AN ENLARGED NATO: MENDING FENCES AND MOVING FORWARD ON IRAQ

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BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
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(III)
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TUESDAY, APRIL 29, 2003

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee), presiding.


The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order. Today the committee is very pleased to welcome Secretary of State Colin Powell. Members are anxious to hear the Secretary’s views on the status of our alliances, the Bush administration’s plans for Iraq, the developing situations in the Middle East region and the Korean Peninsula, and estimates of the State Department’s role in these critical endeavors.

The hearing begins an extraordinary month of activity for the Foreign Relations Committee. Tomorrow we will meet to consider a Resolution of Ratification to expand the NATO alliance to include Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. I am confident the Senate will choose to pass the Protocols of Accession for all seven candidates prior to President Bush’s scheduled trip to Europe later this spring.

On Thursday we will hold a hearing on the President’s nominee for Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs and we will hold a coffee for President Uribe of Colombia. As early as this week, we may begin floor consideration of the State Department authorization bill. Next week we plan to take NATO expansion to the floor and the following week to mark up a Foreign Assistance Authorization bill. Depending on the floor schedule, we also hope to complete action on legislation to fight the global HIV-AIDS pandemic.

All this must be done while the committee evaluates and responds to the evolving situations in Iraq, North Korea, Afghanistan, and other regional hot spots.

Secretary Powell, when you were last before our committee in early February our Nation stood at the brink of war with Iraq. Since that time, the intransigence and depravity of the regime of Saddam Hussein has led to its destruction. Our military forces, led by President Bush and joined by many coalition partners, executed a swift and decisive battle plan that ejected the Iraqi Government
from power. All of us commend the skill, the bravery, the humanity of our Armed Forces in executing this plan.

Despite our satisfaction with the outcome of the combat phase of the war, we must recognize that we are probably closer to the beginning than to the end of our endeavors in Iraq. I have stated that it may take up to 5 years of effort by coalition countries in Iraq to fully achieve our goals of stability, reconstruction, disarmament, and democracy.

This committee has been particularly interested in hearing from the administration about its long-term strategy toward Iraq, commencing with hearings held by Chairman Biden last year and continuing with our hearings this year. Given substantial funding requirements, the need to inform the American people of the magnitude of the burdens to come, Congress and the administration must work closely together if we are to succeed in Iraq.

I think many Foreign Relations Committee members would share my opinion that the inter-branch partnership has yet to materialize, as it should. This committee has many questions, for which we have received few answers. Congress provided emergency supplemental funding for relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and we have not yet been consulted or informed, however, about the administration's plans for use of those funds. We continue to strive to determine the distribution of duties between various departments and agencies within the U.S. Government for reconstruction activities, to identify the strategy of coordinating our efforts with those of foreign governments and international organizations.

Our military forces and reconstruction teams are facing numerous hurdles in Iraq. The challenges include the rise of the Shiite majority, the infiltration of Iranian agents, unilateral statements of authority by various Iraqi nationals, the omnipresent threat of terrorist acts, reestablishing electricity, water service, securing Iraqi antiquities, creating a police force to keep the peace, fairly and effectively distributing food and medicine and securing Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and those with knowledge of them.

Over the long term, the challenges of developing a constitution and establishing an Iraqi Government that is independent, stable, and self-sufficient are truly enormous, and we understand that. Our policies must be clear, transparent, and discussed in terms of long-term security of the people of Iraq, the Middle East, and for ourselves.

Even as we focus on Iraq, we realize the events of the last several months have sharply altered our relationship with allies and the entire international community. The application of overwhelming U.S. military power in Iraq has changed the calculations of some of our opponents. Meanwhile, differences over the U.S. approach to Iraq and revelations that some of our allies may have assisted Saddam Hussein's government have chilled relations with long-time friends.

It is in this context the committee will vote tomorrow on the expansion of NATO. In doing so, we will reaffirm the utility and the necessity of our alliance relationships. But we are cognizant that some of those relationships have suffered deep wounds.

Mr. Secretary, as the principal United States negotiator with foreign governments, we are anxious to hear from you on the status
of our alliances. How can these relationships be repaired and strengthened? How can we ensure that military and economic burdens related to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the global war on terrorism do not fall overwhelmingly on the United States?

As we expand NATO, we must also retool it so it can be a mechanism of burden-sharing and mutual security in the war on terrorism. NATO should not be circumscribed by geographic boundaries when the principal threat against all alliance members is global in nature.

Last week NATO announced its intention to take over the leadership of ISAF in Afghanistan. I applaud this move and congratulate the administration on a crucial step toward peace and stability in Afghanistan. Although NATO is not in a position at this time to perform the same role in Iraq, a strong commitment by individual NATO nations to contribute to long-term peacekeeping and humanitarian duties in Iraq would help heal alliance divisions and reaffirm its relevance.

As always, Mr. Secretary, it is an honor and a pleasure to have you with us today. We look forward to your insights on these matters and others of your choosing and ask for a chance to engage you in the dialog that we have called for.

[The opening statement of Senator Lugar follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Today the Foreign Relations Committee is very pleased to welcome Secretary of State Powell. Members are anxious to hear your views on the status of our alliances, the Bush administration’s plans for Iraq, the developing situations in the Middle East region and on the Korean Peninsula, and your estimates of the State Department’s role in these critical endeavors.

This hearing begins an extraordinary month of activity for the Foreign Relations Committee. Tomorrow we will meet to consider a resolution of ratification to expand the NATO alliance to include Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. I am confident that the Senate will pass the Protocols of Accession for all seven candidates prior to President Bush’s scheduled trip to Europe later this Spring. On Thursday we will hold a hearing on the President’s nominee for Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs and we will hold a coffee for President Uribe of Colombia. As early as this week, we may begin floor consideration of the State Department Authorization bill. Next week we plan to take NATO expansion to the floor, and the following week we intend to mark up a Foreign Assistance Authorization bill. Depending on the floor schedule, we also hope to complete action on legislation to fight the global HIV/AIDS pandemic. All this must be done while the Committee evaluates and responds to the evolving situations in Iraq, North Korea, Afghanistan, and other regional hot spots.

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Despite our satisfaction over the outcome of the combat phase of the war, we must recognize that we are probably closer to the beginning than to the end of our endeavors in Iraq. I have stated that it may take up to five years of effort by coalition countries in Iraq to fully achieve our goals of stability, reconstruction, disarmament, and democratization. This committee has been particularly interested in hearing from the administration about its long-term strategy towards Iraq.

Given substantial funding requirements and the need to inform the American people of the magnitude of the burdens to come, Congress and the administration must work closely together if we are to succeed in Iraq. I think many Foreign Relations Committee members would share my opinion that this inter-branch partnership has yet to materialize. This committee has many questions for which we have received few answers. Congress provided emergency supplemental funding for relief and re-
construction efforts in Iraq. We have not yet been consulted or informed, however, about the administration’s plans for use of these funds. We continue to strive to determine the distribution of duties between various departments and agencies within the U.S. Government for reconstruction activities and to identified the strategy for coordinating U.S. efforts with those of foreign governments and international organizations.

Our military forces and reconstruction teams are facing numerous hurdles in Iraq. Challenges include the rise of the Shiite majority, the infiltration of Iranian agents, unilateral statements of authority by various Iraqi nationals, the omnipresent threat of terrorist acts, re-establishing electricity and water service, securing Iraqi antiquities, creating a police force to keep the peace, fairly and effectively distributing food and medicine, and securing Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and those with knowledge of them. Over the long term, the challenges of developing a constitution and establishing an Iraqi Government that is independent, stable, and self-sufficient are enormous. Our policies must be clear, transparent, and discussed in terms of long-term security for the people of Iraq and the Middle East.

Even as we focus on Iraq, we realize that the events of the last several months have sharply altered our relationships with allies and the entire international community. The application of overwhelming U.S. military power in Iraq has changed the calculations of some of our opponents. Meanwhile differences over the U.S. approach to Iraq and revelations that some of our allies may have assisted Saddam Hussein’s government have chilled relations with long-time friends.

It is in this context that the committee will vote tomorrow on the expansion of NATO. In doing so, we will re-affirm the utility and necessity of our alliance relationships. But we are cognizant that some of these relationships have suffered very deep wounds. Secretary Powell, as the principal U.S. negotiator with foreign governments, we are anxious to hear from you on the status of our alliances. How can these relationships be repaired and how can we ensure that military and economic burdens related to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the global war on terrorism do not fall overwhelmingly on the United States?

As we expand NATO, we also must retool it, so that it can be a mechanism of burden sharing and mutual security in the war on terrorism. NATO should not be circumscribed by geographic boundaries when the principal threat against all alliance members is global in nature. Last week NATO announced its intention to take over leadership of the ISAF in Afghanistan. I applaud this move and congratulate the administration on a crucial step toward peace and stability in Afghanistan. Although NATO is not in a position at this time to perform the same role in Iraq, a strong commitment by individual NATO nations to contribute to long-term peacekeeping and humanitarian duties in Iraq would help heal Alliance divisions and reaffirm its relevance.

Mr. Secretary, it is a pleasure to have you with us today. We look forward to your insights on these matters and to the chance to engage you in a dialog on the administration’s global strategic vision.

The CHAIRMAN. I call now upon the distinguished ranking member, Senator Biden, for his opening comments.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, welcome. It always is a pleasure, and I mean that literally, to have you before us. The only problem is there is so much on our plate and so much on your plate. We could take any one of these subjects and I think fruitfully spend the entire day on it and longer. We understand that you are being pulled in 75 different directions. And I mean it sincerely, we appreciate that. We understand that and we appreciate your being here.

I know we will only be able to touch the surface on a number of the issues that the chairman raised. But before I turn to the business at hand this morning, NATO and our transatlantic alliance and Iraq, not to mention North Korea and a few others, I want to take this opportunity to state—my mom has an expression. She says: If there is something good about someone, tell them, because it is not told often enough. I want you to know how much I personally and I know the chairman and everyone here admires your performance over the last several months.
You have epitomized professionalism. You have brought not only your military bearing, but your deep understanding of international relations, and your contacts and respect that you have throughout the world has served us very, very well. You are the very best spokesman in my view this country has or could have at this time, and I just want you to know I personally appreciate it.

Secretary POWELL. Thank you, sir.

Senator BIDEN. And I greatly welcomed your decision to go to Brussels earlier this month, and I expect you will tell me everyone thought that was a good idea, but I would not believe you. I thought it was a hell of a good idea, you going, and you did it and you did it well, at a very important moment with members of the North Atlantic Council and representatives of the EU. The coalition plans for the postwar Iraq and the possible roles for NATO and the EU; you laid the groundwork for some discussion for that.

Your presence in Brussels and your personal credibility, which I referenced earlier, with the European leaders in particular in my view, most effectively underscored the administration’s stated commitment to involving the alliance and our partners in the reconstruction effort.

I suspect that this reassurance contributed to NATO’s consensus decision to assume command of ISAF in Afghanistan, probably beginning as early as August. I hope it will also lead to an appropriate and effective role for NATO in Iraq. I also very much hope that we will involve as many of our allies in key international organizations as possible, including the dreaded United Nations, the way some people talk about it in securing and rebuilding Iraq in more than a perfunctory way.

Bringing these players into the game offers two things that I think we badly need in Iraq, legitimacy and a way to share the burden. I know the members of this committee are not and I doubt whether you or any other key people are surprised by what is transpiring now in Iraq. The public at large, not having been acquainted with what is likely to happen, seem very surprised, including by the incident that occurred in a town just outside of Baghdad last night by our time today actually.

I do not think any of this, any of this, is surprising. I think there is a whole lot more to come, and I know we have anticipated some of this. But there are two understandable and competing pressures in Iraq, to state the obvious, and I know you know this better than any of us. The first is to withdraw quickly. It is the instinct. I became a broken record along with the chairman on this committee talking about Johnny and Jane ain’t going to come marching home right away like after the last war.

We all talked about, I think the public initially thought that would be the case, but, on the one hand, there is this instinct, desire, and some rationale to bring our troops home as soon as we can so we are not seen as occupiers. The second competing pressure is to stay for the duration, to build a secure, stable, pluralistic Iraq that is on the path to democracy. This is going to require significant time and significant resources.

I agree with the chairman. We have both been talking about this notion that this could happen in months as being preposterous and it is going to be somewhere in the range of five or maybe more
years. There was a very disturbing, but interesting, cartoon in today's paper where the statue of Saddam was going down and a statue of an Ayatollah was being raised in its place, and the caption said, "You wanted regime change."

I know that is not what we want, what the administration wants, but to prevent that kind of thing from happening we are in for the long haul. There is only one way to square this circle, it seems to me, these competing instincts of avoiding leaving too early or, alternatively, bearing alone the massive burden of a prolonged U.S. occupation or U.S. responsibility, and that is to internationalize the problem.

The best way in my view to open the door to maximum participation by other countries and organizations is to get the United Nations to endorse, not run, the security, humanitarian, rebuilding, and administrative missions in Iraq. Without that endorsement, in my view—and I would be obviously very interested in your view—I think it will be very hard for leaders whose people opposed the war in the first place to convince them to pay for and run the risks of peace.

Iraq is not a prize, Mr. Secretary, as you well know, that we should be fighting over. It is a complex society in a very tough neighborhood, with incredibly difficult problems to undertake being solved now. If we do not get help from other countries in a significant way, then we will soon find ourselves making decisions in the most minute detail about the governance of Iraq. If we are the only ones in charge, then we are the only ones going to be there for the blame when anything goes wrong, and there will be a lot to go wrong.

If we are the ones picking the new Iraqi Government, it will be seen as a puppet regime by the Iraqi people and by the Iraqi neighbors. And if we are the only ones running this show, it will be our sons and daughters patrolling the streets in Kirkuk and Tikrit, running the risk of suicide bombers and snipers. It will be our taxpayers footing the entire bill in an overstretched budget, and we will be the ones not only to pay totally for the war, but for the peace.

So I hope that we have the wisdom to seek help and share responsibility for Iraq's transition, and I would respectfully suggest that retaliating against longstanding allies who were not with us in the war, no matter how right we were and how wrong they were, is beneath a great nation. It is beneath a great nation such as ours and profoundly against our own interests.

I would also like to take this opportunity to commend your personnel, the State Department personnel responsible for NATO affairs. Under Secretary Grossman, Deputy Assistant Secretaries Bradtke, Conley, and Bogue, and our Permanent Representative, Nick Burns, our Ambassadors to the seven invited countries and their staffs, they have all done an outstanding job in advising those countries on their candidacy for membership and in preparing the Members of the Senate to consider them.

Tomorrow this committee will mark up an amendment of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, that was signed on April 4, 1949, and we are going to enlarge that membership. I agree with the
chairman; I would be surprised if it is not unanimous and I think we will move very quickly.

Five years ago, I had the privilege of being the floor manager for the ratification for the admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. In the spirited Senate debate on NATO enlargement in 1998, there was already a larger agenda emerging, and that was the entire future of the alliance. In the last months, Mr. Secretary, that issue has taken center stage, so to speak. In fact, the enlargement of NATO has become critical to the integrity of our entire transatlantic relationship.

If we go about it the right way, it can also be helpful to our success in postwar Iraq. Moreover, the alliance as a whole will be strengthened by the extension of Europe’s zone of stability eastward. It will be enhanced by the specialized capabilities of those countries and their development of those capabilities in the current combat and peacekeeping operations.

There is no doubt in my mind, the alliance will be fortified by the admission of members whose passionate commitment to democracy and to the transatlantic relationship stems from the recent raw and painful memory of having suffered under totalitarian rule.

As you know, national leaders at the Prague summit intricately tied enlargement to the transformation of NATO’s mission and capabilities and responsibilities to the modern threats. Yet today, only 5 months later, the leaders of France, Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium met in Brussels to discuss the EU-based security arrangement as an alternative to NATO.

Now, I am not particularly concerned about the strategic implications of this meeting, but I am, however, concerned by the extent to which it reflects dissension, maybe even some disarray, in the alliance.

So I would welcome your views, Mr. Secretary, on the state of our relationship with our current NATO allies and whether or not the meeting in Brussels merely represents a lingering resentment stemming from the raucous disputes in the run-up to this war with Iraq, or does it indicate a parting of the ways with some of our allies regarding how to respond to fundamental security threats, and if so, will that hinder a successful transformation of the alliance mapped out in Prague earlier?

Without any further comment—and I would ask the remainder of my statement be placed in the record, Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in full.

Senator Biden [continuing]. I want to welcome you again. I look forward to your testimony and want to state for the record—and I know it holds for the chairman—that I appreciate—for those who wonder whether we are kept informed, we are kept informed. You never hesitate to call me. I appreciate your calls. I appreciate your updates, and I just want to state that publicly so that people know it is not just merely when we have you before the hearing. There are constant contacts with you on the telephone and I want you to know it is much appreciated.

Thank you.
[The opening statement of Senator Biden follows:]
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Mr. Secretary, welcome. It's always a pleasure to have you speak with the Foreign Relations Committee, and we particularly appreciate your coming up here at this especially busy moment in our diplomacy.

Before I turn to the business at hand—NATO, the transatlantic relationship, and Iraq—I would like to take this opportunity to say how much I admire your performance over the last several months.

You have epitomized professionalism and have been the very best spokesman for and practitioner of U.S. foreign policy.

I greatly welcomed your decision to go to Brussels earlier this month and discuss with members of the North Atlantic Council and representatives of the European Union the Coalition's plans for post-war Iraq and possible roles there for NATO and the EU.

Your presence in Brussels, and your personal credibility with European leaders, in my view, most effectively underscored the administration's stated commitment to involving the alliance and our European partners in reconstruction efforts.

I suspect that this reassurance contributed to the NATO's consensus decision to assume command of ISAF in Afghanistan, probably beginning in August. I hope that it will also lead to an appropriate and effective role for NATO in Iraq.

I also very much hope that we will involve as many allies and key international organizations as possible—including the United Nations—in securing and rebuilding Iraq more than a perfunctory way. Bringing these players into the game offers two things that we need in Iraq—legitimacy and a way to share the burden.

The first is to withdraw quickly—to bring our troops home as soon as we can and to not be seen as occupiers.

The second is to stay for the duration and build a secure, stable, and pluralistic Iraq that is on the path to democracy. This will require significant time and resources.

There's only one way to square this circle . . . to avoid leaving too early or, alternatively, bearing alone the massive burden of a prolonged U.S. occupation. And that is to internationalize the problem.

The best way to open the door to maximum participation by other countries and organizations is to get the United Nations to endorse—not run—the security, humanitarian, rebuilding and administrative missions in Iraq. Without that endorsement, it will be hard for leaders whose people opposed the war to convince them to pay for and run the risks of the peace.

Iraq is not a prize that we should be fighting over. It is a complex society in a tough neighborhood.

If we do not get the help of other countries in a significant way, then we will soon find ourselves making decisions in the most minute details of Iraqi governance.

If we are the only ones in charge, then we will also get the blame for everything that goes wrong.

If we're the ones picking the new Iraqi government, it will be seen as a puppet regime by the Iraqi people and by Iraq's neighbors.

And if we're the only ones running the show, it will be our sons and daughters patrolling the streets of Kirkuk and Tikrit, running the risk of suicide bombers and snipers. It will be our taxpayers footing the entire bill on an overstretched budget—and after we've had to pay for the war.

So, I hope that we have the wisdom to seek help and share responsibility for Iraq's transition. And I would respectfully suggest that retaliating against long standing allies who were not with us in the war—no matter how right we are and how wrong they were—is beneath a great nation such as ours and profoundly against our own interests.

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Mr. Secretary, tomorrow this committee will mark up an amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949 to enlarge the membership of NATO.

Five years ago, I had the privilege of being the floor manager for the ratification of the admission to NATO of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. In the spirited Senate debate on NATO enlargement in 1998 there was already a larger agenda emerging—the entire future of the alliance.
In the last few months, Mr. Secretary, that issue has taken center-stage, so to speak. In fact, the enlargement of NATO has become critical to the integrity of our entire transatlantic relationship. If we go about it the right way, it can also be helpful to our success in post-war Iraq.

Moreover, the alliance as a whole will be strengthened by the extension of Europe's zone of stability eastward. It will be enhanced by the specialized capabilities that these countries are developing and deploying in current combat and peacekeeping operations. And there is no doubt in my mind that the alliance will be fortified by the admission of members whose passionate commitment to democracy—and to the transatlantic relationship—stems from the recent raw and painful memory of having suffered under totalitarian rule.

As you know, national leaders at the Prague Summit intricately tied enlargement to the transformation of NATO's missions and capabilities in response to modern threats.

Yet today—only five months later—the leaders of France, Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium met in Brussels to discuss an EU-based security arrangement as an alternative to NATO.

Now I am not particularly concerned by the strategic implications of this confabulation. I am, however, concerned by the extent to which it reflects dissension—maybe even disarray—in the alliance.

Mr. Secretary, I would welcome your views on the state of our relationship with our current NATO allies.

Does today's meeting in Brussels merely represent a lingering resentment, stemming from the rancorous disputes in the run-up to the war in Iraq? Or does it indicate a parting of the ways with some of our allies regarding how to respond to fundamental security threats?

If so, will that hinder the successful transformation of the alliance mapped out last fall in Prague?

With respect to specific operational issues, can we "agree to disagree" in the future without calling into question the underpinnings of our alliance relationship?

I believe we have made headway in just the last few weeks in healing some of the bruises from our heated disagreements over the use of force in Iraq. Again, I would cite NATO's decision on ISAF as a positive development and an indication of the commitment of our allies to maintaining the relevance of NATO.

Coming to terms on a NATO role in Iraq is the next step. While I know there is ongoing discussion among allies and with the coalition leaders on what a NATO role might look, I would welcome your thoughts on what we might expect.

Once again, Mr. Secretary, let me say how delighted I am to welcome you to the Foreign Relations Committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.

Mr. Secretary, let me just say for the benefit of members of the committee that there will be a rolcall vote at noon and we know that you must leave to go to your duties at noon. So that will effectively be the end of the hearing. With that in mind, with the members' permission, we will adopt a 5-minute question period at this time. We have good attendance. That probably will mean that all of us will have an opportunity to ask questions, and the Chair will be somewhat more rigorous this morning in trying to keep things within the confines of that, in fairness to all members.

