[Senate Hearing 108-985]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-985
COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
BOARD'S REPORT ON THE
SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA ACCIDENT
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 3, 2003
__________
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South
CONRAD BURNS, Montana Carolina, Ranking
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine Virginia
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada RON WYDEN, Oregon
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
Jeanne Bumpus, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
Robert W. Chamberlin, Republican Chief Counsel
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Gregg Elias, Democratic General Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on September 3, 2003................................ 1
Statement of Senator Breaux...................................... 10
Statement of Senator Brownback................................... 9
Statement of Senator Burns....................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Statemnent of Senator Dorgan..................................... 54
Statement of Senator Hollings.................................... 2
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 5
Statement of Senator Inouye...................................... 12
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Report dated March 2003 entitled ``Effectiveness of NASA's
Workforce and Contractor Policies'' from the International
Federation of Professional Technical Engineers, AFL-CIO.... 33
Statement of Senator McCain...................................... 1
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 9
Statement of Senator Snowe....................................... 11
Statement of Senator Sununu...................................... 7
Statement of Senator Wyden....................................... 7
Witnesses
Gehman, Jr., Harold W., Chairman, Columbia Accident Investigation
Board.......................................................... 16
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Letter dated July 23, 2003 to Hon. John McCain from Sean
O'Keefe, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration............................................. 20
O'Keefe, Hon. Sean, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA).......................................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Appendix
Letter dated July 29, 2003 from Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director,
Congressional Budget Office to Hon. Ted Stevens................ 61
Report dated July 29, 2003 from the Congressional Budget Office
entitled ``NASA's Space Flight Operations and Other
Technologically Complex Government Activities Conducted by
Contractors''.................................................. 62
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Sean O'Keefe by:
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 83
Hon. John McCain............................................. 77
Hon. Olympia J. Snowe........................................ 82
Response to written questions submitted to Harold W. Gehman, Jr.
by:
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 88
Hon. John McCain............................................. 84
COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
BOARD'S REPORT ON THE
SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA ACCIDENT
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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 3, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room
SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John McCain,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
The Chairman. Good morning. Last week, the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board released its report on the causes
of the space shuttle accident that occurred 7 months ago. Today
the Committee will begin a thorough examination of its
conclusions.
The Board's final report is one of the most comprehensive
ever produced concerning the management and operations at NASA.
It must serve as a wake-up call to NASA and to the Nation that
we have, for too long, put off hard choices and forced the
space program to limp along without adequate guidance or
funding. As stated in the report, ``Unless the technical,
organizational, and cultural recommendations made in this
report are implemented, little will have been accomplished to
lessen the chance that another accident will follow.'' That's a
very chilling and powerful statement, and I hope all Members of
Congress will pay close attention to that statement, if nothing
else in this report.
The report reminds us that we are still in the
developmental stage of space transportation and that space is
an unforgiving environment which challenges our technical
expertise. It also raises a number of important issues that
will have to be considered as we plan for the future of the
space program. Most importantly, we will have to figure out
where we want the space program to go and what we expect to get
out of it. Then we will have to ensure that adequate and un-
earmarked funds are provided for these missions. It is
imperative that we eliminate wasteful spending and make
efficient use of resources we commit to space exploration.
The Board worked tirelessly to identify and clarify the
causes of this accident, and I'm deeply grateful to its members
for their dedication. Although the technical causes of the
accident have been suspected for some time, the Board's
findings concerning the role that NASA's organizational
structure and culture played in this tragedy are as troubling
as they are valuable.
As the Board reported, ``Complex systems almost always fail
in complex ways.'' The many factors that contributed to the
accident largely demonstrate how far NASA has regressed--its
incomplete and invalid impact analysis, its rejection to seek
satellite images of the damaged shuttle, its reliance on past
successes as a substitute for sound engineering practices, its
organizational barriers that prevented effective communication
of critical information and stifled professional differences of
opinion, and its lack of integrated management across program
elements.
The report further describes NASA's culture as including,
``flawed decisionmaking, self-deception, introversion, and
diminished curiosity about the world outside.'' We'll want to
hear from Administrator O'Keefe about precisely how and when
this culture can be changed.
I welcome Administrator O'Keefe and Admiral Gehman, and
look forward to hearing their testimony on the Investigation
Board's findings and recommendations and NASA's plan to return
the space shuttle program to flight.
Again, I thank Admiral Gehman and his Board members for
their outstanding work. I also think it's appropriate to note
that Mr. O'Keefe and his staff were completely cooperative and
helpful in the Board's investigation. That's not always true in
the past. But I think they deserve credit for being helpful,
even though sometimes it was obviously painful.
I'd like to turn to my friend of many years, and Ranking
Member of the Committee, Senator Hollings, who, as we all know,
made an announcement that he would not seek reelection. I know
that Senator Hollings, until the last moment he is here, will
continue to pursue with vigor, passion, and always non-
controversially, issues that have interested him.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. And I must say to my friend--he is not gone--
but I and all Members of this Committee will miss him because
of his long and outstanding and courageous service on this
Committee and as a Member of the U.S. Senate.
Senator Hollings?
STATEMENT OF HON. ERNEST F. HOLLINGS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA
Senator Hollings. I thank our distinguished Chairman and my
good friend, John McCain. When I left town in the first of
August, I was a bum. I had been serving almost--well, over 50
years in some public office. And as long as you continue to
serve, you're a bum. But soon as I said I was going to get out
of the way, I became a statesman.
[Laughter.]
Senator Hollings. You ought to see the crap that----
[Laughter.]
Senator Hollings.--that they put out. I mean, you've never
seen such stuff.
[Laughter.]
Senator Hollings. I mean, I've invented everything, I've
thought of everything, and everything else of that kind.
[Laughter.]
Senator Hollings. But it has been a distinct pleasure, and
serving seven terms in the U.S. Senate is enough. I'm delighted
to have an additional year here to see if we can straighten out
a few things.
I commend Admiral Gehman and the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board. For example, I was only reading last
night, an article in the London Economist titled, ``Old, Unsafe
and Costly,'' the article detailed why it's time to ``scuttle
the shuttle.'' And that's exactly what you recommend, that the
shuttle be scuttled.
However, I'm sort of intrigued with the findings regarding
the culture of NASA. As an admiral, Mr. Gehman, you understand
that a Navy board of inquiry, would immediately found
responsibility, and whoever was captain of that ship would have
been cashiered. I don't find that in the report--the fixing of
responsibility. That intrigues me. If you were the coach of a
football team, they'd buy up the contract, having lost seven
members of the team.
Let me get right to the point. I think this Committee and
the whole blooming setup is part of the culture. I've been
here, as the distinguished Chairman just commented, for years,
since we've had a Space Committee. Never have I heard anything
about being unsafe.
I'll never forget when the Challenger went down. I talked
to them out there at Morton Thiokol. If I remember the name, it
was an Alan McDonald. And he said, ``We told them, at the Cape,
it was unsafe.'' With those O-rings, particularly the cold
around there, and they were taking too great a risk.`` And he
said, ``There we all were gathered together in the hearing room
there at Morton Thiokol, up there in Iowa, and when the
Challenger blasted off, Jimmy said, `There she goes.' And Henry
said, `Like a piece of cake.' And then all of a sudden she
blew. And everyone in the room knew why. I said, ``Mr.
McDonald, will you come and tell the Committee that?'' And he
said, ``I'd be glad to.'' They headed him off, and he never
testified.
Now, we thought, after the Rogers Committee had gotten into
it, that the Commission had cleaned it up, but, you didn't find
it's been cleaned up. And we came with an independent safety
office. But the independent safety office within NASA itself
has not worked. We've lost seven astronauts.
So rather than part of the culture that you get up here on
the Hill, ``Oh, we're going to get them. We're going to get
that. We're going to be back up in space.'' Uh-uh. We're not
going to get up there until we get a decent shuttle and it's
certified safe by others than in NASA, in my opinion.
I would hope that we had learned a lesson here, because
we're the ones that put the pressure on Mr. O'Keefe. I know we
all had worked with him on the Appropriations Committee, and
when he got appointed that blooming Space Station was--or is, I
think, about $40 billion, or $20 billion--that's right, it's
about $20 billion over budget and about only 40 percent
complete. So when we had the head of the Office of Management
and Budget go over there, we were all concerned about money. We
weren't concerned about safety. So we're part of the culture
right up here on this Committee. And rather than praising each
other how thorough you have been--and it has been a very
thorough--you all have really done a way better job than I
thought was going to happen and get done. You all have really
worked hard, and you've got a very comprehensive report, except
the actual fixing of the responsibility.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hollings follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ernest F. Hollings,
U.S. Senator from South Carolina
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I would like to begin by thanking Admiral
Gehman and his colleagues for an excellent report. When you first came
before this committee in February, some members wondered whether your
group had the wherewithal to be critical enough of NASA. You reassured
us then and the product of your work is excellent. Now we must begin
the process of understanding and implementing your recommendations.
Mr. O'Keefe, I am glad that you are here as well. You certainly
inherited more than you bargained for when you joined NASA. You have
made the commitment that NASA will follow these recommendations. I hope
so. I don't know how you will accomplish that, and the Board appears to
have that doubt, too. Many of us have a sense of deja vu. We tried to
change NASA in 1986 and now we know it just got worse. We have a NASA
Administrator who is saying all of the right things, but having been
here before we wonder if NASA can really heal itself or if Congress
needs to step in--forcefully.
We have many decisions before us. First, we must ensure that we
understand and have the proper insight into the return to flight
process. What is the right thing to do and when should we do it? While
NASA has appointed the Stafford-Covey team, I wonder whether this is
enough. Perhaps we should have a Congressional Review Panel with
experts appointed by the Congress to review this process.
These experts could also help us with our second task--provide a
comprehensive, long-term vision for the space program. Here we are 40
years after the birth of space flight, and we don't have a very good
idea of what we're doing and why, and what we are doing we aren't doing
all that well. NASA made its goal to complete and service a space
station, but even that's changed over the years. Regardless of what you
think of the Station and I'm one who doesn't think much of it-the
reality is that it's there and we need to service it. But it's time to
think beyond Station. What's next for human spaceflight and what is a
purpose to which we can all agree? Obviously, there aren't good answers
to this question today.
Third, we need to figure out how to change NASA's culture. Admiral
Gehman, your report was chilling on this point, and makes us wonder
what on Earth we can do, particularly when the experts we relied on
seemed to have failed us. The Rogers Commission that examined the
Challenger accident recommended a strong, independent NASA safety
organization, strong central control of the Shuttle Program, and
broader participation by authorities who could ensure that safety was
the highest priority. All that failed us, and NASA actively sought to
unravel those changes. I understand your report argues that NASA was
not just complacent and blind about safety, but was proactive about
stopping safe, smart procedures on this mission-and still thinks its
safety culture is top-notch. I think you said their culture was in
denial. My gosh, what are we to make of all this!
The CAIB has once again recommended an independent safety office,
as well as independent technical requirements management so that
schedule worries don't impact decisions about what is safe to fly. My
concern is that we have been here before and that NASA has a terrible
track record. I'm not sure that NASA can reform itself. We in the
Congress may need to help them, whether it's through new institutions
or by changing the Program's responsibilities.
Finally, we'll have to figure out how to do all of this in an era
of dwindling resources. It will take a lot of money to do this right.
We need to weigh our options moving forward and make some hard choices.
I look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, and the other members
of the Committee to do just that.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hollings. And, obviously,
I would ask my colleagues to make their comments as briefly as
possible, since we would like to hear from the witnesses.
Senator Hutchison?
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Senator McCain, Mr. Chairman.
First, I do want to commend the report, the open
investigation that was done. I thank you, Admiral Gehman, for
doing a great job. And I thank you, Administrator O'Keefe, for
letting him do a great job. That says a lot, and it was very
different from the Challenger experience. We appreciate that.
Now we have a blueprint of where to go.
One of the most important things in your report concludes
that the present shuttle is not inherently unsafe, but it does
call for a massive recertification process to ensure flight
safety. I will look to Administrator O'Keefe for his commitment
to the project of recertifying shuttles before they go back in
the air.
The report is a devastating attack on NASA's procedure and
lines of communication. I hope that the Administrator regards
this report as a blueprint for change, and I hope that it is
acknowledged that there can never again be business as usual at
NASA.
You cannot have your most innovative research, your most
technologically advanced challenge done with a bureaucratic
mentality. This doesn't mean you open the treasury, but it
means you lock your vision on a few very big goals, and you do
them right. ``Faster, better, cheaper'' should be thrown in the
wastebasket.
When Senator Nelson and I, particularly, along with the
whole Committee, asked questions of previous administrators,
``Are we sacrificing safety?'' we always got the answer,
``Absolutely not. Safety is the first priority.'' Now we need
to make sure that we have the vision, the scientific
background, and the total change in the bureaucracy at NASA,
from the very top to the very bottom, in line with the
recommendations of the report.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Lautenberg?
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. I will
be brief. And I ask consent that my full statement be included
in the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lautenberg follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg,
U.S. Senator from New Jersey
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing.
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's report is a critical
document that will help those of us in Congress and the public
understand the causes of the Columbia tragedy.
While there appears to be little disagreement about the physical
cause of the accident, the troubling aspect of the report is that it
forces us to ask some very difficult questions about the management of
Federal programs and, the future of the space program itself.
This is not a time to simply assign blame--I believe we need to
look ahead and learn from the lessons highlighted from this report.
It's an appropriate time to examine the improvements needed to
strengthen NASA's workforce and foster a culture of open communication
at NASA.
I believe it's time to look at the effect that NASA's scheme of
outsourcing work on this critical program has had on the safety of the
program.
I have criticized this Administration for being content with buying
``safety on the cheap'' and ``security on the cheap.'' We have seen
this with the Administration's air traffic control privatization plan
and its ill-fated proposal to cut air marshals.
With their zeal to ``outsource,'' just how does the Administration
prevent the budget cutters from cutting out safety and security
protections with the slash of a pen?
But what has the Administration so fired up about its competitive
outsourcing agenda is that it is touted to save money. The accident
investigation report reminds us that ``NASA led the way toward
privatization, serving as an example to other government agencies.'' If
this is truly the case, then I don't think the American people want
other safety-critical work to be handled under a similar program
structure.
It's been reported that at one time only about 1,800 NASA employees
were responsible to oversee some 17,000 contractors. Those numbers have
clear implications for the capacity of NASA to exercise appropriate
oversight--to maintain the flow of vital information--and to assure
full implementation of safety processes. This is not how our government
should be run.
The desire to reach for the stars is as old as human history and
the ambitions embodied in our manned space program are noble ones. But
we have had two fatal accidents in 113 Shuttle missions. Many people
have become inured to the dangers inherent in sending people into space
and bringing them back safely. But the fact is, it's a high-risk
venture. Some risk is unavoidable--that's what makes our astronauts
such brave individuals.
Manned space exploration isn't cheap. If we try to do it on the
cheap, we put safety and people's lives--at risk.
I'm sure we will hear in testimony today and in the future that
safety has never been compromised. But NASA has always had problems
overseeing its contractors. And the National Research Council has
concluded that the contract to manage the Shuttle program awarded to
United Space Alliance in 1996 contained financial incentives for
investments in efficiency, but not for investments in modernization and
safety improvements.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today--not just on the
technical causes of the Columbia accident--but also on the
organizational faultlines which promoted the potential for such a
disaster like this. I also hope to hear testimony on NASA's
relationship with its contractors, Congress's relationship with NASA,
and an analysis of Administration budget requests for NASA past and
present.
Thank you.
Senator Lautenberg. I would just like to make a couple of
quick points. And my hat's off to Admiral Gehman and you, Mr.
O'Keefe, for the very tough task that you took on, and the
outcome that is described in your report, I think, is
understandable and will have an effect on how we think about
things in the future. And I hope that we will learn enough
directly about the safety requirement so that something as
terrible as happened here, the Columbia tragedy, will never
happen again.
But I would go to something of principle and make a note of
the fact that the privatization program that we see in
government almost began with NASA. And now we see that we have
some 1,800 people, I believe the number is, who are overseeing
private contractors, in the multiple thousands, whether or not
they have enough ability, enough structure to make sure that
they're doing what they have to do.
And I'll close with this. On page 109 of your report,
Admiral Gehman, ``The major annual savings resulting from this
spaceflight operations contract, which, in 1996, were touted to
be some 500 million to a billion a year by the early 2000, have
not materialized.'' And I highlight that, because throughout
that paragraph it talks to the lack of success in achieving the
cost efficiencies. And what is it that permitted the costs to
be overrun and still this terrible thing to take place?
And I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we'll find out about the
relationship of the private side of the force and what impact
it had. And I thank you very much and congratulate you again
for the excellent work you've done.
The Chairman. Senator Sununu?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Sununu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I simply want to thank Admiral Gehman and Administrator
O'Keefe for their work, and reiterate Chairman McCain's
emphasis on the level of cooperation that was provided, the
service of the members of the Board. I can't imagine an
emotionally or physically more difficult task than the one that
we gave to you, and we owe a great deal of thanks, of course,
to the Board members, but also to the staff--the staff at NASA
and the staff on the Board--that performed a lot of the more
difficult tasks and probably spent at least as much time as the
Board members themselves. So we're very grateful for your
service and very appreciative of the work product.
The Chairman. Senator Wyden?
STATEMENT OF HON. RON WYDEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I think you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Hollings have
both put your hands on the central question, and that's looking
again at NASA's mission. And my view is that you cannot resolve
the issue about NASA's basic mission without looking carefully
and in a fresh way at the direction of the manned space
program.
And toward that end, Mr. Chairman and colleagues, I'd like
to make a modest proposal this morning. I believe that, within
90 days or, at most, 6 months, NASA should prepare and furnish
this Committee a cost-benefit analysis on the manned space
program. What I would like to learn and what I think would be
helpful to all of us in the Senate is to learn more precisely
what can be accomplished with manned spaceflight and at what
price, and what cannot. Once this information would be made
available to the Committee, then we're in a position, I think,
for the first time in a long time, to look carefully at how
manned spaceflight fits into NASA's future and what can be
accomplished with unmanned spaceflight that would also achieve
the scientific discoveries that have been envisaged for the
agency for some time.
There are other issues that I'm going to want to explore,
but I intend to ask the Administrator about whether he would
prepare a cost-benefit analysis quickly for the Senate on the
manned spaceflight program. The other areas that I want to
explore, particularly how this time we would ensure compliance
with the Admiral's fine recommendations. I think if you look
historically at this issue, after the last tragedy many of the
same recommendations were made that Admiral Gehman is making
now, and clearly many of them were not followed up on. I know
that the Administrator, Sean O'Keefe, feels strongly about
this, as well, and I intend to ask some questions about how
it's going to be different this time and the recommendations
will be followed up on.
But I thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Hollings, for
convening this hearing. I think the country wanted us to do
this quickly, and you all have done that, and I thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Burns?
STATEMENT OF HON. CONRAD BURNS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA
Senator Burns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I'll just
submit my statement for the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Senator Burns. I'd like to just offer a small comment. I,
like the Chairman, appreciate the work that the Director has
done and this Board has done. It took a great deal of courage
to release the report that you did. It needed to be released.
And it took a look at the inside of us, and we're going to have
to reexamine just exactly what we found in there.
I think we now have to redirect our focus now on the vision
and the R&D that goes along with NASA. We know that going into
space will always be risky, at best. And so that work must go
on. I think we will now look at different areas of a more
moderate way to enter space and to move cargo. I think we'll
take another look now at reusables and unmanned. I think, in
our probes, our unmanned probes into the--further out in space
is--they'll be a very important part of this Nation. And so we
have a lot of work ahead of us. But, again, I want to
congratulate you.
And, Senator Hollings, it may just seem like a year to you,
but we'll miss you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Burns follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Conrad Burns, U.S. Senator from Montana
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this important hearing. It
has been more than seven months since our Nation was shocked and deeply
sorrowed by the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its brave and
courageous crew. As a long time supporter of NASA and of manned space
flight, I was particularly concerned about the impact of the accident
on our continuing endeavors in space. It was important for us to look
into the cause of the accident in an objective and expeditious manner,
and I believe that constituting the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board was the right step to accomplish this goal. The Board had an
enormous task, looking not only at where technology let us down but
also human factors that may have contributed to this terrible tragedy.
The accident investigation team has concluded with a fair degree of
confidence the sequence of events that led to the loss of the space
shuttle Columbia. Technical problems, once identified, can be resolved
with sufficient time and resources. What we continue to ponder and
debate is what else can be done to better guard against such mishaps in
the future. In looking over the investigation report, I was pleased to
note that the Board has examined this issue as well, with a special
emphasis on the existing organizational culture within our space
agency.
The Board has put together a comprehensive report that includes 29
different recommendations, including 15 that must be implemented prior
to any 'return to flight'. These recommendations, once implemented,
will undoubtedly add a measure of safety to what is an inherently risky
enterprise--space exploration will continue to challenge our technical
capabilities just as it does our pioneering spirit. It is my hope that
our Nation does not yield ground on either position.
As we analyze and dissect the findings of the report, we in
Congress should be especially mindful of actions that signal our level
of support for the space program. Committing to human presence in space
cannot go hand in-hand with under-funding and unrealistic
expectations--these eventually contribute to the very culture that is
alluded to in the Board's report. While additional oversight will help
alleviate some of these problems, Congress must do its part to
establish clearer priorities for our space agency. I hope that we
continue to look at this issue in the days ahead.
Mr. Chairman, I applaud the efforts of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board in this obviously difficult task. I look forward to
hearing from Admiral Gehman on the findings of the Board and from Mr.
O'Keefe on his thoughts in this matter.
The Chairman. Senator Nelson?
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for
calling this hearing today. Thank you for your leadership in
the oversight role that is going to be needed by this Committee
as we proceed. And thanks to both of you gentlemen for the
extraordinary leadership that you have offered.
Admiral Gehman, I particularly want to commend you, who
I've worked with over the course of the past several months.
Having read a lot of your interviews, having talked to your
very professional staff, talked to the members of your Board, I
think you have done an excellent work product.
I expected what you came out and talked about, the
decisionmaking being influenced by the culture, and we need
very much to attend to that. What I did not expect, but was
pleasantly surprised in your report, that you addressed head-
on, the question of the funding and how, over time--I can draw
my own conclusions, as I have railed in this Committee on
several occasions, that you can't do spaceflight on the cheap,
that there are just too many things in a risky business that
have got to be attended to, and particularly when safety is
overlooked because money is siphoned off of the space shuttle
program to put it onto something else, which has occurred over
the past decade. And so thank you for bringing up that aspect.
And, Mr. Chairman, I will close by saying, again, thank you
for the oversight hearings. And I think this is going to be
extremely important, that in our oversight capacity, that
although we can't lead the space program--that has to go all
the way to the top, to the White House--we can certainly let,
as Senator Hutchison has already said, our expressions of
concern be known of what is adequately funding the program so
that safety is not sacrificed like it has been.
We went through this drill 17 years ago, and safety was
going to be number one. And it was, for about two or 3 years.
And then the hard reality set in of siphoning the money off, of
relegating the safety considerations--because of the day-to-day
financial decisions, they were being relegated to the back
seat.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Brownback?
STATEMENT OF HON. SAM BROWNBACK,
U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
February 1, this country certainly suffered, and the world
suffered, a terrible and tragic loss of the Shuttle Columbia
and her crew, the seven astronauts that were explorers and they
wished to serve their countries, and they did just that. While
certainly saddened by the events that took place on that
fateful day; however, true to this country's resolve, we've
been determined to find and correct the cause and move forward.
That is what this hearing is about today.
I believe it is imperative that America remains at the
forefront of space exploration and discovery, and it's our job
here in Congress to take this report, move forward
expeditiously in getting America back in space safely aboard an
American vehicle. I'm committed to authoring and working on
reauthorizing a bill for NASA during this Congress and use this
report to provide some of the guidelines for that bill. I'm
also pleased to see that the Board recognizes the importance of
a vision for America's future in manned space exploration. And
I believe it's time for us to step back and to really review
that and to establish that vision, and I'm hopeful we can see
created a Presidential commission on the future of space
exploration to establish a common vision for space exploration
by America.
I've held several subcommittee hearings over the last few
months, with not only NASA but other Federal officials, but
also with the private sector companies and entrepreneurs in an
effort to ascertain what America's vision for future space
exploration should be. In all these hearings, one thing has
stood clear: Americans continue to support human spaceflight
and exploration. We cannot allow ourselves to give up and turn
our backs on exploring space and the universe because we have
suffered loss of life. Those are the risks we acknowledge and
accept for the opportunity to improve the quality of life here
on Earth and beyond.
We are tasked today with moving forward to ensure America's
return to flight, and I'm anxious to hear what NASA's response
is to the Board's report. But I'm also very interested in where
they plan to go from here with America's vision in space
exploration.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding the hearing.
The Chairman. Senator Breaux?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN B. BREAUX,
U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And let me join with all of our colleagues on the Committee
who, I think, have a universal agreement on the quality of the
work that was done, Admiral, after this great tragedy, and the
cooperation, Mr. O'Keefe, that NASA had and the role that NASA
played in working out this very detailed investigation of a
very tragic set of circumstances.
It, indeed, is very tragic and is very, very high profile.
If you think that we lose about 40,000 American lives on
accidents every year on our Nation's highways, although this is
an accident involving seven real American heroes, it really
speaks to the essence of what America is all about. In a sense
the quest for conquering outer space is really something that
affects every American very deeply when you see something so
visible as the shuttle tragedy that occurred.
So I have a number of questions about the recommendations
and the culture that, Admiral, you talked about, and how we
change that. But let me just say now that the report, I think,
is well done. And the cooperation, I think, that was exhibited
is also to be commended. And I'll thank you both.
The Chairman. Senator Snowe?
STATEMENT OF HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MAINE
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for
holding this hearing so promptly and responsibly. And I
certainly want to welcome Admiral Gehman and Administrator
O'Keefe here this morning.
This report, as everybody's indicated, is about moving
forward, but the question is how we do so in a manner that
honors the memories of those brave astronauts who lost their
lives, and to prevent a reoccurrence of this tragedy from
occurring in the future.
This report does, I think, represent a giant leap forward
in understanding that which needs to be fixed. I think the
question is the change that needs to occur and the
implementation of that change.
And, Admiral Gehman, I want to congratulate you and the
Board for your extraordinary efforts that you invested in
developing this report, reaching beyond and not just
ascertaining the last thing that occurred, but also
understanding the whole system and patterns of failures and
shortcomings. I think that that is essential for understanding
the complete picture in order to address the inequities and
also the failures overall.
I would also say that we know that this is--as you
indicated, Admiral Gehman, ``complex systems always fail in
complex ways.'' So obviously the solution is going to be
equally complicated. I think what becomes abundantly clear in
this whole process is that the execution and the perpetuation
of comprehensive changes must occur in order for the manned
spaceflight program to continue, and prevent the loss of life
in the future.
And I think we were all shocked by the revelations of the
shortcomings, of miscommunications, obviously the bureaucratic
misfirings. And I think, as a result, we have to know how and
what must be done. But more importantly is establishing a
perpetuity of vigilance in making sure that these things are
implemented for the long-haul and the longevity that it's going
to require. We cannot allow our outrage or concern to atrophy.
You know, we have seen past reports, many of which were
overlooked, and that cannot occur again in this instance.
And so when the spotlight is off, I would hope that we will
be able to be assured that what has been recommended in this
report is going to go forward. And it's not a question of just
depending on previous successes, however tenuous, to predict
future success. The question is, how do we create a permanent
management structure that will enable NASA to succeed in the
future with this program?
And I know we have a lot of remarkable people at NASA, and
I know that your leadership, Administrator O'Keefe, and your
extraordinary work at the Board, Admiral Gehman, that it is
possible and that when we look back at this time of tragic loss
that we can view it as a turning point in the history of
America's manned spaceflight program.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Inouye?
STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I wish to commend Administrator O'Keefe and Admiral Gehman
for this careful, candid, and courageous report. Thank you very
much.
I ask that the complete statement be made part of the
record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Welcome to the witnesses. We'll begin with you,
Administrator O'Keefe. Thank you for appearing today.
STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN O'KEEFE, ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA)
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a statement I'd like to submit for the record, if
you would, and I'll briefly summarize.
The Chairman. And if you'd pull the microphone a little
closer, please.
Mr. O'Keefe. Sure. Is that resonating a little better?
Over our 45 years as an agency, when NASA was founded in
1958, we have found in the course of that history that our time
has been defined by the great successes and the great failures.
In each of these defining moments, our strength and resolve as
professionals has been tested, to be sure. And this one of the
seminal moments in our history. It is defined by a failure.
On February 1, we pledged to the families of the Columbia
seven that we would find the problem, fix it, and return to
exploration objectives that their loved ones dedicated their
lives to. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's report
completes the first of these commitments, and we are indebted
to Admiral Gehman and his Board members for their exceptional
public service and extraordinary diligence in this difficult
task. We wanted an unvarnished answer, and we got it.
As we begin to fulfill the second commitment to the
families to fix the problem, our first step, critical first
step, is to accept the findings, comply with the
recommendations, and embrace this report. There is no
equivocation on that pledge. This report, as many of you have
observed, is a blueprint. It's a roadmap to achieve that second
objective.
Now, in the course of the proceedings of this
investigation, the Board has given us an extraordinary head
start by their candor, their openness, and the release of
findings and recommendations during the course of the
investigation. This has all been conducted in a very open
setting, and they have telegraphed all along the way, in the
course of their public hearings, commentary, exactly what their
findings were as they found them and moved forward, and we've
been listening.
So, again, to start, thanks to their good work and the
manner in which they conducted it, in developing an
implementation plan, and the implementation plan will be
released here later this week with the intent to be updated all
the time on the findings and recommendations--and you'll see
that in this initial effort at it--and divided into two primary
categories, the 29 recommendations of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board, and then a second approach, which is
raising the bar to a standard higher than that. And we will
include in that category everything and anything that's going
to improve this process, as well as the capabilities of the
hardware itself.
As we work through these recommendations, we'll have to
choose options to implement them very wisely in order to be
fully compliant with those recommendations, and we've got to
continually improve and upgrade the plan itself to incorporate
every aspect we find along the way in our implementation effort
and any other observation, from wherever it may come, that
needs to be addressed as we work our way through that in our
commitment to fix the problem.
The report covers hardware failures and human failures and
how our culture needs to change to mitigate against succumbing
to failures of both kind. We must go forward and resolve to
follow this blueprint, and do it in a way that is our very best
effort, to make this a stronger organization. There is no
question about that.
It will require all of us in the agency--not just the human
spaceflight effort, not any one center, not any one program--
all of us at NASA to recognize this is an institutional set of
findings that has application to everything we do. And that's a
profound set of recommendations. We wanted that unvarnished
assessment, and we got it.
This is a very different NASA today than it was on February
1. Our lives are forever changed by this tragic event, but not
nearly to the extent that the lives of the Columbia families
have been changed for the rest of their time.
In taking inspiration from their approach, we must be as
resolute and courageous in our efforts as they have been in
working through this tragedy, and committing ourselves to
accepting these findings, complying with these recommendations,
and embracing this report. We know that how we respond in the
days, weeks, and months ahead will matter as much as what we
decide to do and whether there will be a lasting change that
will withstand the years from now, I think has been observed by
so many here, as well.
We must also resolve that definition and be definitive in
our acceptance of our failures and in following through on our
commitment to the families to fix the problem and return to the
exploration objectives their loved ones dedicated their lives
to. And in that effort we know we've got a lot of work ahead of
us, and we've accepted that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Keefe follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sean O'Keefe, Administrator, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA)
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you here today with Admiral Gehman, who
along with the other members of the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board (CAIB) has selflessly performed a valuable and patriotic public
service these past seven months.
Shortly after the tragic loss of the Space Shuttle and its heroic
crew, I made a solemn pledge to the families of Columbia's crew that we
will find out what caused the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and
its crew, correct what problems we find, and safely continue with the
important work in space that motivates our astronauts and inspire
millions throughout the world. Thanks to the CAIB's thorough report, we
now definitively know what caused the accident. It was a combination of
hardware, process and human failures. We also have a more complete
understanding of the problems that must be fixed at NASA to ensure that
Space Shuttle operations are conducted as safely as humanly possible on
behalf of our Nation's space exploration and research agenda.
Indeed, the CAIB has provided NASA with a very helpful roadmap for
returning to safe flight activities, one that we intend to faithfully
follow. I can assure you, that we will not only implement the CAIB's
recommendations to the best of our ability, but we are also seeking
ways to go beyond their recommendations.
Today's focus is on the hard lessons we've learned from the
Columbia accident and about the hard work that lies ahead before we are
ready to launch the Space Shuttle Atlantis for the STS-114 mission. I
want to emphasize, as we undertake this work, we will be ever mindful
of and appreciative of the people who have helped NASA and our entire
country recover from that terrible first day of February.
