[Senate Hearing 108-53]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-53
IRAQ: RECONSTRUCTION
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 11, 2003
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
87-833 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2003
____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpr.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire Virginia
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Adams, Dr. Gordon, director of the Security Policy Studies
Program, Elliott School of International Affairs, the George
Washington University, Washington, DC.......................... 17
Prepared statement........................................... 20
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 4
Corzine, Hon. Jon, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, statement
submitted for the record....................................... 80
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 3
Marr, Dr. Phebe, former senior fellow, National Defense
University, Washington, DC..................................... 41
Prepared statement........................................... 47
Mitchell, Ms. Sandra, vice president of Governmental Relations,
International Rescue Committee, Washington, DC................. 30
Prepared statement........................................... 34
Romero, Ms. Bernice, deputy director of Policy and External
Affairs, Oxfam America, statement submitted for the record..... 81
Schwartz, Mr. Eric P., senior fellow and director, Independent
Task Force on Post-Conflict Iraq, Council on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC................................................. 9
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Executive Summary of Report of an Independent Task Force on
Post-Conflict Iraq......................................... 14
(iii)
IRAQ: RECONSTRUCTION
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 11, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G.
Lugar (chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Brownback,
Alexander, Coleman, Sununu, Dodd, Feingold, Bill Nelson and
Corzine.
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order. Today, the committee continues
its review of the United States humanitarian and reconstruction
policy concerning Iraq.
At our hearing on Iraq exactly 1 month ago, Under Secretary
of State Marc Grossman and Under Secretary of Defense Doug
Feith were unable at that time to provide many details about
United States planning in this area.
A short time after that hearing, General Jay Garner was
named Director of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance, a new position at the Pentagon. We invited General
Garner to appear before the committee today. Unfortunately, we
have been notified that neither General Garner nor his deputy
are available to the committee.
This, in my judgment, is a missed opportunity for the
administration to communicate its views on Iraq reconstruction,
not only to Senators, who want to help in meeting potentially
complex and expensive requirements, but also to the American
people, whose long-term support of these efforts will be a
necessity.
Nevertheless, the committee will continue to concentrate on
this vital issue. In addition to our hearing today, Assistant
Secretary of State Bill Burns will testify on policy toward
Iraq in a closed hearing on Thursday. If General Garner is not
available to testify, we should hear promptly from responsible
officials in DOD who are available on that day.
President Bush has repeatedly stressed the hope of all
Americans that Saddam Hussein will disarm peacefully.
Unfortunately, Saddam Hussein has not complied with U.N.
resolutions. He has not opened his weapons program to U.N.
inspection teams or accounted for the weapons and materials of
mass destruction that were known to be in his possession.
Fully 12 years after Operation Desert Storm, the world
continues to face the threats posed by Iraq and its ruler.
Baghdad is in material breach of Resolution 1441, even though
the United Nations Security Council voted 15 to 0 that such a
monumental defiance of the United Nations would result in grave
consequences.
Later this week, the Security Council will consider a
resolution proposed by the United States, Great Britain, and
Spain that would find Iraq in noncompliance with Resolution
1441. The last major hope for disarmament without military
action is a united front by the members of the Security Council
in underlining, again, the requirements imposed upon Iraq by
the world community.
Military actions always have humanitarian consequences.
Decisions to go to war always should be made with the sober
realization of the human costs.
But an Iraq armed with weapons of mass destruction and the
possibility of their transfer to terrorist organizations is
clearly unacceptable. Our decision is guided by the knowledge
that failing to act is more dangerous to the future of
Americans and the Iraqi people than taking action now to disarm
Iraq.
President Bush has made it clear that if we are compelled
to resort to military force, there will be a new government in
Baghdad. Therefore, it is vital that the United States joins
with allies and the Iraqi people to reconstruct Iraq once
Saddam is gone.
Our humanitarian and reconstruction efforts must reflect
the considerable interest we have in the health and welfare of
the Iraqi people. The United States must begin humanitarian
relief activities immediately upon securing territory in Iraq
and preparations for reconstruction must move forward with the
same vigor as military preparations.
The Foreign Relations Committee already has heard testimony
from a number of administration officials and private sector
experts on the challenges that the United States will face. Our
first goal must be to ensure security by preserving the
territorial integrity of Iraq while simultaneously finding and
destroying weapons and materials of mass destruction and their
means of delivery.
Security is crucial to the provision of emergency relief,
safe water, sanitation, food, electricity, and basic public
health services. The administration must be aggressive in
encouraging other governments and international organizations
to be active participants in this process.
President Bush and his advisors have spent much energy
trying to assemble the most potent military coalition possible.
It will be vital that they duplicate this effort in seeking a
post-conflict reconstruction coalition that expands the talents
and resources available for Iraqi reconstruction.
And furthermore, we must reach out and consult with our
colleagues in the non-governmental organizational community.
NGO's have a critical role to play in Iraq and we must ensure
that their efforts are fully coordinated.
The Iraqi people have suffered for decades at the hands of
their leaders. We want to contribute to the creation of
fundamental structures for the people of Iraq to enjoy
democracy and economic growth. And the American people must
understand that the United States' military and civilian
personnel will be in Iraq for an extended period of time.
Most experts believe that years of public investment and
expert guidance will be required to establish Iraq as a secure
and responsible member of the world community. And failure to
stay the course in Iraq would risk grave damage to the United
States' credibility, particularly after the last several months
of fractious diplomacy over the propriety of military force.
Leaving Iraq prematurely also could lead to regional
instability, ethnic warfare, failure to eliminate all Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction, and the establishment of terrorist
bases on Iraqi territory.
I understand the administration has assembled a talented
interagency team to implement reconstruction plans. This
preparation must be matched by the commitment of the American
Government. We have an opportunity to secure a path to peace
and prosperity in Iraq, but we must make a commitment to finish
that journey. This committee intends to follow the
administration's progress in the area very closely.
[The opening statement of Senator Lugar follows:]
Opening Statement of Senator Richard G. Lugar
Today the Foreign Relations Committee continues its review of U.S.
humanitarian and reconstruction policy concerning Iraq.
At our hearing on Iraq exactly one month ago today, Under Secretary
of State Marc Grossman and Under Secretary of Defense Doug Feith were
unable to provide many details about U.S. planning in this area. A
short time after that hearing, General Jay Garner was named Director of
the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance--a new
position at the Pentagon. We invited General Garner to appear before
the committee today. Unfortunately, we have been notified that neither
General Garner, nor his deputy, are available to the committee. This is
a missed opportunity for the administration to communicate its views on
Iraqi reconstruction, not only to Senators who want to help in meeting
potentially complex and expensive requirements, but also to the
American people, whose long-term support will be a necessity.
Nevertheless, the committee will continue to concentrate on this vital
issue. In addition to our hearing today, Assistant Secretary of State
Bill Burns will testify on policy toward Iraq in a closed hearing on
Thursday. If General Garner is not available to testify, we should hear
promptly from responsible officials in DOD who are available on that
day.
President Bush has repeatedly stressed the hope of all Americans
that Saddam Hussein will disarm peacefully. Unfortunately, Saddam
Hussein has not complied with U.N. Resolutions. He has not opened his
weapons programs to U.N. inspection teams or accounted for the weapons
and materials of mass destruction that were known to be in his
possession. Fully twelve years after Operation Desert Storm, the world
continues to face the threats posed by Iraq and its ruler.
Baghdad is in material breach of Resolution 1441, even though the
U.N. Security Council voted 15-0 that such a monumental defiance of the
United Nations would result in grave consequences. Later this week the
Security Council will consider a resolution proposed by the United
States, Great Britain, and Spain that would find Iraq in noncompliance
with Resolution 1441. The last major hope for disarmament without
military action is a united front by the members of the Security
Council in underlining again the requirements imposed on Iraq by the
world community.
Military actions always have humanitarian consequences. Decisions
to go to war always should be made with the sober realization of the
human costs. But an Iraq armed with weapons of mass destruction and the
possibility of their transfer to terrorist organizations is
unacceptable. Our decision is guided by the knowledge that failing to
act is more dangerous to the future of the American and Iraqi people
than taking action now to disarm Iraq.
President Bush has made it clear that if we are compelled to resort
to military force, there will be a new government in Baghdad. It is
vital that the United States joins with allies and the Iraqi people to
reconstruct Iraq once Saddam is gone. Our humanitarian and
reconstruction efforts must reflect the considerable interests we have
in the health and welfare of the Iraqi people. The United States must
begin humanitarian relief activities immediately upon securing
territory in Iraq, and preparations for reconstruction must move
forward with the same vigor as military preparations.
The Foreign Relations Committee already has heard testimony from a
number of administration officials and private sector experts on the
challenges that the United States will face in rebuilding Iraq. Our
first goal must be to ensure security by preserving the territorial
integrity of Iraq while simultaneously finding and destroying the
weapons and materials of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
Security is crucial to the provision of emergency relief, safe water,
sanitation, food, electricity, and basic public health services.
The administration must be aggressive in encouraging other
governments and international organizations to be active participants
in this process. President Bush and his advisers have spent much energy
trying to assemble the most potent military coalition possible. It will
be vital that they duplicate this effort in seeking a post-conflict
reconstruction coalition that expands the talents and resources
available for Iraqi reconstruction. Furthermore, we must reach out and
consult with our colleagues in the non-governmental organization
community. NGOs have a critical role to play in Iraq, and we must
ensure that our efforts are fully coordinated.
The Iraqi people have suffered for decades at the hands of their
leaders. We want to contribute to the creation of fundamental
structures for the people of Iraq to enjoy democracy and economic
growth. The American people must understand that U.S. military and
civilian personnel will be in Iraq for an extended period of time. Most
experts believe that years of public investment and expert guidance
will be required to establish Iraq as a secure and responsible member
of the world community. Failure to stay the course in Iraq would risk
great damage to U.S. credibility--particularly after the last several
months of fractious diplomacy over the propriety of military force.
Leaving Iraq prematurely also could lead to regional instability,
ethnic warfare, failure to eliminate all Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction, and the establishment of terrorist bases on Iraqi
territory.
I understand that the administration has assembled a talented
inter-agency team to implement reconstruction plans. This preparation
must be matched by the commitment of the American government. We have
an opportunity to secure a path to peace and prosperity in Iraq, but we
must make a commitment to finish the journey. This committee intends to
follow the administration's progress in this area very closely.
We are pleased to welcome a distinguished panel of witnesses. We
will hear from Eric Schwartz, Senior Fellow and Director of the
Independent Task Force on Post-Conflict Iraq at the Council on Foreign
Relations; Phebe Marr, formerly of the National Defense University;
Professor Gordon Adams, Director of the Security Policy Studies Program
at the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington
University, and Sandra Mitchell, Vice President of Governmental
Relations at the International Rescue Committee.
The Chairman. Let me say before proceeding further that I
know that all of you have learned of the surgery that was
visited upon Senator Biden in Florida. He is recovering well at
the home of his brother. He will be back next week, I
understand, with full vigor. And he sends his best to the
witnesses this morning and to all who are assembled.
[The opening statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Opening Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this timely hearing
on humanitarian assistance and reconstruction in Iraq.
As war looks increasingly likely, it is vital that the United
States take every possible step to mitigate the suffering of innocent
people.
And while it is clear that, if war comes, we will prevail, true
victory will be measured by our successes away from the battlefield.
Our efforts to build a free, stable, and representative Iraq will
be bolstered by the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance and
the implementation of a comprehensive reconstruction program. Failure
to achieve these goals will harm our regional interests and undermine
our credibility. And it would constitute a failure to meet our moral
responsibility.
In the event of conflict, the United Nations has predicted that 10
million Iraqis could run out of food within six weeks. And that there
could be upwards of 2 million internally displaced persons and over 1
million refugees.
Although the administration hopes that the United Nations will lead
these efforts, coalition forces must be prepared to deliver
humanitarian assistance in conflict zones, and in areas where Saddam
might use his weapons of mass destruction.
I hope to hear otherwise today, but to my knowledge, the U.S.
military is not prepositioning enough supplies to handle a major crisis
without the help of the U.N. I also am disappointed that the
administration has not taken more seriously the need to protect Iraqi
civilians from possible chemical and biological weapons attacks, an
issue I have raised repeatedly with the administration since my visit
to Northern Iraq with Senator Hagel last December.
And, Mr. Chairman, if we are to rely on the United Nations, we must
ensure that its agencies get the support they need and that their non-
governmental partners have the time and money to prepare for a crisis.
Thus far, the U.N.'s humanitarian bodies remain sorely underfunded and
the NGOs have received less than $1 million from the U.S. Government.
I was particularly troubled last week when the U.N.'s top
humanitarian official in Iraq said that U.S. and U.N. preparations,
even given a relatively short conflict of 3 to 4 months, were ``grossly
inadequate.''
No matter how optimistic we are, we must be prepared for a worst-
case scenario in which there is protracted urban warfare, the use of
chemical or biological weapons, and the complete breakdown of the Oil
for Food Program. I worry that the administration may not be preparing
for a crisis of this magnitude.
Mr. Chairman, this brings me to my last point: The benefits of
working with the international community cannot be overstated.
The United states will be in a far better position if we can
provide humanitarian assistance and rebuild Iraq in cooperation with
the United Nations and other countries.
These efforts will require billions of dollars and tens of
thousands of personnel over several years.
It is profoundly in our interest to share what will be a massive
burden. And acting under a U.N. flag, as opposed to a U.S. flag, will
minimize resentment from malcontents in the region and beyond.
Securing a second Security Council resolution would be enormously
helpful in bringing others on board for the take-off and for the
landing.
So, Mr. Chairman, I hope we are prepared to step up our
preparations to meet the humanitarian needs of all Iraqis. I also hope
that we will provide the U.N. with the funds necessary to do their
part.
I thank the Chair.
The Chairman. We are very fortunate that in his place today
we have Senator Dodd, a veteran of the trail, and the
distinguished Senator from Connecticut will give the opening
comment on behalf of the Democrats on this committee.
Senator Dodd. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And
thank you for your kind comments about Senator Biden who, as I
think many are aware, had a gallbladder operation and is doing
very, very well, and as you point out, will be back here in
full form and voice very, very shortly.
So I am filling in. Senator Sarbanes--so people understand
there has not been a coup here--Senator Sarbanes, since I am
the third ranking member of this committee, Senator Sarbanes
has a previous commitment with another committee and so could
not be here this morning. And for those reasons, I am sitting
in the chair of Senator Biden this morning. And so I thank you.
I thank you for your very kind comments as well.
Once, again, Mr. Chairman, it is only the early part of
March and we have had a set of hearings in this committee that,
I think, compare favorably with any other period that certainly
I have been in the Congress of the United States, over 30
years. And if this is an indication of where this committee is
going to be going under your leadership, we are going to have a
very, very worthwhile committee process in the coming years,
and I am confident we will.
This is a very, very important hearing this morning and I
am deeply grateful to our witnesses for being here to explore
what is being done to plan for humanitarian relief and
reconstruction in the event we choose the road of war with
Iraq. We are all very, very anxious. I tried to find the right
word here--uneasy, nervous--I think anxiousness is how I
describe my constituency--I was home over the weekend--about
where we are in all of this issue.
And I am especially interested in knowing how far along the
administration and the international community are in planning
for what we may soon embark on. And that is a regime change in
Iraq.
Has the administration, for instance, determined what it is
likely to cost, both the military operations and the aftermath?
Has the administration identified sources of financing to cover
these costs? Who will join us, if not in the coalition to deal
militarily, but in the aftermath? Are there countries that
would not be a part of a military operation but would be
willing to be a part of a humanitarian effort in the wake of
this? Will they contribute to some of the costs of that?
How about the safety of people--with the weapons of mass
destruction, I think most recognize are in existence still in
Iraq--as to what extent the humanitarian relief workers receive
the kind of protections necessary for them to be able to go in
and do the job?
These are just a couple of the questions that come to my
mind immediately. I know there are countless other ones that
people need answers to. And I think we need them sooner rather
than later.
Clearly, long-term peace and stability, as the chairman so
rightfully has already pointed out this morning, in the Middle
East will be affected by how well we plan for and handle
humanitarian relief and the longer term reconstruction in the
post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, should that come to pass.
Our witnesses this morning will, I hope, allow us to get a
better sense of the planning that is, and should be, under way
at this juncture--planning in the administration, the
international humanitarian relief organizations, private non-
governmental organizations.
I would also welcome their perspectives on how far along
international relief agencies and the NGO community are,
generally, in their logistical preparations and pre-positioning
of supplies in order to meet the challenges that may confront
us in Iraq in the coming days and weeks. How much progress has
been made in the sector-by-sector planning, in calculating the
costs of such programs, or in identifying the resources, as I
mentioned earlier, to pay for them?
I am terribly concerned that we are not as far along as we
should be at this juncture, considering we may just be days
away from military action; but frankly none of us really knows
because the administration, unfortunately, has been extremely
vague. And I understand they cannot be as specific as some
would like, but it seems to me there is a distance between
vagueness and specificity that would allow us to at least have
some idea of where we are headed here.
I welcome our panel of expert witnesses this morning. I
believe they will add to the committee's knowledge on this
subject, given their long background experience in this area of
discussion.
I regret, as the chairman has mentioned, that there are no
representatives of the administration here this morning. I know
that this is not due to any lack of effort on the chairman's
part that they be here. And I gather that the administration
declined to make either Mr. Natsios, the USAID administrator,
or General Garner, the Director of the newly established Office
of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance at the Pentagon,
available to us today. That is too bad in my view, because
these are two very important individuals in the U.S. Government
who will be primarily responsible for overseeing U.S.
humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq.
Just because the Congress already voted for H.J. Resolution
114 last year, providing the President with the authority to
disarm Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, certainly did not
mean that Congress need not be kept apprised of what the
administration intends to do, not only in planning for military
action but also in the humanitarian relief and reconstruction
of Iraq in the aftermath of such action.
The administration, in my view, has an obligation to be as
fully candid as they can with the Congress and most
especially--not so much to us--but with the American people as
we ramp up for war, particularly as the decision to go to war
will commit the United States to an extensive and costly
involvement in the aftermath of that war. It will be even more
costly and prolonged if the administration moves ahead alone,
because a sufficient number of U.N. Security Council members
are not yet convinced that all peaceful means of disarming Iraq
have been exhausted.
It is not as though the administration has not discussed
its plans with others. According to recent news articles, Mr.
Natsios has asked five U.S. construction companies: Bechtel,
Fluor Corporation, Halliburton-owned Kellogg, Brown and Root,
Louis Berger Group, and Parsons Corporation to bid on a $900
million contract to rebuild Iraq--clearly only the first phase
in what is likely to be a much more costly undertaking,
depending upon the war damage incurred and the presence or
absence of a burden-sharing by others.
General Garner has also reportedly been in discussions with
one of Kofi Annan's deputies at the U.N. about contingency
plans for wartime humanitarian relief.
In light of those discussions, it is extremely difficult to
understand why the administration declined our invitation to be
here today. I do not think I am alone when I say that I am
extremely uneasy with the manner in which the administration
has approached this issue at the United Nations, with the
Congress, with relief organizations, and most of all with the
American people.
The time has come for the administration to be fully candid
with all of us and to listen to what we and others have to say
about its plans and timetable for action. Military action
against Iraq may be swift and simple. Alternatively, our
involvement in Iraq may turn out to be a long and protracted
U.S. commitment.
Because one should always plan for the worst possible
options, the administration should, in my view, be doing
everything possible to be honest and forthcoming with all
interested parties, particularly this committee, the Congress,
and the American people. And then if the worst comes to pass,
and we certainly hope it does not, then we will be prepared and
be willing to act accordingly.
So my hope would be, Mr. Chairman, that we would find a
little more willingness--and I want to emphasize the point
here--I know the administration has balked at the idea of
giving sort of a specific dollar amount, and I understand their
concern about that. But coming forward and saying this is, at
least, our best case judgment at this juncture, I think, would
be very, very helpful in giving us a better and clearer idea of
how we ought to proceed.
But nonetheless, I am very grateful to these witnesses and
very grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, to give us a chance, at
least, to explore the subject matter with people who are
tremendously knowledgeable about the subject matter before us
today, and I thank you.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Dodd.
Just in fairness to Mr. Natsios, he has testified before
our committee in another hearing, and I think he will be back
in due course.
Senator Dodd. Right.
The Chairman. I was startled, however, as the Senator has
pointed out, that already a contract for perhaps $900 million
has been sent out to five bidders. At least we were apprised of
that by good coverage in the paper. And so we will continue to
be persistent and do our best.
Senator Dodd. Mr. Chairman, I have a statement here from
Senator Biden, which he would like to be included in the
record. That ought to precede my comments this morning.
The Chairman. Very well. And all of Senator Biden's opening
statement will, of course, be made a part of the record.
Senator Dodd. Thank you.
The Chairman. Let me call now upon our panelists, and I
will introduce them in the order in which I will ask them to
testify.
Mr. Eric Schwartz, senior fellow and director, Independent
Task Force on Post-Conflict Iraq, Council on Foreign Relations
in Washington, DC; Dr. Gordon Adams, director of the Security
Policy Studies Program, Elliott School of International
Affairs, The George Washington University, Washington, DC; Ms.