We so much appreciate your coming and will you please proceed with your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Secretary Powell. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a great pleasure to be here again and thank you for your opening statement. Senator Biden, I thank you for your statement. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I will try to be as rigorous in my answers within the 5-minute rule as you are with respect to your questions.
Let me thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Biden, for your favorable comments directed toward the Department and the work we have been doing. Senator Biden, your comments directed toward me really go right through me to the wonderful men and women of the State Department who work so hard every day to serve their Nation.

There has been a lot of discussion about this in recent days, some of you may have noticed. Let me just take the privilege of being here to put some of the criticism directed toward the Department and our transforming efforts into a little bit of perspective. I take the liberty of doing it now, here, because every time I have appeared before this committee over the last 3 years I have talked about my role as foreign policy adviser to the President, but also my role as the leader and manager of the Department of State.

When I became Secretary of State, the President announced my nomination, I immediately assembled all of the reports that have been written about the Department of State in recent years. There were five or six such reports describing changes that the authors believed were needed, and I even found one report that represents the work of a panel that I was on. So in effect I was now being given the opportunity to act on recommendations that I myself had made as part of a panel.

I am very pleased that over the last 2-plus years we have worked hard to fix some of the problems that were real within the State Department or imagined about the State Department. We have presented our case to this committee and other committees of the Congress. You have supported us in a way that the Department has not been supported in recent years. We went for years with our budget being cut, with our personnel being cut. We went for years in the nineties with the Congress not allowing us to hire any new people in the State Department. We went for years with a broken overseas building operation. We went for years without getting into some of the personnel policies that we needed to take a look at.

We have not just been talking about transformation for the last couple of years or studying it any longer. We have been working out all of these issues. The instructions I gave to my staff when I took over Department of State is we are not doing any more transformation studies; we are going to start working from the studies that are before us.

I am pleased that, as the chief steward of the Department, that I have reported what we have done to the Members of Congress as well as to those organizations that were critical of us. Recently we have been given a report card by these organizations and it has been written up rather widely about how the State Department is transforming in a positive way.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make this report available to the members of the committee at an appropriate moment.¹

To show the kinds of things that are happening in the Department, we have instituted leadership training at every single level from junior officer all the way up to career officials going out to be ambassadors. We have got tens of thousands of young Americans

¹The report referred to can be accessed on the Department of State’s Website at: http://www.state.gov/m/rm/c6113.htm
wanting to become part of the Department. We gave the Foreign Service exam three Saturdays ago and 20,000 young Americans took the test that day because they want to be a part of the work that we are doing.

We have fixed our information technology system so that we are now working at the speed of light and we are making sure that every member of the Department has access to information technology. We have a Diplomatic Readiness Initiative, so we are dealing with all of the structural issues that have been problematic within our personnel system.

We have lost lives along with our colleagues in uniform. Since I have been Secretary of State, three members of our family have lost their lives to terrorist incidents, two in Pakistan and one in Jordan. So we are out there on the front lines of offense. We are out there carrying the Nation's message. We are out there taking the values of this Nation to the people of the world, and we are dedicated people, committed to the values, committed to the values of this President.

One can disagree about a particular policy. One can criticize about a particular policy and take issue with a particular policy, and that is all fine and good. But one has to do it in a manner that does not undercut the people who are carrying out those policies. There is no more loyal, faithful, group of employees in this Federal Government than the employees who are in the Department of State working for me, but more importantly working for the policies of the President of the United States and, above all, working for the values of the American people.

We will continue to transform the Department, not talk about it, not have panel meetings on it, but get on with the work of transformation. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that remains my goal, and at least some people who have more than passing knowledge of the situation have given us a pretty good grade as to what we have done. I also take as a statement of endorsement the increased funding that this Congress has provided, the increased hiring authority that you have given to the Department so that we can make the Foreign Service vibrant and more relevant, and I give you my commitment to continue to move in that regard.

Mr. Chairman, I do have a prepared statement with respect to the issue at hand, the expansion of NATO, which I would like to submit for the record and then present a shorter statement.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be included in full.

Secretary POWELL. My statement is a little bit shorter, but I think it is important that I go through it in some detail because of the significance of the step that the Congress, the Senate, will be taking tomorrow. But I am very pleased to testify that the enlargement of NATO agreed to in Prague last November is a positive step forward and it is a significant achievement in the future of the alliance.

I have to kind of go back to January 1989, when I had just left my position as National Security Adviser to President Reagan, and I had been through a number of summit meetings with then-President Gorbachev and President Reagan, and I returned to the Army, and the Army, in either a moment of weakness or a moment of wisdom, made me a four-star general and gave me responsibility over
all of the deployable forces in the United States, most of them designed to reinforce our forces in Europe in time of war against the Soviet Union.

Because I had seen so much in the 2 years that I worked with President Reagan about the way in which the Soviet Union and Europe and the world was changing, I said to my Army colleagues in one of our early commanders conferences: "Guys, a day is coming soon when the Warsaw Pact is going to go away and all of those countries are going to be asking for membership applications in NATO."

They all looked at me somewhat askance because it meant that the world that we had known for all those years since the late forties was now about to be fundamentally changed. We have seen that change. We have seen the change to the point where, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I stand before you to ask that you give your advice and consent to the ratification of the Accession Protocols that will welcome into NATO seven former members of the Warsaw Pact and now new members-to-be of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the most powerful alliance in the world of its nature, an alliance that has as its unique character the connection between Europe and the North American continent. No other alliance does it. That is why these nations want to be a part of NATO.

It not only integrates them more fully into Europe; more importantly, it integrates them into this great transatlantic alliance. It gives them a security relationship with Canada and the United States of America.

This enlargement is part of an ambitious agenda whose goal is to transform the alliance. Mr. Chairman, before I continue let me acknowledge your leadership and the leadership of other members of the committee in this process of enlargement. I know that you and your staff have provided an invaluable guidance to the entire executive branch team. We could not have asked for better cooperation and support from you, Mr. Chairman, or from the committee and other committees of the Congress.

My friends, the West's victory in the cold war and the defeat of Soviet communism signaled a decisive turning point in modern history, a victory for freedom and democracy. But the troubles and tragedies of the past decade have made clear that new threats are rising. We have seen these threats take many shapes, from ethnic cleansing in the Balkans to the terrorist attacks of September 11.

To deal with these new threats, the United States has continued to rely on NATO and will do so in the future. This great alliance, which has kept the peace for more than 50 years, is more than a treaty for collective defense. It is the central organizing force in a great web of relationships that holds North America and Europe together. It represents a community of common values and shared commitment to democracy, free enterprise, and the rule of law.

This was never more evident than on September 12, 2001. On that day the alliance invoked Article V of the Washington Treaty, the basic NATO treaty, and told the world that it regarded the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon as attacks on all of its members. From this historic decision, we know that NATO
has the will to combat terrorism and to address the new threats that face us.

But the alliance must also have the means, so it must transform militarily and politically to secure our collective defense on into the 21st century and to sustain the transatlantic link.

At the historic Prague summit last November, NATO heads of state made decisions that have put us solidly on the path to transformation. Their strong and unanimous endorsement of the U.S.-crafted transformation agenda of new capabilities, new members, and new relationships will help ensure that NATO remains relevant in the days and years ahead.

President Bush and I were particularly pleased that Senator Voinovich of this committee, and Senator Frist, along with other Members of Congress, were able to join us in Prague. There in Prague, our leaders agreed to expand the NATO membership to include all of the new democracies in Europe who are prepared to undertake the responsibilities of leadership and of membership.

Such an enlargement will help to strengthen NATO's partnerships to promote democracy, the rule of law, and promote free markets and peace throughout Eurasia. Moreover, it will better equip the alliance to respond collectively to the new challenges we face. This enlargement will revitalize NATO by expanding its geographic reach, enhancing its military capabilities, and inducting seven countries committed to a strong transatlantic link. It will serve U.S. interests by strengthening both NATO and our bilateral ties with these new allies, who have already done a great deal to support our vision for NATO and for collective security. All seven of the invitees have demonstrated that they are in a position to further the principles of the Washington Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.

The countries invited at Prague have been working intensively in NATO's membership action plan since 1999. In this process they have focused not only on security and defense issues, but also on democratic and market reforms. During these intensive preparations, each invitee has received both support and feedback from NATO.

The United States has also had its own dialog with the seven countries about their reforms. In addition to the day-to-day work of our embassies, we sent an inter-agency team headed by Ambassador Nick Burns, our very able representative in Brussels, in February and October of last year to visit each of the countries to make specific reform recommendations and to evaluate progress.

The prospect of NATO membership helped to create in each country a political atmosphere that encouraged governments to adopt needed reforms. These reforms are in each country's own best interest. In many cases they would have been difficult to bring about without the demands of NATO candidacy.

The record of each invitee government demonstrates powerfully its commitment to NATO. Reform areas included treatment of minorities, creation of a viable political opposition, restoration of private property, willingness to confront the past, combating corruption, and support within that population for NATO membership.

For example, Estonia and Latvia have taken important steps to protect the rights of their Russian-speaking minorities. Their gov-
ernments have eased requirements for citizenship and adopted other measures which provide assurances that all of the people of those countries will be treated with dignity and with respect.

The Baltic States have acknowledged the dark times in their history. When Estonian Prime Minister Siim Kallas visited Washington last September, he publicly recognized Estonians’ collaboration with the Nazis and the participation of Estonians in the murder of Jews during the Holocaust. He did not hide from their history.

All seven invitees have also adopted sweeping measures to combat corruption. Parliaments in Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia have adopted, or are in the process of adopting, tough anti-corruption legislation. These three states have also established special prosecutors to root out public corruption. The new Latvian Government under Prime Minister Repse has instituted a major anti-corruption program. Slovenia has taken important strides in reducing the State’s involvement in private enterprise and Slovenia already has one of the highest Transparency International ratings for clean government among NATO members.

The public support for NATO membership at each of these new member States is very high. In Romania it is above 80 percent. In Slovenia’s referendum last month, 66 percent voted for NATO membership. A clear majority in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania supports membership.

Mr. Chairman, of course there are disappointments. For example, we remain troubled by reports of continuing grey arms sales. Bulgaria and Romania have extensive arms industries with long-standing ties to the Middle East. We have had considerable success in stopping transfers of arms to countries of concern from these countries.

More important for the long term, we are working with these countries to help them improve their system of export controls and to tighten oversight of defense industries. We must not forget as well that the seven invitees also bring tangible security assets to the alliance. Enlargement will bring more than 200,000 additional troops into the alliance, as many as in 1999. It will extend NATO’s reach from the Baltic to the Black Sea both politically and geographically. And the new members will make the alliance stronger and they will bring fresh ideas and energy to the alliance.

I am pleased to report that all seven invitees are already de facto allies in the war on terror. All of them have contributed to stabilization efforts in Afghanistan through Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force. Romania sent its Carpathian Hawks Battalion to Afghanistan and did so using its own airlift rather than asking the U.S. for lift, a feat that several current allies could not have accomplished. That Romanian battalion is now patrolling and fighting beside U.S. soldiers in the most dangerous regions of Afghanistan.

All of the new members have expressed support for the United States’ position on Iraq. In February 2003, immediately following my presentation to the United Nations Security Council on the threat posed by Saddam’s regime, they jointly called for the international community to take decisive action against Iraq’s continued violation of international law in defiance of the Council. They also
issued a joint statement at the Prague summit in November 2002 supporting the United States’ position on Iraq.

Moreover, Mr. Chairman, all of the new invitees sent military liaison officers to CENTCOM, to CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, ahead of possible operations in Iraq. Several of the invitees have provided military support to the international coalition. A Slovak CBRN—chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear—unit is stationed in Kuwait, incorporated into a Czech unit. The Romanians are providing a similar unit. The Bulgarians provide us with the use of their air base at Burgas.

It is clear that the seven invitees are already demonstrating their military value to the alliance. This value has been particularly noticeable given current circumstances wherein some on both sides of the Atlantic are questioning the health of the alliance and the solidity of the transatlantic relationship.

Mr. Chairman, I do not want to minimize the challenges that the relationship faces today as we attempt to shape both it and the alliance for a world no longer fenced off by the cold war. In February we had a bruising debate in NATO over providing assistance to Turkey. In the end, we achieved our goal by providing support for Turkey’s defense. We would have preferred to make that decision at 19 nations instead of at 18, but France would not permit it. The United States and many of its NATO partners found it regrettable that some members so readily discarded their obligations to support an ally with purely defensive assistance. That is all we were asking for. But they did not follow through on their obligation, in order to press their own agendas on Iraq.

Make no mistake, and I make no mistake about it, the disagreement was serious and our delay in responding to Turkey’s request damaged the credibility of our alliance. Nevertheless, outside of the alliance we have been able to come through this one side of a bruising battle and this is the one at the U.N. Security Council with respect to Iraq.

The war is now all but over, although there are still dangers, and the defensive measures that were taken to help Turkey are ended. We can look back at these disagreements and debates with dispassion and against the backdrop of almost a half century of solid cooperation. Such cooperation is not a thing of the past. It is a thing of the future as well.

On April 16, for example, the alliance agreed to assume the lead of ISAF IV in August. This is the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. So notwithstanding all of the fights that we had in NATO, the disagreement over providing support to Turkey, once that issue was behind us, we were able to come together again. And as note was taken during my meeting in Brussels a few weeks ago with all of the alliance members present and in another setting with all of the EU members present as well, we were able to agree in principle and then follow through with action to send the NATO alliance out of area to Afghanistan. Something that would have been unthinkable just 10 years ago is now being done. And we also got an agreement in principle that perhaps something similar might be done with respect to Iraq, although we are nowhere near as close to making a decision on that.
This action with respect to ISAF will bring added continuity to the vital mission of helping to stabilize Afghanistan and take NATO beyond its traditional areas of responsibility. It was a unanimous decision taken by the NAC at 19 without the kind of rancor that characterized the debates over Article IV obligations to Turkey.

One of the challenges we face is understanding the threat. September 11 burned itself irrevocably into the mind of every American. To say international terrorism is just another threat is to defy the instinctual reality that all Americans feel in their heart of hearts. Every American who watched the World Trade Center Towers burn, crumble, disintegrate, with thousands of people inside and who watched the Pentagon in flames knows what terrorism can bring to our homeland.

That reality leads Americans to conclude that terrorism must be eradicated, especially the terrorism that seeks nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction. Some in Europe see it differently. Some see terrorism as a regrettable but inevitable part of society and they want to keep it at arm’s length and as low-key as possible. It is our job to convince them otherwise. This is a threat we share and must combat together, indeed can only combat together.

The United States must continue to lead NATO, as we have for more than 50 years, to deal with this new threat, just as we dealt with old threats. Of course there will be disagreements. We are democracies. None of us follows blindly. We debate, we disagree. On those occasions when we disagree, we roll up our sleeves, put our heads together, and find a way to work things out. At the end of the day, that is our great strength and that is why the transatlantic link will not break. The glue of NATO is too strong and it holds too fast to let it break.

When I was in Europe at the beginning of this month, I also stopped in Belgrade to deliver personally my condolences over the death of Serbia’s Prime Minister Djindjic, brutally assassinated earlier this year. I was struck by the speed with which the government of President Marovic and the new Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Zivkovic is leading a renewed and vigorous political effort to rid that nation of its dangerous criminal elements, to hand over those wanted by the International Criminal Tribunal at The Hague, and to strengthen democracy in Serbia and Montenegro. I was impressed.

Later that day and the next in Brussels, I was heartened, as you heard earlier, by the discussions I had with 21 European ministers as well as European Union High Representative Solana and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson. A majority of these allies had joined the coalition to disarm Iraq. Those allies who did not have welcomed our success even though they were against the effort of going in. They have now welcomed our success and we are all together as an alliance again exploring ways to support stabilization and reconstruction.

Those who write about the demise of NATO are going to be wrong, just like they have been wrong many times in the past. We heard this story after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the cold war. We heard it during the troubled times in the Balkans.
I give naysayers of NATO credit for their persistence, but they are persistently wrong. Any alliance that countries are knocking on the door to get into is anything but dead.

After the heated debate over Turkey, Secretary General Robertson said that the damage to NATO was “a hit above the waterline, not below.” The same can be said about the fallout in NATO from the debate in the U.N. Security Council over Iraq. Nevertheless, NATO must continue to adapt to changing circumstances. It must address the central challenges of this era: rogue States, terror, and weapons of mass destruction.

Increasingly, NATO members will have to be prepared to focus their energies beyond Europe, a reality that will require that member nations possess military forces with the capability to go and fight beyond Europe. The alliance will recover. We will persevere and we must. It is essential that we recover and endure because there is much work which needs to be done and many allies who want to do it.

In Afghanistan we need to ensure the changeover in August goes as smoothly as possible. This operation will constitute NATO’s largest step to date beyond its traditionally Europe-focused role.

In Southern Europe, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia will still demand our attention and our presence. In Macedonia, right now, the European Union has made its first deployment of forces with over 300 troops. These troops and this deployment in no way contradict NATO. In fact, they reinforce the importance of the alliance and complement its work, as the commander of the EU force reports to NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander through NATO’s Regional Command South, a blending of NATO and the European Union as anticipated in the ESDP.

As I have referred to, in Iraq we are exploring what NATO collectively can do to secure the peace. All members have said they are prepared to discuss a role in NATO. We have noted possible alliance roles in stabilization, humanitarian assistance operations, and NATO assistance to coalition partners. These preliminary discussions, if they lead to concrete results, could be the next big step in NATO’s transformation.

In line with this new orientation, Supreme Allied Commander General Jim Jones pointed out at the beginning of this month that NATO will undergo another sea change when it stands up a highly ready Allied Response Force with global reach, as agreed to in Prague last November.

So I believe very, very much that there will be more than enough work to go around, and if NATO can play a role it should. We should not ask ourselves what can NATO do to prove its relevance. We should ask what can NATO do to advance the peace.

The essential elements of the alliance remain firm. NATO’s integrated military structure creates a reservoir of working, planning, and training together that is irreplaceable. The alliance itself can call upon this rich reservoir or, as seems increasingly likely, coalitions of the willing can be drawn from it.

For example, the EU-led operation in Macedonia that I referred to a moment ago is drawing on NATO assets and capabilities to do the job under an EU mandate. Moreover, NATO’s Council provides a valuable forum for discussing matters of war and peace. Fun-
damentally, NATO binds together nations that share the same beliefs and values, nations who accept that vigorous debate is the hallmark of an alliance of democratic nations.

NATO is an alliance within which the seven future members invited at Prague, with the advice and consent of the Senate, will be able to join their colleagues and be welcome to stand and be heard and not be told to sit and be silent.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot outline specific roles for NATO in the future. In some instances we will operate as an alliance, in some as members of a coalition of the willing. We may wage war and we will maintain the peace. For over half a century, NATO was indispensable to security on both sides of the Atlantic. That has not changed. Today the alliance remains indispensable to our security and to meeting the security challenges in a world of diverse threats, multiple challenges, and unprecedented opportunities. The alliance remains crucial to the links that bind North America to Europe and Europe to North America.

Let me also stress, Mr. Chairman, as I come to my conclusion that the door to NATO will remain open. Prague was not the end of the enlargement process, just one step on the way. We welcome the applications of Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, and other future applicants as well. We will continue to enlarge the alliance as emerging new democracies and perhaps some established ones as well pursue membership and as they demonstrate their ability to contribute to the security of the Euro-Atlantic community as required under Article X of the NATO Treaty.

Today, Mr. Chairman, I ask the Senate to make its vital contribution by performing its constitutional duty in helping us transform the alliance. I again urge the committee to act swiftly to recommend that the Senate provide its advice and consent on the NATO Accession Protocols that will welcome our new allies into our alliance: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

Mr. Chairman, I know this committee plans to mark up tomorrow and that you plan to take the protocols to the floor for a vote on May 7. If that occurs, and I have every confidence that it will, President Bush and I will be very grateful, but even more grateful will be these nations and the people that they represent.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your indulgence. I will stop here and respond to questions and I am sure that all of the other issues that have been raised in opening statements will be dealt with in the course of the questions and answers.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Secretary of State Powell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to testify on the enlargement of NATO agreed in Prague last November, and on the future of the alliance.

With respect to enlargement, Mr. Chairman, I strongly encourage the Senate to provide its advice and consent to the ratification of the Accession Protocols that will welcome into NATO seven new members—Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. This enlargement is part of an ambitious agenda whose goal is to transform the Alliance.

And Mr. Chairman, before I continue, let me acknowledge your leadership and vision in this process of enlargement. I know that you and your staff have provided
invaluable guidance to the entire executive branch team. We could not have asked for better cooperation and support.

THE BACKGROUND

The West’s victory in the Cold War and the defeat of Soviet communism signaled a decisive turning point in modern history—a victory for freedom and democracy. But the troubles and tragedies of the past decade have made clear that new threats are rising. We have seen these threats take many shapes, from ethnic cleansing in the Balkans to the terrorist attacks of September 11. To deal with these new threats, the United States has continued to rely on NATO and will do so in the future.

This great Alliance, which has kept the peace for more than fifty years, is more than a treaty for collective defense. It is the central organizing force in a great web of relationships that holds North America and Europe together. It represents a community of common values and shared commitment to democracy, free markets and the rule of law. This was never more evident than on September 12, 2001.

On that day the Alliance invoked Article V of the Washington Treaty and told the world that it regarded the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon as attacks on all of its members. From this historic decision we know that NATO has the will to combat terrorism and to address the new threats that face us. But the Alliance must also have the means. So it must transform, militarily and politically, to secure our collective defense on into the twenty-first century and to sustain the transatlantic link. At the historic Prague Summit last November, NATO heads of state and government made decisions that have put us solidly on the path to transformation.

Their strong and unanimous endorsement of the U.S.-crafted transformation agenda of New Capabilities, New Members and New Relationships will help ensure that NATO remains relevant in the days and years ahead.