First and foremost, we owe enormous gratitude to the brave families
of the Columbia crew. Through their steadfast courage and dignity they
have provided inspiration to the Nation. A fitting memorial for the
crew will be constructed at Arlington National Cemetery. We thank the
members of this Committee for your strong support of the Columbia
Orbiter Memorial Act, which President Bush signed into law on April 16,
2003.
One month ago, the family members demonstrated an incredible spirit
of exploration and discovery in their own right as they joined
astronaut Scott Parazynski in climbing to the top of the recently named
Columbia Point, a prominent vista on Colorado's Kit Carson Mountain
that now honors the memory of the Columbia STS-107 crew.
We are also indebted to the over 14,000 people from the
Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Emergency Management Agency,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Defense Department, U.S. Forest
Service, Texas and Louisiana National Guards and many state and local
law enforcement and emergency service units who contributed to the
recovery of Columbia's debris. As a result of this unprecedented
interagency and intergovernmental cooperative effort, an area in
eastern Texas and western Louisiana about the size of Rhode Island was
carefully searched, resulting in the recovery of thirty-eight percent
of the dry weight of the orbiter, including several key parts from the
left wing, the part of the Orbiter damaged by a foam strike during
liftoff, and the critical Orbiter Experimental Recorder--the data
recorder that verified an validated much of what was learned about the
accident from NASA's Mission Control during Columbia's reentry. We are
deeply saddened to note that one of the helicopters searching for
debris from the Shuttle Columbia crashed in the Angelina National
Forest in east Texas on March 27 killing the pilot and a Forest Service
Ranger. Our thoughts and prayers go out to the families of the
helicopter crew members killed in the accident.
In support of this unprecedented operation, we received tremendous
hospitality and support from the Texas communities of Lufkin, Hemphill,
Nagadoches, Palestine and Corsicana, as well as the Louisiana
communities of Shreveport and Leesville, particularly in support of
activities at Barksdale AFB and Fort Polk. NASA vows not to forget the
many kindnesses bestowed upon our people and the other recovery
workers. We will use the resources and people of our Education
Enterprise to help nurture the spirit of discovery and exploration in
the young people who grow up in the region, just as we are working to
help inspire and motivate school children throughout the country as
they embark on their studies this fall.
Finally, we are grateful for the diligent work of the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board members and staff. As many of you know,
the Board has worked non-stop since they were given this important
responsibility. Admiral Gehman has performed many tremendous acts of
public service throughout his distinguished career, and I'm certain
that the history books will regard his work on this report as among his
most significant contributions to his country.
We accept the findings of the Board and will comply with their
recommendations. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's report
recommendations will be our benchmark for return to flight. Using the
Board's recommendations as NASA's organizing principles for emerging
from the Columbia accident as a safer, stronger and smarter
organization, we are in the process of completing a preliminary return
to flight Implementation Plan which will detail the Agency's evolving
blueprint for returning to flight safely and reliably. This
Implementation Plan will be a living plan and will be updated on a
regular and frequent basis, with input from across our entire Agency
The plan will lay out how NASA will implement the recommendations of
the CAIB, as well as a comprehensive set of self-initiated corrective
actions.
Following the logic of the Board's report, our implementation plan
strategy focuses on making improvements in the following key areas:
Technical excellence--Making specific technical engineering
changes that will enhance our overall technical capabilities.
Among these changes is the establishment of our new NASA
Engineering and Safety Center at the Langley Research Center in
Hampton, Virginia that will draw upon talent throughout our
Agency to take a no holds barred approach to mission safety. If
people in the center spot a problem or potential problem during
their engineering and safety assessments of all our programs,
they will be empowered to get the entire Agency, if necessary,
focused on finding and implementing solutions.
Management--Putting in place more effective management
procedures, safeguards, and decision-making processes.
Organizational Culture--NASA recognizes that prior to the
Columbia, mission cultural traits and organizational practices
within the Agency detrimental to safety were allowed to
develop. We will now work diligently to develop an
organizational culture that reflects the best characteristics
of a learning organization, one based on clear and open
communications throughout our Mission Teams, with a management
culture that empowers both dialogue and achievement.
At the same time the CAIB was developing its report, NASA pursued
an intensive, Agency-wide effort to identify additional actions that
will further improve the Space Shuttle Program. We took a fresh look at
all aspects of the Program, from technical requirements to management
processes, and developed a set of internally generated actions that
complement and go beyond the CAIB recommendations. For example, some of
the types of activities we are focusing on include rudder speed brake
actuator inspections and re-evaluation of catastrophic hazard analysis,
to name a few.
Our implementation plan integrates both the CAIB recommendations
and our self-initiated actions. It is the first installment in a living
document that will be periodically updated to reflect our progress
toward safe return to flight and faithful implementation of the CAIB
recommendations.
We are now determined to move forward with a careful, milestone
driven return to spaceflight activities, to do so with the utmost
concern for safety, incorporating all the lessons learned form the
tragic events of February 1. That's exactly what we will do.
Our Return to Flight effort will involve a team of spaceflight
professionals, led at NASA headquarters by Dr. Michael Greenfield, our
Associate Deputy Administrator for Technical Programs and astronaut
veteran Bill Readdy, our Associate Administrator for Space Flight.
Another astronaut veteran, Jim Halsell, who has flown on five
Shuttle missions, will oversee the day-to-day work required for our
return to flight. As the commander of an upcoming Shuttle Mission, STS-
120, Jim has a very personal interest in ensuring we get Return to
Flight done right. I can assure you we will also rely on the advice and
judgment of all members of the astronaut corps, the men and women who
have the most vested interest in safe operations of the Shuttle
program.
We will also have the benefit of the wisdom and guidance of a
seasoned Return to Flight Task Group, led by two veteran astronauts,
Apollo commander Thomas Stafford and Space Shuttle commander Richard
Covey. Members of the Stafford-Covey Task Group were chosen from among
leading industry, academia and government experts. Members have
knowledge and expertise in fields relevant to safety and space flight,
as well as experience in leadership and management of complex programs.
The diverse membership of the Task Group will carefully evaluate and
publicly report on the progress of our response to implement the CAIB's
recommendations.
There is another body that NASA will greatly rely on in the Return
to Flight process: this committee, and the other Members of Congress
who have a vital interest in how NASA performs our work on behalf of
the American public. We very much respect and value your oversight
responsibility, and I personally look forward to working with you in
the weeks and months ahead to ensure that we do our job right.
Building upon work already underway to address issues previously
identified by the CAIB, the upcoming release of our preliminary
Implementation Plan will mark an important step in our efforts to
address and fix the problems that led to the Columbia accident. We are
about to begin a new chapter in NASA history, one that will be marked
by a renewed commitment to excellence in all aspects of our work, a
strengthening of a safety ethos throughout our culture and an
enhancement of our technical capabilities.
No doubt as we proceed along this path, all of us will be
challenged. I am absolutely certain that the dedicated men and women of
NASA are up to this challenge and we will not let the families of the
Columbia astronauts and the American people down.
Finally, I believe it is important that all 13 CAIB members arrived
at and agreed to the final conclusion of their report: ``The United
States should continue with a Human Space Flight Program consistent
with the resolve voiced by President George W. Bush on February 1,
2003: `Mankind is led into darkness beyond our world by the inspiration
of discovery and the longing to understand. Our journey into space will
go on.' ''
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the Committee.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Admiral Gehman, I want to extend not only our appreciation
to you, but to all members of your Commission, for the
outstanding work they did. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF HAROLD W. GEHMAN, JR., CHAIRMAN,
COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD
Admiral Gehman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Mr.
Chairman. I'll just say a very few comments and ask that my
opening statement be entered for the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Admiral Gehman. I thank the Committee for their compliments
to the Board this morning, and on behalf of the Board, I accept
your compliments. And I also know that the Members of this
Committee share the feelings of the Board that the price this
Nation paid on the first of February was so dear that it
demands now that we do our part to ensure that an accident like
this never happens again.
I would like to return the compliment to the Congress. As
the Congress is aware, we were not a Presidential-appointed
commission. But due to your oversight guidance and cooperation
with this Board, the issue of our pedigree was removed from the
table early on, and all the comments around town this week are
about the merits of the report and not the process by how the
report was written. And the Congress shares in the credit for
turning that situation into a very positive situation, and I
thank every Member of this Committee for assisting us.
I also would like to join in thanking my 12 colleagues, who
essentially gave up 7 months of their life to do this report,
and the over 100 full-time investigators and the thousands of
NASA engineers and scientists who helped us with this project.
When I appeared before you on the 14th of May of this year,
I made a commitment that our report would put this accident
into context. There are many contexts, of course. There's the
context of history, of budgets, of management, the context of
what previous reviews of NASA have told us, and the context of
our Nation's vision about human space travel. I believe that
our report satisfies that requirement and has put this accident
into all these contexts.
First of all, of course, we did establish the physical
cause of this accident. The foam did it. And, by the way, for
those of you who have never actually seen one of these objects,
I brought it along. This object sitting on the floor over
beside me, this is the famous left bipod ramp made out of the
actual foam, and the little black line is approximately where
the fracture occurred that caused this accident. So if you've
never seen one, this is what one looks like.
Thank you, Tom.
The Board was very deliberate in coming to the conclusion
that the foam did it. And the time that it took us to come to
that conclusion allowed us to look rather introspectively and
intrusively into management at NASA.
While we were working on the physical cause, we had many
other people that were looking at how NASA did their business,
particularly the space shuttle program. And we had to ask
ourselves, ``If the foam did it, was this a legitimate
surprise, a new event that caught everybody by surprise? Or, if
not, what is the history behind attempts to understand and fix
this event if it was not a legitimate surprise?''
And what we found, of course, was that this was not a
surprise. NASA had experienced this foam coming off many times
in the past. And then when we got into the issue of learning
how they dealt with this, in a scientific and engineering point
of view, we got into the business about how the shuttle program
handles unknowns, how they handle risk, how they provide for
research or development to understand the processes that
they're dealing with, and how they learn, as an institution. We
were concerned with what we found. And that is really what--
about half of our report is about what we found.
Being concerned with what we found, we then embarked upon
two paths of investigation simultaneously. The first path was
an academic review of how high-risk operations ought to be
conducted and managed. And simultaneously we conducted a review
to see whether or not there were practical instances where
high-risk enterprises around the United States are being
managed reliably and successfully in other areas. And we found
plenty of cases where people deal with high-risk technology and
high-risk enterprises, and do so successfully.
We took a menu or a recipe from the academic review and
some examples from the best safety practices around the
country, put them together in a template, and then judged
NASA's space shuttle program by that template and found it to
be wanting.
Our report then documents extensively, in detail, each of
the issues that we are concerned about, along with documentary
evidence, interviews, statements, pieces of paper, reports that
support our conclusion. And also our report, we feel, concludes
with specific actionable recommendations to make the shuttle
operations more safe.
I'll conclude, Mr. Chairman, by adding one comment, because
it was brought up by the Members several times, and that is the
issue of accountability. The Board does not feel that people
should not be held accountable for their actions. The Board
does believe in accountability. And we believe very strongly
that we have included in our report plenty of documentary
evidence to support accountability if the proper authorities
want to hold people accountable. It's all in the report.
We decided long ago, made it public, and I have defended
the position before this Committee before, that we were not
going to make those judgments. But we put it all in the report.
It's all there. If somebody, the Administrator of NASA or this
Committee, wants to find out whose performance was not up to
standard, it's all in the report and it should be fairly easy
to sort that out.
We just elected that in order to pursue the issues that we
wanted to pursue, we would be better off if we let the proper
authorities take care of accountability and we did not come to
the judgments. But we put all the stuff in the report.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm pleased to be here and ready
to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Gehman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Harold W. Gehman, Jr., Chairman,
Columbia Accident Investigation Board
Good Morning Mr. Chairman, Senator Hollings, distinguished Members
of the Committee.
I know members of this Committee feel as we on the Board do: that
the price this Nation paid on February 1, 2003 was so dear, it demands
we do our part to ensure an accident like this never happens again.
It is an honor to appear today before the Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation. I thank you for inviting me to pay tribute
to the legacy of Rick Husband, Willy McCool, Mike Anderson, Dave Brown,
K.C. Chawla, Laurel Clark, and Ilan Ramon in presenting the findings of
the investigation into the tragic loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia.
Before I begin, I would like to commend the efforts of my 12 fellow
board members, 120 investigation staff members, 400 NASA engineers, and
more than 25,000 debris searchers who have contributed immensely to the
investigation.
Today I will provide the Committee with the final conclusions of
the board with respect to the following three areas:
The physical cause of the accident
The organizational characteristics of NASA that contributed
to the accident
Recommendations the Board has made in regards to the Space
Shuttle Program
I. Physical Cause
The Board has determined that the physical cause of the loss of
Columbia and its crew was a breach in the Thermal Protection System on
the leading edge of the left wing. The breach was initiated by a piece
of insulating foam that separated from the left bipod ramp of the
External Tank and struck the wing in the vicinity of the lower half of
Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panel 8 at 81.9 seconds after launch.
During entry, this breach in the Thermal Protection System allowed
superheated air to penetrate through the leading-edge insulation and
progressively melt the aluminum structure of the left wing, resulting
in a weakening of the structure until increasing aerodynamic forces
caused loss of control, failure of the wing, and breakup of the
orbiter.
Entry data demonstrated that the flaw in the left wing was extant
prior to entry. The flight events are well documented, and establish
that progressive destruction occurred as the orbiter entered the
atmosphere. Superheated air damaged the structure of the wing first,
leading to the abnormal aerodynamic forces that caused the eventual
breakup. Once the orbiter began entry, there was no possibility of
recovery.
The Board reached this conclusion after extensive analysis of five
lines of evidence:
The aerodynamic scenario
The thermodynamic scenario
The detailed system timeline from telemetry and recovered
on-board recorder
The videographic and photographic scenario
Debris reconstruction and forensics
Additionally, the Board conducted foam impact tests in order to
determine that this potential cause was indeed plausible. The tests
proved this, and much more. The tests demonstrated that External Tank
foam shed during launch could create considerable damage to the RCC
panels and the tests also added to the body of knowledge regarding RCC
strength. The foam impact testing ends for all time the common belief
within NASA that foam strikes are just a flight turnaround issue, and
also serves as a dramatic stimulus to change some people's attitudes
about what we really ``know.'' Furthermore, it demonstrates the Board's
finding that the characterization of the Space Shuttle as operational
rather than experimental was flawed. The direct result of this mindset
was the lack of testing on such matters as the cause of foam shedding,
the force of foam projectiles, and the strength of the RCC panels to
withstand such debris strikes.
II. Organizational Causes
Mr. Chairman, the Board believes very strongly that complex systems
almost always fail in complex ways. Most accident investigations fail
to dig deeply enough into the causes beyond identifying the actual
physical cause of the accident; for example, the part that failed and
the person in the chain of command responsible for that failure. While
this ensures that the failed part receives due attention and most
likely will not fail again, such a narrow definition of causation
usually does not lead to the fixes that prevent future accidents.
Our investigation into the loss of the Columbia was designed to get
to the heart of the accident, and reveal the characteristics of NASA
that allowed the accident to occur. As everyone knows, NASA is an
outstanding organization, with highly skilled and motivated people and
a long history of amazing accomplishments. However, there are long-
standing management issues that led to the Columbia disaster.
The organizational causes of this accident are rooted in the Space
Shuttle Program's history and culture, including the original
compromises that were required to gain approval for the Shuttle
Program, subsequent years of resource constraints, fluctuating
priorities, schedule pressures, mischaracterization of the Shuttle as
operational rather than developmental, and lack of an agreed upon
national vision for human spaceflight.
Cultural traits and organizational practices detrimental to safety
were allowed to develop, including:
Reliance on past success as a substitute for sound
engineering practices (such as testing to understand why
systems were not performing in accordance with requirements)
Organizational barriers that prevented effective
communication of critical safety information and stifled
professional differences of opinion
Lack of integrated management across program elements
The evolution of an informal chain of command and decision-
making processes that operated outside the organization's rules
The Board believes that these factors are just as much to blame as
the foam. We began an analysis of how high reliability organizations
handle risky enterprises, creating a template for us to use to examine
management and culture at the Space Shuttle Program. The Board has
concluded that the Space Shuttle Program does not have the
characteristics of a high reliability organization. Furthermore,
history and previous studies demonstrate that NASA, as a whole, does
not ``learn'' well.
The results of our very intrusive investigation into the Space
Shuttle Program demonstrate clearly that gradually and over a period of
many years, the original system of checks and balances has atrophied.
Instead of using a system of checks and balances provided by
independent engineering and safety organizations, the Shuttle Program
placed all responsibility and authority for schedule, manifest, cost,
budgeting, personnel assignments, technical specifications and the
waivers to those specifications and safety in one office. That action
created an office that could make programmatic trades to achieve
whatever goals were set for it by a higher authority. For example, if
meeting the schedule were priority number one, the program could trade
safety upgrades against schedule. We find this to be an excellent
system if one's goal is to know whom to blame if something goes wrong,
but NOT an excellent system if one's goal is to maximize safety.
III. Recommendations
The Board does not believe that the Space Shuttle is inherently
unsafe, and we were under no pressure to say that it was safe. However,
there are things that must be done to make it more safe than it is and
many of these things must be accomplished before return to flight.
Furthermore, if the Shuttle is to continue flying past the next few
years, there are even more safety requirements necessary. Our
recommendations and observations also constitute an attempt to find
items that might be dangers in the future.
There are three types of recommendations in the report. The 15
Short-Term recommendations outline the fixes needed for return to
flight. The 14 Mid-Term recommendations refer to the needs for
continuing to fly for the next three to 12 years. The Long-Term
recommendations discuss the considerations that must be made for
continuing to fly the Space Shuttle beyond 12 years, including
recommendations for replacing the Shuttle.
In addition to the cultural and organizational considerations that
NASA must address, there are several recommendations that stand out.
One of these is the call for NASA to take an integrated approach to the
issue of the danger posed by debris by combining steps to reduce debris
creation in the first place, an overall toughening of the orbiter, both
in the RCC components and the other parts of the Thermal Protection
System, including the tiles, and developing a capability for on-orbit
inspection and repair. The Board studied scores of other findings of
significance with respect to how exactly to prevent the next accident.
Among the numerous recommendations is the need for better engineering
drawings, better safety and quality assurance programs, and improved
documentation. Additionally, there are specific ways to improve the
orbiter maintenance down period without sacrificing safety, as well as
recommendations on what to look for on bolt fractures, holdpost
anomalies, Solid Rocket Booster attach rings, test equipment and
training needs.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, during my last testimony before this committee, I
promised a final report that places this accident in context, rendering
the complete picture of how the loss of the Columbia fits into the
complicated mosaic of budget trends, the myriad previous external
reviews of NASA and the Shuttle Program, the implementation of Rogers
Commission recommendations, changing Administrations and changing
priorities, previous declarations of estimates of risk, workforce
trends, management issues and several other factors. We have done this
to the best of our ability and I believe we have succeeded.
It is our intent that this report be the basis for an important
public policy debate that needs to follow. We must establish the
Nation's vision for human space flight, and determine how willing we
are to resource that vision. From these decisions will flow the debate
on how urgent it is to replace the Shuttle and what the balance should
be between robotic and human space flight, as well as many other
pressing questions on the future of human space flight. Let the debate
begin.
Thank you Mr. Chairman. This concludes my prepared remarks and I
look forward to your questions.
______
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Office of the Administrator
Washington, DC, July 23, 2003
Hon. John McCain,
Chairman,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Pursuant to Section 9(c) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA) (5 U.S.C. App.), this letter is to notify the Committee that
NASA establishing a Return to Flight Task Group. I have determined that
the establishment of the Return to Flight Task Group is necessary and
in the public interest in connection with the performance of duties
imposed upon NASA by law. The Return to Flight Task Group will perform
an independent assessment of NASA's actions to implement the
recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), as
they to the safety and readiness of STS-114. While the Task Group will
not attempt to assess the adequacy CAIB recommendations, it will report
on the progress of NASA's response to meet the of the recommendations.
The Task Group will draw on the expertise of its members and other
sources to provide its assessment to me, and will hold meetings and
make site visits as necessary to accomplish its fact-finding. The Task
Group will function solely as an advisory body and will comply fully
with the provisions of the FACA. A copy of the charter for the Return
to Flight Task Group is enclosed.
The General Services Administration has concurred with the
establishment of this Task Group and has approved its charter. The
filing date for this charter under FACA is today. All information
required by FACA is included in the charter.
We would be pleased to discuss the establishment of the Return to
Flight Task Group with you or your staff.
Cordially,
Sean O'Keefe,
Administrator.
______
RETURN TO FLIGHT TASK GROUP CHARTER
Establishment and Authority
The NASA Administrator, having determined that it is in the public
interest in connection with performance of the Agency duties under the
law, and with the concurrence of the General Services Administration,
establishes the NASA Return to Flight Task Group (``Task Group''),
pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C. App.
Sec. Sec. 1 et seq.
Purpose and Duties
1. The Task Group will perform an independent assessment of NASA's
actions to implement the recommendations of the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), as they relate to the
safety and operational readiness of STS-114. As necessary to
their activities, the Task Group will consult with former
members of the CAIB.
2. While the Task Group will not attempt to assess the adequacy of
the CAIB recommendations, it will report on the progress of
NASA's response to meet theirintent.
3. The Task Group may make other such observations on safety or
operational readiness; as it believes appropriate.
4. The Task Group will draw on the expertise of its members and
other sources to provide its assessment to the Administrator.
The Task Group will hold meetings and make site visits as
necessary to accomplish its fact-finding. The Task Group will
be provided information necessary to perform its advisory
functions, including activities of both the Agency and its
contractors.
5. The Task Group will function solely as an advisory body and will
comply fully with the provisions of the FACA.
Organization
The Task Group is authorized to establish panels in areas related
to its work. The panels will report their findings and recommendations
to the Task Group.
Membership
1. In order to reflect a balance of views, the Task Group will
consist of non-NASA employees and one NASA non-voting, ex
officio member, the Deputy Associate Administrator for Safety
and Mission Assurance. In addition, there may be associate
members selected for Task Group panels. The Task Group may also
request appointment of consultants to support specific tasks.
Members of the Task Group and panels will be chosen from among
industry, academia, and government with recognized knowledge
and expertise in fields relevant to safety and space flight.
2. Task Group members and the Co-Chairs of the Task Group will be
appointed by the Administrator. At the request of the Task
Group, associate members and consultants will be appointed by
the Associate Deputy Administrator (Technical Programs).
Administrative Provisions
1. The Task Group will formally report its results to NASA on a
continuing basis at appropriate intervals, including a final
written report.
2. The Task Group will meet as often as required to complete its
duties and will conduct at least two public meetings. Meetings
will be open to the public, except when the General Counsel and
the Agency Committee Management Officer determine that the
meeting or a portion of it will be closed pursuant to the
Government in the Sunshine Act or that the. meeting is not
covered by the Federal Advisory Committee Act Panel meetings
will be held as required.
3. The Executive Secretary will be appointed by the Administrator
and will serve as the Designated Federal Officer.
4. The Office of Space Flight will provide technical and staff
support through the Task Force on International Space Station
Operational Readiness. The Office of Space Flight will provide
operating funds for the Task Group and panels. The estimated
operating costs total approximately $2 million, including 17.5
workyears for staff support.
5. Members of the Task Group are entitled to be compensated for
their services at the rate equivalent to a GS 15, step 10.
Members of the Task Group will also be allowed per diem and
travel expenses as authorized by 5 U.S.C. Sec. 5701 et seq.
Duration
The Task Group will terminate 2 years from the date of this
charter, unless terminated earlier or renewed by the NASA
Administrator.
Sean O'Keefe
Administrator
July 18, 2003
Date
______
Stafford-Covey Task Group
Biographies
Col. James C. Adamson, U.S. Army (Ret.)
CEO, Monarch Precision, LLC, Consulting firm
Background: Astronaut (STS-28 & 43); President, Allied
Signal Systems Technical Services Corporation, which later
became Honeywell Technology Solutions, Inc. (retired, March
2001); Chief Operating Officer United Space Alliance (1995-
1999). Current member, NASA Advisory Council Task Force on ISS
Operational Readiness.
Maj. Gen. Bill Anders, USAF Reserve, (Ret.)
Retired Chair and CEO of General Dynamics Corp. (1990-1994)
Background: Astronaut (Apollo 8); Executive Secretary of the
Aeronautics & Space Council; Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission; Vice President of General Electric; U.S. Ambassador
to Norway; Member, National Academy of Engineering; President,
Heritage Flight Museum.
Dr. Walter Broadnax
President Clark University, Atlanta, Ga.
Background: Just prior to coming to Clark, he was Dean of
the School of Public Affairs at American University in
Washington. Previously, he was Professor of Public Policy and
Management in the School of Public Affairs at the University of
Maryland, College Park, Md., where he also directed The Bureau
of Governmental Research.
RADM Walter H. Cantrell, USN (Ret.)
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
Background: Commander, Space and Naval Warfare Systems
Command; Executive Director, Technology and Systems, and later
President of Signal Processing Systems Division at Global
Associates Limited; Program Director, Land Level Transfer
Facility, Bath Iron Works, responsible for the design and
construction of a $260M state of-the-art shipbuilding facility.
Dr. Kathryn Clark
Vice President for Education at TIVY, Inc.
Background: Clark is also consultant in the fields of space,
oceans and education. She consults for the Jean-Michel Cousteau
Society, the National Marine Sanctuaries, and the Sea World--
Hubbs Institute to enhance the study of oceans and marine
wildlife and use the data for education and awareness of the
environment of the seas.
Mr. Benjamin A. Cosgrove
Senior Vice President, Boeing Commercial Airplane Group (Retired)
Background: 44 years at Boeing as engineer and manager
associated with almost all Boeing jet aircraft programs,
including chief project engineer and director of engineering
for the 767 program. Current member, NASA Advisory Council Task
Force on ISS Operational Readiness.
Mr. Richard O. Covey, USAF (Ret.)
Co-Chairman, NASA Return to Flight Task Group
Vice President, Support Operations, Boeing Homeland Security and
Services
Background: Astronaut (STS-511, STS-26, STS-38, STS-61);
test pilot; held key management positions in the Astronaut
Office and Flight Crew Operations.
Dan L. Crippen, Ph.D.
Former Director of the Congressional Budget Office
Background: Chief Counsel and Economic Policy Adviser to the
U.S. Senate Majority Leader; Domestic Policy Advisor and
Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs; Senior Vice
President of the consulting firm The Duberstein Group;
Principal in the consulting firm Washington Counsel.
Mr. Joseph W. Cuzzupoli
Vice President and K-1 Program Manager, Kistler Aerospace Corporation
Background: Aerospace engineer and manager for over 40
years. Vice President and Program Manager for Space Shuttle
Orbiter Project for Rockwell International during development
and served earlier as an Assistant Program Manager on Apollo.
Current Member, NAC Task Force on ISS Operational Readiness.
Charles C. Daniel, Ph.D.
Engineering Consultant
Background: Over 35 years experience as an engineer and
manager in the fields of space flight vehicle design, analysis,
integration and test at the Marshall Space Flight Center--from
Saturn V to ISS. He was SRB flight operations lead for STS-1
through STS-8 and Chief Engineer for Space Station. Current
member, NASA Advisory Council Task Force on ISS Operational
Readiness.
Richard Danzig, Ph.D.
A Director of National Semiconductor Corporation, Human Genome
Sciences, and Saffron Hill Ventures
Background: Former Secretary and Under Secretary of the
Navy. Former partner at the law firm of Latham and Watkins.
Current Chairman of the Board of the Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, Senior Fellow at the CNA Corporation,
and member of the NASA Advisory Council.
Dr. Amy K. Donahue
An Assistant Professor of Public Administration at the University of
Connecticut Institute of Public Affairs
Background: Under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act,
Donahue serves as Senior Advisor to the NASA Administrator for
Homeland Security. She teaches graduate courses in public
organizations and management, policy analysis,
intergovernmental relations, and research methods.
Gen. Ron Fogleman, USAF (Ret.)
President and Chief Operating Officer of Durango Aerospace Incorporated
Background: Former Chief of Staff of the United States Air
Force. Managed the Air Mobility Command and served as Commander
and Chief, U.S. Transportation Command. Current member of the
NASA Advisory Council.
Col. Gary S. Geyer, USAF (Ret.)
Consultant
Background: 35 years experience in space engineering and
program management, primarily in senior positions in the
government and industry. Served for 26 years with the National
Reconnaissance Office. Named NRO 2000 Pioneer. Vice President
for Lockheed Martin on major classified programs.
Maj. Gen. Ralph H. Jacobson, USAF (Ret.)
Consultant
Background: USAF Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Space
Shuttle Development and Operations and later as Director of
Special Projects, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force.
President Emeritus, Charles Stark Draper Laboratory. Current
member, NASA Advisory Council Task Force on ISS Operational
Readiness.
Mr. Richard Kohrs
Chief Engineer, Kistler Aerospace Corporation
Background: Over 40 years of experience in systems
engineering and integration of NASA Apollo, Shuttle, and Space
Station programs. Managed the daily engineering, processing,
and operations activities of the Shuttle program from 1985
through 1989. Director of Space Station Freedom in 1989 with
overall responsibility for development and operation. Prior to
joining Kistler in 1997, he was Director of the ANSER Center
for International Aerospace Cooperation.
Susan M. Livingstone
Policy & management consultant
Background: She serves as a member of the National Security
Studies Board of Advisors (Maxwell School, Syracuse
University), is again a board member of the Procurement Round
Table and was appointed to NASA's Return-to-Flight Task Group
for safe return of Shuttle flight operations.
Mr. James D. Lloyd
Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of Safety and Mission Assurance,
NASA
Background: Extensive background in system safety
engineering and management for U.S. Army research and
development programs. Came to NASA in aftermath of Challenger
to help reconstitute the NASA safety and mission assurance
program. Recently selected as the Deputy AA for the Office of
Safety and Mission Assurance.
Lt. General Forrest S. McCartney, USAF (Ret.)
Consultant
Background: Former Director of Kennedy Space Center (1986-
1992). Lockheed Martin Vice President for Launch Operations,
responsible for the Atlas, Titan, and Athena launch operations/
activities at Cape Canaveral, Florida, and Vandenberg Air Force
Base. USAF Program Director for several major satellite
programs. Current Vice Chairman, NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel.
Rosemary O'Leary J.D., Ph.D.
Professor of Public Administration & Political Science at the Maxwell
School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University
Background: An elected member of the U.S. National Academy
of Public Administration, she was recently a senior Fulbright
scholar conducting research on environmental policy in
Malaysia. O'Leary was professor of public and environmental
affairs at Indiana University and cofounder and co director of
the Indiana Conflict Resolution Institute.
Mr. David Raspet
Consultant
Background: Former senior manager, USAF, McDonnell-Douglas
and Boeing. Experiences include leading the Future Imaging
Architecture Space Segment IPT, and working on EELV Program
Mission Assurance and Titan IVB-30 Readiness.
Dr. Decatur B. Rogers, P.E.
Dean Tennessee State University College of Engineering, Technology and
Computer Science
Background: Since 1988, Dr. Rogers has served as the Dean,
College of Engineering, Technology and Computer Science and
Professor of Mechanical Engineering at Tennessee State
University in Nashville, Tenn. Rogers served in professorship
and dean positions at Florida State University, Tallahassee;
Fla., Prairie View A&M University, Prairie View, Texas, and
Federal City College, Washington.
Mr. Sy Rubenstein
Aerospace Consultant
Background: Former Rockwell International and McDonnell
Douglas Employee. Served as President Rockwell International
Space Systems Division responsible for Space Shuttle and Space
Station activities. Former Vice President of Engineering and
Orbiter Chief Engineer during the development and early
operations of the Space Shuttle. Over 25 years of experience in
the design, development and operation of manned space systems.
Mr. Robert Sieck
Aerospace Consultant
Background: Former Director of Shuttle Processing, Kennedy
Space Center. Served as Launch Director for 52 Space Shuttle
launches and has been an engineer on aerospace projects
including Gemini, Apollo, and the Space Shuttle. Current member
of the NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel.
Lt. General Thomas Stafford, USAF (Ret.)
Co-Chairman, NASA Return to Flight Task Group
President, Stafford, Burke & Hecker Inc., technical consulting
Background: Astronaut (Gemini 6A, Gemini 9A, Apollo 10, CDR
of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project); Commandant of the USAF
Flight Test Center; Deputy Chief of Staff, Research,
Development and Acquisition at USAF HQ; served as a consultant
to the President in various capacities and to NASA for the
coordination of Shuttle-Mir activities. Current Chairman, NASA
Advisory Council Task Force on International Space Station
Operational Readiness.