Sandra Mitchell, vice president of Governmental Relations,
International Rescue Committee in Washington, DC; and Dr. Phebe
Marr, a former senior fellow of the National Defense University
in Washington, DC.
In introducing Mr. Schwartz, let me simply mention that he
is going to publish tomorrow an independent task force study
which he has headed on post-conflict transition in Iraq; and so
we look forward to that study, which will be available to
members of the committee and the public fairly soon.
Dr. Marr is always busy, and she is currently updating the
final stages of her book, ``The Modern History of Iraq.'' We
appreciated her testimony of last year. The committee was
somewhat prescient in asking many questions of Dr. Marr, and we
look forward to your testimony again today.
First of all, Mr. Schwartz.
STATEMENT OF ERIC P. SCHWARTZ, SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR,
INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE ON POST-CONFLICT IRAQ, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Schwartz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the
chairman and members of the committee for the opportunity to
testify on this critical issue. And I have, indeed, looked at
these questions rather closely in recent months in my capacity
as director of the CFR project, the Independent Task Force on
Post-Conflict Iraq. That task force, which is co-chaired by
Ambassador Thomas Pickering and Dr. James Schlesinger, and
which has as one of its distinguished members, Dr. Phebe Marr,
will release its report tomorrow morning. And I would be
grateful if the committee would agree to include the executive
summary of that report in the printed record of this hearing.
The Chairman. It will be included in full. Thank you.
Mr. Schwartz. Thank you. Although much of my testimony is
informed by my work on the task force, I am here today in my
personal capacity. I should also say that in addition to my
work at the Council, I was formerly a senior NSC aide during
the Clinton administration and had responsibilities for
humanitarian assistance, management of complex crises and
United Nations issues.
So I have some appreciation, I think, of the enormous
challenge confronting the Bush administration. And while much
of what I say may be somewhat critical in tone, I want to
emphasize that there really is a lot of good work being done by
committed public servants to ensure that, if a war takes place,
battlefield victory will not be lost in the post-conflict
environment.
If the United States does go to war and removes the regime
of Saddam Hussein, our interests will, indeed, demand an
extraordinary commitment of U.S. financial and personnel
resources to post-conflict transitional assistance and
reconstruction. These interests include securing the
elimination of weapons of mass destruction; ending Iraqi
contacts, whether limited or extensive, with international
terrorist organizations; ensuring that a post-transition Iraqi
government can maintain the country's territorial integrity and
independence while contributing to regional stability; and
promoting an internal democratic process in which the people of
Iraq have a meaningful voice in the policy decisions that
impact their lives.
Given the limited time, let me offer five key questions
which I would encourage committee members to raise with
administration officials, and then briefly offer my own
perspectives on each of them.
First, what is the extent of our long-term political
commitment to Iraq? What are we prepared to spend and when will
the administration describe this in detail to the American
people?
It is critically important that the President step up his
efforts to explain to the American people the rationale for
U.S. engagement in post-war Iraq, and it is also essential that
he begin to describe the magnitude of the American post-
conflict commitment. This is necessary if we are going to
sustain long-term support to Iraq, even after senior officials
turn their attention to other crises in the years to come.
So what are the costs? And I speak with an awareness that I
am sitting next to an expert on this subject. If you estimate a
requirement of about 75,000 peace stabilization troops--at a
cost judged by CBO at about $1.4 billion per month--and you
add, say, a first-year U.S. contribution to humanitarian and
economic assistance of about $3 billion, which I would argue is
a very modest amount, then you are at about $20 billion a year
or more.
And these estimates, again, are quite modest. Other
credible estimates are far higher. Moreover, the United States
will need to be prepared to spend comparable amounts in future
years.
And I think it is important to note that it is probably
unrealistic to assume that Iraqi oil revenues will provide the
resources necessary for rebuilding Iraq, especially in the
short term. First, much of the revenue is already being used
for humanitarian purposes under Oil for Food. And additional
reconstruction requirements will amount to tens of billions of
dollars, at a minimum.
Second, large oil capacity and production increases, which
might generate greater revenues, are many years away.
And, finally, the bulk of U.S. post-conflict expenses will
be for U.S. peace stabilization troops, and it would be awkward
at best to use such revenues to pay those costs--to use oil
revenues to pay those costs.
The second question I would raise with the administration
is what specific actions will the U.S. military take to protect
Iraqi civilians in the context of conflict and its aftermath?
U.S. officials must be certain that U.S. troops involved in
combat operations will be in a position to focus, in a
systematic manner, on threats to civilians. In particular, from
the outset of the conflict, the military should deploy forces
with a mission to prevent reprisals and other acts of
lawlessness, and to provide humanitarian aid.
And U.S. military and civilian officials should sustain
this focus throughout the transition. None of the other U.S.
objectives in rebuilding Iraq will be realized in the absence
of public security. If the United States fails to address this
issue effectively, we will fuel the impression that the result
of U.S. intervention is an increase in the humanitarian
suffering of Iraqis.
The U.S. military, in some cases in cooperation with
coalition partners, should also assist civilian victims of any
use of weapons of mass destruction if exposure occurs. They
should press neighboring governments to provide refuge within
their borders for fleeing Iraqis. They should seek to ensure
protection for internally displaced persons, especially if
Turkey and other governments establish camps inside of Iraq.
They should sustain the basic structure of the U.N. Oil for
Food Program, and, over time, actively recruit international
civilian police and constabulary forces from other governments
to assist U.S. troops in public security and in the training of
Iraqis to take on responsibilities in this area.
The third question: what action is the administration
taking to ensure that international organizations and other
governments will contribute meaningfully to the post-conflict
transition effort? Obviously, the administration needs others
if it is to succeed in post-conflict Iraq. This will not only
lighten the load for the United States, but it will also
diminish the mistaken perception that the United States seeks
to control Iraq.
There is much the administration can do to involve others
in the initial stages and over time without sacrificing unity
of effort in the post-conflict structure. While the law of
occupation will provide the general authority for U.S. actions,
we should also work toward U.N. Security Council resolutions
that endorse post-conflict transition structures and enhance
the likelihood of buy-in by others.
And even if those resolutions endorse a U.S. lead,
initially, in post-conflict security and interim civil
administration, they should also promote the lead of the United
Nations and other international organizations on issues such as
humanitarian assistance, the political consultative process
that leads to a transition to Iraqi rule, the management of the
U.N. Oil for Food Program, and international reconstruction.
In addition, a resolution could indicate that
responsibilities in other areas should be further transferred
to the U.N. and/or other governments, as conditions permit.
The fourth question I would raise is what actions are being
taken to ensure the Iraqi character of the political transition
process? Post-conflict conditions would make an immediate
transfer of sovereign authority to Iraqis extremely difficult
and inadvisable in my view. Nonetheless, the Bush
administration and the United States have strong interests in
ensuring that Iraqis continue to play key roles in
administration of public institutions, subject to adequate
vetting. Continuity of basic services will be essential and
thousands of Iraqi civil servants will have to stay on their
jobs.
In addition, the administration should support a broadly
representative political consultative process leading to a
transition to Iraqi rule; and, again to enhance legitimacy, the
administration should endorse U.N. leadership in this
particular effort.
Finally, we must make sure that Iraqis play key roles in
the rehabilitation efforts that U.S. and other reconstruction
funding is likely to support, and I take note of your comment
about bids for construction contracts.
The final question that I would raise is as a government,
are we well organized to meet this challenge? In late January,
the President issued a National Security Presidential
Directive, placing responsibility for managing the post-
conflict rebuilding of Iraq within the Department of Defense.
Defense Department planning efforts appear to complement or
incorporate a range of other administration initiatives,
including the State Department's ``Future of Iraq Project.''
The key challenge will be to transform these activities
into a coherent and unified effort, and ensure that policies
that are formulated in Washington are accepted internationally,
and effectively implemented in Iraq. There are many questions
that are worth raising with officials; not, I emphasize, to
slow them down, but to encourage them to resolve important
organizational questions that are often deferred, or never even
addressed, within the bureaucracy.
First, what role is the new Pentagon office playing in the
policy formulation process, and how will it continue in this
role after many of its personnel have been deployed to the
region? And if it is not a policy formulation body, in what
forum will policy be developed below the principals and the
deputies' levels?
And if action is now centered at the Defense Department,
how can our government take better advantage--better advantage
than it is now taking, of the considerable expertise in
management of post-conflict requirements that exists in other
U.S. Government agencies, including the State Department and
the U.S. Agency for International Development?
In conclusion, recent history has demonstrated that post-
conflict peace building can be extraordinarily complex. In
Iraq, where U.S. efforts will involve uncertainty, trial and
error, and uneven progress, U.S. success will depend on our
determination to sustain a long-term and substantial commitment
of American resources and personnel, to ensure the active
involvement of others in post-conflict reconstruction, and to
promote participation by the people of Iraq in a process that
validates their expectations about political reconciliation and
about a more hopeful and democratic future. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Schwartz.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schwartz follows:]
Prepared Statement of Eric P. Schwartz, Senior Fellow,
Council on Foreign Relations
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:
I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify on the critical
issue of post-conflict Iraq. I have looked at these questions rather
closely in recent months, in my capacity as director of the Council on
Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Post-Conflict Iraq. That
Task Force, which is chaired by Ambassador Thomas Pickering and Dr.
James Schlesinger, will release its report tomorrow morning, and I'd be
grateful if the Committee would agree to include the Executive Summary
of that report in the written record of this hearing.
Although much of my testimony is informed by the work of the Task
Force, I'm here today in my personal capacity.
In addition to my work at the Council, I was formerly a senior NSC
aide during the Clinton administration, and had responsibilities for
humanitarian assistance, United Nations issues, and the management of
complex crises. I have some appreciation for the enormous challenge
confronting the Bush administration. And while much of what I say may
be somewhat critical in tone, I want to emphasize that there is a lot
of good work being done by committed public servants to ensure that, if
a war takes place, battlefield victory will not be lost in the post-
conflict environment.
If the United States goes to war and removes the regime of Saddam
Hussein, American interests will demand an extraordinary commitment of
U.S. financial and personnel resources to post-conflict transitional
assistance and reconstruction. These interests include securing the
elimination of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction; ending Iraqi
contacts, whether limited or extensive, with international terrorist
organizations; ensuring that a post-transition Iraqi government can
maintain the country's territorial integrity and independence while
contributing to regional stability; and promoting an internal
democratic process in which the people of Iraq have a meaningful voice
in the policy decisions that impact their lives.
Given the limited time, let me offer five key questions which I
would encourage Committee members to raise with administration
officials, and then briefly offer my own perspectives.
1. What is the extent of our long-term political commitment
to Iraq? What are we prepared to spend, and when will the
administration describe this in detail to the American people?
It is critically important that the president step up his efforts
to explain to the American people the rationale for U.S. engagement in
post-conflict Iraq, and it is also essential that he begin to describe
the magnitude of the American post-conflict commitment. This is
necessary if we are to sustain long-term support to Iraq even after
senior officials have turned to other crises in years to come.
So what are the costs? If you estimate a requirement of about
75,000 peace stabilization troops--at a cost estimated by Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) at $1.4 billion per month--and you add, say, a
first-year U.S. contribution of humanitarian and economic assistance of
about $3 billion, then you are at about $20 billion in year one. These
estimates of requirements are, in fact, quite modest--other credible
estimates are far higher. Moreover, the United States will need to be
prepared to spend comparable amounts in future years.
I should add that it is unrealistic to assume that Iraqi oil
revenues will provide all of the resources necessary for rebuilding of
Iraq, especially in the early post-conflict period. First, much of the
revenue is already being used for humanitarian purposes under the Oil
for Food Program, and additional reconstruction requirements will
amount to tens of billions of dollars, at a minimum. Secondly, large
oil capacity and production increases, which might generate much
greater revenues, are many years away. Third, the bulk of U.S. post-
conflict expenses will be for U.S. peace stabilization troops, and it
would be awkward at best to use oil revenues to pay those costs.
2.What specific actions will the U.S. military take to
protect Iraqi civilians in the context and the aftermath of
conflict?
U.S. officials must be certain that U.S. troops involved in combat
operations will be in position to focus, in a systematic manner, on
threats to civilians. In particular, from the outset of the conflict,
the U.S. military should deploy forces with a mission to prevent
reprisals and other acts of lawlessness, and to provide humanitarian
aid. And U.S. military and civilian officials should maintain this
public security focus throughout the transition.
None of the other U.S. objectives in rebuilding Iraq will be
realized in the absence of public security. If the United States fails
to address this issue effectively, we will fuel the impression that the
result of the U.S. intervention is an increase in humanitarian
suffering by the people of Iraq.
The U.S. military, in some cases in cooperation with coalition
partners, should also assist civilian victims of weapons of mass
destruction if exposure occurs; press neighboring governments to
provide refuge within their borders for fleeing Iraqis; seek to ensure
protection for internally displaced persons--especially if Turkey and
other governments establish camps inside Iraq; sustain the basic
structure of the UN Oil for Food Program; and actively recruit
international civilian police (civpol) and constabulary forces to
assist U.S. troops in public security--and in the training of Iraqis to
take on responsibilities in this area.
3. What action is the administration taking to ensure that
international organizations and other governments will
contribute meaningfully to the post-conflict transition effort?
The administration needs others if it is to succeed in post-
conflict Iraq. This will not only lighten the load for the United
States, but will also help diminish the mistaken perception that the
U.S. seeks to control Iraq.
There is much the administration can do to involve others in the
initial stages and over time without sacrificing unity of effort in the
post-conflict structure. While the law of occupation will provide the
general authority for U.S. actions, we should also work toward UN
Security Council resolutions that endorse post-conflict transition
structures and enhance the likelihood of buy-in by others. And even if
those resolutions endorse a U.S. lead, initially, in post-conflict
security and interim civil administration, they should also promote the
lead of the United Nations and other international organizations on
issues such as humanitarian assistance, the political consultative
process leading to a transition to Iraqi rule, the management of the UN
Oil for Food Program, and international reconstruction efforts. In
addition, a resolution could indicate that responsibilities in other
areas should be furthered transferred to the United Nations and/or
other governments as conditions permit.
4. What actions are being taken to ensure the Iraqi character
of the political transition process?
Post-conflict conditions would make an immediate transfer of
sovereign authority to Iraqis extremely difficult and inadvisable.
Nonetheless, the Bush Administration has strong interests in ensuring
that Iraqis continue to play key roles in administration of public
institutions, subject to adequate vetting. Continuity of basic services
will be essential, and thousands of Iraqi civil servants will have to
stay on their jobs. In addition, the administration should support a
broadly representative political consultative process leading to a
transition to Iraqi rule, and--to enhance legitimacy--endorse UN
leadership in this effort. Finally, we must make sure that Iraqis play
key roles in the rehabilitation efforts that U.S. and other
reconstruction funding is likely to support.
5. As a government, are we well organized to meet this
challenge?
In late January, the president issued a National Security
Presidential Directive placing responsibility for managing the post-
conflict rebuilding of Iraq within the Department of Defense. Defense
Department planning efforts appear to complement or incorporate a range
of other administration initiatives, including the State Department's
``Future of Iraq Project.'' The key challenge will be to transform
these activities into a coherent and unified effort and to ensure that
policies formulated in Washington are accepted internationally and
effectively implemented in Iraq.
There are many questions that are worth raising with administration
officials--not to slow them down, but to encourage them to resolve
important organizational issues that are often deferred, or never
addressed, within the bureaucracy. First, what role is the new Pentagon
office playing in the policy formulation process, and how will it
continue in this role after many of its personnel have been deployed to
Iraq? If it is not a policy formulation body, in what forum will policy
be developed below the level of principals and deputies? And if action
is now centered at the Defense Department, how can our government take
better advantage of the considerable expertise in managing the post-
conflict requirements that exists in other U.S. government agencies,
including the State Department and U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID)?
In conclusion, recent history has demonstrated that post-conflict
peace-building can be exceptionally complex. In Iraq, where U.S.
efforts will involve uncertainty, trial and error and uneven progress,
U.S success will depend on our determination to sustain a long-term and
substantial commitment of American resources and personnel, to ensure
the active involvement of others in post-conflict reconstruction, and
to promote participation by the people of Iraq in a process that
validates their expectations about political reconciliation and a more
hopeful and democratic future.
Thank you.
Iraq: The Day After
Report of an Independent Task Force on Post-Conflict Iraq, sponsored by
the Council on Foreign Relations
Thomas R. Pickering and James R. Schlesinger, Co-Chairs
Executive Summary
If the United States goes to war and removes the regime of Saddam
Hussein, American interests will demand an extraordinary commitment of
U.S. financial and personnel resources to post-conflict transitional
assistance and reconstruction. These interests include eliminating
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD); ending Iraqi contacts, whether
limited or extensive, with international terrorist organizations;
ensuring that a post-transition Iraqi government can maintain the
country's territorial integrity and independence while contributing to
regional stability; and offering the people of Iraq a future in which
they have a meaningful voice in the vital decisions that impact their
lives.
But U.S. officials have yet to fully describe to Congress and the
American people the magnitude of the resources that will be required to
meet post-conflict needs. Nor have they outlined in detail their
perspectives on the structure of post-conflict governance. The Task
Force believes that these issues require immediate attention, and
encourages the administration to take action in four key areas:
Key Recommendation #1: An American political commitment to the future
of Iraq
The president should build on his recent statements in support of
U.S. engagement in Iraq by making clear to Congress, the American
people, and the people of Iraq that the United States will stay the
course. He should announce a multibillion dollar, multiyear post-
conflict reconstruction program and seek formal congressional
endorsement. By announcing such a program, the president would give
Iraqis confidence that the United States is committed to contribute
meaningfully to the development of Iraq and would enable U.S.
government agencies to plan more effectively for long-term U.S.
involvement.
The scale of American resources that will be required could amount
to some $20 billion per year for several years. This figure assumes a
deployment of 75,000 troops for post-conflict peace stabilization (at
about $16.8 billion annually), as well as funding for humanitarian and
reconstruction assistance (as recommended immediately below). If the
troop requirements are much larger than 75,000--a real possibility--the
funding requirement would be much greater.
For reconstruction and humanitarian assistance alone, the president
should request from Congress $3 billion for a one-year period, and make
clear that the United States will be prepared to make substantial
additional contributions in the future. This initial contribution would
include $2.5 billion for reconstruction and $500 million for
humanitarian aid. (However, if there are significant interruptions in
the availability of Iraqi oil revenues for the Oil for Food Program,
the figure for humanitarian assistance would need to be considerably
higher).
Key Recommendation #2: Protecting Iraqi civilians--a key to winning the
peace
From the outset of conflict, the U.S. military should deploy forces
with a mission to establish public security and provide humanitarian
aid. This is distinct from the tasks generally assigned to combat
troops, but it will be critical to preventing lawlessness and
reassuring Iraqis who might otherwise flee their homes. As women and
children will constitute the majority of refugees and internally
displaced persons, special efforts should be made to ensure that they
are protected from sexual assault and that their medical and health
care needs are met. The Bush administration should sustain this public
security focus throughout the transition. None of the other U.S.
objectives in rebuilding Iraq would be realized in the absence of
public security. If the administration fails to address this issue
effectively, it would fuel the perception that the result of the U.S.
intervention is an increase in humanitarian suffering.
Additional recommendations--protecting Iraqi civilians
Assist civilian victims of any use of WMD. The U.S. and
coalition partners should be ready to conduct rapid assessment
of any WMD use, publicize the results of such assessments,
provide information to Iraqis on how to mitigate the impact of
WMD, and provide assistance to alleviate the health effects of
WMD exposure should it occur.
Seek to ensure protection for displaced persons and
refugees. Administration officials should press neighboring
governments to provide safe haven in their countries for
fleeing Iraqis. If the government of Turkey and other
governments are determined to establish camps within the
territory of Iraq, U.S. officials should seek to ensure that
such camps are safe and secure.
Sustain, for the time being, the basic structure of the Oil
for Food Program. U.S. officials should work closely and
intensively with the World Food Program (WFP) to ensure the
continuation of the distribution network that sustains the Oil
for Food Program. The program should be modified over time to
ensure transparency and effectiveness in meeting Iraqi needs.
Actively recruit international civilian police (civpol) and
constabulary forces. Constabulary units such as Italy's
Carabinieri have equipment, training, and organization that
enable them to maintain public order and address civil unrest.
In addition, international civilian police could play an
important role in vetting, training, and mentoring Iraqi
police.
Key Recommendation #3: Sharing the burden for post-conflict transition
and reconstruction
The Bush administration should move quickly to involve
international organizations and other governments in the post-conflict
transition and reconstruction process. This move will lighten the load
on U.S. military and civilian personnel, and help to diminish the
impression that the United States seeks to control post-transition
Iraq.