President Bush and I were particularly pleased that Senator Voinovich, of this committee, and Senator Frist, along with other Members of Congress, were able to join us in Prague. There, our leaders agreed to expand NATO membership to include all of the new democracies in Europe who are prepared to undertake the responsibilities of leadership. Such an enlargement will help to strengthen NATO’s partnerships to promote democracy, the rule of law, free markets and peace throughout Eurasia. Moreover, it will better equip the Alliance to respond collectively to the new dangers we face.

THE CURRENT ENLARGEMENT

The United States and other NATO Allies signed the Enlargement Protocols last month in Brussels. President Bush has transmitted them to the Senate. Your swift action on these Protocols will bring us a major step closer to realizing President Bush’s vision for a “Europe free, whole and at peace.”

This enlargement will revitalize NATO by expanding its geographic reach, enhancing its military capabilities and inducting seven countries committed to a strong transatlantic link. It will serve U.S. interests by strengthening both NATO and our bilateral ties with these new Allies, who have already done a great deal to support our vision for NATO and collective security.

All seven of the invitees have demonstrated that they are in a position to further the principles of the Washington Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.

The countries invited at Prague have been working intensively in NATO’s Membership Action Plan since 1999. In this process, they have focused not only on security and defense issues, but also on democratic and market reforms. During these intensive preparations, each invitee has received both support and feedback from NATO.

The United States has also had its own dialogue with the seven countries about their reforms. In addition to the day-to-day work of our Embassies, we sent an inter-agency team headed by Ambassador Nick Burns in February and October of last year to visit each of the countries to make specific reform recommendations and to evaluate progress.

The prospect of NATO membership helped to create in each country a political atmosphere that encouraged governments to adopt needed reforms. These reforms are in each country’s own best interest. In many cases, they would have been difficult to bring about without the demands of NATO candidacy.

The record of each invitee government demonstrates powerfully its commitment to NATO. Reform areas included treatment of minorities, creation of a viable polit-
ical opposition, restoration of private property, willingness to confront the past, combating corruption, and support for NATO membership.

For example, Estonia and Latvia have taken important steps to protect the rights of their Russian-speaking minorities. Their governments have eased requirements for citizenship and adopted other measures which provide assurances that all of the people of those countries will be treated with dignity and respect.

All three of the Baltic States have acknowledged dark times in their histories. When Estonian Prime Minister Siim Kallas visited Washington last September, he publicly recognized Estonians’ collaboration with the Nazis and participation in the murder of Jews during the Holocaust.

All seven invitees have also adopted sweeping measures to combat corruption. Parliaments in Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia have adopted, or are in the process of adopting, tough anti-corruption legislation. These three states have also established special prosecutors to root out public corruption. The new Latvia government under Prime Minister Repse has instituted a major anti-corruption program. Slovenia has taken important strides in reducing the state’s involvement in private enterprise. And Slovenia already has one of the highest Transparency International ratings for clean government among NATO members.

The public support for NATO membership in each of the new member states is high. In Romania, it is above 80%. In Slovenia’s referendum last month, 66% voted for NATO membership. A clear majority in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania supports membership.

Among the positive developments, there are disappointments. We remain troubled by reports of continuing gray arms sales. Bulgaria and Romania have extensive arms industries with longstanding ties to the Middle East. We have had considerable success in stopping transfers of arms to countries of concern. More important for the long term, we are working with these countries to help them improve their systems of export control and to tighten oversight of defense industries.

We must not forget as well that the seven invitees also bring tangible security assets to the Alliance. Enlargement will bring more than 200,000 additional troops into the Alliance—as many as in 1999. It will extend NATO’s reach from the Baltic to the Black Sea, both politically and geographically.

And the new members will make the Alliance stronger and they will bring fresh ideas and energy to it. I am pleased to report that all seven invitees are already de facto Allies in the war on terror. All of them have contributed to stabilization efforts in Afghanistan through Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force.

Romania has sent its “Carpathian Hawks” battalion to Afghanistan and did so using its own airlift rather than asking the U.S. for a lift—a feat that several current Allies could not have accomplished. That Romanian battalion is now patrolling and fighting beside U.S. soldiers in the most dangerous regions of Afghanistan.

All of the new members have expressed support for the United States’ position on Iraq. In February 2003, immediately following my presentation to the U.N. Security Council on the threat posed by Saddam’s regime, they jointly called for the international community to take decisive action against Iraq’s continued violation of international law and defiance of the Security Council. They also issued a joint statement at the Prague Summit in November 2002, supporting the United States’ position on Iraq.

Moreover, Mr. Chairman, all of the new invitees sent military liaison officers to CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, ahead of possible operations in Iraq. Several of the invitees are providing military support to the international coalition.

A Slovak CBRN unit is now stationed in Kuwait, incorporated into a Czech unit. The Romanians are providing a similar unit. The Bulgarians provided us with the use of their airbase at Burgas. It is clear that the seven invitees are already demonstrating their military value to the Alliance.

THE SHIFTING LANDSCAPE

This value has been particularly noticeable given current circumstances wherein some on both sides of the Atlantic are questioning the health of the Alliance and the solidity of the transatlantic relationship.

Mr. Chairman, I do not want to minimize the challenges that the relationship faces today as we attempt to shape both it and the Alliance for a world no longer fenced off by the Cold War.

In February we had a bruising debate in NATO over providing assistance to Turkey. In the end we achieved our goal of providing support for Turkey’s defense. We would have preferred to make that decision at 19, instead of at 18, but France would not permit it. The United States and many of its NATO partners found it
regrettable that some members so readily discarded their obligations under Article IV to provide purely defensive assistance to Turkey in order to press their own agendas on Iraq.

Make no mistake. The disagreement was serious, and our delay to Turkey’s request damaged the credibility of our Alliance. Likewise, outside of the Alliance we have come through another bruising battle, this one at the UN Security Council over Iraq. This battle included five current and one future member of NATO. This too has raised troubling voices about the long-term health of the Alliance.

But now that the war in Iraq is over and the defensive measures taken in Turkey are ended, we can look back at these disagreements and debates with dispassion and against the backdrop of almost half a century of solid cooperation. Such cooperation is anything but a thing of the past. On April 16, for example, the Alliance agreed to assume the lead of ISAF IV in August. This action will bring added continuity to the vital mission of helping to stabilize Afghanistan, and take NATO beyond its traditional area of responsibility to address today’s threats at one of their sources. This decision was taken unanimously by the NAC without the rancor that characterized debates over Article IV obligations to Turkey.

Let’s be clear. One of the challenges we face is understanding the threat. September 11 burned itself irrevocably into the mind of every American. To say international terrorism is just another threat is to defy the instinctual reality that every American knows in his or her heart and soul. Every American who watched the World Trade Towers burn, crumble and disintegrate, with thousands of people inside, and who watched the Pentagon in flames, knows what terrorism can bring to our homeland. That reality leads Americans to conclude that terrorism must be eradicated—especially the terrorism that seeks nuclear weapons, and other means of mass destruction.

Some in Europe see it differently. Some see terrorism as a regrettable but inevitable part of society and want to keep it at arms length and as low key as possible. It is our job to convince them otherwise. This is a threat we share and must combat together—indeed, can only combat together.

Of course there will be disagreements. But the United States must continue to lead NATO to ensure our collective security, as we have for more than 50 years. But we must not forget also that we are democracies in NATO. None of us follows blindly. We debate. We disagree. On those occasions when we disagree, we roll up our sleeves, put our heads together, and find a way to work things out. At the end of the day, that is our great strength. And that is why the transatlantic link will not break. The glue of NATO is too strong and holds us too fast to let it break.

When I was in Europe at the beginning of this month, I stopped in Belgrade to deliver personally my condolences over the death of Serbia’s Prime Minister Djindjic, brutally assassinated earlier this year. I was struck by the speed with which the government of President Marovic and the new Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Zivkovic is leading a renewed and vigorous political effort to rid the nation of its dangerous criminal elements, to hand over those wanted by the International Criminal Tribunal at the Hague, and to strengthen democracy in Serbia and Montenegro. I was impressed.

Later that day and the next, in Brussels, I was heartened by the discussions I had with 21 European ministers, as well as EU High Representative Javier Solana and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson. A majority of these Allies had joined the coalition to disarm Iraq. Those Allies who did not have welcomed our success and are now exploring ways to support stabilization and reconstruction.

So I caution those who, yet again, will write about the demise of NATO. We heard this story after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. We heard it during the troubled times in the Balkans. I give naysayers of NATO credit for their persistence—but they are persistently wrong. Any alliance that countries are knocking on the door to get into, is anything but dead.

After the heated debate over Turkey, Secretary General Robertson said the damage done to NATO was a hit above the waterline, not below. The same can be said about the fallout from the debate in the UN Security Council over Iraq. Nevertheless, NATO must continue to adapt to changing circumstances. It must address the challenges central to this era: rogue states, terror, weapons of mass destruction.

Increasingly NATO members will have to be prepared to focus their energies beyond Europe—a reality that will require that member nations possess military forces with the capability to go and fight beyond Europe. The Alliance will recover. We will persevere. We must.
THE FUTURE

It is essential that we recover and endure because there is much work which needs to be done and many allies who want to do it.

In Afghanistan we need to ensure the changeover in August goes as smoothly as possible. NATO will take over and run ISAF headquarters in Kabul, coordinate operational planning, appoint the ISAF commander and supervise the troop contribution process. This operation will constitute NATO’s largest step to date beyond its traditionally Europe-focused role.

In southern Europe Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia will still demand our attention and our presence.

In Macedonia right now, the EU has made its first deployment of forces with over 300 troops. These troops and this deployment in no way contradict NATO; in fact, they reinforce the importance of the alliance and complement its work, as the commander of the EU force reports to NATO’s Deputy SACEUR through NATO’s Regional Command South.

And, as I have referred to, in Iraq we are exploring what NATO collectively can do to secure the peace. All members have said they are prepared to discuss a NATO role in Iraq. We have noted possible Alliance roles in stabilization, humanitarian assistance operations, and NATO assistance to coalition partners. These preliminary discussions, if they lead to concrete results, could be the next big step in NATO’s transformation to an alliance willing and able to take on any role in any region where it feels it can make a contribution to the peace or meet a common threat.

In line with this new orientation, as SACEUR General Jones pointed out at the beginning of this month, NATO will undergo another sea-change when it stands up a highly ready Allied Response Force with global reach, as agreed last November.

So I believe there will be more than enough work to go around, and if NATO can play a role, it should.

We should not ask, what can NATO do to prove its relevance? We should ask, what can NATO do to advance the peace?

The essential elements of the Alliance remain firm:

- NATO’s integrated military structure creates a reservoir of working, planning, and training together that is irreplaceable;
- The Alliance itself can call upon this rich reservoir or, as seems increasingly likely, coalitions of the willing can be drawn from it. For example, the EU-led operation in Macedonia I referred to earlier draws on NATO assets and capabilities.
- Moreover, NATO’s Council provides a valuable forum for discussing matters of war and peace;
- And fundamentally, NATO binds together nations who share the same beliefs and values. Nations who accept that vigorous debate is the hallmark of an alliance of democratic nations.

NATO is an alliance within which the seven future members invited at Prague, with the advice and consent of the Senate, will be able to join their colleagues and be welcomed to stand and be heard and not be told to sit and be silent.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot outline specific roles for NATO in the future. In some instances we will operate as an Alliance. In some as members of a coalition of the willing. We may wage war and we will maintain the peace.

For over half a century NATO was indispensable to security on both sides of the Atlantic. That has not changed. Today the Alliance remains indispensable to our security, and to meeting the security challenges in a world of diverse threats, multiple challenges, and unprecedented opportunities. The Alliance remains crucial to the link that binds North America to Europe and Europe to North America.

Let me stress also, Mr. Chairman, that the door to NATO will remain open. Prague was not the end of the enlargement process, just one step on the way. We welcome the applications of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia and other future applicants as well.

We will continue to enlarge the Alliance as emerging new democracies—and perhaps some established ones as well—pursue membership, and as they demonstrate their ability to contribute to the security of the Euro-Atlantic community as required under Article 10 of the NATO Treaty.

Today, Mr. Chairman, I ask the Senate to make its vital contribution by performing its own Constitutional duty in helping us transform the Alliance. I again urge this Committee to act swiftly to recommend that the Senate provide its advice and consent on the NATO accession protocols that will welcome our new allies into our Alliance.
I understand that the committee will mark up tomorrow and that a floor vote will likely occur on May 7th. If I am correct in that understanding, I am grateful for such speed, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, and I will be pleased to take your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

We will have a round of questions with a 5-minute limit. I will begin my questioning first of all just by saying what a remarkable celebration your testimony was of the hearings that we have had on the issue of the enlargement. We have been joined once again by the Ambassadors of the seven countries that are invitees, who have been faithful in all of these hearings.

We very much wanted you—and the ranking member and I have looked forward to this moment—to outline once again the importance of NATO for the world, for our country, for the relationships we have, and for these seven great nations that will be coming together. We look forward to tomorrow and to May 7 and we are hopeful we will be able to fulfill our objective.

I want to also mention that I just applaud very much your opening comments about reform in the State Department. For 28 months this committee has witnessed and celebrated that, too. What a remarkable phenomenon, 20,000 young Americans taking the Foreign Service exam just 3 weeks ago as a testimony of their own patriotism, their interest in this country, their interest in statecraft and in what you do.

As you know, our request often has been a difficult one for you because we have said, ask us for what you want. You have to work within the confines of an administration and have to work with others, starting with the President, and other people, OMB and so forth. Nevertheless we have asked you to be ambitious. You have been.

When for some reason the Budget Committee before our floor debate cut back that request by $1.050 billion, you called the chairman of the Budget Committee, you called us, and we responded. An amendment that we offered in fact was adopted unanimously, which I think is testimony to something different occurring. As you pointed out, that had not occurred for several years as the budget of the Department was truncated and moved downward, not upward.

So we ask you again: Be bold, be ambitious; call upon us. We would like to help that reform because we have seen it occur.

Let me ask as my question: General Jones, as you have mentioned, has talked about the potential bases and training areas in Eastern Europe. He has mentioned specifically Bulgaria and Romania that have been very helpful recently. Do you have any comment today about those base situations, about repositioning of troops in NATO, or for that matter about what NATO may do in Iraq in the future months, given the desire of many members to be very, very helpful to the coalition?

Secretary POWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your opening comments about the Foreign Service. By the way, when you said 28 months that struck a bell. It used to take us 28 months to access somebody into the Foreign Service.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Secretary Powell. We have now gotten that down to 12 months and we are going to drive it further down.

The Chairman. Great.

Secretary Powell. Also—and I cannot resist this—as you know, we have opened one office up on Capitol Hill to serve Members of Congress. It happens to be on the House side—I know, Chris, I am being as shameless as I can be. Just give me some slack.

Senator Dodd. Call Trent Lott.

Secretary Powell. And I am dying to get an office opened on the Senate side.

Senator Dodd. If we get one more member over here and we are in the majority, I will get you an office.

Secretary Powell. With respect to what General Jones said, it is very sensible, as the alliance has enlarged itself, moving to the East to take a look at a base structure that essentially was created back in the fifties. During my term as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we reduced the size of our forces in Europe from something like 310,000 down to roughly 100,000 to 150,000. A lot of bases went away, but the base structure was not fully rationalized at that time. It was still Armed Forces of the United States along the Iron Curtain, ready to fight the Soviet Union.

Well, most of those nations we were ready to fight are now a part of this transatlantic alliance. So it is very sensible to take a look at the base structure, and not to take a look at it with this intent of how do we get closer to the Russian Federation. That is not the point at all. Anybody who thinks we are somehow creeping back up to a new cold war line, that is not it at all.

It is just sensible to see whether there are other places where we should have facilities, which I think is a better term even than “bases,” facilities that will allow us to move more quickly to other parts of the world as we do out-of-area missions. As General Jones said in the article that I read this morning along with you, Mr. Chairman, we are looking not for a recreation of Fort Hood, Texas, in Bulgaria or Romania, but perhaps barebones facilities where you can go and use it when you need it for exercise purposes or for transit purposes.

So I think if we look at it in that spirit, it is a very sensible idea. We also have obligations with respect to the Russian Federation, previous commitments we made to them to make sure that they do not view this in any way as threatening to them, and I do not think they will see it that way when it has been fully explained.

I am sure that in due course my colleagues at the Defense Department, Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, and General Jones will come forward with fuller explanations for the committee as to what their needs are and what their plans are.

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Biden.

Senator Biden. Thank you.

Time is short. I have one question, Mr. Secretary, and I realize you may not have an answer and you may not wish to opine the answer, but I hope you will consider talking about it. You indicated in your statement that NATO has to focus its attention beyond Europe, in addition to Europe. It seems to me that we are at a moment right now where we have an opportunity to begin to imple-
ment the objective we set out in Prague about an out of area concept, which my chairman has been talking about since the early eighties, the late eighties, or in the eighties, and at the same time have a win-win situation where we are able to get some significant assistance as it relates to Iraq, which is obviously out of area, as well as continue the process of repairing some frayed nerves, if nothing else, if not fundamental relationships, repairing some of the discord that occurred as a consequence of whether to go to Iraq.

I had the opportunity, at the request of the French Ambassador, to spend some considerable time with him. You know him well, a very impressive fellow, and he is very, very well connected to the administration in Paris, beyond being the Ambassador here. There was, in Newsweek, a little blurb in “Periscope.” I am not suggesting it is correct or incorrect. I am not asking you to verify this, but it indicated that, what we all know, Chirac did call President Bush, and indicated, according to Newsweek, indicated that France and Chirac leading France would not object to NATO peacekeeping presence in Iraq and suggested that France implied, according to the article, that it would be willing to contribute a brigade and put NATO presence under overall American control.

Now, without necessarily commenting on that, although I welcome a comment on that if you think it is appropriate, can you give us some sense of whether or not it is necessary, even if the decision was made by the President, that this would be a useful outcome? That is, a formal role for NATO in Iraq under U.S. command. Whether or not you have been told by your NATO counterparts that they would need an overall U.N. resolution, not authorizing but sanctioning that approach?

So it is a two-part question: A, as a predicate to the possibility of a formal U.N. and/or NATO role in Iraq—and I know we have the coalition of the willing, including some NATO members. I am talking about a formal NATO decision out of the NAC to in fact deploy troops for peacekeeping under U.S. command in Iraq. Is there an antecedent requirement of the U.N. to sanction that, A?

B, can you give us any insight as to how far this has percolated up within the administration as to whether or not such a policy would be a wise one, that is to seek a formal NATO role in Iraq?

Secretary POWELL. First with respect to NATO, as I think I said earlier, at the NAC meeting a couple of weeks ago, they certainly reinforced what President Chirac and our President spoke about, the possibility of NATO playing a role. We have suggested to NATO some of the roles they might play and I touched on it in my presentation. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz first broached this with NATO last December when he visited and I reinforced it during my trip to Brussels a few weeks ago.

Some planning is going on and some ideas are being pursued within the Military Committee of NATO. The specific question about whether there is an antecedent requirement of some kind for a U.N. endorsement in some fashion, I think that is an open question, because there are some members of NATO who will say we do not need anything. They are there now and they do not need anything.

Senator BIDEN. Right, I understand.
Secretary Powell. But there are others who might say, before we can go off to that kind of peacekeeping operation, we need chapter VII action or some kind of action on the part of the United Nations.

We are studying all of this, which allows me then to talk about the United Nations role if I may. Senator Biden. The President said, along with Prime Minister Blair and other members of the willing coalition, that the United Nations has a vital role to play. We believe that strongly. We are hard at work now trying to structure what that role should be and how best to get U.N. endorsement of the role that we think is appropriate.

We are in serious conversation with our allies on the Security Council. We have some ideas as to what we think the U.N. should do with respect to the lifting of sanctions, with respect to the endorsement of an interim authority, with respect to an endorsement of our presence. We do not need any U.N. action with respect to legitimizing the act. The actual war in our judgment was completely legitimate——

Senator Biden. I am not suggesting you do.

Secretary Powell [continuing]. Under 1441. So there is a major role for the U.N. to play. They are playing a role already on the humanitarian grounds. The UNWFP and other U.N. agencies are working with the coalition now.

To go beyond the humanitarian role and get into more of an endorsement role and get the U.N. to have a representative of the Secretary General actually participate in the political work that is now going on it seems to me is important. So in the days ahead we will be moving forward with an appropriate resolution, one resolution, perhaps more than one resolution, to seek U.N. involvement and endorsement of the plan to move forward both for the purpose of getting rid of the sanctions, lifting the sanctions, which are no longer relevant, and determining what is the appropriate role to play on the part of the U.N. as a coalition and the Iraqi leaders themselves who are now emerging out of the process we started as they start to put in place a government of Iraqis, by Iraqis, for Iraqis, to paraphrase a great American, and how the U.N. should play a role in endorsing that emergence of Iraqi embryonic leadership.

Senator Biden. Mr. Secretary, you made a very profound statement in my view when you said that the role of NATO far exceeds its military role. I would respectfully suggest that a formal NATO vote and presence in Iraq would have a consequence that far exceeds the military role they would play, and I could not urge it strongly enough. I know it is difficult, but I would strongly urge that take place.

Secretary Powell. There is support within the administration for such a role, as long as it is consistent with what the coalition has to do to achieve its objectives.

Senator Biden. Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden. Senator Hagel.

Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Welcome, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Chairman, I have a statement for the record.

The Chairman. It will be placed in the record in full.

[The prepared statement of Senator Hagel follows:]
Thank you, Chairman Lugar, for calling this hearing. Let me begin by expressing my appreciation and admiration for our witness, Secretary of State Colin Powell. Secretary Powell has led the State Department during a time of historic change and challenge. His diplomatic achievements include an unprecedented international coalition against al-Qaeda and international terrorists and simultaneous management of crises in Iraq, Korea, South and Central Asia and the Middle East, as well as confronting disease and poverty in Africa and Asia. Secretary Powell has brought a unique confidence and prestige to American diplomacy. His remarkable popularity is testimony to the confidence the American people place in his leadership.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been the bedrock of international security since its establishment 54 years ago this month, in April 1949. Although the military dimension of the alliance was instrumental in containing the Soviet Union, NATO was always about more than military security. America’s relationship with our NATO allies has symbolized the common values, as well as the common interests, of democracies united against those international actors who represent tyranny and aggression.

