    [Senate Hearing 108-652]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 108-652

          ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT AT THE U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   ----------

                        MARCH 31; SEPTEMBER 24, 30, 2003

                                   ----------

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

          ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT AT THE U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY

                                                            S. Hrg. 108-652

          ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT AT THE U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                        MARCH 31; SEPTEMBER 24, 30, 2003

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

                         U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman

    JOHN McCAIN, Arizona                 CARL LEVIN, Michigan
    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma            EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
    PAT ROBERTS, Kansas                  ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
    WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado               JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
    JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama               JACK REED, Rhode Island
    SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine              DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
    JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada                  BILL NELSON, Florida
    JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri            E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
    SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia             MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
    LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina    EVAN BAYH, Indiana
    ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina       HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
    JOHN CORNYN, Texas                   MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

                        Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director

                 Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                   __________

                        CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

    The U.S. Air Force Investigation into Allegations of Sexual Assault at
                           the U.S. Air Force Academy

                                 march 31, 2003

                                                                       Page

    Roche, Hon. James G., Secretary of the Air Force; Accompanied by
      Hon. Mary Walker, General Counsel, United States Air Force.....    12
    Jumper, Gen. John P., Chief of Staff, United States Air Force....    16

      Report of the Panel to Review Sexual Misconduct Allegations at the
                        United States Air Force Academy

                               september 24, 2003

    Fowler, Hon. Tillie K., Chairman, The Panel to Review Sexual
      Misconduct Allegations at the United States Air Force Academy;
      Accompanied by Panel Members: Lt. Gen. Josiah Bunting III, USA
      [Ret.], Anita M. Carpenter; Laura L. Miller, Ph.D.; Maj. Gen.
      Michael J. Nardotti, Jr., USA [Ret.]; Col. John W. Ripley, USMC
      [Ret.]; and Sally L. Satel, M.D................................    65

    Investigations into Allegations of Sexual Assault at the United States
                               Air Force Academy

                               september 30, 2003

    Roche, Hon. James G., Secretary of the Air Force.................   265
    Jumper, Gen. John P., USAF, Chief of Staff, United States Air
      Force..........................................................   274
    Walker, Hon. Mary L., General Counsel, Department of the Air
      Force..........................................................   276

                                     (iii)

    THE U.S. AIR FORCE INVESTIGATION INTO ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT AT
             THE U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY AND RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS

                                  ----------

                             MONDAY, MARCH 31, 2003

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:05 p.m., in
    room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Allard,
    Collins, Chambliss, Levin, Reed, Dayton, Clinton, and Pryor.
        Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
    director; and Cindy Pearson, assistant chief clerk and security
    manager.
        Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
    professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff
    member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional staff member; Scott W.
    Stucky, general counsel; and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
        Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
    Democratic staff director; Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel;
    and Peter K. Levine, minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger; Jennifer Key;
    and Nicholas W. West.
        Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul,
    assistant to Senator McCain; Douglas Flanders and Jayson Roehl,
    assistants to Senator Allard; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant
    to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
    Chambliss; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; William
    Todd Houchins, assistant to Senator Dayton; Andrew Shapiro,
    assistant to Senator Clinton; and Andy York, assistant to
    Senator Pryor.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Warner. Good afternoon, gentlemen. We welcome our
    witnesses today.
        Given the importance of this hearing, the Chair offers to
    all Senators present an opportunity to make an opening
    statement. I will proceed with mine to be followed by Senator
    Levin, and then other colleagues.
        We meet today to receive testimony on the U.S. Air Force
    investigation into allegations of sexual assault at the Air
    Force Academy and related recommendations, which I understand
    the Secretary and the Chief of Staff are prepared to share with
    the committee in open session today.
        I want to start by recognizing the contribution by our
    colleague, Senator Allard. He has done noble effort in this
    case, bringing to the attention of the Senate and, indeed, the
    Department of Defense, the serious and disturbing allegations
    at the United States Air Force Academy. Since January of this
    year, Senator Allard and his staff have provided an open line
    of communication for young women, present and former cadets at
    the Academy, and their families, to bring information forward
    on this incident, series of incidents. He has also ensured that
    the investigative efforts underway, both Air Force and
    Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG), will be fully
    responsive to these concerns.
        Throughout the proceedings, I have joined with Senator
    Allard in sending a number of letters to the Department of
    Defense and in meeting with Pentagon officials, indeed the
    Secretary and the Chief of Staff on a number of occasions.
        So I compliment you, Senator, for your work in this matter
    thus far and your continued interest.
        On being informed by Senator Allard some 8 weeks ago of the
    allegations of sexual assault at the Air Force Academy,
    Secretary Roche then assembled a team of investigators, led by
    the Air Force General Counsel, to review the Air Force
    Academy's command climate and pertinent policies and procedures
    regarding the handling of sexual assault cases. The Air Force
    IG and also the DODIG were asked to review individual cases and
    conduct interviews and fact finding.
        I believe that Secretary Roche and General Jumper reacted
    very quickly to the expressions of congressional concern they
    received and they have made, and are making determined efforts
    to obtain all relevant information and to provide this
    committee and Congress as a whole with their current
    recommendations as to how to prevent a reoccurrence of these
    allegations in the future.
        We were, as a committee, promised a complete report on the
    Air Force General Counsel's investigation by today, 31 March.
    We are now informed it will be forthcoming shortly.
        In early February, I contacted Charlie Abell, the Deputy
    Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and
    asked that he monitor the progress of the Air Force
    investigation and ensure the U.S. Military Academy and U.S.
    Naval Academy policies and historical data were also evaluated;
    in other words, all three academies. That is predicated on my
    own experience when in the Department of Defense. If we had a
    problem at one academy, we shared it with the Secretaries of
    the other military departments and the Chiefs of Staff. Then
    that way we worked to ensure that there was no spreading of the
    problem elsewhere, the sharing of the benefit, if there are any
    to be derived, from these incidents to preclude it in the
    future at all three academies.
        Additionally, Senator Allard and I, along with Senator
    Collins, in her capacity as Chair of the Governmental Affairs
    Committee, contacted Joseph Schmitz, the Department of Defense
    Inspector General, requesting that he participate in the
    investigation and ensure an independent review of the Air Force
    efforts.
        I have been pleased, Secretary Roche, with your response to
    these initiatives, and your cooperation with OSD and the DODIG
    in ensuring a complete and thorough investigation.
        Based on the facts received to date by the members of this
    committee, there appears to be an attitude towards women cadets
    by successive commanders at the Air Force Academy, which
    attitude fails to recognize fairly and properly allegations and
    concerns which in good faith were repeatedly brought to the
    attention of the various officers in charge by female cadets.
        Some facts give rise to the conclusion that a climate
    existed that was actually hostile to female cadets. Some facts
    provide a basis to support a conclusion that the promise of a
    safe and secure living and working environment for female
    cadets and, in some instances, female visitors to the Academy,
    was undermined.
        The seriousness of this case is a direct result of how long
    this climate of inaction has persisted. Following the abuses of
    the Navy Tailhook Association Symposium in 1991, following the
    sexual abuse of female recruits at the Army's base at Aberdeen
    in 1996, following determined efforts by DOD and all Services
    to correct these problems, there is a legitimate question as to
    why the leadership of the Air Force Academy allowed these
    situations to persist, given that background.
        Approximately 8 years ago, in 1995, Department of the Air
    Force leadership did recognize the potential for problems with
    regard to sexual harassment and sent the following message to
    all Air Force commands--this was by the Secretary--``Any
    conduct, in any unit, which creates a disadvantage based on
    race, ethnicity, or gender will not be tolerated. Malicious or
    inappropriate behavior as well as different training standards
    cannot be permitted. Any indications that such behavior is
    occurring within a unit will prompt an immediate investigation.
    Those responsible for such action as well as commanders who
    fail to correct these problems will be held accountable.''
        The question before this committee, the question before the
    American public, is why this message was not heeded by
    subsequent leaders at the Air Force Academy? Every Member of
    Congress, all 535, are proud to work diligently in encouraging
    young women to seek nominations to the Air Force Academy. The
    concerns in Congress are not just before the oversight
    committees, such as this one, but in the minds and the hearts
    of every single member of the United States Congress.
        While we await the outcome of investigations into these
    allegations of alleged criminal behavior, we also await the
    Department of the Air Force actions with respect to
    accountability for those who have failed in command and allowed
    an environment in which such behavior was tolerated.
        I repeat the last sentence of the 1995 message from the
    former Secretary of the Air Force and former Chief of Staff of
    the Air Force in their message, ``Those responsible for such
    action as well as commanders who fail to correct these problems
    will be held accountable.''
        I draw the attention of our witnesses, Secretary Roche, the
    Chief, to the quote in your press release of just a few days
    ago, March 26, and I quote it, ``As the problems regarding
    sexual assault allegations predate the current leadership, we
    do not hold Generals Dallager or Gilbert responsible.''
        I pose two questions: Is this quote consistent with the Air
    Force message of 1995? How could Department of the Air Force
    leadership have reached this conclusion here on March 26th
    prior to the completion of any of the three ongoing
    investigations?
        In a press conference last week, Secretary Roche, you
    likened your actions in removing four senior officers at the
    Academy to a corporation merely bringing in its own leadership
    team. With all due respect, sir, the Air Force is not a
    corporation, and what is at issue here are time-honored
    principles of military leadership and accountability, and
    whether or not they were applied.
        These principles demand a deliberate, critical examination,
    and an appropriate measure of accountability, when a command
    fails in some key aspect of its mission, particularly when
    personnel charged to a commander's care have been harmed. This
    committee and the men and women of the Air Force expect these
    principles to be applied in this case, and for commanders to be
    held accountable for any failures of command.
        Reserving judgment in these matters until the Air Force IG
    and DODIG complete their investigations would have been, in my
    own experience, the more prudent and appropriate course of
    action for the leadership of this department.
        With respect to the response of this committee, more fact
    finding and analysis is necessary in order to determine whether
    the actions taken, or not taken by the Superintendent,
    Commandant, and their subordinates, were in keeping with the
    high, time-honored standards of command.
        In the meantime, our focus today and in the future must
    properly be on changing the culture at the Air Force Academy so
    that the young women currently in the Cadet Wing, and those
    entering the Academy this summer, can be assured that all
    cadets, men and women, will have a safe environment in which to
    pursue their hopes and dreams of becoming Air Force officers.
        Senator Levin.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, let me thank
    and commend you and Senator Allard for your continued
    leadership and your strong involvement in the critical issue
    that is before us today.
        Sexual misconduct at the Air Force Academy is tragically
    not a new issue, as our Chairman has pointed out. Following a
    series of reported rapes in 1993, Lieutenant General Brad
    Hosmer, who was then the Superintendent, said, ``We have a
    problem at the Air Force Academy. This problem has existed for
    some time.''
        His comments are very similar to Secretary Roche's public
    comments about the allegations now under investigation. General
    Hosmer attempted to deal with the problem by instituting
    programs to educate cadets on the conduct expected of military
    officers and by changing reporting requirements to encourage
    cadets to report sexual assaults. Despite these measures, the
    Academy received 13 more reports of sexual assault during the
    next 8 months.
        The General Accounting Office issued reports in January
    1994 and March 1995 on sexual harassment at the three Service
    academies. While, of course, sexual harassment includes a lot
    more than sexual assault and rape, the GAO findings are still
    relevant in our consideration of how the Air Force Academy
    deals with allegations of sexual misconduct.
        In the 1994 report, the GAO found ``between half and three
    quarters of Academy women experienced various forms of
    harassment at least twice a month.''
        In the 1995 report, the GAO reported that ``the majority of
    Academy women reported experiencing at least one form of sexual
    harassment on a recurring basis in the academic year 1993 to
    1994.''
        Data contained in the 1994 report shows that between 1988
    and 1993, cadets at the Air Force Academy reported 41 incidents
    of sexual misconduct. During the same timeframe, midshipmen at
    the Naval Academy reported 26 incidents, and cadets at the
    Military Academy reported 40 incidents. Now, a decade after
    General Hosmer acknowledged a sexual misconduct problem at the
    Air Force Academy, we learn that there were at least 54 reports
    of sexual assault or rape at the Air Force Academy during the
    last 10 years. We have also learned that during the last 5
    years, the United States Military Academies received 5 reports
    of rape and 13 reports of other sexual assault; and during the
    last 3 years, the Naval Academy has received 12 reports of
    sexual assault and/or rape.
        It is incredible that the pattern persists of victims of
    assaults being discouraged from reporting the incidents, that
    their complaints were not fully investigated, they were
    ostracized by other cadets, and that they, the victims, were
    punished by the Academy for infractions brought to light only
    because they reported that they had been assaulted.
        I join in the Chairman's questions about a commander's
    accountability. I think these are extremely significant
    questions and go to the heart of the matter.
        I will have a number of questions that I will raise with
    the witnesses regarding that issue of commanders'
    accountability.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
        Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it is
    pretty obvious that your statement and that of Senator Levin
    are very important here, because people are held accountable in
    the military and other aspects of life. When they are not held
    accountable, then obviously those who are supposed to be
    holding them accountable are not doing their job.
        Secretary Roche gave a press conference recently that had
    some of the most incredible evasions of responsibility that I
    have seen in more than 40 years of being involved in the
    military and in oversight of the military as a member of this
    committee:

              Mickey Anderson with the L.A. Times: ``Have you in
            any way reprimanded or disciplined at all the leaders
            who were not honorable? What do you say to the critics
            who say you are going too easy on these people? You
            just said a second ago that these people may have been
            responsible.''
              Secretary Roche: ``The current group cannot be
            responsible for everything that occurred in a 10-year
            period and certainly over a period longer than 10
            years. To hold someone accountable means that there are
            two sides to a story, and they have a side as well. We
            have looked at it. We know that under the
            circumstances, they might not have been more--they
            might have been more clairvoyant. They may have been
            sharper. There may have been a survey they should have
            acted on. But to hold them accountable per se with what
            we now know, no.''
              Question: ``And you are continuing to leave some of
            these people in leadership capacities, their new jobs
            involve leadership, so I presume you trust them.''
              Secretary Roche: ``First of all, there is no reason
            not to trust them. One is retiring. One is coming to be
            a special assistant here. I am not sure of where the
            other two--but one of the four nobody has accused of
            anything. As a matter of fact, he is well liked. But,
            you are trying to get back to a couple of people saying
            they are the whole problem. They are not the problem.
            Let us remember cadets commit assaults against
            cadets.''

        One of the more remarkable statements I have ever heard,
    Mr. Chairman, in my more than 40 years of involvement with the
    military. It is abundantly clear that the Secretary of the Air
    Force has been--he has proved himself totally incapable of
    handling this issue.
        In 1993, Mr. Chairman, there was a problem at the Naval
    Academy. We appointed an outside committee. That was appointed
    with nine outside civilians that were appointed by the Board of
    Visitors, and the Secretary of the Navy and examined the honor
    concept.
        According to former superintendents, this critical report
    has had an everlasting and positive effect. It is clear now
    that since there has been no assignment of responsibility
    except for ``cadets commit assaults against cadets'' that we
    need an outside board to investigate and to recommend whatever
    remedial action needs to be taken. The Secretary of the Air
    Force is either unable or unwilling to address this issue, and
    that is abundantly clear.
        I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Senator McCain, was that board appointed
    by the then Secretary of the Navy?
        Senator McCain. The Board of Visitors and the Secretary of
    the Navy.
        Chairman Warner. All right.
        Senator McCain. This would have to be done by the Secretary
    of Defense clearly, since the Secretary of the Air Force has,
    as I say, rendered himself incapable.
        Chairman Warner. Then that board reported back--my
    recollection is we brought in Admiral Larson.
        Senator McCain. Yes, sir, we did.
        Chairman Warner. He did a wonderful job of straightening
    that problem out.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a very
    serious issue, and I think everyone is treating it with the
    seriousness and the severity it deserves because it is not just
    about the conduct of cadets, but it is the lessons that they
    take into the Air Force, or the Army, or the Navy.
        We were briefed by the Secretary and the Chief of Staff
    about steps that they are taking. I suspect they will allude to
    those steps today, but I just want to underscore the
    seriousness of this issue that goes way beyond the boundaries
    of just Colorado Springs. It goes to the nature of the leaders
    of the Air Force, and I would say also the other Services,
    because as Senator Levin pointed out, there are situations that
    arise on other campuses.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. We thank you for your comments because we
    view you, as one of the members of our committee, again, as
    Senator McCain, a graduate of the Naval Academy, you are a
    graduate of West Point, so your views hold a lot of merit, as
    do those of Senator McCain.
        Senator Allard, we commend you as a committee on the steps
    you have taken in this matter thus far.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just would say,
    your leadership from the beginning of this crisis has been
    exemplary. Over the last 3 months, you have worked closely with
    me and Senator Collins and others to address the very serious
    problems at the Academy. Your interest and attention to this
    matter have made a difference.
        I appreciate the willingness of Secretary Roche and General
    Jumper to appear before us today, particularly during this
    difficult time. The U.S. Air Force has performed brilliantly
    over the skies of Iraq. Thanks to the outstanding work of our
    airmen, we now have near total air supremacy. I also want to
    commend our personnel at Air Force Space Command. They play a
    major role in our current military operations.
        Our forces on the ground know that they can count on their
    colleagues in the air and space to provide them with the
    support they need when they need it. This remarkable
    achievement is a testament to the Air Force's rigorous training
    and superb leadership. Our Air Force personnel are top-notch,
    the best in the world, and have proven time and time again that
    they are capable of conducting tough missions over unfriendly
    skies.
        The U.S. Air Force Academy plays a critical role in
    sustaining and building upon this excellent cadre of personnel.
    The Academy's core values of ``Integrity First, Service Before
    Self, and Excellence in All We Do'' have built character and a
    respect for human dignity in each cadet. The school's honor
    code has helped transform incoming students into highly
    skilled, professional officers capable of leading dozens of
    enlisted servicemen and non-commissioned officers.
        Since its first graduating class in 1959, the Academy has
    produced thousands of Air Force officers, including over 200
    that have become general officers, who have served our country
    with honor and distinction. The school's contribution to our
    country's security is impossible to measure.
        I believe so strongly in the mission of the Air Force
    Academy that at every opportunity, I recommend it to high
    school students around the State of Colorado, as do my
    colleagues on this committee who are equally supportive of the
    Academy.
        The Academy is built on honor and character, and is seen as
    a critical national asset. The allegations of sexual assault
    and rape at the Academy tarnish the school's reputation and
    reflect poorly on the officers it produces. This crisis goes
    straight to the core values of the institution.
        Let us be honest: This has been a catastrophic failure of
    leadership and process. We must learn from these mistakes and
    strive never to repeat them. We must work together to address
    the current climate of fear at the Academy in a manner that is
    deliberate and unambiguous.
        Since last December, over 40 current and former cadets who
    were allegedly sexually assaulted or raped have approached me
    and my staff. Some of these cadets say they were punished for
    drinking or for having sex in the dormitories after reporting
    sexual assault or rape to Academy officials. Others report that
    key evidence, such as rape kits and investigative reports, was
    lost by the Academy's investigative unit. Most troubling of all
    has been the Air Force's refusal to provide confidentiality to
    those who wish to come forward.
        I am saddened to report that only 2 of the over 40 cadets
    that have approached my office have expressed a willingness to
    discuss their case with the Air Force. Many believe that the
    Air Force will punish or blackball them should they come
    forward. Clearly, a climate of distrust is making the process
    of addressing the problems at the Academy more difficult. A
    credibility gap now exists that may take months, even years, to
    bridge.
        The lack of trust between the Air Force and its cadet corps
    highlights the importance of the investigation by the
    Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG). The DODIG is
    seen as an impartial investigator that is willing to listen to
    the concerns of cadets that were allegedly sexually assaulted
    or raped. Many of the cadets that have approached my office
    seem to be willing to discuss their case with the DODIG. It is
    my hope and expectation that the DODIG will quickly seize upon
    this opportunity. It is also imperative that the Air Force
    cooperate with the DODIG as well.
        I appreciate the way Secretary Roche and General Jumper
    have approached these allegations. They were quick to recognize
    the severity of the problems at the Academy and immediately
    ordered a high-profile investigation. I and many of my
    colleagues will be very interested in reviewing the results of
    this investigation once it is completed.
        Secretary Roche and General Jumper also recently announced
    several actions that will hopefully bring the process of
    addressing the cultural problems at the Academy. Replacing the
    Academy's current leadership will be key to ensuring that these
    new measures would be implemented without distraction.
        The lack of attention paid by the Academy's leadership to
    the annual cadet climate surveys, which were recently provided
    to my office, was particularly inexcusable. Each of these
    annual surveys, going back to 1998, clearly indicates a
    pervasive problem with sexual assaults at the Academy.
        Mr. Chairman, I want to let you know that I plan to offer
    legislative language that will require the Secretary of the Air
    Force to report to this committee for the next 5 years on the
    number of reported sexual assaults and rapes, the number of
    prosecuted cases, and actions taken by the Air Force to address
    these sexual assaults and rapes. I believe it is imperative
    that we closely monitor this situation over the next several
    years.
        Again, I thank our witnesses, and I look forward to their
    testimony and to the question and answer period.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. That language would be
    considered in the course of the annual authorization.
        Senator Allard. I hope to bring it forward at that time.
    Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. All right. Thank you very much.
        Senator Dayton.
        Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
    you, Mr. Chairman, for bringing this hearing to the public
    arena so rapidly and also for your leadership in getting us
    right through this regardless of where it leads. Thank you very
    much.
        Senator Allard, also, who is the spirit of this, along with
    you, I commend you also for your leadership.
        I think, Mr. Chairman, you and the ranking member, Senator
    Levin, and Senator McCain, and others who have spoken here have
    covered many of these areas very well. I would just say
    briefly, I think Senator Allard said it is a tragic
    juxtaposition that we have right now a war in which we are
    seeing the best of the Air Force and its courageous pilots and
    others involved in that effort, and now we are dealing with
    this matter which really, I think, is the worst of the Academy.
        I have been also involved in nominating two women who have
    been admitted to the Academy, and I feel very personally
    responsible and alarmed even though--and I do not know their
    outcomes--but to think that we are nominating or sending young
    women to the Academy to go through these kinds of experiences
    and humiliations and then have their lives, if not their
    careers, seriously impaired is, just to me, abhorrent. The fact
    that it has gone on so long without any attention at the very
    top--and I recognize that this preceded your arrival there--but
    is just to me just shocking, and the Armed Forces have set in
    the past very high standards for America's young men and women.
        Its acceptance of all Americans into the Academy, into its
    ranks, they have played a very crucial role in integrating
    these men and women into American society and in the past in
    its acceptance and integration of racial minorities and others.
    It has set the lead for our society in these important
    respects. In this case, it is clearly not only lagging the
    country, but it is proceeding in exactly the wrong direction.
        The number of incidents that have occurred in the last 8 or
    10 years, the fact that none were reported for the previous 20
    years since women were admitted to the Academy, indicates to me
    that this is probably the tip of the iceberg in terms of what
    has transpired there over these years.
        The victims have been punished, and the perpetrators in
    many cases have been promoted, which is sending exactly the
    wrong message and creating an ethic which is antithetical to
    the values of this society, which the Air Force is tasked to
    defend and which it has done so courageously in the past, and
    is doing so today.
        I would say that the change in leadership is a necessary
    beginning, but this will not be completed until there have been
    fundamental changes made in the structure of the Academy and
    the content of its activities and its life and until the
    victims, to the extent possible, every one of them, have had
    their situations, their careers, if they are still in the Air
    Force, remedied and that they have not been sanctioned in ways
    that have lasting effects on their careers; and if they have
    left the Service, an effort has been made to remediate their
    situations, and ensure the violators have been punished.
        I would--reflective of what I have also read in some of the
    views that are under--still current even as regards this
    inquiry and these actions that have been taken, I would support
    what Senator McCain said about the need for an outside
    investigation. I do not believe that it is possible that this
    will be completed to my satisfaction, if it is just an inside
    inquisition.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. I, likewise, am going
    to take to heart Senator McCain's recollection of what
    transpired when both of us were serving on this committee, all
    of us or many of us, several years ago.
        Actually, it was Deputy Secretary of State Armitage who
    headed up that panel.
        Secretary Roche. Headed it up, yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. But I think we should take a look and see
    what the IG of the Department of the Air Force, and the IG of
    the Department of Defense conclude. I know that the Deputy
    Under Secretary of Defense, Charlie Abell, is gravely concerned
    about this matter.
        Senator Collins, we thank you for your work on this in your
    capacity as Chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee. You
    have a special interest in the IG investigations. I commend you
    for your work.
        Senator Collins. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
    thank you and Senator Allard for your leadership in examining
    very closely the response of the Air Force to the many reports
    of sexual assault at the Air Force Academy.
        It has always been one of my proudest honors to nominate
    young men and women to attend our Service academies. I have
    always thought in doing so that I was affording these young men
    and women an extraordinary opportunity to receive an excellent
    education while serving their country. I never dreamed that in
    doing so, I was putting young women at risk for sexual assault.
    That troubles me deeply, and it angers me.
        When I hear Senator Allard talk about year after year the
    cadet climate survey revealing that women had been assaulted, I
    do not understand how that information was ignored. Indeed, in
    1 year, some 167 cadets reported sexual assaults, and the
    response seems to be that in the next year they deleted the
    question. That is very troubling to me.
        It angers me that it has taken a press report to finally
    prompt the Air Force to take action to deal with these
    allegations, after these allegations had surfaced year after
    year in these surveys, as well as in the reports of the young
    cadets themselves.
        Even now, there appears to be a reluctance to hold Academy
    leaders accountable absent congressional pressure to do so. It
    should not take a press expose and congressional hearings to
    force the Air Force to deal with this serious problem. I am
    shocked and appalled that that is apparently what it took to
    focus the attention of the leaders of the Academy and the
    leaders of the Air Force on this problem.
        I do not doubt the sincerity of the Secretary and the
    General when you tell us that you are committed to solving this
    problem, but I do not understand why it has taken years for
    these allegations to be taken seriously and for the climate to
    be changed, and for people to be held accountable. That is why
    I have reached the conclusion that the Air Force no longer has
    the credibility to deal with this issue. I have pressed from
    the beginning for at least an investigation by the Inspector
    General of the Department of Defense as well as congressional
    hearings to delve into this because, based on the evidence I
    have seen, I have lost confidence in the Air Force's ability to
    investigate itself because it should have done so years ago.
        Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing and for
    your leadership and the leadership of Senator Allard and many
    others on this committee.
        Chairman Warner. Senator, I know in your own committee you
    will be looking at aspects of this case.
        Senator Pryor.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not have
    anything to say other than to echo everything that has been
    said. I agree completely and I look forward to hearing from the
    witnesses today.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Chambliss, you have an equal
    responsibility to us as chairman of the Personnel Subcommittee.
    Ordinarily, these matters originate in your subcommittee and,
    if necessary, come before the full committee. But in this
    instance, we felt it imperative to do it with your concurrence.
        Senator Chambliss. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that too,
    because it does show the level that this issue has risen to
    from the standpoint of how you and our colleagues are treating
    this issue. You are treating it with all the due seriousness
    with which it needs to be treated.
        I went home this weekend thinking that I would spend 30, 45
    minutes in preparation for this hearing. I took all of the news
    accounts, all the correspondence home with me, and I wound up
    spending several hours reading, re-reading some of it.
        Mr. Secretary and General Jumper, I will have to tell you I
    am just totally--not just appalled at what has been going on
    for apparently about a decade at the Air Force Academy, it is a
    lot more than that. There appears to be an attitude at the Air
    Force Academy that not just condones what has been happening,
    but it just seems like it is part of the accepted life, if you
    believe the accounts. I do not believe everything I read in the
    press. But I know you two gentlemen very well, both of you. I
    know that you would never condone the type of activity that is
    obviously going on out there.
        I am not sure where we need to go with this. You gentlemen
    have jumped on this early, and I know you have some
    recommendations, some things you have already done, some other
    recommendations you are going to make, but I tend to agree with
    Senator McCain that we have to bring in somebody from the
    outside to tell us where we need to go.
        The one other thing, Mr. Chairman, that concerns me is the
    fact that the leaders in the United States Air Force usually
    come from the Academy. If this type of activity has gone on at
    the Academy, and every cadet must know it has been going on,
    and they just have to, then what has been going on in the Air
    Force?
        That really concerns me about where we are. I think that
    this issue may need to be broadened beyond just the Air Force
    Academy, West Point, and Annapolis into some other areas, which
    I will look forward to discussing with you and other members of
    the committee. I thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. We will now hear from
    our witnesses.
        Mr. Secretary.

     STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES G. ROCHE, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE;
    ACCOMPANIED BY HON. MARY WALKER, GENERAL COUNSEL, UNITED STATES
                               AIR FORCE

        Secretary Roche. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin,
    members of the committee. We appear before you today to report
    on our agenda for change in the United States Air Force Academy
    as a result of complaints regarding incidents of sexual assault
    there and our response to those complaints.
        Mr. Chairman, shortly after I became the Secretary and
    General Jumper became the Chief, we started to spend more and
    more of our time looking at the Air Force Academy, including
    issues of recruited athletes, curriculum--we changed the
    curriculum--altered how to recruit athletes, spent a year
    looking at the honor system and had it revised so as to make it
    a more effective system.
        We are appalled at what we have found, and I do not think
    anyone should think that we have not been. We are both appalled
    and embarrassed on behalf of our country for what we have
    found.
        Since January of this year, we have engaged in a
    comprehensive review of the investigative procedures,
    disciplinary processes, and overall climate at the Academy. Our
    focus throughout has been on fulfilling our goals of educating,
    training, and inspiring Air Force leaders of the highest
    character and integrity, ensuring the safety and security of
    every cadet, and enhancing the trust and confidence of the
    American people in the Academy. We also want to make sure we do
    not graduate and commission any criminals who have committed
    crimes while at the Academy. We have said that over and over.
        It is still a superlative institution and has graduated
    many fine officers. We believe that the proportion of the
    Academy in any given class who has been a problem for the other
    cadets is small.
        We also share in the sense of why the larger group of
    cadets did not know more about this and why, in many cases,
    they did not act themselves. We have tried to think through and
    understand why leaders at the Academy, for at least the last 10
    years, but certainly--I agree with Senator Dayton--since this
    goes back many decades, why they came to the views that they
    did.
        We have both read the summaries of each of the cases that
    have come forward and have tried to base our recommendations on
    those. This issue came to us in January as a result of an
    anonymous e-mail.
        Chairman Warner. What total number of cases is that? That
    is an important statement you just made.
        Secretary Roche. We went back only to 1993, sir. That is
    54, 56 if you add two new ones. Senator Dayton is quite
    correct. Up until about 1992, there were none reported, which
    we found to be extraordinary that there would not be a report.
    The issue then blossoms in 1993, and measures at----
        Chairman Warner. ``Blossom'' is not a good word.
        Secretary Roche. Excuse me.
        Chairman Warner. Try again.
        Secretary Roche. The issue comes to light and is more
    explosive when a number of cadets complain, and General Hosmer,
    who was the Superintendent at the time in the Air Force, then
    instituted a number of actions which they believed would
    address this problem.
        We, then, in our investigation pick up from 1993 so as to
    not have any intervening years. In other words, it is not just
    this year or the last year or 2, but we wanted to go back in
    more depth. We were able to contact the author of an e-mail
    that came to us in January that was sent to us, as well as to
    some Members of Congress, including Senator Allard. We asked
    her if she would be willing to come and speak to us. She did,
    and also brought another former cadet as well. What they had to
    tell us raised serious concerns.
        Based on these reports, we chartered a working group in
    January under the leadership of the Air Force General Counsel,
    the Honorable Mary Walker, who is with me today. While the
    preliminary report is available and we can give it to you, Mr.
    Chairman, the completed report should take another 2 weeks,
    while they collate a number of documents they have just
    received and sharpen each of the points.
        In our charter of the team, we asked them to undertake a
    comprehensive review of the Air Force Academy program and
    practices to deter and respond to sexual assault incidents and
    to report their findings with respect to responsiveness,
    effectiveness, and fairness of our current programs.
        Based on the preliminary report, our own personal
    involvement, interaction with people at the Academy and
    elsewhere and former officers, and the need to prepare to
    accept a new class in less than 90 days, we decided to act and
    issue the changes we issued last week. If needed, we have said
    we would issue additional changes.
        Separately, we asked the Air Force Inspector General to
    review any case about which an alleged victim complained or
    about which the first investigative group found something that
    deserved a more in-depth look.
        When the DODIG was asked to join, we had hoped they would
    have taken over all of the cases so as to ensure that there was
    no sense of the Air Force covering anything up. We tried to do
    a climate look very quickly and to get into a much broader
    look, including how faculty deal with students across the
    board, as well as these particular measures. With regard to
    individual cases--since so often these are cases of--that
    cannot go all the way to court-martial, there is insufficient
    evidence; and because there are two sides to the case, we
    wanted to have a very objective look. The DODIG is working with
    the Air Force IG to do a dispassionate, independent look.
        We have benefitted greatly from congressional input,
    especially members of the Air Force Academy Board of Visitors,
    including Senator Allard, and you, Mr. Chairman, have been
    especially helpful in pointing me in various directions as we
    have tried to do this. There have also been members of the
    House who have done it.
        Both General Jumper and I went out to the Air Force Academy
    to make it clear from both of us that we will not tolerate in
    our Air Force, nor in our Academy, those who sexually assault
    others; those who would fail to act to prevent assaults; those
    who fail to report assaults; or those who would shun or harass
    any cadet who has the courage to report incidents of criminal
    behavior.
        The preliminary findings, sir, in the report, which we can
    give you, they include such things as: there are significant
    indications that the primary value among many cadets is loyalty
    to each other, rather than loyalty to values of our Air Force
    and values of our country in many respects. In other words,
    they will protect each other even when they know of instances
    where they should report them.
        There have been repeated indications through cadets,
    faculty, and staff interviews indicating cadet unwillingness to
    report fellow cadets even for criminal behavior including
    sexual assault. Interviews suggest that this loyalty manifests
    itself in a fear of ostracism if they appear to be disloyal to
    the group, and they appear to believe that reporting is
    inconsistent with the culture that says cadets are supposed to
    support one another.
        But we also noted that the processes we use to encourage
    sexual assault reporting, processes implemented in 1993, some
    of them have had the unintended effect of impeding or
    preventing altogether the investigation of reported assaults,
    and remove the process from the chain of command.
        We have verified that prior to the completion of some OSI
    investigations, at least some cadet victims have received
    notice of discipline action for violating cadet regulations,
    where the behavior arose from prohibited activity related to
    assault complaints.
        Now, we do this almost exactly the way the Naval Academy
    has done it. However, it appears to be a much greater problem
    at the Air Force Academy. We believe part of this problem has
    been a poor feedback loop to the victim so that the victim knew
    what was going on. That has come from a misunderstanding of a
    legal position having to do with the protection of privacy of
    the accused that can be easily fixed.
        Our overall sense, and this we are not proud to say, is
    that a female airman first class on an Air Force base has a far
    better support structure if a problem arises, a far better
    process in the chain of command to deal with the problem than a
    female cadet at the Air Force Academy. That needs to be
    changed.
        We have noted that there have been definitional problems.
    The Academy has used a different definition of ``assault'' than
    has been used at our Air Force bases. For instance, there is
    confusion as to the role of alcohol in giving consent, whether
    consent can or cannot be given if someone feels they are
    alcohol impaired. The problem is, under the law, alcohol
    impairment is a range of things, not a blanket zero one. There
    may have been misunderstandings on the part of a number of the
    cadets.
        At the same time, over the course of the last 2\1/2\
    months, one of the things that has struck General Jumper and me
    is the number of women officers who we know professionally, who
    would stop one or the other of us and say, ``I have never told
    anyone before, but this is what happened to me.''
        It has driven us more than these particular cases, and in
    fact, these go clearly over a very long period of time since a
    number of these officers are now quite senior. We agree that no
    person, no woman should have to undergo some of the things that
    they have had to bear with in order to become an officer in our
    Air Force. That is wrong.
        We have become aware of other aspects of the Academy which
    we believe contribute to the overall climate at the Academy
    that need to be changed. The cadets are learning the wrong
    things about the role of athletics, about the role of sexual
    humor, about the role of what we are teaching male cadets that
    is inimical to their relationships with the female cadets.
        If I may, Mr. Chairman, before turning it over to General
    Jumper, at least make our position clear on the issue of
    replacing the leaders. I believe I have read every or at least
    a summary of every case. I have worked with these officers. One
    has only been there 18, 19 months, and the other has been
    there----
        Chairman Warner. Let us identify them and give them periods
    of time here.
        Secretary Roche. Yes. General Gilbert is in his 19th month
    right now. General Dallager has been there 3 years. General
    Gilbert is the commandant and the officer responsible for
    administering discipline.
        I have spoken with the former Chief of Staff of the Air
    Force. General Gilbert was charged specifically when he went
    out there to deal with disciplinary issues having to do with a
    rather extensive set of complaints and allegations in cases
    involving drugs, and so he has been a tough disciplinarian.
        When I have looked over the cases and looked at both sides
    of the cases--and before asking the Inspector General to look
    to see if there is more that we do not see--and in discussions
    with the General Counsel in the preliminary review and people
    on her team, the sense was that while these officers should be
    replaced, that due process suggests that there is nothing about
    which you can accuse them of the last 18 months, especially the
    last 18 months, that has not been in place for a long time, and
    the fact that they were trying to change.
        Now, they were not putting enough rudder into it, not doing
    enough. We felt that we had to give them very explicit sets of
    directions in order to do more. But it is not that these men
    were callous, Mr. Chairman. It was not that they were not
    trying. In fact, in the cases that came up in the course of
    General Gilbert's tenure of cadet-on-cadet sexual assault,
    there were four. Of those four, three are still open and one
    case was disposed of.
        In many cases, he tried to do things. He tried to take
    cases to court-martial, only to be told by the judge advocates
    that there was insufficient evidence to go to court-martial.
    Whenever he could, if there were administrative reasons to
    discipline a cadet, he did, including having cadets
    disenrolled.
        He also took action against a cadet who had committed an
    off-base crime where the local district attorney would not take
    action. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, General
    Gilbert and General Dallager did take the individual to court-
    martial. The individual is currently serving time in jail for
    the assault against a civilian female.
        So our sense was that while something may come up, and we
    made it clear later on in that same press conference, that if
    something came up in the Inspector General's look that we could
    not see, we would go back and hold any officer accountable.
    With what we saw, and based on what the General Counsel was
    able to tell us about the investigation to date, there was
    plenty of reason to remove these officers so as to have a fresh
    team of leaders--and it may be that the business analogy was an
    inappropriate one. It was just one that is familiar to me,
    while we need to bring in a new group of officers, due process
    would suggest that we could not hold these officers accountable
    for having failed, given their legal advice and what had
    occurred over a very long period of time. I will be able to
    talk about any of that in detail.
        Chairman Warner. I will return to this during the course of
    the questioning period.
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. Have you completed your statement, Mr.
    Secretary?
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. Chief of Staff.

    STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN P. JUMPER, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES
                               AIR FORCE

        General Jumper. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, I want to
    reiterate to both of you, as I have to you and many of the
    distinguished members of the committee here over time, my total
    commitment to ensure to you and to members of the committee and
    to the American people that we will graduate from the United
    States Air Force Academy cadets of character, honor, and
    integrity. We will take whatever actions are necessary to
    correct the climate that has caused any deviation from that
    course.
        As has been said today, the standards of the United States
    Air Force are being demonstrated daily in the skies over Iraq.
    I think that our job is to make sure that those standards exist
    at our United States Air Force Academy.
        Indeed, as the Secretary said, we do have a climate
    problem. We have obviously allowed a climate to evolve at the
    Air Force Academy that prevents alleged victims from coming
    forward and from having their allegations taken seriously. That
    is what we have heard from several alleged victims.
        We are standing by and we are encouraging everyone to come
    forward to give us any information they can possibly give us to
    allow us to get to the bottom of these allegations. We have
    gone to Senator Allard, as he well knows, and he has been very
    helpful on this, to ask him to approach those who have come to
    him and let them come forward.
        Many of these, I think, are no longer on active duty, and
    even the ones that are, there is now a new team in place that
    will receive these allegations in the right spirit and be able
    to deal with them as they are presented with the rights of the
    victims in mind.
        The Secretary and I, as the Secretary said, went out and we
    specifically addressed the cadet wing, the entire cadet wing,
    each of us separately and individually. We talked to the cadet
    wing about their responsibility, to understand their
    responsibility with regard to making sure that no criminals
    graduate from the Air Force Academy and to help us implement
    the new changes that will make sure of that and give them the
    opportunity to help us weed out the criminals among them.
        We have in our recommended changes a group of steps that
    will help us change the conditions that have sometimes
    contributed to an environment where predators might be able to
    take advantage of the opportunities; situations in the
    dormitories in which rules over time did lapse and erode the
    basic dignity that should exist between males and females in
    any situation. How you leave your door open in your room. How
    you room together or separately in the dormitory areas. Things
    like that we can easily correct and it will give each of the
    cadets an opportunity to provide themselves mutual support in
    an environment where some predator might otherwise emerge.
        The changes that we make will allow victims to come forward
    and enter the process at any point, and at any point make sure
    that there are advocates for that victim who will take that
    case seriously. They will ensure that the right sort of trained
    people are present to deal with these, not only the facts of
    the case, but the emotions of the case, which, Mr. Chairman,
    often overwhelm the details and the facts.
        Finally, let me talk to accountability as well. As the
    Secretary said, what we have said publicly, what I have said
    repeatedly in public is that when the accounts are in, when the
    reports are all in, and we assess the details of those reports,
    if there are situations where legitimate victims have come
    forward and they have not been properly heard or they have or
    their allegations have been somehow set aside, or that known
    criminals have been protected in some way, then I can guarantee
    you, Mr. Chairman, that accountability and responsibility would
    be found at the same level.
        I have said this repeatedly, sir, and I repeat it to you
    again today: The Superintendent of the United States Air Force
    Academy reports to the Chief of Staff. No one takes this
    situation more seriously than I do. No one has more at stake as
    far as the reputation of this institution than the Secretary of
    the Air Force and I do.
        Sir, I can guarantee you that I have spared no energy--even
    in the face of this war--nor will I spare any energy to get to
    the bottom of this and to make sure that corrections are put
    into place that you have confidence in and this committee has
    confidence in, and the American people have confidence in.
        I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, General Jumper.
        [The prepared joint statement of Secretary Roche and
    General Jumper follows:]

       Prepared Joint Statement by Hon. James G. Roche and Gen. John P.
                        Jumper, United States Air Force

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. We appear before
    you to report on our efforts to make the necessary reforms at the
    United States Air Force Academy as a result of complaints regarding
    incidents of sexual assault there and the institutional response to
    these complaints.
        The United States Air Force Academy exists to educate, train, and
    inspire so that each graduate is a commissioned leader of character
    committed to our core values of integrity, service, and excellence.
    Above all else, the Air Force Academy is a military organization
    designed to serve the Air Force and our Nation. In pursuit of its goal
    to produce leaders of character, the Academy must establish and nurture
    policies that emphasize the character expected from commissioned Air
    Force officers. To remain relevant to the larger Air Force, the Academy
    will not be managed as a separate entity; rather, it must reflect the
    values and norms of the broader Air Force while maintaining the high
    academic standards of a world-class university.
        We've been engaged in a comprehensive review of the investigative
    procedures, disciplinary processes, and overall climate at the United
    States Air Force Academy. Our focus throughout this process has been on
    fulfilling our goals of educating, training, and inspiring Air Force
    leaders of the highest character and integrity, ensuring the safety and
    security of every cadet, and enhancing the trust and confidence of the
    American people in the Academy. As a result of this review, we issued
    the Superintendent of the Air Force Academy the enclosed policy
    directive that comprises the initial collective judgment of the
    leadership of the United States Air Force on how to fulfill these
    objectives. Enclosed is a copy of that directive. Our objective is to
    ensure these measures are substantially in place prior to the arrival
    of the incoming class of 2007. We look forward to discussing our Agenda
    for Change with the committee.
                                     ______

         MEMORANDUM FOR SUPERINTENDENT, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY
          subject: united states air force academy--agenda for change
        1. The United States Air Force Academy (USAFA) exists to educate,
    train, and inspire our future leaders. In concert with a review of
    investigative procedures, disciplinary processes, and the overall
    climate at USAFA, we have compiled the attached directives designed to
    ensure the safety and security of every cadet and to enhance the trust
    and confidence of the American people in the Academy.
        2. The introduction of this directive document reinforces those
    characteristics we expect to underscore the mission and values of the
    United States Air Force Academy. Character, leadership, integrity, and
    honor are the values we must instill in every cadet and future officer
    of the United States Air Force. These principles have guided our
    development of the attached directives. Specific measures are outlined
    under four principal headings: Leadership, Cadet Life, Officer/NCO
    Selection, and Broader Academy Climate. We expect these changes to be
    implemented immediately and to be substantially in place by the arrival
    date of the incoming cadet class of 2007. An implementation team will
    assist your efforts to fully implement the enclosed policies and
    procedures.
        3. These measures comprise the initial collective judgment of the
    leadership of the United States Air Force, and further initiatives may
    be considered as appropriate. We look forward to working with all the
    stakeholders of the United States Air Force Academy to rebuild the
    climate and culture at the institution and to strengthen its ability to
    develop outstanding scholars and warriors to serve as officers in the
    United States Air Force.
                                                John P. Jumper,
                                          General, USAF Chief of Staff.

                                                James G. Roche,
                                            Secretary of the Air Force.
    Attachment:
        As stated
        DISTRIBUTION: C