The Bush administration will likely be reluctant, especially early
in the transition process, to sacrifice unity of command. On the other
hand, other governments may be hesitant to participate in activities in
which they have little responsibility. The Task Force recommends that
the administration address this dilemma by promoting post-conflict
Security Council resolutions that endorse U.S. leadership on security
and interim civil administration in post-conflict Iraq, but also
envision meaningful international participation and the sharing of
responsibility for decision-making in important areas. The resolutions
could direct WFP or another international humanitarian organization to
assume lead responsibility for humanitarian assistance (and involve
NGOs and Iraqi civil society in aid management and delivery); indicate
that the United Nations will take responsibility in organizing (with
U.S. support and assistance) the political consultative process leading
to a transition to a new Iraqi government; establish an oil oversight
board for Iraq; authorize the continuation of the UN's Oil for Food
Program; establish a consortium of donors in conjunction with the World
Bank and the IMF to consider Iraqi reconstruction needs as well as debt
relief; and indicate that responsibilities in other areas could be
transferred to the United Nations and/or other governments as
conditions permit.
Key recommendation #4: Making Iraqis stake holders throughout the
transition process
The administration should ensure that Iraqis continue to play key
roles in the administration of public institutions, subject to adequate
vetting. Continuity of basic services will be essential and will
require that thousands of Iraqi civil servants continue to do their
jobs. In addition, every effort should be made quickly to establish
Iraqi consultative mechanisms on political, constitutional, and legal
issues, so that the period of interim governance will be limited and
characterized by growing Iraqi responsibility on the political as well
as administrative levels.
Additional recommendation--making Iraqis stakeholders:
Encourage a geographically based, federal system of
government in Iraq. In northern Iraq, the Kurdish population
has operated outside of regime control for over a decade. While
decisions on Iraq's constitutional structure should be made by
Iraqis, the Task Force believes that a solution short of a
federal system will risk conflict in a future Iraq, and that
U.S. officials should adopt this perspective in their
discussions with Iraqi counterparts and with Iraq's neighbors.
other issues of concern to the task force
The rule of law and accountability: Police training must be
supplemented by efforts to build other components of a system of
justice, especially courts. The Task Force thus makes the following
recommendations:
Deploy legal and judicial teams, seek international
involvement. The administration should promote the post-
conflict deployment of U.S. and international legal and
judicial assistance teams to help address immediate and longer
term post-conflict justice issues.
Act early on accountability, seek international involvement
in the process, and ensure a key role for Iraqis. Given the
enormity of human rights abuses by the regime, the Task Force
believes that accountability issues should be an early priority
for the transitional administration. International involvement
in the process, either through the creation of an international
ad hoc tribunal, or the development of a mixed tribunal, will
enhance the prospects for success. The Task Force notes that a
truth and reconciliation process could be established
concurrently with such a tribunal, as a complement to criminal
accountability for those who bear greatest responsibility for
abuses.
The Iraqi oil industry: U.S. officials will have to develop a
posture on a range of questions relating to control of the oil
industry, such as how decisions on contracts for equipment and oil
field rehabilitation will be made; who will consider and make judgments
on the viability of executory contracts for development of oil fields
(at least some of which have as a condition precedent the lifting of
sanctions); and what will be required for transition from the Oil for
Food Program to a transparent and accountable indigenous system to
receive and disburse oil-related revenues?
The Task Force recommends that the administration strike a careful
balance between the need to ensure that oil revenues benefit the people
of Iraq and the importance of respecting the right of Iraqis to make
decisions about their country's natural resources. In particular, the
administration should undertake the following steps:
Emphasize publicly that the United States will respect and
defend Iraqi ownership of the country's economic resources,
especially oil; seek an internationally sanctioned legal
framework to assure a reliable flow of Iraqi oil and to reserve
to a future Iraqi government the determination of Iraq's
general oil policy. The removal of the regime will not alter
Iraqi obligations under the existing, UN-managed, legal
framework for oil, but it will likely result in the need for
modifications. The Task Force believes that a new framework,
which could be affirmed by a Security Council resolution, could
establish a decision-making oversight board with international
and substantial Iraqi participation.
Address potential impact of regime change on Jordanian oil
imports from Iraq. The Iraqi regime has provided the government
of Jordan with free and heavily discounted oil. It is unclear
whether such arrangements would continue in the post-conflict
environment. In view of Jordan's economic situation and its
important role on regional and international security issues,
the administration should make efforts to address Jordanian
needs in this area.
Regional diplomatic and security issues: In the Gulf, U.S.
officials will confront the challenge of effectively downsizing the
Iraq military while seeking to promote a longer-term security balance
in which Iraq's territorial integrity can be maintained. In the Middle
East, a successful U.S. and coalition intervention in Iraq will raise
expectations about a new U.S. diplomatic initiative on the Arab-Israeli
dispute. On these issues, the Task Force makes the following
recommendations:
Closely monitor professionalization and restructuring of the
Iraqi military, including disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration (DDR). These tasks are likely to be carried out
in large measure by private contractors and/or international
development organizations, and will require close supervision
of what might otherwise be an uncoordinated effort. In
addition, the Bush administration should promote programs in
this area that emphasize civilian control of the military and
respect for human rights.
Consider a regional forum for discussion of security issues.
The administration should strongly consider encouraging a
security forum with states in the region. The forum could
address confidence-building measures, and related issues such
as external security guarantees and nonproliferation.
Initiate post-conflict action on the Middle East Peace
Process. The Task Force encourages the administration to give
high priority to an active, post-conflict effort to engage in
the peace process, and also believes that any such action by
the administration must be accompanied by greater efforts by
Arab states and the Palestinian leadership to discourage and
condemn acts of terrorism and violence against Israelis and
elsewhere in the region.
The Chairman. Let me simply mention that the full
statements of all the witnesses will be made a part of the
record, and you may summarize as you wish. Dr. Adams.
STATEMENT OF DR. GORDON ADAMS, DIRECTOR OF THE SECURITY POLICY
STUDIES PROGRAM, ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE
GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Adams. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of
the committee. I am very grateful to you all for your kind
invitation to come and talk on this subject of what is clearly
of compelling and immediate importance.
The United States is near a state of war with Iraq.
Clearly, very little stands in the way of a military campaign,
and the outcome of that campaign is relatively predictable,
though its duration and consequences are somewhat more
difficult to judge.
As we approach that combat, I believe it is critical to
begin discussing and planning for the consequences of that war,
including the costs of a long-term U.S. presence in and
assistance to Iraq.
The administration has argued that discussions of post-war
policies and their costs are speculative, which is certainly
true to a degree, and that they have no bearing on the decision
to go to war, which is and should be based on security
considerations alone.
I believe we should not go to war without a serious
discussions of its consequences, however, and of the long-term
commitments that we may be making overseas and their costs to
the American people.
The test of the success of our policy in Iraq depends on
the post-war outcome, as much as it does on the outcome of
combat itself. Will Iraq, as a result of war and regime change,
be truly disarmed, dramatically different in a way that
increases stability in the region, reduces the risk of
terrorist attack, and provides greater security for the
American people?
We could well win the war and lose the peace, if we do not
tend now to post-war Iraq policy. Winning the peace, however, I
believe, will require a significant long-term U.S. investment
in Iraq, and that investment is worthy of discussion in
advance. That is why I commend you very much for holding this
hearing, Mr. Chairman, and for holding it in advance of a final
decision to go to war.
Let me summarize very briefly--there is a longer statement.
I appreciate it will be put in the record, Mr. Chairman. Let me
just make some key points and allow you to give it some thought
and pose questions.
The first point is a successful war in Iraq will leave the
United States with primary responsibility, primary
responsibility for humanitarian relief, internal security, the
restoration of governance, and any steps toward democracy and
economic reconstruction in Iraq.
Second, we are likely to shoulder even more of this
responsibility in the absence of a U.N. resolution supporting
the use of force if Saddam Hussein fails to comply fully with
Resolution 1441. In my judgment, our isolation may be further
enhanced by a course of diplomacy and policymaking over the
past 4 months that appears to have alienated a substantial
number of friends and allies.
Let me come to my challenge, which is estimating the costs
of what we may do in Iraq after a war is complete. Obviously,
estimating those costs is a great challenge. I wish I could sit
here and analyze for you the adequacy or inadequacy of
proposals being made by the administration, which I know they
are hard at work planning; but we do not have those numbers,
and so I cannot make that judgment.
Instead, in evaluating the potential costs for a post-war
Iraq occupation and reconstruction, I am relying on a number of
outside estimates, including the Congressional Budget Office,
the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the back of
my own peculiar envelope, which is the result of having spent 5
years as a ``green eyeshade guy'' at the Office of Management
and Budget, where I had much opportunity to work, in fact, with
Eric Schwartz on policies that the previous administration
pursued of this nature.
For the most part, there are not hard numbers. We do not
have them here today but that does not mean estimates are not
useful. They bound the problem of cost, and they provide a
sense of the scale of potential need, and the costs of this
policy may have a bearing on policy choices that the Congress
has to make in other areas of Federal policy.
The United States is likely to provide the bulk of the
occupying force, and that is the first cost center I mention in
my testimony, after the war is over. It is an important
statement, because although the costs of an occupying force are
not the oversight jurisdiction of this committee, it is clear
that the Defense Department, as Mr. Schwartz has indicated, is
assuming a major lead responsibility for post-war Iraq
activities; a responsibility that goes well beyond the rules of
engagement in previous conflicts such as the Balkans.
But with the lead there, knowing something about the costs
of that occupying force is important, and my judgment is that,
that occupying force, which will be important to the further
activities that I am going to discuss, could cost between $12
and $14 billion in the first year alone.
Second, humanitarian aid requirements are likely to be
significant and immediate as already testified. In part because
of a legacy of impoverishment under Saddam Hussein, in part due
to damages combat itself may cause to the electrical power,
communications, water, transportation infrastructure, oil
production and distribution facilities, food and medicine
distribution, housing and sanitation systems, and the
population itself. Humanitarian assistance requirements could
range between $1 and $10 billion, with as much as $3.5 billion
of that being required in the first year alone.
Third, governance. Governing Iraq will pose an immediate
challenge, especially the need to establish authoritative
internal and border security as already mentioned, adequate
policing, successful location and elimination of weapons of
mass destruction, no small task as we know, and a working
system of justice. Over time, this governance challenge will be
demanding, especially if we try to create or intend to create a
democracy in Iraq. That is, in my judgment, a nation-building
task par excellence. The governance challenges could cost as
much as $12 billion over 5 years, with substantial funding,
maybe as much as $5 billion being needed up front, principally
to pay for salaries for civil servants that we want to have
stay in place in order to run an effective government.
Fourth, economic reconstruction, which poses another large
challenge. Depending on war damage, there could be substantial
infrastructure to repair, including oil field and pipeline
damage. Over the past two decades, the Iraqi economy has sunk
into virtual nonproductivity outside of oil production. And an
assistance program will be needed to create new productive
opportunities. The costs of reconstruction are very, very wide-
ranging with respect to estimates, from as small as $25 to $30
billion on one end, to a Marshall Plan-type exercise of $100
billion, all of that between 5 and 10 years in duration.
Fifth, it is worth noting that Iraqi debt is substantial,
approximately $62 billion, with claims of $172 billion against
the Iraqis, potential reparations and contract costs, all of
which will pose a substantial burden on the Iraqi state budget
after a war.
These claims and commitments will need to be either
renegotiated or paid to some degree in order to free up
resources for internal needs.
Next, Iraqi oil revenues. Mr. Schwartz has already
testified that these are unlikely to be available to cover all
of these costs. They are probably committed several times over
already.
First, production has to be restored. Second, the industry
will need to use its income to modernize an aging and degraded
production and export infrastructure and to upgrade the
country's electricity grid.
The exploitation of substantial potential and probable
reserves will require substantial additional investments, and
those reserves will not be online for several years to come.
Should Iraq decide to be constrained by OPEC export quotas,
income will be constrained. Should they leave export--the OPEC
export quota regime, significant price declines will affect
their revenues as well.
The macroeconomic impact, to move to my next point, of a
war in Iraq depends on duration, its duration. And I am talking
about the macroeconomic impact here is a cost we need to
consider, particularly if the war has the effect of causing a
long-term price spike for oil. A long-term spike could lead to
major consequences for the U.S. GDP.
On the other hand, a short-term spike followed by declining
oil prices is unlikely to have lasting consequences. And a
lower oil price could have positive consequences.
The next point, the United States will also incur costs in
the current timeframe for commitments it makes to allies for
the war effort. We do not know what those are. We have heard
only vague details, but allied commitments by the U.S.
Government could go as high as $10 to $15 billion, depending on
the outcome of current negotiations.
Finally, the costs of not going to war. It is worth noting
that, arguably, not going to war could lead to costs
maintaining a military presence in the region, continuing the
regime of inspections and weapons destruction, accelerated
funding to combat terrorism abroad, and a high level of
expenditure for homeland security. It is worth having those on
the table.
And my final point, Mr. Chairman, which is that as we face
what could be a significant bill over the coming years, not
just for this year but in the years to come, this whole issue
needs to be set in the framework of longer term budgetary and
fiscal policy for the U.S. Government.
I personally would have to wonder whether a tax cut is an
appropriate enactment at this point, if we are going to incur
costs not currently in the President's budget, but which will
substantially reduce currently projected deficits. Thank you
very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Adams.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Adams follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Gordon Adams, Professor of the Practice of
International Affairs, Director, Security Policy Studies Program,
Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington
University
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
I want to thank the Committee for its kind invitation to testify
today on this subject of such compelling and immediate importance.
The United States is near a state of war with Iraq. Very little now
stands in the way of starting a military campaign. The outcome of this
campaign is relatively predictable, though its duration and
consequences are not. As we approach war, it is critical to begin
discussing and planning for the consequences of that war, including the
costs of a potentially long-term U.S. presence in and assistance to
Iraq. The administration has argued that discussions of post-war Iraq
policies and their costs are speculative and have no bearing on the
decision to go to war, which is and should be based on security
considerations alone.
I am not going to discuss the wisdom of the decision to go to war.
However, I believe we should not go to war without a serious discussion
of its potential consequences for longer-term American commitments
overseas and the costs of those commitments to the American people. The
test of our policy in Iraq depends on the post-war outcome, as much as
it does on the outcome of combat, itself. Will Iraq, as a result of war
and regime change, be truly disarmed and dramatically different in a
way that increases stability in the region, reduces the risks of
terrorist attack, and provides greater security for the American
people.
We could well win the war and lose the peace, if we do not tend now
to post-war Iraq policy. Winning the peace, however, will require a
significant, long-term U.S. investment in Iraq, an investment that
needs to be discussed in advance. I do not believe we have discussed
the implications of this commitment adequately. That is why I commend
the committee and its members, Mr. Chairman, for holding a hearing such
as this in advance of a final administration decision to go to war.
Let me summarize in brief the points I wish to make, and then
elaborate.
A successful war in Iraq will leave the United States with
primary responsibility for humanitarian relief, internal
security, the restoration of governance and any steps toward
democracy, and economic reconstruction in Iraq.
We are likely to shoulder even more of this responsibility
in the absence of a United Nations resolution supporting the
use of force if Saddam Hussein fails to comply fully with
Resolution 1441. Our isolation may be further enhanced by a
course of diplomacy and policy-making over the past four months
that has alienated a substantial number of friends and allies.
Estimating the costs of this responsibility is a challenge.
For the most part there are not hard numbers, nor has the
administration offered any details of its intended policies and
budgets. Nonetheless, estimates are useful. They bound the
problem of cost and provide some sense of the scale of
potential need. Moreover, the costs of this policy may have
bearing on policy choices we make in other areas of federal
policy.
The United States is likely to provide the bulk of the
occupying force after the war. Others may be disinclined to do
so, unwelcome in the region, or simply have inadequate
personnel, properly trained, to carry out this mission. That
occupation could cost $12-48 b. in the first year, alone.
Humanitarian aid requirements are likely to be significant
and immediate, in part because of a legacy of impoverishment
under Saddam Hussein, and in part due to damages combat itself
may cause to the electrical power, communications, water and
transportation infrastructure, oil production and distribution
facilities, food and medicine distribution, housing and
sanitation systems, and to the population itself as a result of
traumatic injury and the creation of refugees. Humanitarian
assistance requirements could cost from $1-10 b., with as much
as $3.5 b. being needed in the first year, alone.
Governing Iraq will pose an immediate challenge, especially
the need to establish authoritative internal and border
security, adequate policing, successful location and
elimination of weapons of mass destruction, and a working
system of justice. Over time, the governance challenge will be
demanding, especially if we intend to try to create democracy
in Iraq, a ``nation-building'' task par excellence. The
governance challenges could cost as much as $12 b. over five
years, with substantial funding (perhaps $5 b.) needed up front
to pay salaries for civil servants we will want to stay in
place.
Economic reconstruction poses another large challenge.
Depending on war damage, there could be substantial
infrastructure to repair, including oil field and pipeline
damage. Over the past two decades, the Iraqi economy has sunk
into virtual non-productivity outside of oil production. An
assistance program will be needed to create new productive
opportunities. The costs of reconstruction include a wide range
of estimates, from $30 b. to more than $100 b. over the next
five to ten years.
Iraqi debt of at least $62 b., claims of $172 b., potential
reparations, and contract costs will pose a heavy burden on a
post-war Iraqi budget. These claims and commitments will either
need to be renegotiated or paid to some degree, to free
resources for internal needs.
Iraqi oil revenues are unlikely to be available to cover all
these costs. First, production will have to be restored.
Second, the oil industry itself will need to use its income to
modernize an aging and degraded production and export
infrastructure and to upgrade the country's electricity grid.
Exploitation of Iraq's substantial potential and probably
reserves will require substantial additional investment and
will not be on line for several years, at least. Iraqi oil
income is likely to be constrained either by OPEC export quotas
or by significant price declines, should Iraq leave OPEC.
The macroeconomic impact of a war in Iraq depends on its
duration, especially if it has the effect of causing a long-
term price spike for oil. The costs to the economy of a major,
sustained increase in the price of oil could be significant. On
the other hand, a short-term spike would not have lasting
consequences and a decline in the price of oil, long-term could
have positive consequences.
The United States will also incur costs in the current time
frame for commitments it makes to allies in the war effort and,
downstream, for commitments we are likely to have to make to
wider regional programs for democratization or steps toward
peace in Israel. Allied commitments might go as high as $15 b.,
depending on the outcome of current negotiations. The costs of
future commitments are unknown, but probably inevitable.
The costs of not going to war also deserve discussion.
Arguably, these could include the costs of maintaining a
military presence in the region, of continuing inspections and
weapons destruction, of accelerated funding to combat terrorism
abroad, and high level of expenditure for homeland security.
One must question the wisdom of a fiscal policy that is
likely to face combat and post-war expenditures of this
magnitude, while submitting a budget that anticipates none of
them, but would aggregate $1.8 b. of deficit between now and
2013, according to the Congressional Budget Office. Health care
policy decisions and tax policy decisions need to reflect this
broader fiscal reality.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF WAR
In my view, a successful war to remove Saddam Hussein and disarm
Iraq will lead to our inheriting Iraq as a virtual ward, a nation for
whose internal well being, security, reconstruction, and economic
recovery the United States will assume primary responsibility. I am not
an expert on Iraq. However, even a well-informed amateur can detect the
following inheritance after a war:
A nation, which has long suffered under repressive
governance by an ethnic minority, leaving substantial ethnic
divisions in the wake of the removal of that government and the
risks of some trouble with its neighbors. It will not be an
easy task to reassemble the pieces of governance and the risks
of postwar inter-ethnic conflict are real.
A people who have suffered humanitarian degradation over the
past two decades, leaving a substantial legacy of food, health
and temporary housing needs. These needs have to be addressed
immediately after the war, including the extent to which they
have been aggravated by that war.
An economy devastated by war, inattention and lack of
productive investment for two decades and saddled with debts,
claims, and reparation demands. This is especially true with
regard to oil production, which, despite substantial proven and
probably reserves, has declined significantly. The Iraqi
economy will require substantial economic assistance to
rebuild, recover and grow.
Some signs of hope: the oil and gas assets, properly
exploited and distributed, can bring long-term benefit to the
Iraqi people; a populace that is educated and capable; a long
historical and cultural tradition of which they are rightly
proud; and for all of its problems, a state apparatus that can
function on a central basis.
An uneasy relationship to the fact of occupation and to the
occupying power. It is far from clear that the Iraqi populace
will welcome the United States as a liberator, even though
Saddam Hussein will be gone. The history of outside occupations
in the Middle East and Gulf region is not a happy one, as the
British and French have experienced. Significant cultural
differences and suspicion are likely to separate the populace
from the occupying force.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Regional analyst Anthony Cordesman has noted how different this
scenario may be from Europe, given this history of colonial occupation,
cultural clashes, and the damage caused by the war itself, among other
things. Cordesman, ``Planning for a Self-Inflicted Would: US Policy to
Reshape a Post-Saddam Iraq,'' rough draft, revision three, Washington,
DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 31, 2002,
p.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We have faced such problems before, in Europe after the Second
World War, in Korea, in the Balkans and, today, in Afghanistan. Their
magnitude in Iraq may be great, however, and their character will
certainly be different. Iraq is not Western Europe, making the Marshall
Plan a misleading template for designing programs or estimating costs.
