[Senate Hearing 108-178]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-178
A REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY IN BURMA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN
AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 18, 2003
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
89-837 wASHINGTON : 2003
____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire Virginia
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN
AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, Chairman
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia Virginia
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Brownback, Hon. Sam, U.S. Senator from Kansas.................... 1
Burke, Kevin, President and CEO, American Apparel and Footwear
Association.................................................... 32
Prepared statement........................................... 34
Craner, Hon. Lorne W., Assistant Secretary, Democracy, Human
Rights and Labor, Department of State.......................... 6
Din, U Aung, Policy Director, Free Burma Coalition............... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 16
Joseph, Brian, Program Officer, Asia, National Endowment for
Democracy...................................................... 22
Prepared statement........................................... 25
Martin, Veronika, Advocate, Refugees International............... 38
Prepared statement........................................... 41
McConnell, Hon. Mitch, U.S. Senator from Kentucky................ 3
Rogers, Kenneth, Associate Dean of International Programs and
Director of International Services (emeritus), Indiana
University..................................................... 36
(iii)
A REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY IN BURMA
----------
Wednesday, June 18, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in
Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam
Brownback, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senator Brownback.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SAM BROWNBACK,
U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS
Senator Brownback. The hearing will come to order. This is
a hearing of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs. We will be hearing about recent developments in the
Southeast Asian country of Burma. This is a result of actions
taken by the Congress in light of the recent crackdown in
Burma, and in light of broader discussion of the United States
toward the military regime in Burma. We have the author of this
major bill, Senator McConnell, who will be first to testify.
Before I go on with my statement, I want to say how
appreciative I am of his great work to focus intensity and
ability to move this legislation on forward. I appreciate that,
and I know the people of Burma deeply appreciate that.
During some ominous twilight hour on May 30 a band of
brutes under the banner of the Union Solidarity and Development
Association launched into an attack on a caravan transporting
Aung San Suu Kyi and supporters of a goodwill tour. The
resulting melee ended in an unknown number of people killed and
injured and Aung San Suu Kyi imprisoned, along with 19 of her
supporters in a nationwide crackdown on her National League for
Democracy, the NLD, and the country's universities, which have
proven to be a fount of democratic activism.
Last week, the New York Times quoted a noted expert as
saying if they can get away with it, this is the end of Aung
San Suu Kyi, if not as a mythical figure, then as a real threat
to them. If people accept that she can be locked away and
nobody can see her, and that other leaders can be silenced and
that the party can be silenced, then they've won the day.
I am confident when I say that they have already lost. As
Secretary Powell's comments in the Wall Street Journal stated,
simply put, the attack on Ms. Suu Kyi, her convoy, and the
utter failure of the junta to accept efforts at peaceful change
cannot be the last word on the matter. I applaud the efforts of
Secretary Powell in Cambodia addressing this and other
important issues at the ASEAN Regional Forum, who has clearly
asserted the United States' policy. The message is clear to the
regime. Time is up for your tyranny.
I am not asserting that our policies have come simply as a
response to this latest crackdown. By contrast, as early as
March, during a House International Relations Committee
hearing, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Daley
stated, ``absent progress, we will be forced to consider, in
conjunction with the international community, sanctions and/or
other measures.''
Ostensibly, the Secretary of State made a reversal of
policy because of a steady buildup of egregious violations by
the regime. The window for dialogue and engagement withered
before our eyes. However, questions remain about the direction
and commitment the U.S. has to executing this new policy. Upon
what equities will we need to trade? Will there be strategic
issues the U.S. would need to transcend if it were to pursue
this policy? Can we expect adequate cooperation from our
allies, regional partners, and other key players? Our witnesses
have answers to most of these questions, and I look forward to
hearing from them.
My own view is that engagement with the regime, whether or
not it was bearing fruit, has shamelessly failed. Systems of
government matter. Unlike some of the other erstwhile communist
states, fledgling democracies in the former Soviet Union, Burma
does not operate under any pretense or suggestion that it is a
democratic-oriented state. Not only does it not get it, the
junta does not want to get it. For the U.S. to have the moral
authority to move forward, we must impose sanctions, namely,
import bans, sacrificing our own economic self-interest in this
particular case; I think it can be very, very successful.
The other measures which extend the visa ban for the
regime's thugs, freeze and seize assets, ban remittances, and
ban travel for U.S. citizens, are all measures to put the
squeeze on the Generals. I'm hopeful that we're going to be
able to work in an international coalition in this effort. Just
last week, the Senate passed a resolution on Burma that allows
the use of sanctions. Normally, I am strongly opposed to the
use of sanctions, but in this particular case I think it is
something that we have to look at very aggressively to send any
type of message at all to this brutal regime.
Let me conclude my comments by simply saying that, one
personal note, a couple of years ago I traveled to the Thai-
Burmese border. It was on an issue regarding trafficking in
persons. It was actually sex trafficking, and one of the
premier places where that was happening in the world was along
the Burmese-Thai border. The reason it was happening there was
because the Burmese Government was running its citizens out of
its country along that border, and a number of young girls were
becoming prey to traffickers into brothels in Thailand and
other places.
This was a direct result of what the Burmese regime was
doing to its own people, leading to this increase in
trafficking in one of the biggest areas in the world. Burma is
a tier three country; it just came out in the Trafficking in
Persons Report. They don't care about the trafficking in
persons, and it continues to happen unabated. This is a
shameful situation that's happening as a result of the policies
of the Burmese Government.
I now have the pleasure of introducing the lead author of
the resolution that passed the United States Senate last week,
Senator Mitch McConnell, who has worked aggressively on the
topic of our relations with Burma and putting pressure on the
Burmese Government. Senator McConnell, I'm delighted to have
you here, and the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. MITCH McCONNELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM KENTUCKY
Senator McConnell. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you for your interest. The timeliness of this hearing
could not be more obvious. I appreciate your support as well as
Chairman Lugar's and Ranking Member Biden's support for the
Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, which we passed out of the
Senate, as you indicated, just last week. That 97-to-1 vote
underscores the Senate's support for the struggle for freedom
in Burma. We sent a very powerful message to Rangoon, that the
freest nation on earth is leading the charge to defend Burma's
courageous democrats, including Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu
Kyi.
As Burma's history informs its future, a cursory
examination of the past should discourage us from believing
that strong words from Senators alone will cause the thugs in
Rangoon to change their ways. The illegitimate Burmese junta
was born in blood, and the leaders of the regime have
maintained their grip on power through violence and
intimidation ever since. For over 40 years, from the military
coup led by General New Win in 1962, until the murder of
democratic dissidents just this last month, the generals who
run things in Rangoon have brutalized their political
opponents, terrorized the Burmese people, and driven the
Burmese economy right into the ground.
Every time the junta has been threatened by the forces of
freedom and democracy, it has violently lashed out against its
critics. We saw this during the 1988 pro-democracy
demonstrations in Burma, again in the 1990 elections won by the
NLD, and most recently on May 30 when, as you indicated, Mr.
Chairman, the ambush on Suu Kyi's convoy occurred that killed
and injured scores of democrats.
Despite the murder and the mayhem, the SPDC has yet to
extinguish the flames of freedom in Burma. What has been most
impressive is the courage and determination of Suu Kyi and all
Burmese democrats in the face of this incredible repression.
They simply refuse--simply refuse--to surrender the principles
of freedom, human rights, and the rule of law to this abusive
regime.
United States sanctions on Burma are a good first step, and
will be watched. Indeed they are being watched around the
globe. But our actions will not be truly effective until our
European allies and Burma's neighbors also place pressure on
the junta. There are many reasons why they should do this.
First, the world's democracies have an inherent obligation to
assist other freedom-loving peoples to achieve their
aspirations for democracy and the rule of law. This is even
more true when freedom is under attack, as is happening in
Burma.
Second, Mr. Chairman, the SPDC poses a clear and present
danger to Burma's neighbors. Burma is a major exporter of
narcotics, small arms, HIV/AIDS, instability, and disease, to
say nothing of the forced trafficking of women and children as
indentured sex workers, which the Chairman has already
referenced. China and Thailand already recognize the growing
HIV/AIDS and narcotics problems spilling over Burma's borders
into their own countries.
As the recent SARS epidemic has illustrated, disease knows
no borders, and it is apparent that all transnational issues
that stem from the SPDC pose long-term threats to the region
and beyond the region.
Finally, the junta's brutal attack on democracy in Burma
received swift condemnation from foreign capitals. Even ASEAN,
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, now meeting in
Cambodia, can no longer ignore this crisis festering in its own
backyard. U.N. Special Envoy Razali Ismail lashed out at ASEAN,
saying, ``constructive engagement is just an excuse for
perpetuating the status quo. ASEAN should be very embarrassed
at what is happening in Burma.''
Maybe ASEAN is embarrassed. The comments of nine members
earlier this week for Suu Kyi's release is a welcome departure
from ASEAN's policy of noninterference in other member states'
affairs, but words must be backed up by concrete actions. ASEAN
members collectively and independently should consider similar
measures proposed in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act,
including travel restrictions and freezing assets of the SPDC.
On this latter point, Mr. Chairman, Razali indicated that a
portion of the junta's assets may be in Singapore. Perhaps the
Senate should discuss this matter when the Singapore Free Trade
Act comes to the floor for consideration. Some of Burma's
regional neighbors have been more aggressive in seeking to
curry favor with the military junta. Bidding for despots is
never a safe bet, and I would encourage those countries,
including Japan, India, Malaysia, China, and Thailand to
rethink the dangers inherent to cooperating with an
illegitimate regime.
Further unrestrained competition between China, Japan, and
India for greater relations with Rangoon may create unintended
and unproductive demands of its own. The Council on Foreign
Relations' Independent Task Force on Burma released its report
just this morning. It contains numerous policy recommendations
that the administration and the U.N. should consider and
implement.
I am pleased to have served on that task force, along with
Senators Lugar and Feinstein, and want to encourage the State
Department to move quickly on one particularly timely
suggestion. America should press the U.N. to convene an
emergency Security Council meeting to sanction Burma.
Let me add one recommendation not included in the task
force report. Diplomatic relations with Burma should be
downgraded by sending Burma's Ambassador in Washington back to
Rangoon until such time that Suu Kyi and all political
prisoners are freed. I sent a letter to Secretary Powell this
very morning suggesting a downgrade in relations, and encourage
other interested Members to do the same.
If the international community has the political will to
stand for freedom in Burma, change can come to that beleaguered
country. America can lead in that effort, but we cannot do it
alone. It is in the interests of the United States, Europe, and
all of Asia that a solution to Burma be achieved. Absent such a
resolution, the major exports from Burma to the region will
continue to be drugs, disease, and refugees. Those are the
major exports from Burma right now, drugs, disease, and
refugees.
Let me close, Mr. Chairman, by saying that the full range
of sanctions cannot be imposed against Burma soon enough.
However, there must be concrete progress and a meaningful
dialogue between the SPDC, the NLD, and ethnic minorities
before any pressure is lifted. It's not enough simply to free
Suu Kyi and other political prisoners. This game that the junta
plays of catch and release has gotten old. Pressure should only
be lifted when a dialogue leads to a successful conclusion of
Burma's struggle for freedom.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to
be here today.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Senator McConnell, for your
statement and the power of it, and I appreciated all the
specifics that you put in it as well. It's a very complete
statement and a very good one. It strikes me anywhere around
the world that when you see evil as concentrated as what we
have in the leadership in Burma, the thing you do with it is
not to negotiate with it. You confront it and you deal with it,
and you face it; you've put forward a number of very specific
items here.
Let me ask you, in your review of actions taken by other
countries to date, have the Europeans been stepping forward on
dealing with Burma? Is there any indication that they will be
putting additional pressure on Burma?
Senator McConnell. Not to the extent that I would like,
and I think the Europeans ought to join us. We have had some
differences recently over Iraq policy. This ought to be
something that we can all agree on.
And I, like you, am typically skeptical of sanctions, but
there is one good example in recent history where a
multilateral sanctions regime worked and actually brought about
regime change, which is what we are seeking here. That was
South Africa where the entire world literally treated the South
Africa Government as a pariah. It was so isolated from the rest
of the world as a result of its own internal policies, very
similar to this, that it did indeed hasten the end of the
apartheid regime.
So there's every reason to believe that an effective
international sanctions regime could well get the job done in
Burma, and I'm hoping that the United States is going to lead
and the Europeans will follow. Of course it's very important
for the ASEAN countries to do a good deal more than they did
just the day before yesterday--they called for the release of
Suu Kyi. Maybe they thought that was a big deal, because they
typically don't comment on internal affairs in ASEAN countries;
but the release of Suu Kyi is not enough, and letting Razali in
to see her for 15 minutes is not enough.
Seeing is not freeing. First, she needs to be out, free to
go about the country, and that needs to lead to an orderly
transition to recognize the outcome of the election in 1990. I
believe that with the U.S. in the lead, with our prestige at an
all-time high throughout the world, this is the time to get
multilateral sanctions regimes in place around the world, and I
think it will make a difference.
Senator Brownback. The Thais have been a good ally of the
United States for a long period of time, and yet have been slow
to move forward on addressing the issue of Burma. Lately, they
have made some stronger statements here, but are we seeing
enough progress being made, or push made by Thailand?
Senator McConnell. No. The Thai Prime Minister met with
the President a week ago Tuesday. I met with him as well. They
have had, as the Senator knows, a policy of constructive
engagement, which basically means they're doing business with
the thugs. I think the Thais need to reverse that policy. The
President himself mentioned that to the Thai Prime Minister in
their meeting. I and others certainly mentioned it up here. I
think that is a policy that clearly won't work.
The Thais could potentially have the greatest impact on the
Burmese regime, because they're right next door. I hope the
constructive engagement policy will change and that they will
join us in an international sanctions regime that can actually
squeeze the junta right out of power.
Senator Brownback. Senator, thank you very much for your
testimony, and I appreciate all of your suggestions.
We will next call up Hon. Lorne W. Craner. He is the
Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at
the State Department, and he will be the next panel
presentation.
Mr. Craner, thank you very much for joining us. Your full
statement will be made a part of the record. You're welcome to
summarize or to deliver off that statement, however you would
choose. We're delighted to have you here.
STATEMENT OF HON. LORNE W. CRANER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Craner. Thank you very much, Senator. Normally I
actually don't read statements at length, but I would like to
read this one; because the administration has a few things to
say, and we would like to say them publicly.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important and
timely hearing. It is with a feeling of outrage and disgust
that I appear here today, because tomorrow a courageous
champion of democracy, Aung San Suu Kyi, will be spending yet
another birthday, her 58th, in detention. The Burmese junta
must release Aung San Suu Kyi immediately and resume a dialogue
with the opposition to formulate with them a plan for
democratization in Burma.
In light of the recent outrageous events in Burma, I will
be updating you on the State Department's current strategy to
respond to those events and reiterating this administration's
unwavering commitment to support the long-suffering people of
Burma as they battle for democracy, human rights, and freedom.
Both the President and Secretary of State have taken a personal
interest in Burma, and many of my comments echo those of the
Secretary in his recent editorial in the Wall Street Journal.
Our worst fears for democracy in Burma have been realized.
We have always doubted the sincerity of the junta's claim to
desire a peaceful transition to democracy. Now we know our
doubts were justified. The orchestration of the ambush of Aung
San Suu Kyi and her supporters on May 30 and the refusal to
account for what has happened leave no room for debate.
The junta, calling itself the State Peace and Development
Council, rules through fear and brutality, and with complete
disregard for the rule of law, basic human rights, and the
hopes and welfare of the Burmese people. The junta's recent
actions make clear the depths to which these thugs will sink to
retain power. Our response must be equally clear.
We commend the bipartisan efforts of Members of Congress to
shine a spotlight on human rights in Burma. We also commend the
Senate for passing the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act
sponsored by Senator Mitch McConnell, who has always been a
great advocate for liberty in Burma for now over a decade.
The State Department supports the goals and intent of this
bill, and we are working on several actions to increase
pressure on the SPDC. Already, we have extended our visa
restrictions to include all officials of the puppet
organization of the junta: the Union Solidarity and Development
Association (USDA), and the managers of state-run enterprises,
so that they and their families can be banned as well.
The United States already votes against loans to Burma from
IFUs like the World Bank. In addition to our existing
sanctions, we are now working on freezing the financial assets
of members of the SPDC and banning remittances to Burma. We are
also considering an import ban. Finally, we hope to place
restrictions on travel to Burma.
As we strengthen our own set of sanctions, we do so in
conjunction with the E.U. Earlier this week, the E.U. began
implementing its own strengthened common position which will
also extend an asset freeze and visa restrictions to leaders of
the USDA and managers of state-owned companies. To be truly
effective, however, Burma's neighbors must join us in
increasing pressure on the SPDC. It is time that Asian
countries take responsibility for the actions of their Burmese
neighbor, the junta that destabilizes the region and smears the
reputation of a regional institution like ASEAN.
As we speak, the Secretary is currently having frank
discussions at the ASEAN Regional Forum about Burma with both
members of ASEAN and other countries in attendance, including
China. ASEAN loses credibility when it allows one of its
members to flout its previous commitments to the organization.
It is time that ASEAN members act decisively and firmly to
address the problems in Burma that affect their region. We
recognize their recent statement in favor of national
reconciliation as a first step. We also support their plans to
send a troika delegation to Rangoon, but we need to see more.
The SPDC's renewed campaign of violence and repression
against the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi shows the junta's blatant
disregard for the basic rights of the Burmese people and the
desire of the international community to see those rights
protected. The most recent crackdown is just one link in a long
chain of appalling behavior against the people and the nation
that the military regime claims to represent.