        Chairman Warner. You and I have a very strong and mutual
    friendship based on common roots going years back in our early
    life.
        General Jumper. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. I have the highest personal regard for
    you, and I detect in your testimony deep feeling.
        General Jumper. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. This case is unfortunate, particularly at
    this critical time in your career where otherwise you and your
    colleagues are brilliantly directing the progress of the air
    elements of this war.
        General Jumper. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Warner. I commend you for that, personally.
        General Jumper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. I guess what I want to do is to go back
    and try and clarify what is in writing here with regard to this
    issue of accountability.
        I have before me what purports to be a news release from
    the United States Department of the Air Force. I read the
    following, ``The new leadership team has been briefed on the
    Air Force directive announced today and will be empowered to
    take full ownership with the changes in dealing with recent
    sexual misconduct allegations, as well as the broader
    environment at the Academy. Roche said that while the cadet
    behavior is at the core of this issue, the leadership must be
    responsible and accountable for the larger environment at this
    institution. `As the problems regarding sexual assault
    allegations predate the current leadership, we do not hold
    Generals Dallager or Gilbert responsible,' he said. `Still,
    change must occur, and a new leadership team to implement these
    changes is in the best interest of the Academy and the Air
    Force.' ''
        My first question is: Why did you not await the conclusion
    of at least your own investigation, I think prudence would have
    dictated awaiting the Defense Department's investigation--prior
    to making the statement, ``We do not hold Generals Dallager or
    Gilbert responsible''?
        Secretary Roche. Sir, I took the position that for the 10-
    year period where we were making the report with all the data,
    they could not have been responsible for that period.
        Chairman Warner. Do you mean any part of the period?
        Secretary Roche. I looked at the period that they were
    there, sir.
        Chairman Warner. Yes, and you gave the times.
        Secretary Roche. In particular, General Gilbert. I looked
    at the cases that were involved. As I said, there were four
    cases of cadet versus cadet. Under those circumstances, three
    are still open, and one was disposed of. On that basis and the
    basis that he had made an insensitive comment about how a young
    woman should be protecting herself----
        Chairman Warner. Which officer are we speaking of?
        Secretary Roche. General Gilbert.
        Chairman Warner. Right.
        Secretary Roche. My sense was that he needed to be
    replaced, that he could not carry on anew with a new set of
    directions, given the climate that was there. That in order to
    have a new climate, we needed to have new people in place. I
    could not find something to base a letter of reprimand or
    anything else on that I would not have to go back and find
    every other commandant who had been there, because the
    proportion that he is responsible for was less than many
    others. The survey data that Senator Allard refers to, some of
    the early surveys are considered not valid because the sample
    size was too small, et cetera.
        But in the last two, the trend since General Gilbert got to
    the Academy having to do with reprisals or sexual harassment,
    improves. So it became a very mixed case. It became an issue
    of, in my belief, these officers should leave because we needed
    to give very strong rudder orders to the Academy, but there was
    no reason based on what we knew to hold them accountable at
    this time. However, we did say at the same press conference,
    and it is not in the announcement, that if something were to
    come up in the Inspector General's reviews that we would, of
    course, hold any officer accountable.
        Chairman Warner. Facts speak for themselves, but you say
    three of the cases were still open on General Gilbert's watch,
    is that correct?
        Secretary Roche. Yes, of cadet-on-cadet, yes.
        Chairman Warner. Is that not reason alone to not come out
    publicly and say you are not going to hold them accountable?
        Here, let me just make this observation. I draw on some
    modest experience, having been an Assistant U.S. Attorney,
    conducted investigations, having had jobs commensurate with
    yours for 5 years-plus. Once people read this and the
    investigation is ongoing, then the investigator goes to a
    subordinate of General Dallager, and suddenly the subordinate
    says, ``He is not going to be held accountable. Why in the
    world should I give the investigators facts?''
        Do you not think this could have negatively impeded the
    ability of the IG of the Department of Defense, the IG of the
    Air Force, with the ongoing investigation to have this
    statement made at this time?
        Secretary Roche. Sir, at the time, I did not think that,
    no.
        Chairman Warner. You did what?
        Secretary Roche. At the time, I did not think it would
    impair either the Air Force IG or the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense IG, in looking at the cases and looking at whether
    there was any violation of procedures or processes which they
    will look at.
        Chairman Warner. But it could well have affected the
    witnesses that they were, on an ongoing basis, going to talk
    to. I will just make this observation.
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir. I take your observation.
        Chairman Warner. I just can't believe it. You went on, this
    is a transcript of the press conference, let us see. You say
    here, ``To suggest that it is their fault would really miss the
    point. The climate did not start 3 years ago, ma'am. Their
    officers, their predecessors, us, our predecessors at the Air
    Force have let the place down by shortchanging in money and in
    manning in terms of the Air Officers Commandry. There is a lot
    of responsibility, bad legal advice.''
        I understood you to say you felt you could not issue a
    letter of reprimand to the current superintendent because you
    would have to issue them to the previous superintendents. I
    can't follow that line of reasoning.
        Secretary Roche. Mr. Chairman, my views were that the
    situation had occurred over a very long period of time. These
    last officers did nothing that I could find that suggested that
    they failed in their responsibility to adhere to the processes
    that were in place. A number of those processes, I believe,
    were mistaken. I believe based on some bad legal advice, they
    were mistaken.
        I also believe that the Air Force, by not fulfilling its
    obligation to ensure that these Air Officers Commanding, which
    are like the major level officers who work with the cadet
    squadrons, that they were not given the proper education and
    the proper training, that the enlisted or senior enlisted
    people were removed from the chain of command over time. All of
    this contributed to the climate.
        Chairman Warner. I am running over my time, but believe me,
    I do not know how much training you have to do to deal with
    these cases. This is plain old common sense; standards that
    were largely taught to us by our parents and at every step of
    our life as we progressed, whether we were in the Air Force or
    anything else, sir. When it is wrong, we know it is wrong.
        Secretary Roche. When issues came to the commandant, each
    one that I had read, he sought to do the right thing.
        Chairman Warner. All right. General Jumper, can you answer
    my question, or do you wish to----
        General Jumper. Sir, I will tell you that we looked at each
    and every case. We have not been through the detailed analysis
    yet that the IG still has to do, and that will come to us over
    the next 2 weeks. If something comes to us that has not come to
    us yet, that tells us that the leadership of the Academy did
    not approach any single case with the full intention of dealing
    with the facts that were put before them, or they hid
    information, or they harbored or protected anyone.
        Chairman Warner. Okay. Well, then, why did you not wait
    until those reports were in your hand before publicly making
    this statement?
        General Jumper. Sir, along with that statement, not
    reported was a statement that said if this evidence comes to us
    as a result of this report, we will take action and the people
    will be held accountable. That was not reported.
        Chairman Warner. Well, I have made my case.
        Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. The problem is both of you are talking about
    the cases that were reported to the commandant. It is the cases
    that were not reported because of the climate that you are not
    addressing and which is a major issue.
        The fact that these particular commanders inherited a
    climate is irrelevant. It is like saying that something was
    done improperly before they got there, and they continued to do
    things improperly; therefore, they are off the hook. No, they
    are not. No way.
        If the climate is improper, which you both acknowledge it
    is and was, the fact that it was improper before they got there
    is not relevant to their accountability. You, instead, talk
    about, ``Well, there were four cases.'' Maybe he handled four
    cases, or they handled four cases properly. What about the 14
    or 40 or 400 that were discouraged from reporting anything
    because of the climate? What about them?
        Secretary Roche. Senator, I absolutely agree with you that
    the climate was bad, but also----
        Senator Levin. No, you do not agree. You do not agree with
    me, because you are saying that you are not going to hold
    anybody accountable for continuing a climate that they
    inherited. You do not agree with me.
        Secretary Roche. In particular, General Gilbert and General
    Dallager used the survey that they were told was the one that
    was valid, the one that was done at the end of 2002. They
    briefed the corps of cadets. They went through the processes
    that had been there in place, like the reporting process, the
    education process, et cetera, and instituted a number of things
    to try to address the climate survey that came out that they
    believed was the one that was valid to use.
        If they had done nothing, then I would feel that they were
    derelict, but they did try to do things as best they understood
    they could do. Certainly, on any particular case that came
    forward which was actionable, they appeared to take as much
    action as they could take.
        Senator Levin. Are you saying that there is no evidence
    that they continued, permitted, or tolerated a climate where
    cadets were discouraged from reporting sexual assaults?
        Secretary Roche. Sir, I believe they took actions to try to
    ensure that this situation did not arise and, if it arose, to
    prosecute any charges of criminality against someone----
        Senator Levin. You keep wanting to go back to that. I want
    to talk about the climate that discouraged cadets from coming
    forward because people would be ostracized or that people would
    be punished for having too much alcohol or other minor things.
    Are you saying that the people who were in charge of this
    process tried to correct the climate where people, cadets,
    females were ostracized, would be ostracized, thought they
    would be ostracized, or in some way their career would be
    hampered by reporting something where there was too much
    alcohol involved? Are you saying that, that there is no
    evidence of that?
        Secretary Roche. They had an amnesty program, which they
    put in place. It was not a blanket amnesty. They did what is
    done at the other academies, which is to deal with the criminal
    issue first, except in one case where they did not that I am
    aware of, and then went back and tried to hold each of the
    cadets who were also involved accountable for violation of
    Academy regulations.
        Senator Levin. Including the women, the victims?
        Secretary Roche. Including the victim, in one case.
        Senator Levin. That violated their own amnesty doctrine,
    because according to the reports that we have, the procedures
    were to encourage cadets to report sexual assaults to ensure
    they receive available medical and counseling services, and
    that they would generally not be disciplined for self-
    identified violations of cadet instructions, such as pass
    violations, unauthorized alcohol consumption, or unauthorized
    dating which may have occurred in connection with the assault.
        So when you say that after the perpetrator was in some way
    dealt with, they went back and went after the victim, that is
    the problem. That is exactly the problem that they perpetuated
    here. It is no excuse to say that they inherited it.
        Secretary Roche. Sir, I am not trying to say they
    inherited----
        Senator Levin. But they perpetuated it if they went back at
    the victim and they said, ``Okay. Now, we have dealt with the
    alleged perpetrator here, and now we are going to talk to you.
    You had too much alcohol.''
        Secretary Roche. Sir, they would not say they had too much
    alcohol. They would say----
        Senator Levin. Whatever the violation was. It is not
    supposed to have happened under the existing amnesty program.
    So you have announced a new amnesty program which just repeats
    what was previous.
        Secretary Roche. No. The one before was one that could or
    could not be put in place. It also, in the cases before--and I
    am trying to do this from my recollection--where they went
    back, there was no criminal activity proven. It was an,
    oftentimes, he-said/she-said situation. There was insufficient
    evidence to take any action. At that point, they then did issue
    demerits for Academy disciplinary violations.
        Senator Levin. For reporting an incident. You are saying
    people who reported the assault on them were disciplined, given
    a demerit.
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir.
        Senator Levin. Their careers were negatively affected. That
    is the climate that is so horrible, is that the victim----
        Secretary Roche. The climate has two parts, sir, if I can
    finish the one part?
        Senator Levin. No. I want to go right at that.
        Secretary Roche. Yes. At this one----
        Senator Levin. That should not have happened, should it?
        Secretary Roche. There are two sides to this, Senator. I
    can tell you that there are sensible people who say that you
    should hold every cadet accountable for the actions of that
    cadet.
        Senator Levin. Do you say that people who report an assault
    upon them should be given a demerit for something like they
    were dating improperly or there was too much drinking?
        Secretary Roche. As you can tell from the actions we have
    issued, I do not believe that.
        Senator Levin. Fine. I want to know what you believe.
        Secretary Roche. I believe you give the amnesty, and it is
    blanket amnesty.
        Senator Levin. Now, one final question----
        Secretary Roche. The second point on ostracization, which
    you also raised, Senator, in fact, this leadership did try to
    work with the cadet leaders to not have that happen.
        Senator Levin. One final thing: The message in 1995, which
    Senator McCain has referred to, is that commanders will be held
    accountable if they fail to correct the problem. There was a
    problem here. They did not correct it. Not only has no one been
    held accountable--and I agree with the Chairman, if you had
    waited for an Inspector General's report perhaps before you did
    that--but you have exonerated people. You are saying they will
    not be held accountable because they inherited a problem that
    they did nothing about?
        I have to tell you the 1995 message was ignored, it seems
    to me, by these commanders and maybe their predecessors. Not
    only has nobody been held accountable, but nobody is going to
    be held accountable because you have exonerated them in advance
    of an Inspector General's report.
        Secretary Roche. Sir, based on the General Counsel's
    report, preliminary report, and based on what we looked at,
    based on reading the cases, they were removed from their
    position. That is one level of accountability.
        Senator Levin. But for different reasons.
        Secretary Roche. They were removed because I did not have
    confidence in them going forward to be able to do what needed
    to be done.
        Senator Levin. Not for any failure.
        Secretary Roche. The failure was consistent with a series
    of failures, bad legal advice, bad procedures and processes at
    the Academy.
        Senator Levin. My time is up. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Remarkable. General Jumper, you just stated
    we do have a climate problem, and then you went on to talk
    about some of the situations and issues that exist.
        In yours and Secretary Roche's comments at that press
    conference, you said, ``There was an issue. A lot of cadets
    feared coming forward because of peer pressure.''
        You go on to say, ``We will take care of any barrier to a
    person coming forward, and particularly in order to ensure that
    we can get at a crime and make sure we do not commission a
    criminal. If a cadet provides or sells alcohol to someone who
    is under age, you will be disenrolled and disenrolled
    immediately. We will change how we select the officers who will
    be air officers commanding. We will return to the time where we
    sent these officers for a year of education. We have allowed
    ourselves to not make use of one of our greatest assets, our
    non-commissioned officers. We will restore the chain of
    command.''
        There is a series of other things that have to do with what
    I have touched on, cluster around women's washrooms and to help
    understand, think of building with four corners, et cetera. You
    just said that arrangement with rooms should not have existed.
        ``Our old rules about doors being open when people not from
    your room are in your room are going to be restored. We will
    crack down on these.'' All those things were going on until
    when? When did you institute these changes?
        General Jumper. We are in the process of instituting those
    changes now.
        Senator McCain. You are in the process of instituting those
    changes now?
        General Jumper. Yes, sir.
        Senator McCain. They were ``a climate problem for a number
    of years.'' Right?
        General Jumper. Sir, there were a variety of problems for a
    number of years. You are exactly right that we are in the
    process of correcting.
        Senator McCain. Okay. ``No one is going to be
    disciplined,'' in your words, ``because we are going to look at
    each and every case.'' I do not get it, General Jumper. When
    you went to school and you were a young officer, were you not
    told that things that happened under your command you were
    responsible for?
        General Jumper. Yes, sir, I certainly was.
        Senator McCain. If there is a climate under your command
    that requires that all these changes have to be made that you
    and the Secretary said needed to be made, that therefore no one
    is responsible?
        General Jumper. Sir, if the climate has eroded over time
    due to a variety of things that have happened over years, I am
    not sure that it is completely evident at any one moment that
    the climate has deteriorated to that point.
        Senator McCain. But you just stated we have a climate
    problem.
        General Jumper. Yes, sir.
        Senator McCain. You describe some of those problems.
        General Jumper. Yes, sir.
        Senator McCain. They are all being changed now?
        General Jumper. It did evolve over time.
        Senator McCain. Oh, it was an act of God? For instance,
    the----
        General Jumper. I mean, the room arrangement, Senator, as a
    matter of fact, is a room arrangement they use at the other two
    academies. They use it successfully. In this case, we believe
    that it contributes to the problems that we have, that have
    been reported at the Academy. We are trying to create the
    environment where people who have not come forward before now
    feel free to come forward and to take those obstacles that they
    state were limitations and allow them to go away. Many of these
    obstacles are not obstacles in other places, but we are trying
    to correct what we find at the Air Force Academy to be
    obstacles to the population there.
        Senator McCain. Obviously you and I and the Secretary have
    a fundamental disagreement here. You said you have a climate
    problem that has been going on for a long time. Now, you are
    making a huge series, a very significant series of changes that
    need to be made in your view in order to change this climate;
    yet no one is being held responsible for that climate, whether
    it be present or past people in positions of authority. With
    all due respect, that flies in the face of everything I learned
    about accountability and responsibility.
        Mr. Chairman, the testimony we have heard today just
    reinforces my view that we really do need to act. I do not know
    exactly who does it, or how we arrange it to have an outside
    board look at this situation. When people are not even being
    held accountable for situations that they say they are fixing,
    there is something Orwellian about that. I thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Secretary Roche. Senator, may I----
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator McCain.
        Secretary Roche.--may I? Senator, may I?
        Chairman Warner. Sure.
        Secretary Roche. I went over everything we have done with
    the Board of Visitors and made it clear, Senator, I do not
    object to outsiders coming and taking a look at this stage. We
    wanted to do something quickly to ensure that when these new
    cadets come enlist in 90 days, the change was made.
        We told the Board of Visitors that at the next meeting that
    they hold, we will have the finished report. We will go through
    everything. At that point, if we need to bring in some
    outsiders--the Board of Visitors, it will be an issue that we
    will address at that time, as Senator Allard well knows as he
    was on the telephone conference, and we can do that.
        We believe we have acted quickly and firmly with the
    situation that we found has occurred over many years, and we
    have tried to delineate where responsibility went. Senator, I
    well may be wrong, but I believe that the accountability goes
    over so many administrations there that I do not know where to
    begin, except at 1993 and forward.
        Senator McCain. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. I share your views
    about an outside independent look at this.
        We have a problem on our side, Senator Levin, that three of
    us are required to be in the meeting of the chairmen of the
    committees now: myself, Senator McCain, and Senator Collins. I
    am going to ask our colleague who is the Chairman of the
    Subcommittee on Personnel, the Senator from Georgia, if he
    would take over now.
        Would you, Senator Dayton, indulge our colleague from Maine
    to ask a question or two because she must join me, and we have
    to depart?
        Senator Dayton. I would be pleased to defer.
        Chairman Warner. Fine. Thank you very much for your
    courtesy.
        Senator Collins. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
    want to thank my colleagues for their courtesy.
        Mr. Secretary, I, like my colleagues, am having difficulty
    in understanding your response to this very serious problem. I
    do not have the benefit that many of my colleagues on this
    panel have of a military background, but I do have the benefit
    of common sense. I am trying to understand how you can say in
    the Air Force press release issued March 26, which quotes you
    as saying that ``As the problems regarding sexual assault
    allegations predate the current leadership, we do not hold
    General Dallager or Gilbert responsible.''
        Similarly, General Jumper, you have been quoted as saying
    you do not believe that the problem starts with the current
    generation of leadership, but then you go on, both of you, to
    say that the responsible people will be held accountable.
        Are you saying then that unless this problem originated on
    the watch of the leadership that they are not accountable?
        Secretary Roche. No, Senator. What we are saying in the
    second part had to do with the Inspector General's report, if
    something comes up where one or the other of these officers
    have done something for which they should be held accountable,
    they would be.
        In terms of the larger question, when you have a succession
    of changes over time, you can hold the last group accountable,
    but they did not create the climate. The climate was created
    long before they got there, and they believe, Senator--and this
    is I am sure very difficult for others to recognize. They
    believe they were working at it. They did a number of things.
    It is not that they did nothing. They made a number of changes.
        Senator Collins. Since when is it the standard that you
    have to have been there when the problem originated in order to
    be held responsible or accountable? I just do not understand
    that line of reasoning.
        Who are you going to hold accountable if you have already
    exonerated the current leadership absent some new findings by
    the Inspectors General? Who are you going to hold accountable?
        Secretary Roche. Senator, I would take it as follows:
    Starting in 1993, measures were taken which they thought would
    correct things. They did not. I would, in this case, hold that
    administration accountable. Then as each turned over, every 2
    to 3 years, each one of them had a chance to go back and fix
    this, and they did not. But they thought they were doing the
    right thing. They thought by having this system that was
    outside of the chain of command that that was taking care of
    the problem.
        These cases that came up--and there were many more cases
    prior to the arrival of either General Dallager or General
    Gilbert. The larger proportion of cases occur well before them.
    So that it appears, even from the survey data, that things are
    getting better to them. But they, in the most recent survey,
    when they saw that the first class female cadets had little or
    no confidence in the system--although a number of the other
    cadets, the sophomores, juniors, and the freshmen seem to have
    reasonable numbers associated with them, but the seniors did
    not, they began to take additional actions to have additional
    training, to reinforce a number of other measures, measures to
    try to ensure that both the problem of assault and the problem
    of reporting assault were dealt with.
        Senator Collins. Let me tell you what is so troubling,
    because what I am hearing you say is this problem has gone on
    for about a decade at least probably, and people have made good
    faith efforts to try to make some marginal improvements. All
    these assaults continued and, as a result, either everybody is
    responsible or nobody is responsible. That does not sound like
    a system of accountability to me.
        When I read news stories such as one in the March 16 New
    York Times that recounts a story of a female former cadet who
    was raped and then the result is that she receives seven class
    D hits and was sentenced to 265 hours of marching in circles
    because she was drinking, this just reminds me of the whole
    approach of blaming the victim.
        General Jumper, with all due respect, today you used the
    phrase ``legitimate victims.'' Is that as opposed to those who
    you apparently think have contributed to their assaults? I just
    think we have so far to go, and until we start holding people
    truly responsible--I do not care whether it is that someone
    inherited a problem. Presumably being part of the leadership of
    the Academy makes it your responsibility to correct these
    problems.
        Secretary Roche. May I?
        Senator Collins. Yes.
        Secretary Roche. Senator, in the case that you report, I do
    not remember any particular news account, but that is a news
    account of one victim's position. Most of the time, there is
    another side to the story. If a cadet came forward and made an
    allegation, and there was not evidence to go forward in any
    Uniform Code of Military Justice process, then the Academy, as
    does the Naval Academy, goes back to the individuals who were
    involved and awards demerits.
        At the same time, ma'am, sometimes there is not sufficient
    evidence to go to a court-martial to be able to prosecute an
    accused cadet, but there is enough administratively that comes
    out such that the cadet is disenrolled. In most of these cases,
    when they could, they did disenroll the cadets. They went the
    extra mile of ensuring that if something happened off the base,
    off the campus, if they could take the court-martial route,
    they did take the court-martial route.
        Senator Collins. Mr. Secretary, my final comments to you
    today are this: When I hear you say that--I understand that
    there are cases where the evidence may not be strong enough to
    support a criminal conviction, but what I have seen and the
    cases that I have looked at is a very clear pattern of blaming
    the victim and of not correcting the overall culture or climate
    that causes the victim to be blamed. This is not just one or
    two cases. This is not just five or six cases. This is not even
    a dozen cases.
        We have a clear pattern of reports of sexual assault where
    the reaction of the Air Force Academy seems to blame the
    victim, and that is unacceptable. We also have a clear pattern
    where it seems to me that no one is going to be held
    accountable for the climate that has made young women cadets
    fearful of reporting or leads to reprisal if they do, and that
    is unacceptable.
        Secretary Roche. It is unacceptable, Senator. What I am
    trying to say is that in a number of these cases, there was
    another side to the case. I do not believe that there is a
    pattern of holding the victim and making the victim be the
    criminal in this case.
        I know of one case where the Academy acted in ways that
    would be offensive to both you and me, where the victim reports
    something, she wishes to be separated from her accused, and
    they remove her from her squadron and move her to another unit
    when, in fact, they should have removed the accused. But they
    did not because, in prior instances, they had been told by
    counsel that they could not do that. So they were trying to do
    the next best thing which, in fact, had a very bad unintended
    consequence, which was to highlight the victim, as if the
    victim had done something wrong.
        A lot of this is a function of the processes in place. We
    are going beyond the other academies; beyond the other
    academies in saying in order to make sure we cannot have any
    obstruction to finding out about criminal activity, we will
    grant the blanket amnesty to everyone, not just the cadet. Even
    if it comes out to be a ``We cannot go forward with
    prosecution,'' we will still keep the amnesty in place. We will
    grant amnesty to other cadets who happen to be there except for
    the senior cadet or any cadet who blocks the investigation. We
    will go the extra mile.
        Senator Collins. I want to thank my colleagues for their
    courtesy in allowing me to proceed. Thank you.
        Senator Chambliss [presiding]. Thank you.
        Senator Dayton.
        Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        In a published news account, General Gilbert publicly
    acknowledged suggesting to one cadet who alleged she was raped
    that she had exercised poor judgment. According to the report,
    that case involved Lisa Ballas, currently a senior cadet, who
    said she was assaulted in October 2001. Then she had a meeting
    with General Gilbert, reportedly that took place on April 8,
    2002, about 6 months after she said she was raped.
        According to Ms. Ballas, ``It was somehow my fault this
    happened to me, full or partial blame,'' Ballas wrote in her e-
    mail, recounting her meeting with Gilbert. She quoted Gilbert
    as telling her, ``You did not have to go to that party. You did
    not have to drink that night. You did not have to play the card
    game. You did not have to follow him back to the bathroom.''
    Gilbert, in his written comments, confirmed that he made these
    remarks to Ms. Ballas. Ballas said that Gilbert scolded her for
    her behavior leading up to the assault, adding that ``If I had
    my way, you would be marching tours,'' a form of punishment at
    the Academy, right next to her assailant. He did not deny
    making that remark. General Gilbert did not support a court-
    martial for Ballas' alleged assailant because of a lack of
    evidence, as was reported. The male cadet received minor
    punishment. She went on to say, ``We have been made to feel
    that we are to blame for these incidents, and we have to fight
    against our own United States military.''
        In another report, ``Once not very long ago, Kira Mountjoy-
    Pepka's eyes shone bright when she spoke of piloting airplanes.
    Few her age seemed to have so promising a future in aviation.
    But now when the conversation turns to flying, the former U.S.
    Air Force Academy cadet dips her head and stares at the floor.
    Ever since she says a fellow cadet raped her a year ago in her
    freshmen year at the Academy, her dreams of flying F16s and her
    love for the Air Force have crumbled. She was the first--in
    November 2001 she was chosen as the year's first freshman to
    fly an Air Force plane, roaring above the Academy's football
    stadium before a game. But her downward spiral began a year ago
    when a senior cadet whom she knew slightly from the Academy's
    Aero Club raped her in her dormitory room.''
        It goes on to say, ``She struggled academically,
    athletically, she was emotionally devastated. She was harassed
    and hounded by the Academy's leadership for minor disciplinary
    infractions until she finally quit last Christmas. While
    Mountjoy-Pepka remains upset about these sexual assaults, she
    is angriest about her treatment by the Academy's majors,
    colonels, and generals, who she says turned the tables on her
    after she reported the assault. She said some officers
    criticized her for acting affectionately with her cadet
    boyfriend, another cadet. They said she was `no lady' and
    suggested that her behavior was generally promiscuous.''
        Sir, I am astonished that you can say that the climate
    under those individuals in the last 18 months or 2 years has
    been substantially different if these kinds of incidents and
    these kinds of statements, publicly acknowledged by General
    Gilbert to have been made by him, are going on there. I think
    it is a perfect example of how this climate there has caused,
    in this case, two young women, their lives to be almost
    destroyed, certainly seriously damaged. She is out of the Air
    Force Academy. She is out, and she does not have that
    opportunity, and her male perpetrator goes on.
        It is just shameful. To me, it is just shameful that it
    happens and it is even more shameful that the Academy and the
    people in charge there let it happen and just now, even now,
    say give lip service that that general cared about things, but
    do not do a damn thing about it. Shameful.
        Secretary Roche. Senator, the comment made by General
    Gilbert was most certainly insensitive.
        Senator Dayton. Insensitive?
        Secretary Roche. He apologized for it, sir. The
    circumstances surrounding the cases, there are other sides to
    this. These are press reports of one side of a story, Senator.
    If, in fact, things----
        Senator Dayton. She is out of the Air Force, the young
    woman to whom that occurred.
        Secretary Roche. She may well have left the Air Force
    Academy, sir. I do not want to get into any particular case,
    because of privacy rules.
        Senator Dayton. She brought her case to the public.
        Secretary Roche. She brought it public. She is out.
        Senator Dayton. She brought the matter public. The both of
    them did.
        Secretary Roche. But I can't--it would be wrong for us to
    give the other side of the story.
        Senator Dayton. All right. You had mentioned in 1993 that
    the new changes were put into place that were supposed to deal
    with this problem. According to another news account, in 1997
    an annual survey of cadets showed that 10 percent of women
    responding said they had been the victim of a sexual assault in
    the Academy in the previous 12 months. Ten percent of the women
    responding said they had been the victim of a sexual assault at
    the Academy in the previous 12 months. Some 75 percent said
    that if they were raped, they would not report it, out of fear
    of retribution.
        Now, I realize, sir, that you were not there during this
    time, but in terms of the culpability of former
    administrations, I would urge that the Inspector General's
    investigation or this independent investigation, which I am
    persuaded is absolutely necessary, to go back into this. If
    they instituted changes in 1993 and were told in an annual
    survey in 1997 that 10 percent of those responding, even if it
    is not a random sample, said they had been a victim of a sexual
    assault at the Academy in the previous 12 months, and they
    continued to believe that they had dealt with the problem, it
    just blows the mind, sir.
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir. I understand. One of the reasons
    we went back 10 years, Senator, is to be able to have as big a
    vacuum cleaner of these cases as we could, to look over the
    period of time.
        Senator Dayton. How about a vacuum cleaner for those who
    were responsible while this was going on?
        Secretary Roche. It turns out with any given
    administration, you find a similar set of circumstances. But
    you do find them all trying to make use of what was done in
    1993 and in 1996 in character development courses, in hotlines,
    in using the cadet sexual assistance program. You find them in
    each case trying to make these things work. We believe that by
    coming out of the chain of command they, in fact, in some cases
    had the unintended consequences of making them less effective.
        Senator Dayton. What changes were made subsequent to 1997
    to this survey, to changes in the 1993 changes that were--
    clearly at that point not having the desired result?
        Secretary Roche. I am not aware of anything that occurs
    between 1997 and last year.
        Senator Dayton. I would appreciate it if somebody could
    give me that, sir. I would like to know.
        Secretary Roche. I do not think there were any major ones.
    They just kept trying to reinforce what they had, which they
    believed and had been told was the way to go. In terms of the
    particulars of a case, as I say, Senator, there are
    complications on both sides. But if, in fact, the events were
    as reported, which we can't back up in some cases--I do not
    want to say this particular case--then it is shameful. We agree
    with you.
        Senator Dayton. I am not trying the cases. I am trying, but
    I--individually, but the sheer number of them and this kind of
    a response, 10 percent of the women responding, and then as I
    say I would like to see what decisions----
        Secretary Roche. We have looked at all the surveys, even
    those they considered not valid. We have looked at some of the
    comments of the cadets. You get them on both sides. Our sense
    is that there was a major climate problem, and that is why we
    have taken the forcible actions we have taken.
        Senator Dayton. I appreciate that you have done so. I am
    just saying that there is a lot more to be done.
        Secretary Roche. But I agree with you on accountability.
    You would have to go back and look at that administration in
    1997 and find the superintendent and the commandant, and
    whatever is done to the current two, you have to do it for
    those two as well.
        Senator Dayton. And that will be done?
        Secretary Roche. We have asked the Inspector General to at
    any given case at any given period if there is something that
    we should go back and do, we will do it.
        Senator Dayton. One last set of questions, you have
    mentioned a couple of times, Mr. Secretary, the athletic
    department. Is there a set of circumstances that differs from
    the Academy as a whole or are there attitudes or actions there
    that go beyond what has occurred elsewhere in the Academy?
        Secretary Roche. We have a sense, Senator, that there have
    been incidents associated with athletes that we are not proud
    of.
        Senator Dayton. What does it mean that you are not proud
    of?
        Secretary Roche. There are reports that are being looked at
    right now of some of the behavior of some of the athletes. We
    know the athletes have a life that is very different than the
    average cadet, the intercollegiate athletes.
        They do not play intramural sports. We do have training
    tables. In some cases, the information flow between the
    athletic department and the commandant's group running the rest
    of the Academy is such that someone dropped from a team can
    stay at the training table for a year and not be discovered,
    that the professional military education for the
    intercollegiate athletes was not being administered to the same
    degree it is for the others.
        Yet in one of the climate surveys you have 43 percent of
    the intercollegiate athletes who responded say they felt
    prejudiced because they were intercollegiate athletes. Our
    sense was that athletics is a means to an end, not an end in
    itself, and therefore we wanted to bring it under the chain of
    command of the Academy more closely than it has been.
        Senator Dayton. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Chambliss. Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I realize there is difficulty sometimes in assessing the
    degree of guilt as you suggest. So I wonder just what your
    attitude might be about relying on an outside source. For
    example, El Paso County is where the Air Force Academy is
    located. The district attorney in El Paso County has, or
    apparently is, reviewing a number of cases as to whether to
    move forward with some allegations of rape at the Academy or
    not.
        What will be your attitude, Mr. Secretary, and that of the
    Air Force, towards those investigations? Should she decide to
    move forward, would you be helpful in trying to provide her
    with the facts that she would need to move forward with her
    case?
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir, absolutely. Our sense is, as we
    discussed at the Board of Visitors telephone conference, that
    we would re-look at the memorandum of understanding between the
    local jurisdiction and the Academy to see who should have a
    first chance to do something and who should investigate.
        In the past, it has typically been deferred to the military
    because there was a higher probability of getting convictions
    with the military. But we would certainly cooperate with local
    authorities and provide the information that we had--or could
    have--to help her in her look, absolutely.
        Senator Allard. Now, there are a couple of things that you
    have given comments on this afternoon that I have to disagree
    with you based on the information as I know it. I would like to
    go over it with you.
        One of them has to do with whether General Gilbert, on
    wanting to move forward with prosecution, was overridden by the
    JAG. To me that does not make sense. My information tells me,
    it is my understanding the JAGs cannot override the commandant;
    only the superintendent of the Academy can do that.
        From my understanding, it is that the JAG, when these cases
    came forward, asked the commandant if they could not move
    forward with prosecution, and his response was, ``Oh, no. Do
    not worry about it. I can handle it.''
        Secretary Roche. Sir, I do not know anything about the
    latter, and I may have misspoken. The commandant in the one
    particular case did wish to go forward. An investigating
    officer, under Article 32 proceedings, did take a look at the
    evidence and told the commandant there was insufficient
    evidence to be able to go forward and get a conviction at
    court-martial and, therefore, they did not proceed with court-
    martial. Now, I would want to go back and look at the
    particular case to see if administrative actions were taken.
        Whenever General Gilbert could go to the Uniform Code of
    Military Justice on a crime like this, he did. In this case, he
    felt that he would like to go forward; I know that. The judge
    advocate who did the initial investigation said there was
    insufficient evidence to get a conviction.
        Senator Allard. Some of the sources that have at least been
    talking to some of my staff, indicate that it was just the
    opposite; that he was, seemed to be willing to assume those
    responsibilities, and to disregard the recommendation of the
    JAG, but that is water under the bridge. I think we need to
    move forward.
        The other area that I want to bring up is, it seems to me
    that when you look at the facts that there was an emerging
    problem as we got closer to 2003--and I know that the climate
    surveys have been disregarded by the Academy to a certain
    degree, but they are the only information that we have.
        When we look at 1998, we have 22 cadets that were
    classified as having been sexually assaulted since having
    arrived at the Academy. In 1991, there is no climate survey;
    2000, there are 17 cadets; 2001, the number is 167 cadets; and
    2002, there are 56 female cadets who said they had been
    sexually assaulted since arriving at the U.S. Air Force
    Academy. Then in 2003, the Academy decided not to have a survey
    or not to ask the question on the survey as to whether they
    have been sexually assaulted or not.
        It seems to me that if you look at 2001 and 2002, those
    numbers are so much larger than the rest of the trend, they
    should have raised a flag.
        Secretary Roche. They obviously did, Senator. In fact,
    looking at both of those, you recall they had had very poor
    participation in surveys up to that point. At that point they
    started to try to pressure cadets into, in fact, filling out
    the surveys. It was the sense of the statisticians who looked
    at them that they were invalid because of contradictory
    answers. A number of the answers in the sexual area were
    contradictory.
        The 2003 one that was released in January was considered to
    be a valid one. General Gilbert, in fact, briefed all the
    cadets. He then instituted yet additional actions, including
    things like--I do not know if he did in 2002 or--in 2002, he
    was already putting more supervision into the dorms, et cetera.
    So they were using those.
        What more they could have done when they looked at a
    particular survey where they were told that it was invalid, I
    am not sure. I found by comparing the surveys, the trends in
    the surveys, you have the oddity that the women cadets report
    that the fear of reprisal decreased between 2001 and 2002,
    whether it was for reprisals from the faculty or from other
    students, et cetera. So it is a small trend, but it was--I was
    seeing mixed things. I saw these less than 24 hours before you
    saw them.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, my time is running short
    here. If you would just bear with me, I would like to ask
    another question.
        Senator Chambliss. Sure.
        Senator Allard. A number of cadets reported sexual assaults
    and rapes to my office, and we are at 40, it has been reported.
    About half of those occurred in 2001, 2002 from the information
    we have in our office. This is not the surveys or anything
    else.
        We have looked at when those alleged rapes occurred. A
    number of them occurred during a summer camp at Jacks Valley
    Training Center, which I understand is the basic training for
    incoming cadets. You made recommendations of dealing with the
    dorms and everything. I did not see any recommendations dealing
    with what action you may take during this training period.
        I wondered if, for the record, you would not elaborate on--
    maybe General Jumper would be the one to do this--what it is
    that you are going to do to assure safety of the new cadets in
    the Academy during their basic training.
        Secretary Roche. We are taking action, Senator.
        General Jumper. Senator, first of all, the Secretary and I
    have written a letter to the parents of each of the new
    incoming cadets talking to them about our commitment to dealing
    with this situation. The new incoming cadets will be separated
    initially, male and female, and will be put through a training
    period where they will be indoctrinated into the situation that
    they are finding themselves in, which is much different than
    the situation they have just left, if they have come from any
    civilian walk of life, about the power structure of the
    Academy, the relationship between the upper class and the lower
    class, the limits on that, and their rights to object to
    bullies.
        We are putting the responsibility for this training of the
    new cadets into the hands of the senior class. The senior class
    will be responsible for administering the discipline. The
    discipline will be aligned with the development of character,
    of honor, and of the sorts of traits and virtues and integrity
    that we expect cadets to have.
        This will happen for a certain period of time over the
    summer. We are waiting for the new commandant to get in place,
    and we will determine exactly how long this should be.
        Before the rest of the cadet wing arrives back for the
    academic year, they will then be integrated into their
    squadrons. Then once into the squadrons, the females will be
    grouped down near the latrine area in the squadron with
    squadron integrity to be able to provide each other mutual
    support.
        Senator Allard. Now, it has been my understanding, General,
    that it has been upperclassmen who have raped female cadets in
    these training camps, so I do not understand exactly how this
    is going to protect the female cadets.
        Secretary Roche. The senior class is going to be made
    responsible for observing the actions of the other two classes
    towards the freshman.
        Senator Allard. I see.
        Secretary Roche. Not just for the summertime, because it is
    mostly the senior two classes who are back for the summer
    program, but for the whole cadet wing when they come back. They
    have to be made responsible for the character, and the honor,
    and the integrity of the entire corps. That is their position
    as senior cadets; not only as the senior class, but as class
    cadet officers in charge of squadrons and in leadership
    positions. That will be the test of their leadership.
        How they help us get through this change in the climate
    that needs to be instilled in these young cadets, and it will
    be taught to the young cadets from the time that they get
    there, this is a major effort that I, along with the Secretary,
    will see that it is installed personally by my personal
    involvement with the classes.
        Senator Allard. How does that differ from what is happening
    now or has happened last year, for example?
        Secretary Roche. They come in and they generally have a
    couple of days where they get some indoctrination, but as a new
    freshman in that disciplined environment that you are not used
    to, most of the things that are said to you the first couple of
    days, as you can understand, Senator, go right over your head.
    The retention level is not good, because they are in a fairly
    disciplined and new and harsh environment. This will then
    continue for a much longer period of time than has been done in
    the past.
        General Jumper. Also, Senator, you notice in our paper we
    talk about getting the Air Officer Commanding much more
    involved, and in terms of supervision of the dorms, et cetera,
    they will also be much more involved in the summer activity to
    make sure that things are handled correctly.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the
    members of the committee.
        Senator Chambliss. Senator Pryor.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        As the two witnesses can tell today, this is a very
    personal matter for members of the United States Senate. I know
    Senator Clinton and also Senator Collins and others have said
    that it is because--one of the greatest things about being a
    Senator is being able to have a hand in the selection process
    of sending our best and brightest young men and women to the
    military academies. So you can tell from the questioning, the
    deep disappointment and dissatisfaction with what we have heard
    about what is going on at the U.S. Air Force Academy.
        I have three points of clarification. First, with regard to
    the surveys, are these mandatory or are they voluntary? I am
    just confused about this. I have gotten the impression
    different times, different ways.
        Secretary Roche. They were in the past voluntary. The
    participation was so low that there was some positive
    incentives offered 1 year to get them to do more. Then in the
    2002 survey, the sense is the cadets were told they could not
    sign out on vacation until they completed the survey.
    Consequently, a number of them played games with the survey.
        Senator Pryor. Okay. Are these surveys given to every cadet
    at the Academy?
        Secretary Roche. They are Internet surveys available to
    every cadet, and every cadet is encouraged to take the survey.
        Senator Pryor. Okay. Is the survey designed by the Air
    Force or by a third party?
        Secretary Roche. The survey is designed not by the Air
    Force, but by a department at the Academy, so it does not have
    the professional development that you would have with either a
    survey organization or the one that is used for a climate
    survey for the Air Force at large. That is why each year you
    notice, they have a self criticism of how they can improve it.
    It is the behavioral science department that was doing this and
    trying to get a sense of the human relations climate.
        Senator Pryor. Okay. My second point of clarification: I
    just want to make sure I understand this. Are you coming here
    today and testifying before this committee that the problem is
    fixed?
        Secretary Roche. Not in any way, shape, or form, Senator.
    We are saying that we have made the first step. That point that
    was raised by some members on our prior visit in closed
    session, we absolutely agree with. If we thought this was
    fixed, no, it is not. It is one of the reasons we want to talk
    this over with the Board of Visitors, how to monitor it. We
    have put in place that every 3 years there will be a full and
    complete audit, so we have no problem reporting anything to the
    committee, et cetera.
        It is the beginning. You are trying to change your cultural
    climate. It has had us look at the entire Academy from signs
    saying ``Bring Me Men,'' to how professors are dealt with, to
    where cadets go after they graduate, to how they are treated
    relative to our other accessions. We have looked at the whole
    thing. But this is merely a beginning.
        Senator Pryor. Do you have at this point a written action
    plan about the steps you intend to take to get it fixed?
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir. We issued that in a directive
    memorandum to the superintendent of the Air Force Academy last
    Wednesday.
        Senator Pryor. Have you provided it to the committee?
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir, we have.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [See previous insert, ``United States Air Force Academy: Agenda for
    Change.'']

        Senator Pryor. Okay. I will be sure and get a copy of that.
        The third point of clarification I just want to seek is:
    Are you opposed to a third-party investigation of what has gone
    on at the Air Force Academy?
        Secretary Roche. No, sir. What I wanted to do was to start
    ourselves so we could move quickly, because we have new cadets
    coming in 90 days. If we had tried to put together something
    from the outside, we would still be working on a charter and
    working on the personnel. We moved very quickly.
        Having gotten these first steps in place, which I believe
    communicates to the parents of any new cadet that that cadet is
    safe when he or she arrives come June, we have no problem with
    outsiders looking at it, and I would hope that in the Board of
    Visitors meeting this would be discussed, and I would be
    delighted to cause one to occur.
        Senator Pryor. When is that Board of Visitors meeting?
        Secretary Roche. I am not sure. It is within the next 30 or
    35 days.
        Senator Pryor. Okay. If there is a third party, would you
    rather it be someone like a local prosecutor there in Colorado,
    or would you rather it be more of a, for lack of a better term,
    blue-ribbon panel that might look at it?
        Secretary Roche. My sense is we have a wonderful Board of
    Visitors, which have some wonderful members on it, like Senator
    Allard and a few others, including former governors. I would
    like to talk over with them what they think would be best,
    since they have invested so much of their time in the Academy.
        Our sense was to move quickly. It had to be people who
    understood the Air Force, understood Air Force rules, and that
    we could move fast in going forward. It could be characterized
    any number of ways, but it would have to be one that would be
    effective. I think the Board of Visitors would be the
    appropriate group to talk about who ought to be on, including
    some of them.
        Senator Pryor. It is obviously unfortunate what has
    happened to some of these men and women during this time period
    who have gone through the Academy. I think perhaps the most
    unfortunate thing of all is that the Academy produces the
    future leadership of this organization.
        It is a very fine organization. I can speak for this
    committee to say we want to support our men and women in
    uniform. We want to support the Air Force and all the branches
    of the Service, but when we hear something like we have heard
    today, when we hear about the climate and the culture at the
    U.S. Air Force Academy, I know that we all have a grave concern
    that it is going to corrupt the entire organization.
        I just want to encourage you to work on the solution with
    all deliberate speed. This committee stands ready to help you
    in whatever way we can to do it. I think having a third-party
    investigation is essential to getting to the bottom of this. I
    want to encourage you to consider doing that.
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir. You understand that the Office
    of Secretary Defense's Inspector General is a third party, and
    we not only welcomed, we had hoped at one point they could take
    a look at all of the cases, so that there was no sense of the
    Air Force covering anything up.
        In terms of specifics, whether it is how to do a mentoring
    program, et cetera, we welcome outsiders, and we recognize
    fully this reflects on the entire Air Force. This is not our
    only source of our future leaders, but it is one of the two
    major sources of our future leaders.
        Senator Pryor. Right. I agree.
        That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you.
        Senator Clinton.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I am struck by the fact that this is at least the third
    time that we have discussed this; I think twice in open
    session, once in a closed session. As became apparent today
    from the reports I received, I think it is clear, Mr. Secretary
    and General Jumper, at least in the minds of many of us on this
    committee, that it has still not been put to rest with respect
    to looking backward at the individual cases that have been
    brought forward for public attention; nor with respect to
    looking forward to the changes that are necessary in the
    culture, atmosphere, and training.
        I think a third-party investigation and a third-party
    consultative relationship with the Academy is absolutely
    essential. There are people who are experts in this field who
    advise major corporations. There are people who have advised
    other academies with respect to some of these issues, and I
    would certainly hope that if you take away from this hearing
    anything, it is what I believe to be an overwhelming sense of
    the committee that there must be independent third-party
    involvement.
        I do not think from my own perspective that the Inspector
    General is adequate. I do not think the Board of Visitors is
    adequate. I think setting up some kind of mechanism where
    people can be brought in to deal with the deep-rooted cultural
    issues and to go through some of the training programs that
    have proved successful in other parts of society has to be a
    part of whatever solution you decide to pursue.
        So from my perspective, I join the call of the chairman and
    the ranking member and others on this committee in urging you
    to quickly move to an independent third-party consultative
    investigative response mechanism.
        We are in the middle of a war. This should not be taking up
    your time. This is not what you should be coming up to testify
    before this committee about.
        From the recent articles I have read, it appears that the
    Air Force actually has a higher percentage of women than the
    other branches. We are very proud to see the young women who
    are flying combat missions over Iraq. This is not what the
    Secretary of the Air Force and, frankly, the general should be
    spending anymore time on. The only way you will be able to put
    this to one side is to go ahead and to make the decision to
    have a totally independent look at this.
        Let the chips fall where they may. Let us figure out what
    else needs to be done. The directive is filled with very good
    goals and important language about the values of the Air Force
    and the Academy, but in order to get from where we are to where
    we need to be, there is some good work that has been done over
    the last 30 years in this field that I think would be very
    beneficial.
        I would urge you to look to that. There are some of us who
    might be able to make some suggestions. I know that in some of
    the major challenges I think the Naval Academy faced in 1993,
    and some of our major corporations have faced in similar
    workplace environmental challenges, there are a group of very
    distinguished, responsible advisors who could immediately come
    in and lend credibility and provide that independence that I
    think we desperately need.
        Secretary Roche. Senator, I have absolutely no problems
    with that at all. Those two parts, I liked how you separated
    into the consultative and the independent look. In the
    consultative area, we have received letters from people who
    have volunteered, some of whom have done this before. I know in
    corporate life it has been done.
        By creating the additional duties of ombudsman for the vice
    commandant and then sitting down with her and speaking to her,
    one of the things we want her to do is, in fact, to reach out
    and to bring someone in. Now, they have done some of that, but
    I do not think with the sense of urgency that we would now want
    there to be.
        In terms of having a group take a new, fresh look at the
    whole Academy, once we have these initial steps in place so
    that we did not have to wait for 6 months, then I am quite
    content to do that, and I would hope to raise that with the
    Board of Visitors as to what the composition of that should be
    to take a look at the longer term.
        We felt we had to do something quickly to assure the
    families of the cadets who were coming, roughly 218 young women
    coming in in June, for a total of about 714 in the cadet wing.
    We wanted to put things in place so that we felt comfortable in
    June.
        But certainly as you and I discussed before, this is the
    first step, and we have no problem bringing in outsiders.
        Senator Chambliss. Secretary Roche, you have been on the
    job for about 2 years, and General Jumper, longer than that.
    While this was not initiated on your watch, it is in your lap.
    I think you can see the sentiment of virtually everybody who
    has anything to say, that somebody from the outside needs to
    look at it.
        Now, very honestly, what you have done to this point in
    time, I think is commendable. I think you approached it exactly
    right. If you had gone ahead and gotten a third-party group
    outside, you are right, Mr. Secretary, antics would be ongoing
    as you tried to put an organization together.
        You have approached it right. You have done what you should
    have done. But I think it is probably time that you come back
    to the committee with some sort of recommendation as to where
    you think you need to go, because otherwise it is pretty
    obvious, I think, the committee is going to act, and with your
    recommendations, it would make it a lot easier.
        There is one other group we had not talked about that I
    hope is very much in your minds as you are going through this.
    That is the alumni. They have helped create the climate that
    exists at the Air Force Academy. I have read some reports on
    some particular situations where alumni have made it well known
    that when they were at the Air Force Academy. They did not have
    any females there, and they take great pride in that. The male
    ego tends to do that sometimes.
        The fact of the matter is we have some outstanding young
    women who are not only cadets but are serving in the Air Force.
    We all know that. To try to further any kind of attitude that
    this should be a male-only club just certainly exacerbates the
    problems. So I know you are thinking through that, but we had
    not mentioned that today. I think obviously it needs to be
    given very serious thought as we move forward.
        Secretary Roche. We have had a meeting with the local
    alumni that was not always congenial in the course of 3 hours,
    where we stood up and took our shots and received them. We are
    appalled by that baseball cap with letters from the Class of
    1979. We have made it very clear that we will not tolerate
    that, and we just do not think that any of the alumni should.
        The alumni, many of them, very much agree with us that
    things have gone on over a long period of time, and it was time
    to shed a fresh light and look at this. We are going to be
    communicating with them by letter.
        We will also be doing an article in the alumni magazine on
    this issue, and trying to make them part of the solution
    instead of any part of the problem, if they are part of the
    problem.
        General Jumper. Sir, if I might add, the Secretary and I
    also plan a trip to the Air Force Academy where we will stand
    before the second class, which will be the seniors next year.
    On the stage with us will be one member of each of the
    graduating classes of the United States Air Force Academy.
    Included among them will be astronauts, former Chiefs of Staff
    of the Air Force, pro football players, and others from all
    walks of life who have gone out and been immensely successful.
    The power of the alumni has been offered to us to back us up in
    our endeavors here.
        Senator Chambliss. One other thing that has been mentioned
    over and over again, but it is not the primary focus of what we
    are talking about, is the situation that in a number of
    particular instances I noted it is repeated that alcohol played
    a significant role. I do not know what we are doing with
    respect to concentrating on eliminating that problem in the
    future.
        I know you have talked about it a little bit, and I have
    seen your regulations. I know, General Jumper, you talk
    particularly about putting the senior person, whoever the
    senior person is at a party or a gathering or whatever, as the
    person in charge. But there obviously has to be a concentrated
    effort made to eliminate alcohol use particularly when we are
    throwing female and male cadets together.
        Secretary Roche. Sir, we have rules that we want to re-
    emphasize about alcohol in the dorms on campus, underage
    drinking. We will differ from the other academies. We have met
    with the superintendents, the secretaries of the other
    Services, the chiefs of the other Services to go over all of
    our preliminary findings of what we are going to do, and we
    will take tougher measures on the provision of alcohol to
    anyone who is under age in that we will disenroll a cadet who
    does so immediately. That is not the case at the other
    academies. They usually give them one chance.
        We feel that we have to make the alcohol issue a very
    pointed one, because so many of the problems seem to have
    alcohol associated with them.
        Senator Chambliss. Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I think there is one statement which you have made
    repeatedly and before today, which really creates problems with
    maybe all of us on this committee, and that is the statement
    that you made publicly that you cannot hold commanders
    accountable for failure when the climate has been in place for
    a long time. I think everyone on this committee that has
    commented on this has just simply found that totally incredible
    and unacceptable.
        You cannot simply say to people that because something has
    happened that way when you got to the job, that it is
    acceptable for you to do nothing about it if it is wrong and
    when it clearly was wrong, as this climate has been.
        I urge you to review that statement that you have made
    publicly and that you have tried to defend here today
    unsuccessfully, because I think everybody here has a real
    problem with that premise. People are accountable for what
    happens on their watch. If they have tolerated a climate where
    women are discouraged from coming forward to complain about
    sexual assault because they think they will be victimized when
    they do so, that is so totally intolerable, so totally out of
    keeping with what the existing current procedure is supposed to
    be at the Academy, much less what you have put in place. It
    just has to be reviewed by you, and I think corrected, because
    that is the one statement here that I think, as much as
    anything that you have said, is just causing some massive
    concern and reaction on the part of members of this committee.
        Do you know what the procedure is in the Army and the Navy
    relative to that issue in terms of your new amnesty provision?
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir. If I can go to the first point,
    I will certainly take a look at it again, Senator. As I
    understand my responsibilities, it will mean going back through
    a series of superintendents and commandants.
        Senator Levin. I do not know why you keep saying that.
    Whatever it means, it means. If people have not carried out
    their responsibilities properly, if that leads to other people
    who have not carried out their responsibilities, so be it. You
    can't just say that it is tolerable for people or acceptable or
    that somehow or other you are not going to act against folks
    who have not carried out their responsibility because their
    predecessors did not carry out their responsibility. If you
    hold people accountable now and that will require you to hold
    others accountable, so be it.
        Secretary Roche. Yes, I understand, sir.
        Senator Levin. Whatever it leads to, it leads to. It is
    sort of a mantra here, and I do not get it. I do not
    understand. The fact that something is inherited and will lead
    to other folks who also did not carry out their responsibility,
    that is just absolutely no excuse for not holding folks
    accountable for not carrying out their responsibility. You have
    repeated that half a dozen times. I do not think it will work
    if you repeat it another half a dozen times.
        Secretary Roche. I will review it, sir. I will review all
    the past people as well. If, in fact, the same thing applies
    for a consistent application of standards, I will apply it
    consistently to all.
        Senator Levin. Do what is appropriate, sir.
        Secretary Roche. I understand.
        Senator Levin. But do not exonerate the current folks who
    are in command because that will lead you to other folks who
    have been in command. If it does, it does. Wherever it leads
    you, take it. You cannot say, ``We are not holding this person
    accountable because that means we have to hold someone else
    accountable.'' I mean, that does not wash.
        Secretary Roche. Sir, it was not that. I did not mean to
    say that at all. It is more a matter of where do you start with
    holding people accountable for climate, and where do you end? I
    take the point, and I will look at it all and do it
    appropriately.
        To your question of the other academies, the process of
    holding cadets accountable for infractions of Academy standards
    or regulations associated with an incident is the practice of
    the Naval Academy, as well. So if someone reports a crime at
    some point, the midshipmen who were involved, whether it be
    friends or, in fact, potentially the victim, especially if it
    leads to a situation of no prosecution, will be awarded the
    appropriate demerits, et cetera. As I have reviewed it with the
    Superintendent of the Naval Academy, it is almost the identical
    process.
        However, I believe where we have failed is the fact that
    we, in some cases, did not wait for everything to be complete
    but more importantly, Senator, we did not give feedback to the
    cadet who came forward with the charges to explain what had
    happened. We did that because the officers involved were told
    that they would be violating privacy rights. It turns out they
    were wrong, but that was the advice that they had been given.
        Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be very
    important for this committee to send out to the other
    secretaries the amnesty provision which is now in place in the
    Air Force.
        Secretary Roche. I have given it to them, sir.
        Senator Levin. I see.
        Secretary Roche. I have given it to them. They have it.
        Senator Levin. All right. Then it is important, I would
    hope, for us to ask the other secretaries whether or not they
    are going to adopt the same provision because, unless you
    assure people who come forward with a complaint of sexual
    assault that if that is not proven in a criminal case, that
    action will not be taken against them because there was
    excessive drinking. I mean, that is an absurd result. It means
    again, as Senator Collins said, you are punishing the victim.
    The test that you cannot proceed in a criminal case is a
    totally different standard. It has just nothing to do with this
    issue.
        Secretary Roche. Sir, I completely agree with you.
        Senator Levin. All right.
        Secretary Roche. Absolutely, yes.
        Senator Levin. Then I think it would be up to our Chairman
    as to whether we ask the other Service secretaries to give us
    their reaction to the new language, which has been adopted in
    the Air Force. It seems to me that language, by the way, I
    think has been in effect in the Air Force for all intents and
    purposes when I read what the current standard is--but whether
    or not it has been in effect or not is not the point here. It
    is now in effect, and I think it is important that they be the
    same standard in the other Services, so we make sure we end
    this absurdity of discouraging people from complaining about
    sexual assaults against them.
        My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Chambliss. Senator Levin, I do know that Senator
    Warner in coordination with you is planning on getting all
    branches back up here to make sure that we have some common
    standard out there that everybody is adhering to.
        Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to get back onto this issue of prosecution. What is
    the penalty for rape on Federal property according to military
    justice?
        Secretary Roche. I am not sure. I am sorry. Can I ask
    General Counsel, if I may?
        Senator Allard. Yes. [Pause.]
        Secretary Roche. I think it depends on whether it is----
        Senator Allard. There was an article written in the paper
    that rape on Federal property could result in the death
    penalty, and they cited a case in 1963 where there was an
    Austrian woman that was raped and then the perpetrator in the
    case, a military man, was actually given the death penalty. Is
    that true?
        Ms. Walker. I do not know about that specific case, sir,
    but there could be instances in which under certain
    aggravation, the penalty could rise to that level.
        Senator Allard. Just for the record, the Counsel has said
    that there are certain situations with aggravating
    circumstances that could result in the death penalty.
        Is that what you are saying?
        Ms. Walker. That is my understanding, sir.
        Senator Allard. That is your understanding.
        Ms. Walker. We can provide that information for you.
        Senator Allard. I would appreciate it if you could provide
    that to the committee.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Aside from Article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
    (title 10, U.S. Code, section 120), there is no Federal crime of rape.
    There is a provision (title 18, U.S. Code, section 2241) that
    criminalizes ``aggravated sexual assault'' (which encompasses rape)
    that occurs ``in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
    the United States or in a Federal prison.'' The penalty under this
    section can extend to life in prison. The ``special maritime and
    territorial jurisdiction'' includes Federal property over which the
    Federal Government exercises exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction
    (title 18, U.S. Code, section 7). The Air Force Academy is a concurrent
    jurisdiction enclave.
        In addition, State criminal laws (including those related to rape
    and sexual assault) apply on Federal property within the United States,
    either directly or as assimilated into Federal law by the Assimilative
    Crimes Act (title 18, U.S. Code, section 13). The penalty for rape on
    Federal property in the United States under the Assimilative Crimes Act
    is the penalty applicable in the State where the Federal property is
    located
        For military personnel, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
    provides a uniform criminal code applicable worldwide. Article 120 of
    the UCMJ (title 10, U.S. Code, section 920) provides that ``Any person
    subject to [the UCMJ] who commits an act of sexual intercourse by force
    and without consent, is guilty of rape and shall be punished by death
    or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.'' The last
    executed death sentence in an Air Force rape case was carried out in
    1954 following a conviction in 1948 under the Articles of War (a
    predecessor of the UCMJ). The last time the death sentence was carried
    out for rape under the UCMJ was in 1961 in an Army case. However, it is
    important to note that in addition to rape, these cases involved
    convictions of murder and attempted murder, respectively.
        In 1977 the Supreme Court, in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, held
    death to be a ``grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for
    the rape of an adult woman,'' and hence ``forbidden by the Eighth
    Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment.'' Whether the death penalty
    continues to be available for the rape of a minor remains unresolved.
    Other punishments that a court-martial can adjudge in a rape case
    include punitive discharge from the Service (dismissal, dishonorable or
    bad conduct), imprisonment, reduction in grade, and forfeiture of pay.

        Senator Allard. Now, to follow up on that, what steps is
    the Air Force taking to better prosecute these cases?
        Secretary Roche. The first step is to ensure the victim can
    come forward, and the second step is to ensure that when the
    victim comes forward that there is a lawyer and a member of the
    Office of Special Investigations, who work for the vice
    commandant, who can sit down with that victim so that the
    individual understands the elements of a crime and that which
    needs to be proven, so as to be able to collect the correct
    amount of evidence as soon as possible and not have the
    situation go off out of the chain of command for many months,
    which has happened in the past, and then to come back when, in
    many cases, it is much too late.
        So the issue is to be able to start immediately to put
    together evidence which would lead to a successful prosecution
    if, in fact, a prosecution could be obtained.
        Senator Allard. I would hope that they would use some good
    common sense processes. For example, the loss of a rape kit,
    that is just that people are not properly keeping track of the
    evidence. I would hope that there is an effort in there to make
    sure that the chain of evidence is protected in some way or
    another.
        Secretary Roche. Excuse me, Senator. I do not know if the
    General Counsel came upon anything, but I have not heard of us,
    other than that press account, losing rape kits. I know they
    are thrown away when there is no prosecution.
        Senator Allard. There was one individual that reported her
    case to us, and we tried to get evidence about her complaint,
    and the response back from the Air Force Academy is that they
    had lost her rape kit.
        Ms. Walker. I remember that. My team looked at it, and to
    date they have found no rape kits that were lost. It could have
    been a miscommunication, but the investigation thus far has
    found none that were lost.
        Secretary Roche. I agree none should be. There should be a
    chain of custody of these, and usually there is a chain of
    custody.
        Senator Allard. We have a letter from the Air Force
    concerning the loss of a rape kit from OSI. We have some
    information we need to share on this. I hope that we can set up
    some procedures where that does not happen. OSI seems to think
    it has happened, and we have a letter that says it happened.
        Secretary Roche. If things are done within the chain of
    command, Senator, you have a heck of a lot better chance for
    that not occurring, for things not being lost.
        Senator Allard. Okay.
        General Jumper. One of the steps, Senator, if I might add,
    is to get these consulting mechanisms that are outside the
    chain of command to first encourage the victim to come into the
    chain of command and, as I said, to be able to deal with the
    emotional side of this so that there can be confidence that
    when they come to the chain of command it will be dealt with in
    the right way.
        Senator Allard. I agree with you. We have to create the
    environment where the victim feels comfortable in reporting the
    rape or the sexual assault case that occurs. But the next step
    is to be able to protect that chain of evidence.
        Secretary Roche. Absolutely.
        Senator Allard. I would hope that the Academy looks at
    working with the local district attorney or having somebody on
    the staff who understands how you can protect the evidence so
    that when you have to go to court or what not, you have the
    information you need to make these set of cases hold up. One of
    the comments that you have made rather consistently is the
    cases seem weak or not. It could be because there was
    inadequate collection of evidence. That seems to me like that
    is an important thing that needs to be looked at.
        Secretary Roche. It's certainly the case when there is a 4-
    , 5-, 6-month delay between the incident and when it is
    reported. Remember, we have some that are 2 years old.
        Senator Allard. The other question I want to bring up and
    talk with you a little bit, and you have alluded from time to
    time that the cadets have a certain responsibility with this
    problem. Have you consulted with the cadets to see if they have
    any suggestions? If so, can you share some of their thoughts
    with us?
        Secretary Roche. The investigative team has. I have talked
    to some cadets. General Jumper has. In many cases, the ones
    with whom I spoke, a number of them believe that they have an
    obligation to do a better job of identifying people who they
    know have done something wrong. The issue that I think they are
    quite ashamed of is some of the ostracization that occurs, the
    shunning, when a victim comes forward, that the little comments
    that are made to that end--that is why in our agenda for
    change, we require that the cadet leaders of squadrons be held
    responsible for ensuring that does not occur.
        General, some points?
        General Jumper. I have met also with several focus groups
    at random and carefully selected among the cadet leadership. I
    have found that the majority of them are responsible. I have
    found outrage on the part of most cadets that this is caused by
    a very few, and the many are getting punished. I have not much
    sympathy with that observation in that it is the cadets who are
    there who have a chance to be a responsible part of the changes
    that we have underway.
        I found quite frankly some cases where ``If you fire this
    person and this person, and leave the rest of us alone, we will
    be just fine,'' which, again, is--I find disturbing, in that
    this lack of ability to accept a certain amount of
    responsibility among a certain minority of cadets.
        Now, these are the things we are working on, Senator, to
    make sure that the burden is felt and understood by the cadets
    that are there.
        Senator Allard. I think every member of this committee,
    including myself, has raised the question: Why is it that we
    have a problem like this at the Air Force Academy and we do not
    appear to have this kind of a problem at the other academies? I
    wonder if you have asked yourselves that and if you have come
    up with any solutions or any observations that you can share
    with this committee.
        Secretary Roche. The benchmarking I did principally was
    with the Naval Academy, because it had a process that was very
    similar, with the following exception: At the Naval Academy as
    on any of our Air Force bases, if someone comes forward with an
    allegation of sexual assault--and recognizing that the
    Academy's definition is very broad, in fact, too broad, it
    would include an unwanted kiss, for instance, it could be
    construed as sexual assault as compared to the more legal
    definitions of indecent assault, sodomy or rape, at the Naval
    Academy you can't make a report that does not go into the chain
    of command system. Now, you can make the report to a chaplain,
    to a set of counselors, to the company officer who is
    comparable to an Air Officer Commanding, at any one of about
    five or six positions. We have paralleled that. That is one
    major difference, that you do not have something go off into a
    consulting group or a counseling group that is associated with
    a particular department in the institution.
        Senator Allard. That is what was happening in the Air Force
    Academy, as opposed to the chain of command?
        Secretary Roche. There were a number of cases where things
    did not get into the chain of command. For instance, at the Air
    Force Academy, depending on how the cadet and the counselor
    felt, the commandant could be told there was an incident, but
    not be told who was the victim and who was the alleged
    perpetrator, unless the commandant then forced, or the
    superintendent, to have that information divulged. This is the
    whole issue of privacy as compared with confidentiality.
    Whereas, at the Naval Academy, once it is reported, you
    surround the victim, as does any one of our airmen at one of
    our bases, and the process goes forward.
        The second thing is the Naval Academy did not have the
    problem of feedback to the accuser, where at the Air Force
    Academy there was a false sense of violation of privacy rights,
    and which had limited how much information was provided to the
    accuser, the victim, so that she might know what had gone
    forward, why there was no Uniform Code of Military Justice
    process.
        In a number of cases, the individuals who were accused were
    investigated, given polygraphs, and passed the polygraphs. It
    is not clear that any of the victims were ever told that, so
    that they would understand that there are two sides to this,
    and that the other side has or at least the individual thought
    there was consent. That is another difference.
        The issuing of demerits for Academy violations, as I say,
    existed at the Naval Academy, and we have decided to do away
    with that, so as to be able to ensure we receive information.
        In terms of any kinds of shunning, they put the
    responsibility on the senior midshipmen to ensure that does not
    occur, and we are putting responsibility on the senior cadets
    to make sure it does not occur. So we have tried to go through
    what their processes are.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I have been informed we have
    a vote going.
        Senator Chambliss. We have just a couple of minutes left.
        Senator Allard. So I know--you want to stop this. So I
    just--again, I reiterate that this is--we cannot tolerate this.
        Secretary Roche. I agree.
        Senator Allard. I think you agree with that.
        Secretary Roche. Yes.
        Senator Allard. We need to take some very meaningful steps.
    I think that you have taken a first step. I think we need to
    continue to evaluate and look at it. I think that those of us
    that are on this committee in future years have a
    responsibility to keep our fingers on this pulse. I think that
    probably each one of you recognize that this is not going to go
    away in 1 year. We have to keep after it. So I just ask that
    you work with the committee, because this is a serious problem
    we need to get eliminated as quickly as possible.
        Secretary Roche. We absolutely agree, Senator, and thank
    you for the help you have given us.
        Senator Chambliss. Gentlemen, thank you all very much for
    being here and helping us deal with this very sensitive
    problem. I thank you for your leadership. Thank you also for
    what you have done for our men and women in Iraq today.
        We will continue to work with you as we move down the road
    to make sure that we all have great confidence in every single
    nominee to the Air Force Academy and every other academy. Thank
    you.
        Secretary Roche. Thank you, Senator.
        General Jumper. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you. We are adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

                           AIR FORCE ACADEMY SURVEYS

        1. Senator McCain. Secretary Roche, what can you tell me about
    surveys that were conducted at the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1997,
    1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002?
        Secretary Roche. The Academy has included various questions about
    sexual assault, gender climate, and sexual harassment in its annual
    climate surveys since 1996. The results of these surveys are being
    considered by the Working Group that I chartered to examine sexual
    assault issues at the Academy and will be discussed in the Working
    Group's report.

