATO, and the new results from
their referendum is really quite extraordinary. This is the
first of the Yugoslav states that have basically triumphed over
their predicament.
In the south, Romania has showed us that reform of the
military, very large militaries, while working with 23 million
people, is possible.
Bulgaria's diplomacy continues to distinguish itself by its
assistance to us and in the Security Council.
So all of these countries have basically chosen their own
way after 1989 but have, indeed, defined themselves as
democracies. Obviously, there is more work to be done and
clearly Senator Voinovich is right that corruption is the most
profound issue that we should continue to work on. We should
continue to talk to our allies--frankly all of them--about this
danger. Corruption is the one thing that can kill a new
democracy.
With regard to their contributions, I think we should also
take a wide view. I do not know how we calculate the military
or strategic value of the solidarity of President Freiberga, or
the non-governmental organizations of Slovakia in working to
overthrow Milosevic. Frankly, Romania and Bulgaria have today
forces in being twice what the European Union will have in 10
years. They already exist, already available, already committed
to the alliance. So both in terms of their principles, in terms
of their contributions, I think the committee members are right
to say that these countries are very well qualified to enter
the alliance.
Turning to the question of NATO's future that Senator Biden
talked about, the road in front of us, I would just like to
quickly review where these countries came from because I had
the opportunity to write a briefing that became known as the
Big Bang several years ago. The argument in that briefing was
the inclusion of these seven countries confers certain
strategic advantages to NATO and other moral benefits for the
community of nations. There are five elements to this claim.
One, that the invitation to the Baltic countries would
bring a comprehensive peace to the Baltic and Nordic region and
set the stage for a new relationship between Europe and Russia.
This seems to have occurred.
The inclusion of Slovakia would create a coherent center
and close the door to transnational crime, making Europe safe
for historic neutrals, and basically set up a situation where
Ukraine could reconsider its relationship with Europe.
The inclusion of Slovenia would create a model for post-
Yugoslav success and accelerate the democratization of the
Balkans.
The invitations to Romania and Bulgaria would bring a
southern dimension to NATO, which would limit transnational
threats to the western Balkans, bring Turkey and Greece closer
to Europe, and begin to set the stage for a security structure
in the Black Sea.
Collectively, these invitations would signal the strategic
integration of Southeast Europe within Euro-Atlantic
institutions which could resonate as far away as Cyprus and the
Caucasus.
So these initial hopes have been realized to a far greater
extent than the founders of the Vilnius Group could have
realized in the year 2000. And Dr. Brzezinski has begun to talk
about this as the third and final phase of European history.
This transformation that began in 1989 has essentially
completed two phases, and we are now beginning a final stage of
transformation.
My argument here would be that in this final stage lies the
answer to Senator Biden's question, that basically NATO has
this key role, and has since 1989, in extending the peace. And
we have an opportunity in this round of expansion to continue
the extension of peace that Steve Hadley and others have talked
about over the last year.
It seems to me we have excellent chances over the next 5 or
6 years to bring in countries in the western Balkans, Albania,
Croatia, and Macedonia, to build an enduring peace as we have
done in the north in the Baltic region and to use NATO as
central in rebuilding our relationship with Turkey, developing
a Black Sea system, reaching out to Ukraine. And it is all
along these frontiers of freedom--these are the new missions
for NATO which have implications for our security. So the
mission of NATO should be nothing less than to set the stage
for the completion of Europe in this next decade, and these
seven countries in the alliance will improve our chances of
success.
Taking the two questions that are topical and of the day,
which may come up at the same time the Senate considers this
treaty, we look at structural changes to the treaty itself.
This is a case where I think one could argue that a good
political case might make bad treaty law.
The first suggestion is on the majority voting system is an
effort to constrain France by restricting decisionmaking. It
seems to me that this would have the opposite effect. Majority
decisionmaking would give rise to factions within NATO which
would attempt to achieve slim majorities to the detriment of
our leadership. The rise of factionalism would inevitably lead
to the passage of half-baked schemes with the United States in
the dissenting minority. And over time, the erosion of U.S.
leadership in NATO would precipitate a decline in American
political support for our security commitments in Europe. At
present, the United States is the only country that can produce
unanimous outcomes at the level of the NAC or, failing that,
the DPC. It seems to me that the process of achieving this
unanimity uniquely favors the United States. The countries
whose ratification you are considering are aghast that NATO
might consider weakening U.S. leadership in NATO, which is the
very aspect of NATO they most admire and have drawn them toward
us, just as their democracies have reached the threshold of
membership.
The second suggestion is that we need an exclusion clause
to protect the institutions from members who deviate from the
principles of the alliance or fall short on human rights. One,
we have not needed that standard for the last 54 years.
But in my view, this expulsion clause would invariably be
employed against the vulnerable and never against the
deplorable. It is easy to envision a 1930's NATO expelling
Czechoslovakia for their mistreatment of the Germans
immediately before an invasion or concluding that the abduction
of Christian children, in quotes, by the Jews of Warsaw
relieved the alliance of the obligation to defend Poland. And
today, if Turkey were threatened by military attack, I am
certain there would be a motion to conclude that deteriorating
human rights conditions obviated any obligation to honor
Article 5 commitments. I have deliberatedly overstated all
this, but the automaticity of Article 5 is the soul and genius
of the Washington Treaty. A provision to expel would introduce
a corrosive mental reservation in the commitment to defend an
embattled democracy and would completely debilitate the
alliance we have built so carefully.
It seems to me that this committee and the Senate have a
far better option. The Senate can significantly strengthen the
constituency, character, and resolve of the alliance by
ratifying the accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia as NATO members.
This affirmative action would improve the security of the
United States, and I think more importantly strengthen the
moral and political fabric of the alliance.
That, Mr. Chairman, concludes my summary.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jackson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bruce Pitcairn Jackson, President, Project on
Transitional Democracies, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you on the case for NATO enlargement and
the qualifications of the seven countries which have been invited to
join the Alliance. I would also like to offer a strategic context for
the decision the Senate is being asked to ratify and to suggest how
this enlargement will further shape and strengthen NATO.
i.
The decision at the NATO Summit at Prague to invite seven countries
to join NATO was a major step in the post-war strategy of the United
States to build a Europe that is whole and free. Assuming we count the
reunification of Germany as a de facto enlargement, the so-called
``Vilnius States'' whose ratification is before the Senate will
constitute the sixth round of enlargement since the formation of the
Alliance in 1949. A brief review of NATO's history suggests that there
are several misconceptions about the current round.
Many people believe that this will be the largest round of
enlargement in history since the Senate may consent to the ratification
of seven states. But NATO has always been as much of an alliance
between peoples as an alliance between governments so population may be
a better guide. Next to Spain which entered in 1982 and East Germany
during reunification, the combined population of the Vilnius States of
43 million constitutes one of the smallest enlargements to date. Greece
and Turkey in 1952, West Germany in 1955, and Poland, the Czech
Republic and Hungary in 1999 were all significantly larger in terms of
population and physical size.
Many people believe that the seven Vilnius democracies are weaker
militarily than their predecessors. This is also a misperception. In
1955, when West Germany was invited to join the Alliance, it had no
army and no budget for defense. Today, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia,
Slovakia and Slovenia have well-trained self-defense forces, regional
security arrangements such as BALTBAT, and have achieved or are
approaching defense budgets of 2% of GDP. The two larger countries,
Romania and Bulgaria, can tell an even more impressive story. After
downsizing and modernization, the end-strength of Romanian forces will
be approximately 75,000 and Bulgarian forces approximately 45,000.
Together, Romanian and Bulgarian forces in being are twice the size of
what the European Union defense force might be in ten years. More
importantly, Romanian and Bulgarian forces are deployable today to most
of the contingencies the EU fictional force could not deploy to
tomorrow.
Some critics have suggested that the quality of democracy in the
Vilnius states is somehow more fragile and potentially reversible than
the democracy in existing NATO states. While it is true that democracy
in the Vilnius states flowered after the Revolution of 1989 making them
some of Europe's newest democracies, their youth in an historical
context does not indicate a weakness of civic society. In fact, the
opposite is true. Few countries in recent European history have
struggled longer for their freedom or worked harder to build democratic
institutions than the countries under consideration by the Senate.
Although these evaluations are highly subjective, it would seem to me
that the democratic credentials of the seven Vilnius states are
superior to Greece, Turkey and West Germany at the time of their
invitations and comparable favorably to where Polish, Czech and
Hungarian democracies were at the time of the Senate's ratification in
1998. In some ways, the energy and enthusiasm of Europe's new
democracies make them more robust than the older democracies of Western
Europe and more resistant to extremism and political backsliding. This
Committee should also be aware that there has been no instance where
democracy has been overturned or reversed in Central and Eastern Europe
since the Fall of the Berlin Wall.
Finally, some critics have argued that this round of enlargement is
exceptional because of the absence of a Soviet threat and the
appearance that the decision of the nineteen NATO Heads of State at
Prague was motivated by political reasons, rather than presumably more
legitimate calculations of military advantage. Here again, NATO's
history conflicts with this view. There has been no Soviet threat
during the last three rounds of NATO enlargement in 1982, 1991 and
1999. When the Senate ratified the accession of Spain in 1982 in a
unanimous voice vote, there was no threat to Spain posed by Soviet tank
armies. It is quite clear from commentary at the time that Franco and
the last vestiges of Spanish fascism had finally died and that it was
time for Spain to rejoin the community of shared values. Every decision
to expand the alliance of democracies has been a political act in the
finest sense of the term ``political.'' Both German enlargement and
German reunification were part of the great project of rebuilding a
democratic Germany. Greece and Turkey were not invited because they
were strong, but precisely because, if they remained isolated, they
would remain weak and vulnerable. For the past fifty-four years, the
central decisions on membership have been guided by the belief that
there is a natural tendency of democracies to ally with one another in
a collective effort to defend themselves and the values they share.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Bradtke, in his
testimony before you last week cited Article 10 of the Washington
Treaty, which speaks to the political question at the heart of the
Senate decision on ratification. Article 10 permits the NATO allies to
invite ``any other European State in a position to further the
principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North
Atlantic area.'' I would like to turn to the qualifications of the
seven invited countries in light of these two criteria: democratic
principles and the willingness to contribute to security.
ii.
President Bush in his historic speech at Warsaw University said
that he believed the community of European states which share our
values and are prepared to share our responsibilities stretches from
the Baltic to the Black Sea. Let me begin with the Baltic States and
focus on how each state has defined its democracy and where they stand
on individual contributions.
Lithuania: Apart from the role Lithuanian freedom fighters played
between 1989 and 1990 in regaining their independence, the signal
achievement of Lithuanian democracy has been its handling of issues
surrounding the Holocaust. For a nation that was itself brutally
victimized by Nazi Germany and held captive by Stalin and his Soviet
successors, the complicity of Lithuanian citizens in the destruction of
the Jewish community in Vilnius and their nation's subsequent
indifference to Jewish survivors came as an unwelcome shock to this
generation of Lithuanians. Nevertheless, consecutive Lithuanian
Governments made Lithuania's painful past their priority. As a result,
Holocaust education is taught at all levels of Lithuania's educational
system. Torah scrolls have been returned to the Jewish Community. The
restoration of the Jewish Quarter in Vilnius is beginning and
legislation is being prepared to enable the restitution of communal
property. While more work needs to be done, Lithuania's commitment to
come to terms with its past should give us great confidence in its
future. Lithuanians have taken the time to build a foundation of
religious tolerance and historical understanding for their democracy.
These values are the core principles of the Alliance.
With regard to Lithuania's willingness to contribute to security,
there can be no serious question. Lithuania is already contributing to
NATO operations in Kosovo and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan
and is sending military medical personnel and logistics experts to
Iraq. From the beginnings of the Vilnius Group in May 2000, it has been
obvious why the new democracies chose Vilnius. Lithuania has been
stalwart on security issues from the days of Popular Front and an
advocate for solidarity with the United States throughout the Vilnius
process. Lithuania and the six other countries I will discuss agreed in
the Statement of the Vilnius Group Countries on February 5, 2003:
Our countries understand the dangers posed by tyranny and the
special responsibility of democracies to defend our shared
values. The trans-Atlantic community, of which we are apart,
must stand together to face the threat posed by the nexus of
terrorism and dictators with weapons of mass destruction. . . .
The clear and present danger posed by the Saddam Hussein's
regime requires a united response from the community of
democracies.
Latvia: Latvia has also distinguished itself in terms of the
democratic transformation of its civic society. Possibly the greatest
accomplishment of Latvian democracy has been the integration of
Latvia's Russian-speaking minority. Despite 50 years of Soviet
deportations and occupation, Riga has reached out to ethnic Russians
who have come to regard themselves as Latvian by offering citizenship
to tens of thousands, reducing fees and language barriers to
naturalization, and removing bureaucratic barriers to political
participation at all levels of elected office. There are many countries
in Western Europe which fall short of the enlightened approach to the
integration of minorities that Latvia has chosen. Secondly, the new
government of Prime Minister Repse has launched a serious campaign to
counter corruption. The Latvians have recognized that corruption is the
single greatest threat to the growth and development of their democracy
and taken steps to eradicate corruption at the governmental level. All
the countries of the Vilnius Group have reached this same conclusion,
and I will try to point out their different approaches.
Latvia is also a stand-out in its contributions to KFOR, ISAF and
has authorized combat forces for deployment to support coalition
operations in Iraq. Few Presidents in the history of the alliance have
made a greater contribution to its political and moral leadership in as
short a time as President Vaira Vike-Freiberga. Many believe (I think
correctly) that the Latvian President has emerged as the moral and
political successor to President Vaclav Havel. Consistent moral counsel
and militant political solidarity may be the most enduring contribution
a democracy can offer to the security of the Alliance.
Estonia: Estonia has focused its effort on sustained democratic and
market reforms which have brought it to the forefront of EU accession
in addition to the NATO invitation it secured in Prague. The Estonian
model has not only resulted in significant economic success but also
informs us of how market-oriented democracies can build cooperative and
equitable relations with Russia. Estonia's role in leading the Baltic
democracies into the European Union also serves to link NATO countries
more closely with the Nordic states and will certainly influence
Finland's decision in 2005 regarding a closer relationship with NATO.
Estonia's contributions to security compare favorably with its
Baltic neighbors. Like Lithuania and Latvia, Estonia is supporting NATO
operations in Kosovo and Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and is
preparing to deploy in support of peacekeeping operations in Iraq. The
willingness of Estonians to contribute to the collective defense of the
alliance is best illustrated by the oft-quoted remark of Prime Minister
Sum Kallas to President Bush shortly before the war with Iraq:
You don't have to tell us about Saddam Hussein. We have seen
what happens when democracies are indecisive. That's when small
countries like ours lose their freedom.
Slovakia: Because of its struggle for political stability since the
Velvet Divorce, Slovakia's democratic credentials are, in many ways,
the most impressive of all the Vilnius states. In the past five years,
Slovaks have fought and won a hard fight with corruption, political
extremism and primitive nationalism. The first anti-Meciar coalition
elected in 1998 consisted of five disparate parties and ran the gamut
of politics from left to right. Few thought it would survive for four
years let alone succeed in major defense reforms and choose as its
final act the enactment of funding for a Holocaust reparation program.
As a result of the seriousness of purpose of this coalition of
democratic parties, Meciar and other extremists were rejected
conclusively in September 2002 and a second, stronger center-right
coalition was reelected. The return of Prime Minister Mikulas
Dzurinda's coalition is the first re-election of a center-right reform
government in Central or Eastern Europe since the fall of the Wall. In
itself, this is a huge achievement in a post-Communist electorate and a
clear indication of the rapidly growing political maturity of Slovakia.
In addition to the sweeping reform of the Ministry of Defense I
mentioned, the Slovak army has joint programs with the Indiana National
Guard and has deployed peacekeepers to Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and
Cyprus. Slovakia has also just deployed a company-size Nuclear,
Chemical, and Biological unit capable of detection and demining to
Kuwait to support coalition operations in Iraq. As impressive as these
contributions are, this Committee should not overlook the political
contributions of Slovakia to Euro-Atlantic security. In addition to a
significant leadership role within the Vilnius and Visegrad Groups,
Slovak diplomacy and non-governmental organizations (NGO's) were at the
forefront of the popular movement to overthrow the Milosevic regime in
Belgrade. Continuing the tradition of Charter 77, Bratislava is the
center of activities for NGO's and human rights activists working for
democratic change in the Balkans and in Europe's eastern neighbors.
Siovenia: In the last decade, Slovene democracy has faced slightly
different challenges than the other invitees because of the difficult
circumstances of Slovenia's independence. Whereas the Baltic States,
Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria are all in some sense the children of
1989, Slovenia is more the oldest orphan of the death of Yugoslavia. In
a remarkably short period of time, Slovenia has built a self-confident,
coherent nation and an economic miracle in the ashes of Milosevic's
first war of aggression. The greatest challenge faced by the Slovenes
was to rebuild the trust of the people in governmental and Euro-
Atlantic institutions, which had failed the Slovene people all too
frequently in the past. The achievement in the recent referendum of 90%
public support for EU membership and 66% public support for NATO
membership is a watershed in the construction of Slovene democracy.
Sadly, the greatest contribution of Slovenia to Euro-Atlantic
security is often forgotten. In 1990-1991, Slovene freedom fighters,
such as Janez Jansa, met invading Serbian forces in the mountains of
Slovenia and defeated them. The Slovene accomplishment can be compared
with the heroic struggle of the Finns in the Winter War, albeit on a
much smaller scale. Like the Finns, the fledgling Slovene state fought
alone for its survival, without Western aid against a superior enemy,
and years before the intervention of Allied forces. Quite without our
help, Slovenia handed Milosevic his first defeat on the battlefield. In
addition to its historical record, Slovenia has contributed
humanitarian assistance and training to Afghanistan, military forces to
NATO operations in Bosnia, and troops and equipment to SFOR and KFOR.
Romania: Romania is both the largest and most consequential
strategically of the Vilnius Group. It is also widely regarded as the
most dramatically improved democracy and economy in Central and Eastern
Europe. The difficulties inherent in constructing democratic
institutions after the civic devastation caused by the Ceaucescu regime
were compounded throughout the 1990's by the recessionary effect of war
in the Western Balkans and the sheer size of Romania's population.
(More than half of the people whose countries may join NATO carry
Romanian passports.) Against this forbidding backdrop, Romania has
rebuilt a free and contentious press, multiple political parties, and a
flowering artistic and literary community. While reforms often move too
slowly in the Parliament and anti-corruption offices are still getting
traction, the reform of the Ministry of Defense and Romanian security
services has become the case study of success in bringing national
security under civilian control and democratic oversight. On the
economic front, former Prime Minister Isarescu, who now chairs the
Romanian Central Bank, has instituted monetary reforms which have
created the conditions for GDP growth rates of nearly 5% for the last
three years. Moreover, this growth has been achieved organically,
without significant foreign direct investment and in a recessionary
European economy.
On defense contributions, Romania has been a stalwart even among
contributors. Less than 48 hours after the September 11th attacks,
Romania and Bulgaria granted blanket overflight rights, basing and port
facilities, and full intelligence cooperation with U.S. forces. These
contributions were approved by a unanimous vote of the Romanian
Parliament despite the fact that the United States had not requested
this assistance either formally or informally. Nevertheless, Romania
and Bulgaria recognized that they had a responsibility to make assets
and access available to U.S. and coalition forces. Romania has
contributed military forces to every major NATO and coalition action in
the last five years: Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq to name but a
few. Finally, Romania is the only country in Europe to deploy a
battalion-strength combat force to Afghanistan using its own military
airlift. Romania is already making concrete security contributions
which exceed the military capabilities of some existing NATO members.
Bulgaria: Bulgaria has faced many of the same structural problems
which Romania confronted and a few of its own. As one of the oldest
nations in Europe, Bulgaria has a long tradition of religious and
political tolerance and, in the post-Communist period, has succeeded in
building robust political parties and a system of free and fair
elections. Bulgaria's long history, however, is a mixed blessing.
Bulgaria's natural conservatism and extended isolation from Western
Europe have slowed the pace of market and judicial reforms and
contributed to a sluggish economic environment, which, in turn, has
contributed to an increasing alienation of the electorate.
Therefore, I disagree with the testimony given to this Committee on
March 27th by Administration officials who suggested that the
management of the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense is the greatest concern
in Bulgarian democracy. I do not think this analysis is correct.
Despite the recent scandal of illegal arms sales, Minister of Defense
Svinarov has held those responsible to account and continues to press
for reform in the military services. The real threat to Bulgarian
democracy lies in a profoundly corrupt judiciary system and the
tolerance of corruption in the business community among the leaders of
Parliament and Government. The greatest danger to Bulgaria's future is
the penetration of the judiciary by transnational crime and the failure
of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to investigate governmental
corruption, organized crime or the manipulation of Bulgaria's media and
political processes by foreign parties. Over the next 5-10 years,
Bulgaria must devote a major effort to strengthening its judiciary and
criminalizing corrupt business and political practices.
Although the pace of non-defense reforms has lagged other Vilnius
Group democracies, Bulgaria's contributions to security, both
militarily and politically, have been exemplary. Like Romania, Bulgaria
has contributed troops and bases to all major NATO and coalition
deployments. From the beginning, Bulgaria has steadfastly supported the
United States in the war on terror and in coalition action against
Iraq. It is also evident that U.S. diplomacy got as far as it did in
the UN Security Council only as a result of the firm support and
solidarity of Bulgaria in what must certainly have seemed to Bulgarians
to be a thankless job. I think Americans should be immensely grateful
for the loyalty of Bulgaria in this difficult and dangerous time.
I have tried to outline the specific challenges facing these seven
democracies as well as their strengths and general willingness to
contribute. I do not think we should expect every post-1989 democracy
to develop at the same rate or to choose the identical path to self-
definition. On balance, however, I believe that each of these countries
is fully qualified in terms of democratic values and security
contributions for membership in NATO. I would now like to turn to how
these new members might shape a ``New NATO'' and contribute to its
changing mission.
iii.
Shortly after the Washington NATO Summit in 1999, I wrote a
briefing which came to be known as the ``Big Bang.'' This briefing
proposed the inclusion of these seven countries in NATO and claimed for
this enlargment strategic advantages for NATO and moral benefits for
the democratic community of nations. On May 19, 2000 in Vilnius,
Lithuania, these propositions were adopted by nine of Europe's new
democracies as their own and became the objectives of the Vilnius
Group. It might be useful to review these original claims in the light
of NATO's new missions and continuing institutional adaptation.
There were five central elements to the argument for the ``Big
Bang.''
1. The invitation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania would
bring a comprehensive peace to the entire Baltic Sea and Nordic
region and set the stage for a new relationship between Europe
and Russia.
2. The inclusion of Slovakia would create a coherent center
in the alliance and close the door to transnational crime. This
would make Europe safe for historic neutrals and allow
countries like Ukraine the opportunity to redefine their
relations with Europe.
3. The inclusion of Slovenia would create a model for post-
Yugoslav success and accelerate the larger democratization of
the Balkans.
4. Invitations to Romania and Bulgaria would bring a
``Southern Dimension'' to NATO. This ``Southern Dimension''
would limit transnational threats to the Western Balkans, serve
to bring Turkey and Greece closer to Europe, and begin to
create a security structure for the Black Sea.
5. Collectively, invitations to Bulgaria, Romania and
Slovenia would signal the strategic integration of Southeast
Europe in Euro-Atlantic institutions and could bring states as
far away as Cyprus and the Caucasus into a peaceful European
system.
Surprisingly, these initial hopes for the Vilnius Group have been
realized to a far greater extent than its founders had any right to
expect. Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski observed shortly after the Prague
Summit that the invitation to the seven countries of the Vilnius Group
marked the beginning of the third and final phase of contemporary
European history. The transformation of Europe which began with the
Revolution of 1989 has effectively completed two major phases. The
first phase, the Visegrad, was marked by the integration of democratic
nation-states with long European histories into modern Euro-Atlantic
institutions. The second phase, the Vilnius Group, saw European nation-
states mature as democracies and integrate into the institutions of the
West.
In the third phase, which began at the Prague Summit and whose
conclusion will presumably mark the end of the period of Europe's post-
war geopolitical transformation, states which are not adequately
democratic, isolated from mainstream European history and, in some
cases, still in the process of defining themselves as nations will
attempt to become integrated European democracies. These states will
define the borders of modern Europe. In my view, the mission of a new
NATO is inextricably linked with these frontiers of freedom.
Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley defined NATO's
strategy in a speech in Brussels on October 3, 2002. He said:
The strategy has three pillars: We will defend the peace by
opposing and preventing violence by terrorist and outlaw
regimes; we will preserve the peace by fostering an era of good
relations among the world's great powers; and we will extend
the peace by seeking to extend the benefits of freedom and
prosperity across the globe. As you can see from these three
pillars this is a strategy that does not render NATO obsolete
but rather envisions a central place for NATO.
The integration of the seven Vilnius states in NATO will create a
stronger, more inclusive alliance which can turn its attention to the
final stage of this defining period in European history. This third
phase will undoubtedly be the most complex of this historical period
and in some ways may be the most critical to long-term Euro-Atlantic
security. Where we find ourselves politically five years in the future
will be where we stand geopolitically for the following fifty years.
Stephen Hadley is right to remind us that NATO is ``the critical
vehicle'' for this task.
Therefore, we should not define the New NATO solely in terms of its
capabilities, lest it become a tool kit without a purpose. Nor should
we define NATO exclusively as an expeditionary force, which would only
serve to create a Foreign Legion for out-of-area peacekeeping and
garrison duties. The mission of the New NATO is to extend the peace.
Over the next five years, we have excellent chances to bring the
remaining three Vilnius countries, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia, into
Euro-Atlantic institutions, thereby building an enduring security
structure in the Balkans. In the few short months since the Prague
Summit, these three countries and the United States have developed an
Adriatic Charter which will serve to accelerate democratic reform and
provide a roadmap to EU and NATO membership. NATO will be central in
rebuilding our relationship with Turkey and, perhaps, developing a
Black Sea security system linking the South Caucasus to their neighbors
around the Black Sea. Ukraine is also seeking a new relationship with
Europe and with NATO. All along the frontiers of freedom, there are
missions for NATO which have major implications for Euro-Atlantic
security. The mission of NATO should be nothing less than to set the
stage for the completion of Europe before the end of this decade. An
alliance with the seven nations of the Vilnius Group will improve our
chances of success in this great endeavor.
iv.
In conclusion, I would like to appeal to this Committee to consider
the proposed amendment to the Washington Treaty on the merits of these
seven democracies. Last week in the Senate Armed Services Committee,
frustration with French diplomacy introduced two questions of
structural change in the Washington Treaty apart from the question of
ratification. These changes would be a great mistake and serve as a
cautionary example of how a good political case can make bad law.
The first suggestion is that NATO might adopt a majority voting
system in an effort to limit France's ability to obstruct prompt
decision-making. Unhappily, this change would have the opposite effect.
Majority decision-making would give rise to factions within NATO which
would attempt to achieve slim majorities to the detriment of U.S.
interests and leadership. The rise of factionalism would lead
inevitably to the passage of half-baked schemes with the United States
in the dissenting minority. Over time, the erosion of U.S. leadership
in NATO would precipitate the decline of American political support for
our security commitments in Europe. At present, the United States is
the only country that can consistently produce unanimous outcomes at
the level of the North Atlantic Council or, failing in that, at the
Defense Planning Committee. The process of achieving unanimity is
uniquely and, perhaps intentionally, to the advantage of the United
States. The countries whose ratification is before this Committee are
aghast that the Senate might consider weakening U.S. leadership in
NATO, which is the aspect of NATO they most admire, just as their
democracies reach the threshold of membership. I share their concern.
The second suggestion is even more pernicious. Some have suggested
that NATO needs an expulsion clause to protect the institution from
members who deviate from the principles of the alliance or otherwise
fail to maintain accepted standards of human rights. Notwithstanding
the fact that this clause has not been necessary for fifty-four years
and that NATO membership has been the most effective mechanism for
democratic reform we have found since 1989, advocates maintain we need
to protect NATO from hypothetical bad actors.
In my view, an expulsion clause would invariably be employed
against the vulnerable and never against the deplorable. It is easy to
envision a 1930's NATO expelling Czechoslovakia for their
``mistreatment'' of ethnic Germans immediately before Hitler's invasion
or concluding that the ``abduction of Christian children'' by the Jews
of Warsaw relieved the Atlantic Alliance of the obligation to defend
Poland. And, today, if Turkey were threatened with military attack, I
am certain there would be a motion to conclude that deteriorating human
rights conditions obviated any obligation to honor NATO's Article 5
commitment. Although I have overstated for the purpose of effect, my
point is that no country could fully rely on Article 5, if the members
of the Alliance harbored the option to expel. The automaticity of
Article 5 is the soul and the genius of the Washington Treaty. A
provision to expel would introduce a corrosive mental reservation in
the commitment to defend an embattled democracy and would completely
debilitate the most powerful military alliance ever created.
This Committee and the Senate of the United States have a far
better option. The Senate can significantly strengthen the
constituency, character and resolve of the Alliance by ratifying the
accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia
and Slovenia as NATO members. This affirmative action would improve the
security of the United States and strengthen the moral and political
fabric of the alliance. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Jackson.
Now, Dr. Asmus.
STATEMENT OF DR. RONALD D. ASMUS, SENIOR TRANSATLANTIC FELLOW,
GERMAN MARSHALL FUND, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Asmus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, Senator
Voinovich. I, too, am going to briefly summarize my statement
so we can maximize the time we have for discussion,
particularly with Senators who I have had the honor to work
with so closely in the past.
But first, I would just like to note that it's not only a
pleasure to be here, but it is also a historical moment. The
vision of Europe whole and free stretching from the Baltic to
the Black Sea is now truly within our reach for the first time.
And I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the
leaders and peoples of those seven countries that received
invitations at Prague and whose Ambassadors and DCMs are
sitting behind me. As we all know, this is a very special
moment for them and a vindication of their hard work and
perseverance over many years.
It is also a special moment for those Americans who helped
make this day reality as well. In particular, I would like to
thank you, Mr. Chairman, and you, Senator Biden, for the
leadership that you and this committee have shown over the last
decade. Were it not for the leadership of this committee, I do
not think we would be here today celebrating this particular
round of NATO enlargement.
At the same time, we all know that we are meeting a time
when NATO is in trouble. While we celebrate the extension of
the boundaries of freedom and security eastward, we are also
facing one of the biggest crises in the alliance's history. An
alliance committed to dealing with the problems of terrorism
and weapons of mass destruction finds itself unable to do so in
the real world when confronted with Saddam Hussein. NATO is
probably more divided and marginalized at a moment in time when
we, the United States, need that unity, solidarity, and support
more than ever.
Indeed, in recent days as I was preparing to testify before
the committee today, people have also asked me; why are we
enlarging NATO when it seems to be in a process of decline? My
answer is that we still need to do so but that we also have to
address the question of where this alliance is headed. But let
me first start with the three reasons why I think enlargement
is still very important in spite of those larger problems we
face.
First, let us not lose sight of what we set out to
accomplish by opening NATO's door, namely to lock in a new
peace order in Europe following the end of the cold war and, to
make sure that the prospect of armed conflict in the eastern
half of the continent became as remote as it has become in the
western half. To a large degree, we have succeeded in doing
that, and that is an historic accomplishment.
Second, as Americans, we wanted to enlarge NATO to help
ensure that a future President would never again have to face
the prospect of fighting a major war in Europe. And at a time
when we are at war in Iraq, and may face a major crisis in
Korea, I often ask myself: imagine what the world would be like
if we also faced an unstable Europe. And I think it is a true
vindication of this policy over the last decade that we can
turn and pivot, as Nick Burns said, to face these new problems,
knowing and being confident that Europe is at peace, stable and
secure. Because if we had to face three major crises at the
same time, we truly, truly would be in trouble as the United
States.
But third, let us also remember that it was our hope that
as Europe became more secure, our European allies would raise
their geopolitical horizon and would become allies not only in
securing the peace in Europe, but also in facing a new set of
challenges from beyond Europe that we knew or sensed were
headed our way. In other words, we hoped not only to lock in a
new peace in Europe, but to gain new allies who would join us
in addressing the new threats of the post-cold war era.
I think September 11 has validated each of these points.
There is not a day that goes by where we should not be grateful
that the U.S. President, for perhaps the first time in nearly a
century, does not have to worry about a major conflict breaking
out on the continent that could draw in the United States. And
as has been said here today, we note that among those allies
supporting us in Iraq today are those new allies of the last
round and this round of NATO enlargement. That is why NATO
enlargement still makes sense.
But this brings me to what I think is the key question we
need to focus on. What do we do, apart from enlargement, to
address the very real crisis we face today across the Atlantic?
How do we revitalize NATO once the war in Iraq is over and the
dust is settled?
The core question we face today is a simple one and,
Senators, both of you alluded to it in your opening statements.
What is NATO's mission in a world where communism is gone and
Europe is increasingly safe and secure? Should its job be
limited to maintaining peace on the continent, a continent that
is increasingly secure, or do we want to retool it to address
the new threats, the Afghanistans and Iraqs of the future?
On paper, we have all--all of us, not just the United
States, but our European allies--answered that question by
saying we want to transform NATO to face the new threats of the
21st century. We have done so because we know that if NATO is
not relevant to these central strategic questions of our day,
it will not play a central role in our thinking.
The problem is that we have agreed to do it on paper, but
we have not figured out how to do it effectively in practice.
Indeed, NATO has thus far failed to find common ground on how
to deal with these threats and that divide--which we see most
clearly in Iraq today--now truly threatens the alliance. The
alliance worked during the cold war because there was a shared
sense of risk and responsibility. That was the glue that kept
us together. During the nineties the glue that kept us together
was the consensus that NATO had to stop the bloodshed in the
Balkans and anchor Central and Eastern Europe to the West.
Today we do not have, or have not yet found, that same
sense of shared risk and shared responsibility. Somewhere
between Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. and many of our European
allies lost each other. Moreover, the sad truth is that today
there is no systematic strategic dialog taking place across the
Atlantic to heal the rift that has emerged.
One day someone is going to write a great book about how
this all happened. But the question we need to focus on today
is not apportioning blame, but looking forward. And once
enlargement is ratified, I believe the administration, as well
as this committee, must focus quickly on how to pick up the
pieces and rebuild the alliance. And we must do so with the
same degree of intensity and commitment that the enlargement
issue has received over the last decade. If 10 years from now,
historians look back on today's hearings and conclude that we
enlarged NATO only to have it fade into irrelevance, then we
all will have truly failed.
Let me conclude by saying I think it is critical for the
U.S. Senate to ratify this round of enlargement quickly and
enthusiastically. It will help complete the work of the 20th
century in securing a Europe whole and free. It will send a
signal that we are still committed to our alliances in Europe
at a time when people question that commitment.
At the same time, we need to start thinking now about how
to repair the alliance once the war in Iraq is over, and to
pursue that goal with the same degree of dedication and
perseverance as we have pursued NATO enlargement.
In these moments of trouble across the Atlantic, I often
ask myself: what would Harry Truman and that generation of
leaders be doing today or want us to do today? As you may know,
Harry Truman once remarked that the accomplishment he was most
proud of was creating NATO. I think Harry Truman would be
aghast if he could come down from the heavens and see the
damage that has been done to the transatlantic relationship in
recent months. And it would be the ultimate indictment of our
leaders on both sides of the Atlantic if, in the need to deal
with Saddam Hussein, we were to undo Harry Truman's greatest
legacy.
Sustaining this legacy is the challenge we need to face
today in this hearing and as we look forward. I think it is
doable. NATO enlargement was difficult, too. Rebuilding the
alliance after Iraq is something that is going to require the
same degree of creativity, of hard work that went into making
NATO enlargement possible over the last decade.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Asmus follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Ronald D. Asmus, Senior Transatlantic Fellow,
German Marshall Fund, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden and Members of the Committee:
It is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the future
of NATO and the accession of seven new Central and East European
members to the North Atlantic Treaty. This is a historical moment. The
vision of a Europe whole and free stretching from the Baltic to the
Black Sea set out a decade ago is now within our reach.
I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the leaders
and peoples of each of the seven countries invited to join the Alliance
at the Prague summit last November. This is a very special moment for
them and a vindication of their hard work and perseverance over many
years. While they have been part of the West in spirit for a long time,
they will now join the West's premier military alliance to help us
defend the territory and interests of the Euro-Atlantic community. As a
result, Europe will be more peaceful, democratic and secure.
It is also a special moment for those Americans who have worked
with these countries to help make this day become reality. I would like
to congratulate the Administration as well as this Committee for its
leadership and support of NATO enlargement. Many members of this
Committee know how much work and heavy lifting was also required here
in the United States to make this day possible. Were it not for the
leadership, perseverance and skill demonstrated by Washington,
including by the leadership of this Committee, I doubt we would be here
today.
We are also meeting at a time when the Alliance is in trouble.
While we celebrate the extension of the boundaries of freedom and
security eastward, we know that the trans-Atlantic relationship faces
one of the deepest crises in its history. The United States is fighting
a war in Iraq and many of our key NATO allies are not with us. An
Alliance that has committed itself to dealing with the problems of
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction as a core mission, finds
itself unable to find common ground on how to confront that challenge
in the real world in the form of Saddam Hussein. As a result, NATO is
divided and marginalized at a time when Western unity, solidarity and
support are very much needed.
One only has to read the newspapers to see the growing doubts on
both sides of the Atlantic about NATO's future viability. Indeed, in
recent weeks I have often been asked why we are even bothering to
enlarge the Alliance further when many people consider it to be in a
process of decline. My answer has been that it is still in America's
interest to successfully complete this round of enlargement in spite of
current trans-Atlantic differences. Let me explain why.
First, we must not lose sight of what we set out to accomplish by
opening NATO's door to Central and Eastern Europe. From the beginning,
the purpose of NATO enlargement was to help lock in a new peace order
in Europe following communism's collapse and the end of the Cold War.
We wanted to promote a process of pan-European integration and
reconciliation that would make the prospect of armed conflict as
inconceivable in the eastern half of the continent as it had become in
the western half.
To a remarkable degree, we have succeeded in doing so. For much of
the 20th century, Europe was the greatest potential source of conflict
anywhere in the world. It was there where the great wars of the 20th
century had started, and where we feared the Cold War could become a
hot one. Today, the continent is more peaceful, democratic and secure
than at any time in recent history. And strategic cooperation across
the Atlantic between the U.S. and Europe through NATO is a big part of
the reason why.
When I was in the State Department, I often told my staff that our
goal was to integrate all the countries from the Baltic to the Black
Sea within a decade of communism's collapse.
If the West failed to achieve this, I told them at the time, future
historians were likely to condemn us as having failed to seize this
moment of history--and rightly so. But today we can be proud of having
achieved that goal on the timeline we set for ourselves--and we did so
without the confrontation with Russia or any of the other dire
scenarios so many critics predicted.
Second, America made NATO enlargement a top priority for moral and
strategic reasons. The moral imperative was to help those new
democracies who had liberated themselves from communism and turned to
us to help them anchor their countries once and for all to the West.
But the strategic imperative was equally important. Simply put, that
imperative was to ensure that America never again had to fight another
major war in Europe. We wanted to use the window that had opened after
the end of the Cold War to lock in a durable peace in Europe. As
Americans, we wanted to be able to face future security challenges
elsewhere in the world knowing that security in Europe was assured.
Third, we also hoped and believed that as Europeans felt
increasingly secure within their own borders, and no longer had to
worry about conflict with Russia or ethnic strife in their own back
yard, they would start to broaden their strategic horizons and focus
with us on a new set of challenges from beyond the continent. In other
words, we hoped that in addition to locking in a new peace in Europe,
we could gain new allies who would join us in addressing the new
threats of the post-Cold War era. And it is certainly no secret that it
was also our hope that new allies from Central and Eastern Europe,
having fought hard to regain their freedom and independence, would also
bring fresh blood, ideas and enthusiasm to NATO and help us transform
it for a new era.
I believe that events since September 11th have validated each of
these points. Just imagine what the world would be like today if the
United States--in addition to the war in Iraq and a budding crisis in
North Korea--also faced an unstable Europe? There is not a day that
goes by where we should not be grateful that today the President of our
country--for the first time in nearly a century--does not have to worry
about a major conflict breaking out on the European continent that
could draw in the U.S. And I know it has not gone unnoticed in this
Committee that among those European allies supporting us on Iraq today
are many Central and Eastern European countries.
That is why, from an American perspective, this round of NATO
enlargement remains strategically crucial. If the last enlargement
round firmly anchored Central and Eastern Europe's core--Poland, the
Czech lands and Hungary--then this round will achieve something just as
historic: the resolving of the Baltic question in the north,
consolidating democracy in the heart of Europe by bringing in Slovakia
as well as Slovenia; and the anchoring of two key countries like
Bulgaria and Romania in southeastern Europe at a time when that corner
of Europe is playing an increasingly important role in the war against
terrorism. There are objectives that are clearly in American interest.
Of course there is another side to enlarging NATO--the increased
risk and responsibilities that we, too, are assuming. The United States
is making the most sacred of all commitments--a pledge to go to the
defense of these countries in a future crisis. Moreover, there are some
potential risks in bringing a large group of countries like this into
the Alliance. This enlargement round consists of a larger group of
countries, some of which are smaller and/or perhaps weaker than those
countries invited to join in 1997.
Let me be absolutely clear. I believe that each of the seven
countries has earned its invitation through the combination of its
domestic performance and its strategic cooperation. If one could
quantify how much reform ground these countries have covered from where
they started a decade ago, many of them have covered as much ground as
their predecessors if not more. They have already acted as allies with
us in conflicts ranging from Bosnia and Kosovo to the war against
terrorism. But we also know that none of these countries are perfect
and that they, like their predecessors, still have a long way to go
before they mature into full-fledged NATO allies.
I therefore support the Administration's decision to pursue what
has become known as a ``Big Bang'' round of enlargement. I know there
is some nervousness in the Senate about what one might call the
``rotten apple'' scenario--i.e., the danger that a country turns out to
have real problems down the road that we do not anticipate today. While
we have worked hard to ensure that is not the case, we cannot exclude
that possibility with total certainty. Indeed, we all know that the
several of the countries included in the last round have had a harder
time integrating into NATO than many imagined. But this is not, in my
view, an argument to not enlarge but rather a reason to take a close
look at how we can update our policies to help them stay on track once
they are in.
I mention this since some voices, in the Senate as well as in the
academic community, have suggested amending the Treaty to allow the
Alliance to sanction or even suspend a member should their performance
be inadequate. This issue was debated in 1998 and I suspect it may be
raised again. Let me just say that while I understand the intent of
such efforts, I oppose such a step because I do not think it will work
given how NATO works in practice, an issue we might be able to come
back to during questions.
This brings me to the final issue I would like to address today:
what do we do, apart from enlargement, to address the very real crisis
across the Atlantic? We cannot ignore the reality that we have just
witnessed a trans-Atlantic train wreck over the issue of Iraq. How do
we revitalize NATO once the war in Iraq is over and the dust has
settled?
Let me start with a small historical footnote. When this Committee,
as well as the Senate as a whole, debated and ratified the past round
of enlargement, many of the most lively arguments and discussions
centered not only on the specific qualifications the invitees. Instead
they revolved around the question of where the Alliance was heading and
what it was becoming. That question is even more pressing today. I
therefore think it is appropriate that our debate on the merits of
enlargement again include the question of how to ensure that a larger
NATO is a stronger alliance.
The core question facing NATO today is simple: what should be this
Alliance's main mission in a world where Europe is increasingly secure
and many if not all of the major threats we are likely to face in the
future will come from new sources beyond the continent? Should NATO's
job be limited to maintaining the peace on an increasingly secure
content--a worthwhile objective but hardly America's only or most
important concern? Or should the Alliance retool itself to address new
threats to its members security irrespective of where they emanate
from? To be blunt, do we and our allies want NATO to have a significant
role in the future Afghanistan and ``Iraqs'' that we will inevitably
face?
This question of NATO's missions was debated at length during the
ratification of the last round of NATO enlargement. At that time, an
overwhelming majority of Senators voted in favor of an amendment by
Senator Jon Kyl that clearly stated that the Alliance had to face these
new threats if it was to remain central in American strategic thinking.
Since then the Alliance has, with increasing clarity, embraced that
goal of being willing and able to meet the new threats of the 21st
century. And it has done so because people realize that if NATO is not
relevant to the central strategic questions of the day, it will cease
to play a central role in our thinking or policy.
The terrorist attacks of September 11th were a watershed in this
regard. They started to convince many previously skeptical European
governments that such a strategic shift was necessary. In Reykjavik
last summer, NATO Foreign Ministers crossed a Rubicon by finally ending
the debate over the so-called ``out of area'' issue. And at the Prague
summit, heads-of-state embraced a set of capability initiatives that,
if successfully implemented, would help NATO turn the corner in terms
of having some modest capabilities to play a larger role in such
conflicts.
But that is all on paper. The divide across the Atlantic on Iraq
now threatens to destroy that limited progress. NATO thus far has
failed to find common ground on addressing these new threats. The
Alliance worked during the Cold War because there was a shared sense of
risk and responsibility across the Atlantic. That was the glue that
kept the Alliance together. During the 1990s the common ground that
brought us together was a consensus that NATO's new job was to stop
bloodshed in the Balkans, anchor Central and Eastern Europe to the West
and try to build a new partnership with Russia--all part of its new
mission of stabilizing Europe as a whole.
Today we lack that common sense of risk and shared responsibility.
Somewhere between Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. and much of Europe
lost each another. The United States, NATO's lead power, feels more
threatened than many of our allies in Europe. That sense of urgency
about confronting potential new threats is not shared by many of our
European allies, at least not yet. Some leaders understand this
imperative--which is why Prime Minister Blair, Aznar and some other
European leaders support us on Iraq in spite of considerable domestic
political risk.
But it is clearly not shared across the continent as a whole, and
especially not in France and Germany. Moreover, the sad truth is that
today there is no systematic strategic dialogue taking place across the
Atlantic that would enable us to reconnect and heal this rift. A
growing number of Europeans, including some of America's closest
friends for decades, believe the United States has or is in the process
of giving up on the Alliance and Europe. Here in the U.S., many people
are baffled over European hostility to the war in Iraq and the depth of
resentment directed against the Bush Administration.
I know some have suggested that a quick fix to get us out of the
current crisis might be for NATO to revisit how it operates and to
consider moving to a new system of decision-making to replace the
current consensus system. Such suggestions have been fueled in large
part by resentment over France's position on Iraq and its refusal,
along with Belgium and for a time Germany, to support steps like
prudent defense planning for Turkey. I very much hope that wisdom
prevails on this issue. We need to be very careful not to do anything
foolish that would damage NATO even more in the longer-term. There may
well be ways in which we can streamline NATO decision making that we
should explore. But the Alliance's commitment to consensus has, on
balance, been a source of great strength over the years and it should
not be abandoned. The answer to NATO's problems is to fix the current
divide across the Atlantic, not to try to find some way to get around
it.