The SPDC's disregard for human rights and democracy extends
to every conceivable category of violation. The junta
suppresses political dissent by censorship, persecution,
beatings, disappearances, and imprisonment. It harasses ethnic
minorities through brutal campaigns against civilians. It
sharply curtails religious freedom. It subjects its people to
forced labor. It recruits children to serve in the military,
and then brutalizes them.
The litany of abuses in ethnic minority regions is
especially deplorable: widespread and brutal rapes, tortures,
murders, forced relocations, forced labor, confiscation of
property, and suppression of religious freedom in villages in
the Shan, Karen, Kayah, Mon, Rakhine, and Tenasserim Divisions.
The violations of the basic human rights of these minority
peoples have devastating consequences that extend from
individuals and their families and communities, to the region
and the world.
The widespread use of forced labor by the SPDC, including
the forced conscription of children into the army, has been an
ongoing concern to the U.S. and the International Labor
Organization. Forced labor is one of the most egregious
violations of worker rights. Since the ILO's request to its
constituents in December 2000 that they review their relations
with Burma in light of the system of forced labor, it has been
trying to work with the SPDC to eliminate forced labor. As the
ILO liaison officer in Rangoon said recently, forced labor
continues to be a serious problem, especially in border areas
controlled by the military.
Our recent report on trafficking in persons, released just
last week, sheds further light on the problem and the Burmese
regime's insufficient response. The SPDC has tried to appease
the ILO with slow increases in the level of their cooperation
with them, but this has yet to lead to any serious actions to
combat the problem.
In May, the SPDC and the ILO agreed on a plan of action
which, if implemented, would have begun to produce some
substantive progress. The ILO decided this month, however, that
the climate of uncertainty and intimidation created by the
events of May 30 did not provide an environment in which the
plan could be implemented credibly.
Forced labor is yet another area in which the SPDC
continues to evade its responsibility to protect the basic
rights of the people of Burma and show its disdain for the rule
of law.
Throughout Burma, there is no freedom of association, no
freedom of expression, and no freedom of the press. Well over
1,000 political prisoners languish in Burma's jails, and the
arrests and unlawful detentions continue. In addition to Aung
San Suu Kyi, at least 100 NLD supporters were detained or are
missing or dead after the incident in late May. NLD leaders,
both young and old, were targeted in this assault. Today, we
fear for the welfare of senior leader U Tin Oo, who reportedly
was injured, and whose whereabouts remain unknown.
We have not forgotten, nor will we forget, any of these
brave individuals who put their lives on the line over the past
two decades to stand, as others have before them, for justice,
democracy, freedom, the rule of law, and the right to be heard.
Together with the international community, we have pressed for
the immediate and unconditional release of all political
prisoners at every opportunity. We will continue to do so until
every prisoner is released to live a life in freedom and peace.
We will also continue to report honestly and accurately on
the crimes of the SPDC in our reports on human rights,
religious freedom, and trafficking in persons and drugs. The
truth will not be hidden. The oppression of an entire nation
must not stand. The international community should pull
together as never before to put an end to the unchecked abuses
perpetrated by this illegitimate and brutal junta. The Generals
must learn that such appalling behavior will deny them any of
the benefits of participation in the global community, and
eventually will deny them the ability to maintain the power
they stole from the legitimate democratic leadership of Burma
in 1990.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much.
Let me ask you a couple of things, starting off with
countries in the region and how they're doing on dealing with
the government in Rangoon. What's been the communication you've
had with China on its relationship with Burma, its support for
the military government, and what's been the Chinese response?
Mr. Craner. Insufficient for what we would like. There is
no evidence that they're willing to change their attitude on
Burma neither in international fora nor bilaterally.
Senator Brownback. This, in spite of the things that have
happened here, the ambush that happened on Suu Kyi, the ongoing
problem? The Chinese have not changed their position towards
Burma?
Mr. Craner. No, they have not.
Senator Brownback. China is a major supplier, a major
military supplier to the Government of Burma. Does that
continue to be the case?
Mr. Craner. That continues to be the case.
Senator Brownback. How do they justify this position given
this takeover by a military government, the trafficking,
narcotics trafficking, sex trafficking that is taking place
right next door to them? They can't deny that it occurs, or do
they?
Mr. Craner. No, they don't deny that it occurs, but you
have to remember that, given the nature of the Chinese regime,
the way they would view the regime in Burma, they are obviously
affected by some of these problems. There is a drug problem, a
big drug problem in southern China along those borders, and
they recognize that trafficking in China needs to be cleaned
up. They have taken some acts over the years, but they are not
yet ready, at this moment at least, to increase their pressure
on the Burmese junta.
Senator Brownback. What about Thailand? What has the Thai
response been?
Mr. Craner. The best way to look at this is to look at the
region and decide as a group, are they moving? I think as
Senator McConnell noted, they have moved in terms of
statements. They are talking about sending a group to Rangoon
to push the regime to release Suu Kyi and open up. I don't
think that is enough, but I also don't think we should
underestimate that movement.
My experience in watching regimes around the world is that
the most useful pressure can come from the United States and
Europe, but it is at least as important to have the neighbors
involved in pressuring a regime to change. It need not include
economic sanctions against a regime in their neighborhood. The
regime in their neighborhood has to get the sense that their
neighbors have tired of them before they look at changing.
Senator Brownback. Is that message being convened by ASEAN?
Mr. Craner. I think the Burmese regime was shocked by the
change, the statement that was made by ASEAN. I don't think it
expected that at all. I think that was an important thing,
though it looks insufficient to us, but I think the Burmese
regime has begun to get the message, as it should, that it is
an embarrassment to the other countries in the region and that
the other countries are tiring of having this kind of mess in
their neighborhood.
Senator Brownback. I would think they would at least convey
that, or grow weary of the trafficking, drug trafficking,
trafficking in persons, the sex trafficking. Do you get
comments from any of the ASEAN countries about that?
Mr. Craner. We do, but as you know well, in many of the
countries in ASEAN, Burma is not the only country with these
kinds of problems. In fact, it's not the only tier three
country in Asia. I think what is more important is the kind of
pressure that we and others are putting on Burma's neighbors in
the region to say, we've had enough, and you have got to get
past this policy of constructive engagement and have a more
useful and forceful policy towards the regime in Burma. I think
that is what will cause them to change, to become embarrassed,
like I said, by the mess in their neighborhood.
Senator Brownback. What about the Europeans? What has been
the response by the Europeans to Suu Kyi's arrest and the
attack on her caravan?
Mr. Craner. Earlier this year, they said that they were
going to wait until October to see if anything changed in
Burma, and on Monday they announced that they weren't going to
wait until October to see if anything changed. Instead, they
were going to impose the sanctions, which are very similar to
ours, that they had originally agreed to withhold until
November. That's why, in this case, nobody should be mistaken
that these are unilateral penalties by the United States
against Burma. The E.U. added to its arms embargo, and
similarly to our actions, added to its visa bans and assets on
more than 150 officers in the junta.
Senator Brownback. So is it fair to say that the United
States and Europe are walking very closely together on dealing
with Burma?
Mr. Craner. Yes. I have to tell you, I think we were
leading. I think we moved much more quickly both here in the
Congress and in the administration than was the case in Europe,
but we have always for some years tried to walk beside Europe
on these issues to make sure that the maximum pressure possible
is brought against Burma.
Senator Brownback. What about Senator McConnell's series of
suggestions that he has put forward that are very, very strong
positions, the lead one being downgrading relations, a letter
to Secretary Powell that he was sending, and then also an
emergency U.N. meeting to discuss sanctioning Burma. What's
your view on the part of the administration of those two items?
Mr. Craner. I'm gong to let the Secretary answer the
letter on downgrading relations, because that just came in this
morning. On the U.N. meeting, it is a good idea; but one needs
to consider what happens at the end of the day when the meeting
is over, and I think the suggestion was in particular for a
Security Council meeting. If one or more of the members of the
Security Council, especially the permanent members, were to not
want to see sanctions, that would not be a good end of the day
at the U.N.
Senator Brownback. But let's play that out. Let's say that
China does not want to see sanctions. Doesn't that expose right
there the major problem, or one of the major problems, in the
Chinese support for this military dictatorship that is treating
its people so poorly? Wouldn't that even of itself be
constructive and instructive?
Mr. Craner. I think it would be instructive, but I don't
think it would add to our knowledge of Chinese policy. What I
would hate to see is the Burmese regime trumpeting a failure by
the U.N. to bring sanctions as a victory for them; that they,
the SPDC, evaded sanctions by the U.N.; and for them to tell
people at home that nobody outside cares about them.
Senator Brownback. Do you have any initial review of where
the U.N. members would be, the Security Council members would
be on a series of sanctions against Burma?
Mr. Craner. If you looked at the slate, most of them would
be interested in that; but again you have the issue of the
permanent Security Council members having a veto, and of
exactly how many votes you would get for that. It is definitely
an attractive idea for the beginning of the day when it
happens. I'm not sure it would look so good at the end of the
day.
Senator Brownback. So what you're saying to me is that
we're going to need to build, bilaterally, pressure around the
world with a number of different countries in building up the
pressure on Burma.
Mr. Craner. Yes. That is something we are doing, and we
want to do, including with China already, not necessarily aimed
at a U.N. Council session. In general, that is something in
which we are redoubling our efforts as we speak.
Senator Brownback. I want to ask about drug production and
movement out of Burma. There have been press reports earlier
this year indicating some question and discussion about heroin
production, and other illicit drugs, closely being linked to
top-ranking Burmese officials and the Burmese armed forces.
I'd like to know, is that accurate from the
administration's perspective, and is the United States taking a
position that Burma is not cooperating in the war against
drugs, narcotic movement, production, and is indeed a state
runner of drugs? Could you inform me of the administration's
view and position on drug production and drug movement in and
out of Burma?
Mr. Craner. I think the most instructive thing is that
earlier this year we refused to certify them as cooperating in
the war on drugs. They had tried to persuade us in Rangoon and
elsewhere that they were cooperating, but we found the evidence
insufficient to be able to certify them in our report to
Congress that we put forth every year. That is the bottom line.
There are just a handful of countries where we're unable to do
that in the world, and Burma is one of them.
Senator Brownback. A handful of countries----
Mr. Craner. That we were unable to certify as cooperating
in the war on drugs.
Senator Brownback. Okay, so indeed that there is drug
movement out of Burma and into the region----
Mr. Craner. Absolutely.
Senator Brownback [continuing].----and globally as well.
Mr. Craner, thank you very much for being here to testify. The
administration has taken a strong stance, and I do hope and
pray for the future of Burma and the Burmese people that we are
successful in putting pressure on this military dictatorship
that has caused so much suffering amongst its own people and
throughout that region and throughout the world.
Mr. Craner. First of all, let me thank you for having the
hearing. Second, on behalf of the administration, I want to
thank the Senate and the House. We have been able to walk with
the Europeans on this, but we have also, I think, been very
united as a United States Government on this. I think that is
very, very important. The third thing I would say is that if
these penalties don't work, we may be coming back to you, as
Secretary Powell indicated in the Wall Street Journal, to put
more and more pressure on the regime and we look forward to
working with you on that.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Mr. Craner.
Now, I'd like to call the next panel.
U Aung Din is policy director of Free Burma Coalition here
in Washington D.C.; Mr. Brian Joseph, program officer for Asia,
the National Endowment for Democracy, also in Washington; Mr.
Kevin Burke, President and CEO of American Apparel and Footwear
Association; and Mr. Kenneth Rogers, Associate Dean of
International Programs and Director of International Services
(Emeritus) Indiana University; and finally, Ms. Veronika
Martin. She's an advocate for Refugees International.
I want to advise the panel and the hearing room that there
was previously scheduled a vote for 3:15. It has not been
called yet. We will start the panel, but we may have to take a
brief recess while I go over to vote, but rather than wait and
see whether we're voting, I thought we would go ahead and get
started.
Mr. U Aung Din. Let me say to the whole panel as well, we
will receive your entire statement into the record. If you care
to summarize, because it is a large panel, that would probably
be best, and your full statement will be in the record.
Mr. Din.
STATEMENT OF U AUNG DIN, POLICY DIRECTOR,
FREE BURMA COALITION
Mr. Din. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for giving me
the opportunity to speak on behalf of 50 million Burmese who
are locked in a battle with an illegitimate military regime to
bring peace, democracy, and human rights to our country. My
name is Aung Din. I sit as a director of policy for the Free
Burma Coalition, an organization based in the United States
with national and international chapters.
I would like to thank you, Senator Brownback and Senators
Mitch McConnell and Feinstein and the members of the United
States Senate for the overwhelming bipartisan vote to approve
the Burma Freedom and Democracy Act last week. By supporting
this legislation, you've sent a clear message to the people of
Burma that you support our struggle for freedom. I ask the
House to act on this legislation soon.
Since you have already heard much about the events
surrounding May 30, 2003, I would like to tell you about my
personal account and discuss the many different ways that the
people of Burma are working to get rid of our country's
dictatorship.
In 1988, I was a student at the Rangoon Institute of
Technology when I and many of my fellow students helped to
organize a nationwide demonstration that almost overthrew the
military government. We marched proudly in front of the
American embassy and waved our banners, because we knew that
Americans believed in freedom and democracy. We avoided the
Soviet embassy for the same reason.
Tragically, as millions of people marched on the streets
the military regime fired on us. Up to 10,000 people were
murdered in a matter of weeks, including students, women, and
even infant children. Those who survived were jailed and
suffered daily torture sessions.
Mr. Chairman, this was one year before the fall of the
Berlin Wall. Unfortunately, because the military refused to let
any international news media inside the country, no one knew
what happened to us. After seeing my colleagues gunned down on
the streets, I was very scared; but I knew I could not give up.
I continued to organize demonstrations and protests, and
eventually I was captured by the regime.
When they arrested me, they handcuffed me, threw a hood
over my head and pulled me off the bus I was riding. I was
taken to a military interrogation center where I was held with
no food, no drink, no toilet, no sleep for one week. My hood
was never removed. Successive shifts of interrogation officers
beat, kicked, and hit me. When I asked for the water, they
laughed at me. When I asked to use the bathroom, they beat me
even more. Many times I almost passed out, but they poured cold
water on my head to wake me up so my beatings could continue.
A month later, I was put in the solitary confinement, where
I stayed for over a year. In Burma, solitary confinement means
no human contact. I was sent to military court and given a
sentence of 4 years in prison. My trial only took 15 minutes,
and I had no lawyer. I spent these 4 years of my life behind
bars.
Senator Brownback. Excuse me, this was in a prison?
Mr. Din. Yes. I was in a prison for 4 years and 3 months.
If there is a hell on earth, it must be Burma's Insein Prison,
where I was jailed. For political prisoners such as myself,
each day centered on interrogations, beatings, and mental
torture. When the guards noticed I had written a calendar on my
wall with a small piece of brick, I was thrown into pitch-black
solitary confinement. When I forgot to stand at attention, I
was forced to crawl on sharp, pointed stones for 100 yards
while the prison guards beat me with sticks and belts.
Many of my fellow prisoners were tortured even more. They
were tortured for dropping a cup of water. They were tortured
for teaching English. They were tortured for anything. Often,
when I tried to sleep, I could hear the screams of those being
tortured. Those screams haunt me to this day. They are the
voices of my friends, many of whom were killed by the violence
inflicted upon their bodies. It is for them that I have
dedicated my life to freeing my country from the evil darkness
that is the ruling military junta.
I would like to tell you about the other brave people of
Burma. There are over 1,600 men and women political prisoners
in Burma, and many have been behind bars for over 10 years. We
talk so many times about numbers that it can be easy to forget
their names and their stories. My friend, Min Ko Naing, has
been in prison since 1989.
For the Burmese people, Aung San Suu Kyi is like George
Washington. Min Ko Naing is like Sam Adams. He is a true hero.
We were both arrested at the same time. He was also severely
tortured. Unlike me, however, he has been held in solitary
confinement for 14 years in an 8-by-10 foot cell, never leaving
for more than 15 minutes per day.
The regime has offered to release Min Ko Naing if he would
sign a document forswearing any political activity and
condemning the democracy movement. He has refused. In the face
of such brutal tyranny, he continues to fight back against the
regime. His courage should inspire us.
Now, I would like to discuss the many different ways people
are resisting the military regime in Burma. One way that we are
working to bring change to Burma is through information. The
National Endowment for Democracy gives money to organizations
along the Thailand-Burma border that help to get information
inside the country, including this newspaper, The New Era
Journal. Every month, we distribute thousands of copies inside
Burma throughout our courier network. Keep in mind that
possession of this newspaper is an automatic 7-year jail
sentence.
We are also very grateful for services from the Voice of
America and Radio Free Asia. Even though many people have been
sentenced to long prison terms for listening to the radio, the
people of Burma listen to these radio programs almost every
night in order to find out what's going on in the world and in
our own country.
My people also continue to organize protests around the
country. Last August, two of my colleagues were arrested for
organizing a protest in downtown Rangoon. In September, 30 more
people were arrested for protesting. In November, a man was
arrested for making an NLD symbol, and in January, two Buddhist
nuns were arrested for organizing a demonstration. In February,
one dozen people were arrested for planning a demonstration,
and in May another man was arrested.
I know that it does not make it in the news very often, but
not a month goes by that the people of Burma are not trying to
organize a nationwide uprising. There are also many actions
taking place in a coordinated manner that are directed at
fostering support for the democracy movement within Burma's
armed forces. The effort is aimed at convincing military
leaders and soldiers that the future of the country lies with
the democracy movement, and not with the regime.
Other actions by underground groups inside the country
allow freedom activists to travel and conduct organizational
work with key groups such as monks and rice farmers. Aung San
Suu Kyi's speeches are copied and distributed by the thousands
on audio tape in Burma. The Burmese people are also defying the
military regime by attending speeches of Aung San Suu Kyi.
These are really more than just speeches, they are democracy
rallies.