We live at a time of danger, unpredictability, and potential global instability. But we also live in a time of historic opportunity. Alliances are not absolved from the forces of change in world affairs. The ability to adapt to the challenges of this new era in world affairs—challenges from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction—speak to the importance of NATO and other international institutions, including the United Nations, that have played such key roles in promoting and protecting our common interests since World War II.

NATO’s decision in November 2002 to expand its current membership of 19 by inviting Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria to begin accession negotiations acknowledges the imperatives of change. I strongly endorse this action and will vote for it. Today, member and candidate countries are expected to do what they can to modernize their forces, including development of niche capabilities and the establishment of a NATO Response Force. But we know that the contributions of an enlarged NATO will not be defined solely by military capabilities. Expanding NATO also encourages a process of political and economic reform in candidate states.

There is a deep security dimension to an expanded NATO. The threats from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction cannot be handled by the United States or any country alone. Defeating terrorism requires unprecedented international cooperation in the diplomatic, military, law enforcement, intelligence and economic areas. If our purpose in an expanded NATO is about defeating these threats to our common security, than bringing these seven new members into NATO is critical to our national security.

Although America’s military power may be unprecedented in world history, NATO will continue to play a vital role in American and global security. In Afghanistan, the German proposal for NATO to take charge of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) represents a new and significant turn in NATO’s mission. At some point, when there is an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, NATO troops may be called upon to help guarantee that peace. NATO might well also play a role in maintaining security in post-war Iraq.

I believe NATO’s next fifty years will be just as important for world peace as its first fifty years.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing, and for placing the issue of NATO enlargement in the larger context of re-building relationships in the aftermath of Iraq. I look forward to Secretary Powell’s testimony.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

At the risk of embarrassing you, Mr. Secretary, and heaping more unending adulation upon your broad shoulders, I would like to associate myself with Chairman Lugar and Senator Biden’s comments about the job that you and your colleagues have done at the State Department. I do not always agree with polls, especially if my poll numbers are not good, but you consistently arrive at 85, 90 percent job approval in this country. Being the most trusted—Senator BIDEN. Ninety-two percent in Delaware. Why do you think I am so nice to him?
Senator HAGEL [continuing]. The most trusted leader in this country is a pretty remarkable thing and I think it points to what you have heard thus far this morning about your leadership and what you pointed out, the people that you lead, the remarkable people that serve in the State Department, which we owe great thanks to, the professionals there.

I would just make one comment on that. About 2 years ago, a young woman who worked for me came in and said: “Senator, my husband and I want to do something for our country and the world.” I said, “well, Erin, I thought you were, working for a distinguished Senator from Nebraska.” She did not dismiss that astute observation that I had made, but she wanted to reach beyond, beyond where she was, and informed me that she and her husband—and they had just had their first baby—were going to take the Foreign Service exam.

Moving forward now to April 29, 2003, she and her husband are both in Nepal with a baby and a 3-year-old, junior Foreign Service career officers, and very, very proud of the work that they are doing for this country and for the world. I think that says as much about the kind of work that you are doing, you are all doing over there in your Department, than any one example, to have people like that quality of people want to be part of that and part of doing something more important than just serving their own self-interest.

Secretary POWELL. Thank you, Senator.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Secretary, the questions that rotated around Iraq, Afghanistan, the role of NATO, have been obviously key to what you have been talking about this morning, the future of NATO. I would be interested in getting your thoughts on some of the great challenges within NATO that you foresee, one being something that we have been dealing with, I suspect will continue to deal with, and that is somewhat of a technology gap between some of our NATO partners.

We recall in Afghanistan that there was some question about whether NATO could participate, should participate, because they were not up to the task in the sense that it would just complicate U.S. efforts there. That was I think the position of some in the Pentagon.

How do you see all of that developing? First, is there a technology gap? Second, what role can these nations coming into NATO play, niche capabilities? Are there such? Is that part of what we will see evolve over the next 10, 15, 20 years? Everybody can play a role, but obviously not the same role.

Secretary POWELL. There is a huge technology gap. There is a serious capability shortfall. Ten years ago at the time of the gulf war, everybody saw what modern warfare was going to be like. Ten years later, it has gone up several more notches with respect to what modern warfare is all about, what the use of military force is all about—digitization, information technology, intelligence system, knowledge of the battlefield.

These young soldiers of ours are wearing things, Senator Hagel, that you and I do not even recognize from our days in the Army as infantrymen. State of the art equipment. It is expensive, but if you want to be serious, if you want to have top forces and if you want to send your people into battle or into other kinds of oper-
ations and to give them every advantage to come out alive as well as successful, then you have got to be prepared to invest in the technology. You have got to be able to rationalize your defense industries. You have got to be able to go to your people and say, this costs money and we have got to make the investment in this if we would be relevant.

The Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, speaks about this all the time. Every time we have a NATO meeting we talk about capabilities. But the individual members of NATO have not met the task of increasing their defense expenditures in order to achieve that capability. It does not come cheaply.

Reference was made to the meeting today in Belgium where four of the nations of the union have come together and created some sort of a plan to develop some sort of a headquarters. I will let my European colleagues discuss that one in the course of the next 2 days. It is only four of the many nations that could have attended, only four did attend. But what we need is not more headquarters; what we need is more capability and fleshing out the structure and the forces that are there with the equipment that they need.

So there is a technology gap and there is a capability gap, and we should not expect countries such as Slovakia to show up as a first world force. They do not have that capability and we should not expect it and they could not afford it and we do not need it. But they can perform niche responsibilities of the kind we have discussed, whether it is with CBRN kind of equipment or a civil affairs kind of function to be performed or a logistics function to be performed or a commando or special forces kind of capability to build into their capacity.

You do not want to ask them to do something that they really cannot do and they will fail at it and they will be disappointed and you do not get what you need. You examine each one of these countries. What are they able to do? What experience do they have? What resources can they put into it? And what can we do to enhance their capability? And that is what they contribute to the alliance, and it becomes part of the reservoir of capabilities that the alliance has available to it.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you again for this hearing this morning.

Mr. Secretary, welcome, and I will just add my voice as well. I think you have done a great job and the country is lucky to have you. And to be the subject of some criticism by the former Speaker puts you on my all star list, so I will leave it at that. But I think the State Department under your leadership has done a remarkable job.

Secretary POWELL. Thank you, Senator.

Senator DODD. I appreciate your comments about them as well. They work very hard all the time and make a significant difference.

In the limited amount of time, Mr. Secretary, just two quick questions if I can. One is in the structure with NATO itself. We are going from 16 countries obviously back in the period of the cold
war now to 26, and I guess it is going to be 29 with Macedonia, Croatia, and Albania possibly coming on board. My concern, and I will not take a lot of time in posing the question, is the obvious one I suppose one would think about here. That is, in the past this has been a basis of consensus. NATO made decisions based on consensus. Obviously we have played a very important role in developing that consensus. Certainly today, as nations seek to become members there is a certain willingness to probably be a bit more supportive on certain matters they might otherwise be a little more hesitant about.

My concern is not today, but looking down the road as we try to develop NATO decisionmaking with 29 nations involved in the process, what can we expect from all of this? If we have an organization and obviously it can play a critical role both militarily and politically, and yet trying to get consensus out of 29 nations with very different political, domestic kinds of problems and situations, it seems to me it is going to get harder and harder maybe for NATO to respond as quickly and as rapidly as we like.

I read with some note these reports done by Secretary Grossman, which seem to me more pointed to the NATO Response Force militarily, as well as one other one that had been done that seems as well to address the question. The President's comments in fact seem to deal more with the military aspect of this.

Back in November, I submitted a piece for the Washington Post in which I suggested something along the lines of possibly sort of a Security Council apparatus here, where you would have those nations, obviously our own, that played a major role here both financially and militarily in some sort of a decisionmaking process, so that as we need to have a rapid response and quick decisions down the road the ability to get that from 29 nations may be extremely difficult.

I wonder if you might comment on the general concept or idea, what sort of your reaction might be to something like a Security Council operation here, No. 1.

No. 2, I saw this report, and it is quickly turning to Iraq, but the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, and it is a flow chart here that sort of lays out the various offices and so forth that will flow here. I am just concerned, I do not see much of a role here for the State Department in any of this, particularly in this line over here that deals with the national governance issue that goes directly back up through General Garner, up to the Secretary of Defense.

Again, just it seems to me lacking in having a heavier role for the political-diplomatic function of State. I do not know if you have had a chance to look at this flow chart, but I wonder if you might comment on that.

Secretary Powell. On the first question of consensus, clearly when you go from 16 to 19 to 26 to 29, decisionmaking becomes more difficult. When you have that many sovereign nations, each one represented at the Council table and all the baggage that comes with them in terms of public opinion and the political dynamic within their Parliament or legislature, it makes it much more difficult.
But I do not think it makes it impossible to act at 29 or even that much more difficult, that much more unwieldy. I think long before you get into the Council chamber, discussions take place, negotiations take place, and you essentially come in with a pretty good lineup. We have been quite effective in bringing people around to our line of thinking within 19. When I look at the next seven coming in and I see how they helped us and how they stood by us in this recent debate over Iraq, I have some confidence that they also would be inclined toward our point of view. But they are sovereign nations to make their own decisions.

So I think that we have been effective in playing a leadership role in the alliance which will help the alliance get through to a consensus decision quickly, and that leadership role will not be diminished as we move forward to either 26 or 29.

I do not see a real solution to the challenge. It will be a challenge, Senator, but I do not see a quick solution in the form of some sort of voting procedure or in the creation of a group of elders or those who are richer. That seems to me to change the fundamental nature of an alliance of free nations coming together, each one as important as any other. It kind of reminds me of the Senate, that same kind of approach.

Senator BIDEN. All the kinetics and compromise.

Senator DODD. Do not use that as an example of efficiency and speed. You are making my point with that analogy.

Secretary POWELL. No, but I am making the original point that the founding fathers made back some time ago. I think all NATO members have to be represented and they all have to be seen as equals in that representation. Does it make things harder? Yes. But does it make things impossible? No. Does it make it a little more unwieldy? Perhaps. But I think it just means we will have to work harder at gaining consensus.

The point was made earlier, and this gives me a chance to respond to it, that we had this disarray within NATO and we have frayed relations, but with how many? Most of them were for us. I mean, most of the nations of NATO were supportive of our position, even in the face of overwhelming resistance from within their domestic constituencies. Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, a lot of the smaller countries as well as some of the countries up north.

We had major disagreements with France and major disagreements with Belgium and a couple of the others, but most of them were for us. So we will work our way through this, and I just think this is one of the costs of doing business when you have an alliance of democratic sovereign nations. So I do not see an immediate solution to the problem. We are looking at it, as we were asked to do. Mr. Grossman has been in touch with our authorities in Brussels to at least examine this as food for thought. Let us take a look at this, see if there is another way, a better way, to do business.

An even greater challenge will exist for the European Union as it expands. So it is worth looking at, but at the moment I do not see an alternative that, to me anyway, would be superior.

With respect to ORHA, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, at the moment I have dozens and dozens of State employees who are working with General Garner. I think at
the last count I have five ambassadors who are over there. Ambassador Bodine is in charge of the central part of the country, to include Baghdad. Other ambassadors are going over.

It was really quite a logical progression as to how we thought this would evolve. In the first instance, when you are essentially going into a country with a military force to take down an entire regime and take out the entire ruling infrastructure, there was no question that this is a military mission, has to be under a military commander, and the military commander has to be the governing authority for some period of time until stability is established and until you are prepared to start handing off to civilian authorities.

As Secretary Rumsfeld, Dr. Rice, and I, as well as the other members of the administration worked on ORHA and what it should look like, it clearly should have a very, very, heavy military, DOD, Pentagon tint to it, and it is well known that we had some discussions as to how strong a tint that should be. But we worked that all out, and so now I have solid representation within ORHA.

I think as time goes on, as General Garner, who is doing a tremendous job, by the way, but as he and the military authorities establish security and stability in the country, as the humanitarian part gets taken care of—nobody is starving. There turned out not to be a starvation problem and food is now flowing into the country. Fix the water system, fix the hospitals, things of that nature; slowly but surely, we will get into institution-building and slowly but surely the political process will rise up out of the Interim Authority and the State Department will begin to play a more significant role, as will other civilian agencies of government.

I have already started to put in place the early infrastructure of a diplomatic presence in Iraq. We have got some fly away kits that will be going in as soon as the security situation allows them to go in, and I have got many more members of the Department ready to go in. We are working very closely with General Garner and with General Franks and his people.

Sure, the gears always tend to grind a little bit when you start down on one of these things, but those gears are now being well-lubricated and I do not anticipate a major problem.

Senator DODD. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. I would like to recognize Senator Biden for a moment.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I just want to explain the absence of Senator Sarbanes. His failure to be here is only because he is at Johns Hopkins. He underwent successfully surgery this morning to remove a benign tumor and we expect him to be back home in a few days and back here shortly after that. But I just wanted to explain why he was not here.

Secretary POWELL. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden. I would say that Senator Sarbanes, always very conscientious, was together with the committee telling us of his regret he could not hear you today. But our thoughts are with him for his recovery.
Secretary POWELL. Indeed.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Chafee.
Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for all you are doing for the country. Senator Biden was asking about the relationship with NATO and the United Nations, particularly in out-of-area missions. I do not know; can you testify as to the candidate States' position on whether we need to go to the U.N. on out-of-area missions?

Secretary Powell. Let me provide an answer for the record because I do not want to speak for each one of them individually, and I am not sure that we have asked them that specifically. But I really do not think it will be a problem for most of the candidate states because some of them are already out of the area with us in what we are doing. They have units in the area even without the U.N. resolution that specifically talks to this follow-on mission for NATO.

But I do not want to speak for each one of them individually without at least checking with my staff and checking with those countries before I speak for them, sir. But I am not expecting a problem with the candidate States on this issue. There may be a problem in their legislature I am NATO familiar with yet.

[The following information was subsequently supplied:]

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

The Honorable Lincoln Chafee,
United States Senate

Dear Senator Chafee:

The Secretary has asked that I follow up on his behalf with regard to the views of the seven NATO invitees on whether UN Security Council endorsement is required for NATO out-of-area operations.

In their support for coalition operations in Iraq, six of the seven NATO invitees—all but Slovenia—have shown by their actions that they do not believe all operations require UN approval, including NATO out-of-area operations. For its part, Slovenia supported NATO military action in Kosovo in 1999 without UN endorsement. Slovene domestic law allows Slovene participation in military actions approved by NATO.

All seven invitees also joined the “Vilnius Group” statements of November 21, 2002, and February 5, 2003: “In the event of non-compliance with the terms of [UNSC 1441] we are prepared to contribute to an international coalition to enforce its provisions and the disarmament of Iraq.”

This statement demonstrates the invitees’ support for U.S. action in Iraq as well as for NATO’s agreement at the Prague summit to undertake out-of-area operations.

We hope this information is helpful to you and appreciate your interest in the subject of NATO Enlargement. Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have further questions on this or any other matter.

Sincerely,

Michael C. Polt,
Acting Assistant Secretary,
Legislative Affairs.

Senator Chafee. I just would comment that as we see the growth of the U.N. and this particular initiative of these member States, these candidates probably being agreed to, and the relationship with the United Nations, particularly at Reykjavik and endorsing more out-of-area missions, just the relationship of the United Nations—I think Senator Biden was asking, do we need to have Security Council or United Nations action as we go to out-of-area missions.

Secretary Powell. Not for every mission, and I would submit that NATO is not subordinate to the United Nations. I think mis-
sessions will come along that will have nothing to do with NATO with respect to out of area. The out-of-area mission that NATO performed, which we sometimes forget, was right after 9/11. NATO AWACS planes came to the United States of America and for months guarded our air space, an example of the kind of out-of-area mission that nobody had ever thought of when we put that capability in NATO.

Some of the things that are going on in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, as well as in Afghanistan, there are nations that were signing up immediately, with or without U.N. endorsement. So I think each one will be reviewed individually in terms of what we are trying to do and whether or not the individual countries, as they consult with their legislatures, believe that there is a requirement for a U.N. resolution, as opposed to NATO as a body in Brussels asking for U.N. permission to do something.

Senator Chafee. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Chafee.

Senator Feingold.

Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Mr. Secretary. Would you just say a little bit, Mr. Secretary, about what kind of capacities do NATO member States and the proposed members have to bring to the table in terms of post-conflict reconstruction? What can they really do?

Secretary Powell. A number of them, interestingly, have a great deal of experience in reconstruction activity that will be relevant to Iraq because a lot of them were involved in construction activity. There is knowledge of what has been done in Iraq previously. We are drawing on that knowledge, and even some of those nations that are hoping to get in there in the future, have done work in Iraq and that knowledge of what has been done previously has been helpful.

I would not expect that these nations are going to be able to make significant financial contributions. They are small and their budgets are modest, but I think we can still expect them to make a contribution that is appropriate to their financial means. Some have offered up small units, some have offered up medical assistance, and each one is trying to respond within their capabilities.

I would be more than pleased to give a complete answer for the record. We are still putting out our net call, so to speak. What is it you can do and what are you willing to do, and between my Department and the Defense Department we are in touch with all these nations to see what contribution they are able to make. We can give you a current status of that for the record, sir.

[The following information was subsequently supplied:]

U.S. Department of State,

The Honorable Russell D. Feingold,
United States Senate

Dear Senator Feingold:

The Secretary has asked that I follow up on his behalf in regard to your inquiry at his April 29 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on NATO members’ capabilities for the reconstruction of Iraq.
As the attached paper of our most current estimates demonstrates, the 19 current NATO members and the seven invitees have contributed or pledged a great deal toward the reconstruction of Iraq in financial, material and other assistance.

We hope this information is helpful to you and appreciate your interest in the subject of NATO Enlargement. Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have further questions on this or any other matter.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL C. POLT,  
Acting Assistant Secretary,  
Legislative Affairs.

Enclosure: as stated.

### Contributions of NATO Members Toward Iraq Reconstruction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Pledged Amount</th>
<th>Delivered Amount</th>
<th>Additional Contributions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>$4,400,000</td>
<td>$4,305,705</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>$72,000,000</td>
<td>$41,088,422</td>
<td>Disaster Assistance Teams; 3 C–130 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>$400,000</td>
<td>$30 water treatment stations, 5 generator stations, staff for ORHA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>$50,000,000</td>
<td>$1,156,069</td>
<td>Convoy of medicines, tents, blankets, field kitchens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>$10,752,688</td>
<td>$10,764,264</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>$86,561,497</td>
<td>$10,936,638</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>$4,627,000</td>
<td>$80 tons of relief supplies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>$190,000</td>
<td>$52,000</td>
<td>Medical and non-lethal defense items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>$3,750,000</td>
<td>$18,000,000</td>
<td>Medical teams and equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>$18,000,000</td>
<td>$16,236,396</td>
<td>Staff for ORHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>$3,743,316</td>
<td>$60,271,089</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>$20,534,759</td>
<td>$20,291,846</td>
<td>Participation in stabilization force with UN cover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>$60,271,089</td>
<td>$4,992,015</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>$1,068,519</td>
<td>$1,068,519</td>
<td>Field hospital</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>$56,000,000</td>
<td>$32,303,818</td>
<td>12,000 blankets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>$329,000,000</td>
<td>$178,547,935</td>
<td>Humanitarian supplies &amp; 150 military medical personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>$5,000,000</td>
<td>$5,000,000</td>
<td>Food for contingency of 276,000 Turkmen refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>$229,000,000</td>
<td>$178,547,935</td>
<td>Staff for ORHA</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Contributions of Proposed NATO Members:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Pledged Amount</th>
<th>Delivered Amount</th>
<th>Additional Contributions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Staff for ORHA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Contributions of NATO Members Toward Iraq Reconstruction—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Pledged</th>
<th>Delivered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia:</td>
<td>Pledged: $64,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia:</td>
<td>Pledged: n/a</td>
<td>Delivered: n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania:</td>
<td>Pledged: $30,000, plus, willing to provide Turkey assistance with refugees</td>
<td>Delivered: Military medical team to Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania:</td>
<td>Pledged: 278 non-combat troops</td>
<td>Delivered: Humanitarian assistance staff for ORHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia:</td>
<td>Pledged: n/a</td>
<td>Delivered: n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia:</td>
<td>Pledged: $200,000, pediatric care</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Deliveries, especially of smaller contributions, may not yet have been noted due to time-lags in calculating receipts.

Senator FEINGOLD. I would appreciate that. In light of that answer, if NATO does play a role in peacekeeping in Iraq, will the organization be stretched thin by also working in Afghanistan, given what you said about their limited capacities and resources?

Secretary POWELL. I do not know until I have a better understanding of what role they might play. Right now the peacekeeping forces that we are looking at for Iraq to come in behind the coalition forces are being structured and headquarters are being identified. We are not yet looking for a NATO headquarters per se.

Whether NATO's involvement in Iraq might actually involve the deployment of one of the NATO headquarters to Iraq or whether it can be done from a present location and sending units under NATO flag to Iraq as opposed to a full headquarters coming in I think is a judgment for the Military Committee to make. But at the moment I do not think it would overstress the capability of NATO, as long as we do not start creating more headquarters that draw resources away from existing headquarters, one of my concerns about the action that was taken in Belgium today.

Senator FEINGOLD. To what degree does public opinion regarding Iraq and potential NATO member States affect the domestic political consequences of joining the alliance for these governments? Have our posts reported on any public manifestations of opposition to membership recently? In general, how stable can NATO be if new members are attempting to withdraw regularly to respond to domestic political pressures?

Secretary POWELL. I think every nation has domestic political pressures it has to deal with, depending on the situation or the crisis before them. In a number of the new candidates, there were concerns about our going into Iraq, just as there were among current member nations. But all of them dealt with that challenge and every one of them got a successful vote when they needed it from their populace.