One of these days someone is undoubtedly going to write a great
book about how and why the Alliance has gotten itself into its current
quandary. But the real question we need to focus on is not apportioning
blame, but rather on finding a way out of the current crisis. Once
enlargement is ratified, I believe the Administration as well as this
Committee must focus quickly on this issue of how to pick up the pieces
and rebuild the Alliance. And it must do so with the same degree of
intensity and commitment that the enlargement issue has received over
the last decade. If ten years from now historians look back at this
round of Senate ratification and conclude that we enlarged NATO only to
have it fade into irrelevance, then we all will have truly failed.
In conclusion, I would like to underscore that it is critical for
the U.S. Senate to ratify this round of enlargement expeditiously and
enthusiastically. It is a critical step in completing the work of the
20th century by securing a Europe whole, free and at peace. It will
send a powerful signal that America is still committed to and cares
about its friends and alliances in Europe at a time when many question
that commitment.
At the same time, I would urge the members of this Committee to
start thinking now about how to repair the Alliance once the war in
Iraq is over--and to pursue that goal with that same degree of
dedication and perseverance as you pursued NATO enlargement. U.S.-
European strategic cooperation is one of the major reasons why the
second half of the 20th century was so much better than the first half.
And no one can doubt that the prospects for making the world--and the
Greater Middle East in particular--a better place in the 21st century
will be much enhanced if the U.S. and Europe once again find common
strategic ground.
Can we still do it? My answer is yes. Will it be easy? No. But a
common strategy across the Atlantic during the Cold War didn't
materialize instantly like magic. It was created by far-sighted leaders
who understood the strategic need to find common ground and who ordered
their best and brightest to harmonize different views and needs. Unless
we learn from the mistakes of recent months, come up with the right
leadership and back it up with the kind of ties that successfully
created common ground in the past, we may be destined to stumble from
one crisis and train wreck to the next.
Former U.S. President Harry Truman once remarked that the
accomplishment he was most proud of was the creation of the Atlantic
Alliance and the transformation of former foes into allies. Truman
would be aghast if he could see the damage done in recent weeks and
months to the trans-Atlantic relationship today. It would be the
ultimate indictment of our leaders on both sides of the Atlantic if the
need to deal with Saddam was to undo Harry Truman's greatest legacy.
______
[From the Wall Street Journal, March 31, 2003]
commentary
We Need to Repair the Rift
(By Ronald Asmus)
As the Bush administration conducts war against Saddam Hussein, one
casualty of this conflict was evident even before the shooting started:
the relationship with France and Germany. In the early months of 2003
we witnessed what future historians might well dub the Great Trans-
Atlantic Train Wreck as Washington, London and Madrid clashed with what
is known in Europe as the Franco-German Axis over how to deal with
Saddam. That clash was, in turn, part of a broader battle within Europe
over who speaks for the continent and what kind of relationship with
America it desires.
Can the relationship be put back together again once Saddam and his
regime are gone? One can envision two very different scenarios.
The first would essentially be a continuation of the political
guerrilla warfare we have seen between Washington/London and Paris/
Berlin in recent mouths. It is likely to be a high stakes knock-down
drag-out fight over how Europe is led and relations with America and
the world are shaped. The other would include a serious attempt by both
sides of the Atlantic to turn the page, close a sorry chapter in U.S.-
European relations and to rebuild this relationship to face the
challenges that still lie ahead.
There are very real reasons why both sides should aim for the
second. Although some U.S. conservatives brush off the alienation of
allies such as France and Germany as a cost-free exercise, America
today bears a higher price in terms of blood and treasure due to the
inability to find common ground in facing down Saddam. To be sure, the
U.S. and British militaries, with help from others such as Australia
and Poland, will win the war on their own. But the much harder battle
may be to win the peace.
That is why the Bush administration should start thinking now about
the day after in relations with France and Russia. Such a strategy has
to start at the top. Magnanimity is a noble American tradition. Once
victory in Iraq is clear, President George W. Bush should make clear
his desire to rebuild this relationship. The president is scheduled to
travel to Europe and Russia in just over two months, including for a G-
8 summit in France. NATO foreign ministers meet in Spain in early June
and a U.S.-EU summit takes place in Washington shortly thereafter.
These meeting can set the stage for reconciliation.
In the case of Europe, those who opposed this war must now face the
fact that they, too, have a shared interest in seeing the U.S. succeed
in not only winning the war but in building a democratic and unified
Iraq. For the consequences of failure to do so on Europe's own doorstep
would surely be felt across the continent. Disarming, stabilizing and
rebuilding a peaceful and democratic Iraq will be an enormous effort.
While the U.S. will necessarily bear the initial burden, much of the
longer-term security presence and resources will have to come from
allies.
The U.S. and Europe may also have a chance to follow up on victory
in Iraq with a push for progress towards Middle East peace. Washington
knows it will never be seen as a champion of democratization and
modernization in the Arab world unless and until it again puts it
shoulder to the wheel resolving the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Mr.
Bush's embrace of the road map may be only the first step of what could
become a top priority of his administration's foreign policy. But if
France and Germany continue to fight Washington, they will have no
influence in shaping this outcome.
Repairing relations with core allies is essential if we are to halt
the marginalization of NATO and if the EU integration is to move
forward. One thing that has become crystal clear in recent months is
that French attempts to create splits across the Atlantic inevitably
divide Europe as well--with a result that leaves all of us as losers.
U.S.-European strategic cooperation is one of the major reasons why the
second half of the 20th century was so much better than the first half
for Western Europe. And no one can doubt that the prospects for making
the world--and the Greater Middle East in particular--a better place in
the 21st century will be much improved if the U.S. and Europe can once
again find common strategic ground.
A common strategy across the Atlantic during the Cold War didn't
materialize instantly. It was created by far-sighted leaders who
understood the strategic need to stay together and who ordered their
best and brightest strategists and diplomats to produce a strategy that
harmonized different views. Unless we learn from the mistakes of recent
months, we are destined to stumble from one crisis and train wreck to
the next.
Former U.S. President Harry Truman once remarked that the
accomplishment he was most proud of was the creation of the Atlantic
Alliance and the transformation of former foes into allies. Truman
would be aghast if he could see the damage done in recent weeks and
months to the transAtlantic relationship today. It would be the
ultimate indictment of leaders on both sides of the Atlantic if the
need to deal with Saddam undoes Harry Truman's greatest legacy.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Asmus.
Let me just comment, before I commence questioning, that I
appreciate especially the contribution that you have made, Dr.
Asmus, in bringing a number of us together in a colloquy that
has involved some Members of the Congress, but more importantly
members of the administration, both current and past.
Otherwise, persons such as Dr. Brzezinski, whom you have
mentioned, offer a historical perspective, and who try to think
through the past 2 years about the challenges of new members
and who then move into new missions, into a Russian
relationship with NATO, and now into the current troubles that
you have described so well.
I appreciate your participation, Mr. Jackson, as a faithful
attender around the table because the wisdom of both of you has
enhanced all of our understanding.
The ranking member and I will indulge in whatever time we
need, but we will set a time for my first round of 10 minutes
so that I will not overstep and likewise, I know he will not
subsequently.
Let me just ask these questions that sort of followup what
both of you have talked about in very sophisticated ways for
members of our body, the U.S. Senate, as we take up the treaty,
as we will--I have no doubt--out of this committee, given the
sentiment of our members for strong relations with European
countries and for this whole idea of Europe whole and free and
the very specific new entrants and this enthusiasm.
We will get to the floor of the Senate at some point, and
we will find other Members who have not been a part of this
colloquy and this enthusiasm who will ask how, really basically
in a common sense way, does NATO work if in fact polling data
indicates fairly large majorities in many countries that are
members of NATO who not only have a very strong view about not
participating in a war with Iraq, but even worse still, a
growing anti-sentiment with regard to the United States in
particular, which is more serious?
In other words, it is sort of hard to parse right now
between the question in which countries would say, ``after all
we are democracies and this specific war we do not like but you
have to understand that, but still our affection for the United
States of America, our desire for solidarity, common defense,
all the rest of it remains just as strong as ever.'' I do not
hear that coming, at least from popular sentiment and from
polling in many countries.
Now, second, this has led, I suppose, to two things that
have been commented on, and I oversimplified problems in both
France and Germany. In France, in fact, there is at least a
group of statespersons who want to set up really a deliberate
counterweight who would say essentially that the supposed
hegemony of the United States in the world is a dangerous
thing. Whether it is Iraq or whatever else it is, we want to
offer leadership to make sure that these folks in Washington
cannot go anywhere that they want to go. We want to make sure
there are sufficient roadblocks, if not to slow it down, to
stop it, and then to sort of jerk them back to reality and back
to some other discussion.
Or the other problem in Germany in which a chancellor, in a
difficult election campaign, finds the same polling data I just
cited, namely that a large percentage of the populace does not
like the way things seem to be heading with the United States
and Iraq. Despite all the protestations of support, the strong
solidarity with America for all these years, he comes out
overreaching, at least in my judgment, anything that needed to
be said, scores a narrow election victory and is stuck with it.
Having said that, Americans also note that German public
opinion has not really changed, whatever the problems of the
chancellor and the relationship may be.
So there you have two different situations, one
representing democracy and sentiment that we respect, and
another maybe a deliberate desire for a counterweight, all
coming along at the time we discuss this treaty and expansion
of the treaty.
So some of our members, not terribly misguided, will say
what is going on here? Why are we even bringing this up right
now? This is rather inappropriate. Why are the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee people having a hearing today in the middle
of this war, in the middle of all of this sentiment? In other
words, are you folks on a different wavelength altogether from
general common sense about our foreign policy? Do you have your
own niche agenda of enthusiasm for Europe and these countries?
Well, in part, we do. That is one reason why the hearing is
going on. We think this treaty is important. The entry of
countries is important, and notwithstanding all that I have
talked about.
But I simply want to get your general sentiment on how, in
the long run or maybe in the intermediate run, we move ahead.
Now, you have made some suggestions today. Perhaps Lord
Robertson's volunteering effort to take hold in Afghanistan in
a more substantial way--or perhaps through contributions--I
noticed the distinguished columnist, Tom Friedman, yesterday
has become enthusiastic about NATO playing a very large role in
Iraq in the post-war situation.
[The article by Mr. Friedman follows:]
[From the New York Times, March 30, 2003]
NATO's New Front
(By Thomas L. Friedman)
In this time of war, I find it helpful to step back a little. So I
went last week to NATO headquarters in Brussels, and, I must say, the
view from there was illuminating. What I think I saw were some huge
tectonic plates of history moving. Here's how I would describe it: 9/11
was the start of World War III, a la Pearl Harbor; the U.S. invasion of
Afghanistan was the initial response, a la the North Africa campaign;
the Invasion of Iraq was akin to D-Day (I hope it ends as well); and
now we are present at the creation of some kind of new global power
structure.
At this new historical pivot point, we're still dealing with a
bipolar world, only the divide this time is no longer East versus West,
but the World of Order versus the World of Disorder. But here's the
surprise: the key instrument through which the World of Order will try
to deal with threats from the World of Disorder will still be NATO.
Only in this new, expanded NATO, Russia will gradually replace France,
and the region where the new NATO will direct its peacekeeping energies
will shift from the East to the South. Yes, NATO will continue to be
based in Europe, but its primary theaters of operation will be the
Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and possibly the Arab-Israel frontier.
No, I haven't lost my marbles. Here's what's going on: Ever since
the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, individual countries--first Britain,
then Turkey, then the Netherlands and Germany--have taken
responsibility for providing the 5,700-man peacekeeping force in Kabul.
It is a very expensive job for one country and it is very inefficient
to be changing brigades every six months, but that was how the Bush
team wanted it. It did not want NATO getting in the way of its combat
troops or nation-building.
But in February, President Bush quietly told NATO's chief, Lord
Robertson, that beginning in August, when the current Dutch-German
force is supposed to leave Afghanistan, the U.S. would like to see NATO
permanently take over peacekeeping duties there and work alongside U.S.
combat troops. If this is approved by NATO, for the first time the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization will be operating outside Europe, in
the heart of the Muslim world.
France is fighting this idea, because it wants to see NATO, the
anchor of America's military presence in Europe, wither away. But many
key NATO members favor the idea, and what's really interesting is that
the Russians have said they would consider sending a platoon as well,
under the NATO-Russia partnership. Even the Chinese have winked their
approval. Both of these big powers feel threatened by the disorder
coming from parts of Central Asia and the Middle East. If France stands
in the way, NATO officials say they will just work around it.
What the U.S. is doing in Afghanistan is ``internationalizing'' the
nation-building process there, because we found we simply could not
pull it off alone. Eventually, we will have to do the same in Iraq.
That is what Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain came over to tell
President Bush this past week. The Bush team keeps arguing that this
silly alliance it cobbled together to fight the war in Iraq is
multilateral and therefore the moral equivalent of the U.N. Nonsense.
Other than Britain, we bought this alliance. Almost every government in
it is operating without the support of its people. Fighting this war
without international legitimacy is hard enough, but trying to do
nation-building without it could be even harder.
Yet, the Bush team is right about one thing. Nation-building in
Iraq can't be done by the U.N. It can't be done by a committee. So what
we will eventually need in Iraq is a credible peacekeeping force that
is multilateral, legitimate and still led by the U.S. That will bring
us back to NATO, possibly in partnership with some Arab and Muslim
armies. This is not your grandfather's NATO anymore. That NATO
patrolled the German-Soviet frontier. This one will be patrolling Kabul
and Baghdad.
And while NATO is changing, it may just go all the way. NATO's
chief, Lord Robertson, is retiring this year (a real loss). A favorite
to succeed him is the Norwegian defense minister, Kristin Krohn Devold,
a woman. So get ready for this CNN headline: ``The NATO alliance, for
the first time led by a woman and including a Russian platoon, took
over peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan today, as a prelude to
taking over peacekeeping in Iraq. France refused to participate.''
Yes, we may be present at the creation of a very new world, and no,
I have not lost my marbles.
The Chairman. So you might say, well, we have become
immersed in the affairs of this world. There is work to be
done. We want to make sure that we do not have failed states.
As a result, we sort of lean into this and this requires
obviously the United States being enthusiastic about the NATO
role and both of us working out some modus vivendi in all of
this, quite apart from the Government of Afghanistan and
President Karzai and the warlords and all the rest out there
and whoever we have to deal with in Iraq in the post-war
situation.
Still, NATO could become busy. Maybe we could have a NATO
commander generally in charge of sort of assigning roles so we
do not have a pickup game each 6 months wondering who might
show up and volunteer in Afghanistan.
This committee has been sort of ardent in our enthusiasm
for making certain we do everything possible to help the
Afghans have a successful state. I hope we will have the same
commitment with regard to Iraq. Both Senator Biden and I have
pointed out that this is probably going to be expensive and
probably time consuming, and we are admonished that we may not
have that much time, that for a number of reasons, what we are
advocating may not work out.
This is a whole collection of things, but it gets to the
heart of what I want to ask, which is essentially in this
question, where goes NATO? In fact, where does it go if in fact
the sentiment of European countries has turned south with
regard to the United States?
That is not a unique predicament, and without being
anecdotal, polling sentiment in South Korea, for example, at a
time of tremendous crisis in the judgment of most of the
members of this committee, is very ambivalent about what is to
be done there. A good number of South Koreans, we are advised,
under the age of 40 feel that we are the problem, the United
States, and that if trouble is going to come there, it will
come because we are agitated about the building of nuclear
weapons and their potential proliferation.
I ask finally, do we have here, for the time being, a split
because of a perception of the world on our part that having
been attacked in New York City with the World Trade Center and
in Washington with the Pentagon, that we are vulnerable? We are
vulnerable to people that are not nation-states, to sub-
national groups, undefined, unknown, without agendas that
strike and try to kill as many Americans and damage as much of
our cities as possible.
In a way, the Europeans really do not get it, do not
understand this. They are closer to the problem maybe in the
Middle East or Iraq and so forth, but strangely do not really
believe that somebody is likely to come through Westminster
Abbey the Eiffel Tower, or the Brandenburg Gate and
deliberately attempt to kill several hundred thousand people
using nuclear weapons if they could get some aboard. Now, this
may still be so far-fetched for our NATO allies that we are
still arguing about mission.
My thought, I suppose, is that we do not know where the
threat is coming from. How any European could feel secure today
is hard for me to believe knowing what has happened in this
city, what has happened in the Hart Building next door with an
anthrax attack. It routed all of us out of there for 96 days,
throat swabs, Cipro tablets for everybody. If you take them,
you do not die. People in the Post Office died. I just do not
conceive that many Europeans understand, despite lecturing to
us that they have been through wars, that they have been
through all sorts of things, exactly what this world is about.
So here the United States comes along and says, we are
worried about proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We
are worried if the North Koreans built a few more bombs and
sold them to somebody to save the economy of their state,
somebody might use them. They might use them in Europe quite
apart from the United States or wherever else they thought they
were going to get the greatest effect.
How do we bridge this gap really in understanding how the
world works? Because if we can, maybe then we have an alliance
that is relevant to what we in the United States believe is our
existential threat, as opposed to a superficial one in which
there may be wars here, there, and yon, and they are very
tragic, but they are very limited in terms of the hundreds of
thousands, millions, cities disappearing, other things that may
be a part of our world that hopefully NATO perceives.
Do either one of you want to begin to comment on that
basket of issues?
Dr. Asmus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Well, my answer--I would start by saying to those
colleagues of yours who ask you why the hell are you holding
this hearing and focusing on this issue, I would say, look, the
U.S.-European relationship remains the single most important
strategic relationship we have, and let us be honest. We may
pay a price in terms of blood and treasure today because of the
rift that we have across the Atlantic. Does anyone doubt that
we would not be in better shape if we had Turkey, France, and
Germany fully behind us in this war, that casualties might be
lower, that that united front may have led Saddam to calculate
differently? This is not a cost-free exercise unfortunately.
Second, I believe this crisis actually was not inevitable.
Many of us have read the Barbara Tuchman's famous book, the
``Guns of August,'' where she shows how World War I was a war
that no one wanted, but which became inevitable by a series of
miscalculations by leaders on all sides. And I have been saying
there is a Barbara Tuchman-like quality to this crisis.
Gerhard Schroeder did not want this crisis. George Bush did
not want this crisis, and I contend that Jacques Chirac did not
want this crisis either. But all of our leaders have made
mistakes that have left us in the bind we are in. I think it
could have been different had people behaved differently, but
that is history.
The question now becomes, Senator, I think that we need to
win the war, and then I think a window will open for us to
think very carefully about putting this relationship back
together. I believe that we can do it--and I listened very
closely, Senator Biden, when you reminded me of all those
``whither NATO'' meetings and conferences you have been to and
that I have sometimes attended with you. You can go through a
spat like this for 6 months. You cannot do it for 3 or 4 years.
Once the dust has settled in Iraq, a window opens to try to
turn the tables and to change the dynamic to reframe the issue.
I think the President has a huge opportunity here. As a
Democrat, I am not in the business of giving a Republican
President advice, but I would suggest that he needs to be
magnanimous in victory. We need to win the war, win it
decisively, and then he has to say to Jacques Chirac and
Gerhard Schroeder, you know, that was terrible. I do not want
to go through that again. It hurt us; it hurt you. Let us send
our guys and gals to sit down with your guys and gals and have
a very honest discussion about what we can do to put this back
together.
And the President--let us not forget--he is going to Europe
in 2 months. And if I was in charge of that trip, I might be
slightly anxious at the moment about the reception he is going
to receive in France as well as Russia. Now, that trip can
either become a prolongation of our current fight. Or it can be
turning a page to a new chapter in U.S.-European relations
where he can come and say: I, as the President of the United
States, want to fix this relationship. I want to do these
things together. I want to restore the credibility of the
alliance and this relationship and I am prepared to do a number
of things. And imagine if he did. People do not believe he is
capable of doing this, but I believe he is. If he were to do
it, it would be the way to turn the page here.
Then you come to the substance, Senator. What do we really
need to do together? Well, I think if we look at a map--and
Senators Lugar and Biden, you both said this, so I know you
agree--what is the big challenge we face? It is the Greater
Middle East. It is the toxic combination in a region that is
contiguous with Europe of terrorism, radical ideologies and
weapons of mass destruction. And I actually think the Europeans
too, are starting to recognize that they have a strategic
nightmare growing on their doorstep. They did not have
September 11. There is a gap in threat perceptions. But if you
go to Europe today, the debate is less about the problem. If
Joschka Fischer was here, even Schroeder if he was here, they
would agree with the problem. They would disagree with our
solution on Iraq. But those are differences we need to move
beyond.
And if you ask me, what do I want NATO to do? If you could
get the President and European leaders to turn the page what do
we want NATO to do? We do want it to take over ISAS in
Afghanistan. I think we all know that some of us wanted it to
do Afghanistan a year ago. I remember a dinner and I remember
an op-ed that the two of you co-authored urging NATO to do
exactly that. And we missed that opportunity. We also wanted
NATO to play a role in Iraq. That was not possible. We will
have a chance to revisit this once the war is over. If we could
get NATO to take responsibility in Afghanistan, to have a role
in Iraq that would be progress. I also believe NATO should be
prepared, if it made sense and if we ever get a Middle East
peace agreement between Israel and the Arabs, to be prepared to
do peacekeeping there.
We need a success story. As you know, in this country we
have the three strikes rule. And I often say, well, NATO is 0
and 2 because we have thus far missed two chances to go out of
area, go beyond Europe. We all said yes in principle to the
idea, but then Afghanistan came. I believe the Europeans were
ready to go to Afghanistan, as limited and as crappy as their
militaries may have been. But we fumbled the football because
the U.S. said we did not need them.
Then we came to Iraq. I give this administration credit. It
came back. Paul Wolfowitz went back to the NAC and said, here
are four creative ways we could use NATO in Iraq. I think the
Europeans blew it on that one.
We are not going to have that many more opportunities in
the future. We have to get one of these right and get things
right soon to turn around this dynamic that you are pointing
to. And if we do so, Senator, I believe you will see a lot of
those public opinion numbers start to change. But if we do not
exploit this window, which will open up this spring after the
war in Iraq, to change this dynamic, I think we really are in
trouble.
The Chairman. Yes, Dr. Jackson.
Mr. Jackson. Sir, with your permission. I have maybe a
little different analytical question here. One of the problems
in evaluating U.S. policy is we tend, since we experience
Europe through NATO, we tend to think every problem in Europe
is a problem in NATO because it is a symptom. That is how we
see the alliance.
One of the things we have not discussed is maybe it is
Europe that is in crisis, not NATO. There may be a profound
political problem that has been disguised through the Nice
process and other processes over the last 2 years. So we may
not really understand what is happening within Europe that is
manifesting itself in the politics of Schroeder or Chirac, and
it may be Europe is in crisis and not actually the institutions
with which we deal with Europe. That would be analytical
question one.
Second, we tend in a period when we are at war--actually in
two wars or two fronts of the same war--we tend to perhaps
interpret some of our foreign policy a little more broadly than
it was intended. Article 5 and the Washington Treaty is not a
contract that they have to agree on Rwanda, they have to agree
on East Timor, they have to agree on the Middle East. There is
nothing in the Washington Treaty that guarantees that Article 5
is a defense of democracy beyond the North Atlantic area. So we
will always have a number of people that do not want to go,
which is fine.
Frankly, many of the powers in Europe with which we have
assembled this great alliance have defined their modern
identity by withdrawing from Dien Bien Phu, withdrawing from
Suez and Algeria and Kurdestan. And just because our view has
changed of the world, theirs has not. They got out of that.
That is how they became modern nations. Just because we want to
go back to those same areas, does not mean they will come.
It will probably take us 10 years to talk them through this
problem. So we are basically again in the period in 1956 when
we disagreed in Suez until the French withdrawal, we had to
talk about the foundations of the alliance. For the next 10
years, we are going to talk about what we think are the
requirements. And frankly, a couple of them are going to decide
they do not want to be members of the military committee
because they did not sign up for it. And that is not bad
because we have so many more people that want to come in and do
share our values.
So that is why I think in addition or perhaps even as a
precondition to this greater project of the greater Middle
East, we really have to talk about the 170 million people that
are actually close to Europe on Europe's borders that actually
do want to have a relationship with this alliance, whether it
be Turkey's relationship with the European Union or Ukraine's
relationship with NATO or the Caucasus, or the western Balkans.
These frontiers of freedom out of area missions. If you do not
get Kiev right, you are not going to get Ouagadougou and
Mogadishu and the difficult things right. In a certain sense,
charity and security begin at home.
Now, the difficult test is when do we use NATO as an
institution out of area. And I do not actually know the answer.
I was hoping Ambassador Burns would supply it. But I notice
that many of the people that serve in the Oval Office actually
went to Yale, but I do not see anybody proposing that Yale
University take over the Oval Office. Many of the countries who
go to Afghanistan were educated in NATO. It does not mean that
NATO goes to Afghanistan. Just so long as the education that
they got carries us when we make the move to move NATO from an
education institution to a management institution. I think this
is a question this committee has uniquely raised. And I do not
think we have the answer yet. I think how NATO responds in
these defining issues will tell us when they are ready to make
the move. But my guess is NATO will move a little more slowly
than Americans would like them to because they are just not
ready and they have not developed the skills.
Anyway, that would be my very preliminary answer to your
discussion.
The Chairman. I thank you both for very comprehensive
answers.
I would just add one final thought, and that is, on your
point, Mr. Jackson, obviously we have not discussed today
economic issues, the World Trade Organization, biotechnics, and
food. Nor have we discussed all sorts of reasons why there are
problems in terms of relationships that we have never
commingled fortunately, we tried to keep security apart from
trade, but that is not easy in our politics, nor in the
politics perhaps of many European countries. I appreciate very
much your answers.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My only
regret is we do not have a couple hours to talk about--I mean
that sincerely--to expound on some of the points made by you,
as well as by our witnesses.
I agree with Ron that, to put it a slightly different way,
the only war worse than one that is intended is one that is
unintended, and I have been driving my staff crazy for the last
6 months talking about it in those terms. I think we have sort
of three riverboat gamblers here, all on the boat at the same
time, all being pushed by different domestic needs and internal
instincts, in France, the United States, and Germany right now.
It is not the time now in my view publicly for us to be
analyzing how things got out of whack so rapidly with Germany
or, as I facetiously said to one of my staff, someone is going
to write a book, ``How Bush Won the War and Lost the World,''
in terms of public opinion here unless we start to get
something straight here. So it does make sense at some point
for us to analyze how we got to this point so catty-wonked
here.
I agree with Bruce that I think the genesis here is as much
a European crisis as a crisis in the institutions. But in
practical terms, Bruce, I think it is a distinction without a
difference. It may require a different remedy, but in terms of
the impact, the impact is the same.
So at some point, Mr. Chairman, God willing this war ending
successfully and quickly, and hopefully us doing the right
thing, I hope there are enough minds out there in the foreign
policy establishment in this administration and among us that
are privately discussing what went wrong at the front end so in
the next, God willing, week or two, if everything went
perfectly, or the next couple months, we do not replicate the
mistakes. I agree again with you, Ron, that I think that we
should be looking at post-Saddam Iraq as an opportunity not
only to generate the prospect of putting Iraq on a path toward
democracy but remedying, repairing our situation in Europe with
France and Germany, as well as others. We should look at this
as an opportunity.
I again drive my staff crazy. I know my quoting my parents'
sayings all the time gets old, and I begin to even sound
foolish to myself. But my dad used to always say when you are a
kid, it is much more difficult to be a graceful winner than a
graceful loser. And another expression he had was, big men can
bend further.
We are the big man on the block here. We should be able to
bend. We should not be putting out press releases or letting
the word go out that we are serving freedom fries on Air Force
One. That is not a very mature thing for a nation to do right
now.
So I hope we get a little smarter about this because I,
like you, Ron--you heard me say in the beginning. I said to my
colleagues, picture a secure America with either no
relationship or a mildly adversary relationship with France and
Germany 10 years from now. I do not get it. When you put it in
that context, I mean, people go, well, of course, you have got
to. Well, you know, little things matter. Words matter. Actions
matter. And as one of you said, we can be out of sorts for 6
months, maybe a year. We cannot be out of sorts here for 2 or 3
years, and this leads me to my question.
By the way, I think the President is capable. I trust the
President's instincts. I disagree with the President profoundly
on a lot of things. Obviously, I am a Democrat who has even
every once in a while fantasized maybe that he should be
removed electorally in the next election. But nonetheless, I
have tried to be supportive, and I have faith in his instincts.
Two things I think are happening. You may not want to
comment on this, but I do think it is related. Maybe I am the
only one who thinks it is related. I think we operate at our
own peril if we underestimate the degree to which there is
legitimate and serious intellectual ferment in France and in
Europe, in terms of a European crisis and their identity
crisis, about American hegemony and the need for a more
independent Europe, or to put it another way, for the United
States not to be a European power. I think there are some very
serious people, very serious intellects, very serious elements
of the French body politic, as well as in other countries, who
sees that in the long-term interest of France and the long-term
interest of Europe and the world.
At the same time, operating here are what is, in a very
oversimplified way, referred to as the neocons, who have been
writing and saying things for the last 10 years that I always
kid my Democratic friends. I say, you know, you are so used to
saying things you do not mean, you do not understand that these
guys on the right, when they say it, they mean it. There has
been a consistent pattern among the intellectual right in this
country and the so-called neocons for the last 10 years about
their vision of the U.S. role in the world with an overwhelming
distaste for multilateral institutions, a relatively high
disregard for NATO, a very serious and genuine assertion on
their part, not born out of anything other than what they view
the self-interest of the United States, is that at the point of
our being, relative to the rest of the world, at the most
profoundly obvious apex of our power, that now is the time to
exercise independently our force, our judgment, and even
better, in the face of world opposition, to exercise it
successfully, thereby leveraging our power, bringing the
malcontents of the world--I do not mean Europe--the malcontents
of the world, the axis of evil group, into compliance.
These guys mean it. They mean it. And I think we are
kidding ourselves if we, in a partisan desire not to
acknowledge it, think that there are not very serious, very
bright, very skillful, and very patriotic Americans in this
administration and in some elements of the Democratic Party who
have the view of the world, who have that--my vast
oversimplification--that neocon view of the world.
And when the President is presented with options, they
usually are cast in sort of the mainstream, internationalist,
Republican--I am going to get him in trouble--the Lugar view of
the world, and this neocon view of the world. And he has some
tough choices to make, some very difficult choices.
I do not know why we do not admit that that more
unilateralist view, that serious and longstanding distrust for
international institutions and multilateral associations is
not--why we pretend that voice is not heard loudly in Europe
and why it does not play into the hands beautifully of those,
particularly within France, who have more of a de Gaulle view
of the world in 2003. I think it is an incredibly combustible
combination.
And so--as the chairman warned you all, we were going to
indulge ourselves here a little bit with no one else around--
that leads me to the following two questions. If you look at
NATO enlargement in terms of the half-full/half-empty
metaphor--what is that old expression? The wish is the father
of the thought or whatever that is. I do not know which it is.
But anyway, I do not know if I am kidding myself here or not.
But I want to believe that the expansion of NATO will have a
mollifying impact upon those institutional voices in Europe
that view the United States' hegemonic influence, even if it is
benign or benevolent, as negative and wish to somehow cabinet
from their perspective that the Ambassadors sitting behind
you--that their countries I want to believe along with, as you
said, Bruce, the 160 million people that they represent,
including the ones that have already been admitted--that they
will have an impact upon those voices in the minority--I think
it is still a minority voice in Europe--that says having the
United States as a European power is not a good thing. They
will have the impact of mollifying, of isolating not in a
formal sense, but isolating that view of the world, most
articulated now or associated with the Chirac government.
But then I ask myself the question, what is more important
to Lithuania, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania? Being a member of the
EU or being a member of NATO? Now, obviously they do not want
to make that choice, and hopefully they will not have to make
that choice. But I wonder whether or not in a world where they
may not feel the threat, the security threat, particularly if
Russia decides to play a French card instead of a U.S. card,
that they may not find themselves, if not directly pressured,
indirectly not having that mollifying impact upon that school
of thought I, in a very oversimplified way, characterize is in
France and other places, but maybe will feel they have to
succumb to that because they will choose at the end of the day
it is better to have the relationship with the two major
economic forces in Europe who determine more than anyone else
their economic well-being in the near term.
Talk to me about that. Is that a false choice? Are those
concerns--is that optimism or pessimism? Are they both
misplaced? Am I way off here? Those are my questions, and I
yield, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Jackson. Let me respond to the question you posed at
the end and then maybe say one or two words about the exegesis.
I think in the process of the last 10 years or more now, 13
years, since 1989, people have come to appreciate, even in
Paris, that the NATO and the EU are parallel and complementary
institutions. Were it not for the success of Treaty of
Washington, there would not be the success of the Treaty of
Rome, that basically solving the fear and insecurity of these
states is the predicate for setting up their political and
market integration and other solutions that these countries
look forward to. I think even in Paris they will admit that. A
high degree of correlation between the Prague and Copenhagen
selections shows that these institutions are talking to each
other, not as much as we might like, but even the first hand-
off between NATO and EU in Macedonia, does suggest they are
trying to find models of cooperation.
I think it is a horrible political thing to take young
democracies and say choose which part of the West you want to
be part of. They should answer in the negative, we choose all
of it, and there should be access to all the institutions and
hopefully this is a temporary judgment of Paris that has been
thrown at them because nothing confirms that that is either
inevitable or desirable.
With regard to your larger question, it probably will not
surprise you that I do not think the title of the book on this
period will be ``How Bush Won the War and Lost the World.'' I
would hope for a more felicitous review of----
Senator Biden. Well, I hope so too. That is not my
judgment. That is not my outcome. I mean, I hope it is
temporary, and I think it can be temporary if we do, in the
next 4 months, make some very important and seriously correct
decisions here. But right now there is no place in the world--
name me a place--where the populations, if any of the polling
data is correct, are as favorable toward the United States as
they were, including the aspirant countries, as they were
before January of last year, for example. There is no place I
have seen. I cannot think of a single one.
Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir. I guess my observation would be it
is hard to predict the post-war world when we are still in a
foxhole at the Kasserine Pass. It is just hard to see that far
into the future before we have come through this period.
I completely agree with your remark and what Ron said
earlier, that the United States diplomacy really has to hit the
ground running and with a positive message and go back on
essentially our messages or ideas, and we have to get back on
the offensive with our ideas.
I think we have learned something about wartime, though,
that this country really did not remember, that wartime really
has constrained our diplomacy not since the beginning of Iraq,
but since the 9/11 attacks. It does exaggerate the effects of
political opinion. It does basically cause ideology to
overshoot its mark a bit in rhetoric which is dangerous because
everything seems to be more inflamed in this period. I think
these are temporary phenomena and that I hope do not obtain.
It seems to me--and probably not for this hearing but
perhaps in the future--this committee actually should consider
structural adjustments in American diplomacy because I am not
sure we have a failure of ideas. There is a serious argument
that we have a failure of instruments, looking at the amount of
aid we have, the way we conduct public diplomacy, the way we
organize our regions. The regions are not coherent. So I think
that there is a lot of organizational stuff that perhaps we can
discuss in some of these meetings outside this committee in
talking about how to improve our ability to get our message out
because they are not really hearing us overseas.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
Dr. Asmus. Thank you, Senator.
Well, there have been two rather spectacular food fights
taking place in recent months. The one has been across the
Atlantic, which we have discussed. The other has been within
Europe, Senator Biden, over who leads Europe and who speaks for
Europe. And it has been that fight between what you might call
the Chirac-Schroeder group versus the Aznar-Blair group with
the Central Europeans largely being on the side of Blair and
Aznar obviously. We need to repair both of these rifts once
this is over.
Like you, I too, sometimes worry about there being a kind
of unholy alliance between our unilateralists and their
unilateralists which feed off of each other. But I still
believe--and I have spent a lot of time in Europe recently--
that the vast majority of European governments, the vast
majority of European peoples want a good, solid, healthy,
strategic alliance with the United States. But just like many
of us are on the edge of losing confidence in Europe; they are
on the edge of losing confidence in the United States.
As a Democrat going to Europe trying to defend the
President, the thing that is so frustrating is that the debate
over Iraq is not about Saddam Hussein. It is all too often
about George Bush. It is about America. And one reason why we
have lost this debate in European public opinion is because we
did not get it framed right. We did not really have a chance to
make the case.
So when it comes back to fixing this problem, I believe--
and I think the President is capable of doing this--we have to
reestablish American credibility. Then we need to repair the
institutions. And then we need very real common projects where
we can succeed because the one thing that hasn't changed is
that the problems are not going away. We can have these
debates, these abstract discussions, but the need to rebuild
Iraq is going to be upon us very soon.
Senator Biden. Do you think the administration wants to do
it? I ask you both that question. That is the $64 question. Do
you think the bulk of the administration wants to do it?
I do not know how you want to do it when, if the
scuttlebutt is correct, there are means by which--trying to
figure out how no contracts in the rebuilding of Iraq can go to
the French or the Germans. I do not how you can say you want to
do it when in fact you want no part of Europe participating in
what a transition government will be, if that turns out to be
the case. I hope that is not the position. But we hear the same
scuttlebutt you hear. We get importuned by--every
administration has divisions in it.
I guess my question is if you do not include Europe in the
reconstruction, or make it incredibly difficult, if you do not
include Europe having a say in what the transition government
will be and what the makeup of it will be, if you do not have
the U.N. having a resolution giving them the cover to be able
to come back in, could you still say you really want to repair
the lines? I mean, how can you do that if you do not do that?
Dr. Asmus. You know, the messages that I hear, like the one
you hear, are very mixed. And it is not clear to me which way
the administration is going to go.
I think there has been a certain sobering. I think there is
a growing awareness that we are at a historical turning point,
and I very much hope that those people in the administration,
understand that we too screwed up, that we have ended up in a
Barbara Tuchman-like scenario where we could destroy the
transatlantic relationship, and that we have a window in which
we can turn this around and that we need to exploit this. But
if those decisions come out the way you describe them, Senator
Biden, we are only digging ourselves in deeper.
Senator Biden. Bruce, what do you think?
Mr. Jackson. I spent a lot of time with this administration
both during campaigns and at the platform and also in the last
2 years. I do not think this administration should bow to
anybody in its transatlantic commitments and its recognition
that the alliance is actually the foundation for how we act in
world politics. You know many of the Zoellicks and the
Wolfowitzs and the Hadleys and the Rices. They have been doing
this for years. Actually they were students again of this
committee. So I do not think anybody disagrees on the
principles.
We have not actually seen diplomacy conducted under this
kind of wartime threat perhaps ever, and it is obviously
constrained outcomes in a way we did not expect. I think if we
were just having an objective test, how many telephone calls,
how many meetings, how many visits to Europe----
Senator Biden. Well, that is really not my question. I am
sorry. I'm not questioning--what I am trying to get at is, if
in fact we shut out NATO by whatever means and NATO members,
particularly those who did not agree with us, from quote, the
``rebuilding,'' however you want to characterize it, from
playing some role a la Karzai, a la Kosovo, even a la Bosnia,
which was not a success in my view, if we shut them out in
those serious decisionmaking processes which relate to who and
how are we going to get to a civilian control of Iraqis, the
Iraqis controlling Iraq, if we shut them out from the
rebuilding, if we shut them out from playing any part in the
security, not dominant--we will play the dominant role--is it
possible, Bruce, to say then that we really do want to repair
this breach? Or does that say that the view held by some names
I will not mention, that you know as well as I know, who do not
want to see us as engaged with NATO as we have been--what does
it say about our policy?
Mr. Jackson. Sir, I agree with you. Obviously our NGO will
be in there campaigning that this kind of stuff should not
happen.
I think one of your colleagues mentioned that there will be
an anger at Turkey and France and Germany. I think this is a
dangerous character, and leadership is needed from you and the
chairman to make sure this does not happen.
Senator Biden. Well, quite frankly, we are counting on guys
as respected as you--I am counting on folks like you, men and
women like you, who are respected, serious voices, who have
relationships and alliances in the best sense of the word with
the administration to weigh in. This is a time for all good men
to come to the aid of their party here. Far be it for me to
speak for the Republican side of this. But I really mean it.
These decisions are going to be made in the next weeks.
They may be made now. This is not something that is going to be
made 3 months from now in my humble opinion.
Well, I have said too much already.
Mr. Jackson. I think Ron said it correctly. Magnanimity is
a quality of our democracy and it is a great thing in victory.
So let us get victory and then we will have magnanimity.
Senator Biden. I am with you. All right. Well, thank you
very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.
We thank both of you. I would just add to the list of
people that might be helpful, members of our committee, and
Senator Biden and I will try to do our best too. I think each
one of us has a responsibility. This is an important time of
decision in which we are all not helpless in trying to
intervene and to weigh in sincerely, at least, with views that
we have. This is one reason why we have had this timely hearing
today. It has been an opportunity not only to talk about the
treaty and commend the seven countries that aspire to
membership, as well as the organization, but to think among
ourselves about the future and the importance of that future
being a bright one for NATO.
So on that note, why, we will end the hearing. We thank you
again for your testimony.
[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the committee adjourned, to
reconvene at 2:30 p.m., April 3, 2003.]
----------
Additional Statement Submitted for the Record
Congress of Romanian Americans,
1000 Gelston Circle,
McLean, VA, April 1, 2003.
The Honorable Richard Lugar,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC 20510
Dear Senator Lugar:
Romania should be embraced by the U.S. Senate as the ``newest''
member of NATO.
Its characteristics, both human and strategic, combine to
underscore its importance as an addition to NATO. Romania has
contributed hundreds of soldiers in peacekeeping efforts to Afghanistan
and the western Balkans and recently has sent troops to Iraq, with
additional troops ready for deployment on request.
There are numerous strategic, military, political and economic
reasons for including Romania as a NATO member.
For military reasons:
Romania has a large and well-trained army, that has demonstrated
its compatibility with other international forces in peace-keeping
missions in Bosnia, Angola, Somalia and the Persian Gulf, and in joint
military exercises with NATO forces.
Romania would be a bridge between the Northern and Southern flanks
of NATO.
Romania has an active bilateral military cooperation with the
United States.
Romania was the first country to join the Partnership for Peace.
Its Armed Forces have not been dependent on Russian training or
military technology for over 25 years.
For political reasons:
In Romania, integration in NATO enjoys the largest popular and
political support of all candidate countries. It is endorsed by a
consensus of the major Romanian political parties and by over 80% of
the population.
In a survey taken for the European Commission in Brussels,
Romanians displayed the strongest pro-American sentiments throughout
the nations of Central and Eastern Europe.
Romania is an oasis of regional political and social stability in
the Balkans.
Romania has a democratic administration, with a distinct Euro-
Atlantic orientation.
Romania protects its minorities. It was showcased by the U.S. 2
years ago, as a model in its treatment of its ethnic minorities.
For economic reasons:
Romania is ready to bear its share of the cost of military
restructuring and modernization to ensure compatibility with NATO
forces through massive purchases of U.S. and West European military
equipment.
Inclusion in NATO would protect the growing American investment in
Romania and thus provide incentives for major projects currently being
evaluated.
Romania's economy follows a steady upward trend.
Romania fulfills the basic requirements for inclusion in NATO.
Civilian control over the military.
Good relations with its neighboring countries (A treaty with
Hungary was signed and ratified in 1996.).
A democratic political system.
Commitment to economic reform and free-market economy.
Demonstrated potential of interoperability with NATO forces.
Romania is an asset to NATO.
Sincerely,
Armand A. Scala, President.
NATO ENLARGEMENT: QUALIFICATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS--PART III
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 3, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m. in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. George V.
Voinovich, presiding.
Present: Senators Voinovich, Lugar, and Corzine.
Senator Voinovich. The committee will please come to order.
I would like to begin by thanking Chairman Lugar and Senator
Biden for scheduling this hearing to continue discussion on the
merits of NATO enlargement. This is the third of a series of
hearings dedicated to the subject which I believe is highly
important as we continue to confront the challenges to global
security and the changing world since September 11.
Now, the question of NATO enlargement is one that has long
been close to my heart. As Mayor of Cleveland and Governor of
Ohio, I have worked closely with constituents in my State with
ties to countries that once were subject to life behind the
Iron Curtain. It is amazing to me how far many of these
countries have come in a short time, rising to embrace
democratic reforms after so many years under Communist rule.
The fact that seven countries once part of the former Soviet
Union, Warsaw Pact and one, Yugoslavia, have been invited to
join the NATO alliance, including Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia is testament to just
how much has been achieved since the collapse of the Soviet
empire more than a decade ago.
Because of a commitment that I have to make, I am not going
to read the rest of my statement, and I am going to have it
inserted in the record so that I can have the opportunity to
hear from our witnesses today, and I want to thank them for
being here today, Dr. Stephen Larrabee of the RAND Corporation,
who will discuss progress made by the Baltic Nations of
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Mr. Janusz Bugajski of the
Center for Strategic International Studies will then highlight
developments in Bulgaria and Romania, and Dr. Jeff Simon of the
National Defense University will cover Slovenia and Slovakia.
[The prepared statement of Senator Voinovich follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator George V. Voinovich
I would like to begin by thanking the Chairman, Senator Lugar, and
Senator Biden for scheduling this hearing to continue discussion on the
merits of NATO enlargement. This is the third in a series of hearings
dedicated to this subject, which I believe is highly important as we
continue to confront challenges to global security in a changed world
post-September 11th.
The question of NATO enlargement is one that has long been close to
my heart. As Mayor of Cleveland and Governor of the State of Ohio, I
worked closely with constituents in my state with ties to countries
that were once subject to life behind the Iron Curtain.
It is amazing to me to see how far many of these countries have
come in such a short time, rising to embrace democratic reforms after
so many years under communist rule. The fact that seven countries once
part of the former Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact or Tito's Yugoslavia
have been invited to join the NATO Alliance--including Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia--is
testament to just how much has been achieved since the collapse of the
Soviet Empire more than a decade ago.
While the seven countries invited to join the Alliance at the NATO
Summit in Prague last November have met the political and economic
qualifications for membership, it is also true that they bring to the
table defense capabilities that will enhance the overall security and
stability of the NATO Alliance. President George W. Bush, Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and the
highest-ranking member of the U.S. military, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers, have all expressed this view.
They maintain that in addition to niche military capabilities, these
countries bring energy, freshness and enthusiasm to the Alliance.
While there are without a doubt disagreements within NATO that must
be addressed, there is general consensus amongst the current members of
the Alliance on the question of enlargement. This was clear to me last
November, when I joined President Bush, Secretary Powell and other
members of the Administration as a member of the Senate delegation to
the NATO Summit in Prague. Our Allies, too, believe that these
countries will make significant contributions, militarily and
otherwise, to the Alliance.
On November 21st of last year, when NATO Secretary General Lord
Robertson announced the historic decision to invite the three Baltic
nations, as well as Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to join
the Alliance, I listened as heads of state from our allied nations--
including the Czech Republic, France, Spain, Great Britain, Poland,
Canada, Turkey, and many others--praised the work done by the seven
candidate countries and expressed their strong support for enlargement
to include these new European democracies.
Secretary General Lord Robertson, after working with the NATO
aspirant countries on comprehensive domestic reforms in preparation for
membership in the Alliance, concluded, (quote) ``We can therefore say
with complete confidence that this round of enlargement will maintain
and increase NATO's strength, cohesion and vitality.''