In December, 20,000 people came to see her speak in Arakan
state. In March, 30,000 people came to watch her speak in Chin
state, and on this latest trip tens of thousands of Burmese
people risked their lives and their livelihoods to participate.
Even when the regime has threatened them with weapons and guns,
they refuse to turn back.
I would like to close my testimony by making a few
recommendations. First and foremost, we need regime change in
Burma. The United Nations has attempted to foster a dialogue
that can lead to a political transition, and events have shown
this to be a failure. Sanctions will serve to cut the regime's
access to hard currency that it uses to finance its instruments
of terror.
In order to accomplish regime change, we must do three
things in addition to increasing sanctions. Firstly, we need to
increase resources to fund the struggle inside Burma. Sanctions
will help us very much, but they should be seen as a first
step. The people of Burma need to be given the tools to effect
change, including money, communications equipment, food, and
humanitarian support to refugees internally displaced, and in
Thailand and India.
Second, the United States needs to pressure ASEAN, Japan
and India to end their political support for the military
regime. China will enjoy tremendous economic benefits from a
free market, politically stable Burma, and this will be in
their strategic national interest. Clearly a democratic Burma
will be better for the entire region.
Third, the United Nations Security Council must act now on
Burma. So far, the United Nations has been worthless in helping
my country. The Burmese regime has played the United Nations
like a dancing marionette.
A Security Council resolution should seek to duplicate the
actions contained in the Burma Freedom and Democracy Act. We
know that freedom is not free. Its cost is measured in the
bodies of dead democracy activists, broken families, and years
stolen from the lives of political prisoners. We are willing to
pay the price, and we do so every day. We want people around
the world to know this. We are freedom fighters, not victims.
Mr. Chairman, this regime will not last. I look forward to
the day when I am able to join my family and friends in Burma,
about telling them that during our darkest hour, when our fight
was far from certain, when despair had almost overcome hope,
that it was the people of the United States and their
representatives sitting in this Congress that lifted the torch
of democracy and lit our path to freedom.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. U Aung Din follows:]
Prepared Statement of Aung Din
Mr. Chairman,
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak on behalf of 50
million Burmese who are locked in a battle with an illegitimate
military regime to bring peace, democracy and human rights to our
country. My name is Aung Din, and as you mentioned I serve as the
director of policy for the Free Burma Coalition, an organization based
in the United States with national and international chapters.
I'd like to thank you Senator Brownback and Senators McConnell and
Feinstein, and the members of the United States Senate for the
overwhelming bipartisan vote to approve the Burma Freedom and Democracy
Act last week. By supporting this legislation, you sent a clear message
to the people of Burma that you support our struggle for freedom. I
urge the House to act on this legislation soon.
Since you have already heard much about the events surrounding May
30th, 2003, I want to tell you about myself and discuss the many
different ways that the people of Burma are working to get rid of our
country's dictatorship. I know that Aung San Suu Kyi is the most
recognized person from Burma, but it is important for the Committee to
know that there are thousands of others in Burma who are committed to
nonviolence and working for the removal of the regime and the
institution of a democratic Burma.
In 1988, I was a student at the Rangoon Institute of Technology
when I and many of my fellow students helped to organize a nationwide
demonstration that almost overthrew the military government. We marched
proudly in front of the American Embassy and waved our banners, because
we knew that Americans believe in freedom and democracy. We avoided the
Soviet embassy for the same reason.
Tragically, as millions of people marched on the streets, the
military regime opened fire on me and my fellow students. Up to 10,000
people were murdered in a matter of weeks, including students, women
and infant children. Those who survived were jailed and suffered daily
torture sessions.
Mr. Chairman, this was one year before the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Unfortunately, because the military refused to let any
international news media inside the country, no one knew what happened
to us. After seeing my colleagues gunned down on the streets, I was
very scared; but I knew I couldn't give up. I continued to organize
demonstrations and protests, and eventually, I was captured by the
regime.
When they arrested me, they handcuffed me, threw a hood over my
head, and pulled me off the bus I was riding. I was taken to a military
interrogation center, where I was held with no food, no drink, no
toilet, and no sleep for one week. My hood was never removed.
Successive shifts of interrogation officers beat, kicked, and hit me.
When I asked for water, they laughed at me. When I asked to use the
bathroom, they beat me even more. Many times I almost passed out, but
they poured cold water onto my head to wake me up so my beatings could
continue.
A month later, I was put in solitary confinement, where I stayed
for over a year. In Burma, solitary confinement means no human contact.
I was sent to military court and given a sentence of four years in
prison. My trial took only fifteen minutes, and I had no lawyer. I
spent the next four years of my life behind bars.
If there is a hell on earth, it must be Burma's Insein prison where
I was jailed. For political prisoners such as myself, each day centered
on interrogations, beatings, and mental torture. When the guards
noticed I had written a calendar on my wall, I was thrown in pitch-
black solitary confinement. When I forgot to stand at attention, I was
forced to crawl on sharp, pointed stones for 100 yards while the prison
guards beat me with sticks and belts. Many of my fellow prisoners were
tortured even more. They were tortured for dropping a cup of water.
They were tortured for teaching English; they were tortured for
anything. Often, when I tried to sleep, I could hear the screams of
those being tortured. Those screams haunt me to this day. They are the
voices of my friends, many of whom were killed by the violence
inflicted upon their bodies. It is for them that I have dedicated my
life to freeing my country from the evil darkness that is the ruling
military junta.
Our families did not escape either. My brother was also arrested
for his participation in the freedom struggle. Many parents and
families were forced out of their jobs by the regime. The regime,
through the military intelligence (MI) apparatus, conducts a scorched
earth campaign against anyone associated with the democracy movement.
other political prisoners
I want to tell you about the other brave people of Burma. There are
over 1,600 men and women political prisoners in Burma and many have
been behind bars for over a decade. We talk so many times about numbers
that it can be easy to forget their names and their stories.
My friend Min Ko Naing has been in prison since 1989. For the
Burmese people, Aung San Suu Kyi is like George Washington. Min Ko
Naing is like Sam Adams--he is a true hero.
Just as much as Aung San Suu Kyi, he was the main leader of our
revolution. He spoke at rallies across the country and called on the
people to believe in freedom. I think that he understood freedom and
democracy at its roots, far before many of the rest of us.
We were both arrested at the same time. He was also severely
tortured. Unlike me, however, he has been held in solitary confinement
for 14 years. It might be that the military regime will never release
him.
In 1994, U.S. Congressman Bill Richardson met Min Ko Naing in
prison. He told the Congressman to continue the struggle for freedom
and democracy. The military punished Min Ko Naing by transferring him
500 miles away from his family. Now, his family can only visit him once
a year. He has never been permitted to leave his 8 x 10 foot cell for
more than 15 minutes per day.
The regime has offered to release Min Ko Naing if he will sign a
document forswearing any political activity and condemning the
democracy movement. He has refused. In the face of such brutal tyranny,
he continues to fight back against the regime. His courage should
inspire us.
I would now like to discuss the many different ways people are
resisting the military regime in Burma. Aung San Suu Kyi is one person
in a democracy movement that is broad and deep. There are hundreds of
activists that are jailed and killed each year who never receive any
attention. Most of my people struggle, suffer, and die without a word
being raised by the international community.
information
One way that we are working to bring change to Burma is through
information. The National Endowment for Democracy gives money to
organizations along the Thailand-Burma border that help to get
information inside the country, including this newspaper, The New Era
Journal. Every month, we distribute thousands of copies inside Burma
through a courier network. Keep in mind that possession of this
newspaper is an automatic seven-year jail sentence.
We are also very grateful for services from the Voice of America
and Radio Free Asia. Even though many people have been sentenced to
long prison terms for listening to the radio, the people of Burma
listen to these radio programs almost every night in order to find out
what's going on in the world and in our own country.
protests and political defiance
My people also continue to organize protests around the country.
Last August, two of my colleagues were arrested for organizing a
protest in downtown Rangoon. In September, 30 more people were arrested
for protesting. In November, a man was arrested for making an NLD
symbol, and in January, two Buddhist nuns were arrested for organizing
a demonstration. In February, one dozen people were arrested for
planning a demonstration, and in May another man was arrested.
I know that it doesn't make it in the news very often, but not a
month goes by that the people of Burma aren't trying to organize a
nationwide uprising. There are also many actions taking place in a
coordinated manner that are directed at fostering support for the
democracy movement within Burma's armed forces. The Burma military is a
force that is kept together through fear and terror. In the 1990
elections, voting precincts in major military areas delivered
overwhelming majorities for the NLD. It is a military that has no
ideological commitment to the ruling regime. The outreach effort is
aimed at convincing military leaders that the future of the country
lies with the democracy movement, and not with the regime.
Other actions by underground groups inside the country allow
freedom activists to travel and conduct organization work with key
groups such as monks and rice farmers. Aung San Suu Kyi's speeches are
copied and distributed by the thousands on audiotape in Burma. I would
be happy to talk about these efforts with you in a more private
setting. I also want to point out that the Open Society Institute,
Norweigen-Burma Committee, and several other organizations--some
government sponsored--are assisting our movement.
attending pro-democracy speeches
The Burmese people are also defying the military regime by
attending speeches of Aung San Suu Kyi. These are really more than just
speeches--they are democracy rallies.
In December 20,000 people came to see her speak in Arakan state. In
March 30,000 people came to watch her speak in Chin State. And on this
latest trip, tens of thousands of Burmese people risked their lives and
their livelihoods to participate. Even when the regime has threated
them with weapons and guns, they refused to turn back.
recommendations
I would like to close my testimony by making a few recommendations
for future policy on Burma. First and foremost, we must make it clear
that, as Senator McConnell has said, we need regime change in Burma.
The United Nations has attempted to foster a dialogue that can lead to
a political transition, and events have shown this to be a failure.
Sanctions will serve to cut the regime's access to hard currency that
it uses to finance its instruments of repression. We must now work on
empowering activists inside the country to allow them to bring maximum
internal pressure against the regime. Either way, they must be removed.
The United States is in a unique position to help bring about change in
the world because Americans believe in freedom and democracy.
In order to accomplish regime change, we must do three things:
(1) Increase Resources to the Struggle Inside Burma
We need increased resources to fund the struggle inside Burma.
Sanctions will help us very much, but they should be seen as a first
step. The people of Burma need to be given the tools to effect change,
including money, communications equipment, food and humanitarian
support to refugees internally displaced and in Thailand and India.
(2) Pressure Other Countries to Stop Supporting Burma's Regime With
Military Sales and Business Investment
The United States needs to pressure ASEAN, Japan, and India to end
their political support for the military regime. China will enjoy
economic benefits from a free-market, politically stable Burma.
Clearly, a democratic Burma will be better for the entire region.
(3) Push the United Nations Security Council to Act on Burma
The United Nations Security Council must act now on Burma. So far,
the United Nations has been worthless in helping my country. The
Burmese regime has played the United Nations like a dancing marionette.
A Security Council resolution should seek to duplicate the actions
contained in the Burma Freedom and Democracy Act.
If the Security Council refuses to act, the United States must help
the Burmese people overthrow the illegitimate junta through the use of
a nonviolent, mass mobilization campaign. I want to stress that we are
not asking for military intervention, but we are asking for political
and moral support directed to activists inside the country.
The regime has been given 2\1/2\ years to bring change to Burma.
Now, it is time to change the regime. We must bring unremitting
pressure against these thugs. The same economic and political
conditions that led to the 1988 uprising are still present in Burma.
The regime is hated by the people and, if enough political space can
open, I can envision another people power mobilization that can sweep
this regime from Rangoon and condemn it to the ash heap of history.
We know that freedom isn't free. It's cost is measured in the
bodies of dead democracy activists, broken families and years stolen
from the lives of political prisoners. We are willing to pay the price
and we do so every day. We want people around the world to know that we
are freedom fighters, not victims.
Mr. Chairman, this regime will not last. I look forward to the day
when I am able to rejoin my family and friends in Burma about telling
them that during our darkest hour, when our fight was far from certain,
when despair had almost overcome hope, that it was the people of the
U.S. and their representatives sitting in this Congress that lifted the
torch of democracy and lit our path to freedom.
Thank You.
[Additional Information Submitted by U Aung Din]
i. men and women who were arrested or disappeared
during the may 30, 2003 attack
1. Aung Aung, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Southwest Township
2. Aung Aung Latt, (F) NLD youth, Mandalay Northeast Township
3. Aung Htoo, (M) NLD, Bohtahtaung Township, Rangoon
4. Aung Khin, (M) NLD, Mandalay Division
5. Aung Ko, (M) NLD, Northwest Township, Mandalay
6. Aung Kyaw Kyaw Oo (aka) Aung Kyaw Myint, (M), NLD youth in-charge,
Mandalay (Age 32) (Confirmed in the Khantee prison, Chin State)
7. Aung Kyaw Myint, (M) NLD, Mandalay Southeast Township
8. Aung Kyaw Soe, (M) NLD, Mandalay Northeast Township
9. Aung Naing, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Northeast Township
10. Chit Yin, (M) NLD, Mandalay Southeast Township
11. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, (Female) General Secretary, NLD (Age 58)
(Confirmed in Yemon Military Camp)
12. Dr. Hla Myint, (M) NLD, Amarapura Township
13. Dr. Hla Soe Nyunt, (M), NLD, Mandalay, Divisional Organizer
14. Dr. Win Aung (M), NLD, Amarapura Township
15. Hla Oo, (M) NLD, Amarapura Township
16. Hla Soe Win, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Southwest Township
17. Hla Than, (M) Mandalay Northwest Township
18. Hsann Lwin, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Northeast Township
19. Htut Soe, (M) NLD youth, Rangoon Division
20. Khin Aung Htwe, (M) NLD, Mandalay Northeast Township
21. Khin Aye Myint, (F) NLD, Mandalay Northwest Township
22. Khin Maung Oo, (M) Photographer, Mandalay
23. Khin Ma Ma Tun, (F) NLD youth, Mandalay Northeast Township
24. Khin Maung Thaung, (M) NLD, Mandalay Southwest Township
25. Khin Mya Win, (F) NLD, Mandalay Southwest Township
26. Khin Oo, (M) NLD youth, Sagaing Division
27. Ko Lay, (M) NLD, Mandalay Northeast Township
28. Kyaw Aun, (M) NLD, Mandalay Northwest Township
29. Kyaw Htike, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Northeast Township
30. Kyaw Kyaw, (M) Mandalay Northwest Township
31. Kyaw Myo Thu, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Southwest Township
32. Kyaw Myo Oo, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Northeast Township
33. Kyaw Soe, (M) Mandalay Northwest Township
34. Kyaw Soe Lin, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay (Age 25)
35. Kyaw Than, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Northeast Township
36. Kyaw Tin Win, (M) NLD youth, Rangoon Division
37. Kyaw Zwar Win, (M) Mandalay Northwest Township
38. Kyi Kyi Myint, (F) NLD, Mandalay Southwest Township
39. Lin Htut Soe, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Northeast Township
40. Myo Zaw Aung, (M) NLD youth, Kawlin Township
41. Minn Lwin, (M) NLD youth in-charge, Mandalay Division, (Age 34)
42. Min Lwin, (M) NLD youth, Rangoon, (Confirmed in the Khantee prison,
Chin State)
43. Min Thein, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Southwest Township
44. Min Zaw Oo, (M) Student, Government Technical College, Monywa--
(Confirmed dead)
45. Moe Thaw (aka) Pho Thaw, (M) NLD youth, Rangoon (Age 32) (Confirmed
in the Khantee prison, Chin State)
46. Myint Kyaw, (M) NLD youth in-charge, Rangoon (Age 37) (Confirmed in
the Khantee prison, Chin State)
47. Myint Ngwe, (M) NLD youth, Yenanchaung Township, Magway Division
(Age 38)
48. Myint Oo, (M) NLD, Mandalay South East Township
49. Myint Wai, (M) NLD youth, Yenanchaung Township, Magway Division
50. Myint Myint Kyi, (F), NLD, Mandalay Division
51. Myo Min (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Northeast Township (Age 31)
52. Myo Naing, (M) NLD, Mandalay Division Organizer
53. Myo Nyunt, (M) NLD, secretary, Ahlone Township, Rangoon Division,
(age 37)
54. Myo Tint, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Southwest Township
55. Myo Zaw Aung, (M) NLD, Mandalay Northeast Township, (Confirmed in
the Khantee prison, Chin State)
56. Nay Myo Lin, (M) Mandalay Northwest Township
57. Naing Naing, (M) Democratic Party for a New Society
58. Nyunt Nyunt, (F), NLD, Mandalay Northwest Township
59. Soe Soe, (M) NLD youth, Htuntone Myothit Township
60. Soe Win, (M) Driver
61. Thander Soe, (F) Mandalay Northwest Township
62. Than Tun, (M) NLD, Kamaryut Township, Rangoon Division
63. Than Htay, (M) NLD, Mandalay Southeast Township
64. Than Htun, (M) NLD, Mandalay Division Organizing Committee,
(Confirmed in the Khantee prison, Chin State)
65. Than Tun Oo, (M) Mandalay Northwest Township
66. Than Win, (M) NLD, Mandalay Northeast Township