Tom Tate
Vice President of Legislative Affairs for the Aerospace Industries
Association (AIA)
Background: With AlA, the trade association representing the
Nation's manufacturers of commercial, military and business
aircraft, helicopters, aircraft engines, missiles, spacecraft,
and related components, he directs the activities of the
association's Office of Legislative Affairs.
Mr. William Wegner
Consultant
Background: Naval nuclear propulsion authority. Deputy
Director to Admiral Rickover in Nuclear Navy Program. Founded
Basic Energy Technology Associates and consulted in the area of
civilian nuclear power plant safety. Board of Directors,
Detroit Edison.
Executive Secretary, Return to Flight Task Group
Mr. David Lengyel
Executive Secretary, Return to Flight Task Group
Background: Executive Director of the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel. Former Manager of NASA's Moscow Technical
Liaison Office. Several years' experience with ISS, Shuttle-Mir
Programs. Extensive knowledge of Columbia Accident
Investigation Board work.
The Chairman. Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. O'Keefe, it's a perfect segue into my first question:
accountability. Culture needs to be fixed. How and when and
what accountability do you expect to enforce here, in light of
Admiral Gehman's statement that there's ample evidence of
individuals, as well as institutions, that should be held
accountable?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. No, I think, as I mentioned in the
opening statement, the manner in which the Board conducted its
activities was so open, so clear, in terms of their approach to
it; and again the approach we used of releasing all the
information that supported that investigative activity, has led
to this result, and it's pretty clear, in terms of what's
involved here, and we've been acting on that as we've moved
through.
The shuttle program management team is a completely new
team today, started--from the program manager all the way
through all the key players, 14 or 15 of the senior folks are
completely new folks in their capacities just in the last
couple of months.
The Chairman. It seems to me that's half of accountability,
Mr. O'Keefe. Have you held others accountable?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. As we've worked our way through
this, there are a range of other participants in this, and I
think what you see is a management team in place that's
different today than it was a year ago, to be sure, and
certainly very different than it was 7 months ago. This is----
The Chairman. Does that mean that those who are replaced
are accountable?
Mr. O'Keefe. The folks who are in positions today will lead
in the future and be accountable for this activity. Those who
are not there, I think you can draw the conclusion from that.
The Chairman. When do you expect this culture to be fixed?
Mr. O'Keefe. I think Admiral Gehman and the Board observed
in the report this is going to be a long, long haul. There's no
question about it. Again, the first step has got to be, without
equivocation, that we accept the findings, we'll comply with
the recommendations, and we'll embrace this report. That's the
first critical step in moving toward the role of, I think, a
full acceptance of a culture change.
And in doing so, I think that's going to take time. We've
got to be very consistent in that message. We've got to be very
consistent in the direction we're going to go. And any
equivocation to that point, I think, is going to falter that
effort. So we've got to be, on the long haul, proceeding in
that direction. But I fully anticipate we will see the
beginnings of that change within 6 months to a year, to be
sure. And we've begun that process as immediately as the day
the report released to assure that everyone understands there
is no equivocation on accepting these findings, complying with
these recommendations, and embracing this report.
The Chairman. Admiral Gehman, would you describe how
Congressional earmarks and NASA's transfer of funding from the
shuttle program to other programs and the declining NASA budget
affected the space shuttle operations and safety?
Admiral Gehman. I certainly will. And we included in our
report the plain facts of the matter, just so that anybody who
wants to do the research can come to the conclusion that over a
period of about a decade the buying power or purchasing power
of the shuttle program has been reduced by over 40 percent.
Really, though, what has happened, in the Board's opinion,
is the very insidious, the powerful but nearly invisible force
of dissatisfaction--dissatisfaction among several
administrations, dissatisfaction among several Committees of
Congress, and even the Administrator of NASA--with the
extremely expensive cost of operating the shuttle. It costs
much more to operate the shuttle than everybody will ever
admit, and over the years, what has happened is that, for one
reason or another, people have tried to wring money out of the
shuttle program in order to pay for other projects.
NASA has essentially been operating under a flat budget,
that flat top line. In order to do other things, there has been
a steady, consistent attempt to wring money out of the shuttle
program, some of it legitimately, by efficiency and
effectiveness. But, nevertheless, since the shuttle program is
so expensive, there have been efforts to squeeze money out of
the shuttle program.
It is the Board's opinion that the effect of this is that--
for a number of years after the Challenger accident, the
management scheme of the shuttle program has been changed to a
very vertical scheme in which the program manager, over a
period of years, had become responsible for schedules,
manifests, costs, budgets, personnel assignments, technical
specifications and requirements, the waivers to technical
specifications and requirements, and safety. And because people
were naturally trying to get money out of this very expensive
program, the program manager began to make trades in that trade
space. And he began to trade things like research and
development into why foam comes off, for measures to make the
schedule. And he began to make trades like that. And the Board
was very concerned that that was too much power in one person's
hands.
If it is your goal to know who to blame if something goes
wrong, having a scheme in which all of that responsibility is
placed in the program manager's hands is a really good scheme
if you want to know who to blame. But if you want to operate
safely, our study of both the theory and the academics and the
best business practices indicates you need to separate the
engineering and the safety from the guy who's responsible for
the cost and schedule, because inevitably they're going to
fight with each other and you're going to get a conflict. And
the person who is being hammered over cost and schedule is
going to trade safety and engineering in order to achieve cost
and schedule.
The Chairman. And Congressional earmarks?
Admiral Gehman. Congressional earmarks do a couple of
things. One thing they do is, they give an overinflated number
of the total value of NASA's budget, because there might be
$400 million or $500 million worth of earmarks, but that's not
really NASA's money to spend because they can't move it around.
The administrator loses his flexibility. He can't buy more
safety and all that kind of stuff.
Probably most of the earmarks that we looked at are
actually adds. Most of them, but not all, were adds. But even
if they were adds, it makes the NASA budget look bigger than it
is, and it reduces the administrator's flexibility for moving
money around.
The Chairman. Senator Hollings?
Senator Hollings. Admiral Gehman, Mr. O'Keefe appointed
you. Did you find him accountable?
Admiral Gehman. I did find him accountable, and I did find
him to be cooperative, and I found him to take full
responsibility for everything that happened on his watch.
Senator Hollings. And by that answer, would you find him
responsible for this ``disaster,'' let's call it?
Admiral Gehman. I find that leadership--all leaders,
including Mr. O'Keefe, including the Congress, including the
White House--are responsible for the conditions that they set
and that set for the conditions for the performance of their
organization. Almost everything that we complain about--every
management trait, every communications problem, every
engineering problem that we complain about in this report--was
set in motion between five and 15 years ago, so they didn't
happen on his watch.
Senator Hollings. It didn't happen on his watch?
Admiral Gehman. That's correct. Almost all of these traits
that we're talking about are traits that happened from two to 5
years after the Challenger accident. That is, right after the
Challenger accident, as Senator Nelson had indicated, all the
energy and zeal and diligence associated with the tragedy
causes everybody to do their job really well.
Let me give you a case in point. The management of the
human spaceflight program, which used to be in Washington,
D.C., in the mid 1990s was shifted back down to Houston again.
And Mr. O'Keefe brought it back up to Washington, as Rogers had
recommended. That's an example of how we kind of migrated away
from the Rogers recommendations.
Senator Hollings. Admiral, I understand. But you've taken
over a ship as a Navy admiral time and again, perhaps at a
different rank, and you didn't put off what happened 15 years
ago to the ship and 10 years ago to the ship. I'm not trying to
embarrass anybody. We're all friends. But I'm trying to break
past this ``culture'' finding and fix responsibility. And you
have categorically said you didn't attempt to do that, fix
responsibility. You have enough facts that would indicate they
didn't hold safety up to standard. Now, Mr. O'Keefe has made a
very categorical and convincing statement about, ``We've got
the message,'' and everything else that----
Mr. O'Keefe, right after this occurred, Chairman McCain and
myself were informed immediately that they had tried their best
to take images, take pictures of the damage done of the shuttle
in flight. And I think it was two, perhaps three, times they--
that is, the Defense Department--were ready to do it, but there
was a formality about requesting it. And the request was made
and then was canceled. In fact, I understand that Linda Hamm,
the Chairman of the Management Team, was responsible. She
consulted with Ralph Roe, the Manager of the Space Shuttle
Vehicle Engineering Office, and that the imagery request having
been made to the Defense Department was canceled by none other
than Linda Hamm, who's now been just reassigned over to Houston
in another office.
And, of all things, when you say, ``I get it, or we're
going to do it categorically, we're going to take every issue,
we're going to do everything,'' we've put Mr. Roe as number two
at the new safety office. That doesn't indicate to me that
you've got it.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. Again, the approach we've taken here
is to completely designate, for the management effort, the
folks who are prepared to lead in the time ahead. And in
dealing with the range of folks who participated in this
activity--and clearly the report lays it out, as does Admiral
Gehman's commentary--I think the approach we've got to take is
put the best judgment to picking a leadership team for the
program management office, as well as all the efforts we're
engaged in here in Washington and across the centers toward
this activity, and picking the best people to do that. That's
who's in place today. This is the best leadership there. And
that's the approach we've taken to this, and it certainly is a
measure of accountability.
On that point, there is no question--and I appreciate
Admiral Gehman's observation of this point--I am personally
accountable for this. I view this as my personal
responsibility. I serve at the pleasure of the President, at
which point he decides that is no longer to his pleasure. I'm
certainly ready to adhere to that. And my obligation between
now and the time he may reach that decision is do my level best
to assure that we accept these findings, comply with these
recommendations, and embrace this report, and we intend to do
just that.
Senator Hollings. Well, if that's the best you can do, is
take Mr. Ralph Roe, who failed in safety and said, ``I don't
want the pictures. I don't want to find out about this
safety,'' and make him responsible for safety. In fact, we all
saw this on TV. NASA officials kept dissembling. We found all
kind of defensiveness. We mentioned this last February when we
had the hearing. And now we find out, having ``got it,'' and
making plans to do this and to do that, we've heard it all
before. Senator Inouye, Senator Stevens, and myself were the
only three on the Committee at the time of the Challenger. We
heard all this before.
So there's no education in the second kick of a mule. I
mean, I'm finding out and listening to the same thing I
listened to 17 years ago, and we've lost seven astronauts. Now,
they talk about an accident, but it was an avoidable accident.
You talk about failures, but it was an avoidable failure. And
here, to make sure that we don't have that same failure again
you take the man who failed in safety and appoint him the
number-two in the safety office.
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, sir, no. Just to be technically clear
about this, that's not the position he's assuming here. What
we've set up and we're creating as of this time next month is
an engineering and safety center which will perform, at least
at minimum among these recommendations of the 29, trend
analysis. In other words, be removed from the operational
conduct of the activity and look at what the prior trends would
be to see if we can identify those cases in which we have
missed things. And we clearly missed the foam on this one.
That's the point that's raised in this report very clearly.
There were seven instances. And had we conducted that trend
analysis, independent of the operational imperatives of flying
the shuttle, we might have caught it. And that's what this new
organization is going to do. And in that regard, we're trying
to assemble engineers who will be removed from that operational
activity and be able to step back with a fresh set of eyes, who
are knowledgeable about the mechanics of this process and, at
the Langley Research Center, organize all those disciplines
among structures and aerospace engineers in order to look at
those observable trends and see if we can identify what that
next instance might be. And you need the folks who have got the
experience to do that. And, in my judgment, to borrow a page
from Wernher Von Braun, when you make a mistake you become that
much more valuable the next time around to seeing exactly where
that'll never be repeated again. And there's great value in
some of that, and it's something we'll certainly test.
And let the measure of what we do be the final conclusion
of your assessment on this, as opposed to what we say. If we
follow through what we're saying we're going to do, let that be
the measure of proof. And, in that regard, Senator, I view that
as a very high standard we need to meet.
The Chairman. Senator Sununu?
Senator Sununu. Thank you.
Administrator O'Keefe, could you talk a little bit about
the return-to-flight team--the makeup of the team, the timeline
that they're going to operate under, and what you think their
biggest challenges will be in getting the job done before we
can even entertain the idea of the shuttle returning to space?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. No, thank you very much for the
question.
The return-to-flight team is composed and led by Colonel
Jim Halsey, who's an Air Force colonel and an astronaut of four
different flights previously. He is slated to be the commander
of the STS-120 flight, which is six flights after the return-
to-flight activity--had been slated before the accident--so he
has a very, very strong vested interest in making sure we get
this right. He is ably assisted by a very extensive team
throughout the four spaceflight centers--Johnson, Marshall,
Kennedy, and Stennis--in the effort in order to assure that we
have pulled together all 29 of these recommendations, as well
as, again, the raise-the-bar objectives that we've established.
And it'll be included in this report, which we'll be releasing
here later this week, early next, which encompasses and covers
all of those recommendations plus all the observations and
every other issue that we have come across to raise the bar,
raise the standard that we're anticipating before we return to
flight.
That's overseen by an internal senior management team of
Bill Readdy, who is also a veteran astronaut, who is the
Associate Administrator for Space Flight, and Michael
Greenfield, who is the Associate Deputy Administrator for
Technical Programs. And they're managing across the entire
agency. So we gather all of the information from the other six
centers that are not spaceflight related in dealing with this
particular set of objectives. There's a range of capabilities
we have across the agency, all of which will be brought to bear
and employed, and there isn't any ambiguity, I think, among the
leadership of the agency. This is all of our agency objective.
Finally, the oversight of our activities will be reviewed
by a external panel led by Tom Stafford, a veteran Apollo and
Gemini astronaut, and Dick Covey, who was the pilot on the
flight immediately after Challenger, in September 1988, and 25
other experts in the fields of engineering, of management
change, of culture change, academics, industry folks, the full
range of background of management, as well as technical
expertise, to assure that we have implemented these
recommendations and that we have selected options that are
compliant and will make this agency stronger.
All those folks are external experts in that regard. They
have already met once. They've got the framework of the
implementation plan. They'll meet again early next week.
They'll be working through this all the way through that time
and beyond our return-to-flight efforts. So we've got this at
three different levels in order to assure that we are not
singing ourselves to sleep on any individual solution here, or
picking our favorite option at the expense of what may be a
better approach.
Senator Sununu. Will their focus be on the 15 or so return-
to-flight recommendations, or are they going to have a broader
task of looking at all 29 recommendations plus the ones that,
in your words, ``would raise the bar'' for NASA?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. The entire package. Everything. And
we certainly--you know, I mean, taking the Board's statements
absolutely literally, it says these 15 ``must be implemented''
prior to that time, and we take that as being a fact, a
finding, that we are not going to dispute and will certainly
move toward. But nothing is being done on those 15 at the
expense of all the others that are engaged in there. Because we
may find, and we certainly have dealt with, a number of
different aspects, during the course of aiding this
investigation, that we believe rise to that same kind of
standard of the 15, as well, that we will be implementing prior
to return to flight.
Senator Sununu. Admiral Gehman, you talk about it, and the
report, I think, is pretty clear, about identifying the causal
relationship between the foam striking the leading edge of the
wing and that leading to the accident. And just following this
through the press and through the work of the Board, it's clear
that a lot of technical effort went into assessing the cause of
the accident.
My question, however, is, Where are the greatest
uncertainties? I mean, we can't know everything about the
accident. So where, in the mind of the Board, collective mind
of the Board, are the greatest uncertainties with regard to the
physical causes of the accident or the physical findings of how
the shuttle came down?
Admiral Gehman. Well, the Board deliberated long and hard,
and we had quite a wrestling match over the words that we would
use to describe the physical cause. By that, I mean we could
have used words like ``all the evidence supports that the foam
did it'' or ``the most probable cause is the foam did it,'' and
we elected not to do that. We elected to say the foam did it.
And that is based on overwhelming confirming evidence, multiple
different avenues of investigation, all of which point to the
same thing.
We do not have a picture of a leading-edge system with a
hole in it. That would have been nice. That would have been
confirmation that the foam did it. We don't have any such a
thing as that. But we are absolutely, positively convinced,
without--beyond a shadow of a doubt, of the physical cause of
this accident, and there's no doubt in our mind whatsoever.
We were concerned, though, that in order for us to reach
that conclusion we had to do some physical tests and conduct
some tests that we thought NASA should have been doing all
along.
Senator Sununu. There's no element of the system or the
technical work that you did that frustrated the Board members?
Again, absent a picture. But were there any other areas of
technical investigation where you had to walk away, saying,
``We don't have all the information we would like about the
nature of the failure''--damage inside the wing, the way that
the shuttle eventually came apart--no uncertainties there?
Admiral Gehman. Only one. Just one, and that is that--and
it's in our report. There's a nice little chart in there that
shows the roll-and-yaw moments that are reconstructed from the
very extensive data recorders which are onboard the shuttle.
And both of the roll-and-yaw moments show the shuttle left wing
losing lift, due to damage, and roll and the yaw starting in
one direction. And then, for some reason, one of them, the roll
moment reverses, and we can't explain why that happens. It's
probably due to a deformation of the wing of some sort.
But of the hundreds of pieces of technical data that we
looked at, all of which point to a hole in the left leading
edge, that's the only one that we can't absolutely
scientifically explain.
Mr. O'Keefe. Mr. Chairman, could I add just one point very
quickly? The approach that the Board took that I found to be
very impressive was, they never fell in love with one scenario.
They, by process of elimination, worked their way through a
fault-tree analysis that included every possible permutation,
and then closed those avenues to reach the conclusions they
did. So we're as informed by the things that they examined that
have nothing to do with this accident, in their judgment, as we
are about the things that they claim do have a specific
contribution. Because there are a number of things they found
that are equally problematic on some future activity unless we
correct it. And so this is a very thorough, extremely extensive
investigation that I believe in our 45-year history has never
been conducted to this depth. Ever. And so it has uncovered a
number of things that are extremely helpful in our pursuit of
the return to flight, which has then informed that raise-the-
bar set of standards of where we intend to go in our pursuit of
return to flight when we're fit to fly.
The Chairman. Senator Lautenberg?
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
And I start by saying to our friend and colleague, Senator
Hollings, that your commentary this morning just confirms that
we listen and listen carefully, have good things to say. And
just because you're out of here doesn't mean that you have to
go quiet. Just remember that.
[Laughter.]
Senator Lautenberg. And to you, Mr. Chairman, for holding
this hearing and the hearings that we've traditionally had here
have been very informative and very open. And, Admiral Gehman,
I commend you. I haven't had a chance to fully read your
report, but it's sprinkled with a candor that we rarely see in
reports to government, because there's always a program to make
sure that we don't attend this party or that party. And I think
that you went right to it.
And how this particular tragic accident happened is
critical because of the loss of life and the loss of confidence
and all of those things. But more importantly is how did we get
there in the first place? And when I look at the executive
summary of your report and you say that, ``the organizational
causes of the accident are rooted in the space shuttle
program's history and culture,'' that means there are things
been going on for a long time, at least you felt so and so did
your colleagues on the report who approved this statement.
The fact of the matter is that, in some ways, it was a
tragedy waiting to happen, because I see in reports----
And, Mr. Chairman, I want to submit a report that comes
from the International Federation of Professional Technical
Engineers. It's their report on the effectiveness of NASA's
workforce and contractor policies, and I think there's
something to be learned from this. And I, again, ask the
request that this be included in the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers,
AFL-CIO
IFPTE Report on the Effectiveness of NASA's Workforce and Contractor
Policies
March 2003
With the tragic loss of the seven astronauts on the shuttle
Columbia, NASA is facing a challenge to its current role and future
mission. Though the agency with the most ambitious scientific mission
in the Federal Government has faced public scrutiny before, the tragedy
provides an opportunity to evaluate and review NASA performance and
management policies.
NASA faced serious challenges well before the recent Columbia
tragedy. A combination of budget cuts, workforce downsizing, and
contracting out of key NASA operations negatively affected the safety
of NASA's manned space program, its ability to retain and pass along
core technical knowledge, and its oversight of the contractor
workforce. NASA's problems arose after the agency went through a
drastic reorganization in the early 1990s. This reorganization was
motivated in large part by the political pressure from Congress and the
White House to replace government work with private sector contracting.
NASA's senior management maintained that they could increase efficiency
and performance while cutting its civil service workforce and relying
on contractors to do the job. Yet, as the process of downsizing and
contracting out proceeded, NASA workers, government reports and space
policy experts warned of the consequences of performing critical
projects, with little-to-no margin for error, with an insufficient
budget and workforce.
The recent history of NASA's reorganization is all the more
relevant in light of the Bush Administration's commitment of eventually
contracting out half the current Federal workforce. Through the Reagan
and Bush Sr. administrations, increasing political pressure to downsize
government intensified. Under the Clinton administration, Vice
President Gore drafted and directed the policy of ``Reinventing
Government,'' downsizing civil servant jobs and contracting out to the
private sector that eliminated some 426,200 Federal jobs. NASA, which
faced scrutiny for over-budget projects after the Challenger accident,
was targeted for major cuts.
Under presidential and Congressional direction, NASA contracted out
much of its work to achieve budget cuts. In 2003, NASA and all Federal
departments and independent agencies are facing quotas to contract out
work. The rationale cited by proponents of moving government work to
the private sector is that the private sector is more accountable, has
incentive to produce at lower cost, and more able to operate at higher
efficiency. NASA's commitment to privatization extends to the most
safety critical operations in the agency. Just before the Columbia
accident, NASA commissioned a study on privatizing the entire shuttle
operation, completely eliminating any NASA work on shuttle maintenance
and operation. Yet there are no comprehensive long-term studies on
Federal contracting, and there remains little evidence to support
privatization proponents' argument that the private sector outperforms
the Federal Government at a lower cost. However, NASA's example offers
some insight to the problems that arise when Federal agencies rely
heavily on contractors.
Today, with NASA relying increasingly on contractors than ever
before, the Columbia shuttle tragedy and the issues surrounding NASA
recall the Challenger shuttle accident in 1986, seventeen years before
the Columbia accident. The Federal investigation into the Challenger
accident revealed the complexities inherent in the NASA management
contractor relationship and the decision-making process that involved
both NASA and NASA contractor Morton Thiokol. Beyond the direct
mechanical causes of the Challenger accident, that episode revealed
larger administrative and managerial problems: the unclear
accountability issues between contractors and NASA; NASA management's
institutional pressure to maintain launch schedules (as promised by
NASA to Congress); the lack of management control between managers; and
the organizational layers between the civil service workforce and the
contract workforce. While the Columbia investigation will likely take
months to return conclusive findings, recent reports from within NASA
and the Federal Government's investigative body suggest similar
conditions currently exist.i
NASA Workforce and Its Critical Mission
At the onset of its creation in 1958, NASA used contractors to
provide many of the services the agency needed. In 1962, NASA employed
23,000 civil servants and used the services of 3,500 contractor
personnel. By 1964, the agency had grown to 32,000 civil servants and
79,000 contractors. Although contractors played a significant role
during the mission to the moon, the agency maintained a civil servant
workforce to provide technical expertise, effectively manage
contractors and perform operations. At that time, NASA also began using
contractors when the agency could not find the talent to fill its
workforce. Though contractors have historically played a role at NASA,
the recent growth of the contractor workforce has made NASA into more
of a contract management agency than a research and development agency.
NASA's contractors perform various services and provide the agency
almost all aircraft and spacecraft. NASA always used contractors to
build spacecraft, design hardware, and control some management
functions. The NASA contracting philosophy stated that any work not
related to planning and evaluation could and should be contracted out.
This philosophy did not leave out the civil service workforce however.
To understand and maintain the products and services purchased through
contractors, NASA needed experienced engineers and scientists. Further,
some scientific and engineering work has no equivalent in the private
sector. Certain jobs, such as the astronaut corps, are part of the
civil service and military because of their critical and governmental
nature. NASA's civil service workforce also provided mission support
services that had no equivalent in the private sector. Though NASA
relied extensively on contractors to accomplish its Apollo moon
missions and valuable aeronautics research of the 1960s, NASA managers,
including eminent program director Werner Von Braun, questioned the use
of contractors over in-house civil servants. Marshall Space Flight
Center's Robert Gilruth, in a letter to George Mueller, Director of
Manned Space Flight, claimed ``the most effective management of future
programs calls for greater in-house engineering capability.''
ii
While NASA kept the contractor workforce during periods of growth
and shrinkage throughout the 1970s and 1980s, in the 1990s contractors
at NASA increased significantly. Although the Federal Government keeps
no official headcount of contract workers, data pulled from Federal
contract information shows an increasing presence of contractors while
civil service jobs disappear. In fact, while NASA aggressively cut
costs in the 1990s and trimmed its civil service workforce, the ratio
of contractors to civil service employees more than doubled. As
evidenced in the data complied by Paul C. Light, a scholar at the
Brookings Institute, NASA civil service jobs fell from 22,100 in 1984
to 20,100 in 1996. Meanwhile, workers employed through NASA contracts
grew from 171,000 in 1984 to 350,600 in 1996. During the same period,
workers employed through NASA grants increased from 7,700 to 26,900.
After staying level throughout the late 1980s at approximately 21,000
full time civil servants, NASA's civil service workforce grew to 24,416
in 1991, then shrunk to a 40 year low of 17,500. The majority of the
civil service reductions were achieved through buyouts, starting in
1995 and ending in 2000. With less than 13 percent of NASA's budget
spent on its civil service workforce (including salary, benefits, and
training), NASA has the second highest contractor to civil servant
workforce ratio in the Federal Government.iii
These workforce shifts occurred as NASA's budget was cut under
Daniel Goldin, NASA's Administrator from 1992 to 2001. He was appointed
in 1992 by President Bush Sr. and directed to cut NASA's budget and
bring the fiscal discipline of the business world to the Nation's
premier science, research and development agency. Under the Clinton
Administration, the NASA budget was cut for seven out of eight years.
Goldin saved the agency some $40 billion under a management plan he
called ``Faster, Better, Cheaper'' (FBC). While the principle behind
FBC was vague and open to interpretation for most of Goldin's tenure,
FBC attempted to ``shorten development times, reduce costs, and
increase the scientific return by flying more missions in less time.''
Using FBC as a way to contract out services and move more of NASA's
resources into the private sector, Goldin eliminated much of the civil
service infrastructure that monitored and held technical knowledge of
the service and products contractors provided and oversaw NASA's safe
and successful operation.
Critics of FBC always doubted NASA's ability to fulfill FBC without
sacrificing either the ``faster,'' the ``better'', or the ``cheaper''.
Concerns became widespread after the highly publicized Mars missions
failed in 1999. Further concerns arose as NASA's workforce reductions
and increased contractor workforce, jeopardized the safety of space
shuttle operations. Enough evidence existed in failed missions, close
calls, and government reports that suggested the tradeoffs of FBC were
inexperienced and reduced workforce capability; increased safety risks;
and minor oversights that resulted in lost spacecraft.iv
In 2000, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) and the NASA
Inspector Generals office took note of the safety lapses in the space
shuttle program caused by the reduction of workforce. NASA's
independent safety review body, the Aerospace Safety Awareness Panel
(ASAP), as well as NASA's Space Shuttle Independent Assessment Team
(SIAT), later echoed these concerns. The studies pointed to one
critical factor: while NASA reduced its space shuttle operating costs
by $1.2 billion, or 30 percent, personnel reductions in its civil
service workforce from 3,000 in 1995 to 1,800 in 2000 placed the
shuttle at greater risk. A 3 percent spending increase came in Fiscal
Year 2000 after space probe failures, repeated warnings about safety
and understaffing, and a Columbia shuttle mission that included
alarming malfunctions such as a short circuit and ruptured cooling
tubes. Although NASA's budget has increased over the last three years,
Congress still expects increased performance from an under-funded and
understaffed workforce. In 2001 Congress, canceled some $530 million of
the proposed $2.2 billion safety upgrades for the space shuttle fleet
which were to span over five years.v
Goldin's NASA targeted the shuttle program for civil service
workforce reductions and improved efficiency by consolidating the space
shuttle's maintenance and reducing the civil service role to monitoring
safety. In 1996, NASA handed over shuttle maintenance to the United
Space Alliance (USA), a contractor partnership between Lockheed Martin
and Rockwell (now Boeing). The six-year contract worth $8 billion was
extended this past summer for two years for $2.5 billion. Currently
some 6,000 USA workers oversee launch operations at Kennedy Space
Center in Florida, while 4,000 workers at Johnson Space Center are USA
employees. Thus, contractors, not NASA employees, do the majority of
the space shuttle work.
In 1999, NASA's SIAT cited concerns that the space shuttle's safety
is eroding due to workforce problems. While both NASA and contractor
employees hold safety in the highest regard, the SIAT report found that
``the workforce has received a conflicting message due to emphasis on
achieving cost and staff reductions.'' With a reduced workforce
directly involved in maintenance of the shuttle fleet, NASA could only
perform safety monitoring, without much control over contractor
procedures.
With a smaller civil service workforce, the GAO found that NASA is
unable to properly monitor contractors' adherence to safety guidelines.
Furthermore, NASA lost technical competence during the workforce
reduction process, as senior employees departed before new civil
service employees and contractors could learn from them.
In testimony before the House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
on April 18, 2002, ASAP Chairman Richard Blomberg spoke of the
``strongest safety concern the Panel has voiced in the 15 years
[Blomberg] was involved with it.'' In the 2001 Annual Report, the
ASAP--a NASA safety watchdog created by Congress in 1967, after a
launch pad fire claimed the lives of three Apollo 1 astronauts--stated,
``inadequate budget levels can have a deleterious effect on safety.''
From 1999 to its latest report released in 2002, ASAP cited grave
concerns for the safe operation of the space shuttle. According to the
report, along with budget and personnel cutbacks at NASA throughout the
1990s, contractors at NASA also provided their services with a reduced
workforce. Regarding NASA's consideration to further privatize the
space shuttle operation, ASAP noted that such a move would inherently
introduce new risks to safe operation.vi
Downsizing also has implications for the future of NASA's workforce
capability. Although NASA halted its downsizing by 1999, its in-house
competency had suffered greatly. A 1999 internal assessment of its
workforce found NASA experiencing skills shortfalls in avionics,
mechanical engineering, computer systems, and software assurance
engineering. GAO also brought attention to much needed space shuttle
safety upgrades that had not been budgeted. By 2000, GAO reported that
NASA's downsized civil service workforce was stretched thin and
overworked.
Fallout From Downsizing
As a result of extensive downsizing and contracting out as much as
possible, NASA is facing a critical human resources problem: how to
replenish a soon-to-retire workforce. While costs have been cut, its
workforce is weaker and less experienced. The civil service workforce
has to do more tasks with fewer staff, and the contractor workforce is
working overtime due to their own staffing shortages. Though NASA hired
200 full-time workers for the shuttle operations in 2002, the shortfall
remains. During the downsizing of the 1990s, 14,268 civil servant
employees left NASA, while only 8,173 employees were hired. Hiring new
workers brings with it new challenges. Training new staff and
incorporating them into the work processes and structure of NASA will
take a great commitment of resources and time.vii
NASA's workforce demographics are expected to compound the problem
further. Within NASA's science and engineering workforce, those over 60
years old outnumber the under 30 population by a ratio of 3 to 1. With
15 percent of science and engineering employees currently at retirement
age and another 25 percent eligible within the next 5 years, NASA has
begun tracking skills, competencies, and measuring what skills are
lacking in the workforce. However, as the GAO reported to Congress in
2002, new hires needed considerable training and faced the challenge of
having to replace more experienced workers, and staffing shortfalls are
expected to continue if not worsen.viii
NASA also faces the challenge of recruiting engineering and science
talent away from higher paying private sector jobs. With many of NASA's
operations in high-cost labor markets, NASA's salaries can be as much
as $20,000 below private sector jobs in the same market. NASA also
looses recruits to the private sector because the hiring process can
take up to six months. Though NASA is looking to implement incentives
to attract, retain and replenish their aging workforce, its budget has
limited their implementation. Furthermore, incentives to retain
experienced workers would also be necessary for new hires to gain
knowledge from the experienced workers. The obvious solution of
providing competitive salaries for all NASA employees has yet to
receive serious political attention.ix
With NASA's workforce is stretched thin, work conditions have
deteriorated. Recent GAO reports on NASA concluded that the civil
service workforce is ``showing signs of overwork and fatigue as a
result of downsizing.'' Unmanned space launch failures in 1998 and 1999
have been attributed to overworked civil service employees.
Overstressed and overworked employees at NASA's contractors also played
a role in recent failures and safety lapses.x
Though NASA is looking to contractors to fill the workforce gap,
various studies have reported the unintended consequence of using
contractor employees over ci vii servants. The SIAT reported that it
``feels strongly that workforce augmentation must be realized
principally with NASA personnel rather than with contract personnel.''