The one I was most concerned about was Slovenia when they took it to their Parliament at the height of the tension over Iraq. To be very frank, Senator Feingold, I was biting my fingernails figuratively over the weekend the vote was taken, because it looked like it was going to be very close. If they had not gotten the successful vote, then they would not have been able to sign the accession document and we would have had a major problem.
But they got the vote at 66 percent, which was handy, handily
over the amount needed, of course. It also means that there are
questions among the remaining 34 percent as to whether or not it
is the right thing for them or not. So yes, there are public opinions
in these nations that sometimes question whether the nation
should be part of this alliance, just like you would find public opin-
ion differences in any one of the existing member nations.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

I thank the Chairman and Senator Biden for calling this important hearing, and
thank Secretary Powell for being here today.

In the wake of the horror of September 11, 2001, NATO decided that those at-
tacks on the United States could be considered an attack on the whole alliance, and
by the beginning of October, NATO had formally invoked Article V for the first time.
I can remember quite clearly how meaningful that news was for Americans, how
important that sense of resolve and solidarity with our allies was in strengthening
our own morale and determination.

There were important questions to be asked then about how NATO can contribute
to the fight against terrorism, and many of those questions remain. At the time, it
seemed that we would answer this question in close collaboration with our allies,
rolling up our sleeves together to re-examine NATO’s role in post-September 11 con-
text. But today, we are coping with a serious diplomatic rift between NATO member
States, with the echoing ramifications of rhetoric about new versus old Europe, and
with press reports speculating on how the U.S. will punish those who did not sup-
port our policy in Iraq. It is in this context that we are considering questions of en-
largement and of NATO’s future. I fear that the earlier question—the question that
deals with our most important policy priority, the question that asks what role
NATO should play in helping to combat global terrorism—may be lost in the shuffle.

In the midst of this murky situation, a few points are quite clear. NATO has a
role to play in maintaining European stability and in maintaining transatlantic co-
operation. It should have a role to play in combating global terrorism, which threat-
ens the security of all. It follows that new member States should have something
to offer relative to all of these objectives.

It is also clear that the United States military and British forces have done an
admirable job of defeating the forces of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, but are now con-
fronted by the awesome and costly task of restoring order. We should welcome bur-
den-sharing in various forms to help us manage this task. And we should welcome
burden-sharing in part to reassure the rest of the world that ours is not a policy
of unilaterally imposing our will by force without consultation or cooperation. This
is not about wanting to be liked, or about being popular in the halls of the U.N.
or European capitals. It is about wanting to be secure and to maintain cooperation
in the fight against terrorism.

I look forward to the testimony today.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.

Senator ALLEN.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, thank you again for your magnificent job and that
of your whole staff. Senator Lugar allowed me to have the gavel
for various hearings on these aspirant countries. I have been a
long-time advocate for those who meet the criteria to join with us
since the days I was Governor working in those days for Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

Some of these ambassadors that you are putting forward and
their willingness to serve, you saw those families that are going to
be separated as their duty stations are in Kyrgyzstan, Moldova,
and a variety of countries. They are good patriots and we commend
them.
I also want to say I am glad to hear your positive comments in response to Chairman Lugar’s comments insofar as the basing in other countries than Germany, where we have 80,000 troops stationed. In this most recent military action in Iraq, clearly other facilities, including Costanza in Romania and also facilities in Bulgaria, were helpful. These countries have been helpful to us in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, in Iraq as well, and will be of continuing importance in the war on terrorism.

So I am one who is a strong advocate for at least reevaluating our options, and I think that having some of our forces, our capabilities, whether for staging or for various facilities, closer to the current threats makes sense. I think it is also important to recognize that those countries, Bulgaria and Romania in particular, want us there, and I think they will be cost-effective. So I look forward to working with you and others in that regard.

Now, insofar as Iraq is concerned, the President on many occasions has said Iraqi oil, is to go to the people of Iraq. I have been interested in a concept which has been adopted here in the United States, in the State of Alaska, where a portion of the oil revenues goes to the citizens of Alaska. I think that helps individual rights. So I think one of the keys, actually the foundational key to the success of Iraq’s Government, is a recognition of individual rights, not rights derived by religious groups, or ethnicity. So a country and their government, their constitution and their laws, need to recognize those individual rights.

On the economic aspect, as far as oil is concerned, if a small dividend can actually go to the people as individuals as opposed to whomever is in control, I think that helps economically. It provides a sense of property rights, which are an important individual right. I would like to hear any comments or thoughts you may have on the constitution in Iraq of creating something like the Alaska Permanent Fund so that the people of Iraq indeed are the owners, not only of their government, but of that key resource of oil.

Secretary Powell. There is an economic theory that we have been examining that is very much related to that. It essentially says if you want to get the most use out of the revenues that come from oil, rather than give it to the government for the government to decide what to do with it, just give it to the people and let them decide what to do with it. It sounds like very familiar economic policy. I will stop there.

Senator Allen. I do not know. There are some people who could use some convincing on this point.

Secretary Powell. The clear point is that the people, if they had access to that money directly, as is the case in Alaska to some of the money that is generated by Alaskan oil, then they can make choices in their own lives with respect to how they will use that money. The money will not go off to bureaucracies and the money will not go to Swiss bank accounts, although we hope we are correcting that once and for all so that is not a risk. But decisions will be made about investing that money in a business or educating a child or building a house or buying clothing, but it will circulate in the economy and it will contribute to the economy.
So yes, Senator Allen, we are looking at this as an alternative. But I have to come back to the first point. It is up to the Iraqi people to decide how they will use the wealth that they have in oil. Senator Allen, I would suspect if they had some sort of a plebiscite or referendum on it, I think that they would all like to get a little dividend on those revenues.

Secretary Powell. I think I would bet on that.

Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Allen.

Senator Boxer. Thank you so much, Mr. Secretary, for all you do. I have a couple of comments and a couple of questions.

Let me just say, the idea of a dividend to the folks is good. We have to see what their needs are as a society. If you decided to disband your Department tomorrow, all that money could go back to the taxpayers. Now, they may like that in the short run, but if we did not have you and the good people you talk about that would be a real problem for us. So I think it is all a question of balancing the needs of the people, which is the debate that we are in constantly, obviously, here.

I am a very strong supporter of NATO expansion. I think back to the days of the cold war when all those folks had no freedom, no countries really. As far as I am concerned, the larger it gets the better if the nations meet the qualifications.

I want to actually mention something. You started off in a way defending your Department, which I understand why you did it, and praising the people in your Department, and I understand why you did it. I think it is a chance for me to just make a statement, not so much to you but perhaps to the broader audience of our country, which is I think there is an attempt in this country by certain leaders to really launch personal attacks against leaders and it is very discouraging to me.

I have seen it with you. I have seen it on the moderate Republicans that I enjoy working with. I have seen it on my own leader, Tom Daschle, about as good a human being you could get. And I am not talking about political attacks. Those are fine. We are grownups, we know that. But it is more a personal type of attack.

So I think whenever we have a chance as colleagues, whether Republican or Democratic, to say that we do not appreciate that—you know, I do not agree with you, Mr. Secretary, in a lot of issues; you do not agree with me. We have never had an ill word between us, and when we can work together we do; and when we cannot, we cannot.

I held up a picture and a book showing the Arctic Wildlife Refuge, beautiful photographs by this photographer, and the Smithsonian now degraded that exhibit to the downstairs level because it was used politically—to hold up a picture of a polar bear and say, look at this, let us consider this. This is not the America I know and love. It is not the kind of Iraq anyone wants to see.

So I just mention it because you spent about 5 minutes defending your Department. There is not one person on this committee, at least I do not know of any, that does not fully respect the work you do and the work that they do.
Now, I have two hard questions. One has to do with the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and I wanted to know your opinion on how it is proceeding. I am one who believed that they were there. That is why I supported more and more intrusive inspections and I supported the Levin amendment that said we have got to get in there, we have got to find them.

You absolutely put the credibility of the United States on the line in front of the United Nations when you said that you believed that they may have 400 bombs filled with chemical agents and 7 mobile biological agent factories and 4 spray tanks from planes, 550 shells with mustard gas, 30,000 empty munitions, enough precursors to stockpile 500 tons of chemical agents, 6,500 bombs from the Iran-Iraq war, 1,000 tons of chemical agents.

So you laid it out very specifically. My question is, do you feel that our people who are searching for these weapons are the very best qualified in the world to do this, and do you think we will get more results when some of these Iraqis that we are capturing now on the list, the card deck—by the way, I am making a card deck of all the people who stole our energy, you know, the Enron people and all that. I have a card deck of those. I love it. I think it is a great idea. Do you think that when we have these people speaking that we will be led to these weapons?

The second question has to do with my Syria Accountability Act that I introduced on a bipartisan basis last year and am about to introduce again. It would increase economic and political sanctions against Syria unless the President certifies that the Syrian Government has ended its support of terrorism, it has withdrawn from Lebanon, it has ceased the development and production of biological and chemical weapons.

This legislation does not in any way condone, urge, or authorize the use of force against Syria. But it does indicate a real concern about their policies. Now, last year the White House stated, "it was not the right time," to pursue the Syria Accountability Act. But I think now maybe is a chance that we can work together and get it done, because my own view is, rather than the sabre-rattling or the threats of war, I think we should just go ahead and start these sanctions if they do not cooperate.

Thank you.

Secretary Powell. Thank you. Thank you very much, Senator, and thank you for your support.

On the first question of weapons of mass destruction, they will be found. The presentation I made before the United Nations on the 5th of February was at the end of 4 straight days of living with the entire intelligence community and going over every single thing we knew. Every day and every night leading up to the 5th of February, I was closeted with our very best experts.

What I presented on that day was information that was all-source and that had other backup to it and not just what they saw in the presentation. Everything we had there had backup and double sourcing and triple sourcing. A lot of the things that were talked about at my presentation and have been talked about in other presentations and Director Tenet has presented to the Congress on a number of occasions had to do with gaps in knowledge, gaps that the Iraqis could have filled if they had intended to fill
them. So whether something is there or not with respect to a certain number of liters of one kind of agent or another could have been reconciled if they had chose to reconcile it, and they did not. So we will try to reconcile it, see whether it is there or not.

It is also important to remember that when Resolution 1441 was passed it began with a clear statement of Iraq guilt. All 15 members of the Security Council who approved and voted for 1441 were saying in the beginning that they believed that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and had not properly accounted for them. So the question of what we find and I am confident that we will find was really resolved when 1441 was passed. Resolution 1441 really was the key element in this conflict in the sense that it not only gave legitimacy to what we did, but it brought the Council together 15 to 0 to say that Iraq is guilty and it is condemnable, and if they do not fix themselves they are subject to serious consequences.

I agree with you—or let me pick up what you said about interviews. We will learn more and we are learning more right now. I am getting almost daily reports of little nuggets that are coming out with respect to what was done, what might have been destroyed in recent days, where certain records are. So I am confident that we will be able to deal with that.

With respect to Syria, I will be traveling to Syria in the very, very near future and all of the issues that are of concern to us, whether it has to do with support of terrorism or weapons of mass destruction or some of the activity that was taking place across the Syria-Iraq border that caused us concern or the fact that Syria is still present in Lebanon, it is still under a state of martial law, all of these issues I expect to have full and very direct conversations with the Syrian leadership about.

My hope is that President Bashar Assad and his colleagues are looking at what is happening in the region and factoring that into their policymaking apparatus—the complete change in circumstances as a result of the end of the Saddam Hussein regime, so they have a different neighbor on their doorstep now, a neighbor that is going to be moving in a democratic way, and hopefully they have factored that in.

The other element that I hope they are factoring in is that some time in the next 24 to 72 hours, I hope, the PLC will confirm Mr. Abu Mazen as the Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority, and when that happens a road map will be delivered by members of the quartet—the United States, Russian Federation, the United Nations, and the European Union—which will lay out obligations and commitments and responsibilities of both the Palestinian side and the Israeli side.

It is going to be controversial. If people want to change and people want to comment on it, let them comment on it and start talking to one another. But above all, let them start taking action, both sides, beginning with ending violence and terror, to move down this road map to the creation of a Palestinian state. The President is committed to put the full weight of his office and all of us behind this. When that starts, I hope the Syrians will recognize that they have a role to play in all of this as we move toward a comprehensive solution that must include Syria and Lebanon.
So I think these two changed elements fundamentally should reshape the manner in which Syria is examining its policies, and I hope that I have a full, candid, and open discussion with President Bashar Assad about this in the very near future.

Senator BOXER. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, just—will you take another look at the Syria Accountability Act, please?

Secretary POWELL. Yes, ma'am.

Senator BOXER. I think it will help you when you meet him.

Secretary POWELL. I will take a look.

Senator BOXER. Tell him we have got it out here. Thanks.

Secretary POWELL. Yes, ma'am.

[The following information was subsequently supplied:]

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

The Honorable RICHARD LUGAR, CHAIRMAN,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

On April 29, during the Committee on Foreign Relations' hearing "An Enlarged NATO: Mending Fences and Moving Forward on Iraq," Senator Boxer requested that Secretary Powell consider the Syria Accountability Act. The United States is at a very challenging time in our bilateral relationship with Syria. We are in the process of intense dialogue with the Syrian regime on a host of issues of concern, including terrorism, connections to the regime of Saddam Hussein, its pursuit of WMD, and the Syrian military presence in Lebanon.

As you are aware, the President asked Secretary Powell to visit Syria for candid discussions on the future of our relationship. We are prepared to brief the Committee on those conversations and offer an assessment of how U.S. policy goals can most effectively be pursued.

In light of this current fluid environment, we ask that you not move forward on this bill at this time.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of this letter.

I hope this information is useful to you. Please do not hesitate to call if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

PAUL V. KELLY,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.

Senator VOINOVICH.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to congratulate you and your team on the outstanding job that you have done. I think you have got more on your plate than any Secretary of State at least in my memory and you are handling it all quite well.

I am really pleased that you are taking your CEO responsibilities very seriously and moving in the personnel area, and technology, and I know you are working to secure the embassies. On another committee in which I am involved, Governmental Affairs, I am chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management and the Federal Work Force, and we are going to be marking up some bills one of these days for the Defense Department, for NASA, and some other legislation that gives departments flexibility. I know that you have a real problem of compression in the State Department, also with bonuses that accrue and cannot be
taken because of unrealistic pay caps. I would really like your human resources people to look at that legislation, to come back with recommendations on perhaps how we can respond to some particular problems that you may be experiencing as Secretary of State.

Secretary Powell. We would be delighted, Senator. Thank you.

[The following information was subsequently supplied:]


The Honorable George V. Voinovich, United States Senate

Dear Senator Voinovich:

This is in response to your request to the Secretary at the April 29 SFRC hearing for recommendations concerning Congressional assistance for the Department as the Federal government considers civil service reforms.

We would like to offer to brief your staff on human capital issues at the Department of State and our management agenda and offer some comments on the legislation currently pending before your committee.

Doug Wertman of my staff will contact your office to arrange such a meeting at your convenience.

Sincerely,

Michael C. Polt, Acting Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.

Senator Voinovich. The other thing that I would like to ask you about is this, when I was with you and the President at the Prague summit, there was a great deal of discussion about the ability of NATO to field forces quickly and effectively to do whatever the forces are needed to do around the world. We also know that the DCI has not worked and now we are talking about the Prague Capabilities Commitment, and we are talking about the NATO Response Force.

The question I have is, are we really serious about this? Have we, for example, underscored to the other members of NATO that they are not stepping up to the plate and doing the job that they are supposed to be doing, reminding them that some of the ambassadors that are here from the aspirant countries are doing more in their defense budgets than members currently of NATO, that they have got to step up and do their job?

Have we specifically identified what the NATO Response Force is going to look like and what individual responsibilities are going to be within that structure? Now, you are talking about going into Afghanistan and visualizing perhaps going into Iraq, but it seems to me that if you are going to do something like this you have got to really be specific about what it is that this rapid response unit is going to be and what people's responsibilities are going to be, and then monitor the performance of individuals that are involved to make sure they move forward.

I would like to know just how formal this is—have we formalized this at all or is it just kind of, well, we are going to move into Afghanistan and whoever has got whatever it is, they will pitch in, and if we go into Iraq they will pitch in?

Secretary Powell. With respect to your first question, there is no NATO meeting that I go to or that my colleague Don Rumsfeld
goes to that we do not press on the need to increase the capabilities of individual countries, not just to go out and buy things, but to buy the right things. Lift, the ability to go out of area, is critical. And if you are going to go out of area and be far away from your home bases, then you have to have the logistics systems, the intelligence systems, and the communications systems that allow you to do that.

Frankly, NATO has not, the individual countries of NATO, have not done a good enough job on this. They talk about it and we have plans and, as you noted, there are always new initiatives coming along, but the initiative we need more than any other initiative is the political will on the part of each and every one of these countries to go to their people and say there are still threats in this world, we are still part of a great alliance, and we have to pay, and we have to make sure that we have first class, world class forces if we are going to send them to Afghanistan or Iraq, a Bosnia or a Kosovo or a Macedonia or anywhere else.

We continue to press at political levels, not just military levels, at political levels for Prime Ministers and Presidents to take this case to their people and to their Parliaments and legislatures. We are not having the kind of success we need. George Robertson, Lord Robertson, has been in the forefront of asking for these increased capabilities.

With respect to the rapid response unit, it is still being created. I cannot answer your specific questions with respect to it, but I will certainly talk to my colleagues both in Brussels and in the Pentagon to see if we can give you a more fulsome answer for the record, sir.

[The following information was subsequently supplied:]

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

The Honorable GEORGE V. VOINOVIKH,
United States Senate

DEAR SENATOR VOINOVIKH:

The Secretary has asked that I follow up on his behalf with regard to what a NATO rapid response force will look like and how individual responsibilities will be delegated within that force, questions you raised in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s April 29, 2003 hearing on NATO Enlargement.

The NATO Response Force (NRF) is still in its early stages of creation. General Jones, as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, has his staff working on the details of this force and a timeline to make it a reality. We expect those details to become clear within the next two months.

Although specific composition is yet to be defined, Allies agree that the NRF will consist of air, ground and maritime forces at very high readiness and rapidly deployable for the full range of Alliance missions. While individual responsibilities have not been assigned, all Allies will be expected to make appropriate NRF contributions. These forces will be as multinational as possible without compromising military effectiveness. Initial operational capability is planned for October 2004, with final operating capability planned for October 2006.

We hope this information is helpful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have further questions on this or any other matter.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL C. POLT,
Acting Assistant Secretary,
Legislative Affairs.

Senator VOINOVIKH. Thank you.
One other thing, Mr. Chairman. I am very interested as a member of this committee in growing anti-Semitism and organized crime in the world. One of the things that I am very concerned about is that we are bringing some new nations into NATO and a couple of them specifically have had some problems with corruption and with organized crime. I would like to know, what are we doing as a country to respond to what I consider a very, very formidable organized crime effort in the old Balkans area and that region in terms of coordinating the EU, SECI, OSCE?

It seems like the opposition is very well organized and we are still trying to get our act together.

Secretary Powell. We of course speak about it rhetorically and let them know that admission to NATO brings with it responsibilities and we are expecting the rule of law, we are expecting transparency, and we are expecting you to root out corruption. Then with each nation, we dial in and speak specifically to them as to their particular needs.

In the case of Bulgaria, when that was of interest we helped them to realize the need to establish an inter-agency anti-corruption commission, which they have just created, chaired by their Minister of Justice. The Bulgarian Parliament just passed new anti-corruption legislation, anti-bribery legislation, and asset forfeiture legislation to take assets away from criminals is pending now before the parliament.

Romania is crafting bills that are aimed at reforming the judiciary, civil service, and political party financing activities. Creation of an anti-corruption prosecutor’s office last fall I think will also help. The media is being turned on within these countries to this kind of corruption that is absolutely corrosive of the democracy that they are now trying to strengthen.

So we are working hard with them. There were a number of other countries that I will not mention by name where we had specific problems with specific individuals and we made it clear to the leaders of those countries, both I did directly and members of my Department, that there was a limit as to what we could do with respect to cooperation either bilaterally or within NATO if these kinds of individuals were going to be around.

Through constant pressure and not letting the pressure up, that problem was dealt with. So we will continue to make clear to these countries that obligation. The obligation that comes with membership in NATO is not just having troops that can go somewhere, but living up to the highest standards of the democratic values that hold this alliance together.

Senator Voinovich. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Senator Voinovich follows:]

I would like to thank the chairman and the ranking member for convening this hearing today, and our distinguished witness, Secretary Powell, for taking the time to appear before the committee this morning. It is clear that there are many demands on your time, and your presence here today is greatly appreciated. I would also like to congratulate you on your efforts during the past several months. You are doing an outstanding job, particularly with so many irons in the fire.

It is good to have the chance to talk with you again about enlargement of the NATO alliance. I was thrilled to be with the President and with you at the NATO Summit in Prague last November, and I will always be grateful for the opportunity
to be in the room when Secretary General Lord Robertson announced the historic decision to invite seven countries—Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia—to join the alliance. I also appreciated the reception that you held for members of the congressional delegation to the summit.

Much has taken place since we spoke in Prague last fall. We find ourselves discussing enlargement as we are at a crossroads in Iraq, with the military campaign to liberate the Iraqi people coming to a close and efforts to promote a democratic, peaceful and secure future for the country just beginning.

Without a doubt, the support of the international community—including our NATO allies—will be crucial as we move forward in Iraq. Many of our NATO allies, including the candidate countries, have already made significant contributions in our efforts to disarm Saddam Hussein and secure a better future for the people of Iraq. Their continued support is highly important as we look not just to win the war, but to win the peace in Iraq.

The question of NATO enlargement has been considered in a changed world following the events of September 11, 2001. The alliance has been challenged to confront new threats, and to develop the capabilities necessary to meet them. As we come together to confront growing challenges to global peace and security, including terrorism and its dangerous link to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, I continue to believe that an enlarged NATO will enhance the security of United States, Europe and the world at large.

While the candidate countries still have work to do on their Membership Action Plans (MAPs), they have already demonstrated their willingness and ability to contribute to efforts to combat threats to world peace. They have acted as de facto allies, and I am glad that the Senate is taking the necessary steps to move forward on the ratification process and make membership a reality for these new European democracies.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your testimony and time with us this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.

Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, I want to thank you personally for raising the issue with your colleagues on Scott Speicher. There is a team in there that is looking for him. The fact that he is on the priority list along with weapons of mass destruction to find is in no part a small measure due to you raising this issue, and I appreciate that.

I just returned with a delegation led by the majority leader from the Far East, with the primary issue being North Korea. We leaned pretty hard on the Chinese leadership, suggesting that where they had in the past yanked the chain of North Korea by shutting off the fuel for 3 days that sent a fairly strong message. I was a little distressed to hear President Hu talk like that they were merely conveners of the meetings. In that meeting and in subsequent meetings, then we bored pretty hard on the Chinese leadership, suggesting that where they thought we had capped since the Agreed Framework of 1994.
When confronted last October, they admitted it and the President made it clear that this was unacceptable, but that he believed a diplomatic solution could be found. He charged me and the members of my team to pursue a diplomatic solution. The President also made it clear that it had to be a solution that was of a multilateral nature. It had to involve the other countries of the region. It was not to be simply a U.S.-DPRK problem, that we would somehow cut a deal around the interests of our friends in the region.

But beyond that, these weapons, if they existed, and if the North Koreans continued to pursue them, were a greater threat to their neighbors than even to the United States, so the neighbors had to be involved. We held to that position despite a great deal of pressure suggesting that, well, why don't you just make this problem go away by talking directly to the North Koreans.

It took us a number of months, but we finally persuaded in straightforward discussions with our Chinese colleagues, finally persuaded the Chinese to play an active role, not just as conveners of a trilateral or multilateral meeting, but to be a full participant in that meeting. And they agreed and, frankly, they participated with considerable relish, and it is now with some pride that they talk about what happened last week.

We would have liked to have seen it be a multilateral meeting with four and five members present, participants. South Korea and Japan we would have preferred to see in the room. That was more than the traffic could bear right now. But I can assure you, they were in the room in terms of their equities, in terms of their interests, and in terms of the representations that we made on their behalf by Assistant Secretary Kelly.

The meeting I have characterized as useful and I think it was. The Chinese in that meeting reaffirmed their position, the position of their government, not only of the government that just left office but President Hu's government coming in, that the Korean Peninsula should be denuclearized. They made that clear at the meeting and made it clear to the North Koreans, and of course reinforced our position.

The Chinese did something else. They also acknowledged the existence of a 1992 agreement between South Korea and North Korea where North Korea previously agreed and entered into this agreement with South Korea that there would be no nuclear weapons on the peninsula. So the Chinese participated fully and presented their case fully.

The North Koreans said a number of things, always with the usual ambiguity around their statements. But they said they had reprocessed all of the rods at Yongbyon. We have no independent evidence to suggest that that is the case, but nevertheless that is what they said. We are not sure it is true, but that is what they said.

They also indicated in an aside that they did have nuclear weapons and they said they told it to the United States 10 years ago during the period when the Agreed Framework was being negotiated. We have checked with every single one of the negotiators on our side from that period and none of them say that the North Koreans actually told them that, although they came close. They certainly made some inferences that could have led somebody to be-
lieve that and they may have believed it themselves, but they never told us that.

So we have always attributed to the North Koreans the possession of one or two nuclear weapons, our best intelligence estimate they might have or could have one or two nuclear weapons, but they have said that they had it.

But then they went on to say: And there is a way to move on. So they gave us a proposal and that proposal would, if it were followed through, according to them, lead to the removal of the nuclear capability and maybe even deal with their missile capability. It is a proposal of a kind we have seen previously from them and it is something that of course I believe that, because our other friends are interested in, we will study. But it is a proposal that is not going to take us in the direction we need to go.

But nevertheless we will study it. I think that is appropriate. We will not be intimidated by their claims and threats. As the President has said often and repeatedly, and there should be no question about it, we will not be blackmailed. We are going to work closely with our friends and allies. We are going to keep this multilateral. We are going to consult with our colleagues in the Security Council. The Security Council has a role to play in all of this and we will continue to hold North Korea, accountable for its behavior in a variety of areas. The President still believes, and I still believe, that a diplomatic solution is possible.

So we had a useful meeting last week. What happens next remains to be seen. We will be consulting here within the administration and we will be consulting with our friends and colleagues. But the North Koreans have pretty much said they are doing these things and they have these things. What that does is makes it clear to everybody in the neighborhood, the South Koreans, the Chinese, the Japanese, the Russians, the Australians, let there be no doubt that the North Koreans have been doing what we said they were doing. Now they must be brought to understand that the presence of this kind of capability will buy them nothing of any use and only the total elimination, verifiable elimination, of this kind of capability, these sorts of programs, and other, more responsible behavior on their part will bring about a solution to this problem and will allow them to do something that they ought to be doing, and that is taking care of 24 million starving people who deserve better than what they are getting from this regime.

So we are clearheaded and openminded about the way forward. The President has given us very strong and clear guidance. We keep all of our options available, but the President continues to believe a diplomatic solution is possible and something that has to be done on a multilateral basis. We are not the only ones with an equity.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.

Senator COLEMAN.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I want the join in the chorus of voices in applauding you and your team for the things that you have done in articulating the vision of the President and in securing the 15 to 0 vote on 1441, for building a very broad international coalition, and for how we are handling the North Korean situation, understanding
that we do not do it alone, that we bring others to the table. So I want to thank you for that.

Second, I also want to state for the record, I strongly support the expansion of NATO and I want to thank my chairman for the speed in which he has pulled all this together. I noted you noted that in your comments.

My question has to do, Mr. Secretary, with the issue of mending fences. I was a Republican mayor in a city in which there was not another elected Republican city official, so I understand about working with those who do not always agree with you and mending fences. But I do believe—and my concern is, I am a strong believer that future behavior is influenced by reaction to past behavior.

The seven invitees strongly supported our efforts in Iraq. They took risks. They did it in spite of concern perhaps among the body politic. Tony Blair took great risks. So my concern is how do we deal with this issue of past behavior—I am going to be very blunt—with France and with Germany? There was a report and it was just one news report about whether France was consulting with Iraq. I am not going to ask you to comment on it, on a single news report.

But I will ask you to address the broader question of consequences for behavior. I would note, perhaps reflecting what I thought was the concern of my distinguished colleague from Connecticut in terms of the operation of NATO, perhaps we do not do consensus any more, that we perhaps go by majority vote. But again, do you recognize or believe that in fact there should be consequences of behavior and that those who were not supportive should somehow—as we build this future relationship, that we somehow respond to that in an appropriate way?

Secretary POWELL. Yes, and it is not a matter of punishing anyone. It is not a word that I use. But I was asked last week in an interview situation, as a result of the difficulties we have had with France in particular, how do we go forward? I said, France has been a friend of the United States for 225 years. We have gone through many things together as two nations that are friendly and are allies, and that is not going to go away. I do not think anybody should suggest that we forget what France did for us and what we have done for France over the years.

But at the same time, their attitudes and some of the actions they took in the course of this debate, we were very much regretful of. Therefore, when the question was then put to me, well, should there be consequences of this, my answer was yes. So we will review all the things we do with France to see whether they are appropriate to the circumstances that have been modified slightly by this disagreement. We will do that.

There is no secret about this. I have had very candid conversations with my French colleague. I speak to him now almost every day. I have spoken to him for the last 3 days, and I had a long meeting with the French Ambassador who was made reference to earlier, Ambassador Levitte, on Friday afternoon. Because we are friends, we can speak candidly.

I also had to point out that the United States has been going about our review of what we should do rather quietly. It sometimes pops out in the paper. But on occasion France has made it quite
clear to some of the nations that did support us, especially some of the aspirant or the candidate nations here, that they were going to pay a price for supporting us. They made it clear it might affect accession in the EU, and they were lectured rather severely for daring to support the United States.

Well, those are consequences. So just do not point to the United States, that we should not review the bidding and we should not consider whether or not there are consequences to be paid for certain kinds of behavior when at the same time and almost in the same voice they are administering consequences to those nations that stood with us.

Senator Coleman. And if I may, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary, being the optimist I am and ending on the positive note——

Secretary Powell. This is not personal. It is business.

Senator Coleman. I would hope that for the aspirant nations, because they were so supportive, that we do raise our voice with those whom they seek to punish and that we do, when we bring them into NATO, that we reflect, the Senate reflects, our support for the things they have done.

Secretary Powell. We have. We will not forget that they were small nations in the face of public opinion that would have suggested that they sort of duck or just say nothing, that stood up for us. They came forward and they said, we see the rightness of this cause and we align ourselves with the United States of America, and they received quite a few bricks thrown their way. The United States will not forget that they stood up with us at a time we needed people to stand up with us.

Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman.

We will continue questioning until noon with a 5-minute limit.

Mr. Secretary, during previous debates on NATO, either for one reason or another, NATO itself or accession debates, two issues have arisen and they were addressed by some of the witnesses that we have had. The first is should consensus, which means unanimity, be the voting structure? The suggestion is made from time to time, and it has been alluded to today, that with more and more members perhaps a large majority would suffice, as opposed to all.

Now, most of the witnesses have dismissed this idea for one reason or another, including an administration witness from our own administration, believing it is in our interest, the United States’ interest, to retain the consensus situation. I raise this issue not preemptively, but in the event that there will be amendments when we have our floor debate. Such have occurred in the past.

The second amendment that is sometimes suggested is, should there be some method of expelling members from NATO or for some departure procedure? Given the fact that this grows larger and larger, at some point in history there may be among NATO members one or more who reject altogether the freedom of speech, freedom of religion, the democratic ethic, human rights. There we are, left with such a member in our midst. What do we do about that?
So the suggestion is there ought to be, while we are thinking about expansion, some way of curtailing and pruning the tree if necessary.

Can you offer your suggestions before we launch into either markup tomorrow or the floor debate with regard to either of these two propositions?

Secretary Powell. I think these are reasonable questions to ask at a time that we are seeing such a marked increase in the size of the alliance. But I think let us study these questions before offering legislative solutions of any kind. NATO is not a committee, it is not a council, it is not a group. It is an alliance, and when you call something an alliance I think that means that everybody has to be together for the alliance to take action.

It has been a successful alliance for all these many years under the rule of consensus. Sometimes we run into problems, just as you do in the U.N. and elsewhere. For the most part we can find workarounds, as we did with the Turkish issue earlier this year. But it seems to me we would probably lose more than we would gain if we tried to find some other way to do it besides consensus. Majority vote, what do the others do, just sit around and fume? I mean, it is not an alliance acting any more; it is part of an alliance acting. So I have a problem with that. But I believe it is worthy of study and analysis.

With respect to bouncing somebody or expulsion, why should there not be membership standards that if you do not meet or if you somehow no longer comply with the original terms of your admission, you should not be rejected? But the Washington Treaty does not provide for that, nor do I know many international organizations that do provide for such rejection. There are some, but not that many.

So this also is worthy of consideration, but right now I would argue against trying in any way to condition the accession to that kind of idea or that suggestion in any legislative manner.

The Chairman. I picked up just one other item. Senator Boxer has mentioned correctly that she and others have offered legislation with regard to Syria in the past and that she might do so again at this point. You have taken that under advisement. Let me just say that in the event legislation is offered or even if it is not, your advice to this committee as to how best we ought to proceed diplomatically with Syria would be much appreciated.

In other words, we do not want to have a debate in the committee or on the floor on Syria while you are in Syria or dealing very directly with a very serious problem. I ask you to be as forthcoming as possible on the issue.

Secretary Powell. We are dealing with a very serious problem, but we are dealing with it in a changing environment, is the point I made to Senator Boxer. It would not be helpful for me right now to also have something that would be pending in the way of legislation. I hope that this is one that Congress will allow the diplomacy to remain in the hands of the President.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Senator Dodd.

Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, again. I do not want to dwell on the point you just discussed with the chairman, but I just express to you again my concern down the road. I do not suggest there is any simple solution to this, and clearly you make a very good point. This is an alliance, it is not a club as such. But once the enthusiasm—once you are in and given the difficulties of expelling someone that is in, and knowing we want this NATO, new NATO, to be a responsive organization that can move beyond the original geographical limitations and with the clear objective at its creation of dealing with the potential of the Soviet Union pouring through the Fulda Gap, as we heard over the years, clearly today we are going to be looking for NATO as I understand it to be performing missions that we cannot even begin to envision. But we know we are going to want to do it fairly quickly.

Knowing down the road that you can have 29 nations that can have opinions—we have used consensus, but it has almost been a veto power among the 16. As I understand it, and you correct me if I am wrong, but almost any one country who has strong feelings against taking some action can pretty much stop the action from happening over the years. At least that is how I understood it.

I am not sure that the Security Council idea is the right one, either, but I get nervous about us setting this up and doing it and not sort of addressing this issue in some way, or at least creating a framework for it to be addressed.

Mr. Chairman, we might want to think about some language that will at least put on notice that we have got to look at this issue so that we will not be surprising new members later on, having brought them into the organization, that we may have some different means by which we allow NATO to respond as quickly as we would like them to to both military and political situations.

I do not really—you have responded to this.

Secretary POWELL. The only point I would make, Senator Dodd, even an Iceland or Luxembourg could express an objection and we not achieve consensus. But the practice has tended not to be that way.

Senator DODD. I agree.

Secretary POWELL. You tend to find a way forward, and the usual voting style of NATO is, when there is an issue before the Council Lord Robertson sends it out to all of the member nations and says: Here is what we believe we ought to do and does anybody want to break consensus on this by Monday morning at noon? And so we all work all through the weekend to talk to those who might be thinking of breaking consensus and persuade them and convince them and cajole them and go through all the diplomatic dance steps necessary to get consensus.

I have played “The Perils of Pauline” almost every other weekend since I got this job on some NATO proposal that we are worried about somebody breaking consensus. Sometimes consensus is broken and then we go through another week of debate. But usually we can achieve consensus and on those rare occasions where we cannot then we find other ways to deal with the problem, as we did with the Turkey situation. It went from NAC down to the DPC.

Senator DODD. Just jumping back if I can, and I wonder if you might comment a little further on the new Palestinian Prime Min-
ister and the cabinet. Give us some sense of what your sense of optimism is about this new individual and the cabinet that is being formed around him, particularly in light of the issues of obviously these perpetuating attacks, terrorist organizations, and the like. Give us some sense of that if you could.

Secretary POWELL. In his speech last June 24, the President made it clear that he was committed to the creation of a Palestinian state in a relatively short period of time to live side by side with Israel, and he also said in order to achieve that vision we have to have transformed leadership. Chairman Arafat was not a partner for peace and he had missed his opportunities.

And we waited until now. We watched this transformation start to take place. We watched the new Finance Minister put in place, who has brought a level of accountability and transparency to the Palestinian Authority that we have not seen before, Mr. Fayad. He has done a very good job, and we are working with him and the Israelis are allowing the revenues to flow back. That was a transformational activity.

Then the Palestinians really came to the conclusion that they did need a Prime Minister, somebody who would have authority, not just a figurehead, but somebody with authority and influence and the respect of the Palestinian people and who could be seen as one of the leaders of the Palestinian people coming forward.

They had to go through their process of, one, creating such a position, empowering it by the PLC, Palestinian Legislative Council, and sometimes directly fighting President Arafat in order to do it. They created the position. Then after more debating, Mr. Abu Mazen emerged as the gentleman destined for that position. There were fights, as you watched last week, between Mr. Abu Mazen and Mr. Arafat as to the nature of his Cabinet, and Mr. Abu Mazen prevailed and that Cabinet is now being presented to the PLC.

So we have a man who has stepped forward to assume a position of leadership and he has fought for it, he has won. I hope he will be confirmed and I hope he will use that leadership. We made it absolutely clear that when the road map is released performance is what counts, not the particular language of a particular paragraph. It is performance.

I hope that the new Prime Minister will speak out immediately and clearly about terrorism and about violence, and I think that, with Mohammed Dahlan as his new Minister of State Without Portfolio, but for security matters, he will act quickly and aggressively to work with Israeli authorities and bring the situation into control, to go after those individuals and organizations who have been conducting these kinds of terrorist attacks.

If we see that kind of not only rhetorical action, and not just one speech, but a constant drum beat to the Palestinian people that it is time to move in another direction, if we see that coming from the new leadership, then I am quite confident that we might be on our way somewhere. I am also confident from my conversations with Prime Minister Sharon, with Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom, the new Israeli Foreign Minister, and other Israeli authorities that they are anxious to move forward. They are not in a situation that they like, with their economy in disarray, with the Palestinian
economy destroyed, and with the Israeli Army deployed as it is trying to keep things under control.

So both parties have every motivation and every incentive to move forward. The road map gives them a way to do that, but it is going to require acceptance of responsibility and performance of obligations on the part of both sides.

Senator DODD. Are you going to plan on making this part of your upcoming trip to Syria?

Secretary POWELL. I expect to be making several trips in the next few weeks.

Senator DODD. This will not be part of the one——

Secretary POWELL. Well, he has not been—it may be happening while I am sitting here, but I will certainly be looking for an opportunity to see him. I am not sure he is ready. He has some work to do and I do not want to burden him with a visit on day one.

Senator DODD. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Dodd.

Senator HAGEL.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, this is a unique opportunity, maybe even historic, I believe, and we have talked about some of the dynamics of this this morning to strengthen our ties with our allies. We have talked about this morning including seven new members into NATO, expanding that base of this alliance. We have talked about NATO taking on a new role in Afghanistan in August, maybe being called upon to take on a role in Iraq, depending on how events develop.

With that unique opportunity presenting itself to reconnect with our allies through the United Nations, certainly through NATO, I first want to recognize what you and the President are doing to not squander this time. You cannot force something that does not fit, but we should not squander this time that we have.

With that, two questions. As you view NATO, as we have discussed the future of NATO this morning, you have just talked a bit about prospects for the road map, peace prospects for the Israelis and the Palestinians, any possibility down the road, once we get a peace agreement, NATO could be called in to help guarantee that peace?

Second question: As we reestablish relationships and recertify and strengthen those ties with our allies, what is the current status of NATO and Russia?

Secretary POWELL. With respect to the first question, we are a long way away from considering what kind of monitoring mechanism might be appropriate if we see progress in the Middle East. I think in the first instance it would have to be the United States. I think that is the only thing that would be acceptable as we get started and try to build up confidence.

We have made that commitment to this process and it is a commitment we have made 2 years ago now. So we stand ready to do that. Whether it can be expanded into something more, it would be premature to suggest that at this point, Senator Hagel.

With respect to NATO?

Senator HAGEL. And Russia.
Secretary Powell. The NATO-Russia Council is performing work. I am very pleased that after the meetings of last year where it was formed we gave it some low-hanging fruit to go after just to get some experience and it did a pretty good job on some counterterrorism and other efforts. Now we are looking for some more substantial work to be done between NATO and Russia within the Council, working—I guess it will soon become 27.

Senator Hagel. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Senator Nelson.

Senator Nelson. Following back up on North Korea, since it is clearly in our interest that we not let them become a nuclear peddler and a peddler of weapons systems, including missiles, what was the reasoning that we let that shipment of missiles go on to Yemen after we boarded the boat on the high seas?

Secretary Powell. We detected the ship, we tracked it. We tried to learn more about its origin and its destination. Based on what we knew, we thought we better stop it and see really what was in it, not just what our intelligence said was in it, and make sure we knew where it was going. There was a concern that, wherever it was going, it might be a transshipment point for those missiles to then go on to Iraq or other places in the region.

Working with our Spanish colleagues who were participating in the interdiction effort, the Spanish Navy stopped it, did a terrific job, boarded the ship, and after moving some cargo out of the way discovered the Scuds. So it is exactly what our intelligence system said it would be.

But then in the process of looking into its destination, we found that it was destined for Yemen. We contacted the Yemeni President. As you know, we have a good relationship with Yemen. They have been cooperating with us on our counterterrorism efforts in the global war on terrorism. And the Yemeni Government had given us some earlier assurances that they were no longer procuring this kind of equipment and this was really grandfathered as the last shipment of a contract that they had entered into.

Because there was nothing inherently illegal about what they were doing and it was a purchase which by international law was acceptable, and with the assurance of the Yemeni President that the missiles were not going anywhere but Yemen and we could check any time we wanted to, and also the assurance that his earlier commitment that no more such contracts were under way or would be placed in the future. It was on that basis and because of our friendship and relationship with Yemen that the judgment was made that it was in the best interest for those missiles to go forward.

But we have demonstrated that we have a capacity to find such things and intercept them and make different judgments at different times depending on what is in the ship and where it is going.

Senator Nelson. Would that have sent a signal to North Korea that they could proliferate?

Secretary Powell. I do not think so because they are not getting any more sales in that place. But one of the things we have to do
is, when we find situations such as this, we need to go to those who are buying and say: This really needs to stop. If you have self-defense needs that are legitimate, there are better places and better sources to deal with those needs than North Korea.

North Korea is exporting not only missiles, but, as we saw in an Australian bust the other day, drugs. So this is a regime that thrives in criminality, and that also has to be part of our comprehensive approach to deal with the regime, going well beyond nuclear weapons and missiles, but their criminal activities, which we have to spend more time and energy dealing with.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Nelson.

We have a few moments before noon and so therefore, Senator Chafee, you will have the final question.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I will just followup. I was on the trip with Senator Frist and Senator Nelson and without fail each of the Chinese ministers from President Hu on down lacked passion for the North Korean issue, but they got passionate about Taiwan getting into the WHO. It would seem to me if we need China to help us broker talks with North Korea we might want to reassess the swift passage of the resolution I think that is before the Senate on allowing Taiwan into the WHO. Without fail, every one of the ministers we met with was very passionate about that issue.

But I do want to get back—I know there is a few minutes—on the NATO enlargement. It seems to me as though there are members of the administration that espouse a stronger NATO at the expense of the U.N. I believe—correct me if I am wrong—it was only a year ago that in Reykjavik that NATO was endorsed to go out of area. So it seems to me that this ascension of NATO could come at the expense of the U.N. as an alliance or an organization that acts around the world.