I share this view, and I believe it is appropriate and timely that
we now consider these candidates for membership in NATO. They have
provided crucial support in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks
against our country on 9/11, and continue to make significant
contributions to the ongoing campaign against terrorism. They have
shown their solidarity in our efforts to disarm Saddam Hussein and
liberate the Iraqi people, and have pledged to work with the
international community to promote security and reconstruction in Iraq
following the end of military action.
The candidate countries have also moved forward with democratic
reforms to promote the rule of law and respect for human rights. On a
subject that remains of strong concern to me--the need to address a
disturbing rise in anti-Semitic violence in Europe and other parts of
the world--several of the candidate countries, including Latvia,
Bulgaria, and Romania, have joined with the United States, Poland and
other countries to actively encourage the chair in office of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to mount a
serious and credible OSCE conference on anti-Semitism. Due in part to
their efforts, the OSCE has agreed to conduct such a conference, and it
is scheduled to take place in June. This is just one example, but it is
indicative of important action that is taking place.
As was highlighted last week when an inter-agency team from the
Departments of State and Defense testified before the Committee, the
seven candidate countries bring nearly 200,000 new troops to the
Alliance. They have also pledged to commit significant resources to
national defense, with Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, and Lithuania all at
or above the 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) mark in 2002.
Slovakia and Latvia were just under 2 percent (1.9 percent and 1.8
percent, respectively) and Slovenia, at 1.6 percent in 2002, has
committed to reach the 2 percent mark by 2008.
The average defense spending among the candidate countries was 2.1
percent for 2002, which is equal to the average spent by current NATO
Allies countries for the same period. It is interesting to note that 11
of 19 members of the Alliance did not reach the 2 percent mark for
defense spending in 2002. Clearly, there is room for improvement in
this regard.
Last week, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc
Grossman testified before the Armed Services Committee regarding the
future of NATO. When asked about the benefits of enlargement, he said,
(quote) ``I believe, senators, that the accession of these countries
are about the future of NATO, and will be good and directly benefit
U.S. interests. Why? They're strong Atlanticists. They're allies in the
war on terror. They've already contributed to Operation Enduring
Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Kabul.''
The list goes on. I agree with Marc's assessment. These countries
already make significant contributions that strengthen the
transatlantic relationship. They have acted as de facto allies, and I
believe they will make important contributions as members of the NATO
Alliance.
While much has been achieved, there is still work to be done as the
candidate countries continue work on their Membership Action Plans
(MAPs). As has been said before, Prague should be viewed as the
starting line, not the finish line.
Efforts have continued since the Prague Summit, and I was very
pleased to learn that the people of Slovenia--who have been engaged in
discussion about NATO membership for many years now--voted
overwhelmingly in support of Slovenia's membership in NATO during a
national referendum on March 23rd, with roughly two-thirds of voters
favoring accession to the Alliance. This was a crucial step for the
country.
It is imperative that the candidates continue to address
outstanding issues that require attention, including military reform,
respect for human rights, and efforts to combat organized crime and
corruption. It is this last piece that perhaps concerns me the most.
These problems have the potential to undermine democratic reforms,
respect for the rule of law and other core NATO values, and I believe
they could be very dangerous if left unchecked.
After meeting with leaders from these seven countries and spending
time in each country that has been invited to join the NATO Alliance, I
am confident that reforms will continue. I sincerely believe that
reforms will be swifter and more complete as these countries are
brought into the Alliance, rather than left out.
As we consider enlargement today, it is clear that the world is a
very different place than it was when Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic were brought into NATO. The world's democracies and
multilateral institutions, including the NATO Alliance, face new
threats to freedom, marked not by communist aggression but instead by
the dangerous nexus between weapons of mass destruction, rogue nations,
and terrorists who shown their willingness to use them against those
who value freedom and democracy, if given the chance to do so.
NATO has been challenged to meet these future threats and has
embarked upon a course to identify the capabilities needed to confront
new challenges to international security. This discussion was a primary
item on the agenda at the Prague Summit, where NATO heads of state
agreed that new challenges could require the Alliance to operate beyond
Europe's borders. The Prague Declaration noted that (quote): ``In order
to carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field
forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, upon decision
by the North Atlantic Council, to sustain operations over distance and
time, including in an environment where they might be faced with
nuclear, biological and chemical threats, and to achieve their
objectives.''
To do so, NATO heads of state announced the creation of a NATO
Response Force, which is envisioned to consist of approximately 20,000
troops who are ready and able to deploy anywhere in the world within 30
days. This is still a paper concept, and we look forward to learning
more about efforts to turn this into a viable force at the June
ministerial in Madrid.
The NATO Summit last November also produced the Prague Capabilities
Commitment, replacing the Defense Capabilities Initiative (or DCI) that
was initiated at the 1999 Washington Summit. It calls on allies to
improve and develop military capabilities, focusing on defenses against
weapons of mass destruction; intelligence; command, control and
communications; and strategic air and sea lift, among other things.
If NATO is to meet future challenges, it is imperative that the
capabilities gap between the U.S. and our European allies be addressed.
The Prague Capabilities Commitment highlights critical needs within the
Alliance. Without adequate capabilities, NATO's ability to respond to
future security challenges will be seriously undermined.
As we discuss enlargement, we must also ask how the candidate
countries will respond to these urgent challenges. We must ask what
role the potential new members will play in the Alliance, and what
contributions they are prepared to make as we assess whether they are
ready to be part of a permanent, stabilizing force in Europe.
The Committee began an examination on the contributions and
qualifications that the seven candidate countries bring to the table
last Thursday, receiving testimony from officials of the Departments of
State and Defense.
We will continue this discussion today, and I would like to welcome
our witnesses. They include: Dr. Stephen Larrabee of the RAND
Corporation, who will discuss progress made by the Baltic nations of
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; Mr. Janusz Bugajski of the Center for
Strategic and International Studies will then highlight developments in
Bulgaria and Romania; Dr. Jeff Simon of the National Defense University
will cover Slovenia and Slovakia.
I thank the witnesses to taking the time to be here today. I look
forward to their testimony. I would like to recognize the ranking
member, Senator Biden, for his opening remarks.
Senator Voinovich. Again, I want to thank the witnesses for
being here today, and we will start with Dr. Stephen Larrabee
of the RAND Corporation. Dr. Larrabee.
STATEMENT OF DR. F. STEPHEN LARRABEE, SENIOR STAFF MEMBER,
RAND, ARLINGTON, VA
Dr. Larrabee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of
the committee. It is a great honor and privilege to be invited
to testify before this committee on the qualifications of the
three Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, for
membership in NATO.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that membership of the Baltic
States in NATO is very much in U.S. interests and will
significantly contribute to enhancing the overall security in
Europe. The Baltic States have made significant progress in
meeting the economic, political, and military requirements for
NATO membership since achieving their independence.
All three States have functioning democratic systems and
viable market economies. Indeed, the growth rates in the Baltic
States are among the highest in Europe. The Baltic States are
also among the most pro-American countries in Europe. Public
support for NATO membership is also extremely strong in the
three countries.
All three Baltic States have made significant progress in
modernizing their military forces and making their forces
capable of operating with NATO forces. Moreover, unlike some
other aspirants for NATO membership who inherited legacy forces
from their membership in the Warsaw Pact, the Baltic States had
to create militaries from scratch after achieving independence.
Mr. Chairman, I do not have time to go through the details
of their modernization plans. Some of this is outlined in my
written testimony, however, let me highlight a few aspects.
Defense budgets in all three have been rising. Estonia's
defense budget increased from 1.6 percent of GDP in 2000 to 1.8
in 2001 and rose to 2 percent in 2002. Defense spending in
Lithuania has also risen.
In 2001, all parliamentary parties signed an agreement
reaffirming their commitment to devote no less than 2 percent
of GDP in 2001 to 2004. To reinforce this commitment, the
extension of the accord until 2008 is currently under
consideration. Latvia has also pledged to raise its defense
spending to 2 percent by 2003.
Given the small size of their armed forces and the strong
financial constraints they face, the Baltic States cannot hope
to build powerful armed forces that can match those of the
larger and richer members of the alliance. Instead, they have
sought to enhance their value to the alliance by developing
specialized capabilities in certain areas, that is to say,
niche capabilities. Latvia, for instance, is developing
specialized ordnance and minesweeping units and is considering
developing a chemical-biological defense unit. Estonia is also
developing a minesweeping unit, while Lithuania is creating a
medical unit.
All three Baltic States, moreover, have shown a willingness
to contribute to the war on terrorism. Latvia deployed a
special forces unit and demining team in Afghanistan, Estonia
sent an explosive detection dog team, and Lithuania deployed a
special forces unit and a medical team, as well as offered its
air space and airfields for Operation Enduring Freedom.
In short, before they had even been invited to join NATO,
the three Baltic States were already beginning to act like
members of NATO and good allies. All three countries also have
lent political support to the U.S.-led effort to disarm Iraq.
All three signed a letter of the Vilnius-10 calling on Saddam
Hussein to disarm. They have also contributed militarily.
Lithuania, for instance, has sent a liaison officer to CENTCOM
and provided overflight rights and transit for U.S. and
coalition forces in the Iraq campaign.
The existence of a large Russian minority in the
territories of the Baltic States has created some tensions with
Russia, particularly in Latvia and Estonia. However, over the
past decade the Baltic States have worked closely with the OSCE
and EU to bring their citizenship and electoral laws into
conformity with OSCE and EU norms and procedures. Both
organizations have certified that the laws of the Baltic States
today fully conform to OSE and EU norms. This has significantly
reduced the credibility of Russian complaints about the
treatment of the minority.
Some Western observers have expressed fears that Baltic
membership in NATO could seriously complicate NATO's relations
with Russia. I do not think this is likely. President Putin
played down the Baltic issue in the run-up to the Prague
summit. He also made clear that his main goal is to improve
Russia's ties to NATO. Thus, he is unlikely, in my view, to
make Baltic membership a major issue in relations with NATO in
the future.
Mr. Chairman, in conclusion let me say that the invitations
issued at Prague are an important achievement. They help to
anchor the Baltic States more firmly in the West and end the
debate about their place in the post-cold war European security
order. At the same time, NATO membership will create a new set
of strategic challenges which the U.S. and the Baltic States
need to address. For much of the last decade, ensuring the
security of the Baltic States was an important U.S. priority.
Indeed, the Baltic States issues spurred some of the most
innovative security arrangements in the post-cold war period.
However, having succeeded in obtaining invitations to join
NATO, the Baltic States now run the risk of becoming victims of
their own success. There is a danger that once the Baltic
States are members of NATO, the United States may essentially
regard the Baltic issue as fixed, so to say, and disengage from
the region.
Indeed, there are signs that this is already happening.
Momentum behind the Northern European Initiative, one of the
most innovative policy initiatives toward the region, has begun
to wane in the last several years. In short, the strategic
framework that shaped Western policy toward the Baltic region
is increasingly becoming obsolete and being overtaken by
events.
That paradigm, that strategic framework centered around the
integration of the Baltic States into NATO. With the
invitations of Prague and Copenhagen, these goals have largely
been achieved. Thus, the challenge in the post-Prague period is
to develop a new paradigm or a new strategic agenda that can
help keep the U.S. engaged in the Baltic region.
I would submit that this new agenda should include at least
four elements, No. 1, enhancing cooperation with Russia, No. 2,
helping to stabilize the situation around Kaliningrad, No. 3,
promoting democratization of Belarus, and No. 4, supporting
Ukraine's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. At the
same time, with growing demands on government resources, some
of the mechanisms of U.S.-Baltic cooperation may need to be
revamped to give a larger role to NGOs and to the private
sector. It is important, however, that the Northern European
Initiative receive adequate funding.
The second key challenge is to assure that Article 5 is not
a hollow paper commitment. While enlargement of the Baltic
States is largely being carried out for political reasons, the
military dimensions remain important. Thus, in the post-Prague
period, the U.S. and its NATO allies will need to give more
attention to the military dimensions carrying out an Article 5
commitment to the Baltic States.
Lacking any clear conceptual thinking about how to defend
the Baltic States, NATO planners may be tempted to dust off the
plans for defending Poland and Central Europe and use them as a
model for defending the Baltic States. However, it is not clear
that the Polish model, that is, large indigenous land and air
forces, plus a robust NATO reinforcement package, is the right
defense model for the Baltic region. The Baltic region lacks
the strategic depth and large military forces that were
available in the Polish case. In addition, Russian forces are
closer, and Belarus does not provide a strategic buffer, as
Ukraine does in the Polish case.
At the same time, to diffuse Russian concerns about the
military impact of Baltic membership, NATO should make a
unilateral commitment that it does not intend to deploy nuclear
weapons or permanently station major combat troops on Baltic
soil as long as there is not a significant deterioration in the
security environment. NATO made such a unilateral statement
during the first round of NATO enlargement, and repeating such
a statement when the Baltic States enter the alliance would
help to ease Russia's anxiety about NATO's intentions.
Finally, the third challenge is to enhance cooperation with
Russia. Some observers have worried that NATO membership will
have a negative impact on Baltic-Russian relations. The
opposite, however, in my view is likely to be the case. Rather
than leading to a deterioration in Baltic-Russian relations, as
some fear, Baltic membership in NATO is likely to lead to a
gradual improvement of Baltic-Russian relations.
Now that the basic battle for long-term security
orientation of the Baltic States has been resolved, Moscow is
likely to stop its bullying tactics and show greater interest
in improving ties with the Baltic States just as happened with
Poland after Poland entered NATO. At the same time, NATO
membership is likely to increase the self-confidence of the
Baltic States and allow them to expand ties to Moscow.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my testimony. Thank you very
much for your attention. I would be happy to answer any
questions you or other committee members have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Larrabee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. F. Stephen Larrabee,\1\ Senior Staff Member,
RAND, Arlington, VA
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This statement is based on a variety of sources, including
research conducted at RAND. However, the opinions and conclusions
expressed are those of the author and should not be interpreted as
representing those of RAND or any of the agencies or others sponsoring
its research.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the baltic states and nato membership
Mr. Chairman, it is a great honor and privilege to be invited to
testify before this committee on the qualifications of the three Baltic
states--Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania--for membership in NATO.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that the membership of the Baltic states in
NATO is very much in U.S. interest and will significantly contribute to
enhancing overall security in Europe. The Baltic states have made
significant progress in meeting the economic, political and military
requirements for NATO membership since achieving their independence in
1991. All three states have functioning democratic systems and viable
market economies. Indeed, growth rates in the Baltic states are among
the highest in Europe.
Public support for NATO membership is also strong in all three
countries. In Latvia, a poll taken in December 2002 showed that 68.5
percent of the population supported membership in NATO. Polls in
Estonia consistently show support for NATO running about 70 percent,
while those in Lithuania indicate that over 75 percent of the
population support Lithuania's membership in NATO.
military reform and modernization
Unlike some other aspirants for NATO membership from Central and
Eastern Europe who inherited legacy forces from their membership in the
Warsaw Pact, the Baltic states had to create militaries from scratch
after achieving independence. Given their small size and limited
financial resources, this has not been an easy task. Nonetheless, all
three Baltic states have made significant progress in modernizing their
military forces and making them capable of operating with NATO forces.
Defense budgets in all three have been rising. Estonia's defense
budget increased from 1.6 percent of the GDP in 2000 to 1.8 percent in
2001 and rose to 2 percent in 2002. Estonia is in the process of
creating a small intermediate reaction force; a battalion-size rapid
reaction force; and 2 brigades of main defense forces.
Defense spending has also risen in Lithuania. In 2001, all
parliamentary parties signed an agreement reaffirming their commitment
to devote no less than 2 percent GDP in 2001-2004. To reinforce this
commitment, the extension of the accord until 2008 is currently under
consideration. Lithuania has also taken important steps to modernize
its forces and make them NATO compatible. It plans to have one NATO-
interoperable Reaction Brigade by 2006. It has also formed a
peacekeeping battalion (LITPOLBAT) with Poland.
In the future, Lithuania plans to have a slightly smaller but more
easily deployable force and to move away from the concept of
territorial defense. In line with this, it is planning to reduce the
number of conscripts and increase the number of professionals in the
armed forces as well as restructure the territorial units to provide
host nation support, protection of key strategic facilities and
assistance to civil authorities. The volunteer and active reserve
forces will also be downsized.
Latvia's defense spending has been the lowest of the three.
However, Latvia has pledged to raise defense spending to 2 percent by
2003. By the end of 2004, Latvia will be able to commit a fully
professional Motorized Infantry Battalion, with some Combat Support and
Combat Service Support Units, to the Alliance for a full range of NATO
missions.
Given the small size of their armed forces and the strong financial
constraints they face, the Baltic states cannot hope to build powerful
armed forces that can match those of the larger and richer members of
the Alliance. Instead they have sought to enhance their value to the
Alliance by developing specialized capabilities in certain areas.
Latvia, for instance, is developing specialized ordnance and
minesweeping units and is considering developing a chemical/biological
defense unit. Estonia is also developing a minesweeping unit, while
Lithuania is creating a medical unit.
support for the war on terrorism
All three Baltic states, moreover, have shown a willingness to
contribute to the war on terrorism. Latvia deployed a special forces
unit and demining team in Afghanistan, while Estonia sent an explosive
detection dog team. Lithuania deployed a special forces unit and a
medical team as well as offered its airspace and airfields for
Operation Enduring Freedom. While these contributions were small and
largely symbolic, they were an important indication that all three
Baltic states were prepared to contribute to the war on terrorism.
All three countries also lent political support to the U.S.-led
effort to disarm Iraq. All three signed the letter of the Vilnius 10
calling on Saddam Hussein to disarm. Lithuania has also sent a liaison
officer to CENTCOM and provided over-flight and transit for U.S. and
Coalition forces in the Iraq campaign.
regional defense cooperation
The three Baltic states have also taken a number of steps since
1993 to strengthen regional defense cooperation. The most important and
successful initiative has been the creation of a joint Baltic
Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT). Composed of a company from each of
the three Baltic states, BALTBAT has been deployed in Bosnia as part of
the Nordic Brigade. The joint peacekeeping battalion is an important
expression of the Baltic states' readiness to contribute to
international peacekeeping. At the same time, it has helped the Baltic
states to gain valuable experience in working closely with NATO.
In addition, several other efforts have been undertaken to enhance
regional defense cooperation:
A joint Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON) has been set up.
BALTRON is composed of a combined Lithuanian-Latvian-Estonian
staff and national ships from the navies of the three Baltic
countries. It is based in Estonia. The long-term goal is to
make the Squadron interoperable and compatible with NATO and
able to conduct mine countermeasure operations.
A Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET), based in
Lithuania, has been established. It is designed to improve
international cooperation between civilian and military
authorities in aviation matters and to increase operational
effectiveness. The data distributed in BALTNET will be
compatible with other European data systems.
A Baltic Defense College (BALTDEFCOL) has been set up in
Tartu, Estonia. Its primary function is to train senior staff
officers and civilians from the Baltic states in NATO-based
staff procedures, strategic planning and management. In
addition to students from the three Baltic states, the first
course of BALTDEFCOL also included students from Denmark,
Germany, Hungary, Sweden and the U.S.
These initiatives have helped to promote a greater sense of
cohesion and regional cooperation among the Baltic states. The three
Baltic states are also cooperating in joint arms and equipment
purchases in order to save money. In August 2001, Latvia and Estonia
agreed to jointly purchase long-range radars from Lockheed Martin. The
radars will form part of the Baltic states' joint airspace surveillance
system (BALNET), which will be integrated into similar NATO systems in
the future.
the russian minority issue
The existence of large Russian-speaking minorities in the territory
of the Baltic states has created some tensions with Russia. Moscow has
often accused the Baltic states, especially Latvia and Estonia, of
discriminating against the minority. However, over the past decade the
Baltic states have worked closely with the OSCE and EU to bring their
citizenship and electoral laws into conformity with OSCE and EU norms
and procedures. Both organizations have certified that the laws of the
Baltic states today fully conform to OSCE and EU norms.
However, overall Moscow has much less influence in the Baltic
states today than it did five or ten years ago. Russia's influence over
the Russian minorities in the Baltic states is declining. While many
members of the minority continue to feel that they are second class
citizens, few wish to emigrate to Russia. Today a growing number of the
younger members of the minority see their fate tied to the process of
European integration rather than to Russia's evolution. This has
reduced Russia's ability to use the minority as a means of pressure on
the Baltic states.
religious tolerance
The Baltic states have also taken steps to promote religious
tolerance and address important historical legacies by creating
Holocaust Commissions. Lithuania, for instance, intends to introduce
amendments into the existing Law on the Restitution of Religious
Property, which would provide a legal mechanism for Jewish property
restitution and compensation for lost communal property. These
amendments are being drafted in cooperation with the Lithuanian
Government Commission, headed by the Minister of Justice, and the
International Committee to Represent Jewish Property Claims in
Lithuania. In Latvia, the subject of the Holocaust is included in the
compulsory history curriculum as a component of general education.
impact of baltic membership on russia-nato relations
For a long time Russia strongly opposed Baltic membership in NATO,
arguing that Baltic membership in the Alliance would cross a ``red
line'' and lead to a serious deterioration of Russian-NATO relations.
At the Helsinki summit in March 1997, President Yeltsin tried to get a
private oral agreement from President Clinton--a ``gentleman's
agreement'' that would not be made public--not to admit the Baltic
states into the Alliance. President Clinton flatly refused to make such
a commitment.
President Putin, however, played down the Baltic issue. While
opposing NATO enlargement in principle, he seemed to recognize that
Russia had over-reacted to the first round of enlargement and appeared
intent on not allowing the Baltic issue to disrupt his effort to deepen
cooperation with NATO. In addition, the closer U.S.-Russian cooperation
on terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks helped to
defuse the impact of the Baltic issue on NATO-Russian relations.
Some Western observers have expressed fears that Baltic membership
in NATO could seriously complicate NATO's relations with Russia.
However, this seems unlikely. As noted, Putin played down the Baltic
issue in the run-up to the Prague summit. His main goal is to try to
improve ties to NATO. Thus he is unlikely to make Baltic membership a
major issue in relations with NATO.
the post-prague agenda in the baltic region
Mr. Chairman, the invitations issued at Prague are an important
achievement. They help to anchor the Baltic states more firmly in the
West and end the debate about their place in the post-Cold War European
security order. At the same time, NATO membership will create a new set
of strategic challenges, which the U.S. and the Baltic states need to
address.
The first challenge is directly related to U.S. policy. For much of
the last decade ensuring the security of the Baltic states was an
important U.S. priority. Indeed, the Baltic issue spurred some of the
innovative security arrangements in the post-Cold War period. However,
having succeeded in obtaining invitations to join NATO, the Baltic
states now run the risk of becoming victims of their own success. There
is a danger that once the Baltic states are members of NATO, the U.S.
will essentially regard the Baltic issue as ``fixed'' and disengage
from the region. Indeed, there are signs of this already happening.
Momentum behind the Northern European Initiative--one of the most
innovative policy initiatives toward the region, has begun to wane in
the last several years.
In short, the strategic framework that shaped Western policy toward
the Baltic region is increasingly becoming obsolete and being overtaken
by events. That paradigm centered around the integration of Baltic
states into NATO and the EU. With the invitations at Prague and
Copenhagen, these goals have largely been achieved. Thus the challenge
in the post-Prague period is to develop a new paradigm--a new strategic
agenda--that can keep the U.S. engaged in the Baltic region.
The pre-Prague agenda centered around stabilizing the Baltic
region. In the post-Prague period, the strategic agenda should shift
from stabilizing the Baltic region to stabilizing the immediate
neighborhood. The new agenda should include 4 elements: 1) enhancing
cooperation with Russia; 2) helping to stabilize the situation around
Kaliningrad; 3) promoting the democratization of Belarus; 4) supporting
Ukraine's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. At the same time,
some of the mechanisms for U.S.-Baltic cooperation may need to be
revamped to give a larger role to NGO's and the private sector.
The second key challenge is to ensure that Article 5 is not a
``hollow'' paper commitment. While enlargement to the Baltic states is
largely being carried out for political reasons, the military
dimensions remain important. Thus in the post-Prague period the U.S.
and its NATO allies will need to give more attention to the military
dimensions of carrying out an Article 5 commitment to the Baltic
states.
Lacking any clear conceptual thinking about how to defend the
Baltic states, NATO planners may be tempted to dust off the plans for
defending Poland and use them as a model for defending the Baltic
states. However, it is not clear that the ``Polish Model''--i.e., large
indigenous land and air forces, plus a robust NATO reinforcement
package--is the right defense model for the Baltic region. The Baltic
region lacks the strategic depth and large military forces that were
available in the Polish case. In addition, Russian forces are closer
and Belarus does not provide a strategic buffer as Ukraine does in the
Polish case. Finally, Western reinforcements are not next door as is
the case in Poland. Thus getting reinforcements to the Baltic states
will be much harder and take longer.
At the same time, changes in warfare and technology--above all
precision-guided weapons and network centric warfare--may give the
United States and NATO new options for defending the Baltic states
which don't require large reinforcements stationed on Baltic territory.
Such options would also reduce the relevance of CFE since these options
would not require large amounts of TLE (Treaty-Limited Equipment) on
Baltic soil.
This is all the more important because Russia may try to use CFE to
constrain the ability of NATO--and especially the U.S.--to carry out an
Article 5 commitment to the Baltic states by limiting NATO's ability to
temporarily station forces on the territory of the Baltic states.
NATO's reinforcement capacity was a major issue in the first round of
enlargement and it could be an issue in the second round of enlargement
as well in regard to the Baltic states. Thus the Alliance will need to
devise a CFE strategy that assures that the interests of the Baltic
states are adequately protected.
Moreover, the Baltic states cannot be expected to announce their
TLE levels until they know how they will be defended and how much TLE
they will need. This highlights the need for NATO to begin to develop
its plans for defending the Baltic states now. Otherwise, there is ``a
danger that the Alliance's CFE policy and its Baltic policy could
operate at cross-purposes, leading to strains in relations with the
Baltic states.
At the same time, to defuse Russian concerns about the military
impact of Baltic membership, NATO could make a unilateral statement
that it does not intend to deploy nuclear weapons or permanently
station major combat troops on Baltic soil as long as there is not a
significant deterioration in the security environment. NATO made such a
unilateral statement during the first round of NATO enlargement and
repeating such a statement when the Baltic states enter the Alliance
could help to ease Russian anxiety about NATO's intentions.
These pledges could be accompanied by proposals for confidence-
building measures. One idea worth considering would be to expand the
German-Danish-Polish Corps in Szczecin (Stettin) to include units from
the Baltic states and eventually perhaps even Russian forces from
Kaliningrad. Initially, cooperation could begin with joint exercises on
an ad hoc basis. But as mutual confidence increased, the cooperation
could be expanded and institutionalized.
The third challenge concerns relations with Russia. In the pre-
Prague period, the main challenge was to overcome Russia's opposition
to Baltic membership. This was successfully accomplished. However, in
the post-Prague period, the key challenge will be to improve
cooperation between the Baltic states and Russia.
Some observers worry that NATO membership will make this task
harder. The opposite, however, is likely to be the case. Rather than
leading to a deterioration in Baltic-Russian relations, as some fear,
Baltic membership in NATO is likely to lead to the gradual improvement
of Baltic-Russian relations. Now that the basic battle for the long-
term security orientation of the Baltic states has been resolved,
Moscow is likely to stop its bully tactics and show greater interest in
improving ties to the Baltic states--just as happened with Poland after
Poland entered NATO. At the same time, NATO membership is likely to
increase the self-confidence of the Baltic states and allow them to
expand ties to Moscow.
Fourth, U.S. policymakers need to ensure that there is no
backsliding away from democratic reform and social tolerance in the
Baltic states. All three Baltic states need to continue to make an
honest reckoning with the past, including the Holocaust. In addition,
they need to intensify efforts to root out corruption.
Finally, U.S. policymakers should continue to encourage the Baltic
states to promote the integration of the Russian minority more fully
into Baltic political and social life. The social integration of the
Russian minority is an important prerequisite for long-term political
stability in the Baltic states as well as for maintaining cordial
relations with Russia.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my testimony. Thank you for your
attention. I would be happy to answer any questions you or other
Committee members may have.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Dr. Larrabee. I had the
opportunity to visit the Baltic States and to see first-hand
what they are doing militarily, and I was extremely impressed
with what they are doing, and I think your comment about the
issue of having a new vision after these new countries join
NATO is very, very important, so that we have a broad vision of
what their respective responsibilities are going to be, and
look at the whole issue of how they would be protected in the
event that they needed to be protected.
Thank you very much, and I have some statements here that I
am going to insert in the record, there being no objection to
them, from the Lithuanian-American Community, Inc., and also
from the Baltic American Freedom League, Inc. Without
objection, they are inserted in the record.
[The statements referred to follow:]
Lithuanian-American Community, Inc.,
National Board of Directors,
213 West Lake Shore Drive,
Cary, IL, April 1, 2003.
Dr. Michael H. Haltzel,
Senior Professional Staff Member,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Dirksen Building,
Washington, DC.
Re: NATO Ratification Hearings
Dear Dr. Haltzel:
Per our recent conversation, I am enclosing herewith the
Lithuanian-American Community, Inc., position paper on NATO
ratification now pending in the Senate. Please be kind enough to
include our remarks in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing
records. We would very much like to address the Committee conducting
the hearings if that is at all possible. However, we understand the
reasons that may make such an address not possible.
Thanking you in advance and wishing you our best wishes, I remain,
Sincerely yours,
Regina F. Narusis, J.D., Chairman,
National Board of Directors,
Lithuanian-American Community, Inc.
Prepared Statement of Lithuanian-American Community, Inc.,
nato position
Lithuanian-American Community, Inc. supports:
1. United States continued involvement and commitment to NATO
and security in Europe.
2. The revitalization of the NATO Alliance.
3. The admission of all seven nations invited to join the
NATO Alliance at Prague in 2002.
north atlantic treaty organization
NATO has been since its formation in 1949 the most effective
defensive alliance uniting North America and Europe. It was
instrumental in winning the Cold War, in encouraging European nations
to foster democracy, rule of law, free market economies and in
preserving peace and stability. Pre-World War II non-engagement or
isolationism has proven to be costly to us militarily, financially and
in loss of life. History has taught us that the United States has been
drawn into European conflicts of the 20th century because our vital
interests are ultimately engaged there.
The world has changed both technologically and geopolitically since
the end of the Cold War. Distances and oceans are no longer barriers to
danger. Established democracies have grown stronger and more assertive,
such as France and Germany. New democracies have emerged and are
seeking their rightful place in world affairs. Our involvement becomes
more crucial as does transatlantic cohesion to prevent conflict among
its key members.
The Soviet Union no longer exists, but new threats have emerged. We
have gone from the risk of nuclear exchange to multiple threats of
global insecurity. The United States will not be able to sort out alone
every international threat that now faces us, without depleting
ourselves physically, mentally and financially. We need allies.
The countries that share our values and history are the NATO
countries. The United Nations is an organization of nations that do not
have the same common values and thus, as recently evidenced, are able
to debate but not solve problems, much less act to correct them.
NATO has survived the test of time. It unanimously and for the
first time in its history, invoked its founding principle of collective
defense on behalf of the United States following the September 11th
attacks. It did at first stumble when Turkey requested assistance in
the event of an Iraqi attack, but it found a means to meet the Turkish
request within the Alliance. The Alliance assisted Russia, the former
adversary, to come to grips with reality. Moscow did sign a new
cooperation pact with the Alliance in May of 2002 in Rome reaffirming
the right of every nation to choose its own allies and alliances.
NATO is reorienting itself, but if it revitalizes itself by means
of further expansion and restructuring of its military forces and
establishing a new NATO Rapid Response Force that can be staffed and
shared by all members, it will become only stronger and better.
nato expansion
The admission of the Czech Republic, Hungry and Poland was a
success. The bulk of the actual costs of enlargement have been borne by
the new countries. Their relationship with Russia has improved, rather
than become a threat. These new members have been true allies. They
have contributed to NATO operations: in NATO peacekeeping missions,
sent specialized chemical warfare troops to the Gulf and hosted the
Iraqi exiles for training to support United States forces. The largest
NATO exercise involving 5,000 troops, ``Victory Strike'', was in
Poland. These new members have given united support to the bond
between. United States and Europe.
In 2002 in Prague the artificial Cold War division of Europe
finally came to an end. NATO leaders approved the Alliance's largest
expansion in its 53 year history. The expansion encompasses Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
NATO accession of these seven nations will change the way we
perceive the region. With the support of the United States, these
nations will take their rightful and equal place in a Europe whole and
free. They are not second class countries. They will not let the
Franco-German domination take root or the Russians exploit the effort
to eliminate United States influence in Europe. These are the nations
that understand the true meaning of freedom and democracy. Because of
their enslavement and long struggle for freedom, their approach to
foreign policy is different from those in Western Europe. They know
that appeasement does not work and that dictators must be dealt with.
These nations have a relationship with the United States that has
stood the test of time. In great part, thanks to the United States,
Europe rid itself of two forms of tyranny--Nazism and Communism. They
see America as the only real guarantor of their security. History has
taught them, that neither France nor Germany can be trusted to put
European interest ahead of their own. The supportive letter from the
Vilnius 10 members proves their loyalty to NATO. These nations are
dynamic, full of new energy and most of all are becoming increasingly
assertive. These countries are also entering the European Union and
will change that organization from within. We all need a united Europe,
not a Western Europe (so called ``old Europe'') or Central and Eastern
Europe (``new Europe''), but a Europe where all nations are equal and
are so treated. Continued United States involvement can help bring this
about. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe want NATO to be
strong and to keep a United States presence. The American influence
through the process of enlargement will only grow. Through enlargement
of NATO all of Europe will be more balanced and reinvigorated.
Enlargement makes strategic sense for the United States and will prove
to be the greatest strategic and political gain for the Alliance.
Though not yet members of the Alliance, the seven invitees to NATO,
have already contributed to NATO, thus have proven their commitment and
worth. They all have sent troops to preserve peace in the Balkans, they
all have supported the United States in the war against terrorism and
made their airspace and bases available to the U.S.-led coalition. They
have joined the Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and are
contributing highly skilled troops. These countries have issued a joint
statement early on supporting the United States efforts to disarm the
Iraq regime. Their governments have declared preparedness to contribute
politically and with other means to the efforts of the United States
led coalition against Iraq. Slovenia is contributing mountain units.
Slovakia is contributing chemical and biological expertise, Romania
sent a battalion of troops to the war zone. Bulgaria is sending
chemical warfare specialists to the Gulf. The Baltic nations are
contributing special units as well as cargo handling and medical teams.
Lithuania alone has sent 914 military personnel, maintained an
infantry platoon with the Polish battalion in KFOR, provided An-26
transport aircraft with crew and logistics personnel and contributed
medical personnel to preserve peace in the Balkans. To the war in
Afghanistan, Lithuania has offered use of its airspace and airfields,
support for ``Operation Enduring Freedom'', deployed medical teams with
the Czech contingent in ISAF in 2002 and German contingent in 2003 and
deployed Special Operations Forces unit in support of OEF. To the war
in Iraq, Lithuania has sent its liaison officer to CENTCOM, signed the
V-10 statement compelling Iraq to disarm, offered overflight and
transit rights to United States and coalition forces and offered cargo
handlers and medics.
foreign policy is and should not be a partisan matter
In 1993 the Clinton Administration made the decision to invite new
members. The 1994 ``Republican Contract with America'' supported NATO
enlargement. On April 30, 1998 United States Senate ratified the last
NATO expansion by a 80 to 19 vote.
The Democrat and Republican Party Platforms of 2000 supported NATO
enlargement, as did both presidential candidates.
On April 5, 2001 seventeen United States Senators, both Republican
and Democrat leaders, wrote a letter to President Bush urging the Bush
administration to ``ensure'' that NATO invites qualified European
democracies to begin accession negotiations at the 2002 Summit in
Prague.
NATO enlargement and ratification is and should remain a non-
partisan issue.
For all the reasons aforesaid, NATO enlargement will support and
increase the security and international interests of the United States.
Regina F. Narusis, J.D.,
Chairman of National Board of Directors,
Lithuanian-American Community, Inc.
Algimantas S. Gecys,
President of National Executive Committee,
Lithuanian-American Community, Inc.
______
Baltic American Freedom League, Inc.,
P.O. Box 65056,
Los Angeles, CA, March 26, 2003.
The Honorable George Voinovich,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC 20510.
Dear Senator Voinovich:
On behalf of the members of the Baltic American Freedom League, I
am submitting the League's statement recommending NATO membership for
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
We respectfully request that the statement be made part of the
record of the Foreign Relations Committee's hearings on amending the
Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949.
You have been a great and true friend to the Baltic American
community and the Baltic countries, and we sincerely appreciate it. The
Baltic American community believes that the Baltic countries are
qualified for membership in NATO, and we hope that you will continue to
support them in this endeavor.
Sincerely,
Valdis V. Pavlovskis, President
Prepared Statement of Valdis V. Pavlovskis, President, Baltic American
Freedom League, Inc.
baltic membership in nato
On behalf of the members of the Baltic American Freedom League, the
Board of Directors respectfully request that the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee support the membership of Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania in NATO and recommend their membership in NATO to the full
Senate.
Since the Baltic countries regained their independence, Congress
has supported the integration of the Baltic nations in western defense
structures. In support, in 1994 Congress enacted the NATO Participation
Act, in 1996 it passed the European Security Act, and in 2002, by an
overwhelming vote, the Freedom Consolidations Act. In addition, last
year the House of Representatives passed HCR 116 and HCR 468
recommending Baltic membership in NATO.
Congress has supported Baltic aspirations to join NATO by annually
providing funding through FMF and IMET for the development of Baltic
armed forces. For a decade, American military advisory teams have
served in the Baltic countries training the Baltic military, and
hundreds of Baltic soldiers of all ranks have graduated from U.S.
military schools. Baltic military forces have participated in joint
military exercises with NATO forces. Recent NATO inspection teams as
well as visits by U.S. Congressional delegations have concluded that
the Baltic countries are qualified for NATO membership.
In the short period since they regained their independence, the
Baltic countries have developed strong and responsible democratic
governments, viable free market economies and transparent and
democratic armed forces. OSCE, the U.S. Department of State, and
various international bodies have found that the Baltic countries
respect and fully comply with international standards of civil and
human rights.
The early fears that Russian opposition to Baltic membership in
NATO would give rise to Russian nationalism and have a deleterious
effect on U.S.-Russian relations have not materialized.
Today, the Baltic countries participate in the Partnership for
Peace program and operation Enduring Freedom. Baltic troops are serving
in the Balkans and Afghanistan.
The Baltic countries were one of the first to support U.S. action
in Iraq, and they were the initiators of the Vilnius Ten declaration in
support of the U.S., in spite of retaliation threatened by their larger
neighbors France and Germany. All three Baltic countries are preparing
to assist in reconstruction of a post Saddam Iraq.
The Baltic countries have demonstrated their willingness and
capability to assume the responsibilities of NATO membership. They
share our values and have proved to be loyal friends of the United
States. As Americans of Baltic heritage, the Baltic American Freedom
League is proud and confident to support Baltic membership into NATO.
We hope that you will too.
We look forward to working with you to gain support for amending
the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 to include Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania.
Senator Voinovich. Mr. Janusz Bugajski.
STATEMENT OF JANUSZ BUGAJSKI, DIRECTOR, EASTERN EUROPE PROJECT,
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Bugajski. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank
you very much for inviting me to offer my perspectives, both on
NATO's future, but more importantly here the inclusion of
Bulgaria and Romania. In the limited time I have, and I will
try and be brief, I will simply present the core of my written
testimony, which is brief to begin with.
Let me say this at the outset. America's national security
doctrine issued in September 2002 declared that the NATO
alliance must be able to act wherever common interests are
threatened, create conditions under NATO's own mandate, and
contribute to mission-based coalitions. To achieve this, quote,
``we must expand NATO's membership to those democratic nations
willing and able to share the burden of defending and advancing
our common interests,'' unquote. I think it is primarily in
this context that the newly invited countries can be assessed.
If, indeed, the United States is determined to cultivate
alliances with reliable partners, whether by reinvigorating
NATO or bypassing its cumbersome decisionmaking procedures,
then each NATO aspirant needs to be measured according to five
basic standards, domestic stability and democracy, bilateral
political cooperation, military collaboration, regional
security, and commitment to the anti-terror coalition. I
believe that in each of these cases, both Bulgaria and Romania
have passed the test for membership. Let me just note a few
examples.
Bulgaria has developed a stable democratic system with a
functioning market economy. It has held several free and
democratic elections, and the political transition between
governing parties has been smooth and trouble-free. The
policies of all major political forces has been pro-reform and
pro-NATO. The Bulgarian economy has been stabilized through an
effective Currency Board that controls State spending, and the
country has registered a steady GDP growth in recent years.
Substantial progress has been registered in the restructuring
of the armed forces into a modern and combat-ready military
tailored to NATO needs.
There is comprehensive political and public support for
Bulgaria's NATO membership, despite the country's financial
constraints, and there is a commitment to allocate
approximately 3 percent of GDP to defense spending over the
coming years.
Bulgaria considers itself a partner and ally of the United
States, and there is overall agreement on major decisions
related to Bulgaria's contribution to NATO and the anti-terror
campaign. As a nonpermanent member of the U.N. Security Council
for the 2002-2003 period, Bulgaria has consistently supported
U.S. positions, unlike several of America's NATO allies.
In terms of contributions to the U.S.-led anti-terror and
anti-rogue State operations, Bulgaria has enabled air, land,
and sea transit to coalition forces and the temporary
deployment of U.S. aircraft for refueling and cargo-lifting
purposes in both the Afghani and Iraqi operations. It has
allocated military units to the International Security
Assistance forces in Afghanistan, and dispatched an anti-
nuclear, biological, and chemical unit on a defensive mission
to a country neighboring Iraq.
Similar to its neighbor to the south, Romania has achieved
a high level of political stability, it has held several free
and fair elections, and created a democratic political
structure. The country's major political forces are committed
to democracy, free markets, and integration into international
institutions.
Romania has displayed economic growth and stabilized the
most important macroeconomic indicators. In terms of military
progress, Romania has established full civilian control,
substantially streamlined its forces, and is intent on
modernizing its military hardware. President Iliescu has
asserted that defense spending will not fall below 2.3 percent
of GDP in the next few years.
Romania itself, similar to Bulgaria, has made significant
progress as America's strategic partner. Bucharest has provided
diplomatic support for the U.S. positions in various
international venues, such as the U.N. and OSCE. It has backed
American immunity from the ICC process, and has on occasion
taken pro-U.S. positions that were at odds with the European
Union.
Romania supported the United States from the outset after
September 11, and participated in the post-war mission in
Afghanistan. Intelligence-sharing and law enforcement
cooperation has been growing. Bucharest has provided political
support for U.S. operation against Iraq, and concrete
assistance in the Iraqi campaign, including fly over rights,
use of ports and military facilities. It has dispatched
decontamination, medical, and demining contingents to the
Middle East, and pledged to participate in Iraq's post-war
reconstruction.
In light of the evidence, I believe that both Bulgarian and
Romanian membership in NATO will directly assist U.S. national
security interests and global strategies, and I cite five
reasons. Let me briefly go through these. This is in
conclusion.
First, NATO entry is a reward for Bulgaria's and Romania's
proven record of reform in recent years, and their commitment
to Western norms and objectives. It will help propel forward
the reform process and enable further military development and
interoperability with U.S. forces. Although neither country is
presently capable of making significant military contributions,
both can offer specialized support in particular niches.
Second, NATO entry for Bulgaria and Romania is a practical
method for reinvigorating the Transatlantic link and creating a
larger pool of interoperable countries with which the United
States can construct coalitions for future security operations.
NATO as an organization will remain divided into allies of
various degrees of dependability for Washington. However,
Bulgaria and Romania can be placed at the high end of the
spectrum and their membership can serve to narrow the
transatlantic divide or provide new bridges across existing
gaps.
Third, NATO entry for Bulgaria and Romania is a valuable
means for buttressing the U.S. position vis-a-vis the European
allies. It will give Washington additional voices of support
within NATO's decisionmaking process, and broaden diplomatic
and political assistance in various international fora and
organizations.
Fourth, NATO entry for Bulgaria and Romania will enhance
the shift of the U.S. security focus to the Black Sea-Caspian-
East Mediterranean triangle. Located on the Black Sea, Romania
and Bulgaria offer more direct routes to the Middle East across
the Black Sea to the Caucasus or through Turkey. The strategic
and economic significance of these regions is increasing,
especially with the development of oil and gas lines from
Russia and Central Asia, and with ongoing regional conflicts
that challenge America's security interests.
And fifth and last, NATO entry for Bulgaria and Romania
will encourage other southeast European countries to accelerate
their reform programs. It will provide vision and direction to
several States in the region that are preparing for NATO
membership, including Croatia, Albania, and Macedonia. It will
also help to place future contenders, including Serbia and
Montenegro, on track for both PfP and eventual NATO accession.
Washington, I also believe, should support Montenegro's
aspirations toward independent statehood if, indeed, the EU-
sponsored link with Serbia proves untenable. The United States
can also take a more active role in ending the U.N.-mandated
status quo in Kosovo and moving that pro-American aspiring
State toward independence.
It is plainly evident, Mr. Chairman, that the greater
number of new European States, the bigger the pool of new
American allies.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bugajski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Janusz Bugajski, Director, East European Project,
Center for Strategic and International Studies
the future of nato: do bulgaria and romania qualify?
Before we can answer the question whether any European state
qualifies for NATO membership, we need to determine how NATO has
evolved and in what way it will be further transformed. The North
Atlantic Alliance is in turmoil if not crisis and the reasons are
plentiful: insufficient burden sharing by the west Europeans,
inefficient decision-making in times of crisis, differing commitments
to potential combat missions, and serious political disputes between
leading Allies. The newly invited east European states need to reflect
that the NATO they are poised to enter is very different to the one
that they first petitioned for membership. For the United States, the
most vital question is whether the entry of seven new democracies,
including Bulgaria and Romania, into the Alliance will help or hinder
America's national interests and global strategies
nato present and future
We have entered a turbulent era in trans-Atlantic relations that
may drastically reshape the strategic map of Europe. While NATO may not
disappear from the scene, it could increasingly: resemble the OSCE
(Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) or a mini-UN with
a more pronounced emphasis on crisis management, conflict prevention,
and ``soft security.'' Alternatively, in addition to promoting stronger
bilateral ties with like-minded Allies, Washington may seek a revamped
NATO structure that can more effectively intersect with U.S. interests.
In this context, it is useful to highlight some of the fundamental
questions that are not only troubling for current members but also for
all NATO aspirants:
Is NATO a coherent and effective Alliance or a fractured
organization with multiple and diverse objectives? Can NATO act
in unison or will it evolve into a looser structure in which
certain members respond to specific crises by assembling
smaller willing coalitions? How will NATO decision-making be
modified to adjust to these new circumstances?
Will NATO remain as a single and capable military alliance,
as well as a security and political alliance? Or will there be
a growing division of labor between combat missions and peace-
keeping operations with an emphasis on smaller ad-hoc
coalitions both within and outside of NATO?