        2. Senator McCain. Secretary Roche, what conclusions could be
    reached from these surveys about reports of sexual harassment, sexual
    assault, and rape?
        Secretary Roche. These surveys are still being analyzed by the
    Working Group, and I'm reluctant to draw any firm conclusions without
    the benefit of their analysis. It does appear, though, that these
    surveys, if properly interpreted, could have served as a warning that a
    significant number of cadets were concerned about the gender climate
    and sexual assault.

        3. Senator McCain. Secretary Roche, when are you going to make
    these critical surveys available to this committee?
        Secretary Roche. This survey data will be included in the report of
    the Working Group, which will be available to the committee as soon as
    it is completed.

        4. Senator McCain. Secretary Roche, a survey reports that 10
    percent of the women said they were sexually assaulted, 75 percent of
    the women in that command said to you that they were afraid to come
    forward in cases of rape because of the reprisals that they would
    endure, and 16 women were brave enough to actually come forward and
    report cases of sexual assault and rape. Why did you decide to dismiss
    these surveys outright or to dismiss them as statistically not valid?
        Secretary Roche. We have not dismissed these surveys. As I said
    previously, they are being considered and analyzed by the Working Group
    that I chartered to consider sexual assault issues at the Academy. We
    have some concern about the statistical validity of these surveys
    because of survey methodology, sample size, and a number of anomalous
    responses (some cadets appear not to have taken the surveys seriously).
    We are concerned in particular about our ability to infer trend data
    from them, because the survey questions and other methodology changed
    from year to year. That doesn't mean, though, that no useful
    information can be derived from them. We will be able to provide more
    information about the utility of these surveys when the Working Group
    completes its report.

                         BEHAVIOR OF THE OFFICER CORPS

        5. Senator McCain. Secretary Roche, if this type of behavior has
    been going on for at least 10 years and there is a climate at the Air
    Force Academy that suggests that cadets are afraid to come forward to
    report cases of sexual misconduct and rape, in what manner have you
    also begun to examine the behavior of the officer corps?
        Secretary Roche. The data we have gathered so far suggests that, to
    the extent the climate at the Academy has discouraged some cadets from
    reporting instances of sexual assault, it has largely been due to
    factors that the Academy environment has exacerbated, including peer
    pressure and victims' apprehension (whether or not well-founded) that
    they may be disciplined for infractions of Academy rules associated
    with the incident. There are no indications that similar conditions are
    prevalent in the officer corps at large. We will remain vigilant,
    however, for evidence that any aspect of this problem may have ``bled
    over'' into the larger Air Force.

        DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST LEADERSHIP AT THE AIR FORCE ACADEMY

        6. Senator McCain. Secretary Roche, have you reprimanded or
    disciplined the leadership at the U.S. Air Force Academy?
        Secretary Roche. As you are aware, I have replaced the leadership
    team at the Academy. I did so because I believe new leadership can most
    effectively implement the changes General Jumper and I have directed at
    the Academy in our Agenda for Change, announced on March 26, 2003, and
    any future changes we may find appropriate after receiving the reports
    of the Working Group, the Air Force and DOD Inspectors General, and the
    review group recently mandated by Congress. I have not reprimanded or
    disciplined anyone and at this point, with several reviews and
    investigations of the Academy situation incomplete, I do not think it
    would be appropriate to do so. I intend to take another look at this
    issue when all the relevant information is in.

                          OUTSIDE PANEL INVESTIGATION

        7. Senator McCain. Secretary Roche, please discuss your views on
    the establishment of an outside panel similar to that set up at the
    Naval Academy to look into the serious circumstances facing the Air
    Force Academy. Please include a discussion of why you have rejected the
    creation of such a panel up to this point, and explain more fully your
    recent comment to the press regarding how your Harvard Business School
    training has led you to believe only an internal review is needed.
        Secretary Roche. I have no objection to an outside review of the
    circumstances at the Air Force Academy and welcome the fresh
    perspective that the review group recently mandated by Congress will
    bring to bear on the situation. At the outset, though, we needed
    answers quickly, and the best way to accomplish that was through an
    internal review. Accordingly I chartered a high-level working group,
    under the leadership of the Air Force General Counsel, to review
    circumstances at the Academy relating to sexual assault. The Working
    Group has largely completed its review, which has been both thorough
    and impartial, and is preparing its report, which will be made
    available to committee when it is completed.

        [Whereupon, at 6:25 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

      REPORT OF THE PANEL TO REVIEW SEXUAL MISCONDUCT ALLEGATIONS AT THE
                        UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY

                                  ----------

                         WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 2003

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:48 a.m. in room
    SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Allard,
    Collins, Chambliss, Dole, Levin, Reed, Akaka, E. Benjamin
    Nelson, Dayton, Clinton, and Pryor.
        Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
    director; and Pendred K. Wilson, receptionist.
        Majority staff members present: Gregory T. Kiley,
    professional staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional
    staff member; Ann M. Mittermeyer, counsel; Scott W. Stucky,
    general counsel; and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
        Minority staff member present: Gerald J. Leeling, minority
    counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Andrew Kent,
    and Nicholas W. West.
        Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul,
    assistant to Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to
    Senator Inhofe; Jayson Roehl, assistant to Senator Allard;
    Lindsey R. Neas, assistant to Senator Talent; Clyde A. Taylor
    IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Christine O. Hill,
    assistant to Senator Dole; Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to
    Senator Kennedy; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
    Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka; William K.
    Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; William Todd Houchins,
    assistant to Senator Dayton; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to
    Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze, assistant to Senator Pryor.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Warner. Good morning, all. I welcome this very
    distinguished panel. Congresswoman Fowler and members of your
    panel, thank you for your public service. Well done. As we say
    in the Navy-Marine Corps: well done, ma'am.
        I have been fortunate, as have other members of the
    committee, to have worked with Congresswoman Fowler for many
    years. She was on the counterpart of this committee in the
    House of Representatives and a real leader in military affairs.
    It is fortunate, not only for the Air Force, but for the
    country, that you and your colleagues took on this very
    challenging task.
        I have known several members of the panel very well.
    Colonel Ripley is a distinguished Marine Corps officer. I was
    not a distinguished Marine Corps officer, but a marine anyway,
    but never in any way that could match his career. General
    Bunting was, of course, head of VMI in our State; and others on
    the panel that I have come to know through your distinguished
    reputations and your wonderful job on this report.
        We meet today to receive testimony on this report of ``The
    Panel to Review Sexual Misconduct Allegations at the United
    States Air Force Academy.'' That is a frightening title, but
    this panel was created by the Congress of the United States.
    These fine Senators on my right and on my left determined at
    one point in time that an unbiased, unaffiliated group of our
    citizens had to be brought together under the strong leadership
    of you, Congresswoman Fowler, to make this assessment for
    Congress. You have done just that.
        So we thank you very much, particularly for the forthright
    and fair manner in which you identified failures of leadership.
    Failures of leadership is a tough thing to say to any member of
    the United States military, but you had the courage to gather
    the facts and to reach those conclusions.
        Hopefully, your work will prevent any such behavior being
    repeated, not only at the Air Force Academy, but at West Point
    and at Annapolis. Those three institutions are the crown jewels
    of their respective branches of service. There is a very close
    identification between those educational institutions and the
    Congress of the United States. Every member on this panel takes
    a lot of time to select from literally hundreds of individuals
    who come to each of us seeking nominations to those academies.
    We work very industriously to nominate only the best and the
    finest. This is not an institution, the academy structure, that
    is just out there. This is a part of the daily activities of
    every Member of the United States Congress.
        As I say, we owe you a debt of gratitude. We were all
    shocked, not only Congress but America, and distressed by the
    allegations of alleged sexual assaults at the Air Force
    Academy, which first came to the attention indeed of Congress--
    and this is a unique function of Congress. When the executive
    branch has failures, people in this country turn to their
    Members of Congress to ask them to examine the situation. That
    was precisely what was done here.
        Before you testify, I would like to set forth for the
    record the sequence of events as I understand them--and other
    members will have their views, but I think we are unanimous on
    this--that led to the establishment of this panel. In January
    2003, Senator Allard, whom I want to commend, came to us and
    brought certain correspondence and statements to the attention
    of myself and other members of the committee.
        He particularly informed me about a female cadet who
    asserted that she had been raped at the United States Air Force
    Academy and who alleged that officials at the Academy had
    attempted to prevent an investigation of this incident. Senator
    Allard and I, at that time, wrote letters both to the
    Department of Defense and to the Department of Defense
    Inspector General (DODIG). We will have more to say about that,
    asking that they look into this allegation.
        We purposely went to the DODIG because we felt there had to
    be a measure of independence within the Department, even though
    the Department of the Air Force had begun its own
    investigation.
        In response to these allegations, Secretary Roche formed a
    working group headed by the General Counsel of the Air Force,
    Mary Walker. Her nomination came before this committee for
    advice and consent and from all we know she is a very capable,
    able professional. The task of the working group was, ``to
    review cadet complaints and the policies, programs, and
    practices of the Academy.''
        Secretary Roche and General Jumper testified at a hearing
    on March 6, 2003, about the progress of the General Counsel's
    investigation. Secretary Roche promised the report and
    recommendations for change would be submitted to Congress by
    the end of March 2003.
        While the Air Force working group was conducting its
    investigation of over 50 female cadets who had come forward
    with allegations of sexual misconduct, members of this
    committee learned of additional allegations of reprisals
    against victims of sexual assaults at the Air Force Academy,
    who had reported attacks against them. These reports included
    ``shunning or ostracizing of victims by fellow male and female
    cadets.''
        The committee learned of a profound lack of trust and
    confidence by female cadets in the former superintendent and
    the commandant of the Air Force Academy to respond
    appropriately to allegations. Perhaps most surprising in view
    of the fact that women have attended the Air Force Academy for
    over 25 years, and taking into account the strides made to
    eliminate sexual harassment overall in the Armed Forces over
    the past decade, this committee learned of allegations of a
    climate of hostility towards women at the Academy and
    acceptance of that climate--I repeat, acceptance of that
    climate--by cadets, faculty, and Air Force leadership.
        On March 26, Secretary Roche and Air Force Chief of Staff
    Jumper publicly announced their ``Agenda for Change'' at the
    Academy. They directed changes at the Academy designed to
    correct conditions that contributed to abuses. A surprising
    aspect of their announcement, however, was Secretary Roche's
    determination that ``as the problems regarding sexual assault
    allegations predate the current leadership, we do not hold
    Generals Dallager or Gilbert responsible,'' and a press release
    to that effect was issued by the Department of the Air Force.
        On March 31, at a full committee hearing of this committee
    on the problems of the Air Force Academy, Secretary Roche
    repeated his assertion that the Air Force Academy leadership
    would not be held accountable for the very serious problems at
    the Academy and would not be replaced. Members of this
    committee at that hearing expressed our deep concerns about the
    direction in which Air Force leadership was going at that time
    and the lack of accountability.
        Secretary Roche subsequently changed course 180 degrees and
    transferred the superintendent, the commandant, and other
    Academy officials. In addition, in July of this year he
    recommended the former superintendent be retired at a lower
    grade. But the Secretary's initial assessment and conclusions
    clearly indicated that an independent panel such as yours,
    Congresswoman Fowler, was needed and Congress acted swiftly to
    make that happen.
        The legislation establishing this panel was drafted by
    Senate Armed Services committee members and included in the
    Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal
    Year 2003. Recognizing the urgency of the situation, the panel
    was given only 90 days to do its task as best it could, and we
    recognize the shortness of time. But, having read this report,
    I think you met the challenge.
        On June 17, a few days before the first meeting of this
    panel, the Air Force released the General Counsel's working
    group report. The conclusion of that working group that there
    was ``no systematic acceptance of sexual assault at the
    Academy,'' ``no institutional avoidance of responsibility,''
    and ``no systematic maltreatment of cadets who reported sexual
    assault'' has justifiably been challenged by Congresswoman
    Fowler and her colleagues on this panel.
        The Air Force General Counsel's conclusion in her report
    that ``a less than optimal environment to deter and respond to
    sexual assault or bringing assailants to justice'' existed at
    the Academy demonstrates the protective mentality that
    undermined the efforts within the Air Force and the working
    group to deal with the problem.
        Therefore, before this committee right now is the question,
    does the working group's decision, which was not to
    specifically address the accountability of various Air Force
    leaders, both military and civilian, regrettably, undermine the
    usefulness of their report? Who made that decision? We will
    find out.
        At this point, I would like to address the pending
    nomination of Secretary Roche. It is submitted by the President
    and the Secretary of Defense and is before this committee. The
    committee will work together on this. I will ask for the
    opinions of each member of the committee as to how this rather
    unique nomination is to be handled. But the point being, it is
    before the committee and certain aspects of his accountability
    or nonaccountability are before this committee as part of our
    advise and consent proceedings.
        I will address several specifics now that were raised by
    your report. While issues relating to accountability of Air
    Force leadership are still being reviewed by the DODIG, I have
    expressed my concerns about proceeding with the Senate
    consideration of the Roche nomination. I did so to the White
    House. I have released the letters. I wrote the President's
    Counsel and asked him if Congress is on notice that the
    executive branch is examining the accountability of a nominee
    that has been submitted by the President, can we in good faith
    proceed with the nomination until such time as all actions by
    the executive branch are completed? That letter has not yet
    been answered by the Counsel to the President.
        So we will have to review that situation. But I point out
    that I am in no way indicating any bias one way or another on
    the Roche nomination. I simply have a duty as chairman to
    consult with my members and to reach our own conclusions. But I
    point out in your report, you task the Inspector General (IG)
    to specifically examine the question of accountability
    regarding the top leadership of the Department of the Air
    Force. Am I not correct?
        Ms. Fowler. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. So we have to determine the IG's actions
    on that. Now, the IG did write to the committee and indicated
    at this time he had no evidence before him to raise questions
    about Secretary Roche. But as you say, he has not yet completed
    his work. You indicate that in your report.
        Senator Levin.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

        Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Let me first join
    you in thanking, congratulating, and commending Congresswoman
    Fowler and her colleagues on the panel for their thorough and
    comprehensive review of the longstanding problems with sexual
    misconduct at the Air Force Academy. It is an impressive
    report, particularly because this panel had only 90 days to
    conduct an investigation and to prepare the report.
        All Senators nominate young men and women from our States
    to the Service Academies. Each of us does so with the belief
    that we are placing these young adults in a safe and secure
    environment where they will receive a first class education and
    where they will be groomed for officership in our Armed Forces.
        Earlier this year, we heard of a pattern at the Air Force
    Academy of victims of sexual assaults being discouraged from
    reporting the incidents, that their complaints were not fully
    investigated, that they were ostracized by other cadets, and
    that they, the victims, were punished by the Academy for
    infractions brought to light only because they reported that
    they had been assaulted.
        In the words of the panel, the leadership at the Academy
    and the Air Force headquarters ``failed to respond aggressively
    and in a timely and committed way to eliminate causes of
    serious problems, and that was a failure of leadership.'' As a
    result, the panel went on, ``female cadets entrusted to the
    Academy have suffered, sexual offenders may have been
    commissioned as Air Force officers, and the reputation of a
    fine institution has been tarnished.''
        Our first order of business has to be to ensure that
    appropriate changes are made at the Air Force Academy to
    provide a safe and secure environment for cadets. This involves
    specific policy changes to improve the Academy environment, as
    well as efforts to hold leaders accountable where the facts
    reflect a failure of leadership. This report provides the basis
    for the Air Force to urgently and strongly address this
    longstanding problem and it will assist us as we oversee these
    actions. Accountability is the key to change. Without it,
    change will be less certain and will be slower.
        The report's conclusion is compelling. ``In addition to
    holding accountable those leaders who fail the Academy and its
    cadets,'' the report says, ``the Air Force must permanently
    change the Academy's institutional culture and implement
    command and oversight improvements that will identify and
    correct problems before they become ingrained in the fabric of
    the institution.''
        Again, I want to thank you, Congresswoman Fowler and each
    of her colleagues, for this is extraordinarily well done.
        Chairman Warner. Before we begin, I would like to submit
    the opening statement of my colleague, Senator Cornyn.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Cornyn follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Senator John Cornyn

        I would like to commend Congresswoman Tillie Fowler and the other
    members of the Panel to Review Sexual Misconduct Allegations at the
    United States Air Force Academy for their thorough and outstanding work
    in preparing the report before the committee today. This report
    provides us many vital recommendations to overhaul the manner in which
    the Air Force Academy handles sexual assault reporting and to create an
    environment free from all forms of sexual harassment. I look forward to
    working with Chairman Warner and other members of the Armed Services
    Committee to study these recommendations for implementation and to
    provide the necessary oversight to ensure that we resolve the problems
    at the Air Force Academy.
        As noted in the report, ``during the 10-year period from January 1,
    1993 through December 31, 2002, there were 142 allegations of sexual
    assault at the Academy, for an average of more than 14 allegations per
    year.'' Furthermore, the Department of Defense Inspector General
    disclosed that a May 2003 survey of Academy cadets showed that 80.8
    percent of females who said they have been victims of sexual assault at
    the Academy did not report the incident. That is simply unacceptable.
        I am deeply saddened and troubled by these findings, and I believe
    we must make every effort to ensure that the Air Force Academy
    environment is free from the fear of sexual harassment. In those
    unfortunate cases when sexual harassment does occur, the victims must
    have the appropriate avenues to report these crimes and receive the
    necessary counseling. Finally, the perpetrators of these crimes must be
    held accountable and punished to the fullest extent of the law. These
    despicable acts and the environment of fear they incite have no place
    in our Nation's military, at any level. We cannot and must not tolerate
    an atmosphere that does not promote the well-being of our cadets.
        I am also deeply concerned by the panel's finding that ``the
    highest levels of leadership had information about serious problems at
    the Academy, yet failed to take effective action.'' The young men and
    women who serve in our Armed Forces rely on the judgment of their
    leadership for guidance and training. Leadership that does not respond
    to serious problems under its command is guilty of a crime of equal
    measure. This leadership, whether present or former, must be held
    accountable for the failures of command at the Air Force Academy.
        As noted by Congresswoman Fowler in her testimony, ``change will
    not happen overnight, nor will it be truly effective without a
    sustained, dedicated focus by Academy officials and senior Air Force
    leadership.'' Although the panel noted that they were impressed with
    the leadership of Secretary Roche and General Jumper, it is absolutely
    crucial that the Air Force continues to pay necessary attention to this
    problem. We cannot allow for another failure of leadership to occur
    when the public spotlight fades.
        I concur with the panel's conclusion that ``the reputation of the
    Air Force Academy, and by extension the Air Force it serves, depends on
    finding a lasting solution to this problem.'' I will work with Chairman
    Warner and the Air Force leadership to ensure that the Air Force
    Academy will have a safe and secure learning environment for all
    cadets. We cannot afford to allow the problems of the past to continue.

        Chairman Warner. We will have a 7-minute round for each
    Senator so that time would be available to incorporate such
    opening comments as you would like to make. So we will now
    proceed, Congresswoman Fowler, to receive your report on behalf
    of the committee.

      STATEMENT OF HON. TILLIE K. FOWLER, CHAIRMAN, THE PANEL TO
     REVIEW SEXUAL MISCONDUCT ALLEGATIONS AT THE UNITED STATES AIR
     FORCE ACADEMY; ACCOMPANIED BY PANEL MEMBERS: LT. GEN. JOSIAH
     BUNTING III, USA [RET.], ANITA M. CARPENTER; LAURA L. MILLER,
      PH.D.; MAJ. GEN. MICHAEL J. NARDOTTI, JR., USA [RET.]; COL.
         JOHN W. RIPLEY, USMC [RET.]; AND SALLY L. SATEL, M.D.

        Ms. Fowler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
    having this hearing today. Before I start into my statement, I
    wanted to tell you what I thought of today when I walked into
    this room. It is a very historic room. I am from the State of
    Georgia originally and Senator Russell was a good friend of my
    family's and I knew him well at one point in my life. So it is
    an honor to be in this room and in this building.
        Thank you again for having this hearing today. I want to
    first introduce officially the members of this outstanding
    panel, because this has been a panel that has really worked
    diligently. We would not have made it within the 90-day
    timeframe if everyone had not been involved in this really
    almost full time to get this report done.
        To my left is Dr. Sally Satel, Colonel John Ripley, General
    Mike Nardotti, and to my right, Ms. Anita Carpenter, General Si
    Bunting, and Dr. Laura Miller. They have each really worked
    hard, and their only agenda was to ensure that every cadet at
    the Air Force Academy had a safe and secure learning
    environment. That is what we have tried to do through our
    recommendations.
        I would also like to recognize the absolutely wonderful
    staff that we have. If they could just stand briefly. They are
    on the front row here. They really were the backbone of this,
    and they have worked many long nights and hours to get this
    done within the timeframe. They did an outstanding job putting
    this together and doing the investigatory work and the
    interviews that needed to be done. So I want to thank them,
    too.
        Chairman Warner. Congresswoman Fowler, I would ask that you
    put into your record this morning the names and the positions
    of each of these staff members, because the hearing record will
    be printed up and I think that many people across the Nation
    would like to express their appreciation to your staff.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Ms. Fowler. We will do that, Senator, thank you. I do have,
    in the back of the report in the appendix is a list of all of
    them, too, and their titles. But we will add that for the
    record also today.
        I want to thank you for holding this important hearing and
    giving me the opportunity to report to you in person on the
    findings of our panel, as required by section 501 of Public Law
    108-11. I know of your leadership and the leadership of this
    committee in instituting this panel. So I really appreciate it.
    I think there was definitely a need for this panel. The Senate
    Armed Services Committee and the House Armed Services Committee
    really worked together to have this established, and I think we
    will see today there was a reason for it.
        Mr. Chairman, there is a quotation I found when I was doing
    some of the work on this, that Socrates likened one's
    reputation to fire when he said, ``When once you have kindled
    it, you may easily preserve it. But if you once extinguish it,
    you will find it an arduous task to rekindle it again.''
        Since the first cadets arrived at the U.S. Air Force
    Academy in 1955, nearly all have lived by the core values of
    the United States Air Force: integrity first, service before
    self, excellence in all we do. By doing so, they kindle the
    kind of reputation for the Academy that we would expect of such
    an institution.
        While not extinguishing it, the sexual assault scandal that
    has plagued the United States Air Force Academy recently has
    certainly tarnished the reputation of this great institution.
    We appear before you today to continue the arduous task of
    restoring both confidence in the Academy and safety for its
    cadets.
        Mr. Chairman, women have served our Nation admirably in
    times of war and in times of peace. They have graduated from
    the Air Force Academy since 1980 and served their country with
    distinction, even paying the ultimate price. I would like to
    call your attention to Section 6, Row F, Number 13. No, it is
    not a reference to a particular section of our panel's final
    report. It is not a seat in Falcon Stadium at Colorado Springs.
    Section 6, Row F, Number 13 is located at the U.S. Air Force
    Academy Cemetery. It is the final resting place of Academy
    graduate First Lieutenant Laura Piper. Lieutenant Piper was
    killed in the line of duty when her Blackhawk helicopter was
    shot down over northern Iraq on April 14, 1994, just 2 years
    after graduating from the Air Force Academy.
        What our panel has learned about the treatment of some
    women at the Air Force Academy is an injustice to all who have
    gone there, women and men. It is not befitting of the sterling
    reputation kindled for so long by more than 35,000 cadets from
    44 classes who have graduated from this institution. Quite
    frankly, Mr. Chairman, it is simply an insult to the career and
    the memory of First Lieutenant Laura Piper.
        When a new round of sexual assault allegations at the
    Academy surfaced earlier this year, this committee wisely
    decided to take a new approach to a problem that has plagued
    the Academy for at least a decade and quite possibly for as
    long as women have attended the institution. You, along with
    your colleagues in the other body, insisted on the creation of
    an independent panel of seven private citizens to, according to
    the public law, ``carry out a study of the policies,
    management, and organizational practices, and cultural elements
    of the United States Air Force Academy that were conducive to
    allowing sexual misconduct, including sexual assaults and rape,
    at the United States Air Force Academy.''
        On May 27, 2003, using the criteria established in the law,
    Secretary Rumsfeld appointed the seven members of our panel,
    and I am pleased that they are all with me today, as I have
    introduced them earlier. I think it is important for the
    members of this committee to know that this all-volunteer force
    could not have been more serious, more dedicated, and more
    determined to solve this problem. I think the best way to
    describe their dedication is to say that each approached this
    effort as if their own daughter was a cadet at the Academy
    today.
        As a result, the panel's final report offers substantive
    and constructive recommendations to rebuild the Academy's
    commitment to its cadets and to the American people. Our
    priority was to help ensure a safe and secure learning
    environment for all the Academy's cadets.
        Unfortunately, the environment at the Academy has been
    anything but. The statistics are appalling. During the 10-year
    period from January 1, 1993, through December 31, 2002, there
    were 142 allegations of sexual assault at the Academy--these
    are known allegations--for an average of more than 14
    allegations a year. That is unacceptable for an institution
    training our Nation's future military leaders. Let me be clear:
    one incident is unacceptable.
        The roots of this crisis go as deep as the institution's
    culture. We found the most striking indicator of the existence
    of a hostile environment for female cadets in the Academy's own
    survey data, data that was simply dismissed by leadership
    because it was ``unscientific.'' Just last year, more than one-
    fourth of the responding male cadets stated that they did not
    believe that women belonged at the Academy. One cadet fourth
    class wrote, ``Even with women in the Armed Forces, they should
    not be at the Military Academies.'' Another, ``Women are
    worthless and should be taken away from the United States Air
    Force Academy.''
        These comments are even more unsettling when you consider
    that women have been at the U.S. Air Force Academy since before
    these young men were even born. Representative Heather Wilson
    had already graduated from the Academy and earned a Rhodes
    Scholarship before they celebrated their first birthday. Eight
    years before they would arrive at the Academy, graduate Laura
    Piper was returning for the last time. These young men have no
    memory of an Air Force Academy without women, yet somehow they
    believe it should be that way.
        When such beliefs cannot be attributed to experience, they
    must then be attributed to character and values. These are
    learned traits and when an institution of higher learning finds
    warning signs like these in its surveys, scientific or not,
    that institution has a problem and an obligation to correct it.
    This report outlines the steps the Academy must take to
    strengthen its character development programs.
        Panel members experienced the gravity of this crisis first-
    hand during our visit to Colorado Springs. We were stunned to
    hear stories from victims, many still too afraid to go public
    with their stories and, more disturbing, too afraid to make an
    official report of the crime. They shared with us how their
    lives had been torn apart by violent assault and an aftermath
    that most of them suffered alone and in silence because of an
    atmosphere of fear and retribution by peers aided by either
    indifference, incompetence, or a combination of both by an
    Academy leadership that they believe failed them.
        Our closed-door experience with these victims is what
    drives our concern with the Agenda for Change policy that
    eliminates any form of confidential reporting of sexual
    assaults. The panel is very concerned that stripping away all
    confidentiality takes the Academy backwards to 1995, when the
    lack of confidentiality resulted in underground support groups
    and unreported crimes. The panel believes that a balance must
    be maintained between the support and treatment of victims and
    the prosecution of assailants. Confidentiality is the fulcrum
    on which that balance can exist and it must remain an option
    for all victims of sexual assault at the Academy.
        The Agenda for Change overlooks an established form of
    privileged communication that is currently available throughout
    the Armed Forces and could benefit cadet victims: the
    psychotherapist-patient privilege. This method of
    confidentiality has been available to the Academy since the
    psychotherapist-patient relationship was recognized in 1999 by
    Presidential Executive Order and implemented in Military Rule
    of Evidence 513. It is in use by both West Point and Annapolis.
        Accordingly, we recommend the creation of a program that
    combines the existing CASIE program, which stands for ``Cadets
    Advocating Sexual Integrity and Education'' with a trained
    victim advocate psychotherapist managing the program. This
    would ensure that the Academy has available to all sexual
    assault victims an established form of privileged communication
    within which to report their assault.
        Giving victims choices helps them regain a sense of control
    over their lives and promotes the healing process. Having a
    trained psychotherapist explain the consequences of their
    choices also increases opportunities for making the right
    choices, thereby further helping to encourage the reporting of
    these crimes. The Academy should not be the only Service
    Academy not to offer this form of confidential reporting.
        The sexual assault problems at the Academy are real and
    continue to this day. But the panel is encouraged by a renewed
    emphasis in Washington to immediately address and solve this
    problem. We are impressed with the leadership of Secretary
    Roche and General Jumper, a much-needed addition after a decade
    of inaction and failures.
        Secretary Roche made a step towards serious reform this
    year by rolling out his Agenda for Change and replacing the
    Academy's leadership team with one that has been quick to take
    action. Though the members of this panel want to be clear, the
    Agenda for Change should be seen as a blueprint, an initial
    step in reversing years of institutional ineffectiveness.
        Each of our panel members agrees that change will not
    happen overnight, nor will it be truly effective without a
    sustained, dedicated focus by Academy officials and senior Air
    Force leadership. The very culture of the Academy must be
    altered before real change can be maintained for future
    generations.
        The panel found that a consistent flaw in previous attempts
    to address this problem, and a flaw that allowed it to happen
    in the first place, was the lack of external oversight. The
    panel recommends the Board of Visitors operates more like a
    corporate board of directors. We recommend the formation of
    committees with specific oversight responsibilities, such as
    academic affairs, student life, and athletics. We recommend a
    minimum of four meetings a year, two of those to occur at the
    Academy. We also recommend that all board members have
    unfettered access to the Academy grounds and the cadets.
        This committee should also more aggressively exercise its
    oversight authority by reviewing reports on the Academy called
    for in our recommendations and the reports that you are calling
    for in the 2004 defense authorization bill.
        I would like to draw the committee's attention to panel
    recommendation number 4, in which we recommend revising the law
    to expand the available pool of potential candidates for the
    position of the dean of faculty beyond the Academy's permanent
    professors. There is a time sensitivity issue here. In order to
    benefit from this reform in the selection of the next dean of
    faculty, which will occur as early as next spring, I would urge
    this committee, should you concur with our recommendation, to
    revise the law in the 2004 authorization bill presently in
    conference. Otherwise, under normal rotation schedules this
    reform could not be effective until some time around 2007.
        Now, I want to draw your attention here to this timeline.
    You also have it. It is the very last exhibit in your report,
    that is a foldout. If you might not be able to read it from
    where you are we have it in there, too. We spent a lot of time
    going through chronicling this crisis, because the question was
    who knew what, when, and what were they trying to do about it.
    So this timeline really lays it out. It lays out the crises and
    the failures of leaders to effectively and aggressively
    respond.
        The warning signs were there, as you will see, year after
    year, but they went unnoticed or they were ignored. We are here
    to report that this panel found a deep chasm in leadership
    during this most critical time in the Academy's history, a
    chasm that extended far beyond its campus in Colorado Springs.
    Sadly, we believe this helped create an environment in which
    sexual assault became a part of life at the Air Force Academy.
        Any credible assessment of sexual misconduct problems over
    the last 10 years must include an examination of the
    responsibility of both Academy and Air Force headquarters
    leadership. Unfortunately, the Air Force General Counsel's
    working group report failed to do that.
        That is why this panel recommends that the DODIG conduct a
    thorough review of the accountability of the previous leaders
    at the Academy and Air Force headquarters. This should include
    an assessment of General Gilbert, General Wagie, and Colonel
    Slavec, as well as former leaders of the Air Force itself. We
    recommend that the results of this review should be provided in
    a timely manner to both the members of the Senate and House
    Armed Services Committee and to the Secretary of Defense.
        Now, I want to point out that the panel has recommended
    that the DODIG investigate the previous leadership. While we
    offer what we believe is some constructive criticism of the
    changes instituted by the present Academy and Air Force
    leadership, we have found neither team lacking in their
    understanding of the seriousness of the crisis or in their
    commitment to find a lasting solution.
        It would not serve the interests of the Academy or its
    cadets to distract the present leadership with a backward-
    looking investigation. Rightly so, the Secretary, the chief of
    staff, the superintendent, and his team are focused on the
    future of this great institution, and the effective resolution
    of this matter requires that their focus remain there.
        We recognize the difficulty in holding accountable those
    who have left their positions of leadership, and particularly
    those who have left the military service altogether. However,
    given the magnitude of this situation and to set a clear
    example of the level of performance expected of future leaders,
    this panel has concluded that every effort should be made to
    formally document the failure of former leaders and to ensure
    that documentation becomes a part of their official military
    records.
        In total, this report contains 21 specific recommendations
    that this panel believes can put the Academy back on track and
    allow it to live up to its potential as a unique institution of
    higher education that also trains future leaders of our Air
    Force. Some are already in various stages of implementation.
    Others can be implemented administratively at the Academy or at
    Air Force headquarters, while some, such as number 4 mentioned
    earlier, will require legislative action.
        While Congress will not necessarily play an implementation
    role in all 21 of our recommendations, we would urge you to
    play an oversight and evaluation role in our recommendations as
    well as those found in the Agenda for Change and the working
    group report.
        Now, I have to say, of course, always a source of envy to
    those of us who are former House members, but well-suited for
    the oversight task, your 6-year terms of office give you a
    unique ability in our Government to track the long-term
    progress of all these efforts aimed at solving this different
    problem.
        So as this panel concludes its work, it is our sincere hope
    that while their leaders make every effort to solve this
    difficult problem, the vast majority of cadets will continue to
    strive to live by the core values of integrity, service, and
    excellence. It is and should always be an honor to call oneself
    a cadet at the United States Air Force Academy.
        That concludes my remarks, Mr. Chairman. The other panel
    members do not have any opening remarks. We are available to
    answer any questions that you or the committee might have.
        [The Report of the Panel to Review Sexual Misconduct
    Allegations at the U.S. Air Force Academy follows:]

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        Chairman Warner. I thank you for an excellent report, and I
    ask that in the course of the questioning--the questions can be
    directed to any member of the panel--where it is directed to
    Chairman Fowler, if there are other members who want to respond
    to that Senator's question, please raise your hand. Hopefully,
    the Senator will permit you to respond.
        Now, I am listening intently. You said that you were asking
    the Inspector General to go back and review the issue of
    accountability. I heard the word ``former leadership,'' which I
    am trying to find the use of that word ``former.'' Is it in
    your report at all?
        Ms. Fowler. The recommendation itself is on page 101.
        Chairman Warner. I am looking at that.
        Ms. Fowler. Then the section that establishes that starts
    on page 37.
        Chairman Warner. The panel recommends that the DODIG
    conduct a thorough review--go ahead.
        Senator Levin. What page were you on, Ms. Fowler? I am
    sorry.
        Ms. Fowler. The accountability section starts on page 36 of
    the report and goes through page 42. The actual recommendation
    is on page 42 and it is also in the recommendations section on
    page 101. We put all the recommendations in one section for you
    also, so they are throughout the report and there.
        Chairman Warner. Now wait a minute. Is it in here, the word
    ``former''? I am trying to go through a lot. I have read it
    through once.
        Ms. Fowler. I do not think it is.
        Chairman Warner. I do not think it is, either, and that is
    why I find it very significant that this morning you include it
    in your opening statement, whereas it is not in the report.
        Ms. Fowler. The reason I did, Mr. Chairman, is because of
    some of the press interpretations over the past day or so of
    what is in our report, that we as a panel wanted to make it
    clear that our primary concerns, if it was not clear enough in
    this report, were with prior leadership. We have uncovered
    nothing to lead us to believe that either Secretary Roche or
    General Jumper were doing anything to not respond to these
    concerns. As soon as they had the information, as far as this
    panel is concerned in our interactions with those individuals,
    they moved in a timely manner. The Agenda for Change, while not
    perfect, was certainly a great beginning. It was needed at that
    time because they could not wait until after school began. They
    made it very clear that it was a blueprint, that it was an
    evolving process. They have made changes to it themselves since
    it was issued.
        So as far as our relationship with both of those leaders,
    it has been a very open, positive relationship. They have been
    very forthcoming with us whenever we asked for information. We
    have met with both individuals and we have not had any
    questions as far as this panel is concerned about their
    performance.
        Chairman Warner. But it is for those reasons that you now
    explicitly exempt them from your recommendations----
        Ms. Fowler. It is up to the DODIG to decide who he is going
    to investigate, not up to this panel. But we wanted, since
    there had been some expressions otherwise in the press----
        Chairman Warner. This is an important point. This committee
    is faced with a very unique issue right now. I have been
    privileged to be on this committee for 25 years, served with
    many chairmen. My distinguished ranking member and I have to
    determine when we are on notice. For example, the Air Force
    this morning issued a clarification. All kinds of
    clarifications are coming out. But they say that: ``The DOD
    Inspector General, the Air Force Inspector General, and the
    recently formed Executive Steering Group are examining other
    aspects of the sexual assault situation at the Academy and
    related Air Force headquarters oversight.''
        As I read that, that does not exempt the current occupants.
        Ms. Fowler. As I said, I cannot speak for the Inspector
    General or for the Executive Steering Group.
        Chairman Warner. I am not suggesting that you are.
        Ms. Fowler. All I can speak for is this panel, is all that
    we can speak for, is for these seven members of this panel. It
    is certainly up to the Inspector General and to the Executive
    Steering Group. When General Jumper appeared before us in late
    July, he made it clear that there was still an open
    investigation ongoing as to the immediate past leadership at
    the Academy, General Gilbert and Colonel Slavec. So we
    certainly refer to that in our report, because he made it clear
    that was still not complete.
        Chairman Warner. At this time might I solicit any other
    views on the panel. Do you concur in the chairwoman's statement
    regarding what I perceive as an addition to the direction to
    the Inspector General, that only the former leadership is to be
    examined, not the current? I observe that the current
    leadership had been in office for well over a year plus while
    these situations and allegations were continuing to accumulate.
        This is of great concern to this Senator. I have to express
    that to you. When I read your report, it seemed clear to me
    that you asked for the IG to look across the board at the
    subject of the accountability at the headquarters.
    Specifically, you took issue with the working group under the
    General Counsel, in which you said: ``The panel is concerned
    about the seeming inability of the Air Force to adequately
    investigate itself. While the Air Force General Counsel's
    working group conducted a thorough investigation of the
    Academy, it completely failed to address one of the most
    significant contributors to the current controversy,
    ineffective Air Force oversight at the leadership.''
        I find this in conflict. I am trying to move around very
    quickly because I thought I had it well organized in my mind
    until you inserted the word ``former.''
        Ms. Fowler. Again, we cannot direct the Inspector General
    as to whom he chooses to investigate. But what we wanted to
    make clear this morning--and I will let some of the other
    members speak to this also--was that as far as our
    investigation was concerned and our dealings with the current
    leadership, both at the Academy and at the Air Force
    headquarters, they have been very receptive, they have
    furnished us any information we needed, they have moved forward
    on trying to make change. But again, it is up to the Inspector
    General.
        Now, as far as the working group report goes, it was a very
    well done report as to what was in it. Our concerns were what
    was omitted, that there were omissions in that report that
    raised questions in our mind about its complete coverage.
        Now, I saw that same release this morning. Our question is,
    if you are going to do a complete review and as you uncover
    these facts, you would think it would have been the
    responsibility of the working group to review them.
        Chairman Warner. I would like to ask if other panelists
    were aware that we were now going to be advised this morning of
    a rather significant departure from what is written in the
    report with regard to the oversight of the Air Force
    headquarters? Does anyone else wish to address this? Colonel
    Ripley, do you? You understand the word ``accountability'' in
    the military.
        You come from the school that Senator McCain and I came
    from. Even though the captain of the ship is deservedly getting
    a night's rest in the bunk, if the ship runs aground, he is
    accountable. Am I not correct in that?
        Colonel Ripley. Correct, sir.
        Sir, I would respond by saying--and of course I am one
    panel member. I am one American citizen. But I think I saw and
    I can represent what a lot of us feel. I have served as a
    marine for 35 years active duty. I have commanded over 10,000
    marines in every situation imaginable.
        I have heard this characterized as a failure of leadership.
    Indeed it is, but I would emphasize or approach it differently.
    I think this was a cataclysmic collapse, an absence of leaders
    taking responsibility when the signs were everywhere. The
    emphasis seems to be on current leadership, but the fact is
    this happened over a period of time without question, going
    back 10 years and more.
        Using my past, which you are familiar with, the enemy was
    in the wire, the ship was heading for a reef in broad daylight,
    and nobody read the signals. It is too late to have abandon
    ship drills when you are on the reef, or to try to close the
    gap, the breach in the outpost. The signals as we came to see
    it in our hearings and our individual questions that we asked
    virtually everywhere, but especially in Colorado Springs, it
    just washed over you like a wave. People simply ignored it.
        They claimed that there are no systemic problems here. I
    disagree with that 100 percent. I think the system sustained
    it.
        Chairman Warner. I thank you, Colonel. General Bunting, do
    you have a comment? You have given a lifetime of service in the
    military.
        General Bunting. I would concur in what Colonel Ripley has
    said, sir. We did find in fact a systemic breakdown in
    supervision, in accountability, in responsibility. But I would
    not confine what we found to the leadership that Colonel Ripley
    was discussing. We found it at every conceivable level.
        Let me give a couple of examples if I may. We heard
    repeatedly that assignments at the grade of lieutenant and
    captain and major to the positions of air officer commanding,
    the tactical officers, the young officers who were assigned to
    work with the cadets, that those assignments were not routinely
    given to the ablest young role models that the Air Force could
    furnish, but rather they were not taken particularly seriously
    and many officers who were assigned to those positions were not
    regularly on duty discharging their responsibilities in a way
    that I think a tactical officer should.
        At the other end of the spectrum, we found the Board of
    Visitors was singularly negligent in the discharge of their
    responsibilities. We found over the last 10 years that the
    average attendance at the single board meeting that was held
    every year was less than 50 percent.
        So when we use the word ``systemic,'' we are using it very
    carefully. There was a breakdown in leadership at every
    conceivable level.
        Chairman Warner. General Nardotti, you have also had
    significant military experience.
        General Nardotti. Let me answer your question directly. I
    concur with the chairman's view.
        Chairman Warner. The question before that I propounded to
    the chairman is the insertion now in the opening statement of
    the word ``former,'' which modifies the recommendation that you
    put in the written report. Is it the consensus of the panel
    that the existing leadership should not be reviewed by the IG?
    I guess that is the question before me.
        General Nardotti. I will speak for myself. I concur with
    Ms. Fowler on this point. That was the understanding of the
    panel, that what we focused on was the leadership over time. We
    understand certainly that a year can be considered a long time,
    but in relative terms and in terms of the opportunities that
    leadership prior to that of the current top Air Force
    leadership, they had more time, an ample amount of time in
    their tenures, with systems in place that should have given
    them a better indication that there was a problem that needed
    to be addressed.
        Certainly the timeframes--we recognize that perhaps the
    timeframes for the people at the Academy that might be held
    accountable would be shorter timeframes, but that is logical
    because they are more directly involved with the problem and
    the need for solutions.
        Chairman Warner. I thank you.
        General Nardotti. I would also point out that at the press
    conference the other day when Congresswoman Fowler explained
    what we meant by the accountability she did make the point that
    we are referring to the past leadership.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you. My time has expired.
        Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to just clarify this recommendation in my own mind.
    It is the same one that Chairman Warner referred to. On page 42
    where you recommend that the DODIG conduct a thorough review of
    the accountability of Academy and Air Force headquarters
    leadership, that review by the DODIG was taking place or was
    initiated before you came into existence, is that not correct?
    Was it not this committee which requested the DODIG to do a
    thorough review?
        Ms. Fowler. Senator, my understanding was that initial
    DODIG review was of the individual cases at the Academy and to
    make determinations as to whether each of those was handled in
    an appropriate manner, whether the results of those were
    appropriate, the procedures appropriate, and any that were not,
    then they would make recommendations on them. Since that time,
    the DODIG has expanded that investigation, just in the past
    couple of weeks. But it initially started out really as a
    review of individual cases, which we were not to do. That was
    not our role. It was the Inspector General's role.
        Senator Levin. Basically, the DODIG will conduct a thorough
    review of headquarters leadership as requested, and if this
    panel requests or anybody else appropriately requests the DODIG
    to look at current as well as past leadership then that is what
    the DODIG will do.
        Ms. Fowler. Yes, sir.
        Senator Levin. It seems to me that we should make it clear,
    Mr. Chairman, that we are not excluding from the DODIG the
    review of current leadership in their process. That is not your
    decision; that is our decision.
        Ms. Fowler. I agree with that, and that is why I made
    clear, we are not officially excluding anyone. We are just
    giving our opinion based on our examination to date, but it is
    not our role to officially exclude or include anyone. That is
    really, as you said, the role of Congress and the role of the
    Inspector General.
        Senator Levin. Right. So that even though you did not in
    your review see anything which you found to represent a
    deficiency or a failure on the part of current leadership, that
    review is taking place now by the IG. It seems to me, Mr.
    Chairman, we should make it clear most importantly to the DODIG
    that we expect them to include current leadership just so that
    it is thorough and complete.
        Chairman Warner. I share those views.
        Senator Levin. That it is not based on your report, but
    just based on a desire that we not exclude anybody from the
    DODIG. It is going to be given to us hopefully by December, as
    I understand it. Where did I get that date from? We do not know
    when it is?
        Chairman Warner. We have heard several dates.
        Senator Levin. All right. But we ought to urge the DODIG,
    obviously, to expedite this review because of the pendency of
    that nomination. All right, so that is something we can
    clarify.
        General Nardotti. Senator, may I add to that, to this
    point. The reason we have placed so much emphasis on the
    accountability of the past leadership is we believe that there
    was an assumption early on that, because prior administrations,
    military and civilian, are gone, they are either retired or
    they have left their positions, that there was simply nothing
    that could be done.
        We were unwilling to accept that. We understand, and we
    have said this in the report, that there are certainly great
    limits on what you could do to those who are long gone from the
    positions. But we believed it was extremely important to have a
    comprehensive look at the past leadership, determine whether
    there were failures, for two reasons.
        Number one, if there were some things done wrong, even at
    the highest levels, even if you cannot do anything of great
    substance to an individual in the way of holding them
    accountable, at least completing the record as to whether or
    not they met the extraordinarily high standard of performance
    that is expected of people in those leadership positions, we
    think that is important for the record. We think it is
    important for the future leadership to understand that merely
    because you leave the position does not mean that all is gone
    and forgotten, that there is a history here and there will be
    accounting at least through history.
        We also thought it was important for the immediate past
    leadership that was removed from the Academy to place this in
    the proper context. They were not the only leaders who failed
    in this instance, in the judgment of this panel. Even if it is
    simply a matter of making a matter of record that other leaders
    had similar evidence before them and failed to act, that they
    should have taken those kinds of actions.
        It may be more of an historical accounting, but we think
    that is important to put the problem in proper context and to
    draw the correct lessons for leadership in the future.
        Senator Levin. Thank you.
        One of the points in your report is as follows: that the
    Air Force General Counsel attempted to shield Air Force
    headquarters from public criticism by focusing exclusively on
    events at the Academy. You disagreed with the General Counsel's
    conclusion that there was no systemic acceptance of sexual
    assault at the Academy or institutional avoidance of
    responsibility, to use your words.
        Now, is there any responsibility on the part of Secretary
    Roche, as the individual who directed, reviewed, and approved
    the General Counsel's working group report, for its failure to
    address leadership failures at Air Force headquarters?
        Ms. Fowler. We could not find any, Senator. The Air Force
    General Counsel review was done independently and, while the
    Air Force General Counsel does work for the Secretary of the
    Air Force, it is my understanding the Secretary of the Air
    Force did not intervene in that report, did not try to direct
    it, that this was a staff report that was delivered to him by
    the Air Force General Counsel.
        As I said earlier, while we think the contents of that
    report are well done, as we did our investigation we kept
    uncovering time and again a lack of information in there about
    Air Force leadership accountability. We are talking about over
    the past 10 years. There were members of that working group,
    Mr. Kip Atlee, who chaired a task force on this issue within
    the Pentagon in 2002 and 2001, and none of the information from
    that task force was included in their report. The Air Force IG
    was part of one of those task forces. That was not included in
    the report.
        So what we have just denoted is our concern over omissions
    from that report. We found no evidence that the Secretary had
    any involvement in the creation of that report or what was in
    it. It was presented to him as a staff report from the Air
    Force General Counsel.
        Senator Levin. Just to finish that one line of questioning,
    when you say that the Air Force General Counsel attempted to
    shield, that is critical of the Counsel doing so?
        Ms. Fowler. It is.
        Senator Levin. But what you are saying is that that does
    not imply, is not intended to imply or suggest any direction to
    do that by headquarters?
        Ms. Fowler. We would have said that if we had thought so.
    But all we knew was that the Air Force General Counsel did not
    include what we considered critical information in her report.
        Senator Levin. But that was not at the direction, implied
    or otherwise, of headquarters?
        Ms. Fowler. We found no evidence of that.
        Senator Levin. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Did you find any reason why she did on her
    own initiative?
        Ms. Fowler. No, we did not, other than, you know how you
    talk behind the scenes with people, whether she wanted to
    please people or whether--now they are saying it was not in her
    purview. But to me if you are doing a thorough report--and part
    of the problem you will see from this timeline is time and
    again studies were conducted, but they became only partial
    studies. If you are looking at the problems at the Air Force
    Academy, which she was doing, you should be looking at the
    whole picture, and part of the picture which people on that
    working group were aware of were problems with the leadership
    at the Air Force over those 10 years. I mean, there were
    members of that working group who had chaired studies of that
    very issue and yet they did not bring that information to the
    working group nor reveal it in their report, and that did cause
    us to raise some questions.
        Ms. Walker herself, it is my understanding, did not know
    about Mr. Atlee's involvement in the earlier study until about
    6 weeks or so before her report was released. So I am not
    blaming Ms. Walker on all of this. I think she had a lack of
    information on some of the things she needed to know.
        Chairman Warner. Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank the members of the panel for a really
    thorough and outstanding job, and I thank all of you for your
    great work as well as your previous service to the country.
        Ms. Fowler, on March 12, 2003, according to a Los Angeles
    Times story, ``Air Force Secretary James Roche on Tuesday
    rejected calls to open his probe of sexual misconduct at the
    Air Force Academy to outside investigators, saying the problem
    was best handled internally. `My Harvard Business School
    training is you do not turn to outsiders; you study something
    yourself, you master it yourself, so that you know what you are
    talking about and you can lead,' he said in an interview with
    the Los Angeles Times.''
        If Secretary Roche's view had prevailed at that time, we
    would not have had your outstanding work.
        Over a long period of time, this issue was discussed. In 26
    March 2003 there was a press conference held by Secretary Roche
    and General Jumper: Question: ``Have you in any way reprimanded
    or disciplined at all the leaders who are [inaudible]? What do
    you say to critics who say you are going too easy on these
    people? You just said a second ago these people may have been
    responsible.'' Secretary Roche: ``The current group cannot be
    held responsible for everything that occurred in a 10-year
    period, certainly over a period longer than 10 years. To hold
    someone accountable means that there are two sides to a story,
    and they have a side as well. We have looked at it. We now look
    at it under the circumstances, and they might have been more
    clairvoyant, they may have been sharper, there may have been a
    survey they should have acted upon, but to hold them
    accountable per se with what we now know, no.''
        Is that pretty much in keeping with your conclusions?
        Ms. Fowler. No, it is not, Senator. While I cannot speak
    for the Secretary, all we can say is that once this panel was
    established the Secretary was very forthcoming----
        Senator McCain. Of course, you know why the panel was
    established?
        Ms. Fowler. Yes, I do.
        Senator McCain. Because of the actions of Congress----
        Ms. Fowler. Exactly.
        Senator McCain.--after the Secretary of the Air Force had
    said, as I quoted to you, that that was not necessary.
        Ms. Fowler. All I can assume, and, again, I did not even
    meet Secretary Roche until he testified before our panel on
    June 23. I had never met him or talked with him until then. But
    I would think that after he became more aware of the
    seriousness and depth of this problem he began to change his
    views.
        Certainly once you established this panel, we never found
    the Secretary to be any less forthcoming. I mean, he came
    forward. In fact, I think some staff of his did not want him to
    come testify before us. He came and testified. Any time we
    needed information, he instructed his staff time and again to
    give us whatever we wanted. So we found the Secretary to be
    very open with us.
        Senator McCain. The fact remains that you would not be in
    existence if it had been his view had prevailed over that of
    the panel.
        Ms. Fowler. Right, the wisdom of this committee established
    this panel.
        Senator McCain. I am pleased that he had cooperated with
    the panel.
        Of course, the working group report has been somewhat
    discredited by your recommendations; is that correct? You are
    in disagreement?
        Ms. Fowler. We cannot agree with the statement--and I will
    paraphrase it now--when they said there was no systemic
    acceptance of this. When you have roughly 142 known allegations
    of sexual assault happening a year over a 10-year period, if
    that is not a systemic problem, I do not know what is.
        Senator McCain. Let me be specific. In your report you say:
    ``In June 2003, after completing her investigation of sexual
    assault at the Academy, Air Force General Counsel Mary L.
    Walker released The Report of the Working Group Concerning
    Deterrence of and Response to Incidents of Sexual Assault at
    the U.S. Air Force Academy (``Working Group Report''). The
    Working Group Report covers many aspects of cadet life, Academy
    policies and sexual assault reporting procedures in place at
    the Academy during the last 10 years. However, it avoids any
    reference to the responsibility of Air Force headquarters for
    the failure of leadership which occurred at the Academy.''
        It seems to me that that is a fairly large omission.
        Ms. Fowler. It was. That is why we pointed it out.
        Senator McCain. Thank you. ``The panel believes that the
    Air Force General Counsel attempted to shield Air Force
    headquarters from the public criticism by focusing exclusively
    on events at the Academy.'' I would say that is a little larger
    than a minor disagreement if the report, in your words,
    ``attempted to shield Air Force headquarters from public
    criticism by focusing exclusively on events at the Academy.'' I
    would say that is a comment of the utmost seriousness.
        Ms. Fowler. As you will see in our report, we documented
    several known facts that were not included in the working group
    report and we questioned why they were not. We had a much
    smaller staff and a lot less time to investigate than did the
    General Counsel working group. Our question was, why were these
    things that we uncovered that we felt were important to culture
    and climate, what was occurring over those 10 years--a lot of
    it is leadership. It is failure of leadership and it is failure
    of command when these types of things are occurring. It is all
    about leadership.
        Senator McCain. General Bunting, is it not a fairly serious
    charge to say that the panel believes that the Air Force
    General Counsel attempted to shield Air Force headquarters from
    public criticism?
        General Bunting. It is a very serious charge and it is very
    seriously meant.
        Senator McCain. Do you think it deserves further scrutiny?
        General Bunting. Sir, it does indeed.
        Senator McCain. General Nardotti, would you agree with
    that?
        General Nardotti. I would agree with that, and the General
    Counsel works for the Secretary of the Air Force, so we would
    consider it his responsibility to take the information that
    this panel has now made available to him with regard to the
    working group report and take appropriate action.
        Senator McCain. Again, I will try not to repeat the
    questions asked by my colleagues. It is an outstanding report
    and one that I think for its candor is really a signal
    achievement, which I think is a remarkable performance on the
    part of the panel. But I think to stop accountability at
    previous leaders is something that I do not quite understand,
    particularly when before this committee the Secretary of the
    Air Force stated--and I would be glad to quote you and send you
    the transcript--that there was no need for discipline to be
    taken against current leaders at the Air Force Academy and that
    he did not intend to do so, and also that there was no need for
    an independent investigation.
        Those are facts, the testimony before this committee and
    public statements by the Secretary of the Air Force. So I am
    curious why we would stop.
        My time has expired. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Senator, I thank you for those very
    probing questions. It is the intention of the chairman, in
    consultation with the ranking member and other members of the
    committee, to consider bringing before this committee in open
    session the Air Force General Counsel. I happen to have made an
    acquaintance with her in the course of the advise and consent
    proceedings.
        The Senate confirmed her because of her very considerable
    professional accomplishments, and I think she should be given a
    chance to explain this. I do not wish to have this counsel or
    someone else be a fall guy, to use a word, without the
    opportunity for them explaining this.
        I think your panel made some very important, critical
    determinations, and this committee is going to probe into this
    very carefully. Thank you.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me commend the panel for excellent work. I had the
    privilege of serving with Congresswoman Fowler in the House,
    and she has done her typical fine job. General Bunting was my
    instructor at West Point and General Nardotti was 2 years ahead
    and represents a distinguished graduate of West Point. I think
    what you have done is a great service, not only to the Air
    Force Academy and the Air Force, but for all the military,
    because the effectiveness of any military organization rests on
    confidence in your comrades. That is based on an ethic of
    selfless dedication one to another, not selfish exploitation. I
    cannot think of more gripping examples of exploitation than
    what you have catalogued in your report. No amount of
    technology or talent will make up for that ethical lapse.
        So what we have to do is really make this a serious
    priority, not just at the Air Force Academy but throughout the
    military. I can assure you that your efforts will be translated
    to West Point. I have already sent your report there. At this
    weekend's meeting of the Board of Visitors we will discuss it
    in detail, and thank you for your service.
        One recommendation you have made in your report is to
    expand the search for the dean outside the faculty of the Air
    Force Academy. But I would note, too, that one of his functions
    is to operate the cadet counseling center. That is, I think,
    the place where most of the information became available, which
    apparently he, or at least allegedly, ignored.
        Is it also a recommendation or could you expand on the
    notion of taking that function away from the dean?
        Ms. Fowler. No, Senator, we did not do that. But we do have
    recommendations in here as to a restructuring of that
    counseling center; we do think it needs to be restructured. It
    needs to have licensed clinical psychologists that are running
    it, it needs to increase its staffing, and it needs to also
    have better trained people as part of that staff.
        So we do have some specific recommendations as to the
    center itself. The center really is run by someone there at the
    center, but it reports to the dean of the faculty. He had the
    information that the center had and that caused us concern,
    that he had that information, he had the results of the surveys
    every year, but never suggested any actions.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        There is another major issue that you have raised. Everyone
    has spoken about it, and that is the culture. In fact, I think
    the essence of your recommendations is the culture has to
    change. One of the most glaring statistics is the fact that 25
    percent of men there still deny the appropriate role of women
    at the Academy and in the Service.
        I wonder if you are recommending or are prepared to
    recommend that those surveys be done in a systematic way to
    determine, not just at a snapshot, but as cadets enter and
    progress, because again I think there is a real question in my
    mind whether they bring those attitudes to the Academy or the
    culture of the Academy develops those attitudes. I wonder if
    you might comment, and I would open it up to the rest of the
    panel, too.
        Ms. Fowler. I would like a couple of them to comment.
        The Air Force has its own survey center, which is
    responsible for developing professionally-done surveys. We do
    not understand why the Academy, if they thought these were
    unscientific, never turned to their own survey center to
    develop ones that they considered scientific. But we have
    suggested that these be done in a different, better manner than
    they have been in the past.
        I would like to ask Dr. Laura Miller, who really went
    through the surveys since 1998 at the Academy and compiled them
    and had some interesting information on those.
        Dr. Miller. The Academy could have done a comparison like
    that, because they offered some of the same questions on the
    survey year after year after year after year. So they could
    look at a particular class and see what were the responses that
    they gave as freshmen and what were the responses that they
    gave as seniors.
        They did very cursory analysis of their findings, dismissed
    them as invalid, and never corrected the problems with the
    survey in administering them again. I should point out that
    these climate surveys address sexual assault, alcohol abuse,
    gender, the gender climate in general, race relations,
    religious discrimination, and differential treatment perhaps
    between athletes. So these are surveys that could provide a
    wide range of very important information to the commanders.
        Senator Reed. Anyone else?
        General Bunting. I would like to respond.
        Senator Reed. General Bunting, please.
        General Bunting. A couple of days ago the question was
    asked, is there some point in the admissions process in which
    young male applicants to the Academy can be asked questions
    about their views of women in the Services, whether women
    should be commissioned, whether women should be at the Air
    Force Academy. I think that is probably an idle and a useless
    question. My own view is that the culture there, as it were,
    infects them once they get there.
        One of the great things about the American Armed Forces and
    the Academies is that the kids that go there are us. They are
    not kids who have spent their life dreaming of being military
    commanders and fighters. They are a wonderful representation of
    this country. I have no doubt that overwhelmingly the young men
    that go to the Academy go with the same attitude towards young
    women that most of us have.
        This is plainly a cultural problem that happens there. I
    might also observe that we have a tendency to dwell on
    diagnosis more than on prescription here, and we keep talking
    about the general and the colonel. But this is a community of
    6,000 or 7,000 people, including a faculty of 560, and to
    change that culture is going to take much more than the actions
    of the most brilliant and dedicated general officer. You have
    to have a huge systemic change, again particularly, it seems to
    me, among the young officers who are assigned there. Those are
    the ones that the cadets see every day. I also think the
    faculty of the institution should be much more heavily involved
    in the cure than it is right now.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, General.
        General Nardotti.
        General Nardotti. I would like to comment on the culture
    issue. I think for incoming cadets a lot of attitudes have to
    be changed. There are standards there that they will find
    nowhere else. They have an honor code. They have to unlearn
    some prior bad habits and adjust their standards. Their
    attitude toward the role of women in the Armed Forces is
    something that, regardless of how they felt about that before
    coming in, is something that they have to learn through
    training and leadership development why it is that women are
    there, in the numbers that they are there.
        I view this as an issue, for those 25 percent of the cadets
    who feel that women do not belong there. They fail to
    understand, and the Academy has failed to teach them, how it is
    that women are at the Academy and in the Services in the
    numbers that they are. It was not based on some abstract notion
    of diversity to achieve certain goals. It was a very well
    thought through and deliberate decision to use women in a way
    that they had not been used before, in order to make the
    volunteer force a success.
        I think it is a mistake to focus too much on the fighter
    pilot example and say, well, we have women fighter pilots,
    therefore they are the same as the men. One percent of fighter
    pilots in the Air Force are women. That is not the point.
        Women do many important things in the Air Force other than
    being fighter pilots, and they do many important missions in
    other Services. They add value and they have contributed
    significantly to the success of the volunteer force over time.
    The force we have today is the best we have ever had. They need
    to learn that lesson and they need to understand that these are
    people that together, the men and women who are there, are
    going to serve together shoulder to shoulder on extraordinarily
    important missions. The attitude that some of these cadets have
    apparently maintained is, again, it is a sensitive and
    difficult leadership development challenge, but they have to
    address it.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        My time has expired. Again, thank you for your wonderful
    work.
        Ms. Fowler. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I would
    like to insert my opening statement into the record.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Allard follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Senator Wayne Allard
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to commend you for your
    leadership on this issue. I have had the privilege of working with you
    on this issue from the beginning, and because of your interest, I
    believe our hard work is starting to pay off.
        Approximately 5 months ago, Congress created the Panel to Review
    Sexual Misconduct Allegations at the United States Air Force Academy.
    The driving force behind this panel was the Air Force's perceived
    inability to hold senior officials accountable for their failure to
    effectively address the growing number of sexual assaults at the
    Academy. As it turns out, our concerns have proven to be justified.
    Unfortunately, as the panel has indicated in its report, it appears
    that we have only begun to scratch the surface.
        I believe the panel did an outstanding job given its 3-month
    deadline and its limited access to information from the Air Force.
    Chairman Fowler, you and the other panel members are to be commended
    for the fine work you have done.
        The panel accomplished what many of us on this committee were
    hoping the Air Force would do on its own: to identify those responsible
    and hold them accountable. Because of the panel, we have discovered
    that the Air Force officials and high-ranking Academy officials have
    known about the sexual assault allegations since 1993. Because of the
    panel, we found out that four Academy officials failed in their duties,
    including one that is still at the Academy. Sadly, as the panel's
    report has noted, ``the Air Force General Counsel attempted to shield
    Air Force Headquarters from public criticism'' in the Air Force's
    Working Group report presented to Congress earlier this year.
        I have been told that the Department of Defense Inspector General
    intends to take a closer look at this issue. It is disappointing that
    it has come to this but an expanded DODIG investigation appears to be
    the only way to assure that those responsible will be held accountable.
        As a member of the Academy's Board of Visitors, I was also pleased
    that the panel looked at the oversight role provided by the Board. I
    can honestly say that we have not done our job. Too many times, the Air
    Force only presented the good news and glowing reports; and too many
    times, the Board of Visitors was content to be led along by the Air
    Force.
        Mr. Chairman, I have a sent a letter to you suggesting that we
    include in this year's Defense Authorization bill the panel's
    legislative proposals pertaining to the Board of Visitors. I believe
    these proposals will be helpful as the Board of Visitors seeks to
    enhance its oversight role. You should also be aware that the Board of
    Visitors is scheduled to meet at the Academy during the October recess.
    This will be the Board's first meeting at the Academy since this crisis
    began last spring. We will be carefully reviewing the recommendations
    of the Air Force's Working Group, the Fowler panel, and examining the
    Air Force's implementation plans for improving the Academy's sexual
    assault and prevention programs.
        Mr. Chairman, I again thank you for all of your assistance. The
    members of this committee, indeed all the Members of Congress, have a
    vested interest in ensuring that the Academy is safe for cadets. We all
    nominate cadets to Service Academies, which makes us all responsible.
        Thank you again. I look forward to our question and answer time.

