[Senate Hearing 108-63]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-63
SAFER EMBASSIES IN UNSAFE PLACES
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 20, 2003
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire Virginia
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared
statement...................................................... 3
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, statement
submitted for the record....................................... 101
Ford, Mr. Jess T., Director, International Affairs and Trade,
U.S. General Accounting Office [GAO], Washington, DC........... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Taylor, Hon. Francis X., Assistant Secretary of State for
Diplomatic Security and the Office of Foreign Missions,
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 82
Prepared statement........................................... 85
Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator
Biden...................................................... 102
Williams, Maj. Gen. Charles E. (Ret.), Director and Chief
Operating Officer, Overseas Buildings Operations Bureau,
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 26
Prepared statement........................................... 31
Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator
Biden...................................................... 107
(iii)
SAFER EMBASSIES IN UNSAFE PLACES
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THURSDAY, MARCH 20, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m. in room
S-116 The Capitol, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the
committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Sununu, and Sarbanes.
The Chairman. The hearing is called to order. Let me
indicate that given the timing and circumstances, and to
expedite the hearing, I will make an opening statement, and
then Senator Biden will be recognized for an opening statement
whenever he is able to come over here. At 2:45 my understanding
is that the President of the United States will speak on the
war, and so we are grateful for the monitor that you have
provided or required for your testimony, because it will serve
a dual purpose today, and it could very well be that by the
time I have completed my opening statement, it may be time to
turn to the monitor for the President's speech.
Following the President, I will call upon our witnesses for
their opening statements, and then we will have questions from
committee members. And as you all understand, we have a
vigorous debate going on on the floor and that is one reason
for situating our hearing here, where people can be close to
the floor for votes or other activity.
We welcome you today. And today the Foreign Relations
Committee gathers to discuss the security of our embassies
overseas. With our military forces engaged in Iraq and the
terrorism threat level raised to high, it is appropriate that
we take up this subject.
Terrorists who seek to harm the United States but who lack
the means to directly attack our homeland have often shifted
their focus to United States diplomatic posts overseas. Recent
attacks on our diplomatic facilities in Karachi, Pakistan, and
Kabul, Afghanistan, as well as the daily warnings sent to our
posts throughout the world remind us that our diplomats are on
the front lines in the war on terrorism.
Being a United States diplomat today demands enormous
courage and dedication. The murder of USAID executive officer
Lawrence Foley last October in Jordan demonstrated the extreme
risk that our diplomats encounter every day as they represent
the United States. It is essential that the Congress, the
President, and the State Department remain committed to
protecting our diplomats and our government representatives
overseas to the maximum extent possible.
The 1983 and 1984 attacks on the United States embassy and
the annex in Beirut and the horrific double bombing of our
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 led to the
commissioning of the Inman report and the Crowe report by the
State Department to examine the security needs of our
diplomatic missions. Many of the recommendations contained in
those reports remain integral parts of today's construction
planning.
Since 1998, the State Department has embarked on a long
term project to replace rather than to merely upgrade many of
our most vulnerable facilities overseas. The money set aside
for replacing posts has grown from just $9.5 million in 1998 to
an estimated $861 million for the current fiscal year. As we
build new embassies, however, we have to recognize that we
cannot turn our buildings into concrete bunkers that are
physically and psychologically removed from the world capitals
in which our diplomats must work. Indeed, many of our older
embassies are located in busy urban areas close to streets.
Achieving the goal of embassy security is complicated by
the fact that an embassy's purpose is to facilitate contact
with the host country. The task of securing embassies,
therefore, will require great creativity, and the application
of new technologies and better construction methods.
Investments in embassy security are paying dividends.
Throughout the world the State Department has worked closely
with host countries to improve the security of our diplomatic
missions. Although the suicide bombing in Karachi last June
tragically killed 10 Pakistanis on the outside of the embassy
and two Pakistani consulate guards, no one inside the compound
was seriously injured thanks to prudent and timely steps taken
to safeguard the building.
While much has been accomplished, much obviously remains to
be done. It is estimated that 80 percent of the State
Department's overseas facilities do not meet the security
standards that were recommended in the mid-1980s. Significant
resources must be devoted to securing our embassies, even in an
era of tight budgets and pressing security needs at home. This
is important not only for the safety of United States
personnel, but also for accomplishing the mission of the State
Department. If we want to encourage senior Foreign Service
officers, many of whom have families, to bid on hardship posts,
we must ensure that our facilities are secure.
It is a great pleasure today to welcome a panel of
witnesses we have assembled to discuss the ongoing efforts to
improve the safety of U.S. diplomatic personnel overseas.
Testifying before us today will be Jess Ford, the Director of
the General Accounting Office's International Affairs and Trade
Division. The GAO has devoted an extensive study to the problem
of embassy security, and it has been an indispensable resource
on this subject for the Foreign Relations Committee, and we are
eager to hear Mr. Ford's report.
We are also most fortunate to have General Charles E.
Williams, Director of the State Department's Bureau of Overseas
Building Operations, and Ambassador Francis X. Taylor,
Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security. The
committee looks forward to hearing from General Williams and
Assistant Secretary Taylor what has been accomplished over the
past several years that they have witnessed, as well as what
they judge to be the most pressing needs for the future.
This concludes my opening statement and introduction of the
panel. And as I say, we would at this point in the record
insert Senator Biden's statement, so that that will be a part
of the permanent record, and each of your statements will be
published in full, so that you need not ask permission for that
to occur. And as I recognize you in the order I have mentioned
in the introduction, please in your own words tell your story,
and then we will respond.
Having said all of that, it appears to be, as we predicted,
about 2:44. I do not know how prompt the White House will be.
They were the other night, and broadcast at exactly 8, so we
hope our technicians will obtain a picture of the President of
the United States in just a few seconds.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, I commend you for convening this hearing. Although we
are now engaged in military conflict, we must remain focused on the
threat of al-Qaeda, which remains a clear and still present danger. We
know, through bitter experience, that American embassies are targets
for the terrorists.
There is no such thing as perfect security. But we must do
everything possible to protect our people who are serving abroad.
Four years ago, after assessing the tragic embassy bombings in East
Africa, review boards chaired by retired Admiral William Crowe found
that there was a ``collective failure of the U.S. government'' over the
previous decade in failing to provide adequate resources to protect
U.S. embassies.
The report made several recommendations, some of which were similar
to those made by an advisory panel chaired by Admiral Bobby Inman
fourteen years before.
Following the Crowe report, this committee responded by developing
legislation, enacted in 1999, which authorized $4.5 billion for embassy
security construction from fiscal 2000 through fiscal 2004. The
legislation also codified several of the Crowe recommendations,
including the requirement of 100-foot setback for all new embassies and
that all new U.S. facilities be co-located on the embassy compound.
Today, we must ask these questions: What is the current state of
embassy security? What have we accomplished in the last four years? Are
we implementing the Crowe recommendations and the law enacted in 1999?
Do we need to revisit the standards adopted after the 1998
bombings, given the changes in the threat of global terrorism? Is the
funding in the President's budget sufficient?
Secretary of State Powell, like Secretary Albright before him, is
committed to providing protection for his people. Secretary Powell has
hired a strong team in General Williams and General Taylor.
Much has been done since the late 1990s. But much work remains. We
still have significant vulnerabilities. The large majority of our
facilities do not meet the minimum requirements for setback. Many posts
do not meet standards for perimeter security.
Our task is complicated by what we now clearly understand: the al-
Qaeda network has a global reach.
Every diplomatic mission, therefore, must now be considered a
target. There is no such thing as a ``low threat'' post. Furthermore,
the recent attack on the AID employee, Mr. Foley, outside his home in
Amman, Jordan, demonstrates that terrorists are beginning to look for
``soft targets.''
The Department has plans to construct over 160 new embassies over
the next 12 years. To support these essential efforts, we need a
significant infusion of resources.
To its credit, the administration is proposing a sensible cost-
sharing plan--to extend capital construction costs to other government
agencies. But the budget otherwise falls short of what is needed.
The President's budget for embassy security provides $890 million
to construct eight new facilities, which is clearly insufficient.
At this pace, it will take twenty years, not twelve, to replace all
the embassies identified by the Department. The Department's own long-
range plan contemplates roughly $1.6 billion for construction in fiscal
year 2004; the President's budget is well below that amount.
We cannot avoid this simple fact: security costs money. We must
devote adequate resources to the task.
I welcome our witnesses today. I know that the two retired generals
before us who have continued their public service at the State
Department are dedicated to protecting their colleagues. I hope this
committee, and this Congress, will give them the tools that they need.
The Chairman. Senator Sununu, do you have any opening
comment or welcome to our guests today?
Senator Sununu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Certainly I would
like to say welcome to the general. I was pleased to be able to
take some time taking a look at the terrific plans and level of
success of some of the early work in the construction program
when I was a member of the Budget Committee in the House. It is
wonderful to see you again, and in some ways under unfortunate
circumstances, but during a time that just emphasizes how
important the security is all over the world for embassy
personnel and their families. Good to see you again.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, we may have been misinformed. Maybe the
President is not going to speak at 2:45. Whenever he does speak
we will obviously watch, but in the meanwhile, if you would
proceed with your testimony, Mr. Ford, that would be great.
STATEMENT OF JESS T. FORD, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND
TRADE, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE [GAO], WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is going to take
about 15 minutes, so please, anytime you want me to stop----
The Chairman. I understand. I apologize for these unusual
circumstances.
Mr. Ford. That's OK, perfectly fine.
I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on
security and the overall conditions of U.S. diplomatic
facilities around the world. U.S. personnel at our embassies
and consulates are on the front lines, often serving in
dangerous locations, and they must rely heavily on law
enforcement and security measures of the foreign country in
which they are located.
As we think about the threats facing our military in the
Middle East, as well as the terrorist threats here at home, we
need to keep in mind that the U.S. Government employs thousands
of people overseas at over 254 locations, and that they, too,
face serious threats.
Mr. Chairman, I plan to walk through some slides and some
videos, some brief videos that we have assembled. Hopefully it
will show up on the monitor back there. About 5 years ago, in
1998, terrorist bombings of the two embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania highlighted the compelling need for safe and secure
overseas facilities. This slide \1\ shows the U.S. Embassy in
Tanzania both before and after that bombing, and the picture on
the right shows the extensive damage that a terrorist bomb can
do to our facilities.
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\1\ Many of the slides and photos Mr. Ford discusses in his
testimony are reproduced in his prepared statement which begins on page
9.
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In November 1999, the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel said
that thousands of Americans representing our Nation abroad
faced an unacceptable level of risk from terrorist attacks. The
panel concluded that many facilities were insecure, decrepit,
deteriorating, and overcrowded, and it recommended a major
capital improvement program to address these problems.
Today, I will focus my comments on the security conditions
at U.S. embassies and consulates, and on the State Department's
efforts to enhance building security, which emphasizes the
construction of new, secure replacement facilities. I will also
comment on the management actions taken by the State
Department's Bureau for Overseas Building Operations which is
responsible for building the security upgrades and the new
facilities.
My comments on facilities security are based on analysis of
State Department data and our recent visit to four overseas
posts. For security reasons, I am not identifying these posts.
My observations regarding State's facility construction program
and its management are based on our ongoing work, which we
initiated at your request and which we plan to report on later
this year.
Before I discuss the results of our work in detail, I want
to explain some of the State Department's security standards
and why they are so important. The Department has identified 5
key security standards for overseas diplomatic facilities to
protect them against terrorism and other dangers.
The first standard the State Department believes is
essential is that office facilities should be at least 100 feet
from uncontrolled areas such as streets where vehicles can pass
without first being checked by security officials. This setback
is to protect buildings and occupants against bomb blasts, mob
attacks, and other threats.
Our first video clip from the State Department shows a test
blast from 100 feet away. As you can see, the blast wave
strikes the test structure with substantial force. However, the
setback keeps the structure out of the blast fireball. A
structure closer to that blast would not only be within the
fireball, but would also receive substantial greater force from
the blast.
The second and third standards are strong perimeter walls
and anti-ram barriers to keep vehicles from breaching the
facility perimeter to get close to buildings before they can
detonate a bomb. The next two videos show tests of anti-ram
barriers and perimeter walls. The test truck is traveling at 50
miles an hour. These walls and barriers are included in all new
embassies under construction and, where feasible, have been
included in State's upgraded security at existing facilities.
The fourth standard requires blast-resistant construction
techniques and materials. Coupled with the 100-foot setback,
this standard provides the best possible protection against
vehicle bomb attack, according to diplomatic security
officials.
The next video illustrates the importance of blast
resistance. The video is taken from inside a test structure
that is 100 feet away from an explosion of the same size shown
earlier. Although the windows have been treated with mylar to
prevent glass from shattering, the building is not blast
resistant. As you can see, the blast force pushes the windows
into the occupied space at a high rate of speed, and causes
significant damage. Blast resistant buildings are designed to
protect against this threat.
The State Department's fifth security standard is
controlled access at perimeter of a compound. At this
controlled access point guards can screen personnel and
vehicles before they enter the embassy compound to verify that
they have no weapons before they can enter the compound.
Mr. Chairman, the State Department has done much over the
last 4 years to improve physical security at overseas posts.
The State Department has constructed perimeter walls and anti-
ram barriers of the kind I just showed and access controls at
many facilities. It has obtained host government approval to
close off nearby streets at many locations, and it has
implemented many other security measures. As of September 2002,
the State Department had completed security upgrades at 113
posts. It had installed mylar window film protection and
enforced entry ballistic resistant doors at another 242 posts.
At all four posts that we recently visited, we observed
many of these recent upgrades. For example, the slide now being
shown shows a new compound access control that was recently
installed at one of the embassies we visited. This permits
effective screening of people and vehicles before they enter
the embassy.
At three of the other posts, local authorities had
permitted the closing of streets to public traffic in order to
protect the facility. However, diplomatic security officials
acknowledge it is not feasible to increase setback by closing
off streets at many other locations. Furthermore, these
officials have told us that upgrades are only partial fixes
that did not bring the buildings up to their overall standards.
In many cases, it is not possible to upgrade existing buildings
to meet all of the standards, such as setback and blast
resistance.
Our analysis of the State Department's data shows that the
primary office building at 232 posts did not meet one or more
of the State Department's 5 key standards that I just
mentioned. As a result, many thousands of employees may be at
risk.
This slide shows the number of primary facilities that meet
the key standard. As shown on the far left, at 81 overseas
posts the primary building meets none of the State Department's
5 key standards. Only 12 posts overseas currently have
buildings that meet all 5 standards.
We have prepared a large display over to my right which
shows this analysis in another way. What we have done is we
have examined four of the standards. We have omitted the one on
blast resistance for security reasons. This display shows the
extent to which facilities meet each of the four other
standards. Above the line are the number of buildings that meet
the standard, and below the line, the red, are the number of
buildings that do not meet each of those standards.
The Chairman. Mr. Ford, what is the total number of
buildings?
Mr. Ford. The total universe of our analysis is 254 major
buildings overseas. In the example, just to point out an
example on the left, the 100-foot setback shows that only 11
percent of the buildings----
The Chairman. Out of 254.
Mr. Ford. That is about 28 buildings.
Our visits to the four posts last month provide numerous
examples of the serious physical security deficiencies. The
main building at each post does not meet setback standards and
is virtually perched on the street. Here is an example of a
U.S. embassy that does not have the 100-foot setback. It is
located very close to a public street, and public traffic,
including trucks and buses, routinely pass by.
Annex buildings at the posts we visited had even more
serious security problems. Three posts had annex buildings
without any setbacks. Here is another example of one of those
buildings. The picture shows the back of an embassy annex
building. It has little or no setback on any of its four sides,
and there is a public gas station on one side that could
potentially exacerbate the bomb blast, the force of a bomb.
Now that we have shown building vulnerabilities, I now want
to comment on the State Department's plan to implement a
multiyear, multibillion dollar construction program. I show on
the next slide that Congress has appropriated substantial funds
since 1998 embassy bombings to improve diplomatic facilities.
From 1998 through 2003, approximately $3.5 billion has been
appropriated.
The slide also shows that the State Department has shifted
its resources from implementing upgrades, as I mentioned
earlier, to constructing new buildings and substantially
retrofitting existing newly acquired or leased buildings. For
example, in 1999, about half of the $692 million provided by
Congress went for security upgrades and about half for
construction projects. In 2003, the State Department plans to
spend about 80 percent of its money on capital construction
projects.
In addition to completing construction in this way, State
believes it needs to place facilities at about another 160
posts. State's current long range plan, prepared in April 2002,
calls for funding of 81 replacement facilities from fiscal year
2002 through 2007. As shown in the next slide, the majority of
these projects are planned for posts in Africa and Europe. For
example, the State Department plans to replace 23 facilities in
Europe by fiscal year 2007 at an estimated cost of about $2.3
billion.
The State Department has completed construction on six
projects in Uganda, Qatar, Tunisia, Fiji, Kenya, and Tanzania.
Over the next 4 years, State plans to complete another 34
posts, including 11 in 2005 and 11 in 2006.
At your request, Mr. Chairman, we are currently reviewing
the State Department's capacity and performance in implementing
this program. Two important questions that we plan to address
are whether or not the construction of the embassies and
consulates is proceeding on time and on budget, and whether the
State Department and its contractors----
[Interruption from television monitor.]
The Chairman. Let's suspend here.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. I apologize for the delay.
Mr. Ford. That is OK. That's fine.
Although the State Department is in the early stages of its
expanded construction program and our work is just underway, we
do have several preliminary observations to make. First, the
State Department has made a number of positive changes in its
management of capital projects. It has developed a long range
overseas building plan, an action that we had previously
recommended.
This plan represents a major improvement in the management
of embassy construction because it provides decisionmakers with
an overall sense of the projected project scope and funding
needs, and it sets performance targets that can be compared
with actual performance. In addition, senior State Department
management has increased its oversight. For example, every
month, General Williams holds a 2-day meeting to review every
one of these projects.
The State Department is also taking steps to accelerate the
construction process, reduce construction costs and further
enhance security of new buildings. For example, the State
Department has developed a standard embassy design for use in
many projects, and has moved toward a design-build method for
contracting.
The use of a standard design and design-build contracting
has the potential to reduce project costs and timeframes. State
has set a goal of a 2-year design and construction period for
each of its embassies which, if met, could reduce the amount of
time in design and construction by almost a year. State has
also instituted an industry advisory panel to help ensure that
it follows the best practices the private sector has to offer.
In addition, the State Department and the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security are seeking to incorporate new technologies
into the construction program. We now have a video that shows
the performance of a new window and building material
technology. In contrast to technology we showed earlier, where
the windows were blown into the work space, in this test the
windows bounce outwards after being struck by the blast. This
new technology shows a lot of promise in providing even greater
protection for personnel in new buildings.