67. Thein Aung Lay, (M) Mandalay Northwest Township
68. Thein Soe, (M) Photographer, Sagaing
69. Thein Toe Aye, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Southwest Township
70. Thein Tun, (M) NLD youth, Yankin Township, Rangoon
71. Thein Zan, (M)
72. Thet Zaw (aka) Thet Tun, (M) NLD youth in-charge, Rangoon, (Age 30)
(Confirmed in the Khantee prison, Chin State)
73. Thura (aka) Thi Ha, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay, (Age 29) (Confirmed in
the Khantee prison, Chin State)
74. Tin Lin, (M) Mandalay Northwest Township
75. Tin Maung Oo, (M) NLD, Mandalay Southwest Township
76. Toe, (F) NLD, Mandalay Southwest Township
77. Toe Lwin, (M) NLD youth, Bahan Township, Rangoon Division (Age 32)
(Confirmed dead)
78. Tin Tin Myint, (F), NLD, Mandalay Division
79. Tun Tun, (M) Mandalay Northwest Township
80. Tun Win, (M) NLD, Mandalay Southwest Township
81. Tin Tun Oo, (M) NLD, Mandalay Division
82. Tun Tun Win, (M) NLD, Mandalay Northeast Township
83. Tin Maung Aye, (M) Mandalay Northwest Township
84. Tun Myint, (M) NLD, secretary, Bahan Township, Rangoon Division,
(Age 36) (Confirmed in the Khantee prison, Chin State)
85. Tun Myaing, (M) Joint-secretary, Sagaing Division
86. Tun Naing Oo, (M) Mon Ywar Township
87. Tun Zaw Zaw, (M) NLD youth in-charge, Rangoon (Age 38) (Confirmed
in the Khantee prison, Chin State)
88. U Aung Soe, (M) NLD, Organizer of Mandalay Division
89. U Chit Tin, (Male), Secretary, NLD, Mandalay Division
90. U Hla Mi (M) NLD, MP Elect, Kawthaung Township
91. U Htwe, (M) NLD, Mandalay Southeast Township
92. U Myint Kyi, (M) MP Elect, NLD, Kathar Township
93. U Paw Khin, (M) MP Elect, Myingyan Township
94. U Par Pa, (M) Vice-chairman, Sagaing Division
95. U Piimya Thin, (M) Buddhist Monk, Okkan Tawya Monastery, Monywar--
(Confirmed dead)
96. U Saw Hlaing, (M) MP elect, NLD, Inn Daw Township
97. U Tin Aung Aung, (M) MP elect, NLD, Mandalay Northwest Township,
(Age 59) (Presumed dead)
98. U Tin Oo, (Male) Vice-Chairman, NLD (Age 75) (Confirmed in the
Kalay prison, Sagaing Division)
99. U Tin Tun Oo, (M) NLD, MP elect, Lewe Township, Mandalay Division,
(Age 40)
100. U Thwae, (M) Mandalay Northwest Township
101. Wanna, (F) NLD, Mandalay Southwest Township
102. Wanna Maung, (M) NLD youth, Htuntone Myothit Township
103. Win Aung, (M) NLD, Divisional Organizer, Sagaing Division
104. Win Khaine, (M) Mandalay Northwest Township
105. Win Ko, (M) NLD, Mandalay Northeast Township
106. Win Mya Mya, (F) NLD, Mandalay Divisional Organizer (Confirmed in
the Northwestern Military Command headquarters, Monywar)
107. Win Myint Oo, (M) NLD, Mandalay Southeast Township
108. Win Phyu Ei, (F) NLD youth, Mandalay Northeast Township
109. Win Thiha Aung, (M) Student, Monywar Institute of Economy
(Presumed dead)
110. Yan Naung Soe, (F) NLD youth, Mandalay Northeast Township
111. Yee Yee Lin, (F) NLD youth, Mandalay Northeast Township
112. Ye Min Zaw, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Southwest Township
113. Ye Myint Aung, (M) NLD, Mandalay Northeast Township
114. Zaw Lay, (M) NLD, son of Hla Myint, Amarapura Township
115. Zaw Win Tun, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Southwest Township, (Age 27)
(Confirmed in the Khantee prison, Chin State)
116. Zaw Zaw Aung, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Southwest Township
117. Zayar Tun, (M) NLD youth, Mandalay Southwest Township
118-124. 7 Buddhist Monks, From Yankin Monastery, MonYwar
125-138. 14 drivers, (M) names not known yet
139-144. 6 Divisional Executive members, Sagaing Division, names not
known yet
145-158. 14 NLD youth members from Sagaing Division, names not known
yet
ii. men and women who were arrested or disappeared
after the may 30, 2003 attack
1. U Aung Shwe, (M) Chairman, NLD, MP elect, Mayangone Township (House
arrest--May 31, 2003) (Age 85)
2. U Lwin, Secretary, (M) NLD, MP elect, Thongwa Township (House
arrest--May 31, 2003) (Age 79)
3. U Than Tun, (M) CEC, NLD, MP elect, Taungtha Township, Secretary,
CRPP (House arrest--May 31, 2003) (Age 82)
4. U Nyunt Wai, (M) CEC, NLD, MP elect, Taungoo Township (House
arrest--May 31, 2003) (Age 77)
5. U Lun Tin, (M) CEC, NLD, MP elect, Mawlamyine Township (House
arrest--May 31, 2003) (Age 82)
6. U Hla Pe, (M), CEC, NLD, MP elect, Mawlamyine Gyun Township (House
arrest--May 31, 2003) (Age 76)
7. Thakin Soe Myint, (M) CEC, NLD, MP elect, South Okkalapa Township
(House arrest--May 31, 2003) (Age 79)
8. U Kyi Maung (M), Former Chairman of the NLD, MP elect, Mayangon
Township (House arrest--May 31, 2003) (Age 80)
9. U San Linn, (M) Chairman, NLD Mogot Township (June 3, 2003)
10. U Kyaw Htin, (M) Vice-chairman, NLD Mogot Township (June 3, 2003)
11. U Ko, (M) Vice-chairman, NLD, Mogot Township (June 3, 2003)
12. Ko Myo, (M) NLD, Yankin Township (June 4, 2003)
13. Thein Oo, (M) Officer in-charge, NLD headquarters, Rangoon (June 4,
2003)
14. Soe Win, (M) Officer in-charge, NLD headquarters, Rangoon (June 4,
2003)
15. U Andastiya, Buddhist monk, Kayah State (June 4, 2003)
16. U Soe Win, (M) MP elect from Bago Township, National Party for
Democracy, member of CRPP (June 5, 2003)
17. U Ne Win, (M) Vice-chair, NLD, Kachin State (June 5, 2003)
18. U Naing Zaw Win, (M) Joint secretary, NLD, Kachin State (June 5,
2003)
19. U Maran Po Thar, (M) NLD, Kachin State (June 5, 2003)
20. U Hla Maung, (M) MP elect, Kyar Inn Seikkyi Township, CRPP member
(June 5, 2003)
21. U Aye Win, (M) NLD, Bassein Township (June 6, 2003)
22-26. Another 5 persons from Bassein Township, were arrested together
with U Aye Win on June 6, 2003.
27. U Thein Oo, (M) MP elect, Oak Twin Township, Bago Division, member
of the National Party for Democracy, a new member of the CRPP
(June 6, 2003)
28. U Saw Tun, (M) NLD Organizer, Monywar Township (May 30) (Sentenced
two years imprisonment from a summary court)
29. U Myint Hlaing (M), Father of political prisoner San San Maw (F)
(June 10, 2003)
30. Tin Hla (M), Husband of a political prisoner San San Maw (F) (June
10, 2003)
31. Maung Maung Lay, (M) NLD, Kyimyingdaing Township (June 10, 2003)
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much; thank you for your
courageous struggle; thank you for continuing in that until the
people of Burma are free. We will be standing with you.
We have a vote on now. I will go over and vote and be back
shortly. We will take a brief recess, probably about a 10-
minutes; and then we will reconvene. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Senator Brownback. I call the hearing back to order. I'm
sorry, that took much longer than I thought it would. I was
caught on the floor, then I had to take a call as well; so, my
apologies for doing that.
Mr. Joseph, it's good to have you here. Just to reintroduce
you quickly, you are a program officer for Asia, National
Endowment for Democracy. We're delighted to have you here, and
please, the microphone is yours.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN JOSEPH, PROGRAM OFFICER, ASIA, NATIONAL
ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY
Mr. Joseph. Thank you very much. I want to thank the
committee and Senator Brownback for inviting me to testify
today on this important and timely issue. I'm a program officer
for Asia at the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). I've
managed the NED's Burma project since 1996.
The NED has been deeply involved in supporting democracy
and human rights in Burma since 1990, when we made our first
Burma grant. Today, thanks in large part to the strong interest
that Congress has taken in Burma, the NED now awards over $2.4
million per year in grants to 35 different Burmese groups
dedicated to bringing democracy to their country. This support
has been instrumental in sustaining and empowering the
democratic opposition in Burma, and increasing pressure on the
military regime.
Attached to my written testimony is a list of the
Endowment's fiscal year 2002 Burma grants. Please note that
because the Burmese junta has targeted the NED in the past for
its support of the pro-democracy movement in Burma, the NED no
longer publishes the names of recipient organizations.
The situation inside Burma today is arguably more explosive
than at any time since the 1988-1990 period when the State Law
and Order Restoration Council, or SLORC, unleashed a violent
crackdown that left thousands dead, in prison, or in exile.
When military-backed thugs attacked pro-democracy leader Aung
San Suu Kyi and her convoy on a dark road outside of Monywa on
May 30 of this year, all hope for a quick and peaceful
negotiated settlement to Burma's longstanding political crisis
evaporated.
With Suu Kyi once again in detention, NLD offices
shuttered, and scores of pro-democracy activists dead or
missing, the regime looks to be firmly in control. But for as
long as Suu Kyi and her supporters continue to fight for
democracy, the regime's grasp will be conditional on its
willingness to use brute force to stay in power. The junta is
not a partner for peace and national reconciliation in Burma.
It is an obstacle that must be overcome.
In short, the May 30 attack on the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi
demonstrated three things: one, Senior General Than Shwe and
the army hardliners are calling the shots; two, the regime is
willing to do whatever it deems necessary to hold onto power;
and three, despite its rhetoric to the contrary, the SPDC, or
the State Peace and Development Council, the successor military
junta to the SLORC, understands full well that if given the
opportunity the people of Burma would once again come out en
masse in support of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.
In a country where the balance of power is so uneven, and
where the military regime maintains absolute control over all
facets of life, it is essential that efforts to promote a
transition to democracy address this imbalance directly.
Sanctions alone are not enough to effect change in Burma,
but as part of a larger strategy to promote democracy they are
an essential ingredient. Coupled with continuing support for
the democracy movement and humanitarian support for the
hundreds of thousands of displaced Burmese, the United States
is a leader in supporting the struggle for democracy in Burma.
During the year between Aung San Suu Kyi's release from
house arrest in May 2002 and the attack on her and her convoy
in May 2003, there was a marginal expansion of political space
in Burma. Small as this opening was, it presented democracy
activists with new opportunities. For example, the NLD was able
to reopen nearly 100 district- and township-level offices, and
visit six of the seven ethnic states, drawing large and
energetic crowds wherever it went.
The regime has now shut those offices and closed those
channels. Citizens again have no way to contribute openly to
the political life of their country. However, pro-democracy
activist groups based within Burma and abroad have well-
established underground channels of communication that allow
for effective work inside Burma even under extremely trying
circumstances.
I now want to provide you with a glimpse of the type of
work being done by the pro-democracy movement with support from
the NED. One of the priority areas of concentration for the NED
is support for independent news and information.
In Burma, radio, print media, and television are state-
controlled. Internet access is limited to all but a handful of
SPDC generals and their cronies. Listeners or readers of banned
material, as U Aung Din mentioned, are subjected routinely to
intimidation and sometimes harsh prison terms.
Pro-democracy organizations based in Thailand, India and
further abroad work to counteract the SPDC-controlled media and
propaganda through radio, print media, and human rights
reports. As the only Burmese-run independent media outlets in
the world, these organizations also serve as a training ground
for Burmese journalists who will be called upon to establish a
free press in Burma after the transition to democracy.
Radio continues to be the most efficient and effective
means of reaching sizeable audiences in Burma. The BBC, Radio
Free Asia, the Voice of America, and the Democratic Voice of
Burma, a Burmese-run short-wave radio station, provide the
people of Burma with independent and accurate Burmese language
news and information. The NED-funded DVB also broadcasts in a
number of major ethnic languages, reaching important yet
isolated communities.
Newspapers and magazines published in Thailand and
distributed through underground networks inside Burma and along
its borders reach tens of thousands of readers. Even in the
face of harsh measures to curb the circulation of these papers,
demand continues to grow.
Other groups are working to inform the international
community of the human rights conditions in Burma and to
empower people to fight to protect their rights. Recent reports
by NED grantees have documented the use of rape as a weapon of
war in the Shan state, religious persecution of Christians in
the Chin state, forced labor in Mon state, displacement in
Karen state, and violation of women's rights throughout Burma.
The second priority area of funding for the NED is
institution-building. Since General Ne Win seized power in
1962, Burma has been ruled by military regimes that have
decimated the country's civil society and destroyed its
educational system. It is essential to develop and support
alternative networks and organizations that can operate outside
military control and begin to reconstruct basic elements of
civil society. At present, this work must be supported through
exile-based organizations with well-established links to the
democracy movement inside Burma.
In line with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's repeated calls for
unity in the ranks of the pro-democracy movement, support
should be directed at efforts that strengthen cooperation,
coordination, and unity among the various ethnic, student, and
pro-democracy groups.
Because of time limitations, let me now skip very quickly
to the end of my remarks--you can find my full remarks in my
written testimony--and say where does this leave us, and what
do we do about Burma? Although Burma experts often discuss
splits in the military and divisions between the intelligence
and army branches of the junta, the military seems fairly
united. Absent some crushing event, the regime seems unlikely
to turn on itself, but if the regime is so secure in its
position, why has it not been able to rid itself once and for
all of the democracy movement?
The simple answer is because the democracy movement derives
its strength from the people of Burma and is led by one of the
world's most courageous, committed, and principled leaders. The
democracy movement also draws strength from the international
community. When international organizations such as the ILO
take unprecedented steps to address forced labor abuses in
Burma, or when the United States passes tough sanctions
legislation, the effect is twofold. It punishes the regime for
its behavior, and bolsters the democracy movement, which has
consistently urged governments around the world to avoid doing
anything that will prop up the regime.
There is no easy answer to the challenge presented by
Burma, yet in one significant way the situation is very
promising, for there is a peaceful and legitimate alternative
to the regime. That alternative is Aung San Suu Kyi and her
colleagues in the NLD. They deserve our full and open support.
The United States should continue to pursue a strategy in
Burma that combines punitive measures that target the regime
while simultaneously supporting efforts to build a strong
democratic alternative.
I have a number of other recommendations, but because I'm
out of time I refer you to my written testimony for those.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Joseph follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brian Joseph
introduction
I want to thank the Committee and Senator Brownback for inviting me
to testify today on this important and timely issue. My name is Brian
Joseph and I am a program officer for Asia at the National Endowment
for Democracy. I have managed the NED's Burma project since 1996. The
NED has been deeply involved in supporting democracy and human rights
in Burma since 1990 when we made our first Burma grant. Today, thanks
in large part to the strong interest the Congress has taken in Burma,
the NED now awards over $2.5 million per year in grants to 35 different
Burmese groups dedicated to bringing democracy to their country. This
support has been instrumental in sustaining and empowering the
democratic opposition in Burma and increasing pressure on the military
regime. Attached to my written testimony is a list of the Endowment's
FY 2002 Burma grants. In the past, the Burmese junta has targeted the
NED for its support of the pro-democracy movement in Burma. To protect
the security of our Burma grantees, the NED does not publish the names
of recipient organizations.
political situation
The situation inside Burma today is arguably more explosive than at
any time since the 1988-1990 period when the State Law and Order
Restoration Council, or SLORC, unleashed a violent crackdown that left
thousands dead, in prison or in exile. When military-backed thugs
attacked pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi and her convoy on a dark
road outside of Monywa on May 30 of this year, all hope for a quick and
peaceful negotiated settlement to Burma's long-standing political
crisis evaporated.
In the short term, the regime has stopped democratic development
dead in its tracks. With Suu Kyi once again in detention, National
League for Democracy (NLD) offices shuttered, and scores of pro-
democracy activists dead or missing, the regime looks to be firmly in
control. But as long as Suu Kyi and her supporters continue to fight
for democracy, the regime's grasp will be conditional on its
willingness to use brute force to stay in power. The Burmese
population's rejection of strong-man rule and its support for democracy
are undiminished.
In October 2001, when the State Peace and Development Council
(SPDC), the successor regime to SLORC, announced that it was holding
talks with the National League for Democracy, the international
community supported efforts to build trust and understanding between
the regime and the NLD. For better or worse, the international
community at that time gave the regime yet another opportunity to
demonstrate its commitment to national reconciliation. Although there
have been indications for the past few months that the negotiations
between the two parties had been stalled for quite some time, Aung San
Suu Kyi and the NLD continued to operate as if dialogue was still
possible.
Since her release from house arrest on May 6, 2002, Aung San Suu
Kyi and the NLD have worked to rebuild their decimated party and to
reconnect with the people of Burma. After re-opening their office in
Rangoon, Suu Kyi and various NLD members began to travel the country.
In less than a year, Suu Kyi made nine trips outside of Rangoon,
visiting six of the seven ethnic states and drawing increasingly large
and energetic crowds as her travels progressed. Although it is
impossible to know exactly what precipitated the government's decision
to attack her party on May 30, the positive reception the NLD received
wherever it went punctured one of the SPDC's most important self-held
myths. That is, that the military alone could guarantee the territorial
integrity of a united Burma.
The regime had to find a way to put Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD
back in a box. A democratic opposition with widespread support from all
corners of the country posed a direct threat to the military government
and had to be neutralized. The May 30 nighttime attack did more than
result in the re-arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi and the death of at least
four, and potentially as many as 70, of her supporters. It also
reconfirmed that the regime is willing to train its guns, once again,
on unarmed civilians.
Prior to the May 30 attack, many Burmese dissidents and observers
believed that progress, if not imminent, was at least a possibility.