        I would like to join my other colleagues in complimenting
    you on a job well done. I think that you have opened the eyes
    of many people and I think you have brought new information to
    the table that has not been discussed and considered in the
    past, and that is the reason the panel was formed. I want to
    compliment you on all that effort.
        I also would like to just go back to your testimony, if I
    might, Ms. Fowler. In your testimony, and this is on page 3 of
    4 on the fourth and fifth paragraph, you say: ``But the panel
    is encouraged by renewed emphasis in Washington to immediately
    address and solve this problem. We are impressed with the
    leadership of Secretary Roche and General Jumper after a decade
    of inaction and failure. Secretary Roche made a step towards
    serious reform this year by rolling out his Agenda for Change
    and replacing the Academy's leadership team with one that has
    been quick to take action.''
        My question is, this was in your testimony typed. I did not
    see a change here, and I am not one to quibble over one word or
    anything like that. But that is your statement and you did not
    change that at the last minute, is that correct, Ms. Fowler?
        Ms. Fowler. No, that is my statement, and that was my
    statement at the press conference the other day. We are very
    impressed with the new leadership team at the Academy. General
    Rosa, General Weida, and Colonel Gray are doing an outstanding
    job. They have moved at a very quick pace really to implement
    some long-needed changes. So we are very impressed with what
    they are doing. I think they were great additions to the
    Academy.
        Senator Allard. Let me ask each one of the panel and see if
    you agree with that. I will start with you, Dr. Miller. Do you
    agree with that statement?
        Dr. Miller. Yes.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Bunting, do you agree with that
    statement?
        General Bunting. Yes, sir, I do.
        Senator Allard. Ms. Carpenter, do you agree with that
    statement?
        Ms. Carpenter. Yes.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Nardotti, do you agree with that
    statement?
        General Nardotti. Yes, we do. I would just say that we do
    disagree with the current command on the issue of
    confidentiality. We have addressed that in the report.
        Senator Allard. Yes, and I might get to that on my
    questioning.
        Then Mr. Ripley, do you agree with that statement?
        Mr. Ripley. I do.
        Senator Allard. Dr. Satel, do you agree with that
    statement?
        Dr. Satel. Yes, Senator, I do.
        Senator Allard. Thank you.
        You did bring up, Mr. Nardotti, that there is a
    disagreement on confidentiality. For the benefit of this
    committee, would you please, Ms. Fowler, explain what the
    thoughts are about how to deal with confidentiality? I
    understand that this is an option that is going to be given to
    the cadets, as to whether they want to have disclosure or
    whether they want to keep it quiet. If you could help explain
    that process and when that cadet is going to make that
    decision. I think that is critical as to when that cadet would
    make that decision.
        Ms. Fowler. Yes. Senator Allard, first I want to thank you
    for your leadership on this. Your staff was invaluable to us
    when we were in Colorado Springs as to enabling us to meet with
    victims and setting up meeting places. I want to thank you for
    your leadership and your assistance in our panel's
    investigation.
        While we commend the new leadership, it does not mean we
    walk in lockstep with everything. One of our main concerns,
    particularly after we were in Colorado Springs and met with
    several victims, was that the Agenda for Change did away with
    any form of confidential reporting. What we heard from every
    single victim we met with, without exception, was that you have
    to have some avenue for confidential reporting. The rape crisis
    center in Colorado Springs said you have to have some avenue
    for confidential reporting, and in fact, in a minute, I want to
    ask our expert here to talk about this.
        So we really struggled. This is one of the areas we
    struggled with trying to find a way to establish an avenue for
    confidential reporting for these cadets without going back to
    the old system that did not work. One of our attorneys--I
    really commend him--came up with the fact that in 1999 a
    Presidential Executive Order was issued which established for
    the Armed Forces the psychotherapist-patient privilege, and
    then it was reinforced by military law.
        This is available to all the Armed Forces. It is available
    now to both of the other Service Academies, and the Air Force
    Academy seemed not to have been aware of that as a route that
    could be taken. So we have recommended that there be a two-
    pronged route there, that those young women who want to just
    immediately report this officially, that route is available.
    But if a young woman, because this is a very traumatic
    experience for a young woman to go through, and if she is not
    ready yet to go through the official channels, then there needs
    to be a route by which she can talk to someone who is trained
    in how to handle this.
        We have recommended that they bring on board, whether it be
    a psychotherapist or a licensed clinical counselor or a
    psychologist--there are definitions under the rule that can
    meet those qualifications. But these sort of people need to be
    at the Academy. There needs to be someone with those
    qualifications running the hotline, running the cadet
    counseling center, so that a young woman can go to someone that
    is well-trained, that her conversation with that person will be
    privileged, and that person will be trained also to help
    encourage that young woman to go the official route and explain
    to her that if she does not eventually take that route her
    assailant will never be brought to justice. You have had some
    well-meaning people dealing with these young women, but they
    have not had the proper training, they have not had the proper
    information to help bring them along.
        We found many of these young women were not encouraged to
    officially report. In fact, they were told not to because they
    would be ostracized, it would ruin their career, the Air Force
    Office of Special Investigations would not handle it properly,
    and for all manner of reasons.
        So we were pleased to find this privilege existed. We
    strongly recommend that this confidentiality privilege also be
    adopted at the Academy.
        I would like to ask Anita Carpenter, who has been a rape
    crisis counselor for 13 years and brought so much experience to
    this panel, if she wanted to comment.
        Senator Allard. I would like to hear from her, but in
    effect what you have done is you have taken an Air Force rule
    and you are making sure that it applies in the Academy.
        Ms. Fowler. Right.
        Senator Allard. That has been one of the recommendations we
    have had all along, to make Air Force rules uniform throughout
    the Service, including the Academy.
        Ms. Fowler. This way they would not have anything unique at
    the Academy. This is available to everybody in the whole Air
    Force.
        Senator Allard. Ms. Carpenter.
        Ms. Carpenter. Thank you. I will add, Senator, that we did
    take something that is existing in the structure and say, they
    have a mental health counseling center available to them and it
    needs to be better utilized. They also have a chaplains' system
    of privacy available to them that they can look at to implement
    victim confidentiality measures. I cannot stress enough as a
    victim advocate who has worked with countless numbers of rape
    victims the need for confidentiality.
        My greatest concern without confidentiality is that a year
    from now we will see the Air Force Academy coming forward and
    saying, lo and behold, we have solved this problem, when in
    fact they have driven it back underground, as they did back in
    1995 when they did not have a system of confidentiality.
        Senator Allard. My time has expired, but this is going to
    be an issue of discussion, I think, part of the Board of
    Visitors meeting, Mr. Chairman, that is scheduled in October. I
    am sure this is something we will have to talk about at that
    Board of Visitors meeting.
        Thank you. I have more questions, Mr. Chairman. I will
    catch you on my second round.
        Chairman Warner. Let the record show that you are a member
    of the Board of Visitors.
        Senator Allard. Yes.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Allard, will you take that
    initiative at the Board of Visitors meeting?
        Senator Allard. I do plan on that, Mr. Chairman, yes.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Pryor.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Fowler, I would like to ask about a connection,
    what the connection is, if you could explain to the committee
    the relationship between the athletic programs and the sexual
    misconduct. I understand there is a connection there and I
    would like to hear your thoughts on that.
        Ms. Fowler. If I could call on Colonel Ripley who has
    really been looking into that and has some views on it I think
    you would like to hear. Colonel Ripley.
        Colonel Ripley. Senator, one of the things that became
    apparent during our very first hearings there--and this was
    from the old leadership, meaning the commandant, the assistant
    commandant--was an inference that whoever happened to represent
    athletics at the time--and that included coaches, that included
    the athletic director, whomever--they sat on their superior
    committee there that made all determinations, all the important
    determinations at the Academy, and they had a significant
    amount of influence.
        So that if an athlete were deficient in academics or
    whatever the problem might have been, the athletic
    representative there could essentially veto or override the
    decisions of even the commandant. We found that very unusual.
    We also heard inferences from victims that athletes were
    excused from certain things and that the climate or the aura
    was such that the term ``privilege'' comes to mind. They could
    operate somewhat more independently, more freedom of action.
    There was one charge I heard, which was stunning for me, was
    that the athletes, in this case I remember it was football
    athletes, took very much pride in the fact that they never wore
    their dress uniform until graduation.
        All of this was an inference that an athlete has a better
    run of things and has more control, and therefore less
    supervision perhaps, and ability to do whatever the athlete
    wanted to do.
        Senator Pryor. Is it your observation that those are not
    isolated incidents, but that it is really systemic?
        Colonel Ripley. It is considered a general application.
        Senator Pryor. Do you know how many instances there were of
    an override or where an athlete was maybe let off the hook, so
    to speak?
        Colonel Ripley. The most egregious example we heard was one
    that as I recall when we began had not yet been adjudicated,
    but it involved one athlete, I believe it was a boxer, who had
    been charged and eventually convicted of rape, while we were
    there.
        Senator Pryor. Yes, ma'am?
        Dr. Miller. The General Counsel working group had just a
    couple paragraphs about the accused and, because of Privacy Act
    information and because the IG reports are going case-by-case
    and looking through at all the accused, we were not able to do
    an in-depth analysis of that case. They mentioned that they saw
    among the accused no disproportionate representation among
    athletes. But I think it is important to break out the
    different athletic groups and to also look at those who were
    admitted to the Academy with waivers, who entered below Academy
    minimum standards, in order to participate in athletics.
    Information from the Air Force personnel center shows that
    increasingly year after year more cadets are admitted below
    standard with academic waivers to participate in athletics. So
    in the future research we might want to consider looking at
    those who are admitted with waivers versus those who are not.
        Senator Pryor. Good, thank you. Chairman Fowler, that goes
    to the next question I was about to ask, and that is, I know
    that under the mandate you had a very limited time to do this
    and a very tight timetable. I know you all put as many hours as
    you possibly could into this, and I understood you had, what,
    maybe two, three hearings, and then you did a number of less
    formal interviews with various witnesses.
        I am curious about the numbers of witnesses that you
    actually talked to and the panel actually talked to. But I am
    also curious about if you had more time what in addition would
    you have done?
        Ms. Fowler. I think, Senator, the timeframe worked out all
    right. It was a short timeframe, but it made sure that we just
    worked really hard. As I said, these members took a lot of time
    off from their professions to devote the time. Many of our
    staff members took leaves of absence from their regular jobs to
    come devote their time to this. So we knew we had the 90 days
    that started when we had our first hearing on June 23. That
    clock was ticking, and we just said we are going to get this
    done. I think, as you can see, it is a very thoroughly done
    report.
        I cannot really say there is anything we would have done
    more than what we did. What we have done is call for some
    further review that was not appropriate anyway. We are not the
    IG. The IG needs to do the type of investigation we have called
    for. There might be some more boxes of information somewhere,
    but we received box after box of records and information that
    our staff went through. We interviewed most of the people with
    whom we needed to talk. There still might have been a few prior
    leadership people in the Air Force we would have liked to talk
    to, but we just ran out of time. But we interviewed the main
    people we needed for our purposes.
        Senator Pryor. My last question is that I notice in your
    report you talk about a chasm in leadership and how that led to
    the problems there. In your opinion, and I would like to hear
    from the panel generally, do you think that the chasm in
    leadership has been corrected? In other words, is it fixed
    today or is it being fixed today?
        Ms. Fowler. We think it is fixed today. As for the new
    leadership at the Academy--the superintendent, the commandant,
    the vice commandant--we are very impressed with them. We met
    with them both unofficially and officially. I have had several
    conversations with the superintendent since that time, and we
    are impressed with their leadership, with their commitment,
    with their moving forward.
        We have also been impressed with the actions that Secretary
    Roche and General Jumper have been taking and their personal
    involvement over the past several months in this issue and in
    their implementation of change. So I think we are very well-
    satisfied with the current leadership.
        General Bunting.
        General Bunting. I am impressed by the current leadership
    as well. But the American military seems to treat the higher
    grades of officers as though they are interchangeable parts.
    They are Renaissance people, and they can do anything they are
    assigned to do. In my view the academies would be better served
    to find people as superintendents and deans who have a real
    vocation for that kind of work and leave them alone and let
    them stay there a long time.
        In the past, we have had examples such as General
    Goodpaster who went to West Point. He was brought out of
    retirement, I think stayed there for 5 or 6 years. I think one
    of the things all of us were troubled by was the Academy and
    Air Force practice of turning over officers very quickly, so
    there is not much continuity of leadership.
        Senator Pryor. Mr. Chairman, that is all the time I have.
    Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Pryor. That
    is an important topic observation and it is one that this
    committee has dealt with in the past, establishing the terms of
    the occupancy of the position of the Academy head.
        Will you indulge me, Senator Dole, for 1 minute? Senator
    Allard thought it was important that we know this. Last night,
    he met with the Inspector General, and he reports to me this
    morning that in that conversation he explicitly brought up the
    question of the scope of his ongoing review of this situation
    and specifically how he intends to treat the current
    leadership, civilian and uniformed, in the Air Force.
        Senator Allard. The purpose of the meeting that I had with
    the DODIG yesterday afternoon is twofold. Number one, I wanted
    to verify with him that he would move forward with the
    recommendations that were put in the report from the panel here
    that is before us. He assured me that he would move forward and
    continue to address those issues, particularly as far as the
    personnel were concerned over this since 1993. He was going to
    go ahead and do that.
        Then the second matter that I brought up to him was--as you
    and I had talked to him in the past--if we run across any
    individual case where new information comes forward. I shared
    that with him, and I am not at liberty to share that
    discussion. But I just wanted to assure that he was going to be
    prepared and he assured me that he was at this present time. He
    had already seen the report and had followed the discussion
    with the panel and was in the process of reviewing the
    leadership issues from 1993 up to the current time.
        Chairman Warner. To the current, that would include Roche
    and Jumper?
        Senator Allard. We did not clarify that in that discussion.
        Chairman Warner. Well, that will be clarified.
        Senator Allard. Yes.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
        Senator Dole.
        Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly want to
    express my appreciation to you and to ranking member Senator
    Levin for the focus that you have put on this vitally important
    matter--good discipline, fairness within our Military
    Academies--and giving us an opportunity to discuss the findings
    of the independent review panel today. I certainly want to
    underscore all the kudos that have been expressed today.
    Congresswoman Tillie Fowler is a close friend of mine. I
    appreciate your outstanding work and that of the panel members.
    This is a job extremely well done in a very timely manner.
        It is my hope that by following the recommendations of the
    panel all of the Services, not just the Air Force, can entrust
    their future officers to these institutions confident that only
    the highest standards of conduct and character will be required
    and upheld. The Service Academies must focus on the deliberate
    development of military officers, providing the required
    mentoring, guidance, and discipline to ensure excellence in
    future leaders. Now daily, of course, we see in the news just
    how critical those leaders are to our Nation and specifically
    to our sons and daughters whose lives are dependent on their
    leadership.
        Now, as part of his Agenda for Change, the Secretary of the
    Air Force briefed this committee on the new blanket amnesty
    plan. In your report, it is mentioned that an amnesty program
    was also established under the watch of General Hosmer in 1993.
    What are your views on this most recent policy and how is it
    different from the program initiated 10 years ago under General
    Hosmer? How do you think this amnesty will be managed?
        Also, as you answer that question, let me ask you to put it
    in context of the honor code as well, because the intent of the
    honor code as I understand it is to hold future officers to an
    explicit standard of conduct, part of which is to not tolerate
    any abhorrent behavior among fellow cadets. How can this
    amnesty program be resolved within the spirit and intent of the
    honor code?
        Ms. Fowler. Thank you, Senator Dole. As I am sure you all
    know, she has been an outstanding addition to the United States
    Senate. We have known each other a long time.
        We have some concerns about the amnesty provisions, and we
    have raised the question in our report. In fact, we encourage
    the Air Force Academy to look at the procedures that the other
    two Service Academies use in encouraging reporting. The amnesty
    was put in back in 1993 and then redone again this year to
    encourage reporting. If a cadet has committed an offense such
    as underage drinking for which they could be in trouble, and
    then at the same time they were doing the drinking a sexual
    assault occurred, they wanted to make sure that cadet was not
    hindered from coming forward to report the sexual assault by
    worrying that they would get in trouble that they were drinking
    underage. So that was the intent of putting in the amnesty.
        There have been some concerns about misuse of amnesty and
    might there be other ways to encourage reporting. The way it is
    used at the other academies is that they say they will provide
    amnesty, but only after they have done an investigation of the
    facts of the case and then determine if amnesty is appropriate,
    rather than giving blanket amnesty from the very beginning.
        So there are some differences there that are important and
    that we think that the Academy needs to relook at that. The
    intent is well done because it is to encourage reporting, but
    we are not sure that this blanket amnesty is maybe the best way
    to go.
        General Nardotti is a former judge advocate, and I want to
    see if he might want to add to that, too.
        General Nardotti. Basically, I agree with the way
    Congresswoman Fowler has described it. Basically, under the
    Agenda for Change, essentially a blanket amnesty, with a few
    exceptions, was going to be the policy going forward. The other
    academies that have applied this successfully do not use
    blanket amnesty. They do it on a case-by-case basis. We think
    there is a lot of merit to that. We think there are
    complications should a case go to trial ultimately if you have
    blanket amnesty or effectively immunity in place.
        So for a variety of reasons, it makes sense to do it on a
    case-by-case basis, not the least of which is that it is
    important in the leadership development of the people that are
    at the Academy. The mere fact that someone had been subject to
    an assault but may be subject to be accountable for their own
    other misbehavior is something that we think should be included
    in the equation and should not automatically be eliminated. We
    certainly think it enhances the credibility of someone who
    comes forward with a complaint if they are doing that
    understanding that they have something at risk as well in that
    process.
        Ms. Fowler. Dr. Satel.
        Dr. Satel. Just one final element to this is the concern
    about a moral hazard that this kind of thing creates, where
    people might actually allege sexual assault when it did not
    occur in order to protect themselves from redress for another
    kind of infraction. So that was yet another consideration for
    making it a case-by-case basis.
        Ms. Fowler. You referred to the honor code. The honor code
    says you shall not lie, cheat, or steal. What we have found is
    cadets know they need to abide by the honor code, but they do
    not necessarily consider that sexual assaults come under the
    honor code because it does not come under lie, cheat, or steal.
    This then goes back to character development and values and
    ethics to understand that honor encompasses more than not
    lying, cheating, or stealing.
        Senator Dole. Thank you.
        Did you examine what role the women officers assigned to
    the Air Force Academy may have played on the existing culture,
    and were an adequate number of women officers assigned on the
    commandant's staff, on the academic faculties, on the athletic
    faculties?
        Ms. Fowler. There were not enough, and they are working to
    increase that, because we found an absence of female role
    models in the officer corps at the Academy. I know this year
    they have increased that number somewhat and they are working
    to increase it more, because it is very important that these
    young men and women have these role models there on the campus,
    what they call air officers commanding. They now have increased
    the number of women that are part of that program. So I think
    the Academy is making every effort to bring in more women in
    those roles at the Academy.
        Senator Dole. Were the women who were involved who were
    there in your view empowered in any way to break the chain of
    abuse, and did you discover any instances where these women who
    should have acted as mentors and leaders either were negligent
    or were silenced?
        Ms. Fowler. We were very disappointed in that the immediate
    past training group commander, Colonel Laurie Slavec, who had
    the safety and security of these cadets in her command, in her
    responsibility, did not take action several times when it was
    needed. In fact, her view as given in her testimony to the
    working group, was that it was not a true rape unless it was a
    violent assault. She had some unique views in this area. What
    happened then was young women really were afraid to go to her,
    were concerned that there would be retribution, that she would
    give them what they call Form 10s, which are forms of a
    reprimand at the Academy.
        She really appeared to be creating an atmosphere of a lack
    of encouragement of reporting, which was unfortunate, to have a
    woman in that position, and yet that was the message she was
    sending.
        Senator Dole. Thank you. My time has expired.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Dayton.
        Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Just to make sure I have this right, the General Counsel's
    report, which basically says lots of terrible incidents have
    occurred, but no one is responsible for this whole period of 10
    years, was led by the Deputy General Counsel, who was prior to
    that part of a working group that during 2000-2001 was
    supposedly dealing with these matters?
        Ms. Fowler. The working group was led by Mary Walker, who
    is the Air Force General Counsel.
        Senator Dayton. Right.
        Ms. Fowler. But the Deputy General Counsel, one of the
    deputies because there are several, who was involved in this
    working group had, we discovered as we went through the
    records, led a working group in 2000-2001 on this very issue of
    sexual assault, sexual harassment problems at the Academy.
        Senator Dayton. This was not mentioned in the General
    Counsel's report?
        Ms. Fowler. It was not mentioned in the report.
        Senator Dayton. The deputy, who was part of this group,
    even though the General Counsel was ultimately responsible, was
    investigating matters that he had been previously involved on
    and that was excluded?
        Ms. Fowler. It is our understanding that Ms. Walker did not
    know of his involvement until just several weeks before her
    report was issued.
        Senator Dayton. Was the Inspector General also a part of
    this working group?
        Ms. Fowler. No, the DODIG was not a part.
        Senator Dayton. The Air Force Inspector General?
        Ms. Fowler. It is my understanding the Air Force Inspector
    General was a part of this group. Again, we had some questions,
    because the Air Force Inspector General had been involved also
    in the study back several years before.
        Senator Dayton. The Air Force Inspector General is now
    conducting this other review of whether the prior reviews have
    been conducted properly and prior actions have been taken or
    not taken?
        Ms. Fowler. My understanding is that the Air Force
    Inspector General is conducting a narrow review of individual
    cases. They are looking at individual cases as to how each
    individual case was handled by the Office of Special
    Investigations and by the process.
        Senator Dayton. Mr. Chairman, I think it is a waste of
    taxpayers' money for these investigations to take place by
    people who are clearly compromised and whose results are not
    credible, and they take a lot of time to come up with things
    that are meaningless, that disguise more and hide more than
    they actually reveal. In 90 days, you have done a vastly
    superior job to anything that has been done institutionally for
    the last decade. So I thank you for that, but I just think it
    underscores something bigger.
        The big question I have is, is the Air Force Academy, is
    the Air Force itself, capable of really going to the bottom of
    this and really making the systemic changes, or, as you said,
    is the culture so infected that everybody who is part of the
    institution is infected with these attitudes and this tolerance
    and everything else? I think this shockingly suggests to me
    that there is not within the institution or the organization
    the capability to either come forward with what has actually
    occurred or to make those necessary changes.
        On that point, your report at page 43 says the officer with
    the greatest experience and responsibility for the sexual
    assault program is the dean of faculty, General Wagie, he's
    directly responsible for the cadet counseling center for the
    Center for Character Development for conducting the student
    surveys, all of which proved to be totally inadequate in
    dealing with any of these problems over a decade and he's still
    there in his position as dean of faculty?
        Ms. Fowler. Yes, he is. It is my understanding that he is
    retiring early next year and that is the reason for our
    recommendation, because they will be picking a new dean of
    faculty who will serve a period of 3 to 5 years.
        Senator Dayton. He just stays on until he retires. There
    was--Senator Allard brought it to their attention--a sexually
    explicit skit that was performed at an official English
    Department dinner by cadets, and presumably would the dean know
    about something like that or have they reported to him
    something like that occurring?
        Ms. Fowler. Yes, and it's my understanding that after
    Senator Allard brought this to the attention of some of the
    authorities that finally that professor was removed.
        Senator Allard. That's my understanding.
        Ms. Fowler. The professor that was responsible for that is
    no longer at the Academy.
        Senator Dayton. Okay, but the dean is still there and the
    department goes on. The member of the leadership team that was
    replaced received a medal in recognition of her performance at
    the Academy?
        Ms. Fowler. That was most disturbing to us and interesting.
    We just found this out a few weeks ago that it was Colonel
    Slavec that received the medal.
        Senator Dayton. Was that a medal for her unique views on--
    --
        Ms. Fowler. It says for her meritorious performance at the
    Academy. We were concerned, since General Jumper had made it
    clear to us that there was an ongoing investigation of the
    former leadership at the Academy and that had not been
    completed. So for her to be awarded a medal, and I think it was
    April or May, for her service there called into question why
    that was done, and that was done by General Gilbert. We found
    out, as we wanted to know who gave her the medal. It was
    General Gilbert, who had been the former commandant, who in
    private session with us raised questions about her performance
    yet then turns around and gives her a medal for it.
        Senator Dayton. That's as far as you can determine the
    highest level in the chain of command where that decision was
    made to confer a medal? Was it not? The Chief of Staff of the
    Air Force or the Secretary of the Air Force?
        Ms. Fowler. My understanding is this was the commandant
    that could do this.
        Senator Dayton. It sends quite a message to everyone
    involved exactly what their priorities are.
        The honor code, you pointed out, prohibits lying, cheating,
    stealing, and tolerating, and it also says to do the right
    thing at all times, but that does not evidently in the culture
    include committing acts of sexual assault or rape. Do they just
    believe the honor code doesn't apply?
        Ms. Fowler. There's no one said that explicitly, but that
    appears to be some of the part of the culture problem there. We
    call for some major changes in the Center for Character
    Development. That was instituted by General Hosmer, who was an
    outstanding superintendent and who has worked with us on this.
    He started some very good programs in 1993 and 1994, but
    unfortunately after he left some of them were not implemented
    in the way they should have been. What we say is that the
    Center for Character Development needs to have a mandatory
    class every year. It needs to be a class in which this becomes
    part of their life. They use case studies, they use examples so
    that they begin to inculcate those values and ethics that are
    so important to have in a commanding officer in the United
    States Air Force. They need to be acquiring those throughout
    their 4 years at the Academy through that center, not just
    going and sitting and listening to some speeches, which is what
    it is now, that goes right over their heads and causes them to
    just check the box and leave.
        Senator Dayton. So this commander was responsible in 1993
    and 1994, when some of these matters were brought to him
    almost, in some cases, the testimony or statements of women
    then were verbatim. Let's continue to what you heard in your
    review. Over the last decade we've had various commands come
    and go and the culture's deteriorated, but no one's responsible
    because everybody inherited the culture that preceded them. My
    two-part question I'd like to ask each of you to respond to if
    you would please, one is, is this institution able to correct
    itself from within given how, as you've said in your own
    comments, General, the culture's been infected? Is it so
    pervasive that we should close the institution down for a year
    and just go through a revamping? Should we dismiss everybody on
    the faculty who has to have some involvement in this and just
    clean the whole shop? I respect your views on the new command,
    and I hope they're as outstanding as you believe they are, but
    no one who has preceded them has been able to make any
    difference in this. I don't have any confidence that
    fundamentally this is going to change just because two or three
    people at the top have changed.
        Ms. Fowler. Senator, I do want to make clear, and we have
    it in our report several times, that the vast majority of
    cadets at the United States Air Force Academy are honorable
    young people. This is only a small minority.
        Senator Dayton. I'm not talking about the cadets, though.
    I'm talking about those who are faculty and the leadership, up
    above, including the dean who's still around and, et cetera.
        Ms. Fowler. The majority are honorable. Many of the
    leadership were good, but as you will see in this time line,
    and I don't think I referred to it, but the very last chart in
    your book is the time line. There were well-meaning people
    along the way who put things in place, but then because of the
    military turnover, they left. The next person coming in either
    didn't know about it, or was not as concerned about it, so it
    would rise and fall with concerns or with what would happen. No
    continuity.
        Senator Dayton. While all these well-meaning people came
    and went, 80 percent of the present women have experienced a
    sexual assault at some time in their 4 years. I guess I'd go
    back to my question; is it going to be possible to change it by
    replacing the top leadership and putting in a few changes, some
    of which you've already determined are counterproductive? Or is
    it so badly infected that it's unrealistic to think that the
    present organization itself can be self-corrected?
        Ms. Fowler. Let me have each of the panel members speak
    quickly to that.
        Dr. Miller. Our recommendations are for a comprehensive
    program to change it, so it's important that all the
    recommendations are taken together, including an outside board
    of visitors that's more active, more access to the public from
    the cadet level up to the top, so we don't think that you can
    just change the problem by changing the leaders. We do think
    you need outside monitoring and help.
        General Bunting. I'd make a quick but general comment about
    American universities and the way faculty members are now
    selected and the way they see their duties. When many of us
    were in college, 30 or 40 or 50 years ago, the most important
    person in our lives at the college was some assistant professor
    who took a personal interest in us, perhaps we visited in his
    house, we got to know his family, he represented, by the way he
    lived his life, something that we could aspire to be. What's
    happened generally in the universities, and I think the Air
    Force Academy is not to be excluded from this, is that
    professors nowadays see their role as people involved in the
    lives of young students as much less important than they used
    to. They are very anxious to retain their authority and stature
    in their field, to publish frequently, to do a lot of research;
    but as active agents in the education of these kids, they are
    much less involved than they were at one time.
        I've made this point several times during these
    discussions. You have a faculty of very able people at the Air
    Force Academy, about half of whom I believe are civilians. Many
    of them have the equivalent of tenure. They should be involved
    as active agents in fixing this situation, but nobody talks
    much about them. They need a strong dean and some assistant
    deans to convince them of their importance in executing this
    imperative.
        Ms. Carpenter. I, too, believe that there is hope for
    change within the existing structure with accountable
    leadership, involved leadership, external oversight,
    monitoring. I think that positive changes can be made and I
    think that we can cite examples out in the civilian world of
    that teacher who is teaching in the ghetto system where it's
    crime-ridden and drug-populated, and she holds those students
    accountable and forces them to be responsible for themselves
    and makes that difference. Therein lies that accountability and
    ability to change.
        General Nardotti. Senator, I would echo the comments of the
    other panel members and say that, first of all, the leadership
    that is in place is impressive, and I think that we should
    expect that they will fix the problem. They must fix the
    problem. Just as anywhere else in the military, if there were a
    serious problem you wouldn't call a time-out and take 6 months
    or a year to fix it. The organization needs to keep operating.
    It continues to have a mission. The Air Force Academy has a
    very important mission. It is succeeding in many ways with the
    vast majority of the cadets, but we have responsible leaders
    that we believe are fully capable of dealing with the problem.
    The challenge is going to be continuing that commitment over
    time, and that has been the problem over the past 10 years.
        There have been some efforts, previously described as
    spasmodic, to deal with the problem, some of them very well-
    intentioned, some of them very well-thought through. But it's
    very clear that the follow-through simply was not there. Going
    back to what we mentioned before there was General Hosmer, who
    was very focused on the problem, and took some very
    extraordinary measures, proper measures, given all the
    circumstances. However, he left after about a year and a half.
    But the leadership that is there now we believe is focused in
    the right way.
        Dr. Satel. I think there are four good reasons for
    optimism, and two have been emphasized; the first being the new
    leadership--the new superintendent, commandant, vice
    commandant--that's been mentioned as well as our
    recommendations, especially the enhanced oversight and the
    longer tenure. But number 3 would be the incredibly intense
    spotlight that has been trained on this issue, and number 4,
    the fact that we named names. Obviously, we're not the ones to
    decide the fate of these individuals, but that was a very
    specific response--we had a very high threshold certainly for
    doing that, because it's a serious thing to do, but I would
    think that would really get people's attention that people will
    be held accountable, and that's yet another dimension to why I
    think this will be taken very seriously.
        Senator Dayton. Thank you. Again I'd just like to commend
    you for your outstanding service. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My
    time has expired. I just would like to support your observation
    about asking the General Counsel to appear here for her
    remarks. I also think we should look very seriously at whether
    anybody within that establishment is capable of conducting a
    further report because I hate to waste taxpayers' dollars and
    time to come out with something that's going to be compromised
    before it even arrives. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator
    Clinton, and I note Senator Collins will follow, very
    graciously you wanted your colleague to go ahead.
        Senator Clinton. I thank the chairman and my colleague,
    Senator Collins. I thank the panel for an extraordinary public
    service. This is a very impressive report. The thoughtfulness
    of your analysis and recommendations, if followed, should put
    us on the right path, and I would hope that in addition to
    following the recommendations of the chairwoman with respect to
    the dean of faculty, we would consider looking at all of these
    recommendations and putting them into the DOD authorization,
    because I think that we need to set a benchmark against which
    we can hold accountable and measure the progress that is being
    made.
        Chairman Warner. On that point, Senator, I'm glad you
    raised that. In consultation with the ranking member, we're
    going to see what we can incorporate in the pending conference
    report such that this matter is addressed immediately. General
    Bunting, who was former commandant at Virginia Military
    Institute (VMI), points out the need to have a dean, or freedom
    of selection of the dean, and not be limited by the membership
    on the faculty. That's an important observation that you've
    drawn from your experience at VMI. Thank you.
        Senator Clinton. I want to ask each of the panelists to
    respond to a question because I am still somewhat confused
    about the difference in emphasis between the first
    recommendation concerning awareness and accountability about
    the DODIG's conduct of a thorough review of the accountability
    of Academy and Air Force headquarters leadership, and the
    chairwoman's testimony this morning with respect to a thorough
    review of the accountability of the previous leaders at the
    Academy and Air Force headquarters.
        My question is this: Did anyone in the present or prior
    leadership of the Air Force or the Department of Defense
    explicitly or implicitly suggest to or ask you to, limit the
    panel's recommendation about the DODIG's investigation to
    former Air Force and Academy leaders?
        Dr. Miller. No. What I understood Ms. Fowler to be saying
    this morning is not a departure from what we said, but a
    clarification that in the course of our research there were
    questions raised about previous leaders. In the course of our
    research, none of the problematic questions raised dealt with
    the current leadership so that we're not arguing that the
    current leadership should be excluded, but just that, of the
    evidence we have, we only have questions about the performance
    of prior leaders. No one asked us to exclude the current
    leadership. I don't believe that's what Ms. Fowler said, and I
    personally agree that we have no evidence to exclude them. We
    only have evidence raising questions about the previous
    leadership.
        Senator Clinton. General?
        General Bunting. Yes, Senator. I would agree with and
    endorse that answer. Our interest once we got underway,
    basically, was at the Academy. We focused very intensely on
    what was happening there and did not spend a great deal of time
    addressing that issue.
        Ms. Carpenter. I would concur with Dr. Miller and General
    Bunting that we were looking at the process over a decade and
    we were dealing with a new leadership that had just started
    action, so our main focus was on the previous leadership.
        Chairman Warner. Could I just make a statement of fact for
    the record? Secretary Roche was confirmed by the Senate on May
    24, 2001. According to my calculation, he was in office for 20
    months before the letters that Senator Allard and I forwarded
    to the various people to begin to look at this. General Jumper
    was confirmed by the Senate on August 3, 2001, giving him
    somewhere around a little less than 18 months, so I just point
    out that they had been in office for, I think, significant
    periods of time. You draw on Colonel Ripley's, I think, rather
    dramatic metaphor, this was a ship in broad daylight sailing
    into a reef, and according to General Bunting, systemic
    problems were manifest to everybody who wished to see them.
        Ms. Fowler. In answer to your question, Senator Clinton,
    number 1, this has been an independent panel. No one has given
    us any directions as who to include or exclude in our
    recommendations and our review. We have operated totally
    independent of anyone in any place of leadership at the
    Pentagon or here on the Hill. That's been the good news and
    we've operated in a very fair and transparent manner.
        It has been our opinion, as stated earlier, we can't make
    an official recommendation. I stated in the press conference in
    answer to a question on Monday, and again stated in my release
    this morning, that the information that we uncovered in our
    investigation, we could not find a reason to call for an
    investigation of the current leadership, but we could certainly
    find reasons to call for investigations of prior leadership
    when we saw time and again lack of action on their part. From
    what we investigated and learned, this current leadership, once
    it was brought to their attention, which was earlier this year,
    then they did take immediate action.
        The Agenda for Change was issued before the working group
    report was finalized. They got the interim report, and they
    moved forward and put out the Agenda for Change, which needed
    to be done. You had young women cadets arriving at the Academy
    in June. They could not let those current procedures, the ones
    that were in place before them, stay in place. So we commended
    them for their action, even though we didn't agree with
    everything in it. It was better to move forward and get some
    changes started than to sit around waiting on all these reports
    to be finalized.
        General Nardotti. Senator, I would just say that there was
    a lot of emphasis on the past leadership because of something
    that I said earlier, the assumption that nothing could be done
    about the past leadership, and it was our very strong opinion
    that something needed to be said about what we concluded about
    past leaders. Not much really needs to be said about the
    current leadership because they're still in place and action
    can be taken, so there was nothing that the report has said as
    far as saying that no action should be taken; we didn't find
    any. Certainly the leadership of the Department of Defense and
    certainly Congress has options that can be applied against the
    current leadership that are simply not available with respect
    to the prior leadership, and they should not be omitted merely
    because of the passage of time.
        Colonel Ripley. Senator, my colleagues--I agree with all of
    them in that the focus, of course, when we began was certainly
    on the problem itself and how it developed, and we were trying
    to get at that issue of how in the world could this come about,
    so our focus was somewhat on the past. Be that as it may, as we
    began to continue our hearings and individual comments, it was
    obvious that this was the overused term, a systemic problem,
    and yes, at no point did we consider anyone exempt, current,
    former, future, anyone exempt from any of our recommendations
    such as they were at the time or would become. Let the chips
    fall where they may. If there are current problems and, as the
    report suggests, we think the DODIG should have a closer look
    at this, then that should be done, meaning current leadership
    should be held accountable.
        Dr. Satel. I say the same thing. No one told us that we
    should limit our investigation in any way. We did find
    Secretary Roche responsive, but the DODIG and this committee,
    as well, will have an opportunity to pursue with him whether or
    not in fact you feel he did live up to his responsibility.
        Senator Clinton. I thank the panel, and I thank the
    chairman for helping to clarify that prior doesn't mean a long
    time ago, that there has been a continuing set of issues that I
    think we need to leave open with respect to prior and present
    leadership. As the Colonel, I think, rightly said, let the
    chips fall where they may, based on whatever this committee
    continues to investigate and with a very strong admonition to
    the DODIG that by no means is there any agreement on this
    committee that any current leadership is exempt from a thorough
    investigation, that the plain words of the recommendation
    should be taken exactly as they are presented. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. I thank the Senator very much.
        Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First let me
    apologize to the chairman and to the committee for my late
    arrival. As, I know Congresswoman Fowler can appreciate this, I
    was chairing the Governmental Affairs Committee and was unable
    to be in two places at once, but I am pleased to join you now.
        I realize that some of my questions may be somewhat
    duplicative of what has already gone forward, but I feel so
    strongly about this issue that I'm going to proceed anyway. The
    chairman arranged a briefing in early August, I believe it was,
    with the IG, who shared with us the results of the survey of
    the female cadets at the Academy.
        Chairman Warner. Excuse me, Senator. That would be the
    DODIG.
        Senator Collins. Yes, the DODIG. I had early on requested
    the DODIG to investigate this matter in my capacity as Chairman
    of the Governmental Affairs Committee. I was stunned and
    appalled at the results of that survey, as I'm sure was every
    person in this room. It showed, for example, that 11.7 percent
    of the female cadets surveyed from the class of 2003--this is
    recent, 2003--had indicated that they were the victims of
    either an attempted rape or an actual rape. It showed that
    overall in that class, and the first figures I gave you were a
    subset of the ones I'm about to give you, that 24.2 percent
    said that they were the victims of a sexual assault or an
    attempted sexual assault.
        Another troubling fact to me was that the longer these
    women remained at the Academy, the more likely it was that they
    would be victims of sexual assault or attempted rape, and that
    the percentage of cadets who had experienced these crimes, and
    that's what they are, increased the longer that they were
    there. It's so troubling to me as someone who has encouraged
    young women to go to these academies and has had the honor of
    appointing them that I may be putting them in danger of a
    sexual assault. I just can't get past that fact.
        I'm further alarmed that the IG reported that most of the
    cadets did not feel that they could come forward and report
    this, and indeed, 88.4 percent, an astounding number, strongly
    disagreed or disagreed with the statement that most cadets were
    willing to come forward and report a sexual assault incident
    regardless of loyalty to the offender. That is just
    extraordinary about what it says about the climate of
    intimidation at the Academy.
        So let me begin by first thanking you for your thorough
    work, for your extraordinarily important work, and I believe we
    should quickly adopt all of your recommendations. But I remain
    troubled, as I think many of the members do, with the response
    of the very highest of levels of the Air Force to this scandal.
    I remember very well Secretary Roche and General Jumper coming
    before this committee, being questioned by this committee, and
    assuring us that everything was under control, that the working
    group, which you've been very critical of, was doing a good
    job, and most extraordinary, making conclusions before
    investigations were even complete.
        So the one recommendation or the one finding in your report
    that I question is your statement that Secretary Roche acted
    appropriately. I don't know whether you had the benefit of
    reviewing the testimony of our hearing when all of us were
    pressing him and encouraging him to withhold judgment until he
    had all the facts and telling them that we believed that this
    was the tip of the iceberg. So I'm having trouble with
    accepting the finding that he acted appropriately, and,
    Chairwoman Fowler, we'll start with you.
        Ms. Fowler. Our opinion is based on our interaction with
    the Secretary. Senator McCain read some of the Secretary's
    comments. We had reviewed some of those also from earlier this
    year. I don't know any of us who as we've learned more facts
    haven't changed our opinions along the way, because knowledge
    always helps. My assumption would be, and I do not know because
    I have not talked to the Secretary about this, would be that he
    didn't have enough knowledge when he was making those
    statements back in February and March as he acquired later. As
    far as our concerns were, we saw that the Secretary moved
    forward in a very expeditious manner in promulgating the Agenda
    for Change, that there was a need before the new cadets came in
    June to immediately get some of these processes and procedures
    changed.
        He and General Jumper, as soon as they had the interim
    report from the working group, moved forward with that Agenda
    for Change. It is not perfect, and they made clear that it was
    a work in progress, and would be an evolving document, but
    there was a need to move forward as quickly as possible, and so
    we commended him for that. He came before our committee June 23
    to testify and answer questions, spent a long time with us
    answering a lot of questions. We had never met with him before
    then, but we were very impressed then with his candor, his
    forthrightness, his personal commitment to moving forward on
    this. During the time of our investigation, we have never had
    any problem with his being available to answer questions, with
    his making sure that the Air Force gave us what we wanted. Any
    time we had some lower level person seeming to slow it down,
    all we had to do was make a phone call, we got what we wanted
    in a timely manner.
        So as far as this panel's interaction with the Secretary,
    it's been a positive experience as far as during the course of
    our investigation. We can't speak to his interaction with this
    committee or any other, but as far as our interactions with
    him, we have found him to be very forthcoming and to be very
    receptive to making changes. As you have seen over the past few
    months, and part of that is due to some of the things that we
    have brought out in our hearings, he has been making
    modifications to the Agenda for Change. We have appreciated
    that they have had an understanding that, again, you make
    changes as you learn more information. We consider that still a
    work in progress, and these changes are not going to happen all
    overnight. It's going to take a while. You don't change a
    culture overnight. It takes a while to do this and we're hoping
    that next year there's going to be somebody in place, hopefully
    this executive steering group as well as this committee, to
    look back and say, okay, what's working and what is not.
        We hope our recommendations get implemented and we hope
    they work, but there's no guarantee until you put them in place
    and then someone has to review those. There is a great need for
    external oversight as well as internal.
        Chairman Warner. Senator, you have another 2 minutes, go
    ahead.
        Senator Collins. Thank you. I appreciate that, Mr.
    Chairman. Do any of the other members want to comment on this
    issue?
        General Bunting. I'd like to make a quick comment about an
    agency of this whole enterprise, which thus far has escaped the
    rigorous discussion of this entire group, namely the Board of
    Visitors. When a university goes bad for a year or 2, look at
    the administration, fire the president, but when there is a
    long record of abuses of this kind, you should then, it seems
    to me, look at the Board of Visitors of the institution, which
    is ultimately responsible for that.
        We studied the Board of Visitors carefully. As somebody who
    has run a couple of colleges, my main problem was keeping
    enough time to deal with boards of visitors who were on me like
    a cheap sweater all the time. They were good people and they
    were very much involved. Here we have an institution whose
    governing board was negligent, it seems to me, in their
    discharge of their responsibilities. They met once a year in
    Colorado Springs for a kind of dog and pony show. The average
    attendance was less than 50 percent. Some members never went to
    meetings at all. I went through all of the minutes of about 15
    years' worth of Board of Visitors' meetings. For 2000, I
    couldn't find the minutes. The reason was there was never a
    meeting. That's the kind of thing which it seems to me ought to
    be looked at very severely.
        Senator Collins. Mr. Nardotti, did you have a comment, too?
        General Nardotti. Yes, Senator, just a couple of points for
    emphasis. First, it doesn't surprise me that Secretary Roche
    and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force wanted to take hold of
    this problem and deal with it as best they could within their
    discretion, including--and I wish Senator McCain were here--it
    doesn't surprise me that Secretary Roche wanted to investigate
    this internally. You would expect that of a military leader.
    This is an organization that he or she would be responsible
    for, and they're going to take that responsibility and deal
    with it, and specifically with the problem that they had to
    deal with, it was an ongoing issue. They have climate issues,
    they have issues in terms of how do you deal with the
    reporting. That's not something that can wait for a number of
    investigations to be done.
        I certainly understand your point that, yes, there is
    wisdom in incorporating the evaluations of others, but I think
    as the leader of the Air Force, the senior civilian, as the
    chief of staff, the senior uniformed person, they believed,
    rightfully, in my opinion, that they needed to take some
    action. They have superiors. The Secretary of Defense, if he
    wanted to stop them from doing that and do something else, he
    could have directed that. Of course they answer to Congress in
    ways as well, so certainly their prerogatives could have been
    curtailed, but I think I would have been more troubled if they
    basically went into a non-action mode and didn't try to deal
    with the problem.
        This is not a problem, as everybody understands, that is
    susceptible to any easy solution, and it also is something that
    they are dealing with, and if you go back over the timeframe,
    consider what's happened over the tenure of the Chief of Staff
    of the Air Force and the Secretary since September 11. I think
    that has to be thrown into the equation that all secretaries,
    all chiefs, are challenged, but there have been extraordinary
    challenges for the Services, and they had that extraordinary
    challenge to deal with and another very complex issue to deal
    with here and assessing all of that and seeing where the
    Secretary wound up. Yes, he resisted, certainly, in some of the
    issues, but he did come around at some critical points and make
    some decisions with respect to personal actions and to the
    decisions that had to be made. We tried to take all that into
    account as we, in our limited view, assessed what we should say
    about the Secretary and the Chief.
        Senator Collins. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, just one final
    quick comment. I don't think that we should expect the
    Secretary to just ``come around.'' I think we should expect him
    to lead, and I have real questions about whether there was
    effective leadership here.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, and actually, Senator, I'm
    going to pick up on one of your points here, and that is--
    Senator Allard read this--what you say here, ``we are impressed
    with the leadership of Secretary Roche and General Jumper.''
    Now, I'm referring to this famous press release by the
    Department of the Air Force at 3:00 p.m., 26 March 2003, in
    which they say, ``As the problems regarding sexual assault
    allegations predate the current leadership, we do not hold
    Generals Dallager and Gilbert responsible.''
        Now they made that finding at a time when they just started
    to investigate it. The IG of the Air Force was investigating
    it. We later got the IG of DOD involved. Reaching conclusions
    as dramatic as that at a time when this situation is just
    bursting on the public scene, and mind you, the Secretary had
    been in office for 20 months, I'm puzzled by how you can make
    such a statement of clarity here that you're impressed. Did you
    question him about this release?
        Ms. Fowler. This panel did not come into existence until
    mid-June. We were not in existence back in March, February,
    when all this was occurring.
        Chairman Warner. But the committee sent you copies of this.
    I know that for a fact.
        Ms. Fowler. When we questioned the Secretary, he was not as
    emphatic on that area. I think by then, by mid-June, he had
    received the report from the General Counsel that he had just
    gotten it. We just got it like a day or 2 before our hearing.
    As I stated earlier, as we all receive new information, then we
    re-look. As you have seen, the Secretary then chose to demote
    General Dallager, he lost a star in his retirement. The verdict
    is still out, I believe with respect to General Gilbert and
    Colonel Slavec as to what responsibility will be held or not.
    According to General Jumper, that is still under review.
        So, again, this has been an evolving process and we
    didn't--when we talked to the Secretary----
        Chairman Warner. My question was simply, did you ask him
    specifically about this press release?
        Ms. Fowler. I couldn't say whether we did or not, but as
    far as his responses to us that day, it was clear that this was
    still all under review.
        Chairman Warner. Still what?
        Ms. Fowler. That there was still a review going on as far
    as leadership responsibility.
        Chairman Warner. Then do you think it's a question of
    judgment to have made a decision as finite as this at the time
    he knew investigations were ongoing?
        Ms. Fowler. Well, obviously it wasn't a finite decision
    since he changed it later.
        Chairman Warner. Okay. We'll stop there on that one. Then I
    would say that, look, I'm not head hunting. I'm a former
    military Secretary myself, I say with humility. I'm no
    stranger, having spent 5 years, 4 months, and 3 days, during
    the height of the Vietnam War in the Department of the Navy,
    and I value tremendously what I learned from the uniformed and
    other colleagues in the department at that time. I've been able
    to spend my 25 years in the Senate here on this committee
    drawing on that experience, tremendously valuable. So I have
    the highest regard for the Service Secretaries. But I have a
    responsibility on this committee that's eminent. The Secretary
    of Defense asked that we start within days the hearing on
    General Jumper. This testimony and this record are very
    valuable as a contribution. We have to take it into
    consideration so I'm trying to clarify this.
        I go back to your statement this morning that the current
    leadership should not be included in the IG's investigation,
    just former. How do you----
        Senator Levin. Excuse me, I don't think that's----
        Ms. Fowler. No, I was going to say that. I've said it I
    think three different times, we'll have to go back to the
    record, that this is not an official statement. It's just our
    opinion as based on the information we have, that we haven't
    uncovered any reason for that, but it is only our opinion, it's
    not an official recommendation, and it's going to be up to the
    IG----
        Chairman Warner. We understand that.
        Ms. Fowler.--and this committee to make that decision.
        Senator Levin. Would the chairman yield just for that to
    clarify?
        Chairman Warner. Sure.
        Senator Levin. I don't think that this panel is even saying
    that the current leadership should not be included. What they
    are saying is they want the prior leadership to be looked at,
    and they don't have any evidence relative to the inclusion of
    the current leadership. But they're not finding that the
    current leadership should not be included, they're saying that
    that would be up to us if we believe they should be or if the
    IG believes they should be.
        Ms. Fowler. Thank you, Senator Levin. You said it much
    better than I could.
        Chairman Warner. All right. Anyway, you elected to use the
    word ``former'' here this morning. Do you have evidence that
    sexual allegations continued to occur for the 20 months that
    Secretary Roche was in office?
        Ms. Fowler. As you've seen by our time line and by the
    chronology, they've been occurring every year, but we do not
    have evidence that either the Secretary or the Chief were
    informed of what was occurring. That's been part of the
    problem, a lack of communication sometimes, between Academy
    leadership and headquarters leadership. That's why we support
    the institution of this executive steering group, that it be a
    permanent group so that there is an entity that does continuous
    oversight of these issues at the Academy.
        As General Nardotti stated, September 11 came, you have a
    Secretary and a Chief of Staff who are involved in some really
    critical national security issues, and in the meantime, no
    one's telling them what's going on at the Academy. There has to
    be a body that's going to be always looking at that, and that's
    why we say this executive steering group that the Secretary has
    instituted should be made permanent so you won't have these
    lapses occur again in knowledge at Air Force headquarters.
        Chairman Warner. I'll just ask one further question in this
    area. When I was Secretary, I very strongly relied on the
    General Counsel. I frequently met with him. I did not ever say,
    you take this task, go off and do it by yourself without my
    monitoring it, but that's my management style. I felt that the
    General Counsel of the Department of the Navy was very much a
    part of the leadership, but by this morning's testimony, I
    think it's confused. This only looking at the past would exempt
    the General Counsel from review by the IG at the very time your
    report brings some very strong denunciations on the performance
    of the General Counsel and that working group.
        Ms. Fowler. We are not questioning the integrity of Mary
    Walker. I think she is a very good General Counsel.
        Chairman Warner. No, I'm not suggesting you are.
        Ms. Fowler. We are not making any recommendations as to
    whom the IG should investigate. Her report was well done, but
    what we have pointed out is that in the course of our
    investigation there were certain omissions from that report
    that caused us concern, that we thought should have been
    included in a comprehensive review of the past 10 years.
        Chairman Warner. Well, that's well done, but you didn't do
    A, B, C, and D, so I think that's somewhat contradictory. Let
    me just move on to another subject. Let's go back to 1995, the
    past which you looked at. Following completion of the DOD task
    force on discrimination and sexual harassment in 1995, this
    committee conducted a hearing on Air Force programs. Then-
    Secretary of the Air Force Sheila Widnall, who co-chaired the
    DOD task force with Dr. Edwin Dorn, testified that the Air
    Force had implemented all of the panel's recommendations and
    assured this committee that the Air Force had taken necessary
    steps to ensure an effective program was in place.
        Did you have Secretary Widnall before you? Were you able to
    determine if serious consideration was given by the Air Force
    to implementing the DOD task force recommendations at the Air
    Force Academy? Can you explain why the proven systems for
    responding to those reports of sexual harassment, including
    physical violence, were not implemented in the Department of
    the Air Force?
        Ms. Fowler. As I stated earlier, Senator, when I was asked
    the question about what we would like to have done if we had
    had a little more time, one of my statements was that there was
    some of the prior leadership we did not have the opportunity to
    interview. Dr. Widnall was certainly one we would like to. Of
    course, she's been very involved in the NASA investigation
    because she's on that board and hasn't been as available. We
    think that the IG needs to look back over the tenure of each of
    the Secretaries for the past 10 years, because, as you said,
    Dr. Widnall did chair a task force on that, part of it dealt
    with the Academy, and what was the follow-through on it.
        Again, if you look at the time line, sometimes there were
    studies done, reports made, but then no follow-through on
    implementation. They would tell the Academy to do it, but then
    no one was looking to see did the Academy really do what they
    said they were going to do. So there was a disconnect between
    Washington and Colorado Springs.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The chairman has
    made reference to a press release of the Air Force, and I think
    very properly so. As a matter of fact, I think I actually led
    the way at that hearing back in March in criticizing the
    Secretary of the Air Force for that release. I think he was way
    off in suggesting that they should not look at leadership
    issues, and again, the record will speak for itself, but I
    think I actually was the one who said, are you kidding, you're
    not looking at leadership omissions? They changed their
    position.
        I think every member of this committee took the same
    position that, of course, you have to look at leadership
    omissions. You can't just look at the people who committed
    crimes here, you have to look at the failure of leadership to
    change the environment. So I happen to agree with the chairman
    in terms of his criticism of the Secretary of the Air Force for
    this press release, and again I emphasize I joined very
    strongly in it. Indeed I did more than join.
        But I think it's important that we understand precisely
    what you're saying here, and I think I understand it, but I
    want to just summarize my understanding of it. You are critical
    of the working group report for failing to go after, excuse me,
    to review or to inquire or investigate headquarters in terms of
    any omissions on their part. Is that correct?
        Ms. Fowler. Yes, or to reveal information that we know they
    knew, that members of the working group were aware of, that did
    not make it into their report, such as the 2000/2001
    investigation that a member of the working group chaired, and
    yet it doesn't appear in their report.
        Senator Levin. So there is information that they, or at
    least members of the working----
        Ms. Fowler. Some of the members. As I said, I'm not sure
    Ms. Walker had all that information, but some of the members of
    that group did.
        Senator Levin. Well, that's important, and I think the
    significance of your making that distinction should not be
    lost, and I don't think I understood it even, frankly, until
    this moment. You are not then criticizing the working group
    necessarily for failing to include information which it had as
    a working group. You don't know that they had it.
        Ms. Fowler. We don't know what every member had.
        Senator Levin. You know that a member of that working group
    had information which presumably should have been shared with
    the working group?
        Ms. Fowler. We do know that--I believe it was in April--the
    member of the working group who had chaired that 2000/2001
    review, shared with the other members of the working group his
    role in that. Now, what more he shared with them I do not know.
        Senator Levin. Okay. So that they may or may not be subject
    to criticism for leaving out information which they knew?
        Ms. Fowler. I would hope that--if I had been working on
    that working group and a critical member had said, oh, I forgot
    to tell you all in the beginning, but I chaired a review of
    this very issue in 2000 and 2001, I think I would have gone and
    looked to see what that report said and did, because here I am
    in the middle of a review. But we don't know.
        Senator Levin. Have you reached any conclusion on that
    narrow issue as to whether the working group failed in that
    regard?
        Ms. Fowler. We have a page or so in our report that lists
    some of the omissions that we are aware of that were not in
    that report.
        Senator Levin. Let me read you from page 4 of your report,
    because I want to see if there's some other place that you've
    gone further than this. You've indicated that, ``any credible
    assessment of sexual misconduct problems over the last 10 years
    must include an examination of the responsibility of both
    Academy and Air Force headquarters leadership. The working
    group report failed to do that even though the Air Force
    General Counsel had access to considerably more information,
    resources, and time for study than did the panel.'' Are you
    concluding then that the working group failed based on what
    they knew to make an assessment, which the information in their
    possession should have led them to make? Is that where you're
    at?
        Ms. Fowler. Senator, if you will look at the next page,
    page 5, it details there matters that we uncovered, and that as
    far as we could uncover, that were known to members and staff
    of the working group, but were not included or only obliquely
    referenced to in their report. We detail those on page 5, and
    those were sufficient to cause us to raise the question as to
    why were they not included.
        Dr. Miller. That continues on to page 6 as well.
        Ms. Fowler. It goes on.
        Senator Levin. That continues on page 6. The criticism of
    the working group, which then is laid out here, for failing to
    take adequate note of, and to inquire into, then the question
    raises: Does that criticism apply also to the Secretary?
        Ms. Fowler. As far as we know, and again, this is just our
    knowledge, the Secretary was not involved in the development of
    the working group report, that that report was developed by the
    General Counsel and her working group. So the information we
    had was that this was a staff-directed and a staff-done report
    that was presented to the Secretary of the Air Force as well as
    to others. General Nardotti would like to make a a comment, if
    he could, on that.
        General Nardotti. If you were to look, Senator, at the
    charge that the working group, the General Counsel's working
    group, had, the focus clearly is on the activities at the
    Academy, so technically when they focus on what is happening at
    the Academy, they covered all of the bases. Our position is, in
    looking at the information that we came across, which we
    believe the General Counsel working group should have come
    across much more easily than we could have, was that you could
    not tell the entire and complete story without explaining the
    involvement of headquarters, because at various times over
    those years, you had involvement of the Air Force Office of
    Special Investigations, the IG, and the Judge Advocate General
    was involved in looking at the problem at one point.
        There was clearly attention by the headquarters to this
    problem at the Air Force Academy, and General Hosmer told our
    panel that although he did not run his courses of action before
    the Secretary before he took them, he had many discussions with
    Secretary Widnall about what was going on, what he was doing.
    We believe that there was knowledge of things in place, and
    what we have been critical of, with respect to the General
    Counsel's report, to fairly assess what went wrong, you can't
    tell that story just from looking at the Academy side.
        I think, again, our point also was a matter of fairness.
    How do you put this entirely on the backs of the leadership of
    the Academy? Certainly they have primary responsibility because
    they run that institution, but some of these issues that were
    raised, the issue of confidentiality, how they were dealing
    with confidentiality was something that was wrestled with at
    headquarters' level, and Mr. Atlee's involvement later on had
    to do with that, but the point is, the larger issue is, that
    the headquarters had visibility and involvement in this and
    that appears nowhere in the General Counsel's report.
        Senator Levin. I'm just going to conclude with two points.
    Number one is we are making it clear to the Inspector General
    that we want the Inspector General to review the actions or
    inactions of leadership, including the present, that is going
    to be made, as I understand it from the chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Correct, a letter that you and I will
    jointly prepare.
        Senator Levin. That is going to made clear to the Inspector
    General. So we're going to clear that issue up, even though you
    didn't find any evidence of something that troubled you
    relative to the current leadership.
        Ms. Fowler. All we could report on is what we uncovered.
        Senator Levin. By the way, your independence is very
    clearly reflected here today, and we're very proud of that
    independence, including independence of the Pentagon,
    independence of the Academy, and independence from us. You've
    stood your ground here.
        Ms. Fowler. We tried to follow through in your intent in
    establishing the panel.
        Senator Levin. That was the intent. But we have a
    responsibility, which the chairman surely symbolizes here, that
    we're going to make sure that that Inspector General's report
    covers the current leadership. That's our responsibility, okay,
    regardless of whether you found evidence or not, we have a
    responsibility. That's point one.
        You apparently did not ask the Secretary of the Air Force--
    you don't remember asking specifically whether or not these
    matters were brought to his attention.
        Ms. Fowler. I haven't reviewed the transcript from June.
        Senator Levin. All right. I think, Mr. Chairman, it would
    be incumbent on us in making clear to the IG that we expect
    them to include current leadership in their review, to ask the
    IG to specifically inquire of the Secretary of the Air Force
    whether or not the Secretary of the Air Force was aware of
    these facts that are laid out on page 5 and 6. That's number
    one.
        Number two, after our hearing that the chairman has
    referred to, which I think was that date of March 30, we all
    were just aghast that the Secretary of the Air Force was not
    looking at the leadership issue. I think all of us concluded,
    how do you omit the leadership? Now, my question of the
    Secretary of the Air Force would be, if he were standing here,
    after that hearing and after he took steps to change the
    current leadership at the Academy, why did he not then inform
    the General Counsel that he wanted the General Counsel to look
    at the leadership issue as well as the specific events? Once we
    had been so critical of the Secretary of the Air Force for
    failing to look at leadership--when he said he can't go
    backwards, we said, sure you can, you have to hold folks
    accountable--he still apparently did not broaden his charge to
    the General Counsel for that report.
        Now, the working group--what was the date of their report?
        Ms. Fowler. They reported in June. I don't know the exact
    date but it was mid-June.
        Senator Levin. There were a couple of months there that the
    working group, it seems to me, I don't know if they could have,
    but should have been looking at the leadership issue once the
    Secretary of the Air Force knew that this committee wanted the
    leadership issue to be looked at. That is something that I
    think we should inquire of the Secretary of the Air Force and
    also make sure the Inspector General asks the Secretary of the
    Air Force, because that to me is something which was so
    dramatic that we were interested in that issue.
        Chairman Warner. I think that is an important point, and I
    think we should give this panel the opportunity to tell us. Did
    you inquire of the General Counsel what instructions did you
    get to include or not include this very valuable section? Like
    you say, any credible information over the past 10 years must
    have an examination? Did you inquire of her?
        Ms. Fowler. No, Mr. Chairman, she testified just a couple
    of days after we had received her report, so we had only--we
    had seen her interim report that she had issued a couple of
    months before--we'd only had her report in hand a few days. It
    was not until we were well into our investigation----
        Chairman Warner. I see.
        Ms. Fowler.--and we began to uncover information that we
    would go back and see was not in that report that we began to
    raise these questions.
        Chairman Warner. Did you consider perhaps recalling her to
    bring that very serious point up?
        Ms. Fowler. At that point in time her report was complete.
    So all we could do was raise it and let you know and let the
    offices that at the Pentagon know that these were omissions.
    The report was closed, the working group was through, and so
    there was no way we could get that reopened by this panel.
        Chairman Warner. Did you explore with the General Counsel
    how the charter for her working group was established, and did
    the Secretary at any point in time after issuance of the
    charter, did he return and suggest amendments or expansions?
        Ms. Fowler. As I said, Senator, when she came before us, we
    had just had her report a few days in hand, and as far as we
    knew, it covered everything, so it was not until several months
    later as we began to find these omissions that we started to
    see these questions and then her report was over.
        Chairman Warner. So we do not have before us today any
    facts relating to an ongoing collaboration between the General
    Counsel and the Secretary or the Under Secretary or other
    supervisors of the General Counsel as to how the parameters of
    her working group should be expanded or restricted?
        Ms. Fowler. We did not have that.
        Senator Levin. But what we do apparently know is that the
    Air Force yesterday indicated that the General Counsel was
    carrying out the instruction that they were to look at
    procedures at the Academy and not the actions up in the chain
    of command.
        Ms. Fowler. We've seen that press release.
        Senator Levin. Now, if that's true, then the question has
    to go to Secretary Roche, if that's accurate. Why, after being
    grilled by this committee and being told by this committee--we
    were interested in March in leadership failures--did you not
    amend the instruction to the General Counsel to tell the
    General Counsel, hey, don't just look at the Academy procedures
    or activities, look at the leadership failures as well? That's
    a question, it seems to me, that Secretary Roche has to answer.
        Chairman Warner. We're going to listen to further comments
    from the panel, but at this time our colleague has sought
    recognition.
        Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I want to assume--are we
    under the 6-minute rule or whatever, and I want to still have
    my opportunity to have a second round to make comments or
    questions.
        Chairman Warner. You have the full opportunity right now.
    Why don't you start?
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wrote a letter
    to you dated September 24 asking that we review the
    recommendations from the panel and see if we can't possibly get
    those in some form of legislation from this panel here.
        Chairman Warner. That is correct.
        Senator Allard. So I want to make that a part of the
    record, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Correct, and you'll be working with
    Senator Levin, myself, and other members of the committee to
    incorporate in the conference report certain provisions that
    would become the law, assuming we can get a conference report
    accepted.
        [The information referred to follows:]