There is no lengthy history here of democracy, free movement of
capital, a strong and organized industrial labor force or a long
history of positive relations and ethnic ties with the United States.
Nor is Iraq the Balkans where the war, while devastating, left
substantial parts of these countries untouched, including many parts
that had a strong tradition of industrial development. Nor, on the
other hand, is Iraq the same as Afghanistan, which had virtually no
central government or bureaucracy, and has precious few economic
assets.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The Center for Strategic and International Studies points out
that Iraq ``is far from a failed state.'' It has a functioning
government and bureaucracy and little tradition of religious
fundamentalism, despite pronounced ethnic divisions. Center for
Strategic and International Studies, A Wiser Peace: An Action Strategy
for a Post-Conflict Iraq, Frederick D. Barton and Bathsheba N. Crocker,
Project Directors, Washington, DC: CSIS, January 2003, p.10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The goal of post-conflict U.S. policy in Iraq should be tailored to
the conditions of the country and the region, not imposed from some
external template used in other countries or regions. Policy should aim
at assisting the emergence of a viable state, capable of governing
internally, disarmed of its weapons of mass destruction, and prepared
to behave in a peaceful and responsible way toward its neighbors and
other countries in the world. As one experienced participant in post-
conflict reconstruction efforts put it: Iraq ``must be neither a basket
case nor a bully'' once the conflict has ended and the recovery and
reconstruction task has been underway for a time.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Scott R. Feil, ``Iraq: looking Beyond Saddam's Rule: Setting
the Conditions for Stability: the Military Role,'' paper for the INSS/
NPS Workshop, 21-22 November 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I want to make one other important point. The task is a large one
and the United States cannot carry it out alone. War, itself, may not
require substantial participation by other nations and may even be
affordable, though we will not have the benefit of the substantial war
subsidies we received in the first Gulf War. Succeeding at establishing
the peace will require substantial participation by other countries,
international institutions and non-governmental organizations.
While I do expect we will receive some cooperation in the post-war
effort in Iraq, the administration's policy process of the past few
months could pose a serious problem in this regard.
While the outcome of a Security Council vote on an new resolution
is not yet known, there is substantial evidence that our diplomacy and
pressure, statements made by leading officials about other nations, and
the clear message that the administration will proceed to war without
Security Council support have all left a legacy of ill-will and
mistrust among our friends and allies. Combine the manifestly less
coalition-oriented nature of the pending military campaign with the
apparent bitterness among friends and allies, and one has to wonder
about the willingness of these same friends and allies to help us with
governance and reconstruction, once the war is over. The United States
could find itself carrying a substantial share of the post-war burden,
in addition to the costs of the war itself.
THE TASKS TO BE UNDERTAKEN
With these statements as backdrop, let me turn to the post-war
policies and costs, at least to set a range for the tasks and costs we
may face very soon.
There has already been much discussion of the military campaign and
the potential costs of that campaign. It is not my task to discuss the
war plans or the range of cost estimates involved. Even these are
somewhat hard to estimate, given the uncertainties we face with respect
to force size, the duration of the war, anticipated casualties and the
conditions in which the war will be fought (urban warfare, serious
Iraqi resistance, use of chemical or biological weapons).\4\ The
algorithms for estimating military costs are, however, reasonable well
known. We have deployed forces, conducted combat and withdrawn forces
many times, including one major recent experience in this theatre. Even
here, we need to keep in mind that the costs of nearly every war have
been misestimated (generally too low), as has the pace and outcome of
the conflict itself.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ CBO, in its recent review of the President's budget, has
increased its estimated costs of deployment, combat and redeployment
from its initial estimates made in September 2002. Deployment costs are
now estimated at $14 b., combat at $10 b. for the first month at $10 b.
and each subsequent month at $8 b, with redeployment costs at $9 b. A
two-month war, including deployment and redeployment costs would cost a
total of $41 b., using these estimates. A separate analysis, using
earlier CBO data, suggested that a force of 250,000 involved in a two-
month war could cost $35 b. Steve Kosiak, ``Potential Cost of A War
with Iraq and Its Post-War Occupation,' Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, February 25, 2003. The administration is rumored
to be considering a supplemental request of over $60 b., which may
include even higher estimated costs for comparable combat.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the end, one important consequence of combat operations for
post-war Iraqi occupation tasks and costs will be the extent of the
damage that the war leaves behind, in terms of civilian casualties,
destroyed cities and residences, damaged infrastructure, and oil field
destruction. War is neither pretty nor antiseptic; it is likely to
leave the occupiers with a major human and economic reconstruction
task.
My focus is on the legacy of war and of two decades of
authoritarian rule. Administration spokespersons have spoken hopefully
of the goal of establishing a democratic, peaceful, disarmed Iraq,
unified and living in peace with its neighbors, almost as a
``demonstration project'' for the region and a deterrent to those who
would wish the U.S. and its allies harm. Hope springs eternal in some
American breasts, but the struggles and time it has taken to achieve
political stability, democracy, and economic growth in the Balkans over
the past ten years should temper our optimism. The same harsh reality
is being learned day-by-day in Afghanistan, where security is
uncertain, central government a phantom, and economic recovery almost
non-existent. Count me among those who do not believe that Americans
with the best of intentions and a fair bundle of cash can accomplish
anything, especially bringing countries with a long history of living
otherwise, swiftly into democracy and free markets. The tasks I
describe below are likely to take a very long time and may well fail,
given the problems in the surrounding social, economic and political
environment.
The potential costs the United States might incur in carrying out
these tasks are manifestly difficult to estimate. The Congressional
Budget Office has foregone making such estimates, ``even roughly,
because they depend on highly uncertain decisions about future
policies.'' Therefore, it describes such estimates as ``quite
speculative.'' \5\ You have invited me today to tread into that zone of
uncertain speculation, which I do with some trepidation. For the most
part there are no publicly available hard numbers for these tasks.
Nevertheless, even wide ranges of estimates are useful. They bound the
problem of cost, provide some sense of the scale of potential need, and
may have implications for other areas of federal policy demanding
budgetary resources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Congressional Budget Office, ``An Analysis of the President's
Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2004,'' p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In defense of the ranges I will offer, let me only say that the
administration is going through the same guess work, as we speak, in
the process of preparing a supplemental request to fund the FY 2003
costs of an Iraqi war, occupation and reconstruction. The
administration has noticeably better resources for making such
estimates than most of us in the private sector. They need to do this
work, but it is unfortunate that it is being done without significant
public comment or discussion, beyond what might have been said this
morning.
With that caveat, let me describe the central tasks we will face
and provide at least a range of potential estimates for their cost.
PROVIDING AN OCCUPYING FORCE
Unlike the Balkans, where the Europeans rather quickly provided
roughly 80% of the peacekeeping forces, the United States is likely to
provide the bulk of the force occupying Iraq. This is for three
reasons. First, other countries, both in the region and outside it,
that have been unwilling to support the U.S. military effort are likely
to shy away from the task of dealing with the consequences of the war.
The pool of participating nations may shrink, especially among the
substantial European land forces. Second, the history of European
colonialism in the region is likely to lead to some reluctance on the
part of countries that have participated in Balkans peacekeeping to
play an occupier role in Iraq. Third, few other countries today have a
military as large as ours or as trained to the occupation mission. Over
time, an occupying force must be rotated, meaning the base force at
home needs to have a pool of at least twice and probably three times
the size of the force deployed forward. The British are severely
stretched today by the forces they have already deployed in the region.
Were France and Germany to participate, their forces would be stretched
as well and unlikely to compete in numbers with the United States.
In other words, despite the views put forward by some that U.S.
forces can be quickly in and out of Iraq, this is unlikely. The
occupying force, moreover, is likely to have quite broad rules of
engagement. Over time, the American military has learned that
restricting its role in peacekeeping to occasional patrols, separating
large hostile forces and negotiating disagreements is just not viable.
In Iraq, such restrictions on the ROI are virtually ruled out. Their
mission is occupation, with broad responsibility for internal security,
inter-ethnic peace, oil field security, leadership protection, special
operations against remaining hostiles and terrorists, governance and
control of the Iraqi military, distribution of humanitarian assistance,
and, above all, scouring Iraq for and destroying weapons of mass
destruction. Even this may be too limited a view of their likely
mandate.
What is an occupation likely to cost? While these costs do not have
direct implications for the jurisdiction of this committee, I cite
estimates here because they are of consequence to the American taxpayer
and the mission of occupation is intimately knitted into the fabric of
post-conflict Iraq policy. Hence, if the U.S. is to bear these costs,
they are part of the realistic discussion we must have on the policy.
According to the Congressional Budget Office, an occupation force
ranging from 75,000 to 200,000 would cost between $1 b. and $4 b. a
month to sustain. The annual costs could be $12-$48 b. over the first
year, depending on force size.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ CBO, ``Estimated Cost of a Potential Conflict with Iraq,''
Letter from Dan L. Crippen to the House and Senate Budget Committees,
September 30, 2003, p.7. These estimates were not changed in the more
recent CBO update [note later]. CBO notes that these forces would have
to be rotated as well, which would be unsustainable for the U.S. Army
at the level of 200,000 troops in the occupation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CBO estimates are based on the average cost of maintaining an
Army peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo. They need to be considered a
low-end estimate, however, since the conditions of occupation, rather
than peacekeeping, in Iraq are likely to be significantly more
stressful and the tasks more demanding than they were in the
Balkans.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ William Nordhaus estimates substantially higher costs, ranging
from $75 b. for a five-year occupying force of 75,000 to $500 b. for a
ten year occupying force of 200,000 over ten years. It seems unlikely,
however, that the US would retain a force that size over a period that
long; forces are more likely to decline along a slope toward zero,
probably over a shorter period of time. In any case, the 200,000 figure
is unsustainable over that period. See Gordon Adams and Steve Kosiak,
``the Price We Pay,'' New York Times, February 15, 2003, p. A31 and
Kosiak, above, February 25, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
The Committee will hear other testimony with respect to the
humanitarian assistance needs of post-war Iraq. These are likely to be
significant. Two decades of Saddam Hussein's rule have impoverished the
country to a level well below its former standard of living, including
higher rates of disease and hunger. In particular, unlike the pre-Gulf
War I period, a significant proportion of the Iraqi population now
relies on the government for food and basic necessities.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ According to a UN task force, this proportion could reach as
high as 60% of the population. See ``Likely Humanitarian Scenarios,''
United Nations task force report, December 10, 2002, p.3. Available at
http://www.casi.org.uk/info/undocs/war021210.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, the sanctions over the past decade have clearly been
painful. For all the distribution of food and medical goods that have
resulted from the Oil for Food Program, this has not reversed the
decline in the Iraqi standard of living. Moreover, some part of the
funds generated by oil sales have been diverted to supporting the
ruling clique's standard of living.
Finally, the war itself will have potentially devastating
consequences across the board. It could result in damage or destruction
of much of the electrical power, communications potable water
distribution, and transportation infrastructure, a halt to oil
production and sales, limits on the distribution of food and medicines,
the destruction of housing and sanitation systems, traumatic injury and
illness, and the creation of a sizeable refugee populations.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Same, p.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The administration is already visibly planning for the distribution
of emergency supplies, food and temporary housing, as the combat moves
along and once the war is over.
The costs of humanitarian assistance will be mostly borne in the
early stages of the operation, as they were in Europe after the War and
in the Balkans. Assuming a cost of $500 per person as in the Balkans,
and one to two million Iraqis affected for two to four years, Prof.
William Nordhaus estimates that the costs of humanitarian assistance
could range from $1 to $10 b.\10\ On the other hand, a United Nations
task force estimated in December 2002, that the ``caseload'' for
humanitarian assistance could reach 7.5 million Iraqis, largely as a
consequence of combat operations in a war.\11\ The first year costs for
such a caseload could be in the range of $3.5 b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ William D. Nordhaus, ``The Economic Consequences of a War With
Iraq,'' in Carl Kaysen, Steven E. Miller, Martin B. MaIm, William D.
Nordhaus and John D. Steinbruner, War With Iraq: Costs Consequences,
and Alternatives, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Committee on
International Security Studies, Cambridge, MA, 2002, p.67.
\11\ ``Likely Humanitarian Scenarios,'' above, p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The up front character of humanitarian assistance could mean a
large administration budget request for FY2003, perhaps in the range of
$3 b. to cover the large anticipated caseload. Over time, however, this
is the most likely form of assistance for international partners to
provide, including the Red Cross, UNHCR, UNICEF, World Food Program,
World Health Organization and the International Organization for
Migration, other countries and a host of non-governmental
organizations. It should be noted, however, that the international
organizations are looking to the U.S. as a major provider of the funds
for these activities.
COSTS OF SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE
Security, stability and long-term governance in Iraq will be the
priority task, once the conflict has ended. Near-term security will
come at the very top. The Center for Strategic and International
studies has identified several key, immediate tasks for the occupiers,
based on experiences in the Balkans and Afghanistan and specific
conditions in Iraq: putting a international security force in place for
near-term policing needs, recruiting police internationally for
deployment to Iraq, locating, securing, and eliminating weapons of mass
destruction, establishing a transitional administration, creating a
rapidly deployable international team to provide equitable justice, and
screening or demobilizing the existing police and security
apparatus.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ CSIS, above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These are only first steps. The United States is likely to be
principally responsible, in the near-term, for governing Iraq under an
occupation and facilitating a transition to indigenous government.
Policy will need to focus quickly on sorting out the capabilities of
the central government and on the strengthening Iraqi civil society,
neither of which is an easy task. Iraq has a capable civil service, but
it will require budgetary and salary support early on, as it has in
Afghanistan.
In addition, the administration has repeatedly stated the ambition
of bringing a democratic Iraq into being. Despite earlier rejection of
such a policy, this policy will involve ``nation-building'' par
excellence. This ambitious, perhaps unachievable goal, will require
support for a fair, objective and accessible system for the
administration of justice, retraining and recruitment of police,
strengthening Iraqi civil society (voluntary associations and non-
governmental organizations), and bringing all three major Iraqi ethnic
groups fully into the governance process.
Our experience with such programs is decidedly mixed. Freedom
Support Act and SEED funds included active programs for the support of
both government and civil society throughout central Europe and Russia.
Oversimplifying, the results of these programs have not been entirely
positive (nor entirely negative). It is difficult to impost a culture
of democracy on unreceptive soil and sometimes more difficult if the
source of funding is seen by some in the society as suspect. Where
indigenous societies have a strong history of fair justice and civil
activity, such programs can take off rapidly.
After two decades of authoritarian rule and scant history of
democracy, it is not clear how fertile the Iraqi soil will be to such
an effort.\13\ Moreover, if the Iraqis look at the United States as an
occupying power, with some fear and doubt, that concern may reflect on
organizations created by American funding even if staffed and operated
by Iraqis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ A Carnegie Endowment analysis suggests that the effort to
create democracy in Iraq is a decidedly long-term task, and far from
easy. To quote the document: ``the idea of a quick and easy democratic
transformation in Iraq is a fantasy,'' requiring the United States ``to
engage in nation-building on a scale that would dwarf any other such
effort since the reconstruction of Germany and Japan after World War
II.'' See Marina Ottoway, Thomas Carothers, Amy Hawthorne and Daniel
Brumberg, ``Democratic Mirage in the Middle East,'' Policy Brief no.
20, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October
2002, p.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It will be worth making an effort of this kind, however, even if it
falls short of full democratization. Creating a stronger civil society
and a more transparent state bureaucracy and eliminating a repressive
security apparatus can only be positive steps forward. If we are true
to our words that we will be liberating the Iraqi people, the
governance investment will be needed over the long-term to demonstrate
even these more limited results. Moreover, germinating and growing a
more democratic Iraq appears to be a core part of the ``demonstration
effect'' the administration's policy will have on the region as a
whole. There is substantial doubt that such an effect will take place.
Many countries and populations are unlikely to welcome a U.S. invasion,
strengthening anti-U.S. feeling in the region. Moreover, it is not
clear that the terrain is fertile for democracy in many Middle Eastern
countries.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ The Carnegie analysis notes that ``the Middle East today lacks
the domestic conditions that set the stage for democratic change
elsewhere.'' Above, p.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The costs of support for security and governance will be high,
especially in the beginning before local tax and oil revenues are on
line. Costs of supporting the salaries of the Iraqi civil service could
run as high as $50-100 m. a month at the start; the currency will need
to be reprinted, technical equipment (computers, etc.) will be needed,
police training and equipping will be critical, the justice system will
require some cleaning out and retraining, local groups will need
support in cash and in kind. It would be reasonable to assume costs of
$5 b. in the first year, tailing off over a period of five years by
about a billion a year to a total five-year cost of $12 b.
There may be some support from other countries and international
organizations for such expenditures. Policing may have international
support, as it has in the Balkans. The search for and destruction of
weapons of mass destruction could be carried out under UN auspices,
though the United States shares in the costs for these teams. When it
comes to governance, salaries and democratization, it is not clear that
other donor countries are prepared to take on this almost
``missionary'' task or to provide the fiscal support it will require.
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION
The long-term effort to reverse the devastating effects of two
decades of authoritarian rule, sanctions and war on the Iraqi economy
will be an enormous challenge. While Iraq is not a regional economic
powerhouse, it has the capacity to become one, with substantial oil and
gas resources and the capacity to export petroleum products. Over time,
with adequate oil exports, the country should be able to raise the
standards of living, health and education of the populace.
Iraq is very far from this optimistic goal today. The Iraqi economy
has deteriorated over the past two decades, with GDP per capita now
substantially lower and the bulk of the population dependent on state
handouts. As I will note shortly, the oil industry has declined over
the same period of time and, yet, remains almost the only source of
export earnings for the Iraqi economy.
An important subset of the reconstruction issue is the matter of
Iraq's international sovereign debt, international claims, potential
reparations costs and contract claims. At more than $62 b., Iraq
sovereign debt is very high, compared to its GDP, one of the highest in
the world.\15\ In addition, according to the CSIS analysis, unsettled
claims against Iraq submitted to the UN Compensation Commission total
$172 b. and another $27 b. remains to be paid on already settled
claims. Beyond that, the Iran-Iraq war has given rise to $100 b. in
reparations claims. Finally, Iraqi contracts pending with various
foreign countries come to an estimated $57.2 b. One-by-one, these
financial ``overhangs'' will have to be dealt with--through
rescheduling or renegotiations--if Iraq is to have sufficient resources
to invest in its own reconstruction. The good will of other nations
will be essential for the U.S. to lead in resolving the problem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ CSIS, above, p.23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The task of rebuilding and growing the Iraqi economy will take time
and significant resources. Citing a UN report on the costs of restoring
Iraqi infrastructure to its prewar level after 1991, William Nordhaus
estimates that overall reconstruction costs could be $30 b. in current
year dollars. He arrives at roughly the same number using a capital
output ratio for oil countries, which he calls the ``minimal rebuilding
needs in postwar Iraq.'' \16\ More ambitiously he suggests that a
Marshall Plan for Iraq could cost as much as $75 b., assuming it would
take six years. As noted, however, the prospects for success in
spending Marshall Plan levels of resources on Iraq are minimal, given
the dramatic differences in levels of economic development and
political and societal organization between Europe and Iraq. Similarly,
a Council on Foreign Relations working group has estimated that
economic reconstruction in Iraq could cost between $25 and $100 b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Nordhaus, above, p.66.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States cannot shoulder costs of this magnitude. Ideally,
other organizations such as the United Nations Development Program, the
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank can play an important role,
as well as the European Union. U.S. international leadership in this
effort will require intensive and careful cultivation of other nations
and international organizations, or the U.S. could well be left with
the lion's share of reconstruction assistance.
OIL REVENUES AS A SOLUTION
The availability of Iraqi oil revenues has suggested to some that
Iraq, itself, may generate the resources to fund the reconstruction
task, relieving the U.S., other nations and international organizations
of the responsibility. This expectation is likely to be illusory,
however. Oil revenues generate something around $10 b. a year for the
Iraqi economy, down from previous highs. Production has fallen from a
peak of roughly 3.5 million barrels per day (bpd) to roughly 2.8
million bpd. Moreover, one immediate consequence of combat will be the
shutdown, and possibly severe damage to this capacity. Depending on the
level of damage, it could take several years to restore the oil fields
to their current level of production. Industry analysts and experts
believe that much of the revenue from the oil fields will be needed
simply to repair, rebuild, and upgrade the oil industry infrastructure
to pre-1990 levels, and the effort could take from 1.5 to 3 years.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ This is the estimate of the Joint Council on Foreign
Relations/Baker Institute working group. See Guiding Principles for
U.S. Post-Conflict Policy in Iraq, Report of an Independent Working
Group cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the James A.
Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University, Edward P.
Djerejian and Frank G. Wisner, Co-Chairs, New York: Council on Foreign
Relations, 2003, pp.19-20. Cordesman, above, and the CSIS report both
agree with the conclusion that oil revenues are at best inadequate,
given the variety of needs to which they might be put.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is clear that there is significant long-term promise in the
Iraqi oil fields. Only 17% of the 74 proven fields of reserves have
been exploited and probable reserves would make the Iraqi oilfields the
second largest reserve in the world after Saudi Arabia. It will take
substantial investment over some years, however, to exploit those
reserves. The Council on Foreign Relations working group estimates that
this investment, alone, will require $30-40 billion in investment,
setting aside the roughly $25 b. needed to upgrade current export
capacity and restore the Iraqi electricity grid to its pre-1990 level
of capacity.