The report found instances where important technical knowledge was
possessed by only one civil servant. If that employee were to leave
NASA, that technical knowledge leaves NASA as well.xi
Contractors, Safety, and Performance
For over twenty years, presidential administrations have planned
for NASA's privatization. Though previous plans to privatize the
shuttle fleet in the 1980s were placed on hold after the Challenger
accident, the Reagan Administration set the course for NASA's
privatization. In 1984, Congress amended NASA's charter ``to seek and
encourage to the maximum extent possible the fullest commercial use of
space activities.'' Under Goldin, NASA moved to privatize both manned
space programs, the space shuttle and the International Space Station
(ISS). In 1998, Congress passed the Commercial Space Act with
bipartisan support. The law forbade NASA from building space launch
vehicles and directed NASA to plan for the privatization of the shuttle
and the ISS while encouraging private sector development and operation
of future reusable launch vehicles.xii
NASA's most apparent attempt to privatize major operations is the
space shuttle. In 1995, a NASA commissioned study called the Kraft
Report recommended that shuttle operations be contracted to one single
contractor. The report cited that restructuring of the shuttle program
was needed to reduce an overabundance of engineers and man-hours spent
on each shuttle mission. The report suggested the shuttle could now be
considered ``operational'' rather than ``experimental,'' suggesting
risks associated with the shuttle had been mitigated since the
Challenger accident. The report concluded with a recommendation that a
consolidated shuttle operations contract could serve as a precursor to
``further industry involvement and progression toward the privatization
of the space shuttle.'' xiii
As a result of the Kraft Report, NASA awarded a non-competitive
contract for shuttle flight operations to a joint-venture by Lockheed
Martin and Rockwell called United Space Alliance (USA). Boeing acquired
Rockwell's space business in 1996 and took its place in USA. Though the
intended goal of reducing costs was achieved, the contracting of NASA's
most safety-critical operations had repercussions.
After NASA awarded USA the shuttle operations contract, many
commentators and investigative reports warned of the potential dangers
of increased privatization. Criticism came from within NASA, as well as
outside critics, warning of the workforce and safety implications.
Space policy analyst John Pike of the Federation of American Scientists
predicted the reports' recommendations would one day be considered as
``the turning point that led to the next shuttle accident.'' Apollo
Astronaut John Young warned ``you can't reduce people without
introducing a lot of risk because you just work people too hard.'' In a
letter to President Clinton, Jose Garcia, a NASA manager with over 30
years of experience expressed urgent concern regarding the pressure to
downsize the workforce and extensive contracting of shuttle operations.
Because ``the shuttle is a complex R&D vehicle that requires NASA to
play an important oversight role'', Garcia wrote to Clinton, ``it would
be better to cancel the manned space flight program than to recklessly
endanger a future shuttle and its crew'' by contracting out and
reducing NASA's role in shuttle operations.xiv
During the past two years, NASA has been moving closer toward
privatizing shuttle operations. A 2001 study conducted by a NASA team
at Johnson Space Center concluded that compete privatization of the
space shuttle was necessary as NASA's workforce entered retirement.
Under a privatized scheme, the private shuttle operator would handle
NASA's current role of overseeing safety and technical requirements. In
the fall 2002, the Rand Corporation delivered similar findings on
privatizing the shuttle workforce in a follow-up study.xv
However, the NASA body responsible for evaluating manned aerospace
programs warned that privatization could exacerbate safety risks. In
2002, the ASAP Chair Richard Blomberg told the House Subcommittee on
Space and Aeronautics that NASA would have to indemnify any privatized
shuttle operator from financial risk and require a technically
experienced workforce to assess and regulate that risk. However,
Blomberg reported that, ``it is difficult to cultivate and maintain
this government workforce when all operations have been turned over to
the private sector.'' Blomberg also noted that a departure from the
``traditional government/contractor checks and balances'' to privatized
operation ``would increase risk significantly for a time,'' and would
not improve safety from current levels.xvi
Direct evidence of contractor failure to perform efficiently came
in 1999 with the failure of a series of Mars spacecraft. The failures
highlight how NASA contractors and NASA's managerial commitment to FBC
traded avoidable risk for lower cost. In September 1999, the $125
million Mars Climate Orbiter crashed into Mars. It was later revealed
that contractor Lockheed Martin had used English measurements to
calculate trajectory while NASA specified and navigated the craft using
metric units. In December the same year, the $165 million Mars Polar
Lander crashed into the planet's surface as its braking thrusters
failed to fire properly. NASA's internal investigation revealed that no
system wide tests had been done on the Mars Polar Lander before launch.
Two Deep Probe 2 microprobes accompanying the Polar Lander were also
lost without contact and, according to a Mars Independent Assessment
Team head Tom Young, simply were ``not ready to launch.''
Under budget constraints, the renowned Jet Propulsion Laboratory
(JPL) and Lockheed Martin tried to perform a mission they did not have
the resources. Lockheed Martin significantly understaffed the
development of the Polar Lander, Mars Observer and Deep Space 2
hardware, and then increased staffing by 80 percent halfway through the
project. After additional engineers and technicians were brought on,
Lockheed Martin required them to work in excess of 70 hours a week. Not
only did this increase the costs of the spacecraft by $121 million, 44
percent over the original costs, but it also resulted in an overworked
and poorly managed staff producing slipshod spacecrafts. Because launch
dates were fixed and calculated so that the spacecrafts would
rendezvous with Mars, Lockheed Martin rushed to meet their deadlines,
while making simple yet critical mistakes.
Though JPL--an academic center under exclusive NASA contract to
operate space probes--has a unique technical capability, it did not
provide the necessary support the missions needed. Lack of review and
analysis of risks allowed for consecutive failures. NASA's
investigation into the probe failures also noted ``competent, but
inexperienced, project managers'' and inadequately trained navigation
personnel at JPL did not catch Lockheed Martin's mistakes. Though
Lockheed Martin's Mars Climate Orbiter navigation software used English
units rather than the NASA specified metric units, JPL personnel could
have saved the spacecraft before it crashed. However, with an
understaffed workforce that did not fully understand the Climate
Orbiter craft, JPL navigators failed to recognize anomalies caused by
the spacecraft's navigation. NASA's mangers also lacked experience to
understand the risks and potential for failure involved in planetary
space missions. The inadequacy of testing and oversight on construction
of Deep Space 2 probes was so severe that NASA does not have insight
into why it failed beyond that it was not tested for
operations.xvii
While NASA did score successful low-cost robotic missions under
FBC, such as the Mars Pathfinder and the Mars Global Surveyor, the
overall results were not successful. NASA contracted an investigation
through the Aerospace Corporation to compare the new mission regime to
the traditional robotic probe projects. The study found that the
failure rate under FBC missions was 44 percent compared to 30 percent
for traditional missions. FBC missions were 57 percent more cost-
effective than the traditional model. The faster, better, cheaper
missions provided an average of 79 instrument months, over three times
less than the average 305 instrument months that traditional robotic
missions provided. The Aerospace Corporation report concluded that to
achieve ``faster'' and ``cheaper'', the mission must give up ``better''
by reducing scope and science return on a ``per mission basis.''
xviii
Contractor fault was also cited in a string of unmanned commercial
and military space launch vehicle failures in 1998 and 1999. With seven
launch failures over two years, launch vehicle builders Boeing, builder
of two of the failed rockets, and Lockheed Martin, builder of the
remaining five failed launches, faced intense scrutiny. With three of
the undelivered payloads being military satellites, the Air Force
investigated the cause of the failures. At the risk of losing
commercial business, Boeing and Lockheed Martin also conducted their
own internal investigations. Beyond the direct technical causes, all
the investigations came to similar conclusions: the companies' poor
oversight and evaluation and understaffed workforce allowed engineering
and workmanship deficiencies. Even the Defense Department contractor
responsible for assessing and certifying the operability of defense
launch systems, the Aerospace Corporation, cited its own reduced
workforce and limited resources under a $3.65 million
contract.xix
Though NASA's recent experience with contractors shows the limits
of performing dangerous and difficult work through the private sector,
a privatized NASA may be even more detrimental. NASA's core mission is
research and development of new technologies in aerospace, expanding
human knowledge of airflight, spaceflight and space and earth sciences
for the benefit of the public, including the engineering and scientific
communities, as well as the private sector. Privatizing NASA would move
aerospace and earth and space science research out of the sphere of
public goods and into private hands.
As a public good, the data and research that NASA produces from its
projects are publicly available. A telling example of private ownership
of space research is the privatization of the Landsat remote sensing
satellite system. The Carter Administration's 1978 proposed plan to
privatize the satellites was realized in 1985 when EOSAT, a joint
venture by Hughes and RCA, took over the operation of the system. The
Landsat data that was once available to the international science and
research community was now EOSAT's proprietary data. The cost of
purchasing Landsat data increased from $400 to $4,400 an image, out of
the reach of many researchers in the scientific community. After NASA
and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration requested
relief from high prices, Congress passed and President Bush Sr. signed,
the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, putting the satellite
system back in the government's hands again. The bill acknowledged that
privatizing Landsat, a research program that provides essential data,
had deleterious effects and is not likely to work in the
future.xx
Privatization allows for the possibility that profitability and
market value, rather than scientific value, will prioritize the
scientific and research work that NASA currently does. Even though a
privatization scheme can be developed to give the Federal Government
some oversight into strategic planning, the Federal Government would be
unable to staff a workforce without some operational knowledge.
Further, the lack of safety and risk oversight that results from NASA's
understaffed civil service workforce, demonstrates how a privatized
aerospace venture would be prone to safety issues.
For the purposes of securing funding and winning contracts,
contractors have an incentive to aggressively price their service and
products. The space launch failures in 1999 point to private sector
managers cutting staff and diminishing engineering quality to
competitively price their launch services. As NASA's independent
investigation into the 1999 Mars spacecraft failures shows, both
Lockheed Martin and JPL, the academic contractor, placed concern with
cost before success. While Lockheed Martin's proposal was aggressively
priced, they were not able to provide an effective product. Instead of
relaying risk assessments and concerns to NASA, JPL's communication
with NASA ``was more one of advocacy for the program and presenting a
positive image to the customer (NASA Headquarters).'' xxi
In recent years, NASA's mission has been defined by budgets, not
science. With private sector salaries significantly higher than
government's, NASA is losing its ability to attract talented
individuals, as ambitious science and engineering are secondary to
contracting, privatizing, and cost cutting. While a publicly funded
aerospace program can invest in developing projects that have a high
scientific value but no immediate profit, private industry's
involvement in aerospace is justified by profit first and foremost.
Before the decision to launch the doomed Challenger in January 1986,
shuttle contractor Morton Thiokol's senior managers overruled a
contractor engineers concerns for the safety of the launch and gave
NASA the go-ahead to launch. The contractor's management chose not to
contradict NASA managers who were eager to launch. With the contract up
for renewal, Morton Thiokol was eager to please NASA
managers.xxii
In the coming months, the investigation into the Columbia accident
will answer where accountability for the critical failure lies. With
the majority of the shuttle's functions under the control of one
contractor, United Space Alliance is already facing scrutiny. With a
chorus of warnings about the dangers of contracting out a manned space
vehicle that offers little room for a safety lapse, presidential
administrations, Congressional budget appropriations committees and
NASA senior managers that pushed for lower costs over successful
operation, may also have to face scrutiny for their decisions that
reduced the effectiveness of NASA.
Endnotes
i Chun Wei Chao, The Knowing Organization (Oxford,
1998), ch. 5. Chao discusses management lapses at NASA and Morton
Thiokol, the Thiokol engineers recommendation against the launch of the
Challenger in cold temperatures and the organization deficiencies in
the NASA-contractor relationship that permitted managerial decisions to
override engineering concerns.
ii Arnold S. Levine, Managing NASA in the Apollo ERA,
(NASA, 1982).
iii Paul Light, Paul Light, True Size of Government,
Appendix A. Light modeled his estimates on FPDS data by using agency
contract purchase information and types of contracts purchased. Because
the FPDS system was implemented in 1984, that year is the earliest an
estimate can be made for.
iv Goldin quoted in Jason Peckenpaugh, ``Doing Fewer
Projects More Safely,'' Government Executive, August 1, 2001.
v NASA FBC Taskforce Final Report, March 13, 2000. For
data on NASA workforce numbers, see http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/
codef/workforce/.
vi Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, Annual Report for
2001, March 2002, p 9.
vii GAO Report, Space Shuttle Safety: Update on NASA's
Progress in Revitalizing The Shuttle Workforce and Making Safety
Upgrades, September 6, 2001; Roberta Gross, Inspector General NASA,
Testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, 106th Congress May 2, 2000.
viii David Walker, GAO Director, Testimony before House
of Representatives Committee on Science Subcommittee on Science and
Aerospace, 107th Congress, July 18, 2002.
ix Roberta Gross, Inspector General NASA, Testimony
before the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management,
106th Congress May 2, 2000.
x GAO Report, Space Human Capital Challenges, August 15,
2000.
xi Space Shuttle Independent Assessment Team, Report to
Associate Administrator--Office of Space Flight, March 9, 2000.
xii Equals Three Communications and Booz Allen Hamilton,
Commercial Market Outreach Plan for the International Space Station,
prepared for NASA, February 2002.
xiii Report of the Space Shuttle Management Independent
Review Team (Kraft Report), NASA, February 1995.
xiv Kathy Sawyer, NASA Plans Privatization for Shuttle;
Cost-Cutting Will Hurt Safety, Critics Contend, Washington Post, June
7, 1995, A1. Jose Garcia, Letter to President Clinton, August 29, 1995.
xv Craig Covault, ``Shuttle Privatization Raises Safety
Issues,'' Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 24, 2001; Craig
Covault. ``Shuttle Shakeup Eyed for Cost, Safety Goals,'' Aviation Week
& Space Technology, September 23, 2002.
xvi Richard Blomberg, Former Chair Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel, Testimony before the House Subcommittee on Space and
Aeronautics, 107th Congress, April 18, 2002.
xvii Mars Independent Assessment Team Report, NASA,
March 2000; Tom Young, MPIAT Chairman, Testimony before House Science
Committee, 107th Congress, March 14, 2000.
xviii Beth Dickey, Midcourse Correction, Government
Executive, September 1, 2000. Michael A. Dornheim ``Aerospace Corp.
Study Shows Limits of Faster-Better-Cheaper,'' Aviation Week & Space
Technology, June 12, 2000; Todd Mosher, Robert Bitten, et al.,
``Evaluating Small Satellites: Is the Risk Worth It? [Aerospace
Corporation Report]'' presented at AIAA/USU Conference on Small
Satellites, August 1999.
xix Frank Sietzen, Launch Failures and Recovery Shape
1999's Space Competition, Space.com, posted December 28, 1999; Pete
Aldridge, Aerospace Corporation President, Testimony before House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 106th Congress, July 15,
1999.
xx National Research Council, Bits of Power: Issues in
Global Access to Scientific Data (National Academy: 1997).
xxi Mars Independent Assessment Team Report, NASA, March
2000.
xxii James Colvard, ``Savings Can Have a High Price,''
Government Executive, November 1, 1998.
Senator Lautenberg. One of the things that they noted in
their report was that when a previous administrator--and I
can't be delicate here, and it's not in criticism; it's just
the information that I looked at this--Daniel Goldin, NASA's
Administrator from 1992 to 2001, appointed and directed to make
the cut on NASA's budget and to bring fiscal discipline of the
business world to the Nation's premier science organization.
The agency was then put under a management plan called FBC,
``faster, better, cheaper.'' And I wonder if you'd make a
comment about the availability of resources. Did the 1,700 NASA
employees have the capacity--and I mentioned this in my
comments earlier--to supervise 18,000 contractor workers? Was
there any failure, in your view, that lay heavily at the
doorstep of the contractors to provide the kinds of service
that might have averted this catastrophe?
Admiral Gehman. Thank you, Senator. The Board found--and we
looked at this extraordinarily hard. We interviewed hundreds of
people. We walked the shop floors of all the centers all over
the country where components are made. And we did not find
cases where the contractors were taking shortcuts or were
cheating or weren't doing their job well. We didn't find any
cases like that.
The Board did find, however--and it's in our report--that
the management level--that is, the vertical level--that the
program has decided to contract to seemed to us to be a little
too high. By that, I mean it appeared to us that they were
contracting out management functions. They were almost to the
point where they were contracting out government functions. And
it appeared to us that we didn't find anything wrong. I mean,
we didn't find anybody doing anything wrong in that case. But
what we found was--then was that when the Government had to
make a decision, they no longer had the technical expertise,
because the function that they were supposed to be supervising
was being done by a contractor. And if you look at the mission
management team decisionmaking, you see them consulting people
that are experts on whether or not this is a problem. And
they're all contractors. And there doesn't seem to be a
government person who has the technical knowledge anymore,
because they contracted it all out.
So we didn't find any wrongdoing.
Senator Lautenberg. I understand.
Admiral Gehman. But we did find that perhaps, because so
many of the oversight functions were being done by contractors,
the expertise goes with the function, we found that the U.S.
Government seemed to be shortchanged.
Senator Lautenberg. So if there isn't blame--and I
understand very clearly what you said--then structure certainly
was one of the problems. And I assume, therefore, it's a
continuing, or might be a continuing, problem.
The question is whether or not we're prepared to devote the
resources to building this organization's capacity to the point
that it needs to go on these relatively dangerous missions. We
know they're dangerous, and we try our best to protect
everybody involved with the program. But are there enough
resources? Senator McCain's question about what earmarks do.
Well, it robs the program of its appropriate funds to get this
job done.
Mr. O'Keefe, what do you think about the resource on this?
Mr. O'Keefe. Again, it is a very subjective matter, and it
is one that----
Senator Lautenberg. That's why we hired you.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Senator Lautenberg. To be subjective.
Mr. O'Keefe. I fully understand. And my judgment on it is
that we have the resources necessary to continue operations in
a way that is responsible. The points that Admiral Gehman has
raised, I think, has been echoed in a Congressional Budget
Office report released this last month. If you'd permit me, Mr.
Chairman, I'll submit it for the record, that compares this
effort and the resources and what they refer to as
``technologically complex tasks'' performed similarly at other
agencies and departments across the Federal Government, and
find no remarkable distinctions in that regard.
Having said that, the depth of this investigation is deeper
than any I have ever been involved in, in my public-service
time. And as a consequence, the observations of the Board and
the findings of the Board are going to inform us as we go
through the examination of the spaceflight operations contract,
which comes up for renewal in a year, in order to figure out
exactly how we change that alteration, based on the findings,
recommendations, and basic views expressed in this report.
There's a lot to be learned from that. And while the surface
coverage, even from CBO, says ``not a lot of comparability
between other major systems integration programs,'' that's not
good enough, as far as we're concerned, because the findings of
this Board are fact, and we intend to run that to ground to
find out how we alter the contractual arrangements, as well as
our own conduct, in order to do this stronger and a better way.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Hutchison?
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. O'Keefe, were you ever advised or aware, during the
Columbia mission, that there was a serious problem, or any
problem, from the foam strike on liftoff?
Mr. O'Keefe. No.
Senator Hutchison. I'd like to pursue the issue of
resources again. Mr. O'Keefe, you had a scientific advisory
board that you asked to determine what the resources of NASA
should cover, What should be the mission? You got the report
back. I would ask you if you think you have the resources to
implement that report and establish a vision that not only is
scientifically viable, but that the American people can see the
necessity to continue?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, ma'am. The very specific review that we
asked, and I think you're referring to, is the scientific
prioritization to be conducted aboard the International Space
Station. That was conducted last summer and early fall. We
have, in fact, assessed that. The prioritization is the
scientific objective agenda that we will pursue on
International Space Station, and the funds necessary to conduct
that activity is contained in the President's budget that's
before the Congress pending now to pursue that for Fiscal Year
2004 through 2008 as a projection. So that clearly is our
intent. We're going to follow that prioritization. That's what
the findings of that scientific group was, representing all the
disciplines of what could be conducted on an International
Space Station, and proceed from there.
To the larger question you posed, though, I think the issue
that we've tried to codify and is to codify, and it's part of
this year's strategic plan that was released along with the
budget, as well, is an effort to be very selective about the
areas we intend to pursue and apply those resources as
extensively as need be in order to do an extraordinary job in
those areas. And then for those areas that don't fit within the
category of our three primary mission areas, that we simply not
attempt to do them passingly, but just elect not do them at all
and, instead, be very selective about what we do. And I think
the budget and the strategy that's before you is our attempt to
try to pursue that.
Certainly things changed on the 1st of February, and that's
what we need to assess and go back and continue to re-look this
relative to the Board's findings and the approach that we
intend to take.
Senator Hutchison. So, if I could summarize, you think that
you have set the priorities and you have the resources
necessary to accomplish those top priorities and leave the ones
at the bottom by the wayside.
Mr. O'Keefe. In the scientific objectives, the answer is
yes. Again, in terms of our performance of those activities,
we're going to be guided by other additional views that the
Board may have found here as we go through this to upgrade,
update, and improve this approach toward it. But in terms of
the science priorities, I think you're exactly right. That
effort, a year ago, was the first time we'd ever had a
prioritization set that began with the number one and moved
progressively through two, three, four, and five. Prior to
that, everything was the number-one priority, which, therefore,
meant nothing was a priority.
Senator Hutchison. I'd like to ask Admiral Gehman. It's
clear from your report that there was insufficient resource and
that NASA was stretched too thin to achieve its multiple goals.
Do you believe that the agency is more budget-driven than
mission-driven? In the past. Not going forward, obviously,
because we're indicating that there is going to be a change.
But do you think it was too budget-driven rather than mission-
driven?
Admiral Gehman. We believe that the budgets had a lot to do
with what happened, with how the management system morphed over
the years. And we believe that budgets are one of the
constraints on the program. Yes, ma'am.
For example, I was just looking through the report. I was
going to try and find it to quote the page to you--normally,
I'm like a Bible preacher; I can quote the page that everything
is--and I couldn't find it. There's a little sidebar in there
which talks about the shuttle upgrade program. The shuttle
upgrade program is essentially unfunded. There's a
recommendation in here that if you're going to fly this shuttle
beyond about 2010, you should completely requalify or recertify
the shuttle. That would be a very expensive proposition. Not
funded.
We suggest that we need to reestablish the independent
technical review authority or reestablish the position of
engineers as being independent from the program so engineers
can do engineering work independent from the program. And then
when you ask for an engineering program--an engineering
evaluation, or an engineering decision, you're getting an
evaluation from people who don't care anything about the
schedule, for example, or the need to make a launch. That
requires a couple of hundred people or a couple of thousand
people to be funded from someplace, which is currently not
funded, because now everything is charged against one of the
programs.
So budgets are a big issue. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Hutchison. Let me just ask Administrator O'Keefe,
in my last couple of seconds. He's talked about the upgrading
of the shuttles and the recertification of shuttles, which you
have said you're committed to doing, and we also have the new
space orbital vehicle that will replace the shuttle. And I
would like to ask you if you think--you've said you have the
resources to do your high priorities. Have you taken into
account the upgrading of the shuttles? And do you have any
intention of speeding up the process of the space orbital
vehicle that would replace the shuttles?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, ma'am. Two out of three of those. Again,
our discussion a moment ago was on the science priorities. But,
as it pertains to the three specific items he's mentioned,
again, those now are findings, and, therefore, they're treated
as fact. Out of the three issues, two of them there are
resources set aside. Whether they're sufficient or not is
something we've got to evaluate.
For the upgrading of the shuttle, there is a Service Life
Extension Program (SLEP) budget line item that's in the budget
the President presented to the Congress on February 3. We have
to assess exactly what those upgrades are that need to comply
specifically with these findings. Whether that comports exactly
or whether additional resources are necessary is something that
time will tell.
In the second area, in terms of the independent technical
authority, Admiral Gehman is exactly right. Whether that takes
200 or 2,000 additional engineers--don't know yet; we're going
to have to assess all those options. Indeed, he's right. That's
not something we anticipated. That's not something that's
contained in this budget, but we intend to do it and will
assess what those resource requirements are as we work our way
through this.
So the approach would--and as far as the orbital space
plane is concerned, there is an additional amount in--there is
amounts in the budget before Congress now that was proposed for
2004. The initial funding was----
Senator Hutchison. Five hundred----
Mr. O'Keefe.--agreed to by the Congress as part of the
President's amendment, in November of last year, to last year's
budget.
Senator Hutchison. It's not enough to increase the----
Mr. O'Keefe. That's exactly right. And I was just about to
say that. You're exactly right. The issue of accelerating its
delivery is something we need to look at; and the issue is not
so much of how much more it will cost, but how much more
resources you need earlier in order to achieve that. And that's
something we've really got to assess now and make a
determination of whether that is in the best interest overall,
to pursue that particular approach. But we're working that
diligently and have got some answers on what it would take to
accelerate this for an earlier delivery of whatever ultimate
design would come out of this competitive effort that we're
pursuing right now.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Senator Wyden?
Mr. O'Keefe. Appreciate it very much.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin, Administrator O'Keefe, with this question of
my sense that you really can't define NASA's mission now
without getting on top of the question of manned spaceflight.
And I think we're about to start a whole array of commissions
and studies and the like. And I would like to ask you whether
you could furnish us, within 90 days, or, at most, 6 months, a
solid cost-benefit analysis with respect to manned spaceflight.
Because I think that's what the Congress really needs. And I
know that what I get asked all the time--and certainly there
are a lot of critics that say, ``Look, they give the bulk of
the money to manned programs, but most of the research seems to
come from areas that aren't manned.'' What's your reaction to
the proposal I made this morning that you give this Committee a
solid cost-benefit analysis on manned spaceflight within 90
days, or, at most, 6 months?
Mr. O'Keefe. It's a very intriguing idea. I'll give it my
best shot. I think that's a very thoughtful way to go about
approaching it, and I'll do my very best to provide such a
document and an analysis that would demonstrate that. That's a
step forward, I think, in proving this.
Two things, though, to observe, as well, though, that--just
to be clear on the facts. A third of the budget is really
dedicated toward spaceflight activities, of which 25 percent is
shuttle, additional amounts are for International Space
Station. And then the other two thirds is toward earth science,
space science, all the things that are not specifically related
to spaceflight activities. So it already is skewed heavily
toward activities by a factor of roughly two to one, the kinds
of functions that are performed by robotic and distant means.
So that's an approach.
The other thing we've got to really assess here--and,
again, in pursuit, I think, earnestly to answer the question,
the very thoughtful proposal you've put forward, on how to
conduct such an analysis--we've got to find some way to factor
in what is the cognitive skills that human beings bring to the
occasion in these cases. There are some things you simply can't
do without a human intervention. And we've got to be selective
in the cases in which we expose humans to those risks. And
that's essentially what I think you're posing, and it's a very
interesting way to go about doing it, and I'll give it my best
shot, Senator.
Senator Wyden. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to follow up
with you and Senator Hollings. I've made the proposal, but
obviously I'd very much like to do it within the bipartisan
approach you've followed in this Committee.
But, to me, that is the bottom line. We have got to get a
cost-benefit analysis with respect to what is done in the
manned versus unmanned area. And I'll be following that up and
look forward to talking to my colleagues about it.
The second question, Admiral Gehman, if I might, involves
the compliance issue. I think Senator Hollings touched on this.
I mean, the whole history here is tragedy and recommendations
made, and then somehow they don't get followed. I'd like your
recommendations with respect to how it could be different this
time, and to bring about compliance. I mean, for example, I
mean, just on a kind of basic level, I mean, we could ask
Administrator O'Keefe to come on in here every 90 days and
basically say, ``Look, this is what we've done in the last, you
know, 90 days.'' I want to give you a crack at how you'd
approach it.
But what I think you want to do, and the dedicated people
who staffed this effort want to do, is make sure we're not
sitting here in the face of another tragedy. And your thoughts
with respect on how to make sure that there's compliance this
time, I think, would be another area I'm interested in.
Admiral Gehman. Thank you, Senator.
As I indicated in my opening remarks, I agree with your
concern, and, as I said in our opening remarks, I think we owe
it to the memory of the seven heroes who died to make sure that
we do everything we can to prevent this accident from happening
again.
In the history of NASA, which we studied very carefully and
documented in our report, indicates that NASA, like any other
big bureaucracy, responds to the forces that are acting on it.
And, unfortunately, over a period of a long period of time,
budget, schedule, and cost forces became very important to NASA
and they started to affect the program.
The question about how to prevent this from happening again
is a very intriguing one. The Board has spent some time
scratching their heads about it. We have a couple of examples
that have worked well in the past. In the case of the
Challenger accident, you may recall that the Rogers Commission
required that NASA redesign the solid rocket booster joints and
O-rings. It wasn't just the O-rings. It was the whole joint.
And they also recommended that an oversight committee be
established to supervise that, a non-NASA oversight committee.
And that oversight committee was in existence for almost 3
years. And they disapproved the first couple of NASA redesign
efforts.
You could appoint some kind of a panel or a committee to
advise the Congress as to whether or not these management steps
have been taken and whether or not they're really working and
all that sort of stuff. There is a precedent for that.
I think the Members of this Committee are very much aware
that there is a congressionally appointed or congressionally
created oversight panel already in existence, called the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP). You might want to
assign them with some duties and responsibilities, maybe
reformat them, the membership to get at the issues that you're
concerned about.
Senator Wyden. Admiral, if I might--because I know I'm just
about to run out of time, and I want your opinion in one other
area--the technical engineering authority that you have talked
about strikes me as a way to bring about some of the
independence and oversight that's important. I would like to
hear your thoughts on, sort of, the nuts and bolts of how that
would work, and also yours, Administrator O'Keefe, whether you
accept the recommendation, and, in effect, how something like
this would work.
I mean, the first thing that strikes me is, if NASA puts up
the money for it, then you say to yourself, how does that
facilitate the kind of independence that you're talking about?
But given the fact that you put great weight on this technical
engineering authority, tell us how you think it would work. And
I'd like both of your reactions. I know my light is on, but I'd
like the reaction of both you gentlemen on that.
Admiral Gehman. Senator, thank you for that question. That
question probably gets to the most important recommendation,
and probably the core of our report, and that is that we have
found that--over the years, that a legitimate system of checks
and balances has been lost in NASA in which there are
independent and resourced and robust agencies that kind of
check up on each other, within NASA. The Board does not feel
that we need to create another entity or an anti-NASA or
something like that. But what has happened is, is this
independent and robust system of checks and balances has been
lost. And it's been lost in the name of efficiency and
effectiveness.
And the manifestations of that are really what our report
is all about. All the e-mails that didn't get acted on and the
inability of engineers to affect things and the overwhelming
power of informal chains of command by people in the program
and things like, all those things are fixed if you create an
engineering world in which engineers can have a robust and
honest difference of opinion and you don't do management by
view graphs. You use technical papers instead of view graphs
and overheads and all those bad things we talked about.
What this organization would do, what we think the key
ingredient to the success of this scheme is that this
organization must, in fact, own a function. By that, I mean,
simply creating an organization that sits on the sideline and
kibitzes or second-guesses other people is not good enough. Our
suggestion is that this organization actually has to own part
of the process. And the part of the process we suggest is that
they have to own the technical requirements and specifications
and all waivers to them. Now, that implies that they have to
understand those technical requirements and specifications.
They have to understand why they're there. If anybody wants a
waiver to them, they have to understand the rationale for the
waiver. And if they don't want to grant the waiver, they have
to understand why they're not granting it. So that suggests an
engineering enterprise of some size.
It used to be that way a long, long time ago, and that
really gets to the core--that really gets to the core of our
recommendation, because many--half, 60 percent--of all the ills
that we list in our report are immediately fixed because of
this enterprise that we recommend. It could be within NASA. We
don't necessarily suggest that it has to be outside of NASA.
Mr. O'Keefe. Sir----
The Chairman. Senator Brownback?
Mr. O'Keefe. Oh, I'm sorry.
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Mr. O'Keefe. The request was that I respond, as well.
The short answer is, it's a finding, and, therefore it's a
fact. It's a recommendation, so, therefore, we're going to
comply with it. No further debate on that issue. And what
Admiral Gehman and his colleagues on the Board have pointed to
is a organizational characteristic that I recognize from my
Defense Department experience years ago, particularly the Navy
Department experience, which is to have a severability between
that institutional force which owns and kind of takes control
of specifications and engineering requirements and those that
are faced with the program operational considerations of cost
and schedule and all the other factors that go into the day-in
and day-out kinds of work, and make a very clear severability
of those functions. Got the message. That's a clear
recommendation. We're going to sort through the options of what
is the best approach to do it. And, again, the oversight
function that we have put in motion is the Stafford-Covey team
of Tom Stafford and Dick Covey, and their 29 or 30 colleagues
in all these different disciplines of management, engineering,
technical change, organization change, and culture change. All
those different experts will then be the judge of whether we
have picked the appropriate option to do that. And we will not
proceed until such time as we're satisfied that we have
selected an option that is not only compliant, but really does
follow through on the point that's being raised here.
A final observation is, I concur wholeheartedly on Admiral
Gehman's view that there is a statutory board in place right
now that the Congress enacted 30 years ago after the Apollo
fire, the ASAP, the panel that is focused on these, you know,
safety objectives. I think the charge that I'm hearing here and
as well as the approach that we need to take is, take that
statutory oversight function and reinvigorate it. And we'll
have to kind of cogitate on what the right ways are to do that,
and certainly would appreciate your support and help in that
pursuit, as well.