                                          United States Senate,
                                    Washington, DC, September 24, 2003.
    The Hon. John Warner, Chairman,
    U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee,
    228 Russell Senate Office Building,
    Washington, DC.
        Dear Chairman Warner: The Panel to Review Sexual Misconduct
    Allegations at the U.S. Air Force Academy included a number of
    legislative proposals in its report released on September 22, 2003.
    These proposals were designed to correct problems in law that would
    strengthen the United States Air Force Academy's Board of Visitors
    oversight role and grant the Air Force greater flexibility with regard
    to the placement of personnel in key leadership positions.
        Specifically, the panel recommended the following:

             The revision of Section 9355 of Title 10 of the United
            States Code for the purpose of reducing the number of
            congressional members on the Board of Visitors; requiring each
            Board member to pledge full commitment to attend each meeting
            and to carry out all the duties of a Board member; terminating
            any Board member's appointment who fails to attend in two
            successive meetings; providing clear oversight authority of the
            Board over the Academy; and eliminating the current requirement
            for Secretarial approval for the Board to visit the Academy for
            other than annual visits.
             The revision of Section 9335(a) of Title 10 of the
            United States Code which limits the available pool of potential
            candidates for the position of the Dean of Faculty.

        I believe these proposals have merit and would be helpful in
    improving the Air Force's response to sexual misconduct at the Air
    Force Academy. I would appreciate your consideration of these proposals
    as a possible addition to the Fiscal Year 2004 Defense Authorization
    bill. Thank you for your time and consideration.
                Sincerely,
                                                  Wayne Allard,
                                                 United States Senator.

        Senator Allard. I appreciate your allowing me to work with
    you on that, Mr. Chairman. Then there are a few things that I
    just want to address, Mr. Chairman, that were brought up by
    members of the committee, and I had an opportunity to visit
    with the superintendent of the Air Force Academy,
    Superintendent Rosa, in August.
        Senator Pryor had brought up the issue about how the
    athletic department had a separate sort of area over here, and
    it wasn't necessarily under the control of the superintendent.
    He's corrected, that according to that meeting, and also he
    does recognize that there is a deep cultural problem. He has
    spoken not only to the cadets themselves, but he's spoken to
    the alumni from the Air Force Academy, which I think is very
    key, as well as to the parents of the cadets, and said, look,
    we're all part of this problem, we all need to resolve it.
    Also, he understands the problems of working with the cadets
    and what-not. As I began to survey them, I think there was a
    recommendation that came out of Senator Dayton when he said
    that we need to begin to survey them when they first come into
    the Academy. I'm going to suggest this to the Board of Visitors
    on their survey, where we do it every year and progress and see
    how their attitudes change, as Mr. Bunting suggested, as they
    move through the Academy and see if we can't begin to have an
    impact on some of the cultural thinking at the very start.
        The reason I want to bring this up is because I think the
    leadership that we have at the Academy right now knows and
    recognizes a problem, which is the big difference from what we
    had in previous years, and I think that they're trying to
    address that. I just think it's proper that we recognize it at
    this time.
        I also have a question that I want to bring up. Now, the
    panel report described in general terms the efforts of various
    Academy and Air Force leaders going back to 1993. The panel did
    not specifically assess the efforts of these leaders, with the
    exception of the four Academy officers, which was described in
    your report. That was Major General John Dallager, Brigadier
    General David Wagie, Brigadier General Gilbert, and then
    Colonel Laurie Slavec. My question is, why didn't the panel
    assess the efforts of previous Academy officials and Air Force
    leaders who could have addressed the Academy's climate that
    permitted sexual assaults?
        Ms. Fowler. Again, in our 90 days we couldn't go to in-
    depth detail on every former Academy official, but if you will
    look at our chronology section, we do go through--we take each
    year starting in 1993 to 2003 and we do a fairly good
    chronology on who was in the leadership then and what was
    occurring, and what was supposed to be happening in
    relationship to that. If you go through this chronology, and
    you go through the time line that is in the back, I think our
    panel did a good job in 90 days of documenting that.
        Senator Allard. I saw those charts back there, yes.
        Ms. Fowler. It gives you a good overview. As far as in-
    depth, getting into why something wasn't followed through on,
    we don't know that. But we do know if a report was made, we
    document that it was made, or if something was started, we
    documented it was started. The problem is sometimes that it
    didn't get continued on the next year.
        Senator Allard. Now, here's the other question. I want to
    address one of the specific individuals that was mentioned in
    your report, that was Brigadier General David Wagie, who has
    served in the Academy for 16 years. During much of this time,
    General Wagie was responsible for the Academy's sexual assault
    response program, the administration of social climate surveys,
    which were not scientific, yet as the panel says in its report,
    he failed to recognize the problems and take appropriate
    action. Despite his failures, he continued to remain as dean of
    the faculty. Why do you believe the Air Force has not held
    General Wagie accountable?
        Ms. Fowler. That is a good question and that's one we are
    raising, because General Wagie was the officer who had the most
    responsibility for the sexual assault program and for the
    administration of these social climate surveys. He had the
    information every year. For the 5 years that he's been dean he
    was receiving that information. There's a question on some of
    the others sometimes as to whether they had it or whether they
    did not, but General Wagie did, and yet he, as far as we could
    determine, took no actions to make the surveys more scientific,
    he took no actions in relationship to the startling information
    that was coming out of those surveys as to the numbers of
    sexual assaults, as to the climate, as to the fears, the
    retribution, why these young women weren't reporting. He didn't
    move forward.
        The cadet counseling center came under him. They reported
    to him, and yet time and again we can find no evidence that
    General Wagie came forward with the information he was
    receiving. We don't even see that he communicated that to the
    commandant or to the superintendent. We can't find the evidence
    of it. But he certainly had the information and was in a
    position of responsibility to begin some implementations of
    some changes, and that we can find no evidence that he did.
        Senator Allard. Do you think that it's possible?
        Chairman Warner. Is he not part of current leadership?
        Ms. Fowler. He is.
        Chairman Warner. Should he not be therefore included in the
    IG's review?
        Ms. Fowler. We recommend that he be included in it. He's in
    the list of names. We have his name in the list of who should
    be looked at.
        Senator Allard. Now, the thought is occurring to me, did
    you look at the reporting of these instances? I mean, this
    current superintendent expressed to me a concern about these
    instances being reported to him, so he knows, as the
    administrative officer, what's going on. Did you find a
    definite break-up in information getting up to the higher
    officers? When something happened in the Academy, was it
    getting reported to those in charge? Was that happening?
        Ms. Fowler. It's a gray area.
        Senator Allard. Then when we had a problem at the Academy,
    was it getting reported to the people in charge in the
    Pentagon, and was it going up from there? Would you talk a
    little bit about this communication, which I think was a part
    of the problem?
        Ms. Fowler. It was definitely part of the problem, and this
    is definitely a gray area, and in our chronology you will see
    some years we were able to document that reports were made to
    Air Force headquarters in Washington. Other years we were not
    able to document that. Some years we were able to document that
    there was information that the superintendent had. Other years
    we didn't have that documentation. What is being said is that,
    oh, we didn't know, or often times prior leadership was saying,
    we didn't have that information, we didn't have that knowledge.
    We know sometimes they did, but sometimes they did not.
        There was poor communications set up, a real lack of
    keeping good records. When we went to get this information, we
    found a lot of times they just didn't keep the records. We have
    recommended they do a better job of retaining records. Because
    of the turnover, we do recommend that the superintendent should
    be there 4 years, the commandant should be there 3 years.
    Commandants have been staying there an average of 18 to 24
    months. 18 months? You're barely there before you are gone. You
    have to have more continuity in the top Academy leadership so
    that someone is overseeing what is happening there and has that
    information to act on.
        General Nardotti. Senator, just a comment on the
    information flow. I think that we concluded there was certainly
    a breakdown of information that was a product of how they were
    handling their reporting system, the confidentiality system
    that had been in place. We didn't find evidence that the
    command had evidence of incidents upon which they could act and
    that they failed to act on that. The problem in the reporting
    system and the problem with dealing with these kinds of very
    difficult cases, if you don't get certain information right
    away in terms of evidence, and if you don't do certain things
    investigatively right away, it becomes very difficult to
    prosecute, and that was the problem with the way the
    confidentiality was being handled in two respects. Number one,
    they basically had the confidential reporting. They weren't
    collecting that information. The victims were not being advised
    of what the consequences of that failure to go into official
    channels would be, and some of them were left with the
    impression that action could be taken later when it could not.
        Trying to strike that right balance, and General Hosmer's
    thought, even though he was the one that initiated the
    confidentiality, his belief, and we agree with this, that
    number one, you need to get the reports in. If you don't have
    confidentiality, you're not going to get the reports. If you
    get the reports in and you put the victim in the proper hands
    of somebody who is qualified to deal with a person with that
    kind of emotional experience and mental experience that you're
    far more likely to get them directed into the right path to
    both take care of them physically, emotionally, mentally, and
    also to give them confidence in the system that if they get the
    information into the right channels, it can be dealt with.
        That fell completely apart and the struggle over those--you
    look at this 10-year period--that continued to be a problem,
    and that definitely affected the information flow of when the
    leadership got information. They were getting it that these
    things were happening. They weren't getting it in time to take
    concerted action against the perpetrators. We don't fault them
    for that, that they didn't prosecute enough people. What we do
    fault them for is there were the indicators there that the
    problem was persisting and they were not taking enough
    concerted, consistent action to deal with them.
        Senator Allard. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Yes, Dr. Miller, you've been very patient.
        Dr. Miller. The comment I had was directly to the issue
    that Mr. Levin was raising about the parameters or the limits
    of the charter that the working group had, and I'd just like to
    point out that they did cover the area of the Board of
    Visitors, which could perhaps be analogous to headquarters in
    terms of oversight that has some interaction with the Academy
    grounds.
        Chairman Warner. Why don't we just proceed right down the
    panel if that's agreeable to you. General Bunting, do you have
    some further observations you would like to offer to the
    committee?
        General Bunting. Less than a minute's worth, sir, because I
    know your time is limited.
        Chairman Warner. We're not in a rush. This is one of the
    most important issues pressing our military.
        General Bunting. What we have here is a very sick man. What
    we have here is a very sick man, and we have made a very
    thorough and lengthy diagnosis, the panel has, you have, these
    other working groups have, and it seems to me that a
    prescription has to be implemented and implemented quickly.
    It's not only a matter of a talented lieutenant general and his
    new leadership team going in to do the things that are
    necessary, but it's a matter really of transforming an entire
    culture, which, as somebody said, is the soil within which
    these sexual assaults and this kind of misbehavior has grown
    up.
        It seems to me that everybody involved has to make a
    positive contribution towards doing this, and I have made this
    point two or three times this morning, but I would like to make
    it one last time. If the dean has been there 16 years, and
    there has been accumulating evidence of this kind of behavior,
    and the president of the university, the superintendent has
    done nothing about it, what about the Board of Visitors? What
    about this oversight committee of eminent elected officials
    from the Senate and those appointed by the President? It seems
    to me in the future that has to be looked on as a very
    important resource in evaluating the work of the Academy as it
    goes along.
        I would make one last point. I stress again the importance
    of junior grade leadership: lieutenants, captains, and majors.
    These are the young officers who are around these cadets all
    the time. They are members of their generation. They were born
    in 1980 or 1985. Those are the people that these young cadets
    are going to look at as models of integrity, and as General
    Nardotti has said several times, particularly with regard to
    their understanding of the importance of the contribution of
    women to the Academy and to the Air Force.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, General Bunting, and indeed you
    draw on being superintendent of a prestigious military center,
    VMI, which in many ways is parallel to the Air Force Academy,
    West Point, and Annapolis. Ms. Carpenter?
        Ms. Carpenter. I think as a general comment I commend
    everything that's happened here to raise attention to the issue
    of sexual violence, that it's a pervasive problem in society in
    general. The advantage that we have at the Academy is that it
    is a controlled environment, and it is an environment which we
    hold to a higher standard, so we have an opportunity to make an
    impact. I think that, positively implemented and monitored, it
    has the opportunity to permeate throughout society and affect
    the 700,000 women who are sexually assaulted in the United
    States, so I appreciate the attention that this has been given.
        Chairman Warner. I think that's an important observation.
    I'm certain that the superintendents of West Point and
    Annapolis, who have followed this proceeding and your report
    very carefully, take note of that, and indeed perhaps other
    colleges and institutions across the Nation, although not
    military, can learn from this tragic experience. Yes, I was
    going to pass right down. General?
        General Nardotti. If I could just make three points for the
    record. Going back to a point that Senator Levin raised earlier
    about why we didn't look more closely or pursue this issue with
    the General Counsel's report, we were trying very hard, given
    the timeframe that we had, not to get diverted on that issue.
    That could have really absorbed a lot of time and effort, and
    quite frankly we didn't really need an explanation. We were
    satisfied that, based on the information that we found with
    respect to headquarters' involvement, though it wasn't in the
    General Counsel's report, we believe it should have been in the
    General Counsel's report, we were going to say that, and we
    think the point will be made and it could be dealt with
    appropriately later.
        Again, with respect to the current leadership, obviously
    they're vulnerable in the sense that they still can be held
    accountable. That's why our focus was on those that, the
    presumption was, could not be held accountable, the past
    leadership.
        This was a point on confidentiality, going back to
    something that Senator Allard had raised, it is important to
    note that the solution we've come up with with respect to the
    Military Rule of Evidence 513, the General Counsel does address
    that in their report, but they effectively dismiss it or
    interpret it in a way that it doesn't create any solution, and
    notwithstanding the fact that they mention it in the General
    Counsel's report, when you look at the Agenda for Change, you
    don't see a word that supports a confidential approach. If you
    look at the statements of the leadership of the Air Force
    Academy, confidentiality, confidential reporting, doesn't
    appear anywhere in the list of priorities. So we would just
    point that out to you that, in fairness to the General
    Counsel's report, that point is there, but we disagree strongly
    with the way they have interpreted that and the way they think
    it can be applied.
        To the extent that Air Force instructions are a problem,
    they can solve that. The Secretary of the Air Force can solve
    those problems, we believe, pretty quickly and make this a
    workable solution.
        The last thing I would say, and this went back to a point
    that Senator Pryor raised about the issue of athletics, I just
    would make a comment in fairness to the new leadership,
    specifically to General Weida, when we were out at the Air
    Force Academy we did talk about that. He is very sensitive to
    that issue, and he had taken definite steps to make sure that
    the previously removed athletes--athletes who were less
    involved in the wing--were going to become much more involved
    in things. He was making some significant changes in that
    regard, and we believe that was another indicator that the
    leadership out there is going in the right direction. Thank
    you.
        Colonel Ripley. Senator, I believe General Bunting stated
    it correctly. This is a very major problem. This is not a small
    issue. I'm sure that's obvious to anyone and it wasn't really
    obvious to me, I would say, until I saw the length, the
    breadth, the depth of this overall issue, much greater than I
    had presumed. It will not be fixed with a quick fix. That
    should be obvious as well. It's systemic, it spreads itself
    right across the Academy, virtually everywhere, faculty, cadet
    wing, leadership, athletics, you name it, they were all
    involved and they all need some sort of a redirection and
    perhaps an understanding of the whole issue of what women do,
    not just for the Air Force, but for our great Services in this
    country. That has to be looked at predominantly before anything
    gets fixed, and it extends back to the headquarters here.
        I believe unless those involved look at this as serious as
    this committee has and this panel has, it will take a long time
    to convince anyone that the certain parameters and the obvious
    ways we operate are going to be that successful. What I'm
    saying is, we have to step outside the box and make sure that
    the changes, not just that this panel recommends, but our
    entire approach to fixing this problem is creative and
    unlimited.
        Chairman Warner. I thank you very much, Colonel, and I
    agree that we have to do some out-of-the-box thinking on this
    problem, but I believe that this panel has laid that foundation
    and sent a very strong signal that will be heeded by the
    Department of the Air Force.
        Dr. Satel. I certainly agree with the sentiments my
    colleagues have expressed. Hopefully the changes in the climate
    and the culture that we talk about will make future incidents
    rare, but I'm sure, unfortunately, things will still occur. As
    Anita mentioned earlier, though, one of the biggest worries is
    if there is no confidentiality, then the problem may become
    subterranean, so that is a very important thing for us, you,
    and the Academy to reconsider. But also importantly in terms of
    women coming forward, if they see in the future that they are
    treated with sensitivity and respect and that there's a
    determination to pursue wrongdoing and that people who require
    redress are in fact punished, then I think that will have very
    much of a facilitating effect on women coming forward. So the
    system has to work in an integrated fashion, you can't just
    change one part of it at a time. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. We thank you.
        Ms. Fowler. Senator, can I wind it up for the panel? I
    skipped myself since I was chairman to be last. I just first
    want to thank the committee for recognizing the need for an
    independent panel. I think from our report it's obvious that
    there was a need for such a review and we are hopeful that
    these 21 recommendations will be implemented. There are a
    variety of means by which they need to be, some by legislation,
    some the Board of Visitors can do, and some the Air Force needs
    to do, but we hope they will be implemented. We think they are
    important. We particularly are concerned, as was mentioned
    earlier, we struggled a long time with the confidentiality
    issue. It goes to the very heart of reporting and we think it
    is extremely important that this be adopted, our recommendation
    in that area. It's going to take the Air Force some discussion
    too on that, but we hope the committee can work with them and
    get them to work their way through on it.
        As we said earlier, this change is not going to happen
    overnight and it's going to take a dedicated, sustained effort
    by the Academy leadership and the Air Force leadership to alter
    the very culture of this institution. In our opinion, the
    reputation of this institution is at stake and it needs to take
    a dedicated, sustained oversight to see that this occurs,
    because today it is an honor to be a cadet at the United States
    Air Force Academy, and it should always be an honor to be a
    cadet there. That's what this is all about, making sure that
    every cadet at that institution is in a safe and secure
    learning environment.
        That was the goal of this panel. As you have seen, every
    one of them has been very involved in this review and these
    recommendations reflect the opinion of the whole panel. Thank
    you again for having us and for instituting this panel.
        Chairman Warner. Let me just draw on one concept: It will
    not change overnight. I don't want this hearing to send a
    message to a female cadet at the Air Force Academy that tonight
    she could be subjected to something like that, that's not what
    you meant.
        Ms. Fowler. No, we're talking about culture.
        Chairman Warner. I think there's a check and balance in
    place now.
        Ms. Fowler. There are processes and procedures in place now
    that are much better, but cultural change, which is what the
    end of my sentence refers to, does not happen overnight, and
    that is equally as important to make sure this is lasting is
    that the culture there is changed.
        Chairman Warner. Let me just make this observation and then
    conclude. We talked a lot about accountability today. Now I
    want to talk about a chapter in the history of this committee
    with regard to this subject, and we have to be accountable for
    our actions as a committee. Roughly July 2000, we had before us
    the nomination of Major General Hopper to become three stars.
    He had been a former commandant at the Air Force Academy. We
    received from--just coming into the committee--a letter from a
    former surgeon general of the Air Force bringing to our
    attention that during the course of General Hopper's tenure at
    the Academy there were allegations of sexual assault.
        The committee took action as follows. We then referred that
    to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I must say that a
    colleague, Senator Landrieu, likewise intervened on this case;
    she was a member of this committee I believe at that time. We
    asked the Department of the Air Force to investigate this and
    the Office of the Secretary of Defense. You make reference to
    that in your report.
        Ms. Fowler. On page 27, we refer to it.
        Chairman Warner. Page 27. Those investigations were
    completed. The Air Force and OSD came back to this committee
    indicating that General Hopper had no degree of accountability
    for those allegations which should affect the advise and
    consent proceeding and his being promoted. Well, the rest is
    history. The rest is history now today. So I just want to thank
    people who are not in this hearing room and may not even be
    following this hearing, but who had the courage to forward to
    this committee information that they possessed either first-
    hand or second-hand about these allegations. If it were not for
    the general public to come forward and help Congress in matters
    like this, I think in my opening statement I referred to, there
    are times when there's problems in the executive branch, for
    which we have oversight responsibility, and it's the general
    public, citizens just whose sense of integrity and honesty and
    fairness, in all probability, violation of clear law offends
    them. They have the courage to take the time to contact the
    Members of Congress. I wish to thank them in this case.
        I believe that your report will engender further
    communications from individuals who perhaps have knowledge that
    somehow has not surfaced and come to the attention of anyone in
    a position of responsibility to date. So that's another great
    service that this panel has done.
        Senator Levin and I have enjoyed a strong working
    relationship and friendship for some 25 years on this committee
    and we've been through a lot of hearings. This has been a tough
    hearing because it's a tough subject. We've asked tough
    questions and you've responded with absolute fairness,
    fortitude, and courage. I think we've clarified one or two
    things that may have caused a little confusion in the course of
    better than 3 hours that we've gone into this. I feel that our
    committee has responded and that we've shown you the enormous
    interest. The number of members here was significant today who
    attended and participated in this hearing.
        Again, on behalf of the American public and particularly
    the military, be it the Air Force, the Army, the Navy, the
    Marine Corps, the Merchant Marine, or any others, thank you.
        Ms. Fowler. Thank you, Senator. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. The hearing is concluded.
        [Below are questions for the record submitted by committee
    members for this hearing. Due to the Panel to Review Sexual
    Misconduct Allegations at the United States Air Force Academy
    disbanding shortly before this hearing, some answers have not
    been supplied for the record (#5 and #9).]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

                              AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP

        1. Senator McCain. Ms. Fowler, the report repeatedly refers to a
    lack of accountability and failure of leadership on the part of both
    the Academy and Air Force headquarters here in Washington, DC, in
    dealing with this situation. You further identify that the chain of
    command for the Superintendent of the Academy is a direct line to the
    Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Secretary of the Air Force.
    Based on my military experience, this means that responsibility for the
    lack of accountability and failure of leadership by the Air Force
    headquarters ultimately resides with the Secretary and Chief of Staff.
    Do you agree with that assessment? Why is that not specifically stated
    in the report?
        Ms. Fowler. The report carefully delineates the chain of command
    that exists between the Academy and Air Force headquarters, and
    identifies as part of the solution to the problem ``an actively engaged
    chain of command with external oversight.'' Our report also spans a 10-
    year period that includes six acting or confirmed Air Force Secretaries
    and four Chiefs of Staff and six Superintendents. Throughout the 10-
    year period, various leaders had various levels of information about
    the sexual assault problem at the Academy and took various degrees of
    action to deal with the problem. The panel did not find that the
    current Secretary or Chief of Staff failed to take timely or
    appropriate action.

        2. Senator McCain. Ms. Fowler, General Bunting, General Nardotti,
    Ms. Carpenter, Colonel Ripley, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Satel, the report
    mentions, and General Nardotti commented specifically in the hearing,
    that the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and subsequent wars in
    Afghanistan and Iraq commanded much of Secretary Roche's and General
    Jumper's attention. Are you suggesting that military leaders should not
    be held fully accountable for failing to take appropriate action to
    protect the safety of their subordinates from a situation that they had
    responsibility for because they are busy?
        Ms. Fowler, General Bunting, General Nardotti, Ms. Carpenter,
    Colonel Ripley, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Satel. The point of reference to
    the events of the post-September 11, 2001, world was to provide context
    to the committee concerning the press of official duties and
    responsibilities for the Secretary and Chief of Staff. The safety and
    security of Air Force personnel and the anti-terrorism/force
    protections measures would be at the forefront of their concerns. The
    panel did not make a finding that Secretary Roche and/or General Jumper
    failed ``to take appropriate action to protect the safety of their
    subordinates from a situation [for which] they had responsibility.''

        3. Senator McCain. Ms. Fowler, one of the most disturbing elements
    of the stories conveyed to me by the victims is that not only did the
    Academy and Air Force do nothing effective to deal with their sexual
    assault, it is alleged that Academy leadership in fact persecuted these
    women, denied them their constitutional rights, systematically
    undermined the victim's credibility, and chased them out of the
    Academy. I know that these allegations were made known to the panel.
    Why is this not even addressed in your report?
        Ms. Fowler. The DOD Inspector General and Air Force Inspector
    General are separately investigating the handling of all sexual assault
    cases from the last 10 years. In a letter dated September 19, 2003, the
    DOD Inspector General informed the panel that his office had,
    ``reviewed all completed AFOSI criminal cases over the past 10 years
    for thoroughness and sufficiency, with a special focus on allegations
    of reprisal.'' Because his final report will not be issued until
    December 2003, and our panel's congressional mandate expired on
    September 23, 2003, we did not have the benefit of those findings for
    inclusion in our report.

                                MEDIA INFLUENCE

        4. Senator McCain. Ms. Fowler, General Bunting, General Nardotti,
    Ms. Carpenter, Colonel Ripley, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Satel, the report
    comments that as a result of the media attention generated when the
    current scandal surfaced, the Air Force moved swiftly to address the
    problem of sexual assault at the Academy. The report also states that
    the evidence before the panel shows that the highest levels of
    leadership had information about serious problems at the Academy, yet
    failed to take effective action. Do you believe the Air Force would
    have continued to ignore, as it has for over 10 years, the sexual
    assault problems at the Academy if media attention had not forced
    senior leaders to finally take action? Why?
        Ms. Fowler, General Bunting, General Nardotti, Ms. Carpenter,
    Colonel Ripley, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Satel. Congressional involvement
    was key to the positive action the Air Force is taking, specifically
    the personal involvement of Senator Allard and Congressman Hefley.
    Congress' recognition that the severity of the problem warranted an
    independent panel comprised of citizens with specific expertise
    relating to the proper treatment of sexual assault victims, as well as
    knowledge of the Service Academies, was also vital to ensuring
    appropriate actions were identified and taken.

                                  LEGAL ACTION

        5. Senator McCain. Ms. Carpenter, as an advocate for victims of
    sexual assault, would you please comment on the importance of victims
    being permitted to know the outcome of legal or administrative action
    taken against their alleged attacker?

        6. Senator McCain. Ms. Fowler, General Bunting, General Nardotti,
    Ms. Carpenter, Colonel Ripley, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Satel, I have been
    contacted by several of the alleged victims from the Air Force Academy,
    some of whom you have also met with. I found the accounts of their
    treatment by Academy leadership to be appalling and disturbing. Based
    on your investigation, do you believe that legal as well as
    administrative action is warranted against some former Academy leaders?
    Why?
        Ms. Fowler, General Bunting, General Nardotti, Ms. Carpenter,
    Colonel Ripley, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Satel. The victims who met with our
    panel and spoke about their ordeals were simply heart-breaking. Our
    panel was shocked, appalled and troubled by what we heard. The victims'
    testimony helped us craft a report that put the victim first. Again,
    the DOD and Air Force Inspector Generals are investigating and
    reviewing all actions in alleged sexual assault cases. We understand
    they are reviewing specifics details and actions of the victims,
    alleged perpetrators, Academy leadership, and the Air Force
    headquarters leadership. We understand their report will be completed
    in December 2003, and we expect Air Force leadership to take
    appropriate legal or administrative action.

                            INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE

        7. Senator McCain. Ms. Fowler, General Bunting, General Nardotti,
    Ms. Carpenter, Colonel Ripley, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Satel, the bias in
    the Air Force working group report that shields Air Force leadership
    brings in to question the credibility of any future reports on this
    matter by any Air Force organization. Considering the gravity of the
    accusations that have been levied against the Academy and Air Force
    leadership, should this investigation have been turned over to the
    Department of Defense Inspector General earlier?
        Ms. Fowler, General Bunting, General Nardotti, Ms. Carpenter,
    Colonel Ripley, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Satel. Our 90-day review uncovered
    information that is clearly disturbing, and the Air Force with
    considerably more time and resources did not include the same
    information. We believe the DOD Inspector General involvement is
    essential.

        8. Senator McCain. Ms. Fowler, General Bunting, General Nardotti,
    Ms. Carpenter, Colonel Ripley, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Satel, a number of
    the victims have contacted me to convey their skepticism of any further
    reviews on this matter by anyone associated with DOD. In your opinion,
    should an outside agency like the Department of Justice be asked to
    investigate the case?
        Ms. Fowler, General Bunting, General Nardotti, Ms. Carpenter,
    Colonel Ripley, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Satel. We believe the DOD Inspector
    General will provide a full and fair investigation.

                           COLONEL LAURIE SUE SLAVEC

        9. Senator McCain. Ms. Carpenter, what impact do you think the Air
    Force's decision to award Colonel Slavec a medal for her tour at the
    Academy will have on the victims of sexual assault who feel they were
    further persecuted by this colonel, or who were afraid to come forward
    for fear of persecution by her?
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

                               SERVICE ACADEMIES

        10. Senator Akaka. Ms. Fowler, I was appalled to find out about the
    sexual misconduct targeted at women at the Air Force Academy. This type
    of behavior is not acceptable. In reading through your report, it seems
    that there is a deep cultural aspect to this problem, which you mention
    is not unique to the Air Force Academy, and is also a problem at the
    other Service Academies. Would your recommendations be relevant to the
    other Service Academies? If so, which recommendations should be
    implemented by the other Service Academies?
        Ms. Fowler. Yes, our panel's recommendations may be relevant to the
    other Service Academies and should be carefully considered for
    implementation. We understand that the DOD intends to pursue this
    evaluation with the Service Academies.

                                FEAR OF REPRISAL

        11. Senator Akaka. Ms. Fowler, the report found that cadets were
    afraid to report sexual misconduct because of the fear of reprisal,
    discrimination, or harassment. The Air Force has taken a number of
    steps to address this problem. Do you believe fear of reprisal is still
    a problem at the Academy?
        Ms. Fowler. Our panel was surprised by the deep cultural issues
    that the Academy must recognize, understand, and take action to change
    the mindset of individual cadets and the culture of the cadet wing and
    the Academy. The cultural changes necessary will not happen overnight,
    and despite steps to address the problem, fear of reprisal remains a
    concern among cadets as evidenced by the latest Air Force Climate
    Assessment Survey in September 2003.

        [Whereupon, at 1:08 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    INVESTIGATIONS INTO ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT AT THE UNITED STATES
                               AIR FORCE ACADEMY

                                  ----------

                          TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 2003

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:55 p.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
    Allard, Collins, Ensign, Chambliss, Levin, Reed, Akaka, Bill
    Nelson, and Clinton.
        Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
    director; Gabriella Eisen, nominations clerk; and Pendred K.
    Wilson, receptionist.
        Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
    professional staff member; William C. Greenwalt, professional
    staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional staff member; Ann
    M. Mittermeyer, counsel; Scott W. Stucky, general counsel; and
    Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
        Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
    Democratic staff director; Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel;
    and Peter K. Levine, minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Andrew W.
    Florell, and Andrew Kent.
        Committee members' assistants present: Cord Sterling,
    assistant to Senator Warner; Christopher J. Paul, assistant to
    Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe;
    Lance Landry and Jayson Roehl, assistants to Senator Allard; D.
    Armand DeKeyser, assistant to Senator Sessions; James P.
    Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Senator Collins; James W. Irwin and
    Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistants to Senator Chambliss; Meredith
    Moseley, assistant to Senator Graham; Christine O. Hill,
    assistant to Senator Dole; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to
    Senator Cornyn; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi and Richard Kessler,
    assistants to Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey, assistant to
    Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator
    Clinton; and Terri Glaze, assistant to Senator Pryor.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Warner. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen,
    colleagues. The committee meets today to receive additional
    testimony regarding the allegations of sexual assault at the
    United States Air Force Academy.
        We welcome Secretary Roche, General Jumper, and the General
    Counsel of the Air Force, Mary Walker.
        I felt very strongly at the conclusion of the testimony
    given by the panel appointed by Congress, presided over by a
    very distinguished former Member of Congress, Tillie Fowler,
    that those allegations raised in that hearing should be
    readdressed in the context of giving each of you the
    opportunity to respond. My colleague, Senator Levin, and other
    members of the committee concurred, so that's the reason we are
    here today. Plus the fact, I have to tell you, in my experience
    of some many years in association with the United States
    military, and particularly the academies, this issue is at the
    very forefront of almost every Member of Congress, because we
    are the ones, together with the Secretary and the Chief and
    others, who make the nominations to the Academy. These are
    young people that come from the big cities and the small towns
    all across America, and they expect a lifestyle and an
    environment that is second to none in terms of quality,
    integrity, and honesty to fulfill their own individual goals.
        This committee's going to take such time as it deems
    necessary to work our way through this very tragic situation.
        Last Monday, September 26, the congressionally-mandated
    ``Panel to Review Sexual Misconduct Allegations at the U.S. Air
    Force Academy''--that is the title used in the law--issued its
    report, which contained a number of findings and
    recommendations. On Wednesday of last week, Congresswoman
    Fowler and the other six members of the panel testified before
    this committee. During the course of that hearing, other
    members of this committee and I indicated our intention to have
    the Air Force General Counsel appear before the committee to
    respond to the panel's conclusion. We then decided to include
    the Secretary and the Chief.
        The hearing today will enable these witnesses to address a
    number of issues identified by the Fowler Panel, including the
    omissions in the Air Force investigation to date of the
    problems at the Air Force Academy. It will also give,
    particularly, Ms. Walker and Secretary Roche an appropriate
    opportunity to respond to the panel's express belief that the
    Air Force General Counsel attempted, ``to shield Air Force
    headquarters from public criticism by focusing exclusively on
    the events at the Academy.''
        I view today's hearing as an important next step in the
    difficult process of ensuring that the problems of sexual
    harassment, sexual assault, and hostile attitudes toward women
    at the Air Force Academy, which hopefully are in the past
    tense--indeed, the entire Air Force itself, General Jumper--are
    eliminated finally once and for all. That's the ultimate goal
    of all of us.
        Achieving that goal, however, depends upon a clear
    understanding of how our Air Force and Air Force Academy
    leadership failed, or did not fail, as the case may be; we are
    here objectively to listen to the past history and to such
    information as they may have had.
        As noted in Congresswoman Fowler's report, ``The Air Force
    and the Academy cannot fully put this unfortunate chapter
    behind them until they understand and acknowledge the causes.''
    The report goes on to state, ``In order to make clear the
    exceptional level of leadership performance expected of future
    leaders and to put the failures of recently removed Academy
    leadership in perspective, there must be further accounting. To
    the extent possible, the failures of the Academy and the Air
    Force headquarters leaders over the past 10 years should be
    made a matter of official record.'' I'm quoting that report,
    all of which you have well in mind. But those who have joined
    here in this room today, and those who are following this
    hearing, I have to recite exactly what is in that report.
        I would be remiss if, at this point, I did not address the
    pending nomination of Secretary Roche to be the next Secretary
    of the Army. I have stated my concerns about proceeding with
    Senate consideration of Secretary Roche's nomination while
    issues relating to the accountability of Air Force leadership,
    including Secretary Roche, are still being reviewed by the
    executive branch, that being the Department of Defense
    Inspector General (DODIG). In a press release by the Air Force
    on the Fowler hearing, which was given to us today, there were
    references to other inquiries going on in the Pentagon.
        Now, at that point, if I may stop, my colleagues here full
    know the constitutional responsibility of the United States
    Senate to give advice-and-consent to Presidential nominations,
    and that we do regularly. I've been privileged to be on this
    committee many years. I have felt that throughout the years, no
    matter who is chairman, we try to render an impartial and, in
    many respects, totally nonpolitical judgment in accordance with
    our constitutional mandate. But when we're on notice--I mean,
    actual notice--that the executive branch, a separate but co-
    equal branch of the government, is continuing to investigate
    allegations or facts relating to the nominee pending before the
    United States Senate, the question arises, can we go forward
    until such investigations are completed?
        One of the reasons I'm a bit late, the President's counsel
    just called me on the phone, because he has several letters
    from me in front of him raising this juxtaposition between the
    activities of the executive and legislative branches on this
    nomination. His counsel to me has been very helpful on this,
    and he understands and respects entirely the constitutional
    obligations of this body.
        I always proceed with these nominations in a totally
    unbiased manner and with total neutrality, and wait until all
    the facts are before me before I cast my vote, together with
    other Members.
        So, at this time, I cannot give you a definitive answer,
    Mr. Secretary, but I'm continuing to work through that
    situation, in consultation with the ranking member and other
    members of this committee.
        Bear in mind that this problem at the Air Force Academy
    was, once before, referred to this committee. Several years
    back--I'll put in the record the explicit details--it was
    brought to our attention, by an individual who was in a
    position to have knowledge, that there were problems at the
    Academy. As is the routine of chairman of the committee, I was
    chairman at that time, we referred it to the Department of
    Defense (DOD) for an investigation. The Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Force Management and Policy, after the Air Force
    Inspector General had investigated, came back and assured this
    committee that the allegations raised in that communication to
    the committee had been fully investigated and there was no
    basis on which the committee, at that time, should hold up the
    nomination by the President of an officer in the Air Force for
    higher promotion. Absolutely no basis.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The reference by Chairman Warner concerned the Air Force and the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense response to a letter from the
    chairman and ranking member about a nomination then pending action by
    the Committee on Armed Services of an Air Force officer who previously
    had served as commandant of the U.S. Air Force Academy.
        The committee forwarded the attached memorandum on July 27, 2000,
    to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Policy
    requesting comment. The attached memorandum is titled ``Sexual and
    Physical Assault at the U.S. Air Force Academy'' and identifies many of
    the problems that were identified in 2003 that resulted in Secretary
    Roche's order to establish a Working Group.
        The Assistant Secretary of Defense responded to the committee on
    September 5, 2000 (letter attached), that the Air Force Inspector
    General had investigated and thoroughly reviewed the allegations and
    they were found to be unsubstantiated.