State's time line for completing the replacement of all 160
remaining posts will depend on the amount of money we receive
for the construction program and how well the Overseas Building
Operations Bureau and its contractors are able to perform. The
President has requested $890 million in fiscal year 2004 to
build embassies at eight posts. As shown at the next slide,
assuming funding levels based at the fiscal year 2004 level, it
would take about 20 years to fund the replacement program.
This time line, which is represented in the red, could be
shortened if the State Department receives more funds.
According to the Office of Building Overseas projection, the
program to replace the remaining 160 posts could be completed
in about 12 years if it receives about $1.4 billion annually
for capital projects.
Because of the high cost and the importance of providing
safe facilities as quickly as possible, we believe this program
will warrant continued oversight.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I will be glad
to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and
Trade, United States General Accounting Office [GAO]
WHY GAO DID THIS STUDY
The 1998 terrorist bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania, which killed more than 220 people and injured 4,000,
highlighted the compelling need for safe and secure overseas
facilities. In November 1999, an independent advisory group, the
Overseas Presence Advisory Panel, said that thousands of Americans
representing our nation abroad faced an unacceptable level of risk from
terrorist attacks and other threats. The panel called for accelerating
the process of addressing security risks to provide overseas staff with
the safest working environment, consistent with the nation's resources
and the demands of their missions. Moreover, the panel concluded that
many U.S. overseas facilities were insecure, decrepit, deteriorating,
overcrowded, and ``shockingly shabby,'' and it recommended major
capital improvements to redress these problems.
GAO was asked to (1) assess the current conditions of overseas
diplomatic facilities, including security, maintenance, office space,
and information technology; and (2) provide some preliminary
observations regarding State's efforts to improve facility conditions
by replacing existing buildings with new, secure embassy compounds.
[March 20, 2003]
Overseas Presence
CONDITIONS OF OVERSEAS DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES
What GAO Found
The State Department has done much over the last 4 years to improve
physical security at overseas posts. For example, State has constructed
perimeter walls, anti-ram barriers, and access controls at many
facilities. However, even with these improvements, most office
facilities do not meet security standards. As of December 2002, the
primary office building at 232 posts lacked desired security because it
did not meet one or more of State's five key current security standards
of (1) 100-foot setback between office facilities and uncontrolled
areas; (2) perimeter walls and/or fencing; (3) anti-ram barriers; (4)
blast-resistant construction techniques and materials; and (5)
controlled access at the perimeter of the compound. Only 12 posts have
a primary building that meets all 5 standards. As a result, thousands
of U.S. government and foreign national employees may be vulnerable to
terrorist attacks. Moreover, many of the primary office buildings at
embassies and consulates are in poor condition. In fact, the primary
office building at more than half of the posts does not meet certain
fire/life safety standards. State estimates that there is a backlog of
about $730 million in maintenance at overseas facilities; officials
stated that maintenance costs would increase over time because of the
age of many buildings. At least 96 posts have reported serious
overcrowding.
While State continues to fund some security upgrades at embassies
and consulates, State is shifting its resources from these upgrades
toward constructing new buildings and substantially retrofitting
existing, newly acquired, or leased buildings. Funding for these
capital projects has increased from $9.5 million in fiscal year 1998 to
a requested $890 million in fiscal year 2004. In addition to completing
ongoing construction projects, State believes it needs to replace
facilities at about 160 posts at an estimated cost of $16 billion. At
the proposed fiscal year 2004 rate of funding, it will take more than
20 years to fully fund and build replacement facilities. While GAO has
not fully analyzed State's performance in the early stages of this
large-scale building program, GAO has observed that State has taken a
number of positive steps to improve its program management. Because of
the high costs and importance of this program, GAO believes the program
merits extensive oversight.
Testimony of Jess T. Ford
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to be here to discuss our work on the security and
overall conditions of U.S. embassy and consulate facilities around the
world. The 1998 terrorist bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania, which killed more than 220 people and injured 4,000,
highlighted the compelling need for safe and secure overseas
facilities. Following the bombings, three high-level independent groups
cited physical security problems at numerous overseas facilities. In
November 1999, one of these groups, the Overseas Presence Advisory
Panel,\1\ said that thousands of Americans representing our nation
abroad faced an unacceptable level of risk from terrorist attacks and
other threats. The panel called for accelerating the process of
addressing security risks to provide overseas staff with the safest
working environment, consistent with the nation's resources and the
demands of their missions. Moreover, the panel concluded that many U.S.
overseas facilities were insecure, decrepit, deteriorating,
overcrowded, and ``shockingly shabby,'' and it recommended major
capital improvements to redress these problems. You asked us to assess
current facility conditions and what the State Department is doing to
improve them.
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\1\ Secretary of State Albright established the Overseas Presence
Advisory Panel following the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa to
consider the organization and condition of U.S. embassies. Department
of State, America's Overseas Presence in the 21st Century, The Report
of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999).
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Today I will focus my comments on the security conditions at U.S.
embassies and consulates. I will also discuss building maintenance,
office space, and information technology conditions. Our observations
are based on an analysis of data from the State Department's Bureaus of
Diplomatic Security, Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO), and
Information Resources Management, and our visits last month to four
posts where we examined how facility conditions affect security risks
and mission effectiveness. For security reasons, I will not be
identifying these posts. Finally, I will discuss some preliminary
observations regarding State's efforts to improve facility conditions
by replacing existing buildings with new, secure embassy compounds.
These observations are based on our ongoing review of State's
multibillion-dollar embassy and consulate construction program on which
we will report later this year.
SUMMARY
The State Department has done much over the last 4 years to improve
physical security at overseas posts. State has constructed perimeter
walls, anti-ram barriers, and access controls at many facilities; has
obtained host government approval to close off nearby streets at many
locations; and has implemented other measures. However, even with these
new improvements, most office facilities do not meet security
standards. Our analysis showed that as of December 2002, the primary
office building at 232 posts lacked sufficient security because it did
not meet one or more of State's five key standards.\2\ These standards
are a 100-foot setback between office facilities and public streets or
other uncontrolled areas, the presence of perimeter walls and/or
fencing, anti-ram barriers, blast-resistant construction techniques and
materials, and controlled access at the perimeter to the compound.
Moreover, at 81 posts, the primary building did not meet any of these
standards. Only 12 posts have a primary building that meets all 5
standards. As a result, thousands of U.S. government and foreign
national employees may be at risk. Our visits to four posts last month
provide numerous examples of serious physical security shortcomings.
None of the primary office buildings at the four posts meets setback
standards, and three posts have annex buildings without any setback. At
one post, an annex building has little or no setback on four sides, and
there is a public gas station on one side that could potentially
exacerbate the blast force from a bomb. In addition, U.S. personnel at
two posts occupy leased space in office buildings constructed with
extensive glass walls, which post officials told us could shatter,
seriously injuring or killing many occupants in the event of a large
blast. Security officials at the posts we visited are concerned that
many of the buildings we observed are vulnerable to terrorist attacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ At most posts, there are multiple buildings, often dispersed
throughout the city. Our analysis focused on the primary office
building at each post. At an embassy, the primary office building is
called the chancery.
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Many of the primary office buildings at embassies and consulates
are in poor condition. In fact, the primary office building at more
than half of the posts does not meet certain fire/life safety
standards. During one site visit, post officials described several
buildings as fire traps--old wiring could cause fires, and there are
limited fire exits. State estimated that there is a backlog of about
$730 million in maintenance at overseas facilities, and officials
stated that maintenance costs will increase over time because of the
age of many buildings. Many embassy and consulate buildings are old,
and at the four posts we visited, several buildings were constructed in
the 1800s. We observed sinking foundations, crumbling facades, and
serious cracks in the walls and around the windows. At one post, duct
tape and plywood have been used in the ambassador's suite to seal
around a window opening. At least 96 posts have reported serious
overcrowding. At one post we visited, crowded office space was
dramatic--for example, the Political Counselor, who is one of the most
senior officials at the embassy, had an 8 by 13-foot cubicle, and
another work area had a cramped 7-foot ceiling height.
While State continues to fund some security upgrades at embassies
and consulates, it is shifting its resources from implementing upgrades
toward constructing new buildings and substantially retrofitting
existing, newly acquired, or leased buildings. Funding for State's
capital projects has increased from $9.5 million in fiscal year 1998 to
a requested $890 million in fiscal year 2004. In addition to completing
construction that is under way, State believes it needs to replace
facilities at about 160 posts. This will be an expensive effort,
costing an estimated $16 billion, and will require a sustained level of
funding over many years. State's timeline for completing this program
will depend on the amount of funding it receives and how well it
manages the program. At the proposed fiscal year 2004 rate of funding,
about $890 million for the construction of replacement facilities at 8
posts, it will take more than 20 years to fully fund and complete
construction.
In the past, we have raised concerns regarding State's performance
in managing its overseas real estate programs. While we have not fully
analyzed State's performance in the early stages of this large-scale
building program, we have observed that OBO has taken a number of
positive steps to improve its program management. For example, it has
developed a long-range plan to help guide decision making, has taken
steps to reduce the amount of time for designing and constructing new
embassies and consulates, and has installed an industry advisory panel
to ensure that ``best practices'' are in place. Because of the high
costs associated with this program and the importance of providing
secure office space as quickly as possible, we believe this program
merits extensive oversight.
BACKGROUND
The United States maintains more than 250 diplomatic posts,
including embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic offices, located
around the world.\3\ More than 60,000 personnel--U.S. and foreign
service nationals--work at these locations. About 50 government
agencies and subagencies operate overseas, including the Departments of
State, Defense, and Justice; and the U.S. Agency for International
Development.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The number of embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic posts
changes as new posts are opened and posts are closed. In addition,
State has a small presence in some other locations that are not
included in these figures. For example, it has five 1-person posts in
France, called American Presence posts.
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Since the 1970s, U.S. diplomatic personnel overseas have been
increasingly at risk from terrorist attacks and other acts of violence.
In response, the State Department in 1986 began a substantial embassy
construction program, known as the Inman program, to protect U.S.
personnel and facilities. In 1991, we reported that State was unable to
complete as many projects as originally planned due to systemic
weaknesses in program management, as well as subsequent funding
limitations. This construction program suffered from delays and cost
increases due to, among other things, poor program planning,
difficulties in acquiring sites, changes in security requirements, and
inadequate contractor performance.\4\ Following the demise of the Inman
program in the early 1990s, the State Department initiated very few new
construction projects until the Africa embassy bombings in August 1998
prompted additional funding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ U.S. General Accounting Office, State Department: Management
Weaknesses in the Security Construction Program, GAO/NSIAD-92-2
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1991).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the 1998 bombings, terrorists attacked the U.S. embassies in
Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. These large-scale truck
bombings killed more than 220 people, including 12 American U.S.
government employees and family members, 32 Kenyan national U.S.
government employees, and 8 Tanzanian national U.S. government
employees. In addition, the bombings injured more than 4,000 Kenyans,
Tanzanians, and Americans.\5\ Figures 1 and 2 show pictures of the
embassy in Tanzania before and after the bombings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ State Department, Report of the Accountability Review Boards:
Bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dares Salaam,
Tanzania, on August 7, 1998 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1999).
Since these embassy bombings, U.S. facilities and personnel have
faced continued threats from terrorist and other attacks. Embassy and
consulate employees are on the front lines, often serving in dangerous
locations, and must rely heavily on the protection provided by the law
enforcement and security measures of the foreign country in which they
are located. From 1998 through 2002, there were 30 terrorist attacks
against overseas posts, personnel, and diplomatic residences. During
that same period, overseas posts were forced to evacuate personnel or
suspend operations 83 times in response to direct threats or unstable
security situations in the host country. (See table 1.) During the
first 2 months of 2003, overseas posts authorized the departures of
personnel and/or their families a total of 11 times due to security
concerns.
Table 1: Threats against U.S. Diplomatic Personnel and Posts, 1998-2002
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number and Type 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Terrorist attacks......................................... 10 9 2 2 7 30
Evacuations............................................... 22 12 7 18 19 78
Authorized/voluntary.................................... [13] [10] [4] [17] [9] [53]
Ordered................................................. [9] [2] [3] [1] [10] [25]
Suspended operations...................................... 4 1 ....... ....... ....... 5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of State Department data. Security Standards.
Security Standards
Before I discuss the results of our work, I want to explain some of
State's security standards and why they are important.\6\ State
identified five key security standards for overseas diplomatic office
facilities to protect them against terrorism and other dangers. First,
State believes that office facilities should be at least 100 feet from
uncontrolled areas, such as a street where vehicles can pass without
first being checked by security officials. Therefore, this distance
helps to protect the buildings and occupants against bomb blasts, mob
attacks, and other threats. In establishing the setback standard, the
State Department determined that at 100 feet, the effects of a bomb
blast have diminished to the point where the cost of site acquisition
and construction to protect against the remaining blast effects are
relatively affordable. State notes that additional setback may not be
practical at many locations. Exhibit 1 is a video clip from the State
Department showing a test blast from 100 feet away.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ These standards apply to the construction of new buildings.
Existing buildings are required to meet the setback standard to the
``maximum extent feasible.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second and third standards are strong perimeter walls and anti-
ram barriers to ensure that vehicles cannot breach the facility
perimeter to get close to the building prior to detonating a bomb.
Exhibits 2 and 3 are video clips from the State Department showing the
effectiveness of these walls and barriers.
The fourth standard requires blast-resistant construction
techniques and materials. Among other things, these materials include
reinforced concrete and steel construction and blast-resistant windows.
Diplomatic Security officials state that flying glass is a primary
cause of injuries and deaths in a blast. Coupled with a 100-foot
setback, blast-resistant construction provides the best possible
protection against a vehicle bomb attack, according to Diplomatic
Security officials. Combined, these four standards mitigate the effect
of a vehicle bomb attack and prevent the building from suffering
catastrophic collapse and complete destruction.
State's fifth security standard is controlled access at the
perimeter to the compound. At this control access point, guards can
screen personnel and visitors before they enter the embassy compound to
verify that they have no weapons and that they should be allowed to
enter, and can fully search vehicles before they are permitted to enter
the compound.
STATE HAS DONE MUCH TO IMPROVE FACILITY SECURITY BUT MOST FACILITIES
STILL DO NOT MEET SECURITY STANDARDS
Over the last 4 years, State has accomplished much in improving
posts' security through various security upgrades. These upgrades
include the installation of Mylar shatter-resistant window film and
forced entry/ballistic-resistant doors; the construction of perimeter
security walls and fences, jersey barriers, and compound access
controls; and the stationing of additional police and security guards.
In June 2002, a bomb attack against the U.S. consulate in Karachi
demonstrated the effectiveness of recent security upgrades to the
compound. As shown in figure 3, physical damage to the building was
minimized by these upgrades. As of September 30, 2002, State had
completed security upgrades at 113 posts and had installed Mylar window
film barriers and forced entry/ballistic-resistant doors at 242 posts.
Further, to address security concerns at some of the buildings
without a 100-foot setback, State has secured host government
cooperation in either closing adjacent streets and/or posting local
police officers as guards to monitor and control surrounding streets.
State has also acquired adjacent land at 34 posts to increase setback
since the 1998 embassy bombings. For example, State purchased a gas
station next to an office annex building in Athens, Greece, and closed
the gas station, thus increasing setback and improving security.
At all four posts we visited, we observed that recent security
upgrades have enhanced security. At three of these posts, local
authorities have permitted closing off streets to public traffic in
order to protect U.S. facilities. However, Diplomatic Security
officials acknowledged that it is not feasible to increase setback by
acquiring land and closing off nearby streets at many locations.
Furthermore, these officials also told us that security upgrades were
partial fixes that did not bring the buildings up to physical security
standards. As a result, many buildings and their occupants remain
vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Exhibit 4 is a video clip from the
State Department that illustrates this vulnerability. It shows the
effect of a blast 100 feet away on an office that does not meet the
standard for blast-resistant construction. The windows have been
treated with Mylar sheeting, a standard upgrade that mitigates the
effects of glass shattering in a blast. Although Mylar provides some
protection, the non-blast-resistant window construction may allow glass
to be forced into the building at a high rate of speed.
To assess the security of embassy and consulate facilities, we
analyzed State Department data to determine if the primary facilities
meet State's five key standards that I discussed earlier. Figure 4
shows the portion of posts where the primary office building meets or
does not meet four of the five security standards: setback, perimeter
wall or fence, anti-ram barrier, and compound access control. At the
request of Diplomatic Security officials, we will not discuss details
on the remaining standard, blast-resistant construction, due to its
sensitivity. We can say, however, that facilities completed since the
late 1980s are considered to be blast resistant. Figure 5 shows the
number of primary facilities that meet one, two, three, four, or five
of the physical security standards.\7\ For example, it shows that the
primary office facility at 81 posts met none of the five standards. Of
these, 36 facilities are in locations that the State Department has
designated as posing a high or critical threat level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Our analysis of facilities' security focused on the primary
facility at 244 posts for which State provided security data.
Setback
As shown in figure 4, only 28, or 11 percent, of the primary
buildings meet the 100-foot setback standard. More than half of the
primary buildings have less than 15 feet of setback--these buildings
are virtually perched on the street. Figure 6 is an example of a post
with limited setback.
At the four posts we visited, all of the primary office buildings
have limited setback from the street and several annex buildings have
no setback. As shown in figure 7, one of these buildings is adjacent to
a public gas station, which could exacerbate the effects of a bomb
attack.
Another building, with little setback, is located next to a main
thoroughfare. Consequently, public traffic, including trucks and buses,
routinely travels within feet of U.S. government office space. At three
of the four posts we visited, the embassy had secured host government
cooperation in closing at least one street surrounding the primary
office building; however, embassy officials at one location noted that
these agreements were temporary and could be revoked at any time.
Moreover, the embassies had not been able to close streets running next
to all of their facilities, such as office annexes. For example, figure
8 depicts the view from a senior official's office in an annex building
where post officials were unable to close the main thoroughfare that
runs directly in front of the building.
Perimeter Walls or Fences and Anti-ram Barriers
Perimeter walls or fences and anti-ram barriers are two standards
that work together to protect facilities. We found that 120 primary
facilities lack an adequate perimeter wall/fence, while 147 lack
adequate anti-ram barriers. Diplomatic Security officials explained
that in many cases, posts are unable to install these upgrades due to
host country limitations, such as their impact on traffic flow,
parking, and the operation of adjoining residences and commercial
buildings. Diplomatic Security officials stated that perimeter upgrades
have been installed at all posts that are able to accommodate them.