The Chairman. Senator Brownback?
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, for being here today.
Admiral Gehman, in the report it's replete about there's a
need for a change of culture. And I think there was one news
account that put it accurately, that ``Technology is easy.
People are difficult.'' How do you change a culture at an
institution without changing the people involved? This seems to
me that if you're talking about a cultural issue here, you're
not talking about moving boxes or organizational charts around;
you're talking about changing whole mentalities and whole
attitudes. And that seems to me that you are talking about
major wholesale changes in personnel within the NASA system. Is
that accurate?
Admiral Gehman. Senator, we anguished over this issue for a
considerable amount of time, and we also did not--we did not
start our investigation with this position. We kind of came to
it. And I think that in order to answer your question directly,
I have to make it clear that the Board made a clear distinction
between management problems and management fixes, and culture.
We, in our minds, in our framework, we view these two things as
two separate things.
Management can easily be fixed by wiring diagrams and
changing rules and regulations and moving people around and
changing functions and all that kind of stuff. But the cultural
issues are more difficult to get at, much more difficult. We
had a little saying that you can fix a management problem by
reorganizing, but you can't fix a cultural problem by
reorganizing.
Cultural problems are going to have to be driven--bad
culture--there's good culture, too, by the way. There's the
culture of safety and a culture of honesty and a culture of
openness and all those kinds of things, which needs to be
reinforced. But bad cultural traits, which we tried to list
specifically in our report so we weren't just waving our arms
and beating our breasts here, need to be driven out of the
system by active--proactive leadership, and not just leadership
from the administrator. He can't do it alone. It's going to
take--he can affect probably two levels below him, and then the
people below him can affect two levels below them. But it's
going to have to take active leadership on behalf of several
layers of management in order to get at this problem, and it
can't be done in a few days or a few months. And, therefore, we
did not make it a return-to-flight thing. It's----
Senator Brownback. Let me--because my time's going to be
limited on this--isn't what you're describing, though, that
you're going to have to make major personnel changes to change
those attitudes, the culture----
Admiral Gehman. You can----
Senator Brownback.--up and down through the organization?
Admiral Gehman. My experience has been that you can change
the behavior of people. You can't change the attitude of
people, but you can change their behaviors. I would suggest to
Mr. O'Keefe that after trying as hard as he can and repeating
the message over and over again, if there's somebody out there
who doesn't get it, he has to be replaced.
Senator Brownback. And quickly.
Mr. O'Keefe, in looking at the comprehensive list of
recommendations there in chapter 11, it takes me back a little
bit. You know, the return-to-flight requirements are extensive.
How long do you think those would take to get implemented, and
at what cost?
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, there are 15 very specific
recommendations that must be implemented--you're exactly
right--prior to any return-to-flight activity. And the answer
is, it will occur when we've determined we are fit to fly.
Because not just those 15, but anything else we determine that
falls into the category of issues which would otherwise
compromise successful mission accomplishment is going to have
to be accomplished. That bar has to be that much higher. It
can't be just those 15.
Senator Brownback. No time-frame then? You can't establish
any timeframe? I think you've said that in other interviews.
What about the cost?
Mr. O'Keefe. Again, we have to assess that. Because it
really turns on which options we select to implement each of
those, particularly those 15, and then all the other
recommendations, as well, and the other things we've included
in the raise-the-bar, kind of, inputs area. So as we work
through, with the Stafford-Covey team, exactly what options
we're going to choose, that will then yield a price tag, which
will give us a better judgment of exactly what that's going to
take.
Senator Brownback. Let me build on that, if I could. And
this is, I think, along the line with what Senator Wyden was
saying. As you appraise that, there's going to be a cost
associated with that. I hope you also look at it and question
whether it would be just a better thing to invest in a
different technology, if, at some point, we look at--that
sooner rather than later, maybe even much sooner, we ground the
shuttle and go to a different system, if the cost of
implementing this is so high, relative to going to a new
technology or a new system. And I would hope that, as you
appraise this, that you look at--this is the amount of time it
would take us to get the shuttle back to flight. This is how
much it would cost. Are we throwing good money after bad?
There's a fair feeling that this is an older technology. It's a
complex technology that we may just be at a point--it's time to
say shuttle the scuttle--shuttle the scuttle--scuttle the
shuttle, and we move on to the next technology. And I hope you
will be making that appraisal, rather than just saying, ``Well,
we're on this line and we're going to go that track.''
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. As you review the implementation
plan, which, again, will be released late this week, early
next, and you--that's going to continue to inform the debate of
what the scope and magnitude of return to flight's going to
require. I'm certain we're going to have a spirited debate, in
terms of what exactly that will entail, what it'll cost, what
the tradeoffs are. And, again, we intend to be under multiple
levels of oversight review in that process.
Senator Brownback. And I can assure you Congress is going
to be looking at that question.
Mr. O'Keefe. Sure.
Senator Brownback. How much time?
Mr. O'Keefe. Absolutely.
Senator Brownback. What's its cost? Is it just time to go
to a new technology? Which, I have to tell you, my leaning is
just clearly that that's the way we should be going at this
time. There are two major disasters. It's a complex system.
It's an older design. This is a 30-year-old design that we're
into now. I just can't help but to think that we would do much
better--and it may also be a cultural issue when you go at a
new technology. We can bring a new team in to design where
we're going to next. And that new team will have a different
cultural--are you going to be able to shape the attitude of
that culture?
I think cultures are critically important. I think it is to
the country, and I think it is to institutions. I know it is in
my office. And this may be the answer to both the cultural and
the technology.
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, Senator, you've asked me to keep an open
mind. I'd just ask that you do the same. As we work our way
through this implementation plan, my plea would be let's all
keep an open mind in terms of where the options need to go.
Senator Brownback. That's fair enough.
Mr. O'Keefe. I'd appreciate very much.
Senator Brownback. I hope you also will think about
creating this Presidential commission on the future of space
exploration. Congress can do that, but that's really an
Executive Branch function. And the report noted that we lack a
comprehensive and engaging vision. The way I've been looking
and seeing is we're stuck mentally in low-space orbit, our
thinking is. And I just think you need to get--and I think the
country wants to engage in a discussion on what's our vision
for space. It's not just NASA. It also involves--I mean, it's
discovery and exploration, but it's also commercial and
military--to engage that broader discussion of where are we
going as a country here. Because I think the country wants to
go, but they need that vision that really unites and says,
``This risk is worth it. This cost is worth it.''
So I hope you'll consider that, a Presidential-level
commission to work with establishing that. I know there are
difficulties with it, and there's not a simple answer, but a
vision really is a critical thing to unite a country.
Senator Brownback [presiding]. Now, I'll be chairing the
hearing the rest of the way out, and who's--Senator Nelson is
next up. Sorry about that.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, everybody up here wants this program to be
successful. And so I'm going to ask some very specific
questions.
We have heard the Admiral say--in his excellent report, he
has stated ``buying power has been reduced 40 percent over the
last 10 years.'' The Admiral has said here today that ``money
has been squeezed out of the shuttle program.'' And I'm doing
exact quotes from what you said, Admiral. You talked about how
the program manager had made trades on the cost; how, looking
ahead, that you should separate engineering and safety from the
cost and schedule part of the evaluation. And you talked
about--all leaders are responsible for the results--the
Administrator, the White House, and Congress. You specifically
stated that.
So realizing that that has been part of the problem in the
past, now I want to ask some very specific questions, Mr.
Administrator, as we go forward. This is not partisan. The
space program is not partisan. A lot of these questions have
been addressed by Senator Hutchison, as well.
I would like to know if you have had discussions--you or
any of your immediate people--with the White House--OMB is part
of the White House--about the increased expenditures that
you're going to come to Congress to ask for.
Mr. O'Keefe. We are pursuing an interagency discussion on
the larger U.S. space exploration objectives. The result of
that will yield a very specific answer to your question that
will manifest in a request from the President in whatever
period of time that takes.
Senator Nelson. It's a request for supplemental that you're
talking about.
Mr. O'Keefe. No, sir. I'm not specifying exactly what form
it will take, whether it's an amendment or a supplemental or
part of a regular budget request. All that's being vetted now.
Senator Nelson. Well, as the Admiral said, the leadership
problems involved everybody in the past. So if we're going to
fix this problem, the Congress is going to have to help you and
the White House fix the problem. So we're going to need to know
how much we're going to have to help you to fix the problem. So
can you give us any kind of idea what we're talking about?
Because right now decisions are being made in the
Appropriations Subcommittee on the 2004 budget.
Mr. O'Keefe. Indeed. And that process is underway. And as
soon as we can get an answer, that's precisely what I have an
obligation to come back to you and your colleagues to deliver.
Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. OK. You said you had ongoing discussions.
Have you had ongoing discussions in the range of a billion-and-
a-half dollars of return-to-flight additional monies?
Mr. O'Keefe. We have had ongoing discussions. I really
don't want to get into what the current state of play is or
what the numbers might be, because they really run the gamut. I
think, again, as I mentioned in response to Senator Brownback's
commentary, the cost of this is going to depend on which
options we choose. There are 29 recommendations, and a whole
range of raise-the-bar objectives we're going to have to do. So
each of those options is going to have a price tag. The answer
to that very specific question will come from the total of how
much it takes on the options you select for all 29 of those and
every other issue contained in the raise-the-bar inputs that
are equally important, in our judgment. So I can't give you an
answer to that until we can do that math.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Administrator, you have heard me be
very critical of past administrations, both parties, on the way
that they use budgetary sleight of hand over the years to get
us into the fiscal condition that we are finding, where NASA
has not given the specific money directed at safety. You've
heard me talk about how the space shuttle budget and the Space
Station budget were lumped together back in the 1990s, and then
money was transferred around.
Now, it is very much the responsibility of the Congress, as
we look at your budgets, to know specifically what has
happened. Now, for example, maybe you can share this with us.
Of course, as Admiral Gehman said, not only have the budgets
been flat with regard to the space shuttle, the budgets have
actually--in real buying power, has been a 40 percent drop over
10 years. And, indeed, where I see the difference in what the
Administration has requested in 2003 for the space shuttle,
roughly $3.2 billion, you would think it was an increase going
to the 2004 request of three-point-nine. But, in fact, the
institutional account, which includes a lot of the
infrastructure that was $1.2 billion in the past is zeroed out.
So a number of those institutional costs, including things like
infrastructure, are part of that additional funding increase.
So where is the increase in your 2004 request that specifically
gets at the problem of safety and safety upgrades?
Mr. O'Keefe. There is a budget line item within the shuttle
program for Service Life Extension Program. Of that, we have to
identify the prioritization that's underway, that was started
before the accident, to begin to work through exactly what is
the prioritization of selection of those upgrades and their
timely implementation. So the answer to the question is, that's
the funding stream that's there. It's not one year. It's in
2004 and each successive year thereafter. There's a continuing
funding stream that follows thereafter. As a consequence, this
is an enduring program that we intend to put specificity to
which upgrade implemented at which time based on which
prioritization's set--and, again, informed by a lot of what we
will learn as we implement these findings and recommendations.
Senator Nelson. OK.
Senator Brownback. Senator----
Senator Nelson. I see my time is up.
Senator Brownback. Senator Breaux?
Senator Breaux. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And,
once again, thank you, Admiral, for a very fine report. And
also thank you, Mr. O'Keefe, for the cooperative effort that
you've shown in producing this report.
I'd just ask you, with regard to the Lockheed Martin
facility in Michoud, down in New Orleans, what kind of
cooperation did you get, Admiral, in working with them and
finding out what they did and everything else?
Admiral Gehman. Senator, we got outstanding cooperation at
Michoud. And, in particular, we did a lot of work down there,
because we and the workforce at Michoud wanted to understand
the properties of foam better than had been understood in the
past. And, therefore, we asked them how to go about that, and
they worked right alongside us in conducting--devising and
conducting various experiments.
And certainly the best commentary I can get--I can give you
is the very--is the dissection of the already-built bipod ramps
that we did. This showed some problems inside those bipod ramps
that were unknown beforehand, and it took a considerable amount
of courage on those people to help us do that.
Senator Breaux. Did the separating of the foam from the
external fuel tanks become an ``acceptable risk'' to NASA?
Admiral Gehman. The categorization of ``separation of
foam'' changed over the years. It migrated from a very, very
serious category to a category that was not so serious, until
it absolutely disappeared off the radar scope altogether. And
yet it was the same physical event. And that is a--that's a
mistake.
Senator Breaux. It seems to me that we've had this
separation of the foam from the very beginning, that we've had
separation of foam--the first known incident was back in 1983.
The most recent incident, other than this tragic accident, was
only 3 months before this final accident. And your report
points out that photos exist of foam separating for 65 of the
79 missions, for which we had imaging that was available. And
then the regulations of NASA on external tank debris limits
said very clearly that ``no debris shall emanate from the
critical zone of the external tank on the launch pad or during
a set, except for such material which may result from normal
thermal protection systems reception due to a set heating.''
So we've had foam separation from the very beginning,
throughout numerous launches, 65 of 75 that we saw pictures of,
and as recent as 3 months before this incident, plus a
regulation of NASA itself that says no debris separation is
acceptable or should be allowed. And yet we were still
launching shuttle missions knowing that this was continuing and
knowing that we had a regulation that said, ``Don't allow this
to happen.'' To me, that seems like a monumental breakdown. Can
you comment on that?
Admiral Gehman. Yes, sir. And it gets to the core of our
recommendation to have an independent technical authority. The
adjudication of whether or not the foam anomaly should be
treated as a showstopper or not is made by a board, a board of
engineers and managers, at the space shuttle program office.
And the chairman of that board is the space shuttle program
manager. So what we have is a case where the program manager,
who has pressures on him for cost and schedule and manifests
and lots of other things, having to determine whether or not
this anomaly, which is now before the board for adjudication,
whether or not he should make a big administrative deal out of
this or make a small deal out of it. He knows that if he makes
a big deal out of it, it might jeopardize or slow down future
launches. He also knows that if he doesn't understand why this
is happening, it'll cost a couple of million dollars to do some
research and development, a couple of million dollars that he
doesn't have, to find out why foam is doing this and what are
the properties of it and how to fix it. And so this one person,
who's got all these pressures on him, is making these
decisions, and we found to be not a good system.
Senator Breaux. I'm not sure how an outside board is going
to help you on this particular degree of investigation or
supervision, because we already knew it was happening. We have
a rule that says ``no debris shall separate or shed,'' and we
have numerous instances of launches where this was occurring.
It was despite a rule that said, ``Don't let it happen.'' It
was happening, and we were continuing to launch vehicles
knowing it was happening. An outside board's going to tell us
the same thing we already know.
Mr. O'Keefe, was it a matter of cost? I mean, we have a
regulation that says it should not happen. It was happening,
and we were still launching knowing that it was happening as
much as 3 months before this launch. Is the reason that it was
allowed to continue a cost reason or was it simply people
ignoring the regulations and ignoring what was happening?
Mr. O'Keefe. I don't discount anything that Admiral Gehman
has offered here. Again, I think those are all contributing
factors. But I think there are two overriding reasons why this
happened.
The first rule, which you cite properly, exactly, very
precisely, that was set is viewed in the agency and within the
shuttle program as a ``goal.''
Senator Breaux. As what?
Mr. O'Keefe. A goal. Not a requirement, not a hard, fast
specification. That's a fool's errand, heading down the road
toward saying, ``Well, we'd like to achieve this,'' because
that means we regularly rationalize why we would waive
something we view as a goal, not as a requirement, as a
specification. And that's a big mistake. So we've really got to
look back. So that's the first issue, we really have to make
that rule as firm as you just described it to have folks
understand what is it that's inviolate that you simply cannot
transcend, and where are those cases in which there's a desired
objective that we have to continue to achieve, and find a way
to get there, or else simply define this as a goal that's not
achievable.
And the second case is, what we're dealing with here is
human nature. It is--like everything else in life, when you see
something repetitively, it begins to fuel a rationalization of
why that's not a problem.
Senator Breaux. That's the cultural problem.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. They go hand in hand, but I think
they have to be viewed compatibly. That human tendency we
shouldn't be surprised to see in engineers when we see it in
everyday life.
We all know anytime you walk down a metropolitan street,
anytime there is a homeless person sitting inside of a doorway,
there is some number of people who are stunned by the fact that
people walk by with absolutely no cognizance of the fact that's
going on and have ignored it. If anybody came from a South
Pacific paradise island and walked down that same street,
they'd be aghast at seeing at humanity is being treated and
would be amazed by how it is we, as a people, could tolerate
that.
And so it's that first occasion in which you see it that
raises that interest level. We shouldn't be surprised when
engineers act just like the rest of people do. When they see
something repetitively, they begin to rationalize and begin to
look at things and assume what it is they think they know about
it. And in every other instance--and here's the big mistake,
and Admiral Gehman and the Board pointed to this very, very
clearly--this human nature said, ``If nothing happened
previously, it probably won't happen again in the future.''
That's the wrong direction. It ought to go in the opposite
approach, which they have said repetitively in this report,
which is, ``We've got to prove that it's safe, not prove that
it's not.'' And that's a point that really has to be driven
home. As a consequence, we really have to take that same
mindset and understand that while this is a human nature, human
characteristic, that when we see things repetitively, that we
take it for granted or begin to make assumptions or whatever
else. It simply can't be tolerated here, because the stakes are
too high.
Senator Breaux. Well, we all know what happens when we
assume.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. We do it in every discipline. Every
single discipline in every walk of life. There are assumptions
that are considered to be inviolate, and we've got to go back
and question what those assumptions are. That's a real tough
order, and it's one that's going to take us a lot of time and
discipline.
Senator Brownback. Senator Dorgan?
STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. DORGAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA
Senator Dorgan. Admiral Gehman and Administrator O'Keefe,
thank you for your testimony this morning.
I was thinking, as I was sitting here, having read recently
about the December 17, 1903, 59 second flight by the Wright
brothers at Kitty Hawk, and in the 100 years since, we have had
all manners of tragedy and exhilaration and success. And
especially the space program, it seems to me, is the one aspect
of going from leaving the ground to walking on the moon, the
one aspect of walking on the edge of the envelope of technology
and science, and one would expect that there will always be
those who suffer the consequences of tragedy in those
circumstances.
But these tragedies that have occurred, this one
especially, and the investigation you have completed tell us
that there are certain things that can and should and must be
done to prevent this from happening again. I mean, the fact
that we're dealing on the edge of the envelope in science and
technology does not in any way excuse tragedies that could have
been prevented. And those heroes, as you've described them and
as our country understands them to be, and that space--in the
space shuttle should expect--should have expected then and
certainly the future astronauts should expect everything
possible is being done to provide for their safety.
I want to ask you just about two issues quickly. And let me
say, first of all, Admiral Gehman, I'm not a scientist or--I
don't have the technical ability, perhaps, to have fully
digested everything that your report includes, but it seems to
me you have done a massively thorough job.
Administrative O'Keefe, you have, I think, been a very
stand-up Administrator here in these circumstances. I raised
questions immediately about the proposition of whether NASA
could create its own investigative board reporting to NASA.
Others raised the same questions. You responded immediately by
changing the Board's charter, removing references to the
requirement that NASA oversee and review the Board's
investigation and so on. I think the result of that,
Administrator O'Keefe, gives us a report that does have true
independence. And I think your working with it the way you have
has been admirable, and I appreciate that leadership.
I want to ask you----
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, sir.
Senator Dorgan.--a few things.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you.
Senator Dorgan. One, the requirement of the mission
management team meetings every day during a shuttle flight,
those--NASA regulations required such meetings every day, and
my understanding is, from your report, it occurred--those
meetings occurred only five times during the 16-day mission,
and that discussions regarding the risks of the foam strike and
the need for additional imagery, the request for imagery did
not surface at all at these meetings that were held. So, 15 of
these, or 16 of these meetings should have been held, I guess,
and five of them were held; and at the five that were held, no
discussions were developed in those meetings with respect to
the request for imagery, despite the fact that beneath all of
that these discussions were occurring. Can you describe that,--
perhaps both of you describe that for me. Is that part of the
culture issue or part of the assumption issue that never came
to the attention of those who should have been attending to it?
Admiral Gehman. I'll start off by saying that the
characterization is correct that you made. They held five MMT
meetings in the 16-day flight. They're required to meet every
day. We went back to the three previous missions and counted up
the number of times the MMT met. And guess what? They don't
meet every day. They've been meeting every third day for as
long back as we can find records. And this is an example of
culture at work.
What happens is, you've got regulations, ``You've got to do
it this way.'' Over a period of years and years and years, you
kind of atrophy to where you do it this way. You're violating
your own rules and regulations, and now you're sending all
kinds of informal messages through the system, that it's OK to
violate your rules and regulations. And then the top-level
managers are doing it, ``We don't need to meet every day. We
can meet every third day. It's good enough. E-mails are good
enough.'' And we're not sure what e-mails count for. I mean,
are e-mails official communications, or not?
And so this is a classic case. So I wouldn't blame the fact
that there were only five meetings on this mission as being
causative. In other words, that's the way they've been doing it
for years, so there's nothing different about it.
Now, we made the point in our report that these meetings
are very short, that some of them were 30 minutes long. The
longest one was about 50 minutes long. And if they really had
met every day, maybe they would have inquired into some of the
more minute details of what was going on, and the subject of
imagery might have come up. Pure speculation.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. O'Keefe?
Mr. O'Keefe. This report very clearly indicates that the
rules and regulations that we have promulgated over the years
are treated much the same way as stop lights in Naples; they're
advisory. That's not tolerable. We cannot have that. We've got
to go back and really look at what those operational procedures
call for, and put in motion that which we believe. And that's
part of the recommendations. That's part of our raise-the-bar
input standards that we really have to implement and have a
very clear understanding of how those operational rules will be
promulgated and followed as we go through this.
Because the intent behind the MMT, I think it's a good one,
which is to coordinate views and positions, inputs, and then
serve it up for decisionmaking. Well, there was an awful lot of
stray voltage, is what this report indicates, of lots of
communication going on, but to no particular point, in some
cases, or to no particular decisionmaking alternative. That's a
failure, really, to understand the purpose of the rules. And
over time, I think, as the chairman of the Board observed, as
well as all of his members, that, over time, if these things
are viewed as advisory, what's the point? Why are they there?
And that's something we've really got to take back as a strong
indictment of the culture, and we've got to correct it.
Senator Dorgan. And, Administrator O'Keefe, the reason I
asked this specific question is the mission management team
meetings--I don't know much about this at all, except that my
assumption would be that ``mission management'' means just what
it sounds like, managing the entire mission. And the fact that
it didn't meet, not only in this shuttle flight, per
regulation, every day, but in other shuttle flights, as well,
but, more than that, the fact that when it did meet, it did not
have the information flowing up to it of questions being raised
in the organization about the question of whether they should
have additional imagery to determine whether this foam had
caused some damage to the wing. I mean, that's an
organizational issue, it seems to me, and a structural issue of
very significant----
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Senator Dorgan.--importance to the future of operations of
NASA.
Mr. O'Keefe. It's an important process question that must
be resolved. No question.
Senator Dorgan. And I wanted to ask, just briefly, a
question about the next-generation launch vehicle. The return-
to-flight for the shuttle, one hopes, will occur at some point
when we have satisfied all of these issues, and there's much
work to be done. But my understanding is that the next-
generation launch vehicle is meant to complement rather than
replace the shuttle. And as I read the investigative report,
what you are saying, Admiral Gehman, is that this shuttle
vehicle is yesterday's technology, it needs to be replaced
rather than to have some other vehicle complement it at some
point. And this gets back, I think, to the question that my
colleague, Senator Nelson, was asking, as well. I mean, all of
that costs an enormous amount of money. Replacing this launch
vehicle completely will be a significant capital requirement,
will it not?
When we go back to return-to-flight with the space shuttle,
will you, by that time, have made a decision about what your
next-generation launch vehicle will be and whether it's going
to fully replace it in a certain time period, or whether you're
going to continue to try to complement it as your current plans
would indicate?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. No, the short answer is yes, indeed.
By the time we return to flight, we really have to have an
answer to those questions, and we're in the process right now,
very hard, of trying to resolve precisely what the composition
of this will be, using as the baseline the integrated space
transportation plan that we have presented to the Congress as
part of this year's budget and was endorsed last year as part
of the President's amendment in November.
I'd ask Admiral Gehman to comment, though, on the
characterization of this particular finding, because I read it
a little differently. And rather than have us go through mutual
interpretations here, let's ask the oracle to render exactly
what was the intent behind the words that are used here, in
terms of chapter 9 and where we should be going.
Admiral Gehman. After we had studied this system in such
great detail, the Board felt that we owed it to the public and
to the United States and to the Nation to editorialize a little
bit on the safety and the longevity and the life span of the
shuttle, as we know it.
In chapter 9, we opined that the Board was surprised and
disappointed to find ourselves at--here we are at 2003, and we
don't even have a replacement vehicle on the drawing boards. I
mean, we're still debating. We're having a debate about the
replacement vehicle. The Board found that the shuttle is not
inherently unsafe. It can be operated for another number of
years if the recommendations of this Board are followed through
on. But the Board finds that operating it for another 20 years,
or something, is beyond our--beyond the scope of our
imaginations, and that sometime in the period of something like
10 years from now, if you're going to operate it more than
about 10 years, you're going to have to fully recertify and
fully requalify the vehicle, which would be extraordinarily
expensive.
Senator Dorgan. From what I understand your answer to be,
if you were an astronaut and if the recommendations of the
Board were followed, you would not have difficulty joining the
crew and flying the shuttle----
Admiral Gehman. That's absolutely correct.
Senator Dorgan. You would fly it yourself.
Admiral Gehman. That's correct.
Senator Dorgan. All right. I expect you won't get the
opportunity, unless it's a----
Admiral Gehman. I asked.
[Laughter.]
Mr. O'Keefe. Fortunately, that was not a finding and
recommendation which we intend to accept and comply with. So,
as a consequence, this is a debatable point, and I think he
wants to head back to his sailboat.
Senator Dorgan [presiding]. Well, this is obviously deadly
serious business, and the work you have done has been long and
labored, but I think you've accomplished much with it. And I
think that the Chairman has done a real service for this
Committee and for the Senate in calling this hearing today at
this time. And you've done some significant benefit, I think,
for this country and its space program in your testimony and in
the work you've done prior to it.
Let me just make one final comment and say that I come from
North Dakota. I mean, I don't have a space launch pad in the
middle of my state, as do Florida and Texas. But I really
believe a society that stops exploring stops progressing. I
think space exploration has been very important for this
country. I want it to succeed. I want it to continue. I think
the benefits are very substantial. But it will only succeed and
continue if we understand that these tragedies require an
enormous amount of work to understand what has happened and
prevent it from happening again. Again, we're operating on the
edge of the envelope of knowledge here, and some wonderful men
and women--heroes, in my judgment--one of whom served with us
here in the Senate, Senator Glenn, have been the pioneers in
space travel. But I really think we're just at the beginning
phase of understanding what the rest of our universe is and how
to explore it and the benefits it can provide for us.
So let me, again, thank the Chairman, who had to depart.
And Senator Nelson has a final question, and then he will close
out the hearing.
Senator Nelson?
Mr. O'Keefe. Senator, if I could just quickly observe----
Senator Dorgan. Yes.
Mr. O'Keefe.--on your point, I think you've got it spot-on.
I mean, we are really in the equivalency here in space
exploration of the age of sail. We have really just gotten
started. As humankind has pursued this approach, it is very
early in this process. And we've got a long way to go. And the
expanse to what we could conquer by this really is just
unimaginable in its expanse. And so, as a consequence, I think
exactly the way you've characterized this is precisely the way
I look at it. This is a daunting challenge, and we're at the
very beginning of it. It's a tremendous responsibility, and
it's one we take very seriously.
Senator Dorgan. Thank you very much.
Senator Nelson?
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, sir.
Senator Nelson [presiding]. Senator Dorgan, I want to pick
up on your question about the next-generation vehicle.
Mr. O'Keefe, you and I have talked many times, both
privately and publicly, about how you could get some more money
with regard to this next-generation vehicle. And one of the
things we have discussed is that other agencies of the Federal
Government could share in the expense of developing the
technologies, that NASA would oversee the research and
development, because those technologies would be of value to
other agencies. Would you share with the Committee what is
happening there, from a financial perspective in the future?
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, the current ongoing effort we have
underway--for example, on the X-37 technology demonstrator--is
a good example of the kind of arrangement in which there are
advantages that may be derived for multiple purposes. And so,
as a consequence, NASA and the Defense Department--Air Force,
particularly--are really examining exactly where that approach
is going. We are financing with them the overall expense
related to the launch and test phase of that particular
technology demonstrator.
The orbital space plane, which is, again, the follow-on
effort that Senator Dorgan referred to--we are right now in the
process of inviting the industry to respond to the
requirements, which, again, can be summarized in one page. This
is what we want it to do, and here are the capabilities we
need. And there are a number of different technologies that are
accented, if you will, that may have great application, or the
Defense Department may go in on that, and we are engaging in
discussions with them.
But at this present time, on the orbital space plane, the
objective is that we get about the process of finding a
complementary asset that is crew-transfer vehicle in its
orientation, that the Board observed in chapter 9, is the kind
of thing we need to do, as expeditiously as possible. And we're
now in the process of trying to figure out, How do you define
``expeditious''? How quickly can it be done? What's it going to
look like? And the industry is actively playing in that and
working through that particular contractual effort that's being
engaged right now. So we should have an answer to that in very
short order.
Senator Nelson. Do you expect that, in a net outflow of
dollars from NASA, that that will require additional money to
be budgeted in NASA?
Mr. O'Keefe. It heavily depends on how soon we want to see
delivery of the asset. As I mentioned in response to Senator
Hutchison's comment, the amount that we have included in the
NASA budget now before Congress in the 5-year stream, certainly
is a resource allocation for an orbital space plane. It will
not be sufficient to cover any delivery date that we may
desire. To the extent we want to accelerate that, it isn't
going to require more in aggregate. It may require more up
front. And that's part of what we've got to sort through now.
But, again, very thoughtful questions, commentary, and
direction that you've given us at previous hearings, and along
with other of your colleagues, prompted us to go back and look
at that trade study, figure out what it's going to take in
order to accelerate this. What are the approaches we would use
in that regard? And in no instance have we made the
requirements negotiable. We've made those the fixed constant,
and everything else around it the variables that we may want to
consider, in terms of accelerating its delivery or what other
approach you'd use for crew transfer versus crew rescue and the
like.
Senator Nelson. And what timeframe, so that we can be
expecting it, would you expect to come to the Congress for that
kind of request?
Mr. O'Keefe. To the extent that a request is required, it
will be at the point in which the President determines that
that's necessary, and that's exactly when it will be delivered.
Senator Nelson. And is your answer the same, then, with
regard to the additional expenses that will be required for the
return to flight?
Mr. O'Keefe. Again, those are more dependent. I've got to
serve up to, I think, all--within our administration, a clear
understanding of the options we choose for the 29
recommendations and the raise-the-bar inputs, that are going to
be equally important, and make a determination of how much we
need in order to implement the options we've chosen. And that
is going to--again, be a fulsome debate within the
administration, and we're in the midst of that now.
Senator Nelson. All right. I will just merely close out my
comments and the considerable fine hearing that we've had and
thank you both by saying you've read the Gehman report. The
Gehman report said that the cost-cutting in the past has been
part of the problem. That's what I said I was pleasantly
surprised in seeing in the report, because I didn't anticipate
that Admiral Gehman's Board was going to address cost. It is
part of the problem, and they have identified it. And the long
and short of it is, over four administrations--and this is
bipartisan, both parties--that NASA has been, to use my word,
``starved'' of funds. And it has always been that Office of
Management and the Budget that has said ``nyet'' to NASA.
I think everybody, including the Members of this Committee,
that want, as Senator Dorgan so eloquently said, to see our
space program continue to be robust and fulfill that desire of
this Nation to explore, needs to know that you're going to be
in there fighting in the internal fights in the administration,
with OMB, and the White House, to make sure that the monies are
there for NASA.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. That answer is good enough for me.
[Laughter.]
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, sir.
Senator Nelson. Admiral Gehman, again, you've done a great
service to the country, an enormous service. We thank you from
the bottom of our hearts.
No other questions from the Committee. The Committee is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Congressional Budget Office--U.S. Congress
Washington, DC, July 29, 2003
Hon. Ted Stevens,
Chairman,
Committee on Appropriations,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In response to your request, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
has reviewed the past and current use of contractors by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to operate and maintain the
Space Shuttle. CBO has also examined other cases in which the United
States government uses contractors to perform technologically complex
activities. CBO's examination focuses on selected activities that it
judges to be of interest based on their content. While informative,
these examples do not constitute a comprehensive review of
technologically complex activities conducted by the government. Nor has
CBO audited the performance of the government sponsors or contractors
involved in these activities.