Obviously, NATO does not have the diversity of the United Nations. It is a European, Christian-based organization largely and the U.N. of course is very, very different. So could you comment on that? Are there members of the administration that are pushing for a stronger NATO at the expense of the United Nations?

Secretary POWELL. I think we are all pushing for a stronger NATO, but I do not think it necessarily competes with the United Nations or is at the expense of the United Nations. Of course, NATO has Turkey as a member, a very, very productive member of NATO over the years, a Muslim country, a Muslim democracy.

So I do not see them as competing. We need both. We need both organizations. Very often, in trying to forge a consensus in NATO, you will find NATO members who are also U.N. members asking for U.N. approval of the action being taken. So I think they serve as complementary organizations.

If I may end my answer with a reference to something that I think Senator Dodd said about kicking a member out. Sometimes when a member is not meeting the highest standards of the organization, the best place for the member to be is in the organization. I can think of a couple of situations over the past 50 years where we have governments representing nations inside NATO that certainly were not meeting our standards of representative government, and I think it was well in the interest of NATO and the
transatlantic alliance to have that country and that government inside NATO, where it could be pressured, where it could be brought into consensus, where it could be tutored and cooperated with to eventually get back to the kind of government that we expected it to be when it became a member of the alliance in the first place.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.

The record will be kept open of this hearing until the end of the day.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, just briefly again.

I am sorry, Mr. Secretary, I do not have a copy of this myself. I am looking at this chart.

Secretary POWELL. Do you have a date on it?

Senator DODD. That is the September—April 11. I will get one for you.

Mr. Chairman, I raise this not so much—I do not want the Secretary to comment. It is just troubling to me. There is a line here that I just draw your attention to if you get a copy: Deputy for Policy, I do not know who—Lawrence Di Rita and Ryan Henry are the two names. “National governance, local governance” directly back up through General Garner. We are talking about nation-building. I am just concerned, Mr. Chairman, about—the Secretary answered the question, so I am not asking him to respond to this. But this is troubling to me, that we sort of bypass all of this here directly through the Defense Department. I think the State Department ought to be playing at least, in the role of national governance-building or local governance-building—the fact that we are going to lay that on the Pentagon seems to me to be getting rather excessive.

So I just raise this with you. I do not know much more about it. I do not even know who these individuals are. But I start seeing a line that bypasses everybody else and shoots up——

Secretary POWELL. All of that, this is not a current and accurate chart, and it will be even less accurate within the next few days.

Senator DODD. Thank you. That is the best news all day.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JON S. CORZINE

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing on NATO enlargement. I thank the distinguished Secretary of State for appearing before this committee and sharing some of his views on this topic.

Even as the U.S. addresses dangers in the Middle East, it is critical to consider the other serious threats to global security, including the awful possibility that foreign terrorist organizations will gain access to weapons of mass destruction. Iraq was not and is not the only country with access to weapons of mass destruction, and we should not feel completely secure until we are confident that those weapons will not fall into the hands of terrorists.

I have no doubt that an enlarged NATO can be of tremendous assistance to combat that mutual threat. NATO is not a throwback to the cold war as some have charged, but a dynamic institution that needs to be enlisted in the global fight against terrorism. Recent events, particularly the approval of a rapid response force to combat terrorism, only act to confirm NATO's importance in that effort. Only a
dynamic and adaptable force can have any hope of prevailing over a dynamic and adaptable enemy, and NATO is building such a force.

Although recent events may have placed a strain on alliance relationships, the institution itself endures and will need to take on greater and greater responsibilities in countering a diffuse and virulent threat. And that includes “out-of-area” activities in Afghanistan and Iraq. With the global nature of the threat facing NATO countries, as the distinguished chairman of this committee explained at an earlier hearing, unless NATO operates “out of area” it could be “out-of-business.” I think we can all be gratified by NATO’s recent decision to operate “out-of-area” and take over responsibility for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Now we must actively seek a role for the alliance in post-conflict Iraq. I understand that despite early opposition, France has committed to consider a role for NATO and I hope such a role can be arranged.

As part of the effort to improve NATO’s capacity to counter terrorism, I believe expanding NATO to include seven new countries makes a great deal of sense. These seven burgeoning democracies will present a united front in the fight against terrorism, will help share our burden, and will confer additional international legitimacy to our cause. It will improve intelligence cooperation and interdiction cooperation, two areas that have increased in importance tremendously in the past decade.

It would be absolutely tragic if recent transatlantic tensions stymied efforts to improve and expand what has been a tremendously important and effective institution for more than five decades.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMERICAN HUNGARIAN FEDERATION OF METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON, DC, FRANK KOSZORUS, JR., PRESIDENT

Since the 1960s the American Hungarian Federation of Metropolitan Washington, D.C. (the “Federation”) and its predecessor organization have monitored developments in Central Europe and United States policy toward that region. The Federation supports NATO’s enlargement because it believes that (1) an enlarged NATO, consisting of stable and secure countries and as an organization of collective defense, is in the vital interest of the United States; and (2) since an indispensable component of security in Central and Eastern Europe is a commitment to democracy, including the respect for the rule of law and the rights of national and religious minorities, Romania and Slovakia should be encouraged to continue their reforms to promote that vital American interest.

NATO’S ENLARGEMENT ADVANCES UNITED STATES INTERESTS

During the Cold War, NATO successfully kept the peace in Europe by deterring outside aggression. The United States recognized that threats to European security represented threats to American security as well. That common purpose shared by Western democracies was the glue that ensured that NATO would not falter in its mission and prevail over the Warsaw Pact.

At the end of the Cold War and as a result of the strong leadership exercised by the United States, the Alliance enlarged to take on Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. That enlargement not only served American moral objectives, it also advanced United States security interests in Europe. A security vacuum was filled as the three new NATO members were reintegrated with the West. They helped stabilize Europe by contributing to NATO’s new mission of stopping ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and keeping the peace in the Balkans. All three also served as models for the other countries aspiring to be NATO members.

While NATO invoked Article V in response to September 11 and sent AWACS to patrol American airspace, it must continue to transform and implement the Prague commitments to meet the new threats presented by terrorism. Despite the current rift in the wake of the war against Iraq, the United States must remain engaged in Europe and NATO to carry out the war against international terrorism. As Senator Biden noted on May 1, 2002 before this Committee, “no one should doubt that NATO ... remains essential to the security of the United States.” At the same meeting, Senator Lugar stressed that “the war on terrorism makes it all the more important to accelerate the task of consolidating democracy and security in Central and Eastern Europe.”

The current round of enlargement will continue this process and further stabilize Europe from the Baltics to the Balkans and the center of the continent. In sum, a secure Europe and an enlarged NATO with members committed to Western values and prepared to assist in the war against global terrorism will advance American strategic concerns.
Minority Rights. Long-term American interests in maintaining a strong and stable alliance capable of joining the war against terrorism, however, will be served only if the invited countries are required to push through much needed political reforms. In order to promote this fundamental American interest, NATO must ensure that the new members are committed to Western values by deeds, not just by verbal assurances. They must be prepared to contribute to the security of Europe. Security, however, is as much a function of the stability that is associated with democracy and minority rights as it is a function of military reforms and equipment in the context of multi-ethnic Central and Eastern Europe.

This was recognized during the first round of NATO’s enlargement. The March 26, 1997 RFE/RL report titled, “Europe: U.S. Senator Outlines Criteria for NATO Expansion,” reported that Senator Biden “said Senators will determine whether the prospective members maintain democratic institutions, respect civil and minority rights and keep their military forces under civilian control before they vote their consent.” (Emphasis added.) In his article, “Slovakia and NATO: The Madrid Summit and After,” National Defense University Strategic Forum, April 1997, Jeffrey Simon wrote: “In sum, the major stumbling block to Slovakia’s candidacy to NATO arises from questions about the most fundamental criterion—the shared democratic values of respect for the rule of law and minority rights.” (Emphasis added.) The Membership Action Plan (“MAP”), developed after the first round of enlargement, also embraces minority rights. As Robert A. Bradtke, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs testified before the House International Relations Committee on June 19, 2002, “[t]he success of the MAP is reflected in the real progress that all of the aspirants have made in addressing difficult and sensitive issues. . . . They are all working hard to consolidate democracy and the rule of law, to strengthen judicial systems . . . to improve the treatment of minorities . . . .” (Emphasis added.)

The question of minority rights and European stability is not an academic exercise. As the tragic events in the Balkans in the nineties demonstrated, a primary cause of tensions and violence in the region is discrimination against and intolerance toward national, ethnic and religious minorities by the majority. Moreover, a government that fails or refuses to respect minority rights can hardly be deemed genuinely democratic, even if it has come to power through the ballot.

The genesis of today’s inter-ethnic challenges in the middle of Europe can be traced back to the beginning of the last century. The Peacemakers following the First World War created a new European order by drastically redrawing the map of the continent, often ignoring the vaunted principle of self-determination in the process. When the dust settled after the peace conference, over 30 million people found themselves living as minorities in the new Europe. This system was perpetuated by Stalin and lasted until the end of the Cold War. Now with the end of the Cold War, the governments of the region should be held accountable to the international community, especially on questions of human and minority rights. Some minorities are still denied a host of rights and subjected to continuing discrimination, however. A persistent problem in many parts of Central and Eastern Europe is the mistreatment of the Roma and conspicuous anti-Semitism. As noted below, Romania and Slovakia have yet to fully respect the rights of their respective Hungarian minorities. Regardless of its target, discrimination is not only inconsistent with Western values, the rule of law and inter-ethnic harmony, it also undermines regional security.

The prospect of NATO membership has motivated the invitees to address minority rights. Lithuania, a strong and deserving candidate for NATO membership, has gone far in respecting the rights of its Polish and Russian minorities and providing them schooling in their mother tongue. This process needs to continue if NATO is to be strengthened as it enlarges.

Romania is strategically significant and has contributed military forces to NATO and coalition actions. Its democratic reforms, while undeniable, have been overstated. As Adam LeBor in his article, “Alliance bends its rules for strategic Romania,” Times Online on November 20, 2002, noted, “Romania will be invited to join Nato this week despite its endemic corruption, a systematic lack of government transparency and poor progress towards a Western-style civil society.” The 2002 Country Reports on Human Rights released by the Department of State documents many of these problems as well.

Romania must continue its reforms in the area of human rights to approach Western norms. More than a decade after the Revolution, Romania has yet to fulfill its promises to its more than 1.5 million strong ethnic Hungarians. While Bucharest
lavishly funds the Orthodox Church engaged in a church building spree, it has returned less than 1% of the more than 2000 religious and communal properties illegally seized during the Communist era to Romania’s Hungarian minority. Romania disregards the constitutional guarantee relating to the right to an education in the mother tongue. Romania has even failed to establish Hungarian language departments at the Babes/Bolyai University, much less restore the independent Hungarian state university in Cluj/Kolozsvár.

Slovakia has progressed since the Meciar government. Nonetheless, the 2002 Country Reports notes that “[e]thnic minorities . . . faced considerable societal discrimination.” Id. at 1. Moreover, “[d]ecentralization to provide more autonomy to regions in education, land ownership, and restitution of confiscated property continued to be an issue for the large Hungarian minority.” Id. at 12. In addition to the denial of adequate representation as a result of gerrymandered Meciar-era territorial units and curtailed opportunity to use their mother tongue, agricultural and religious communal properties have not been returned to Slovakia’s ethnic Hungarians because of the discriminatory effect of the Benes Decrees.

CONCLUSION

NATO must be enlarged to fulfill its mission and serve the security interests of the transatlantic community. At the same time, the United States and the alliance should take steps to promote continued progress by Romania and Slovakia in developing laws and practices toward their minorities that are compatible with Western values and NATO’s security goals. The time is now for NATO to seize the moment and help countries with less than adequate records accelerate, consolidate and institutionalize enlightened minorities policies. The carrot of NATO membership has been a strong incentive for every serious invitee to undertake much needed reforms. The review and reform process should not stop with full NATO membership, however. The United States and NATO will have to continue to monitor the pace of progress and reform to ensure that the new members live up to their commitments and promote regional security by respecting the human rights of their national and religious minorities. As part of this process, Romania and Slovakia should be expected to expeditiously resolve the long-pending religious, educational and other Hungarian minority community property restitution matters.

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE,
OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,
156 FIFTEENTH STREET, N.W.,

DEAR SENATOR:

As the Senate prepares to take up the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, I want to be sure you are aware of the American Jewish Committee’s strong support for this measure.

AJC Executive Director David A. Harris testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in support of the first round of NATO enlargement, in November 1997. Last summer, in advance of the November 2002 Prague summit in which accession was approved for the seven additional Eastern and Central European states, Mr. Harris convened the ambassadors of those states at a Washington news conference to express AJC’s support for that important step and for the follow-up ratification by our and other NATO member governments. He asserted:

“... We now have the remarkable opportunity—on our watch—to extend the democratic zone of security, stability, tranquility, and mutual assistance to embrace the seven candidate countries...”

“To act in Prague in November is to address the legitimate security interests of the seven candidate countries, to expand the borders of the trans-Atlantic community at peace, to extend the reach of—and deepen the commitment to—democratic values and respect for human rights, and to strengthen America’s global role, especially in the wake of September 11, as we face such transnational threats as international terrorism.”

“History has given us a previously unimaginable chance. The choice should be clear. The time to act is now. The beneficiary will be the collective security of the democratic family of nations...”
A copy of Mr. Harris's statement of last summer follows. On behalf of the more than 125,000 members and supporters of the American Jewish Committee, I urge the Senate's ratification of the second round of enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Respectfully,

JASON F. ISAACSON, DIRECTOR.

STATEMENT OF DAVID A. HARRIS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE, AT THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, JULY 30, 2002

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for joining us at this press briefing.

I would like to extend a special welcome to the distinguished diplomats from Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia who have joined us here today, as well as to Bruce Jackson, the president of the U.S. Committee on NATO, and to my colleague Rabbi Andrew Baker, the director of International Jewish Affairs for the American Jewish Committee and a participant in the recent Riga Summit.

On November 5, 1997, I had the privilege, on behalf of the American Jewish Committee, to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the first round of NATO expansion, involving the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. We were the first American Jewish organization to come out publicly in favor of NATO enlargement, a fact of which I am most proud.

Moreover, I might add that, in the very same spirit and motivated by the same post-Cold War considerations, we were the first American Jewish organization to support the unification of Germany, to call for the recognition of the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and to endorse the lifting of trade restrictions imposed by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment on Bulgaria and Romania.

I would like to quote from our 1997 Senate testimony on NATO enlargement:

We are convinced that opportunity is temporary, not permanent. Either it is seized or it is lost. The opportunity presented by an expanded NATO is one that should not, must not, be lost. An expanded NATO means greater stability for Central Europe, a region that was the cockpit for the two world wars that brought such horror to the twentieth century.

Retaining the North Atlantic alliance in its Cold War configuration would have meant continuing an historic injustice—the abandonment by the democratic West of the small nations of Central Europe. Let me remind us all that it happened in 1938 at Munich and 1945 at Yalta, and the West watched from the sidelines as Soviet power squashed fledgling and promising democratic movements in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1981.

An expanded NATO not only strengthens democracy in those nations embraced by the alliance at Madrid, but encourages the other countries in the region to accelerate their own democratic and economic reforms, as well as resolve long-simmering disputes. The 1994 Poland-Lithuania agreement on good neighborly relations and military cooperation and the 1996 Hungary-Romania bilateral friendship treaty are just two examples. Moreover, integration in the Western alliance offers a real safeguard for the rights of Jews and other minority communities, historically the target of national, religious, or ethnic hatreds in too many places.

It would be premature to become too specific today about the scope of a second, or a third, tranche of NATO expansion, but it is important to keep very much alive NATO's openness to further waves of expansion. To do otherwise is to dash the hopes of tens of millions of Europeans, from the Baltics to the Balkans, that their future might include membership in NATO, and to imply a recreation of European spheres of influence, a profoundly destabilizing step that could have unintended, even unforeseen, consequences.

That was 1997. At the time, we heard a number of respected voices speak out in opposition to NATO expansion.

George Kennan, the legendary architect of the U.S. postwar containment policy of the Soviet Union, said that expansion "is the beginning of a new cold war," and added that such a step "would make the Founding Fathers of this country turn over in their graves."

Tom Friedman, the admired New York Times columnist, criticized the proposed policy in a number of op-ed pieces, citing fear of the Russian reaction and worrying
that enlargement would “dilute [NATO’s] power every bit as much as baseball expansion diluted Major League pitching and made every 90-pound weakling a home-run threat.”

Other critics voiced concern that America could be dragged into a war not of our choosing because of Article 5, which commits all NATO countries to help defend any member that is attacked, or cited the prospect of stratospheric costs to help the three new member countries—the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland—modernize their forces and integrate militarily into the collective security pact.

In point of fact, the critics were wrong.

There has been no new cold war with Russia. To the contrary, we have witnessed a promising new chapter evolve in the relationship between NATO and Russia, and this development is to be heartily welcomed.

NATO strength has not been diluted by the addition of its three newest members, but rather enhanced by the laudable efforts of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to contribute to the alliance by providing additional security for the collective defense of the member nations.

Article 5 has indeed been invoked—in fact, for the first time since NATO’s founding in 1949. The country that sought the decision was none other than the United States, and it happened exactly one day after this nation was attacked on September 11, 2001. In other words, America’s ability to respond to the menace of international terrorism was actually helped, certainly not hindered, by an enlarged NATO.

And those who floated estimates of tens, even hundreds, of billions of dollars in costs to the U.S. taxpayer for expansion were way off. Indeed, the U.S. taxpayer has barely felt the impact.

In sum, the first round of NATO enlargement to the east has been a success. It is now time for a second round.

The American Jewish Committee urges the 19 NATO member countries gathering in Prague on November 22 to seize the moment and extend formal invitations for full membership to Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Our position, needless to say, assumes that nothing will change between now and then in these countries’ commitment to the core democratic values enshrined in NATO. We would also encourage NATO to make clear that, down the road and subject to performance, further enlargement is possible for other aspiring nations.

As the American Jewish Committee noted in a statement just adopted by our leadership:

Through continued adherence to the membership action plan for new countries, these [seven] countries will demonstrate their commitment to democracy and the rule of law, peaceful conflict resolution, and the protection of human rights. Their accession to NATO membership will serve the national security interest of the United States. For these reasons, the American Jewish Committee voices its support for the continued expansion of NATO and the accession of these new member nations.

The American Jewish Committee also calls on these countries to redouble their efforts in the months ahead to complete the still open process of restituting Jewish communal property and preserving Holocaust memory and its integrity. [There remains much work to be done in both respects, and any delay would only complicate matters.]

Ladies and gentlemen, this is potentially a moment of historical definition. We dare not let it pass.

The twentieth century began with territorial conflicts throughout Europe, most notably in Central and Eastern Europe. They led directly to the First World War and planted the seeds for the Second World War as well. After the massive devastation wrought by these two wars, as well as numerous regional conflicts, the second half of the century was largely defined by the Cold War and the confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, followed by the devastating events in the Former Yugoslavia.

In sum, it was a brutal, bloody century, but at the end of the day the ideologies of Fascism, Nazism, Communism, and ethnic cleansing were vanquished and democracy, open societies, and the rule of law prevailed.

We now have the remarkable opportunity—on our watch—to extend the democratic zone of security, stability, tranquility, and mutual assistance to embrace the seven candidate countries.

Of course, there will be significant transitional challenges in integrating the seven countries into the NATO framework. Given the scale of the project, how could it be
otherwise? The fear-mongers, no doubt, will once again invoke the same issues as they did in 1997, but they will be as wrong today as they were then.

To act in Prague in November is to address the legitimate security interests of the seven candidate countries, to expand the borders of the trans-Atlantic community at peace, to extend the reach of—and deepen the commitment to—democratic values and respect for human rights, and to strengthen America’s global role, especially in the wake of September 11, as we face such transnational threats as international terrorism.

History has given us a previously unimaginable chance. The choice should be clear. The time to act is now. The beneficiary will be the collective security of the democratic family of nations.

On April 12, 1949, President Harry Truman sent the NATO Treaty to the United States Senate for approval. On that occasion, he said:

This Treaty is an expression of the desire of the people of the United States for peace and security, for the continuing opportunity to live and work in freedom.

Events of this century have taught us that we cannot achieve peace independently. The world has grown too small, The oceans to our east and west no longer protect us from the reach of brutality and aggression.

Together, our joint strength is of tremendous importance to the future of free men in every part of the world.

We must continue to work patiently and carefully, advancing with practical, realistic steps in the light of circumstances and events as they occur, building the structure of peace soundly and solidly.

The times may have changed rather dramatically since 1949, but, strikingly, the words of President Truman are as applicable in today’s world as they were then and serve to underscore the case for NATO enlargement.

We at the American Jewish Committee shall do our utmost, working with like-minded institutions, to ensure that the vision of an expanded NATO becomes a reality.

HUNGARIAN HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION,
P.O. BOX J, GRACIE STATION,

The Honorable RICHARD G. LUGAR
Attention: Ken Myers, Legislative Assistant

DEAR SENATOR LUGAR,

When the Resolution of Ratification of NATO Enlargement comes to the Senate floor, we appeal to you to voice the expectation that:

• Romania quickly restore 2,140 church and community properties illegally confiscated under communism from the 1.5 million-strong ethnic Hungarian population; and that
• Slovakia reverse the discriminatory, present-day legal impact of the 1945 Benes Decrees which prevent the restitution of properties confiscated from the 520,000 ethnic Hungarians of that country.

These, and other longstanding human rights deficiencies, should have been resolved during the 13 years since the downfall of communism. We urge you to call upon these countries to now comply with, and actually implement, the common values of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights and minority rights shared by NATO members.

As expressed by Congressman Tom Lantos of California, “Only by the safeguarding of religious and minority rights and freedoms will the NATO zone of stability be extended to nations that share a demonstrated commitment to democracy and a true community of values.” (See attached statement, October 7, 2002)

Your 35,715 Hungarian-American constituents (2000 census) will be grateful for your statement, or any assistance you may provide in restoring the rights long-denied to Hungarian minority communities.