Is NATO largely superfluous for U.S. policy not only in
terms of military capabilities and performance, but even in
terms of collective political and diplomatic support? If France
and Germany can block the United States on the UN Security
Council and in NATO decision-making, will a different sort of
trans-Atlantic Alliance emerge, one that bypasses some of
Europe's older democracies?
Will the United States severely diminish its involvement
with NATO, both militarily and politically? Washington is
increasingly disregarding NATO as an organization in its
struggle against rogue regimes and terrorist networks and
focusing instead on bilateral relations with more dependable
allies. As a result, is NATO's significance declining
regardless of its enlargement into the eastern half of Europe?
europe's new democracies
America's National Security Doctrine issued in September 2002
declared that the NATO alliance must be able to act wherever common
interests are threatened, create coalitions under NATO's own mandate,
and contribute to mission-based coalitions. To achieve this: ``We must
expand NATO's membership to those democratic nations willing and able
to share the burden of defending and advancing our common interests.''
It is primarily in this context that the newly invited countries can be
assessed:
The east Europeans operate on two basic principles--to keep
NATO united and effective and to maintain U.S. engagement in
Europe. In their estimation, even if the former fails the
latter must succeed to help ensure their own security. The
obvious fear is that if France or Germany or any other power
can block Alliance planning for assistance to a long-standing
NATO ally, such as Turkey (and disregard NATO's Article 5),
then an Alliance reaction to a potential Russian threat to
Estonia, Lithuania, or Poland could prove even more timid.
All NATO applicants view the United States as the preeminent
guarantor of their security, freedom, and national
independence. Both publicly and privately, east Europe's
political leaders remain skeptical about west Europe's security
capabilities and deliveries. Moreover, they are fearful lest
some new French-German-Russian axis undermines American
engagement in Europe and diminishes their own sense of
security. East Europe's objective is not to choose between
Europe and America but to help protect Europe by keeping
America engaged in the ``old continent.''
If Washington sees only obstruction and uncooperativeness in
Paris, Berlin, and Brussels, then it can redirect its resources
and refocus its interests on more willing allies elsewhere in
Europe. Reports that Washington may be planning to move
military bases from Germany to Poland indicate that some of the
older allies are no longer viewed as dependable or their
positions are no longer perceived as strategically significant.
Although at present the military potential of the new European
democracies is limited, Washington can help invest in
developing their military capabilities over the coming decade.
If indeed the United States is determined to cultivate alliances
with reliable partners, whether by reinvigorating NATO or by bypassing
its cumbersome decision-making procedures, then each NATO aspirant
needs to be measured according to five basic standards: domestic
stability and democracy; bilateral political cooperation; military
collaboration; regional security; and commitment to the anti-terror
coalition.
bulgaria's qualifications
Domestic Stability and Democracy
Bulgaria has developed a stable democratic system with a
functioning market economy. It has held several free and democratic
elections and the political transition between governing parties has
been smooth and trouble-free. The policies of all major political
forces have been pro-reform and pro-NATO, and even the post-communist
Socialist Party has developed a Western orientation. Bulgaria has not
experienced any significant ethnic conflicts although the social and
economic position of the large Roma minority remains a point of concern
as in several other east European states. The sizable Turkish minority
is represented in the coalition government.
The Bulgarian economy has been stabilized through an effective
currency board system that controls state spending and has registered a
steady GDP growth in recent years. However, much of the population
experiences low standards of living and foreign investment has been
limited. The country still faces problems with corruption and the
judiciary system is often ineffective and needs to be more resolutely
restructured. Anti-corruption measures have been implemented, but more
tangible results will be evident with more comprehensive judicial
reform.
Substantial progress has been registered in the restructuring of
the armed forces into a modern and combat-ready military tailored to
NATO needs. Force Structure Reviews have been completed in full
compliance with NATO requirements. Democratic civilian control over the
armed forces is being consolidated and the government needs to maintain
its commitment to streamlining the armed forces in line with its
Defense Plan 2004.
There is comprehensive political and public support for Bulgaria's
NATO membership despite the country's financial constraints, and there
is a firm commitment to allocate approximately 3% of the GDP to defense
spending over the coming years. There is a high level of protection of
classified information in compliance with NATO standards while controls
over the export of possible dual use weapons and technologies have been
tightened.
Bilateral Political Cooperation
Bulgaria considers itself a partner and ally of the United States
and there is overall agreement on major decisions related to Bulgaria's
contribution to NATO and the anti-terrorist campaign. As a non-
permanent member of the UN Security Council for the 2002-2003 period,
Bulgaria has consistently supported U.S. positions unlike several of
America's NATO allies. The current center-right government has backed
Washington in the Iraqi crisis despite some verbal criticism by the
Socialist President Georgi Parvanov and the Socialist opposition in
parliament. Although the Socialists are supportive of NATO membership,
some of their leaders maintain close links with the Russian
authorities, which seek to diminish America's global role. Such ties
have weakened over the past decade and it is clearly in U.S. interest
to limit Moscow's political interference in Bulgaria's domestic and
foreign policy.
Military Collaboration
Bulgaria has supported U.S. and NATO military operations in both
word and deed. It granted airspace for the NATO ``Allied Force''
operation in Serbia in March-June 1999 and the transit of NATO forces
and equipment for the ``Joint Guardian'' operation in Kosova in July
1999. Bulgaria played an important role in avoiding a possible crisis
in relations between NATO and Russia in June 1999 by denying Russian
forces overflight rights during NATO's liberation of Kosova. Sofia
interacted with NATO during the transit of KFOR contingents through
Bulgarian territory. Bulgaria has also participated in two NATO-led
operations: in SFOR (Bosnia-Hercegovina) and in KFOR (Kosova) and is
the only NATO PfP state to participate with its own contingent in SFOR.
Regional Security
Bulgaria maintains good relations with all of its neighbors and has
no outstanding disputes. It has played a leading role in a number of
regional cooperation formats, including the multi-national South East
European Peace-Keeping Force (SEEBRIG), and has hosted its headquarters
in the city of Plovdiv. Sofia has participated in the regional security
initiative SEDM (South East Europe Defense Ministerial). Bulgaria has
played a constructive role vis-a-vis Macedonia and was the first
country to recognize Macedonia's independence in 1992. It has also
contributed to democratic developments in Serbia following the ouster
of Slobodan Milosevic in 2000.
Anti-Terror Coalition
In terms of contributions to the U.S.-led anti-terror and anti-
rogue states operations, Bulgaria has enabled air, land, and sea
transit to coalition forces and the temporary deployment of U.S.
aircraft for refueling and cargo-lifting purposes in both the
Afghanistan and Iraq operations. It has allocated military units to the
International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and
dispatched an anti-nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) unit on a
defensive mission to a country neighboring Iraq. Moreover, Bulgaria has
consistently supported the U.S. position toward the Iraqi question on
the UN Security Council.
romania's qualifications
Domestic Stability and Democracy
Similarly to its neighbor to the south, Romania has achieved a high
level of political stability, held several free and fair elections, and
created a democratic political structure. One troubling element has
been the parliamentary representation of a populist-nationalist party,
which has exploited Romania's economic difficulties. Nevertheless, the
country's major political forces are committed to democracy, free
markets, and integration into international institutions.
Ethnic relations have remained reasonably stable in Romania
although some disputes have been visible with the Hungarian minority.
The persistent problem of poverty with regard to the large Roma
minority will require more intensive governmental and international
involvement.
Romania has displayed economic growth and stabilized the most
important macro-economic indicators. With reductions in the public
deficit, stabilized inflation, and strengthened foreign relations, both
Romania and Bulgaria are pushing toward EU accession over the next few
years. However, the IMF has stressed that Bucharest needs to maintain
consistency in its economic policies to avoid lurching back toward the
stagnant economic conditions notable in the 1990s.
In terms of military progress, Romania has established full
civilian control, substantially streamlined its forces, and is intent
on modernizing its military hardware. President Ion Iliescu has
asserted that defense spending will not fall bellow 2.3% of GDP in the
next five years. Romania still has some problem areas that need to be
tackled more resolutely in the years ahead. In particular, official
corruption needs to be combated, the judicial system overhauled, and
the screening of ex-Securitate personnel staff continued in order to
protect official defense secrets and NATO intelligence.
Bilateral Political Cooperation
Romania has made significant progress as America's ``strategic
partner.'' Bucharest has provided diplomatic support for the U.S.
positions in various international venues such as the UN and OSCE. It
has backed American immunity from the ICC (International Criminal
Court) process and has on occasion taken pro-U.S. positions that were
at odds with the European Union. President Bush's visit to Romania
after the NATO summit in November 2002 highlighted the closeness of the
bilateral relationship.
Military Collaboration
Romania and America have developed close military contacts, through
joint exercises, educational programs, and arms contracts with U.S.
companies. Romania is thereby becoming increasingly interoperable with
NATO and with American forces. Bucharest has completed a new
headquarters for SEEBRIG in Constanta on the Black Sea that will help
ensure the unit's interoperability with NATO. Romania has also
contributed one ship to the BLACKSEAFOR multinational naval patrol and
will play an increasingly important role in this region.
Regional Security
Romania has endeavored to play a stabilizing role across several
regions, including South East Europe and the Black Sea zone. It has
participated in several Balkan peace-keeping missions, including in
Bosnia-Hercegovina, Kosova, and Albania, and in several regional
security initiatives such as SEDM (South East Europe Defense
Ministerial). Bucharest has established a regionally focused anti-crime
center in Bucharest under the auspices of SECI, originally an American
initiative. It has helped to coordinate, together with Bulgaria, its
approach on NATO accession through participation in the ``Vilnius 10''
group.
Anti-Terror Coalition
Romania supported the U.S. from the outset after September 11th and
participated in the post-war mission in Afghanistan. Intelligence-
sharing and law enforcement cooperation has been growing. Bucharest has
provided political support for the U.S. operation against Iraq and
concrete assistance in the Iraqi campaign, including fly-over rights,
use of ports and military facilities, dispatched decontamination,
medical, and demining contingents to the Middle East, and pledged to
participate in Iraq's post-war reconstruction. Seventy soldiers
belonging to Romania's anti-nuclear, biological, and chemical unit
(NBC) are stationed in the Persian Gulf region. The unit will intervene
behind front lines ``for decontamination actions'' in the event the
Iraqis use chemical or biological weapons against coalition forces.
u.s. interests in nato enlargement
In sum, both Bulgaria and Romania together with the other NATO
invitees have matured into self-sustaining democracies. As in Central
Europe, American ``democracy-building'' assistance needs to be
privatized and indigenized under competent local control. A self-
standing civil society, a broad spectrum of political parties, and a
professional free media can develop more effectively without
unnecessary, inappropriate, and sometimes counter-productive outside
oversight. Such an approach will send a strong signal of trust and
commitment to America's new allies. In the light of the evidence, both
Bulgarian and Romanian membership in NATO will directly assist U.S.
national interests and global strategies.
NATO entry is a reward for Bulgaria's and Romania's proven
record of reform in recent years and their commitment to
Western norms and objectives. It will help propel forward the
reform process and enable further military development and
interoperability with U.S. forces. Although neither country is
presently capable of making significant military contributions,
both can offer specialized support in particular niches.
NATO entry for Bulgaria and Romania is a practical method
for reinvigorating the transAtlantic link and creating a larger
pool of interoperable countries with which the United States
can construct coalitions for future security operations. NATO
as an organization will remain divided into allies of various
degrees of dependability for Washington. Bulgaria and Romania
can be placed at the high end of the spectrum and their
membership can serve to narrow the trans-Atlantic divide or
provide new bridges across existing gaps.
NATO entry for Bulgaria and Romania is a valuable means for
buttressing the U.S. position vis-a-vis the European allies. It
will give Washington additional voices of support within NATO's
decision-making process and broaden diplomatic and political
assistance in various international fora and organizations.
NATO entry for Bulgaria and Romania will help enhance the
shift in the U.S. security focus to the Black-Caspian-East
Mediterranean triangle. Located on the Black Sea, Romania and
Bulgaria offer more direct routes to the Middle East, across
the Black Sea to the Caucasus, or through Turkey. The strategic
and economic significance of these regions is increasing,
especially with the development of oil and gas lines from
Russia and Central Asia and with ongoing regional conflicts
that challenge America's security interests.
NATO entry for Bulgaria and Romania will encourage other
Balkan countries to accelerate their reform programs. It will
provide vision and direction to several other states in the
region that are preparing for NATO membership, including
Croatia, Albania, and Macedonia. It will also help to place
future contenders, including Serbia and Montenegro, on track
for PfP (Partnership for Peace) and eventual NATO accession.
Washington should also support Montenegro's aspirations toward
independent statehood if the EU-sponsored link with Serbia
proves unsuccessful. The United States can also take a more
active role in ending the UN-mandated status quo in Kosova and
moving that pro-American aspiring state toward independence. It
is plainly evident that the greater number of new European
states, the bigger the pool of new American allies.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Bugajski. Dr. Simon.
STATEMENT OF DR. JEFFREY SIMON, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW,
INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE
UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Simon. Mr. Chairman, it is a great privilege to be here
today. I have submitted a longer statement for the record. Due
to the limited time I will make a few brief comments which I
hope will help frame this afternoon's discussion on enlargement
and NATO's future.
I want to state clearly that I support NATO's November 2002
Prague summit decision to enlarge the North Atlantic Council to
26, recognizing that NATO will be a very different organization
from what it has been. After the December 2002 Copenhagen
summit decision to enlarge to 25, the EU also will be a new
institution. The dual enlargement will reduce institutional
variable geometry in Europe with eight new NATO members
overlapping in the EU in 2004.
The U.S. military footprint is also likely to change in
Europe by the thinning of troops in Germany with a new presence
shifting to the east and the southeast. Hence, a new EU-NATO
institutional relationship will be needed, particularly with
the EU now in Macedonia and perhaps soon in Bosnia, and NATO
enlargement can play a positive role here.
Mr. Chairman, NATO enlarged during the cold war for
purposes of defense and enlarged again during the post-cold war
to incorporate producers of security. September 11, 2001
changed our perception of risk and the criteria for extending
NATO invitations. I believe that the seven new members share
common values, interests, and perceptions of risks, but they
are weaker and smaller than the 1999 entrants. We need to
remember some lessons suggested from the 1999 enlargement.
First, integration was more difficult and long term than
anticipated, second, NATO had to alter its expectations in
terms of performance, and third, when the new members joined
NATO they still required assistance. The dual enlargement,
coupled with the changing U.S. military footprint, will likely
influence the course and evolution of the new NATO, new EU and
European security in the northeast, in the southeast, and in
the center.
In the northeast, with Baltic States in NATO and the EU,
along with Poland in the EU in 2004, and with the U.S.
footprint in Poland, we will likely see continued strong
defense interests in support of NATO and U.S. political and
military cooperation there.
In the southeast, greater institutional variable geometry
will result, with Romania and Bulgaria in NATO and delayed EU
entry. The U.S. footprint here will be important, because the
EU assumed the NATO mission in Macedonia and plans the SFOR
follow-on in Bosnia, and because U.S. presence will reinforce
Romania and Bulgaria's strong support of NATO and U.S.
political and military cooperation.
In the center, why Slovakia and Slovenia, which is what you
asked me to focus on. Both will be in the EU in 2004. Both
provide a land bridge, although this is of diminishing
importance to Hungary, but evince weak support for NATO. If the
September 2002 Slovak elections, or the 23 March 2003 Slovene
referendum went differently, I would not be defending their
ratification today.
Let us look at Slovakia. With 5\1/2\ million people, it
started late. It started on 1 January, 1993. It had the dual
curse of on the one hand having to build a new defense
establishment from scratch, but it also inherited large forces
from the former Warsaw Pact, so it had the worst of both
worlds. Public confusion on NATO existed due to two failed
referenda that were basically pushed in 1997 and 1998 under
Vladimir Meciar.
What progress has Slovakia made? On the government level,
they have, in fact--this is under Dzurinda's government--
engaged in very significant educational initiatives to build
popular support for NATO. The government also supports the
United States in the war on terrorism with overflights, they
have sent troops to Afghanistan and Kuwait, and they support
our Iraq operations.
Second, the U.S. defense assessment which we provided for
Slovakia in 2000 provides the conceptual basis for their army
2010 program. They presently have a total active force of
30,000, 14,200 professionals and 15,800 conscripts of 12-month
duration. Implementation of their reform, I can report, is
going well. Their recruitment should lead to 20,000
professionals by 2007. They have maintained since 2002 1.9
percent of GDP for defense, and they are effectively planning a
niche capability.
The one cloud on the horizon is the fact that there could
be, though not very probable, a referendum on NATO that some
elements are presently pushing in Slovakia.
Let us go to Slovenia, a country of 2 million. Here we find
weak NATO support. We did have, as you well know, a referendum
recently where 66 percent of the populace turned out in support
of NATO. We were all very relieved, if not surprised. And 89.6
percent supported the EU One could argue that this was somewhat
of an aberration in that it was response, I think, to the
Djindjic assassination, which reminded many Slovenes that they
live in a rough neighborhood.
What progress have they made? They have a stable economy
and a stable polity, probably the most stable of all the seven
entrants. Our U.S. defense assessment in 2000, which we also
worked with them, helped to establish some realism in their
defense planning. In 2003, right now, they have got a total
active force of 7,800. That is 4,640 professionals and 3,160 7-
month conscripts who are not terribly useful.
Let us look at implementation. Frankly, if I compare their
implementation to others, some of their implementation is worth
questioning. They plan an all-volunteer force by the end of
2004, and they hope to have 7,800 professionals by 2008. They
still have a way to go. They have attempted to promise NATO one
battalion across the board, but frankly, this is unrealistic.
Defense expenditures are presently 1.61 percent of GDP, and
they claim a goal of 2 percent by 2008, which frankly, with low
social support, like Hungary, this may not come to fruition.
They have provided weapons to the Afghan National Army.
They have managed the demining fund, but they remain hesitant
on Iraq. The Prime Minister has criticized Foreign Minister
Rupel for signing the V-10 declaration but, to their credit,
they have sent as a substitute 100 troops to Sector North in
Bosnia in January of this year.
Why Slovenia? Its accession to NATO and EU provides,
really, a symbolic segue for FRY successor States to Euro-
Atlantic institutions. This is picking up on Janusz' point.
Hence, Slovenia's incorporation in the list enhances the
security and stability in the southeast quadrant of Europe.
For these reasons, I support the ratification of the seven
Prague summit invitees to join the alliance, but based upon
lowered, more sober, and realistic expectations. First, we need
to recognize new members are smaller and have weaker military
and institutional capacities than NATO's 1999 entrants, and
they will find it difficult to meet NATO's staffing
requirements. Hence, we should not terminate eligibility for
certain U.S. programs like the Warsaw Initiative funds as we
did in 1999.
Second, after accession, NATO leverage will diminish. How
can we keep them on course with defense budget and force goal
commitments? All except Romania will become ineligible for FMF
for not signing Article 98 of the ICC. Perhaps we should
reassess their FMF eligibility on a case-by-case basis and
provide waivers, as we have done for other NATO allies, but
link waivers to performance.
Third, since the United States has already performed
defense assessments for all the 2004 invitees, after accession
we might focus on the means to assist their development of
niche capabilities and encourage forging cooperative links
between the NATO Response Force and the European Rapid Reaction
Force of the EU.
Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your
questions and comments.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Simon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Jeffrey Simon,\1\ Senior Research Fellow,
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The opinions expressed or implied in this paper are solely
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
INSS, the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or
any other governmental agency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NATO, the core institution defining the transatlantic relationship,
stands at a crossroad. Now that the Alliance's 21-22 November 2002
Prague Summit has passed into history, NATO will need to focus on
implementing its decisions that include the adoption of transformed
command arrangements, a NATO Response Force (NRF), a Capabilities
Commitment to deal with post-September 11th security challenges, and
substantial enlargement of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to 26
members in 2004. The ``new'' NATO will be a very different organization
from what it has been. On balance, integration of the seven new members
on NATO will make a modest but generally quite positive contribution to
this transformation of transatlantic security affairs.
The European Union (EU)'s decision at Copenhagen on 12-13 December
2002 to enlarge from 15 members today to 25 by mid-2004 will similarly
challenge and transform that organization. In 2004 eight of NATO's new
members (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania,
Estonia, Slovakia, and Slovenia) also will be in a ``new'' EU.
The dual (NATO and EU) enlargement will further reduce the
``variable geometry'' that has existed between the two institutions in
Europe and result in ``mingling EU and NATO cultures'' with unknown,
but potentially significant consequences. However, the EU's eight new
NATO members, who have recent historical memory of Soviet domination,
joined the Alliance because they see it as the best vehicle to
guarantee their security and defense concerns and strongly support the
active U.S. political and military engagement on the continent that
NATO helps assure. For these reasons, one hopes and expects that they
will exert their influence to support greater EU-NATO cooperation on
security and defense issues, and therefore have beneficial effects on
both institutions by helping to bridge the transatlantic gap.
The United States' military ``footprint'' is also likely to change
in Europe not just by thinning of its presence in Germany, but also by
acquiring a ``new presence'' and shifting in the direction of Europe's
east and southeast. If the U.S. and Europe are to be successful in
working together, a new EU-NATO institutional relationship will be
needed, in part, due to the overlapping responsibilities that have
become evident with NATO's involvement in western Balkan international
border security. Additionally, both sides of the Atlantic need to work
to ensure that the EU ESDP and emerging European Rapid Reaction Force
(ERRF) are complementary and does not become competitive.
This is particularly important now since the EU on 31 March 2003
has assumed responsibility for NATO's ``Operation Allied Harmony'' in
Macedonia and would be more so if the EU were to assume leadership of a
follow-on force to NATO's SFOR in Bosnia. After the 2004 dual
enlargement, the resulting ``variable geometry'' of the EU and NATO in
the Balkans could likely have security repercussions there. Hence,
there will be a greater need to maintain NATO for defense and
reassurance and in deepening cooperation between the two institutions.
why nato enlargement?
NATO during the Cold War (1949-1991) maintained a consensus on the
USSR/Warsaw Pact threat as defined in Military Committee 161 threat
assessments. While we knew our opponent's capabilities, we did not know
his intent. Defense of Europe remained a central U.S. priority as
embedded in NATO's MC 14/3 ``flexible response.'' Hence, when NATO
enlarged during this period it was for the purpose of defense. In the
midst of the Korean War, Greece and Turkey were added in 1952 to
contain the USSR, the Federal Republic of Germany with its newly
created Bundeswehr in 1955, and Spain in 1982 for strategic depth.
The post-Cold War (1991-September 11, 2001) period was marked by
the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact and with their
eclipse, the perception of common threat. When NATO enlarged it was for
enhancing stability and security. The July 1990 London Summit stressed
openness to cooperation and willingness to break down former dividing
lines in Europe. The November 1991 Rome Summit deepened this
cooperation and created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC),
and the January 1994 Brussels Summit clarified the Alliance's openness
to enlargement (Article 10) and launched Partnership For Peace (PFP).
When invitations were extended at the Madrid Summit in July 1997, and
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined on 12 March 1999,
enlargement was justified as incorporating ``producers'' of (political,
economic, social, and military) security as defined in the September
1995 Study on NATO Enlargement.
What lessons should we have learned from the 1999 enlargement?
First, the three new allies found integration to be a more
difficult and long-term process than they anticipated. Promised
Target Force Goals and defense commitments had to be
renegotiated, extended, or changed.
Second, the Alliance had to alter its expectations in terms
of performance and found it more difficult to gain compliance
once the new allies were members.
Third, we assumed that upon ``graduation'' to becoming a
full member, they could stand on their own feet. They were
excluded from many programs that had been put into place to
help prepare them become the allies they wanted to become, and
that we wanted them to become. In the end, we might conclude
that the overall enlargement was ``successful,'' though to date
Hungary's performance has not been as satisfactory as that of
Poland and the Czech Republic.
The events of 11 September 2001 changed our perception of threat
and the criteria for extending NATO invitations. Although the 1994
Brussels Summit issued a declaration ``to intensify our efforts against
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of
delivery'' and the 1999 Strategic Concept referred to terrorism in an
Article 4 context, terrorism remained in the background during the
post-Cold War period. But when NATO invoked Article 5 on 12 September
2001, the issue was raised to the forefront of NATO's post-Cold War
agenda and the divergence in transatlantic risk assessments became more
apparent.
Clearly the United States perception of risk has changed, and the
huge increase in defense expenditures reflects this. Although European
NATO allies invoked Article 5 and some have provided defense assistance
in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan and to Operation Iraqi
Freedom, risk assessments remain diverse, especially when searching for
any increases in defense expenditures. In a total reversal from the
Cold War, where we knew our opponent's capabilities but not his intent,
in the war on terrorism we know our opponent's intent, but not his
capabilities. While NATO remains a ``defensive'' Alliance, the U.S. war
on terrorism requires ``offensive'' operations (e.g., pre-emption)
often far beyond the territories of NATO members. This mentality shift
strains the transatlantic relationship, particularly for those European
allies who do not share the same perception of risk and had come to see
NATO's main role as providing reassurance and stability, rather than in
defending Europe.
If 11 September had not occurred, it is likely that the Prague
invitation list would have been smaller. The Prague Summit invited
seven Membership Action Plan (MAP) partners from the Baltic to Black
Sea to join the Alliance because we believe they share common values
and perception of risk. Will enlarging the NAC to include 26 members
sharing common values and interests be sufficient to help NATO to deal
with these risks or will enlargement only make them worse?
The seven new members' physical and institutional capacities are
substantially weaker than Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic,
whose performance as allies has been ``mixed,'' though can be judged as
successful. However, some of their demonstrated deficiencies suggest
``lessons'' for us as we pursue the integration of NATO's seven new
2004 allies. Certainly, the MAP introduced at the April 1999 Washington
Summit has witnessed the evolution of a defense reform process that
should ease some post-accession challenges for the new invitees, but
their weaker capacities suggest the need for greater patience and
further assistance as they prepare to assume the obligations of full
membership.
The 2002 Prague Summit's invitees have substantially weaker
capabilities than NATO's three new 1999 members (Poland with a
population of 38 million, and Hungary and the Czech Republic with 10
million) because they are smaller and have less developed institutional
capacities. Each of the seven invitees has significant strengths and
deficiencies, and in light of their support after September 11, 2001,
it was more difficult to make ``credible'' distinctions among the
seven. They were clearly ``more viable'' than Albania and Macedonia
whose fundaments of statehood have been in question and who have been
``consuming'' NATO's security and defense resources, and Croatia, who
had just joined the MAP in 2002 and is only beginning its reform.
Omitting any of the seven invitees would have raised credibility issues
because the ``strengths'' of any excluded partner would have been
weighed against the ``weaknesses'' of the invited. An invitation list
of seven made credible NATO's Article 10 commitment to openness and
prevented ``drawing lines'' in Europe.
dual enlargement and the changing u.s. military ``footprint''
With the challenge of the war on terrorism, the Prague Summit
Declaration has addressed the question of what capabilities it needs by
creating a ``NATO Response Force (NRF) consisting of a technologically
advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force
including land, sea, and air elements . . . [with] full operational
capability by October 2006. The NRF and EU Headline Goal should be
mutually reinforcing while respecting the autonomy of both
organizations.'' It approved the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC)
as part of an effort to create minimal necessary capabilities to deal
with a high threat environment. Individual allies have made firm
commitments to improve capabilities in the areas of chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear (CBNR); intelligence,
surveillance, and target acquisition; air-to-ground surveillance; C3;
combat effectiveness; strategic air and sea lift; air-to-air refueling;
and deployable combat support and combat service support elements.
The PCC and NRF will allow NATO's new European allies to operate
with U.S. forces through the entire conflict spectrum. For some allies,
their contribution would consist of small niche units (e.g., police,
engineering, de-mining, chemical decontamination, alpine, and special
forces) with secure communications, ample readiness, and capable of
deployment. The NRF is to comprise up to about 21,000 personnel
including land, sea, and air components capable of being deployed
within 3-30 days of a NAC decision and conduct operations for up to 30
days. On the positive side, it provides NATO's new small allies with
the theoretical capacity to focus on niche specialization as a way to
``extend'' national and multi-national capabilities and ``fill'' (not
close) the gap.
The 2004 dual enlargement coupled with the likelihood of a changing
U.S. military ``footprint'' in Europe will likely influence the course
and evolution of the ``new'' NATO, ``new'' EU, and (Northeast,
Southeast, and Central) European security.
Baltics. After the three Baltic States enter NATO and the EU (with
Poland) in 2004, there will be greater institutional geometric
congruence in Europe's northeast quadrant. If the U.S. military
footprint shifts from Germany to include Poland, it should likely have
a substantial impact on Baltic political and military cooperation
(e.g., on the future of the North-East Corps and Baltic Brigade--
BALTBRIGADE). The three Baltic MAP partners--Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania (with respective populations of 1.5, 2.55, and 3.6 million)
are very small, have real defense interests arising from lingering
concerns about Russia, have been willing to support the U.S. and NATO
farther afield, and are likely to seriously focus on developing NATO
niche defense capabilities with the U.S and Poland.
Romania and Bulgaria. Europe's southeast quadrant will witness
greater institutional ``variable geometry'' with the entry of Romania
and Bulgaria into NATO in 2004, because of their delayed 2007 EU
accession schedule. If the U.S. military footprint moves toward Romania
(and Bulgaria), it likely will have a substantial impact on Balkan
political and military cooperation particularly since the EU has just
assumed responsibility for the Macedonia operation and has expressed
its willingness to take over the Bosnia operation after the SFOR
mandate ends. It could also influence the evolution of the Southeast
European Brigade--SEEBRIG. Romania and Bulgaria, the two Balkan
invitees, are relatively large (with respective populations of 21 and
7.9 million), and have provided substantial military support during
Kosovo, Afghanistan, the war on terrorism, and now Iraq. Their NATO
membership strengthens their governments by undermining the agendas of
domestic nationalists and populists and contributes to southeast
European stability and security.
why slovakia and slovenia?
The Committee has asked me to focus my remarks on Slovakia and
Slovenia, the two Prague and Copenhagen invitees, in Europe's center.
Both provide a land bridge of diminishing importance to NATO's
``island'' of Hungary and, for different reasons, have traditionally
registered stronger support for the EU and lower public support for
NATO. Indeed, had the 20-21 September 2002 elections in Slovakia or 23
March 2003 referendum in Slovenia gone differently, I would not be
defending their ratification today.
Slovakia, a country of 5.5 million population, started later than
the other MAP invitees in that it only acquired independent statehood
after the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic's ``Velvet divorce'' on 1
January 1993 and had to build its defense establishment from scratch
while having to cut its inherited Warsaw Pact armed forces. It also had
the disadvantage of Vladimir Meciar's tumultuous rule that had a
disruptive impact on the Slovak public's understanding of NATO
membership obligations and benefits. The two failed NATO referenda
during Meciar's rule on 23-24 May 1997 and 19 April 1998 contributed to
Slovak confusion by asking if they wanted nuclear weapons and foreign
troops deployed on their soil, rather than informing and educating the
populace. Indeed, Slovakia would not likely have received an invitation
if Meciar had returned to power in the recent September 2002 elections.
Slovakia has made substantial progress in overcoming these early
problems. First, the Mikulas Dzurinda (1998-2002) government launched a
significant NATO educational campaign that did raise public awareness
of, and support for NATO. Although public support for NATO has recently
eroded (as in many NATO countries) in the build-up to the Iraq war, the
Slovak government has fully supported the war on terrorism, has
provided overflight and transit rights to Afghanistan and sent an
engineering unit to ISAF in Kabul, and publicly supported the U.S. in
Iraq. In fact, at the moment 69 Slovak soldiers are in Kuwait as part
of the Czech Chemical unit participating in Operation Enduring Freedom.
Second, the U.S. has provided Slovakia with a defense assessment in
2000 that provides much of the conceptual basis for their defense
reform, and ever since Slovakia has been implementing its Army Model
2010 program. Though Slovakia is experiencing many of the ``normal''
problems associated with such a complex endeavor, their strategy is
realistic. With a total force structure of 30,000 (14,200 professionals
and 15,800 12-month conscripts) in 2003, Slovakia is doing well in
implementing a Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) on a
government-wide basis, maintaining defense expenditures at 1.9 percent
of GDP since 2002, meeting recruitment objectives to build an all-
volunteer army of 20,000 by 2007, and planning a NATO niche capability.
One over the horizon concern has to do with the possibility of a
NATO referendum. The political opposition is attempting to gather the
necessary 350,000 signatures to hold a referendum that could become
problematic in light of depressed public support for NATO. Though
possible, the probability remains low.
Slovenia is a small country with a population of roughly two
million. Though starting from a very weak position regarding its low
public support and limited physical capacity to integrate with NATO, it
has made substantial progress of late. First, Slovenia's popular
support for NATO has been perennially weak. Their 23 March 2003
referendum that resulted in a vote of 66 percent support for NATO (89.6
percent voted for the EU) pleased and relieved many who had concerns
that Slovenia's low public support might result in a negative vote. Why
did this occur? Some have speculated that the recent split within NATO
over Iraq may have confirmed for Slovenes that other NATO members have
a voice on security and defense matters. Also the 12 March 2003
assassination of Zoran Djindjic in Serbia and Montenegro may have
reminded many Slovenes that they live in an unstable region and being a
member of NATO provides some benefits. But whatever the reasons, the
referendum has put to rest earlier concerns that the government had not
been doing enough to convince its public to support NATO.
Second, Slovenia has a stable political and economic environment
that some of the other NATO invitees do not enjoy. It has been active
in the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and MAP and has put most of the
necessary NATO membership legislation in place. The U.S. has also
provided Slovenia with a defense assessment in 2000 and ever since
Slovenia has been implementing its army reform program. With a total
force structure of 7,800 (4,640 professionals and 3,160 7-month
conscripts) in 2003, Slovenia is striving to build an all-volunteer
force by the end of 2004 with plans for 7,800 professionals by 2008.
Former DSACEUR General Mackenzie has helped engender greater realism in
Slovene defense planning (e.g., total wartime strength plans have been
reduced from 73,000 to 43,000 to 26,000, and should be 14,000--8,000
professionals and 6,000 wartime reservists in 2010), but they still
have a way to go. The Slovene objective to provide a battalion to ``the
full range of alliance missions'' by the end of 2004 is probably
unrealistic. While the 2003 defense budget of 1.61 percent of GDP is to
increase to 2.0 percent by 2008, with low social support, potential
economic constraints, and less NATO leverage after they join, this goal
(as we have seen in Hungary) may not come to fruition.
Third, Slovenia has provided assistance in Afghanistan by providing
weapons to the Afghan National Army and managing the de-mining fund,
but has evinced hesitation on Iraq. Prime Minister Anton Rok wanted a
UN resolution before commencement of operations in Iraq and criticized
Foreign Minister Rupel for signing the V-10 declaration in February.
Germany has substantial influence due to the fact that it was first to
recognize Slovenia's independence in January 1992 and remains
Slovenia's largest trading partner. Despite Slovenia's position on
Iraq, on 15 January 2003 Slovenia added a company of roughly 100 troops
to Bosnia's Sector North to the two platoons of Military Police and the
medical unit that it maintains in Sarajevo.
Fourth, and perhaps the most important reason for Slovenia's
ratification is that its accession to NATO (and EU) provides a symbolic
segue for the former Yugoslavia to euro-Atlantic institutions. In this
way, Slovenia's accession contributes to stability and security in
Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Macedonia (and
non-Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania), who remain quite distant
from both institutions.
after nato ratification and accession
In closing, I believe that seven new members will make modest
contributions to Alliance defense, provide valuable political and
strategic support to the Unites States in the advancement of our
interests in Europe and more globally, and help bridge the
transatlantic gap. I support ratification of the seven Prague invitees,
but based upon lowered, more sober and realistic expectations.
First, we need to recognize that NATO's seven new allies are
smaller and have weaker military and institutional capacities. The 1999
NATO members, who are generally much larger, have found it very
difficult to fill civilian and military staff positions at NATO, even
four years after accession. NATO's seven new members will find this
task particularly challenging and continued support will be necessary.
For this reason, we should not repeat the mistakes that we made in 1999
when we terminated eligibility for many U.S. programs under the
assumption that the new allies could stand on their own feet. Hence, we
should think about extending the eligibility of new NATO members for
some programs (e.g., such as Warsaw Initiative Funds).
Second, since lessons of the 1999 enlargement suggest that once in
NATO most leverage is lost, we need to ensure necessary adherence to
the completion of reforms after actual accession. We need to prevent
repeating the past experience of promises made by aspirants before
accession on defense budgets and force goals then remained unfulfilled
after becoming members. Most of the new NATO allies (except Romania)
will become ineligible for FMF because they have not signed Article 98
of the ICC. Since the U.S. has extended waivers to many old NATO
allies, we might review and consider the possible granting of waivers
to the new allies on a case-by-case basis linking assistance to
performance.
Third, NATO's new members have found it very difficult to finance
their military participation in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
All new members have had to finance their operations abroad by either
increasing defense budgets, postponing modernization, increasing debt,
and/or borrowing funds by floating government bonds. Among the
``lessons learned'' by the three new 1999 NATO members were that: (1)
the process of developing capabilities involved ``severe bumps,'' (2)
NATO did not increase common support funds; (3) and the anticipated
``savings'' from cutting armed forces did not materialize for
modernization. (This third factor is only relevant to Bulgaria,
Romania, and Slovakia, and not the three Baltic states and Slovenia who
had to build armed forces from scratch). These ``lessons'' have
relevance to NATO's seven new members, who have different capacities to
develop niche capabilities. Since the U.S. has already performed
defense assessments for all MAP partners, after accession we should
focus on the means to assist the new NATO members, based upon
performance, in developing niche capabilities and encourage the eight
new NATO members in the EU to forge cooperative links between the NRF
and ERRF.
In summary, this round of enlargement can be successful and
contribute to a revitalized NATO if we recognize that the new allies
are smaller and have weaker capacities, that we continue certain U.S.
programs on a case-by-case basis in tandem with progress on meeting
NATO commitments, and are successful in improving EU and NATO
cooperation.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you very much, Dr. Simon. I
appreciate very much each one of you coming to testify today,
and I appreciate Senator Voinovich chairing the hearing for the
first period this afternoon.
I want to ask each one of you as a practical matter, and
you have touched upon this, Dr. Simon, in your final paragraph,
after the treaty is ratified by the NATO countries, you suggest
that leverage with regard to the applicants may diminish. It
may not be lost altogether. After all, they signed up to
obligations, have some sense of their own defense and destiny
in these situations.
More specifically, with regard to their relations with the
United States of America, it is significant that they are among
the nations who have been most enthusiastic about our foreign
policy vis-a-vis Iraq currently, and that has been noted and
appreciated. Is that likely to diminish? Leaving aside the Iraq
situation, but other foreign policy issues that may come along
the trail in the war against terrorism, how grounded would you
characterize, for instance, Slovenia and Slovakia, which has
been--especially for you in your testimony, and other witnesses
may want to address other countries, what is the vision that
these applicants have with regard to the overall war against
terrorism, or do they have a sense such as we do in this
country of where that may go?
Dr. Simon. I guess I will respond.
The Chairman. If you will start, and then I will ask Dr.
Larrabee.
Dr. Simon. As I pointed out, I think that on the one hand
there is a fundamental disconnect, I think, as in my longer
testimony, we in the United States psychologically are at war,
and I am not convinced that many of our NATO allies have that
same psychological framework.
We have, if you look at the 1999 class, Poland, Hungary,
the Czech Republic, I think one can assess and say that, No. 1,
it was a successful enlargement, and that Poland and the Czech
Republic specifically have done a very successful job in their
support of our activities.
It is a little more mixed when you look at Hungary, and you
can go into that fairly closely. If you look at the seven that
we are presently intending to bring in on this enlargement, I
think for some of the reasons that Steve Larrabee alluded to,
although it was in my testimony as well, that you have an
overlapping in the EU and NATO, a very strong ally, bilateral
relationship between Poland and the United States, and I think
that what you will probably see is a fairly strong support for
the U.S. position, but I caveat this. It depends upon how the
war in Iraq ends and how credible the weapons of mass
destruction that we find there will be in justifying the
positions of those States.
But in my part of the world it is very clear that Slovakia
has been very much leaning forward and out there, and they are
in Kuwait right now with the chemical decontamination unit, so
there can be no quarrel, and as I say, the Czechs are there, so
there is no reason to suspect that their support may, in fact,
diminish.
I am still personally not convinced about Slovenia, but as
I mentioned, I think the main reasons for Slovenia are this
strategic direction and location, and I think this is the
incorporation of Romania and Bulgaria and the shifting U.S.
presence, and I think we have to look at that southeastern
direction from that perspective.
The Chairman. Thank you. Dr. Larrabee.
Dr. Larrabee. As you well know, Mr. Chairman, the Baltic
States are among the most pro-American countries of the
aspirants within NATO. They know the meaning of freedom. They
had to fight for it themselves, so I think that their
contribution to the war on terrorism will continue.
They have already made, for their small size, I think,
substantial contributions. Latvia, as I mentioned in my
testimony, has deployed a special forces unit and demining team
in Afghanistan. Estonia has sent an explosive detection dog
team, and Lithuania has deployed a special forces unit, so they
are already contributing. Indeed, I think that is one of the
most important aspects that even before they were invited to
join NATO, the three Baltic States were already beginning to
act like NATO allies even if they were not already pro forma
officially NATO allies, and I think you have a population, as
well as a leadership, which, as I said, is pro-American, which
understands the meaning of freedom, so I am not particularly
worried that they are not going to contribute to the war on
terrorism.
I think also that they understand that they are moving into
a new environment, strategic environment where the agenda is
changing, and that there will have to be some effort to
harmonize their strategic agenda with the American strategic
agenda if they want to continue to keep the United States
strong and engaged in the region.
The Chairman. On the subject of the Baltic States, you have
been a scholar of this for many, many years. I remember maybe
10 years ago that in visiting even with our diplomatic
personnel in the capitals of the Baltic States, they would
point out to me sort of in a tutorial fashion that essentially
these States were tied to Finland or to Sweden or to others
geographically, that Americans would have to understand we were
going to have limited commercial ties with those States, maybe
limited ties of other sorts.
Now, that point of view, I think, in terms of our own
diplomacy has changed dramatically over the years. At least I
hope that is the case. What has been your tracing--leaving
aside their views toward us, our views toward them, how more
robust has that grown, in your judgment?
Dr. Larrabee. Well, I think the interest, and I have to say
something in favor of the previous administration which I think
took a very forward-leaning view toward the Baltic States and,
indeed, without the strong American commitment under both
administrations, the Baltic States might not have been invited
to join NATO as soon as they have, so I think the American
commitment and the American engagement in the Baltic States is
very important, as I tried to say in my testimony.
One of the important things after Prague--it is not over.
There is now emerging a new strategic agenda. The old one
essentially revolved around trying to get into NATO. The new
strategic agenda revolves around maintaining, making sure the
United States stays engaged, finding ways in which to develop a
credible Article 5 commitment, and also move from trying to
prevent Russia from blocking NATO membership to developing a
cooperative partnership and more cooperative relations with
Russia, and all of this will require, in my view, strong,
continued strong American engagement.
The danger is, in my view, that with the United States now
focusing on many other issues beyond Europe, and particularly
in Iraq and the Middle East, may tend to look at the Baltic
issue and say, well, it is fixed, let us move on, let us do
something else, let us leave this to the EU I think that this
would be a mistake.
These are countries which are small, but they are very
committed to democratic and Western values, and they are
particularly strongly pro-American, and if we could try to get
a consensus, if they were to work with their Baltic and Nordic
neighbors and also expand ties with Poland and with Germany,
you could have a Baltic coalition which would consist of seven
or eight countries, that is, the Nordics, the Baltics, as well
as Germany and Poland which also have Baltic interests, which
could be quite a strong--I do not want to say a lobby within
the EU and NATO, but nonetheless share common strategic
interests with the United States, and we should not forget
that. That is not just the three Baltic States, but it is the
larger Baltic region that we are talking about.
The Chairman. That is a very important idea. I thank you.
Dr. Bugajski.
Mr. Bugajski. Thanks very much. My two countries, Bulgaria
and Romania, the two countries I am covering, are absolutely
committed to the American relationship. In fact, I would say
that it is not so much NATO membership that is leverage with
them, but the bilateral relationship with the United States is
the leverage. In other words, they value that relationship
above all others, and I would go as far as to say for them NATO
is the United States, because it is the United States that
ultimately guarantees their security, their independence, their
freedom, and I think they well understand this, as do some of
the central Europeans.
On the terrorism front, both Romania and Bulgaria have
already contributed to the best of their abilities. I have
outlined this in my testimony. But in addition, I would say
because they are much closer to the front lines in the Middle
East and the Caucasus, the potential trouble spots, the
breeding grounds of terrorism, if you like, which pass from
that area into Europe, I think they feel much more vulnerable
as a result, and they are more likely to participate much more
closely with the United States than maybe some of these smaller
central European countries. So I have no doubt that that
relationship will strengthen, because it is in their interest
for that relationship to strengthen and for them to fulfill the
criteria that they are supposed to with NATO entry.
The Chairman. Let me ask this question, not to provoke
comment, but simply for the benefit of the stimulus of this
hearing. Outside the Senate Chamber, for a variety of reasons,
say in the last hour, I have been asked by a number of press
people about NATO. One question was, why is this committee so
active in holding hearings right now with regard to the NATO
treaty and discussing this subject, the implication of one
questioner being that for the moment it appears that there are
motions, some are coming or going, and hopefully going in my
judgment, that is, withdrawn, censuring various countries for
their activities vis-a-vis our feelings about Iraq, some of
them NATO members.
So in essence they were wondering, is there a disconnect,
are you folks over in the Foreign Relations Committee busy on
one agenda and people in various Departments of our Government
working another agenda.
Now, I will just try to be reassuring. We are all on the
same agenda, and Secretary Powell's presence in Brussels now is
important. It made the visit longer by going past Turkey on the
way, but that was important, too. The point that I have tried
to make, without diminishing any amendments by my colleagues,
is that our committee is on an affirmative course. We are
trying to think about the future.
The future, at least for most of us in this committee,
strongly includes NATO, likewise, the United Nations and other
valuable international organizations, and almost any future
that we can envision in Iraq or elsewhere requires the
cooperation of a lot of nations, and my guess is that Secretary
Powell in Brussels now has been suggesting ways that NATO can
be very helpful in the post-Iraq situation in the same way that
Lord Robertson has made vital suggestions, I think, with regard
to the future of Afghanistan, so that we do not have failed
States, incubators for al-Qaeda or anybody else for that matter
who organizes that way.
Having said that, the fact is that the nations, the seven
applicants listening to all of this may wonder if the prize has
been diminished. In other words, if membership in NATO, which
looked very, very important a while back, remains that
important.
Just advise me for a moment from your own ties how the
prize looks, and second, is there a perception on the part of
the seven applicants that in any way United States enthusiasm
for NATO has been diminished, or is likely to be by this
situation, because that is important. We were talking about the
bilateral ties, about the way in which the United States
participates in Europe through NATO and gives assurance to
individual countries as well as the collective whole, but if
you can, give some vent to your own feelings presently about,
whither NATO and how the applicants look at it.