The activities CBO examines span a broad range and include
maintaining and upgrading weapons systems, designing and producing
weapon systems, operating and maintaining government nuclear
facilities, and designing nuclear weapons. The nature of the work
contractors perform varies among these activities. In some cases
contractors are designing and producing complete multi-element systems;
in other cases the contractors maintain or install upgrades to specific
government-owned hardware or operate facilities for the government. How
the government defines the work that the contractors perform also
varies--in some cases the government provides a set of detailed,
comprehensive specifications; in others the government uses top-level
performance measures, leaving some or many details to be defined by the
contractors. The cost of the work varies from annual expenditures of
tens of millions of dollars to billions of dollars. The contracts used
are in some cases sole-source and in others competitively awarded; some
contracts are cost plus fee, and some are firm-fixed price. The size of
the government workforce performing oversight of the contractors varies
from less than one hundred to more than a thousand people, and how that
oversight is conducted also varies. Thus, many of the elements of the
examples CBO has examined differ from the ways NASA uses contractors to
operate the Shuttle. Nonetheless, all of the examples considered by CBO
involve the government's use of contractors to perform demanding,
technologically complex tasks, a situation that is not unique to NASA.
The attachment to this letter describes CBO's review, which was
prepared by Adebayo Adedeji, David Arthur, Eric Labs, Fran Lussier, and
Robie Samanta-Roy of CBO's National Security Division. CBO's staff
point of contact for this effort is J. Michael Gilmore.
Sincerely,
Douglas Holtz-Eakin,
Director.
Attachment
cc: Honorable Robert Byrd
Ranking Member
______
Attachment
NASA's Space Flight Operations Contract and Other Technologically
Complex Government Activities Conducted by Contractors
Congress of the United States--Congressional Budget Office--July 29,
2003
Contents
Summary and Introduction
History of NASA's Use of Contractors to Operate the Shuttle
The Space Flight Operations Contract
United Space Alliance
SFOC Implementation
SFOC Fees
NASA's Oversight of the SFOC
Other Technologically Complex Government Activities
The Coast Guard's Deepwater Project
The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
The Future Combat System
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Logistics Support for the B-2 Bomber
National Missile Defense--National Team
Refueling/Overhauls for Aircraft Carriers
The Savannah River Site
Trident Ballistic Missile Submarine Conversions to Perform
Conventional Missions
TABLES
1. Examples of Selected Technologically Complex Government Activities
Conducted by Contractors
2. The Space Shuttle's Workforce, 1992 to 2002
FIGURE
1. Annual Budgets for the Space Shuttle
______
Summary and Introduction
The space shuttle, formally known as the Space Transportation
System (STS), was developed during the 1970s. The first operational
shuttle, Columbia, was delivered to the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) in 1979 and first flew in 1981. The shuttle
consists of a reusable orbiter manned vehicle, two reusable solid
rocket boosters (SRBs), and an expendable external tank that holds the
propellants used by the orbiter's three space shuttle main engines
(SSMEs) during launch. The shuttle fleet initially consisted of four
orbiter vehicles, and NASA initially planned for the STS to fly up to
60 missions per year; however, at most, it has flown only eight
missions annually. In 1986, the Challenger exploded on its ascent to
orbit, and subsequently, the Congress authorized funds for a
replacement vehicle. On February 1, 2003, the Columbia disintegrated as
it reentered Earth's atmosphere. Currently, there are three remaining
orbiters in the fleet--Atlantis, Discovery, and Endeavour--which have
about 75 percent of their design life remaining, based on a goal of 100
missions per orbiter.
The space shuttle program continues to be one of the most
significant individual portions of NASA's budget. In the President's
budget for 2004, the space shuttle accounted for about 26 percent of
NASA's total proposed funding.
In 1995, NASA began planning to consolidate the numerous individual
contracts it was using to operate the shuttle into a single contract
let to a single contractor. In 1997, NASA initiated the first phase of
that consolidation by contracting with United Space Alliance (USA), a
limited liability company owned jointly by Boeing and Lockheed
Martin.\1\ Under the Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC), USA was
to perform some--but not all--of the tasks associated with shuttle
operations. Not all of the originally planned consolidation has
occurred, although additional activities were subsequently incorporated
under the SFOC in Phase II, which began in 1998. In particular, the
propulsion elements, such as the external tank, SSMEs, and propellant
portions of the SRBs, have not been incorporated under the contract.
NASA still uses multiple contractors, albeit a lesser number than it
used originally, to operate and maintain the shuttle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Limited liability companies (LLCs) have characteristics of both
regular corporations and partnerships. Like the stockholders of regular
corporations, the owners of LLCs are not personally liable for the
debts and liabilities of the organization. However, an LLC can be taxed
as a pass-through entity, like a partnership, so there is no corporate
tax on its net income. The profits of the LLC are automatically
included in the owners' income for tax purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the request of the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations
Committee, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has reviewed NASA's
past and current use of contractors to operate the shuttle. CBO's
review also describes other cases in which the U.S. Government uses
contractors to undertake technologically complex endeavors like the
shuttle's operation and maintenance (see Table 1). CBO's examination
focuses on selected illustrative activities that it judges to be of
interest on the basis of their content. Although selected to be
informative, the examples do not constitute a comprehensive review of
the government's technologically complex activities. Nor has CBO
audited the performance of the associated contractors or government
agencies.
The activities that CBO examined span a broad range and include
maintaining, upgrading, designing, and producing weapon systems;
operating and maintaining the government's nuclear facilities; and
designing nuclear weapons. The type of work that contractors perform
varies among those activities. For example, in some cases, the
contractors may design and produce complete multielement systems; in
other cases, they may maintain or install upgrades to specific
government-owned hardware or operate government facilities.
How the government defines the work that the contractors perform
also varies--in some instances, the government may provide a set of
detailed, comprehensive specifications; in others, it may use less
specific performance measures, leaving some or many of the details to
be defined by the contractors. The cost of the work ranges from annual
expenditures of tens of millions of dollars to billions. The contracts
used are sometimes sole-source contracts and sometimes competitively
awarded; some are of the cost-plus-fee type, and others feature firm
fixed prices.
Table 1.--Examples of Selected Technologically Complex Government
Activities Conducted by Contractors
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Activity Government Department
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coast Guard Deepwater Project Department of Homeland Security
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Department of the Air Force
Program
Future Combat System Department of the Army
Lawrence Livermore National Department of Energy
Laboratory
Logistics Support for the B-2 Department of the Air Force
Bomber
National Missile Defense--National Department of Defense
Team
Refueling/Overhauls for Aircraft Department of the Navy
Carriers
Savannah River Site Program Department of Energy
Trident Ballistic Missile Submarine Department of the Navy
Conversions to Perform
Conventional Missions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
The size of the government workforce that oversees the contractors
for a given activity varies from less than 100 personnel to more than a
thousand, and how that oversight is conducted may differ from activity
to activity. For example, in some cases, the government may require
contractors to prepare and submit reports according to government
specifications; in other cases, it may use internal contractor-
generated reports.
In sum, many of the features of the activities that CBO has
examined differ from the elements that characterize NASA's use of
contractors to operate the space shuttle. As is the case with the
shuttle's operation, however, all of the examples involve the
government's use of contractors to perform demanding, technologically
complex tasks, a situation that is not unique to NASA.
History of NASA's Use of Contractors to Operate the Shuttle
As noted earlier, from the early 1980s through 1996, NASA used
numerous contracts with individual contractors to operate and maintain
the space shuttle. In late 1994, NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin
formed an independent team to propose approaches to improve the
shuttle's management. The team was led by Christopher Kraft, the flight
director during the early Mercury and Gemini missions; its membership
was drawn from the aerospace industry and former NASA leaders. NASA
stated that the panel's objective, set within the context of flat NASA
budgets and initiatives to reduce the civil service workforce, was to
maintain safety while significantly decreasing total operating costs.
The Report of the Space Shuttle Management Independent Review, also
known as the Kraft report, was released in February 1995, and its key
recommendation was to place the shuttle's operations under a single
prime contractor. In addition, the review team recommended that NASA
reduce its involvement in and oversight of the operation of the space
shuttle, transferring responsibility for daily operations to the
contractor; and that various elements of the shuttle program, such as
its processing before flight and its flight operations, be consolidated
and reduced, along with the minimizing of NASA-contractor interaction.
The Kraft report stated (p. 8): ``Many inefficiencies and difficulties
in the current Shuttle Program can be attributed to the diffuse and
fragmented NASA and contractor structure. Numerous contractors exist
supporting various program elements, resulting in ambiguous lines of
communication and diffused responsibility. This type of fragmented
structure and contract management provides little promise for
significant cost reductions.''
In September 1995, NASA held a competitive bidder's conference for
the Space Flight Operations Contract, which was attended by Boeing,
McDonnell Douglas, Rockwell/Lockheed Martin/United Space Alliance, and
a small business (BAMSI International). USA was to be a limited
liability company, with ownership split equally between Rockwell and
Lockheed Martin--which at the time together accounted for approximately
69 percent of the dollar value of all shuttle-related prime contracts.
In November 1995, the NASA administrator submitted a so-called
Determination and Findings to the Congress, which concluded that it was
in the public interest to award a sole-source contract for shuttle
operations to USA. NASA awarded the SFOC effective October 1, 1996, and
a total of 9,400 employees of Rockwell, Lockheed Martin, Unisys, and
Allied Signal became employees of USA. In December 1996, Boeing
acquired Rockwell and hence joined Lockheed Martin as an owner of USA.
Prior to initiation of the SFOC, NASA had taken steps to make the
shuttle program more efficient. Over a period of five years starting in
1990, operational maintenance requirements and specifications decreased
from 11,000 to 8,000, while the number of hours of labor devoted to
processing each vehicle for a mission was cut from about 1 million to
750,000. Operating costs were reduced by about 25 percent. The majority
of the reductions in NASA's overall shuttle workforce and budgets since
1992 occurred before the SFOC was initiated (see Figure 1 and Table 2).
SFOC costs have varied over time because of changes in its content
(for example, the incorporation of additional activities under Phase
II) and variations in annual launch rates. The reductions in the space
shuttle's budget and workforce that occurred from 1990 to 1995 are due
in part to changes that NASA made in its requirements for inspecting
the shuttle during processing. Before 1989, preparing the shuttle for a
launch required contractor and government personnel to execute about
44,000 government mandatory inspection points (GMIPs) and 325,000
designated inspection points (DIPs). GMIPs are required by NASA in
order for it to accept the work performed by its contractors on the
shuttle. DIPs are inspections performed on work that if not
accomplished correctly could result in the loss of life, a vehicle, or
a mission or in a major schedule delay. Between 1993 and 1995, NASA
introduced a ``structured surveillance'' program in which technicians
were allowed to ensure the quality of their own work, primarily for
non-single-point failure systems. That approach reduced GMIPs to around
22,000 and DIPs to around 140,000 per launch. During the 1997-1998
period, NASA made a concerted effort to further reduce nonessential
inspections, which resulted in a drop in GMIPs to around 8,500.\2\ The
DIP count, however, remained at 140,000.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ After wiring problems were found on Columbia in 1999, a few
more GMIPs were added.
\3\ As an example, before 1997, both NASA and contractor personnel
performed postflight inspections of the thermal protection system,
although NASA determined which tiles to repair and replace and
performed the final preflight inspection. After the reduction in
inspections, USA conducted the postflight inspection and determined
which tiles to repair and replace. NASA then performed the final
preflight inspection. In this case, the contractor performed the same
number of inspections, but NASA was able to eliminate one set of
inspections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 1. Annual Budgets for the Space Shuttle
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Notes: SFOC = Space Flight Operations Contract. About 10 percent of
total SFOC costs are for work related to the International Space
Station.
This figure does not include salaries for NASA's civil servants or
overhead.
The Space Flight Operations Contract
The SFOC (formally known as NAS 9-20000) between NASA and the
United Space Alliance, is a cost-plus-fee contract. According to NASA,
the SFOC is a``completion form'' contract under which the contractor is
responsible for performing a specific set of tasks defined in a
statement of work that is part of the contract.
The value of the original contract was $6.94 billion and the period
of performance was from October 1, 1996, through September 30, 2002,
with two two-year options. The first of the two options has been
exercised, for a cost of $2.9 billion, and will expire in September
2004. The second option would extend the contract through September
2006. NASA also has two other shorter-term options under consideration
that would extend the contract through December 2004 or March 2005. The
total value of the contract to date, including shuttle upgrades and
other annual authorizations, is $12.8 billion.
Table 2. The Space Shuttle's Workforce, 1992 to 2002
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1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
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NASA Employees 4,000 3,800 3,300 3,066 2,650 2,196 1,954 1,777 1,786 1,759 1,724
Associated with
the shuttle
program
Associated with n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,604 1,252 1,260 1,251 1,219 1,191
the SFOC a
SFOC Contractor n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 12,207 11,989 11,820 12,859 13,478 12,958
Personnel a
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Notes: Not all personnel who work on the shuttle program do so full-time. The numbers of government personnel in
the table denote full-time equivalents assigned to the program.
SFOC = Space Flight Operations Contract; n.a. = not available.
a The SFOC was initiated in 1997. CBO was unable to obtain comprehensive data on the numbers of NASA civil
servants and of contractor personnel associated with overseeing and executing the individual contracts that
NASA used to operate the space shuttle before the SFOC's initiation.
United Space Alliance
Under the SFOC, USA has overall responsibility for processing
selected shuttle hardware, which includes:
Performing inspections and modifications of the orbiter,
Recovering the expended solid rocket boosters,
Assembling the sections that compose the SRBs,\4\
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\4\ USA does not manufacture the SRB propellant sections (or the
external tank or SSMEs). Rather, the contractor receives the SRB
sections at the Kennedy Space Center, assembles them to form two
boosters, and attaches the boosters to the shuttle's external tank.
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Attaching the external tank to the orbiter, and
Installing the space shuttle main engines within the
orbiter.
In addition to processing shuttle hardware, USA is responsible for
mission design and planning, astronaut and flight controller training,
design and integration of flight software, payload integration, flight
operations, launch and recovery operations, vehicle-sustaining
engineering, flight crew equipment processing, and operation and
maintenance of shuttle-specific facilities such as the Vertical
Assembly Building, the Orbiter Processing Facility, and the launch
pads. USA also provides spare parts for the orbiters, maintains shuttle
flight simulators, and provides tools and supplies, including food, for
shuttle missions. About 10 percent of the value of the SFOC pays for
shuttle-related activities that support the International Space
Station, including training, mission planning, mission operations, and
flight equipment and supplies.
SFOC Implementation
In 1995, prior to the SFOC's initiation, NASA had 85 separately
managed contracts with 56 contractors. Those contracts were either
fully or partially funded by the shuttle program and were used to
operate and maintain the shuttle fleet. In 1996, spending on those
separate contracts totaled about $3.14 billion. Phase I of the SFOC,
begun in 1997, consolidated 12 of the contracts (plus two smaller
subcontracts), which had a total cost of about $1.36 billion in 1996.
In July 1998, Phase II of the SFOC was initiated to incorporate the
activities associated with 15 additional contracts and subcontracts.
Those activities included processing of the SRB and maintenance of
flight software and equipment used by the flight crew. As a result of
Phase II, 1,375 employees of United Space Boosters Inc., Lockheed
Martin, and Boeing became employees of USA.
Originally, Phase II was planned to incorporate contracts for
maintaining and upgrading the shuttle's main engines, the external
tank, and the propellant sections of the SRBs. However, responsibility
for those activities has not been added to the SFOC. According to NASA,
part of the rationale for excluding those activities was the agency's
philosophy that it should continue to separately manage contracts that
involved significant development activities. To support the separate-
management approach, some NASA officials also cite the results of a
study of military space-launch programs, called the Broad Area Review
(BAR), which was conducted by the Air Force in 1999. The Air Force
commissioned the BAR after a number of launch vehicle failures and near
failures. The review's key finding was that the Air Force had been
exercising insufficient management and engineering oversight of its
contracts for space launch vehicles.
SFOC Fees
The overall fee that USA has earned to date amounts to about 9
percent of the contract's cost measured on an annual basis. The
contract establishes several categories of fees that USA can earn,
which are based on a variety of criteria, both objective and
subjective. The criteria include meeting specific schedules for
performing key activities associated with preparing the shuttle for
launch; executing a safe, successful mission; and reducing the costs of
operating the shuttle.
NASA states that the fee system is structured to meet the program's
goals, which are, in order of priority, (1) flying safely; (2) meeting
the launch manifest--that is, launching the shuttle and its payloads on
schedule; (3) ensuring that the shuttle can be operated and supported
throughout its expected design life; and (4) improving the overall
shuttle system. Under the contract, USA can earn no fee for cost
reduction unless it exceeds expectations for safety. And if NASA
determines that USA is responsible, through its acts or omissions, for
the loss of an orbiter or for loss of life during the period from the
beginning of final launch preparations through the return of the
orbiter, USA will lose all fees for the six-month performance period in
which the loss occurs.
NASA's Oversight of the SFOC
Under the SFOC, NASA has the following responsibilities and roles:
Maintaining ownership of the shuttles and all other assets
of the shuttle program;
Managing the overall process for ensuring the shuttle's
safety;
Developing requirements for major upgrades to all assets;
Participating in planning shuttle missions and in directing
launches and executing flights;
Performing surveillance and audits and obtaining technical
insight into contractor activities;
Deciding whether to ``commit to flight'' for each mission;
and
Managing government-to-government relations, including
international interactions.
NASA divides management and oversight of the shuttle program among
three major centers:
The Johnson Space Center (JSC) houses the Shuttle Program
Office and is the primary site for the astronauts' activities,
including the selection of flight crews, training and support
(under the SFOC), and extravehicular activity. In addition, JSC
has primary responsibility for such SFOC-related activities as
shuttle flight operations, software, and equipment processing;
shuttle integration; and the orbiter.
The Kennedy Space Center has primary responsibility for
processing, launch, and landing operations, all of which are
conducted under the SFOC.
The Marshall Space Flight Center is primarily responsible
for all of the shuttle's propulsion elements, including the
external tank, the shuttle's main engines, and the SRBs. The
boosters actually have two components: the propellant portions
(the reusable solid rocket motor) and the nonpropellant
portions, which are also referred to as the SRB. Of those
elements, only the nonpropellant portion is currently under the
SFOC.
Within NASA and located at the three centers described above are
technical management representatives (TMRs), also referred to as
subsystem managers, who are responsible for executing the tasks
associated with NASA's roles and responsibilities. Within USA, there
are associate program managers, each of whom has a counterpart TMR
within NASA.
As a result of the SFOC, some of NASA's tasks and positions
associated with shuttle oversight and management were moved to USA.
They include 425 tasks and 25 positions associated with flight
operations; 305 tasks (no positions) associated with ground operations;
and 38 tasks (no positions) associated with integrated logistics.
Before the SFOC, NASA's subsystem managers were the primary focal
point for all technical issues relating to a shuttle subsystem. Those
managers were aware of and took part in day-to-day decisionmaking
regarding any technical problems that arose with the shuttle subsystems
for which they were responsible. Under the SFOC, the NASA TMRs
participate less in daily decisionmaking. They are responsible
primarily for overseeing changes in the design of shuttle subsystems
and processing, and for resolving anomalies that occur during shuttle
flights.
Other Technologically Complex Government Activities
The remainder of this paper examines examples of other activities
that the government undertakes by using contractors. The activities
span a broad range of effort, and they vary in their annual costs, the
types of contracts used, the incentives the contracts contain, how work
to be done under the contracts is defined, and how the government
oversees the contractors' work. Thus, many of these activities have
features that differ from those characterizing NASA's use of
contractors to operate the space shuttle. However, all of the
subsequent examples involve the government's use of contractors to
perform technologically complex tasks.
The Coast Guard's Deepwater Project
The Coast Guard is undertaking a project, which it calls Deepwater,
to redesign the way it performs its missions in deepwater regions--that
is, regions that are 50 or more nautical miles from the U.S. coastline.
That effort involves determining the numbers and types of ships, fixed-
wing aircraft, helicopters, and surveillance sensors that the service
will need for such missions for the next 30 years.
The first phase of the Deepwater project was a competition
conducted in 1997 in which three contractor teams were each awarded a
$21 million contract to design a Deepwater ``system'' for the Coast
Guard. After judging the results, the Coast Guard selected Integrated
Coast Guard Systems--a joint-venture limited liability company formed
by Northrup Grumman and Lockheed Martin--to build the Deepwater system.
That single contractor is to provide the Coast Guard with all of the
elements that compose the Deepwater system--ships, aircraft,
helicopters, and sensors--over a 30-year period. The contractor will
also provide whatever other systems are needed to ensure that the
system is integrated--that is, that all Deepwater elements can
communicate with each other and exchange needed information.
According to the Coast Guard, no other government agency has ever
attempted to replace its entire set of core mission systems by using a
single contractor instead of a piecemeal approach. Moreover, in
contrast to past projects in which detailed specifications were
provided to a contractor that then supplied equipment that matched
them, the Coast Guard conducted the Deepwater design competition by
employing a set of less detailed measures of performance.
After Integrated Coast Guard Systems delivers the ships, aircraft,
and other assets that compose the Deepwater system and following a
period of transition, the Coast Guard will use its personnel to operate
the equipment and perform minor maintenance. Currently, the service
employs contractors to perform major maintenance on selected equipment,
and it plans to continue that practice. In general, the Coast Guard has
not yet determined the role that Integrated Coast Guard Systems will
play in maintaining the Deepwater elements. However, it has decided not
to purchase the high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicle that is part of
the Deepwater system and that will be used to perform surveillance
missions but rather to lease it from, and have it maintained by, the
contractor.
The Coast Guard has divided the remainder of the Deepwater project
into six five-year contracts characterized as indefinite-delivery,
indefinite-quantity contracts.\5\ Their total potential value is $14
billion to $15 billion. The first five-year contract period has a
potential value of $3 billion to $5 billion.
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\5\ The contracts do not specify the exact numbers and types of
items that the contractor must provide to the Coast Guard during each
five-year period. Those details will be decided yearly and will depend
on a number of factors, including available budgetary resources.
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Under the terms of those contracts, the Coast Guard will develop a
set of task and delivery orders each year that describe the work that
Integrated Coast Guard Systems should accomplish and the equipment that
it should deliver. Those task and delivery orders can be structured as
either cost-plus-fee or firm-fixed-price arrangements. The contractor
may also receive an additional annual award fee if the work performed
on all task and delivery orders is deemed satisfactory by the Coast
Guard.
At the end of the five-year period of each contract, the Coast
Guard will evaluate the contractor's performance. The most important
determinants of the service's overall satisfaction with the
contractor's efforts will be whether operational effectiveness has been
increased and total ownership costs have been reduced. Although the
Coast Guard has a once-a-year opportunity to ``walk away'' from the
contract, the contractor is bound to fulfill its contract
responsibilities for the full five-year term so long as the Coast Guard
wants it to continue doing the work. If, at the end of the five years,
either side no longer wants to work with the other, either party can
terminate the relationship.
The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
According to the Air Force, the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
(EELV) program is a new approach to obtaining the capability to launch
satellites into orbit. With the EELV contract, the Air Force states
that it is purchasing, for a firm fixed price, not actual launch
vehicles but commercial launch services supplied by a contractor that
is responsible for ensuring that the services are provided
successfully. In a further departure from traditional practices, the
Air Force will not pay all of the contractors' costs to design and test
the new EELVs. Instead, the service has required the contractor to
share in those development costs because of the potential commercial
market for the launch vehicles developed under the EELV program.
(However, the originally anticipated market has not as yet
materialized.)
To initiate the EELV program, the Air Force executed two ``other
transaction'' authority agreements with Boeing and Lockheed Martin in
October 1998.\6\ Underthose agreements, the government provided $500
million to each contractor to develop a family of EELVs. According to
the Air Force, each contractor has also spent from $1.5 billion to $2
billion of its own funds on EELV development.
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\6\ ``Other transaction'' agreements are financial assistance or
acquisition arrangements other than procurement contracts, grants, or
cooperative agreements. The ``other transaction'' authority contained
in title 10, section 2371, of the U.S. Code permits the military to
enter into such arrangements to carry out basic, applied, and advance
research projects without regard to statutes or regulations that
constrain the use of contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements.
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Currently, the EELV program comprises two families of launch
vehicles, the Delta IV and the Atlas V; there are multiple versions of
each vehicle to meet the demand for medium-, intermediate-, and heavy-
weight payloads. The first Lockheed Martin vehicle, the Atlas V, flew
on August 21, 2002, and the first Boeing vehicle, the Delta IV, flew on
November 20, 2002. Both flights were successful but carried commercial
payloads. The first Air Force payload was successfully launched by a
Delta IV on March 10, 2003.
Rather than eventually selecting a single contractor, the Air Force
expects to engage continually in competitions between Boeing and
Lockheed Martin to procure launch services using EELVs. The Air Force
states that this continual competition is needed to ensure that the
United States always has the means available to launch spacecraft.
In 1998, the Air Force awarded initial launch services contracts
for 26 EELV launches: 19 Boeing Delta IV launches, for a total of $1.5
billion, and seven Lockheed Martin Atlas V launches, for a total of
$506 million. The Air Force anticipates awarding a second set of
contracts in the summer of 2003 for up to four launches and a third set
of contracts in the fall of 2003 for up to 18 launches. Recently, as a
penalty for Boeing's unlawful possession of a competitor's proprietary
information, the Air Force reduced the initial Boeing contract to 12
launches and increased the initial Lockheed Martin contract to 14
launches. In addition, the Air Force also disqualified Boeing from
competing for three additional launches and awarded them to Lockheed
Martin.
The Air Force's EELV program office is located in Los Angeles, with
additional personnel located at both the eastern (Cape Canaveral) and
western (Vandenberg Air Force Base) launch ranges. The program office
currently employs 76 Air Force personnel to manage the EELV program.
Lockheed Martin and Boeing together have approximately 3,600 employees
to manufacture and launch their respective versions of the EELV.
Four key performance parameters have been established for the EELV
program: mass-to-orbit specifications, reliability, standard payload
interface, and a standard launch interface.\7\ Under the launch
services contracts, a launch service is deemed complete and accepted
with the intentional ignition of the first-stage engine and the first
intentional detonation of the first-stage tie-down of the launch
vehicle. In other words, the contractors are responsible for ensuring
that an EELV successfully ignites and begins to lift off the launch
pad--but not for ensuring that the Air Force spacecraft it carries
successfully reaches orbit.
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\7\ There are seven mass-to-orbit standards that specify given
masses to given orbits--for example, the launch vehicle must get 17,000
pounds of payload into a low Earth orbit with a certain inclination.
The vehicle's design reliability must be at least 98 percent. The Air
Force has specified a standard interface for accommodating payloads
that each vehicle must be capable of providing. The launch interface
requirement states that medium, intermediate, and heavy versions of a
launch vehicle must be able to be launched from the same pad.
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There are no incentive or award fees in any EELV program contract.
According to the Air Force, the contractors are expected to launch
successfully in order to increase their competitiveness in the
marketplace. Consequently, the government does not have penalty clauses
associated with the EELV contract in the event of the loss of a
vehicle. (Rather, the penalty to the contractor would be the potential
loss of future business from government sources and commercial firms as
a result of the failure.) Both contractors, in what is known as the
``best-customer clause,'' guarantee that they will not sell a
commercial launch service using an EELV for less than the cost that the
government has negotiated for a similar launch service.
The Air Force states that it has relied heavily on ``insight''
rather than ``oversight'' in conducting the EELV program. For example,
the service notes that it has not required the contractors to provide
the government with special or unique documentation or data. Instead,
the government has relied on the same documentation that the
contractors use to manage their respective programs.
The Future Combat System
Traditionally, in developing battlefield weapon systems, the Army
has established separate programs for each system--such as the Abrams
tank or Comanche helicopter--relying on a prime contractor to develop
each one. But in the case of the Future Combat System (FCS), the Army's
next generation of weapons, the service is using a nontraditional
approach that assigns substantial authority to a single contractor.
That contractor, referred to as the lead system integrator (LSI), will
develop and integrate 18 different systems--new families of manned and
unmanned ground vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles--to replace the
service's current fleet of tanks, armored vehicles, self-propelled
howitzers, and various other systems.\8\ The Army has contracted with
Boeing--which has teamed with Science Applications International
Corporation--to act as the LSI and to coordinate the development,
testing, and production of all 18 systems, their associated sensors,
and the communications networks to connect them all.
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\8\ The total cost for equipping all of the Army's maneuver
brigades with FCS could be as high as $300 billion.
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According to the Army, the LSI will ``develop, manage, and execute
all aspects'' of the program, acting as the government's industry
partner.\9\ In that role, the LSI will undertake many of the activities
that the Army would have performed under a more traditional approach.
Those activities include issuing requests for proposals (RFPs);
developing performance requirements for FCS as a whole as well as for
individual systems and subsystems; evaluating responses to the RFPs;
and, with the Army's concurrence, awarding the contracts to develop the
individual systems. The LSI will also design tests, analyze system
performance trade-offs, and manage production. The Army has used
``other transaction'' authority agreements in executing contracts for
FCS and states that it believes that ``FCS is larger and more complex
than traditional developments, and thus requires an alternative
procurement approach.'' As a consequence, the Army chose to rely on an
LSI ``after studying lessons learned by the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration's (NASA) space station and the Missile Defense
Agency's (MDA) Ballistic Missile Defense Systems approaches to
designing and developing extremely large and complex systems of systems
projects.'' \10\
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\9\ Department of the Army, ``The Lead System Integrator (LSI)
Agreement for the Future Combat System (FCS) Program,'' Army
Information Paper (June 18, 2003), provided to the Congressional Budget
Office.
\10\ Ibid.
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During the concept and technology development stage from March 2002
through June 2003, Boeing was responsible for developing, delivering,
updating, and maintaining an overarching architecture for all of the
systems included in FCS; supporting the Army's Training and Doctrine
Command in refining operational concepts and requirements; identifying
and evaluating potential concepts and technologies; conducting
demonstrations; and developing performance specifications and the
documentation to support a successful transition to the system
development and demonstration (SDD) phase of the project. As part of
that effort, Boeing issued 23 RFPs for development tasks to be
performed during SDD and evaluated the responses in preparation for
awarding the contracts in the fall of 2003. For work performed during
the concept and technology development stage, the government agreed to
pay Boeing a total of $154 million.
The government recently exercised its option under the concept and
technology development contract to extend its agreement with Boeing to
include the system development and demonstration phase. Activities to
be performed by the LSI during that phase include managing the design,
manufacture, and testing of prototypes; evaluating whether the systems
are ready for production; identifying and performing the tests and
producing the documentation needed to enter the next phase of the
acquisition process; providing detailed cost estimates and cost
reports; and supporting Army personnel who will use the equipment once
it is fielded. Boeing, in conjunction with government representatives,
is also responsible for awarding contracts for the 23 systems and
subsystems that were defined in the concept and technology development
phase. The SDD phase of the FCS program is estimated to extend through
December 2011, with the total value of the contract currently set at
$14.9 billion and annual funding levels ranging from $1.3 billion to
$4.3 billion.
Although the Army signed a contract with the LSI on May 30, 2003,
to perform the work described above, the final details have yet to be
settled. In fact, one of the tasks to be completed during the first
seven months of the contract is to establish the fee structure and
criteria that will apply to the remainder of the contract (that is,
from early 2004 until December 2011) and to reconcile Boeing's
projected expenditures with the government's projected funding and the
program's scope of work.\11\ Other tasks that Boeing must perform
include updating the technical specifications; demonstrating command-
and-control software; evaluating or negotiating all 23 subcontracts for
which RFPs were let and fully defining at least 85 percent of them; and
reaching agreement on the staffing of integrated product teams (IPTs),
which include both contractor and government personnel.
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\11\ Department of the Army, Agreement Between the Boeing Company
and U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command Concerning Future
Combat System (FCS) System Development and Demonstration (SDD) Phase,
DAAE07-03-09-F001 (May 30, 2003).
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A total of $130 million has been allocated to this effort for 2003,
with an additional $60 million planned for 2004. Of that total $190
million, a base fee of $10 million has been set aside for Boeing with
an additional $15 million available in incentive fees. The incentive is
structured to motivate Boeing to complete the tasks described above--
and in particular to establish the final details of the contract--
before the end of December 2003.\12\
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\12\ Starting on December 30, 2003, and every 30 days thereafter,
the $5 million incentive fee for working out the final details of the
contract will be reduced by $800,000. If the contract is not fully
defined by the end of May 2004, Boeing will not receive any of the $5
million incentive fee.