The oil revenues that exist today are likely to be used in the oil
fields, with some left over for claims settlements and humanitarian
assistance. Longer-term, some have argued, resources will grow with
major increases in production, perhaps to the 6 million bpd level. Even
this estimate must be treated with caution. Iraq was a founding member
of OPEC and is likely to remain in OPEC. Production quotas will limit
Iraq's ability to grow its production at the rate some expect. Were
Iraq to leave OPEC and enter the open market, moreover, its oil exports
would be likely to depress international oil prices. While this may be
good news for oil importing countries, it would depress revenues
realized from increased production.
THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF A WAR
The question of oil takes me to another potential cost of an
invasion of Iraq--the impact of war on oil prices and the impact of oil
prices on the U.S. and global economies. There is no question that even
the prospect of war in Iraq has had an impact on oil prices, which are
already nearing $40 per barrel. A war itself, most economists seem to
agree, will spike oil prices even higher. Part of this spike would
reflect simple market fear; part could result from significant damage
to the Iraqi oil fields as a result of combat. The cost to the economy
of that spike will depend on how long prices stay high.
Economist William Nordhaus uses a Brookings Institution study on
oil market shocks to estimate that if oil prices should rise to $75 per
barrel over a year, there could be as much as a $778 b. cost to the
U.S. economy over the next decade as productivity slowed down and the
economy reentered a recession. On the other hand, if the war were
short, Iraqi production were not significantly curtailed, and oil
prices fell back to pre-buildup levels, the impact on the economy could
provide a small positive lift of $40 b. to the GDP over the next
decade.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Nordhaus, pp.70-71
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More broadly, the economy could respond to war fears by sliding
into a recession anyway, independent of oil prices. There are many
causes of a recession, however, which has been with us for some time.
Nordhaus argues that the economy may have already discounted the impact
of a war, along with other negative economic news over the past
year.\19\ If the war is quick and the oil price rise brief, economic
performance could actually improve later in the year. On the other
hand, if the war is extended, oil fields are burned and the regional
reaction is negative to violent, the economy could return to negative
growth.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Nordhaus, p.75.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In either case, the impact of changes in defense spending itself
are likely to have only a marginal impact. Defense as a share of U.S.
GDP has declined from 5-7% levels of two decades ago to roughly 3.4% of
GDP today. The marginal change as a result of an additional $100 b. in
defense spending is a very small fraction of GDP, with minor
consequences for the economy.
WIDER BUDGETARY COSTS AND ISSUES
Support for Allies
One budgetary cost that has not been disclosed or even fully
estimated is the cost of additional foreign economic and military
assistance to countries that would support the U.S. war effort.
Newspaper reports have rather fully discussed a potential $6-10 b.
package of economic and military assistance for Turkey, should the
Turks agree to provide staging areas for U.S. force invading Northern
Iraq. There have also been discussions of assistance to other
cooperating states, including Jordan and Israel, which could range from
$2-5 b. beyond current budgets.
Wider Regional Programs
This item falls in a far more speculative category of spending. If
a program is instituted to change Iraqi politics, there is every
possibility that such efforts will be expanded beyond current budget
forecasts to other countries in the Middle East region. If the region
accommodates an invasion and occupation willingly or, for that matter,
if it does not, there may be a broad expansion of U.S. public diplomacy
programs in the region to support the policy the U.S. is pursuing or
persuade others of its benefits. Such efforts will also require
additional resources, beyond those currently budgeted, but no clear
estimate can be made at this point.
Another regional program might be significantly greater U.S.
involvement in the outcome of the Second Intifada and Israel/Palestine
relations. Regional specialists suggest, with reason, that the
governments and populace in the region see the Israel/Palestine
conflict as directly tied to broader regional issues. The credibility
of U.S. efforts to disarm Iraq and change the regime will clearly be
linked to how willing the administration is to engage this related
issue. The administration has recognized this connection, albeit only
briefly, but should the U.S. engage, there is almost certain to be an
outcome which includes additional U.S. spending, either for economic or
military assistance or, as some have suggested, to support a U.S.
military presence as part of a peacekeeping force in that part of the
region.
THE COSTS OF NOT INVADING IRAQ
These potential costs deserve discussion, though they have received
little analysis to this point. If the United States were to stand down
in the current confrontation, the administration would need to estimate
and budget for the costs of maintaining force in the theatre, without
combat, which might be similar to the costs of an occupying force. The
costs of on-going inspections would need to be estimated, including a
U.S. contribution. The administration might well argue that the costs
of allowing Saddam Hussein to proceed with his weapons programs and
policies in the region also need to be estimated, including the long-
term consequences for stability, terrorism and even oil prices of
allowing him to acquire weapons of mass destruction. They might also
point to the potential costs of withdrawing U.S. forces from a region
grown increasingly hostile to the U.S. military presence and the costs
of a continued high level of investment in anti-terrorism operations
and homeland security measures, given continued support for and growth
of terrorism emerging from this part of the world. I cannot estimate
these costs, nor can the administration, but some of them may be the
result of a different policy.
THE BUDGETARY IMPACT OF POST-WAR IRAQ POLICY
I would be remiss as a budget analyst if I did not comment on the
question of whether the federal budget can support the budgetary costs
I have outlined above. As many of these costs are expressed in ranges,
I will not add them together to provide one single rollup figure. But
these are costs over and above current estimates of spending, hence
they will most certainly add to the federal deficits projected into the
future.
The Congressional Budget Office has just released its analysis of
the President's budget. Perhaps most important is the increase in the
deficits projected for FY 2003 and FY 2004, which would rise to $287 b.
and $338 b. in those years. According to CBO projections, budget
deficits would remain negative throughout the next ten budget years,
with a shift in cumulative deficits over that time from an OMB-
projected cumulative surplus of $891 b. to cumulative deficits of $1.8
trillion dollars over the ten years.\20\ The out-year numbers in these
forecasts are frequently, and rightly, suspect. The near-term numbers
show deficits reminiscent of the 1980s and early 1990s. The proposed
budget does not include any of the costs I have discussed in this
testimony, which would further increase the projected deficits. Nor
does it include any CBO re-estimate of the budgetary consequences of
Medicare reform, or the potential costs of a prescription drug benefit
program or extension of Alternative Minimum Tax changes past FY 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ CBO, An Analysis of the President's Budgetary Proposals for
Fiscal Year 2004: An Interim Report, Washington, DC: CBO, March 2003,
Table 1, p. 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In sum, deficits are likely to be high and go higher. This broader
budgetary impact is not necessarily an obstacle to the administration's
policy. It does deserve discussion, however, as the administration's
policy is being considered. With some sustained economic recovery,
higher deficits could well lead to higher interest rates and a squeeze
on capital availability. If any of these consequences are likely, it
may make sense for the tax policies proposed by the administration to
be put on hold.
CONCLUSION
I again commend the committee for this hearing. It is vital to
understand the long-term consequences and the fiscal implications of
those long-term policies for the U.S. taxpayer. For this Committee, the
Congress and the country, what follows a war will be even more
important than the war itself. Ensuring a disarmed and peaceful Iraq
and a peaceful region is an important, if ambitious policy goal.
Without serious planning and fiscal commitments, however, we could win
this particular battle and be worse off in the long run.
Our most important need in a post-war Iraq world is a broad
community of support for the effort that needs to be made. The United
States cannot achieve its aims alone. What concerns me most is that the
diplomatic strategy leading up to the war may have seriously alienated
nations we will need for the post-war effort. The consequence could be
that we face these major long-term tasks with less international
support than they require.
The Chairman. Ms. Mitchell.
STATEMENT OF SANDRA MITCHELL, VICE PRESIDENT OF GOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank
you for the opportunity to talk to you today about the state of
the humanitarian response to the consequences of military
action against Iraq.
I have submitted my statement for the record, and will take
this opportunity to briefly highlight four issues requiring
immediate action to improve the state of preparedness. They are
access, funding, coordination, and plans to avoid humanitarian
crises after a war and during a U.S.-led occupation.
First, access; the humanitarian community must have
unhindered access to Iraq and its border countries to
strengthen response capacity. Non-governmental organizations
and faith-based organizations do the heavy lifting during an
emergency. We build the refugee camps, we provide fresh water,
distribute food and medicine, and then we help rebuild
communities when the fighting stops.
The U.N. high commissioner for refugees, UNICEF, the World
Food Program, WHO, USAID, the European Union, and other donors
depend on us as their implementing partners. And when they look
around Iraq and the border countries right now, they see very
few operational NGOs.
The United Nations and U.S. sanctions have kept all but a
handful of NGOs out of Iraq and the region. For the past 6
months, the International Rescue Committee and other NGOs have
been waiting for the U.S. Government to grant licenses that
would allow us to conduct emergency planning answers to
interrogatories inside Iraq and Iran. These licenses are only
now forthcoming and they are restrictive. They do not allow
humanitarian agencies to freely assess conditions on the ground
and then take whatever actions we deem are required.
Given the overall inadequate state of humanitarian
preparedness, such licensing procedures are obstructive and
must be suspended to facilitate our unhindered access to Iraq
before, during, and after any intervention.
The government of Iraq must also grant unhindered access to
humanitarian relief agencies. Iraq is currently obstructing aid
preparation by denying visas to aid workers and delaying
imports of relief supplies.
Second, resources. Less than $1 million has been spent by
the U.S. Government to support non-governmental agencies who
will do most of the work to aid refugees and displaced persons
in Iraq if war comes.
Less than $1 million to support American organizations
preparing to respond to the humanitarian consequences in a war
backed by 250,000 American soldiers with grave risk to their
own lives if weapons of mass destruction are released.
The United Nations and the humanitarian communities are
struggling to put in place the kind of operational and
logistical framework that can support relief efforts if
populations inside Iraq flee, either from fear, from attack, or
from weapons of mass destruction.
Having received less than $1 million from the U.S.
Government, NGOs are having to rely on the generosity of
private contributions from the American people. Unfortunately,
these alone are not sufficient.
Funds have not been available from the United Nations or
other traditional donors either. The U.N. funding appeal for
its own contingency preparedness remains unfilled, so the U.N.
has no ability to boost the capacity of its implementing
partners. Where is the Iraq supplemental? Where are the funds
needed right now to meet the needs of Iraqis if war breaks out?
The humanitarian funding must be de-linked from the
political and military issues of war. USAID and the State
Department's Bureau of Population Refugees and Migration
traditionally work with the United Nations and the humanitarian
community, and their offices provide funding for the care of
refugees and displaced persons in countries all over the world.
These funding mechanisms must now come online quickly. We
finally heard from the administration last week when aid
agencies were asked to submit operational concept papers. The
filing deadline was yesterday, but where is the funding?
New money is needed for the humanitarian consequences in--
of Iraq--of war in Iraq. It would be wrong to scrub existing
humanitarian accounts when there remains urgent, unmet
humanitarian needs throughout the world.
More de-linking of the humanitarian plans from the war
plans is required to save lives. I understand that USAID must
coordinate with the military and rely on ground forces to
provide security, and that this government's humanitarian
response will likely have a military flavor. That is not an
uncommon response for a country planning for war. But the same
military tint must not color the response launched by the
international and humanitarian aid communities.
More funding must be spent now to support the humanitarian
efforts of the United Nations and its implementing partners, or
insufficient response capacity will remain in place.
Third, on the issue of coordinating relief efforts, it must
be noted that a humanitarian crisis already exists in Iraq. For
more than a decade, the world's largest humanitarian relief
effort has been underway through Iraq.
The United Nations Oil for Food Program has been the life
line for 60 percent of the population or an estimated 16
million people. This is a massive distribution network for food
and medicine, with more than 46,000 distribution points.
In the event of military action, the United Nations will
withdraw international staff, interrupting the oil for food
system, which can quickly collapse, if the food supply pipeline
or the distribution is then disrupted by war.
Maritime insurance rates are already spiking and risks
increase daily for food shipments navigating their way to Iraqi
ports past the U.S. naval fleet and ground forces.
The United Nations' top humanitarian official for Iraq said
2 weeks ago that food stocks and supplies being prepositioned
are not sufficient for the known needs of Iraq.
Iraq's emergency response capacity will weaken during
conflict and cannot provide for the humanitarian needs of its
25 million people.
U.S. planning has so embedded humanitarian tasks and
activities with the military war plan that vital information
remains classified and meaningful dialog continues to be
muffled and one-directional. Coordination of relief efforts is
best handled by civilians and preferably on a multilateral
basis by the United Nations.
Coordinating a humanitarian response must also be de-linked
as much as possible from any planned response against Iraq.
Recently, the administration stated its willingness to separate
the humanitarian issues from the political issues facing North
Korea. The same should be done for Iraq. This is best
accomplished by U.S. support for all necessary actions that
grant the United Nations clear authority for coordinating and
mounting a humanitarian response that is inclusive of its
implementing partners.
I would like to emphasize this point and explain from the
humanitarian community's perspective why U.N. authority and
civilian oversight of humanitarian activities is so important.
First, the military should do what it does best, fight
wars. And the humanitarian organizations should do what we do
best, care for civilians and deliver assistance to those in
need.
Second, humanitarian assistance must be provided on an
impartial basis to ensure that all civilians in need,
regardless of race, creed, nationality, or political belief,
have fair and equal access to aid. The United Nations is
clearly more independent and impartial than any one party to
the conflict; and, therefore, should coordinate and direct
relief efforts.
And, third, confusing humanitarian and military activities
carries great security risks for those delivering assistance.
Aid workers, obviously, are not armed. We cannot defend
ourselves and we must never be mistaken for members of the
military. Their lives depend on this.
On this point, I would like to call your attention to the
continued abduction of Argan Erkel, a Dutch humanitarian worker
abducted 7 months ago in Dagestan. We see Mr. Erkel's case as
part of an increase in violence against civilian populations
and against humanitarian aid workers trying to assist victims
with relief. Please join the humanitarian community in asking
the Russian authorities to give their highest political
commitment to assure the release of Mr. Erkel.
I would like to conclude with some steps that the United
States must be prepared to take to avoid humanitarian crises
after war.
We have seen no plans on how the Bush administration plans
to protect Iraqi civilians after an intervention and while
transitional institutions are being stood up. The U.S.
Government should be formulating plans now to transfer power as
quickly as feasible to legitimate civilian structures in Iraq.
The Fourth Geneva Convention, of which the United States is
a signatory, sets forth essential steps that occupying powers
must take in order to avoid humanitarian crises. These steps
hinge on the United States protecting the rights of Iraqi
civilians in Iraq in the same way it does for Americans here.
These duties are obligatory upon first contact with Iraqi
civilians and they require much more than providing the basic
needs of food, water, and shelter.
Grave humanitarian concerns will continue to befall Iraq
the day after the regime falls. Of critical importance to any
provision of humanitarian aid for Iraq is public order and
security. The delivery of humanitarian assistance cannot be
assured in areas that are not secure.
As Saddam's regime falls, the internal security framework
will collapse and conditions for lawlessness and impunity will
ripen. Security vacuums will then appear.
Under the Geneva Conventions, the United States will have
the duty to restore and ensure public order and safety in Iraq.
This duty requires the United States and its allies to use
their own personnel to provide a safe environment and ensure
public order as they advance into Iraq. These forces must
transition quickly to policing functions and fill a security
vacuum that exists to provide no space for reprisal and
revenge.
The Geneva Conventions also require the United States to
promote the rule of law and ensure that basic judicial and due
process guarantees exist for all Iraqis. As a signatory of the
Geneva Conventions, the United States will be expected to
fulfill all these obligations.
It will be critical that U.S. forces correctly identify and
protect vulnerable populations and communities that may be most
at risk. USAID disaster assistance response teams and the
Office of Transition Initiatives are well suited to identify
and assess the immediate protection needs of the Iraqi
population, and they should be encouraged to do so.
I understand that Senator Biden is crafting legislation to
address the protection needs of women and children in armed
conflict. I would urge the committee members to support this
legislation because it will focus USAID and the State
Department's response to the protection needs of conflict-
affected populations, which are equally as important as food
and shelter.
My final comment concerns the state of preparedness for
responding to the humanitarian consequences of weapons of mass
destruction. I am afraid nothing has really been done to
coordinate a planned response to help Iraqis if weapons of mass
destruction are released upon them. There is no capacity in the
international and/or American humanitarian community to respond
to emergencies involving weapons of mass destruction. We do not
know what the capacity is of the U.S. military to help in such
a case. A serious discussion of this question remains to be
held.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Ms. Mitchell, for that
very important testimony.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Mitchell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sandra Mitchell, Vice President, Government
Relations, International Rescue Committee
The International Rescue Committee (IRC) \1\ continues to advocate
for a peaceful resolution to the Iraq crisis. Nevertheless as a
humanitarian organization we must take prudent, preparatory measures to
meet the humanitarian consequences of a conflict. In that regard, the
IRC remains concerned about the lack of preparedness for emergency
relief operations and reconstruction efforts if they are required for
Iraq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Founded in 1933, the International Rescue Committee is one of
the world's largest nonsectarian nonprofit organizations, providing
global emergency relief, rehabilitation, protection, resettlement
services and advocacy for refugees, displaced persons and victims of
oppression and violent conflict. The IRC, which currently provides
assistance in some 30 countries, is committed to freedom, human
dignity, and self-reliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. HUMANITARIAN NEEDS ALREADY EXIST
A. Current Situation. The starting point for contingency planning
begins with an already bleak humanitarian situation in Iraq. The United
Nations' statistics are well known:
one million children under the age of five are chronically
malnourished;
five million Iraqis lack access to safe water and
sanitation;
60% of the population or an estimated 16 million Iraqis are
dependent on the UN Oil-for-Food Program for their food
rations.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ For a comprehensive discussion on the Oil-for-Food Program and
health of the Iraqi population see: ``Health and Human Rights
Consequences of War in Iraq: A Briefing Paper'' Physicians for Human
Rights, 14 Feb 03. http://www.phrusa.org/research/iraq/021403.html
Assuming there are no population movements, household food reserves
are expected to last for no more than six weeks if the pipeline breaks.
Economic hardship is already driving many poor families to sell extra
food rations distributed by the regime in anticipation of war.\3\ Water
treatment and electric generation plants are in disrepair, and
hospitals and clinics suffer from chronic shortages of medicines and
equipment. If populations do move, then in addition to food and
medicine, sanitation, safe water and diarrhea-control programs will be
essential to prevent death.\4\ The UN Oil-for-Food Program is the
single largest humanitarian assistance effort underway in the world,
and it has existed in Iraq for more than a decade. Any military
intervention will further shock and disrupt the fragile humanitarian
condition of Iraq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ UN Press Briefing on Humanitarian Preparedness Planning for
Iraq, 13 Feb 03 (Under-Secretary General).
\4\ Yip, R., Sharp, T.W., Acute Malnutrition and High Childhood
Mortality Related to Diarrhea--Lessons Learned from the 1991 Kurdish
Refugee Crisis, JAMA, Vol. 270, Issue 5, pp. 587-590, August 4, 1993.
In March of 1991, fearing further persecution from the Iraqi Army,
approximately 500,000 Kurds fled toward Turkey. From March to May 1991,
the leading causes of death for Kurdish children under 5 in the
mountain camps along the Turkey-Iraq border were diarrheal disease,
dehydration and malnutrition. These diseases represented 75% of the
total under-5 mortality. One of the lessons learned from the 1991
Kurdish refugee crisis is that ``adequate food and basic medical care
may not be sufficient to prevent high morbidity and mortality where
sanitation, safe water and diarrhea-control programs are lacking.'' (p.
590)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Inadequate Response Capacity in Iraq. The current state of
emergency preparedness in Iraq is cause for alarm. Estimations are that
there are less than 20 international humanitarian non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) in Iraq. While more than that number have
attempted to carry out assessment missions, few NGOs have been able to
establish an operational capacity inside Iraq during the last 6 months.
This is due to sanctions, both UN and U.S. for American NGOs, a lack of
funding, difficulty in obtaining visas from the regime and the
expenditure of private resources to other more immediate crises around
the world. Many of the international agencies with emergency capacity
in Iraq are expected to withdraw staff in the event of a military
intervention--this includes the United Nations. The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and a handful of aid agencies are
preparing to stay during a conflict but only the ICRC has amassed
significant supplies and resources for such contingencies. Although
ICRC will reduce its international staff by 50% in the event of
conflict they have pre-positioned food and non-food supplies in Iraq
and the border countries for several hundred thousand internally
displaced persons.
The Iraqi national NGO capacity is modest in size and scope.