For further details regarding these human rights issues, please feel free to contact us, or visit http://www.hhrf.org/natoexpansion. Thank you in advance for your concern and action.

Very truly yours,

LÁSZLÓ HÁMOS
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I join my colleagues in urging adoption of House Resolution 468, which expresses the support of the House for the enlargement of NATO that is planned for the Prague Summit later this fall. Millions of Americans of Central and East European descent share that view, as they demonstrated since the NATO expansion of 1999, when Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were invited to become members of the North Atlantic Alliance. They—and most other Americans—recognize that a vital U.S. foreign policy interest will be served by continuing to expand the zone of democracy and stability in Europe.

I have been and remain a strong proponent of NATO enlargement to include those countries that have demonstrated their commitment to democratic reforms, including firm protection of minority rights of the diverse ethnic communities that live in these countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Mr. Speaker, I want to mention a particular interest and concern regarding minority rights of two large historic Hungarian communities—the 1.5 million Hungarians in Romania and the 520,000 in Slovakia. The major unresolved issue affecting the minority communities of both countries is the continued postponement of the implementation of laws for restitution and/or compensation for communal property confiscated from Hungarian religious and educational institutions. Although both Romania and Slovakia have taken important steps to address this critical question of property restitution, progress has been both slow and disappointingly limited.

Mr. Speaker, I urge both countries to pursue restitution more vigorously in the coming months, until fair and complete restitution is implemented according to the rule of law. Only by the safeguarding of religious and minority rights and freedoms will the NATO zone of stability be extended to nations that share a demonstrated commitment to democracy and a true community of values. I urge the governments of Romania and Slovakia to work to resolve these important issues, and I urge all of the countries who seek admission to the North Atlantic Alliance to remember that we in the United States consider treatment of ethnic minorities as an important measure of a democratic society.

SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA,
205 MADISON STREET,

To: The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Chair, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

From: John J. Karch
Slovak League of America

DEAR SENATOR LUGAR:
Faxing you a five-page letter on behalf of the Slovak League of America regarding Slovakia’s membership in NATO. We appreciate your outstanding leadership and support.

Many thanks and very best wishes,

JOHN KARCH, PH.D.
Executive Director

SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA,
205 MADISON STREET,
Passaic, NJ, May 2, 2003

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Chair, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN LUGAR:

On behalf of the Slovak League of America (League) and the two million Americans of Slovak ancestry, many thanks for your leadership and positive comments leading to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s 19–0 vote for NATO enlargement, your strong support for continuing Voice of America broadcasting to Central and Eastern Europe, as well as for the restoration of SEED funding. We are, of
course, particularly gratified that the Republic of Slovakia is among the seven invitees and signers of the Protocols of Accession for membership in NATO.

Now, with the upcoming deliberations in the Senate for ratification of the Protocols, we again request your strong support of Slovakia as a qualified, worthy candidate for NATO membership.

The League, organized in 1907, is composed of the following major Slovak American organizations: The First Catholic Slovak Ladies Association, First Catholic Slovak Union of the U.S., and Canada, Slovak Catholic Sokol, National Slovak Society of the USA, Ladies Pennsylvania Slovak Catholic Union, Slovak Newspapermen’s Association of America, and the Slovak Garden, Inc. in Florida.

The Slovak-American connection is historical. Living under oppressive conditions, some half-million Slovaks emigrated to the U.S. in the second half of the 19th century. The League fought for Slovak autonomy and later independence of Slovakia which culminated on January 1, 1993. Slovak and American values were similar: Western orientation, independence, liberty, democracy, rule of law, family, morals. They are industrious, loyal, and dedicated to commitments.

In the first NATO expansion into Central and Eastern Europe, Slovakia was one of the Visegrad Four cited in Senate Bills—with Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary but was subsequently excluded because of various domestic and foreign problems. However, following the 1998 Parliamentary elections, new government embarked on a determined course of needed reform, commitment, and political will to meet the criteria for NATO membership.

The results of the September 2002 Parliamentary elections encouraged the new coalition government to continue the policies of military, political, economic, and social reform internally and meeting the requirements established by the Membership Action Plan (MAP). The results were gratifying to NATO members, including the United States, and at the Prague Summit Slovakia, along with six others, was invited to join NATO.

Over recent years the Slovak government not only unveiled a comprehensive plan leading to NATO membership but was determined to pursue vigorously its implementation. Slovakia’s prodigious efforts have not gone unnoticed. In Bratislava March 10, his third visit since November 2001, the Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, said: “I have witnessed firsthand the progress made in preparing for NATO membership.” He cited the country’s “shared democratic values” with NATO members and commended the “hard work . . . to promote the goal of NATO membership,” the “hard work . . . to actually implement political, military and other reforms, and meeting NATO standards . . . to create a Europe whole and free, democracy and common values.”

TESTIMONY

In their testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. officials and experts reflected a positive response about the invitees. On April 29, Secretary of State Colin Powell said: “I strongly encourage the Senate to provide its advice and consent to the ratification of the Accession Protocols that will welcome into NATO seven new members.” All seven, he reported, “are already de facto Allies in the war on terror” and support the U.S. position on Iraq. Specifically, he cited Slovakia’s strong anti-corruption legislation and NBC unit in Kuwait.

On April 10, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz also characterized the seven invitees as de facto allies. He visualized two imperatives for enlargement: moral and strategic, the moral to help the new democracies, and the latter a “united Europe of common values will help avoid the major wars.” He was followed by Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace who said that “each of these nations has demonstrated the ability to make a contribution to the Alliance. They have made a firm commitment to the basic principles and values set out in the North Atlantic Treaty. The accession . . . will enhance NATO’s military effectiveness.” Noting they exhibit “member-like” behavior, General Pace said they “demonstrate their readiness to accept the responsibility of membership,” providing assistance. He cited Slovakia’s engineering unit in Afghanistan and an NBC unit to support the war in Iraq.

On April 8, Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman asked the Foreign Relations Committee “to act swiftly and positively” to the President’s request on ratification of the Accession Protocols. He said “This enlargement will strengthen democracy and stability in Europe, revitalize NATO and benefit the United States.” He elaborated on the progress of all seven and cited individual contributions on a chart, including Slovakia’s deployment of an engineering unit to Kabul.

Regarding Slovakia specifically, State Department’s Robert Bradtke testified that Slovakia “has demonstrated its readiness and commitment to supporting U.S. na-
tional security interests by contributing to the global war on terrorism, operations in the Balkans/Afghanistan, and in Iraq. The U.S. Ambassador to NATO, R. Nicholas Burns, Slovakia has been reducing its "antiquated military machine" with "success," now is capable of "making a significant contribution to Alliance defense" and the country is also on a "very positive political and economic trajectory." Defense Department's Ian Bremzinsk said "Slovakia's current reforms are solid and follow the 'Force 2010' Long Term Plan, which is the product of a comprehensive defense review created with U.S. assistance."

In commenting on, and recommending for accession all seven invitees, Bruce P. Jackson said "Slovakia's democratic credentials are, in many ways, the most impressive of all the Vilnius states." He emphasized the "sweeping reform" of the Ministry of Defense and cited some of Slovakia's programs abroad. National Defense University's Jeffrey Simon said; "Slovakia has made substantial progress" and its government has "fully supported the war on terrorism." He, too, supports the ratification of all seven, as did Dr. Ronald Asmus without commenting on them individually.

Slovakia's Preparedness

Many references have been made about the qualifications of the invitees, including democracy, rule of law, free market economy, armed forces, human rights, values, reforms, progress, capabilities, and some concerns. The Slovak Republic is a Parliamentary Republic reflecting Western democratic principles. It has three branches. The Executive consists of the President, as Head of State, the Cabinet, headed by the Prime Minister and Ministers; the Legislative (National Council or Parliament), a unicameral body of 150 deputies; and the Judiciary with a Supreme Court and a Constitutional Court. Since 1999, the President is elected by direct vote for a five-year term. Slovakia has universal suffrage (from 18 years of age). The legislature is elected on the basis of proportional representation for four-year terms. The SR has a wide spectrum of political parties.

The President is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the Minister of Defense is a civilian. The Constitution guarantees fundamental human rights and freedoms that are familiar to us. In its just released annual report "Freedom of the Press 2003" on worldwide mass media, Freedom House classified Slovakia in the top—"FREE"—category. Slovakia has very good relations with the U.S. and Western countries, as well as others. At the signing of the Protocols of Accession, March 26, Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan singled out three of Slovakia’s neighbors—the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland—"who unselfishly have been sharing with us their lessons learned from the process of the adherence to the Alliance."

The newly-elected government in 1998 inherited substantial fiscal and economic problems, including low international investment, and a foreign image not conducive to NATO membership. The Dzurinda-led coalition embarked on an ambitious program with impressive results. Today, Slovakia exhibits a free market economy while continuing vigorously with its reform program. Slovakia is a member of import organizations, including Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

In its 2002 country brief, the World Bank reported that "Slovak Republic's economic transformation over the last four years has positioned the country well for European Union (EU) accession. Indeed, Slovakia satisfied EU's stringent requirements, signed the Accession Treaty in April, and will hold a referendum May 16-17 on EU membership. Since polls indicate a highly favorable outcome, Slovakia will become a member in 2004. The country's GDP growth has been increasing, from 2.2 percent in 2000 to probably over 4 percent in 2003, inflation continues decreasing, from 12 percent in 2000 to possibly the 4 percent range this year, and unemployment is dropping below 18 percent this year. Based on performance, prospects for the future appear promising domestically and increasingly attractive to international investors.

Slovakia's Armed Forces

For years the Slovak public has judged its Army a most trusted institution. Slovakia's Armed Forces have performed magnificently in their missions abroad. To find a contrary view would be difficult. In their testimony, officials and experts have cited some, most recent, of their performance abroad. I add others. Slovakia was an early signatory to Partnership for Peace and a participant in its programs as well as with the Indiana National Guard. The Government had embarked on a revolutionary transformation of its Armed Forces, adopting a new strategy and an extensive reform program, as reflected in the Membership Action Plan.
(MAP) and its progress is ongoing. The two percent budgetary requirement for the Armed Forces is being reached, again reflecting Slovakia's determination to keep its commitments and guarantees. The objective is for the military to be fully interoperable with those of NATO members.

One such commitment is to fulfill Slovakia's international treaties. Accordingly, Slovakia has participated, and continues to participate, in numerous international (NATO, UN, OSCE, EU, and Coalition) peacekeeping, peace support operations, and humanitarian missions. These are:

- UN: Engineering Battalion in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1996-98)
- UN: Observation Mission in Angola (1997-99)
- NATO: Engineering unit for Peace Support in Albania (1999)
- UN: Disengagement Observer Mission in Golan Heights (1998-
- UN: Peacekeeping in Cyprus (2001-
- UN: Military Field Hospital in East Timor (July 2001-6/03)
- UN: Observation Mission in Lebanon and Syria (1998-
- UN: Observation Mission in Sierra Leone (1999-
- UN: Humanitarian Operations in Iraq (2000-03)
- NATO: Peace Support Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1998-
- Also, AF deployed 2-helicopter unit (2002-
- NATO: Stabilization in Kosovo, SR Mechanized Company, part of a Czech-Slovak Bn, of multinational Brigade under UK Command (2002-
- EU: Monitoring Mission on former Yugoslav territory (2000-
- OSCE: Observation Mission in Republic of Georgia (1999-
- OSCE: Observation Mission in Moldova (1998-
- FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM: Engineering unit for Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan (September 2002-

Mr. Chairman, we, of the Slovak League of America, have been aware of the criteria for NATO membership, and have observed developments in Central and Eastern Europe generally, and in Slovakia intensely. As loyal American citizens, we believe Slovakia has made impressive strides in ten years of independence, that it meets NATO requirements superbly, and that it is in the vital national interest of the Senate to ratify the Accession Protocol with Slovakia. We appeal to you, Mr. Chairman, to again apply your commendable leadership qualities in the Senate's discussion of its advice and consent.

Sincerely,

JOHN J. KARCH,
Executive Director.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF HON. COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question 1a. Have your counterparts in Europe, Japan and elsewhere told you that UN endorsement for the post-conflict phase would improve chances for gaining contributions of troops and money? Do our key allies believe that the UN should play an important role in managing Iraq's political transition?

Answer. A number of our Allies and others in the international community had expressed a preference for UN Security Council support of their participation in post-conflict Iraq. In addition to responding to UN humanitarian appeals, a number of countries sought to contribute to Iraq's economic reconstruction and recovery in cooperation with the Coalition. Some states also expressed interest in the possibility of providing security forces either individually or through a regional framework such as NATO.

UN Security Council Resolution 1483 facilitates the participation of our Coalition partners and others in the international community in reconstruction and stabilization efforts. The resolution notes that states that are not "occupying powers" may work under the Authority and welcomes their willingness to contribute personnel, equipment and other resources. The first Operative Paragraph of the resolution includes an explicit appeal by the Security Council to member states and concerned organizations to help the people of Iraq reform their institutions and rebuild, and to "contribute to conditions of stability and security in Iraq." The resolution also calls upon states to help meet humanitarian needs and provide resources for reconstruction and rehabilitation of Iraq's economic infrastructure, thereby opening the door for a broad range of assistance. Member States and regional organizations,
such as NATO, are further called upon to contribute to the overall implementation of the resolution.

UN Security Council Resolution 1483 fulfills the President and Prime Minister Blair’s promise made at Hillsborough of a vital UN role in all aspects of Iraq’s reconstruction, including the political process. Other Allies and Council members also believed the UN should play an important part in the political transition. Specifically, the resolution mandates the Secretary General’s Special Representative to work intensively with the Coalition Provisional Authority and the people of Iraq to advance efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative governance, including facilitation of a process leading to an internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq. In adopting SCR 1483 by a vote of 14–0, Council members expressed broad satisfaction with the UN role outlined in the resolution and the fact that the UN Special Representative would be closely involved in the political process. The resolution allows the Coalition Provisional Authority and the UN Special Representative the needed flexibility to assist the Iraqi people in determining their own political future. We look forward to working with the Secretary-General’s newly appointed Special Representative Sergio De Mello, who brings a great deal of experience to this position.

Question 1b. Are our allies comfortable making their contributions through the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, which is in the Defense Department chain of command?

Answer. There are a number of different methods for our international partners to support Iraqi efforts to rebuild their country. Currently, there are coalition officials working directly with the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) on the ground in Iraq. Of the approximately 1,000 personnel working in ORHA, 40 percent are from our coalition partners. In many cases these officials are coordinating bilateral assistance for the people of Iraq.

Other donors have chosen to provide assistance through UN agencies, including in response to the UN Humanitarian Flash Appeal, other international organizations and NGOs. The Coalition, through ORHA and the USAID/State DART teams on the ground, are working to ensure that this assistance is effectively provided and is coordinated with other donor efforts and those efforts of the Iraqis in various sectors.

As specified in UN Security Council Resolution 1483, the UN Special Representative will work closely with the Coalition Authority to ensure that humanitarian and reconstruction assistance coming through UN channels and NGOs is coordinated and supports overall efforts to improve the quality of life for Iraqi citizens.

Question 1c. What is the Administration doing to bring other countries into the Iraq reconstruction effort? What success are you having? What additional support could you gain with a UN Security Council resolution?

Answer. We have been engaged in a long-running effort to develop international support for our efforts to disarm Iraq and assist the Iraqi people in establishing the foundations of a prosperous, democratic nation. Our efforts to engage other countries on post-conflict support began before Operation Iraqi Freedom as part of our coalition building exercises. Numerous countries have already committed either in-kind or cash contributions to the post-conflict effort, and others indicated that they would be able to do so following the adoption of a UN Security Council on post-conflict resolution. UNSCR 1483 facilitates and encourages the participation of the international community in the reconstruction of Iraq. We expect that there will be a donors pledging conference later this year attended by a broad representation of countries and international organizations to contribute to the effort.

Question 1d. Where do we stand on the issue of recruiting international police forces to help improve the law and order situation in Iraq? How many forces have been pledged and by whom? When will they arrive? Who will undertake that mission in the interim?

Answer. We continue to seek assistance from the international community for contributions to assist in post-conflict Iraq. As has been reported in the press, there have been conferences in London and Warsaw to firm up troop contributions to stability operations. We are confident that approximately 16 countries will be contributing troops. In addition, there are approximately another 16 countries with which we (along with the UK and Poland) have been in discussions; we are confident that a number of these countries will also contribute troops.

However, we are not planning to deploy an international civilian police force in Iraq, but instead are standing up an Iraqi national civilian police force within existing structures. While CENTCOM still has primary responsibility for stabilization and security, over half of the pre-war Baghdad police force has reported to work and...
is conducting joint patrols with U.S. military forces. The objective is to transfer civilian police functions from military forces to Iraqi civilian police as quickly as they are able to assume the responsibilities.

To help us determine what will be needed to fully reconstitute Iraq’s criminal justice system, a Department of Justice-led international team is on the ground to conduct an initial assessment of the sector needs throughout Iraq. We expect the initial assessment will be completed in early June.

Following the assessment, DynCorp International, under contract to the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), will provide up to 1,000 civilian advisors to help the government of Iraq organize effective civilian law enforcement, judicial, and correctional agencies.

We are also approaching selected other governments to request assistance and contributions. Britain, Canada and Denmark have contributed senior police and judicial experts as members of the DOJ-led assessment team that will determine the type and extent of assistance needed. We are also discussing offers from other countries for criminal justice expertise and equipment, and will coordinate all offers of assistance to avoid confusion and duplication of efforts.

**Question 1e.** Have you had any success in recruiting other nations to share in the burden of serving as the senior advisors in the various Iraqi ministries?

**Answer.** Yes, there are a number of international staff participating on the ground in Iraq, including a senior Italian official serving as the senior advisor in the Ministry of Culture and an Australian expert serving as one of the two senior advisors to the Agriculture Ministry. In addition, UK Major General Tim Cross serves as one of the three Deputy Directors and Danish Ambassador Ole Olson serves as Regional Coordinator for the Southern Region.

**Question 1f.** Given the particular sensitivity of oil, would you be open to recruiting someone from a friendly oil-producing country instead of having direct American control of the oil sector?

**Answer.** We recognize the political sensitivity of Iraqi oil and have appointed an Iraqi oil official, Thamir Ghadhban, to serve as the interim head of the oil management team. As such, Mr. Ghadhban will make the day-to-day management decisions in the oil sector, including sales, marketing and production decisions. We have also established an advisory board, headed by an experienced international oil executive, Philip Carroll, to provide advice to Mr. Ghadhban and his staff. The advisory board will include Iraqi and non-Iraqi oil experts.

**Question 2a.** Do you think the United States should choose the members of the Interim Authority or otherwise indicate our preferences, or should we remain neutral in the process?

**Answer.** The United States, acting with our coalition partners, will engage in a broad range of consultations with all sectors of Iraqi society as part of the process to establish an interim authority in Iraq. Given the lack of democratic institutions in the country after decades of Ba’athist rule, it will be very important that the coalition ensure that the interim authority represents the full diversity of Iraq’s population, including women and religious and ethnic minorities.

**Question 2b.** Will insiders or exiles form the majority on the interim authority?

**Answer.** The Coalition Provisional Authority, working with the UN Special Representative, will help the Iraqi people form an Iraqi interim administration (IIA) to serve as a transitional administration until an internationally recognized, representative government is established by the people of Iraq. Both Iraqis recently liberated from Saddam’s rule and those Iraqis who have been living abroad, often in democratic societies, will have important roles to play in the IIA.

**Question 2c.** What are the critical ingredients of a successful political transition?

**Answer.** The Coalition is working to create the conditions for the people of Iraq to form an Iraqi interim administration (IIA). We are also working with Iraqis to ensure the effective administration of justice, the formation of an independent judiciary, and to help to establish the rule of law. We are also looking at steps to promote transparency and anti-corruption, and establishing an appropriate mechanism—probably a constituent assembly—to draft a new constitution.

We have facilitated elections in several areas at the local government level to speed the delivery of basic services and begin the process of establishing representative government. Other local, regional and, ultimately, national elections must follow. We are engaged in efforts to support civic education, promote independent and professional media, and establish civil society institutions as key elements of a successful political transition.
We are supporting Iraqi efforts to develop a new system that will be built around personal freedom and of law, a system that will provide increased economic opportunities for Iraqis and support the country’s political transformation.

The Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Sergio de Mello, can and should play a vital role in the political and economic transformation of Iraq.

We recognize the need to provide the IIA, the Coalition Provisional Authority, and the UN Special Representative the flexibility needed to assist the Iraqi people in determining their own political future. Just as non-Iraqis cannot impose a government on Iraq, we cannot impose a particular process in what is a dynamic situation. In these circumstances, an attempt to produce a firm “blueprint” for the formation of Iraqi political institutions would be doomed to failure.

Question 2d. What will be the State Department’s role in guiding Iraq’s political transition? Will State play a subordinate role to the Defense Department?

Answer. The President has appointed Ambassador L. Paul Bremer as Presidential Envoy to Iraq and, as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Ambassador Bremer has the overall responsibility for overseeing Iraq’s political and economic transformation. At the President’s direction, Ambassador Bremer reports directly to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld.

There are a number of USG agencies, including the State Department, currently in Iraq supporting Ambassador Bremer as part of the CPA.

FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL

Question 3. Regarding the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, why has the United States decided to re-open the negotiation of an issue that has already been decided by prior negotiations? Is it your opinion that re-opening the negotiations on the FCTC does not imperil international support for and eventual enactment of the Treaty? If the U.S. position is again defeated, will the United States continue to insist on opening the treaty or will the U.S. permit the treaty to go forward, which appears to be the desire of the vast majority of the WHO member nations?

Answer. As of April 29, the U.S. was engaged in discussion with countries to determine the level of interest in adoption of the treaty with a limited amendment removing the article prohibiting reservations.

The U.S. endeavored over the past three years to negotiate a treaty that would help the world advance toward the level of tobacco control we have achieved in this country. At the same time, we tried to ensure that the Framework Convention would be a treaty that the United States would be able to sign and likely ratify.

The Administration will carefully review the treaty language before making a final decision on signing.