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Although the government will retain ultimate control of the FCS
effort, the program's management structure--in which the LSI and the
Army form integrated product teams--gives the contractor extraordinary
responsibility and authority. The agreement signed in May 2003
envisions IPTs at several levels. The highest would be the program
management team cochaired by the LSI program manager and the Army's FCS
program manager. Below that would be 14 second-tier IPTs, each of which
would also be cochaired by representatives of both the LSI and the
government.
Decisions by IPTs are expected to be reached by consensus between
the cochairs, but the contract also includes a mechanism for settling
disputes. In cases in which consensus cannot be reached, the decision
of the LSI cochair will prevail. Government cochairs can initiate a
request for review of decisions with which they do not concur but must
do so in writing to the next-higher-level IPT and propose an
alternative approach to the disputed decision as well. The same
hierarchical rules apply to the higher-level IPTs--that is, the LSI
cochair has the final say. The highest decisionmaking authority for an
issue raised through this process is the LSI program manager. However,
any appeal that the LSI program manager does not support must be
reported to the Army's FCS program manager. Ultimately, it is the
Army's FCS program manager who has not only the final word but also the
authority to override the LSI program manager's decision and direct
that changes be made to the program.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Since 1952, the Department of Energy (DOE) and its predecessors
have contracted with the University of California for management and
operations (M&O) of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL).
Under the contract, the university is responsible for managing,
operating, and staffing the lab; accomplishing the missions assigned to
it; and administering the M&O contract with DOE.
LLNL was established in 1952 as a facility dedicated to research on
and development of nuclear weapons designs. The lab encompasses two
sites covering a total of almost 8,000 acres; it has 600 buildings and
employs about 5,400 personnel. Its current missions include ensuring
that the Nation's nuclear weapons remain safe, secure, and reliable;
acting as a steward of U.S. nuclear weapons through activities ranging
from dismantling weapons to remanufacturing the enduring stockpile;
ensuring the availability and safe disposition of plutonium, highly
enriched uranium, and tritium; assisting in remediation and reduction
of wastes from the nuclear weapons complex; and helping to deter,
detect, and respond to the proliferation of unconventional weapons.
DOE's total obligation to the university in 2002 for managing and
operating LLNL was $1.6 billion.
The ultimate responsibility for executing the contract lies with
the regents of the University of California, who have delegated
management and oversight authority to the university system's
president. The president, in turn, appoints the director of the lab
(subject to the regents' and DOE's approval). The university oversees
the three national labs that it manages for DOE (the other two are Los
Alamos National Lab and Lawrence Berkeley National Lab) through the
office of the vice president for laboratory management as well as
through a regents' committee, a president's council, and two additional
senior-level councils and committees.
DOE oversees operations at LLNL through its Oakland Field Office,
which maintains about 140 personnel at the LLNL site. The assistant
manager for National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) operations
in the Oakland Field Office heads the LLNL site office and reports to
the manager of the Oakland office. DOE's representatives at the LLNL
site office are responsible for ensuring that nuclear activities at
LLNL are carried out safely and in accordance with current laws and
regulations. In particular, the NNSA staff at the site office oversee
nuclear research, nuclear safety, and related matters, and the
environmental management staff at the field office oversee
environmental restoration and waste management activities, including
the construction of a new waste treatment facility. Thus, the lab must
gain approval from its DOE overseers before proceeding with new
construction or operations.
The existing contract between DOE and the University of California
was signed in January 2001 and extends through September 2005. Because
LLNL is a federally funded research and development center, the
contract for its management and operation is exempt from competition
and is merely an extension of the original 1952 contract between DOE
and the university. However, the current version of the contract
incorporates revisions that reflect DOE's updated acquisition
requirements. The contract also includes performance objectives and
measures that DOE began to include in its contracts in the mid-1990s in
response to widespread calls for reform.
The LLNL contract, as revised for 2003, includes nine performance
objectives, each of which is supported by as many as eight performance
measures.\13\ Performance objectives are negotiated annually, before
the start of the fiscal year, with performance tracking and reporting
carried out by the contractor throughout the year. Evaluations and
assessments of the university's progress based on the performance
objectives and measures are conducted annually by the university and by
DOE, and part of the compensation that the university receives for
managing LLNL is an adjustable fee based on those evaluations. In 2003,
for example, an adjustable fee based on performance could account for
$4.3 million of the $7.1 million that the university may receive in
compensation unrelated to the direct costs of managing and operating
LLNL. (The remaining $2.8 million is fixed and covers the university's
indirect costs.)
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\13\ Those standards are spelled out in Modification No. M456,
Supplemental Agreement to DOE Contract No. W-7405-ENG (revised March 4,
2003)--specifically, in Appendix F, Standards of Performance. One
example is the performance objective to use the university's strengths
to recruit, retain, and develop the workforce. The university's
progress in meeting that objective is to be judged on the basis of two
performance measures: first, providing the skills necessary to enhance
the science base by implementing recruiting and retention strategies;
and second, implementing leadership and management development programs
aligned with workforce planning and diversity objectives. Another
example of a performance objective is the one for maintaining a secure,
safe, environmentally sound, effective and efficient basis for
operations and infrastructure. That objective is supported by eight
performance measures, of which developing a long-term plan with DOE to
reduce inventories of surplus and excess special nuclear material and
onsite waste is an example.
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Logistics Support for the B-2 Bomber
Contractors are significantly involved in certain support
activities for B-2 bombers, specifically aircraft maintenance, aircraft
modifications, and training. In comparison, Air Force units perform
mission planning and payload preparation. Contractors provide some
assistance in those latter two activities (for example, by helping keep
automated mission planning tools up to date and functioning), but the
Air Force considers the planning of strikes and the loading of
munitions on the bombers to be inherently military tasks that should be
performed by Air Force support squadrons and by the Air Force personnel
who compose the bomber squadrons.
B-2 maintenance is performed both by contractors and by Air Force
personnel. In general, the Air Force handles maintenance when the
aircraft are with the 509th Bomb Wing; it uses a contractor to perform
the bombers' periodic and much more extensive programmed depot
maintenance (PDM). There is, however, some contractor support on the
flight line. For example, a few contractors work at Whiteman Air Force
Base, where the B-2s are based, to help with issues that might arise
with the special low-observable surfaces on the aircraft or with its
engines.
Much of the PDM work that is done under contract involves replacing
the bombers' exterior low-observable coatings, a very specialized task
on the B-2. A study of PDM alternatives conducted by the Air Force in
the mid-1990s determined that the facilities and skills needed for that
special coating maintenance as well as for maintenance activities
associated with other unique aspects of the B-2 could best be provided
by Northrop Grumman, the B-2's original manufacturer. As a result, the
overhauls are conducted at Northrop Grumman's Plant 42 facility in
Palmdale, California.
Much of the contract work for the B-2 is consolidated under an
umbrella flexible acquisition sustainment team (FAST) contract with
Northrop Grumman. The FAST contract does not itself define the work to
be performed. Rather, it serves as a vehicle by which individual work
orders tailored to the specific maintenance needs of individual
aircraft can be executed.
Since the B-2 program is relatively young and the PDM cycle is
seven years, the PDM arrangement has been in place only since 2000. A
so-called delivery order for PDM is executed annually under the FAST
contract, whose yearly value is about $60 million and typically
includes work on two aircraft. According to the Air Force, the initial
annual contracts were set up as cost-plus-award-fee arrangements
because the specific nature and extent of the maintenance that would be
required was not well understood. With the experience gained under the
work conducted over the period from 2000 to 2002, the Air Force has
begun to execute PDM contracts as firm-fixed-price agreements.
The PDM contracts also have incentive aspects (notwithstanding the
firm-fixed-price feature), which include a program for reduction in
total ownership costs (RTOC). The goal of the program is to reduce the
Air Force's overall costs for maintaining the B-2 without impairing
essential system functions or performance characteristics. Savings from
RTOC initiatives are shared with the contractor.
As with maintenance, B-2 training is split between Air Force and
contractor personnel--who are provided by the Link Simulation and
Training Division of L3 Communications, Inc. (formerly Raytheon and
before that, Hughes). Contractor personnel are involved in operating,
maintaining, and modifying the B-2 training systems. Link operates and
maintains the aircrew and maintenance training devices and also
develops and modifies maintenance training courses. Course development
and academic instruction for the B-2's aircrews are provided by
Northrop-Grumman under a subcontract to Link, with Air Force
instructors supplementing that instruction. In addition, Link operates
and maintains the Weapons Loading Trainer.
Those contractor-performed training activities are covered under
the Training System Contractor Logistics Support Contract, for which
Link is the prime contractor. The period of performance on the $325
million contract is eight years.
National Missile Defense--National Team
In order to define the elements of its ``layered'' missile defense
concept and the manner in which those elements will interact, the
Missile Defense Agency within the Department of Defense turned to a
largely contractor-staffed organizational structure called the National
Team. In addition to contractors, the National Team consists of
employees from the Department of Defense and federally funded research
and development centers (such as the Aerospace Corporation); it is
divided functionally into two major components: one for systems
engineering and integration (SE&I) and the other for integrating battle
management, command, control, and communications (BMC2&C). Those two
teams, as they are known, interact with MDA personnel in designing and
developing an overall missile defense system.
According to MDA, a key feature of the National Team is that the
two teams are behind a ``firewall,'' which separates them from other
contractor personnel who are developing missile defense hardware. That
arrangement was necessary because the prime contractors leading the
national teams are also engaged in weapon system development and
production. National Team contractors must thus sign conflict-of-
interest and associate contractor agreements to ensure that
information--including proprietary data that team members employed by
individual contractors would otherwise not be free to share--flows
between the SE&I and BMC2&C teams.
The SE&I team is led by Boeing, with participation from Lockheed
Martin, and the BMC2&C team is led by Lockheed Martin, with
participation from Boeing. General Dynamics, Northrup Grumman/TRW, and
Raytheon are also represented on both teams. The role of the SE&I team
is to define a ``toolbox''--consisting of weapons, sensors, and
communications components--and integrate those systems to forge a
single, layered ballistic missile defense system (BMDS). The SE&I
team's responsibilities also include characterizing the threat
environment. The role of the BMC2&C team is to develop the components
for planning, control, monitoring, and execution of the BMDS.
MDA used ``other transaction'' authority agreements with Boeing and
Lockheed Martin to form the National Team. The period of performance
for both the SE&I's and the BMC2&C's agreements is divided into two
parts. Part I lasts for four months; its tasks include definition of
the BMDS processes and an initial assessment of the system's elements.
Part II, which lasts for 10 years, covers the design, modeling and
simulation, and virtual prototyping of the BMDS. Part II is structured
as a two-year base contract, followed by four two-year options.
Together, both Part I contracts (SE&I and BMC2&C) total about $28
million. MDA estimates that funding for Part II of the SE&I contract
and Part II of the BMC2&C effort will total $953 million and about $1.7
billion, respectively.
The National Team contracts are structured as cost-plus-award-fee
arrangements, with the fee amount based on a mix of subjective and
objective criteria. The total award fee available through December 2003
for the SE&I contract is $34.5 million; $30.8 million is available for
the BMC2&C contract.
Refueling/Overhauls for Aircraft Carriers
The Navy's nuclear-powered aircraft carriers must be refueled and
overhauled periodically throughout their 40- to 50-year lifetimes. Only
one shipyard in the United States--Newport News, owned by Northrup
Grumman--is capable of undertaking the required work. The Navy provides
Newport News with nuclear fuel and detailed specifications for
refueling the carrier's reactor and overhauling the other ship's
systems. The work performed by Newport News includes removing the
expended nuclear fuel, installing new fuel, and delivering the expended
fuel to the Navy for storage and disposal. Newport News also assists in
conducting sea trials of the refueled and overhauled carrier prior to
its return to operations.
The Navy uses sole-source contracts to perform the refueling
overhauls and structures them as cost-plus-award-fee arrangements.
Newport News and the Navy negotiate a target cost for the work and a
target fee. In the most recently awarded contract, which was for
refueling and overhauling the USS Carl Vinson, the fee component of a
total $1.52 billion contract was $144 million, or about 10 percent.
Under the terms of the contracts, Newport News can earn an additional
fee amount (up to a preset maximum) for underrunning the cost target
but will lose part of the fee (down to a preset minimum) if costs
exceed the target.
Every carrier undergoing maintenance has a detailed list of
specifications developed by the Navy as to how the work is to be done.
Any work that cannot meet the specifications must receive a waiver from
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), which oversees work performed by
Newport News.
Newport News is responsible for developing and following a quality
control process and for performing quality assurance. NAVSEA personnel
monitor and audit the shipyard work and perform random sampling to
ensure that Newport News is following its quality control and assurance
processes. That oversight is carried out by the Navy's supervisor of
shipbuilding, conversion, and repair (SUPSHIP) located at Newport News.
The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (commonly known as Naval Reactors)
also has an office at the shipyard to monitor the process of refueling
the carrier. All work done by the contractor must pass a final
inspection by NAVSEA to ensure that the work has been done to all
specifications before being accepted.
Once the ship is delivered and accepted, it goes through a series
of sea trials, which the Navy performs over a three-to four-month
shakedown period. Every system on the ship is tested, and the carrier
is pushed to its limits to ensure that it can perform properly upon its
return to operations. The ship must receive a series of certifications
from the Navy to show that it passed all the tests. After that, there
is an eight-month postshipyard availability during which the contractor
must fix all items discovered during the trials that did not meet the
specifications or pass the at-sea tests. The Navy covers the cost of
resolving problems identified during the sea trials.
The Savannah River Site
The Department of Energy's Savannah River Site (SRS) was
constructed during the early 1950s to produce and separate plutonium
and tritium for nuclear weapons. In 1989, the Westinghouse Savannah
River Company (WSRC) took over the contract with the Department of
Energy to manage and operate the facility, which had been held since
1950 by the E.I. duPont de Nemours Company.
Since the mid-1990s, the bulk of the activities at Savannah River
have involved managing the storage and treatment of radioactive waste
from production activities, the storage of special nuclear materials
such as components from dismantled weapons and spent nuclear fuel, and
the recycling of tritium from surplus nuclear weapons. The site covers
a total of 198,000 acres (or 310 square miles) and employs about 13,000
personnel. Under the current contract, WSRC is responsible for
providing the personnel, equipment, materials, supplies, and services
necessary to manage and operate the site.
Oversight of the contract is provided by about 400 DOE staff at the
Savannah River Operations Office (SRO), which is located on the
Savannah River site. The manager of the SRO is responsible for contract
management and oversight of the site's environmental restoration and
waste management activities, which represent about 80 percent of all
work that DOE has contracted for there. (An assistant manager of the
SRO is responsible for overseeing stewardship of the Nation's stockpile
of nuclear weapons and materials; those stewardship duties constitute
the remainder of the activities at SRS and fall under the purview of
the National Nuclear Security Administration.) WSRC is responsible for
managing the work of a team of contractors and subcontractors at SRS.
The team includes Bechtel Savannah River and BNFL, Inc., which together
manage engineering, design, and construction activities; and BWXT,
which handles shut-down, decontamination, and decommissioning of excess
facilities. BNFL, Inc., also manages solid waste activities.
The existing contract between DOE and WSRC is an extension of the
contract that was awarded competitively to WSRC in 1997; it was signed
in early 2001 and extends through the end of September 2006. DOE's
total obligation to WSRC from October 1, 2000, through September 30,
2006, is $8.4 billion, yielding average annual allotments of $1.4
billion. Under the contract, WSRC is responsible for five major groups
of activities:
Performing environmental restoration tasks such as
identifying, characterizing, and assessing waste units and
affected groundwater; preparing plans for closing selected
facilities; managing remediation of waste sites; monitoring
inactive waste-and groundwater units; and accelerating early
remediation activities;
Decontaminating and decommissioning excess facilities,
including several produc tion reactors and chemical processing
facilities;
Developing new areas of research and development;
Managing the site's nuclear programs, which include the
processing of tritium, and supporting long-term planning to
maintain the tritium supply and stabilize and store existing
inventories of nuclear material; and processing high-level
waste for eventual long-term storage or disposal; and
Providing site support by protecting human health and safety
and the environment in all activities; managing the design and
construction of new facilities; providing operational support
such as utilities, transportation, and maintenance and repairs;
and supporting long-range and strategic planning for the site.
The contract between WSRC and DOE includes a multiyear fee ``pool''
of $345 million to fund performance-based incentive awards over the
contract's six-year term. Performance incentives and measures are
negotiated before the beginning of each Fiscal Year and are used to
determine annual awards. In March 2001, the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board raised concerns that the incentives could encourage waste
processing at the expense of safety.\14\ However, an internal DOE
review conducted in response to those concerns concluded that the
incentive structure in place did not compromise safety and that it
correctly emphasized waste processing.\15\ Moreover, it concluded that
the onsite DOE representatives responsible for monitoring the contract,
in order to stress DOE's safety concerns, had appropriately reduced the
contractor's award fee to reflect less-than-acceptable performance.
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\14\ Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, High-Level Waste
Management at the Savannah River Site, Recommendation 2001-1 (March 23,
2001), p. 5.
\15\ Department of Energy, Independent Review Team, Independent
Assessment of the Savannah River Site High-Level Waste Performance
Based Initiatives, EM-INTEC-02-008 (December 2001).
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In July 2002, the assistant secretary for environmental management
at DOE initiated an internal review of the incentive structure at SRS
as part of an effort to ensure that incentives in DOE's major site
contracts were properly linked to its overall strategic plan for
environmental management and the strategic plans of the individual
sites.\16\ In the case of SRS, DOE's review team concluded that the
site's contract incentives were not designed to accelerate risk
reduction and closure (two goals of DOE's environmental management
efforts) but rather to motivate cost savings.\17\ In response to that
finding, WSRC and the SRO, at the direction of the assistant secretary,
revised the performance objectives and incentives in the SRS contract
for 2003 to better align them with DOE's environmental management
goals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Memorandum from Jessie Hill Roberson, Assistant Secretary of
Energy for Environmental Management, to various DOE field offices,
``FY2003 Contract and Performance Objectives and Incentives for
Environmental Management,'' July 2, 2002.
\17\ Department of Energy, Savannah River Site Trip Report (July 9,
2002).
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Trident Ballistic Missile Submarine Conversions to Perform Conventional
Missions
The Trident submarine conversion program will convert four existing
Ohio classTrident submarines, which formerly performed strategic
nuclear missions, to a conventional configuration that will provide
special operations and conventional strike capabilities. The program
comprises activities to manufacture the ``kits'' required to convert
the four submarines, conduct engineering refueling overhaul (ERO) of
the four ships' nuclear reactors, and install the conversion kits. The
conversion kits consist of lock-out chambers and associated equipment
for use by special operations personnel, launch tubes (multiple all-up-
round canisters) for conventional Tomahawk missiles, Tomahawk missile
fire-control systems, and information management and communications
equipment.
The initial work on the program (such as concept and initial design
studies) began in 2000, and detailed design efforts commenced in 2002.
Refueling overhauls and conversion kit manufacturing and installation
will take place between 2003 and 2007. The first ship in the line (USS
Ohio) is expected to be operational in its new configuration in 2007.
The four conversions are expected to cost $4 billion over the period
from 2000 through 2009.
The Navy plans to carry out the conversion program by using a
public/private partnership approach. The conversions begin with the
installation of a new reactor core (the ERO) in each submarine. Public
shipyards--the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard on the West Coast and the
Norfolk Naval Shipyard on the East Coast--will each perform two
refueling overhauls as part of the overall program. Those shipyards
will also provide a portion of the technical labor and other services
and support required to install the conversion kits in the four
submarines, work that will be managed by a contractor but performed at
the public shipyards. The Electric Boat (EB) division of General
Dynamics Corporation will design and manufacture the conversion kits
and manage their installation, including providing most of the labor
needed for that task.\18\ EB is designated as the conversion execution
manager--the single entity responsible for the conversion kit's design,
manufacture, installation, and testing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Other contractors (Northrop Grumman Marine Systems and General
Dynamics Advanced Information Systems) are also involved in the design
and manufacture of the systems that go into the conversion kits.
However, EB is responsible for the overall integration of the systems
with those of the ship.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EB's installation of the kits and its testing activities will use
the Navy's labor resources at the public shipyards. The shipyards will,
in effect, operate as a subcontractor to EB under the conversion
installation contract. That is, EB will receive money under the cost-
plus-fee contract for the ``touch labor'' provided by the public
shipyards and will then reimburse them for the cost of the labor that
they have supplied.\19\
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\19\ The authority for the shipyards to undertake this type of
arrangement derives from the Center of Industrial and Technical
Excellence (CITE), which allows a government entity with exceptional
technical capabilities to provide services to a private party if doing
so benefits the government. According to the Navy's cost accounting and
funding rules for its shipyards, EB will be charged the variable costs
of using the labor, while the fleet, as ``owners,'' will foot the bill
for the shipyard's facility and administrative overhead.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EB's work on the design and manufacture of the conversion kits is
being done under a sole-source cost-plus-fixed-fee contract that
includes performance incentives.\20\ The contract has two main parts.
The first, which is worth about $400 million, covers the detailed
design of the conversion kits and ship modifications. The second part,
totaling about $116 million, covers the procurement of materials needed
for the conversion. Each portion of the contract has a total available
fee of 10 percent, including incentives for timeliness and cost
control.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ The noncompetitive procurement stems from two factors: EB was
the original designer and manufacturer of these Ohio class submarines,
and the Navy has determined that the project's time schedule does not
permit a competitive procurement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The other major contracts in the conversion program are for the
multiple all-up-round canister (MAC), designed and manufactured by
Northrop Grumman Marine Systems, and the attack weapon control system
(AWCS), designed and manufactured by General Dynamics Advanced
Information Systems. The contracts for the MAC (totaling $155 million)
and AWCS (totaling $117 million) are both of the cost-plus-incentive-
fee type. For the MAC, the maximum fee is 16 percent; the maximum fee
for the AWCS is 15 percent.
A Trident submarine conversion program office established within
Naval Sea Systems Command is responsible for the overall management and
technical oversight of the conversion program and retains approval
authority for critical design elements.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ In 2002, NASA and NAVSEA initiated the NASA/Navy Benchmarking
Exchange to examine the Navy's submarine safety assurance program and
compare its features with NASA's safety program for the space shuttle.
The goal was to identify a set of lessons learned that could benefit
NASA. The two organizations published an interim report in December
2002 outlining similarities in and differences between the design,
test, operation, and maintenance of submarines and the shuttle. In the
report, NASA identifies potential opportunities for change that it
should consider, including the implementation of the NAVSEA
organizational model for submarine safety compliance verification,
which would establish within NASA an office independent of the shuttle
program to verify compliance with safety procedures and measures; and
the development of a comprehensive set of detailed and specific NASA
safety requirements that its future human-operated space systems must
meet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Navy's supervisor of shipbuilding--EB Groton Office--is the
supervising authority and administrative contracting officer for all EB
work (specifically, the de sign, manufacture, installation, and testing
of the conversion kits). SUPSHIP Groton oversees and certifies the
conversion work on behalf of NAVSEA. The public shipyards perform the
refueling overhauls under NAVSEA's oversight.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain to
Hon. Sean O'Keefe
Question 1. After reviewing the Board's report, do you believe that
the proposed March 2004 date for return to flight is still valid?
Answer. The March-April 2004 launch window was set for planning
purposes only. This target date allowed the program to establish
milestones for the return to flight process, and the Space Shuttle
program will not return to flight until those milestones have been
fully met. The CAIB made 15 Recommendations that must be resolved
before return to flight. Assessing those recommended actions and our
technical progress to date; we have revised our launch-planning window
to September-October of 2004. We will not commit to launch again until
we, in concurrence with the Stafford-Covey Task Group, have assessed
our completion of the Return-to-Flight actions and advised the NASA
Administrator that we are ``fit to fly.''
Question 2. NASA has established a task group headed by veteran
astronauts, retired U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Thomas Stafford
and Space Shuttle commander Richard Covey, to perform an independent
assessment of NASA's actions to implement the Board's recommendations.
How will you ensure that this task group is fully independent, and will
make sure that the Board's recommendation will be implemented?
Answer. The Return to Flight Task Group is chartered under the
Federal Advisory Committee Act. As such, the Task Group operates under
statutory procedures that help insure its independence. For instance,
all documents considered by the Task Group are made available to the
public and all meetings where the Task Group deliberates to make its
consensus decisions in advance must be open for public scrutiny. To
further insure its independence from scheduling or any other
programmatic pressures the Stafford-Covey Task Group reports directly
to the NASA Administrator, not to the Office of Space Flight or Space
Shuttle Program. The 28 members have been chosen for their knowledge in
a wide range of issues, from space flight to management of complex
organizations, and have indicated their willingness to undertake public
service. Of the 28 members of the Stafford-Covey Task Group, only ex-
officio member Mr. James D. Lloyd is a current NASA employee. The
members of the Stafford-Covey Task Group have already demonstrated
their independence of opinion in their interactions with Admiral
Gehman.
Question 3. The Board report has stated that NASA's culture played
a role in the Columbia accident, and viewed the agency's ``cultural
resistance as a fundamental impediment to NASA's effective
organizational performance.'' In the weeks before the report was
released, senior NASA officials were quoted as downplaying the role of
culture in the accident. What specific actions do you intend to take to
shake up NASA's culture and break down its resistance to outside
recommendations?
Answer. NASA accepts the CAIB Recommendations calling for a more
independent Safety and Mission Assurance organization, a reorganized
Space Shuttle Integration Office that is responsible for the flight
performance of all Space Shuttle elements, and an independent Technical
Engineering Authority that will exercise ownership of Space Shuttle
failure mode, effects analysis, and hazard reporting systems. The new
NASA Engineering and Safety Center will be one part of this
reorganization strategy, and will serve as the basis for opening up new
avenues of communication and promoting a culture of safety through
engineering excellence. Additional organizational changes are under
review.
Fourteen of the senior managers on the Space Shuttle program are
new to their positions. They and the NASA Administrator are responsible
for emphasizing that all elements of the Agency understand the role of
free and open communication. Through them, NASA will actively encourage
people to express dissenting views, even if they do not have the
supporting data on hand, and create alternative organizational avenues
for expressing those views.
NASA will continue to seek the participation of independent experts
from outside the Agency, including the Stafford-Covey Task Group,
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, the NASA Advisory Council, the NASA
Office of the Inspector General, and others.
NASA will take aggressive action to identify areas where we can
improve our culture and take action to do so. NASA will take the
following steps as stated in NASA's Implementation Plan for Return to
Flight and beyond.
Create a culture that values effective communication and
empower and encourage employees to take ownership over their
work processes.
Assess the existing safety organization and culture to
correct practices detrimental to safety.
Increase our focus on the human element of change management
and organizational development.
Remove barriers to effective communication and the
expression of dissenting views.
Identify and reinforce elements of the NASA culture that
support safety and mission success.
Ensure that existing procedures are complete, accurate,
fully understood, and followed.
Create a robust system that institutionalizes checks and
balances to ensure the maintenance of our technical and safety
standards.
Work within the Agency to ensure that all facets of cultural
and organizational change are continually communicated within
the NASA team
NASA has proactively focused on cultural change starting in July
2002 when the Administrator formed the One NASA team. The team's
objectives included defining the actions needed to create a more
unified NASA organization and formulating a set of specific
recommendations for organizational and cultural change that can elevate
NASA to a new level of effectiveness and performance. The One NASA team
has identified a set of recommendations and actions to senior
management, which are being implemented. Since the release of the CAIB
report, the Agency is evaluating how the cultural issues raised by the
Board can be addressed by this ongoing activity and other culture
change activities in the near future.
One specific area of concern from the Board's report was the
operation of the Shuttle's Mission Management Team (MMT) at Johnson
Space Center (JSC). NASA has quickly moved out to address that concern
and has made some major changes. In perhaps the most convincing way yet
that NASA ``gets it,'' the new chairman of the MMT outlined some major
changes to improve communications among engineers and managers, to
ensure dissenting views are heard and to correct the cultural
shortcomings blamed in part for the Columbia disaster. New members will
be added to the MMT and outside experts will be brought in to coach the
managers on decision-making skills and regular mission simulations will
be held to test those skills in make-believe emergencies.
The new chairman stated that his basic model of management would be
consensus. Consensus style of management will open lines of
communication to make sure people get their dissenting and minority
opinions on the table. In the near to long term, outside safety and
management experts will be brought in on a regular basis as part of a
continuing education program.
The above is one of many changes and activities that are already
ongoing at NASA to bring about the desired cultural change the Board
recommended.
Question 4. The Board analyzed two possible scenarios that might
have been used for rescuing the Columbia crew: repairing the damage on
orbit or rescuing the crew with the Atlantis. The Board found that the
option using Atlantis ``had a considerably higher chance for bringing
Columbia's crew back alive.'' Had NASA done any training or simulations
prior to the Columbia accident for what to do in case of a major tile
loss or Reinforced-Carbon--Carbon breach on an orbiter? What are NASA's
plans for dealing with a potential similar crisis in the future, and is
NASA currently training astronauts to do an orbiter-to-orbiter transfer
as is discussed in the report?
Answer. NASA had conducted a number of engineering studies as to
the efficacy of on-orbit repair of Space Shuttle tiles between 1979 and
1981. Before the first launch of the Space Shuttle in April 1981,
Shuttle program managers were most concerned with a ``zipper'' effect
during flight, whereby the loss of a single whole tile would initiate
the loss of large areas of tile. Engineering data showed that some
surface damage to tiles in flight, short of the loss of a whole tile,
did not jeopardize the thermal design requirements for the vehicle.
When later analysis and flight tests showed that the Space Shuttle tile
system was not as vulnerable to zippering due to the loss of single
tiles, the in-orbit tile repair research was cancelled. No similar work
was done for on-orbit Reinforced-Carbon-Carbon (RCC) repairs.
Instead of an orbiter-to-orbiter crew rescue procedure in the case
of future, irrecoverable damage to a Space Shuttle on-orbit, NASA is
evaluating the feasibility of providing a lower-risk Contingency
Shuttle Crew Support (CSCS) capability. CSCS is a contingency
capability that will provide another response to known, but remote,
risks and circumstances. In the event of an on-orbit emergency
precluding reentry and landing, the Shuttle orbiter would transfer its
crew to the ISS. The crew would remain on the ISS until they could be
returned to Earth.
Question 5. Last week, the Washington Post reported that the
President plans no immediate upgrade of NASA's budget or mission. The
article went on to state that the Administration intends to issue by
early next year a blueprint for interplanetary human flight over the
next 20 to 30 years. Can you comment on whether or not the Fiscal Year
2004 budget request should be revised given the grounding of the
Shuttle fleet? Should the Shuttle be funded at the same level? NASA
plans to release its Return-To-Flight Implementation Plan next week. I
assume it will lay out what needs to be done prior to the next launch.
Will NASA's plan also identify the required resources to implement that
plan?
Answer. Until we can do a full analysis of the CAIB Requirements
for Return to Flight, including an accounting of some of the design and
production work that can be covered under existing continuing
engineering contracts, the President's FY 2004 budget request for the
Space Shuttle Program represents the most prudent funding level for the
program. The Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle Return to Flight and
Beyond identifies the engineering resources, but not costs, that will
be required to respond to the CAIB Recommendations and to carry out
those initiatives that we have identified that raise the bar above the
CAIB Recommendations. As noted in the Implementation Plan, it will be
updated, as our plans are refined. NASA will identify financial
resources required as the specific implementation tasks are finalized.
Question 6. The General Accounting Office is expected to release
its report on impacts of the Columbia accident to the Space Station
later this month. Does NASA have any idea of what the costs of the
delay would mean to the Station's budget?
Answer. NASA has been assessing the impacts of the Columbia
accident on the ISS program since the accident occurred, and is now
assessing the impacts of the NASA response to the CAIB recommendations
on the ISS. To date, the Station program has estimated impacts in
excess of $130 million starting in FY 2003. NASA expects the majority
of the costs to be realized in FY 2004 and FY 2005. The estimates are
based on a roughly one year slip in Station assembly and do not account
for any additional logistics and assembly missions or the
implementation of those CAIB recommendations that may affect the ISS.
The estimates account for: delays in planned contractor de-staffing;
contract equitable adjustments; the re-certification of flight
hardware; replacement of the extended duration orbiter capability lost
on Columbia; logistics carrier re-manifesting; spares and EVA tool
replacement; and U.S. operations in Russia in support of crew rotation
and Station resupply. A delay beyond one year, additional assembly and
logistics missions, and CAIB implementation could drive ISS costs close
to $200 million. But as stated above, all of the required assessments
are still in work and a total cost impact cannot be provided now.
Question 7. Selection of NASA safety and quality personnel should
be based upon meeting specific qualifications and possessing the right
attitudes and disciplines for these critical positions. Certainly, the
practice of assigning personnel to safety and quality as a part of an
adverse personnel action must be stopped. Do you believe that those who
have been re-assigned as a result of the Columbia accident do in fact
meet such employment criteria?