This perception was fueled in part by Razali Ismail, the UN special
envoy to Burma. Although it is impossible to know for certain given the
severe restrictions on speech and information in the country, reports
indicated that the people of Burma were more or less willing to defer
to the NLD and Suu Kyi and to trust their judgment that the Razali-
backed dialogue, along with nonviolent protest, might eventually lead
to a negotiated transition. The hope that the regime was sincere in its
commitment to dialogue has now been smashed.
By carefully planning and ruthlessly executing a brazen, thuggish
attack on the NLD, the regime exposed its true nature to the world. The
junta is not a partner for peace and national reconciliation in Burma.
It is an obstacle that must be overcome.
The regime made the cold calculation that there would be no serious
repercussions, international or domestic, for its treatment of the
nonviolent democracy movement led by Aung San Suu Kyi. The United
States and the European Union have already proven them wrong on the
first score. The people of Burma will prove them wrong on the second.
In short, the May 30 attack on the National League for Democracy
and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi demonstrated three things:
One, Senior General Than Shwe and the army hardliners are
calling the shots.
Two, the regime is willing to do whatever it deems necessary
to hold on to power.
Three, despite its rhetoric to the contrary, the SPDC
understands full well that if given the opportunity the people
of Burma would once again come out in mass in support of Aung
San Suu Kyi and the NLD.
In a country where the balance of power is so warped and where the
military regime maintains absolute control over all facets of life, it
is essential that efforts to promote a transition to democracy address
this imbalance directly. As long as the regime continues to believe
that its actions will be met with little more than perfunctory rhetoric
from governments around the world, it will not change.
Sanctions alone are not enough to effect change in Burma, but as
part of a larger strategy to promote democracy, they are an essential
ingredient. Coupled with continuing support for the democracy movement
and humanitarian support for the hundreds of thousands of displaced
Burmese, the US is a leader in supporting the struggle for democracy in
Burma.
The only way the suffering of the Burmese can be relieved is
through the achievement of a genuine transition to democracy. For forty
years, military governments in Burma have looted and bankrupted the
country, systemically hunted down and decimated ethnic minority
populations, and endorsed the use of rape against citizens as a tool of
war. Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD offer a credible and democratic
alternative. We should support them in their efforts.
promoting democracy in burma
During the year between Aung San Suu Kyi's release from house
arrest in May 2002 and the attack on her and her convoy in May 2003,
there was a marginal expansion of political space in Burma. Small as
this opening was, it presented democracy activists with new
opportunities. For example, the NLD was able to reopen nearly one
hundred district- and township-level offices and the regime allowed for
greater communication between ethnic political leaders and their NLD
counterparts. The regime has now shut those offices and closed those
channels. Citizens again now have no way to contribute openly to the
political life of their country. However, pro-democracy activist
groups, based within Burma and abroad, have well-established
underground channels of communications that allow for effective work
inside Burma even under extremely trying circumstances.
Burma's borders with Thailand, India, China, and Bangladesh are
long and porous. The geographic periphery of Burma itself is a ring of
ethnic nationality states that are ruled by ethno-military
organizations, the vast majority of which are either openly hostile to
or at the very least weary of the regime. These conditions make it
virtually impossible for the junta to shut off all channels of
communication between activists in exile and the people of Burma.
As of one the principal organizations supporting democracy in
Burma, the National Endowment for Democracy has provided timely,
critical financial assistance to Burmese democrats since 1990. The
Endowment's Burma project has grown each year and now provides more
than $2.5 million to roughly 35 groups working to advance the goals of
Burma's elected representatives; to strengthen unity and self-reliance
among Burma's pro-democracy and ethnic groups; and to provide
independent news and information.
Independent News and Information
Objective, accurate, and timely information is essential to combat
the military junta's relentless disinformation campaign to discredit
the pro-democracy movement, to sow distrust among the ethnic and pro-
democracy groups, and to cover up its abysmal human rights record. The
only newspapers legally available in Burma are the military junta-
controlled official newspapers--Kyay Mon (The Mirror) and Nay Pyidaw
(The Guardian) in Burmese, and MyanmarAhlin (The New Light of Myanmar)
in English and Burmese--and the relatively new government-sanctioned
Myanmar Times, published by an Australian national and reportedly close
to Lt. General Khin Nyunt. All radio and television is state-
controlled. Magazines, including business and economics magazines, are
highly censored. Internet access is limited to all but a handful of
SPDC generals and their cronies. Listeners or readers of banned
material are subjected routinely to intimidation and sometimes harsh
prison terms. Ethnic groups face particularly severe restrictions in
the use of their own languages in public life.
Pro-democracy organizations based in Thailand, India and further
abroad work to counteract the SPDC-controlled media and propaganda
through radio, print media, and human rights reports. As the only
Burmese-run independent media outlets in the world, these newspapers,
radio stations and magazines also serve as a training ground for
Burmese journalists who will be called upon to establish a free press
in Burma after the transition to democracy.
Radio continues to be the most efficient and effective means of
reaching sizeable audiences in Burma. The BBC, Radio Free Asia, Voice
of America, and the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), a Burmese-run
shortwave radio station, provide the people of Burma with independent
and accurate Burmese-language news and information. The NED-funded DVB
also broadcasts in a number of major ethnic languages, reaching
important yet isolated communities.
Newspapers and magazines published in Thailand and distributed
through underground networks inside Burma and along its borders reach
tens of thousands of readers. The NED supports a number of print
outlets, including a Burmese-language newspaper and an English-language
monthly magazine that seek out and print a diversity of opinion and
commentary about democracy as well as news about Burma. Even in the
face of harsh measures to curb the circulation of the paper and
magazine, demand continues to grow.
Burma is a human rights catastrophe. Recent reports by NED grantees
have documented the use of rape as a weapon of war in the Shan States,
religious persecution of Christians in the Chin State, forced labor in
Mon State, displacement in Karen State, and violation of women's rights
throughout Burma. These groups work to inform the international
community of the human rights conditions in Burma and to empower people
in Burma to fight to protect their rights.
Institution Building Programs
Since 1962 when General Ne Win seized power, Burma has been ruled
by military regimes that have decimated the country's civil society and
destroyed its educational system. It is essential to develop and
support alternative networks and organizations that can operate outside
military control and begin to reconstruct basic elements of civil
society. At present, this work must be supported through exile-based
organizations with well-established links to the democracy movement
inside Burma.
In line with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's repeated calls for unity in the
ranks of the pro-democracy movement, support should be directed at
efforts that strengthen cooperation, coordination, and unity among the
various ethnic, student, and pro-democracy groups. An expanded base of
support for Aung San Suu Kyi will make it harder for the military to
consolidate its control while continuing to ignore her repeated calls
for national reconciliation and tripartite dialogue between the NLD,
the military regime, and the ethnic forces.
Women's groups based in countries that border Burma have carried
out a variety of training and education programs in recent years to
increase awareness of democratic values and women's human rights, to
address public health concerns such as HIV/AIDS awareness and maternal
and child health practices, and to provide skills training in
handicrafts and agriculture as a means to increase opportunities for
income-generation and self-reliance among refugees and internally
displaced women. In 1999, a coalition of these border-based women's
groups joined forces to work to increase the participation of women in
the struggle for democracy and human rights, build mutual understanding
among all nationalities, actively participate in the national
reconciliation and development process, and elevate the role of the
women of Burma both at national and international levels.
The Endowment believes it is a priority to support the development
of ethnic organizations so that they are better able to participate as
equals in the discussions regarding the future political structure of
Burma. Grants to ethnic nationality-based organizations allow them to
solidify their core operations, reach more people through increased
training programs, and distribute their literature to a wider audience.
Assistance to ethnic groups will also complement the pro-democracy
movement's efforts to build solidarity between the pro-democracy
groups, most of whose members are ethnic Burmans, and the ethnic
nationality forces.
Assistance should also be directed to border-based student and
youth groups that work with counterparts inside the country to increase
awareness of and respect for human rights and democracy through
education workshops, foreign affairs training programs, and production
and dissemination of materials. These dedicated students and other
young peoples, who run great risks to remain in touch with and assist
networks of democracy supporters throughout Burma, also disseminate the
pro-democracy material of the larger movement.
Over the course of the past two years, Burmese pro-democracy
organizations in exile, working in consultation with democrats inside
the country, have dedicated greater attention and resources to
researching and planning for a future democratic Burma. The Endowment
has supported work in developing federal and state constitutions for a
democratic Burma, drafting proposed labor laws, and drawing up plans
for a transition to a market-based economy. Despite such efforts,
transition planning is still in its infancy. Increased effort should be
directed at a broad range of initiatives designed to address pressing
issues that Burma will face following the transition to a democratic
government. In collaboration with NGOs, think tanks, universities, and
researchers, Burmese groups can develop policy alternatives with
implementation plans that address issues such as education; health; the
rule of law and reform of the judiciary; human rights and transitional
justice; economics and public finance; agriculture; federal, state and
municipal roles; energy, the environment, and natural resources;
reconciliation and ethnic rights; peace building and civil society; and
humanitarian needs.
Over the past 15 years, more than 10,000 university and secondary
school students have left everything behind and fled Burma in order to
carry on the struggle for democracy and human rights in their homeland.
Those who remained in Burma, and those too young to have participated
in the democracy uprising of 1988, have few opportunities: school
supplies are scarce and out-of-date; teachers are poorly trained and
paid; schools have been closed for extended periods on a seemingly
regular basis; and students are seen as a threat to stability, not an
asset to the country. Those students and pro-democracy activists whose
educations were cut short when they went into exile have had few
opportunities for education and training. The more than 100,000 Burmese
refugees in Thailand have little or no access to secondary education or
skills-training opportunities.
The Endowment places a high priority on expanding opportunities for
Burmese to receive training opportunities, whether as interns or as
part of structured projects. The Endowment looks to support ethnic
organizations as they work to improve their ability to resist the
junta's efforts to destroy ethnic cultural cohesion by harshly
punishing any use indigenous languages in local schools--a blatant
violation of international human rights standards protecting indigenous
cultures and languages. Ethnic leaders are painfully aware that primary
education, even in Burmese, much less in ethnic languages, is severely
inadequate in their enclaves. These leaders know that the current
generation of youth must receive better educations if the leadership is
to hold out any hope for a more prosperous life.
Despite the cease-fire agreements between ethnic groups and the
government in the mid-1990s, people and groups inside Burma are as
vulnerable as ever to the regime's abuses. Recent estimates put the
number of internally displaced persons at more than 500,000. It may
even exceed 1,200,000 out of a total population of about 46 million
people. Efforts should be made to provide humanitarian relief through
pro-democracy activist groups to non-combatant opponents of the
military junta, especially ethnic minorities, women, and students, in
order to encourage greater unity among those struggling for democracy,
relieve the hardships suffered by displaced persons and victims of
political repression, and strengthen self-reliance as a means of
staving off exploitation.
conclusion
The State Peace and Development Council rules Burma with an iron
fist. The regime believes that it alone is responsible for maintaining
unity and securing the peace in Burma. Although Burma experts often
discuss splits in the military and divisions between the intelligence
and army branches of the junta, the military seems fairly united.
Absent some crushing event, the regime seems unlikely to turn on
itself. But, if the regime is so secure in its position, why has it not
been able to rid itself once and for all of the democracy movement?
The simple answer is because the democracy movement derives its
strength from the people of Burma and is led by one of the world's most
courageous, committed, and principled leaders. The democracy movement
also draws strength from the international community. When
international organizations such as the ILO take unprecedented steps to
address forced labor abuses in Burma or when the US passes tough
sanctions legislation, the effect is twofold--it punishes the regime
for its behavior and bolsters the democracy movement, which has
consistently urged governments around the world to avoid doing anything
that will prop up the regime.
The organizations and projects that the Endowment supports have
also made a significant contribution to the struggle for democracy and
human rights in Burma. Through our grants program, we have supported a
range of Burmese-, English- and ethnic-language independent media
projects; internal labor- and student-organizing efforts; human rights
education, advocacy and research; and coalition building among the
various pro-democracy and ethnic forces. These groups are the lifeline
to their colleagues inside Burma.
The regime is unlikely to negotiate in good faith with a partner
whose principles and popularity makes it inherently a threat to the
regime, but whom the regime believes lacks actual power. The NLD
represents a real threat to the regime. The challenge is to continue to
strengthen the NLD while weakening the regime so that any future
dialogue will be between equals. Clearly, that is easier said than
done. There is no easy answer to the challenge presented by Burma. Yet
in one significant way the situation is very promising, for there is a
peaceful and legitimate alternative to the regime. That alternative is
Aung San Suu Kyi and her colleagues in the NLD--to this day the clear
winner in the last free election to be held in this shackled land. They
deserve our full and open support.
The United States should continue to pursue a strategy in Burma
that combines punitive measures that target the regime while
simultaneously supporting efforts to build a strong democratic
alternative. Specifically, the United States Government should:
(1) Continue to take a leading role in the international
community to hold the Burmese generals responsible for their
conduct.
(2) Work with our allies in Asia--Japan and Thailand in
particular--to ensure that their Burma policies reflect a
strongly pro-democratic agenda.
(3) Encourage the UN secretary general to become engaged on a
sustained and personal basis. Specifically, the U.S. should
work with the United Nations to introduce democratic
benchmarks, including the right of the NLD to open and staff
offices, and to publish a newspaper. These benchmarks must
include a specific timeframe for their implementation. The
current UN-backed process, which has no enforcement mechanism,
has run its course and should be scrapped.
(4) Work with our ally Thailand to ensure that it provides a
safe and secure environment for nonviolent Burmese pro-
democracy activists working in exile.
Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to testify here
today about this important topic and, more importantly, for your
ongoing support of the work the NED does to promote democracy in Burma.
National Endowment for Democracy (NED) Fiscal Year 2002 Burma Grants,
from the NED Annual Report 2002
(*indicates funding source other than annual congressional
appropriation)
Because the Burmese junta has targeted the NED in the past for its
support of the pro-democracy movement in Burma, the NED no longer
publishes the names of recipent organizations in Burma.
(A) Capacity and Institution Building
$60,000* To undertake a multifaceted legal research and education
program to promote respect for human rights arid the rule of
law in Burma.
$16,000 To support a capacity-building and leadership-training program
for ethnic-nationality youth from Burma.
$15,000 To support the third meeting of the Chin State Constitution
Drafting Working Group and consultation with an international
constitutional expert about the draft document.
$80,000* To distribute human rights and democracy materials inside
Burma; to train party activists in effective techniques of
nonviolent political action; and to provide humanitarian
support for party activists and others along the Thai-Burma
border and inside Burma.
$45,000 To be used towards core support and to support its national
reconciliation and political solidarity program, which promotes
unity among prodemocracy and ethnic forces in Burma; and to
conduct basic political education training for grassroots
activists from Burma.
International Republican Institute $200,000 To provide partial core
funding and technical and strategic support for prodemocracy
political organizations in exile and to increase cooperation
with Burmese ethnic nationality groups.
International Republican Institute $260,000* To provide specialized
training to exiled Burmese political organizations and to
provide support to prodemocracy organizations in exile that
disseminate information in Burma about democracy and nonviolent
political action.
(B) Education and Outreach
$15,000 To distribute material on human rights and democracy, monitor
the human rights situation in Burma, and educate monks and
Buddhist laypeople about the nonviolent struggle for democracy
in Burma.
$68,307* To research, document, and publicize the treatment and status
of political prisoners in Burma and to provide basic
humanitarian assistance to political prisoners and their
families in Burma.
$380,000* To support the implementation of the Burmese prodemocracy
movement's comprehensive strategic plan aimed at creating a
political environment in Burma that is conducive to dialogue
between the National League for Democracy and the Burmese
military junta.
$40,000* To conduct a series of leadership workshops for members; to
hold capacity-building workshops for women along the Thai-Burma
border; to publish a bimonthly Burmese-language newsletter; and
to maintain three small reading rooms.
$40,000* To conduct an intensive training-of-trainers course; to
implement human rights education and training courses for
grassroots participants, including women and ethnic activists;
to publish a Burmese-language human rights manual; and for core
support.
$50,000* To support a Bangkok-based foreign affairs office to conduct
diplomatic activities in Southeast and East Asia in order to
build international support for the democracy movement in
Burma.
$10,000 To educate, train, and empower Burmese women in exile in India
to take a more active role in the prodemocracy struggle and to
promote women's rights in Burma and among the exile community.
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs $112,502 To
provide technical assistance to Burma's elected democratic
leadership for a campaign to build international support for
democracy in Burma among parliamentarians, governments, and
political-party leaders worldwide.
(C) Humanitarian Assistance
$10,000 To support training courses and workshops and to publish a
bimonthly newsletter that highlights the plight of the
internally displaced population.
$40,000* To be used towards core support for an umbrella organization
comprised of representatives from major prodemocracy and ethnic
organizations, to enable it to coordinate health and education
programs for refugee populations in Thailand and India and
ethnic populations inside Burma.
(D) Information and Media
$25,000* To publish and distribute an English-language bimonthly
newsletter on the human rights situation in western Burma and
to organize a two-week capacity-building training for forty
human rights activists.
$160,000* To support a twice-daily Burmese- and ethnic-language
shortwave radio broadcast of independent news and opinion into
Burma, and to strengthen the station's ethnic-language
programming.
$12,000* To publish and distribute two monthly human rights
newsletters--one in English and one in an ethnic language--for
the international community and for audiences in Burma and in
exile in Thailand.
$10,000 To conduct women's empowerment and capacity-building workshops
for displaced women; to document and report on the situation of
women in eastern Burma; and to provide basic social services
for displaced women in Thailand and inside Burma.
$40,000* To produce English-language human rights reports on
conditions in southern Burma; to educate Mon inside Mon State
about democracy and human rights; and to publish a bimonthly
Mon-language newsletter and a monthly Mon-language newspaper
for citizens in Mon State and for Mon refugees along the Thai-
Burma border.