                        Assistant Secretary of Defense,
                                          4000 Defense Pentagon
                                     Washington, DC, September 5, 2000.
    Hon. John W. Warner,
    Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
    United States Senate,
    Washington, DC.
        Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter of July 27, 2000,
    concerning the nomination of [deleted] United States Air Force, for
    assignment as [deleted] and for appointment to the grade of lieutenant
    general. His nomination is pending action by your committee.
        The Air Force Inspector General thoroughly reviewed [deleted]
    allegations. The allegations have been investigated and found to be
    unsubstantiated.
        The Secretary of the Air Force fully supports [deleted] nomination.
    Accordingly, I request his nomination for appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant general proceed forward for confirmation.
                Sincerely,
                                   Alphonso Maldon, Jr.
    cc:
    Senator Levin

        Now, this committee relied on the executive branch once,
    and as history tells us, for some reason that investigation at
    that time, in my judgment, was flawed and should have somehow
    turned the page and seen the problems that existed at that
    time, because these problems go back a decade.
        I think I'll put the balance of my statement in the record.
    I think I've addressed most of the issues that are before us.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner

        The committee meets today to receive additional testimony regarding
    the allegations of sexual assault at the United States Air Force
    Academy. We welcome Secretary Roche, General Jumper, and the General
    Counsel of the Air Force, Ms. Mary Walker.
        Last Monday, September 22, the congressionally-mandated ``Panel to
    Review Sexual Misconduct Allegations at the U.S. Air Force Academy''
    issued its report, which contained a number of findings and
    recommendations. On Wednesday of last week, Congresswoman Fowler and
    the other six members of the panel testified before this committee.
    During the course of that hearing, I indicated my intention to have the
    Air Force General Counsel appear before the committee to respond to the
    panel's conclusion regarding the efforts of the Working Group, which
    the Air Force formed to investigate the problems at the Air Force
    Academy, and which was chaired by Ms. Walker.
        On Friday, Secretary Roche and General Jumper requested an
    opportunity to testify before the full committee, as well. I consulted
    with Senator Levin and promptly scheduled this hearing to ensure that
    they had that opportunity.
        The hearing today will enable the witnesses to address a number of
    issues identified by Congresswoman Fowler's panel, including the
    omissions in the Air Force's investigations to date of the problems at
    the Air Force Academy. It will also give Ms. Walker and Secretary Roche
    an appropriate opportunity to respond to the panel's express belief
    that the Air Force General Counsel attempted to ``shield Air Force
    Headquarters from public criticism by focusing exclusively on events at
    the Academy.''
        I view today's hearing as an important ``next step'' in the
    difficult process of ensuring that the problems of sexual harassment,
    sexual assault, and hostile attitudes toward women at the Air Force
    Academy--indeed, in the Air Force itself--are eliminated. That is the
    ultimate goal.
        Achieving that goal, however, depends upon a clear understanding of
    how Air Force and Air Force Academy leadership failed to effectively
    address these problems over the years. As noted in Congresswoman
    Fowler's report, ``The Air Force and the Academy cannot fully put this
    unfortunate chapter behind them until they understand and acknowledge
    the cause.'' The report goes on to state, ``in order to make clear the
    exceptional level of leadership performance expected of future leaders
    and to put the failures of recently removed Academy leadership in
    perspective, there must be further accounting. To the extent possible,
    the failures of the Academy and Air Force Headquarters leaders over the
    past 10 years should be made a matter of official record.''
        I would be remiss if, at this point, I did not address the pending
    nomination of Air Force Secretary Roche to be the next Secretary of the
    Army. I have stated my concerns about proceeding with Senate
    consideration of Secretary Roche's nomination, while issues relating to
    the accountability of Air Force leadership--including Secretary Roche--
    are still being reviewed by the Department of Defense Inspector
    General.
        The problems at the Air Force Academy date back at least a decade,
    but they did not end when Secretary Roche and General Jumper assumed
    their posts in the spring and summer of 2001. Indeed, some would
    conclude that these problems have gotten worse over the past 2 years.
        Last Thursday, 23 members of this committee forwarded a letter to
    the DOD Inspector General requesting that he ensure a thorough review
    of the accountability of current Air Force leadership--including
    Secretary Roche and General Jumper. I ask unanimous consent that a copy
    of that letter be inserted in the record at this time.
        Although Congresswoman Fowler testified that her panel found no
    evidence indicating problems with the performance of Secretary Roche or
    General Jumper in this matter, a complete assessment of accountability
    demands a comprehensive review, which extends through the current
    leadership of the Air Force.
        In conclusion, I would like to recognize the fine work of
    Congresswoman Fowler's panel. Because of that panel's work, we now have
    a better understanding of the full extent of the problems at the Air
    Force Academy, the root causes of the problems, and what remains to be
    done so that we can guarantee a safe and secure environment for all
    cadets at the Air Force Academy. Congresswoman Fowler and the
    distinguished members of her panel significantly advanced the goal of
    restoring the Air Force Academy to the level of respect and trust that
    it must regain.

        Chairman Warner. Senator Levin.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me welcome our
    three witnesses here today as you have, Mr. Chairman.
        We have received two reports on the matter which has been
    described by our chairman. The two reports, as he referenced,
    are a Working Group Report and a report by the Fowler Panel.
    The Working Group Report was the result of a group coming into
    existence that was directed by Secretary Roche, and Ms. Walker,
    as the Air Force General Counsel, headed that Working Group.
    The Fowler Panel Report was the result of a panel consideration
    as directed by Congress, and the members of the panel were
    appointed by the Secretary of Defense. The panel's report was
    released to us just last week and was the subject of the
    hearing that the chairman has referred to on September 24.
        Now, the findings of the two reports are inconsistent in a
    number of significant ways. One of the most significant
    inconsistencies is that the Working Group Report found that
    there was, ``no systemic acceptance of sexual assault at the
    Academy, no institutional avoidance of responsibility or
    systemic maltreatment of cadets who report sexual assault.''
    The Fowler Panel took issue with that finding, stating the
    following, ``The panel cannot agree with that conclusion, given
    the substantial amount of information about sexual assaults and
    the Academy's institutional culture that was available to
    leaders at the Academy, Air Force headquarters, and to the
    Office the Air Force General Counsel.''
        Now, the Working Group Report did not find leaders
    accountable for failing to change the culture at the Academy,
    while the Fowler Panel recommended that the DODIG conduct a
    thorough review of the accountability of Academy and Air Force
    headquarters' leadership for the sexual assault problems at the
    Academy over the last decade.
        During our hearing, Ms. Fowler recommended that the DODIG
    review the accountability of ``previous leaders,'' at the
    Academy and Air Force headquarters, leaving open the issue of
    whether the DODIG review should include an assessment of the
    accountability of current Air Force leadership. She did not
    modify the panel's formal recommendation that, by its own
    terms, did not limit review of accountability to past
    leadership. She indicated that a request for a review of the
    actions of current leadership was entirely up to us, but that
    they had found no reason to recommend such a review.
        In order to ensure that there's no confusion about what we
    decided to do, we wrote the DODIG, under the chairman's
    leadership, and asked that the DODIG review include both past
    and present leadership. In our review, Mr. Chairman, I think
    you would agree, it is important that the actions of all the
    leaders, past and present, be documented and be assessed.
        I think it is important to point out that we have not made
    a determination that any specific individual should be held
    accountable for failure of leadership. What we are saying is
    that the actions of all leaders involved need to be simply
    documented and assessed, because only after the facts are known
    can issues of accountability be appropriately determined.
        So our minds are open concerning accountability, but we are
    determined that there be a thorough inquiry into the actions of
    all who were aware of the continuing reports of sexual assaults
    at the Air Force Academy to determine whether leaders took
    appropriate actions, based on the information available to
    them, to ensure the safety of the young women addressed to
    their care as cadets at the Air Force Academy.
        Again, assessment of leadership actions can only lead to
    the documentation of facts, whichever way that falls. The
    letter that we wrote to the DODIG is consistent with the DODIG
    review that was called for by the Fowler Panel Report. This is
    the opportunity, which we look forward to, for our witnesses
    today to give us their assessment of the reports, which have
    been made available to us, as well as to any other comments
    which they might want to make. It is highly appropriate that
    they be given this opportunity.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin. We'll include
    the letter to which you referred. We have over 20 signatures
    thus far. The committee issued that letter, following the
    Fowler Panel's testimony, calling on the DODIG to make certain
    that their examination covered those areas.
        I would also like to have the statements of Senators Allard
    and Cornyn inserted in the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

                                    ------

        [The prepared statements of Senators Allard and Cornyn
    follow:]
                   Prepared Statement by Senator Wayne Allard

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to say how much I appreciate your
    involvement on this issue. Your interest has helped build momentum
    toward ensuring the safety of not only cadets at the Air Force Academy,
    but also those at West Point and the Naval Academy. Your previous
    experience as the Secretary of the Navy has been invaluable as we
    sought to better understand the role of the Air Force headquarters in
    these matters. Again, I thank you for your leadership, Mr. Chairman.
        I also wish to thank Secretary Roche and General Jumper for their
    commitment to the cadets at the Air Force Academy. In January, the
    chairman and I notified the Air Force of the allegations of sexual
    assault and Secretary Roche and General Jumper responded immediately.
        They instructed the General Counsel to begin a comprehensive
    investigation and personally traveled to the Air Force Academy to speak
    to the cadets about these allegations. Last week, members of the Fowler
    Commission stated before this committee that they were impressed by
    Secretary Roche and General Jumper's response to these allegations. I
    also know that many of the victims, particularly of those who
    approached my office, greatly appreciated the personal involvement of
    the Air Force's senior leadership. It has made a difference to those
    affected the most by these assaults.
        While I believe the Fowler Report was a good examination of the Air
    Force's investigation, as with most panel reports, it left us with
    several questions that need answers. I appreciate your willingness,
    Secretary Roche, General Jumper, to try and answer some of these
    questions for the committee. Though a thorough discussion on the Air
    Force's investigation is necessary, let me say that we must keep our
    eye on the ball and not forget to continue to make sure the Air Force
    reforms are working.
        We must remember that cadets are still at the Academy and a climate
    of fear continues to persist. The results of the superintendent's most
    recent Social Climate Survey further indicate that much work remains to
    be done. Sadly, as many as 25 percent of male cadets still do not
    believe women should be at the Academy and a large percentage of women
    still fear the reprisals for reporting a sexual assault.
        So as we discuss this matter, we need to focus on the Academy and
    the cadets who will some day be the leaders of our Air Force. Since we
    all have nominated cadets, we all have an obligation to ensure that the
    measures implemented by the Air Force improve the safety of all cadets.
    We cannot afford to overlook this important responsibility.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the question and answer
    period.
                                     ______

                   Prepared Statement by Senator John Cornyn

        I would like to thank Senator Warner for holding this important
    hearing. Last week, the committee received critical testimony from
    members of the Panel to Review Sexual Misconduct Allegations at the
    United States Air Force Academy, headed by Congresswoman Tillie Fowler.
    The panel provided several recommendations on how to correct the
    unacceptable problems at the Air Force Academy. The panel's first
    recommendation was for the Inspector General of the Department of
    Defense (DODIG) to conduct ``a thorough review of the accountability of
    Academy and Air Force leadership for the sexual assault problems at the
    Academy over the last decade.''
        I joined Senator Warner, Senator Levin, and other members of the
    Armed Services Committee in sending a letter to the DODIG requesting
    that the Inspector General conduct a thorough review of the Academy and
    Air Force headquarters leadership as recommended by the Fowler Panel.
    We also asked that the DODIG include an assessment of the
    accountability of the current leadership as well as the previous
    leadership.
        As a United States Senator, I am honored to nominate young men and
    women to attend our Nation's service academies. We have a solemn
    obligation to ensure the Air Force Academy, as well as the other
    service academies, are free from the fear of sexual harassment. We will
    not tolerate anything less than an environment that fosters the lofty
    ideals on which this country was founded. Sexual harassment, in any
    form, is simply not acceptable.
        As we all know, the nomination of Secretary Roche to be Secretary
    of the Army is currently before the committee. I believe we should wait
    for the conclusion of any ongoing executive branch investigations
    before we proceed with the nomination. In order to make an informed
    decision on the nominee, it is important that we have all the facts. I
    am encouraged by the fact that the Fowler Panel noted they were
    impressed with the leadership of Secretary Roche and General Jumper,
    but the seriousness of the problem at the Air Force Academy demands
    that we have a complete understanding of the role of the Air Force
    leadership--past and present. This is even more critical with the
    allegation in the Fowler Panel report that ``the Air Force General
    Counsel attempted to shield Air Force Headquarters from public
    criticism by focusing exclusively on events at the Academy.''
        As I noted in my testimony in last week's hearing, we cannot afford
    to allow the problems of the past at the Academy to continue. I look
    forward to working with Chairman Warner and the Air Force to ensure
    that the young women who attend the Air Force Academy are treated with
    the dignity and respect that they deserve.

        Chairman Warner. Several members have indicated they would
    like to make a quick comment.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I have to get back to the committee that I chair. I want to
    make just a very brief comment, because I will not be here for
    the round of questioning.
        First of all, I'd like to go back to the Tillie Fowler
    Panel, and they point out one problem that I think needs to be
    called to our attention. ``The panel is well aware of the
    difficulty of holding accountable those who long ago left their
    positions of responsibility and now are beyond the reach of
    meaningful action by the Department of Defense.'' I think that
    speaks for itself.
        They went on to give a history of this. I only will mention
    that, ``Since at least 1993, the highest levels of Air Force
    leadership have known of serious sexual misconduct problems at
    the Academy.'' The report goes on to talk about how not much
    was done, in spite of that, until these two witnesses before us
    arrived on the scene. Reading further, ``Recent widespread
    media attention caused the Air Force to address the problem of
    sexual assault at the Academy. In March of 2003, Air Force
    Secretary James Roche and Air Force Chief of Staff John P.
    Jumper announced a series of directives in policy improvements
    at the Academy known as the Agenda for Change.'' It goes on to
    describe that, but the summary is, ``The Agenda for Change is
    evidence that Air Force, under Secretary Roche's leadership, is
    serious about taking long overdue steps to correct the problem
    in the Academy.'' Finally, ``The panel is encouraged by a
    renewed emphasis in Washington to immediately address and solve
    this problem. We are impressed with the leadership of Secretary
    Roche and General Jumper. After a decade of inaction and
    failures, Secretary Roche made a step towards serious reform
    this year by rolling out his Agenda for Change and replacing
    the Academy's leadership team with one that has been quick to
    take action.'' In other words, she's applauding what they've
    been doing.
        Now, I served in the House of Represenatives with Tillie
    Fowler. She's a very thorough person. One of the problems that
    I have, Mr. Chairman, with hearings like this, is we'll come in
    here and listen for maybe 3 hours while this group of experts,
    seven people who have never been challenged, in terms of their
    credentials, spent 90 days, perhaps 500 hours working. I talked
    to Tillie Fowler, and I am very satisfied they did their due
    diligence, and feel that we should really commend these two
    gentlemen for taking action when nobody else would.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you.
        In my opening statement, I abbreviated it to save time, but
    I specifically commended Tillie Fowler and her panel for the
    work that they did.
        Are there other colleagues who want to make a quick
    observation, and then we'd proceed with testimony?
        Senator Allard. I just want to commend you for stepping
    forward, your leadership when I brought this to your attention,
    and joining me in dealing with this very serious problem at the
    Academy. Of course, we're all worried about the long-term
    security of all the cadets at the Academy.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you.
        Again, these matters were brought to the attention of this
    committee by whistleblowers and not the Department of the Air
    Force uncovering it on its own initiative. This committee has a
    fiduciary responsibility, Mr. Secretary, to the entire Senate.
    When we pass on a nomination or an issue and make
    recommendations to the United States Senate, we do so hoping
    that they will attach credibility to our actions and our
    judgment, and that's why we're proceeding with great care on
    this very sensitive and important matter.
        Now, Mr. Secretary, if you would lead off.

      STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES G. ROCHE, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

        Secretary Roche. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
    Levin, members of the committee.
        First of all, Mr. Chairman, I completely agree with the
    role of this committee in nominations. I was a staff director
    for the minority here. I have always observed that it
    approached these matters with great diligence, and I fully
    respect that, sir.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you for that reference. You have a
    very good record before this committee, not only as staff
    director, but, indeed, in most actions. I think there are one
    or two with which several of our colleagues disagree. We're not
    going to get into the leasing arrangement now, but----
    [Laughter.]
        Secretary Roche. Please, Senator.
        Chairman Warner.--other than that, you've tried hard.
        Secretary Roche. Thank you, sir.
        Let me begin today by thanking the committee for inviting
    General Jumper, Ms. Walker, and myself to update you on our
    actions regarding the Air Force Academy, as well as to provide
    you with some context for evaluating our approach to these
    problems and decisions we have made.
        Mr. Chairman, I have a longer statement. I ask that it be
    put in the record. I'll try and summarize it.
        Chairman Warner. Your statement and those of all witnesses
    will be included in today's record in their entirety.
        Secretary Roche. We also would like to commend the work of
    Congresswoman Fowler and her distinguished team of experts. We
    learned a lot from her and her colleagues, and we agree
    wholeheartedly with the recommendations contained in her
    report. However, we want you to know, to the best of my
    knowledge and to the best of General Jumper's and Ms. Walker's
    knowledge--I'll let General Jumper and Ms. Walker speak for
    themselves--there was no shielding and no hiding in the Working
    Group Report. We were looking for history. We were looking for
    facts. We were looking for just the facts, so they could speak
    for themselves, sir.
        The first point I would like to make to you, Senator, is
    that General Jumper and I believe that the cadets at the Air
    Force Academy this moment are safe, that we have put in the
    procedures, the patrols, lots of things to ensure that the
    parents of our cadets can sleep tonight at ease, knowing their
    daughters are safe, and that their sons are safe, as well.
        Our singular purpose at the U.S. Air Force Academy is to
    produce officers of character, who are prepared to lead airmen
    in the profession of arms, potentially into harm's way.
        Now, General Jumper and I, to the best of our knowledge,
    have been more engaged and more probing than any other
    secretaries and chiefs in the history of the Air Force. In my
    19 months, up to January, and General Jumper's 16 months, as of
    January 3, we engaged in a review of the honor code, working
    with Retired General Mike Carns, who, by the way, had a
    daughter in attendance at the Air Force Academy.
        We were tipped off by a reporter that there were issues
    about recruited athletes, and we dug into that. To make the
    point, we, after reviewing what was happening, put a
    restriction on the number of recruited athletes. We spent a
    great deal of time in the technical curriculum, because it was
    starting to slip, and it was starting to shift over to too many
    cadets going to liberal arts majors because of the workload. We
    fixed that, made the core curriculum much more technical, and
    also introduced multiple language studies. We reinstituted the
    basic flying program, so that could fit in. We invigorated our
    sense of military professionalism by creating the four-star
    lecture series, where we ask each of our four-star generals to
    come to the Academy at least once a year and to lecture and be
    with the cadets involved.
        We took actions with failures, as well. There was a case of
    a 13-year-old young woman who was assaulted at a summer camp.
    That cadet was tried and placed in jail. There are eight court-
    martial convictions for drugs. There was a rape perpetrated in
    Los Angeles by one of our cadets. That cadet is in jail. We
    worried about credit- card theft, embezzlement, pornography, a
    stolen textbook ring, and we took firm action against each of
    the cadets involved.
        You may recall, Mr. Chairman, that there was a skit put on
    by the English Department, which, in our estimation, was
    inappropriate. It was an issue that came to the attention of
    Senator Allard. By the time I got back to my office, I had a
    copy of the same letter, and we found it to be something we did
    not want to see in our Academy. We removed the chairman of the
    department and also the number two, and later had that
    particular professor convinced that he should no longer be a
    permanent professor in our Air Force.
        We visited the Academy repeatedly. But at no point during
    this entire period were we informed about a major problem with
    gender relations or sexual assault. We spent time with alumni,
    alumnae, board of visitor members, cadets, parents, many of
    whom are active-duty officers with daughters and sons at the
    Academy, faculty, and ex-faculty. Two members of our staff are
    women with extensive experience at the Academy. I even
    maintained a dialogue with the superintendent of the Naval
    Academy in an attempt to gain insight into potential problems
    on the basis that the competing academies would probably know
    more about the other academies than people in their own
    service, and I was helped greatly by the superintendent of the
    Naval Academy. Yet there were no suggestions of a widespread
    gender problem. The subject was not addressed openly by either
    officers or cadets. But had we received such information, I
    assure you our actions would have been as firm and swift and
    decisive as our approach to the other issues we have faced.
        Now, it was January 2, at the end of the winter holiday
    that I received, among others, a copy of an e-mail from a
    cadet, and it was an extraordinarily long and pained e-mail,
    and I was very disturbed by its content. Within 24 hours, I
    asked the General Counsel to try and work to arrange to find
    that cadet. It was written with a pseudonym. We put feelers out
    and offers. The cadet did come forward to speak with us over at
    the General Counsel's office. In fact, two cadets came. They
    also had a chance to speak with Senator Allard and his staff.
    Senator Allard and I talked about this early on and decided we
    had a major problem that was much deeper.
        Within days, I chartered a Working Group to focus on the
    problems at the Academy to tell John and me what, in fact, we
    had on our hands, how did it get this way, and what can we do
    about it? We wanted a factual history of the last 10 years at
    the Academy, the 10 years being the period from 1993, when
    General Hosmer had put in many changes to address a problem
    which had occurred in the prior 10 years. Days later,
    recognizing that we were, in one case, looking at the
    procedures and what had occurred at the Academy, I directed the
    Air Force Inspector General to start a parallel investigation
    to look at the complaints against commanders and assess the
    potential command accountability on a case-by-case basis so
    that we had a parallel path, looking at each case. In the
    cases, a number of the victims were concerned about how they
    were treated, concerned about issues of how the command
    responded, and we wanted to have that documented in a due-
    diligence manner. At the same time, the Working Group was
    looking at procedures, why did this happen, and why didn't we
    know about it?
        Later, based on your request, our Air Force IG was joined
    by the DODIG, who we believe provided welcome oversight, and I
    met with them as soon as they received your letter, welcomed
    them, and said, ``This is good, because it'll mean that our own
    IG will have some sense of oversight and will, therefore, be
    more credible,'' and that they were going to both oversee what
    our folks were doing, as well as to look at broader issues of
    accountability.
        We took, as our first responsibility, the safety of the
    cadets and measures to encourage reporting of any assaults, and
    to begin to alter the culture at the Academy that allowed this
    to develop. Headquarters accountability was an issue that came
    up much later, because we recognized that this three-star
    command was like any other three-star command, and there was
    not a lot of infrastructure overseeing what happened at the
    command because we don't normally do that in any of our other
    three-star commands. Yet it meant that we were not being
    informed of things. We did not know what was going on in the
    sorts of detail that we now feel is necessary.
        I believed, as the Working Group progressed, that they
    should focus on the issues at hand, because we knew that the
    parents of the class of 2007 were going to make their
    decisions, or work with their sons and daughters to make their
    decisions, probably in April and May as to whether or not to
    show up in June, and our great concern is that we might have
    lost the confidence of the American people. Therefore, we
    wanted to work quickly to put things in place so as to regain
    that confidence and to give us a chance, and we did that.
        As we went further, it was quite clear that we did not have
    the leadership and management infrastructure at headquarters,
    so we built an entire infrastructure arrangement that gives us
    executive steering group insight--the vice chief of staff, the
    assistant secretary for manpower--on a continuing basis so that
    we won't have to dig for things or wait for someone to bring it
    to our attention, but, in fact, can have insight on a
    continuing basis.
        In August, I was shocked to see the four pages you
    referenced earlier, Mr. Chairman. I had never seen those. I had
    no knowledge of them. General Jumper had no knowledge of them.
    I asked Ms. Walker; she had no knowledge of them. It first came
    to our attention with an article in the newspaper. It then took
    us at least a week to find them, and they were buried in an IG
    report. It was shocking that the Air Force, both in 1996, when
    that came forward, and also in 2000, when you asked the issue
    be readdressed, that people in responsible positions ignored
    the underlying situation and viewed it so narrowly.
        Senator Levin. Could I interrupt you? Because I don't know
    what four pages you're referring to.
        Secretary Roche. In the material that the chairman sent
    over to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
    Readiness, in July 2000, there was a four-page attachment,
    which listed an assessment of what was happening at the Academy
    written in 1996. It's in outline form, but it was attached to
    that. In fact, it was the basis that was used to evaluate that
    the officer in question and his nomination, how did he do with
    that.
        Chairman Warner. I was chairman at the time, Senator Levin,
    and it's that chapter to which I alluded in my opening
    statement that this committee, frankly, got burned one time,
    and we're not going to get burned again.
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir. I fully understand.
        What fascinated me was two parts, Mr. Chairman. One, that
    people in responsible positions could read that and not
    recognize that it wasn't a narrow issue of a particular
    officer, should he be promoted or not, but there was a backdrop
    to that. One should have asked the question, ``Well, is it okay
    now?'' or, ``What was it?'' In fact, nothing was done. It's
    hard for me to imagine that anybody in a responsible position
    could look at that and not ask a whole lot more questions. It
    started to answer the question, ``Why didn't the headquarters
    of the Air Force know what was going on?'' In fact, those four
    pages made the point, they did.
        This came, as I say, in August. The Working Group's report
    was finished in June. I have no doubt that had the Working
    Group had those four pages, that they would have taken the
    section on future studies, where they said that the
    headquarter's relationship should be examined, they would have
    built a much richer terms-of-reference. They would have used
    this. Then I would have argued with my boss that this is
    something that the DODIG should look at or DODIG, not the Air
    Force, because I'd be looking at my predecessors, who were in a
    different administration, and no matter what conclusion we came
    to, it would be somehow doubted. But it was absolutely
    appropriate that the DODIG look at that. So I support Ms.
    Fowler's position in that position especially.
        Chairman Warner. Let me interrupt. The term
    ``headquarters'' is used in a number of documents. I want to
    make it clear that is the Department of the Air Force over
    which you are the senior responsible presiding civilian.
        Secretary Roche. Yes, I am.
        Chairman Warner. The Department is, where you, as Chief of
    Staff, and your deputies----
        General Jumper.--and the Superintendent of the Air Force
    Academy, Mr. Chairman, reports directly to me.
        Chairman Warner. Right.
        Senator McCain. So it's all one big oversight of
    information that was sent to you but somehow got lost.
        Secretary Roche. Senator, I don't know why it didn't get to
    me or why it didn't get to General Jumper. The irony, Senator,
    is that it remarkably agreed with what we had found. If it had
    disagreed, one could imagine not wanting to see one's thoughts
    disturbed. It absolutely agreed, and that was the shock. If, in
    fact, the situation looked like that in 1996, and it's the same
    situation that we formulate in 2003; it's unlikely that it was
    bad, got better, and got bad again. It meant that over a period
    of time, it was that way. This completely agreed. Even some of
    the words were identical. For instance, the difficulty of how
    confidentiality was treated was pointed out in 1996 as a
    problem; it's the same situation we discovered in 2003. So I
    only regret that it was not brought to my attention, from
    anyplace it might have been.
        Senator McCain. Communications from the Chairman of the
    Armed Services Committee are not brought to your attention.
        Secretary Roche. I'm sorry?
        Senator McCain. Communications from the Chairman of the
    Armed Services Committee are not brought to----
        Secretary Roche. Oh, Senator, in this administration,
    absolutely, something from the chairman would be brought to my
    attention. This was in the prior administration----
        Senator McCain. Oh, I'm sorry.
        Secretary Roche.--and it's probably in a file cabinet
    someplace. It was not picked up and dealt with by the Office of
    Secretary of Defense then. I agree, the Air Force looked at
    this very narrowly instead of recognizing that it was a broader
    problem and should have gone immediately to see if the
    situation in 2000 was the same as described in 1996.
        In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, there have been failures at
    the Air Force Academy. Of that, there is no doubt. General
    Jumper and I have been and remain intensely focused on
    correcting these problems and restoring the confidence of the
    American people in their Air Force Academy. Our focus
    throughout has been of fulfilling our goals of educating,
    training, and inspiring Air Force leaders of the highest
    character and integrity, ensuring the safety and security of
    every cadet, and enhancing the trust and confidence of the
    American people in the Academy.
        I'm proud to point out, Senator, in the midst of all of
    this, the work that we did on the rushed basis that we did it
    is measured by the fact that in June we had the fourth largest
    class of women to begin the Air Force Academy in the history of
    the Academy. The parents are giving us a chance. We have to
    make sure we live up to it. We will stay this course, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Recent climate surveys show that the attitudes there are
    going to take a long time to change. In fact, General Jumper
    and I spent Friday in Colorado Springs with the leaders of the
    Air Force Academy, and one of our concerns is that they might
    become discouraged because things cannot happen fast.
        The good news is that the confidence of the women cadets in
    the new leadership team and its desire to address these issues
    has become quite high. With what we have learned in our
    interactions, the efforts of the Working Group and the Fowler
    Commission, and what we will learn from the IG investigations,
    which are ongoing--they will not be complete until December--we
    are prepared to deal with issues of accountability
    expeditiously once they're finished.
        We appreciate the support you and the Members of Congress
    have given us, and we sincerely appreciate the suggestions you
    have provided throughout our response to this crisis. I am
    especially grateful to Senator Allard for the time he has spent
    working with me on this, and working with General Jumper.
        Again, we appreciate and applaud the work of the Fowler
    Commission. Thank you, sir. I'd be glad to answer your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Roche follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Hon. James G. Roche

        Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee. Let me begin
    today by thanking the committee for inviting General Jumper, Ms.
    Walker, and myself to update you on our actions regarding the Air Force
    Academy, as well as to provide you with some context for evaluating our
    approach to these problems and the decisions we have made.
        Mr. Chairman, you and members of this committee have been actively
    involved in highlighting the scope and nature of the sexual assault
    problem at our Academy. You've offered us your thoughtful suggestions
    since this issue was first brought to our attention, and you were
    responsible for the appointment of an independent panel of American
    citizens to review this matter.
        We commend the work of Congresswoman Fowler and her distinguished
    team of experts. Throughout their review, we required that our staff
    cooperate fully with the panel because our goal is the same as yours--
    to provide for the safety and security of our cadets, and to ensure
    that we produce officers worthy of the special trust and confidence of
    our Nation. We are grateful for Ms. Fowler's diligence, as well as her
    valuable recommendations. The commission has done a great service to
    the institution and to our Air Force. We have learned a lot and we
    wholeheartedly agree with her recommendations. However, I would want
    you to know that, in the report of the Working Group, there were no
    shields or any attempts to do anything other than to portray the facts
    so they might speak for themselves. We look forward to working with the
    Secretary of Defense and you as we move forward to study and act on the
    panel's findings.

                                  * * * * * *

        Mr. Chairman, from the very beginning of my tenure as Secretary, I
    have been intensely focused on sustaining our position as the world's
    finest air and space force. We do this, not merely by investing in
    platforms and systems, but principally by investing in people. Nowhere
    is this more important than one of our premier sources of training
    future leaders, the Air Force Academy. This is America's Academy.
    Because of the unique position of responsibility these officers will
    assume upon graduation, we owe it to you--and the citizens you
    represent--to get it right.
        At the Academy, a singular purpose drives us: producing officers of
    character who are prepared to lead airmen in the profession of arms,
    potentially into harm's way.
        Thus, we have been shocked and appalled to learn of the character
    failures of some of our cadets, and possibly, even some of our
    graduates. We do not condone these criminal acts, nor do we tolerate a
    culture that discourages the reporting of those who would perpetrate
    such acts. We must create an environment of trust and allegiance, not
    to misplaced notions of loyalty, but to standards of officership that
    will not tolerate criminal behavior or the attitudes that allow sexual
    harassment and assault to occur.
        Shortly after I assumed my post on June 1, 2001, General Mike
    Ryan--our Chief of Staff at the time--and I talked about the Air Force
    Academy and about the fundamental obligation we have as custodians of
    this great institution. From the beginning of my tenure, one of my
    principal goals has been to strengthen this institution--to reinforce
    the foundations that have produced our success, and to make changes
    that would advance our mission there. Working closely with Generals
    Ryan and Jumper, and long before the sexual assault issue was brought
    to our attention in January of this year, we have been actively engaged
    on Academy issues.
        We sought to reinvigorate a sense of military professionalism. In
    the last months of 2001 and the first half of 2002, we had court-
    martialed more cadets than we had in the previous 10 years at the
    Academy--eight for drugs alone. We had cadets involved in credit card
    theft, embezzlement, pornography, sodomizing a minor, and a stolen
    textbook ring. We took firm action against each of them. This level of
    misconduct convinced me that we needed to invest yet more of our
    personal time and effort to make positive changes at the Academy, and
    that we have.
        During my term to date, I've visited the Air Force Academy more
    than any other Air Force installation or operating location outside of
    Washington--nine times. General Jumper has been there repeatedly as
    well. I believe that no previous Secretary of the Air Force or Chief of
    Staff has devoted more time and effort to the Air Force Academy than
    General Jumper and myself. In all these endeavors, our first concern
    was the welfare of the cadets at the Academy. I would like to review
    some highlights:

             In October 2001, we went to Colorado to consider and
            make changes to the Academy's Honor Code system. Working with
            retired General Mike Cairns, who chaired an independent report
            on the honor system, we made it more responsive, added due
            process steps, and reaffirmed our commitment to the values that
            underlie the code.
             Immediately following this review, we took on the
            issue of recruited athletes. We were accepting an increasing
            percentage of recruited athletes. In March 2002, we issued our
            guidance, limiting the number of recruited athletes to no more
            than 25 percent of the incoming class. Again, we took this step
            to get the institution refocused on training, education, and
            character development of future Air Force officers.
             In May 2002, I went to the Academy to focus on cadet
            military professionalism. During this meeting, I directed the
            establishment of a Senior Officer lecture series, wherein
            superb Air Force leaders--officers like General Buzz Moseley
            and Chuck Wald--would take a greater hand in the training and
            development of our future officers. General Jumper also
            encouraged every 4-star officer to visit the Academy annually.
            I concluded this visit by doing what I want all of our leaders
            doing there--teaching cadets personally. I chose to teach a
            case on acquisition ethics. General Jumper also taught a class.
             Over the summer of 2002, we took on the curriculum
            issue. We conducted a complete review of the curriculum and
            made significant changes to enhance the science and technology
            requirements for cadets. We established a new Systems
            Engineering major, expanded language requirements for liberal
            arts majors, and reinstituted basic airmanship training for the
            cadets.
             While we were working on these items, we cracked down
            on those who fell below standards: we clamped down on those
            involved with illicit drugs. We imprisoned the cadet who
            assaulted the young lady at summer camp and implemented new
            screening rules for camp volunteers. Further, in this case, we
            took charge of the relations between the Academy and the young
            lady's family due to the poor performance of some of the
            Academy personnel involved. We removed a permanent professor--a
            department head--who was responsible for an inappropriate and
            sexually explicit skit performed by some cadets.

        We have tackled all these issues--the Honor Code, recruited
    athletes, the curriculum, issues of character and leadership
    development, enforcement of standards, additional training for staff,
    and much more--in my first 19 months on the job and General Jumper's
    first 16 months at the helm. At no point during this entire period were
    we informed about a major problem with gender relations or sexual
    assault. We spent time with alumni, alumnae, cadets, parents--many of
    whom are active duty officers--with daughters as well as sons attending
    the Academy, faculty, and ex-faculty. Two members of our staff were
    women with extensive experience at the Academy. I even maintained a
    dialogue with the Superintendent of the Naval Academy in an attempt to
    gain insight into potential problems. Yet, there were no suggestions of
    a widespread gender problem. This subject was not addressed openly by
    either officers or cadets. Had we received such information, I assure
    you our actions would have been as firm and swift and decisive as our
    approach to the other issues we faced.

                                  * * * * * *

        When we received a single e-mail from a cadet in January of this
    year, we were disturbed by its content, and the pain that was in the
    message. We contacted the author of the e-mail and we asked her if she
    would be willing to come in to talk to our representatives. She did so,
    and brought a former cadet as well. What they had to tell raised
    serious concerns.
        Based on these reports--as well as reports to Members of Congress,
    especially Senator Allard--we took immediate action. We chartered a
    Working Group in January, under the leadership of the Air Force General
    Counsel, the Honorable Mary Walker. In our charter to the team, we
    specifically and intentionally focused on determining the scope of the
    problem at the Academy, and what did we need to do to begin to fix it.
    What went wrong? How could it happen? How long has it been going on? We
    asked them to undertake a comprehensive review of the Academy programs
    and practices that were designed to deter and respond to sexual assault
    incidents, and to report their findings with respect to the
    responsiveness, effectiveness, and fairness of our current programs. We
    wanted facts. We needed to change the Academy and earn again the
    confidence of the parents of our cadets--especially those cadets
    considering entering the class of 2007. Our charter was very specific:

             Review the current programs, policies, and practices
            at the Academy as compared to the rest of the Air Force;
             Review the cadet complaints and provide an opportunity
            for cadets, former cadets, and other members of the Academy
            community to make constructive comments;
             Evaluate how well the Academy's process to assist
            victims and punish offenders has worked in the last 10 years;
            and
             To offer recommendations to us as a basis for us to
            make changes at the Academy.

        Time was of the essence. We did not ask them to investigate, report
    on, or draw conclusions on the activities of the headquarters. We
    wanted facts and factual history, not speculation. Our immediate and
    compelling focus was to provide an environment for our cadets free from
    sexual assault and sexual harassment while ensuring that if a sexual
    assault did occur, the crime would be reported, the victim would be
    supported, and justice would be done. Within a week or so, I also
    directed the Air Force Inspector General to undertake a parallel
    investigation into every case where a victim felt that justice had not
    been done so as to assess command accountability. Furthermore, I
    directed Ms. Walker to develop a factual history in the report of the
    last 10 years at the Academy to provide General Jumper and me with the
    basis for evaluating how our officers dealt with what they found there.
        While the Working Group and the IG team were doing their work,
    General Jumper and I repeatedly went to the Academy to personally
    engage with the cadets and the leadership. I addressed the entire
    student body and the assembled faculty in February during a conference
    on Character and Leadership Development. The following week, General
    Jumper did the same. We made it absolutely clear that we were going to
    fix this problem, and that the cadets could expect significant change,
    not just in matters related to sexual assault, but in the entire
    Academy climate.
        To learn, we reviewed the work of the Working Group as they
    developed history and diagnosis. When we received Ms. Walker's interim
    report in March, we personally assembled a group of officers and
    leaders with experience at the Academy, other academies, and Air Force
    ROTC to help us review an agenda that would allow us to make swift and
    decisive changes at our Academy.
        Mr. Chairman, we want to be very clear how we viewed our
    responsibility: first and foremost, protect our cadets, reestablish the
    confidence of the parents of our cadets, attack any barriers to
    reporting, and begin to change the culture which had developed over the
    past two and a half decades that tolerated sexual harassment.
        First, we expeditiously pursued our review at the Academy and
    issued our Agenda for Change because of our overarching responsibility
    to protect the cadets who were at the Academy and the incoming class.
    We were compelled to immediately address these issues so we could
    reassure the parents of our current and future cadets that their
    children would be safe. I'm proud to report that the class of 2007 has
    the fourth largest number of women in the Academy's history.
        Beyond all other matters, we were committed to eliminating the
    climate at the Academy that discouraged reporting of sexual assaults
    and encouraged a misplaced loyalty to protecting those who committed
    criminal acts. Our focus was on the Academy, its current cadets, and
    the incoming class. Our concern was to act to make swift and decisive
    change.
        We viewed that as our responsibility as the Air Force's senior
    leaders. It is why we issued an Agenda for Change that was a beginning
    of an overall, intensive effort to fix the problems at the Academy. We
    needed to make leadership changes to get the process started, and
    attack the entire climate, from basic cadet life and staff training to
    the specific processes by which we deter and respond to sexual assault.
    The preliminary Working Group Report was very helpful in giving us
    diagnoses and raising issues needing to be addressed.
        The new Academy leadership team--a team General Jumper and I
    assembled after interviewing many candidates--and our Executive
    Steering Group at the Headquarters have taken the Agenda for Change and
    the General Counsel's final report and translated them into 63 action
    items. We've established a headquarters oversight mechanism that is
    tracking implementation as well as providing support to Academy
    leadership. Our team just returned from 2 weeks at the Academy where
    they reviewed our progress to date. This construct will be made
    permanent and will ensure that our successors maintain the needed
    attention on the institution.
        As of today, we can report that we have made progress in
    implementing these changes, although we have a great deal of work yet
    to do, as Ms. Fowler correctly notes in her report. Generals Rosa and
    Weida, and Colonels Gray and Monteith are officers of action and are
    the right leaders at the right time for the Academy. We have opened up
    the Academy to public scrutiny, and have invited all concerned with
    resolving these problems to offer their criticism and inputs. We have
    invited the cadets to be part of this process. We have worked with the
    other services and the leadership of the U.S. Military Academy and the
    Naval Academy to capture their best practices. We have been open and
    direct with the Fowler Panel, the DOD Inspector General, the Board of
    Visitors, and this committee, as well as your counterparts in the
    House.
        We recognize that our initial blueprint for action may need
    modifications, as in the case of our approach to a ``confidentiality
    track'' for victims. As we have already done, we will continue to
    modify our actions, to incorporate best practices, to ask help from
    outside experts, to bring the Academy in line with the processes used
    throughout the Air Force, and to ensure that we continue the process of
    changing the culture at the Academy.
        As recent surveys have shown, changing attitudes will be something
    we can't solve in a matter of months, and significant problems still
    exist. While I feel confident that we have assured the safety of our
    cadets, it is disturbing to read in our latest cadet climate survey
    that more than 20 percent of our male cadets believe that women do not
    belong at the Academy. This calls into question our admissions
    procedures. More disturbing, these attitudes seem to have spread as
    cadets become more senior over time. In that same survey, however--
    which General Weida and Colonel Gray briefed to us just last Friday--
    our Freshman cadets reported they are confident in their new
    leadership, less tolerant of honor code violations, and are more likely
    to confront their peers. Further, our women cadets overwhelmingly
    expressed confidence that our new leadership team is serious about
    addressing issues of sexual harassment and assault. We need to nurture
    those attitudes, and I'm confident that our new leadership at the
    Academy is moving in the right direction. We need to ensure that they
    do not become discouraged with the slow pace of progress.
        It will take strong leadership and a consistency of purpose to
    sustain this movement. Even though we've been at war as we've responded
    to this crisis, it's received no less attention than it would have
    during peacetime. We remain engaged, and will continue to take decisive
    action on matters of leadership, training, and the enforcement of
    standards at the Academy, and throughout the Air Force. This is our
    commitment to you and all those we serve. It is what the American
    people expect of those entrusted with their sons and daughters and the
    security of this Nation.

                                  * * * * * *

        Mr. Chairman, there have been failures at the Air Force Academy; of
    that there is no doubt. General Jumper and I have been and remain
    intensely focused on correcting these problems and restoring the
    confidence of the American people in their Air Force Academy. Our focus
    throughout has been on fulfilling our goals of educating, training, and
    inspiring Air Force leaders of the highest character and integrity,
    ensuring the safety and security of every cadet, and enhancing the
    trust and confidence of the American people in the Academy. We will
    stay this course. With what we have learned from our interactions, the
    efforts of the Working Group and the Fowler Commission, and what we
    will learn from the IG investigations, we are prepared to deal with
    issues of accountability expeditiously.
        We appreciate the support you and the Members of Congress have
    given us, and we sincerely appreciate the suggestions you have provided
    throughout our response to this crisis. Again, we appreciate and
    applaud the work of the Fowler Commission.
        Thank you, I will be happy to answer your questions.

        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
        I think the record, at this point, should reflect, when you
    made reference to the letter that I sent, the Secretary of the
    Air Force at that time was Whit Peters; Chief of Staff, General
    Ryan. Perhaps in the Q&A--I don't want to take up time now--you
    could tell us whether or not you went back and asked them what
    happened; why that wasn't addressed.
        Senator Levin? Any further comment on the record? Because
    otherwise we'll go now to the General Counsel.
        Senator Levin. Perhaps just one question, if you could
    clarify. The Air Force IG was a member of the Working Group?
        Secretary Roche. There were members of the IG staff on the
    Working Group.
        Senator Levin. Not the IG.
        Secretary Roche. No, sir.
        Senator Levin. Okay.
        Secretary Roche. No, sir.
        Senator Levin. The staff members--according to Tillie
    Fowler----
        Secretary Roche. Oh, I'm sorry. The General Counsel,
    correct. He was on the overall panel.
        Senator Levin. That's what it says in the Fowler Report.
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir. General Hewitt.
        Senator Levin. And was it he who did the review in 1996?
        Secretary Roche. No, sir. He arrived in 2000. He arrived 2
    weeks before the answer was given back to the committee. It
    happened within the first 2 weeks of his tenure. In 1996, he
    was off flying airplanes.
        Chairman Warner. General Jumper.

    STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN P. JUMPER, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED
                            STATES AIR FORCE

        General Jumper. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the
    committee, thank you for the opportunity to address you all
    today. I also want to thank you for your continued support of
    our Air Force men and women, and for your concern about the
    cadets at our Air Force Academy.
        I'd like to also add my appreciation to that expressed by
    Secretary Roche to Ms. Fowler and the members of her committee
    for the report and its recommendations, and I add my full
    support to those recommendations.
        Mr. Chairman, I assumed my present position on the 6th of
    September 2001. In addition to the events of September 11, one
    of the initial topics of discussions between Secretary Roche
    and myself was about the Air Force Academy. He had been
    directly involved with my predecessor, General Mike Ryan, on a
    number of issues that he's outlined to the committee this
    morning, in doing due diligence on issues that were already
    underway, to include, I might say, a formal review of the honor
    code with General Mike Carns that what was reported out to us
    shortly after I arrived in my new position.
        He could have, at any time, turned to me and said,
    ``Jumper, the superintendent reports to you, you take all these
    things and go off and report back to me,'' but he knew the
    urgency of the day that was dictated by the events of September
    11, and we worked on these things together from the very
    beginning. As I said, Mr. Chairman, as the Air Force Chief of
    Staff, the Superintendent of the Air Force Academy does report
    directly to me. We worked these issues as a team, and I do feel
    the responsibility for what does happen at the United States
    Air Force Academy.
        Indeed, we're both engaged at many levels of the Academy
    issues. During my many trips to the Academy, I had occasion to
    talk to children of general officers who go to the Academy. My
    own daughter went out and participated in an ROTC program in
    the summer of 1996 at the Air Force Academy, spent the summer
    there. I attended many athletic events. I had the opportunity
    to be with many cadets on many levels, both formal and
    informal, with the alumni and with their parents. On no
    occasion during any of those times, during my initial tenure as
    the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, was any problem with
    regard to the abiding sexual climate there ever brought to my
    attention, although other problems were, of the type that
    Secretary Roche mentioned, and were acted upon.
        Then with the arrival of this e-mail on January 2, 2003, I
    can tell you--I was there--Dr. Roche reacted immediately to
    that e-mail with an immediate answer to the General Counsel to
    get underway with the appropriate committees and boards that
    conducted the subsequent investigations.
        Very quickly thereafter, I want to emphasize, there was a
    parallel effort to get the Air Force Inspector General underway
    on looking thoroughly at all of the techniques and the
    processes that went into the investigations that took place, to
    make sure that the leadership at the Academy reacted to those
    properly and that the processes and procedures were as they
    should have been, and we stepped out on that quickly.
        Our focus at the immediate time was to focus on, as the
    Secretary said, when the new cadets would arrive at the end of
    June and to get a letter out to their parents to outline
    quickly to them the steps that we thought were necessary to
    assure the safety of their people. Many of those steps had to
    do with the culture and the character of the Academy that we
    knew had to change, but we also knew that nothing was going to
    change unless the cadets themselves were a part of that change.
    Those are points that were pointed out in the report by Ms.
    Fowler.
        The subsequent Agenda for Change that was published by the
    Working Group focuses on a great deal of--pardon me?
        Secretary Roche. Published by us.
        General Jumper. That was published by us, exactly right,
    released by us.
        The words that have to do with character, integrity in the
    preamble of that document are largely words that came from my
    own pen and show the conviction that I personally have to the
    long-term culture and integrity of the organization.
        We also undertook, with the help of the Alumni Association,
    to begin work on a new Center for Character and Leadership
    Development that we will join with the Alumni Association to
    open as a place where formal research on this thing can be done
    and made available to all.
        We learn more about this situation every day, Mr. Chairman,
    as we continue to probe and reports continue to come in. So the
    Agenda for Change is, indeed, a living document that will
    continue to be updated as changes dictate. As we tend to find
    what elements of the agenda work and don't work the best,
    adjustments will be made.
        Mr. Chairman, I think that the Secretary and I have,
    indeed, been engaged, and engaged actively, in this problem,
    and we will continue to be engaged, understanding that this is
    a long-term problem. This is not one that we will address, as
    tended to have been done in the past, with a quick solution. We
    understand that the problem took years to develop, and the
    solution will take a long time for us to implement. But we are
    engaged in the long term. We intended, with the Agenda for
    Change, to institute changes that were, indeed, for the long
    term.
        But I reiterate that I am the one responsible. I am the one
    the superintendent reports to. I'm responsible not only for the
    Air Force Academy, but for the conduct of the entire Air Force,
    along with Secretary Roche, in their conduct in war, and, as we
    have seen, our Air Force operates throughout the world over an
    extended period of time.
        Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to be here
    today, sir, and look forward to your questions.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, General, and we expected no
    less from you to accept full accountability. Thank you.
        General Counsel.

     STATEMENT OF HON. MARY L. WALKER, GENERAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT
                            OF THE AIR FORCE

        Ms. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members
    of the committee. Thank you for giving me this opportunity to
    discuss my role and that of the Working Group convened by the
    Secretary of the Air Force to review the policies, programs,
    and practices to deter and respond to sexual assaults at the
    Air Force Academy. I should note, for the time-frame reference,
    that I assumed my duties November 12, 2001.
        My office and the Working Group that I chaired have worked
    diligently with Secretary Roche and General Jumper to review
    the Academy's policies and programs over the last 10 years and
    to capture the facts surrounding the sexual assaults at the
    Academy in response to cadet complaints Secretary Roche
    received in January of this year.
        My office interviewed the cadet who wrote the e-mail, and I
    personally met with her and another assault victim very early
    on. We were very concerned about the issues they raised. The
    Secretary was concerned as well, and thus, he demanded a
    focused, aggressive effort to determine the facts and to
    implement changes at the Academy.
        The Working Group's report was not a staff report that was
    handed to the Secretary and the Chief. I worked very closely
    with the Secretary and General Jumper throughout the Working
    Group's process, as did other members of the Working Group. I
    met regularly with Secretary Roche, and had an ongoing informal
    dialogue with him about the issues being raised. As soon as the
    first staff team was dispatched to the Academy, he was provided
    feedback as I received it, and he and the Chief received a
    draft of the preliminary findings before they were made
    formally available to them, on March 19, as well as other
    various drafts of the final report of the Working Group, for
    their comments.
        The Secretary and the Chief provided comments to us on the
    draft reports. The Working Group members also individually
    reviewed the draft report and made comments as well, and those
    comments were addressed in the final report.
        During the course of the Working Group's review, the
    Secretary raised questions and provided comments. He was very
    concerned we report the facts, let the facts speak for
    themselves, and that we not speculate. We were very careful to
    document with original source documents each fact in the
    report.
        During the course of the Working Group's report
    preparation, I asked that a historical section be included so
    that we could see how the policies and programs developed over
    time. This necessarily involved the Academy leadership and what
    they had done to address the issues over time. As this
    developed and we received more information, the staff team and
    I became concerned that if accountability of leadership was to
    be considered in this process, an inspector general was better
    suited than the Working Group to look at these matters. I was
    aware of the parallel efforts underway by the Air Force
    Inspector General and the Department of Defense Inspector
    General, looking at many of these issues.
        I took this issue to the Secretary, and he agreed,
    reminding me of our charter to look at policies and programs in
    light of the cadet complaints, not at leadership
    accountability. He stated that he and General Jumper would be
    looking at leadership's role after all the reviews and reports
    had been completed.
        It was the direct involvement by the Secretary and the
    Chief of Staff that enabled them to understand the depths of
    the challenge we faced, and also contributed to their ability
    to author the Agenda for Change. Our charter from Secretary
    Roche was to find the facts, no matter what the facts revealed.
    The Working Group did not engage in a protective mentality to
    shield Air Force leaders, past or present. That would have
    completely undermined our efforts to protect victims and to
    pursue the changes that were needed at the Academy.
        Much has been made of facts the Working Group did not have.
    I was not aware of the facts developed by the Fowler Panel
    regarding the prior headquarters' involvement in Academy sexual
    assault issues in the 1996/1997 time frame referred to at page
    5 of the Fowler Panel report. However, the Working Group was
    aware early on of the Office of Special Investigations (OSI)
    concern raised in late 1999 or early 2000, with the
    confidential reporting process at the Academy, and they were
    aware that the OSI commander viewed this as preventing OSI's
    receiving information on reports of assault sufficient for them
    to be investigated. I raised the same issue that had been
    raised in 2000, and that is when I learned of the prior
    question raised by OSI.
        As I understand it, this concern was raised, and various
    functions at headquarters discussed the issue. These were some
    of the same offices that were participating in the Working
    Group this year.
        The 2000 issue raised by OSI, was not that consideration
    was not being given to review of sexual assault issues and
    sexual harassment at the Academy, but, rather, it was an OSI
    complaint about the confidentiality reporting process. I am
    told the effort consisted of one, possibly two, meetings,
    acquisition of information, exchanges of views on the issue,
    and an exchange of e-mails, with long periods of inactivity;
    months where nothing happened.
        When it became apparent these discussions could not resolve
    the issue, Mr. Atlee, who is currently my deputy, recommended
    that the OSI commander and the Academy superintendent meet and
    attempt to resolve the issue directly. The OSI commander
    subsequently did meet with the superintendent and the
    commandant, and afterwards reported they had reached an
    agreement that resolved his concerns, and the confidential
    process of reporting remained in effect.
        The Working Group was aware of the issue raised by OSI in
    2000. That is, they were aware, in 2003, that it had been
    raised in 2000. This issue is documented in the Working Group's
    report at pages 17, 20, 141, and all of the footnotes cited in
    those paragraphs dealing with that issue.
        Had we been aware, however, of facts concerning the prior
    involvement of Air Force leadership in the sexual assault
    issues at the Academy in the 1996/1997 time frame, we would
    have included them in the report, as well. Based on what I now
    know about those issues, they only serve to underscore the
    Working Group's 43 findings; among them, findings that the
    Academy's programs, though well-intentioned, were not working,
    that there was a culture problem at the Academy, and that the
    confidential reporting process, though well-intentioned, had
    failed.
        The facts are the facts, and I would have included any
    relevant facts essential to our review. It is inconsistent with
    my intent to paint a complete picture to suggest I would have
    withheld relevant facts. Those were relevant facts. Had I been
    asked, I would have made this clear to the Fowler Panel.
        The Working Group provided Secretary Roche exactly what he
    asked for, a detailed report that delineated the nature and the
    scope of the problem at the Air Force Academy that the cadet
    victims complained of, with recommendations for change.
        In addition to the 43 findings, we made 36 recommendations
    for change and identified 12 areas for further study. One of
    the areas for further study was the need to examine the extent
    to which Air Force headquarters had been and should be involved
    in the oversight of sexual assault and sexual harassment issues
    at the Academy.
        I believe the report of the Working Group met its charter
    and provided invaluable information, which served as a
    foundation for the important changes that have been made for
    the good of the Academy and the cadets it prepares to become
    officers.
        The military and civilian members of the Air Force who gave
    up nights and weekends with their families for months to
    complete the Working Group's effort are dedicated people,
    military and civilian, who care deeply about these issues. To
    their credit, Lieutenant General Rosa, Brigadier General Weida,
    are now implementing and executing the changes they
    recommended. These changes, brought about by the Secretary and
    the Chief in response to the information they received, work
    toward a safe environment for our cadets and one in which
    future officers, both men and women, can thrive.
        I thank you for this opportunity to help clear up these
    facts, and I await your questions.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Walker and the Report of the
    Working Group Concerning the Deterrence of and Response to
    Incidents of Sexual Assault at the U.S. Air Force Academy
    follow:]

                   Prepared Statement by Hon. Mary L. Walker

        Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee. Thank you
    for giving me this opportunity to discuss my role and that of the
    Working Group convened by the Secretary of the Air Force to review the
    policies, programs, and practices to deter and respond to sexual
    assaults at the Air Force Academy.
        I assumed my duties as Air Force General Counsel on November 12,
    2001.
        My office, and the Working Group I chaired, have worked diligently
    with Secretary Roche and General Jumper to review the Academy's
    policies and programs over the last 10 years and to capture the facts
    surrounding the sexual assaults at the Academy in response to the cadet
    complaints Secretary Roche received in January 2003.
        My office interviewed the cadet who wrote the e-mail and I
    personally met with her and another assault victim. We were very
    concerned about the issues raised. The Secretary was as well and thus
    he demanded a focused, aggressive effort to determine the facts and to
    implement changes.
        The Working Group's report was not a ``staff report'' that was
    ``handed to'' the Secretary and the Chief. I worked very closely with
    Secretary Roche and General Jumper throughout the Working Group's
    process as did other members of the Working Group.
        I met regularly with Secretary Roche and had an ongoing informal
    dialog with him. As soon as the first staff team was dispatched to the
    Academy, he was provided feedback as I received it, and he and the
    Chief received a draft of the preliminary findings before they were
    formally provided to them on March 19, as well as various drafts of the
    final report of the Working Group for their comments.
        The Secretary and the Chief provided comments to us on the draft
    reports. The Working Group members also individually reviewed the draft
    report and made comments.
        During the course of the Working Group's review, the Secretary
    raised questions and provided comments. He was very concerned we report
    facts and let them speak for themselves and that we not speculate. We
    were careful to document with original source documents each fact in
    the report.
        During the course of the Working Group's report preparation, I
    asked that a historical section be included so that we could see how
    the policies and programs developed over time. This necessarily
    involved the Academy leadership and what they had done to address the
    issues over time.
        As this developed, and we received information, the staff team and
    I became concerned that if accountability of leadership was to be
    considered, an Inspector General was better suited than the Working
    Group to look into these matters. I was aware of the parallel efforts
    underway by the Air Force and DOD Inspectors General.
        I took this issue to the Secretary and he agreed, reminding me of
    our charter to look at policies and programs in light of the cadet
    complaints not leadership accountability. He stated that he and General
    Jumper would be looking at leadership's role after all the reviews were
    completed.
        It was the direct involvement by the Secretary and the Chief that
    enabled them to understand the depths of the challenge we faced and
    also contributed to their ability to author the Agenda for Change.
        Our charter from Secretary Roche was to find the facts--no matter
    what the facts revealed. The Working Group did not engage in a
    ``protective mentality'' to shield Air Force leaders (past or present).
    That would have completely undermined our efforts to protect victims
    and pursue the changes that were needed at the Academy.
        Much has been made of facts the Working Group did not have. I was
    not aware of the facts developed by the Fowler panel regarding the
    Headquarters' involvement in the Academy sexual assault issues in the
    1996-1997 timeframe, referred to at page 5 of the Fowler panel report.
        However, the Working Group was aware early on of the OSI concern
    raised in late 1999, early 2000 with the confidential reporting process
    at the Academy that the OSI commander viewed as preventing OSI's
    receiving information on reports of assaults sufficient for
    investigation. I raised the same issue and that is when I learned of
    the prior review.
        As I understand it, this concern was raised and various functions
    at Headquarters discussed the issue. These were some of the same
    offices that were on the Working Group in 2003.
        The 2000 issue consideration was not a review of sexual assault
    issues and sexual harassment at the Academy, but rather an OSI
    complaint about the confidentiality reporting process. I am told the
    effort consisted of one (possibly two) meetings, acquisition of
    information, exchanges of views on the issue, and an exchange of e-
    mails with long periods of inactivity. When it became apparent these
    discussions would not resolve the issue, Mr. Atlee recommended that the
    OSI commander and the Academy Superintendent meet and attempt to
    resolve the issue directly. The OSI commander subsequently met with the
    Superintendent and Commandant and afterwards reported they had reached
    an agreement that resolved his concerns.
        The Working Group was aware of the issue raised by OSI in 2000, and
    the issue is documented in the Working Group's report (at pages 17, 20,
    and 141, and footnotes at each page).
        Had we been aware of the facts concerning the prior involvement of
    Air Force leadership in the sexual assault issues at the Academy in the
    1996-1997 timeframe, we would have included them in the report.
        Based on what I now know about those issues, they only serve to
    underscore the Working Group's 43 findings--among them findings that
    the Academy's programs, though well intentioned, were not working, that
    there was a culture problem, and that the confidential reporting
    process had failed. The facts are the facts and I would have included
    any relevant facts essential to our review.
        It is inconsistent with my intent to paint a complete picture to
    suggest I would withhold relevant facts--and those would have been
    relevant facts. Had I been asked I would have made this clear to the
    Fowler panel.
        The Working Group provided Secretary Roche exactly what he asked us
    for--a detailed report that delineated the nature and scope of the
    problem at the Air Force Academy the cadet victims complained of with
    recommendations for change. In addition to the 43 findings, we made 36
    recommendations for change, and identified 12 areas for further study.
    One of the areas for further study identified was the need to examine
    the extent to which Air Force headquarters has been and should be
    involved in the oversight of sexual assault and sexual harassment
    issues.
        I believe the report of the Working Group met its charter and
    provided invaluable information that served as a foundation for the
    important changes that have been made for the good of the Academy and
    the cadets it prepares to become officers.
        The military and civilian members of the Air Force who gave up
    nights and weekends with their families for months to complete the
    Working Group report are dedicated people who cared deeply about the
    issues.
        To their credit, Lieutenant General Rosa and Brigadier General
    Weida are now implementing and executing the changes recommended. These
    changes work toward a safe environment for our cadets and one in which
    future officers--both men and women--can thrive.
        I thank you for this opportunity to address the committee and look
    forward to answering your questions.
                                     (start)
                                     ______