Answer. No personnel have been assigned to safety and quality
positions as a result of adverse personnel actions. The reassignment of
any NASA employee is predicated on an analysis of the duties and
performance requirements of the new position and a determination that
the individual being reassigned has the ability and the experience
necessary to perform the new duties and meet the new performance
expectations. Performance expectations at the SES level include
leadership and communications skills. As I have stated before, I have
full confidence in the NASA team. Mobility across the Agency is a high
priority to ensure that a variety of expertise and perspectives are
applied to all areas of NASA activities, including safety. Recent
reassignments to various positions at several NASA Centers reflect the
selection of the best person for the job.
Question 8. Are any additional personnel changes forthcoming?
Answer. At this time, no additional personnel changes are planned
that are related to the Columbia accident.
Question 9. Given the recent losses of vehicles over the past few
years with other NASA programs, including the break-up of the CONTOUR
spacecraft in August 2002 and the crash of the Helios solar electric
airplane in June of this year, have you identified any similarities
between these accidents?
Answer. Although specific details of these accidents and the NASA
and contractor elements involved vary considerably, NASA has identified
that some of the underlying causes are similar. These similarities
include weaknesses in independent engineering oversight, inadequate
analytical tools, and weak identification and follow-through on
potential technical problems. As a result, NASA is also considering
these other weaknesses and the associated lessons learned in evaluating
how to apply the recommendations, findings, and observations of the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board's report to project management
and engineering work throughout NASA.
Question 10. The Board has stated that NASA has not
``institutionalized'' its ``lessons learned'' approaches to ensure that
knowledge gained from both good and bad experience is maintained in
corporate memory. The Naval Reactors program and the Navy's Submarine
Flooding Prevention and Recovery program have demonstrated the merits
of an ``institutionalized'' program. While NASA has a lessons learned
system, it is voluntary. Do you have any plans to more formally
``institutionalize'' NASA's ``lessons learned'' program?
Answer. Yes. NASA is conducting a major overhaul and consolidation
of its various lessons learned systems to ensure they are timely,
candid, relevant, trended, well promulgated, and properly incorporated
in both training and design requirements. This overhaul had been
initiated by NASA about two months before the Columbia accident, and is
being further augmented to include the observations of the CAIB's
report. The lessons learned systems upgrades are being based in large
part on the Navy/NASA Benchmarking Study that has also focused on the
high-quality systems of the Naval Reactors and SUBSAFE programs.
Question 11. Do you plan to apply any lessons learned from the
Columbia accident to other areas of NASA? If so, where?
Answer. We will apply the lessons learned from the Columbia
accident throughout NASA. In addition to the specific technical
lessons, the organizational and cultural lessons are applicable to much
of the other aspects of NASA work. Recognizing that one size does not
fit all within NASA, we have formed a task group headed by the Goddard
Space Flight Center Director to evaluate how best to apply all of the
findings, observations, and recommendations of the Board's report to
other NASA elements.
Question 12. The Board has recommended that NASA develop practical
capabilities to inspect and effect emergency repairs to take advantage
of the International Space Station, and to be used independently of the
station. What are the technical requirements for implementing the CAIB
recommendations and how soon can they be implemented?
Answer. NASA's near-term plan for risk mitigation calls for Space
Shuttle vehicle modifications to eliminate the liberation of critical
debris, and improved ground and Shuttle vehicle cameras for debris
detection and damage assessment. On-orbit surveys of the vehicle's
thermal protection system will be conducted using the Shuttle Remote
Manipulator System and the Space Station Remote Manipulator System
cameras, and ISS crew observations during Shuttle approach and docking.
Techniques for repairing tile and Reinforced Carbon-Carbon by
extravehicular activity are under development. The combination of these
capabilities will help to ensure a low probability that critical damage
will be sustained, while increasing the probability any damage that
does occur can be detected and the consequences mitigated in flight.
NASA's long-term risk mitigation steps will refine and improve all
elements of the near-term plan, ensuring an effective inspection and
repair capability, not reliant upon the Space Station, is in place in
time to support the next Hubble Space Telescope servicing mission.
Question 13. How will grounding of the Space Shuttle and NASA's
``return to flight'' efforts affect NASA's budget for Fiscal Year 2004?
NASA has identified approximately $108 million in FY 2004 associated
with implementation of an initial set of actions tied to the CAIB
recommendations and other corrective actions, which are summarized in
Enclosure #1.
Answer. Where applicable, hardware-related rough-order-of-magnitude
(ROM) costs are primarily engineering estimates based on previous
development and integration activities. Items also include nonrecurring
ROM cost for studies, implementation and retrofit if appropriate, and
include recurring ROM cost if required. In addition, ROM costs are
included for engineering resources for certification and verification.
We will be refining our estimates over the next few months, and we will
keep the Committee informed as decisions are made.
Question 14. What effects will these efforts have on NASA's plans
regarding the International Space Station?
Answer. NASA's post-Columbia strategy for the ISS will continue as
planned. The ISS program will complete all ground development
activities in accordance with its original schedules. Launch package
testing and integration will be completed as planned so that the flight
hardware is ready for Shuttle integration when launch dates are
determined. Operations-related products will be developed to the degree
practicable, then placed ``on the shelf'' until launch dates are
defined. The Station workforce will remain intact except for the
contractor personnel no longer required for development activities or
essential to assembly activities.
The ISS Continuing Flight Team (CFT) was chartered to review all
CAIB results for applicability to the ISS Program. This team will
ensure that all necessary steps are taken to apply the lessons learned
from the Columbia accident to the ongoing operation of the ISS.
Representatives from all NASA field centers supporting human space
flight, as well the Astronaut and Safety and Mission Assurance offices,
are members of the team. NASA will continue to work closely with its
International Partners and keep the lines of communication open as NASA
implements process improvements and enhancements as a result of lessons
learned from Columbia. The first edition of NASA's Implementation Plan
for International Space Station (ISS) Continuing Flight has been
provided to Congress.
NASA is also assessing the financial and workforce impacts of the
implementation of the CAIB recommendations on the ISS program, and will
adjust workforce allocations and budget to accommodate all required
changes to the program. NASA intends to re-baseline the ISS program
during next year's budget formulation cycle.
Question 15. One of the issues of greatest concern to me is the
fact that there were three requests for on-orbit imaging of Columbia,
and that Shuttle management turned down these requests. What steps do
you intend to take to ensure that similar requests are not ignored in
the future?
Answer. NASA has concluded a Memorandum of Agreement with the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency that provides for on-orbit
assessment of the condition of each Orbiter vehicle as a standard
requirement on every flight. In addition, NASA is putting in place
standard operating procedures to implement this, and any other relevant
agreements. Also, in order to improve the technical and cultural
capabilities for the Mission Management Teams (MMT) responsible for
Space Shuttle flight operations, NASA will conduct regular MMT
simulations with realistic in-flight crises, engage independent
internal and external consultants that will address the management,
cultural, and communications issues raised in the CAIB report, and
continue benchmarking best practices from other high-risk
organizations.
Question 16. What recommendations can you offer Congress to help
formulate the future of the human space flight program?
Answer. The Administration is currently working through an
interagency process to formulate future space exploration objectives,
including those for the human space flight program. Following the
conclusion of the process, the Administration plans to work closely
with Congress on the development and implementation of plans for the
future of the human space flight program.
Attachment
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______
Responses to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Olympia J. Snowe to
Hon. Sean O'Keefe
From the report, I understand that after the first accident,
investigators found that at the Marshall Space Flight Center, for
example, managers tended toward ``management isolation.'' I also note
from the report--and this is not new, but in now looking at these
issues in their totality--that separate responsibilities for different
shuttle systems and production are located at different geographical
``centers'' around the country.
Finally, I note in the report that Daniel Goldin implemented at
NASA the management notion that a corporate headquarters should not
exert bureaucratic control over a complex organization, but rather set
strategic directions and provide operating units with the authority and
resources needed to pursue these directions. Another principle was that
checks and balances were unnecessary and some times counterproductive,
and those carrying out the work should bear primary responsibility for
its quality.
Question 1. Mr. O'Keefe, do you believe, that even after the first
accident, the destruction of the Challenger, and the subsequent changes
at NASA that there was ``management isolation'' at the various centers?
And do you agree with the management philosophies I just outlined from
Dan Goldin?
Answer. During my tenure at NASA, I have not seen evidence of
``management isolation'' as described in the report by the Rogers
Commission. Also, I cannot speak to Dan Goldin's management principles
or the direction his team pursued during his ten-year tenure. His team
was working under a different Administration with different guidelines.
Under today's circumstances and my management philosophy, there will be
checks and balances throughout the Agency, and NASA Headquarters will
be more involved in all Programs.
Question 2. Do you believe that there should be a different
management standard for NASA, given its unique role in general, and
within the government specifically, and given the inherently risky
nature of its mission for human life? In other words, should NASA reach
for a different standard than, say, the management structure of an
International Widget corporation, or is good management practice just
good management practice?
Answer. Good management is good management. Implementation of
various management practices should be tailored for various industries.
The U.S. Government as a whole has a special responsibility as the
steward of the public trust, to maintain the highest standards of
management excellence. To that end, NASA is currently working with
other high-risk entities, such as the Navy submarine safety programs,
to benchmark their best practices and incorporate these experiences
into NASA's programs.
Question 3. According to the report, after two close calls in July
1999 with STS-93, former Administrator Dan Goldin chaired a Shuttle
Independent Assessment Team (SIAT). Among the findings of the team was
that, ``The SIAT was concerned with ``success-engendered safety
optimism. The Space Shuttle Program (SSP) must rigorously guard against
the tendency to accept risk solely because of prior success.''
Mr. O'Keefe, can you tell me in the wake of that assessment, to
your knowledge, specifically what steps or mechanisms, if any, were in
place to answer that criticism? And, if there were mechanisms that were
put in place, how did they hold up with regard to what happened with
Columbia, and particularly with the numerous requests for satellite
imaging, as well as the assessments of the foam strikes?
Answer. Based on the SIAT final report, NASA concluded that most of
SIAT's recommendations were aimed at bringing best practices from other
high-risk organizations into the Space Shuttle program (SSP). Prior to
my arrival at NASA, the Space Shuttle program had begun a series of
regular senior management meetings that specifically addressed the
issue of complacency and the inherent risk to the SSP relative to
process and procedure change. After I became NASA Administrator in
2002, this review process was expanded to include of best practices
from the Navy submarine safety programs and working to incorporate this
experience into all of NASA's programs, including the Space Shuttle
program.
NASA, and especially the Space Shuttle program have had mechanisms
in place that allow employees to submit safety concerns to safety and
program management. Since the Columbia Accident and the subsequent
Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommendations, additional
measures are being taken to improve and streamline this reporting
process. Initial management changes have been put into place, such as
the establishment of a new independent NASA Engineering and Safety
Center, initiation of Mission Management Team training and simulations,
and a reorganization of the Space Shuttle program to include stronger
systems integration.
Question 4. That same SIAT report also found that communication
problems and concerns upward to the Space Shuttle Program from the
``floor'' also appeared to ``leave room for improvement.'' Mr. O'Keefe,
was this warning heeded within NASA--if so, what kind of priority was
the concern given and then looking forward, how do you ensure that, if
changes are made, the impact of those changes are being assessed, and
that the changes don't fall by the wayside? Because I believe that will
largely dictate how NASA functions in the future, and the future safety
of the Shuttle Program.
Answer. As stated in the response to the above question, a number
of different actions have been taken to further enable communication
from both the ``top-down and bottom-up'' within NASA. The Agency will
take additional actions in the future as we work with representatives
from industry, academia, and other government organizations to
determine how best to institutionalize ``best practices'' into the NASA
culture, with clear communications being a high priority area for
improvement.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Hon. Sean O'Keefe
Question 1. Admiral Gehman, in your view, what role did NASA's
relationship with contractors have in the breakdown in communication
that led to the organizational failures you discuss in the Board's
report? If NASA was performing all of the contracted work rather than
its contractors, would these communication breakdowns have been as
likely?
Answer. Since the earliest days of its human spaceflight program,
NASA has relied upon the expertise of the Nation's aerospace
contractors to carry out its programs. The CAIB noted that there were
communications problems within the Space Shuttle program as a whole,
both within the government and, to a lesser extent, between the
government and its contractors. In response to these findings, NASA is
taking steps to improve its own internal communications and to enhance
the ability of the Space Shuttle program to provide insight into
contractor operations.
Question 2. ``Mr. O'Keefe, the Kraft report of March 1995 found
that `` many inefficiencies and difficulties in the current Shuttle
Program can be attributed to the diffuse and fragmented NASA and
contractor structure. Numerous contractors exist supporting various
program elements, resulting in ambiguous lines of communication and
diffused responsibilities.'' What actions did NASA take to address this
concern in the Kraft report?''
Answer. The Kraft report was the product of a team of government,
aerospace industry, and former NASA leaders, formed by NASA
Administrator in November 1994, to review Shuttle operation management
and ``propose innovative approaches to decrease total operating costs
while maintaining systems safety.'' The report stated the Shuttle
program should:
Establish a clear set of program goals with greater emphasis
on cost-efficiency and ``user-friendly'' payload integration.
Redefine management structure, separating development and
operations and disengaging NASA from daily operation of the
Shuttle.
Change environment in the Program to pursue these goals.
The report concluded the best approach was to consolidate
operations under a single-business entity. A NASA-Prime Contractor
program structure was proposed to separate development vs. operational
activities, minimize NASA-contractor interfaces, eliminate overlapping
tasks, and strengthen responsibility for operations and motivation to
reduce costs. NASA would define clear Shuttle operations requirements
with limited oversight. This change allows the contractor to perform
day-to-day operations, increasing the content and scope of work being
performed by the private sector. The government would still retain all
Shuttle mission execution responsibilities. Regular and independent
review of program restructuring process is done to ensure safety.
On November 30, 1995, the NASA Administrator established a single
contract, the Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC), ``to consolidate
all mature operational areas of the Shuttle program.'' NASA recommended
awarding the SFOC to the United Space Alliance (USA), a joint venture
of Rockwell International (now the Boeing Company) and Lockheed Martin
Corporation. This decision was based on NASA's commitment to launch the
International Space Station on schedule, and to maintain safety. The
SFOC contract was initiated in October 1996. To date, twenty-one
separate Space Shuttle contracts of the have been consolidated into
SFOC.
Since the Columbia accident and at the recommendation of the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board, the Space Shuttle Integration
Office has been reorganized. The integration function has been
strengthened and elevated to a higher level in the Space Shuttle
program organization to make it capable of integrating all of the
Shuttle program elements including those performed by the contractor
community. It also has been given the authority and accountability for
the integration function.
Question 3. I believe that there is an inherent conflict of
interest between profit and the level of funding spent on safety. The
Space Flight Operations Contract rewards cost reductions to the
contractor, United Space Alliance. But doesn't this create a culture of
creating ``minimum safety requirements'' or ``safety on the cheap''?
Outside of costly government oversight, which could obviate any
savings, is this type of an economic performance-based contract ideal
in for safety-critical programs like the space shuttle?
Answer. To be a good steward of the Government's funds, NASA must
manage each of our contracts efficiently and effectively. Like other
NASA contracts, safety is a critical factor in the rating of
performance under the Shuttle Flight Operations Contract (SFOC). Safety
is used as a key factor in the award fee earnings determination for
SFOC and is the only individual factor for which the contractor
receives a separate specific score every six months. It carries a
significant weight and serves as a ``gate'' for the contractor's
ability to reap their share of any cost savings. In order to pass this
``gate'', the contractor must achieve a safety evaluation factor
rating, which, at a minimum, reflects effective performance;
accomplishment of requirements in a timely and efficient manner; and
work which substantially exceeds minimum contract requirements. This
``gate'' feature is used under the contract to deter any motivation by
the contractor for taking a ``minimal'' approach to safety in order to
increase cost reduction. It serves to emphasize the importance of
safety and the need to achieve much more than the ``minimum'' safety
requirements. Regarding the use of a performance-based contract for the
SFOC, we feel it has been and can continue to be effective for
management of Shuttle operations. Notwithstanding that, we had
commenced a review of the contract terms and alternate approaches to
the current contract structure prior to the Columbia accident in order
to effect improvements. We are currently assessing any additional
changes that may be necessary as a result of the CAIB Report, and plan
to renegotiate the contract terms in the near future to reflect the
current NASA priorities and CAIB recommendations.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain to
Harold W. Gehman, Jr.
Question 1. The report indicates that three different requests were
made for on-orbit imaging of the Columbia, and makes it clear that the
Debris Assessment Team felt that it needed these images to analyze the
effect of the foam strike. Why did the Shuttle management reject these
requests?
Answer. Shuttle managers firmly believed that foam could not damage
the RCC panels. They therefore characterized the request for pictures
as a superfluous request to prove that the shuttle condition was safe.
Since managers ``knew'' the shuttle was safe, they wanted engineers to
``prove'' it was unsafe before they went to the effort to request
national level imagery. Since the engineers needed images to determine
the extent of damage, they were unable to ``prove'' the condition of
the shuttle was unsafe. Second, NASA managers assumed they knew the
capabilities of national level imagery and that national level imagery
could not detect damage on the shuttle, despite the fact few of them
were familiar with imagery capabilities or even had the security
clearances to know what capabilities were available. Third, there was
confusion about the source of the imagery request. An informal request
for imagery originated on Flight Day Two at Kennedy Space Center
outside of normal request channels. KSC members, realizing they had not
followed proper protocols, terminated actions taken to that point
requesting imagery. A subsequent formal request for imagery from the
Debris Assessment Team was mistakenly interpreted by the MMT as the
same informal request from KSC. The MMT claimed to never have been
aware of a formal request for imagery from the Debris Assessment Team.
Their belief that foam could not damage RCC, the engineers' lack of
proof that the shuttle condition was unsafe, confusion as to the source
of the request, and their erroneous assumptions regarding national
level imagery capabilities, led Linda Ham to cancel the requests for
imagery.
Question 1a. What recommendations did the Board make to ensure that
similar requests are not ignored in the future?
Answer. First, the CAIB eliminated the issue by requiring an on-
orbit inspection of the orbiter on each flight soon after orbit
insertion. The Board made significant recommendations regarding the
need to change the safety culture. Second, the Board directed NASA to
update its process for requesting photos of the orbiter while on orbit.
Third, the Board directed NASA to place additional cameras on each
orbiter to better determine when damage exists. Fourth, the Board
directed NASA to improve the quality of orbiter imagery during launch
and ascent. All of these will directly contribute to ensuring that
engineers have the best imagery data available during any similar
future situations.
Question 2. Question 2 should be answered by NASA.
Question 3. Your report states that based on NASA's history of
ignoring external recommendations, or making improvements that atrophy
with time, the Board has no confidence that the Space Shuttle can be
safely operated for more than few years based solely on renewed post-
accident vigilance.
(a) Do you expect that all of the CAIB's recommendations, not only
the ``return to flight'' ones, will be implemented by NASA? Do you
believe that the NASA task force created to assess NASA's
implementation of the CAIB recommendations is the correct approach?
Answer. The Board believes that Congress, the Administration and
NASA will determine what recommendations, and to what extent those
recommendations, will be implemented. The Board did not prioritize and
believes all the recommendations should be implemented and all the
significant issues addressed in Chapter 10 should be addressed by NASA
because they fall into the category of ``weak signals'' that could be
indications of future problems.
(b) What are the limiting factors affecting the safe operation of
the Shuttle beyond more than a few years?
Answer. As the Shuttle System ages, new and sometimes unpredictable
reliability issues will arise. Since these issues are unpredictable,
they must be dealt with as they come up. The present management system
does not do that well. To quote from the report:
``Based on NASA's history of ignoring external recommendations
and making improvements that atrophy over time, the Board has
no confidence that the Space Shuttle can be safely operated for
more than a few years based solely on renewed post accident
vigilance. The Board felt the Management system is inherently
unsafe beyond the short-term. Complex systems almost always
fail in complex ways and the Board is convinced that NASA can
fly again in the near-term if the RTF recommendations are
followed. However, NASA needs to look into the organizational
and cultural aspects to lessen the chance another accident will
occur beyond more than a few years. Additionally, the Shuttle
is an aging spacecraft in a research and development era
requiring special attention to orbiter corrosion, orbiter
maintenance down periods/major modification, test equipment,
etc. The Board has serious concerns how NASA can manage an
aging shuttle life cycle with a lack of an integrated hazard
analysis system.''
NASA needs to be resourced to effect change recommended by the CAIB
report . . . many of the organizational recommendations retract
previous management efficiencies in favor of a new, more balanced
system of checks and balances which will increase budget and manpower
demands. These organizational changes are necessary to improve the
safety culture and create an atmosphere of high reliability.
Question 4. The report speaks of a ``broken safety culture'' at
NASA. Can you elaborate on this for the Committee?
Answer. Safety culture refers to an organization's characteristics
and attitudes--promoted by its leaders and internalized by its
members--that serve to make safety the top priority.) In this context,
the Board believes the mistakes that were made on STS-107 are not
isolated failures, but are indicative of systemic flaws that existed
prior to the accident.
The investigation revealed that in most cases, the Human Space
Flight Program is extremely aggressive in reducing threats to safety.
But we also know--in hindsight--that detection of the dangers posed by
foam was impeded by ``blind spots'' in NASA's safety culture. The
investigation uncovered a troubling pattern in which Shuttle Program
management made erroneous assumptions about the robustness of a system
based on prior success rather than on dependable engineering data and
rigorous testing.
Further, the Shuttle Program's complex structure erected barriers
to effective communication and its safety culture no longer asks enough
hard questions about risk. (Had the Shuttle Program observed insight
from High Reliability, Normal Accident and Organizational Theory,
reviewed Best Safety Practices and learned from its own history, the
threat that foam posed to the Orbiter, particularly after the STS-112
and STS-107 foam strikes, might have been more fully appreciated by
Shuttle Program management. Evidence of the broken safety culture is
seen in the ``prove it's unsafe'' approach to the foam strike. This
attitude by management kept them from seeing the need to conduct
serious contingency planning on whether or not the Shuttle was in
trouble and how to save it either by on-orbit repair or rescue. Every
problem was simplified and reduced to the least threatening posture
that truncated management's entire thought and decision processes.
Question 5. The Board recommends preparing a detailed plan for
creating an independent Technical Engineering Authority, independent
safety program, and reorganized Space Shuttle Integration Office. Why
is it necessary to complete the plan for these operations, as opposed
to implementing the operations themselves, before the shuttle returns
to flight?
Answer. The recommendations to create a technical engineering
authority, a truly independent safety organization and an effective SSP
program integration office are designed to prevent the gradual return
to bad habits that normally occurs at all large organizations as the
memory of a tragic accident fades. As noted in the Report, the Board is
confident the next half dozen flights will receive all the vigilance
and oversight possible. Several Board members have extensive experience
managing large organizations and know with some personal knowledge that
the kinds of changes represented by these recommendations are
fundamental, complex and challenging to implement. These three
recommendations are changes in FUNCTIONS, not just wiring diagram
changes and they will take considerable time to implement. Therefore,
getting the plan written and submitted in a timely manner is important
and the actual implementation should be done thoughtfully and
carefully.
Question 6. The Board recommends establishing an independent
Technical Engineering Authority that is responsible for technical
requirements, and all waivers to them, that will build a disciplined
approach to identifying, analyzing, and controlling hazards throughout
the life cycle of the Shuttle System. How should this new authority be
designed and staffed to prevent some of NASA's bad habits, such as the
reliance on past successes as a substitute for sound engineering
practices, from leaching into this new organization?
Answer. The Board intentionally declined to tell NASA how to
specifically structure this new organization.
Question 7. The Board recommends that NASA Headquarters Office of
Safety and Mission Assurance should have direct line authority over the
entire Space Shuttle Program safety organization and should be
independently resourced. The Rogers Commission made a similar
recommendation.
(a) Why is it important that the Office of Safety and Mission
Assurance has direct line authority over the Space Shuttle program and
be independently resourced?
Answer. The question should state ``Why is it important that the
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance have direct line authority over
the Space Shuttle safety program and be independently resourced?'' The
Board did not recommend that the Safety office have direct line
authority over the entire SSP.
In order for a safety system to be effective and for people within
the organization to feel comfortable using it, it must operate outside,
but in parallel with the normal management chain of command; it must be
equal in stature to the organization it monitors; it must have
visibility into all levels of the organization; it must report directly
to the senior leader in charge of the overall organization; and, it
must have its own line item budget. Each of these is explained below.
Safety must operate outside the normal management chain of command.
If we expect people to report problems, they must feel secure within
the organization to do that. If they feel threatened, a safety program
operated outside the normal chain of command, allows them an avenue to
raise a safety concern without feeling like they are jeopardizing their
livelihood. In the case of the shuttle program, the safety organization
was controlled by the SSP, so the program dealt with safety concerns
about the program. This structure allowed the shuttle program manager
to unilaterally waive technical requirements (such as the debris
prevention requirement). An independent technical authority or safety
function would ensure technical requirements are met or resolved before
subsequent launches. Engineers stopped viewing the safety office as a
reporting option since their complaints basically went right back to
the program, leaving them vulnerable to retribution from management.
Safety must be equal in stature to the organization it monitors.
Safety programs must have a status that can stand up to the program it
monitors. It does this by having a sufficient budget, high-quality
safety professionals who are respected by their peers and a link to
senior leadership to give them relevance. If safety is not of equal
stature, the safety program will be ignored.
Safety must have visibility into all levels of the organization. No
area of any program within an organization can be exempt from review
and monitoring by the safety office. Without visibility and authority
to challenge at all levels of the organization, the safety program will
not be effective.
Safety must report directly to the senior leader in charge of the
overall organization. Safety gives the senior leadership of an
organization a different perspective on problems and solutions. If it
is not directly reporting to the senior leadership, then the programs
view it as a less important function within the organization. Safety
must also have the authority to stop an operation for safety reasons
and that authority can only come from senior leadership. Finally, to
have relevance at all levels of an organization, safety must be
directly reporting to the senior leadership.
Safety must have its own line item budget. Safety programs need
great people and they need sound budgets. If they must rely on the
program or other parts of the organization to fund their activities,
they will never be relevant and will always be limited in
effectiveness. Owning their own budget empowers all the other concepts
discussed above and gives the safety office the autonomy it needs to be
highly effective. The safety budget should not compete with space
shuttle program funds.
(b) Why has NASA been so resistant to this recommendation?
Answer. Good safety programs cost good money and require good
people in order to be effective. Shuttle program managers believed they
were always being safe so a robust safety program didn't add value to
what they were doing. If it didn't add value, then why fund it? Since
the SSP owned its own safety budget, they could decide how much safety
they wanted to buy. As budgets became constrained, the safety budget
was continuously cut to make up funds. In fact, most of safety was
matrixed from other areas of NASA or contracted out.
Question 8. Since October 1996, Space Shuttle operations have been
managed by the United Space Alliance.
(a) Could you please explain how contracting out Space Shuttle
operations have affected NASA's in-house engineering capabilities?
Answer. Over the years, NASA, in efforts to reduce government head
count and operate more efficiently, assigned more work and
responsibility to contractors and relied more heavily on contract
financial incentives, as opposed to direct Government oversight. The
result is that NASA technical expertise has winnowed down to the point
that NASA no longer always has the sophisticated and elegant system of
oversight by very knowledgeable people that such a complex enterprise
requires. The Board is also concerned that functions have been shifted
to contractors that should be performed by Government personnel,
resulting in the shift of technical expertise from the Government to
the private sector.
(b) The report states that the Space Shuttle should be considered a
developmental vehicle, not an operational one. How would this change of
status effect NASA's requirements for the United Space Alliance
contract?
Answer. The differences between how a developmental vehicle is
managed vs. how an operational vehicle is managed are profound. NASA
management repeatedly stated that the Shuttle is officially considered
a developmental vehicle, however the Board found ample evidence to
conclude the Shuttle was being employed in an operational manner. The
Board found no evidence to suggest that the contract had anything to do
with this accident, but did find procedures that should be carefully
reviewed prior to the next contract solicitation.
The most significant issue that concerned the Board was the
extensive management functions that are included in the contract. While
there is nothing wrong with this as a policy, the practical result is a
migration of technical expertise from the government sector to the
private sector. It is our opinion that NASA is best suited to answer
any questions regarding changes in requirements of the USA contract.
However, anytime a government owned developmental vehicle is being
flown a requirement exists for significant government oversight.
Whether the shuttle is developmental or operational affects the overall
management approach to flying the shuttle. It would call for a more
distinct line of separation between government and contractor and
require retention of a greater level of technical expertise by the
government in order to be more deeply involved at the subsystem level.
It is also the Board's opinion that were the Columbia viewed as
developmental, procedures may have been in place to more exhaustively
seek out the extent of damage to the left wing leading edge instead of
continuing the ``operational'' 16-day science timeline.
(c) Could you please discuss the Board's findings regarding
relations between NASA and United Space Alliance as they worked to
determine the damage done to Columbia by the foam debris strike? OK
Answer. The report describes this relationship on page 142. After
United Space Alliance became contractually responsible for most aspects
of Shuttle operations, NASA developed procedures to ensure that its own
engineering expertise was coordinated with that of contractors for any
``out-of-family'' issue. In the case of the foam strike on STS-107,
which was classified as out-of-family, clearly defined written guidance
led United Space Alliance technical managers to liaise with their NASA
counterparts. Once NASA managers were officially notified of the foam
strike classification, and NASA engineers joined their contractor peers
in an early analysis, the resultant group should, according to standing
procedures, become a Mission Evaluation Room Tiger Team. Tiger Teams
have clearly defined roles and responsibilities. Instead, the group of
analysts came to be called a Debris Assessment Team. While they were
the right group of engineers working the problem at the right time, by
not being classified as a Tiger Team, they did not fall under the
Shuttle Program procedures described in Tiger Team checklists, and as a
result were not ``owned'' or led by Shuttle Program managers. This left
the Debris Assessment Team in a kind of organizational limbo, with no
guidance except the date by which Program managers expected to hear
their results: January 24. Had this Tiger Team authority issue been
clarified, the Debris Assessment Team would not have taken ``no'' for
an answer in response to their request for imagery. They would have
demanded imagery as a necessary requirement to be able to do their
damage assessment and used the shuttle program as their authority.
Question 9. NASA is currently developing an Orbital Space Plane to
transport astronauts to the International Space Station. Based on your
analysis of the development of the Space Shuttle and the lessons
learned, what actions should be taken in developing the new Orbital
Space Plane?
Answer. The most important step we can take in designing the next
orbital vehicle is to agree on a national vision on what we want the
manned space program to accomplish. This would lead to the development
of a concept of operations followed by a set of requirements for the
vehicle to meet the objectives of a vision. The concept of operations
and the requirements would then drive the design of the new orbital
vehicle. Without an agreed national vision, the next orbital vehicle
will fall victim to the same set of design compromises that plague the
current orbiter fleet and the previous failed attempts to implement a
replacement for the Space Shuttle.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Harold W. Gehman, Jr.
Thank you for your continued dedication and support of the Columbia
Investigation, and for your thoughtful questions for the record. I hope
that you will find the following responses to be satisfactory.
Question 1. Role played by ``NASA's relationship with contractors''
in the ``breakdown in communication that led to the organizational
failures.''
Answer. Over the years, NASA, in efforts to reduce government head
count and operate more efficiently, assigned more work and
responsibility to contractors and relied more heavily on contract
financial incentives, as opposed to direct Government oversight. The
result is that NASA technical expertise has winnowed down to the point
that NASA no longer always has the sophisticated and elegant system of
oversight by very knowledgeable people that such a complex enterprise
requires. The Board is also concerned that functions have been shifted
to contractors that should be performed by Government personnel,
resulting in the shift of technical expertise from the Government to
the private sector.
Question 2. If NASA was performing all functions, would these
communications breakdown have been as likely?
Answer. Yes, the communications problems occurred where they always
occurr, at the interfaces between offices and functions. Those
interfaces exist in purely governmental organizations as well as
contractor organizations. Once again, the only issue the Board was
concerned about was the migration of technical expertise that went with
the migration of oversight positions to the private sector.
Question 3. Is there an inherent conflict of interest between
profit and safety?
Answer. Not in the sense that one can infer the level of safety by
the level of profits. However, in this business, careful attention to
technical detail, not profit levels, should be the principal focus for
managers and workers, both government and contractors alike.
The Board found no evidence that profit considerations contributed
to the accident or compromised safety. However, the elaborate, multiple
profit incentives NASA has adopted in efforts to promote contractor
efficiency and performance, risks making technical considerations
secondary to profit considerations among managers and workers. Where
emphasis should be on determining what is the right thing to do
technically, knowing that company profits are directly at risk, can
encourage ``good news reporting'' and make it more difficult for
management and workers to surface problems that could delay schedules
or otherwise adversely affect profit.