Compound Access Control
We also found that 108 posts either lack or have inadequate
compound access control, a system of gates, barriers, and guard booths
that is used to pre-screen personnel and vehicles before entering the
embassy grounds. At one embassy we visited, visa applicants could gain
access to the embassy building prior to undergoing proper screening,
which would be a serious concern in the case of a terrorist action.
Figure 9 depicts an inadequate compound access control booth, which is
located within the embassy compound. The Security Officer acknowledged
that this was a serious weakness and that visitors were not screened
adequately before entering the embassy building. Construction of a new
compound access control system is scheduled to begin in May 2003.
Figure 10 depicts a newly upgraded compound access control system that
facilitates full screening of all vehicles and persons prior to their
gaining access to the compound.
Ambassadors and security officers at three of the four posts we
visited emphasized that in addition to facilities not meeting
standards, there were security difficulties associated with the number
of office facilities at their post that were spread out around the
city. Three of the four posts we visited had more than five locations,
and post managers were concerned that this made it extraordinarily
difficult and expensive to implement security measures. Officials also
stated that dispersion of facilities complicates emergency action
planning. We note that frequent travel between dispersed facilities may
also pose security risks to personnel because terrorists and criminals
can target them while they are in transit. In the construction of new
embassy compounds, all U.S. government offices are required to be
located on the compound.
BUILDINGS ARE IN POOR CONDITION
State Department data show that many buildings are in poor
condition. At 133 posts, the primary office building has certain fire/
life safety deficiencies. At one post we visited, the fire escape for
the 6th floor of the chancery was a chain-link ladder strapped to a
heating radiator (fig. 11). OBO fire officials explained that a number
of posts were unable to meet fire standards, such as sprinkler systems
and proper number of exits, due to the structural limitations of the
building. This underscores the Department's position that many
buildings are in a condition that will not allow a security and safety
upgrade.
Another safety problem is the seismic condition of buildings.
Although the State Department does not have data on seismic conditions
at all facilities, it acknowledges that embassy and consular employees
at some locations may be working in buildings that do not protect
against earthquakes. At one of the posts we visited, located in an
earthquake region, the consular building has a very poor seismic
rating. The State Department has been unable to locate a suitable
temporary facility that can house the consular services while the
landlord makes seismic improvements to the current building. The
landlord has absolved himself from any responsibility in the event of
earthquake damage.
Maintenance Is Serious Concern
Maintenance is a serious concern because ``essential maintenance
and repair requirements have long been unfunded,'' according to OBO
documents. In May 2002, State estimated that its repair backlog to be
about $736 million. For the primary office buildings alone, maintenance
needs exceed $316 million, with the primary building at more than one-
third of all posts having more than $1 million in maintenance
requirements. OBO projects that maintenance costs will increase over
time because many of the facilities are so old and antiquated, some
dating back to the late 19th and early 20th century. Our visits to four
posts provided numerous examples of maintenance problems. All of the
posts we visited had buildings with serious maintenance concerns that
are common to old and deteriorating buildings, such as sinking
foundations, crumbling walls, bursting pipes, and electrical overloads.
Office Space Is Crowded
Although there are no specific criteria to measure the adequacy of
office space, OBO has provided posts a questionnaire to help them
evaluate space needs. Based on post inputs, OBO's Long-range Overseas
Buildings Plan describes space conditions at posts where it plans a new
facility or major rehabilitation. We counted 96 posts mentioned in the
plan where OBO described the office space as being crowded or poorly
configured. During our post visits, we verified that crowded and poorly
configured office space is a problem. This was particularly true in the
controlled access areas of the embassies where classified information
is stored and processed. Because of the special requirements of these
areas, it is generally not feasible to lease additional space as the
embassies have done to expand office space for unclassified work. One
post had severe overcrowding in its chancery. To cope, the post
resorted to creating workspaces under a stairway and in storage areas.
One office stacked a printer on top of shelving that can only be
accessed with a stepladder in order to make room for another small
workstation. This post used trailers located behind the chancery to
augment office space. In addition, all of the posts expressed concern
that the crowded conditions would get worse because they anticipate
staff increases to handle additional responsibilities, such as
performing more rigorous screening of visa applicants. Several
ambassadors told us that the dispersion of office space in multiple
buildings hindered operational efficiency. This is because personnel
spend significant amounts of time going from one facility to another to
conduct daily business.
Information Technology Issues
I will now briefly discuss information technology capabilities at
overseas posts, which, along with office facilities, are an important
part of diplomatic readiness. State has long been plagued by poor
information technology capabilities. In 1999, the Overseas Presence
Advisory Panel reported that many posts are equipped with obsolete
systems that prevent effective interagency information sharing.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ America's Overseas Presence in the 21st Century: The Report of
the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Secretary of State has made a major commitment to modernizing
information technology. According to State officials, the department
invested $236 million in fiscal year 2002 on key modernization
initiatives for overseas posts and plans to spend $262 million over
fiscal years 2003 and 2004. State reports that its information
technology is in the best shape it has ever been, and embassy personnel
at the four posts we visited agreed, noting that they now have improved
Internet access and upgraded computer equipment. State is now working
to replace its antiquated cable system with the State Messaging and
Archive Retrieval Toolset (SMART), a new integrated messaging and
retrieval system.
We have raised a number of concerns regarding State's management of
information technology programs, and believe that State's information
technology modernization efforts warrant management attention and
oversight to ensure that State is following effective management
practices. In 2001, we reported that State was not following proven
system acquisition and investment practices in attempting to deploy a
common overseas knowledge management system.\9\ State canceled this
initiative because it could not get buy-in from other foreign affairs
agencies. In 2001, we reported on State's information security
problems, including weaknesses in access control that place information
resources at risk of unauthorized access.\10\ As State continues to
modernize information technology at overseas posts, it is important
that it employs rigorous and disciplined management processes on each
of its projects and that it addresses its information security
weaknesses. This is particularly important on the SMART system, which
State acknowledges is an ambitious effort. The Office of Management and
Budget recently reduced funding for the system because of concerns that
State was not employing effective management processes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: State
Department-Led Overseas Modernization Program Faces Management
Challenges, GAO-02-41 (Washington, D.C.; Nov. 2001); and U.S. General
Accounting Office, Foreign Affairs: Effort to Upgrade Information
Technology Overseas Faces Formidable Challenges, GAO/T-AIMD/NSIAD-0O-2
14 (Washington, D.C.; June 2000).
\10\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges
and Program Risks: Department of State, GAO-O1-252 (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 2001).
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REPLACING BUILDINGS IS STATE'S LONG-TERM SOLUTION TO PHYSICAL SECURITY
PROBLEMS
State continues to make security upgrades at some posts, but it is
shifting its resources toward replacing existing facilities with new,
secure embassy compounds or substantially retrofitting existing, newly
acquired, or leased buildings. As shown in figure 12, funding for
State's capital projects has increased from $9.5 million in fiscal year
1998 to a requested $890 million in fiscal year 2004. State is still in
the early phase of this multiyear, multibillion-dollar construction
program. I will discuss this program briefly and then make several
preliminary observations regarding State's management of this program.
Summary of State's Regulations and Plans for Future Construction
Following the 1998 east Africa bombings, State identified about 185
posts needing replacement facilities in order to meet security
standards. As of February 10, 2003, State had begun to replace 25 of
these posts with new or retrofitted embassy and consulate compounds.
From fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2003, State has received
approximately $2.7 billion for its new construction program. OBO
officials estimated that beginning in fiscal year 2004, it will cost an
additional $16 billion to replace facilities at the remaining 160
posts. OBO plans to construct these replacement facilities on embassy/
consulate compounds that will contain the main office building, all
support buildings, and, where necessary, a building for the U.S. Agency
for International Development.
To help manage this large-scale construction program, OBO developed
the Long-range Overseas Buildings Plan, first published in July 2001
and most recently updated in April 2002. The latest version of the plan
outlines and prioritizes proposed capital projects over 6 years, from
fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2007, based on input from State's
Bureau of Diplomatic Security, regional bureaus, and agencies with
overseas presence.
According to the April 2002 plan, State plans to fund the
replacement of facilities at 81 posts at an estimated cost of $7.9
billion from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2007. As shown in
figure 13, the majority of these projects are planned for Africa and
Europe. OBO plans to release the next update of the Long-range Overseas
Buildings Plan by the end of March 2003.
Of State's 25 post replacement projects funded after the 1998
embassy bombings, State has completed the construction of 2 new embassy
compounds and major retrofits of 2 newly acquired buildings that will
serve as embassies.\11\ The remaining 21 projects are currently in the
construction process. These consist of 18 new embassy and consulate
compounds, 1 consulate compound renovation, and 2 newly acquired
buildings undergoing major retrofitting for use as embassies (see fig.
14). State plans to initiate another 7 post replacement projects in
fiscal year 2003 and 8 post replacement projects in fiscal year 2004.
These projects will be completed in fiscal years 2005 and 2006,
respectively, if they adhere to State's planned 2-year construction
schedule.
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\11\ Capital project figures exclude support buildings such as
Marine Security Guard Quarters, U.S. Agency for International
Development buildings, and General Services Operations buildings that
were built independently of new embassy compounds.
Regarding the four posts we visited, a replacement facility is
under construction at one post and fiscal year 2006 funding is
scheduled for replacement facilities at two posts. The replacement
facility for the fourth post is not currently scheduled; however, post
officials told us that a replacement facility at their location would
be included in OBO's March 2003 update of the Long-range Overseas
Buildings Plan. Assuming that funding were made available to replace
facilities for the three posts in fiscal year 2006, construction would
not be completed until about 2009. Ambassadors at two of these posts
expressed concern that it would be difficult to wait that long for a
solution to their facility needs and that interim measures were needed.
State's Management of the Recently Expanded Construction Program
We are currently reviewing State's capacity and performance in
implementing its large-scale construction program. Two important
questions for program oversight by this and other committees are: (1)
Is the construction of embassies and consulates proceeding on time and
on budget? (2) Do OBO and its contractors have the capacity to properly
manage the program and ensure that funds are used wisely? State is in
the early stages of its expanded construction program and, therefore,
has not yet established a clear track record that would provide
complete answers to these questions. However, we do have several
observations based on our ongoing work.
First, OBO has made a number of positive changes in its management
of capital projects as the construction program has expanded over the
past few years. As mentioned earlier, OBO developed the Long-range
Overseas Buildings Plan in July 2001, an action we had previously
recommended.\12\ This plan represents a major improvement in the
management of embassy construction because it provides decision makers
with an overall sense of proposed project scope and funding needs, and
sets performance targets that can be compared with actual performance.
Further, in February 2002, OBO leadership convened the Industry
Advisory Panel. The panel consists of volunteer industry
representatives who meet quarterly to discuss issues related to OBO's
construction program and advise OBO management on industry's best
practices. Moreover, senior OBO management has increased its oversight
of ongoing capital and other projects. For example, each month, the OBO
Director holds a 2-day Project Performance Review meeting to review the
progress and problems of all ongoing OBO projects in detail. In
addition, OBO is requiring contract administration training for all
senior field staff who are to supervise new embassy and consulate
construction.
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\12\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Embassy Construction: Better
Long-term Planning Will Enhance Program Decision-making, GAO-01-11
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, State is taking steps to accelerate the construction
process, reduce construction costs, and further enhance physical
security conditions of new buildings. For example, OBO has developed a
standard embassy design for use in most projects and has moved away
from a ``design-bid-build'' method of contracting toward a ``design-
build'' method. Use of a standard design and design-build contracting
has the potential to reduce project costs and the time taken to
implement projects. Table 2 provides details of the three standard
designs that OBO has developed for small, medium, and large posts. OBO
has set a goal of a 2-year design and construction period for its
standard embassy design buildings, which, if met, would reduce the
amount of time spent in design and construction by almost a year.\13\
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\13\ Current new post construction projects have a contract
schedule averaging 2 years and 11 months to complete. Only one project
completed thus far--the new embassy compound in Kampala, Uganda--has
used the standard embassy design.
Table 2: Characteristics of Standard Embassy Designs for New Capital
Projects
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ General
General size construction cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Small new office building 46,285 gross square $45 million
feet
Medium new office 79,653 gross square $65 million
building feet
Large new office building 121,632 gross square $85 million
feet
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Long-range Overseas Buildings Plan, April 2002.
\1\ This figure is in 2002 dollars and excludes value added tax and land
costs.
In addition, OBO and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security are actively
seeking to incorporate advanced technologies into the construction
program. Exhibit 5, a video clip from the State Department showing the
performance of new windows and building materials, indicates that these
technologies show promise of providing an even greater level of
physical security for personnel operating in new buildings.
While OBO has taken positive steps, we do have concerns regarding
requirements for staffing levels at locations where OBO is planning to
build a new embassy compound. We believe that improvements are needed
in how the State Department and other agencies project staffing
requirements for new embassies. In April 2003, we will report to the
Chairman of the House Government Reform Committee's Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations that
staffing projections for new embassy compounds are developed without a
systematic approach or comprehensive assessments of the number and
types of staff who would be needed in the future. Without adhering to a
systematic process for developing future staffing needs at U.S.
embassies and consulates, the U.S. government risks building the wrong-
sized facilities, which could lead to security concerns, additional
costs, and other work inefficiencies.
Funding and Timelines for Completing the Construction Program
State's timeline for completing the replacement of all 160
remaining posts will depend on the amount of funding it receives for
the construction program. For fiscal year 2004, State's Long-range
Overseas Buildings Plan called for almost $2 billion to fund the design
and/or construction of 19 capital projects; in contrast, the
President's proposed fiscal year 2004 budget requested $890 million for
8 new diplomatic posts. As shown in figure 15, at the proposed fiscal
year 2004 rate of replacement, it would take about 20 years to fund and
22 years to complete construction of the estimated 160 remaining posts
(assuming a 2-year design and construction period). Figure 15 also
shows that this timeline would be shortened if State receives more
funds annually. According to an OBO projection, the program to replace
the remaining 160 posts could be completed in 12 years if OBO receives
$1.4 billion annually for new capital projects.
In a January 2001 report,\14\ we identified potential industry
bottlenecks and management issues that could affect State's ability to
further expand and increase the pace of the construction program. These
potential problems include the availability of appropriate sites for
new buildings, particularly in major urban areas; appropriately cleared
U.S. labor; construction materials; and unique security materials, such
as glazing for windows and forced entry- and ballistic-resistant doors,
Further, State and its contractors may require more management
resources to implement and manage the program. In our continuing work
for the committee, we will be considering these and other issues
related to State's and its contractors' performance in building new
embassies and consulates.
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\14\ GAO-01-11.
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Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy
to answer any questions you or other members of the committee may ask.
The Chairman. Thank you very much for that statement.
General Williams.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. CHARLES E. WILLIAMS (RET.), DIRECTOR AND
CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, OVERSEAS BUILDINGS OPERATIONS,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
General Williams. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of
the committee, for this opportunity to discuss the Office of
Overseas Building Operations, which has the mission to provide
diplomatic and consular facilities for our government personnel
overseas. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman and the committee,
for the support that has been provided to the State Department
and specifically the area that I have commanded during this
period of time.
I am going to make a few short remarks, and then I am going
to show you some slides which will depict what we have been
about which I think can make the point.
The mission of the Overseas Building Operations obviously
was reshaped by the 1998 bombings of our embassies at Dar es
Salaam in Tanzania and Nairobi, as you clearly have pointed
out. This was reinforced, Mr. Chairman, by the events of 9/11,
and all of this together has caused us to rethink about the
whole notion of accelerating the construction of new facilities
that can satisfy the Department's stringent security standards
and provide our diplomatic personnel safe, secure, and
functional office and residential environments.
As you know, the Congress and the executive branch have
identified the Overseas Building Operations in the Department
as the State's single property manager for diplomatic,
consular, and other related civilian support properties of the
U.S. Government overseas. I want to take this occasion again to
thank the committee and the Congress for their recent efforts
to reinforce the Overseas Building Operations' role as the
single real property manager, because I believe this is the
right approach. The GAO recommended this management
arrangement, and it was good to see the Congress support this
as well.
The combination of administrative reforms and planning,
design and construction of new embassy compounds and the
implementation of a cost-sharing program will go a long way
toward implementing the recommendations of the Overseas
Presence Advisory Panel and the GAO for long term planning and
construction of new facilities, and operations and maintenance
of existing facilities.
I hope through this testimony that it will be clearly
demonstrated that the efforts that we are making to bring
rational and efficient management to the overseas building
operation will be clearly shown. We take our new results based
management approach very seriously, and we are committed to
achieving the goals of ensuring that every government employee
overseas has a secure, safe, and a functional facility in which
to conduct our foreign policy.
At this point, I would like to take you through a series of
charts \2\ which will depict our program to date.
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\2\ The charts referred to are reproduced in General Williams'
prepared statement which begins on page 31.
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Starting first of all with how it all started, I joined
Secretary Powell during the transition, and it is from his
vision that we started on this journey of totally revamping the
way State would manage its properties overseas. The Secretary
has given me total support, and it is a pleasure to have that
in place in order to do this difficult job.
Security, Mr. Chairman, is paramount. That is the bottom
line, quite frankly. Starting in 1998 and to some degree in
1999 after our activity in Europe, we have seen that our
diplomatic facilities have been threatened. Studies and reports
through the years have also pointed out that our buildings are
unsafe, many are neglected and overcrowded, the image of our
presence is negative in some locations, and records and reports
have also pointed out that the funding has been too low.
Construction targets, yes, have not been met throughout the
years.
What we have on our plate today. At the 260 locations, we
have diplomatic missions. We have 22 new embassy compounds
under construction today for about $1.5 billion. We have 9 new
embassy compounds planned for construction in 2003 and we will
be awarding them later this year. There are also many rehabs
and other improvements.
The capital security program, as has been pointed out by
Mr. Ford, is pegged now at 160 new embassy and consulate
compounds for a total estimate of about $16 billion. We think,
with the plan we have in place, we can complete this work in
about 12 years if we are able to have available about $1.4
billion a year going forward.
What guides all of this process is our newly created long
range overseas building plan. This is a plan which offers us a
``road map'' which shows all of the construction and
rehabilitation, including the State Department and all of the
tenants' staffing that would be associated with business
overseas, Our own includes USAID, as well. This plan is updated
annually. It covers a 6-year period, including the execution
year.
The new embassy compounds--I keep emphasizing compounds
because we are not just building a diplomatic building, but
rather we are building a compound, on a green, 10-acre site.
Enclosed in this 10 acres is a 9-foot anti-climb wall which
disallows any vehicular penetration, and then a series of
facilities and structures inside of that compound.