National NGOs have increased in the north but tend to focus on
development-oriented projects and thus will need enhanced capacity for
any relief operation. The Iraqi Red Crescent Society is operational
countrywide and, while strongly influenced by the government, does
provide a network for assistance and capacity building activities. Some
response capacity exists in neighboring states, though serious
questions remain as to the depth and humanitarian commitment of
existing plans. In northern Iraq, local de facto Kurdish authorities
have engaged in emergency preparedness and their structures can be
utilized in any response. Despite repeated pleas however for the pre-
positioning of emergency relief supplies, the de facto authorities have
received very little international assistance--this again is the result
of sanctions. Great uncertainty surrounds any potential humanitarian
response by the Iraqi government, and thus the Iraqi government's
response capacity is not factored into contingency planning until a
post-conflict stabilization period.
II. INADEQUATE HUMANITARIAN PREPARATIONS FOR WAR
A. Bush Administration's Plan. Several weeks ago the Bush
Administration unveiled six principles underpinning its humanitarian
relief strategy. IRC generally agrees with these principles: minimizing
civilian displacement and damage to civilian infrastructure; relying on
civilian relief agencies; committing to effective civil-military
coordination; facilitating the operations of international
organizations and NGOs; pre-positioning relief supplies; and supporting
the resumption of the UN Oil-for-Food Program. While the principles are
fine, we remain concerned about the lack of resources and action taken
to implement them.\5\ As discussed below, an immediate humanitarian
response cannot be mounted for Iraq given the inadequate state of
preparedness of the international and non-governmental agencies--the
same agencies that the Administration's strategy is relying on.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ For a further analysis of the implementation of the
Administration's principles see: ``U.S. Announces Intention to Rely on
Civilian Relief Agencies for Humanitarian Response to Iraq,'' Refugees
International 27 Feb 03. http://www.refintl.org/cgi-bin/ri/
other?occ=00612
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. United Nations Preparations. UN contingency planning is based on
a ``medium case'' scenario that assumes a conflict would severely
disrupt critical infrastructure and the Iraqi government's capacity to
deliver basic services and relief, including food rations delivered
under the Oil-for-Food program. This planning scenario calls for the
evacuation of all UN international staff and the suspension of UN
programs at the outbreak of conflict. Shortages of fuel and power in
urban areas would shut down water and sewage treatment plants. Up to
half of the population would be without access to potable water and up
to 10 million people may require food assistance during and immediately
after a conflict. Up to two million people may become internally
displaced, while between 600,000 and 1.45 million asylum seekers may
flee towards neighboring countries.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ U.N. Funding Requirements for Humanitarian Preparedness
Measures, 14 Feb 03.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
UN agencies are pre-positioning stocks of essential relief items
and fielding emergency response personnel to the region. Food
sufficient for 250,000 beneficiaries has been pre-positioned for ten
weeks (less than a planned WFP target figure of 900,000 for pre-
positioning purposes). Water and sanitation supplies have been
stockpiled for 300,000 people inside and outside Iraq. Emergency health
kits have been pre-positioned by UNICEF for some 900,000 women and
children inside Iraq. In addition, WHO has pre-positioned emergency
health kits for 240,000 people for three months outside Iraq. Winter
kits, including shelter material, have been pre-positioned by UNHCR for
a displaced population of 118,000 (against a potential refugee caseload
of 600,000). The ordering and pre-positioning of supplies by UN
agencies continues.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite this planning the UN's top humanitarian official for Iraq,
Ramiro Lopes da Silva, said recently that Iraqi's near-total dependence
on government food rations means that a massive and immediate
humanitarian relief operation would have to be mounted to prevent
widespread starvation. Although current plans call for the U.S.
military to stockpile 3 million daily rations and the UN World Food
Program to store food for 900,000 people for 10 weeks, he said these
efforts would not be sufficient to satisfy the need.\8\ UN preparations
continue to be hampered by a lack of funding. UN appeals totaling more
than $200 million remain unfulfilled despite pledges by the United
States and a handful of other donors. The perception that the U.S.
government will act unilaterally against Iraq has greatly chilled
humanitarian donations to the UN and to NGO relief agencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ ``U.N. Official Warns Of Iraqi Food Crisis'' The Washington
Post, 28 Feb 03, page A18. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
articles/A13499-2003Feb27.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. American NGO Preparedness. The American NGO community, with a
few exceptions, is largely absent from Iraq. Only a handful of American
NGOs have permission to operate in government-controlled Iraq and these
are not the nation's largest relief agencies. Those that are present
must deal with a lack of donor funding as well as continual government
obstruction and restriction on their activities. In the north, there is
more NGO activity and a better relationship with the authorities.
However, agencies are hampered by limited access to the area. They are
considered illegal entities by the government in Baghdad and must
travel in and out via neighboring states and this has been greatly
curtailed in recent months. Unlike Kosovo and Afghanistan, American
NGOs have relatively little presence in the region and would not be
able to mount a fast and significant response from neighboring
countries. Moreover, U.S. sanctions against Iraq forbid American NGOs
from traveling to Iraq and from providing humanitarian assistance in
Iraq and Iran. Efforts by long established American humanitarian NGOs
to obtain meaningful exemptions from the sanctions have so far been
largely unsuccessful.
American NGOs operational in Iraq have made some contingency plans
for shifting into emergency mode. In Iran, Kuwait,\9\ and Jordan some
American NGO planning and coordination is taking place but it is deemed
inadequate by humanitarian advocates. IRC is part of an NGO consortium,
funded by USAID/OFDA, that has set up a shared logistical base in
Jordan. Total funding for the five NGOs members of the consortium is
approximately $900,000. With this exception NGOs are relying on their
own private contributions to mount a response. Although the U.S.
government has solicited and is accepting humanitarian aid proposals
from NGOs critical funds are not yet forthcoming.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\0\ ``Unready: The View from Kuwait,'' Refugees International, 3
March 03. http://www.refugeesinternational.org/cgi-bin/ri/
bulletin?bc=00497
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The European Union, the UK's Department for International
Development and other traditional NGO donors have not yet released
contingency or preparedness funds to American NGOs. Some donors have
told IRC that they are reluctant to release funds because they do not
want to be perceived as supporting the U.S. war effort or signaling
that war is inevitable. Some U.S. private foundations have cited
similar reasons for denying funding for Iraq contingency activities.
D. No Planned Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction. Another
critical question remains unanswered. Who will assist the Iraqi people
if there is a release of weapons of mass destruction? The NGOs have no
capacity to respond to immediate needs although they may be able to
assist fleeing populations assuming an absence of infection or
contagions. The UN and ICRC similarly have little if any capacity to
respond if weapons of mass destruction are released. What is the
capacity of the U.S. military to help in such a case--a serious review
and discussion of this question is still outstanding.
E. Poor Coordination. The issue of coordinating a potential
humanitarian response for Iraq currently evokes emotion and frustration
from all actors involved in contingency preparations. This is largely
the result of U.S. planning that has so embedded humanitarian tasks and
activities with the military war plan that vital information remains
classified and meaningful dialogue continues to be muffled and one-
directional. From the perspective of the humanitarian community the
coordination of emergency relief activities is best handled by
civilians and preferably on a multilateral basis by the UN. Simply put,
the UN is able to operate with more independence and impartiality than
any one party to a conflict. IRC remains concerned that humanitarian
coordination led by the U.S. military (including USAID which will be
embedded with the military) will continue to chill the participation of
humanitarian NGOs and non-American donors and this could have
devastating effects for the Iraqi people.
Traditional structures are being established to facilitate
coordination. The U.S. military and the Kuwaiti government have
established a Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) that will serve as a
point of contact for humanitarian actors to deconflict logistical
activities, exchange information and garner vital security information.
The UN has established a temporary humanitarian coordination office in
Cyprus, incorporating a Joint Logistics Center, a Humanitarian
Information Center and joint air services and communications
arrangements to ensure connectivity with field offices in the region
and in Iraq.
InterAction (a coalition of 160 American NGOs) organized an Iraq
Working Group in October that holds weekly meetings with USAID and
State/BPRM. It must be stressed that to date these meetings have
largely focused on the obstacles and challenges facing the American NGO
community in mobilizing an emergency response to Iraq. Again, because
the U.S. government's humanitarian plans are so interwoven with the war
plans much of the discussion at these meetings has been one-way. This
has at times frustrated U.S. government officials as well as the NGOs.
F. Impact of Minimal NGO Presence. UN agencies are dependent on
implementing partners, and when they look around Iraq and the border
countries they see very few NGOs present. USAID and the large Disaster
Assistance Response Team being assembled is similarly dependent on
implementing partners, and they too see very few NGOs poised and
prepared to respond if military action is taken. The U.S. military
cannot be relied upon to satisfy the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi
people. They are neither trained nor equipped to do so on the scale
that may be required. Their involvement should be as a last resort and
then only under civilian command. As the situation now stands, NGOs and
the humanitarian community they comprise have been marginalized in the
build up to war. Relations between American humanitarian NGOs and the
U.S. government continue to deteriorate as we remain largely sidelined
by sanctions and an absence of resources.
Any humanitarian relief operation can only be effective if NGOs are
positioned and ready to implement life saving activities in partnership
with the United Nations and other donors. As described above, it is
IRC's opinion that emergency relief NGOs are largely unprepared for war
in Iraq and efforts to mobilize them in the region lag far behind war
preparations.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ ``Avoiding a Humanitarian Catastrophe in Iraq'' Refugees
International, 5 Feb 03. http://www.refugeesinternational.org/cgi-bin/
ri/bulletin?bc=00487
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. IMMEDIATE ACTION TO SAVE LIVES
Unhindered Access for Humanitarian Agencies. The U.S.
government must facilitate the access of international and
American assistance into Iraq before, during and after any
planned intervention. The U.S. should immediately suspend
licensing requirements for humanitarian NGOs to operate in Iraq
and Iran.
Resources. Unless more funding is provided to the UN and
humanitarian NGOs the needs of Iraqi civilians cannot be met in
the event of war. It must be stressed that humanitarian funding
provided to date by the United States is for contingency
activities only; the costs and plans for an actual response are
so interwoven with the military war plans that they remain
classified. Any funding provided must be ``new funds'' and not
be at the expense of other humanitarian needs around the world.
Oversight is critical to ensure that existing humanitarian
accounts are not scrubbed for Iraq.
Discuss Humanitarian Plans. De-classifying the humanitarian
annexes to the war plans will enable the United Nations and
NGOs to identify gaps and better prepare for life saving relief
operations.
UN Authority. The political, military and humanitarian
issues surrounding future action in Iraq must be delinked.
Coordination of humanitarian activities should be led by the
United Nations. The U.S. government should support all
necessary actions that grant the United Nations authority for
humanitarian actions.
Border Countries. If there is military action against Iraq
the potential for population movements is high. Accessing these
countries will be essential for fleeing refugees and
humanitarian aid agencies. The U.S. government must take all
steps to ensure that border countries accept refugees and allow
humanitarian agencies unhindered access to provide life-saving
assistance.
IV. STEPS TO AVOID HUMANITARIAN CRISES AFTER WAR
The United States has stated its intention to occupy Iraq until
power can transfer to transitional or democratic structures. The United
States should be formulating plans now to transfer such power as
quickly as feasible to legitimate civilian structures. The Fourth
Geneva Convention, of which the U.S. is a signatory, sets forth
essential steps necessary to avoid humanitarian crises by requiring
that the United States, as an occupying power, protect and assist the
civilians of Iraq. This means that the United States must be prepared
to provide for and protect the rights of Iraqi civilians in the same
way it now does for the American people. These duties attach upon first
contact with Iraqi civilians and they mean much more than providing
food, medicines and shelter.
In addition to the immediate humanitarian concerns facing Iraq and
those related to population movements resulting from any military
strike, grave humanitarian concerns also surround Iraq the ``day
after'' the regime falls. Of critical importance to any provision of
humanitarian aid for Iraq is public order and security. Delivery of
humanitarian assistance cannot be assured in areas that are not secure.
As Saddam's regime falls, the internal security framework will collapse
and conditions for lawlessness and impunity will ripen. As an occupying
power the United States will have the duty to restore and ensure public
order and safety in Iraq. This duty requires the United States and its
allies to use their own personnel to provide a safe environment and
ensure public order as they advance into Iraq. These forces must
transition quickly to policing functions and fill any security vacuum
that exists to leave no space for reprisal and revenge. Similarly, the
United States as an occupying power must promote the rule of law and
ensure that basic judicial and due process guarantees exist for all
Iraqis.\11\ As a signatory of the Geneva Conventions the United States
will be expected to fulfill all obligations therein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ See, ``International Humanitarian Law Issues In A Potential
War In Iraq.'' Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, 20 Feb 2003. http://
www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/iraq0202003.htm
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Ba'ath party has been a bloody regime. High crimes and human
rights abuses by Saddam's regime against the Kurds, Shi'a, Turkmen,
Sunni and non-Ba'ath members are well known and accepted. The regime's
grip extends to all ministries of the government and all security
forces. The education system teaches Saddam's politics, and the
administration of justice with Ba'ath appointed investigators,
prosecutors and judges validates Saddam's control and abuse. The
immediate post-Saddam era may include security, political and judicial
vacuums--a lawless state. Impunity is almost guaranteed in such
circumstances.
The International Rescue Committee does not subscribe to the
conventional wisdom that Iraqis of various ethnic and political groups
lay in wait for Saddam's regime to collapse in order to go after each
other and carve up the country. The overall impression is that Iraqis
are sick of war and are prepared to move forward together in a post-
Saddam setting. Still, isolated radicals, hardliners and spoilers,
including the current regime, are likely to create tension and exploit
any security vacuum. They may ``cleanse'' areas by forcing entire
communities to move in order to access valuable resources, to solidify
power, to attain ethnic homogeny or to extract revenge for past crimes
left unanswered. If left free they will continue with impunity.
A. Identify Security Vacuums. If they enter Iraq, U.S./Coalition
forces may find populations that have been forcibly displaced by
Saddam's regime or other radical elements during a military
intervention. Iraq may also be suffering from ethnic-cleansing tactics
by local de facto authorities that are consolidating power by forcing
populations from areas they intend to control. U.S./Coalition forces
may also encounter populations displaced by reprisals and vindictive
violence against vulnerable groups and individuals who are at risk
because of their profession, their political or ethnic affiliation or
because they are perceived by others to be collaborators or
perpetrators of human rights violations. With over 30 years of Ba'ath
state sponsored terror, many scores await settling in Iraq. Police,
judges, prosecutors and others associated with the Ba'ath reign of
terror will likely flee or hide. If the law and order vacuum is not
quickly filled by U.S./Coalition forces hardliners, spoilers and
radicals will seize the void and dislodging them will not be easy. If
this happens and there are no police or judicial systems in place to
fill the vacuums, lawlessness and impunity will follow. Combined such
forces can spiral quickly out of control with devastating effects for
displaced persons. Under the Geneva Conventions the U.S., as an
occupying power, will be responsible for ensuring that does not
happen.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Fourth Geneva Convention; Art. 51, Protocol I [Article 51:
Protecting the civilian population from acts or threats of violence
that have the primary purpose of spreading terror.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Identify Geographic Populations At Risk. We know that potential
flash-points are based on both geography and the characteristics of
vulnerable populations. Mapping out the ethnic boundaries of
neighborhoods in Baghdad (e.g., Christians, Sunni etc.), Kirkuk
(Turkmen, Arabs etc.), the Shi'a towns (rival Shi'a factions) and the
Tikrit villages provides a snapshot of potential fault lines for
communal violence and vulnerability to human rights abuses. To know
where Saddam forcibly moved and resettled populations is to know where
potential tensions, reprisals and movements can ignite.\13\ It is also
important to know the location of isolated communities of one group
within a larger concentration of another group, e.g. a Turkmen village
surrounded by Kurdish villages. In order to provide effective security
in the absence of local police it is essential to know where tensions
may be the highest and who may be the most vulnerable to attack and
revenge. Security must be restored first in these places and protection
given to the most vulnerable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ See, John Fawcett and Victor Tanner ``The Internally Displaced
People of Iraq'' (Brookings November 2002) for an excellent discussion
on the forced population movements of Saddam's regime and ethnic fault
lines. http://www.brookings.org/fp/projects/IDP/articles/iraqreport.htm
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Identify Vulnerable Populations. Some vulnerable populations are
not only geographically centered but are scattered throughout Iraq.
Because the number of Ba'ath party members is believed to be around one
million, reprisals based solely on party membership are not expected.
Targeted revenge would be more likely against Ba'ath members
individually identified as being part of Saddam's reign of terror
(police, judges, prosecutors, members of the security forces perceived
to be instigators of terror etc.). Moderate or emerging political and
community leaders will remain vulnerable to radicals, hardliners and
spoilers for some time. Identifying such individuals and then
protecting them will be key to securing conditions for normalization.
Forty-eight percent of all Iraqis are under the age of 18. History
continues to remind us that women and children remain the most
vulnerable in times of conflict and transition. Heightened awareness of
such vulnerabilities must be incorporated into all planning for Iraq--
both now and in the future.
D. Develop a Proactive Strategy. The absence of national human
rights protection mechanisms in Iraq and the unlikelihood that
international police, civil servants or human rights monitors will be
deployed to coincide with the entry of U.S./Coalition forces means that
military personnel will have to engage directly with the local
population to foster a stable and secure environment. Reaching out
quickly to local political, military, religious and community leaders
is key to establishing the trust needed to manage crisis and revenge.
Personnel first on the ground must have an understanding of local
issues including past human rights abuses, factors driving local
tensions and the political motivation of community leaders. Local
leaders are key to managing and mitigating a climate of revenge and
reprisals and must be included in a robust protection strategy that
emphasizes justice and the rule of law. Confidence and trust must be
fostered quickly.
Checkpoints, roadblocks and concertino wire can all limit hostile
access to vulnerable areas and thus improve security. The duration of
such security measures, however, must be carefully considered to avoid
the creation of enclaves and ghettos that harden into segregated
communities requiring never-ending security resources. In situations
where there has been great suffering or where tensions are uniquely
high, military rule may still be the only way to protect the human
rights of the local population. U.S./Coalition forces must quickly grip
the prospect of protecting, policing and providing judicial guarantees
and due process in all or part of Iraq in order to protect civilians
and prevent a slide into lawlessness. To be effective, such rule must
be absolutely transparent and must comply with international human
rights and humanitarian law standards.
E. Conduct Policing. Currently in Iraq, all policing is conducted
by hard-line Ba'ath members. The fall of Saddam means the collapse of
the internal security framework. Until such time as a political
solution becomes apparent for governing Iraq after Saddam, U.S./
Coalition forces must be prepared to undertake immediate policing
measures.\14\ Given the disparate skills and tasks of the U.S./
Coalition military, it is not feasible to believe that any soldier can
undertake policing actions. Accordingly, there will have to be a mix of
soldiering and policing in its most basic sense. To facilitate this
difficult task, clear rules of engagement that encompass arrest
procedures, treatment in detention, management of detention facilities
and access to detainees by counsel, family members, ICRC etc., must be
delineated in advance of any military intervention. Knowing how these
plans will be explained to the local populations must also be thought
out in advance if confidence is to be built. Looters, killers, thieves
and other criminals will require arrest and the administration of
justice. If there are no credible local police, the U.S./Coalition
forces will be expected to arrest criminals and protect the Iraqi
public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Articles 71-76 Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 75, Protocol
I [Articles 71-76: Be prepared to provide basic judicial and due
process guarantees in the aftermath of conflict.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In this regard ``force protection'' or security guidelines must be
reviewed. A complicating and limiting factor for forces seeking to
stabilize Kosovo in the immediate aftermath of the NATO air campaign
were force protection requirements which limited direct contact with
local civilians. Some NATO forces moved in two-vehicle convoys, troops
were heavily protected and armed and rarely conducted foot patrols
amongst the civilian population, while others wore less armor and
utilized foot patrols extensively to gain the confidence of the local
population. Some forces rented apartments and deployed troops along
ethnic fault lines within cities and villages and were thus better
positioned to manage and respond to local tensions. The lack of a
robust and consistent response by the international community to
policing and judicial voids contributed to the lawlessness that
enveloped Kosovo during the first six months after the war--the effects
of which continue to be felt in reconstruction efforts.
F. Bridge Judicial Vacuums. As uncomfortable as this topic is for
both civilians and the military, U.S./Coalition must prepare to roll
out some kind of transparent and fair process to administer justice in
the months following a military intervention if a judicial vacuum
exists. Emergency judicial systems can include the selection and
appointment of panels of local judges and prosecutors who can be
transported around the country to ensure the due process of those
detained by U.S./Coalition forces. This model was used in Kosovo,
albeit with varying degrees of success due to confusion over the
applicable law, the bias of some local judges and a limited focus on
pre-trial detentions and the investigation of criminal complaints.
International judges and prosecutors were eventually brought to Kosovo
to try the more contentious human rights violations and ethnically
related hate crimes.
East Timor and Cambodia provide other models with more direct
international administration. Given that U.S./Coalition forces will
likely detain members of the Iraqi security forces, members of the
Ba'ath regime and others who seek to destabilize the country, there
will be an immediate need for some system to administer justice.