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        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
        We'll now proceed to a round of 6 minutes initially, and
    may go to a second round.
        To the distinguished General Counsel, the question of what
    directions did you receive from the Secretary as to the scope
    of your investigation initially, and did you, in the process of
    your work, confer with him and receive additions, revisions to
    the initial guidance? Are there documents? Would you provide
    those documents to this committee?
        Ms. Walker. Yes, sir. There is a written charter.
    Initially, the Secretary asked me to form a group to address
    these issues and fix the problem. I believe the initial
    guidance was verbal. It was very consistent with the written
    guidance that followed it, a month or so later. We do have
    that, and we can provide it.
        It is also reflected in the report, and it has been
    consistent, that we were to look at the policies, programs, and
    practices at the Academy concerning its program to deter and
    respond to sexual assaults, in light of the cadet complaints,
    and we were to make findings and recommendations for change.
        The cadet complaints, the interviews that we had and the e-
    mail that came in, specifically dealt with the way they had
    been treated once they reported an assault.
        Chairman Warner. In my short period for questions, I'm
    trying to get this procedure. You got verbal, then written
    guidance. In the course of your work, did questions arise, in
    your mind, which you addressed either to the Secretary or Under
    Secretary, or anyone else in the Air Force secretariat, for
    further guidance?
        Ms. Walker. Whenever questions came up, I went directly to
    the Secretary. That would have been probably on a weekly basis.
    The one I described in my testimony was fairly significant,
    because it would determine the nature of the report. In other
    words, there were issues concerning Academy leadership's role
    over the 10-year period, and I told him that we were
    uncomfortable dealing with accountability in that group. We
    felt it was an IG's role.
        Chairman Warner. Let me go back to the procedures. So
    throughout the process, you were in a consultative process with
    the Secretary. Under Secretary?
        Ms. Walker. No. The Secretary----
        Chairman Warner. Just the Secretary?
        Ms. Walker.--and the Chief. It was never the Under
    Secretary.
        Chairman Warner. When you finished your initial work, did
    you prepare a draft report and submit it to the Secretary and
    the Chief? Did they make changes to your final report?
        Ms. Walker. There were two stages, sir. There was the
    interim report, March 19, that was essentially a memorandum.
    They received a draft, which they gave me comments on. There
    was also a final. Basically it was the same as the draft, but
    with some questions possibly answered.
        Then, for the final report, in June, there were several
    drafts--at least two, maybe three--provided to them. We
    received comments and questions. But during the entire process,
    before the report was reduced to writing, there were also
    consultations and information being provided to them.
        Chairman Warner. Did you, at any time, consider that while
    it may not have been part of the original instruction from the
    Secretary, that your responsibility would embrace, frankly,
    reviewing the Secretary's actions during the period that he was
    in office prior to his knowledge of this situation?
        Ms. Walker. This Secretary?
        Chairman Warner. This Secretary was in office some 20
    months before these matters came to light. I presume that we
    can work on an assumption that the problems at the Academy
    persisted in that period of time. Now, if the facts are
    different, then I think the committee should know about it. I
    don't believe there's a clear demarcation in this culture and
    its problems with the appointments of Secretary Roche and
    General Jumper. In all probability, these problems continued,
    because both Secretary Roche and General Jumper repeatedly have
    said they had so much contact with other problems and people at
    the Academy and the problems never came to their attention. So
    I assume, from that, that it was ongoing and that your
    investigation now indicates it was ongoing.
        So my question is, did you ever feel, as the General
    Counsel, that you should take it upon yourself to examine their
    actions or inactions as being consistent with addressing this
    problem?
        Ms. Walker. First of all, our charter was directly to look
    at the Academy and not look at issues of leadership
    accountability. I have stated that. But even when I brought
    leadership accountability to the Secretary, it didn't occur to
    me, no, to investigate the very leaders who were dealing with
    the problem.
        Chairman Warner. I don't understand your language here,
    ``It didn't occur to me, no.'' Please rephrase that. Maybe I
    missed it.
        Ms. Walker. You asked me if it occurred to me to look at
    the current leadership, Secretary Roche and General Jumper. The
    answer is no, because they were dealing with the problem that
    had been brought to them.
        Chairman Warner. So you did not, on your own initiative,
    say, ``I think I'd better look into everybody's actions.''
        Ms. Walker. The only thing I will tell you, sir, is that,
    at the end of the report, we recognized that we had not dealt
    with the issue of leadership, in terms of what their role has
    been in the past and what it should be. That is why the area
    recommended for further study is that issue. We simply did not
    have time, nor was it in our charter, to get to that issue.
        So we brought the issue up, but, no, we did not attempt to
    include current leadership, and we had been directed
    specifically not to include accountability issues in the review
    of the Academy.
        Chairman Warner. Mr. Secretary, both you and the Chief have
    testified to being physically present at the Academy, and
    dealing with a number of the individuals. You dealt with a
    series of problems, understandably swiftly and firmly, but this
    one never came to your attention. In any way are you suggesting
    that this problem didn't persist into the period in which each
    of you have been in office?
        Secretary Roche. Mr. Chairman, I'm not sure, but my sense
    is there was no point, when I was confirmed, that all of a
    sudden things stopped. There were both new events, but there
    was also the adjudication of prior events, and I think they
    continued along the way. There were some cases, like the Los
    Angeles case and the case of the assault on the 13-year-old
    young woman, which we observed were handled by the Academy, and
    there were court-martials. That there was a major problem
    associated with female cadets and sexual assault did not come
    to our attention, and it is one of the things that bothered me.
        Chairman Warner. Does that indicate to you, based on your
    extensive experience--and you, Chief--that this culture was
    very skillful in its covering up of these incidents? I mean,
    the fact that you all had so much contact with the Academy and
    the people there, and no one ever came to you. I accept your
    good faith representations. But it was ongoing, and it had been
    there, and it was there, and yet you state this morning, ``It
    will not happen tonight.''
        Secretary Roche. No.
        Chairman Warner. Then that culture has been stopped
    somehow.
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir. There's two points I would make,
    Senator. One is that a lot of this was kept very much in a
    small group of people's hands, so that when, in fact, we did
    act, we----
        Chairman Warner. Is that cadets, and cadets and staff, and
    supervisors and the like?
        Secretary Roche. All of the above, sir. Because a number of
    the women cadets were very upset when we, in fact, started to
    take action. They felt that they didn't realize that it was
    that big a problem, that we were overreacting. In fact, I spent
    2 hours, well after midnight, with some cadets who were really
    quite upset that this all was coming out. It became clear that
    there was not a widespread understanding that this was a
    widespread problem.
        So the culture of holding it close had to do with, among
    other things, the privacy rules and the Academy officials
    trying to adhere to those. It had to do with what they sent up
    the chain of command and what they did not send up the chain of
    command.
        Chairman Warner. My time is running out. But you've pierced
    that now, and you're able to assure this committee and, indeed,
    Congress, this is over.
        Secretary Roche. Oh, yes, sir. I can do that, because we
    now have climate surveys and everything else, and they are made
    very transparent.
        Chairman Warner. General, you said that you hold yourself
    accountable. Yet on March 26, 2003, it's my understanding that
    you were working on this problem, and the General Counsel and
    others were looking at it, and yet you joined the Secretary, as
    I understand it, in a press release, which, in effect, said,
    ``As the problems regarding the sexual assault allegations
    predate the current leadership, we do not hold Generals
    Dallager and Gilbert responsible.'' I find that difficult to
    comprehend. It was an ongoing investigation, yet the two of you
    decided that these two seniors were not responsible.
        General Jumper. Sir, I think that if that sentence had
    continued, it would have been ``for the whole 10 years worth of
    issues that we discovered.'' I went on to say that the IG
    investigation that the Secretary had put in place was put into
    place over a long term so that each of the cases could be
    thoroughly studied to make sure that the leadership did react
    properly to each of those cases.
        Chairman Warner. Then you bring to the committee's
    attention such other documentation as what we have before us,
    which is this press release----
        General Jumper. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner.--because that's not in here. I find this a
    very difficult thing to understand in a very clear and precise
    rendering of a decision at the time this thing is just in its
    formative stages and investigations are going on.
        Mr. Secretary, do you wish to address this?
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir. I tried, and I didn't do it very
    articulately, in March. Let me subscribe to Congresswoman
    Fowler's point, which summarizes it, ``We believe you cannot
    hold someone accountable for that which they inherit, but you
    can certainly hold them accountable for how they've dealt with
    that which they inherited.'' That was the point I was trying to
    make at the press conference when I said that we could not hold
    the officers accountable for the climate. General Jumper--let
    me finish his other sentence--has said, ``But if, as we go
    forward, there are things for which people should be held
    accountable, we will,'' and we have, and we're prepared to go
    forward.
        The Working Group's report, by being a history and putting
    all the facts down, gives a lot of illumination as to problems
    of leadership at the Academy. It was the basis for our deciding
    to change out all four of the leaders, the preliminary report
    was. It was the basis for much of the Agenda for Change, which
    was written either by General Jumper or myself. It was also a
    good, solid basis for me to recommend to the Secretary of
    Defense that we not retire the existing superintendent at a
    three-star level, but, rather, at a two-star level.
        General Jumper. There's more to come. As the IG report
    comes in, we believe, in December, there will be more
    information for us that will talk to us about accountability
    and then allow us to initiate due process on those that we find
    wanting in their responsibilities.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        In April, General Barnidge, the Air Force Chief of
    Legislative Liaison, informed my staff that you, Secretary
    Roche, had directed the Air Force General Counsel to go back
    and determine what information was available to the Commandant
    or Superintendent at the Academy that should have raised their
    awareness of climate problems and whether they reacted
    appropriately to that information, and, second, whether any
    member of the Academy leadership established any barriers that
    prevented victims from reporting misconduct. Now, that was to
    apply to both the current and past individuals who held those
    positions at the Academy. That's what General Barnidge told us.
        So, Secretary Roche, first, did you, in fact, give that
    guidance to Ms. Walker?
        Secretary Roche. Senator, the night of our hearing, where
    it was very clear that we were not communicating as we would
    have liked to, both you and the Chairman tried to help us. We
    listened. We went back to my office that night, and we said we
    wanted to formulate two questions that we would be using to
    judge people on how they dealt with that which they inherited.
    The first question was, ``Did any officer put an additional
    barrier in the way of any woman making a report?'' The second
    question we would ask would be, ``Was there evidence to suggest
    that a commander had enough information so as to recognize that
    he or she had to dig a lot more, do a lot more, because while
    it may not have been crystal clear that there was a problem,
    there were enough indicators that we would expect a commander
    to, in fact, investigate more deeply?''
        We did not give that direction to Ms. Walker. What we asked
    Ms. Walker to do was to continue to provide facts--facts on
    both sides, facts about what happened, who did what, when did
    they do it--but that we would use those questions to pass
    judgment on the officers with respect to their satisfying their
    command responsibilities.
        Senator Levin. Who were you asking the questions to?
        Secretary Roche. We would ask the questions of each of the
    officers involved there.
        Senator Levin. You asked Ms. Walker to ask those two
    questions of all the officers?
        Secretary Roche. No, sir.
        Senator Levin. Who did you ask?
        Secretary Roche. They are questions we would ask of a
    situation.
        Senator Levin. You don't ask questions of a situation. You
    ask questions of a----
        Secretary Roche. Ask of ourselves. In fact, we applied it
    to the Superintendent. We would ask ourselves, with the
    information we had available to us, could we form a judgment
    that the officer involved, in one case, had enough indications
    that there was a significant problem, that that officer should
    have acted or should have called for help or should have done
    something else, as we would any commander in any one of our
    command positions.
        Senator Levin. So that the statement, then, of the Air
    Force Legislative Liaison Chief to my staff that you directed
    Ms. Walker to ask those questions was wrong.
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir.
        Senator Levin. Okay. Since that was obviously the point of
    our colloquy with you, why not ask Ms. Walker, as part of her
    Working Group, to make an inquiry on those issues? Why are you
    just asking yourself, instead of asking your General Counsel to
    reach her own conclusion and ask those questions?
        Secretary Roche. The General Counsel knew we would be
    asking those questions.
        Senator Levin. How would she know?
        Secretary Roche. Because I told her. We were very open,
    these are the questions that we would use to judge, and that if
    there was any information that could illuminate those questions
    for any of the officers there, that they should be included in
    the Working Group report.
        Senator Levin. But that she should not make an inquiry into
    the responsibility of the leadership herself. That should not
    be included in her Working Group's investigation.
        Secretary Roche. What we wanted was a dispassionate, not
    argumentative, report that we could then follow up with.
        Senator Levin. I know that, but my question----
        Secretary Roche. Because we had a parallel----
        Senator Levin.--my question is----
        Secretary Roche.--we had a parallel process, Senator, that
    was going on----
        Senator Levin. You told your General Counsel, then, to ask
    officers you talked to questions which could allow you to reach
    a conclusion about those questions, but you did not ask her and
    her Working Group to give you a report on those questions
    relative to the leadership at the Academy.
        Secretary Roche. We did not ask her to ask those questions
    of anyone. We said those are the questions that we would be
    asking of the facts as they were assembled, and we would also
    be including results----
        Senator Levin. Then they weren't asked----
        Secretary Roche.--from the----
        Senator Levin.--to assemble facts which could help you
    answer those questions. In other words, since we had this
    colloquy going back and forth, why not ask the Working Group,
    ``Hey, leadership has a responsibility here, and if they
    inherited something, they've got a responsibility to change the
    climate, not just accept it.''
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir.
        Senator Levin. ``We want you to include how did they deal
    with what they inherited in your investigation.'' Instead of
    doing that, you did what you just described, assuming I can
    understand it. Why didn't you ask that?
        Secretary Roche. Effectively, the General Counsel and the
    Working Group were describing events that occurred, and they
    were illuminating those questions across the board.
        Senator Levin. Ms. Walker, yesterday's edition of the
    Colorado Springs Gazette reported that a staff member who
    worked closely with you said that you removed proposed findings
    from your Working Group report that addressed senior official
    involvement in a 2000/2001 review by Air Force headquarters
    sexual assault Working Group into procedures for responding
    into allegations of sexual assault of the Air Force. Do you
    know what I'm referring to?
        Ms. Walker. I know what you're referring to, sir, yes.
        Senator Levin. Are you aware of any draft comments prepared
    for your Working Group report that addressed the efforts of
    this earlier sexual assault Working Group?
        Ms. Walker. I'm sorry, I may not have understood your
    question----
        Senator Levin. Let me repeat it.
        Ms. Walker. Thank you.
        Senator Levin. Even though I'm out of time. I think I've
    probably----
        Chairman Warner. You're allowed to repeat it. Go ahead.
        Senator Levin. Are you aware of any draft comments prepared
    for your Working Group report that addressed the efforts of
    that earlier sexual assault Working Group?
        Ms. Walker. Which earlier sexual assault Working Group?
        Senator Levin. The one that was involved in a review in
    2000 and 2001 by the Air Force headquarters sexual assault
    Working Group? Are you aware of that?
        Ms. Walker. Yes, let me speak to the issue. In my opening
    statement I mentioned that the 2000 inquiry, based on the OSI
    concern about the confidential reporting process that precluded
    them from getting information sufficient to investigate
    assaults, was known to the Working Group and it was documented
    in the report in three different places and footnotes. So I am
    very well aware of that. It was in the report. Now, whether
    there were portions that could have been, at one time, in and
    were out, I don't know.
        This report went through incredible edits. At one point,
    the Secretary said it was too long and we should be more
    succinct. He wanted us to be clear. So we attempted to make it
    shorter. Of course, we got more information, which made it
    longer. So ultimately, I don't think I was able to reduce it
    much.
        But I'm not aware of any findings, to speak to that
    article, that were omitted; I just don't remember any findings
    being omitted. Lots of text was in and out from time to time
    because it was verbose. Being written by a committee, it looked
    like a camel at one point.
        Senator Levin. Things written by this committee are an
    exception to the camel rule, by the way. [Laughter.]
        Chairman Warner. Thank you.
        Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. I'd just follow up on Senator Levin's
    statement. Here's the news report that he just referred to:
    ``Speaking on condition of anonymity, a staff member who worked
    closely with Walker said investigators were told to look into
    the 2000 inquiry and high-level officials' involvement in it.
    They then wrote their findings, only to have Walker remove them
    from the June report.'' Did you or did you not remove those
    findings of the people that were directed to look into the 2000
    inquiry and high-level officers' involvement in it from the
    report? Yes or no?
        Ms. Walker. Senator, to my knowledge the answer would be
    no. We have that in the report itself. Now, it could have been
    edited down. Lots of things were edited down.
        Senator McCain. No, I'm asking whether you had them
    removed. That's the allegation.
        Ms. Walker. I don't remember.
        Senator McCain. You don't remember.
        Ms. Walker. I had lots of things edited down.
        Senator McCain. There's a lot of ``don't remembers'' around
    here. Do you still stand by your statement that the finding
    that there was no systemic--I'm trying to find the language--do
    you still stand by that in your report, that there's no
    systemic----
        Ms. Walker. The conclusion again: there were 43 findings.
    What you're speaking to is the conclusion----
        Senator McCain.--there was no systemic acceptance or
    ``institutional avoidance of responsibility.'' Do you stand by
    those words?
        Ms. Walker. Based on the information on the Academy that
    the Working Group had, this was the conclusion derived by the
    staff team based on the evidence they had. If we had the
    evidence today that is additional to that which we had----
        Senator McCain. Do you stand by those----
        Ms. Walker.--we might have changed the conclusion.
        Senator McCain. It might have changed your conclusion?
        Ms. Walker. Yes, it might have changed the conclusion.
    Because we did not have----
        Senator McCain. Might have changed your conclusions------
        Ms. Walker. Might have changed the conclusions----
        Senator McCain.--that there was no systemic----
        Ms. Walker.--not the findings.
        Senator McCain.--acceptance or institutional avoidance of
    responsibility.
        Ms. Walker. Yes.
        Senator McCain. Wow.
        Mr. Chairman, because we're in the ``the dog ate my
    homework'' and ``it didn't happen on my watch'' defense here,
    I'd like for all members to be able to see the statement of Ms.
    Kira Mountjoy-Pepka, who was raped in March 2002, describing
    not only the rape, but the subsequent treatment that she
    received at the Air Force Academy. It's a remarkable statement.
    I had a meeting with her, at her request, in my office. It's
    really a very sad story happening on Secretary Roche's and
    General Jumper's watch.
        Chairman Warner. It will be included in the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Senator McCain. Just so we can make sure that the record is
    clear, I'd like to completely read, just for a minute, the
    press conference that Secretary Roche and General Jumper held
    on March 26, 2003. Mickey Anderson with the L.A. Times said,
    ``Have you in any way reprimanded or disciplined all leaders
    who are responsible; what do you say to the critics who say
    you're going too easy on these people? You just said a second
    ago that these people may have been responsible for.''
    Secretary Roche replied, ``The current group cannot be held
    responsible for everything that occurred in that 10-year period
    and certainly over a period longer than 10 years. If you're
    going to hold someone accountable for something, they had to
    have full authority to deal with it. To hold these two or three
    people accountable is an easy thing, instead of getting at the
    larger problem. They're leaving their jobs. They are
    professionals who were hurt badly because they clearly feel
    themselves that they should have been clairvoyant in seeing
    things that they have not been able to see.'' Clairvoyant. ``To
    hold someone accountable means there are two sides to a story,
    and they have a side, as well. We've looked at it. We know--
    look, under the circumstances, they might have been more
    clairvoyant, they may have been sharper, there may have been a
    survey they should have acted on. But to hold them accountable,
    per se, with what we know now, no. But if the IG finds specific
    evidence that an officer should have done something, not to do
    it, yes.'' Then Mickey Anderson said, ``You're continuing to
    leave some of these people in leadership capacities. Their new
    jobs involve leadership. So I presume you trust them.''
    Secretary Roche replied, ``First of all, there's no reason not
    to trust them. One is retiring, one is coming to be a special
    assistant here, I'm not sure. I believe one got a meritorious
    service medal. But one of the four, nobody's accused him of
    anything. As a matter of fact, he's well liked. But, again,
    you're trying to get back to a couple of people, saying they're
    the whole problem. They're not the problem. Let's remember,
    cadets commit assaults against cadets.'' That's the statement
    made by Secretary Roche at that remarkable press conference.
        Secretary Roche, it's been reported, on March 31, the very
    afternoon you were cautioned by this committee for failing to
    pursue accountability for sex abuse at the Academy, you granted
    a discharge in lieu of a court martial for a first lieutenant
    Air Force Academy graduate for sexual assault on an airman
    first class. You reportedly chose to do this despite the
    recommendation of several general officers in the chain of
    command for court martials. Do you have anything to say about
    that?
        Secretary Roche. Yes, Senator, I do. That was a case that--
    there were people on both sides of the issue--there were many
    of them--there were also general officers on the other side of
    the issue, as well. There is a group called the Air Force
    Personnel Council, which is a dispassionate group of officers
    and civilians, who look at each of these cases and try to make
    sure that we're consistent over a period of time. That group
    has proven to be very useful in case after case, and they made
    a recommendation, with which I agreed. By the way, it was the
    same recommendation that General Jumper agreed to. There were
    general officers on both sides of the issue, Senator.
        Senator McCain. Ms. Walker, in the Fowler Commission
    Report, I want to repeat, ``In June 2003, after completing her
    investigation of sexual assaults at the Academy, Air Force
    General Counsel Mary L. Walker released the report of the
    reporting group. The reporting group covers many aspects of
    cadet life, `it avoids any reference to the responsibility of
    Air Force headquarters for the failure of leadership which
    occurred at the Academy'.'' Then they go on to say, ``The panel
    believes that the Air Force General Counsel attempted to shield
    Air Force headquarters from public criticism by focusing
    exclusively on events at the Academy.'' That's a pretty serious
    charge from a very credible panel. I think you ought to have
    the opportunity to respond to it.
        Ms. Walker. It's absolutely false, and it's based on no
    evidence whatsoever that I'm aware of, and I was shocked when I
    heard it.
        Senator McCain. I was shocked, too.
        Mr. Chairman, could I just mention one thing? At another
    hearing, I asked, ``Why do we need an FAA-certified airplane?''
    Secretary Roche, ``A tanker has to be an FAA-certified
    airplane, sir, because it goes to lots of places in the
    world.'' I have a letter from the FAA, that said they don't
    need to be FAA certified.
        Secretary Roche. Senator, I was wrong. I mean Global Air
    Traffic Management (GATM) and not FAA certification.
        Senator McCain. I'm sorry that you don't know those simple
    facts, as Secretary of the Air Force, as to whether a tanker
    needs an FAA certification, particularly when you're using it
    as a justification for the increased outrageous cost of the
    tanker.
        Secretary Roche. Senator, you recall, at your hearing, I
    said that I would get back to you for the record, that I did
    question myself on that. And, in fact sir, the history----
        Senator McCain. Again, I have to read from the record:
    Chairman, ``Why do we need an FAA-certified airplane?''
    Secretary Roche, ``A tanker has to be certified--FAA-certified
    airplane, sir, because it goes to lots of airfields around the
    world in many countries, it flies around the United States, the
    same way we can't fly certain drones over parts of the United
    States, because they're not appropriate.''
        Secretary Roche. I was wrong, sir.
        Senator McCain. End of statement.
        Secretary Roche. I was wrong.
        Senator McCain. You didn't say you would get back to me.
        Secretary Roche. Senator, you recall at the time, you said,
    ``Hey, I've flown planes that were not FAA certified lots of
    places.'' I then said, ``I'd like to get back to you.'' In
    fact, I had in mind--what occurs is that we use FAA updates for
    the airplanes. That's why we get them certified by the FAA,
    because they become the research group that tells us when
    there's safety-of-flight issues that have to be updated.
        Senator McCain. This is a small thing, but that's not true
    either. We do not regulate the operation of those aircraft,
    except for airspace limits, and we have not issued a
    certificate to the existing fleet of KC-135 tankers. That's not
    correct, either.
        Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions.
        Chairman Warner. Did you, General Jumper, desire to respond
    to any of the comments made by our distinguished colleague?
        General Jumper. No, Senator. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Warner. Secretary Roche, anything further?
        Secretary Roche. No, sir, other than to say I was wrong
    about the FAA certification.
        Chairman Warner. Then let's close out on that issue.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
    witnesses here today. This subject is not only important to the
    Air Force, it's important to all the Services, and I think that
    should be put on the record.
        General Jumper, you, I presume, personally selected General
    Gilbert to be the commandant.
        General Jumper. No, sir, I didn't. That was my predecessor.
        Senator Reed. So you had no involvement in his selection?
        General Jumper. No, sir, I did not.
        Senator Reed. Now, you became Chief of Staff in September
    of 2001?
        General Jumper. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. He became the commandant in 2002, but he had
    been pre-selected by----
        General Jumper. No, sir, he was the commandant during 2001.
    General Ryan selected him. I met him after he became
    commandant. He was commandant certainly by October or November
    of 2001, because I met him in Washington for the first time.
        Senator Reed. I have the report here and it might be a
    mistake in the report, but it has a list of the Academy
    commandants, and General Gilbert is August 2002, it says is his
    date, to 2003. General Jumper is September 2001 to the present.
        General Jumper. 2001.
        Senator Reed. That is a mistake, then?
        General Jumper. Yes, sir, I believe that's a mistake.
        Senator Reed. Then that report should be corrected.
        In your contact with General Gilbert, I presume he must
    have come in for some type of briefing or interview shortly
    after you took over. Is that correct?
        General Jumper. Sir, actually, I think my first contact
    with him was when I visited out there shortly after, but, yes,
    we did have a discussion.
        Senator Reed. He raised none of these issues about climate,
    about anything?
        General Jumper. Actually, sir, early on, when I first met
    him, he had been involved in some of the general-officer
    preparation courses that we have, and he had been also, I
    believe, operated on for a knee problem. In our first
    engagement, he really had not had a chance to become thoroughly
    involved in the situation.
        I did have a conversation early on with General Ryan, my
    predecessor, who told me that when he selected General Gilbert,
    it was to go out there and to deal with an emerging drug
    problem and discipline problems with regard to the neatness in
    the dormitories and the like. That was the charter to Gilbert
    early on.
        Senator Reed. So based on your comments today and your
    response to my question, is that no one----
        General Jumper. No one knew.
        Senator Reed. No one alerted you to the issue of this
    pervasive sexual misconduct.
        General Jumper. That's correct, sir.
        Senator Reed. Secretary Roche, your position is the same,
    that no one----
        Secretary Roche. Senator, for my track record, for better
    or for worse, I act very quickly. General Jumper is the same.
    If someone had told us that there was a pervasive problem--I
    can assure you if we jumped on recruited athletes and we jumped
    on curriculum changes and we worried about drugs and--in fact,
    the one case of the 13-year-old, we found the Academy was
    handling it so badly, we took the case away from them, the
    relationship with the parents, and had it done by our General
    Counsel, immediately, as soon as we found out about it. In
    fact, as soon as Senator Allard let me know about it and I did
    my homework, we sent a group out there to deal with it. We
    would have jumped on that, for a number of reasons. One, I live
    in Annapolis. I have watched what has happened to the Naval
    Academy. I would be very hypersensitive to this issue had it
    come up. When asked, we were told this is a model program, it's
    being used as a benchmark by the other academies.
        Senator Reed. Are you gentlemen familiar with General
    Wagie, who was the dean. Are you familiar with him, General
    Jumper?
        General Jumper. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. Over an extended period of time?
        General Jumper. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. It appears, in the Fowler Report, that he was
    the key staff person who ran these programs, who collected the
    data. Apparently, in your contact with him, he never made any
    revelation of this situation, although for, I think, upwards of
    16 years, he was seeing mounting evidence of this?
        General Jumper. Over a period of time, sir, he was in
    charge of gathering the surveys, the surveys that, I might add,
    never got to the attention of the leadership of the Air Force.
    For various reasons, the surveys were discounted, and those are
    a matter of record. We are in the process right now of
    replacing him and looking for his replacement. There was some
    concern that the way that his replacement had to be selected
    was from the existing tenured professors at the Air Force
    Academy. The Secretary was not happy with that, and neither was
    I, and we didn't want to undertake a search under those
    constraints. So that was the reason for the delay in taking any
    action with regard to the dean.
        Secretary Roche. May I, Senator?
        Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, please.
        Secretary Roche. General Wagie is the academic dean. As the
    academic dean, he did not have any disciplinary authority, but
    he certainly had all of these people reporting to him, and he
    was a repository of knowledge. It is clear the superintendent
    let down his colleagues. We are now forming the search
    committee. We're going to ask that one of the other academies,
    if possible, provide someone to that search committee. We have
    to work only with permanent professors until the law is
    changed. The committee has been very good in trying to see if
    they can move that law.
        One of the concerns about just pulling him out would be not
    having an academic dean and concerns as to how the issue of
    accreditation would be handled by the Western States, who do
    the accreditation of the university.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary and General Jumper, none of
    these issues are easy, obviously, but it seems to me that this
    is contrary to your previous assertion, Mr. Secretary, that you
    haven't taken dramatic action, that, as I read the Fowler
    Report, the one person at the Academy that for 16 years
    discounted these issues, these surveys--I can't think of anyone
    at that level who would claim that they're just invalid surveys
    and not go out and fix the surveys.
        Secretary Roche. I agree.
        Senator Reed. Yet he remains on post, on duty, because
    you're worried about accreditation. Again, I think part of--
    this is not the key point--but part of the difficulty we have
    is that the urgency comes, but it comes after--too many days
    have passed.
        But I don't think we'll get to the bottom of this here,
    because this is not exactly a forum that's going to discover
    precisely what was done and when it was done. This is also an
    opportunity to raise questions, but I don't think it'll provide
    any definitive answers.
        I will conclude where I began. The esteem of the Academy,
    the Air Force Academy, is something that's critical to all
    Americans and to every service member, and it's been severely
    challenged by these incidents.
        Thank you, gentlemen and Ms. Walker.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Allard, you're next, but if you'd
    allow me just to make an observation.
        Yesterday, I was visited, General Jumper, by some venerable
    Virginia Military Institute (VMI) graduates, of many years
    past, and I was reminded of the enormous pride of the State of
    Virginia, in having VMI in our State. I know, Senator Allard,
    how the people of Colorado have an enormous pride in the Air
    Force Academy, being a part of your State. I hope they
    appreciate the efforts that you have made from the very
    beginning in this case to try and ascertain what the problem
    was and how best you and others can rectify it. The people of
    Colorado would want you to do that, and I thank you for the
    service that you've rendered thus far.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You're right, the
    people of Colorado take tremendous pride in the Air Force
    Academy. If you visit Colorado, one of the things that you
    visit is the Air Force Academy, in addition to the mountains
    and everything else. So we do take good pride, and we're
    obviously interested in making sure that this is an institution
    of high quality. Like a lot of Members in this institution, the
    U.S. Senate, I help select individuals who attend that Academy.
    Like all of you, we want to make sure that once we've made
    those recommendations, that they get a good-quality education
    and a type of education that will allow them to serve the
    country with distinction.
        Chairman Warner. I wish I could take credit for selecting
    General Jumper to go to VMI, but I didn't. [Laughter.]
        You're a distinguished graduate of that institution.
        General Jumper. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Warner. You hold it dear to your heart.
        General Jumper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Allard. I just have a couple of brief questions
    about the current leadership, and then I'll get into some other
    questions in more detail. I was glad to hear, Mr. Secretary,
    that you'd just been out to the Air Force Academy. General
    Rosa's been at the Academy now for 3 short months. How would
    you assess his performance so far? Quickly, if you would,
    please.
        Secretary Roche. He was spectacular. We spent a long time
    interviewing candidates. I think you know each of the
    candidates has been hand-selected by General Jumper and myself.
    Both he and General Weida had prior experience in an academic
    institution. They are both doing spectacularly well. Our
    concern is that they not flag.
        Senator Allard. Thank you. Okay, now, General Weida, you
    think his performance has been as admirable?
        Secretary Roche. Absolutely.
        Senator Allard. Okay.
        Ms. Walker, you testified before the Fowler Commission, on
    June 23, 2003, on Air Force's Working Group's report. During
    that opening hearing, you stated that, ``I felt like the
    issue''--and you were referring to sexual assaults--
    ``personally was overblown and inaccurately portrayed.'' Is
    this still your belief?
        Ms. Walker. That was a specific question directed to me
    regarding the press articles on the issues. They asked me if I
    believed the issues had been fairly portrayed in the press.
    Remember, this was in June, before the press had--basically,
    just received our report, and the early press reports were
    really ones that involved a lot of speculation. I said, at the
    time, I did not believe those articles had fairly portrayed the
    issues. I was hoping that, in light of the report and the full
    analysis, they would now have the full----
        Senator Allard. Let me ask you this question, then.
        Ms. Walker. Yes.
        Senator Allard. Do you feel, now, that the issue of sexual
    assaults has been overblown and inaccurately portrayed?
        Ms. Walker. The way you phrase it, sir, the answer would be
    no. I don't believe the issue of sexual assault at the Academy
    has been overblown.
        Senator Allard. I'm just trying----
        Ms. Walker. I believe some of the articles have not fairly
    set forth all of the parameters of the issues.
        Senator Allard. But, I mean, we've had two surveys. You
    have the one that was done by the Department of Defense
    Inspector General, and said that there was definitely a problem
    there----indicates there's a problem.
        Ms. Walker. Oh, absolutely. Right. We had one.
        Senator Allard. You just now have another report coming out
    that was just put out by the Air Force, says there's a problem.
        Ms. Walker. There's no question----
        Senator Allard. My question, again, is, do you feel like
    the issue of sexual assaults has been overblown or inaccurately
    portrayed?
        Ms. Walker. Okay. The answer to that would be no, it has
    not been overblown. But you were asking me about a question to
    which I directed my answer----
        Senator Allard. Initially, I asked you a direct quote. You
    qualified it.
        Ms. Walker. Right.
        Senator Allard. I came back with a direct question.
        Ms. Walker. Yes.
        Senator Allard. So I really wanted to know what your
    attitude was today.
        Ms. Walker. No, absolutely not.
        Senator Allard. That was the purpose of my question.
        Ms. Walker. We have a very big problem, and it isn't one
    that's solved with just one report or one study. It will take
    time and energy of all the leaders to make a real change in the
    institution that is necessary.
        Senator Allard. According to the Air Force's Working Group
    report, a number of cadets--and this is for you, Ms. Walker--
    who were suspected of committing a sexual assault graduated
    from the Academy over the last 10 years. Do you have any idea
    how many of those cadets went on to serve in the Air Force?
        Ms. Walker. These are just suspects. They are not those who
    were convicted or found to be----
        Senator Allard. Suspected of committing a sexual assault,
    that's correct.
        Ms. Walker. Right. I don't have that percentage, sir, but
    we could do that.
        Senator Allard. Actually, I'm not looking for percentages.
    I'm just looking for an actual number.
        Ms. Walker. Right. I don't have that at my command, but we
    could provide that to you, because we would know all of the
    disposition on the cases where there was a subject and there
    was an investigation. Absolutely.
        Senator Allard. Sure. I think that would help us. We'd like
    to have that as part of the committee record.
        Ms. Walker. Okay, we'll be happy to provide that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Eighteen cadets who were alleged to have committed sexual assaults
    between January 1, 1993 and December 31, 2002, (the period considered
    by the Working Group) have graduated from the Academy and were
    commissioned. (The report of the Working Group, based on information
    from an Academy database, indicated that 19 suspects had graduated.
    Review of that information after the report was published revealed that
    one of those suspect's records had been coded erroneously and the
    suspect had in fact been disenrolled.) Of the 18, one was cross-
    commissioned into the Army and remains on active duty in the Army. One,
    who had already been commissioned at the time the allegation was made,
    received a letter of reprimand and has now separated from the Air
    Force. Another is now deceased. Of the 15 currently on active duty in
    the Air Force, one is still under investigation for the alleged
    assault, in one case the allegation against the suspect was recanted,
    and one was acquitted at court-martial. There are ongoing DOD and Air
    Force Inspector General investigations. In addition, Secretary Roche
    has asked the Air Force IG to examine the commissioning suitability
    process in these cases. After completion of these investigations,
    Secretary Roche will examine the findings to determine what follow-on
    steps may be appropriate.