Dr. Larrabee. Well, perhaps I could begin just to address
that. I think in all of the NATO-aspirant countries there is
some concern, and not only in the aspirant countries but in
some other parts of Europe about the U.S. commitment and the
way we handled Afghanistan obviously reinforced that, although
there are some good reasons for why we did it, but nonetheless
it certainly has caused some questions, but I think as we look
at the post-Iraq situation, one of the things that is clear is
we are going to need allies. We are going to need them.
We may not need them so strongly in the military campaign,
but we are certainly going to need them in terms of the
reconstruction, and that if you think of the war on terrorism,
this is not something the United States can carry out alone. It
requires wide cooperation, lots of partners in many areas
beyond the military, particularly, obviously banking,
counterterrorism, intelligence, border controls, many of these
things, for all of these things looking even beyond NATO we are
going to need partners, so I think that the steps that
Secretary Powell has taken beginning today to try to rebuild
these relationships is extremely important.
Let me just say, though, that when we talk about NATO it is
well to remember that if you look at the letter of the 8, and
you add that to that the letter of the Vilnius-10, you have 18
members of NATO, or 18 out of a prospective 25 or 26 that
supported the United States, and I think that is an important
element.
Here we see that the newer members of NATO and the
prospective members of NATO have a slightly different
perspective on some of the security issues than some of the
traditional members, but I think it would be a mistake, I have
to emphasize, if the United States tried to play one part of
Europe off against the other. I think this will provoke
resentment not only in the old Europe, but even among some of
the newer members.
After all, they are going to become members, most of them,
of the European Union. They do not want to have to choose
between Europe and the United States. They are Europeans, and
they want to be a strong part of Europe themselves, so I do not
think it would be a good idea to try to drive a rift between
old and new Europe, but just the opposite, to try to rebuild
this relationship after Iraq.
The Chairman. Do you have a comment, sir?
Mr. Bugajski. Just to add to that, Mr. Chairman, obviously
they see the NATO they are entering is very different from the
NATO they first petitioned in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, I
think two important principles are still there for them. No. 1,
NATO means permanent security, and always will according to
Article 5. No. 2, it means American involvement, not only in
Europe, but direct American involvement in their security, and
that, too, is absolutely crucial for them.
They do feel, I believe, in talking to some officials, that
they can contribute to reinvigorating the NATO alliance, which
they feel one way or another, because of the transatlantic
rift, seems to have diminished, and I think through their
contributions, however small, but collectively, they will carry
some weight.
They can help to reinvigorate and change the alliance to
confront the sort of challenges that we will be facing in the
future, which is not a Soviet threat, but it will be terrorist
threats, it will be threats of neighboring and unstable
regions, and I think above all they are very much intent on
rebuilding that transatlantic relationship and rather than, as
Stephen said, creating rifts within Europe their intention is
to heal those rifts in Europe by rebuilding a stronger
relationship with America.
In other words, may seek to reverse current trends, and I
do believe that they are committed to that, because that is in
their national interest.
The Chairman. Thank you. Dr. Simon.
Dr. Simon. As in my remarks, the fact that if you look at
the 10 new members of the EU in 2004, 8 of them are basically
NATO members as of 1999 and 2004, and the key here is, I think,
in terms of the future of the alliance, is that they, in fact,
successful in hammering out cooperative linkages between the EU
and NATO, and I think frankly these 8 overlapping members have
that role to play and want to play that role.
Just being up in the Baltic States talking to a number of
key people there, one thing stuck in my mind that is quite
pertinent to this, and it supports my two colleagues. They said
basically--and this is key in all three countries--we want to
love Mother and Father, meaning the EU and NATO. We do not want
to have to make Sophie's Choice, and in that sense I think we
are going to see those 8 members taking an active role in
forging that cooperation, which is very much in our interest
and in the interest of the future of the alliance.
Dr. Larrabee. They do not also want to be treated as
disobedient children.
The Chairman. Let me ask, just taking a look at the future,
what role are the States that are now on the threshold of
coming into NATO likely to play in future expansion of NATO?
What is the unfinished business of the concept of Europe whole
and free, and what contributions could the applicant States
make in fulfilling that destiny?
Mr. Bugajski. Let me go first, because it pertains, I
think, more directly to my two countries, Bulgaria and Romania,
whose neighborhood is not still absolutely secure and stable,
as we know. I think that their entry would signal to the other
aspirants, particularly Croatia, Albania, Macedonia, that they,
too, can become members over the coming years if they fulfill
specific criteria, if they stay on track, conduct the sort of
military reforms that Bulgaria and Romania have conducted,
build a close relationship with the United States and so forth.
So I think it is in our national interest to have them in
because they will then project the same sort of criteria to
other neighboring countries coming out of a very bad
neighborhood who do want to joint NATO, who do want to have a
close relationship with the United States.
Second, I would say eastward, and Romania actually is the
most interesting in this regard because it faces both the
southern, still-to-be-fully stabilized region, and also the
eastern post-Soviet territories, in other words, Moldova and
Ukraine that it borders, I do believe those two countries also
eventually have to become NATO members. How long it will take I
could not tell you at this point. Obviously, it depends a lot
on domestic politics.
The Chairman. Both Moldova and Ukraine.
Mr. Bugajski. And Ukraine, and eventually Belarus as well,
but that is another matter at the moment.
Romania obviously can play a very stabilizing role vis-a-
vis the former Soviet space. Its relationship with Ukraine has
improved vastly. It now is beginning to establish a better
relationship with Moldova.
Once Moldova sorts out its own separatist movement in
Transnistria, I think Romania can play a very positive role
eastwards. In other words, as a NATO member, as a future EU
member it can serve as a positive example, economic, social,
political, military, toward its eastern neighbors. In both
regional directions I would say Romania is very important.
Bulgaria is also very important. It has played a very
positive role in the south Balkans over Macedonia. It has not
played any nationalist cards. Its ethnic relations have been
probably the most stable in the region and it, too, can serve
as an example throughout the region.
Both of those countries coming into NATO would immediately,
be read in those other countries that they too can make it, if
they stick to it. If they stick to the program, to the criteria
that have been laid out, they, too, can become permanently
secured.
Dr. Simon. To pick up on that, I think the key prize here
is Ukraine. It is a very large country, and you can approach
Ukraine from both the southeast--Janusz was talking about--
particularly if you do see some kind of a changed true presence
in Romania and a very strong Romanian support for the future of
NATO.
Up in the northeast we have a very close relationship, as
you know, with a newer but old member of the alliance, Poland,
who has very close ties with Ukraine, combined units operating
in Kosovo, et cetera, and I think with the U.S. presence
perhaps evolving in Poland and working with what is now the
Northeast Corps, becoming a Baltic Corps, you could have very
positive impact on Ukraine.
I think you will see from the three Baltic States and from
Poland very strong pressures in NATO over the coming years to
basically project, and radiate that stability, and it will be
something that, on the one hand, can be very helpful in moving
in that direction as well as from the direction of Romania, but
it is also something that we may have to curtail in light of
the dilemma that we have with the current situation in Ukraine.
The Chairman. Is there any doubt in the minds of any of you
three, as our witnesses today, that the sharing of the basic
ethical and moral values, what-have-you, of NATO by the seven
applicants would have any reason to terminate? That is, they
would move off in some other direction?
One of the profound aspects about NATO and consensus is
that we all believe in human rights and democracy and freedom
of speech, freedom of religion, and that is one of the most
attractive aspects of that, and it would appear apparent that
the seven applicants share those values, but the question
always is raised whenever we have a NATO discussion, what if
somebody has a change of heart with regard to the way that the
politics in the country goes, and suddenly we have a member
State that does not share these values, that for reasons of
economic crisis or a charismatic figure or whatever, suddenly
something happens.
Now, there is no way of ever guaranteeing that, I suppose,
with regard to all the current members, but what is the
stability factor of the seven that we are now talking about
today? Would you give any opinions about that?
Dr. Larrabee. Maybe I will start. In my case, in the case
of the three countries that I have been asked to testify about,
I have to say that I have very few doubts, particularly because
these countries have fought very strongly for their own
freedom. They know what it is like not to have lived under
freedom. They have begun to build very strong democratic
systems, so I am not too worried.
If I could though, however, I would like to go back to the
last question you asked, because I think it does pertain
particularly to the Baltic States. That is, thinking about what
may come after Prague, in my remarks, in my testimony I raised
the question that these invitations issued to Prague are
obviously an important achievement, and they help to anchor the
Baltic States into the Western community and the debate about
their security orientation.
At the same time, the invitations do create a new set of
strategic challenges, and one of those challenges will be,
first of all, to keep the United States engaged in the region
and second to find a new strategic agenda that will do that.
Now, in my discussions in the Baltic States over the past 6 or
8 months, I have found that there is a willingness to think
about a new agenda there, and this new agenda--if the old
agenda in some way was to try to fix the Baltic problem, that
agenda has now been basically achieved.
The question then becomes, what is the new agenda that
could kind of bind the United States together with the Baltic
States, and here, as I suggested in my testimony, the new
agenda could include four elements, enhancing cooperation with
Russia, helping to stabilize Kaliningrad, promoting the
democratization of Belarus, and supporting Ukraine's
integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.
That is an agenda in which it seems to me the United States
shares many strategic interests with the Baltic countries as
well as many Nordic countries, and including Poland, and
perhaps even Germany and some countries in the Vilnius-10, so
there is a core, it seems to me, around which the Baltic States
can move from stabilizing the region to helping to stabilize
the immediate neighborhood.
Mr. Bugajski. Mr. Chairman, just to answer your question,
as you know, democracy is always a work in progress. It is
never absolutely complete, but in the case of my two
countries--I will not address the others because my colleagues
can probably better do so. In the case of Bulgaria and Romania,
I do believe they have passed the point of no return, in other
words, no return to some kind of authoritarian system, whether
Communist or nationalist.
There is always a danger of some sort of populist figure
appearing on the horizon, but I have not seen it, and even when
one has appeared, as in Romania, the vote is still fairly
restricted, or let us say on the level of some of the West
European countries, if you look at some of our allies.
I would say all these countries do have marginal groups or
extremist groups of both left and right, but then they would
not be democracies if they did not. I do not see, unless there
is some major economic catastrophe, I do not see a populist
nationalist figure coming to the fore, and this is why I think
NATO membership would help them on the way, not only to
security but also to prosperity and avoidance of extremism.
But the EU has to step in also, and the accession process
to the EU is going to be absolutely critical, because even
though I outline in my testimony that they have achieved
macroeconomic stability, there is still a lot of poverty, there
is still a lot of very bad economic conditions in some parts of
these countries, and this is why I think the onus is on the EU
to assist, to help them get over the hump and to join the club.
Dr. Simon. I guess first, looking at recent events, we did
have some problems, at least on the issue of Turkey and the
NAC, but it was not from new members. It happened to be some
very old members, France, Germany, and Belgium, and we were
able to at least get around that by moving it down to the DPC.
France is not in the integrated military command, and we were
able to make that work.
The nightmare which a lot of us have thought about with our
seven new entrants as well as the other three is, what happens
if things do go bad? Can you not develop a penalty box, or some
concept like that, and there are notions that are in some of
the things I have laid out. Let me say on the penalty box
notion, it is probably impossible to implement for political
reasons, but it does make a lot of sense in theory.
On the other hand, on being able to engage in decisions
when a government does not want to cooperate, there are notions
perhaps of different ways of developing consensus or making
decisions in the alliance. I do not think that a strategy will
necessarily get us there. It will probably be, as we saw in the
recent case with France, Germany, and Belgium, through actions
and having to respond accordingly, but some notions would be
extending the principles of not breaking silence to Article 4
implementation, and then having only those countries in the
coalitions of willing that would be engaged in the military
operation basically provide the military guidance.
In effect, this is sort of a combined joint task force
within NATO, not a combined joint task force to the EU, as we
did at the Brussels summit in 1994, but I think it is a
critical issue. I think that no matter what strategies we have,
we will probably bump into it when the situation arises and
grapple with it at that time.
The Chairman. Well, I raised it because at our last
hearing, one of our witnesses I felt gave very constructive
testimony to the question that arises, should we, given the
recent problem with Turkey, move toward a majority vote, or
supermajority, two-thirds, or something of this sort, as
opposed to the consensus, and his advice was no, we should not
do that, for reasons I do not want to reiterate, but I thought
it was an interesting discussion, and it is not entirely
academic.
Having participated now in several expansions of NATO
debates and votes and treaties on the floor, not all of our
Members in the Senate have always been enthusiastic about NATO.
Some have simply argued it is a burden and some, perhaps not
many now, were more isolationist and protectionist in the past
than I suspect the current membership of the Senate, and I am
grateful that is the case, but some have seen a lot of expense
for the United States, and commitments, and with the passing of
the cold war what may have been one reason why people wanted to
sign up in Europe, but likewise was one reason why the United
States was engaged with Europe.
But the Soviet Union is over, so the issues in this country
are, what kind of involvement do we want to have in other
countries, and after Somalia, the answer was not very much. It
was a long time before we got into Bosnia, for example, and the
struggle to take care of human rights conditions in Kosovo, and
there we had a veto on the Security Council with the Russians,
or at least opposition resulted in that, so we had an ad hoc
situation of sorts, a coalition of the willing at that time for
humanitarian reasons.
So these are not totally academic issues and I suspect,
when we have our debates on this treaty, that some of this will
rise again, although I do not anticipate in majority form, but
we are trying in these hearings--really we appreciate your
specific testimony--to be very thorough so that all of our
Members would say that this committee has discharged its
responsibility to ask the whole gamut of questions about the
qualifications of the members, their attitudes toward Europe,
toward us, toward peace, toward democracy, as well as
creativity as to what the new missions, goals of the
organization ought to be.
So I thank each one of you for contributing really
remarkable papers, as well as your forthcoming responses to
these speculative questions and I am going to ask on behalf of
the distinguished ranking member, Senator Biden, and myself
that we keep the record open for 24 hours so the Senators who
were not able to be present might participate in that way.
Conceivably they might have questions to the three of you, and
if you could respond promptly, that would be helpful in
completing our record and making it available to our
colleagues.
Unless you have further testimony, I will adjourn the
hearing, and thank you very much for coming. The hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the committee adjourned, to
reconvene at 9:30 a.m., April 8, 2003.]
NATO ENLARGEMENT--PART IV
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar
(chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Chafee, Sununu, Biden, Boxer, Bill
Nelson and Corzine.
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order.
We are especially pleased today to welcome Marc Grossman,
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. He will be
followed by William Kristol, editor of The Weekly Standard and
General Wesley Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander in
Europe; they will address the committee as a panel following
Secretary Grossman.
Today the committee is holding its fourth hearing on NATO
Enlargement. We have undertaken this review of NATO in
preparation for a floor action in May. And I would say
parenthetically that in visiting with the majority leader,
Senator Frist, he has assured me that the week of May 5 is
still on target, at least given all the problems that come to
majority and minority leaders in scheduling the Senate agenda,
but that is our objective. And that is one reason for
proceeding vigorously with these hearings in a timely manner
now.
At that time, we will have this review of the NATO
situation and the Protocols of Accession to the Washington
Treaty for Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, Slovakia,
Bulgaria and Romania. I am most hopeful the Senate will pass
the Protocols of Accession for all seven candidates prior to
President Bush's scheduled trip to Europe late this spring.
Even as the committee works to fulfill this legislative
duty, our review of NATO has an additional purpose. With U.S.
forces heavily engaged in Iraq, this committee and the Senate
must consider what role NATO can and should play in a global
war on terrorism. NATO has to decide if it wishes to
participate in the security challenge of our time. It has to
decide whether it wants to be relevant in addressing the major
threat to the safety and economic well-being of the citizens of
its component countries. If we do not prevent major terrorist
attacks involving weapons of mass destruction, the alliance
will have failed in its most fundamental mission of defending
our nations and our way of life.
And this reality demands that as we expand NATO, we also
retool it so it can be a mechanism of burden-sharing and mutual
security in the war on terrorism. America is at war, and we
feel more vulnerable than at any time since the end of the cold
war and perhaps since World War II. We need and want allies to
confront this threat effectively. Those alliances cannot be
circumscribed by geographical boundaries.
Many observers will point to the split over Iraq as a sign
that NATO is failing or irrelevant. I sharply disagree. But as
we attempt to mend the alliance's political divisions over
Iraq, we must go one step further and ask: If NATO had been
unified on Iraq, could it have provided an effective command
structure for the military operation that is underway now? And
would allies beyond those currently engaged in Iraq have been
willing and able to field forces that would have been
significant to the outcome of that war? In other words,
achieving political unity within the alliance, while important
to international opinion, does not guarantee that NATO will be
as meaningful as a fighting alliance in the war on terror.
Now for more than 50 years, NATO was uniquely able to forge
consensus among the allies, maintain political will, gather
resources, and coordinate action to defend Europe from military
attack. The alliance stated its desire to remain relevant at
the Prague summit last November, when NATO heads of state
approved the NATO Response Force and the Prague Capabilities
Commitment as part of the continuing Alliance effort to improve
capabilities for waging modern warfare. The alliance also
declared it would tackle the threat of weapons of mass
destruction.
In our previous committee hearings on NATO, we have heard
encouraging testimony that our allies are taking promised steps
to strengthen their capabilities in such areas as heavy airlift
and sealift and precision-guided munitions. We have also heard
that the seven candidates for membership are developing niche
military capabilities that will be useful in meeting NATO's new
military demands. But much work is left to be done to transform
NATO into a bulwark against terrorism.
An early test will be NATO's contribution to peacekeeping
and humanitarian duties in the aftermath of combat in Iraq. A
strong commitment by NATO nations to this role would be an
important step in healing the alliance's divisions and
reaffirming its relevance for the long run. While the immediate
aim of our hearings has been to debate whether the seven
candidate countries have met NATO membership standards, I would
observe that the dominant concern of the committee in the
hearings has been NATO's relevance and cohesion. This focus
would seem to indicate confidence among committee members that
the aspirant nations are ready for membership.
I anticipate an overwhelming vote in favor of NATO
enlargement. The affirming message of the first round of
enlargement led to improved capabilities and strengthened
transatlantic ties. I am hopeful and I am sure the committee
joins me in wishing that the second round will do the same.
We look forward now to hearing from the distinguished
ranking member, Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
these hearings and the quality of the witnesses you have had in
this and all the hearings, particularly this last hearing.
I am anxious to hear from Secretary Grossman, who I think
is one of the most talented people with whom I have served in
my years here in the U.S. Senate. And as well as from General
Clark for whom I have an incredibly high regard; and Mr.
Kristol, for whom I have an equally high regard, although I do
not always understand him. But he can explain some things to
me.
I am delighted that they could join us today to discuss the
future of NATO. This hearing is not a parenthetical exercise in
dealing with pressing issues in the Middle East, and the Korean
Peninsula, and matters elsewhere in the world. We are talking
about the future, as you and I agree probably as much or more
than any two Members of the Congress, of our most vital
strategic partnership.
NATO is not just a bedrock of transatlantic relations. It
is the most successful political military alliance that has
ever been assembled. NATO's members, though they may disagree
on tactics as we have recently seen, share the same objective
of securing and protecting the freedom of the North Atlantic
area. And now the question is--and again as we say in this
body, it sounds awfully artificial, but I would like to
associate myself with the remarks of my friend from Indiana,
the chairman--on the expanded or altered responsibility that I
think it must step up to now.
This hearing is the last in this series connected with our
consideration of the next round of NATO Enlargement, agreed
upon last November at the Prague summit. The Accession to NATO
of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia can, I believe, in the long term result in a
qualitative strengthening of the alliance's military
capabilities. But even to achieve that result will require
energetic efforts on the part of all seven of these countries.
But more importantly in my view, this round of enlargement
represents an important step in what those of us, like you and
I who have been here a while and many of the witnesses, in what
we used to talk about. And that is the zone of stability
extended for a Europe that is free and whole, an objective that
I think is still very, very much in our interest.
When I am occasionally accused of being too--how can I say
it? Well, I am occasionally criticized for thinking NATO has a
value that some think exceeds what I suggest it is. Well, I
always say to people: Imagine our foreign policy interest in
the future, our interest around the world being secure without
a free and whole and stable Europe. I cannot imagine it, quite
frankly.
This round represents that enlargement; that is, moving
that zone of stability. Above and beyond enlargement though,
NATO is facing several fundamental choices, one of which you
mentioned, Mr. Chairman. The U.S. and its allies can choose to
fulfill the capability commitments made in Prague, which is
sort of Senate and NATO speak for saying they are going to
spend more money and upgrade their military capability, and to
reshape NATO to meet the new security challenges of the 21st
century, or to continue to demur.
Specifically, we can realign national defense planning,
increase and better prioritize defense expenditures, and make
the new NATO Response Force fully operational by 2006. We can
disprove doubts about the irrelevance of NATO in the new
security environment by acting now to expand NATO's role in
Afghanistan and, in my view, to plan for NATO's engagement in
post-war Iraq, which I happen to think is vital for a number of
reasons I will not bore anyone with right now.
Or the members of the alliance can take, as they say, the
other fork in the road, a dramatic but no longer far-fetched,
centrifugal option. And that is, an alternative that would
permit political differences to paralyze NATO's decisionmaking
bodies and bar the alliance from providing collective defense.
NATO's institutions would become more a fora for routine
consultations and training grounds for military exercise and
its forces eventually cannibalized in favor of coalitions of
the willing, or a separate EU security arrangement.
If I sound unduly pessimistic, please let us consider
several recent events: The Bush administration's initial
decision in the fall of 2001 to decline the offers of most
allies to participate in combat operations in Afghanistan; the
rancor and dissension in the NAC this past January and February
regarding Turkey's Article 4 request for assistance; the
Belgian call last month for a summit of selected European Union
members, i.e., not including the British, to develop an EU-
based Security Alliance outside of NATO, which as I understand
it is very different than what we were talking about up to now,
of having this European force within NATO; and in my view, the
denigration of NATO by some very, very important, bright and
serious intellectuals in this country, many of whom people this
administration, about the lack of relevance of NATO generated
by what is referred to as the neo-cons.
Regarding this new grouping that the Belgians were talking
about last month of a European Union, EU-based Security
Alliance, Mr. Prodi suggested this would be a different path,
and he is the President of the EU's Commission.
I do not believe that these events, either individually or
collectively, as yet represent an irreparable break in Alliance
solidarity. But for all the conferences over 30 years you and I
have attended about whither NATO, I think they are the most
serious, the most serious challenges to NATO. And they exist at
this moment in my view, and they convey a stark warning for the
future unless we get this right in the very near term.
The way forward is not just a decision for the United
States. All of our allies, as well as prospective new members,
must decide how best to shape NATO's strategic agenda and make
it operational. American leadership can have a tremendous
influence in this process, but only if we demonstrate a
concrete commitment to remaining engaged on the ground in
Europe. And as I said earlier, by supporting a role for NATO in
Afghanistan, and I hope in post-war Iraq, I hope that we will
make these cases not just in Brussels and other European
capitals, but home as well, here in the United States as well.
For that reason I greatly welcomed Secretary Powell's
decision to go to Brussels last week and discuss with members
of the NAC a substantive role for the alliance in post-war
Iraq. Although no decision was taken, the discussion was
undertaken. I look forward to hearing in the days ahead the
response from our allies on exactly what form a NATO role might
take.
Marc, I know you share our desire to see a stronger, more
vibrant NATO that is both capable and willing to confront
security challenges wherever they arise. And I would
particularly welcome your views on how the seven aspirant
countries can help NATO adapt to the new security challenges
that we face.
We are also extremely fortunate, as I said at the outset,
to have General Clark and Bill Kristol here to contribute to
this critical strategic discussion. General Clark, whereas the
last time we invited you here in May of last year, we engaged
in a similar debate about NATO's future. Although we are
dealing with many of the same questions today, the run-up to
the war in Iraq, and the war itself, have changed the context
of the debate and, in my view, not for the better.
So I welcome your uniquely qualified prospective on how the
alliance can and should move forward.
Bill, we may not always agree, but I have an incredibly
high regard for you, both through your magazine and your own
commentary you have done as much as anyone to shape the foreign
policy debate in this country and influence the Bush
administration. I also appreciate your longstanding commitment
to the alliance as a member of the U.S. Committee for NATO, and
I am anxious to hear what you think about the future here
beyond the seven aspirant countries.
Once again, Mr. Chairman, let me say that I am delighted
that you have these three witnesses, and I look forward to
having a discussion with them about some of these issues that I
have raised, and others.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.
As a point of personal privilege, let me mention that in
our audience today are 73 eighth grade students from Bremen
Middle School in Bremen, Indiana. And I just want to note for
the record that in Indiana we take foreign policy seriously and
early.
And I am very grateful that these students that are led by
their teacher, Jan Reed, have come to Washington and have
chosen to make this hearing a part of their trip.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, if you will excuse me, as a
point of personal privilege: I want those students to
understand that my alma mater, Syracuse, won the National
Championship last night in basketball that you, Indiana, the
last time we were there, in the last second robbed us of.
The Chairman. Yes, yes.
Senator Biden. Not ``robbed'' us; that is the wrong choice.
Defeated us on the playing field very well.
So I congratulate you on having defeated us in the past,
and I want to note that we have finally prevailed, not over
Indiana, but over Kansas.
The Chairman. The Hoosiers congratulate the Orange.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
The Chairman. I congratulate my colleague.
I want to mention also that Secretary Grossman has
participated for the last 2 years faithfully in roundtable
discussions that Ron Asmus at the Council on Foreign Relations
really was most responsible for bringing together. A number of
those in the room today have been participating in these
meetings. Marc participated as an administration official, who
really has a strong policy set of options here, and we really
appreciate that participation. I mention this because many of
the questions that he will be responding to today have been
raised by other colleagues around the table for the last 2
years. It has been an informative experience for all of us
trying to think through the challenges and the opportunities.
With that, Secretary Grossman, we would be pleased to hear
your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARC I. GROSSMAN, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Grossman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Biden. It is an honor for me to be here today. Thank you all
very much. I hope, Senator, you might allow me to put the
longer statement in the record.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Grossman. If I might just make a shortened version of
it, I would appreciate that.
The Chairman. Published in full.
Mr. Grossman. Thank you very much.
Let me first of all say how grateful we are for your
leadership, Mr. Chairman, and for Senator Biden's, on the issue
of enlargement, on the issue of NATO and on the issue of the
future of NATO. I also want, as I do before this committee, to
thank you very much for your support for the men and woman of
the State Department. And as a point of my personal privilege,
if I could have one: I hope many of the people who are here in
the eighth grade will consider careers in the Foreign Service
and in the Civil Service, and in the service of their country
in the great Department of State and join us in that endeavor.
So we are very glad that they are here as well.
Mr. Chairman, as you said, you have offered opportunities
over the past 2 years to have a conversation about the future
of NATO. I can tell you that these meetings have always been of
value to me. When you say that I am likely to answer some
questions that came out of those discussions, I hope they are
not questions that I posed and then could not answer myself,
but we will do the very best that we can.
As Senator Biden said, Secretary Powell was at NATO last
week, and I thought if I might just give you a short report
about what transpired there because I think it is very
important about the adaptation of our alliance. As you saw, the
Secretary met NATO and EU Foreign Ministers both together and
then separately. He met Secretary General Robertson, the EU
Presidency and Commission leadership, Ambassadors from the
Vilnius-10 countries, 9 other Foreign Ministers; 21 meetings in
all.
And the Secretary's message in Brussels were really two
fold and very clear: First, that we value NATO and the
transatlantic partnership it anchors; and second, that it is
time to look to the future, to the future of what this alliance
can do and, as Senator Lugar said, to look to future threats
and to look also to the future to include the stabilization and
reconstruction of Iraq.
Senator Biden, the Secretary there reminded all of the NATO
Foreign Ministers of the presentation made last December by
Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz, where he suggested that
NATO roles could be important in Iraq, should be important in
Iraq and could include peacekeeping, weapons of mass
destruction security and destruction, and the delivery of
humanitarian assistance.
We remain open to a NATO role in Iraq. As you said, no
commitments were made. But no ally raised objections to these
proposals. And the Secretary said that we would followup on
these suggestions and see what, if anything, can be done.
Mr. Chairman, as you say, the committee has heard testimony
on NATO enlargement from people both inside and outside of the
administration. I would say that there is broad support in this
country and in the alliance for this next stage of enlargement
because, as you both said, for fifty years NATO has been the
anchor of Western security. And as Senator Biden said, this
issue and these hearings are not a parenthesis. This expansion
of NATO is extremely important to the security of the United
States.
The end of Soviet communism did not diminish NATO's
importance. The democracies of NATO made and keep the peace in
the Balkans. In 1999, NATO stopped ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.
NATO's just-completed mission in Macedonia has also brought
order to that new democracy.
And as we have discussed on a number of occasions in this
committee, NATO responded to September 11 by invoking Article
5, an attack on one member considered an attack on all. And in
the aftermath of September 11, NATO sent AWACs to patrol U.S.
airspace, logging almost 4,300 hours, 360 sorties, 800 crew
members from 13 nations. And 13 nations now contribute to help
in Operation Enduring Freedom.
NATO allies lead the International Stabilization force in
Kabul. German and Dutch troops replaced Turkish troops who, in
turn, replaced British forces. Lord Robertson and some of our
other allies would like to see NATO take a larger role in ISAF,
and so would we.
As Secretary Powell said at NATO last week: ``NATO should
look at how the Alliance could play an even greater role in
Afghanistan, up to and including a NATO lead for ISAF.''
NATO is the central organizing agent for transatlantic
cooperation. It represents, as you both said, not just a
military alliance but a political military alliance, a
community of common values and shared commitments to democracy,
free markets and the rule of law.
NATO is key to the defense of the United States. And so
therefore, as you both said, NATO must continue to lead and to
adapt.
The November 2000 NATO Prague summit launched a
transformation of NATO with a three-part agenda: New members,
new capabilities, and new relationships.
The job you have given me today, Senator, is to discuss
enlargement, which is key to that transformation.
At the Prague summit, NATO leaders invited the seven new
democracies--Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia, and Slovenia--to join NATO. And in Brussels on March
26, NATO Ambassadors signed the protocols to begin the formal
process of admitting the invitees into the alliance.
The President expects to forward the Accession Protocols to
you and to the Senate for its advice and consent on
ratification in the coming days. And I respectfully ask this
committee to act swiftly and positively on that request. And I
appreciate the report you have given about the conversation you
have had with Mr. Frist.
Enlargement, I believe, will strengthen democracy and
stability in Europe, revitalize an adapted NATO and benefit the
United States. Enlargement will encourage and consolidate
reforms in the seven invitees, expanding NATO's geographic
reach and including seven committed Atlanticists, who already
act as allies in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The invitation to these seven States followed an intensive
program of preparation under NATO's Membership Action Plan. And
I know that you have held two hearings on this particular
issue. And as you heard at that time, the alliance worked with
the aspirants to encourage political, economic and military
reform. Be clear: There is still work to do in all of these
areas, but we are working with the aspirants on a daily basis
and they are committed to further reform in all of these areas.
These seven are also committed to the transatlantic
alliance. They are allies in the war against terror. They have
contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom and to the
International Security and Stabilization Force in Kabul.
And since we do not mean this hearing to be an eye test, I
would just invite you to look at the charts \1\ that I have
handed out--this is the large version of it--which shows across
the board, by the seven aspirants in Afghanistan in Operation
Enduring Freedom, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, in the Balkans,
what all these countries have already contributed. And as you
both said, a real military contribution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The charts referred to can be found beginning on page 161.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Chairman, all of these countries have also joined in
strong statements of support for U.S. policy and, in some
cases, have lent physical military support to the United States
and Coalition military mission in Iraq. All of the invitees
have committed to spending at least 2 percent of their gross
domestic product on defense. And as you can see from this chart
or the small one that I have handed out, all seven already
spend a higher percentage of their GDP on defense than almost a
third of our current NATO membership.
We are also greatly benefited because publics in these
countries strongly support NATO membership. On the 23rd of
March, in a referendum I know you all watched, Slovenians went
to the polls to support NATO membership. And the ``Yes'' vote
won with 66 percent. In Romania and Bulgaria and the three
Baltic States, support for NATO consistently stands at above 70
percent.
Together these allies will contribute as many as 200,000
troops to the alliance; approximately equal to the number of
new forces that came in the last enlargement of NATO in 1999.
What of future enlargement? I believe that the door to NATO
should remain open. In his speech at Warsaw University in 2001,
the President said that, and I quote, ``all of Europe's
democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, all that lie
between should have the same chance for security and freedom
and the same chance to join the institutions of Europe, as
Europe's old democracies have.'' So we welcome the continuing
pursuit of membership by Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, and will
continue to consult closely with these nations on their
membership action programs, as well as others who may seek
membership in the future.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Biden, you both mentioned the question of
new capabilities, the second major outcome of the Prague summit
in 2000. And because you give me the chance here today to talk
about new capabilities, I would like to do that because I
believe that the most important challenge facing NATO is
building its capabilities to face the modern threats of
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. And as Senator Biden
said, NATO has some fundamental choices to make because the gap
in military capabilities between the United States and Europe
is the most serious long-term problem facing NATO.
As the chairman said, at the Prague summit NATO's leaders
decided to close this gap, and Europeans committed to spend
smarter, pool their resources and pursue military
specialization. For example, Germany is today leading a
consortium to get more airlift. Norway leads a consortium to
get more sealift. Spain is leading its consortium to get more
air-to-air refuelings. And the Netherlands is taking the lead
to get more precision guided munitions.
This is a good start. And although you have heard testimony
that has been optimistic, I believe that followup and actual
spending and the success of these consortia will be absolutely
critical.
NATO's leaders also created at Prague, as you both
mentioned, the NATO Response Force. We need NATO forces
equipped with new capabilities and organized into highly ready
land, air and sea forces able to carry out missions anywhere in
the world. And I believe that NATO can and, in appropriate
circumstances, should undertake military operations outside of
its traditional area of operations, as you have both called
for.
The NATO Response Force will be a force of approximately
25,000 troops, with land, sea and air capability, deployable
worldwide in 30 days. NATO leaders agreed that the NATO
Response Force should be ready for exercises by October 2004
and mission-ready by October 2006. It also needs to streamline
its command structure.
The third area, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Biden, that Prague
talked about was new relationships. As you and I have discussed
in the past, and I have testified, this third area of adaption
and transformation is the growing web of partnerships that NATO
has. And who could have imagined 10 years ago, when we worked
so hard on Partnership for Peace, that when it came time for
U.S. Forces and Coalitions Forces and NATO Forces to fight in
Afghanistan, that all of these countries that had worked so
closely with us in partnership for peace, would play such an
important role in dealing with the Taliban and Osama bin Laden?
In May 2002, President Bush, President Putin and other
Allied heads of state and government inaugurated the NATO-
Russia Council. And since then NATO and Russia have been
working on projects in key areas such as combating terrorism,
in peacekeeping, and non-proliferation. And in fact, the
Council sponsored an unprecedented civil emergency exercise in
Russia, simulating a terrorist attack involving toxic
chemicals, which brought together 850 first responders from
more than 30 allied and partner nations. And we will continue
to develop and expand our partnerships with willing States like
Ukraine or others in Central Asia and the Caucasus.
Mr. Chairman, you and the ranking member both referred to
what I consider to be the bruising debate in February about
defense for--support for Turkey under Article 4 of the NATO
Treaty. The alliance in the end did arrive at the right answer.
The Defense Policy Committee directed military assistance to
Turkey to address a threat of attack from Iraq. And that
military assistance is now in place. NATO deployed AWACs,
Patriot missiles, nuclear, biological and chemical defense
teams.
And I think that we should not be in any doubt that that
debate and that disagreement did damage the alliance. I think
that Secretary General Robertson is right though, that it was a
hit above the waterline and that NATO would recover. And
Secretary Powell's visit last week to the alliance is part of
that recovery.
Because it is essential that NATO continues to knit
together the community of European and North American
democracies as an alliance of shared values and collective
security, I believe it would be wrong to draw the conclusion
that we should stop pushing NATO to change to address these new
threats. Indeed, I believe that we should redouble these
efforts. For, at the end of the day it is to NATO that we
return to seek common ground and cooperation on the issues
facing the transatlantic community.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to
make that statement.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Secretary
Grossman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Grossman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Marc I. Grossman, Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs
Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, Senators, it is an honor for me to be
before you today.
We are grateful for your leadership, Mr. Chairman, and for Senator
Biden's, on the issue of enlargement.
You have offered opportunities for discussion on enlargement over
the past several months. These meetings have been of value to me and to
other Administration officials. Also, I would like again to thank
Senator Voinovich for his participation in what was an historic NATO
Summit in Prague in November.
Let me begin by reporting on Secretary Powell's April 3 meetings at
NATO.
The Secretary met NATO and EU Foreign Ministers together and later
with just NATO colleagues. He also met Secretary General Robertson, EU
Presidency and Commission leadership, Ambassadors from the Vilnius-10
countries and separately with nine Foreign Ministers. Twenty-one
sessions in all!
The Secretary's messages in Brussels were clear: first, we value
NATO and the transatlantic partnership it anchors. Second, it is time
to look to the future, including the stabilization and reconstruction
of Iraq. The Secretary reminded NATO ministers of Deputy Secretary of
Defense Wolfowitz's presentation to the North Atlantic Council last
December, when he suggested that NATO roles could include peacekeeping,
WMD security and destruction and delivery of humanitarian assistance.
We remain open to a NATO role in Iraq. No commitments were made. No
Ally raised objections to these possibilities. We will follow up with
allies and see what, if anything, can be done.
The Committee has heard testimony on NATO enlargement from people
within and outside the Administration. There is broad support here and
in the Alliance for this next stage of enlargement.
For fifty years NATO has been the anchor of western security.
The end of Soviet Communism did not diminish NATO's importance.
The democracies of NATO made and keep the peace in the
Balkans.
In 1999, NATO stopped ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.
NATO's just-completed mission in Macedonia has also brought
order to that new democracy.
NATO responded to September 11 by invoking Article 5; an attack on
one member will be regarded as an attack on all. NATO sent AWACS to
patrol U.S. airspace, logging 4300 hours; 360 sorties, with 800
crewmembers from 13 nations.
Thirteen Allies now contribute to Operation Enduring Freedom.
NATO Allies lead the International Stabilization force in Kabul.
German and Dutch troops replaced Turkish troops in ISAF, who
replaced British forces. Lord Robertson and some of our Allies would
like to see NATO take a larger role in ISAF. As Secretary Powell said
at NATO last week: ``NATO should also look at how the Alliance could
play an even greater role in Afghanistan, up to and including a NATO
lead for ISAF.''
NATO is the central organizing agent for Trans-Atlantic
cooperation. It represents a community of common values and shared
commitments to democracy, free markets and the rule of law.
NATO is key to the defense of the United States. And so NATO must
continue to lead and to adapt.
The November 2002 NATO Summit at Prague launched a transformation
of NATO with a three part agenda: new members; new capabilities and new
relationships.
new members
My job today is to discuss enlargement, which is key to this
transformation.
At the Prague Summit, NATO leaders invited seven new democracies--
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia--
to join NATO. In Brussels on March 26, NATO Ambassadors signed the
protocols to begin the formal process of admitting the invitees into
the Alliance. The President expects to forward the accession protocols
to the Senate for its advice and consent on ratification in the coming
days.
I respectfully ask this committee to act swiftly and positively to
this request.
This enlargement will strengthen democracy and stability in Europe,
revitalize NATO and benefit the United States.
Enlargement will encourage and consolidate reforms in the seven
invitees, expanding NATO's geographic reach and inducting seven
committed Atlanticists, who already act as allies in Afghanistan and
Iraq.
The invitation to these seven states followed an intensive program
of preparation under NATO's Membership Action Plan. The Alliance worked
with the aspirants to encourage political, economic and military
reform. There is still work to do in these areas and we continue to
work daily with the aspirants on these issues. They are committed to
further reform.
These seven are committed to the trans-Atlantic Alliance. They are
Allies in the War on Terror. They have contributed to Operation
Enduring Freedom and to the International Security and Stabilization
Force in Kabul.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See charts, ``Political and Military Contributions by NATO
Invitee Countries,'' on page 161.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At Burgas, Bulgaria provides basing for U.S. transport aircraft
supplying Operation Enduring Freedom. Bulgaria also sent an Nuclear
Biological and Chemical decontamination unit to Afghanistan.
Estonia sent a team of explosive experts to Afghanistan.
Latvia has contributed medical personnel to ISAF in Kabul.
Lithuania deployed special operations forces to Afghanistan last
year, and this year provided a team of medical personnel.
Romania has an infantry battalion serving in Kandahar and military
police unit and transport aircraft serving Kabul.
Slovakia deployed an engineering unit to Kabul.
Slovenia has provided assistance with demining in Afghanistan.
They have all joined strong statements of support for U.S. policy
and in some cases have lent support to United States military mission
in Iraq.
All of the invitees have committed to spending at least two percent
GDP on defense, and as you can see, all seven already spend a higher
percentage of their GDP than almost a third of the current NATO
membership.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See chart, ``2002 Defense Spending,'' on page 165.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Their publics strongly support NATO.
On March 23, Slovenians went to the polls to support NATO
membership. The Yes vote won with 66%. In, Romania, Bulgaria and the
three Baltic states, support for NATO stands at above 70%.
Together the invitees will also contribute as many as 200,000 new
troops to the Alliance--approximately equal to the number added by
NATO's last enlargement in 1999.
What of future enlargements? The door to NATO should remain open.
In his speech at Warsaw University in 2001, the President stated that,
``all of Europe's democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea all
that lie between should have the same chance for security and freedom
and the same chance to join the institutions of Europe--as Europe's old
democracies have''.
We welcome the continuing pursuit of membership by Albania, Croatia
and Macedonia. We will continue to consult closely with these nations
on their Membership Action Plan programs as well as with others who may
seek membership in the future.
new capabilities
Mr. Chairman, enlargement is only one aspect of a much broader
transformation launched at Prague and now being undertaken in Brussels.
The most important challenge facing NATO is building its
capabilities to face the modern threats of terrorism and weapons of
mass destruction.
The gap in military capabilities between the United States and
Europe is the most serious long-term problem facing NATO.
At the Prague Summit in November, NATO's leaders decided to close
this gap.
European Allies agreed to ``spend smarter,'' pool their resources
and pursue specialization. For example:
Germany is leading a 10-nation consortium on airlift.
Norway leads a consortium on sealift.
Spain leads a group on air-to-air refuelings.
The Netherlands is taking the lead on precision guided
missiles and has committed 84 million dollars to equip their F-
16's with smart bombs.
This is a good start. Follow-through will be critical.
NATO's leaders also created at Prague the NATO Response Force. We
need NATO forces equipped with new capabilities and organized into
highly ready land, air and sea forces able to carry out missions
anywhere in the world.
NATO can and, in appropriate circumstances, should undertake
military operations outside its traditional area of operations.
The NATO Response Force will be a force of approximately 25,000
troops, with land, sea and air capability, deployable worldwide on
thirty days notice. NATO leaders agreed that the NATO Response Force
should be ready for exercises by October 2004 and mission-ready by
October 2006.
NATO also needs to streamline its command structure for greater
efficiency.
new relationships
The third area of transformation is the growing web of
partnerships. Who could have imagined ten years ago, when we conceived
Partnership for Peace that this program would repay such dividends in
Central Asia, when the United States found itself at war in
Afghanistan?
In May of 2002, President Bush, President Putin and Allied heads of
State and Government inaugurated the NATO-Russia Council.
Since then NATO and Russia have been working on projects in key
areas such as combating terrorism, peacekeeping, and non-proliferation.
The Council sponsored an unprecedented civil emergency exercise in
Noginsk, simulating a terrorist attack involving toxic chemicals, which
brought together 850 first responders from more than thirty allied and
partner nations.
And we will continue to develop and expand our partnerships with
willing states like Ukraine or those in Central Asia and the Caucasus.
Mr. Chairman, in February, the Alliance went through a bruising
debate about defense support for Turkey under Article 4 of the NATO
Treaty.
The Alliance did arrive at the right answer. The Defense Policy
Committee directed military assistance to Turkey to address a threat of
attack from Iraq. That military assistance is now in place: NATO
deployed AWACs planes, Patriot missiles, and Nuclear, Biological and
Chemical defense teams.
This disagreement did damage the Alliance. It is my view, however,
as Secretary General Robertson himself said afterwards, that this was a
hit above the waterline and that NATO would recover. Secretary Powell's
visit last week is part of that recovery.
Because it is essential that NATO continues to knit together the
community of European and North American democracies as an Alliance of
shared values and collective security, it would be wrong to draw the
conclusion that we should stop pushing NATO to change to address these
threats.
Indeed, we should redouble those efforts.
For at the end of the day, it is to NATO that we return to seek
common ground and cooperation on the issues facing the trans-Atlantic
community.
The Chairman. Let me mention again as you have, that the
intensity of effort has proceeded with each of the seven
applicant countries, in what might be called a perfection of
their defense arrangements and their contributions to the whole
and likewise, in some cases, sort of a tidying up of history.
Without reference to the current seven, I remember in the
case of the three States that came into NATO before, there were
border disputes and ethnic problems and political leftovers.
And it was a very good time, at least for both Europe and for
the applicant States, to address these issues which the
politics internally of those countries might not have permitted
for periods of time. That has been the case again.
The idea of Europe whole and free is a great deal more of
both, it seems to me, through the process that has been
undertaken. At the same time, one of the things that is most
interesting, I believe, about the world currently is the failed
State syndrome, or the situation in which States do not perfect
what they are doing, or become more cohesive, democratic.
Reference has been made critically of the United States as we
assisted the Afghan tribes, Pakistanis, others, in war against
the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan. As victory was assured
and the Soviet troops were withdrawn, our troops were withdrawn
fairly shortly thereafter. Not a great deal of interest was
paid for a period of time. Some might argue that Afghanistan
was never a failed State, but others would say, in fact, it had
many of the symptoms.
Among these were the ability of the al-Qaeda camps to set
up operations. They could have appeared in various other
places, but they sought a place that was more hospitable.
Afghanistan proved to be that point and, therefore, suffered a
war as they were pushed out and still continue to be pushed out
in that case.
As the situation in Iraq comes to a conclusion, one of the
dawning issues is: Will Iraq be a successful State, or will it
in fact take on some of the symptoms of a failed State? If the
latter occurs, it is a much larger situation in both terms of
geography, as well as population in Afghanistan.
On the one hand, NATO, through Lord Robertson's initiative,
has been attempting to address how NATO allies could be more
effective in Afghanistan, a place that is some distance from
Europe but clearly a part of the War Against Terrorism. The
success of that State and all the intersections of life that
come within the surrounding area are very important to our
security. I applaud Lord Robertson's initiative in this
respect. I am hopeful that that general idea will be adopted,
as opposed to anxiety in 6 months as to which a European
country, or whether any country, will step up to leadership in
ISAF, including the United States. It seems to me that is an
unfinished agenda, but an important one in which NATO's role
could be very, very important.