Some of the projects that we have completed are depicted
next. Doha in Qatar, which is in a very, obviously, sensitive
location as we speak. This embassy has been completed during
the past 2 years. In Lima, Peru, the next slide shows a very
large annex that was complete as well.
Tunis in Tunisia, we just opened this new facility just
before Christmas, and Dar es Salaam, which we are very proud
of, 3 weeks ago we opened the new embassy in Tanzania. And Mr.
Chairman, I would like to pause here to pick up a point that
you made in your statement to us, and that is we should be very
sensitive about not building bunkers, and I am happy to report
to you that this facility picks up the local facade and the
surroundings of Tanzania and Dar es Salaam, and the natives are
very appreciative to that.
This next building on the same campus, is a USAID building
in Dar es Salaam, and just up the coast 200 or so kilometers is
Nairobi, which opened 1 day after Dar es Salaam, and it was a
wonderful ceremony with almost 1,000 people at each location.
Moving to Europe and Zagreb, Croatia, we are about 6 weeks
away from opening this new facility in Croatia. In Istanbul,
Turkey, another very key location, this is a very large
consulate. As you see once again the facade of these buildings
picking up the local treatment and once again demonstrating
that they are not bunkers.
In the Emirates, in Abu Dhabi, this shows another new
complex about 50 percent complete. In Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire,
also a similar arrangement. Sofia, Bulgaria, one of our younger
countries, we are about 25 percent along the way with that
facility. Sao Paulo, Brazil is another new location that we are
completing a new consulate. In Yerevan, Armenia, also we have
started work there as well, and Luanda, Angola, a very
difficult place to work and a very small site, but we were able
to launch that one as well. Abuja, Nigeria is the other
location.
And finally, Kabul, in Afghanistan. On 14 acres, the
original embassy grounds, we are reconstructing the total
embassy complex with our own new utility system so that we will
never have the difficulty when, that we encountered in Kabul
during this recent activity. On this compound we will have
houses, we will have quarters for our marines, and it will be a
fully secure compound. We are under construction there as well.
This next slide, Mr. Chairman, shows our performance,
because Mr. Ford had made reference to that. We were entrusted
with $1.5, close to $1.7 billion last year. We obligated all of
that. You can see how these funds were distributed around.
A couple of points to make on this next slide are that the
performance during this past year was about an 84 percent
increase over any previous year, and it is important to point
out that through this program we were able to generate savings.
We generated some $63 million of savings through better costing
tighter budget, shorter duration, so out of the funds that were
provided we were able to generate enough funds to build another
small embassy.
In terms of workload, in March of 2001, OBO was managing
about $.7 billion of work, and that has increased now to $3.5
billion. In fiscal year 2002, the last previous year, we
awarded 13 new compounds. They are listed on this chart. This
year, in fiscal year 2003, we will be launching the
construction on this list, which is 9 new compounds plus one
left over, Dili, East Timor left over from last year.
Beijing is in the mix for this year as well. This obviously
will be the largest diplomatic facility that State has ever
undertaken. This picture shows a rendering of how that will
come out. We would expect to break ground there sometime in
early fall.
This next one shows the facilities that are planned for
fiscal year 2004. As you can see, there are three USAID
buildings as well that are programmed for fiscal year 2004.
Berlin is also in the mix in fiscal year 2004. We are
hoping to break ground, after many, many years of trying to
reconstruct an embassy back at the same location where it all
began, quite frankly. It has a lot of political significance,
as you know, and this is where the Wall was located which
divided that city.
The Chairman. General, we have been discussing this for
many, many years at the Department.
General Williams. That is correct.
The Chairman. Now, is this back 100 feet? [Indicating to
slide.]
General Williams. It is not back 100 feet at every side,
Senator Lugar, but we have worked through all of the waivers in
order to make it work for us. What is important is that we have
worked out these arrangements with the neighbors to allow us to
do certain activities in terms of checking vehicles and the
like, and all of those agreements have been sorted out.
The Chairman. We are still on the same plot near the
Brandenburg Gate?
General Williams. Same plot. That is correct, so now we
have the ``rights of passage'' out of the way so we can move
forward, and we are really pleased with that.
The Chairman. Good. Yes.
General Williams. This next chart shows some of the
security compound upgrades. These are at the locations that are
not new facilities. This happens to be in Djibouti, which is a
very significant location.
This next one shows another, what I call a, sort of a
remote post out in Angola, and another one in South America.
Our organization is operating from a results-based mentality,
and with this we are responsible to have in place performance
measures that work and at the same time an industry advisory
panel that advises us.
On this list, I will just illuminate a couple of these
because some have been already mentioned. These are best
practices. What we are most proud of is the industry advisory
panel and an interagency facilities council, and obviously our
relationship with the GAO and the inspector generals, we try to
work in partnership to see the same issue and work toward a
solution.
This slide shows the industry advisory panel that we
established 1\1/2\ years ago. It meets every quarter and
advises me and my senior staff on industry best practices.
There are nine members, who are very seasoned in their
business, who come in on their own nickel and help us, and in
fact they promote this program and our practices as much as we
do.
Our management responsibilities are as depicted here, but
this next slide shows Kampala, Uganda, and the Secretary
visited this area right after this new facility opened about 18
months ago and asked me, why could we not use this concept and
come up with a standard design. So we took this small embassy--
this happened to be just one wing of it--in Uganda and
developed a standard design.
What that means is that we now have on the shelf a small,
medium, and large template for a very quick embassy
construction, and this allows us now to move much faster and
cut years off the schedule that we had once had in place. It is
an excellent concept for getting after embassies in those small
countries that are emerging.
Next slide.
This shows the performance and accountability. Mr. Ford
made reference to that, the monthly reviews and the like, and
finally moving to the new initiative, which is cost-sharing.
Cost-sharing is an initiative that we feel will go hand in hand
to everything else that we are trying to do here. This is where
the tenants who occupy our platform will pay a pro rata share
per capita, starting in 2004, and help us get these facilities
done on an expedited scale.
Finally, on the last slide I would just like to--I know
this is very difficult to read, but this is the Director of the
USAID building in Dar es Salaam. This was his quote about what
he felt about the new facilities that we were trying to put in
place.
[The prepared statement of General Williams follows:]
Prepared Statement of General Charles E. Williams, Director and Chief
Operating Officer, Overseas Buildings Operations Bureau, Department of
State
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, for this
opportunity to discuss the efforts of the Department of State and the
Overseas Buildings Operations Bureau (OBO) to provide secure diplomatic
and consular facilities for U.S. Government personnel overseas.
OBO's mission, reshaped by the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies
in Dar Es Salaam and Nairobi, and reinforced by the events of 9/11, is
to accelerate the construction of new facilities that can satisfy the
Department's stringent security standards and provide our diplomatic
personnel safe, secure, and functional office and residential
environments.
As you know, Congress and the Executive Branch have identified OBO
in the Department of State as the single property manager for
diplomatic, consular, and other related civilian support properties of
the United States Government overseas.\1\ I want to take this occasion
to thank the Committee and the Congress for their recent efforts to
reinforce OBO's role as the single real property manager, as
recommended by the GAO, both in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act
in the 107th Congress and in the Omnibus Appropriations Act in the
108th Congress.\2\ Managing the U.S. Government's overseas properties
is a delicate and complex set of responsibilities, involving properties
with a value of approximately $12 billion, and the centralization of
this function in the Department of State allows for professional,
business-like management of these assets.
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\1\ GAO Report, entitled Current Law Limits the State Department's
Authority to Manage Certain Overseas Properties Cost Effectively, July
11, 2002, lays out the origins of this arrangement, from Congressional
Report language, to OMB direction, to Department guidance documents.
See page 2 of the Report.
\2\ Section 213 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 2003,
Pub. L. 107-228, reversed section 738 of the USDA Appropriations Act,
which conflicted with the Department of State's role as the single real
property manager. GAO Report GAO-02-790R included in its
recommendations, ``Congress may wish to consider repealing section
738.'' Similarly, section 215 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub.
L. 108-7, modified an earlier appropriations act (Section 220, Pub. L.
106-554 App. A) that gave the Centers for Disease Control independent
authority to lease real property overseas, restoring that authority to
the Secretary of State.
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When I joined Secretary Powell's transition team in December of
2000 to evaluate the Department's overseas facilities status and
program, I reviewed the Inman Report, the Crowe Report, the Overseas
Presence Advisory Panel (OPAP) Report, and various GAO reports on the
challenges facing our government in providing secure, safe, functional
facilities from which to conduct our foreign policy mission. The OPAP
Report stated flatly that ``The condition of U.S. posts and missions
abroad is unacceptable. . . . [I]nsecure and often decrepit facilities
. . . threaten to cripple our nation's overseas capability.'' And GAO
reported in January 2001 that ``The need to adequately protect
employees and their families from threatened terrorist attacks overseas
may very well be the single most important management issue facing the
State Department.''
Our Government currently employs almost 60,000 people, representing
over 30 agencies at 260 overseas posts. The Diplomatic Security Bureau
of the Department has concluded that at least 160 of those posts do not
meet current security standards and should be replaced with new embassy
compounds. Yet our Government was building new embassies at the rate of
about one a year--a ``business as usual'' approach that could never
catch up to the needs identified by OPAP and GAO. Inadequate funding
was defended in part on the ground that the Department did not have the
capacity to build more rapidly even if it were given the funds.
Secretary Powell persuaded me to take on the task of reshaping the
Department's overseas buildings operations so it could handle the task
that needed to be done. With strong support and encouragement from
Secretary Powell, I instituted significant organizational and
management reforms in the structure and operations of what is now OBO.
Over the last two years, we have already seen significant successes in
cutting costs, putting in place standard designs and an integrated
design review process, and reducing the construction period for new
embassies through a ``fast track'' process. Congress has rewarded OBO
with increased support and flexibility to carry out our mission, for
which we are very thankful. In Fiscal Year 2002 we demonstrated the
capacity to manage $1.8 billion. The capacity-building task is not
completed, and I am determined to continue working to improve our
operations.
Let me briefly address the reforms I have instituted with respect
to managing the process of constructing secure new diplomatic
facilities and improving security at existing facilities, so the
Committee can see why I believe OBO is now capable of handling the
tasks that need to be done.
RESTRUCTURING OBO
My first order of business as Director and Chief Operating Officer
of OBO was to take advantage of its elevation to Bureau status as the
occasion for a comprehensive reorganization. The new organizational
structure reflects the life cycle of our properties: Planning and
Development, Project Execution, Operations and Maintenance, and Real
Estate and Property Management.
Equally as fundamental as the new organization chart is a new
organizational philosophy: every employee at OBO must be accountable,
just as the organization as a whole must be held accountable for
performance, and both senior management and staff must focus on
results, not just business as usual.
I have also put in place performance measures and a number of
specific management tools that improve OBO's ability to accomplish its
mission:
We set up a systematic process to gather the most accurate
information possible about long-term staffing plans not only of
the Department of State, but also of other agencies and
departments, including Treasury, Justice, and Defense, who
occupy many of the Department's facilities.
We prepared and published a Long-Range Overseas Buildings
Plan to establish construction priorities among posts, based on
a weighing of security risks and practical capability to
execute projects. The LROBP sets out in detail how the
Department will address its many competing facilities
requirements over the next six years, and it is the linchpin to
State's Overseas Buildings Operations. The first Plan, prepared
in July 2001 and released to Congress in April 2002,
encompasses 72 security capital projects estimated at more than
$6.2 billion, 9 other regular capital projects totaling $1.6
billion, 70 major rehabilitation projects estimated at $436
million, general maintenance and repair needs of over $500
million, and real estate acquisitions and disposals. The first
annual revision and update is in the process of being
finalized.
We established an Industry Advisory Panel to take advantage
of industry expertise.
We chartered an Interagency Facilities Committee, which met
for the first time in July, 2002 and will meet quarterly, to
provide a forum for all agencies that occupy Department
facilities overseas to discuss their needs and concerns.
We have adopted a holistic, business-case approach to
evaluating real property acquisition, lease-purchase,
management, and disposal decisions.
We use Standard Embassy Designs for the first time in the
Department's history, and modular construction where
appropriate, both of which can improve quality, reduce costs,
and shorten design and construction duration.
We conduct Integrated Design Reviews and interagency
coordination to ensure that our designs will meet applicable
health, safety, security, and functional standards and serve
the needs of all of the agencies that will be using the
facilities.
We have put in place the first completely secure system for
handling sensitive documents with designers and contractors.
I personally conduct monthly accountability and performance
reviews of every OBO Division and project.
In pursuing these reforms, OBO has worked to develop a
progressively closer relationship with the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security. This effort extends across the board, from careful
coordination of the security requirements in planning New Embassy
Compounds, major rehabilitations, and perimeter and compound security
projects, to integrated scheduling of post-construction security
certifications that allow the Department to make use of completed
structures without delay. I am pleased to say that Ambassador Taylor
has continued the policy of active cooperation between our Bureaus that
has made our projects move smoothly to successful conclusions. He and
his staff have made concerted efforts to understand and accommodate the
needs of the planners and construction managers in OBO, and I am happy
to take this opportunity to thank them publicly for that vital
cooperation. I am also pleased to report that OBO has developed an
outstanding relationship and working arrangements with the intelligence
community.
These changes have produced results. OBO's increased capacity has
gone hand-in-hand with a dramatic increase in funding requested by the
Administration and appropriated by Congress. As a result, OBO is
currently planning and executing new facilities on a larger scale than
the Department has ever managed before. As of today, OBO has 22 New
Embassy Compound (NEC) projects underway, involving $1.5 billion, and
we intend to obligate funds for another 9 NEC projects involving $883
million in Fiscal Year 2003.
Over the course of 2003, OBO expects to break ground for New
Embassy Compounds in Abuja, Nigeria; Beijing, China; Cape Town, South
Africa; Conakry, Guinea; Dushanbe, Tajikistan; Kabul, Afghanistan;
Phnom Penh, Cambodia; Tashkent, Uzbekistan; Thilisi, Georgia; and
Yaounde, Cameroon.
I am even more pleased to say that we will be cutting ribbons to
open New Embassy/Consulate Compounds in Istanbul, Turkey, and Zagreb,
Croatia. Earlier this month Under Secretary Grant Green and I had the
pleasure of presiding over the dedication of our New Embassy Compounds
in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, replacing the embassies
that were destroyed in 1998.
I want to assure you that all of these new facilities are secure,
safe, functional, and aesthetically appropriate to their surroundings.
They will provide excellent diplomatic platforms for the execution of
U.S. foreign policy for decades to come.
In addition, we have 68 major rehabilitation projects underway and
expect to initiate another 42 such projects with Fiscal Year 2003
funds, for a total of $576 million in rehabilitation and security
upgrade projects in process. OBO now has the capacity to manage $1.8
billion in NEC projects on an annual basis.
Over the last two years the Department has developed a major new
initiative: a Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program that will
dramatically accelerate our embassy construction program and encourage
agencies to right-size their overseas presence. This Program implements
the OPAP Report recommendation for a new financing mechanism for
embassy construction and supports the President's Management Agenda
item on rightsizing. The initiation of this Program was announced in
the President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2004, with actual allocations to
other agencies to commence in FY2005.
As designed by the Department, the Capital Security Cost-Sharing
Program will ensure that all agencies and departments share in the cost
of new, secure diplomatic and consular facilities. When fully
implemented, it will allocate funding on the basis of each agency's
overseas presence in classified and unclassified space. We will seek a
Program at the Washington level that will result in minimal
administrative burden and controversy over agency shares. This
structure for the program will reflect the advice we received from the
Office of Management and Budget and from the Department's Industry
Advisory Panel, which both thoroughly examined various structures and
alternatives.
In addition to funding the urgent needs for secure facilities, this
capital costsharing arrangement will encourage each agency to right-
size its staffing, by reflecting more closely the true cost of
stationing employees overseas. The overall effect on agency budgets
could add about 10%-15% to what agencies now report as their total cost
of stationing an American U.S. Government employee overseas.
The combination of administrative reforms in the planning, design,
and construction of new embassy compounds and the implementation the
cost-sharing program will go a long way toward implementing
recommendations of OPAP and GAO for long term planning and construction
of new facilities and for proper operation and maintenance of existing
facilities.
I hope this testimony demonstrates the efforts we are making to
bring rational and efficient management to OBO and the Department of
State. We take our new results-based management philosophy very
seriously, and we are committed to achieving the goal of ensuring that
every U. S. Government employee overseas has secure, safe, and
functional facilities in which to conduct the foreign policy of the
United States.
Thank you for your interest and attention. I will be happy to
address any questions you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, General Williams.
Ambassador Taylor.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANCIS X. TAYLOR, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON,
DC
Ambassador Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. I am honored to have the opportunity to appear
before you today to talk about security of our embassies and
consulates abroad.
Congress has indeed played a major role in assisting our
Department in improving our ability to provide secure
facilities and the security of our embassies abroad. As a
result of the 1998 embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es
Salaam, Congress passed new legislation now referred to as the
Secure Embassy Counterterrorism and Construction Act, mandating
the standards set forth in Mr. Ford's presentation. The
Department has faithfully complied with the certification
requirements outlined in that legislation, and I can state
unequivocally that this has resulted in construction of safer,
more secure facilities for our diplomats overseas.
Congress also provided generous and most necessary funding
in the form of an emergency security appropriation in the
aftermath of the 1998 embassy bombings. This funding allowed us
to install shatter-resistant window film, duck and cover alert
systems, and closed circuit TV recording systems worldwide. We
upgraded our technical security systems' power and wiring which
allowed us to improve our perimeter security at our most
threatened posts, with better walls, public access control,
screening booths, and additional anti-ram protection. And it
provided us the means to purchase explosive detectors and x-ray
equipment for virtually every post in the world.
Improvements made to the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, as Mr.
Ford mentioned, with this funding, undoubtedly saved many lives
when a suicide car bomber struck in June 2002.
Mr. Chairman, I am not here on this occasion to provide a
discourse solely on the actions we have taken jointly in the
past. You have asked the GAO and Mr. Ford to report on the
state of our facilities. I think their presentation has fairly
and accurately stated the depth of our requirements in order to
meet the Department's diplomatic goals in a relatively safe and
secure environment.
You have also heard from my colleague, General Williams, on
his restructuring of the Bureau of Overseas Building Operations
to meet these requirements. He has outlined his goals,
execution strategies, and budget requests. I think the success
of his efforts are quite self-evident. His efforts, and more
importantly his results, have built a new level of credibility
with Congress and convinced skeptics that the Department can
adapt to new methods of management and utilize some of the best
practices from industry. I support his efforts, and my offices
within Diplomatic Security will continue to work very closely
with OBO to ensure that his efforts continue in a safe and
secure manner.