Civilians caught up in revenge, reprisals, plunder or opportunistic
crimes must also be detained by U.S./Coalition forces in the absence of
local police and judicial structures. Knowing in advance what the
applicable law will be for such behavior will facilitate the re-
establishment of the rule of law. Prudent planning in this regard
should consider the potential involvement of some international
jurists/prosecutors to prevent the appearance of bias and prejudice by
local structures tainted by Saddam's regime. Ensuring U.S./Coalition
military logistical support to jump-start the judicial system can also
be planned in advance. This includes protecting courthouses, minimizing
damage to judicial offices, providing essential materials needed to
administer justice (generators, computers, paper etc.), salaries and
personal security for judges and prosecutors.
G. Deal with Past Abuses. As soon as possible after a regime
change, discussion and plans for dealing with past human rights abuses
and humanitarian law violations must be made available to the Iraqi
people. Removing collective guilt and assigning individual
responsibility for past crimes against Iraqis is an essential step for
rebuilding the country and reconciling disparate groups. Failure to
fulfill this transitional justice need or glossing over its importance
will leave open space for frontier justice and local reprisals.
H. Provide Transparency. In the event of a regime change, Iraqis
will need to know quickly and publicly what the policies will be for
dealing with past crimes, current and future detentions and the
administration of justice while civilian structures reorganize--and
some time, we know, will be required to vet and regroup key government
functions. U.S./Coalition forces should also put in place a civilian
complaint procedure or ombudsman-like system to allow Iraqis to lodge
concerns and comments regarding the behavior of U.S./Coalition military
personnel. Despite the complexities, such a mechanism can serve as a
critical confidence building measure for local community leaders and
all Iraqis.
I. Curb Discrimination. As reformed or new civilian authority
begins to take shape, human rights violations may emerge in
bureaucratic patterns of abuse. Civilians may be evicted or prevented
from returning to their property through quasi-legal means such as the
promulgation of discriminatory laws or the manipulation of land/
property records. Access to hospitals, schools and other social
services can be hindered by ethnic discrimination or membership in a
vulnerable group. Such restrictions can lead to further population
displacements. Remedial measures for such behavior must be available to
prevent the institutionalization of discrimination. Judicial processes
best fulfill this need.
J. Secure Property. Water installations, irrigation works, dams,
dikes, agricultural areas for crop production, food stocks, livestock,
oil fields and the related infrastructure, hospitals, power plants etc.
must all be secured for the benefit of the population. It is critical
to protect these assets from attack during an intervention and then to
secure them quickly for stabilization.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Protocol I
[Cultural sites, places of worship and other objects deemed
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population must be
protected by U.S./Coalition forces. This should also include places
where documentation essential to preserving the rights of the Iraqi
people may be housed.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Years of forced displacement have rendered millions of Iraqis
without access to their homes and property. Untangling and resolving
property disputes and conflicting claims will affect the rights of
returning refugees and the internally displaced. To facilitate this
process, it is critical that property records be located and secured
quickly by U.S./Coalition forces. Courthouses, police stations and the
offices of security forces often contain documentation essential for
clarifying property interests and the status of those displaced.
K. Protect Detainees and the Missing. Political detainees and
issues relating to missing persons will also require fast attention and
a planned response. When Saddam opened the prisons a few months ago, he
left an unknown number of Iraqis in detention as ``enemies of the
state'' and ignored the pleas of family members searching frantically
for their missing kin. Quickly the affected populations will demand
action and answers from U.S./Coalition forces on these issues.
V. CONCLUSION
It is the conclusion of the International Rescue Committee that
while much planning regarding the above issues has occurred very few
resources have been spent to operationalize the plans. The lack of
preparedness for the humanitarian consequences of war stands in stark
contrast to the military state of readiness. It is urgent that all
available resources be marshaled as well for this humanitarian
response.
The Chairman. Before I call upon you, Dr. Marr, let me make
this announcement: On behalf of the committee, we understand
that at 10:30, which is not far away, a rollcall vote will be
held on the Senate floor on a motion to instruct the absent
Senators to come to the floor. It is a parliamentary vote but,
nevertheless, one in which we shall all want to participate in.
At 11 o'clock, there is to be a meeting on the Senate
floor, in which all members have been requested to discuss the
advise-and-consent provisions as they pertain to judicial
nominations; and the Vice President will be in the chair, I am
advised.
Dr. Marr, after you commence your testimony, will you
please go through to the conclusion. I will be here to hear
you, and probably other members will be here as well.
The Chair will then recess the hearing to vote, and will
then return, and other members may do the same; but we will
continue to proceed with the hearing. This is a very important
hearing on behalf of the Senators and the American people.
And so at that point, as we return, we will have a round of
questions from Senators as they are able to participate.
Dr. Marr, would you please proceed?
STATEMENT OF DR. PHEBE MARR, FORMER SENIOR FELLOW, NATIONAL
DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Marr. Well, I, too, would like to thank you, Mr.
Chairman, and the committee for inviting me again. And I hope I
can add something to what I have said previously.
Like Mr. Schwartz, I have five questions that I have asked
myself and would ask you about this venture, and I realize that
my task is to attempt to look at this from the Iraqi
perspective, as best I can.
I have been asked to address some of the issues the United
States will face in the aftermath of this military action.
Obviously the task is going to be affected by what military
action is taken, how successful it is going to be, and what
kind of destruction might ensue.
It is also clear that humanitarian efforts will be needed
in the immediate aftermath of the war. I did not intend to
address those issues; they are not my focus.
I am assuming here that it is the day after, the allies are
in control of Iraq, and that such humanitarian efforts are
underway.
Here are the five fundamental issues and problems that I
see the United States facing in the transition period as it
attempts to establish a new regime. First, I would make a
distinction between two tasks here, governance and
administration. By governance I mean the political process of
selecting leaders, mobilizing public support, adequately
representing various elements of the population, and
implementing policy. That is going to be a long-term effort and
very difficult job in Iraq.
By administration, I mean the daily business of running
government and providing services. As I say, the first is going
to be difficult, probably the most difficult task facing the
United States in Iraq.
The second should be relatively easy, if all goes well.
Unlike many other developing countries, Iraq does have a
functioning bureaucracy capable of running most services in the
country. After the United States has vetted top levels of this
administration, the political levels, the United States should
plan to use this bureaucracy, which is the repository of much
of Iraq's skilled middle class, to run much of the country.
These Iraqis should constitute the new face of the post-
Saddam administration. Nonetheless, I think we need to be aware
of some difficulties in using this bureaucracy.
Iraq is over-bureaucratized. In its heyday, possibly a
third of the population, exclusive of the military, worked for
the government, directly or indirectly. In Iraq's command
economy, government controlled the education system, much of
the media, all large and most medium-sized industry, as well as
providing the usual government services. We all know about a
large military and a numerous and ubiquitous security service.
This service should be reduced.
In any event, in the post-gulf war Iraq, under sanctions,
these institutions have already shrunk. The Ba'ath party cadre,
which used to constitute about 10 percent of the population is
now down to about 2 percent. The military, of course, has been
drastically downsized since the gulf war, but is still very
large.
The bureaucracy has shrunk as well. Moreover, it is not as
effective as it used to be. Because of sanctions, most
bureaucrats, on fixed salaries, often work a second or third
job, which obviously gives them less time to do the work for
which they were hired.
Corruption is now rife in the bureaucracy for much the same
reason. There are two additional weaknesses of this bureaucracy
worth mentioning. One is that it is highly centralized. There
is no tradition of decentralization in Iraq.
Under the Ba'ath, the civil service has been thoroughly
cowed by the political leadership. It is not used to--and
perhaps not even yet--capable of taking much initiative.
Initiative is going to be in short supply.
And second, we want to keep in mind that this central
bureaucracy does not function in the Kurdish area of the north,
which has developed its own administration.
A second aspect of this first point is governance. The
establishment of some kind of representative political system
capable of formulating and implementing policy is going to be
much more difficult. We all know that Iraq has not had such a
system for decades. The closest it came to a representative
system was in the last years of the monarchy, before 1958. And
even then the system did not function very well and was
overthrown.
In addition to the absence of democratic practice, the
multiethnic, multisectarian nature of Iraqi society complicates
the process. Iraq will need to establish a rule of law,
including a new court system; obviously a constitution, which
provides some kind of separation of powers; a functioning
parliament or representative assembly; a responsive executive;
and some sort of local government, possibly under a Federal
system.
The building of such a system must be undertaken by Iraqis.
Exile Iraqis, some of them working with the State Department,
have devoted considerable time and effort to this process, but
it must now include Iraqis inside Iraq. This is going to take
time and need help from outside. Most important, as everyone
today has mentioned, it will require security and a peaceful
environment while the process is being worked out.
Iraq has had little experience in local government and
decentralization--for example, at the municipal, county, and
state level. This is an area that could be developed with
considerable benefit for all.
Decentralization would help address the issue of ethnic,
sectarian, and regional diversity. It would help develop the
basis of a more democratic and representative government at the
grass roots.
The sooner such local institutions of governance can be
established, the better. It would also bring Iraqis into the
new administration and give this administration an Iraqi face.
And I feel as we move in and occupy the country, government
could be established established fairly rapidly at the local
level.
The second question I would raise here is one I have raised
before, and that is the issue of finding alternative political
leadership at the national level for a transitional period
until the new constitutional structures can be put in place.
There are two options, an inside option and an outside option,
if we are talking about Iraqis rather than Americans or the
international community.
The outside option is well known. It consists mainly of
exiled Iraqis--with the exception of the Kurds, of course, who
are in their own country--who have formed a number of political
groups with great diversity of views. Their difficulties are
well known to all of us. They have had difficulty in achieving
a consensus. They are outsiders, as exiles, whose support
inside at the moment is unknown.
And as outsiders coming in, they are likely to be somewhat
resented by those inside. But they also have some strengths
which should be used. For the most part, they are more likely
to be pro-Western and more favorably disposed to U.S. aims and
goals. They are a known quantity. And they have a better
understanding of democratic processes, having lived in the West
for some time.
A number of them are already in the north, building bridges
to the new Iraq. The issue is whether they will succeed in that
and how much support they should be given by the United States.
The inside option is virtually unknown, since no
alternative leadership can emerge in Saddam's Iraq. Once the
top layers of Saddam's regime are removed, we will essentially
find three pillars of the current regime remaining.
The first is the kin-and-clan network, which Saddam has
relied on. This goes well beyond his family and has penetrated
a number of institutions. In the countryside as well, tribal
groups have come to hold more authority. Clan politics and clan
leadership is likely to persist.
Second, of course, are the institutions of state we have
mentioned--the party, the military, the bureaucracy, the
education system. These have been thoroughly Ba'athized. Even
if the party disappears, the cadre will not.
And these are the institutions which will be needed to run
the state. While a few of these Ba'athists will remain loyal to
Saddam and his family, that is not the problem. The problem may
be a more deeply ingrained attitude toward power and authority,
which will persist.
So, too, will the nationalist attitudes that have been the
backbone of the Ba'athist ideology. This may be particularly
true in the media and the education system. I am looking at
some of their textbooks, and they will require some attention.
Some de-Ba'athization may be necessary if long-term U.S.
aims are to be achieved, and this will not be an easy task.
The third pillar is an economic elite which owes its
wealth, in large measure, to state patronage. Indeed, there may
be a temptation to rely on this class for economic development
and reconstruction, since it will be readily at hand.
But it seems to me, over the long term, one of the most
constructive things the United States could do would be to
separate this economic class from the state and move to the
creation of a true, and more independent, economic private
sector.
It may be easier to support and sustain inside leadership
in these bureaucratic institutions which may emerge after we go
into Iraq. But the question and the problem with that is how
much real change will it represent?
Ultimately, there is going to be no other solution except
to marry the insiders and the outsiders in some formula that
allows some balance.
The third issue is the nature of the response we are likely
to find to the United States and even an international foreign
presence in Iraq. And here I may be saying a few things that
run a little bit counter to what has been said here.
While I believe that change will definitely be welcome by
virtually all of the population in Iraq, the U.S. presence may
be less welcome among some sectors of the population than
others. In recent years, especially since the rebellion of
1991, regional differences are more pronounced--and let me go
through the regions.
The south, which is predominantly Shi'a, as you probably
know, has been neglected. It has seen a shrinkage of
population. In fact, according to my estimates, possibly as
little as 30 percent of the population now lives in the south.
The port city of Basra, once a thriving city and intellectual
center, has also shrunk in population.
Basra used to have very strong ties with Kuwait and the
gulf. Basra and other cities and towns of the south are the
areas that most need reconstruction and economic revival. Here,
I think a resuscitation of jobs and services is vital.
And we should encourage these links with the gulf--
especially Kuwait--to help mend fences between Iraq and that
country and the GCC.
In Shi'a area are the religious shrine cities of Najaf and
Kabala, which will have to be treated with extreme sensitivity.
While opposition to the regime is deep here, that may not
equate to welcoming a U.S. or even a Western presence. Iranian
ties may be strong here as well. It would be helpful to have
immediate contacts with the clergy in these towns and to
establish a good working relationship with them.
They will be interested in more religious freedom, a
revival of their seminaries, and encouragement of pilgrim
traffic for the area, which of course, works to their economic
benefit.
When we get to the center of the country, the so-called
Sunni center, we are going to find a mixture; 50 percent, half
of the Iraqi population now lives in this center, some 30
percent in the capital. It shows you how much population is
concentrated there.
In Baghdad, a large portion of the population is Shi'a,
living in poor satellite cities around Baghdad. They are
resentful of the middle and affluent classes.
The educated classes, of course, are overwhelmingly
concentrated in Baghdad and its environs. For the most part,
they should welcome change. They are looking for a return to
normalcy and participation in the new government.
In the smaller cities and towns of the so-called Sunni
triangle, north and west of Baghdad, along the Tigris and
Euphrates, this is the heartland of the regime, and we may meet
with some resentment and opposition here. This is the region
that has benefited from Ba'ath rule, it provides the Ba'ath
support system, and it will find itself dispossessed.
It has the most to fear from change. In this area, contact
with some of the clan and tribal leaders with support for their
regions could help neutralize whatever opposition there may be.
In the north, among the Kurds, we have a known quantity: we
know who they are. We are not going to meet with opposition
here, but we do face real problems. The Kurds have been
governing themselves for a decade in the north; and, in recent
years, have had more prosperity. Their aspirations for
separatism, as expressed, for example, in their textbooks, are
clear. Their concept of federalism is somewhat suspect by
others in Iraq, as well as the Turks.
Working out a formula that is satisfactory to all will be
difficult; so, too, will be the status of Kirkuk. The Kurds
want Kirkuk, with its oil, included in their self-governing
area.
The United States also faces the problem of a radical
enclave around Halabja that has escaped control of the Kurds.
And in the end, policing the border both with Turkey and Iran,
disarming the Peshmerga, will also be difficult. The entry of
the Turks into this region--and possibly the Iranians--would
only complicate matters.
While some sort of federalism and a degree of
decentralization seems called for, the ethnic federalism that
some Kurds are insisting on may be an enticing prospect
initially, but it would cause difficulties later on.
The fourth point is that the United States is going to face
a paradox in attitudes in Iraq, especially in the center, but
also in the south. This bears on the issue of the response to
the forces. Most Iraqis want change and will welcome it; they
long for a return to normalcy and freedom.
We will not face opposition to a change of regime, except
among Saddam's hard core supporters. This should give us a
honeymoon period, if we move smartly to restore services,
provide jobs, and get the economy moving. But many of these
same people are intensely nationalistic. They have a long
tradition of putting a desire for independence at the top of
their priorities.
They are not going to welcome foreign rule and a foreign
presence for too long. In six months, a year, I think you are
going to start to see some questions asked and some opposition
surface.
That presents us with a dilemma and we will have to make
tradeoffs. To get real political and social change, a
constitutional regime, for example, will take time. But the
longer we stay, the more we risk generating national resentment
and opposition.
On the other hand, if we turn over to existing elites
rapidly, we will get less change, including satisfaction of our
own interests. We need to be aware of this potential for
opposition and take measures to neutralize it.
Here are some suggestions of how to do that: restore
normalcy and services as soon as possible; get Iraqis in the
administration and in leadership positions up front as soon as
possible, sooner rather than later; shift to indirect rule,
with Americans behind the scenes rather than in front, as soon
as possible. Timing is going to be very critical. The length of
the transitional period, how fast we can move to a constituent
assembly will be critical.
It is very important to state our intent to turn over the
administration to Iraqis in some future timeframe and clearly
outline the direction we are going in, in terms of policy, and
stick to it.
Incidentally, the British experience during the mandate is
very instructive here. They originally brought in a direct
administration; they put few Iraqis in the administration. The
result was the 1920 revolt, very costly for the British. After
this they learned their lesson and switched to indirect
administration. Even so, they met with constant nationalist
opposition for their entire time there.
Last, there is the issue of international cooperation in
the administration of Iraq. Most of the benefits of this
internationalization, such as burden sharing, would accrue to
the United States. And I certainly favor bringing in the
international community.
The United States will need help in rebuilding Iraq and it
should try to get it from the international community. But I
have asked myself, how much this will help giving us legitimacy
inside Iraq. U.N. and international cooperation might work
better in some areas than others. This would certainly be true
of humanitarian efforts; rebuilding of the economy and
providing some services.
I do not know whether an international force or cooperation
from the international community in providing security,
preventing retribution will go down very well. I am not sure we
are going to face enormous amounts of anti-Americanism to start
with.
The local population expects U.S. forces to be present and
will respect U.S. force. It wants law and order kept. We want
to avoid something that looks like an international occupation
and a new mandate.
The Iraqis, in my experience, are a very proud people. They
will resent being put in the category of, say, East Timor,
which is a very extreme example.
And the last point that I would like to make is to urge
putting Iraqis in charge as soon as possible. The Iraqis do
want change. They want us to stay the course. They want help
but they are going to expect to run their own country and soon.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Marr follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Phebe Marr, (Author, Specialist on Iraq)
ESTABLISHING A NEW REGIME IN IRAQ
I have been asked to address some of the issues the U.S. will face
in the aftermath of military action in seeking to establish a new
regime in Iraq. Obviously this task will be affected by whatever
military action is taken, how successful it has been, and what kind of
destruction has ensued. It is also clear that humanitarian efforts will
need to be undertaken in the immediate aftermath of the war. These are
not my focus. I am assuming here that the U.S. and its allies are in
control of Iraq and that such humanitarian efforts are underway.
I would like to point, here, to five fundamental issues/problems
the U.S. will face in the transition period as it attempts to establish
a new regime, and make a few suggestions on resolving them.
First, I would make a distinction between two tasks: governance and
administration. By governance I mean the political process of selecting
leaders, mobilizing public support, adequately representing various
elements of the population, and implementing policy. By administration,
I mean the daily business of running government and providing services.
The first is going to be extremely difficult in Iraq--indeed the most
difficult task facing the U.S.; the second should be relatively easy,
if all goes well.
Unlike many other developing countries, Iraq does have a
functioning bureaucracy capable of running most services in the
country. After the U.S. has vetted the top levels of this
administration--the political levels--the U.S. should plan to use this
bureaucracy, which is the repository of much of Iraq's skilled middle
class, to run the country. These Iraqis should constitute the new face
of the administration.
Nonetheless, the U.S. needs to be aware of some difficulties in
using this bureaucracy. Iraq is over-bureaucratized. In its heyday,
possibly a third of the population exclusive of the military, worked
for the government, directly or indirectly. In Iraq's command economy,
government controlled the education system, much of the media, all
large and most medium sized industry as well as providing the usual
government services. In addition, there has been a large military and
numerous and ubiquitous security services. The four major elements of
administration are the Ba'ath Party, the military, the various security
services, and the bureaucracy.
In the post-Gulf war period under sanctions, these have shrunk. The
party cadre, which used to constitute 10 percent of the population is
now down to about 2 percent. The military, while still large, has been
drastically downsized, from about 1 million in 1990 to about 400,000.
So, too has the bureaucracy. Moreover, because of sanctions, the
bureaucracy is much less effective than it used to be. Most
bureaucrats, on fixed salaries, often work a second or third job to
make ends meet, thus giving them less time to do their regular job. For
the same reasons, corruption is now rife. There are two additional
weaknesses of this bureaucracy worth mentioning. One is that it is
highly centralized; there is no tradition of decentralization in Iraq.
And, under the Ba'ath, it has been thoroughly cowed by the political
leadership. It is not used to--possibly not yet capable--of taking much
initiative. Second, this bureaucracy does not function in the Kurdish
area of the north, which has now developed its own administration.
Governance--the establishment of a representative political system
capable of formulating and implementing policy is going to be much more
difficult. Iraq had not had such a system for decades. The closest it
came to such a system was in the last years of the monarchy and even
then the system did not function well and was overthrown. In addition
to the absence of democratic practice, the multi-ethnic, multi-
sectarian nature of Iraqi society complicates the process. Iraq will
need:
The establishment of a rule of law, including a new court
system.
A constitution which provides some separation of powers.
Functioning parliament or representative assembly.
The establishment of a responsive executive.
Some sort of local government, possibly under a federal
system.
The building of such a system must be undertaken by Iraqis; exile
Iraqis have already devoted considerable time and effort to this
process, but it must now include Iraqis inside Iraq. This will take
time and need help from outside, most importantly security and a
peaceful environment while the process is being worked out.