Now, I agree with the ranking member that in Iraq NATO's
role could be very important. I do not want to engage in a huge
argument that is off stage at least with this one about the
future governance of the country. Nevertheless, the
contribution that NATO might play seems to me to be fairly
obvious. That may be true of some other places, which brings me
to my question to you. The applicants as they approached NATO
saw NATO, maybe as all of us did a while back, as a very strong
alliance that defends Europe, a way in which the United States
participates vigorously in that defense, having gone through
two world wars, but now having had the success of 50 years of
peace.
Yet here we are in a world in which the threats may not
always and maybe increasingly will not be, in the War Against
Terrorism, nation States with return addresses, with
responsible parties. The question of how that transition is
made by NATO to the threat that each one of us have as
transatlantic alliances, is absolutely critical.
In the discussions that you or others in the State
Department have had, or in our government with the applicable
nations, what sort of discussions have proceeded about this new
world in which we live? By this I mean, the world of terrorist
cells, or organizations, subnational groups, the kinds of
threats that seem to be obvious in the War Against Terrorism.
What sort of preparation has come with any of the seven? Quite
apart from the incumbent membership back in Brussels, I focus
on the seven because this is an area in which, as you say,
there has been a shaping of values, a strengthening of values
and abilities. Can you comment on these preparations?
Mr. Grossman. Yes, Senator, I would be glad to. First let
me say in response to your opening comments, that I could not
agree more that this goal and philosophy of a Europe, whole,
free and at peace, has been a great magnet for people who want
to join this alliance. And when I think back 10, or 11 years
ago with people who had said, ``Well, the Warsaw Pact will
break up. NATO has to break up as well,'' and of course, we are
still having people want to join this club. And I think it is a
very powerful tool for reform, and it is a very powerful tool
for people to have goals.
And as you say, if you look at the applicants, what they
have done in the areas of Holocaust assets, Holocaust
remembrance, dealing with their border, dealing with their
neighbors, all of these things have been part and parcel of
their desire to get into NATO.
Second, I think that the issue of the failed States and the
system around, and dealing with failed States is an extremely
important one. NATO does not have the only responsibility
there, but there are important things that our country can do
in terms of your support, for example, for the Millennium
Challenge Account, for dealing with HIV/AIDS, for making sure
that we are supporting democracy and good governance around the
world because those are important parts of dealings with failed
States as well.
I think, Senator, in terms of what these seven are getting
into and know they are getting into, I think that anybody who
realizes for NATO what the implication of the 11th of September
was; when a terrorist operation can be planned in Afghanistan,
refined in Hamburg, and then carried out in the United States,
I believe that the out-of-area debate is over forever.
And these States did not just turn up to be NATO members.
They were in MAP. They were in Partnership for Peace. They knew
what they were getting into. And the other reason I think they
knew is because they watched the three earlier new members,
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. And you will recall in
April 1999, we signed them up, and as General Clark will
remember, 2 weeks later they were at war. And so anyone who
joins this alliance today I think realizes that this is serious
business.
The final thing I would say is that each of them have
looked for a way to contribute to this future war against
terrorism. Again, I would refer you to the chart and follow
down the contributions to the war in Afghanistan, where each of
them has brought some capability to this war. So our
conversations with them about future threats are complete. Our
conversations with them about future threats are honest, and I
think that they have really stepped up, not only in niche
capabilities, but in answering the call from this political
military alliance.
The Chairman. I want to make just a comment before I
conclude my questioning about some of the values that have been
helpful for us in the United States. I use once again maybe
parochial anecdotal examples, but I was aware at the
Indianapolis Speedway 3 years ago that Indiana had a strong tie
with Slovakia. I was aware of this because the Commander of the
Slovakian Armed Forces was there with some of his staff
members. During the Armed Services celebration back in the
infield, he wanted to have what amounted to a summit conference
and literally set up a table in which we were there talking
about the relationship between Indiana and Slovakia.
At that point we did not have a strong relationship. As a
matter of fact, many people in Indiana had not traveled to
Slovakia, and were not aware of the virtues of the country; but
not for long. With the National Guard units, hundreds of
Hoosiers began going to Slovakia perennially, and some staying
there for fairly large periods of time. They became strong
advocates for Slovakia at a time in which the politics of the
country were much more troubled than during the current
situation. They demanded that the Members of Congress and
others take an interest in the country, and also visit it.
Now, it is a two-way proposition in which there is a
learning curve on the part of the American public. Our support
for NATO, our support for involvement of the countries, takes
place in large part because of the missionary work of others.
I cite just one more situation in a visit to Lithuania. It
turned out that the hotel in which I was staying abutted to a
very large facility, which I went next door I discovered was a
huge basketball academy. It was founded by one of the NBA stars
who comes from Lithuania and started this enterprise. That is
very congenial for a Hoosier to begin with, to find
productivity and hundreds of young people involved in it.
Senator Biden. I knew that you would get basketball back
into this somehow.
The Chairman. So we have not forgotten. In any event, what
I found also in the course of those conversations, was that a
number of people, who were sort of hovering about the scene,
were going to Florida that weekend. They were going to be in
training with members of the National Guard of that State, and
I think some people from Michigan were coming down. It was very
sophisticated training. You know, the fact that people would be
commuting from there to Florida over the weekend for Guard
training and so forth, struck me as new. Nevertheless, I found
that it is not, that the amount of interoperable situations
going on here with our State organizations, our local people,
are extraordinary.
This is one reason why NATO has legs. The idea really is
infectious when you have freedom and you have this kind of
cooperation and the extension of the ideals and the training.
I note that once again the Ambassadors of each of the seven
States are with us today. I have spotted you as you have come
in at various times, and we appreciate that. We acknowledge
that and are delighted that you are a part of this hearing and
have been, really, in all of our hearings as we have had these
conversations.
I yield now to my distinguished colleague, Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
I have a lot of questions and I will, I guess, submit some
of them in writing. But this notion of NATO and Afghanistan or
in Iraq, out of area, in your view do most of our NATO allies
believe in order to make that decision, they need, in effect,
an umbrella resolution from the U.N. authorizing that?
Mr. Grossman. Senator, I would say for Afghanistan the
answer to that is no. For Iraq, yes. I would say that if they
were lined up here, to a person, they would look for some kind
of legitimacy from the United Nations.
Senator Biden. Now it seems obvious on its face why they
would make that distinction, but explain to me, if you would
for the record, why you believe they make that distinction.
Mr. Grossman. I think that they would make the distinction
because in their perspective what has happened in Afghanistan
has legitimacy. Clearly around the world there is some
involvement of the United Nations. There is continuing
involvement of our forces in Operation Enduring Freedom. And
ISAF has been going on now for 18 months, so people I think
have accepted this.
Iraq is something new and although we might not see it
exactly that way, and I do not speak for obviously all the
other governments, my assessment is that most of them would
seek some United Nations legitimacy.
Senator Biden. How would they explain Kosovo? There was no
U.N. I mean, we went with a coalition of the willing and
essentially NATO----
Mr. Grossman. Right.
Senator Biden [continuing]. Into Kosovo. And I must admit
as General Clark will remember, I recommended to the President,
among others--I was not the only one--to, since we could not
get a resolution, just bypass it and go straight to go.
How would they explain that they were willing to do it
where they did not have the U.N. approval? That was--is it
because it was in area?
Mr. Grossman. That is part of it, I think. Part of it is,
of course, that at that time, for them anyway, this was a much
closer issue. But as you say, I mean, a number of countries, a
large number of countries went with us into Kosovo, and I think
we should remember that a large number of countries are with us
in Iraq as well.
Now I know that Senator Smith, when he was chairing the
European Affairs Subcommittee, gave me a sentence that I have
never forgotten, which he said, ``You know, the whole point of
the lesson of World War II was never again, not never again
unless there is a Security Council Resolution.'' And I think
that is right, and that is the position of the United States.
Security Council Resolutions, I believe, are important but they
are not necessary if you have to take action.
Senator Biden. There is a good deal of debate in the
foreign policy community and among intellectuals in this
country about whether or not the neo-conservative view, and I
am not trying to--in the interest of time, I realize that is a
generalization--that there is a significant difference in the
threat perception on the part of NATO members, Europe, the EU--
they are different, I acknowledge--but from the European
perspective about what threats are immediate and real in this
world, and the U.S. perception of those threats. And a thesis
that is emerging and gaining some significant credibility and
adherents, is that it is a consequence of an imbalance in
capabilities; that the Europeans, lacking the capability to
meet these threats, are inclined to conclude that they are not
real threats. We, having the capability because we have kept up
at a considerable pace our military spending and modernization,
are prepared to meet these threats and so we are prepared to
acknowledge that they are imminent.
And Mr. Kagan goes on to write in his book, he said,
``There is more to the transatlantic gulf than a gap in
military capabilities. And while Europe may be enjoying a free
ride in terms of global security, there is more to Europe's
unwillingness to buildup its military power than confront''--
excuse me. Let me start this over again. ``There is more to
Europe's unwillingness to buildup its military power than
comfort with the present American guarantee.'' And it goes on
to say, ``Europeans over the past half century have developed a
generally different perspective on the role of power and
international relations. This perspective strings directly from
the unique historical experience since the end of World War II.
Consider again the qualities that make the European strategic
culture; the emphasis on negotiation, diplomacy, commercial
ties, international law over the use of force, the seduction
over coercion, multilaterialism over unilateralism. As German
Foreign Minister Fisher put in his speech outlining his vision
of Europe, `The core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was,
and still is, the rejection of the European balance of power
principal and hegemonic ambitions of individual States that
have emerged following the peace of Westphalia in 1648.' ''
This treatise goes on to expand that notion that there is
essentially, as I understand and to read it--maybe Mr. Kristol
will clarify this for me if I am wrong--is that ``there is a
genuine divergence of interest, perception and willingness to
exercise force and the tools needed to deal with whatever
threats are available. That it is''--because they go on to say
it is ``ideological, beyond just the difference in threat
capabilities.''
So it leads me to this question: How do you explain the
unwillingness, thus far, of the significant and most powerful
nations in NATO to meet their commitments that they have made
to modernizing and upgrading their capabilities, not just since
Prague but actually since the late 1980s? Do you view it in
these terms, that they view the utility of the use of force and
power as somehow dangerous? Or I mean, if that is the case,
then it seems to me that there is a fundamental problem that we
have in NATO. Can you talk to that or speak to that a little
bit?
Mr. Grossman. I will do my best. First, Senator, I think it
is important that, from my perspective anyway, that we not
generalize too much about Europe and what Europe thinks and
that Europe might be moving down a path that is----
Senator Biden. Germany.
Mr. Grossman. Well, but I think it is important, because I
will come to that at the end. But you do have the eight
countries, very important countries, who signed a statement in
support of Operation Enduring Freedom. You do have the V-10
countries. And so I think that there is a lot of public ferment
in Europe, and a lot of difference in public opinion in Europe,
but I would not generalize too much.
And in a sense, one of the good things about this
enlargement, that I hope that you all will be for, is we are
bringing in countries who, I think, see the world very much in
the way that we do and wish to act. I think the big distinction
here is between countries who are not prepared to act, and
countries who are prepared to act, and we need to have as many
countries in the alliance as possible who are prepared to do
something.
Senator Biden. If I can stop you.
Mr. Grossman. Yes.
Senator Biden. But if you can define for me, by ``act''--I
believe acting is in part made up of the willingness to spend a
larger portion of their GDP in order to have capabilities.
Mr. Grossman. I agree with you completely.
Senator Biden. Then why have we not--I mean, do you
anticipate that that will--that it is likely to change? What I
worry about, quite frankly, is: With some of the larger, more
powerful nations in NATO thus far refusing to act in building
their military capabilities and the disparity widening between
us and them, that the aspirant countries, although committed to
act, once in will find it very difficult to be sort of the odd-
man-out in terms of actually, with their more limited
capability, increasing their defense budgets in the face of
what are growing domestic needs and concerns. I mean, a little
example here, I am worried about which example they will
follow.
Mr. Grossman. I think for all of the reasons that you cite.
First, I think that some countries do not want to spend more
money. Second, there are countries who have different
priorities and do not wish to invest further in defense. Third,
I think, and you would have to ask them, is a lot of energy
right now, of course, is going into this creation of the future
of Europe. And you mentioned yourself, Senator, in your opening
statement, this idea of the Belgians getting together with a
few countries to have a defense capability.
I think work outside of the NATO-EU relationship, work that
tears down the alliance is greatly negative to us. So I do not
think that these countries--and if you look at France for
example, France is not a pacifist country. France is involved
around the world militarily. France is a country actually that
has increased its defense spending.
And so what we need to do, all of us, as we have been
trying to do, is make sure that people see the threats as we
do, as transatlantic threats, and then work through NATO and
through this NATO-EU relationship to get these challenges met.
I think Germany--and again they would have to speak for
themselves. Germany is a different question because it comes
from a different history. But if you look at what the Germans
were prepared to do in the Balkans, help in Afghanistan,
continuing efforts in NATO, I think we can work our way through
this and have an alliance that is prepared to meet its
responsibilities.
Senator Biden. With your permission, may I ask just a short
followup question, with the permission of my colleagues?
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Biden. Have all of the eight countries that signed
the declaration on Iraq met their NATO capabilities
commitments? Or have any of them? In other words, you know, you
made the point, and it is accurate----
Mr. Grossman. Right.
Senator Biden [continuing]. That we had eight NATO
countries sign on to a declaration supporting the effort in
Iraq. I am just curious: Who among them, and if you want to do
it for the record, has met their NATO capabilities commitments?
Mr. Grossman. I would do it for the record. I mean,
obviously some of them--I know off the top of my head, the
answer to some of them is ``no,'' because they fall below a 2
or 3 percent GDP defense spending ratio; for example, Denmark,
for example. But people are making contributions in other ways,
and I would be very glad to take that question for the record.
Senator Biden. Good. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Grossman. Nice to see you, sir.
Senator Chafee. I saw one former administration official
refer to NATO as the ``Mother of all Coalitions.'' Is that what
is envisioned? And what are the dynamics vis-a-vis the United
Nations if that is the administration's direction?
Mr. Grossman. Well I think that NATO is the greatest of all
Coalitions. As both Senators said in their introductions, this
is the greatest alliance that we have ever been involved in and
the greatest political military alliance.
And so I have always thought of NATO as the place you go to
consult with your closest friends, the place you try to act
with your closest friends, the place you try to put together
military capability with those others who are prepared to act.
And as I said to Senator Biden, my view is U.N. Security
Council resolutions, the blessing of the United Nations, action
with the United Nations are always desirable but not, in the
end, necessary. And so I believe that if we have to act as we
did in Kosovo, or if we have to act in a Coalition as we are
today in Iraq, we will do that. And that is a very, very
important part of the NATO alliance.
For example, sir, who could have thought on October 7,
2001, when we needed to act militarily with our allies in
Afghanistan, that we would be knocking on the door of all kinds
of countries in Central Asia, who, what do you know, had been
with us in the Partnership for Peace for 10 years? Think how
much harder that would have been to convince countries to join
us had we not made that investment. And I think that investment
pays off every single day.
Romania, for example, is a country that deployed its own
forces, with its own airplanes to Afghanistan. There are a
number of allies, our present allies, who could not do that.
The Bulgarians have let us stage out of Borgas in Bulgaria. The
three Baltic States have each provided niche capabilities, but
important capabilities, in Afghanistan and are prepared to in
Iraq. So this is a tremendous organizing principle that we
believe in, in NATO.
Senator Chafee. Am I correct to assume, then, that there is
a minimizing of the United Nations relationship that we have
traditionally----
Mr. Grossman. No, sir.
Senator Chafee [continuing]. Had as we empower NATO
further?
Mr. Grossman. No, sir. All I was trying to say was that, in
the end, when a decision has to be made by our President and
our Congress, I think the rule that we would live by is that
United Nations sanction, United Nations resolutions are
desirable but not necessary.
Senator Chafee. And now, how do you envision the rising
influence of, in particular, India and the People's Republic of
China, and as you look to the relationship with NATO?
Mr. Grossman. Well, certainly NATO is not a threat to
either of those countries. Very interestingly, the Chinese
Ambassador has been reaching out to colleagues at NATO because
they see, as PfP countries, that Central Asian States which are
important obviously to Chinese security, are having this
relationship with NATO and they would like to have a
conversation, too.
So I believe--I cannot speak for Lord Robertson. I think
the alliance would be prepared to speak to anybody on any
subject, but certainly the alliance is not a threat to either
of those countries and we would welcome a conversation with
either of them.
Senator Chafee. I guess it comes back to my original
question. It seems as though the United Nations, a traditional
body after World War II for resolving our disputes, is slipping
in stature as NATO rises. Disavow me of that thought if----
Mr. Grossman. Well, with respect, sir, if you think of what
President Bush did on the 12th of September of last year, we
went to the United Nations General Assembly and made a speech
about Iraq. And we spent 8 weeks then trying to bring together
Resolution 1441, which I think was a great triumph for the
United Nations and for the United Nations Security Council.
But then when it comes to the inability of the Security
Council then to act on 1441 which calls for serious
consequences, then the United States and its Coalition partners
felt the need to act. I believe, sir, that if a second
resolution would have passed and the United States and its
Coalition partners would have had that second resolution, we
would have welcomed it. But it did not pass. Our President felt
the need to act and I believe that was the right thing to do,
sir.
So I do not think these are in competition. I just want to
be absolutely honest with the committee and not ever be in a
position of saying that NATO would have to ask the United
Nations' permission to act. I think that would be something
that, I believe as I have understood this committee and
certainly that I believe personally, would be a mistake.
Senator Chafee. Yes, I understand what you are saying. My
difference would be that the UN's failure to act--I would
dispute that; I think they were acting. Resolution 1441
certainly was stricter and the inspections were continuing and
the President took a different course, decided not to go
through the United Nations, and I just have a difference of
opinion on that, of course.
One more question as we look at the changes of--see more
emphasis on NATO, where were the great failures of the United
Nations? Post-World War II, you could argue that our great
adversaries Russia and China are now our friends and allies
with relative loss of bloodshed, some peripheral battles and
skirmishes, conflicts if you will, but no great battles. We won
the cold war through a policy of working the United Nations,
working through nuclear deterrence and the bad word,
``containment.'' Where were the failures?
Mr. Grossman. Well, sir, first of all, I think the United
Nations for the United States has been a wild success since the
end of World War II. I am not here to bash the United Nations.
I am not here to criticize the United Nations. All I was trying
to do is be honest and say that there are circumstances in
which I would not seek the permission of the United Nations if
the United States or NATO had to act.
And with respect, sir, I think part of the, not
disagreement but the dialog that we are having, is that I do
not believe the one organization was responsible for the total
outcome of the cold war. It was a combination of those things.
For example, you very rightly cited the very important impact
of the United Nations on ending the cold war.
I might say, sir, that in addition, there was a 50-year
commitment of NATO to spend money on defense, to say that they
would deter an attack by the then Soviet Union on the then
divided Europe. I would say, for example, that the decision of
NATO countries, a courageous decision and a very controversial
decision at the time, to deploy INF missiles was one of the
reasons that the Soviet Union gave it up.
And so I think that the United Nations was an important
part of this. I do not dispute that, sir. But I think that NATO
played an important, a very important role in winning the cold
war, as did the commitment of the United States and other
counties to year, after year, after year, spend money on
defense.
I would say one other thing, if I could. We are today--
imagine it, we are today considering bringing into the alliance
the three Baltic States, the three Baltic States whose
incorporation into the Soviet Union, I think, was one of the
great illegal acts of the last century. And for 50 years this
country, our country, had a non-recognition policy and we stuck
to it, and it was the right thing to do. And here we are now,
the Soviet Union is gone, and we are going to bring these three
countries into NATO. I think it is a remarkable achievement.
And so, with respect, sir, the United Nations plays a role.
Absolutely. But it was the determination of the United States,
its allies and NATO, that also played an important role in
winning the cold war.
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much.
Mr. Grossman. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Chafee.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
I am supporting expansion of NATO. My own view has been
since the day the Soviet Union ended that it would be great to
have everybody in there, everybody including Russia eventually.
How is Russia coming along?
Mr. Grossman. Well, in its relationship with NATO,
actually, Russia is coming along pretty well. As I testified--
--
Senator Boxer. That is what I am talking about.
Mr. Grossman. I am sorry. That is good because that is the
one thing that I know about today.
It is actually coming along pretty well. You will remember,
Senator, that we signed the NATO-Russia Council Treaty.
Senator Boxer. Yes.
Mr. Grossman. Every week now, NATO Ambassadors, at 20, meet
together. We are working with the Russians on issues of civil
emergency planning, airspace management, weapons of mass
destruction, and anti-terrorism. And as I testified, actually
we just had a very big civil emergency planning exercise based
on the release of a toxic chemical weapon in Russia in which
850 first responders from 30 countries participated. And so I
think this is going pretty well.
We need to have some successes and then if we can, take
this up to the next level. But as I testified here a year ago,
we want this at-20 arrangement to be good for NATO and to be
good for Russia as well.
Senator Boxer. I wanted to support something you said about
not making generalizations about Europe, like putting them into
old Europe and new Europe. That is a generalization; it does
not make sense. I never thought it did when the statement was
made, and I think it is destructive.
I also think it is important, whether you are talking about
NATO or the United Nations, to realize that there are times
when people do not see the issues exactly the way we do. We do
not see the world the way they do either. So what is the
problem?
Mr. Grossman. Well, from my----
Senator Boxer. I mean, what is all the angst? The fact of
the matter is: Every single nation is going to see an issue in
a different context given their relationship with a particular
part of the world, given the views of their people, et cetera,
et cetera. Why the vitriol when you are trying to live in a
world where we have to work with our colleagues all around the
world?
This war on terrorism is with us forever and we cannot
resolve it alone. So in this case of Iraq, we have got to be
very careful, it seems to me, to respect other countries. We
may not agree with them at all, but to go down a path of
saying, ``Well, we do not really care what you think,'' you
know, I think is very destructive and I just would like to hear
your comments on it.
Mr. Grossman. Sure. Let me make two comments, if I could.
First, in terms of NATO and Iraq: The first thing I say is, of
course, the NATO Council is not the Politburo, and we sit
around the table with 19, and we hope some day with 26, other
democracies. And so I think it is right for you to point out
that if you believe in democracy, you have to believe in
democracy. And these people come and they represent their
governments and their people. Fair enough.
Senator Lugar said in his opening statement that for 50
years, you know, there really have not been that many
controversies. But when I think back to NATO being thrown out
of France in 1966, or the pipeline issues in the 1980s, the INF
disagreements, people said, ``Oh, this is the end. It is all
over. We cannot get through this,'' but I believe that we will
get through this because we are a community of democracy.
The second thing, Senator, on Iraq in particular, is that
we have actually gone to the alliance now for 4 or 5 months and
we have said, first in December and then last week when
Secretary Powell was there, and we have said, ``Look, we think
there are four or five ways that NATO could, could participate
in Iraq. It could participate in weapons of mass destruction
destruction. It could participate in peacekeeping. It could
participate in humanitarian issues.''
But we are not going to demand, or dictate that NATO do
this because as the Chairman and the Ranking Member said, NATO
has a choice to make. So when Secretary Powell was there last
week, he said, ``These ideas, these possibilities are still on
the table. We would like to work with you on them.''
But the choice really is for NATO to make because we can do
this without NATO. We would rather do it with NATO, but we are
not here to dictate to NATO. NATO is a community of
democracies. My own view is that I hope that NATO will say,
``Yes,'' to these ideas because it would be good for us, good
for NATO and put NATO clearly on the side of meeting future
threats.
Senator Boxer. Well, I think that it would be good if the
whole world helped us in Iraq, to be honest. They owe $60
billion in debt. That is a little lower than ours, but that is
a big burden. Somebody has got to figure that one out. And
given the destruction on the ground, et cetera, and given the
fact that our people could be targets, I am very hopeful that
NATO takes a role and I am very hopeful that the U.N. takes a
role. I am very hopeful the whole world takes a role because I
think it is better for us, frankly, and better for the Iraqi
people in the end. So I think that is true. I have just one
more question for you.
Mr. Grossman. Please.
Senator Boxer. And that is, I have for a long time been
concerned, along with my colleagues on this committee, about
the stability of in Afghanistan outside the main cities. And
have we asked for NATO's help in taking a lead role in
expanding the peace force there? Because, you know, clearly
after September 11, NATO was so strong and so wonderful in
invoking Article 5 of the treaty, and looking at September 11
as a war against them. And it just seemed to me since this
stability in Afghanistan is so important--if I said ``Iraq''
before, forgive me. I meant Afghanistan.
Mr. Grossman. You said Afghanistan.
Senator Boxer. I did? Good, because I am still a little
jetlagged from coming back from California and the time change.
So I just wonder--I know that they are studying the issue.
But wait until you see it because I think, I have always said
Afghanistan, we just cannot afford failure there. And with
Iraq, we cannot afford failure there.
Mr. Grossman. Agreed.
Senator Boxer. I think the best way to protect against that
is to get the largest number of nations to help us in these
areas. So where do you see that peacekeeping force going and
NATO's role in it?
Mr. Grossman. I see it in two parts, Senator. First, that
what we are trying to do today is to encourage the NATO
alliance to take on, kind of, the core headquarters organizing
mission of the International Security Force in Afghanistan. We
have had over the last 18 months British Forces, followed by
Turkish Forces, followed by German Forces, Dutch Forces, and we
hope the Canadians will take over in the future.
And of course, everyone said, ``Well, why reinvent this
wheel very 6 months? Why have new headquarters and new
arrangements when NATO could do this?'' And so one of the
things that Secretary Powell really supported last week at NATO
was NATO playing a larger role there at the core of the
International Security Force in Afghanistan.
The second part of your question though, since I want to be
totally honest with you, the question of enlarging the role of
ISAF is not yet a question for NATO. We are going to take this
one thing at a time and see if we cannot get NATO to be the
organizing principle. And then at some point in the future, who
knows what will happen? There might be some expansion, but for
the moment we have always said we are not opposed to this
expansion, but so far there have not been very many volunteers
to do it.
Senator Boxer. Well, let me just take you on, on that. You
know, I am so tired of hearing that, ``We do not oppose it.''
You do not support it. I mean, that is--you know, you are
just playing with words here, ``We do not oppose it.'' If we do
not support it, it is not going to happen. I mean, let us face
it; that is a fact.
And the fact is that we have seen reports from all the
folks there who talk to me all the time, they are banging down
my door, and they are very worried about this long term
stability. And I just--you know, this business of ``We do not
oppose it,'' what does that mean? Do you support it? Do you
support expanding it?
Mr. Grossman. We would support it. I think we would support
it if there were also other countries who were also prepared to
do it.
Senator Boxer. NATO.
Mr. Grossman. Well, maybe that comes. But as I say, I do
not want to--I want to stay within what we are doing here
because the first step is to get NATO organized to keep the
ISAF mission as it is, so that we do not waste a lot of energy
reinventing this wheel every time. I really--I do not know how
to speculate about the future. But I take your point and I
would be glad to report it back and talk to Ambassador Burns
about it. Fair question.
Senator Boxer. Yes. I mean, I think to say that you do not
oppose expansion, it just--I think we ought to support it and
get that country in a safer mode----
Mr. Grossman. Right.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Because we cannot afford that
country to explode.
Mr. Grossman. I think there are though, Senator, just--and
I do not mean to be in an argument with you, but there are
other ways that we are trying to expand security. For example,
we and the French are together trying to train the Afghan
National Army, and battalion after battalion of that Army is
being trained. And they will, I think, go out and bring the
writ of the central government in Afghanistan farther and
farther.
Senator Boxer. I know that is coming along very slowly, but
I understand that.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.
Senator Sununu.
Senator Sununu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have an issue, or at least a first question, about some
of the language that was used. And I think it was used in the
exchange between you and Senator Biden and I am not finding
fault with either of you, but I want to clarify the language.
You each talked about a willingness to act, a refusal to
act, as if acting were somehow an arbitrary or subjective
choice of the NATO members within the alliance. Now, it would
seem to me that alliance members ought not to be making an
arbitrary choice whether or not to act or not act, but they
ought to be making their decision within the context of an
alliance framework that explicitly states circumstances and
conditions, and opportunities under which alliance members
would be expected to participate. And certainly there may be
disagreements about level or type of participation, strengths
and weaknesses. And all of this discussion about changing the
role of a specific alliance member is part of that.
But as NATO is constructed, does it not make sense to call
for action under a consistent set of terms, a consistent
framework that is applied from circumstance to circumstance?
Mr. Grossman. Yes, sir. That said, NATO is also flexible
enough to recognize that, for example, when in February there
was this challenge over NATO support for Turkey, when it could
not be done in the North Atlantic Council at 19 members, NATO
had the capacity to then meet in the Defense Planning Committee
at 18 members, and take this decision. And so there was a
country in that case that chose not to act, and I have to let
them explain why they did not do that, but we did not let the
alliance be frozen in that case.
Senator Sununu. I understand that, and it would seem to
me--I am not asking you to speak for them. But in that
circumstance the argument against action would, or certainly
should be that a country does not believe that a specific
action is in keeping with the framework the alliance, the
charter that is again applied consistently from time, and not
that it just does not want to act in this particular case. It
is not just refusing to act; it is making a coherent argument
that a specific action is not in keeping with the alliance's
charter.
Mr. Grossman. Yes, sir.
Senator Sununu. Are those the arguments that were put
forward? I do not claim to have followed the discussion and the
debates over that authorization so closely that I know the
specific arguments put forward by France.
Mr. Grossman. No, and I am not here to speak for France.
The French Ambassador, I know, would be glad to visit with you
all.
But I think in this case it goes back to the conversation
that I was having with Senator Chafee, which is: The argument
that France was making is that it was not time for NATO to act
in defense of Turkey because it presumed what might or might
not happen at the United Nations. And here, sir, is a
particular case where it was not an argument about NATO. It was
an argument about the relationship between NATO and the United
Nations.
Senator Sununu. And that is precisely my next point. Again,
you are not speaking for France, but that is a different point,
a different argument than arguing that this is not in keeping
with our alliance. You are suggesting an argument that said,
``This may be keeping with our alliance, but we want the U.N.
to go first.''
And I have an even greater problem with that argument
because to suggest that U.N. authorization is ever required as
a precondition to NATO action is to suggest that, by virtue of
their veto in the Security Council, China and Russia who are
partners of ours in a number of areas--but that is to suggest
that China and Russia should always have veto power over the
choice of NATO to act. Is that a fair characterization?
Mr. Grossman. I believe that the United Nations should
never have veto power over the capacity of NATO to act.
Senator Sununu. But, well, if they have--if the Security
Council, though, is called on to be asked to authorize any NATO
action, that is by definition, because of the way the Security
Council operates, giving veto power to those countries.
Mr. Grossman. Yes, sir. But it is the position of the
United States, and I believe very much backed by most members
of this committee, that United Nations Security Council
resolutions are desirable but not necessary, and they----
Senator Sununu. I understand your position, and I
understand the position and I agree with it.
Mr. Grossman. Yes, sir.
Senator Sununu. I am just trying to clarify that we have a
situation where, if these characterizations are fair we have
members of NATO arguing----
Mr. Grossman. Yes, sir.
Senator Sununu [continuing]. That it is no longer the
charter and the framework of the charter, and even the
interpretation of the charter that should govern actions and
choices for actions; but that in addition to that, we should be
providing members of the United Nations Security Council with a
vote and, specifically non-NATO members, with a veto power of
the authorization of those actions.
Mr. Grossman. I think--I am sorry.
Senator Sununu. I think we are in agreement, but----
Mr. Grossman. Yes, sir.
Senator Sununu. I think that is a very important
distinction and I think that is an issue that--and obviously, I
suppose, to state the obvious, needs to be resolved within the
NATO membership as we move forward. And it is an expectation,
and it needs to be resolved because it is part and parcel of
the expectations for action that those who are being asked to
join NATO will have.
And I think the expectations for action in-area or out-of-
area are critical here. The framework for those actions are
critical because you need to set expectations and be clear
about expectations when they join and that will help us avoid
internal conflicts later on. Any comment?
Mr. Grossman. Yes, sir, I would like to comment. I just
want to repeat again that it is our policy that we would not
seek the--we would not feel the necessity to seek authorization
of the United Nations for NATO action. Desirable but not
necessary is our policy.
And I will say, sir, that this of course is not a new
issue. And, in fact, with a very strong backing of this
committee when we walked up to the NATO summit in 1999, this
was ``the'' main issue in the drafting of the New Strategic
Concept. And I can remember testifying in front of this
committee, and the committee saying to me that ``If you allow
any language in that Strategic Concept which says that it was a
must for NATO to be authorized by the United Nations,'' I think
a number of Senators here said that they would sponsor the
resolution to have me fired, and us to walk away.
So this is a very strongly held position certainly of me
personally, I believe of the administration, and I would say, I
think, of the leadership of this committee.
Senator Sununu. A second question in my mind flows out of
the importance of setting these expectations, is then to define
the circumstances under which we undertake out-of-area
operations. In your testimony you say that in appropriate
circumstances--we should not have to take military operations
outside the traditional area of operations.
Can you describe in a little bit more detail, with a little
bit more clarity, what those circumstances are, or how you
would define them on a consistent basis, what test you would
apply? Because I do believe it is important that new members
understand what those tests will be in the future.
Mr. Grossman. I believe the most important test is the test
that is in the NATO Treaty, which is a threat to the territory,
the integrity, the system of a NATO member.
And for example, I would go back to the conversation that I
was having with Senator Boxer. I believe that the fact that we
are here in 2003 thinking about a NATO role in Afghanistan, a
NATO role in Iraq, defines what this new NATO is going to be
all about. I mean, I have either the benefit or the lack of
benefit, as you look at it, from having lived in this alliance
for a very, very long time. And people, you know--it was
unimaginable that NATO would act outside a very strict area,
but as I say----
Senator Sununu. I am sorry. When was it unimaginable that
NATO would act outside of a certain area?
Mr. Grossman. Up until the middle of the 1990s. And again--
--
Senator Sununu. And how and when did that perception
change?
Mr. Grossman. I believe, sir, that it changed as we
headed--well, first, it headed--it changed because of the
failure of the international community in the Balkans, and then
the return of the international community to the Balkans. And
General Clark can speak to this much better than I, but the
readiness of NATO to act to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in
1999. And I also believe that the debate over the new strategic
concept of NATO in 1999, which put in, what, terrorism, weapons
of mass destruction, are all transnational issues. And if you
are going to attack them you have got to do that outside of the
area.
Senator Sununu. But is it not fair to say that even prior
to the middle of the 1990s, that out-of-area action would
certainly be, not anticipated, but understood to be a potential
by the NATO members? And out-of-action in Eastern Europe, out-
of-action in the former Soviet Union, at a time and a place--if
there were a defense threat, if there were an attack on a NATO
member, that could certainly lead to out-of-area action in
Eastern Europe and Russia. It would seem to me that it is not
that it was never contemplated before 1995; it is that that is
a particular area in which NATO action was not previously
contemplated. I do not see anything necessarily new about the
concept of out-of-area; it is just the concept of these
particular areas, which prior to the early 1990s, were not
necessarily viewed to be a direct national security threat to
NATO members.
Mr. Grossman. Fair enough. I think that it is both
geography and the threat. These weapons of mass destruction,
that is not necessarily a threat from a certain geography.
Terrorism, as I said, you have something planned in
Afghanistan, refined in Hamburg, carried out in America, that
is not a geographic question.
When I think back on it--you know, memory is always a
tricky thing. When I think back on it, I think if I had been
testifying here 10 years ago, the question of out-of-area would
have been much, much more controversial, Senator, and I think
that it is a good thing that it is not.
Senator Sununu. Well, maybe I am putting too fine a point
on it, but the question of out-of-area would have been a much
more complicated question, or controversial question?
Mr. Grossman. Controversial, yes, sir.
Senator Sununu. Or the question of acting in Iraq, or
Afghanistan? Because I do not think the question of NATO acting
in Eastern Europe at the time, you know, in 1989, or 1985, or
in 1980, would have been very controversial or the question of
NATO acting in the Soviet Union, or the question of NATO acting
in various parts of the Pacific. I do not think those
necessarily would have been controversial.
Mr. Grossman. Well, I would have agreed with your comment
all the way up to the Pacific. With respect, I think anything
out--15 years ago, 10 years ago, anything that was out of a
very strict definition----
Senator Sununu. You do not think that if China in the
1950s, 1960s, or 1970s, posed a significant security threat to,
say, the United States?
Mr. Grossman. It is hard to look back. It is hard to
speculate, but I do not--no, I do not believe that would have
been a NATO----
Senator Sununu. Fine. I will withdraw the point about the
Pacific. But you understand my point, that this--the out-of-
area concept, I do not see as being that new, or dramatic, or
different. It is the areas and the new threats that have
emerged in the last 10 years that are new and different.
And the distinction here, I think, is somewhat important
because when you start talking about out-of-area, people think
that you are radically changing, or reinterpreting the charter,
or coming up with some totally new role, or responsibility for
NATO, when the core mission remains a defensive security
alliance of like-minded Nations.
Mr. Grossman. Absolutely correct.
Senator Sununu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Let me just intervene temporarily without
getting involved in the discussion. But I just remember giving
a number of speeches and papers in 1993, and the idea that
routinely, or even at all, NATO would act out-of-area was very
controversial. As a matter of fact, most countries simply did
not believe it at all. They were adamant about the question.
And in fact, it was so controversial, that it really did not
arise as a point of changing the doctrine, even as we moved
toward the first tranche of new members. And we had had that
experience already in Desert Storm before, in which we had sort
of a pick-up of volunteers, coalition of the willing of sorts,
in those days.
But in any event, it is an important discussion because
clearly the statement you have made today is: The issue is
pretty well passe. We are out-of-area, at least if we are
serious about terrorism and the rest of the world. But a lot
has changed in 10 years and you have been testifying right
throughout that period of time.
Mr. Grossman. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Senator Corzine.
Senator Corzine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
Secretary being here.
Let me follow on in this context of the community of
democracy which you stressed. Are these expectations that we
have been talking about which I guess are a proxy for the
mission of NATO--do you believe that they are fully
established?
Is there a consistent understanding of what those
expectations of all members, are or is it to be debated in each
individual circumstance, out of area being one of those issues
or the nature of preemption as opposed to defensive responses?
Is it understood in all of those various areas that the
Secretary talked about last week, whether it is weapons of mass
destruction destruction, or humanitarian aid or peacekeeping
operations, nation-building operations? How does this community
of democracies have a solid set of expectations in all of those
various areas if we are dealing with generalities?
Mr. Grossman. Two points, sir. First, I think in terms of
the expectations of the seven countries we are talking about
now, their expectations are very clear. And the reason is that
we did a better job this time than we did the last time because
we had what was called the membership action plan, and so
countries have very clear goals in terms of their political,
military, economic reforms programs. And so you would obviously
have to ask them because they are represented here, but I doubt
that any Ambassador to Washington from any of these countries
or any Foreign Minister or Defense Minister has any
misunderstanding about what the deal is here.
If you talk though, second, about these future issues,
``What do you do in Iraq? What do you do in Afghanistan?'' the
way this particular community of democracies sets its
expectations is the way that you would want us to, which is
through the debate of these things.
I mean, as I answered Senator Boxer, the Secretary went to
NATO last week. He did not demand or say, ``You have to
participate in Iraq.'' He said, ``Here are four or five ways
that this alliance could become involved. These issues are on
the table. Let us debate this thing and decide what NATO wants
to do.''
So once these countries are in, they are full partners in
the conversation about what future expectations might be like.
Senator Corzine. And what checks and balances are there to
any individual or group of nations inside the coalition with
respect to judgments they take with respect to any of those
difficult choices that may be on the agenda?
Mr. Grossman. I do not know if I would describe it exactly
as a check and balance, but I believe that for over 50 years
the consensus principle has worked at NATO to bring decisions
rather than to deny them. And in a sense, you think maybe that
is counter-intuitive. But I think people who sit around that
table have made their commitment to the alliance, have these
moral and political commitment to one another, are looking for
ways to come to some agreement. Does it always work that way?
No, sir.
Senator Corzine. Is there a commitment to defense, or is it
commitment to all of these other extensions? I think this gets
at that question about where we were with out-of-area actions.
People may have felt that they had a commitment that was
different 15 years ago than they do today with regard to those.
Mr. Grossman. Maybe so. But I think, sir, that people felt
that they had a commitment that was different when the alliance
was formed in 1949. I think one of the great things about NATO
has been how it has had the capacity to adapt. I mean, the
threat today is not the same threat that it was in 1949, and
yet, we do not have members bailing out and saying, ``Hey, I
signed up to fight the Soviet Union. No more Soviet Union, I am
out of here.''
We have countries, in fact, wanting to join this alliance
because the new threats that we have are key to them as well.
So we are not holding anybody there at that alliance in chains.
And I think if it ever came to it--I cannot imagine, but if it
ever came to it, that someone would say ``This alliance no
longer fits my world view,'' we are not going to strap them to
their seat. But again, I believe that the consensus principle
and the solemn commitment people make to collective defense and
this community of values--because community is actually what it
is--holds people together. It keeps them at the table. It keeps
them trying to come to make a solution, and that is right.
Senator Corzine. And you find no grave risk of that
community of values fraying and breaking apart in the current
circumstances and debate about preemption.
Mr. Grossman. On the contrary, Senator Corzine, I think the
fact that over the last x number of years, ten new countries
have wanted to join this alliance as actually a reinvigoration
of that community of democracies. I know when I sit around the
NATO table and I look at countries who 20 years ago were
dictatorships and 20 years ago were Warsaw Pact members and 20
years ago were run by somebody else and the fact that they are
today making their own decisions, that is a huge reinvigoration
of the alliance and also I think a great reflection on the
alliance's importance in the future. So I would see it exactly
the opposite, sir.
Senator Corzine. I am not necessarily claiming one view or
another, but I do believe that you could make the case that
Senator Chafee did, that other strategic principles led to the
evolution of these democracies and changes that were brought
about and, therefore, one might argue that there are principles
at work that have worked that may be effective in the future.
I appreciate it very much.
Mr. Grossman. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Corzine.
We much appreciate your testimony, Mr. Grossman.
Mr. Grossman. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you, as always, for your strong
advocacy and leadership. We look forward to your reappearances
before our committee.
Mr. Grossman. Anytime. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. The Chair would like to now call Mr. Kristol
and General Clark.
As both the ranking member and I have mentioned in the
introduction of our hearing today, we are especially fortunate
to have both of you before us. You both have distinguished
records of public service and important ideas on the subject in
front of us. I would like to ask you to testify first, General
Clark, and then followed by Mr. Kristol. In the event that you
wish, your full statement will be made a part of the record in
full. That will be true for both of you. You may proceed as you
wish.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL WESLEY K. CLARK, USA (RET.) FORMER SACEUR,
CHAIRMAN AND CEO, WESLEY CLARK & ASSOCIATES, LITTLE ROCK, AR
General Clark. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
members of the committee. It is a real pleasure to testify
before you today. I really appreciate this opportunity, and I
want to thank you for all of the support that you have given me
and the members of my commands during the time that I served in
uniform.
I came here several times and I remember the very strong
support this committee gave for the previous round of NATO
enlargement, the depth of your questions, your concern and I
think it was much appreciated by those of us who served in the
alliance at the time.
For those of us who served in the alliance the prospect of
adding these seven new members is a dream come true. We watched
as these nations of Eastern Europe shook off the legacies of
communism and struggled to find their way to the West. In that
struggle, the prospect of NATO membership, and its promise of a
security association with the United States, was a very strong
motivating factor. And so we are moving to fulfill their hopes.
I want to congratulate and applaud the work of both
administrations, the Clinton administration and the Bush
administration, in making this day possible. And I especially
want to congratulate the Armed Forces, the governments and the
peoples of the seven prospective new members of NATO, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania.
Your hard work and dedication to the principles of democracy
and liberty has made NATO membership--the prospect of NATO
membership possible.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the full statement that
I submitted put in the record, but if I could just summarize
some key portions of it now.
We are meeting at a time of both great hope for these seven
new members but also a time of great danger for NATO because
NATO today is at risk. It is an organization in search of a
mission, actually in despair at the lack of a mission.
It was excluded from intimate participation and support of
the United States' war on terror in 2001. It was apparently,
although I was not on the inside, excluded from early planning
and engagement in the war against Iraq, despite the fact that
its member nations could clearly see the planning moving ahead.
It became an afterthought, an organization to which we
turned at the end. It was a kind of resource bank from which
the United States could draw support from the under-committed
or unprepared or those who were not on the inside, a sort of
clean-up organization, to follow on after the United States did
the hard work of protecting its security.
As one official told me wryly last year, ``NATO, Keep the
Myth Alive.'' Recently, as NATO members have quarreled publicly
and angrily about matters of war and peace, it is brought back
to the fore again, what many in this country have concluded
about the alliance, that it is an organization whose time has
passed, that the issues which divide the United States from
Europe are too broad to be bridged by an old treaty and an
experienced bureaucratic process.
This group charges that the old allies contribute too
little, our respective attitudes are too different, and the
focus of American security interests lies elsewhere. Mr.
Chairman, this is not a dispute about NATO; this is a debate
about the nature of America's interests abroad and how we
should pursue them.
This is a question about American leadership, not about the
alliance. In this debate, one group apparently believes that
with the end of the cold war, our purposes in Europe were
essentially finished, that the countries there have no real
choice but to support the broad outlines of American policy and
that, therefore, our most important work is now centered on the
Middle East and Asia, where we are most likely to fight.
They have looked to there, rather than the old countries of
Europe, as the vital areas of engagement. They see troop
deployments oriented toward potential theaters of war as
critical. They are prepared to use military power in coercive
diplomacy and preventive conflicts. And they would reduce much
of our half-century-old military presence in Europe. This is
not a strategy that emerged in response to the terrorist
strikes on New York and against the Pentagon, but rather it
took advantage of those events to gain ascendancy.
I see greater promise in a different approach. I love the
men and women in the Armed Forces. We have got the greatest
military in the world. I am very proud to have been able to
wear our country's uniform for 34 years. But I believe our
security as a Nation and the safety of every American is best
enhanced by a broader and more visionary leadership which
enlists capable and committed allies in support.
I believe we are safer when we are liked than when we are
hated, when we are respected, not when we are feared. I think
American power should remain a wellspring of inspiration, not
become a source of concern. At the end of the Second World War,
when the United States was producing 50 percent of the world's
gross domestic product and we had a monopoly on nuclear
weapons, President Harry S Truman addressed the founding of the
United Nations with this thought, that without new security
structures we would never move beyond the philosophy of our
enemies, namely, ``might makes right.''
And he said to deny this premise, and we most certainly do,
we are obliged to provide the necessary means to refute it.
Words are not enough. He said we must, once and for all,
reverse the order, and prove by our acts conclusively that
``right has might.''
And that was the logic behind the founding of the United
Nations as the cornerstone of the international institutions of
the post World War II world. And while it is certainly clear
today that the American military is unchallengeable, we do not
know what the future will hold. For all of our military
strength, we are only 5 percent of the world's population, and
other larger nations, particularly in Asia, are developing
their own strength economically and their military potential.
And we must conduct ourselves with the aim of not only
dealing with immediate challenges but also establishing the
precedents, procedures and institutions that we need for
decades ahead. One of my predecessors in NATO, General
Eisenhower, warned in his farewell address as President in 1959
that ``America's leadership and prestige abroad depend not
merely upon our unmatched material progress, riches and
military strength, but on how we use our power in the interests
of world peace and human betterment.''