The Bureau of Diplomatic Security [DS] is not standing
still, either. A highly focused development effort in our
Physical Security Office has successfully delivered new
products and methods that will allow OBO to better mitigate our
vulnerabilities. The Department of State's proprietary
standards for forced entry and bullet-resistant doors and
windows, once the only standards in industry and government
concerned with this type of security, have been supplemented by
the adoption of industry standards promulgated by Underwriters
Laboratory and the American Society of Testing and
Manufacturing.
We have developed and commercialized a totally new,
lightweight, laminated glass window that will lower cost and
simplify installation. This material is now commercially
available. We have pioneered new developments in anti-ram
vehicle protection and provided new products more acceptable to
foreign governments and architects. We have done this in
partnership with other government agencies to leverage our work
and provide better answers across our spectrum of needs.
DS special agents serving in regional security offices
anchor our overseas security efforts and provide a first line
of defense for U.S. diplomatic personnel, their families, U.S.
diplomatic missions, and national security information. We have
more than 420 DS security officers in 157 countries advising
chiefs of mission on security matters and developing and
implementing the programs that shield each U.S. mission and
residence from physical and technical attack.
A little known fact is that the DS also provides security
professionals at OBO construction projects overseas for the
entire duration of construction. These individuals, known as
site security managers, are DS special agents there to ensure
that the project security requirements are foremost in the
important and complex efforts of constructing new facilities.
Our level of cooperation with OBO has never been as close as it
has been today. The Department's need for safe and modern
facilities has never been more apparent. DS and OBO goals have
never been as clearly aligned. We need your continued support
to build upon the fine efforts that the Department has made in
the last 3 years to construct more new embassies and
consulates. If General Williams says he can produce even more
on an annual basis, then DS will be there supporting his
efforts.
While I have only been the Assistant Secretary since
November, Mr. Chairman, I think you know I spent 31 years in
our Air Force investigations and counterintelligence and more
recently as the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, and therefore
I have had an opportunity to watch DS in action, and I could
not be more proud to have been asked by the President and
Secretary to lead this fine organization of talented
professionals in performing this very complex mission overseas.
In addition to supporting our overseas construction
program, we have a multifaceted partnership with domestic and
foreign law enforcement agencies. These relationships ensure
better security abroad for Americans and foreign national
employees of the Department of State, and help to secure our
national borders here at home. They have been built over time
to provide a layered and secure environment for the conduct of
diplomacy and the promotion of America's interests worldwide,
as well as helping us to increase security awareness among all
Americans living and working abroad. I would like to just
highlight several of those initiatives that we are involved in.
In calendar year 2002, our agents investigated nearly 5,000
passport and visa fraud cases and made more than 400 arrests.
These felonies are often committed in conjunction with more
serious crimes by individuals looking to change their
identities and conceal their activities and movements. DS has
investigated passport and visa fraud cases that have been
connected not only to terrorism, but also to drug trafficking,
international organized crime, money laundering, pedophilia,
and murder. Our investigation helps secure U.S. borders and
protects the national security of the United States.
Domestically, DS is actively involved in the homeland
security effort. DS's 8 field offices and 15 resident offices
coordinate with our Consular Affairs passport agencies to
vigorously investigate passport fraud. Our visa fraud branch is
working collaboratively with the Department of State Office of
the Inspector General: Office of Investigations to examine all
allegations of consular malfeasance and employee corruption,
and I am proud to report to you, Mr. Chairman, that the
difficulties in coordination that once existed between the OIG
and DS with regard to sharing investigative information no
longer exists. We have an excellent agreement on the exchange
of information, and there is more fraud than all of us can do
together, so we do not have to fight over who gets what.
We have DS agents represented in 19 of the FBI's 56 Joint
Terrorism Task Forces to coordinate the passport and visa
aspects of those investigations and, indeed, most terrorism
investigations do go overseas and come back to the States.
Those relationships that we have with the FBI and our other
partners are particularly useful in bringing those culprits to
justice.
In addition, DS conducts protective intelligence
investigations into threats made against the Secretary of
State, our employees, and foreign dignitaries under our
protection, and foreign missions that are assigned here in the
United States. Since the East Africa bombing, DS has
investigated thousands of these threats directed at our
missions and personnel around the world.
We protect more dignitaries than any other agency in the
U.S. Government. Our special agents guard, as I said, the
Secretary of State 24 hours a day, and go everywhere that he
goes. We also protect the U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations, and foreign dignitaries who visit the United States,
approximately 150 visitors in the last year.
Among those dignitaries who have received DS protection are
Foreign Ministers, foreign heads of state, members of the
British Royal Family, and representatives of Middle East peace
delegations, and the Secretary General of NATO, to mention a
few. DS coordinates its protection with State and local police
and with other Federal law enforcement agencies in the cities
to be visited.
The DS Office of Foreign Missions also assists foreign
embassies and their consulates in the United States with
security for their missions and personnel, and the convergence
of security information with the foreign missions' role of
managing or assisting foreign missions here has never been
closer. Particularly as threats have arisen in our own country,
foreign missions have looked to us and OFM for assistance in
threat data and in protecting their facilities.
Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned, I have the remainder of my
statement, but in the interests of time I will stop there and
look forward to your questions and those of the committee.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Taylor follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Assistant Secretary
of State for Diplomatic Security and the Office of Foreign Missions,
Department of State
Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, and distinguished members of the
committee--I am honored to appear before you today with my esteemed
colleague to speak on the issue of security of our Embassies and
Consulates abroad, and our efforts with both domestic and foreign law
enforcement agencies to ensure the security of Americans abroad and to
protect our borders. As Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, I
am acutely aware of, and in many ways responsible for, countering the
serious threats to Americans and American facilities operating
overseas.
Congress has played an important role in the evolution of how the
Department of State protects our operations overseas. As a result of
attacks against our facilities in the 1980s and the problems associated
with the first effort at building the new embassy in Moscow, the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1989 and 1990 included a
requirement that the Secretary certify to Congress that adequate and
appropriate steps are taken to ensure that the Department builds safe
and secure facilities.
As a result of the 1998 embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar-Es-
Salam, Congress passed new legislation, now referred to as the ``Secure
Embassy Counterterrorism and Construction Act'', mandating 100 feet of
setback and collocation of all Foreign Affairs agencies in newly
constructed facilities overseas, unless a specific waiver was granted
by the Secretary or myself.
The Department has faithfully complied with the certification
requirement, and I can state unequivocally that this has resulted in
the construction of safer more secure facilities overseas.
SAFER EMBASSIES
Congress also provided generous, and most necessary, funding in the
form of an emergency security appropriation in the aftermath of the
1998 embassy bombings. This funding allowed us to install shatter
resistant window film; duck and cover alert systems; and CCTV recording
systems worldwide. We upgraded our technical security systems, power,
and wiring. It allowed us to improve our perimeter security at our most
threatened posts with better walls, public access control screening
booths, and additional anti-ram protection. And it provided us the
means to purchase explosive detectors and X-Ray equipment for virtually
every post in the world. Improvements made to the U.S. Consulate in
Karachi with this funding undoubtedly saved many lives when a suicide
car bomber struck in 2002.
However, I am not here this on this occasion to provide a discourse
solely on actions we have jointly taken in the past. You have asked GAO
to report on the state of diplomatic facility conditions. I think their
presentation has fairly and accurately stated the depth of our
requirements in order to meet the Department's diplomatic goals in a
relatively safe and secure environment.
You have heard from General Williams, on his restructuring of the
Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations to meet these requirements. He
has outlined his goals, execution strategies, and budget requests. I
think the success of his efforts is self-evident. His efforts, and more
importantly his results, have built a new level of credibility with
Congress, and convinced skeptics that the Department can adapt to new
methods of management and utilize some of the best practices from
industry. I support his efforts, and my offices within Diplomatic
Security will continue to work closely with OBO.
The Bureau of Diplomatic Security is not standing still either. A
highly focused development effort in our physical security office has
successfully delivered new products and methods that will allow OBO to
better mitigate our vulnerabilities. Department of State proprietary
standards for forced entry and bullet resistant doors and windows, once
the only standards in industry or government concerned with this type
of security, have been supplemented by adoption of industry standards
promulgated by Underwriters Laboratories and the American Society of
Testing and Manufacturing. We have developed and commercialized a
totally new lightweight laminated glass blast window that will lower
costs and simplify installations. This material is now commercially
available. We have pioneered new developments in anti-ram vehicle
protection and provided new products more acceptable to foreign
governments and architects. We have done this in partnership with other
U.S. government agencies to leverage our work and provide better
answers across our spectrum of needs.
DS Special Agents serving in Regional Security Offices anchor our
overseas security efforts and provide a first line of defense for U.S.
Diplomatic personnel, their families, U.S. Diplomatic Missions, and
national security information. More than 420 DS security officers in
157 countries advise chiefs of missions on security matters, and
develop and implement the programs that shield each U.S. Mission and
residence from physical and technical attack. A little known fact is
that DS also provides security professionals at OBO construction
projects overseas for the entire duration of the construction. Known as
Site Security Managers, these DS agents ensure that project security
requirements are foremost in these important and complex efforts.
Our level of cooperation with OBO has never been as close as it is
today. The Department's need for safe and modern facilities has never
been more apparent. DS and OBO goals have never been as clearly
aligned. We need your continued support to build upon the fine efforts
the Department has made in the last three years to construct more new
embassies and consulates. If General Williams says he can produce even
more on an annual basis, then DS will be there supporting his effort.
While I have only been the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic
Security since November, I was the Department's Coordinator for
Counterterrorism. Before that, I spent 31 years in the Air Force Office
of Special Investigations, serving as its Commander from July 1996
until my retirement in July in 2001. In all of these positions, I have
had the privilege to work with the men and women of the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security and the Office of Foreign Missions. I am awed by
the scope of their missions and the dedication and professionalism they
demonstrate daily in protecting Americans and American interests
worldwide. I was particularly proud, when recently, the Federal Law
Enforce Officers Association (FLEOA) recognized 12 of our people with
the association's highest honor for courage demonstrated in rescues
last March as they evacuated 15 Americans stranded in Ramallah
``working literally meters away from Israeli-Palestinian firefights'',
and again last April when our agents rescued 18 Americans, including
six children, along with nationals from Britain, Japan and Italy who
had been trapped by fighting in Bethlehem.
In addition to supporting the overseas construction program we have
a multi-faceted partnership with both domestic and foreign law
enforcement agencies. These relationships ensure better security aboard
for Americans and foreign national employees of the Department of
State, and help to secure our national borders here at home. They have
been built over time to provide a layered and secure environment for
the conduct of American diplomacy and the promotion of American
interests worldwide, as well as helping us increase security awareness
among all Americans living, working and traveling abroad.
INVESTIGATIONS
In the area of investigations, during the 2002 calendar year, DS
Special Agents investigated nearly 5000 passport and visa fraud cases
and made over 400 arrests. These felonies are often committed in
conjunction with more serious crimes by individuals looking to change
their identities and conceal their activities and movements. DS has
investigated passport and visa fraud cases that have been connected not
only to terrorism, but also to drug trafficking, international
organized crime, money laundering, pedophilia and murder. Our
investigations help secure U.S. borders and protect the national
security of the United States.
SECURING OUR BORDERS
Domestically, DS is also actively involved in the border security
effort. DS' eight Field Offices and fifteen Resident Offices coordinate
with Consular Affairs Passport Agencies to vigorously investigate
passport fraud cases. The DS Visa Fraud Branch is working
collaboratively with the Department of State OIG Office of
Investigations to examine all allegations of consular malfeasance and
employee corruption that may compromise the integrity of the visa
process. DS is represented on 19 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF)
around the country, and works closely with the FBI and other federal
law enforcement agencies to investigate any passport or visa fraud
investigations with a possible terrorism nexus. DS, in partnerships
with the Bureau of Consular Affairs and State OIG, plays an important
role in helping to secure our nation's borders. It is because of this
partnership that we will succeed.
PROTECTIVE INTELLIGENCE
In addition, DS conducts protective intelligence investigations
into threats made against the Secretary of State, other Department
employees, facilities here and abroad, foreign dignitaries under our
protection, and foreign missions in the United States. Since the East
Africa bombings, DS has investigated thousands of threats directed at
our missions and personnel around the world.
REWARDS FOR JUSTICE
DS also administers the interagency Rewards for Justice Program,
which allows the Secretary of State to offer rewards for information
that prevents or resolves acts of international terrorism against U.S.
interests worldwide. There is no doubt that information received under
this program has put terrorist behind bars, saved thousands of lives,
and is a key component of the U.S. Governments fight against
international terrorism.
PROTECTIVE OPERATIONS
Diplomatic Security protects more dignitaries than any other agency
in the U.S. Government. DS Special Agents guard the Secretary of State
24 hours a day, seven days a week, everywhere he goes in the world. DS
also protects the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, and foreign
dignitaries who visit the United States (approximately 150 each year).
Among those foreign dignitaries who have received DS protection are
foreign ministers, former heads of state, members of the British royal
family, representatives of the Middle East Peace Delegations, the
Secretary General of NATO, Palestinian Authority Chairman Yassar
Arafat, and the Dali Lama. DS coordinates this protection with state
and local police and with other federal law enforcement agencies in the
cities to be visited. The DS's Office of Foreign Missions also assists
foreign Embassies and their Consulates in the United States with the
security for their missions and personnel. I would like to thank the
committee for the increased agent authorities provided last year that
will assist us in the conduct of this mission.
CRISIS MANAGEMENT
DS Special Agents serving in regional security offices anchor our
overseas security efforts and provide the first line of defense for
U.S. diplomatic personnel, their families, U.S. diplomatic missions,
and national security information. DS Special Agents, in concert with
other mission or post elements, formulate a number of subject specific
action plans to deal with various emergency contingencies ranging from
hostage taking to evacuations. Often in times of crisis and political
instability, DS Special Agents rely on the U.S. military for
assistance. Since the early 1990s, DS agents have worked closely with
the military, especially the U.S. Marine Fleet Anti-terrorism Security
Teams, which have provided emergency force protection support for
Department of State operations in a number of countries throughout the
world when the host government was unable to do so.
INTERNATIONAL LIAISON
In addition, special agents are the primary liaison with foreign
police and security services overseas in an effort to obtain support
for U.S. law enforcement initiatives and investigations. Much of the
investigative and law enforcement liaison work done by special agents
abroad is on behalf of other Federal, State and local agencies. The
Bureau receives more than 5,000 requests for overseas investigative
assistance from U.S. law enforcement each year, and has achieved
noteworthy success in locating and apprehending wanted fugitives who
have fled the United States.
ANTI-TERRORISM ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
The war against international terrorism is one that the United
States cannot wage alone. Through the Anti-Terrorism Assistance
Program, DS arranges for training in the United States for civilian
security personnel from allied governments in police procedures focused
on terrorism. Since the program's inception in 1983, more than 31,000
foreign students from 127 countries have received training in bomb
detection, crime scene investigations, airport and building security,
maritime security, and dignitary protection. These officials return to
their countries better prepared to fight terrorism and protect
Americans overseas in times of crisis. DS has received numerous stories
from foreign police officers who have utilized their ATA training
successfully to counter terrorist situations in their countries.
The economic and national prosperity of the United States depends
on a strong and vigorous private sector that is able to conduct
business safely and securely throughout the world.
OVERSEAS SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL
In addition to protecting our people, information, and property,
DS, through the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), works with
the U.S. private sector on security issues abroad. The Council, one of
the preeminent public-private partnerships in the United States today,
was established in 1985 and is co-chaired by DS. It consists of
representatives from the U.S. government and the U.S. business
community on overseas security issues of mutual concern. Since its
inception, over 2,300 U.S. companies have repeatedly sought assistance
from the Council.
The Council operates an electronic database that can be accessed
via the Internet by OSAC's constituency. This database contains a
directory of all Foreign Services posts by country, including regional
security officers, police organizations, State Department travel
advisories, security and crime situations, terrorism profiles,
significant anniversary dates, and messages highlighting information of
interest to American business travelers. DS Special Agents also provide
unclassified security briefings and other professional advice to U.S.
businesses overseas.
Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Consular Affairs are at the
forefront of our nation's efforts to adequately secure our borders from
possible terrorist threats. Those efforts begin at the consular
interview window in each of our Embassies and Consulates around the
world. DS is deploying additional agents overseas to expand our
investigative efforts to identify fraudulent applicants and other
individuals who attempt to compromise the integrity of our passport and
visa process. DS agents and Consular Officers working at our embassies
and consulates continue to work closely with numerous host government
law enforcement authorities to identify, arrest, and prosecute these
individuals before they reach our shores.
I would like to thank the Committee for its continuing interest and
support of the Diplomatic Security Service and the Office of Foreign
Missions and would welcome any questions you might have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. I will ask a few
questions, I will then recognize Senator Sarbanes, and then we
will alternate as long as we are here. We appreciate the
thoroughness and the detail of your testimony and the visuals.
Let me just ask a general question. Has the danger level
that we are now talking about today--in addition to discussing
your efforts to combat it--always been a problem for American
diplomacy? Historically, is this a new phenomenon, so I am
interested in whether anybody has done any research. Is this a
spike? Do we go through cycles in the history of our country in
which our embassies, and particularly these buildings we are
talking about today, quite apart from the personnel who are in
them, have been targets for the vicious attacks that you have
discussed?
Does anyone have any historical perspective of this
phenomenon?
Ambassador Taylor. Mr. Chairman, I think terrorism as a
phenomenon, and our embassies as a symbol of America, American
power and American values have increasingly, since the sixties,
become increasing targets.
The Chairman. You would say since that point?
Ambassador Taylor. Since that point.
The Chairman. Because a lot of these places were built, as
you pointed out, up against streets, thoroughfares, right in
the middle of major cities, so apparently people who were
building them in those days and those that occupied them for
decades did not have the same fear that we have been talking
about today.
Ambassador Taylor. Indeed, that is quite true.
General Williams. But I will point this out, Mr. Chairman,
that as we were opening the embassy in Nairobi, for example,
obviously some very senior host nation officials were in
attendance, and they were very supportive and were quick to
point out that we were doing it right. So we are at a time now
in our operations where it has been a sea change, and we hope
that the condition of our buildings will not be at this level
for much longer. I do think it is recognized worldwide that we
have to take a different approach.
The Chairman. You mentioned earlier, and I touched upon
this in my opening statement, that we are trying very hard to
have embassies that are at least approachable. I mention just
anecdotally an experience several years ago, when I was one of
the first guests in our new embassy residence in El Salvador.