$80,000* To publish a monthly English-language news magazine providing
independent news and information about Burma and events in
Southeast Asia, and to maintain a Burmese- and English-language
Web site.
$30,000* To conduct a series of women's rights and empowerment
training workshops in Thailand and India for Burmese women of
various ethnic groups.
$12,000* To publish a twenty-eight-page monthly trilingual newsletter
that serves as an alternative news source for readers in Burma,
in refugee camps along the Thai-Burma border, and in exile in
Thailand.
$14O,000* To publish and distribute inside Burma an independent
monthly Burmese-language newspaper focusing on the struggle for
human rights and democracy.
$25,000 To write, edit, publish, and distribute a quadri-lingual
monthly journal focusing on eastern Burma.
American Center for International Labor Solidarity $425,033* To work
from its Washington, DC, office to support the program of the
independent labor movement in exile to educate workers and
other citizens, both exiled and inside Burma, about labor
rights and democracy, and to document violations of
internationally recognized labor rights.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Mr. Joseph. I
appreciate that testimony. We'll go to the next witness.
I would note to the people watching that the two pictures
we have on the side are given to us by the Free Burma Coalition
and the International Republican Institute, and one is of Suu
Kyi at a rally, and the other is of a young man that was caught
in the crackdown. I think they show some of the scenes that
were taking place in Burma.
Next is Mr. Kevin Burke; he is president and CEO of the
American Apparel and Footwear Association. Thank you very much
for joining us today.
STATEMENT OF KEVIN BURKE, PRESIDENT AND CEO, AMERICAN APPAREL
AND FOOTWEAR ASSOCIATION
Mr. Burke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having us here
today and for the opportunity to testify before this
subcommittee on what I consider a very, very crucial matter.
I am the president and chief executive officer of the
American Apparel and Footwear Association (AAFA), the national
trade association in the apparel and nonrubber footwear
industries. Our association represents nearly 700 large and
small companies who produce and market clothing and shoes in
the United States and throughout the world. We also represent
many of the suppliers to our industry.
First and foremost, the members of AAFA strongly support
trade sanctions against the ruling military junta in Burma and,
in particular, applaud the Senate's actions last week in
approving 97-to-1 the legislation introduced by Senators
McConnell and Feinstein and joined by 60 of their colleagues.
This legislation will ban all United States imports from Burma
until the President of the United States can certify that Burma
has taken significant and positive steps toward democracy and
improved human rights for all of its people.
AAFA hopes that this legislation will be part of a
multilateral process that will ultimately involve more pressure
from the United Nations and others in the international
community.
Now, you might ask why our association and its members
would support a ban on United States imports from Burma. Now,
there are many reasons for this, but I will speak of only two
today. Our association cares very deeply about labor and human
rights. These issues are some of the most important factors our
member companies consider when choosing a company or a factory
to make their shoes or garments. If a country or factory has
the ability to make high quality garments or footwear, but we
are not satisfied with the labor or human rights situation, we
will avoid these countries and we will avoid these factories.
At the request of our members, AAFA has embraced labor
rights, human rights, and social responsibility not only in
principle, Mr. Chairman, but also in practice. Corporate social
responsibility represents one of the central tenets of AAFA's
mission statement and its trade policy.
Now, AAFA has followed through on this commitment with
concrete actions, of which our stand on Burma is just one of
many. For example, AAFA has strongly supported the Worldwide
Responsible Apparel Production program, otherwise known as
WRAP. WRAP promotes a code of conduct that ensures that core
labor concepts, including a minimum age and a prohibition
against forced labor, are understood and practiced in the shop
room floor and also by management. WRAP relies upon independent
third-party monitors to certify that individual overseas
factories are in compliance with WRAP's code of conduct. Many
AAFA members subscribe to WRAP and other similar codes of
conduct that are certified by independent organizations.
We have also created a forum for our members so our members
can discuss best practices in corporate social responsibilities
through our Social Responsibility Committee. I had the honor of
presenting this past week our Excellence in Social
Responsibility awards, which I'm holding here today--I brought
this as an example--to members of our association who in our
view and an independent view have excelled in this area,
demonstrating their support of labor and human rights in the
workforce. We do this every year, and we are certainly hopeful
that our members will increase their participation in this
program.
This brings me to my second point. Our association felt it
was time to take one step further our commitment to corporate
social responsibility with respect to Burma. Two years ago, due
to persistent and egregious violations of ILO conventions on
forced labor, child labor, and the overall abhorrent labor
situation in Burma, the ILO took the unprecedented step of
calling for its member countries to take concrete actions,
including economic sanctions against the military regime in
Burma.
Most countries failed to heed this call. Many of our
members, however, did heed the call and publicly pledged to
stop sourcing from Burma. Since the ILO took this position,
little, if any, progress has been made in Burma. Abuses of
labor and human rights are still rife throughout the country.
According to the United States Government's own report on
this subject, the recently released 2002 Country Report on
Human Rights Practices in Burma, the Burmese Government has,
and I quote, continued to restrict workers' rights, ban unions,
and use forced labor for public works and for the support of
military garrisons. Other forced labor, including child labor,
remains a serious problem despite recent ordinances outlawing
the practices, unquote. In fact, the situation has
deteriorated, with the economy in ruins and human rights abuses
rampant, due largely to the inept and corrupt policies and
practices of Burma's military rulers. Thanks in large part to
the efforts of AAFA's members and other responsible companies
in this industry, United States apparel imports have declined
significantly from Burma in the last couple of years.
Now, despite this decline, United States total imports from
Burma still reached $360 million last year, with United States
imports of Burmese apparel, textiles, and footwear accounting
for 85 percent of that total. This money helps prop up the
military regime because, in our understanding, many of the
apparel and footwear factories are owned by supporters of the
military junta who have directly benefited from the junta's
forced labor infrastructure projects and its nonexistent
enforcement of labor laws. The military junta would not exist
without the support of these thugs and their cronies.
Our association and its members realize that the only way
to implement effective change at the factory level in Burma is
to effectively change the government at the national level.
Without effective democratic reform and protection of basic
human rights at the national level, flagrant labor rights
violations will continue to run rampant at the factory level.
AAFA and its members cannot make this change alone. We feel
that it is time not only for our association but for the United
States Government to take a stand that it will no longer
tolerate or support the actions of the military regime in
Burma. The most effective and the only way to do this is to
impose an outright ban on all United States imports from Burma.
As the events of the last few weeks have proven, words
alone have failed to effect positive change in Burma. Decisive
actions through the imposition of new sanctions is the only
route available. This is the right thing for our association,
this is the right thing for our Government, and for all other
governments around the world who hold dearly the dignity and
respect of all human beings. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the
opportunity to be here this afternoon, and I look forward to
any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Burke follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kevin M. Burke
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee
today on this important matter. I am the President and Chief Executive
Officer of the American Apparel & Footwear Association--the national
trade association of the apparel and non-rubber footwear industries.
Our association represents nearly 700 large and small companies who
produce and market clothing and shoes in the United States and
throughout the world. We also represent many of the suppliers to these
industries.
First and foremost, the members of AAFA strongly support trade
sanctions against the ruling military junta in Burma and, in
particular, applaud the Senate's action last week in approving 97 to 1
the legislation introduced by Senators McConnell and Feinstein and
joined by 60 of their colleagues.
This legislation will ban all United States imports from Burma
until the President of the United States can certify that Burma has
taken significant and positive steps toward democracy and improved
human rights for its people. AAFA hopes that this legislation will be
part of a multilateral process that will ultimately involve more
pressure from the United Nations and others in the international
community.
You might ask why our association and its members would support a
ban on United States imports from Burma. There are many reasons, but I
will speak of only two.
Our association cares very deeply about labor and human rights.
These issues are some of the most important factors our member
companies consider when choosing a country or factory to make their
shoes or garments. If a country or factory has the ability to make a
high quality piece of apparel or footwear, but we are not satisfied
with the labor or human rights situation, we will avoid those countries
or factories.
At the request of our members, AAFA has embraced labor rights,
human rights, and social responsibility not only in principle, but in
practice. Corporate social responsibility represents one of the central
tenets in AAFA's mission statement and its trade policy.
AAFA has followed through on this commitment with concrete actions,
of which our stand on Burma is just one of many. For example, AAFA has
strongly supported the Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production program
or ``WRAP.'' WRAP promotes a code of conduct that ensures that core
labor concepts--including a minimum age and a prohibition on forced
labor--are understood and practiced on the shop room floor and by
management. WRAP relies upon independent, third-party monitors to
certify that individual overseas factories are in compliance with
wrap's code of conduct. Many AAFA members subscribe to wrap and other
similar codes of conduct that are certified by independent
organizations.
We have also created a forum where our members can discuss ``best
practices'' in corporate social responsibility, through AAFA's Social
Responsibility Committee. I had the honor of presenting last week our
``Excellence in Social Responsibility'' awards, which I am holding here
today, to members of our association who have excelled in this area,
demonstrating their support of labor and human rights in the workplace.
This brings me to my second point. Our association felt it was time
to take one step further our commitment to corporate social
responsibility with respect to Burma. Two years ago, due to persistent
and egregious violations of ILO conventions on forced labor, child
labor and the overall abhorrent labor situation in Burma, the ILO took
the unprecedented step of calling for its member countries to take
concrete actions, including economic sanctions, against the military
regime in Burma. Most countries failed to heed this call. Many of our
members, however, did heed the call and publicly pledged to stop
sourcing from Burma.
Since the ILO took this position, little, if any, progress has been
made in Burma. Abuses of labor and human rights are still rife
throughout the country. According to the United States Government's own
report on the subject, the recently released 2002 Country Report On
Human Rights Practices on Burma, the Burmese government has, and I
quote ``. . . continued to restrict worker rights, ban unions, and used
forced labor for public works and for the support of military
garrisons. Other forced labor, including child labor, remained a
serious problem despite recent ordinances outlawing the practice.'' In
fact, the situation has deteriorated with the economy in ruins and
human rights abuses rampant due largely to the inept and corrupt
policies of Burma's military rulers.
Thanks in large part to the efforts of AAFA's members and other
responsible companies in this industry, United States apparel imports
have declined significantly from Burma over the last couple of years.
Despite this decline, United States total imports from Burma still
reached $360 million last year with United States imports of Burmese
apparel, textiles, and footwear accounting for 85 percent of the total.
This money helps prop up the military regime because, in our
understanding, many of the apparel and footwear factories are owned by
supporters of the military junta who have directly benefited from the
junta's forced labor infrastructure projects and its non-existent
enforcement of labor laws. The military junta would not exist without
the support of these cronies.
Our association and its members realized that the only way to
implement effective change at the factory level in Burma is to
effectively change the government at the national level. Without
effective democratic reform and protection of basic human rights at the
national level, flagrant labor rights violations will continue to run
rampant at the factory level.
AAFA and its members cannot make this change alone. We feel that it
is time not only for our association, but for the United States
Government to take a stand that it will no longer tolerate or support
the actions of the military regime in Burma. The most effective and
only way to do this is to impose an outright ban on all United States
imports from Burma. As the events of the last few weeks have proven,
words alone have failed to effect positive change in Burma. Decisive
action, through the imposition of new sanctions, is the only route
available. This is the right thing for our association, for our
government, and for all other governments around the world who hold
dearly the dignity and respect of all citizens.
Thank you.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, and thank you for the
testimony. With your association being so opposed to exports or
imports from Burma to the United States, why are we still
importing so much from Burma, footwear and clothing?
Mr. Burke. These are unfortunately contractors who make
garments, and hopefully they're not my members, and I believe
most of my members have pulled out already. These are what I
would call black marketeers. I would certainly hope that if
there are any of my members that are over there, they would be
out right away, but we as an association have made a very, very
strong stand against the import of these products. It is the
right thing for us to do.
Senator Brownback. You're talking about, if I've got your
numbers right, about $288 million worth of clothing and
footwear coming into this country from Burma?
Mr. Burke. That is correct.
Senator Brownback. By black marketeers?
Mr. Burke. And contractors that have no respect for human
rights.
Now, our association, Senator, made a statement that said
that we will not support any companies or contractors who
produce in Burma. Now, we can't control what these companies
do. We can only insist that we take the right stand on this. As
an association we really have no legal control on what they do.
We can simply make a statement on behalf of the industry that
you ought to be out.
Senator Brownback. I appreciate the push, and I appreciate
your stance on behalf of your industry. I just did not realize
the number was quite that high.
Mr. Burke. I wish it wasn't that high. I wish it was at
zero.
Senator Brownback. I do, too, or that the regime would
change.
Mr. Rogers, good to have you here, Kenneth Rogers,
Associate Dean of International Programs, Director of
International Services (Emeritus), Indiana University. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH ROGERS, ASSOCIATE DEAN OF INTERNATIONAL
PROGRAMS AND DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL SERVICES (EMERITUS),
INDIANA UNIVERSITY
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Chairman, it's an honor to have been
invited to offer an international educator's perspective on the
current situation in Burma, and to suggest several ways in
which both the United States and other nations which share a
common concern about Burma's future might help to ensure that
some of the country's most important needs in democratic
institution-building, health and human services, especially
education, and economic development, might be addressed early
on and with optimum results.
Very briefly, in my testimony I propose to focus on the
roles that exiles, and more particularly Burmese students in
the United States and elsewhere abroad, might play in helping
to rehabilitate their beloved homeland. As a preface on student
involvement in popular political reform movements in Burma, I
would just mention that college and university students have
long been at the forefront of popular movements in Burma.
During the final decades of British rule, Rangoon
University students came of age, advocating first self-
government, then independence for Burma. The heroic leadership
of former Rangoon University student leader Aung San--whose
astute efforts won the promise of independence and of a bright
future for his country, only to be halted by an assassin's
bullet in 1947--has been an inspiration to generations of young
Burmese ever since. Among them his example has galvanized
opposition and resistance to the brutal repression of military
regimes that have ruled the country for the last 41 years.
College and university students are therefore proudly
regarded by Burmese at-large not only as champions of freedom
and democracy, but also as a precious resource for restoring
democracy and the nation's economic health.
My own personal and professional involvement with Burma and
with Burmese students dates from 1962, the year in which I
began a 4-year assignment with the United States Information
Service as a Foreign Service Officer in Burma. My involvement
with Burmese students again came to the fore in the early
1990s, when I was contacted by colleagues in the city of Fort
Wayne, Indiana, to work with them in assisting newly-arrived
refugee students from Burma. I will quickly jump to the present
to say that there are now in the State of Indiana alone more
than 3,000 refugees from Burma, most of them former students,
pro-democracy activists. Happily, some have been able to go
forward with their education, but I will come back to that.
I am especially pleased, too, that in the same period since
1993, Indiana University has administered the State Department-
funded Burmese refugee scholarship program for the Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs. This program has made
possible the completion of higher education degrees for more
than 60 scholars and professionals from Burma, and has placed
them at institutions throughout the United States.
Ten years of working with Burmese student exiles have led
me to the conclusion that, individually and as a group, they
are capable of contributing vitally important knowledge and
experience to the process of moving their homeland toward
democracy, as well as to the economic and social advancement of
their fellow countrymen and women. But the extent to which they
will be able to do so with maximum success is going to depend,
in my opinion, upon adequate preparation in advance of their
return home and, in particular, a grounding in practical Burma-
specific methods or strategies for bringing about needed
changes or reforms of existing structures, policies, and
practices in the Burmese educational system.
In attempting to determine the kinds of advanced
preparation that Burmese students who have been educated abroad
will need in order to avoid pitfalls and problems that, once
they return to their homeland could easily frustrate or even
defeat their efforts to revitalize the educational system and
other elements of the nation's infrastructure, we should not
only heed realities of the current situation in Burma, but also
those that foreign-educated students from developing countries
beyond Burma have encountered.
Let me briefly elaborate. Within Burma, the system of
education, long-impoverished and in disrepair, has become
practically dysfunctional. United Nations' statistics indicate
that the Burmese military government spends only 1.1 percent of
gross domestic product on education. Education at the tertiary
level has been totally and systematically emasculated by the
military regime, which regards university students with
suspicion, if not hostility, as enemies of the government.
To deter dissident students from organizing anti-government
demonstrations, Burma's military rulers have ruthlessly shut
down institutions of higher education for years at a time, and
have even relocated the campuses of some of them to remote
areas away from population centers. On the other hand, they
have shortened the academic year to 4 months in some fields of
study.
As of the year 2001, the nation's universities had been
open for only 3 of the previous 12 years, thereby creating
enormous backlogs of waiting students, including an estimated 5
million high school graduates kept in limbo for years waiting
for admission to universities, while on the other hand tens of
thousands of university matriculants were waiting for
institutions to reopen so that they could get on with
completing their degrees.
The situation is pretty grim. I think, in conclusion, what
we need to do is take note of the situation that returnees have
faced in Afghanistan and Iraq, post-Taliban Afghanistan and
post-Saddam Iraq, and take steps to help the Burmese students
who are abroad now who have acquired knowledge and have skills
that can be used in the rehabilitation of their home country,
to give them the opportunity to organize and prepare to help
make that transition as smooth as possible.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Mr. Rogers, and
that's a very thoughtful point. I did not realize that they had
completely shut down higher education, although it almost
stands to reason that this regime would do something like that,
as deplorable as it is, and as much as it absolutely mortgages
your future if you don't have students coming forward that are
well-trained to be able to serve the people and serve society.
Ms. Veronika Martin is an advocate for Refugees
International. We're delighted to have you here with us today.
STATEMENT OF VERONIKA MARTIN, ADVOCATE,
REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL
Ms. Martin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank
Senator Brownback and Senator Lugar also for organizing this
hearing, and I would like to thank the Senate for its
overwhelming support for the people of Burma by passing the
Burma Freedom and Democracy Act. Having worked with ethnic
Burmese for more than 10 years, I'm honored to offer testimony
on behalf of Refugees International.