        Senator Allard. Then, of those that went on to serve in the
    Air Force, also, how many are still serving in the Air Force
    would be helpful.
        Ms. Walker. Realizing some were found innocent, if they
    were, and then----
        Senator Allard. Then you can put a qualifying note on them.
        Ms. Walker. Exactly.
        Senator Allard. Yes, that would be fine.
        You mentioned, in your opening comment, about the 13-year-
    old who had been raped at a summer camp.
        Secretary Roche. Assaulted, sir. Assaulted, not raped.
        Senator Allard. Assaulted, you're right. Yes, and
    eventually there was a guilty plea of consensual sodomy, to be
    more specific.
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir.
        Senator Allard. Okay. That was an Article 32 hearing. The
    cadet in that case had 60 days in jail, dishonorable discharge,
    then had to pay $120,000. Now, the girl, the 13-year-old
    victim, was never allowed to testify at the hearing. Why was
    that?
        Secretary Roche. Senator, I don't know. It's the issue that
    I brought up earlier, of a case that we thought was not handled
    well by the judge advocates, that the parents were ignored,
    when they should not have been ignored, that a deal--whatever
    the proper word is--between the prosecution and defense was
    made, without the prosecution dealing with the parents to see
    how they would react. I found it very disturbing. I also found
    it very disturbing that the parents were just surprised by this
    and that there were some other senses that they had in terms of
    how people in their neighborhood and the girl's school had been
    dealt with. So I directed the General Counsel to dispatch
    lawyers out there and to take over the handling of the matter,
    but it was after the court martial had concluded.
        Senator Allard. It's my understanding now that the Air
    Force lawyers have not resolved the issues of that rape with
    the family. Are you aware of that?
        Secretary Roche. There are claims that the family is
    making, and they're being discussed and debated. Yes, sir.
        Senator Allard. Yes. I'm concerned about how these
    discussions are going, but I'm glad to hear that it's on your
    radar and that you're watching it very closely.
        Secretary Roche. Oh, yes, sir.
        Senator Allard. The Fowler Report mentioned four specific
    Academy officers, three of which have been relieved of their
    command at the Academy, and the only remaining officer is
    General Wagie. It's already been brought out about how involved
    he was in being a filter through all these reports. I'm not
    sure that I got a clear response from you, and my question is,
    why is he still at the Academy?
        Secretary Roche. Senator, it is my judgment that because
    he's the academic dean, and the Academy is also a university,
    and there are accreditation issues, that to pull him and have
    an absence of an academic dean for a long period of time was,
    in the midst of all the other turmoil, not the right thing to
    do, that although he was the individual to whom the center
    reported and who was responsible for the surveys, he was not in
    the disciplinary chain. He did nothing to or had any
    interaction with the young women who filed complaints, that we
    had to replace him as soon as possible, and we are doing that.
    He will retire as soon as we can get a replacement. We have
    tried hard to see if we can change the law so we could have a
    broader look, including a possibility of a civilian dean. The
    law now states we must take a permanent professor. Sir, you
    recall we have relieved one permanent professor of his job, so
    we're trying to be careful who we bring in behind General
    Wagie, but he'll be retired by the early spring.
        Senator Allard. Will there be any further discipline, other
    than just a retirement?
        Secretary Roche. When he retires, Senator, then we have to
    make a judgment as to whether he served properly in grade, and
    we'll made that judgment at that time.
        Senator Allard. You mentioned the difficulty in dismissing
    permanent professors at the Academy and ran across that with
    the English professor. You talked about the Monty Python skits
    that were going on there. Can you share some of your views
    about permanent professors at the Academy?
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir. In the Agenda for Change, we
    have taken steps within our bounds of what we can do, in terms
    of how long they would be expected to serve. If they serve
    beyond that, it has to be with a waiver given by the
    headquarters of the Air Force. We want the Secretary, the Chief
    of Staff, to be very much involved in the choice of permanent
    professors so that we know what kind of people we have there.
    We have also said that department heads who are head of a
    department for these extended periods of time is not healthy,
    that we want turnover there. So we've also made a number of
    changes within the law on how these people rotate and what they
    do.
        General Jumper. Also, sir, if I might add, the lower-
    ranking professors come from the active-duty Air Force, they
    come in and out, and they bring the perspective of the current
    Air Force, contemporary Air Force, to the Academy.
        Senator Allard. Do you feel that we need to change the law
    in regard to who we put in as the dean of the university?
        Secretary Roche. Oh, Senator, absolutely.
        Senator Allard. We need to have a bigger pool, it seems to
    me.
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir. For instance, we don't know why
    we can't choose a civilian.
        Senator Allard. Yes.
        Secretary Roche. To the best of my knowledge, the academic
    dean at the Naval Academy is a civilian. I don't see why we
    can't do that if there's a particular civilian who meets the
    qualifications as of the quality. But there may be another
    officer, another general officer, at Maxwell or somewhere else,
    who, while not a permanent professor, would be a spectacular
    academic dean and would, in fact, be someone that the
    accreditation group would say is fine.
        Senator Allard. If we would get the law changed in this
    session of Congress, does that give you time enough to look
    beyond just permanent professors?
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir. What I've directed to happen is,
    we are going to start screening candidates among the permanent
    professors. We believe that between now and the next month or
    two, if you're going to be able to make a change in the law,
    it'll happen, and then, at that time, we will bring in other
    candidates, as well. If we can't get it changed this year, then
    I'm afraid we're going to go one more round with one of the
    permanent professors.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I see my time's expired.
        Chairman Warner. Senator, in the discussions you've had
    with me and our distinguished ranking member, I think we're
    looking at trying to get it in as part of the legislative
    package with the $87 billion supplemental appropriation, aren't
    we? Or in the Defense Authorization bill.
        Senator Allard. Or the conference report. It would be on
    the conference report.
        Chairman Warner. And/or both. Because we regard it of
    tremendous important, this position.
        Secretary Roche. Mr. Chairman, there's two things you're
    doing for us that we really appreciate. One is permanent
    professors, and the other is to change the rules on the board
    of visitors to make the board of visitors a much more energetic
    and much more focused group, and we appreciate both of those.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I'm on the board.
        Chairman Warner. Are you familiar with that provision?
        Senator Allard. I agree wholeheartedly with that provision,
    as far as the board of visitors----
        Chairman Warner. Do we need Congress to energize a board?
        Senator Allard. Yes.
        Chairman Warner. Wait a minute. You're on some interesting
    grounds there. I really want to do everything we can to help
    you on that issue. I don't mean to treat it lightly. Because,
    the Fowler Panel exhibited some real courage to stand up here
    before the Congress of the United States in the face of one our
    colleagues, who, in the course of the hearing, was a member of
    that board.
        Senator Allard. Right. Part of the recommendations is to
    reduce the number of members on that board, for that very
    reason, who are in Congress.
        Chairman Warner. I think the board is a very important
    institution. I know that when I was privileged to have your
    position, Mr. Secretary, I labored long and hard over the
    recommendations for membership on that board.
        Anyway, occasionally I've had the opportunity to go on the
    Naval Academy board, based on my modest association with the
    Navy and the Marines over the years. I just felt I didn't have
    the time to devote to it here in Congress.
        Secretary Roche. It's an issue of time.
        Chairman Warner. So we'll work on both provisions.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Do you have suggested language with regard
    to the board?
        Secretary Roche. I think we've already worked with your
    committee on that, sir, this year.
        Chairman Warner. But you're comfortable with the language
    we're looking at with regard to the----
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. I thank our colleague from Maine for the
    time that I took for those questions.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you for the many hours that you've
    spent on this case, too.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. This is another one of your agenda items.
    You've spent a lot of time on it. You've been to all the
    meetings, just about, in my office on this question.
        Senator Collins. I appreciate your leadership, and that of
    Senator Allard, on this very important matter.
        Mr. Secretary, you have repeatedly said that if someone had
    told you there was a pervasive problem, you would have acted.
    You've said that you would have had to have been clairvoyant to
    know that these problems existed. You've also testified, at the
    March hearing, that shortly after you became Secretary, you and
    General Jumper started to spend, ``more and more of our time
    looking at the Air Force Academy. We spent a year looking at
    the honor system.'' I'm wondering, with that kind of in-depth
    review, how you missed the many indications and reports of
    problems with sexual assault at the Academy.
        There is ample evidence that reveals that sexual misconduct
    problems at the Academy have existed, at a minimum, since 1993.
    For example, there are three different GAO reports--one issued
    in 1993, one in 1994, and one in 1995--which identify issues of
    sexual harassment at the Academy. In 1996, the Air Force
    Surgeon General notified the Air Force Chief of Staff of
    serious sexual misconduct at the Academy. In 1997, a team of
    lawyers at Air Force headquarters recommended changes in the
    Academy's sexual assault reporting procedures. In 1998, the
    Chief of Sexual Assault Services provided a briefing to senior
    Academy leadership, which began with a slide titled ``We have a
    problem,'' which referred to Academy statistics on sexual
    assaults.
        There were numerous cadet climate surveys in which cadets
    identified problems with sexual assault. In 1998, 22 cadets
    said that they had been sexually assaulted. In 2000, 17
    reported that they had been sexually assaulted. In 2001, 167
    cadets indicated that they were sexually assaulted. In 2002, 80
    cadets said that they had been sexually assaulted. In 2003,
    interestingly, they were not asked the question.
        You were sworn in as Secretary, I believe, on June 1, 2001.
    If you did an in-depth review of the Academy with General
    Jumper, how did all of these reports, year after year, going
    back to 1993, from credible sources--such as the General
    Accounting Office, such as the Surgeon General, such as the
    Chief of Sexual Assault Services, such as the cadet surveys,
    which, even if you argue with some of the statistics, they
    clearly show a problem--how could you miss this?
        Secretary Roche. Senator, I understand your question. There
    was no process in the Air Force for any of that material to
    come to headquarters. When we would go out to the Academy to go
    after an issue like the honor code or something else, we were
    triggered by something, either a press article or, in the case
    of the honor code, by the study that General Ryan and Whit
    Peters had asked General Carns to perform. None of these things
    came to our attention.
        The 1996 material from the Surgeon General, for instance, I
    saw for the very first time in mid August of this year. We were
    not aware of it. The GAO reports from the early 1990s, I didn't
    go back to ask if there were GAO reports, nor did General
    Jumper. You'll recall, ma'am, not as an excuse, but there was
    also September 11 and a war in Afghanistan, other things.
        When something was brought to our attention, we went and
    addressed it. When the question was asked of people, because of
    my familiarity with the Naval Academy, ``What is the gender
    climate like,'' we got the answer that this was a model program
    that had been put in in 1993, it was addressing issues, and
    there was no sense that there was anything different than that,
    when, in fact, it certainly was. We were never told about
    surveys, et cetera.
        What I can say, Senator, is, the Air Force should have put
    in place mechanisms of transparency to the headquarters of what
    was going on in the Academy. Right now, they exist. This can
    never happen again.
        Senator Collins. Ms. Walker, my question to you is very
    similar. In your report--and Senator McCain has quoted this--
    you concluded that the Working Group did not find, ``systemic
    acceptance of sexual assault at the Academy, institutional
    avoidance of responsibility, or systemic maltreatment of cadets
    who report sexual assault.''
        I don't know how you could have reached that conclusion if
    you did even a cursory review of the cadet surveys and of the
    many, many reports and other evidence from credible sources
    that I outlined in my question for Secretary Roche.
        Ms. Walker. When the staff brought me that conclusion,
    toward the middle of the report-writing, I asked the question,
    ``Given what we found, how can we support this?'' Basically
    what I was told in the presentation of the evidence was--and I
    actually think Ms. Fowler's comments in her testimony, as
    opposed to the report, support this--that this was a case of
    good people, well-intentioned, realizing there were issues,
    addressing them, putting programs in place, putting training in
    place, meeting with the female cadets, and believing they were
    addressing the issue. But still, over time, there have been
    issues of sexual harassment that haven't gone away, and there
    have been sexual assaults that continue to happen. So we
    believed that there were issues that had to be addressed that
    were not working, despite the well-intentioned programs. But
    they did not, as a matter of course, accept sexual assault.
    There was not an avoidance of the issue. Every single time we
    found there was an issue, they addressed it, they thought they
    had it fixed.
        I think that that's part of the problem. They really did
    think they had it fixed, but they didn't. As we looked at the
    10-year period, it continued, such that they hadn't had it
    fixed. But I will tell you today, based on the information that
    we've received, we might not have had those conclusions in
    place. As I said to Senator McCain, I believe the conclusions
    would have been different. But based on the information we had,
    and if you look at the leadership section in the back of the
    report, you will see a continued parade of leaders who
    recognized there were issues and attempted to deal with them.
    That's what we meant by there was no avoidance of the issue.
    They stepped up to the plate. They just weren't able to
    effectively fix it.
        Secretary Roche. May I, Senator? May I answer that?
        Senator Collins. Certainly.
        Secretary Roche. The part that shocked me most when I read
    the 1996 material, now last month, was that I could no longer,
    in any way, agree with two parts of the general assessment,
    that there was no systematic acceptance of sexual assault
    because the top leadership of the Air Force knew something and
    didn't do anything about it. I don't know all the details. All
    I know is that there was something that was here in Washington,
    and I don't understand why they didn't jump on it.
        No institutional avoidance of responsibility--again, I
    would have to agree with you, once you see that, you are
    compelled to go out and start to dig. I wish someone had
    provided that to me in June 2001, or at any other time, or to
    General Jumper. We are of the same personality. We would have
    attacked it.
        Senator Collins. I can't think of a clearer pattern of
    avoidance of institutional responsibility than to ignore this
    many reports going back a decade. Because these aren't
    isolated. They're year after year, from highly credible
    sources.
        Secretary Roche. In the surveys, we wish the surveys had
    been sent to the headquarters. We wish there was something at
    the headquarters that gathered them. All I can tell you is
    that, now and in the future, that sort of a situation where
    things are kept close at the Academy, can't happen.
        Senator Collins. General Jumper, in the executive summary
    of the Fowler Report, there is a conclusion that reads as
    follows, ``Since at least 1993, the highest levels of Air Force
    leadership have known of serious sexual misconduct problems at
    the Academy.'' Do you agree with that conclusion?
        General Jumper. I do.
        Senator Collins. Then why didn't anyone do anything about
    it?
        General Jumper. Senator, I think people thought they were
    doing something. That's when the CASIE system was started, in
    1993, by General Hosmer. That was set up and was touted as a
    model program. Up until last year, we had other people coming
    to us to use that as an example. As a matter fact, that
    answered the 1993 GAO survey. Then, for a period of time, we
    thought we had, the Air Force Academy thought it had, and the
    leadership thought it had, a model program that was in place
    out there. The fact that these surveys that should have come
    forward didn't come forward, there's no excuse for that,
    Senator. There's no excuse. We are jumping on that problem, and
    it's not going to happen again. The fact that the
    superintendent of the Air Force Academy didn't properly
    communicate with the Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the
    Air Force on these issues is, there is no excuse for that.
        So our Agenda for Change is one that we hope will put in
    the changes that will effect lasting and enduring change so
    that these sets of conditions cannot be repeated, and that the
    oversight for the Air Force Academy is in place and will remain
    in place.
        Secretary Roche. Senator, if I, again, may?
        Senator Collins. Would you indulge me with one final
    question?
        Secretary Roche. May I make a comment, ma'am?
        Senator Collins. Certainly.
        Secretary Roche. Very quickly. It is that the standards----
        Chairman Warner. Let's have the witness--this a very
    important inquiry--give adequate time for their responses.
        Senator Collins. Right.
        Chairman Warner. Had you finished, General Jumper?
        General Jumper. Yes, sir, I had.
        Chairman Warner. Mr. Secretary?
        Secretary Roche. The standard that I raised earlier of, did
    someone put a barrier or was there information that would lead
    a commander to make a different decision, is the standard that
    General Jumper and I will use to judge each of these officers.
    The basis for that will be the work done by the Working Group
    plus the work done by the IG staff, because quite often,
    Senator, these are issues of, ``How do you feel about a
    commander's performance? Did the commander live up to the
    standards we expect of our other commanders?'' In the case of
    the superintendent, for instance, a three-star general is
    exactly the rank of the officer that was running the war in
    Iraq. We demand enormous things of these people. Given the
    evidence, we would have expected them to have acted and him to
    have acted.
        Senator Collins. Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired.
    Could I ask just one more question?
        Chairman Warner. Go ahead.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Ms. Walker, are you aware of the survey of the female
    cadets of the class of 2003 that was conducted by the Inspector
    General?
        Ms. Walker. Yes, I'm aware of that.
        Senator Collins. What was your reaction to the statistics
    that showed that nearly 12 percent of the women in the class of
    2003 reported that they were victims of either rape or
    attempted rape, and I believe it was 24 percent reported that
    they were victims of sexual assault or attempted sexual
    assault? Did that cause you to rethink your conclusion that
    there was not a systemic problem?
        Ms. Walker. Let me just try to take this in pieces. First
    of all, any numbers like that would be of concern. The numbers
    that the IG found in his survey were higher than the numbers
    that we had had, but not terribly inconsistent with them. I
    think the percentages that were showing up in the surveys were
    15 percent, 16 percent, something like that. So they were not
    totally dissimilar than the survey numbers we had.
        But we had a couple of factors here that caused us to not
    fully understand or trust the data. First of all, the
    definition of sexual assault in use at the Academy included
    those things which were not sexual assault.
        Senator Collins. Then limit your response to the definition
    of rape and attempted rape, which is the legal definition. It's
    still almost 12 percent.
        Ms. Walker. I'm not minimizing the fact that there is a
    problem at the Academy dealing with sexual assault, and I've
    said that. There is a problem, and leadership is dealing with
    it. We recognized that in the report, that there is problem,
    and that has to be dealt with.
        So, yes, we were concerned. We were concerned the whole
    time we were doing this report. But, again, the fact that the
    Academy recognized they had an issue and were trying to deal
    with it is what we were trying to say, that they weren't
    avoiding it. They were putting things in place to deal with it.
    When they thought they had dealt with it, what we saw, over
    time, was that the problem wasn't going away. There were still
    issues of harassment. At the end, they weren't functionally
    working well together, so the victims were not being treated as
    they should be, and that's why we made the recommendations that
    we did, based on the findings that we were able to make.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Have you had enough time?
        Senator Collins. I have. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. I try, as a chairman, to listen very
    carefully. If I heard you, in response to this important
    question, you said, ``I'm not in any way trying to deny there
    is''--that's present tense--``a problem at the Air Force
    Academy.'' Now, I think the Secretary started with a very
    dramatic opening sentence, ``Tonight, there is no problem.''
    Wait a minute. Am I correct? I want to get this right.
        This hearing is being followed, and let's get--between the
    two of you, sort out your----
        Secretary Roche. If I may, sir?
        Chairman Warner. Yes.
        Secretary Roche. What I said was, the young woman cadet is
    safe tonight at the Air Force Academy.
        Chairman Warner. That connotes to me there isn't a problem,
    and she can freely move around the halls and enjoy the
    Academy's benefits.
        Secretary Roche. She can, but she may wind up at a party
    somewhere and still have a problem. She could be in a parking
    lot and we not be able to cover it. It doesn't mean that it's a
    100-percent guarantee; it means all of the things we can think
    of to accord her protections that she should have are now in
    place, including having officers and enlisted and other cadets
    doing roving patrols of the dormitory 24 hours a day, 7 days a
    week, which is putting enough of a strain on the Academy that
    we are going to have to assign more billets out there. All of
    the things to protect them. Any barriers to reporting have been
    removed. So, on that basis, a woman is safe.
        However, the attitudes of our cadets are something of which
    we are not proud. We are not proud that 20 percent of the males
    believe that women should not be at the Air Force Academy. We
    are not proud that only 10 percent of the women in one class
    believe that they would report an assault, because they might
    be ostracized. We're not proud of that at all, nor is the new
    team, but we are working at it, and working at it, and working
    at it, and we'll continue to do so, Senator.
        Chairman Warner. That's important. Then that clarifies, I
    believe, your comment.
        Ms. Walker. That's really what I was speaking to, sir. I
    believe that what needs to be done is being done, but I also
    don't believe that we can claim victory yet, because it's going
    to take some time to see this play out.
        Chairman Warner. I want to be careful with this ``claim
    victory.'' So let's work on it.
        I think I get the message. I hope that you're doing
    everything you can. I don't want to interrupt the next Senator,
    but I guess I leave with a heaviness of heart that this
    institution has had to employ such measures as guards, and
    patrols and frequent checks. I hope there's joy left.
        We'll return to that at some point in time.
        Senator Clinton has spent a lot of time on this issue and
    attended all of our hearings. Senator, it is your turn.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize that
    other commitments required me to leave this very important
    hearing. I have tried to follow, from a distance, the questions
    that have been asked, and obviously I know that our panel
    appreciates the extraordinary and profound concern and sadness
    that I think all of us feel about this situation.
        I don't want to go over already plowed ground, but I wanted
    to ask a few specific questions, which I don't believe have
    been addressed. It is more in the terms of going forward.
        We heard, last week, from the panel that reported to this
    committee, that, in their report, they are critical of the
    effective elimination of confidential reporting, as called for
    in the Agenda for Change. The panel found that the Agenda for
    Change's elimination of confidential reporting, ``creates a
    significant risk that victims will not come forward at all,
    and, thus, lose the benefits afforded by professional
    counseling,'' to say nothing of the issues about reporting
    assaults and improper conduct. In light of the panel report,
    Mr. Secretary and General, will you reconsider the value of
    confidential reporting?
        Secretary Roche. Yes, ma'am. One of the wonderful things
    about that panel is we were able to have a dialogue, and they
    were as torn as we between privacy and confidentiality, between
    the fact that we were developing aspiring officers, who have an
    obligation to tell us when there's a felon in their midst. The
    work that they came up with, the notion of the psychotherapist
    who can provide counseling and not be part of the chain of
    command, so that we can worry about a particular cadet who has
    gone through trauma and deal with the trauma of that cadet and
    then try to bring her to the chain of command, where we can
    then avoid the problems of the past, where nothing happened, or
    even if we can do such things. One of their witnesses testified
    that there's not an inherent conflict if you think of it on a
    temporal basis. If, right away, you do what you have to do, in
    terms of rape kits, et cetera, but you tell the young woman,
    ``Look, we're not going to go forward until you're okay and
    you're ready, but should you choose to go forward, we don't
    want to be precluded in prosecution because we don't have
    evidence.'' Ms. Fowler and I have spent hours trying to think
    that through.
        One of the things that General Jumper and I are doing is
    we're going to look at the suggestions there, not just for the
    Air Force Academy, because if it's good enough for one of those
    young women, it's good enough for one of our young women at
    Kunsan Air Base. Do it for both.
        Senator Allard. Would the Senator yield on that?
        Senator Clinton. Yes.
        Senator Allard. That's really an important issue, and
    visiting with the chairman on the Fowler Commission, she had
    indicated that this is something that the commission really
    struggled with. Finally they went to the Naval Academy, and my
    understanding is that this is the process that's currently
    followed in the Naval Academy, or something very close to it,
    where they actually have a turn in the road here. You can
    either go with a public disclosure or go with the publicity of
    going to the psychotherapist and the patient-doctor
    relationship there, keep it private if they decide to do that.
    So your response to her question is that, yes, you think there
    is a possible credible solution.
        Secretary Roche. We want to work at that, Senator, and we
    think there is a way to do it, but we don't want to do it just
    for the Air Force Academy. We want to do it for the whole Air
    Force.
        Senator Allard. Senator, that's a very important question
    that Senator Clinton brought up, and thank you for letting me
    interrupt you on that.
        Chairman Warner. Your time will not be docked for the
    colloquy, without objection.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate my
    colleague, Senator Allard's, intervention there, because no one
    has worked harder on this issue. I think, in addition to
    Annapolis, I believe West Point has a similar approach. So I
    think that it is important that the Agenda for Change be
    changed in light of the panel's findings and further
    consultation with experts.
        I think it's also important to look at the Agenda for
    Change with respect to the panel's conclusion that it did not
    address the need for permanent, consistent oversight by Air
    Force headquarter leadership, as well as external oversight by
    the Academy's board of visitors. In fact, I think Chairman
    Fowler made a very telling point when she said that oftentimes
    the members of the board of visitors didn't attend meetings and
    they weren't involved. It did not have either the prestige or
    the participation that one would expect.
        So have you done any self-examination about what better
    oversight and leadership can be provided by both headquarters
    and the board of visitors?
        Secretary Roche. Yes, ma'am. Already, we have in place a
    mechanism to provide the oversight of the Academy that has a
    senior-level group, which consists of the Vice Chief of Staff
    of the Air Force, on the uniformed side, the Assistant
    Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower, to represent me, the
    General Counsel, and the superintendent. There is a working
    group below that. We put a 1-year sunset clause on it in order
    to get everybody to get everything done from these panels in 1
    year. But it's our intention, and the Fowler Report commends us
    for this and recommends that we institutionalize and make it
    permanent. We will do so, so that we don't have a situation
    like the one that Senator Collins raised earlier, of things
    never coming up to senior-level attention.
        Senator Clinton. Finally, Secretary Roche, I have been
    discussing with you the importance of mentors and role models
    in setting acceptable standards of conduct for cadets. In their
    report, the panel includes several recommendations for better
    training of cadets. It recommends that the staff and faculty
    place a renewed emphasis on education, on character education,
    on the encouragement of responsible consumption of alcohol by
    cadets, and that, overall, the panel found that the Agenda for
    Change did not go far enough to institute enduring permanent
    changes in culture and gender climate at the Academy. Now, I
    assume you also agree that the Agenda for Change has not gone
    far enough in that direction.
        Secretary Roche. It was the best that Jumper and Roche
    could do in 90 days. We were very willing to have it expanded,
    to be challenged. In fact, the cadets have given us some good
    ideas, and we will follow up with each of those items, because
    we think there is more to do.
        We have some good news, finally. The selection board for
    Air Officers Commanding Program this time at the Academy picked
    the best, and the system provided them, instead of giving them
    50 reasons why it can't happen. We are sending people off to
    school. One cadet suggested we were not teaching the Uniform
    Code of Military Justice early enough to cadets. We now have
    changed that, and early on when they get there in this fall
    semester we'll be doing a lot of education about the Uniform
    Code of Military Justice.
        Through all this, Senator, an interesting point to the
    chairman about joy, is that the cadets are now feeling a heck
    of a lot better about themselves and the place, and they're
    actually starting to have some fun, because they know what the
    boundaries are, they know how serious we are, and they're
    making the point that the morale has improved dramatically this
    year, as compared to this point last year.
        General Jumper. Senator, if I might pile on, let me just
    say, once again, that there's no belief on the part of this set
    of leaders that this is a short-term problem with a short-term
    solution. So that the character and the integrity issues, the
    honor code issues have to be dealt with over a period of time.
    This is going to be a subject of intense education through
    engagement by our own four-star-level officers with the cadets,
    personally. We've already begun that, and it's going to take
    awhile.
        Senator Clinton. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is expired.
        Chairman Warner. Senator, if you want to take another
    minute or two, please.
        Senator Clinton. I think this might also be useful. I've
    spoken to the Secretary about this and will certainly try to
    provide some names of people who could be helpful. But I think
    it would be useful to invite some outsiders, perhaps, to
    address the cadets on some of these issues, and I would
    particularly recommend some women leaders. I think of my
    colleagues, Senator Collins, Senator Dole, Senator Hutchison,
    Senator Landrieu, others, people who have served on this
    committee, people who have insight into the code and the
    standards of the military. I really, having now immersed myself
    in the information, and particularly the impressive work of the
    panel that we heard, there's a real disconnect on the part of
    many of these young men between the profession and the Service
    that they are pledging their lives to and the expectations that
    the leadership of that Service has, but, even more, the
    expectations of the leadership of their country and the broader
    citizenry has.
        I think it might be useful to have some real airing
    sessions, perhaps, if she hasn't, with Chairwoman Fowler and
    others. I really do think that these young men, to be very
    blunt about this, need to see some women in leadership
    positions and need to have give and take, and need to hear----
        Secretary Roche. Right.
        Senator Clinton.--from women of stature and position, that
    times have changed, and that to be a leader today means more
    perhaps than it did in the past, in terms of sensitivity. It is
    troubling to me to think that among the many efforts that young
    men and women in the Air Force have undertaken in the last 2
    years to free women in Afghanistan and free women in Iraq, and
    then to hear about attitudes of young men at the Air Force
    Academy that are very reminiscent, frankly, of those attitudes
    that were part of the Taliban's approach, part of the reaction
    toward women going to school, being part of leadership.
        So I think that perhaps some kind of a speaker session,
    some kind of an effort to really present the cadets with
    leadership examples and to challenge them and to challenge the
    ideas that they may have either brought with them or acquired,
    would be a start to this process.
        Secretary Roche. Senator, we agree. In fact, we are
    organizing some things.
        There's a little bit of good news. About 3 weeks ago, for
    the first time in the history of the Air Force, we awarded four
    distinguished flying crosses for heroism in battle to women
    aviators. First time. Now, when they go to the Academy, no
    male--no male--can look down on them.
        Second, we began training pilots, women pilots, in 1978.
    The first class of graduates was 1980. That class and the two
    following--the 1978, 1979, 1980 classes--are just now coming up
    to general officer ranks. They're not going to be specialists.
    They're going to be honest-to-goodness pilots, navigators, et
    cetera, who will be the right role models. I think we are only
    one generation away from a commandant who's a woman, general,
    pilot, line officer, and, not long thereafter, a point we will
    have a woman superintendent.
        But there are increasing role models, and we've found that
    the Academy brings in the wrong kinds of people. In a
    management course, for instance, Senator, instead of bringing
    in successful Air Force officers who were graduates, they bring
    in successful businessmen who left after 5 years and went out
    and made a lot of money. When we found that out, we said,
    ``well, that's silly. There are a whole bunch of terrific
    officers who are serving in active duty. Why don't you bring
    them in? Or bring some retired officers in, not bring
    businesspeople who left right away.'' So we are working on
    that.
        Senator Clinton. Bring some women in.
        Secretary Roche. Absolutely, ma'am.
        Chairman Warner. That's a very encouraging chapter in this
    hearing today, that testimony you've just given, and joined in
    by General Jumper, and I thank you, Senator. I find it very
    encouraging.
        I don't say what I'm about to say with any facetiousness.
    My good friend, Senator Levin, and I came here 25 years ago,
    and we have seen a change in this institution, and that change
    was, I think, very thoughtfully, carefully, and accurately put
    in that book, ``Nineams Counting, The Women of the Senate.''
    Maybe a few copies ought to be sent to the Academy for required
    reading.
        Now we have to return to some of the hard parts about this
    case, which we still have to explore. I guess everybody draws
    on their own experience in the educational institutions, but I
    had, in my own modest career, some tough times in coming right
    out of the Navy in World War II and going to college. Then in
    law school, I got into a couple of ruts, but survived. Faculty
    members were just enormously important in not only working with
    me, but working with a whole range of students. They knew when
    a student was in need of a little help. I have some of the
    fondest memories of faculty members who worked with us and
    invited us to their homes in the evening for a little libation
    and discussion and private seminars. How is it that they were
    oblivious to this thing? Were there not a number of female
    members of the faculty to whom maybe cadets could turn to and
    say, ``Can I reach out to you, as a civilian, and share my
    thoughts?'' Can anybody address this?
        General Jumper. Sir, that's a very good question, and we
    have talked to members of the faculty as part of the people
    that we addressed. We've talked to the Air Officers Commanding,
    who are with the squadrons all day, every day. The answer is,
    no, they did not come forward with any evidence the cadets had
    come to them with any specific problem. Again, it's difficult
    to explain. In the report, I don't think that there's any
    specific reference to this. But in my personal experience, in
    my personal conversation with this cross-section, I've cut it
    many ways, Senator. I went out there, I visited with the cadets
    that were going to be the seniors and the juniors this year,
    and I challenged them on their leadership responsibilities and
    told them that unless their attitudes changed, that there would
    be no change at the Academy. I met with Air Officers
    Commanding, with the enlisted people that are also, again, with
    the cadets every single day, with members of the faculty, with
    alumni, et cetera. I can tell you, sir--and you know me, sir;
    we've known each other a long time----
        Chairman Warner. Oh, yes.
        General Jumper. If any of this had been brought to my
    attention, I would have jumped on this with both feet, just
    like the Secretary would have, I can tell you. I can't explain
    it, but it was not a thing that was so high on the screen of
    the people that I talked to about this. As a matter of fact,
    other things were brought to my attention, so there was no fear
    about talking to me.
        Chairman Warner. That leads me to another question relating
    to some personal experience. I'm often asked, ``What was your
    best job in life,'' and I have to tell you that my period in
    the Navy secretariat was just superb. I remember when the late
    John Chafee, our highly esteemed, beloved colleague, and I
    walked into the Pentagon, the Republicans had taken over, there
    were Democrats there, holdovers, and they sat down with us, and
    we spent some time with the Secretary of the Navy, who
    graciously stepped down, and the Under Secretary, and then the
    various uniformed people came up and shared. So there was a
    feeling of continuity. Now, it was a period in which the
    Vietnam War was at one of its very significant high pitches,
    and so there was a pressure on us that was quite serious. The
    country's at war today, and so I assume similar pressures are
    on. But there was a transition.
        Then, through the years that I was there, they'd all come
    back and visit with us, ``How're you doing?'' I can't
    understand how some of these uniformed or prior-service
    Secretaries didn't come in and say, ``How are you dealing with
    this problem. I tried my best,'' because let me draw your
    attention to this. It's rather interesting.
        General Ronald Fogelman, a former Air Force Chief of Staff,
    was quoted in a media story last week as saying that the
    problem of sexual assaults at the Academy was ``an issue that
    was known and being worked on at the Air Force and at the
    Academy. If we didn't take the right remedial action, that was
    our fault, but it wasn't for lack of trying or being engaged on
    the subject.''
        Somehow that filter that you feel was present during your
    administrations wasn't there. He had the facts. He worked on
    it.
        Did any of the old-timers come in, such as General Ryan? I
    just have the highest regard for him. His father was chief of
    staff of the Air Force when I was Secretary of the Navy, and
    I've known the Ryan family for years. Didn't he come in and
    chat with you a little bit?
        General Jumper. Sir, yes, sir. We talked about it. Matter
    of fact, he gave me a list of things, in my turnover with him
    that had to do with the drug problem that was emerging. It had
    to do with the academic curriculum that the boss was working
    on, with the honor code. But on that list of things was not a
    concern about sexual assault.
        Chairman Warner. All right. What about you, Secretary?
        Secretary Roche. I had a couple of months with Mike. Mike,
    in particular, wanted me to concentrate----
        Chairman Warner. This is Secretary Whit Peters?
        Secretary Roche. I'm sorry. This was General Ryan.
        Chairman Warner. Oh, Ryan.
        Secretary Roche. General Ryan.
        Chairman Warner. General Ryan. Then you might address----
        Secretary Roche. Whit Peters, to do both.
        Chairman Warner. --Secretary Whit Peters.
        Secretary Roche. General Ryan was very concerned about the
    honor system at the Academy, and one of the things he did with
    both of us, like an older brother, is say, ``Okay, here are the
    things you have to continue to do when I'm gone.''
        Whit Peters and I have become friends, and Whit and I
    speak. He had no sense of this, because he would have passed it
    on if he had had it. This is not a Republican/Democratic issue.
    Any one of us who knew this would have gone on and done
    something. Whit, in fact, had to deal with a different problem
    at the Academy having to do with an allegation of the misuse of
    funds for an elaborate kitchen in the superintendent's home.
        Chairman Warner. We remember that one well here. He was a
    good secretary.
        Secretary Roche. But this particular issue never came up,
    even though we still deal with each other.
        Chairman Warner. I certainly speak for myself, but we
    thought Whit Peters did a good job, and he was before the
    committee many times. So that filter was apparently in place
    under his administration.
        Secretary Roche. I have had lunch separately with General
    Fogelman talking about issues. He had a two-fold issue of one
    of character development at the Academy where we were not
    sending good role models, in terms of pilots and others, out
    there, because they were so needed. We've corrected that. The
    second issue he had was with the intern program in the
    Pentagon, where we were bringing young officers in, but not for
    enough time for them to really gain something. In both cases,
    General Jumper and I made the changes that Ron recommended.
        Chairman Warner. My time is up. This is the second round,
    but we're joined by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Nelson,
    for your first round.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I'll just make a couple
    of comments and be very brief.
        Isn't it ironic, Mr. Chairman?
        Chairman Warner. Excuse me. Yes?
        Senator Bill Nelson. Isn't it ironic that we are having
    these questions of communication in the Department of Defense
    at the very time that the military has performed so splendidly,
    not only in Iraq, but in Afghanistan, before. Yet we're talking
    about matters of human communication, from one to another.
        I saw it last week in trying to get into this problem of
    the National Guard and the equitable policy of serving with
    this new policy of 12 months boots-on-the-ground after being
    mobilized. Just in trying to get information from the
    Department of the Army, with three different generals, I
    received four different answers over the course of 18 hours. So
    it's the old human difficulty of communication, and we're
    seeing testimony having to do with the same thing here.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
        Senator Levin. Senator Nelson is here. He brought to our
    attention--first, an article that occurred in the St.
    Petersburg Times yesterday or the day before yesterday, about
    an allegation that the Pentagon had asked MacDill's Special
    Operations people to put into their budget $20 million padding
    so that the money could be used later by the Pentagon for some
    other purpose, to quote the St. Petersburg Times. Then this
    morning, that article appeared, or that allegation appeared, in
    The Washington Post. It is a very troubling allegation. As
    always, we're appreciative to Senator Nelson of Florida for
    being on top of so many issues. We have talked about this as he
    brought it to both our attention, I believe, Mr. Chairman.
    While he is here, perhaps we could just spend 1 minute on this,
    so that we have agreed that we would, on behalf of the
    committee--you as chairman, and I as ranking member--at the
    suggestion of Senator Nelson--raise this issue directly with
    the Pentagon and ask them to respond and to comment on this
    because it's a very serious allegation.
        Chairman Warner. First, the Senator and I talked about it.
    He is very careful to consult with both of us when he has
    issues. We think it must be brought to the attention of the
    Pentagon and give them an opportunity to respond to this very
    serious allegation.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, if this allegation were
    true, it is of the most serious consequence and breach of law,
    for we appropriate monies for specific purposes, and that money
    cannot be reprogrammed unless it has the direct authority of
    the legislative branch of government. The question is begged,
    if these allegations are true in what was requested, a $20
    million padding, which money would be siphoned off and used for
    other purposes outside of Special Operations Command, and it
    was ultimately, according to the allegations, $20 million, if
    that's correct, how widespread is this practice elsewhere in
    the Pentagon? I think this deserves attention.
        Chairman Warner. I think, for the moment, we really
    shouldn't participate in any speculation. I find the current
    leaders in the Pentagon, civilian and uniform, have a full
    plate and are struggling with major issues.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Absolutely.
        Chairman Warner. So let's just go about this as any
    responsible chair and ranking member would in response to a
    very fortunate suggestion by yourself, and let's not speculate
    for the moment.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Levin. Let me also add my thanks to Senator Nelson
    for the suggestion, because it is really important that we get
    a prompt answer from the Pentagon on this allegation because of
    its seriousness.
        I want to get to this question about what rises to the top.
    Senator Collins went through a long list of items, which
    apparently were unknown to folks who were writing these
    reports. The Working Group was apparently unaware of a decade
    of--you're shaking your head. You were aware of it?
        Ms. Walker. It's all documented in the report, most of what
    she was talking about.
        Secretary Roche. But not the 1996----
        Ms. Walker. Right, not that.
        Senator Levin. But not the 1996--and that's the one I want
    to talk about, because the Fowler Panel said the following,
    that, ``In 2000, the Senate Armed Services Committee requested
    an investigation of allegations by the former Air Force surgeon
    general that sexual misconduct at the Academy in 1996 had not
    been investigated or had been covered up. The Air Force
    inspector general conducted a limited 30-day review, but did
    not investigate serious institutional problems after 1996. The
    Working Group report does not mention that 2000-to-2001 review,
    even though the Air Force IG was a member of the Working
    Group.''
        Now, is that correct?
        Ms. Walker. No. The Working Group report mentioned it--I
    believe I mentioned the page numbers that it does--at three
    different places and footnotes.
        Senator Levin. I thought that you were referring to AF-OSI
    investigation.
        Ms. Walker. The 2000 inquiry was based only on the OSI
    complaint, to my knowledge, sir. That's what it dealt with.
        Senator Levin. But the investigation of institutional
    problems in 1996 was not brought to your attention.
        Ms. Walker. Oh, no.
        Senator Levin. It was brought to your attention.
        Ms. Walker. It was not.
        Senator Levin. Okay, now, that's what I want to focus on.
        Ms. Walker. Okay.
        Senator Levin. You have the Inspector General of the Air
    Force on your Working Group. The Inspector General's office
    looked at that 1996 period, but did not bring it to the Working
    Group's attention. Is that correct? Are we together?
        Ms. Walker. That's correct.
        Senator Levin. Now, have you asked the Inspector General of
    the Air Force why did he not bring that to the Working Group's
    attention?
        Ms. Walker. I have not asked the Inspector General that. He
    only just returned, and he was out of town when this initially
    came up.
        Secretary Roche. I asked him, Senator.
        Senator Levin. What was his answer?
        Secretary Roche. He said that he was on the job for
    something like 2 weeks when he----
        Senator Levin. On which job?
        Secretary Roche. Excuse me, the job of Inspector General--2
    weeks, when he approved the answer back to the committee,
    wherein the Air Force and OSD, in 2000, the prior
    administration, viewed the letter in the most narrow of terms,
    with respect to the officer under consideration, as to whether
    there were any allegations that were substantiated on his
    behavior. But the backdrop of the entire 1996 matter was not
    looked into, and it was a shock to all of us.
        Senator Levin. The backdrop of the matter wasn't
    investigated, but the fact that there were allegations of
    sexual misconduct at the Academy in 1996, which had not been
    allegedly properly reviewed by the then--an officer then who
    was in charge, was brought to his attention.
        Secretary Roche. Yes. But it was narrowly done, that the
    allegations against this officer, whether they were
    substantiated or unsubstantiated--I have now gone back and read
    the whole----
        Senator Levin. Wasn't one of the allegations, that he took
    no action?
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir. The IG, at the time, said that
    this allegation was unsubstantiated. But they narrowed it down
    so much----
        Senator Levin. Therefore, he knew about the allegations
    that he took no action about a sexual misconduct climate at the
    Academy.
        Secretary Roche. I don't remember if it's exactly sexual
    climate, sir. All I know is that the allegations, as stated,
    were found to be unsubstantiated, but it was such a narrow look
    at the one particular officer that what surprised me was that
    someone didn't say, ``Well, wait a minute. This is in the
    context, and then the context is the problem.'' The current
    Inspector General, who was then the Inspector General, who
    signed the memo back to you, had been on the job for 2 weeks,
    and he had no memory of this 3 years later.
        Senator Levin [presiding]. Ms. Walker, since the chairman
    is not here, let me just ask a few more questions, although my
    time is up. Did your Working Group ever discuss the history of
    Air Force leadership responses to allegations of sexual assault
    against cadets at the Air Force Academy?
        Ms. Walker. The history of their responses to the
    allegations?
        Senator Levin. Right.
        Ms. Walker. In the report, we document each leader, the
    superintendent, and the commandant's dealing with the issues of
    sexual assault during their term at the Academy, and then
    there's a follow-on section in the report that deals more
    pointedly with leadership and that issue of what leadership did
    and what they knew and dealt with at the time. So, yes, I
    believe we do in the report. But, again, we do not attempt to
    make judgments on accountability. We let the facts speak for
    themselves. But it's pretty clearly laid out there, sir, I
    believe.
        Senator Levin. In January 2003, Secretary Roche, you
    directed your General Counsel to lead this high-level Working
    Group to ``review cadet complaints and the policies, programs,
    and practices of the Academy to deter and respond to incidents
    of sexual assault.'' That's the quote from the directive. Did
    you ever direct your General Counsel to limit the Working
    Group's review so that it would not assess the leadership of
    former Air Force headquarters personnel?
        Secretary Roche. The subject of former Air Force
    headquarters personnel, I don't recall that coming up. I did
    tell them to stick to their charter as they went along, because
    the parallel path that the Air Force Inspector General's work
    that we chartered them to do, was, in fact, to take a look at
    allegations against our officers at the Academy, over time. The
    subject of headquarters only comes up very late, and then there
    is the issue of, do you try to do that now or do you go and do
    it afterwards, after you have the IG report? Mainly, Senator,
    because even now the Air Force IG is looking at cases back from
    1994, 1995, 1993, in that earlier period, and you'd like to
    have that in order to be able to ask the questions of the
    leadership at that time.
        Senator Levin. What is the answer to my question, then?
        Secretary Roche. The answer to your question is, I don't
    recall ever having a discussion about limiting the
    headquarters. I did ask her to stick to her charter.
        Senator Levin. I understand that, but you never remember a
    discussion relative to not getting into or assessing the
    leadership of former Air Force headquarters personnel.
        Secretary Roche. No, sir, although it comes up as a future
    study, and I thought that was the appropriate place for it to
    be.
        Senator Levin. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner [presiding]. Secretary Roche, this is a
    hearing particularly on this issue, but, as I said, the
    committee has before it the President's nomination for you to
    become Secretary of the Army, and we are working with a number
    of people, including the White House Counsel, to sort our way
    through precedents of the respective branches of government
    pertaining to nominations. But, for the record, are you aware,
    at this time, that the Inspector General is continuing its
    investigation of the Air Force Academy problems with regard to
    the sexual assault allegations?
        Secretary Roche. Let me see if I understand you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. I just asked if you are aware that the
    Inspector General of the Department of Defense is continuing
    its investigation of the Department of the Air Force with
    regard to these problems?
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir. We have the Air Force Inspector
    General and the DOD Inspector General doing that, to end in
    December. There is a new letter from the committee asking that
    the Inspector General look at numbers of individuals, including
    General Jumper and myself.
        Chairman Warner. Yes.
        Secretary Roche. I am aware of that.
        Chairman Warner. You are aware of that. Therefore, you
    understand the problem that's before the Senate and, indeed,
    this committee that has jurisdiction with regard to that
    nomination at this time.
        Secretary Roche. Senator, I respect this committee's
    deliberations. I think you know that this position as Secretary
    of the Army is not something I asked for, but that the
    Secretary of Defense asked me to do. My preferences were
    stated. However, at this stage in history, when someone like
    Secretary Rumsfeld needs help, my sense is I have an obligation
    to help him, and I think all of us have an obligation to do
    whatever we can to help our American Army right now.
        Chairman Warner. I respect that view. The Inspector General
    has indicated to this committee, in prior correspondence, that
    he has no information of a negative sense before him now as it
    relates to you. So we're trying to work our way through that.
        But I'd draw your attention to this release by the
    Department of the Air Force on September 23, 2003, and I just
    think I'll ask that the release be given to you so you can read
    it. It relates to what's going on in the way of investigations
    in the Pentagon now. See if it comports with your
    understanding, and maybe you can explain something that's not
    clear in this.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        This is the response to question we provided to media who asked
    yesterday (Denver Post, Rocky Mountain News, and Colorado Springs
    Gazette). We did not make a release.

              Question. What is the Air Force reaction to the Fowler
            Commission's criticism of the General Counsel's Working Group
            report?
              Answer. The Working Group was originally chartered by Dr.
            Roche to evaluate ``the effectiveness and appropriateness of
            the Academy's processes to deter or respond to sexual
            assault.'' The group accordingly examined the policies,
            programs, and practices at the Air Force Academy designed to
            deter and respond to incidents of sexual assault. The Working
            Group's charter was to focus specifically on the Academy rather
            than study past Air Force Headquarters involvement in or
            accountability for Academy sexual assault issues.

        The Working Group fulfilled the Secretary's charter in a
    comprehensive, transparent manner. Preliminary feedback from the team
    and their final report formed the basis of the Secretary's and Chief of
    Staff's actions in implementing the Agenda for Change, installing a new
    leadership team imbued with a new sense of purpose at the Academy, and
    ongoing efforts to bring Academy culture in line with the core values
    of the Air Force. Additionally, as the Fowler Commission Report
    highlights, the Working Group at the conclusion of their report
    recommended further studies, to include an examination of Air Force
    Headquarters oversight of the Academy and specifically its responses to
    sexual assault. The DOD Inspector General, Air Force Inspector General,
    and the recently formed Executive Steering Group are examining other
    aspects of the sexual assault situation at the Academy and related Air
    Force Headquarters oversight.

        Secretary Roche. I don't think I've seen this, sir.
        Chairman Warner. Just take your time.
        Secretary Roche. Okay.
        Chairman Warner. It's the last sentence, and I'll just read
    it for those who do not know this.
        Secretary Roche. Yes.
        Chairman Warner. ``The DOD Inspector General, the Air Force
    Inspector General, and the recently formed Executive Steering
    Committee are examining other aspects of the sexual assault
    situation at the Academy and related Air Force headquarters
    oversight.'' That Air Force headquarters would again refer to
    the entire secretariat, would that not be correct?
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir. What this sentence is doing is
    saying that, while the Fowler Report is finished, the DOD
    Inspector General's work is not done, the Air Force Inspector
    General's work is not done. The executive steering group is----
        Chairman Warner. I don't know about that group, and that's
    the one which I would----
        Secretary Roche. The executive steering group, Mr.
    Chairman, is that mechanism we have put in place in order to
    have constant oversight of the Air Force Academy. It's the one
    that Ms. Fowler points to, commends us for doing, but then asks
    that we make it permanent and not just have it stand for a
    year.
        The remainder of the sentence having to do with related Air
    Force headquarters oversight, is the work of that executive
    steering group to ensure that there is oversight into the
    future as to what's happening at the Academy.
        Chairman Warner. But this release confirms what you've just
    likewise confirmed, with the exception of the executive
    steering group. That's a new entity, at least to this Senator.
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir. That's mentioned in the Fowler
    Report as something they want to see permanent.
        Chairman Warner. Therefore, there are three entities in the
    executive branch--namely, the Department of the Air Force, and
    one in DOD--that are examining, quite frankly, all aspects of
    this case, including your actions and that of General Jumper.
        Secretary Roche. I think narrowly, sir, the DODIG and the
    Air Force IG have a charter in place. The executive steering
    group is looking at mechanisms, management mechanisms. They're
    not looking at particular people for responsibility. They're
    looking at management mechanisms so as to preclude information
    being available at the Academy that ought to be available to
    the Chief of Staff and the Secretary.
        Chairman Warner. I understand.
        Secretary Roche. They're not investigating anyone.
        Chairman Warner. Okay, it's mixed up in that sentence the
    way it's been drawn.
        Secretary Roche. Yes, it is.
        Chairman Warner. So there's only the two entities that are
    examining this matter in a continuing examination.
        Secretary Roche. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. I thank you.
        This hearing has been a tough one for all of us, but I
    think it's important, the material we've covered. I think
    you've brought a good deal of clarity to some situations that
    many members of this committee, I think 23, are concerned about
    in the letter we expressed to the DODIG and others.
        I thank you very much for your public service and for
    coming and, in my judgment, trying the best you could to
    forthrightly and honestly respond to the questions of this
    committee.
        The record will remain open through close of business
    Thursday--I'm not sure when business closes Thursday night, but
    thereabouts--for purposes of submitting other questions by both
    the members in attendance and those who were not able to
    attend. We had very good attendance today, I might add, given
    the tremendous conflicting pressures on this body right now for
    many reasons.
        Secretary Roche. Mr. Chairman, if I may?
        Chairman Warner. Yes. Take your time.
        Secretary Roche. We are much appreciative of the fact that
    you, personally, a number of other members of this committee,
    have taken the time to help us through this. This is not
    something either of us prepared for in life. We recognize we
    don't start out with instantaneous great knowledge. Your staff
    directors have been very helpful to us, and you, in particular,
    have tried to guide both John and me in a couple of cases, and
    we want to tell you, we go back and we review what you told us,
    and we're doing our best to deal with this.
        We can assure you that as long as either of us are in
    positions of responsibility in the Air Force, we will continue
    to make this a major personal issue. I know that Ms. Walker has
    put in an enormous amount of time to try to provide us with a
    backdrop of information that we can use to judge commanders as
    you would have judged commanders when you were Secretary of the
    Navy.
        I'm an ex-ship captain. My partner here travels at a lot
    faster speed than I ever did, but we both know what it is a
    commander should do, and we will hold them accountable to that.
        Chairman Warner. I thank you for that, because, that Navy
    that both you and I love a great deal, if the captain's in the
    bunk getting needed rest and the ship goes aground, he accepts
    the accountability and the responsibility.
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. I think you're stepping up to that.
        Secretary Roche. We had a great fight today, my partner and
    I, as to who was the captain of this ship. I am the captain of
    the ship, and he claims he's the captain of the ship. Senator,
    we will both be willing to accept responsibilities as captain
    of this ship.
        Chairman Warner. I think that's a good note on which to
    conclude.
        Counselor, I admire you for your professionalism. We have
    some honest differences of views between members in the panel
    by the distinguished former congressperson, whom you respect
    the work that she did in that panel, and somehow we're going to
    sort through this in what's in the best interest of the Nation
    and this wonderful institution in which we all have such great
    pride, and the generations that are going through today.
        I, just today, was with a group of Senators, and we're just
    marveling at the quality of the men and women in the Armed
    Forces today and the responsibilities that they're accepting,
    and the courage and the hardships that they and their families
    are experiencing.
        So we have to do our best, in our respective positions of
    responsibility, to give them the support that they deserve.
        Secretary Roche. Mr. Chairman, you would be very pleased to
    know Ms. Fowler and a number of members of her commission
    haven't decided that the subject is over. They are open to us.
    They have offered to be able to help us, consult with us, and
    we'll take them up on that. There are a couple of members there
    that are really spectacular.
        Thank you very much.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. We are adjourned.
        [Additional information submitted for the record follows:]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

                            KNOWLEDGE OF ALLEGATIONS

        1. Senator McCain. Secretary Roche and General Jumper, when did you
    become aware of the problems at the Air Force Academy? Be as specific
    as possible as to the date that you were made aware of incidents in any
    way related to sexual abuse and misconduct at the Academy, beginning
    chronologically from your confirmations as Secretary and Chief of
    Staff. Also include the actions taken as a result of each incident.
        Secretary Roche. Since early in my tenure as Secretary, which began
    in June 2001, I have been aware of cultural aspects of the Air Force
    Academy that have caused me concern and which I have addressed. Most
    notably, I have been concerned that the Academy appeared to be
    relatively isolated from the rest of the Air Force, and staffed by too
    many individuals who lacked currency in Air Force operational matters.
    I have addressed a series of separate issues, and with General Jumper
    have actively worked to bring the Academy back into the Air Force.
        Regarding sexual assault and gender climate issues, although my
    office would be informed of individual Air Force Office of Special
    Investigations cases by means of brief summaries, the first indication
    I had of a significant issue regarding sexual assault at the Academy
    was a copy of a letter received in the Headquarters on 3 June 2002 from
    the attorney of a family whose 13-year-old daughter was the victim of
    sodomy by a cadet and who complained that the Academy had not handled
    the case well. The General Counsel conducted a review of the matter
    and, as a result, a number of corrective measures were initiated at the
    Academy and actions taken Air Force-wide to address concerns associated
    with the case. Also, in June 2002, I learned of an Academy English
    Department dinner that had occurred in April 2002 involving a skit
    containing wholly inappropriate sexual content. I was disturbed both by
    the incident itself, and the lack of an appropriate response by the
    leadership of that Department. General Jumper and I immediately became
    involved to correct the situation. Although there were isolated
    congressional inquiries primarily related to specific cases, including
    one requesting information about sexual assault statistics, these were
    answered routinely at the staff level and did not come to my attention.
    On January 2, 2003, I received what has become known as the Renee
    Trindle email, alleging extensive sexual assault problems at the
    Academy. We were able to reach out to the author and ask that she speak
    with us. She and another former cadet did so. I directed my General
    Counsel to establish a Working Group to examine the Academy's policies,
    programs, and practices and to make recommendations to me. Throughout
    that examination, General Jumper and I received information updates,
    concluded that immediate changes were warranted, personally developed
    an Agenda for Change, and initiated that Agenda on 26 March 2003. I
    have continued my detailed personal involvement.
        General Jumper. I became Chief of Staff of the Air Force in
    September 2001. A part of my duties includes being the direct
    supervisor of the Academy Superintendent, a lieutenant general. In that
    capacity, I had many discussions with the Superintendent and
    necessarily relied upon him to keep me informed. My other sources of
    information included the Air Staff and Secretariat. I shared concern
    with the Academy's apparent isolation from the rest of the Air Force
    and joined with him in a variety of actions to address those concerns.
    My office was informed of individual cases investigated by the Air
    Force Office of Special Investigations by means of summaries. I was
    generally aware of the concerns regarding Academy handling of the case
    involving the 13-year-old who was sodomized by a cadet, and of the
    corrective actions taken.
        In June 2002, along with the Secretary, I learned of an Academy
    English Department dinner that had occurred in April 2002 involving a
    skit containing inappropriate sexual content. I shared the Secretary's
    concern about the incident and the lack of an appropriate response by
    the leadership of that Department. We immediately became involved to
    correct the situation.
        On 28 June 2002, my office received an anonymous complaint alleging
    problems at the Academy, including sexual assault. (The letter
    indicates the Senate Armed Services Committee also received a copy
    along with others.) The anonymous complaint was referred to the Air
    Force Inspector General and the IG conducted a complaint analysis that
    determined at the time that there was not sufficient information to
    initiate a full investigation. Although there were isolated
    congressional inquiries primarily related to specific cases, including
    one requesting information about sexual assault statistics, these were
    answered at the staff level and did not come to my attention.
        On January 2, 2003, the Secretary and I received what has become
    known as the Renee Trindle email, alleging extensive sexual assault
    problems at the Academy. I agreed with the Secretary's decision to
    direct the General Counsel to establish a Working Group to examine the
    Academy's policies, programs, and practices and to make
    recommendations. Throughout that examination, we received information
    updates and agreed that immediate changes were warranted. We personally
    developed our Agenda for Change and initiated that Agenda on 26 March
    2003. The Secretary and I have continued our extensive personal
    involvement.

                                     MEDIA

        2. Senator McCain. Secretary Roche, the Fowler Report comments
    that, ``As a result of the media attention generated when the current
    scandal surfaced, the Air Force moved swiftly to address the problem of
    sexual assault at the Academy.'' The report also states that, ``the
    evidence before the panel shows that the highest levels of leadership
    had information about serious problems at the Academy, yet failed to
    take effective action.'' Why did it take media attention before you
    decided to do anything about the situation at the Academy? Do you
    believe that you reacted with expediency? Please explain your answer
    clearly.
        Secretary Roche. It did not require media attention for me to
    initiate action. I have acted decisively whenever a matter appearing to
    require my action has come to my attention. With regard to sexual
    assault issues at the Academy, as soon as I discerned institutional
    problems, I took expeditious action--and well before it was a matter of
    media attention. As soon as I became aware of issues regarding the
    handling of a case of sodomy by a cadet with a 13-year-old, I directed
    an inquiry and corrective actions. When I had indications of
    inappropriate program content of a sexual nature within the English
    Department, I took action to correct the problem and to replace the
    responsible leadership. As soon as I received an email detailing
    institutional problems at the Academy, well before media interest, I
    tasked the General Counsel to lead a multi-disciplinary group to
    address the issue and make recommendations. When initial information
    from that process--a process with which I stayed in regular contact--
    indicated that swift corrective action was required, General Jumper and
    I took action, and we have continued our personal involvement to this
    day.

                        CULTURE AT THE AIR FORCE ACADEMY

        3. Senator McCain. Secretary Roche and General Jumper, has the
    culture that has existed for over 10 years at the Air Force Academy
    resulting in a permissive environment and accepting of criminal sexual
    behavior ``graduated'' in to the officer corps?
        Secretary Roche. First, I must take issue with the broad
    generalization embodied in the question. It implies that the cadets of
    the last 10 years, men and women, are generally accepting of criminal
    sexual behavior. That is not the case. While we have identified
    significant concerns, all that we know indicates those concerns apply
    to a small minority of the men and women who have attended the
    Academy--and that the vast majority internalize and exemplify the core
    values and high standards of the Air Force for integrity, excellence,
    and service. As for the minority who may not have ``gotten the Air
    Force message'' at the Academy in the past, I have every reason to
    believe that it must have been brought home to them when they entered
    the Air Force at large. Our commanders simply will not tolerate less
    than equality of treatment and respect for each other. For those who
    will not conform to Air Force standards, corrective action is taken.
        General Jumper. I do not accept the implication that the cadets of
    the last 10 years, men or women, are generally accepting of criminal
    sexual behavior. I agree with that, while we have identified
    significant concerns, those concerns apply to a minority of the men and
    women who have attended the Academy--and the vast majority internalize
    and exemplify the core values of the Air Force of integrity,
    excellence, and service. To the extent there have been cadets who
    graduated without internalizing the values of the Air Force, I am
    confident they have discovered that there is no place in the Air Force
    for such attitudes. The very small minority who may not practice our
    values will continue to be weeded out.

        4. Senator McCain. Secretary Roche and General Jumper, what have
    you done to verify that it has not?
        Secretary Roche. I have discussed these issues extensively with the
    appropriate senior leadership of the Air Force, including the Assistant
    Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) (SAF/MR), the
    major command commanders, the Inspector General, the Judge Advocate
    General, and others. I have tasked SAF/MR to examine the Air Force
    processes relevant to sexual assault and that examination is underway.
    I have tasked the Inspector General to include sexual assault and
    harassment as a special interest item in all Inspector General
    evaluations and to report back to me.
        General Jumper. I have participated with the Secretary in the
    discussions with the senior leadership of the Air Force, and concurred
    with the taskings to SAF/MR and the Inspector General that he related
    to you in his written response. In addition, we have directed an
    examination of the oversight role of the Air Force headquarters as it
    relates to sexual assault and harassment issues throughout the Air
    Force. This falls under the guidance of the SAF/MR.

        5. Senator McCain. Secretary Roche and General Jumper, what have
    you done about cases where an alleged criminal has been commissioned?
    Please explain fully.
        Secretary Roche. I know of no specific cases in which a convicted
    criminal has been commissioned. I am aware of several cases where
    accusations have been made, and for a variety of reasons ranging from
    recantation by a witness, to acquittal, or the evidence otherwise being
    determined by the command authorities to be insufficient to prevent
    commissioning, those cadets have been subsequently commissioned. I have
    asked the Inspector General to examine each of those cases in which a
    cadet accused of sexual assault has subsequently graduated and been
    commissioned. I will consider the results of those reviews when they
    are completed. In the meantime, I believe it is appropriate to
    recognize that the protections of due process apply to members on
    active duty with the Air Force as well.
        General Jumper. I share the views of Secretary Roche and support
    his actions.

                               ``WORKING GROUPS''

        6. Senator McCain. Ms. Walker, you released in a statement after
    the Fowler Report was released that you were following orders from
    Secretary Roche when you focused the Working Group's investigation on
    procedures followed at the Academy, and not actions taken up the chain
    of command within the Air Force. Were you specifically told not to
    review actions by Secretary Roche and General Jumper, even though their
    actions or inactions clearly have a bearing on this serious matter?
        Ms. Walker. I was not told to avoid review of the actions of
    Secretary Roche and General Jumper. However, I did not have a reason to
    believe such a review was necessary. I was given a specific charter to
    examine the policies, programs, and practices of the Academy, and I was
    told not to address Academy leadership accountability issues. That was
    being addressed by other reviews that would be provided to the
    Secretary and the Chief. I was aware throughout most of the course of
    the Working Group's activities that the Air Force Inspector General was
    examining individual cases (indeed I recommended it), the Fowler
    Commission was also charged with accountability issues, and that the
    Department of Defense Inspector General was conducting oversight of the
    Air Force activities, and had itself undertaken responsibility for an
    examination of accountability issues.

        7. Senator McCain. Ms. Walker, it is further reported that
    subordinates in your Working Group included information related to the
    2000 inquiry and high-level officials' involvement only to have it
    removed by you. Why would you remove any information that is relevant
    to your investigation? Please explain fully.
        Ms. Walker. There were many drafts of the report and each was
    edited by several people, including me. I did not remove information
    from drafts of the report that I considered relevant to the Working
    Group's tasking and which was adequately substantiated. My objective,
    and the Secretary's instructions to me, was to keep to the Working
    Group's charter, avoid unsubstantiated statements or unsupported
    conclusions, and to keep the report to a reasonable length. Where the
    Working Group, the staff team, or the other editors, including me,
    suggested changes or omitted information for one or more of the reasons
    noted, and after consultation with the Secretary, we attempted to
    document areas we did not address that were deserving of additional
    study (including the Air Force Headquarters' past and future role in
    sexual assault issues). The 2000 discussions on the confidential
    reporting system were specifically described in the report.

        8. Senator McCain. Secretary Roche, why did you put limitations on
    the scope of the Working Group's review? Please explain fully.
        Secretary Roche. The Working Group was chartered to perform a
    specific function, to assist General Jumper and me in examining the
    policies, programs, and practices in effect at the Academy in the
    context of the cadet complaints and, where appropriate, to make
    recommendations for change. It was, consciously and deliberately, an
    Air Force staff function to address the present problems, not an
    accountability review. Early on in that process, I tasked the Air Force
    Inspector General, under Department of Defense Inspector General
    oversight, to examine specific allegations by victims and others,
    intending them to follow those leads wherever it took them. In
    addition, I note that by April 2003 I was aware of and welcomed the
    proposal for an independent panel to review the Air Force work and to
    address accountability issues. Further, I was in communication with the
    Department of Defense Inspector General and knew, as stated in his 2
    May 2003 memorandum, that he was undertaking an examination of
    accountability issues. I needed information and recommendations quickly
    to work the issues. I also believed it would not be appropriate for the
    Working Group to address accountability issues that would have included
    the headquarters' past involvement.

                            INFORMATION FOR VICTIMS

        9. Senator McCain. Secretary Roche, do you feel it is appropriate
    for an alleged victim of a crime to be informed of the results of
    disciplinary action taken against the accused? Explain your answer
    fully.
        Secretary Roche. I believe it is appropriate for an alleged victim
    of a crime to be informed of the result of the disciplinary action
    taken against the accused to the extent permitted by law. I directed
    the General Counsel to revise Air Force instructions to allow the
    fullest disclosure of information under current law to victims, and
    that effort is underway. In this regard, I note that the Privacy Act,
    as interpreted by the courts, significantly restricts the information
    that may be provided. I also note that in passage of the Victim and
    Witness Protection Act of 1980 and the Victims Rights and Restoration
    Act of 1990, Congress did not provide exceptions to the Privacy Act to
    ameliorate this result. I believe this issue would be worthy of
    congressional attention.

                                 ACCOUNTABILITY

        10. Senator McCain. General Jumper, if there was a disciplinary or
    professional breakdown in a military organization, how far up the chain
    of command do you feel is accountable for that breakdown? Explain your
    answer fully.
        General Jumper. I believe that any determination of this nature
    must be made on a case-by-case basis. Considerations that would be
    relevant at any level of supervision include: the individual's
    involvement in the problem; the individual's awareness of the issue;
    whether the individual impeded reporting or contributed to a lack of
    awareness; and, the extent to which it was or was not reasonable for a
    superior to have relied upon a subordinate (including the relative
    seniority and experience of the subordinate).

        11. Senator McCain. Secretary Roche and General Jumper, what, if
    anything, have either of you done with respect to the decision to award
    Colonel Slavec a Meritorious Service Medal for service that appears to
    be anything but meritorious while she was assigned to the Academy?
    Please explain your answer fully.
        Secretary Roche. I have asked, through the Assistant Secretary of
    the Air Force (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), for the Air Force
    Decorations Board to review this matter and make a recommendation
    regarding it.
        General Jumper. I am aware of, and agree with, Secretary Roche's
    actions.

        12. Senator McCain. Secretary Roche and General Jumper, should
    military leaders be excused for failing to take appropriate action to
    protect the safety of their subordinates from a threatening situation
    for which the leader has responsibility? Does being busy excuse that
    leader from being held accountable?
        Secretary Roche. Such determinations must be made on a case-by-case
    basis. As a general matter, a principal responsibility of military
    leaders is the safety of their subordinates. Evaluation of an
    individual's discharge of this responsibility turns on whether the acts
    or omissions of the leader were appropriate under all of the
    circumstances (including what actions the leader did take to avoid such
    threatening situations).
        General Jumper. I agree with Secretary Roche. Such determinations
    must be made on a case-by-case basis. As a general matter, a principal
    responsibility of military leaders is the safety of their subordinates.
    Evaluation of an individual's discharge of this responsibility turns on
    whether the acts or omissions of the leader were appropriate under all
    of the circumstances.

        13. Senator McCain. Secretary Roche and General Jumper, how do your
    own actions with respect to the Academy comply with your answer to my
    last question? Please explain fully.
        Secretary Roche. I am satisfied that I have acted appropriately
    regarding these matters. Please see my responses to earlier questions.
    I serve at the pleasure of the Secretary of Defense and the President.
        General Jumper. I believe that I have acted appropriately in these
    matters. Please see my responses to earlier questions. I serve at the
    pleasure of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary of Defense,
    and the President and will respect their determinations.

                            SUMMER CAMP ASSAULT CASE

        14. Senator McCain. Secretary Roche, in your statement you discuss
    the case of a 13-year-old female who was sexually victimized by a 22-
    year-old cadet as though it is a success story. When questioned about
    it in the hearing, you cast the entire event in a far more negative
    light. Please review your testimony. Which is it? Please explain your
    answer fully.
        Secretary Roche. There is no success story when a child is
    tragically victimized by an adult. In terms of the Academy's response
    to the incident, there were good and regrettable elements. Of
    particular note, on the positive side, was the initiative and
    professionalism of Air Force Office of Special Investigations personnel
    who became aware of a potential crime and, despite the absence of a
    complaint, pursued the matter to conviction of the culprit. On the
    regrettable side were shortfalls in the prosecution, including
    communication and involvement with the family. I believe that when the
    concerns of the family became known at the Headquarters Air Force level
    they received careful attention, and corrective actions were
    implemented to reduce the chances of recurrence of similar problems at
    the Academy and elsewhere in the Air Force.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

                       AIR FORCE RESPONSE TO ALLEGATIONS

        15. Senator Akaka. Secretary Roche, I have read the ``Report of the
    Panel to Review Sexual Misconduct Allegations at the United States Air
    Force Academy'' that was published by the independent panel chaired by
    Congresswoman Fowler and also attended the hearing held by the Senate
    Armed Services Committee on September 24, 2003 in which Congresswoman
    Fowler discussed the panel findings on the review of sexual assault
    allegations at the United States Air Force Academy. I was appalled to
    find out about the sexual assaults targeted at women at the Air Force
    Academy and to learn of the attitude, particularly by Academy officers,
    that resulted in a culture which encouraged and perpetuated such
    behavior. What steps are you taking now to ensure this type of behavior
    and institutional culture of intolerance is no longer tolerated at the
    Air Force Academy?
        Secretary Roche. We have been engaged on a concerted course to
    solve these problems, beginning with General Jumper's and my ``Agenda
    for Change'' issued on 26 March 2003. The Report of the Air Force
    Working Group made 36 recommendations for change, and identified 12
    areas for additional study. Each of these areas is receiving close
    attention. In addition, we have had the benefit of the Fowler
    Commission report, studied it carefully, and are using it to refine our
    way ahead. We replaced most of the top leadership slate of the Air
    Force Academy and have an exceptional team of officers in place leading
    the changes there. They have identified additional areas that they are
    working, and have established an Academy team to ensure that corrective
    actions are carried through to completion. We are closely monitoring
    our progress. We're totally focused on changing the adverse aspects of
    the Academy culture and building on the best of the institution. We've
    drastically changed our processes to support victims of sexual assault
    and are giving close attention to investigation of and responses to
    allegations of sexual assault. The entire Academy program is undergoing
    changes, from improvements to the living environment to enhanced
    leadership courses, with constant emphasis on respect for and loyalty
    to values. The new Superintendent has accomplished a survey of cadets
    that was coordinated with Air Force experts in these matters, and the
    results have shown us where we're making progress, and confirmed areas
    that still need work. We have had the benefit of similar assistance
    from the Department of Defense Inspector General. At the Headquarters,
    I've put the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower and Reserve
    Affairs) in charge of an executive oversight process, to ensure ongoing
    awareness, assessment, and guidance by the Headquarters. He is
    implementing a structure to provide this oversight into the future, and
    through changes in leadership and administrations. We are working with
    the Board of Visitors to strengthen that process, and we have proposed
    legislation to assist in that regard and to improve the way we select
    academic leaders for the Academy. We are totally committed to making
    the fine institution that is the Air Force Academy a place that all
    Americans can view with unmitigated pride.

        16. Senator Akaka. Secretary Roche, do you believe the processes
    you have put in place for the Air Force Academy would be relevant to
    the other Service Academies?
        Secretary Roche. I must defer to the respective Services'
    leadership and the Department of Defense. However, we have shared our
    lessons learned with the other Services and we are all actively
    exchanging information so that we can benefit from each other's
    experiences.

                            REPRISAL AGAINST VICTIMS

        17. Senator Akaka. Secretary Roche and General Jumper, I was
    disturbed to read in the independent panel report that cadets were
    afraid to report sexual misconduct because of the fear of reprisal,
    discrimination, or harassment. The report states that the Air Force has
    taken a number of steps to address this problem. Can you outline the
    steps the Air Force took to address this problem?
        Secretary Roche. Please see my reply to question number 15.
    Particularly relevant to this aspect are the creation of the Academy
    Response Team and the institution of policies designed to provide
    cadets confidence that they will be treated fairly when they report
    sexual assault. The Academy Response Team is a multi-disciplinary group
    led by the Vice Commandant, a colonel well-trained and experienced in
    these issues. The primary focus is taking care of victims and
    encouraging reporting. Part of this is strenuous measures to ensure the
    victim's privacy, and an amnesty program designed to alleviate concern
    by victims that either they, or the cadets who are witnesses, will be
    the subjects of discipline for violations of Academy rules that are
    revealed in the course of reporting sexual assault. The leadership team
    at the Academy has also focused on a variety of measures designed to
    change an unhealthy emphasis in Academy culture on loyalty to peers,
    rather than loyalty to institutional values, an aberration that has led
    to harassment of those who report sexual assault. We are sending a
    strong message that reprisal, discrimination, and harassment have no
    place in the Academy or in the rest of the Air Force.
        General Jumper. I concur in Secretary Roche's response. The
    Secretary and I have repeatedly traveled to the Air Force Academy to
    forcefully emphasize our personal messages to the cadets that such
    conduct will not be tolerated.

        18. Senator Akaka. Secretary Roche and General Jumper, do you
    believe fear of reprisal is still a problem at the Academy?
        Secretary Roche. Leadership is making inroads but it requires
    constant vigilance. I believe that fear of reprisal has been
    significantly reduced at the Academy as a result of the corrective
    measures we have taken. However, I do not believe that it has been
    eliminated by any means. This is a process that has only begun and will
    require concerted and constant attention. We are committed to this
    course over the long term.
        General Jumper. I agree with the views expressed by Secretary
    Roche.

        [Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., the committee adjourned.]