And those of us who have served in the Armed Forces have a
full appreciation of the ultimate limitations of military
power, no matter how capable and benignly led and directed.
America's strength was really built on the strength of our
economy and our values.
Our economic strength has been the basis of our success in
building allies and friends, opening markets, winning
investors' confidence, and encouraging peace and stability
worldwide. And that is the process that we must continue. We
should be focusing our security efforts on how to prevent war,
not on preventive war. Deterrence and containment are still
largely valid concepts, even in the post-cold war world.
This means focusing on ending both conventional and
unconventional weapons proliferation, encouraging the peaceful
resolution of disputes, and improving opportunities for all
nations around the world to achieve some of the security,
democracy and prosperity that Americans enjoy today. We should
be seeking to prevent the emergence of frictions and tensions
that might lead to conflict.
When problems do arise, we should use diplomacy and
economic measures first, and force only as a last resort. If
fighting is necessary, we should aim to work multilaterally
with strong allies if we can, and unilaterally only if we must.
And in each of these tasks, we should expect the greatest
potential for support from our friends and allies in Europe.
These European nations reflect our values, share our
heritage, and understand our culture and interests more than
any others anywhere. Together, we are more than 600 million
people, depending on where you draw the lines, half the world's
GDP, and three of the five permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council. Working together, we can assure
prosperity and security for our people.
Terrorism and weapons of mass destruction proliferation may
change the nature of the threats we face, but they do not
fundamentally alter the nature of the responses we should
undertake.
The U.S. military response against the Taliban and al-Qaeda
in Afghanistan was essential, but there are clear limits to the
role of military force in attacking terrorists as many of the
terrorist cells have been embedded within our own allies, where
we must work with information sharing, law enforcement, and
their judicial systems to break up terrorist planning and
activities.
Doing this requires the closest harmonization of law,
standardization of procedures, and a deep-seated trust that can
only be built by unshakable bonds of collective security among
allies. And when the Nation is in imminent danger, every
American President has always had the authority and
responsibility to consider the use of force preemptively, and
many have done so.
But this has not changed the broader pattern of
international affairs with which we must be concerned, our
interests in promoting trade, travel and commerce abroad;
encouraging the free flow of capital and ideas; sustaining
international institutions to end the burden of leadership,
working difficult issues like trade and development, economic
growth, environment and security.
American leadership has traditionally sought the support
and assistance of international institutions to spread the
burdens and increase the legitimacy of necessary security
measures, and to promote our broader interests as well.
Mr. Chairman, NATO is one of these international
institutions that has a critical role to play in assuring our
collective security. It is a ``consensus engine.'' It reflects
not only common interests between nations; it creates them.
These member nations of NATO are our closest friends in the
international world.
It is the engine that binds us, converting national
perspectives and issues into agreed alliance positions. Yes,
for all of its multinational character, NATO is an American
institution. It looks to us for leadership. It is effective
only if it is diligently worked by American leadership,
respected by our officials, and tended to carefully by our
staffs.
Much of that work is time consuming, inconvenient, and
difficult and, some would suggest, out of all proportion to the
military contributions of the alliance. But here is the point:
NATO has never been a purely military alliance. It has always
been fundamentally political, aiming at heading off war through
deterrence and resolve and adding to the legitimacy of American
efforts throughout the world.
It has been the foundation for much of America's success. I
believe that today, as we are moving beyond the Balkans and out
of area with NATO, we should be putting NATO as the centerpiece
of our efforts to deal with the issues of terrorism,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and peacekeeping
beyond the borders of Europe.
NATO could be ``multifunctionalized.'' It should serve as a
consensus engine, not only for military diplomatic policy, not
only focusing on a 25,000 man rapid reaction force, but helping
us to harmonize laws and procedures to counter international
terrorism, establishing common procedures for information
security to strengthen efforts against proliferation of WMD
and, of course, dealing with military requirements even beyond
Europe.
It was a great and very painful experience for me to go to
one of our government offices not too long ago and be briefed
on our efforts in the war against terrorism and find that our
government considers two of our greatest problem countries to
be Germany and Spain in dealing with the real problems with al-
Qaeda. I think we should be asking ourselves why that is and
what we can do to strengthen their responses against al-Qaeda.
The vision of NATO, I believe, remains to be achieved, but
I think it presents the most important opportunity for this
Nation and our leaders in forging international consensus and
an effective effort against international terrorism.
And I believe that enlarging NATO is an essential step in
this direction. It will help us deal with the security threats
that we face today. This enlargement, of course, began with
fears of Russia. But fundamentally, NATO's enlargement is in
Russia's interest as well.
And we have helped Russia come to terms with the new NATO,
and we are very appreciative that Russia does accept the
concept of this enlargement. But NATO has proved itself a
bulwark of stability for Europe as well. Each of the countries
now under consideration for NATO membership has already played
a crucial role in military operations and peacekeeping in the
Balkans that I experienced when I was the NATO commander. And I
want to particularly recognize the leadership and the courage
of Romania and Bulgaria during the Kosovo campaign when they
denied Russian air over flight requests during the crisis at
Pristina airfield.
It was the first time that these nations had ever been able
to actually stand up to Russia or the Soviet Union and say
``No,'' and they did. They said, ``No, you shall not pass.''
And they did not. And they kept their pledge.
Gratitude, of course, is not a sufficient rationale for
admitting these and other candidate nations into NATO. But I do
believe that each of the nominated States has met NATO's
criteria for membership in terms of stability, economic reform,
democratic governance, civilian control of the Armed Forces,
resolution of border disputes and lingering ethnic problems,
and commitment to the rule of law and human rights. They have
worked their military structures.
They are embarked on a process of transformation that may
take a decade, but they are ready to join the alliance, just as
the first three were ready. Some have cited the relatively
modest forces that the new members could contribute as cause
for concern. But I have watched them move forward.
I think they are making important steps. I think the costs
are relatively insignificant of bringing them in in terms of
financial burden on the United States, and I think they will be
very strong members and supportive members of NATO's
decisionmaking process.
So, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I ask your
support of NATO membership for these seven nations. I hope that
you will not only support them but also report out your support
for greater American efforts in the transformation of NATO,
seeking to take NATO and move it forward to a new level as an
institution central in the American effort to combat the
threats in the world we deal with, not just a link between the
United States and Europe, but the central international
institution to take us forward to a new level of American
security.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, General Clark.
[The prepared statement of General Clark follows:]
Prepared Statement of General Wesley K. Clark, (USA Ret.) Former
SACEUR, Chairman and CEO, Wesley Clark & Associates
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you very much for the
opportunity to testify before you today. Thank you also for the support
you have given to me and to other members of my commands during the
time I had the privilege of serving in uniform. I have enjoyed working
with you over the years, and I sincerely appreciate your inviting me
back to testify here today on such an important matter as the future of
NATO.
It is truly a privilege to testify on the subject of NATO and its
enlargement. For those of us who served in NATO command and policy
positions over the past decade, the prospective addition of these seven
new members is a dream come true. We watched as these nations of
Eastern Europe shook off the legacies of Communism and struggled to
find their way to the West. In that struggle, the prospect of NATO
membership, and its promise of a security association with the United
States, was a very strong motivating factor. Now we are moving to
fulfill their hopes. I also applaud the work of both Administrations--
the Clinton Administration and the Bush Administration--in making this
day possible. And, I especially want to congratulate the armed forces,
the governments and the peoples of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania; your hard work and
dedication to the principles of democracy and liberty has made NATO
membership possible.
Unfortunately, NATO is once again at risk. It is an organization in
search of a mission, excluded from intimate participation and support
in the U.S. war on terror, excluded from early planning and engagement
in the war against Iraq. For many, it has become an after-thought. As
one official told me wryly last year, ``NATO--Keep the Myth Alive.''
Recently, as NATO members have quarreled publicly and angrily about
matters of war and peace, some have looked at this organization and
concluded that its time has passed, that the issues which divide the
U.S. from Europe are too broad to be bridged by an old treaty and an
experienced bureaucracy. They have charged that the old allies
contribute too little, our respective attitudes are too different, and
the focus of American security interests lies elsewhere.
But this is at bottom not a dispute about NATO; rather, it is a
debate about the nature of America's interests abroad and how we should
pursue them. This is a question about American leadership. In this
debate, one group apparently believes that with the end of the Cold
War, our purposes in Europe were essentially finished, that the
countries there have no real choice but to support the broad outlines
of American policy, and that therefore our most important work is now
centered on the Midddle East and Asia, where we are most likely to
fight. They have looked there, rather than the old countries of Europe
as the vital areas of engagement. They see troop deployments oriented
toward potential theaters of war as critical; they are prepared to use
military power in coercive diplomacy and preventive conflicts; and they
would reduce much of our half-century-old military presence in Europe.
This strategy did not emerge in response to the terrorist strikes on
New York and the Pentagon, but rather took advantage of those events to
gain ascendancy.
I see greater promise in a different approach. I believe our
security as a nation, and the safety of every American, is best
enhanced by a broad and visionary leadership, which enlists capable and
committed allies in support. We are safer when we are liked, not when
we are hated, when we are respected, not just feared. American power
should remain a wellspring of inspiration, not become a source of
concern. As President Harry S Truman stated at the founding of the
United Nations in 1945 [without new security structures] . . . ``we
will be forced to accept the fundamental philosophy of our enemies,
namely, that Might Makes Right. To deny this premise, and we most
certainly do, we are obliged to provide the necessary means to refute
it. Words are not enough. We must, once and for all, reverse the order,
and prove by our acts conclusively, that Right Has Might.''
And while it is certainly clear that today, the American military
is virtually unchallengeable, we cannot know what the future will hold.
For all our military strength, we are only 5% of the world's
population, and other, larger nations, particularly in Asia, are
developing their own economic strength and military potential rapidly.
We must conduct ourselves with the aim of not only dealing with
immediate challenges but also establishing the precedents, procedures
and institutions that we need for decades ahead.
One of my predecessors in NATO, General Dwight D. Eisenhower,
warned in his farewell address that ``America's leadership and prestige
depend, not merely upon our unmatched material progress, riches and
military strength, but on how we use our power in the interests of
world peace and human betterment.'' And those of us who have served in
the Armed Forces have a full appreciation of the ultimate limitations
of military power, no matter how capable and benignly led. America's
strength was really built on the strength of our economy. And our
economic strength has been based on our success in building allies and
friends, opening markets, winning global investors' confidence, and
encouraging peace and stability world-wide, even as tens of thousands
of American manufacturing and service jobs continues to flow overseas
to lower cost areas.
We should be focusing our security efforts first on how to prevent
war. Deterrence and containment are still largely valid concepts, even
in the post-Cold War world. This means focusing on ending both
conventional and unconventional weapons proliferation, encouraging the
peaceful resolution of disputes, and improving opportunities for all
nations around the world to achieve some of the security, democracy and
prosperity that Americans enjoy. We should be seeking to prevent the
emergence of frictions and tensions that might lead to conflict. When
problems do arise, we should use diplomacy and economic measures first,
and force only as a last resort. If fighting is necessary, we should
aim to work multilaterally with strong allies if we can, and
unilaterally only if we must. And in each of these tasks, we should
expect the greatest potential for support from our friends and allies
in Europe.
These European nations reflect our values, share our heritage, and
understand our culture and interests more than any other country. We
are together more than 600 million people, approximately half of the
world's GDP, and three of the five permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council. Working together, we can assure prosperity
and security for our people as well as most of the world.
Terrorism and weapons of mass destruction may change the nature of
the threats we face, but they do not fundamentally alter the nature of
the responses we should undertake. The U.S. military response against
the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan was essential, but there are
clear limits to the role of military force in attacking terrorists;
many of the terrorist cells have been embedded within our own allies,
where we must work with information sharing, law enforcement, and their
judiciaries to break-up terrorist planning and activities. These
activities require the closest harmonization of lows, standardization
of procedures, and deep-seated trust among allies.
When the nation is in imminent danger, every American President has
always had the authority and responsibility to consider the use of
force preemptively, and many have done so. But this has not changed the
broader pattern of international affairs with which we must be
concerned--American interests in promoting trade, travel and commerce
abroad: encouraging the free flow of capital and ideas; and sustaining
international institutions to ease the burdens of leadership in working
difficult issues like trade and development, economic growth, the
environment and security. American leadership has traditionally sought
the support and assistance of international institutions to spread the
burdens and increase the legitimacy of necessary security measures, and
to promote our broader interests as well.
NATO, one of these international institutions, has a critical role
to play in assuring our collective security. NATO is itself a
``consensus engine'' able to convert disparate national interests into
common NATO policy. It not only reflects common interests between
nations, it also creates them. These member nations of NATO are our
closest friends in the international world. NATO is the engine that
binds us, converting national perspectives and issues into agreed
Alliance positions through a proven system of issue papers, council
meetings ministerial meetings and summitry.
Each nation in NATO is represented by an Ambassador, who brings
national perspectives and concerns, into a formal and informal system
of consultations and meetings to calibrate differences, seek
compromises, and build consensus. International staffs analyze national
issues and positions to help formulate policies to achieve consensus
and govern implementation. Alliance military headquarters, with very
strong U.S. participation and leadership, are available to provide
military advice, and to conduct military operations with the forces
that nations provide.
Yet for all its multinational character, NATO is essentially an
American institution. We not only took the lead in organizing and
sustaining it, we also are its largest stakeholder and major
contributor. Organizationally it looks to us for leadership. NATO is
effective only if it is used diligently by American leadership,
respected by our officials, and tended carefully by their staffs. Much
of the work is time consuming and inconvenient, and many would suggest,
out of all proportion to the military contributions that the Alliance
can add to U.S. capabilities.
But here is the point: NATO has never been purely a military
alliance. It has always been fundamentally political, aiming at heading
off war through deterrence and resolve. It has been the foundation for
much of America's success in promoting our economy and our values not
only in Europe but throughout the world.
Even after the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO served a
vital purpose in support of American diplomacy in Europe and the
Balkans, and in establishing the common understandings there that
enabled agreement on a host of other issues elsewhere. Today we should
be engaging NATO as the centerpiece of our efforts to deal with the
issues of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and
peacekeeping beyond the borders of Europe. NATO could be
``multifunctionalized,'' to serve as a consensus engine helping us
harmonize laws and procedures to counter international terrorism,
establish common procedures for information security to strengthen
efforts against weapons proliferation, and of course, to deal with
military requirements even beyond Europe.
This is a vision of NATO that remains to be achieved, but it offers
an important opportunity for this nation and our leaders. Enlarging
NATO is an essential step in this direction. It will strengthen the
alliance, promote greater stability in Central and Eastern Europe and
allow us to deal more effectively with many of the new security threats
facing us today.
During the 1990's NATO membership offered hopes to Eastern European
countries that the cycle of threat and conquest which marked Europe in
the 20th Century would never be repeated. At first, to be candid, NATO
membership was seen as protection against repeated Russian domination.
As one foreign minister remarked to me several years ago, ``Today
Russia is weak, but someday she will be strong again, and before that
day, our country must be a member of NATO.'' Another minister, from a
different country explained, ``Distrust the Russians? There are many
reasons. In 1878 . . .'' he began.
While we may discount such fears today, these concerns are very
much alive in Eastern Europe. As one President told me, ``In Europe,
you must think forty years ahead in planning security . . .'' Indeed,
our recent disagreements with Russia, despite the highest hopes and
most cordial relations between the heads of state, should warn us that
all states have their own interests--not necessarily ours--in their
aims.
But fundamentally, NATO's enlargement is in Russia's interest as
well. Stability and peace in Eastern Europe is essential if Russia's
own economic and human potential is to be realized. And the Baltic
States, in particular, may have vital roles in providing, Russia with
access to Western ideas and cultures, accelerating the economic and
political development of Russia itself. While many in the Russian power
ministries may yet oppose the entry of the Baltic States, Russia has
nevertheless acquiesced, in part due to the diligent efforts of NATO's
political leaders, and in particular, Secretary General George
Robertson, to offer an improved mechanism of consultation and
engagement for Russia.
The new mechanism has enabled Russia to overcome the legacy of its
resistance to NATO's operation in Kosovo, and Russia should now feel
that it has an opportunity to have its interests fully considered by
the Alliance before final decisions are made on critical issues. On the
other hand, from my own experience, I would second the warning that
many have given over the years, that Russia must not have a veto on
NATO activities, either formal or informal.
Beyond the issue of Russia, though, the decade of the 1990's proved
that NATO had a role in promoting the stability of southeast Europe.
Engagement in the Balkans defined NATO's purpose for a decade, and
still dominates NATO activities today. NATO in Bosnia ended a war that
had claimed perhaps 150,000 lives and displaced more than 2 million
people. And in Kosovo, NATO actions rectified an emergent ethnic
cleansing campaign which threatened to throw a million and a half
Albanian out of their homes.
Each of the countries under consideration now for NATO membership
played crucial roles in military operations and peacekeeping in the
Balkans. I would like to thank especially Bulgaria and Romania, who, at
considerable risk, accepted NATO over flights, isolated Serbia from
resupply, and refused Russian air over flight requests during the
crisis at Pristina airfield. They helped NATO achieve victory in that
vital campaign and establish a peaceful occupation of Kosovo
afterwards. It was NATO's first--and hopefully, last--war, and we
should be grateful to them.
Gratitude itself, however, is not a sufficient rationale for
admitting these and other candidate nations into NATO. Each of these
nominated states has met NATO's criteria for membership in terms of
stability, economic reform, democratic governance, civilian control of
the armed forces, resolution of border disputes and lingering ethnic
problems, and commitment to rule of law and human rights. Their
military structures have been reduced and reorganized from the legacies
of the Warsaw Pact and Cold War experience. And they have each worked
on their Membership Action Plans, a series of measures to ready them
for integration into NATO military structures, though completing the
military transformations may well take up to a decade to complete.
Some have cited the relatively modest forces that the new members
could contribute as reason for concern. Yet as I watched the evolution
of their capabilities during my tenure in Europe, I was impressed with
the quality of their emerging leaders, their willingness to work
together in forming collective capabilities, like BALTBAT, and their
determination to live up to their resource commitments in funding their
security needs. I also appreciated the geography and facilities they
offered to the alliance--vast training opportunities, unused airstrips,
port and refurbishment facilities, and of course, an increased zone of
stability to add to the protection of existing NATO member states. In
sum, these are substantial contributions.
As far as costs are concerned, these should be relatively
insignificant. During discussions of NATO's first round of enlargements
five years ago many in our Congress voiced objections on the basis of
costs. Figures ranging into the billions of dollars were cited. In
fact, the overall cost has been virtually nil, since the new entrants
are obligated to pick up a share of NATO's infrastructure and
administrative budgets, thereby reducing our own expenses. And if some
modest costs do arise, such as from redeployments of U.S. troops or
training ranges, I believe we should evaluate these in terms of the
benefits of the prospective changes.
A third area of concern sometimes raised has been in NATO decision-
making procedures. Many have suggested that somehow these additional
members might render ineffective NATO's decision making process of
unanimous consent. I believe the politics and the records of these
prospective members refutes that concern. As is clear from the
diplomacy preceding U.S. actions in Iraq, these states are very
strongly pro-U.S., and are likely to side with us in facing the issues
ahead. Certainly in the Kosovo campaign, the three new members proved
the most loyal of allies, often at great risk to their support at home.
In any event, it has always been the case that those with the most
resources at risk have the heaviest weight in deciding the issues at
hand. I would urge that NATO's decision making process not be altered
or abridged.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I ask your support of NATO
membership for these seven nations. They have the long term commitments
to be part of the West, they have met the democratic standards
essential for NATO members, and they have positive and tangible
contributions to make to our own security. Bringing them in will
strengthen the Alliance and allow us to respond more effectively to the
new security threats facing us today.
Finally, and perhaps more importantly as we look ahead, I also ask
that you report out your support for their membership with a view for
further transformation of NATO to serve as the clearing point and focal
point for increased efforts against terrorism and the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. Our allies are critical to our success in
these areas. And, as you do so, I would hope that you would call for
greater commitment from American leadership in the further
transformation of NATO, that our nation may energize a new era of
collective efforts to strengthen our security abroad, reduce our
burdens at home, prepare the institutions and procedures we will need
to guard American interests decades into the future, and make every
American safer and more welcome at work or at leisure anywhere in the
world.
The Chairman. Mr. Kristol.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM KRISTOL, EDITOR, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, AND
CHAIRMAN, PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICAN CENTURY, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Kristol. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden,
members of the committee.
It is a pleasure to testify on the future of NATO. I should
say that the Project for the New American Century, which I
chair, and Weekly Standard magazine, which I edit, have always
supported an American foreign policy that is grounded on strong
alliance ties. That is why we supported the original
enlargement of NATO and we support the current enlargement of
NATO.
I applaud the President, actually, for being bold in
pursuing a big enlargement of NATO at this time. One forgets
that just 2 years ago, it was considered unlikely by most
people that you would be meeting here today to consider
accepting seven new nations into the NATO alliance.
And I think the President has shown real leadership in that
respect. Indeed, if you look at the founding document for the
Project for the New American Century--I say this for Senator
Biden, since he is interested in neo-conservative thinking----
Senator Biden. I am. I am.
Mr. Kristol. I know. So I am trying to be of some
assistance here as a witness, you know.
If you look at the original statement of the Project for
the New American Century, its founding statement of
principles--now famous, I should say--signed by people like
Dick Cheney and Don Rumsfeld who both probably spent about 40
seconds looking it over in their busy jobs and figured that
they did not see anything they disagreed with so they signed it
without knowing it was going to cause so much heartburn around
the world 5 years later.
One of the four founding principles, actually, one of the
four essential tasks we set before us if we were to correct
what we saw as a drift in American foreign policy is to
strengthen our fundamental alliance ties. So I do speak as a
strong supporter of our alliances, of the importance of allies
in doing what we have to do in the world, and in particular of
NATO. And so I think on that, there is probably considerable
agreement.
Now, what about the future of NATO? I think Senator Boxer
asked the right question, which is a sensible question, which
is, ``What is the problem,'' in a way, and in some respects
there isn't that much of a problem. Or the way I put it is
this: There is not much of a problem with about 15 of the 19
current members of NATO and there will not be much of a problem
with 23 of the 26 members when NATO enlarges.
But the problem is that NATO works by unanimity, and we
have a pretty fundamental disagreement with a couple of rather
important NATO members; France, in particular I would say, and
Germany. And I guess for the sake of honesty, I would simply
say that we need to be concrete and straightforward about this.
We can say nice things about NATO as an institution without
mentioning the names of any countries that are in it, but at
the end of the day, if we have a fundamental disagreement--if
Iraq is going to be a model for the future and not an exception
for the future in the sense that we are going to continue to
have fundamental disagreements about threats and about what to
do about certain threats with nations like France and Germany,
or more precisely with France and Germany, then the utility of
NATO becomes a question. It does not mean it cannot still be
very useful, and I would so argue that it would be useful. We
would just have to disagree on certain things and do certain
things outside NATO as, in fact, Iraq is being done.
I very much hope, incidentally, that the reconstruction and
the democratization of Iraq could be done in part through NATO.
In fact the Project for the New American Century played a role
in getting bipartisan signatures on two letters, which I ask to
be submitted, along with my statement, for the record, from
senior Clinton administration officials and conservative
Republicans outside the government endorsing a strong role for
NATO in the reconstruction of Iraq.
So I think we can agree to disagree on certain things and
then agree to agree and work together on many other things. But
the disagreements are not trivial and we should not pretend
they are. And the question I really do think comes down more to
France than to Germany. I am not an expert on each nation, and
it would be foolish to sit here and predict the internal
domestic political prognosis of either nation, but I think at
the end of the day, Germany is still committed to a strong
transatlantic relationship.
They are very averse to use of force, which is
understandable and, frankly, fine. They do not need to
participate in things that we might believe we need to do. I do
not think that they would necessarily go out of their way to
stand in the way of our doing what we believe to be in our
national interest. They might stand aside, and that is fine.
I think France is a different issue. One really has to be
honest and just ask: Is France committed to NATO as we
understand a traditional commitment to NATO? This is not a
silly question. I mean, France itself of course has not been
simply committed to NATO. They pulled out of the military
alliance in 1966.
One had thought in the 1990s that they were coming back in
fully to NATO, but I think it is fair to ask after the last few
months what the future of U.S.-French relations are and to ask
it, not in the spirit of recrimination which would be silly,
and not in the spirit of punishing anyone which would be silly,
but just in an honest way in looking forward and trying to
sensibly evaluate and make foreign policy. What do we
anticipate?
Well, my basic view would be we do not know what to
anticipate, so we should do our best to work with the major
nations of NATO. But we also need to be open to the possibility
that we will turn out to have disagreements in the future as we
have had in the last few months with France.
Therefore, we cannot rule out the possibility of having to
do certain things without U.N. Security Council sanction and/or
without NATO support since unanimity remains presumably a
principle of action for NATO. I think in a certain way it is
that simple. Nostalgia cannot be a guide, obviously, to foreign
policy.
In fact, it was never so easy in the past, as we now think
it was. I really do think that we need to resist that sort of
partisan point scoring and pretending than better diplomacy
would have fundamentally changed the outcome in the U.N.
Security Council or French or German views with regard to Iraq.
There were, of course, failures of diplomacy by this
administration. There were failures of diplomacy by the
previous administration. I am sure General Clark would agree
that in the Balkans, at the end of the day, Milosevic had to be
stopped and it would not have mattered whether the U.N.
sanctioned NATO intervention. We had to go to war to stop
Milosevic's ethnic cleansing.
And the truth is in this instance it would not have
mattered in this sense that France and Germany fundamentally do
not agree with our rationale for the war in Iraq. And they were
not going to change their mind if Don Rumsfeld was nicer to
them. These countries deserve to be taken more seriously than
that in a sense. Their leaders deserve to be taken more
seriously.
They have a fundamentally different view of the threat, a
fundamentally different view of the agility of inspections, a
fundamentally different view of whether containment and
deterrence would have worked in this case. They are certainly
entitled to that view. I do not think that we ever asked them
to really abandon that view.
We never asked them to help in the military action. We
simply did ask them--and here is where I think that the rub
comes in terms of France. We did ask them, I would say, to step
aside if they did not agree and not to positively obstruct our
both diplomatic efforts that were preparatory to the military
action and, of course, the military efforts themselves.
I would say there that one has to really raise a question
about France in particular. It is one thing not to agree. It is
one thing to make public one's disagreement. That is perfectly
legitimate. It is another thing to really go out of one's way,
I would say, to make it harder to build--for us to include
other nations in a coalition, including nations like Turkey
which were quite important to actually helping militarily and
not just symbolic help from the outside.
And I would just contrast that with Kosovo. Kosovo was not
a direct, vital national security interest obviously of the
United States. I say this as someone who supported the
intervention in Kosovo.
Kosovo was a direct vital interest to NATO and certainly to
the European nations in NATO, and we stepped up when we needed
to. Maybe we could have done it a little bit more quickly and a
little more elegantly, but we stepped up when we needed to,
when our European partners in NATO needed us.
All we asked of them in this instance regarding Iraq was to
stand down in a sense. And I think Germany did, in fact,
basically stand down and was perfectly happy to simply stay out
of the whole thing. France did not. And so if France really
wants to try, not only to step aside when we are pursuing
fundamental foreign policy goals, but actually to obstruct
them, it is going to be a problem.
And it is going to be a problem no matter how much we all
like NATO and it is going to be a problem no matter how much
the administration tries to work with NATO. It is going to be a
problem because they are part of NATO and NATO operates by
unanimity, and probably will continue to do so for the
foreseeable future.
I very much hope NATO can remain strong. I think it can
remain strong. I am not sure it can remain quite as central as
General Clark suggests to American foreign policy, but it can
certainly remain a very important part of American foreign
policy, especially I think in dealing with the European theater
and some of the security tasks in a place like Iraq, where you
do need a serious security force as part of the nation-building
effort.
I do not think that we can put all of our eggs in that
basket, on the other hand, for the obvious reason that we have
two major participants in the institution with whom we may end
up having some fairly fundamental differences. So I would say
that the future of NATO is important, but it cannot preclude
coalitions of the willing and I do not think it should preclude
some creative thinking about other institutional arrangements
with other nations, sub-groups of NATO, obviously nations
outside of NATO, outside of Europe, India--relations with other
democracies in Asia.
I think this is a moment like the late 1940s, a present-at-
the-creation sort of moment, and it is not enough to simply say
these institutions worked well for 50 or 60 years. Let us just
assume that they will work well for the next 50 or 60; I hope
they will. But even so they should be reformed, as you all are,
I think, are going to reform NATO by enlarging it to work
better for the future.
But it may just be that we need to look seriously at some
new possibly institutional arrangements in addition to ad hoc
coalitions of the willing for the future. NATO does not
preclude having separate arrangements in certain respects with
countries of Eastern Europe or other countries in Europe as the
occasion warrants.
I do not have any well-developed ideas on this. I just
think this is a very fluid and pregnant moment really for
American foreign policy, and it may well be that some
creativity is called for in addition to reiterating our
commitment to older institutions like NATO and, for that
matter, like the United Nations.
So I think the challenge to NATO is not from neo-
conservatives. It is not from anyone in the Bush Administration
particularly. It is not from people in the U.S. Senate. It is
from the real world. And we have to deal with these real
problems. And the question is--is NATO a means to deal with
these real problems? NATO is also an end in itself in certain
ways because it is an institutional embodiment of a
relationship, of an alliance that has some worth in its own
right.
But it also is obviously a means to dealing with real
threats like terror and weapons of mass destruction. And we
should make NATO deal with those threats as well as we can, but
we should not close our eyes to its deficiencies and failures
and to the need to find other mechanisms where necessary.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Kristol.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kristol follows:]
Prepared Statement of William Kristol, Chairman, Project for the New
American Century
Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to testify once again before this
august committee, on such an important and timely subject: the future
of NATO. The Project for the New American Century, which I chair, has
always supported an American foreign policy that is grounded on strong
alliance ties. Indeed, in the Project's founding ``Statement of
Principles''--found at: http://www.newamericancentury.org/
statementofprinciples.htm--we argued that strengthening those ties was
one of four essential tasks before us if we were to correct the drift
we perceived as existing in American foreign policy.
More concretely, we supported the first post-Cold War enlargement
of NATO. And we support the pending one. I am pleased that we are so
close to seeing that bipartisan vision become reality. And just
recently, the Project helped organize two bipartisan statements
proposing a key role for NATO in post-Saddam Iraq. (Mr. Chairman, with
your permission, I would like to submit the two statements for the
record. They can also be found at: http://www.newamericancentury.orci/
lettersstatements.htm.)
In general, we continue to believe that the goal of maintaining
peace and prosperity in the world is best accomplished by working with
our democratic allies both to protect existing democracies and, where
necessary or possible, to expand liberty's reach to other nations.
But what of the future of NATO and, more generally, of the trans-
Atlantic relationship? Obviously, there are questions about the health
of the alliance. The first thing I would say is that it is too late to
paper over these questions and pretend all is well. We need, as my
colleague and Project co-founder Robert Kagan has argued (see his ``Of
Pardise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order''), to be
honest about the differences in world view between some in Europe--
especially in France and Germany--and many in the United States. Within
the U.S., we need to avoid cheap partisanship that casts blame unfairly
either on the last administration or the present one. Undoubtedly, both
administrations have made diplomatic mistakes. What administration
hasn't? But the problems with the alliance go beyond European
preferences for the charm of President Clinton over the directness of
President Bush' and beyond the American preference for the policies of
Chancellor Kohl over those of Chancellor Schroeder.
In general, I would argue that the Bush Administration has been
quite responsible with respect to the trans-Atlantic alliance. When
President Bush came into office, common wisdom held that, if NATO did
expand again, the expansion would be quite limited in scope and number.
But it was the president's vision of a ``Europe, whole and free'' that
has led NATO to this day. Moreover, this past summer, at Prague, the
administration put forward a number of constructive proposals for
reforming and reenergizing NATO. And, finally, and principally at the
behest of our European allies, President Bush went to the United
Nations in September 2002 and secured U.N. Security Council Resolution
1441. The Bush Administration is not responsible for the current crisis
in the alliance.
Who, or what, is? The answer to ``who'' is France--and secondarily,
Germany. The answer to ``what'' is the new post-9/11 world to which the
U.S. has reacted in one way, and France and Germany in another.
This is not the place for France-bashing. But it is the place to
tell the truth. At best, the government of France is uninterested in
the trans-Atlantic alliance. At worst, it wants to weaken it. France's
priority lies with the European Union and/or the UN--not NATO. And
there is no question that many in Paris desire to see a France-led
European Union as a counterweight to U.S. power. Germany, a troubled
nation with economic and demographic difficulties, and an
understandable aversion to the exercise of military and nation-state
power, has followed France's lead. The European Union as a whole has
embraced a view of the world that is post-nationalist, post-historical,
and extremely reluctant to use military force even in a just cause.
The United States is different. The ``distinctly American
internationalism'' the president has articulated in speeches and in the
White House's National Security Strategy--and with which I am in basic
agreement--is quite far removed from the ``European'' view of the world
in both the nature of the threats we face and certainly what strategies
to employ to deal with them. How do we bridge the gap?
We won't entirely. Washington and the capitals of Europe cannot
help but have some differences of perspective on interests and threats
for the simple reason that the U.S.'s role in the world is far
different from theirs. America has global responsibilities no other
nation has, or will have, and that is bound to create differences in
strategic outlook. That said, we cannot abandon our basic convictions
because they make some Europeans uneasy. We cannot fail to confront the
threats we face, and we cannot fail to carry out our historic purposes
in defending and expanding freedom, because some Europeans balk. We can
agree to disagree where we must, and agree to work tougher where we
can. There are many such occasions--the reconstruction of postwar Iraq
being one conspicuous one.
We should seek new or improved institutional arrangements through
which to work together. Coalitions of the willing are fine, and
sometimes necessary. But, where possible, longer-lasting organizational
arrangements would be preferable. Does this mean re-vitalizing NATO? I
hope so. Does it means reforming NATO? I think so--perhaps, for
example, by moving to a super-majority vote to authorize action,
binding of course only on those who choose to contribute, but still
under the NATO umbrella. In a sense, this would institutionalize the
coalition of the willing. It would also increase Washington's interest
in using and working with NATO. And, finally, it would give our allies
a healthier say in these decisions.
We also might want to explore new institutional arrangements that
allow us to work in particular ways with our new allies in Central and
Eastern Europe, and our friends elsewhere in Europe, as well. We can't
confine ourselves to Cold War structures. Institutional creativity is
needed for a new world. There may also be ways to institutionalize our
friendship, and common interests, with democracies like Turkey, Israel,
and India, in conjunction with NATO or outside of NATO.
No one thinks it a good thing for the U.S. to go it alone--though,
at times, we may have to act with fewer friends than one might wish.
Nor, I trust, do we want to hand over U.S. interests or decision-making
to the United Nations--an organization that seeks to speak for the
``international community'' but actually reflects the particular state
interests of its Security Council members. At its best, NATO represents
a healthy multilateralism, a multilateralism that rests on shared
democratic principles and a shared history of meeting the challenge
posed by Soviet communism. The challenge in the days ahead will be to
see whether NATO, as presently constituted, is up to meeting the new
threats we face. Some positive steps have been taken: NATO's
intervention in Kosovo was an important precedent. The contribution
made by our allies and soon-to-be allies to the military effort in
Afghanistan and Iraq are also significant. The question we have to ask
is whether such efforts will be the exception rather than the rule in
the future.
I think the Bush Administration is off to a good start in moving
NATO in the right direction. The world is a dangerous place and we need
help in dealing with these dangers. Accordingly, we need to do as good
a job as we can in creating an alliance that has the military and
institutional capabilities to confront these dangers effectively. But,
at the end of the day, our priority has to be dealing with these
dangers, not placating allies who are more concerned with the exercise
of American power than the threats we face.
[Attachments.]
Statement on Post-War Iraq
march 19, 2003
Although some of us have disagreed with the administration's
handling of Iraq policy and others of us have agreed with it, we all
join in supporting the military intervention in Iraq. The aim of UNSC
Resolution 1441 was to give the Iraqi government a ``final
opportunity'' to comply with all UN resolutions going back 12 years.
The Iraqi government has demonstrably not complied. It is now time to
act to remove Saddam Hussein and his regime from power.
The removal of the present Iraqi regime from power will lay the
foundation for achieving three vital goals: disarming Iraq of all its
weapons of mass destruction stocks and production capabilities;
establishing a peaceful, stable, democratic government in Iraq; and
contributing to the democratic development of the wider Middle East.
To enhance the prospects of success, American efforts in the weeks,
months, and years ahead must be guided by the following principles:
Regime change is not an end in itself but a means to an
end--the establishment of a peaceful, stable, united,
prosperous, and democratic Iraq free of all weapons of mass
destruction. We must help build an Iraq that is governed by a
pluralistic system representative of all Iraqis and that is
fully committed to upholding the rule of law, the rights of all
its citizens, and the betterment of all its people. The Iraqi
people committed to a democratic future must be integrally
involved in this process in order for it to succeed. Such an
Iraq will be a force for regional stability rather than
conflict and participate in the democratic development of the
region.
The process of disarming, stabilizing, rebuilding,
reforming, preserving the unity of, and ultimately
democratizing Iraq will require a significant investment of
American leadership, time, energy, and resources, as well as
important assistance from American allies and the international
community. Everyone--those who have joined our coalition, those
who have stood aside, those who opposed military action, and,
most of all, the Iraqi people and their neighbors--must
understand that we are committed to the rebuilding of Iraq and
will provide the necessary resources and will remain for as
long as it takes. Any early fixation on exit strategies and
departure deadlines will undercut American credibility and
greatly diminish the prospects for success.
The United States military will necessarily bear much of the
initial burden of maintaining stability in Iraq, securing its
territorial integrity, finding and destroying weapons of mass
destruction, and supporting efforts to deliver humanitarian
assistance to those most in need. For the next year or more,
U.S. and coalition troops will have to comprise the bulk of the
total international military presence in Iraq. But as the
security situation permits, authority should transfer to
civilian agencies, and to representatives of the Iraqi people
themselves. Much of the long-term security presence, as well as
the resources for reconstruction, will have to come from our
allies in Europe and elsewhere--suggesting the importance of
involving the NATO Alliance and other international
institutions early in any planning and implementation of the
post-conflict stage.
American leadership--and the long-term commitment of
American resources and energies--is essential, therefore, but
the extraordinary demands of the effort make international
support, cooperation, and participation a requirement for
success. And just as a stable, peaceful and democratic Iraq is
in the region's and the world's interest, it is important that
the American-led stabilization and rebuilding effort gain the
support and full involvement of key international organizations
in the work of rebuilding Iraq.
The successful disarming, rebuilding, and democratic reform of Iraq
can contribute decisively to the democratization of the wider Middle
East. This is an objective of overriding strategic importance to the
United States, as it is to the rest of the international community--and
its achievement will require an investment and commitment commensurate
with that. We offer our full support to the President and Congress to
accomplish these vitally important goals.
[Signatories:]
Ronald Asmus, Max Boot, Frank Carlucci, Eliot Cohen, Ivo H.
Daalder, Thomas Donnelly, Peter Galbraith, Jeffrey Gedmin, Robert S.
Gelbard, Reuel Marc Gerecht, Charles Hill, Martin S. Indyk, Bruce P.
Jackson, Robert Kagan, Craig Kennedy, William Kristol, Tod Lindberg,
Will Marshall, Joshua Muravchik, Danielle Pletka, Dennis Ross, Randy
Scheunemann, Gary Schmitt, Walter Slocombe, James B. Steinberg, and R.
James Woolsey.
______
Second Statement on Post-War Iraq
march 28, 2003
We write in strong support of efforts by Prime Minister Tony Blair
to ``get America and Europe working again together as partners and not
as rivals.'' While some seem determined to create an ever deeper divide
between the United States and Europe, and others seem indifferent to
the long-term survival of the transatlantic partnership, we believe it
is essential, even in the midst of war, to begin building a new era of
transatlantic cooperation.
The place to begin is post-war Iraq. There should be no question of
our common determination to help the Iraqi people establish a peaceful,
stable, united, prosperous, and democratic Iraq free of weapons of mass
destruction. We must help build an Iraq that is governed by a
pluralistic system representative of all Iraqis and fully committed to
the rule of law, the rights of all its citizens, and the betterment of
all its people. Such an Iraq will be a force for regional stability
rather than conflict and participate in the democratic development of
the region.
The Iraqi people committed to a democratic future must be fully
involved in this process in order for it to succeed. Consistent with
security requirements, our goal should be to progressively transfer
authority as soon as possible to enable Iraqis to control their own
destiny. Millions of Iraqis are untainted by service to the Ba'athist
dictatorship and are committed to the establishment of democratic
institutions. It is these Iraqis--not Americans, Europeans or
international bureaucrats--who should make political and economic
decisions on behalf of Iraq.
Building a stable, peaceful and democratic Iraq is an immense task.
It must be a cooperative effort that involves international
organizations--UN relief agencies, the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, and other appropriate bodies--that can contribute the
talent and resources necessary for success. It is therefore essential
that these organizations be involved in planning now to ensure timely
allocation of resources.
Of particular concern, the effort to rebuild Iraq should
strengthen, not weaken transatlantic ties. The most important
transatlantic institution is NATO, and the Alliance should assume a
prominent role in post-war Iraq. Given NATO's capabilities and
expertise, it should become integrally involved as soon as possible in
the post-war effort. In particular, NATO should actively support
efforts to secure and destroy all of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
stockpiles and production facilities (a task that should unite the
United States, Canada and all European allies committed to peace and
non-proliferation), ensure peace and stability are maintained in
postwar Iraq, and assist in the rebuilding of Iraq's infrastructure and
the delivery of humanitarian relief. The Atlantic Alliance has pledged
to confront the new threats of the 21st century. No current challenge
is more important than that of building a peaceful, unified and
democratic Iraq without weapons of mass destruction on NATO's own
borders.
Administration of post-war Iraq should from the beginning include
not only Americans but officials from those countries committed to our
goals in Iraq. Bringing different nationalities into the administrative
organization is important because it allows us to draw on the expertise
others have acquired from their own previous peacekeeping and
reconstruction efforts. It will also facilitate closer and more
effective ties between the security forces in post-war Iraq and those
charged with administrating the political and economic rebuilding of
Iraq.
International support and participation in the post-Iraq effort
would be much easier to achieve if the UN Security Council were to
endorse such efforts. The United States should therefore seek passage
of a Security Council resolution that endorses the establishment of a
civilian administration in Iraq, authorizes the participation of UN
relief and reconstruction agencies, welcomes the deployment of a
security and stabilization force by NATO allies, and lifts all economic
sanctions imposed following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait a decade ago.
[Signatories:]
Gordon Adams, Ron Asmus, Max Boot, Frank Carlucci, Eliot Cohen, Ivo
H. Daalder, James Dobbins, Thomas Donnelly, Lee Feinstein, Peter
Gaibraith, Robert S. Gelbard, Reuel Marc Gerecht, Philip Gordon,
Charles Hill, Martin S. Indyk, Bruce P. Jackson, Robert Kagan, Craig
Kennedy, William Kristol, Tod Lindberg, James Lindsay, Will Marshall,
Christopher Makins, Joshua Muravchik, Michael O'Hanlon, Danielle
Pletka, Dennis Ross, Randy Scheuneman, Gary Schmitt, Helmut
Sonnenfeldt, James B. Steinberg.
The Chairman. Senator Biden has mentioned to me the
desirability of having perhaps two rounds of questioning now
and with the permission of the witnesses and your endurance and
likewise the Senators, we will attempt to accommodate the
members who wish to do that. But we will have a 7-minute time
limit on the questions.
And I will begin by asking you, General Clark: I am
intrigued by your comment that we are in a safer world where we
are better liked by nations. And likewise, you mentioned that
sometimes even NATO's role with regard to Afghanistan was
considered an afterthought in search of a mission.
Let me just ask two parts on this, one of which is: If, in
fact, NATO develops this ready force of 25,000 people that
Secretary Grossman was mentioning, 25,000 armed forces with
sufficient lift capacity to go really anywhere all over the
world, one of the problems with Afghanistan, which many of you
pointed out, is that the British had some lift capacity, other
countries virtually none, so that in order to play a quick
role, someone had to lift them there, and there are problems in
this.
One can say that they would have developed this lift
capacity in due course if their budgets had been greater and so
forth, and maybe they would, but at least I understand the
25,000 force contemplates somebody having lift capacity so that
NATO could be theoretically involved anywhere.
There is new relevancy sort of built in maybe to these
discussions, but the other point, however, leads me to wonder:
In the event that popular opinion in Germany and France had
been different in this period of time, would it have made a
difference in their democratic dialog with regard to the
support of the United States or the support of NATO? And if so,
what could we have done, say, not in the last year, but in
maybe years prior to that time? Public opinion in those two
countries, quite apart from most of the rest of Europe--as you
take a look at the public opinion polls, people just asked
starkly, ``Are you in favor of the United States action in Iraq
or not,'' and the overwhelming majority say ``No.'' We have
problems now in Russia and Russian public opinion. Very adverse
trends have set in maybe in the last year or so.
Now, we can say that success breeds success and so forth,
but maybe so, maybe not. I want you, sir, to discuss to what
extent is Mr. Kristol's point valid that even if, let us say,
French public opinion strongly favored the American position,
that the French might have acted otherwise. Or was it more the
fact that the chancellor in his reelection campaign in
Germany--and even Mr. Chirac enjoying finally at some point in
his career a surge of popularity--sort of latched on to this
and thus supported a rather perverted view, in my judgment,
that the French ought to stand up against the Americans.
To that extent, I think Mr. Kristol is absolutely right, if
that becomes French foreign policy. They may see their mission
as frustrating us, and leading a vanguard of some other willing
group to make sure that we are not hegemonist, that we do not
get our way, that in essence something else happens, and that
is very serious.
Was that actually a doctrine formulated in France, or was
it not circumstantial maybe coming from the popularity of a
position that Chirac found? Can you comment on all of this?
General Clark. Mr. Chairman, I think as usual, you put your
finger really on the sort of heart of the issue. Let me see if
I can address it from several different azimuths. In the first
place, I think there is enormous goodwill for the United States
and for Americans in France, in Germany and throughout Europe.
Second, for some long period of time, there has been a
thinking in the French political class that with the end of the
cold war, that the United States should play less of a dominant
role in the alliance, that there might be other perceptions of
ways to reach interest.
And during this period, the United States was focused
essentially internally. We did not create a new vision in our
own country of what our role in the world should be after
containment of the Soviet Union passed away as our greatest
national obligation. And so there was a period, a decade of
drift in which we reacted episodically. And as you know very
well, it was a decade also in which this country was split by
partisan disputes.
I want to say that I very much appreciate Bill Kristol's
perspective and the support that his organization has always
brought to NATO enlargement, because many in the conservative
movement were on the other side of that debate. They saw the
issue as one of burden sharing. They represented a penny-
pinching America that wanted a pound of support for a pound of
commitment, rather than a broader vision which would have seen
American leadership as needing the endorsement and legitimacy
of other sovereign States. So during the 1990s when we could
have built a broader vision, we did not.