Now, during the 1980s when there were serious problems in
that country, at least some of our diplomats desired to go
outside of town, and they did. The place was out of town, and
it did have a wall around it.
Some of the personnel in the embassy said it is not like
the old days, where you have coffee downtown, and you would
pick up on the street gossip and the local rumors. Something
has been lost here. As professionals, in watching this
academically as well as professionally, do you feel it is a
reasonable compromise? In gaining the security, do we still
have a feeling that we are a part of the community, to the
point that other nationals are willing to come in and share
with us what is on their mind?
General Williams. Let me just say from a building
perspective we are utilizing all new green sites, Beijing, in
China, is a good example. Where we select these sites, we do a
lot of coordination with the host government to determine where
the planned development and growth will be going. We try to
always build in the corridor where the new development is
headed. So we have a new embassy compound that is going up in
Beijing, for example, and in other places, Zagreb, I can
mention that as well. At each location we are building where
the future new and modern business will be.
The Chairman. So your research encompasses local plans and
some sense of confidence on the part of the local governments?
General Williams. That is correct. That is correct.
The Chairman. So they know where you are building, and that
is consonant with their ideas.
General Williams. That is correct, and also during the
period of time while we are building, local and new activities,
hotels, office buildings and the like are being built by the
host country.
The Chairman. Now, during another hearing we have had this
week as a part of the buildup toward the authorization bill for
American diplomacy, we discussed the idea that you mentioned
today very prominently, of cost-sharing. We discussed who
exactly are in our buildings, our annexes and other facilities.
We were visiting with people from the intelligence community,
from the Treasury, the FBI and others, and I would say one of
the nice things about the hearings this time around, as opposed
to a couple of years ago, is that all these people are getting
along better with each other.
I can remember in the post 9/11 days having some hearings
behind closed doors in which people within our own government
became so agitated at each other, and so visibly angry, that
they went back to their principals--and I can remember one
occasion where Cabinet officials were engaged in arguments that
afternoon that their subordinates had been involved in that
morning. Everybody went back to a firewall mentality.
Now, at least with FBI, Treasury, Customs, these people all
seem to be saying really nice things about each other, as well
as the State Department. This leads me to the question, in our
total government picture, does everybody have the same idea of
cost-sharing?
In other words, in the Treasury budget submission this year
do they have an item for paying State Department something, and
does OMB adjudicate all of these claims as to what is
equitable? Physically and bureaucratically how does it work?
General Williams. Let me try and give you what we know at
this point. We have tried to put in place a system and an
approach that is fair. We are using a per capita approach
because we did not want to deal with the square footage
approach as it has caused some problems in the past. So if you
are in a classified seat you pay for a classified seat, if you
are in an unclassified seat, you pay for an unclassified seat
and it makes it very equal across the board. We are proposing
that this cost sharing apply to all facilities and not just new
ones.
Any time you introduce a break from a tradition,
particularly where you have not had to budget, obviously there
is a little feedback and a little push back. I frankly think,
Senator, we can get over this. It is going to be a transitional
period. What we have said to OMB, that we think the plan ought
to be phased in over maybe a 5-year period----
The Chairman. A phase-in period.
General Williams. A phase-in period to allow everybody to
vet and participate.
We have also put in place an interagency facilities council
where all of the participating tenants can come together at
least three or four times a year and hear DOS, who is the
manager of the program, explain what is taking place. This
gives them an opportunity and a sense of participation.
The Chairman. Are they all examining the rents together,
and they know per capita----
General Williams. That is correct.
The Chairman. But then, do all pay?
General Williams. Well, we are expecting all to pay once we
get this launched, and OMB is in the process of becoming the
adjudicator on budget structure. We still are working with them
to make certain that we get the program fine-tuned as to how
the budget will work. I believe, Senator Lugar, this will do
two things for us. First, it will help us get the sizing right
at each post. I think also we will be building the right type
of facilities. It allows DOS to get out of the deep hole that
we are in and get our new facilities on line much faster.
We have got 160 new embassies to build. It is going to take
a lot of money. This concept will generate more income or more
funds for us. It will help us move from the $800 million or so
a year to the $1.4 billion level that we need. I just think it
is the right path to go. We can sunset this, because it will
not be a program we would have to keep in place forever. I
estimate that we could get the 160 done, then we could look at
either phasing the program down, or possibly terminating it,
depending on how we are doing at that time.
The Chairman. I just have one more question. You point out
that $1.4 billion is required per year to do all of this in 12
years, as opposed to the 20-year time line that you have.
Certainly, in terms of the security of our people and of our
buildings, the shorter term option would be ideal. Twelve years
is a long time in this world, as to how many things may change.
General Williams. That's right.
The Chairman. This committee has encouraged the Secretary
of State overtly at roundtables like this, or in more public
situations when he appears in the Caucus Room in the Russell
Building, to ask for the money, because without very strong
advocacy by the Department the request is unlikely to survive
several other scrutinies. Have you asked for it this year? What
is the level that you approached OMB with, or what did they
grant? Where do things lie at this moment?
General Williams. Well, it is known because it is in our
long range plan. It is fortunate right now we do have a long
range plan in which we lay out the next 6 years of what we see
the requirements to be.
The method of providing us the millions, the billion and a
half that we need, the cost-sharing mechanism is in place to
generate about $600 million of it.
The Chairman. Ah, so that gets you from the $800 million to
the $1.4 billion.
General Williams. That is correct. That is why the cost-
sharing initiative is so critical.
The Chairman. Yes, but it phases in over 5 years, so you
get just a piece of this at a time?
General Williams. Yes. That is correct. We will have to
work up to it.
The Chairman. All right.
Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
A number of us on this committee have been very concerned
about this issue for a long time, and I am very pleased that
one of the early things Senator Lugar is doing in his
chairmanship is to schedule this very subject for a hearing. I
think I am accurate when I say that more Ambassadors have been
killed in the line of duty over recent decades than admirals
and generals put together, so our diplomats are at real hazard,
there is no question.
And looking at Mr. Ford's report from the GAO I am struck
by how much is left to be done, and I say that without any
intended criticism of those who are trying to bring things up
to standard, because you start out with a huge backlog to be
done, and I think under the circumstances a lot of very good
work is taking place.
The fact remains, though, that even under the best of
circumstances there is a large time interval before we can get
things up to the point where someone can come along and say,
well, we have pretty well secured our facilities around the
world, and it is good to go from 20 to 12 years, but you have
still got 12 years in between there where people are at risk,
and that chart, of course, was just a further demonstration of
it, the one that Mr. Ford provided, of how we are falling
short.
The Chairman. We saw before you came in, Paul, on the
monitor graphic displays of explosions and what happens in
these places without the items that are there.
Senator Sarbanes. Which leads me to this question. Is there
a kind of an emergency program to pick things up fast--I do not
want to say makeshift--but with measures that do not represent
a new embassy, or a completely refurbished embassy, but at
least in the short run would have a substantial impact on the
security situation? And how intense is that program? Anyone on
the panel may wish to reply. Mr. Ford, do you want to take a
crack at that first before we go to the others? Do you
understand the question?
Mr. Ford. Well, I--yes, I think I know your question. As I
mentioned in my statement, the State Department at least
immediately after the bombings received a substantial amount of
money from the Congress to do security enhancements which were
designed to address the immediate problems at facilities
overseas.
So, for example, they did install some of those anti-ramp
barriers that I mentioned earlier to help protect against car
bomb attacks. They did install the controlled areas to try to
make sure that people were properly screened, and vehicles were
properly screened. They did install some perimeter fencing.
They put in mylar on windows so the glass would not shatter,
which caused quite a bit of the deaths in the bombings in
Africa. So I think there has been a lot of steps that the
Department has taken to try to mitigate some of those problems.
The problem is that we are pretty much at the end of that.
Now we have other physical security problems, as I outlined,
that have to be addressed, and absent a new building, I cannot
speak for the experts, but I think they have a problem in
trying to make those places as safe as they can be for the
people who have to work there.
Senator Sarbanes. Does anyone want to add to that?
General Williams. Yes. Senator Sarbanes, I think that our
problem is exactly the way you put it. Can we do something in
the interim as an emergency? Yes, we can. We have looked at a
number of ways. We have received some good input from industry
on being able to put up a very quick, hardened type of facility
which can serve as an interim until such time that we could do
it completely right.
What we are talking about from the standpoint of the 12
years is building that embassy compound that has all of the
features and structures that it takes to run the business, the
chancery building, our consulate, has the general services
building, quarters for our marines, parking, and all this is
enclosed in a secure 9 foot, anti-climb wall.
Can we do something in the interim that is quicker? Yes, we
can. It is a question of being able to get sufficient funding
for that. We really want to be able to, with investments of the
magnitude we are talking about. In summary, we wanted to make
certain that we put something in place that had a useful life
that would justify the investment.
Now, could we manage more than 1.4? Yes, Senator, we could.
We could, even today with our management capacity--of course,
Mr. Ford will have some comments about this when he finishes
his report. I think we could operate very comfortably with $1.8
billion a year. This would cut that time from 12 to something
around 10 years. We pegged at this $1.4 billion amount because
we thought it was reasonable from the standpoint of what we are
trying to move from, but yes, we could go faster.
Senator Sarbanes. Let me put the question in a somewhat
different way. Are you satisfied in your own mind, sanguine
about the prospect that if something happened at one of our
embassies, in the aftermath someone would not come back and
say, well, you know, if they had done one, two, and three--they
had a plan to completely redo this embassy compound, but that
was x number of years away, and that was lined up in the
priority key and someone made a judgment that other things
should come ahead of this place, and we think all of those
reasons were correct, but what they failed to do was to do the
kind of survey that came back and said, gee, you know, they
should have done this and that, all of which could have been
done in a very short period of time, and not at a huge project
expense, and that would have given them a heightened security
and might well have avoided the considerable amount of the
damage that was done?
Now, in the sense, have all of the embassies been scrubbed
down with that kind of an analysis?
Ambassador Taylor. If I may, Senator Sarbanes, I think you
are absolutely correct, and we have done that. Certainly the
standards that General Williams is building buildings to, and
the time line is a projected time line, but in the interim we
have installed interim upgrades to all of our facilities.
We have worked to add surveillance detection and guards and
have worked with governments to close streets to give us more
stand-off. That's not always possible at every facility, but
there is not an RSO or a Chief of Mission anywhere in the world
that does not examine this on a daily basis.
The legislation setting forth the standards has given us an
opportunity to approve waivers that increase, marginally
increase security at facilities while not meeting all of the
standards, so we have applied those waivers where we could
improve the security of our people or our facilities in the
interim until such time as we have the money to build.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, in some instances, I presume that a
deficiency in the physical facilities can to some extent be
made up by personnel. If you have more personnel doing a more
careful job, you can compensate for it, at least in the
interim, which leads me to this question. I am very interested
in this proposed Center for Antiterrorism and Security
Training.
Now, they went out and vetted a lot of sites and the
conclusion that was reached, as I understand it, was that it
ought to go into the Aberdeen Proving Ground up in northeast
Maryland, for a lot of reasons. There are a lot of existing
facilities there that can be refurbished. There is
infrastructure in place that would provide logistical support.
There is ample room for expansion, a lot of compatible units
for interface, and so forth.
Now, there was funding for that, but it was dropped in
conference on one of the appropriation bills. Is it going to be
included in the supplemental? I mean, it seems to me this is
something we obviously need to move on. I gather that it is
cost effective because it would consolidate all of these
various training activities that are located in a lot of
different places and establish a proper center with a high
level of training.
Should we expect to see that in a supplemental, or would
this not be a particularly opportune time to try to move this
Center for Antiterrorism and Security Training forward?
Ambassador Taylor. If I may, Senator Sarbanes, certainly
the CAST, the Center for Antiterrorism and Security Training
has been a high priority and remains a high priority for the
Department for two reasons; one, as you mentioned, the ability
to consolidate training of our agents and, most especially, our
antiterrorism assistance program where we train foreign police,
law enforcement, and security organizations in the latest
techniques of antiterrorism and combating terrorism, has been a
key part of the President's war on terrorism for capacity
building, improving the capability of our partners to work with
us on antiterrorism.
I am not at a point where I am allowed to speak on what the
President may put forth in the supplemental, except to say that
it is a priority for our Department and we will continue to
work hard to try to bring it online, because we believe it is
cost effective and important to our future.
Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman, let me just note that when
Ambassador Taylor says he does not know what the President will
put forward and whether it is a high priority for the
Department, I mean, the only intervening institution in this
decisionmaking process is the Office of Management and Budget,
and I have to say, because we seemed to encounter the same
problem on a lot of homeland security measures as well, where
they seem to be moving up from the operating agencies and then
somehow they get swallowed up somewhere into the dark as they
are trying to make their way forward, that it seems like we
need some new thinking, perhaps, at OMB about the urgency of
some of these matters and about moving things forward. They
seem to be the only ones who have not broken out of the old
cast of thinking in terms of addressing the situation. You all
are not expected to comment on that. I just wanted to put that
on the record.
Could I make one final point? I have some concern--I think
Senator Lugar expressed it earlier--that we do these things in
a way, and I think we have to provide some imagination and
innovation in order to do this, where we get the heightened
security without transmitting some message that we are in a
complete bunker mentality, and that the nation that was founded
on freedom and liberty does not present an image of a closed
society. I think we have to be careful. We even have a problem
around the Capitol, doing it here, to be honest about it.
And in that regard I have one experience that I want to
communicate, and I hope you all will check back on it. At the
American Embassy in London, on Grosvenor Square, at the western
end of the square that comes right up toward the embassy and
faces the front of the embassy, the embassy has sealed off the
street at the front. London has agreed to do that, so that is
blocked off.
They have put up fences into the park itself, into the end
of the park, very unattractive fences, if I may say so, but
that is to keep people from going to the upper end of the park
where they would be right opposite the embassy, across the
street from the embassy, so it backs them into the park and
gives you kind of a no-man's zone at the upper end of the park.
Unless something has changed since I last saw it, behind
that fence, it looks like a trash heap. I mean, it is really a
mess. So you have got this ugly looking fence, and you have
this area behind the fence, still part of the park, but it has
just been allowed to go to pieces. The whole thing looks
terrible.
Now, it does not need to look terrible in order to enhance
security. In fact, I would think that having this, the
vegetation and everything probably harms the security rather
than helps it, because it provides a certain amount of
concealment.
Anyhow, could someone get back to that embassy and see what
they can do about it? They could put up a nice fence and then
maintain the area behind the fence, and we would not have this
appearance problem.
Ambassador Taylor. Senator Sarbanes, if I may respond, just
two comments. First, in my first job in the Department as
Coordinator for Counterterrorism and in this job as Assistant
Secretary for Diplomatic Security, the Secretary has made it
very clear that he shares both yours and Senator Lugar's
concerns, as well as the committee's concern, about American
diplomacy not being conducted from a bunker.
Security is a very, very important part of what we do, but
it is not the reason that we are there. We are there to conduct
the foreign policy of America, to represent American values,
and we can assure you that that is a constant part of what we
consider as we try to put forth the security arrangements for
our people and facilities.
Second, I am informed that we are presenting a plan to
Westminster authorities to improve the image that you've just
described for better security this month, and I would be happy
to share with your staff what the plan is.
Senator Sarbanes. OK. I would be very interested in that.
The Chairman. That is a major victory of this hearing.
General Williams. Senator Sarbanes, let me just mention
about the aesthetics and the bunker mentality. I commented and
responded to the chairman earlier that this has been one of the
things that we have paid an awful lot of attention to, and part
of helping us get it right from that standpoint, we have an
industry advisory panel, people who do this for a living, who
advises us. It is a standing panel on these and other matters,
on how to capture the security requirements and at the same
time ensure that the building looks like a modern office
building and suitable, from a representational standpoint, for
diplomatic business.
For an example, our new facilities that just opened in East
Africa and Tunisia, as you walk into the grand entrance into
either one of those facilities, you see a very modern building
that looks very much inviting. It looks like other very modern
structures in that country, and we have taken great effort to
make certain that the building itself would carry a modern
look.
At the same time, we have to, because of windows and other
security matters we have to do, we try to blend those in and
then put a facade on the building that looks like the rest of
the structure, so we are paying attention to that.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, it is important, because obviously
the embassy is a major statement by the United States in the
particular country in which it is located, and lots of people I
think form impressions about us from the embassy.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.
I have two questions, one of which addresses priorities.
This is a more difficult problem, than it used to be, in that
it affects some countries that are perceived as more likely to
produce hostility against our embassies.
Now, I suppose given the war on terrorism, we are not
really dealing with nation states, but rather we are dealing
with individuals who may be from many countries, and who set up
a resident cell, or who come in to the country really to do
their dirty work, so it could be a country that is relatively
placid that is visited by these people who threaten our
embassies.
I am not certain how you focus on priorities, yet there
must be some sense of which embassies are most vulnerable. I
just want some assurance that this is a part of the
consideration.
General Williams. Yes, Senator, we do. In fact, our
diplomatic security side of State makes a vulnerability
analysis on what is the most vulnerable and they feed this back
to us, and we operate from that list. That sets the priority,
and we go out and we purchase--we tie everything to that
priority list, so what is considered to be No. 1 is what we
work from, all the way down through the entire list.
Ambassador Taylor. Every country also, Senator, General
Williams is correct, every country performs security to a
certain level, so while their facilities may be somewhat more
vulnerable or less vulnerable than others, they have other
things in their security kit bag in terms of local
relationships, surveillance detection, working with
intelligence and security services, that helps provide the
outer rings of security that are so necessary in places that
once we did not think were as vulnerable as we found in 1998 in
Africa, when we were expecting attacks in one place and they
occurred somewhere else. So this is a part of how we do
security on a day-to-day basis around the world.
The Chairman. Now, on another note one of the joys of
embassies or consulates or American studies in the past were
libraries, containing displays with pictures or artifacts of
our country. One of the great values of these places were their
accessibility, where you could walk in or go by on these same
streets that were abutting the traffic, and see some very
attractive aspects, pictorially or otherwise, of our country
that might intrigue visitors.
How do we do that now? How do persons, young persons, old
persons, anybody who is interested in our country, find this
resource behind all the barriers? Do we advertise that it
exists and make it less formidable, so somebody might walk in?
I am just curious as to your perception of how we meet this
mission. Or have we just decided that in a dangerous world,
that's just the way it goes and we really cannot do that sort
of thing anymore?
General Williams. First of all, for the new facilities,
Senator Lugar, that we are putting up, they are well
advertised, in terms of----
The Chairman. All the features they might have for the
local people?
General Williams. That is correct, and also in terms of
ensuring that our embassies have the right type of art and
representation of America, we work with--and of course we have
an arts in embassies dimension in our business, and also we
have a lot of civilian groups that work with us, and we allow
them to donate the art.