Over the last 8 months, RI has conducted two assessment
missions focused on the human rights and humanitarian situation
of Burma's ethnic minorities. My testimony will focus on two
issues, first, the prevalence of rape by Burma's army against
ethnic minority women, and second, protection problems facing
Burmese refugees before and after their flight to neighboring
Thailand or to Bangladesh.
Refugees International's investigation on human rights
violations against women and girls documented the widespread
use of rape by Burmese soldiers to brutalize women from five
different ethnic nationalities on Burma's eastern border.
Additional informal research completed on RI's recent visit to
the western border points to a similar pattern.
RI conducted interviews with women from the Karen, Karenni,
Mon, Shan, and Tavoyan ethnicities. In the course of 26
individual interviews with women and men and two focus groups,
RI learned of 43 cases of rape or attempted rape, with 23 of
those confirmed through eyewitness testimony or physical
evidence. In about one-third of the cases, the confirmed cases,
the abusers raped the women on military property, and in over
one-third of the confirmed cases he was an officer in Burma's
army.
Rape happened in a variety of circumstances, during forced
labor assignments, while foraging and farming, during
incarceration in military camps, and by intrusion into
families' homes.
The specific rapes RI documented are but a fraction of
those perpetrated by Burma's army. Of the 45 ethnic women who
participated in RI focus groups, 75 percent said they knew
someone who had been raped. It is clear that rape and increased
militarization go hand in hand. There is also a direct
connection between rape and migration. Many women flee Burma
either because they have been raped, or because they fear being
raped.
Rape also occurs while women are in flight. As an example,
I want to share with you the story of Thay Yu. Thay Yu is Karen
mother in her forties who was fleeing to Thailand because of
oppression by the military in her village.
Near the border of Thailand, a group of six Burmese
soldiers caught one of the families traveling with her. It was
a family of four composed of parents, a nursing baby, and a 6-
year-old girl. Thay Yu hid in a nearby bush while soldiers
killed the baby with a blow to the back of the neck. They then
raped the mother, while forcing the husband to watch. After
killing the mother by stabbing her through her vagina with a
bamboo pole, they shot the husband. The 6-year-old daughter ran
away and hid in a tree, where Thay Yu collected her and brought
her to Thailand after burying the bodies of her parents. This
gruesome story is one of many we documented.
Widespread rape and human rights abuses against ethnic
minorities are committed with impunity. The culture of impunity
contributes to a military atmosphere in which rape is
permissible. In only two of the 43 cases RI documented were the
perpetrators punished. These punishments were extremely
lenient.
Because the SPDC and, by extension, its army view the
ethnic minority groups as insurgents, their rape of ethnic
women is a way of waging war on the civilian populations. By
engaging in a widespread practice of rape against ethnic
minority women, Burma's army is violating customary
international law as well as both national laws and
international obligations under the multilateral treaties it
has ratified.
The SPDC has denounced reports about rape issued by local
human rights groups, the U.S. Department of State, and RI. They
have concluded that such reports were fabricated. RI's research
tells a different story. These rapes are not a deviation
committed by rebel soldiers. They are part of a pattern of
abuse designed to control, terrorize, and harm ethnic
populations through their women.
RI recommends that the SPDC stop military buildup and begin
demilitarizing the ethnic areas. The SPDC should further
fulfill its obligations under the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, both of which it
ratified.
The support of 33 United States Senators in signing a
letter to Kofi Annan last year calling for an investigation
into the rapes, as well as the United States Department of
State's own verification of the problem of rape in Burma, have
demonstrated significant support. The U.S. Congress, and
particularly the Senate, can continue to play a leading role by
publicizing human rights abuses committed by the regime and
continuing to put pressure on the SPDC.
I would now like to move the focus of this testimony on
protection problems faced by Burmese refugees and internally
displaced persons in ethnic minority areas. I have divided this
testimony into two parts. Each part reviews the situation of
ethnic Burmese before and after their flight to Thailand or to
Bangladesh.
RI has interviewed refugees who fled Burma's eastern and
western borders from the following eight ethnic groups. These
include the Karen, Karenni, Shan, Mon, Tavoyan, Rohingya,
Rakhaing, and Chin. These groups represent Buddhist, Christian,
and Muslim individuals.
To discuss the human rights situation in eastern Burma, I'd
like to share with you a remark made by an older man from the
Mon ethnic group. He told me, they, referring to the SPDC,
treated me like an animal, like a dog. They broke my head until
blood streamed out. My jaws, cheeks, and ribs were broken. The
SPDC can do what they like. They can kill and rape. We are
weaker than they.
Refugees in Thailand indicated they had fled from their
homes because they could no longer endure abuses such as forced
labor, torture, forced relocation, rape, property and crop
confiscation, and summary executions. One Burmese army defector
interviewed by RI described the instructions given to him by
his superior, who told him, in the front line, everything in
the village of the ethnic groups is yours, women, domestic
animals, you are free to do anything you want. You can even do
so if you have a wife at home.
Forced relocation is another form of abuse affecting
hundreds of thousands of Burmese. Villages are evacuated or
destroyed, its people forced to move to an area overseen by the
army. Relocation sites are devoid of schools and health care.
There are 176 sites that house 350,000 people and an
estimated 300,000 are on the run or in hiding in Thailand. It
is estimated there are a million internally displaced persons
living in eastern Burma. They have practically no access to
humanitarian assistance. What little information is available
from these areas indicates that malnutrition, starvation, and
death from preventable diseases are common.
The SPDC denies their existence. No U.N. agency or
international organization has come to their aid. The
internally displaced of Burma have for the most part been
abandoned by the United Nations and by the international
community, who insist on the permission of an illegitimate
regime to access this population in need of life-saving
humanitarian assistance.
In conclusion, I want to refer to our recommendations. To
address the needs of these forgotten people, RI recommends that
international organizations push for independent access to
these IDPs for emergency assistance, that the Royal Thai
Government allow Burmese fleeing a well-founded fear of
persecution entry into Thailand and access to humanitarian
assistance, and that the Royal Thai Government should also
allow the UNHCR to carry out its refugee protection mandate.
The United States Government can play a leading role in
encouraging the cooperation of Thailand, Burma, and the United
Nations in meeting these objectives by confirming publicly the
scope of Burma's IDP problem, advocating for independent
humanitarian access to ethnic minority areas, and providing
resources for emergency assistance to IDPs. I will refer you to
our written testimony on more information about abuses of
Burmese refugees in Thailand, as well as the situation of the
Muslim Rohingya from Burma who have fled to Bangladesh.
Thank you for the opportunity to share our findings.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Martin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Veronika A. Martin
I would like to thank Senator Richard Lugar and Senator Sam
Brownback for organizing this hearing on the development of democracy
in Burma. I would also like to thank the Senate for its overwhelming
support for the people of Burma by passing the Burmese Freedom and
Democracy Act of 2003.
Having worked with ethnic Burmese for more than 10 years, I am
honored to offer testimony on behalf of Refugees International (RI).
Over the last eight months, RI has conducted two assessment missions
focused on the human rights and humanitarian situation of Burmese
ethnic minorities. My testimony will focus on two issues: first, the
prevalence of rape by Burma's army against ethnic minority women in
Burma; second, protection problems facing Burmese refugees before and
after their flight to neighboring Thailand and Bangladesh.
Rape of Ethnic Minority Women
According to Burma's ruling military regime, the State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC), Burma's army ``safeguards national
solidarity and peace.'' According to women and men from Burma's ethnic
minority groups, particularly those living in the ethnic States along
Burma's eastern and western borders, the army does the opposite. Rather
than look to the army for protection, ethnic people flee in fear at the
sight of a soldier. Refugees International's investigation on human
rights violations against women and girls documented the widespread use
of rape by Burma's soldiers to brutalize women from five different
ethnic nationalities on Burma's eastern border. Additional informal
research completed on RI's recent visit to the western border points to
a similar pattern.
Although rape by soldiers in Burma has been a well-known, well-
documented problem for at least a decade, a report by the Shan Women's
Action Network (SWAN) and Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF), License
to Rape, inspired an unprecedented level of international interest and
outrage regarding the rapes of women from only one ethnic group. RI's
research crossed ethnic boundaries to confirm that Burma's military
frequently rapes women from various ethnic nationalities.
RI conducted interviews with individuals and focus groups of people
living in refugee camps, in villages in Thailand and with people still
living inside Burma. RI interviewed women, men, indigenous NGOs and
local leaders about sexual violence committed by Burma's armed forces
against women from the Karen, Karenni, Mon, Shan and Tavoyan
ethnicities. In the course of 26 individual interviews with women and
men and two focus groups composed of 45 women, RI learned about
numerous instances of rape against ethnic women: specifically, 43 cases
of rape or attempted rape against women from these ethnic groups, with
23 of those confirmed through eyewitness testimony or physical
evidence. In about one-third of the confirmed cases, the abuser raped
the women on military property, and in over one-third of the confirmed
cases, he was an officer in Burma's army. Rape happened in a variety of
circumstances: during incarceration in military camps, during forced
labor assignments, while foraging and farming and by intrusions into
families' homes.
The specific rapes RI documented are but a fraction of those
perpetrated by Burma's army. Every one of the 45 ethnic women who
participated in the RI focus groups said she had heard about rapes
occurring in her area of origin, and 75 percent said they knew someone
who had been raped. It is clear that rape and increased militarization
go hand-in-hand; when more soldiers are sent to an area, typically more
rape occurs. It is significant that rape occurs on military property
because even in those cases where the officer wasn't the one to commit
the rape, he knew or should have known about it. In the vast majority
of the cases, the rapes occurred in conjunction with other human rights
abuses, such as forced labor, forced relocation, forced portering,
torture, and extrajudicial executions. Furthermore, there is a direct
connection between rape and migration. Many women flee Burma either
because they have been raped, or because they fear being raped. Rape
also occurs while women are in flight.
As an example of the dangers women face while trying to reach
safety in Thailand, I want to share with you the story of Thay Yu. Thay
Yu is a Karen mother in her forties who was fleeing to Thailand because
of oppression by the military in her village. Near the border of
Thailand, a group of six Burmese soldiers caught one of the families
traveling with her. It was a family of four, composed of parents, a
nursing baby and a six-year-old girl. Thay Yu hid in a nearby bush and
while soldiers killed the baby with a blow to the back of the neck,
then raped the mother while forcing the husband to watch. After killing
the mother by stabbing her through her vagina with a bamboo pole, they
shot the husband. The six-year-old daughter ran away and hid in a tree,
where Thay Yu collected her and brought her to Thailand after burying
the bodies of her parents. This gruesome story is one of many we
documented. The treatment of ethnic minorities by SPDC soldiers is
inhumane beyond description.
Widespread rape and human rights abuses against ethnic minorities
are committed with impunity, both by officers and lower ranking
soldiers. Officers committed the majority of rapes documented in which
the rank of the perpetrator was known. The culture of impunity
contributes to the military atmosphere in which rape is permissible. It
also leads to the conclusion that the system for protecting civilians
is faulty, which in turn suggests the rape is systematic. Due to the
well-known impunity for rape, survivors and families are extremely
reluctant to complain about rape. In the rare cases where victims or
their families actually do complain to military officials, army
personnel often respond with violence. In only two of the 43 cases RI
documented were the perpetrators punished--these punishments were
extremely lenient, such as the payment of 1000 Kyat or the equivalent
of one US dollar.
As an example of the impunity granted soldiers I want to share the
story of Naw Mu Doh who told us she saw soldiers take her sister away
from their home and transport her to their military camp. She heard her
sister calling for her brother and father to help her because ``they
are raping me.'' They could do nothing to help her. A day after her
sister was taken, the soldiers brought her body back for the family to
bury. Her wounds indicated clearly that she had been raped, perhaps to
death. Despite the fact that the soldiers continued to return to their
village after the murder, Naw Mu Doh and her family were too afraid to
complain. One month later, her father was killed by the army.
According to RI's conversations with more than 150 people along the
Thai/Burmese border over the period of one month, RI's research
indicates that women from ethnic groups along Burma's eastern border
experience rape at the hands of Burma's army on a consistent and
frequent basis. Because the SPDC, and by extension, its army, view the
ethnic minority groups as ``insurgents,'' their rape of ethnic women is
a way of waging war on civilian populations. By engaging in the
widespread practice of rape against ethnic minority women, Burma's
army, (an arm of the State), is violating customary international law
as well as both national laws and international obligations under
multilateral treaties. These treaties include the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, both of which the SPDC has
ratified. In doing so, the SPDC agreed not only to ensure that their
activities did not contravene the letter or spirit of the treaty; they
also agreed to take affirmative steps to realize the commitments
enumerated in the treaty. By permitting--either actively or tacitly--
Burma's army to rape ethnic women with impunity, the SPDC violates
these agreements.
The SPDC has denounced reports about rape issued by ethnic women's
and local human rights groups, the US Department of State and RI. They
have conducted their own investigation in Shan State (with the active
participation of SPDC general Khin Nyunt's wife), which has led them to
conclude that such reports were fabricated. RI's research tells a
different story. These rapes are not a deviation committed by rebel
soldiers; they are part of a pattern of brutal abuse designed to
control, terrorize, and harm ethnic nationality populations through
their women.
On November 19, 2002, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
by consensus a resolution on the human rights situation in Burma,
``express[ing] grave concern at . . . rapes and other forms of sexual
violence carried out by members of the armed forces'' and the
``disproportionate suffering of members of ethnic minorities, women and
children from such violations.'' It is clear these abuses are directly
linked to the internal war the SPDC is waging upon its own citizens.
Until the violence ceases, and until the SPDC establishes and enforces
adequate laws prohibiting rape and ends the culture of impunity for
these horrific crimes, freedom from rape for ethnic women from Burma is
impossible.
Recommendations
For there to be any change, the SPDC must first acknowledge the
epidemic of rape perpetrated by its army before this can change. RI
further recommends that SPDC stop all military buildup and begin
demilitarizing the ethnic areas promptly. The SPDC should further
fulfill its obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). This includes ceasing
all practices and policies, which discriminate against women, including
violence against women. Furthermore, the SPDC should fulfill its
obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which
prohibits gender-based violence against girl children.
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights should ensure that if any
investigation of rape inside Burma should be conducted by UN officials,
it is done by experts on sexual violence, with guarantees of full
access and complete, ongoing security for all witnesses and victims.
Any restrictions on these terms could endanger the very women the
investigation is designed to protect and should result in the
investigation not taking place, or being aborted.
The support of 33 U.S. Senators in signing a letter to Kofi Annan
calling for an investigation into the rapes, as well as the United
States Department of State's own verification of the problem of rape in
Burma, have demonstrated significant support. The U.S. Congress, and in
particular the Senate, can continue to play a leading role by
publicizing human rights abuses committed by the regime and continuing
to put pressure on the SPDC and the United Nations to meet the
aforementioned objectives.
Protection problems facing Burmese refugees before and after their
flight to neighboring Thailand and Bangladesh
I would now like to focus this testimony on protection problems
faced by Burmese refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in
ethnic minority areas. I have divided this testimony into two parts.
Each part reviews the situation of ethnic Burmese before and after
their flight to Thailand and to Bangladesh.
RI has interviewed refugees who have fled the eastern and western
borders of Burma for reasons of abuse or because of a well-founded fear
of persecution by the government from the following eight ethnic
groups: Karen, Karenni, Shan, Mon, Tavoyan, Rohingya, Rakhaing and
Chin. These groups represent Buddhist, Christian and Muslim
individuals.
Human Rights Situation in Eastern Burma Prior to Flight to Thailand
``They treated me like an animal, like a dog. They broke my head
until blood streamed out. My jaw, cheeks and ribs were broken--the SPDC
can do what they like--they can kill and rape. We are weaker than
they.'' These are the words of an older man from the Mon ethnic group
whom we interviewed.
Refugees interviewed by RI in Thailand indicated they had fled from
their homes because they could no longer endure the human rights abuses
by the army. Among those consistently listed were forced labor,
beatings and torture, forced relocation, rape, property and crop
confiscation and summary execution. One Burmese army defector
interviewed by RI described the instructions given to him by his
superiors: ``In the frontline, everything in the village of the ethnic
groups is yours--women, domestic animals. You are free to do anything
you want. . . . you can do so even if you have a wife at home in your
village.''
Other forms of abuse consistently levied against ethnic Burmese
fleeing to Thailand are a result of Burma's worsening economy and 50
percent inflation. These include forced labor, land confiscation,
taxation, extortion and rice quotas that interfere with people's
ability to provide for themselves.
Some of the most common forms of abuses occurring in eastern Burma
are forced relocation and its attendant forced labor. Forced relocation
involves the often-sudden evacuation or destruction of a village and
forced move of all available villagers to a relocation site overseen by
the army. Evacuated areas are considered ``free fire zones'' where
individuals found there may be shot on site. Individuals are then moved
to relocation sites, settlements devoid of basic infrastructure that
hold ethnic people hostage to forced labor and abuse. Relocation sites
have been likened to concentration camps. Since 1996, when the
government began to implement a stronger counter-insurgency plan, 176
relocation sites have been documented, housing more than 350,000
people. An estimated additional 300,000 individuals have chosen to live
on the run and in hiding, rather than move to these sites.
In total, it is estimated that there are one million Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs) living in eastern Burma. Most are unable to
plant and harvest. With practically no access to humanitarian
assistance, reports of malnutrition, starvation and death from
preventable diseases--to the extent any information is available at
all--abound. Yet despite documentation of their existence and
circumstances, no UN agency and no international NGO has come to the
aid of this population. They have in effect been abandoned by the
United Nations and by the international community. Only small covert
efforts conducted over the border have been able to address some of the
emergency needs of these populations.