I was especially disappointed after the Kosovo campaign in
which, despite efforts that some of us made to have lessons
learned really developed and acted upon, no lessons learned
were ever acted upon inside NATO so far as I can determine.
Instead, we went off on this pursuit of military capabilities
as though adding a few strike bombers and precision strike
capacity were going to change the alliance, when the real
problem in the mechanism was intelligence sharing, common
decisionmaking, common perceptions of the threat and building a
system that would let NATO run military operations rather than
being a sort of adjunct junior partner to the Americans with a
window in to some of the video teleconferences when that was
permitted.
And that is the way we had to run Kosovo. We could have
gone forward but we did not. Because of the frictions generated
both here and abroad during the Kosovo campaign, we turned our
backs on reforming NATO. Instead, we defended NATO from the
challenge of the European defense program rapid reaction force.
We essentially wasted 2 years with the alliance in arguing
about a 60,000-man commitment and how it would interface or not
interface with the NATO planning process and whether or not it
would duplicate NATO. We did not put forth, as the leaders of
the alliance, a broader vision. That is our obligation. I see
the red light. I probably cannot go forward here. But it was
our----
The Chairman. Keep going.
General Clark. It was our obligation to put forward that
broader vision. We have to communicate not only a like of
Americans in Europe, but an appreciation for why we see our
security interests as we do. There are legitimate disputes
about why the United States felt it was necessary to go against
Saddam Hussein. When it was time to address and lay the
groundwork for that, we did not. We could have used NATO to
build that groundwork. We did not. As a result, it sort of
sprung forth to the Europeans. They could not see it. So when
we needed to carry popular opinion in Europe, we did not. We
made it available as a political issue to be used in European
election campaigns.
The Chairman. I appreciate that answer very much. Without
extending it, I think the issue we have been discussing of
public diplomacy with regard to the Near East or the Middle
East sort of comes into view at this point. In large part many
of us now recognize an absence from the field for quite a while
in terms of giving an American view that might have been more
attractive, and dismay that we are so disliked; and it is
improbable in the course of this current conflict that we are
going to turn that around by public diplomacy.
Still, as you say, there will be a lessons learned period
again, where we are going to be in that stage. Our ability not
to simply withdraw, come back home and forget about it, deal
with other issues for 10 years, you know, might lead to a
different aftermath.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Well, let me pick up where you just left
off, Mr. Chairman. I noticed both witnessed nodded their head,
as well as I nodded my head, when you said in terms of the
Middle East if we had laid out more of a vision of what we
anticipated, what we thought, what we wanted, what our foreign
policy goals were, that it just may have been or turned out a
little differently.
And it takes me--and I hope I am connecting the dots
accurately here--to Mr. Kristol's point that it is not the
alliance, it is several within the alliance with whom we may
have a fundamental disagreement on, for lack of a better
phrase, ``the world view,'' that constitutes the security
interests of each of those countries, relative to ours. I would
argue that or posit in the absence of our laying out our view
as it relates to how we see the Middle East emerging, not just
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, that a motive was ascribed to
us in France and Germany and elsewhere that may or may not be
the President's view.
Someone just handed me a Newsday article of March 16, 2003,
that I had not seen before, where it starts off, entitled
``Pushing U.S. Toward War, A More Aggressive Military Stance
Despite'' or--excuse me--``Desire to Help Israel Among the
Factors.'' The byline of the story was reported by Ann Hoy and
Timothy Phelps and Ken Fireman of the Washington Bureau. It
starts off and it says, ``In 1992, two civilian officials
drafted a document called Defense Planning Guidance for the
Pentagon, a blueprint for the Department's spending priorities
in the aftermath of the first gulf war and the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Both the document and the authors were relatively
obscure, but not for long.''
It goes on to say, ``The document argued that the United
States should seek such a degree of military and strategic
preeminence that potential rivals would be deterred from ever
trying to compete with it. America should be prepared to use,''
I am quoting, ``military forces unilaterally to further its
interests, and when acting with others it should expect to do
so mainly through ad hoc assemblies, rather than establish
international institutions.''
It goes on to say, ``The draft specifically envisioned
employing preemptive forces to deny nuclear weapons to
countries such as Iraq and North Korea. The draft touched off a
storm of controversy when it became public. One senior
Democrat''--that is me--``denounced it as advocating literally
Pax Americana that would be unsustainable and
counterproductive. President George Bush, the first, apparently
agreed and the document was quickly disavowed.''
And it goes on to talk about how it reemerged as a policy.
Now whether it really is the policy of this President, in my
experience, you have equally as much or more than I do with our
European friends, my impression is that they think it is, that
the essence of that document and rationale written in 1992 has
become the policy of the United States. Now, I have argued even
with my own caucus that I do not--I think the jury is still out
on that and the President has not made a decision although I am
becoming even skeptical of my own assertions.
The more I read of--and I have been devouring every so-
called neo-con document I can find, Bill, trying to educate
myself, because much of what--the premises laid out I think are
pretty accurate from the place from which they start.
Now, so the reason I raise this is that, Mr. Kristol, you
seem--not ``seem.'' You have indicated that this fundamental
disagreement may--and you imply that it may be more permanent
than transitory with France and less likely with Germany, but
let us stick with France for a moment. And if this fundamental
disagreement on the view of the world is irreconcilable, or at
least in the near term, irreconcilable, and I am not trying to
put words in your mouth, but if it turned out to be that, then
it seems pretty important that we understand or I understand
what it is that our policy is in the Middle East. There are
many with whom I have spoken in Europe who really do not think,
reading much of what has been written in the last decade by
some incredibly accomplished individuals and intellectuals,
yourself included, in this country that this really is not
about Iraq in the Middle East. This goes beyond Iraq, that the
next target is Syria, that Syria is on, not the watch list but
on the hit list, and that what is expected to happen is that we
are just merely going to pivot from Baghdad and head to Syria
and this notion of this split among neo-cons, as I call them,
folks like you who follow through and are more idealistic in
terms of--I hope you are not offended by that--nation-building
and those who are the more so-called realists, who I would put
Cheney and Rumsfeld more in that school, who seem united on the
notion that this notion of democratization of the Middle East
is something that will be led at the tip of a bayonet rather
than with the projection of ideas and other institutional
constructs that may be put in place.
So the bottom line question I have is: Our European friends
that I have quoted without naming, are they right that we are
about to go into Iraq? What is the logic of--excuse me. I mean,
into Syria. What is the logic of the arguments put forward by
Mr. Wolfowitz and others whom I respect? Would it be
inconsistent to fail to go to Iraq now, particularly if Iraq--
excuse me; I keep saying ``Iraq''--to go to Syria now,
particularly if there is any proof that Syria has allowed the
Iraqi regime to harbor or to hide any weapons of mass
destruction or--and if you listen to Condi Rice, and I am
starting to listen very closely to what everybody says these
days, when I met with her recently, or not so recently, within
the month, indicated that Hezbollah was the real problem. It
was not al-Qaeda that was a problem, but the real serious
threat was that Hezbollah has sanctuary in Syria.
So what is our policy in the policy you and others are
proposing? Would it be inconsistent not to follow on to Syria,
or is it consistent to internationalize the reconstruction and
the nation-building in Iraq and basically find other
institutional means to deal with our concerns about Syria? What
is necessitated for there to be a consistency in this new
American century?
Mr. Kristol. I will try to answer a little bit of that very
challenging question.
Senator Biden. The bottom line is Syria.
Mr. Kristol. First, obviously, I do not speak for the Bush
administration. I do think they have been tolerably clear
incidentally though, the President in the national security
document that they issued in September, in his major speeches
about his general view of the world. One can agree or disagree
with these views. They obviously are not going to tell everyone
ahead of time exactly what their policies are, which I am sure
are in flux with respect to every nation and a lot depends on
how these different nations behave, I gather.
For example, people in the administration, and you may
share this judgment, thought Syria was behaving quite
responsibly until about 2 or 3 weeks ago, heartened by the fact
that Hezbollah seemed to have been pulled back, that there was
no trouble on the northern border of Israel, that Syria did not
seem to be exploiting the situation. And then I gather, and I
know no more than I have read in the papers about this, that
there were worries that Syria was unfortunately not behaving so
responsibly in the last couple of weeks, in assisting Iraq in
certain ways.
But you know, I will let the Bush administration speak for
itself. I would simply say, look, the President said, you know,
we have a real problem with terrorist groups, we have a real
problem with States that support terrorist groups, and we have
a real problem with dictators developing weapons of mass
destruction, especially if they have connections with terrorist
groups.
That implies a policy that would view with concern
developments in Iran, some developments--some aspects of
government policy in Syria and, of course, other parts of the
world, North Korea most obviously. That does not mean that you
invade any or all of them. It does not mean military force is
the first option or even an option at all in some cases. It
does mean that one's policy toward these nations is not just
sitting back and accepting the status quo.
I do think it means one's policy toward these nations is
not saying stability trumps everything and we cannot do
anything because God knows that the situation could be worse if
we push or pressure or use diplomatic or political means to try
to push these regimes to change so much. I also think it is the
case that history shows that the deal we made with a whole
bunch of dictators in the Middle East, understandable though it
was at the time it was made or over the period it was made in a
totally bipartisan manner by Republican and Democratic
administration--maybe now it is not such a great deal, which is
why Saudi Arabia become a big question.
I mean, we turned a blind eye toward the Saudi export of
Wahabi Islam which has destabilized large parts of the Islamic
world and of course has been in some ways a breeding ground for
terror. I think that is a problem. It does not mean that we can
go in and change the Government of Saudi Arabia overnight. I
think it changes in my mind the costs and benefits of taking a
very passive hands-off almost approving policy toward the
Saudis and never putting pressure on them----
Senator Biden. Well, we should be----
Mr. Kristol [continuing]. And never putting pressure on
them to change, at least to export Wahabi Islam regime.
Senator Biden. But that is kind of----
Mr. Kristol. So that is just one----
Senator Biden [continuing]. A harder nut.
Mr. Kristol. Well, it is a little easier to take on Syria.
Senator Biden. Because we benefit there, but----
Mr. Kristol. Right. Right. If you want my predication we
are not going to go to war with Syria in the next 6 months.
That is my prediction. But it is based on only reading the
papers. I do not think that the troops are going to pivot
either right or left.
Senator Biden. Well, I guess what I am trying to say----
Mr. Kristol. I imagine that they are mostly going to try to
stabilize the situation in Iraq and then come home. But let me
just make one quick comment and then--we are up to the
Wolfowitz document from 1992. Most people can agree or disagree
with that document, I guess. I read it at the time. I think it
still remains part of the original document.
Was the problem of the 1990s that we were too assertive or
that we were the opposite, I think that I agree with General
Clark here. We tried to take a bit of a holiday from history.
We did not show the kind of leadership that we could have
shown. We were too slow to act in the Balkans.
Wolfowitz, to his credit, in 1992 was fighting a losing
fight in the Bush administration to get serious about
Milosevic. And the Secretary of State at the time, Jim Baker,
said, ``We do not have a dog in that fight.'' The mood after
the gulf war and at the end of the cold war was very much,
``Let us come home, enjoy the peace dividend. Let us not get
involved in messy situations.''
Somalia intensified that mood obviously after Mogadishu and
then Rwanda happened and that was another failure, in my view
on the part of the United States and in that case on the part
of the U.N. And then we were even slow, I would argue, in
Bosnia and Kosovo, though we certainly did the right thing
there. We did not deal in a very straightforward, in a very
forthright way with Saddam in spite of a lot of threats to do
so in the mid to late 1990s. Of course, with respect to terror
itself, we were very slow, I think, in the response to Osama.
So I would argue that the basic--the error of the 1990s was
that we were too timid, not that we were bullying our way
around the world too much.
Senator Biden. I am not suggesting otherwise. I do not mean
this as a criticism of Mr. Wolfowitz. I am trying to find out
what the----
Mr. Kristol. Implications.
Senator Biden [continuing]. The philosophic underpinning of
this policy is. And that is I guess to say very bluntly if, in
fact, knowing that Hezbollah, Hamas, the Jihad to some degree
is in, around, given cover by the Syrian Government, if, in
fact, they did sell, you know, material or give material to the
Iraqis, would the present Bush policy be viewed as inconsistent
if after it was made to Bashir Assad saying, ``Have them cease
and desist, get rid of them,'' and he did not do it, would it
be inconsistent in terms of a coherent policy if, in fact, they
did not use military force? It seems to me, if I follow the
logic, there would be an inconsistency.
Mr. Kristol. Well, use of military force is a practical
judgment and there are huge costs associated with doing so and
one has to be cautious before just cavalierly supporting it. I
think that, in fact, that--)
Senator Biden. I would not suggest that it is cavalier. I
think it would be fairly well thought out. I am not sure that--
--
Mr. Kristol. But if it is, I would not rule it out. And I
guess my only point of view would be that it seems to me if you
really look back, the President came to a certain decision
after 9/11 and a decision I very much agree with and I think
most probably do, which is our previous sense of what U.S.
policy should be toward the Middle East in general was flawed,
that we had made a big bet on, let us call it stability, and
that it turned out that the stability had certain side effects
like producing Osama and the like, and that we have to have a
different attitude toward terrorists and groups and toward the
nations that supported and hosted and harbored those terrorists
groups and supported them, and it is particularly dangerous to
have dictators developing weapons of mass destruction.
So a lot depends on Syrian policy, but yes, I think that
sitting back and accepting a Syrian, sort of passively
accepting Syrian sponsorship of terror, sitting back and
passively accepting a North Korean race to get--to establish a
nuclear assembly line, those are inconsistent with what the
President has articulated. It does not mean that military
action is the first or the preferred option, or maybe it will
never be an option in those cases, but I think--let us say an
active American foreign policy as opposed to a passive one I
think is required.
Let me just add one more thing, just from a diplomacy point
of view, though, which is what Senator Lugar and General Clark
discussed. I just noticed this compared to when I was in the
executive branch 10 years ago, one side effect of the
centrality of the EU and of NATO in some respects in Brussels
is that we do not do enough public diplomacy in the nations
themselves.
You know, Secretary Powell--and I do not blame him for
this--goes to Brussels all the time to meet with all the
Foreign Ministers. It is a very cost effective way to have 15
bilateral meetings. They are all right in Brussels. The truth
is, for that reason he has almost never been to Berlin or
Paris. That is literally true, I believe, incidentally, as
Secretary of State. I think he has been once maybe to each of
these two capitals, which means that you do not get the effect
of being able to influence public opinion directly in those
countries, and being able to meet with leaders in those
countries beyond the very narrow circle of literally Foreign
Ministers and people who are in government.
I think it has been a big failure and this is of public
diplomacy. It is not at all partisan failure, but almost a
structural failure. We need to spend much more time speaking to
the actual opinion leaders and peoples of those countries
instead of going to the U.N. to meet with Foreign Ministers or
Brussels to meet with Foreign Ministers. So one odd side effect
of our commitment to these multi-lateral institutions--and
obviously, I am not saying that we should not be committed to
these institutions--but one odd side effect is that we do not
do the kind of more direct public diplomacy that we used to do
much more of.
And I think we have paid a big price with the European
public opinion. I am shocked when I go to Germany and France
and talk with people there and try to make the case as best as
I can for what I think, which obviously is not the
administration exactly, but how often they just say, well,
regardless of whether they agree with me or not, or whether I
am quite where the administration is--and I am not in some
cases--they just have never even had this conversation. You
know, there are a few of you Senators who do try to go, but
they really rarely see senior policy officials directly, in the
capitals of these major nations, and as a result, I think we
have paid a price with public opinion.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, it may not be an appropriate
time now, but I would either like the general to respond, if he
could to my question and what Mr. Kristol said or if he can
remember--if he can hold it until when others get finished.
The Chairman. Let me just take the second course, so that
in fairness to our other colleagues----
Senator Biden. Yes.
The Chairman. But I hope that General Clark has not
forgotten the dialog with the distinguished ranking member and
will be able to contribute.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Mr. Chairman, and welcome witnesses. I do
want to clarify one thing.
In the first panel, I made a statement, peripheral
conflicts after World War II and certainly in the context of
superpowers colliding, may be the peripheral, but certainly for
the many tens of thousands of lives lost, they were not
considered peripheral, so I would like to correct that.
And gentlemen, as we look at the two conflicting points of
view here, certainly I think our present foreign policy you
might argue is one of a Curtis LeMay approach, ``might does
make right,'' and I would like to ask Mr. Kristol to comment
and critique the General Clark doctrine of foreign policy. To
me it is quoting Truman and Eisenhower and laying out a sane
course of action that does not alienate our many friends around
the world and working with the chief goal of stopping
terrorism. Can you comment on the Clark doctrine?
Mr. Kristol. I am not actually sure that Wes and I differ
quite as much as you say, but I do not want to ruin any
possible future chances he has by saying that though, so I
will----
General Clark. I would welcome your support.
Mr. Kristol. I doubt that. But the--anyway, no, look, I am
not sure how much we differ. But I really strongly differ, with
all due respect, Senator, with the notion that the Bush
administration has some sort of ``might makes right'' doctrine.
The Bush administration has used military force twice in its 2
years, in Afghanistan where there is no, I take it, dispute
that they were right to do so. Maybe they could have involved
NATO more. I am not sure about that. And in Iraq, where I
believe they did receive appropriate support from both bodies
of Congress and I believe will have fought what will be viewed
as a just and necessary war, a war of liberation and a war
where we are going to discover weapons, probably have already,
maybe discover weapons of mass destruction, which I think would
pose an unacceptable danger to us. That is it.
I mean, they proposed in my view rather modest increases in
the defense budget to accommodate this world of new challenges
after 9/11 and that is basically the great militarization of
American foreign policy that everyone is talking about. They
are committed to the reconstruction of Iraq.
Senator Biden and I talked a year ago and I think that, you
were worried understandably that they would hold to their older
view, I think that we shun nation-building. And I think to
their credit, actually, they have moved pretty far off of that.
We can quarrel a little bit about exactly what role the
U.N. should play and exactly how internationalized the nation-
building should be, but ironically the criticism almost now is
that they are doing too much unilateral nation-building, not
too little. But that is a much better debate to have, of how
exactly to do the nation-building and the democracy building
than the opposite.
I guess I just do not agree that that is a fair
characterization of the Bush administration foreign policy.
Senator Chafee. You recognize, you said, in your trips
abroad the rising anti-Americanism. I think even in Canada they
are booing our national anthem. Certainly, that is the negative
ramification of our present foreign policy. Where have we gone
wrong there and how counterproductive is that, again, to what
General Clark said is the goal of fighting terrorism?
Mr. Kristol. Well, you know, look, it is a very big
question about the--especially about Europe, I think, and
especially really about France and Germany and that has been
addressed by various people in interesting books, like my
friend Bob Kagan, about how much of this is due to different
world views, how much of this is due to diplomatic blunders by
us, how much has this been due to sort of opportunistic
political maneuvers by various leaders in those countries. And
I think it is hard to tell, and let us see what happens after
Iraq. Let us see what happens in terms of cooperation in the
rebuilding of Iraq. Let us see what happens in cooperation in
other parts of the world.
I would not exaggerate the crisis. I mean, I come back to
Senator Boxer's question of ``What is the problem?'' I mean,
there are real problems, but we are also working together with
these countries all over the place, including in Afghanistan
and in Kosovo and in Bosnia and to some degree in East Timor. I
mean, it is not as if the U.S. Government and the European
governments are not doing an awful lot of things together. So I
guess I am not--this is a big war, the war in Iraq. It was a
big decision obviously, by the Bush administration.
Senator Chafee. Do you dispute that, as Senator Biden
quoted from the 1992 Defense Planning Guide, that generally it
has been a radical departure from foreign policy of the past?
Mr. Kristol. I do dispute that.
Senator Chafee. You do dispute it.
Mr. Kristol. I think it is a continuation of precisely the
Truman through Reagan foreign policy. No one can really dispute
that--I do not think it is a big departure from Reagan. I guess
we could have a quarrel about whether Reagan himself was in the
tradition of Truman or not. That was argued in the 1980s.
Yes, I do dispute it. Look, it is better to be--as General
Clark said, it is better to be liked than hated, but it is also
important to be feared by one's enemies. And the problem of the
1990s was not that we were not liked enough. The problem of the
1990s is that we were not feared enough by those who hated us.
Osama bin Laden said that, you know, we are a ``weak horse.''
Somalia in my view, and again, this was--there is plenty of
blame to go around on this because they were Republicans in the
Congress and, I think, right after Somalia who particularly
pushed for the quick withdrawal which, we paid a huge price
for. And so I do think that the problem with the 1990s was more
about weakness than strength. In terms of European public
opinion, you know, we will see what happens after Iraq.
Look at British public opinion. It has changed an awful lot
in the last month apparently, partly rallying to Tony Blair's
leadership, and I think partly rallying to what we are
discovering in Iraq. Are people really going to say after we
discover the extent of Saddam's brutality and torture that it
was a mistake, that it was so simple as they thought, so
crudely and simply a mistake to have gone to war to liberate
the people of Iraq? Are they really going to say that this is
just about might making right?
If we do do a good job on the reconstruction of Iraq--and
that is awfully important--and if Iraq has a decent government
and the Iraqis are beginning to be able to govern themselves in
the easily near future and we show that we are willing to stay
and work with other countries to help them reconstruct that
nation, is it going to be that easy for people in Britain and
Germany and France to just continue to complacently assume that
this was a kind of crazed doctrine of the President and a few
advisors and it was not a benefit to the Iraqi people and to
the world? I am doubtful about that.
Senator Chafee. Well, that may be. I am just having
difficulty in what to me seems like just radical differences
from the point of view of the neo-cons which you so
articulately represent and General Clark's traditional point of
view, but as Senator Biden, forgiving ad hoc assemblies, the
whole notion of preemption, which we saw in Iraq essentially,
``We are going and whether it is weapons of mass destruction
evidence or not, this is--we want regime change. We are
going.'' So it is a completely new direction in our foreign
policy.
I know my time is up, so thank you.
Mr. Kristol. President Clinton said in February 1998, that
we cannot accept Saddam with weapons of mass destruction. The
implication of that was that preemption would have been
justified if we could not depend on the inspectors to go ahead
and, in fact, the inspectors could not have been depended on to
go ahead. So I guess I would differ on that--I do not deny that
the President has adjusted foreign policy in certain ways post
9/11. I guess I would deny that the break is quite as radical
as you suggest.
Senator Chafee. Yes, and General Clark made a good point
about using 9/11.
Mr. Kristol. And I do not know. General Clark I think
supports the use of----
Senator Chafee. Whenever you are in trouble, I see you use
9/11. It was before 9/11. It was a foreign policy before 9/11.
General Clark said it.
Mr. Kristol. I am not sure that is right. I myself
supported removing Saddam from power before 9/11. Obviously, we
have supported it since 1997. The Congress in certain respects
supported regime change in Iraq way before 9/11 by passing
legislation in 1998.
I do think that, my personal view--and this is just an
outsider looking in, is that the President was much more
possessed of the urgency of this after 9/11, but that is an
empirical question. But I mean, I should let General Clark
speak for himself.
I am not so sure that we disagree on the use of force,
since we both support the use of force, supported the use of
force in Kosovo and I take it he supports the use of force in
Iraq. I think he would have done the diplomacy a little
differently. But I do not think he quarrels with where we came
out.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Yes. Mr. Kristol, I just have to say a
couple of words about some of the things you have said. In
terms of the resolution in 1998 which I voted for for regime
change, it had nothing to do with preventive war at all. If you
read it, what it talked about was helping the people in the
opposition to make the changes there. So that is No. 1.
If someone voted for that, I can tell you, I was not voting
to go to war. That is No. 1. I was trying to do what General
Clark suggests, which is prevent war, prevent war by supporting
those folks who would in fact overthrow Saddam.
Now, I also, I could not believe when you said that it was
stability in the Middle East that created Osama bin Laden. It
was in fact instability in Afghanistan which allowed him to
move in there, into that void. And the weapons that were
obtained by the Taliban that eventually found their way into
al-Qaeda and the rest were remnants of that war and the fact
that we walked away.
I just do not like when history is rewritten since I have
lived through a lot of it as a Senator or a Member of Congress.
I also remember being stunned when Donald Rumsfeld went to sit
across from Hussein, Saddam Hussein and tell him the good news
that the Reagan administration was taking them off the
terrorists list.
And when we found those weapons of mass destruction, and
the inspectors as you know destroyed more than were destroyed
by all of our bombs, the components came from this country to a
great degree. They had the stamp of our companies on them. So I
do not think that we should rewrite history. I think that we
need to look at it in an honest way.
I also appreciate your point of view, Mr. Kristol. I have a
great deal of respect for you. But I do not think that you and
General Clark have in any way come out with the same vision,
because I took the notes of what you said and when General
Clark talked, he did not just say ``It is better if the world
likes us.'' That is trivializing what he said.
He said, ``We are safer when we work with the world.'' That
is serious. Maybe you think we are safer when we have so much
of the world right now having attitudes toward us which are,
let us say, way beyond disrespectful. I do not think so.
I think you are right when you say that we need to talk to
the people. I have supported anything we can do to get to the
people and tell them about America and what we are like and
what our people are like. And when General Clark said we should
prevent war, not wage preventive war, that is very different
than your statement which is Iraq--if Iraq is to be a model,
not an exception, we are probably going to have to have more of
these coalitions of the willing.
So I think, Mr. Chairman, the juxtaposition of these two
fine people here who are so smart and can articulate their
positions so well is just a brilliant stroke, because as I look
at my State, a lot of the arguments that are coming right out
here are the arguments that we are hearing back there.
And needless to say, knowing me, as you all do, I do
believe we are safer when we work with the world. And it is
hard. Diplomacy is hard. But war should not be an instrument of
foreign policy. It should be a last resort.
Now, everybody says that. In due respect, Mr. Kristol did
not. He basically said, look, Iraq may be the model. And that
leads to Senator Biden's point. Well, what is next? What is the
next in these great models? And maybe if I did not have to
eulogize every single day more and more Californians who are
dying here--and I am up way beyond 20, and a lot of them are
leaving spouses and little kids and the rest, maybe this could
be an interesting abstract conversation.
I just want to read from candidate George Bush and ask
General Clark to comment on it. He said, ``Let me tell you what
I am worried about. I am worried about an opponent who uses
nation-building and the military in the same sentence. See, our
view of the military is for our military to be properly
prepared to fight and win war and therefore prevent war from
happening in the first place.'' And I think that in many ways
is what General Clark has said here today.
And I wonder if, General Clark, you could comment on those
thoughts.
General Clark. Well, thank you very much, Senator. I think
that many things have changed as I look at this
administration's foreign policy from the prescriptions that
were offered by then Governor Bush during the campaign. He did
speak of a humble America then and one that was respectful. And
he was concerned about nation-building and to some extent, some
of these changes have been the essential changes of a group of
people who stayed out of government during the 1990s, watched
from the sidelines and did not understand the actual demands on
the U.S. Government. I am talking about the criticism of
national building.
In fact, dirty word or not, it is something that the United
States has to do and this administration was dragged
reluctantly into the problem of resolving the dispute in
Macedonia in June 2001. U.S. reluctance to use NATO and let
NATO get involved in that period deepened the conflict and cost
lives, even in Macedonia.
I remember getting calls at the time from this. This was
before the terrible events of 9/11. Something happened after 9/
11. We do not know what that was. No one can clearly understand
it. It may be as Senator Chafee said, all along there was a
desire to get Saddam. I have read books in which this was
apparently discussed inside the administration, ``Let us get
him.''
I have heard it was discussed in the campaign, although I
do not remember. I never personally heard it discussed during
the campaign, but I think you can find records of people
talking about this. I do not know what happened, but what I
know is that in life and war and diplomacy, there is sort of
two kinds of plans. There are plans that might work, and there
are plans that will not work. And when you are trying to
protect America's role in the world and you line up all of the
things that are important to us in priority order, if you set
this Nation of nearly 300 million people against the rest of
the world and take away the legitimacy that our values, our
rule of law, our 225 years of history has given us, you are
setting us on a course that will at some point, despite the
power of the American military, despite the courage of the
young men and women in uniform, despite the incredible
competence we have seen displayed on the battlefield in Iraq,
at some point, it is going to run into the weight of other
people's interests, concerns, their notions of legitimacy, and
it will bounce back against us.
So it may not be in Iraq. It may be in Syria. It may be in
whatever comes after that, if there is anything after Iraq. We
do not know. But I do think that the logic that was in Governor
Bush's statement about the need to prevent war is the right
logic.
The problem with war as an instrument of foreign policy is
that it is usually counterproductive to try to change people's
minds by killing them or their relatives. And so in occasion
twice in the 20th century against two separate adversaries, we
defeated their Armed Forces, we changed their governments, and
it worked out great. And these two countries are allies and
have been staunch allies against an outside threat. But in most
cases, it leaves lingering hatreds and resentments and problems
that later generations of diplomats and, unfortunately,
soldiers have to clean up.
That was the record after World War I. That is the
persistent record in Europe. It is the record after any number
of conflicts in the Middle East. And I pray that it will not be
the record after the work that we are trying to do in Iraq. I
just want to address one more thing, because I do not know if I
will have the chance to come back to it.
Mr. Kristol said that we probably ended up fundamentally in
agreement on Iraq. I am not sure about that. I could never
personally see--I always felt that we would have to deal with
Saddam Hussein in one way or another. I was never convinced
that an improved program of sanctions and containment would not
work, although eventually such a program might leak and we
might have to deal with him. I could never see quite the sense
of urgency for going after Saddam when we did.
If you are inside an administration that does these things,
you view it as leadership. When you are on the outside and look
at it, you view it as something that is more or less not--it is
not understandable, totally understandable. You cannot quite
grasp it. I could not quite grasp it. I could not quite see the
connection with Saddam Hussein and the war on terror because,
of all the Arab States, he was the least likely, it seemed to
me, to actually be working against al-Qaeda, and that is what
the Agency testified up here on the Hill and said, unless we
posed a critical threat to him. That, on the other hand, I
mean, we are in it.
I support, you know, our total and complete success and the
men and women in the Armed Forces. And I am concerned about the
aftermath. And if that is where Bill Kristol comes out, I hope
he will associate himself and his magazine with me.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. General Clark, I know you have some urgency
to leave us shortly and I do not want to impose longer. I would
like to, if I may, to recognize Senator Corzine and then get
back to Senator Biden's----
Senator Biden. You do not have time.
General Clark. No, I want to take time for that, if I
could, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. We would appreciate that.
Senator Corzine.
Senator Corzine. I will cede most of my time to Senator
Biden's question, because I think the application of the
concepts of ``axis of evil'' and preemption and how this pivots
is one of the most important questions we could ask with regard
to all of these things.
But I do want both of you to comment briefly on one of the
lessons learned, which I think is reflected not so much in how
governments have acted, but how the populations of countries
have acted. Spain has an overwhelming opposition in its
population and may end up undermining our coalition of the
willing through the fullness of time because populations have
not been convinced of what it is and there are others, Italy
and other places, where public opinion is not necessarily where
the leadership is.
But I think that one of the problems that I think has
consistently been shown here is that we have not had a
consistent argument about what it was that we were trying to
accomplish in Iraq and it is almost parallel to what is the
mission of NATO. We started out with regime change and then the
prosecution of war on terrorism, and then the elimination of
the distribution of weapons of mass destruction and democracy
and stability in the Middle East, tyranny and oppression. The
sequence of those arguments was made out over 6 months, not at
a given point in time, not in a coherent way.
So I wonder if one of the lessons we learn, not only with
our allies, but also in how we present these cases here at home
to buildup the common support for policies--is not one of the
lessons that we need to be able to articulate these missions,
these goals in a much more direct way? Or otherwise, we have a
fall back to, ``you are with us or against us,'' ``might makes
right,'' ``axis of evil'' kinds of propositions with regard to
policy. I think I will leave it there, both of you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Corzine. Do either of you
have a comment on it?
General Clark. Well, if I could answer that. I think I
understand the question as you were going through this.
Senator, what struck me was that Iraq is, in many respects, it
was the toughest case if you take the idea that you need an
active foreign policy in the Middle East, because even though--
in some respects it was the easiest case because you had a U.N.
Security Council resolution and you could say he has defied it
for years.
Now, Syria is not in active defiance. Iran is not in active
defiance. Libya is not in active defiance, the same way. Each
of these countries has weapons of mass destruction. Each of
these countries to one degree or another supports terrorism.
Each of these countries to one degree or another would like to
take on Israel and defeat Israel and run the Israelis off the
continent.
So Iraq was in one sense the toughest case because it was
least active in support of terrorism, and probably least
connected to 9/11 although we will not know that for sure and
we may be disproved because after we are into Baghdad we will
probably find all kinds of information if we can find the
papers in those burned out ministries. There is no telling what
Saddam may have been up to.
But that is true of the Middle East. Having once gone into
Iraq, then I think the chain of logic is actually more clear
after that. It is now an easier step to go to the Syrians and
say, ``Now, look, you got the message from Iraq, right? You
understand that weapons of mass destruction make you less
secure from us, not more secure. You understand that you will
not deter us. We understand that you have Iraq weapons hidden
here in Syria. We understand that you are supporting terrorism
through Hezbollah. Now, please change or else.''
I think that is a pretty clear and convincing argument. The
problem with it is it is a suboptimization of what we as the
United States should be seeking. As bad as the Syrian regime
may be or the Iranian regime, we have higher interests in the
world. The question is: How do you line up those interests and
pursue them? And this where I come back to one of the things
that Bill Kristol said, among many that I agree with. We have
not done enough in public diplomacy. Instead of pursuing public
diplomacy, we killed it because we cutoff the funding for the
State Department's public information programs, their
libraries, their outreach abroad, their consular staffs. We
have shrunken embassies and taken away their resources,
something I know this committee is very familiar with, but it
happens even in countries like France because it is gone to we
have opened up embassies in Belarus, or we tried to at least
before it was pushed out.
And the result of this has been that we have failed to
build the bridges of understanding that I think are desperately
needed in the world. We should be having a deep debate with our
allies about Syria right now and Iran. Do they constitute
threats? What measures would we like to see to ensure that they
do not constitute a threat? Because the alternative to that is
we continue to move forward with an active policy and we end up
with responsibilities with more and more nation-building and
taking care of people in a culture which has not been conducive
to outside engagement in the past and which diverts important
resources from other domestic priorities, which forces us to
divert our Armed Forces, which causes us to lose legitimacy in
the world in light of our broader pursuits.
So I think there is a clear chain of logic if you follow
this. And Iraq may have been the toughest, but having crossed
Iraq, I think the other dominos could fall. The question is: Do
we want them to? What are our broader priorities in the world,
and what is the best way to achieve those priorities? And is it
through this chain of knocking down some of these regimes who
have historically harbored and supported terrorists and
simultaneously gone after weapons of mass destruction?
To me, it is a very pragmatic set of issues that need to be
explored and they need to be explored with our allies fully in
our confidence, and we need to agree on jointly what we are
going to do.
The Chairman. Senator Biden, would you like to renew your--
--
Senator Biden. I will not renew it at all. Knowing the
general, he remembers what I said. I would just add an addendum
here.
After 9/11, it seems to me that after 9/11 and in the face
of, not connected, but in the face of Iraqi disregard for the
U.N. resolutions that had been passed starting after the first
gulf war, it seems to me we had an opportunity to not only
threaten and ultimately use military force in Iraq, but an
opportunity to unify the West, at least, including I would
add--this sounds counterintuitive--including Russia in a new
set of standards for what constituted appropriate and
inappropriate international behavior on the part of people who
transferred weapons of mass destruction.
Let me give you one example. I cannot imagine why we did
not spend any time trying to work out with our NATO allies,
first the Russians and the Chinese, as well a new international
regime, if you will, as to what is appropriate behavior in
transferring weapons.
For example, here we were, the President of the United
States had to suffer the ignominious requirement of releasing a
North Korean shipment to, we think--we think we know where they
are going to--we do not know where they are supposed to transit
from because we made no effort. We made no effort after 9/11 to
focus on as those kinds of international, if not regimes,
agreements. As the kids used to say 10 years ago, we ``
dissed'' the International Criminal Court, which I do not think
we should have belonged to in light of the way in which it was
written and other international agreements. It was sort of
counterintuitive.
And what confused me was I thought we had a legitimate
rationale--although I agree with you, general. I never felt
that Saddam was a clear and present danger. He was a long-term
danger. If we let him go for another 3 to 5 years, he would get
a nuclear capacity, in my view, which would fundamentally alter
the relationships, not intercontinental, but probably theater
and it would alter relationships. I thought we would eventually
have to deal with him.
But I was put in a position, like many were, of we either
do nothing or we support doing something now. And I thought
that was a pretty easy choice, quite frankly.
But the point I want to make is that what confused me was
every time Secretary Powell would go to make a case based upon
existing international law and existing international
agreements, you would have the Vice President show up, at the
Veterans of Foreign War and say, ``By the way, inspectors do
not matter anyway,'' or you would have Rumsfeld talk about
preemption. It was almost as if it was a deliberate attempt, if
we are going to proceed, to not proceed with the aid,
assistance, underpinning of international organizational
structures which we created, we, the United States created
after World War II.
So if you can factor it, this takes me to my fundamental
question. The Europeans seem to have read--and maybe they were
intransigent no matter what. Maybe no matter what we did we
have a neo-Gaullist who now is the king of Europe in terms of
popularity after having been--having the scare of his life with
Le Pen getting 20 percent of the vote or whatever, in his
newfound popularity.
But it seems to me that there is an incredible distrust for
this administration's motives or its agenda, its policy. So if
you can wrap that into this notion of the disagreement relating
to what constitutes a threat to security, what motivates the
Europeans and NATO versus what--or France in particular and
what motivates us. I probably confused you.
General Clark. No, I think there is a, you know, broad
center to the many different elements you are raising, Senator.
And if I could, I would start with the general perception
that--and I think Bill Kristol put it very clearly. He talked
about differing interests between the United States and France.
And the question I would ask to unravel this is: Why are the
interests different?
We are interested in security. They are not interested in
security? We are interested in fighting against terrorism. They
are not interested in fighting against terrorism? We are
interested in being able to pursue international trade and
development. They are not?
So what are the--oh, I know. French farmers, French farmers
each like to keep their own--OK, so we have a different view on
agricultural policy.
But when you go past the sort of narrow economic
differences which are inevitably reflected in democratic
political systems, I think there is a broad core, a very strong
common interest.
I think what happened is that there is a certain opaqueness
to the direction of American policy, and that opaqueness is
here today in the issue you are raising about Syria. And since
you raised it, let me just respond to it. I think, as I was
just saying to Senator Corzine, there is a very clear chain of
logic that could take us into Syria. There is probably no
decision to have done that yet.
And it is probably asking too much for a government to come
forward and say, ``Look, here is what we have been thinking
about. Here is what we have been worried about. We do not want
to do this, but you need to understand that this is where we
are going.''
And yet that is clearly the warning that has been given.
And even, you know, some of these countries have not been as
clear on the uptake as they might have been after 9/11, but it
should be unmistakable now that Syria and Iran are both in the
gun sights. The question is--they know it. Our allies know it,
but are we dialoguing and building a relationship around the
best way to deal with this?
It comes to the second major point that I would like to
make. Foreign policy should be about problem solving. It should
not be about taking an ideological or non-ideological template
and imposing it.
The process of foreign policy is to protect your nation's
interests, all of them. And to do that, you face a series of
challenges and obstacles and problems, and you have to deal
with those problems. The difficulty that the nations in Europe
had was they could not see the Iraq campaign as a pragmatic
next step in dealing with the problems of terror partly
because, as Senator Corzine said, there were many different
explanations given, partly because there was never a clear
connection, partly because our public diplomacy did not provide
them the information that we had available in the United
States, partly because our media did not raise in the United
States the question that they themselves were raising about our
policies in Europe.
And so as I look at the whole thing, I believe that what we
need to do is we need a pragmatic foreign policy. There is no
reason to either accept stability in the Middle East, per se,
or activity in the Middle East per se as essentials.
The question is: How do we solve--how do we meet our goals
of a safer, more secure America in which we can live the way we
want to live and enjoy the prosperity and travel and global
interconnections that have made us the Nation we are?
And I think that is the debate that needs to be held in a
pragmatic way, not based on fear and threat and alert
conditions and so forth. But I think Americans have to come to
terms with this and we need to bring our allies onboard with us
in this debate, because ultimately, if we stand--and this is, I
guess, the third major point.
This is not about NATO. And this is not me as an old NATO
commander going out and trying to put everything in the
template of Kosovo, although certainly it was personally an
important experience for me. I was privileged to sit inside the
top councils of deliberation for some time during the 1990s,
and what I recognized was that there was two distinctive views
of the world. There is one view of the world in which you build
your allies and your alliances and you worked your friends. And
with those friends together, you dealt with your issues. And
there is another view that says all you have to do is deal with
your enemies, and the only reason you have your friends is to
help you deal with your enemies.
I reject the latter. I support the former. In other words,
I think that if the United States stands with Europe, together
with 600 million people and half the world's GDP, we can
pragmatically deal with all of the challenges to European and
American security with the right approach, the right
leadership, the right public diplomacy, the right dialog.
Whereas, if we isolate ourselves and focus only on going after
what we see as the most immediate threat, we will take this
Nation down a blind alley, whether it is in the next country or
the country after that or the country beyond that, from which
we will find ourselves in debt, in trouble, in trouble with our
volunteer force, in trouble with our budget, in trouble with
domestic priorities, in trouble in terms of international
agreements and elsewhere that will result ultimately in a set
back to the achievement of American aims abroad.
Senator Biden. It is a lot of hard work, though, is it not?
It is hard.
General Clark. It is hard. It is exactly what you said:
Diplomacy is difficult and demanding. But I really do believe
the answer to the question you are asking is: Let us get a
pragmatic foreign policy. Let us use the institution of NATO,
enlarge it, bring it together as a focal point for U.S. efforts
in the world.
Mr. Kristol. If I could just add a word. Yes, look, I
accept the standard of a safer and more secure America if you
expand it, as I think General Clark would too, to a safer and
more secure world for friends and allies, if the people are
seeking democracy and liberty around the world. And let us just
judge the war in Iraq by that standard. I am perfectly happy to
be judged by that. Let us see how it plays out. Let us see
whether we think we have not made ourselves more secure and the
Middle East actually more secure as a result of removing Saddam
Hussein and dealing with the threat of weapons of mass
destruction and liberating the people of Iraq.
In terms of people, I would just say that we have talked a
lot about the French people and the German people. People all
over the world are unhappy about us, but I would like to
mention the people of Iraq. I think the people of Iraq deserve
some mention. We let them--we encouraged them to rise up in
1991. I was in The White House then.
We let Saddam--we stood by as Saddam slaughtered them. If
you ask me, why we are unpopular--the genuine grievance against
us in the Arab world was a legitimate grievance, I would say,
was that we intervened in 1991, saved the Amir of Kuwait, saved
the Saudi royal family, stabilized oil supplies, which was
important. You could not let Saddam obviously control all of
that oil wealth.
But then we stood back as actual Arab people rose up
seeking freedom. And that, if you want to start talking about
why we have problems in some respects among Arab populations as
opposed to Arab governments, I think that was a problem and I
think, conversely, the liberation of the people of Iraq will be
a benefit.
Syria, look, we do need to talk to our allies and friends
about Iran and Syria. I think Secretary Powell spent an awful
lot of time actually talking about Iran with various countries,
Russia for example, where we have not been as successful as we
had hoped in persuading them to help on the proliferation
problem.
We have argued with our allies about commercial dealings
with Iran. Syria is not something that we have paid a fair
amount of attention to but, look, at some point you may end up
with a different analysis of the problem.
It is not so much that France and we have different
interests. We clearly have a different perception of how to
deal with some of these problems, and we should do a better job
of persuading them that our perception is right. But there may
come times when one has to make a decision and I think that the
President did have to make a decision in this case.
I do not think delay would have fundamentally changed it,
Chirac would not have changed his mind 6 months later. And I
think we would have been at greater risk. So I am perfectly
happy to be held to the pragmatic standard of judgment. But I
would just say: Let us be serious about that standard. But
Syria seems to be suddenly--I do not know quite why--in
everyone's mind. But yes, if the Syrian Government feels
pressured to cut down on its support for terror or be less
irresponsible in some of its dealings in the Middle East, that
would be a good thing as a result of Iraq and that does not
mean successful diplomacy only involves being liked by people.
It also involves pressuring nations that do not make their
decisions based on whether they like you so much or not.
There are an awful lot of dictatorships in the Middle East,
I think, that respond to--where it is important to be respected
and even a little bit feared. And I think, in fact, we will be
better liked by the peoples of those nations if we are a little
tougher on the dictatorial regimes that they are saddled with.
I think the evidence of that is actually there in Iran.
Senator Biden. I can tell you why we are concerned about
Syria. There is a sense that there is an evolving rationale
that is going to justify a decision that has already been
taken. I may be wrong about that, but that is why we are
concerned, why, I speak for myself, why I am concerned.
The Chairman. Let me just make a couple of comments----
Senator Biden. Could I ask unanimous consent to strike----
The Chairman. You have permission to strike that from the
record.
I just want to announce that tomorrow, in fact, the
committee will have an opportunity to expand American
diplomacy. We are going to have the markup of the
reauthorization bill for the State Department. I think it is an
important juncture. And the markup we started with provides
more money in about five ways for the State Department and for
diplomacy than the State Department asked for officially. We
think that is important, both the broadcasting and the
embassies and a number of things many of you would have
commented on.
I would say that our hearing today was, of course, about
NATO and really the expansion of the treaty. But one of the
things that has come to my mind is that one reason why perhaps
things are moving well with the seven States that are coming in
is that the United States has spent a lot of quality diplomacy
on those seven.
Secretary Grossman himself, quite apart from Ambassador
Burns and others and Members of Congress and whatever, have
visited the seven probably with greater frequency than a good
number of major countries throughout the world that are outside
those seven. So there is something to be said for having more
diplomacy.
It leads me to wonder, however, and I just say this with
the ranking member present, that we do not have, for example,
an Assistant Secretary for Latin America. We have not had for
several months.
Now, here we are prior to the U.N. vote--granted, that is
not the best time to begin starting public either or private
diplomacy as the case may be. But I received calls from the
administration, and the ranking member may have, too, asking
for intervention with President Vicente Fox and/or others that
I might know in Mexico, Chileans, who are also there.
Now, for a long while, we left Chile standing by the
telephone waiting to be invited into NAFTA. This has gone on
for years through several administrations, I fear, by this
time. Likewise, with the Mexicans, they had some expectations
that have not been fulfilled. Their Foreign Minister resigned.
And here we are. It is a bit late at this point because even
then we are not prepared to remedy the situations. We might
show some acknowledgment that we are there.
I am hopeful that we are able to expand our vision, able to
handle more clients simultaneously, because I suspect that we
might be more successful if we can.
Let me just call now upon patient Senator Chafee. Do you
have a final valedictory comment?
Senator Chafee. No.
The Chairman. I thank both of you very much.
Mr. Kristol. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Biden. Thank you, gentlemen.
General Clark. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee adjourned, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair .]
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