For an example, when we get about halfway through with the
construction of a building, we bring in those who want to
donate art, those who want to participate and help with us, and
they come together and put in place some wonderful pieces. And
I hope through your travels you will have an opportunity to
visit some of the new embassies we are putting up now, and you
will see nice sculpture, you will see nice representation of
America.
For an example, even in East Africa we have on one floor,
which represents sort of the Old West, you can look and you can
see representation through murals and paintings and art that
would give you an impression that you are in the Western part
of the United States, so all of that makes a big difference as
well.
The Chairman. Well, general, on that point--now, I have not
been into all of these places, but I have been into several and
I have seen just what you are talking about, and it is very
exciting. What is not clear to me is how an ordinary citizen
off the street is going to see the same thing.
You know, I have an American passport and some people know
who I am, so I can go in there. But I am also concerned that
the same things that I am seeing, that I am excited about are
there as a part of the experience, is no longer available. This
is not your problem precisely. You are talking about buildings
and security. Although, it is your problem in a way, so that
you plan building security with this consideration and in such
a way that our overall mission, or one part of it, is achieved.
Ambassador Taylor. If I might, Senator Lugar, I agree with
you, it is a challenge, and former Under Secretary Char Pierce
in her efforts to reach out through public diplomacy has begun
to build partnerships with many countries overseas to try to
balance using the Internet, using other display techniques that
can be done more securely and still allow that kind of face of
America to be presented to citizens around the world, so it is
a challenge.
The notion that we would have cultural centers out there as
they once were, where people could come in and go, is a very
difficult thing to do in today's security environment, but we
are working with public diplomacy to allow them to do the
outreach so important to what they do, but to do it securely,
and allowing American values and a better understanding of
America to get to people around the world so they really do
learn who we are.
The Chairman. In the same way, this committee is
preoccupied as Senator Sarbanes has pointed out, with the
security issues. We have spent productive time with
professionals like yourself. We are in the public diplomacy
area, and you may be doing better in security than we are doing
in public diplomacy, although this is arguable. Both are very
tough challenges, but nevertheless, they are both important,
and trying to determine how to do these things simultaneously
is a challenge.
Now, let me ask finally: you have identified 260 buildings
in the discussion here today. Is this number likely to go up or
down? We witness new nations being formed from time to time, of
course, and some do not have full ambassadorships, but they are
still important facilities in terms of security. In your long
term projections, does the Secretary or anybody else give you
any direction as to whether American diplomacy is going to
expand architecturally or physically? Are we assuming that 260
is it, and then we can amend it plus or minus 5 or 10, if
necessary?
General Williams. Well, in our long range plan, Mr.
Chairman, we are looking at 260 as sort of being where we are
going to be pegged. Obviously, we may have a plus-up of one or
two here and there, but I think for the purpose of putting a
strategic plan in place on sort of where State will be, I think
it has been accepted that it is 260.
The Chairman. Let me ask the question this way. A country
the size of China, for example, may still be expanding
dynamically. We do not know precisely what the population
trends will be there, or anywhere else. It is a very big place,
a billion people more or less, and becoming more and more
sophisticated as the wealth of the country grows, along with
the infrastructure of their cities in various locations.
We have a fine embassy there, and you have illustrated
where we are headed there, with some other outposts. But it may
be discovered in the fullness of time that we will need more
facilities if we are to have an impact there, whether it is in
public diplomacy or in processing of visas, or all of the
regular things.
I can see that in China, or in India, or some countries
that have very, very large populations, that ties with the
United States will expand and we want that to be the case in
term of a peaceful world.
That does not all have to be done in buildings, but still
those are big countries geographically. I am just curious, from
the standpoint of long range planning, whether people are
considering this sort of situation.
General Williams. Well, from the standpoint, Senator, of
looking at presence, in our plan we ask our political and
economic people who are making forecasts about what the
presence in a particular location should be, they give us the
footing that we need in order to project the facilities, so we
take our lead from the presence input that is provided to us by
those in DOS who are making those projections. So we can
capture it in the plan, because in our plan for each project we
talk about the importance and the significance of that
particular location to do the U.S. Government's diplomatic
activities.
So to pick up and expand in a situation like you just
mentioned, China is growing, Mexico is growing, we know that
they are out there and something could happen. We would first
try to solve the problem through some regionalization, or
something of that nature, so that we would not have a major
task of standing up another consulate, or a large embassy.
The Chairman. Very well. Now, the flip side of this is that
you are now into the cost-sharing business, and the number of
agencies inside these places have been expanding over the
course of time. New missions have been founded by other
agencies of government, and then they have found you, so let us
say they are prepared to pay the rent, but at the same time
there may be more of them.
In terms of the planning, you can do this on the back of
the State Department, for instance, but is there any
coordination, in which you ask Treasury or the FBI, or USTA or
others, questions as to what their missions may encompass, so
that as you are building these places they include a ball park
estimate of what uses they may have?
General Williams. Yes, Senator. In fact, the protocols for
our planning, the front end part of planning is to go to the
source, that is, go to the post. We send a planning team out to
the post and sit down with the post. We start first with the
authorized number of spaces for all elements and then have them
try to think 6 years ahead with us and say--now, with cost
sharing we have to add, understanding you have to pay for it--
so that we can get this right.
So we come away with a sign-off by all. We require them to
sign off on exactly what they think the prediction would be,
and then we size the building from that information and we
build in every new facility at 10 percent growth, so as to
allow 20 or 30 additional seats in each building for
unpredicted growth.
Mr. Ford. I would like to comment a little bit in this
area. We are doing another piece of work for the House, looking
at the process the general mentioned about the other agencies
establishing a disciplined process, and we are going to be
issuing a report later next month which indicates that there is
an issue here about how well they are doing in that area.
The Chairman. I see.
Mr. Ford. I know from talking to General Williams he is
concerned that the numbers of the EBCs from all of these other
parties are good numbers, because he has to build to that size,
and he does not want to have to be in a position where we build
an embassy that is going to be full the day we open and there
is no room to grow, and that has unfortunately happened in a
couple of cases.
So I think you are touching on an important point. We are
going to be making some recommendations to OMB and the State
Department to try to get the other agencies, which seem to be
where a lot of the problems are, to take it more seriously and
have a more rigorous process to make sure they give the general
good numbers to build against.
The Chairman. Right, and this is a study now the House
Foreign Affairs Committee has requested?
Mr. Ford. It is actually the House Government Reform,
Congressman Shays' subcommittee.
The Chairman. Government Reform. Well, hopefully you and
the Congressman will share your findings with our leaders. I
appreciate knowing that Congressman Shays is interested in this
issue. He has visited a good number of these places, sometimes
with some of us. We appreciate that information.
Senator Sarbanes, do you have any additional questions?
Senator Sarbanes. Ambassador Taylor, who has the
responsibility to try to address the security situation of
Americans overseas, not our government personnel? It seems to
me in the situation we now find ourselves through this
terrorism threat that the most vulnerable of all are Americans
overseas. Now, they may want to do a high profile thing in the
United States, but at least that is here, but we have literally
millions of Americans overseas, business people, students,
religious people, and many of them are located in areas where
they are almost there alone, so to speak. Does that come under
your jurisdiction?
Ambassador Taylor. It is a shared responsibility between us
and our consular affairs people, and American Citizens
Services. I think you know we have a very extensive Web system
of getting consular notices out, warning notices out to
Americans when Americans register, when they arrive in a
certain country, so we know where they are and we know how to
get messages out to them about threats. And that has been
certainly a growing business since 9/11, although it was very
large even before 9/11.
The other thing we have that is probably the most effective
public-private partnership is our Overseas Security Advisory
Council, which has membership from more than 2,500 business,
church denominations, universities, and it is growing at a rate
of about 10 to 12 new entities every week that have joined
OSAC, we call it. And OSAC is essentially an information
exchange where private industry shares information among
themselves as well as with us on threats to Americans
throughout the world, and through that partnership we have been
able to reach out literally to tens of thousands of Americans
across the world.
When we had the unfortunate assassination of the missionary
in Sidon, Lebanon, it was through OSAC that we called in all of
the missionary groups and spent a half-day seminar talking
about soft targets and how we can help, or how they can work
with us to help their missionaries as they are out around the
world. So it is shared responsibility between OSAC, our Office
of Citizens Services, and we take it very seriously in getting
to American citizens as they travel the information they need
to protect themselves.
Senator Sarbanes. Has the GAO looked at any aspect of this?
Mr. Ford. Not recently. Several years ago we did some work
on the travel advisory system that the State Department put
out. I can tell you that I believe the current level of effort
that the Department undertakes to notify Americans is much
better than it was, say, 10 years ago. You can pick up the
Washington Post and look at the travel section on Sunday. There
is almost always an advisory section in there that often comes
from the State Department.
The Ambassador mentioned OSAC, which is a new organization.
I think it has only been in existence for a couple of years.
Well, the predecessor to that, it was my recollection was that
it only covered the business community, but I could be wrong.
But I think overall the Department has definitely made much
more of a conscious effort overseas.
I know whenever we go into an embassy, the consular affairs
section, that is a major part of what they are now focused on,
is trying to find ways to keep the American community in that
country informed about what is going on, so we have not
assessed it in detail, but if I look back from where it was
before, I think the State Department has done a much better job
in this area.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, you do not have the power to order
Americans out of a country, do you?
Ambassador Taylor. No, sir. An American citizen, no, sir.
Senator Sarbanes. So if they choose to put themselves at
risk, they can do so, right?
Ambassador Taylor. Yes, sir. We certainly work with people
to encourage them to leave.
Senator Sarbanes. It is kind of anomalous to hear these
reports coming out of Baghdad from press people who are sitting
there watching the missiles coming in.
Thanks very much.
The Chairman. Much like, in a different venue altogether,
seeing high rise buildings being built on the road up to the
DMZ in South Korea. You wonder whether someone has a different
kind of perception than we might have, but there you are.
I think Senator Sarbanes' point is well taken. It is truly
remarkable, given the number of Americans who are abroad in all
sorts of ways, some of them permanently, others as students,
travelers, businesspeople, that the number of security cases is
so low that we are able to maintain a staff of just three
people down in Colombia, for example. The sheer volume, and as
Paul has elicited from you, the fact that you serve of your own
volition, is impressive. If you want to go into harm's way, you
can go ahead, and hopefully our State Department people, our
consular people, are able to rescue you.
Ambassador Taylor. Actually, Senator, it is one of those
unsung here missions that our consular people do every day.
The Chairman. Exactly. Which makes the quality of life for
all of us, the extension of our freedom much more substantial.
I really congratulate you all on the studies you have done
prior to this hearing, and for the specific work in your
testimony here. I think the graphics and the details of your
studies that you presented were very, very helpful to us, and
so we thank each of you for participating, and the hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the committee adjourned, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
----------
Statement Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold
Mr. Chairman, today's hearing is especially timely. With war in
Iraq, we are facing the possibility that these developments will
provoke additional attacks on our diplomatic facilities abroad. Last
year, as chairman of the African Affairs Subcommittee, I visited the
site where our Embassy in Nairobi once stood, and saw the Memorial Park
now devoted to the memory of the 212 people, including 12 Americans,
who were killed in the August 1998 terrorist attack on the U.S. Embassy
in Kenya. I have also visited our Embassy in Tanzania, which was
attacked the same day. We have devoted a lot of attention to homeland
security over the past 18 months, and rightly so. But our people
overseas may also be vulnerable to the designs of international
terrorists.
Since the late 1960s, more than 200 U.S. Foreign Service personnel
have been killed in the line of duty. Their names are engraved on a
plaque in the lobby of the Truman Building. Most of the names have been
added since 1983, and the list keeps getting longer. Secretary Powell
tells us that more U.S. ambassadors have been killed in the line of
duty since World War II than military general officers. We frequently
say that our diplomatic personnel are our first line of defense in the
fight against global terrorism. Yet nearly 18 years after the Inman
Report, we are told that 160 of our 260 overseas posts do not meet
security standards. I was recently in our Consulate in Capetown, South
Africa, a clearly unsafe facility that has been raising concerns about
security for some time. A new consulate is slated to be built. But that
is little comfort to those who are working there now. A diplomatic
career entails inherent risks. Diplomats must get out and mix with
societies abroad in order to do their jobs. We cannot isolate them
inside fortresses around the clock. But we owe it to them to keep those
occupational risks to a reasonable minimum by providing safe and secure
places in which to live and work. We can clearly do better, and we must
do better. It shouldn't take 20 years to give our people the security
that they deserve.
----------
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Responses of Hon. Francis X. Taylor, Assistant Secretary of State for
Diplomatic Security to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by
Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Question. Does the Department disagree with anything presented by
GAO in its testimony? In particular, does the Department agree with the
statistics that the GAO presented with regard to the percentage of
posts that don't meet the various security standards?
Answer. The Department believes the GAO presentation was a fair and
accurate portrayal of the security situation at our embassies and
consulates abroad. The information used to prepare the GAO report was
drawn, for the most part, from DS and OBO files and data, supplemented
with trips to posts overseas by GAO personnel. The statistics were
accurate insofar as they represent our primary facility in each city.
At many of our posts there are multiple small office locations that
also do not meet security standards, which must necessarily be
collocated with any newly constructed U.S. Embassy or Consulate.
Question. What are the primary reasons that current security
standards have not been met?
Answer. When the Department builds new facilities every effort is
made to meet security standards. Congress wisely included a waiver
clause in the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of
1990 (Title VI of Appendix G of P.L. 106-113 or SECCA, which for new
construction requires all U.S. agencies in country be collocated and be
provided 100 feet of setback) Since the enactment of SECCA, the
Secretary has only approved seven waiver requests. In three cases,
Luanda, Sao Paulo, and Belfast, security factors and national Security
considerations led to decisions to build on sites or acquire a building
that did not allow for a full 100 feet of setback. In the remaining
four cases the Secretary agreed to requests by the Director of Peace
Corps to allow its offices to remain off compound, in accordance with a
``Sense of Congress'' that recommends he do so when permitted by
security considerations.
Where we have not built new facilities, it is for the most part not
possible to fully meet security standards. Old buildings usually cannot
be retrofitted to meet modern seismic or blast protection standards.
Setback is not available in downtown settings where our facilities are
traditionally located. Where we have been able to secure permission to
install perimeter barriers and anti-ram protection, we have. But the
majority of our facilities cannot be made to meet security standards
unless they are replaced.
Question. After the Africa bombings in 1998, the Department talked
about moving away from a ``threat list''--with different levels of
threat assigned to each post--because the attacks in Africa made it
clear that the terrorists had exploited a vulnerability. That is, the
terrorists figured out that we didn't regard posts like those in East
Africa as high threat posts. Given the recent attacks on U.S.
personnel--such as those attacks on military personnel in Kuwait, or
the assassination of Mr. Foley in Jordan--it seems obvious that the
terrorists are looking not only at hard targets but softer targets such
as personal residences. We also have a lot of facilities, like AID
missions or former U.S. Information Service buildings, which are not
collocated on Embassy compounds.
a. Please describe how you assess the threats at each post.
Answer. From a macro perspective: Upon the receipt of threat
information, the U.S. Embassy or Consulate's Emergency Action Committee
(EAC) will convene immediately to discuss the credibility of the
information and implement the necessary security measures to combat the
threat. The DS Regional Security Officer (RSO) and all other post
security and counterterrorism elements are represented in the EAC,
which is usually chaired by the Ambassador or Deputy Chief of Mission
(DCM). In Washington, DC, all significant threats are discussed twice a
day (and once on Saturday) via the secure video meetings convened by
the NSC's Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG). All key agencies of
the Intelligence Community are represented and contribute in this
meeting on a daily basis. Diplomatic Security chairs for the Department
of State.
From a micro perspective: The responsible DS intelligence analyst
will (1) consider the source of the threat, (2) the logic of the
threat, (3) the tactical tendencies of the group responsible for the
threat, (4) the targeting patterns of the group, (5) the geographic
capability of the group, and (6) the vulnerabilities of the intended
target. The threat will either be assessed as (a) credible, (b) not
credible, or (c) insufficient data to determine credibility. If (c)
then the DS analyst will try to acquire more information by going back
to the agency or post that acquired the initial threat information. The
responsible DS analyst will discuss the threat with other DS analysts
and officers, State Department officials, and the Intelligence
community to obtain different opinions of the threat and the group
responsible. This process helps the analyst produce a more accurate
assessment of the threat. Assessing terrorist threats is still an art
and not a science. As in art, threats can sometimes be interpreted
differently.
b. What is being done with regard to providing security at
residences? What further steps are you contemplating?
Answer. Over the past year, security coverage at both official
facilities and residences has been expanded beyond that envisioned
after the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es
Salaam. These security increases are related to crime factors as well
as the ongoing war on terrorism.
In FY 2002, DS provided $66,053,100 primarily for static
residential guards, residential foot patrols, mobile patrols, and
residential security upgrades to include application of Shatter
Resistant Window Film (SRWF) at residences. The FY 2003 projection is
at least $84,094,400, a significant increase in protection and
resources. Program improvements to provide greater security to official
USG personnel under Chief of Mission authority include: (a) Providing
additional funding to support increased levels of police presence at
official facilities and residences; (b) Expanded Surveillance Detection
assets to high profile residences, route analysis, schools, Embassy
social events, residential compounds and Embassy clustered residences;
(c) Increase the level of static guard coverage at residences in
conjunction with more effective mobile patrols; (d) Encourage posts to
develop appropriate housing pools to maximize available security
resources.
Question. In 1999, Congress enacted the Secure Embassy Construction
and Counterterrorism Act of 1990 (Title VI of Appendix G of P.L. 106-
113). Section 606(a)(2) required that all U.S. agencies in country be
co-located on the compound. Section 606(a)(3) required that there be
100-foot setback from the perimeter at each newly acquired facility.
Congress provided some flexibility in the statute by allowing the
Secretary of State to waive the restrictions if he can certify that
security considerations permit the waiver.
a. Please describe the process for implementing these
requirements. Are these standards still appropriate? Should
they be strengthened? Or are they too restrictive?
Answer. Every request for a waiver is carefully weighed. The tenant
organization requesting the waiver submits the request to the post and
to Diplomatic Security. The request for a waiver must first be
supported by the head of agency resident at post, and then be vetted
and have the support of the Chief of Mission and the Regional Security
Officer. If granted, documentation explaining the request along with
CON and RSO concurrence is forwarded to DS. The Physical Security
Programs office reviews all the factors and makes a written
recommendation in the form of a decision memorandum. The Chief
Operating Officer of OBO, General Williams, is consulted if it is a
State Department property, and then the DS Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Countermeasures reviews the submission. The Assistant Secretary is
then requested to decide, factoring in essentials such as the security
factors, threat, national security requirements, and local conditions.