The complete lack of security and access to fundamental goods and
services, including healthcare and education, as well as the frequent
subjection to violent human rights abuses, have caused many ethnic
people from these areas to undergo the dangerous journey across
militarized and mined areas to enter Thailand. Despite the risk of
denial of entry at the border by some authorities--an act in violation
of customary international law--Burmese continue to flee to neighboring
countries at the rate of three to four thousand per month. Many do so
only as a last resort, having heard that Thailand may deny them entry
at the border, deny entrance into refugee camps or subject them to
abuses as so called ``illegal migrants.'' Despite Thailand's attempts
to deter Burmese from entering, there continues to be an increase in
asylum seekers over the past year suggesting that human rights abuses,
if not increasing, are certainly continuing, as the military struggles
for total control of ethnic areas.
Recommendations
To address the needs of these forgotten people RI recommends that
international organizations push for independent access to these IDPs
for emergency assistance. To ensure that those fleeing human rights
abuses or a well-founded fear of them can reach safety RI recommends
that the Royal Thai Government allow Burmese fleeing a well-founded
fear of persecution, not ``fighting'' as the current criteria define,
entry into Thailand and access to humanitarian assistance. The Royal
Thai Government should also allow the UNHCR to carry out its refugee
protection mandate, which it has been unable to implement
appropriately.
The United States Government can play a leading role in encouraging
the cooperation of Thailand, Burma and the United Nations in meeting
these objectives by confirming publicly the scope of Burma's IDP
problem, advocating for humanitarian access to ethnic minority areas
and providing resources for emergency assistance to affected
populations.
Protection of Burmese Refugees in Thailand--The Role of the Royal Thai
Government and the UNHCR
Only a tiny fraction of Burmese who have entered Thailand since
1984, approximately 120,000 people, have been permitted to live in
refugee camps. Burmese seeking refuge in Thailand, primarily ethnic
minorities from eastern Burma, have had no access to a status
determination process for almost two years, and thus, no access to
refugee camps or protection and care. As a result, Burmese enter
Thailand as part of the growing ``illegal migrant'' population. Their
presence marks the largest migration flow in Southeast Asia, burdening
neighboring Thailand with an estimated two million Burmese seeking
either a safe haven from human rights abuses and persecution or the
opportunity to survive and earn a living, or both. The Royal Thai
Government classifies all Burmese now entering Thailand as ``illegal
migrants.'' This misnomer leaves them vulnerable to exploitation and
forced relocation back to Burma. Legitimate asylum seekers are forced
to live in limbo on the margins of Thai society either along the border
or in urban centers.
Life as an illegal migrant often exposes Burmese to abuse and
exploitation. This is especially true for women who are trafficked or
sexually exploited at the hands of Thai authorities. Vulnerable
individuals such as single mothers, elderly, handicapped or the ill
have little option but to live on construction sites, in fruit
orchards, or to work as domestic help with limited or no access to
healthcare or education for themselves or their children and
practically no legal redress should they suffer abuses. Abuses by Thais
against Burmese are common. In one recent incident in May, six
``illegal migrants'' were shot and burned with the involvement of Thai
officials. To date, no one has been held accountable.
The Royal Thai Government has invited United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to have an extremely limited role in
Thailand. This limits the UNHCR's ability to protect Burmese refugees
from classic refugee rights violations such as refoulement, denial of
entry at the border and unscreened deportations of Burmese who are not
in camps, but have legitimate asylum claims. UNHCR has also been unable
to advocate for guarantees that incoming Burmese be allowed to enter
camps, leaving new arrivals unprotected. Third country resettlement is
virtually non-existent, at the request of the Royal Thai Government.
An example of UNHCR's inability to protect legitimate refugees is
reflected in the case of the Shan people. Since 1996, the Burmese army
has forcibly relocated over 300,000 villagers in Shan State, resulting
in a mass exodus to Thailand. Furthermore, the Burmese army's use of
forced relocation, forced labor and its accompanying human rights
abuses including rape, have resulted in over 1,000 new Shan arrivals
per month to only one district in Thailand. Credible estimates place
the number of Shan refuge seekers in Thailand at well over 150,000. The
Royal Thai Government, however, has not organized refugee camps for the
Shan, and UNHCR has been unable to push for any protection or
assistance for this group.
To make matters worse, rather than advocate for the Shan as
legitimate refugees, UNHCR classifies Shan people and other non-camp
based Burmese as illegal migrants without conducting any status
determinations. Because there is no admissions process for them to
undergo and no camps to house them, they have no choice but to live as
illegal migrants. No schools are available for the children and health
care is difficult to obtain. Shan women, many of whom have suffered
from rape and other gender-based abuses, are particularly at risk of
further exploitation. As one Shan refugee stated, ``It is worse for the
woman because she has no protection, and this is especially true if she
has mental or physical problems; generally, there is more problem for
her survival.''
Interviews which I conducted while living in Thailand previously,
with individuals who were forced back to Burma and subsequently escaped
detention indicate that persecution is common not only for those
accused of links to resistance groups (such as refugees) but those
accused of having engaged in labor union activities in factories in
Thailand. This makes it imperative that UNHCR have a presence at
deportation sites so that individuals with legitimate claims of
persecution if they are returned to Burma, can be entitled to certain
basic protections in Thailand. It is critical that the distinction be
made between those fleeing a well founded fear of persecution or human
rights violations, including those violations that cause extreme
poverty and people motivated only by economic opportunity in Thailand.
Recommendations
In order to ensure the protection of Burmese in Thailand, RI
recommends that the Royal Thai Government (RTG) establish a legitimate
status determination process for Burmese ``illegal migrants'' and allow
protection and assistance to Burmese fleeing a fear of persecution and
human rights abuses. Burmese identified as fleeing a fear of
persecution would be protected by international human rights principles
and international customary law. This should also apply to the Shan
people. Furthermore, it is also critical that Burmese about to be
deported for being ``illegal migrants'' have the opportunity to make a
claim for asylum as internationally accepted principles of non-
refoulement would prescribe. The UNHCR should work with the Royal Thai
Government to put in place a procedure to assess the eligibility of
potential deportees for protection prior to their deportation.
The United States Government can play a leading role in encouraging
the cooperation of Thailand, and of the UNHCR in meeting these
objectives. The U.S. Government can also assist by providing resources
for basic assistance to vulnerable non-camp-based populations.
Human Rights Situation in Western Burma--prior to flight to Bangladesh
On Burma's western border RI documented the flight of the Rohingya
from northern Arakan State as a direct result of Burmese government
policies. These policies deny them citizenship under the 1982
Citizenship Law, limit their religious practice, facilitate land
confiscations for army camps or settlement by Buddhist settlers and
prohibit them from leaving their villages. Restrictions on Freedom of
movement limit their ability to access markets, employment, education
and medical care. Unlike the Buddhist Rakhine who also live in Arakan
state, or the ethnically dominant Burmans, the Rohingya must pay a
significant fee in order to register for marriage or birth. As with
most ethnic groups, RI interviewed Rohingya who were subject to
persecution and human rights abuses for being accused of links with
resistance groups. Such discrimination has contributed to a continuing
influx of Rohingya into Bangladesh, estimated at more than 10,000 in
2002. This adds to the existing caseload of 21,000 ``prima facie''
Rohingya refugees and an estimated 200,000 unofficial Rohingya
currently living in Bangladesh.
Protection of Burmese Refugees in Bangladesh--The role of the
Government of Bangladesh and the UNHCR
Despite a clear record of discrimination by the Government of Burma
against Muslim Rohingya, the UNHCR has stepped up repatriation efforts
in an attempt to phase out its responsibilities to the 21,000 refugees
residing in camps in Bangladesh. This group remains from the mass
exodus of 250,000 Rohingya who sought refuge in Bangladesh in the early
90s. These refugees received ``prima facie'' refugee status, obliging
UNHCR to protect and assist them. Refugees fleeing similar conditions
following the mass repatriations in 1994 and 1995, however, were less
fortunate, having been labeled economic migrants who have no legal
right to UNHCR's protection and assistance. While conditions for
Rohingya inside Burma have hardly changed in the last decade, what
appears to have changed is UNHCR's policy towards Rohingya concerning
rights to UNHCR protection and support. In less than two weeks, the
UNHCR is planning to end its role in repatriations of Burmese Rohingya
to Bangladesh. By the end of the year, they plan to phase out
assistance with a final pull out anticipated by the end of next year.
By stepping up repatriation efforts and reducing assistance to
refugees, UNHCR has created an environment in which protection for the
Rohingya is virtually untenable. In the course of an assessment mission
to Cox's Bazaar district in April, where Rohingya refugees live in
camps and illegally among the local population, RI found clear evidence
of attempts by camp officials to coerce refugees to return to Burma.
Methods of coercion which refugees reported to RI include a reduction
in certain basic entitlements, including food, withholding of medical
services or pharmaceuticals, forced relocation within the camps to
poorer housing, beatings, and, most commonly, threats of and actual
jail sentences.
Mohammad, a father of six in his thirties, was asked to agree to
repatriate by camp officials in the presence of UNHCR. When he dared to
tell UNHCR he did not want to return, he alleges that the camp
authorities later beat and tortured him until he fell unconscious. He
was then sent to jail on false charges for more than two years. UNHCR,
aware of his situation, was unable to help him. Now that Mohammad is
out of jail, he faces the same predicament. Already the camp leader has
threatened him with another jail sentence if he does not agree to
repatriate. ``I have only two choices: I go to jail, or I go back to
Burma. Going to jail is better than going to Burma,'' he stated.
A local Government representative, concerned over UNHCR's premature
withdrawal from its repatriation role, has admitted that, ``UNHCR's
decision to withdraw from the camps has caused us to try to speed up
repatriations. The refugees who do not want to return cannot stay here.
The Government will send them back even if they do not want to go.
Bangladesh is a poor country and cannot take care of this situation.''
UNHCR has been unable to ensure that returns are voluntary. UNHCR
has received dozens of reports of coercion from refugees and other
concerned sources, but repatriations continue to scale up with no clear
response to allegations of involuntary returns. Some refugees have
chosen to leave the camps and live illegally in hiding in surrounding
towns.
UNHCR claims that once it disengages from the repatriations, it
still plans to perform its protection duties. UNHCR's poor record
monitoring repatriations to date, and the fact that by its own
admission it is under-staffed, give cause for concern about the future
of protection for the Rohingya. With responsibility for the camps being
handed over to the Government of Bangladesh, it is unclear how UNHCR
will be able to uphold its protection mandate.
UNHCR insists that refugees have the option of integrating into the
community once it disengages. As a challenge to this assumption,
however, one has only to look as far as the slum settlement of 4,000 in
Teknaf. Government authorities evicted this group of illegal Rohingya
from their homes in late 2002. They now live in horrendous conditions
with mortality rates near emergency levels and no means of obtaining
basic services and protection. As illegal immigrants they are not
allowed to own land, have access to education and public health care,
or enjoy the basic rights granted to citizens of Bangladesh. As one
local authority stated, ``Refugees cannot integrate with the local
people. They will have to take care of everything for themselves. This
is difficult in this region when you don't own property.'' Cox's Bazaar
is one of Bangladesh's poorest and most depressed areas. Further
``disengagement'' of UNHCR from the Rohingya caseload amounts to
disengagement from their legal obligation to provide assistance and
protection to these refugees. The proposed phase out plan is likely to
leave the Rohingya with limited redress for assistance or protection
from refoulement or abuse by local authorities.
Recommendations
In order to give these Rohingya the protection from non-refoulement
that is their right, RI, recommends that the Government of Bangladesh
honor the principle of non-refoulement and UNHCR continue its camp-
based assistance and protection role. It is imperative that
repatriation activities cease until an independent investigation has
been conducted into the voluntary nature of repatriations. UNHCR must
strengthen, not weaken its protection activities by increasing its
presence in the camps and increasing expatriate staff who are not
subject to local pressures. Donor governments should continue to fund
humanitarian and protection programs for the Rohingya. Meanwhile, the
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and independent
human rights monitors should conduct an investigation into the
discriminatory policies and human rights abuses of the Government of
Burma against the Rohingya.
Thank you for the opportunity to share RI's findings with the
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Ms. Martin, for that
testimony.
Why do you think the Thai Government has been hesitant in
something that seems such a clear situation? Why have they not
been more helpful towards the refugees, more condemning towards
the Burmese Government?
Ms. Martin. My sense is that they are very afraid of a
magnet effect, a so-called pull factor, that if they are more
hospitable to Burmese who want to enter Thailand, that a great
percentage of the country of Burma would come into Thailand. I
think there is great concern that an Indochinese-type refugee
situation would occur again.
Nonetheless, there are 2 million Burmese already in
Thailand, and because Thailand has not allowed them access to
refugee camps, they're now living illegally, as illegal
migrants. They don't have access to health care, education, or
any legal redress, and they are routinely, or they're often
abused by Thai individuals and authorities as well, so we have
an underground or illegal population who don't have access to
assistance, and in their own way are then creating a problem
with Thailand.
Senator Brownback. That was my experience at the border. I
mean, you've got population, and they're going to flee. If
they're being persecuted, pursued, killed in their own
communities, they're going to flee, you're going to have that
situation, and you just create a pool of very vulnerable people
that Thailand is going to deal with anyway.
Ms. Martin. Exactly, and I think a perfect example of a
vulnerable group are the Shan people. This is an ethnic
minority that has not been allowed any access to refugee camps.
It's estimated that there are 150,000 in Thailand, and they
have fled well-documented abuses in Burma, including rape.
Thailand has not allowed them any sort of assistance, so
one way that the United States Government could support this is
to actually have some financial resources for these displaced
populations in Thailand that are not in camps, particularly
vulnerable populations such as women and children who are
forced to live on construction sites and have no access to any
assistance or protection.
Senator Brownback. So the United States could provide more
funds for the refugees in Thailand, and I doubt we're taking
very many refugees into the United States from Burma, but we
should.
Ms. Martin. Right. I think that Thailand is not permitting
Burmese to leave Thailand, to give them exit permits to enter
the United States.
Senator Brownback. So we could press the Thai Government
about that issue as well.
Ms. Martin. That's right.
Senator Brownback. Would that be correct?
Ms. Martin. That's right, and I think also in terms of
providing more resources for Burmese in Thailand, that would
have to go hand in hand with advocacy with the Thais to allow
that to happen, because at this time, they are not allowing
international organizations to assist Burmese who are so-called
illegal migrants. We would argue that many of them are
legitimate refugees, but at this time Thailand does not allow
assistance to them.
Senator Brownback. Because of the lateness of the hour, I'm
not going to be able to ask many questions, but Mr. Aung, I
particularly appreciated your testimony and your perseverance;
I wanted to note that, to be here, and your continued advocacy
on behalf of the people that continue to suffer. Do you have
any further policy recommendations? You have put forward some,
but in reaction to either Senator McConnell's or other
recommendations that you heard on this panel, or from Lorne
Craner? Do you have any other thoughts on their policy
recommendations?
Mr. Din. We expect the United States Government will bring
our issues to the United Nations Security Council to take more
action. We expect the United Nations Security Council will
adopt a similar resolution like the Burma Freedom Democracy
Act, so we would like to ask the United States administration
to work more actively organizing China and other countries who
may oppose the idea to bring the situation to the United
Nations Security Council.
Senator Brownback. Would anybody on the panel oppose
tighter United States and global sanctions on Burma? There are
differing points of view sometimes on this that you hurt the
people more than you help, but the democracy advocates inside
Burma have all advocated no, keep the pressure on the regime,
and I wondered if there was any difference of opinion on that
in the panel.
[No response.]
Senator Brownback. Okay. I wanted to make sure of that.
Mr. Din. Mr. Chairman, the most important thing is that
sanctions is called by Burmese democracy leadership, sanction
is called by people of Burma inside. The people argue that
sanctions will hurt some people. Yes, we agree, sanctions will
hurt some ordinary people, but with a minimum impact, but it
will be far less than the whole country suffering under the
military regime. It will be small sacrifice, and then the
sanctions worked for South Africa. We have seen that, so we
believe sanctions will work for my country, too.
And my country has a very unique situation. We have a
strong political party which won a landslide victory in 1990
general election. We have Members of Parliament elected by the
people, who are ready to rule the country. We have strong
democratic leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi. We have strong
people who are ready to sacrifice their life to have freedom
and democracy, so we believe that sanctions will work for our
people of Burma.
Senator Brownback. I think they will, and they will
particularly be successful if we could get a broader coalition
internationally to support us with that. I know the
administration is committed to making that happen as well,
because these are best if they're done in a large press push
internationally, for us to push these on forward.
Yes, Mr. Rogers?
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Chairman, I would just add that, assuming
that the sanctions have the desired effect and bring about a
change, I think it's terribly important for us to be prepared,
for the Burmese to be prepared for the transition to a
democratic government and so on, and so I would advocate
strongly that our Government take the lead in helping to
organize for the change-over, the transition, if you will, to
avoid a chaotic, perhaps even a very violent situation that
could follow.
And to the extent that Burmese students returning to their
home country can play a role in helping a kind of domestic
Peace Corps, if you will, to get out to all parts of the
country and help begin the transition peacefully I think would
be very important.
Senator Brownback. That's a good suggestion. I want to
thank very much the panel for being here. Thank you for your
patience during the recess that we had. Thank you for your
expertise and your commitment to a free Burma.
I tell you, I look at these situations around the world,
and I get to see a fair number of them, but it is really my
hope and prayer and my belief that dictators around the world
are on the run, and we're going to keep them on the run. People
deserve to be free, and if there's anybody anywhere in the
world that is not free, it takes away from the freedom of all
of us.
We should advocate for that, and we should press that, and
I am hopeful we can get a broad coalition to continue to press
for the freedom of the Burmese people. They've certainly
suffered long enough, and it is time they were able to live
free. Thank you very much for your commitment, and for being
here.
[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]