If it is delegable, the Assistant Secretary approves or disapproves the
request. If it is non-delegable, he makes a recommendation to the
Secretary. The requirement is appropriate.
b. What factors led you to recommend a waiver (in those cases
not delegable) or agree on a waiver (in those cases delegable)?
In what cases have waivers been appropriate?
Answer. In non-delegable cases, I have only recommended one waiver.
This was for relocation of Consulate General Belfast to a newly
acquired building. The Department will not be able to replace all its
facilities with newly constructed buildings, even if funding for 160
new embassy compounds is provided. Alternate execution strategies such
as acquiring already constructed facilities and enhancing their
security must also be utilized. In this case, the combination of
overall security, local conditions, and a realization that this
facility was likely to be the best available led to the recommendation.
In delegable cases, where no new construction was taking place, the
A/S for DS authorized waivers based on the type of operation, i.e.
American presence post, a consular agency, or CDC office, the security
provided, and local security and threat conditions. The waivers were
appropriate in all cases.
c. Of the waivers granted for AID and Public Diplomacy
facilities in CY2002, please provide information on the amount
of setback that will be provided at each facility.
Answer. USAID, Office of Public Diplomacy, and CDC waivers of
Setback--2002. (Dates listed below are dates the waivers were signed by
DS.)
Kinshasa
Waivers of setback and collocation were granted by the Acting
Assistant Secretary on 08/21/02. The waivers permitted the new CDC
office to be located in the Mobil Oil Building and the expansion of the
already existing USAID office in that building. The 10-story building
has commercial office space on the first, second, and third floors. The
fourth through 10 floors are apartments. The building has the following
setback:
South side--60 feet;
West side--35 feet;
North side--zero to 70 feet; and
East side--five feet.
Minsk
Waivers of setback and collocation were granted by the Assistant
Secretary on 02/04/02. The Public Diplomacy Office is located on the
ground and first floors of a three-story commercial office building.
Setback from the exterior of the building to the perimeter is more than
100 feet on two sides and approximately 60 feet on the other two sides.
Sarajevo
Waivers of setback and collocation were granted by the Acting
Assistant Secretary on 06/17/02. The waivers allow the relocation of
the CPA and GSO offices to space on the first through fourth floors and
a portion of the fifth floor of the USAID NAB, a 12-story office
building leased in its entirety by USAID. Following renovation, USAID
occupies the sixth through 12th floors.
Original acquisition of the USAID building was approved 11/12/99
with the setback from the property perimeter as follows:
North side (river)--five feet;
East side--105 feet;
South side--52.5 feet; and
West side--100 feet.
Tirana
Waivers of setback and collocation were granted by the Assistant
Secretary on 01/02/02. The waivers allow temporary relocation of the
USAID offices to the second floor of the nine-story Sheraton Hotel
until completion of the Embassy Annex on the Embassy compound. The
hotel building has setback from the property perimeter as follows:
North side--65.7 feet;
East side--360 feet;
South side--425 feet; and
West side--360 feet.
Question. General Taylor, in your written testimony, you describe
the effort to respond to threats against personnel in our State
Department facilities domestically and abroad. I understand that you
get numerous threats at post every day.
a. Has the volume and nature of threats to our overseas
personnel changed significantly since the September 11th
terrorist attacks? What is the volume today?
Answer. Since 9/11, there has been in increase in the volume of
threats directed at overseas U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel.
Such increases are normally seen after major terrorist attacks and
controversial U.S. foreign policy or military actions. Similar
increases were noted after the 1991 Operation Desert Storm, 1998 East
African Embassy bombings and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole. The
current military action in Iraq will also most likely generate an
increase in terrorist threats.
The nature of the threat against overseas U.S. diplomatic interests
has not significantly changed. The threat scenarios still primarily
involve attacks on our facilities either with standoff weapons or
vehicular suicide attacks. However, since the attack in Bali we have
noticed an increase in terrorist threat reporting concerning plots and
interest in ``soft'' U.S. targets. Many of these reports involve al-
Qaeda. As we harden security around our facilities and principal
officers, it is logical that terrorists would look for softer U.S.
diplomatic targets. It is not yet clear whether this is an emerging
trend or simply a temporary tactical shift. Terrorists still believe
that they acquire more political capital by attacking a U.S. Embassy or
assassinating or kidnapping a principal officer than by attacking soft
targets. Attacks on soft targets may simply be a holding action
designed to demonstrate that the group is still active and to inspire
local sympathizers and supporters.
b. Does the Department have the resources to investigate such
a volume of threats? And if the volume should increase
significantly?
Answer. The Diplomatic Security Service is adequately staffed and
prepared to respond to the current volume of threats and has the
capacity to absorb an increase in threat related investigative activity
for a short period of time. However, our current resources do not
provide us with the flexibility to respond effectively to a sustained
period of increased threats requiring an investigative response. Such a
situation will tax DS personnel and force reallocation of resources
from other critical programs impacting on both Department and national
security priorities.
c. How do the various entities in a mission--Diplomatic
Security, FBI, CIA, and others--coordinate within a post and
with Washington to investigate a threat?
Answer. The Chief of Mission (CON) is ultimately responsible for
security at post. His primary security advisor is the RSO. The
Emergency Action Committee (EAC) is an organization established at a
Foreign Service Post by the CON or principal officer, for the purpose
of planning and coordinating the post's response to contingencies such
as threats. The RSO, CIA and FBI are just three of the many members of
an EAC. The RSO submits a cable to Washington on EAC meetings. In
Washington, DC, all significant threats are discussed daily (except
Sunday) via the secure video meetings convened by the NSC's
Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG). All key agencies of the
Intelligence Community are represented and contribute in this meeting
on a daily basis. Diplomatic Security chairs for the Department of
State.
Question. The most recent semi-annual report of the Inspector
General (covering April to September 2002) contains a summary
discussion of the review of the 28 missions it inspected in this
period. The unclassified part of the report says this:
``Of all the findings the most prevalent pertained to
emergency preparedness. U.S. Missions are required to review
Emergency Action Plans on an annual basis and to submit a fully
revised plan every three to five years . . . the inspections
determined that more than half of the missions had not
conducted the required review and testing of their emergency
procedures. The importance of these findings cannot be
overstated. As noted by survivors of the most recent large
vehicle bomb attacks against the U.S. Consulate in Karachi,
Pakistan, the lack of personnel injury was attributed to the
instinctive response by staff as a result of frequent emergency
procedure drills. The deficiencies noted in all emergency
procedure programs are easily correctable, usually requiring
little if any additional resources.''
The report also asserts that in the area of physical security, the
``most common deficiency was the lack of current technical and physical
security surveys. These reviews are essential to ensuring the currency
of the mission's physical, technical, and procedural defenses.''
a. Do you agree or disagree with these conclusions?
Answer. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security agrees with the
conclusion that a well formulated Emergency Action Plan (EAP) that all
members of the Emergency Action Committee (EAC) contribute to and
participate in can indeed prepare a mission for emergency situations.
Additionally, the annual review for accurate information and full
participation drills are a key element in emergency preparedness of a
post.
b. If you agree, what is DS doing to remind ambassadors and
regional security officers of the importance of security drills
and of conducting regular surveys?
Answer. In January of 2001, the Department at the request of the
Bureau of Diplomatic Security changed the 12 FAH 1, Emergency Plans
Handbook (EPH), Section H-060 Drills, to reflect new guidance to
missions for types and frequency of drills. To reinforce this and other
changes to the EPH, Diplomatic Security provides all outgoing
Ambassadors, Regional Security Officers (RSO), Assistant Regional
Security Officers (ARSO) and Post Security Officers (PSO) with
briefings and training on general EAP preparations, changes in the EPH
and post specific needs and requirements for emergency preparedness.
Additionally, DS reminds the EAC Chairperson and RSC via State cables
when their specific EAP is due/overdue for revision. As major changes
are made to the EPH, State notification cables are sent to all posts
advising of the changes and compliance requirements. The post Emergency
Action Committee (SAC) is responsible for ensuring that periodic drills
are conducted and reported per 12 FAH-1 Section H-063. The EPH is
considered a living document and changes are made to it as security
procedures change, generally due to a heightened threat environment.
The EPH changes will in turn require each individual post EAC to assess
the new guidance and make appropriate changes to their EAP.
Question. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security oversees the anti-
terrorism assistance program. The funding for this program has
increased significantly in recent years, especially since September 11,
2001. The request for Fiscal Year 2004 is $106.4 million, an increase
of over $40 million compared to the FY 2003 request. The Congressional
Budget Presentation indicates that a recent program assessment
concluded that it is ``moderately effective.''
a. The number of people in the Office of Anti-Terrorism
Assistance is the same in the request for FY 2004 (15) as in FY
2000, when the program was funded at a level of $31 million. Is
this number of staff sufficient to manage these kinds of
budgetary increases? If so, why?
b. Please provide information about the program assessment
which found the program ``moderately effective.'' What
problems, if any, did the report identify?
Answer.
a. The overall number of individuals supporting Antiterrorism
Assistance (ATA) programs has grown dramatically with budget
gains, to more than 90 individuals, through increases in the
number of contractors employed by ATA. Although there are many
advantages to the utilization of contractors for the kinds of
programs ATA operates, additional full time, State Department
employees in supervisory positions would enhance overall
program management. ATA is seeking reorganization for
additional supervisory positions through the Department of
State personnel system.
b. The rating referred to in the question above came from the
Office of Management and Budget's Program Assessment Rating
Tool (PART). Introduced for the first time in the President's
FY 2004 budget presentation, PART is an element of an ongoing
effort to assess the effectiveness of federal programs and to
hold agencies accountable for accomplishing results. The PART
evaluation considers four critical areas of assessment: purpose
and design, strategic planning, management, and results and
accountability. Scores in each of these areas are combined to
achieve an overall qualitative rating that ranges from
Effective, to Moderately Effective, to Adequate, to
Ineffective. Programs that do not have acceptable performance
measures or have not yet collected performance data generally
receive a rating of Results Not Demonstrated. OMB completed
reviews for 234 programs for this year as a representative
sample of government programs. More than half of all programs
reviewed (50.4 percent) received the Results Not Demonstrated
rating. 5.1 percent were judged Ineffective; 14.5 percent
Adequate; 24.0 percent Moderately Effective; and just 6.0
percent Effective. Although the Antiterrorism Assistance
Program's overall rating of 78 percent was comparatively
favorable to other State Department and US Government programs,
the PART review indicated that ATA has not fully satisfied the
requirement for ``measurable long-term outcome goals.'' ATA has
numerous anecdotal success stories of course graduates from
many different countries using their training to free American
hostages or identify the perpetrators of a terrorist bombing.
However, ATA is now also developing objective country-by-
country measures of effectiveness that will enable it to better
calibrate national progress and returns on training and
equipment investment.
Question. General Taylor, you indicated that there are RSOs in 157
countries. We have posts in 186 countries. Who performs the functions
of a security officer in the remaining 29 countries? Is such coverage
adequate? If so, why?
Answer. Security is a major concern at each post and we believe
coverage is adequate because Regional Security Officers and Post
Security Officers are assigned to every location in the world. Of the
remaining countries (29), 15 have no American presence and 14 are
smaller facilities such as those in the South Pacific (Micronesia,
Solomon Islands, Marshall Islands) and Caribbean (St. Johns, St.
George's). An American Post Security Officer who is overseen by a
nearby RSO provides the security function. The RSO will visit the post
quarterly and is always available for guidance. DS will continually
monitor each security situation and workload to assign an RSO when
needed, but a more effective use of assets has been a second officer at
a larger, busier post.
______
Responses of Maj. Gen. Charles E. Williams (Ret.), OBO Director and
COO, Department of State, to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Question. General Williams outlined an ambitious program to
construct over 160 new Embassy compounds worldwide over the next 12
years. Even a dozen years is, however, a long period of time given the
security threat.
a. Is there a way to complete 160 projects on a faster
schedule?
Answer. As General Williams indicated in his testimony on March 20,
2003, OBO currently has the capacity to manage $1.8 billion in NEC
projects on an annual basis. At that funding level the job could be
completed less than 12 years.
If additional funds were made available, OBO would be prepared to
make the appropriate adjustments in its staffing levels and management
structures to accommodate an even more aggressive schedule for
constructing New Embassy Compounds.
As was also noted in the testimony, the Department's major new
initiative, the Capital Security Cost Sharing Program, establishes the
mechanism to allocate the costs of an accelerated program throughout
agencies at our overseas missions. At present, other agencies
contribute only to the operating costs of our facilities, but
contribute nothing for the capital cost of the long-term facilities
they use. The initiation of this Program was announced in the
President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2004, with actual allocations to
other agencies to commence in FY2005. The full implementation of this
program plus the current level of appropriations funds would allow OBO
to accelerate the program from 26 years to 12.
b. Are there any other legislative impediments that stand in
the way of your doing your job quickly and efficiently that
Congress should consider?
Answer. The most important consideration is consistency of funding
levels. The success of the Capital Security Cost Sharing Program
depends on assured, long-term funding. In order to maintain the
interest of private industry, funding levels must be maintained over
the long term and can not be reduced after a few years.
We believe that the Capital Security Cost Sharing Program is fully
justified by our need to relocate U.S. Government employees overseas
into secure, safe, and functional facilities as soon as possible. In
addition--and as an added benefit--it also has a strong ``rightsizing''
component: For each overseas employee, agencies and departments would
have to pay into the fund for new, secure office space.
Question. The Congressional Presentation Document for OBO's Design
and Engineering function contains a program increase of $1.2 million
for ``Increase in Travel (Business Class)''. Please elaborate on the
nature of this increase. Has there been a change in policy or practice
with regard to use of business class travel?
Answer. The cost and amount of TDY travel conducted by OBO's Design
and Engineering (DE) division has increased significantly due both to
departmental changes in the travel policy and changes in the number of
division staff and their roles and functions following OBO's 2001
reorganization.
2002 regulatory changes in departmental travel policy increased the
amount of authorized business class travel, increasing DE travel costs.
Revisions to Department of State's regulations (Foreign Affairs Manual
6 FAM 147.2-4) require, with narrow exception, that travelers be
provided business class air accommodations for all TDY or Permanent
Change of Station travel of 14 hours duration or longer.
The number of DE staff traveling and the number of TDY trips
accomplished have also dramatically increased. Following the 2001 OBO
re-organization of offices and divisions, all OBO design and
engineering functions were consolidated in the DE Division. As a
result, DE grew by 30 additional staff members previously assigned to
other OBO divisions: Security Engineering (15), Design Management (10),
and Fire Protection (5), many of whom travel frequently. These
increased travel costs could not be absorbed within the current
operating budget. In addition, CEO's Standard Embassy Design (SED)
strategy also now requires that DE architects and engineers travel to
project sites to support the SED planning function. Given the enlarged
OBO mission to construct, renovate, and maintain secure and functional
facilities in 260 embassies and consulates, DE has also been required
to support a greater number security, construction, and maintenance
projects worldwide. This, too, has resulted in increased TDY travel.
Question. Of the New Embassy Compounds requested in FY 2004, do the
costs for the NOB set forth in the budget include land costs?
Answer. Land costs for the New Embassy Compounds requested in the
FY 2004 budget are not included. Site acquisition costs for Accra,
Ghana; Belgrade, Serbia-Montenegro; Lome, Togo; Panama City, Panama;
and Surabaya, Indonesia were included as part of the FY 2003 budget.
The sites for the Algiers, Algeria and Berlin, Germany NECs as well as
the Abuja, Nigeria and Kingston, Jamaica USAID Buildings are already
USG-owned. The decision to buy a new site or utilize an existing USG-
owned site in Rangoon, Burma is still under consideration. Site
acquisition funds requested in the FY 2004 budget will be used for
purchasing sites during FY 2004 for NECs to be built in FY 2005 and
beyond. Our FY 2004 request includes $63.2 million for site
acquisitions and planning for future NECs.
Question. Of the New Embassy Compounds requested in FY 2004, please
provide information on the design/construction parameters as to size--
that is, whether the post is based on the ``small'', ``medium'', or
``large'' standard design.
Answer. The Standard Embassy Design (SED) allows the Department to
take advantage of standardized designs based on staffing requirements
of embassies. This reduces the time to construct facilities overseas
and their overall cost. There are three SEDs:
Small <4300 sq. meters
Medium 4300-7400 sq. meters
Large >7400 sq. meters
Surabaya, Indonesia is a small SED. Algiers, Algeria and Lome, Togo
are medium SEDs. Accra, Ghana; Belgrade, Serbia-Montenegro; and
Rangoon, Burma are large SEDs.
Berlin and Panama are considered ``Special'' Embassies as their
size is beyond the parameters of a large SED due to extraordinary
security or operational needs.
The USAID buildings for Abuja and Kingston are not considered a
part of the SED program. However, based on their size, they would be
considered small.
Question. General Williams, your presentation indicates that there
is a ``participating contractor pool for the NECs'', which now consists
of 14 such contractors. Please explain how contractors are selected and
qualify for participation in the pool. What does membership in the pool
signify? What are the names of the 14 contractors? Are all such
contractors U.S. firms?
Answer. The process starts with contractors responding to an
advertised synopsis. The pool consists of prequalified contractors
selected on the merits of their technical proposals that demonstrate
the contractors' ability to meet established criteria; such as adequate
financial resources, record of past performance, and technical
capabilities. Several of the companies that are in the 2003 NEC pool
are from the 2002 NEC prequalified contractors list, since the
prequalification is good for two years. These fiscal year 2002
companies merely had to submit a letter of interest in response to the
2003 NEC program. All of these companies are U.S. firms. The list of
firms that have been in the pool over the past several years include:
Caddell Construction Co.
J.A. Jones Construction Co.
Hensel Phelps Construction Co.
Fluor Intercontinental
B.L. Harbert Int'l., LLC
ABB SUSA, Inc.
HB Zachry Co. (International)
Perini Corp.
HITT Constructors
Jordon Construction
Parsons
Dick Pacific
Carothers Construction/Arkel International (Joint Venture)
AECON/Leo Daly (Joint Venture)
As new NEC projects come in for FY 2003, they will be advertised so
that new firms will be given the opportunity to prequalify, and be
added to the pool.
Question. To what degree are contractors for NECs subject to
competition?
Answer. NECs are competed in both phases of the solicitation
process. A technical competition is held in the prequalification phase,
and a price/technical competition is held among the list of
prequalified firms in the second phase. The result of this two-phase
competition action will result in a contract that offers the best value
to the U.S. Government.