Iraq has little experience in local government or
decentralization--at the municipal, country or state level. This is an
area that could be developed with considerable benefits for all. It
would help address the issue of ethnic, sectarian and regional
diversity and it would help develop the basis of democratic and
representative government at the grass roots. The sooner such local
institutions of governance could be established, the better. It would
also bring Iraqis into the new administration and give this
administration an Iraqi face.
A second issue is finding alternative political leadership at the
national level for a transitional period until new constitutional
structures can be put in place. There are two options: the inside
option and the outside option.
The outside option is well known. It consists mainly of exile
Iraqis (with the exception of the Kurds) who have formed a number of
political groups with a great diversity of views. Their difficulties
are well known. They have had difficulty achieving consensus. And they
are outsiders whose support inside is unknown. As outsiders they are
likely to be resented by those inside. But they also have some
strengths which should be used. For the most part, they are likely to
be pro-Western and more favorably disposed to U.S. aims and goals. They
are a known quantity. And they have a better understanding of
democratic processes for having lived in the West. A number of them are
already in the north building bridges to the new Iraq. The issue is
whether they will succeed in that effort and how much support they
should be given by the U.S.
The inside option is virtually unknown, since no alternative
leadership can emerge in Saddam's Iraq. Once the top layers of Saddam's
regime are removed, we will find three ``pillars'' of the current
regime. (1) The kin and clan network on which Saddam has relied. This
goes well beyond his family and has penetrated a number of
institutions. In the countryside as well, tribal groups have come to
hold authority. Clan politics and clan leadership is likely to persist.
(2) The institutions of state: the party; the military; the bureaucracy
and the education system. These have been thoroughly Ba'thized. Even if
the party disappears, its cadre will not. These are the institutions
which will be needed to run the state. While few will remain loyal to
Saddam or his family, deeply ingrained attitude toward power and
authority will persist. So, too, will the strong nationalist attitudes
that have been the backbone of Ba'thist ideology. This may be
particularly true in the media and education system. Some de-
Ba'thization may be necessary if long term U.S. aims are to be
achieved, but this will not be an easy task. (3) An economic elite
which owes its wealth, in large measure, to state patronage. Indeed,
there may be a temptation to rely on this class for economic
development and reconstruction since it will be readily at hand. One of
the most constructive things the U.S. could do, however, would be to
separate this economic class from the state and move to the creation of
a true, and more independent, private sector.
It may be easier to support and sustain the development of
``inside'' leadership which may emerge anyway, but the problem is
whether it will represent a real change. Ultimately, there is a need to
marry the insiders with the outsiders.
A third issue is the nature of the response to the U.S./foreign
presence in Iraq. While change will definitely be welcome by virtually
all the population in Iraq, the U.S. presence may be less welcome among
some sectors of the population than others. In recent years, especially
since the rebellion of 1991, regional differences are more pronounced
in Iraq.
The south, which is predominantly Shi'ah has been neglected. Seen a
shrinkage of population, particularly the port city of Basra, once a
thriving city and intellectual center. It used to have strong ties with
Kuwait and the Gulf. Basra--and other cities and towns of the south,
need reconstruction and economic revival. Here a resuscitation of jobs
and services is vital. Links with the Gulf--especially Kuwait--should
be encouraged to help mend fences with that country and the GCC. The
religious shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala will have to be treated
with sensitivity. While opposition to the regime is deep here, that may
not equate to welcoming a U.S. or Western presence. Iranian ties may be
strong as well. Contacts with the clergy will be essential to establish
a good working relationship. They will be interested in more religious
freedom, a revival of their seminaries, and more pilgrim traffic from
which the area derives economic benefit.
In the Center, we will find a mixture. Fifty percent of Iraq's
population lives here, some 30 percent in the capital. In Baghdad, a
large portion of this population is Shi'ah and poor, resentful of the
middle and affluent classes, often--but not entirely--Sunni. The
educated classes are overwhelming concentrated in Baghdad and its
environs. They should, for the most part, welcome change. They are
looking for a return to normalcy and participation in the new
government. In the smaller cities and towns of the sunni triangle--the
heartland of the regime--we may meet with resentment and opposition.
This region is the one that has benefited from Ba'th rule--it provides
the Ba'th support system-and it will find itself dispossessed. It has
the most to fear from change. In this area, contact with some of the
clan and tribal leaders with support for their regions may help
neutralize opposition.
In the north, among the Kurds, we have a known quality. Here we are
not going to meet with opposition, but we do face real problems. The
Kurds have been governing themselves for a decade in the north, and in
recent years, have had more prosperity. Their aspirations for
separatism--as expressed in their text books for example--are clear.
Their concept of federalism is suspect by others in Iraq as well as the
Turks. Working out a formula that is satisfactory to all will be
difficult. So, too, will the status of Kirkuk.The Kurds want Kirkuk,
with its oil, included in their self-governing area. The U.S. also
faces the problem of the radical enclave around Halabja and has escaped
the control of the Kurds. And in the end, policing the border,
disarming the peshmerga, will also be difficult. Entry of the Turks--
and possibly the Iranians--will only complicate matters. While some
sort of federalism and a degree of decentralization seems called for,
the ``ethnic'' federalism that some Kurds are insisting on may be
enticing initially, but cause difficulties later on.
Fourth, the U.S. will also face a paradox in attitudes in Iraq,
especially in the center, but also in the south. Most Iraqis want
change and will welcome it by any means, including military action and
occupation. They long for a return to normalcy, and some freedom. We
will not face opposition to a change of regime, except among Saddam's
hard core and the supporters who do not want a change of status. This
should give us a ``honeymoon'' period, if we move smartly to restore
services, provide jobs and get the economy moving. But many of these
same people will be intensely nationalistic. They have a long tradition
of putting a desire for ``independence'' at the top of their
priorities. They will not welcome foreign rule and a foreign presence.
For it may not take long--six months, a year--for that opposition to
surface. This presents us with a dilemma and we will have to make trade
offs. To get real political and social change--a constitutional regime,
for example--will take time. But the longer we stay, the more we risk
generating national resentment and opposition. On the other hand, if we
turn over to existing elites--the less change we will get, including
satisfaction of our interests. We need to be aware of this potential
opposition and take measures to neutralize it.
Restoring normalcy/services.
Get Iraqis in the administration/in leadership positions
sooner rather than later.
Shift to ``indirect rule''--advisors, behind the scenes--as
soon as possible.
Timing--do more in a shorter period of time.
State our intent to turn over to Iraqis in some time frame
and outline the direction of policy and stick to it.
The British experience is instructive here. They began their
occupation during World War I with direct rule. Col. Arnold Wilson, of
the India Office school of thought, brought Indians, the rupee. Few
Iraqis held posts. This generated the 1920 rebellion which was
widespread and costly for the British. The British then shifted to
indirect rule. They governs through a treaty, an ``elected'' monarch, a
constitutional system, advisors. They used RAF to keep order and
developed an indigenous army. They put Iraqis in government. Even so,
they met with constant nationalist opposition, and gave Iraq
``independence'' in 1932.
Lastly there is the issue of international cooperation in the
administration of Iraq. Most of the benefits of this
internationalization, such as burden sharing, would accrue to the U.S.
The U.S. will need help in rebuilding Iraq and should try to get it
from international community. It is less clear how much this will help
with ``legitimacy'' inside Iraq. UN, or other international cooperation
might work better in some areas than others. Certainly this would be
true of humanitarian efforts; rebuilding of the economy and providing
some services. I don't know how an international force to provide
security, prevent retribution, will go down. Local population expects
and will respect U.S. force. It wants law and order kept. We will want
to avoid something that looks like an international occupation; a new
``mandate''. The Iraqis are a very proud people. They will resent being
put in the category of East Timor or Kosovo. In any case, we should
work to keep the neighbors out--except to undertake legitimate economic
activity, and to put Iraqis in charge as soon as possible. Iraqis will
expect to run their own country, and soon--not hand it over to
foreigners.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Marr, for a
tremendous educational experience, I think, for each one of us.
Likewise, the blinding complexity and cross-currents that you
have mentioned, I think, are obvious to all of us too.
Let me mention what may now be obvious, that there will not
be a rollcall vote at 10:30 on the Senate floor, but for
Senators who are anxious about it, let me give reassurance. The
meeting on the floor at 11 on advise and consent will continue,
and that is still going to happen at 11.
Likewise, I would just mention that friends at the Pentagon
have advised the Chair that the Pentagon began a background
briefing at 10 a.m. this morning on plans for reconstruction
and humanitarian assistance in Iraq. I have no idea who is
conducting the briefing. It is only for the press but
presumably the press will be forthcoming with whatever occurs
at the briefing.
Later on in the day, Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers
will be holding their daily briefly ceremonies at 1:30, and so
there may be opportunities there. You cannot be everywhere, but
you are, at least, at a point where we are all learning a great
deal this morning and we appreciate that.
We will proceed with questions with a 7-minute time limit
and have rounds.
Let me say, first of all, as I start my questioning, that
the accounting complexities of this situation are difficult but
important. On the one hand, we have had testimony from Mr.
Schwartz and Dr. Adams, as they have tried from their
experience as people who have been in the budgetary services of
our country to estimate some dollar amounts, which are very
large.
And likewise most of the panel, maybe all of you, have
indicated these amounts might be recurring for several years,
that this is not a short-term requirement, although perhaps the
up-front expenses in the first year would be abnormally high as
we are finding others to share the burden.
At the same time, the accounting for the fallout of the
tragedy of September 11, 2001 is a daunting experience. The
immediate cost of the tragedy in New York City and the Pentagon
are important for us to understand. What are called the
frictional costs for the American economy--that is, the cost
for all the security apparatus, for the decline in our
airlines, the hotel industry, the restaurant industry,
additional taxation--these costs must be considered. Indeed,
many economists would say that, although the economy may have
been in a downward slope before the tragedy, what occurred on
September 11 and its aftermath accelerated economic downturn in
a big way, and maybe still does.
So, a part of our predicament accounting-wise is that we
are about to discuss a budget in which a deficit of over $250
billion is predicted and with the thought that in the event
that there are hostilities in Iraq, a supplemental
appropriation debate will be commencing almost immediately,
adding tens of billions of dollars to that amount.
OMB, with a very doleful forecast, suggests that the
American Government could be in deficit for a decade. Not all
of the forecast is attributed to September 11, but at the same
time, a lot of it is, because life changed thereafter including
the accounting fallout.
Now, one can say, ``Well, do not lay all that on Iraq
alone. After all, al-Qaeda is elsewhere, so may be other
terrorist organizations.'' Fair enough. This is an important
proposition, to try to discuss up front the costs and burdens,
and how we are going to stabilize; and the rest of the world
with Europe in recession, the Japanese still in recession.
Where are the sources of growth in the midst of this
instability in the war against terrorism or the specific facets
of the Iraqi conflict?
Second, it just seems to me we have to grapple with the
whole problem of failed states. And many of you as scholars are
discussing this problem, that is, if there are states that do
not work very well or not at all, these are often harbors for
al-Qaeda cells or other cells. Even in a state that has
strengths, Pakistan, the search for Osama bin Laden goes on
there. Somebody was found there the other day, of great
consequence.
The inability to govern, to have functioning institutions
this is reoccurring not only in the Middle East, but in Africa,
and potentially even in South America, as we finally will take
a look at those situations. It is very difficult.
And the other side of the coin is that our Nation has not
been much interested in the so-called nation-building business.
Perhaps, if it were renamed ``successful states'' or something
of this sort, we would feel better about it, but we have not
felt very good about it.
And all of the costs flowing from that are very, very
substantial. So this is still a new business for us, even given
Bosnia, Kosovo, and the work that we are doing in Afghanistan,
which we have been trying to explore in this committee.
And now you are talking about a very big extension of these
efforts; many years, billions of dollars, American commitment,
complex relations with a country that has a history of many
proud people. I would just say that even if we were doing this
several years in advance of potential military action, it would
be difficult to get it right, for anybody who is President,
administrator, or what have you.
At the present time, we really are going to have to
understand--and I do not mean to quibble about this--that this
is sort of an all-hands evolution. The Pentagon office has some
coordination; meetings are going on there frantically. Some of
you may be involved in those meetings from time to time and
contribute to them.
Other nations have been involved in some of the meetings,
and it is probably helpful to get a cross-fertilization of
questions and experiences from others. As we discovered in this
committee, this all started about 6 weeks ago. The purpose of
our venture today is to understand how complex this is, how
difficult it is going to be for anybody, but to understand that
this responsibility is almost upon us--unless the world unites,
Iraq takes a different view, and we are spared military
conflict and war, which is still a possibility.
I will share that I received a call from Secretary Powell
yesterday about noontime. He was reviewing the morning's work,
ad seriatim, as he is working with the representatives of
Security Council people. We have reviewed the arguments of
people that we know. I was asked to make calls. I suspect other
Senators have been asked to do that. This really is an all-
hands effort to try to make our diplomacy work.
In any event, I have pretty well exhausted my time just in
analyzing the problem, but let me ask any one of you what you
can say to us about the whole problem of nation-building? How
do we speak to the American people about it, because we said up
front that we needed to talk about the cost, which is pretty
daunting. That is a good reason not to get involved in nation-
building, because as you have suggested, that means tradeoffs
of other things we want to do for Americans, such as health
care, education for our children or for our adults, or for that
matter, postponement of infrastructure in this country while we
are concerned about repairing the damage in another.
But address why our own security, our own safety in the
world, may be dependent upon successful states; and not only
how do we do this, but how do we enlist other nations
throughout the world to understand that their security also
depends upon successful states, on creating functioning places
that work.
Have any of you done work in this area? Probably all of you
have. Mr. Schwartz, would you care to comment on that?
Mr. Schwartz. Well, Mr. Chairman, the main point I infer
from your comments is that this is an enormous undertaking. The
money is beyond what we would ever have expected; but, in fact,
it is cheap at the cost.
That is essentially what you are saying--or at least what I
inferred from your comments, which causes me only to reaffirm
my initial point: that the President needs to be speaking about
this commitment to the American people.
My articulation of the costs was not designed to strike
fear in the hearts of people and cause them to say, ``OK. We
should not engage in the post-conflict exercise.'' Rather it
was designed to emphasize that it is all the more important for
the President to make the case. The President clearly believes
this post-conflict exercise is worth doing, but he has got to
be speaking to the American people and making the very same
points that you were making; he has got to be making them more
than simply in a line in a speech--such as the other night,
when he said, we will help the Iraqis to rebuild their society.
That is great, but there has got to be several paragraphs below
that statement, with details.
In terms of the nation-building and the success or failure
thereof, I think we have done better than most have given us
credit for. The Balkans is an example of ``the dog that does
not bark.'' Although illegality is not absent from the Balkans,
basically the American effort in the Balkans, I would argue,
has been largely successful; not an overwhelming success, but
it is an effort in nation-building which has had considerable
success. And as a result, we have avoided many, many problems
that we would otherwise have confronted.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Adams.
Dr. Adams. Mr. Chairman, I think you have put your finger
right on the most difficult question that we face here. There
is a kind of an irony to having had the perception for a couple
of years that nation-building was not the agenda of this
administration to now have the sense that we are about to
embark on one of the biggest exercises in nation-building we
have ever undertaken.
And that is going to pose a huge dilemma as you have quite
rightly structured it for the taxpayers, because the gist of my
testimony is that it is going to take a long time. And gist No.
2, if you will, is that we are going to require help, because
the full burden of this exercise cannot rest on the United
States. And as Dr. Marr's testimony suggests, if it does, it is
not as likely to be as well-received in Iraq as if we have
substantial international participation.
This is a big deal. This is not a small deal. It does
strike me that the planning for this big deal did start rather
late and is still very much at a preliminary stage right on top
of what may be hostilities. But it is clearly the sense of the
administration--I think the President has communicated this,
that they have very ambitious goals for the future of Iraq that
go very quickly to the installation of some more democratic
form of government in Iraq.
I am perhaps somewhat more skeptical than Mr. Schwartz
about our ability to carry this exercise off in any near-term
timeframe. The history of the 20th century is replete with
failed efforts to try to create democracies in areas where the
soil is not terribly fertile for that exercise.
This is a country, as Dr. Marr suggests, that has a long
history of authoritarian and clan governments but absolutely no
detectable history of serious democratic governance.
So, what that means is it is going to take a long time. It
is a big deal. It will take a long time. It will take a lot of
money. It will require substantial international participation
and a certain amount of finger-crossing to hope that the
exercise comes off.
It is critical to the long-term success of our goal of
achieving stability in the region and critical to the other
goal that you mentioned, which is achieving a more stable world
with respect to terrorism. If this exercise fails and Iraq
becomes a failed state, and it is not now a failed state, in my
judgment--if it becomes a failed state after we have succeeded
in removing Saddam Hussein, then the risks for terrorism and
the other expenditure centers that you point to the cost of
fighting the war on terrorism internationally; the cost of
homeland security could increase for us.
So, there is now a very high level of symbolic importance
to the success of this exercise in Iraq.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Well, I do not want to interrupt, because I
think it is a very fundamental question. Why do we not just
continue and ask the other two witnesses if they would like to
comment on Senator Lugar's question?
The Chairman. Very well.
Ms. Mitchell.
Ms. Mitchell. I think with the exception of natural
disasters, humanitarian crises are generally the result of
failed states or states which are very close to failing and are
unable to protect the citizens.
I am side-stepping the issue of the justness of the war
with regard to Iraq. The obligations of this country are pretty
clear in a day-after scenario, which are the Geneva
Conventions. The United States has stated its intent to
occupy--it is a cold war term, I know, but nevertheless, I
think the meaning is that we have responsibilities as a nation,
should a military intervention be undertaken with regards to
Iraq.
The humanitarian crises, which could befall Iraq in a day-
after scenario could, indeed, be extremely serious if the
security framework collapses.
The Chairman. Dr. Marr.
Dr. Marr. I do not think we should be quite so pessimistic.
We tend to keep pointing out all the negatives.
I would say two things about Iraq that perhaps do not apply
to other failed states. Since the gulf war, for which we had
some responsibility we have unintended outcomes, particularly
in the north, partly as a result of a humanitarian crisis. Iraq
is a failing state.
I agree that it has not failed yet. But if you look at the
north, you see, exactly what we are talking about, lack of
control of borders, lack of control of territory. And we have a
little pocket of territory right up there, which is worrisome.
The longer we leave Iraq in the current state, the more it
is going to fail. It has not yet failed; it is still revivable.
So to me, pulling the plug and saying, ``Well, what comes after
is going to be worse than went before,'' is not acceptable. In
other words, putting it off is going to be worse than taking
care of it now.
Second, although I recognize resources are going to have to
be put into Iraq and it is going to take some time to revive
the oil industry, we know that it has oil resources.
I am less pessimistic about the financial side of this over
the long term. Iraq has a very energetic population. They do
have oil resources and, within a reasonable period of time,
they should not be on the dole at all.
What this is going to require is a long-term effort in
human resources and a political effort to do it right. That is
going to be the cost, I think, more than a burden to the
budget.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Thank you, Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. No. Thank you all and that is excellent.
I think Senator Lugar asked the pivotal question. I guess I
am at a juncture here. My questions will work off an
assumption. I do not really like the assumption I am about to
make, but let us for the sake of discussion, make it, and that
is that the war has happened, that we have--whatever time it
has taken--hopefully very short--that we have ``prevailed
militarily.'' And it is now a question of what will we do.
And I would like to use the opportunity of your presence
here to sort of try to be optimistic about this and talk about
what we ought to be doing in order to minimize the costs here,
to maximize the participation of others, principally to see to
it that the innocent civilian populations and the people of
Iraq who deserve a lot better than they have been getting
certainly under Saddam Hussein and what they might be getting
if we neglect the aftermath here, might have an opportunity of
achieving. So I would like to ask some very specific questions
about how we might do this well, or at least a lot better than
appears to be we are doing at this juncture.
So let me begin by something as basic as this: First of
all, what about the office? There has been this discussion here
about the location of the Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance in the Pentagon. Comment, if you would,
about the wisdom of this, as opposed to, I guess normally in
times past, this would be at the State Department or USAID or
some other venue other than the military venue--or does the
military venue in this case make some sense?
I do not know if we want to rule it out of hand as a bad
idea that we have had examples in the past historically. I
accept, Dr. Adams, your conclusion that we have not done
terribly well in building these states. The thoughts that came
to mind immediately were sort of Korea and Japan. Now, they
were longer in view historically and we spent a lot of time
working at it, but I would argue that both those countries did
not have much of a history of democracy. And yet because of our
persistence and our involvement, our institution-building, our
building of human institutions, Dr. Marr, that you point out,
resulted in two pretty strong democracies today as a result of
a half century of commitment. So, there are examples where it
can work.
But tell me, first of all, what do you think about the idea
of having the Office of Reconstruction come out of the Pentagon
rather than out of a non-military base? I do not know who
feels--let us start with you, Mr. Schwartz.
Mr. Schwartz. Well, let me just answer your first question
directly. I would have--if I were in charge, I would have done
it differently. But I think it is a credible decision, and it
is one that the administration should work with, and others
should try to support it.
Let me just say one advantage of it is unity of command.
You have got the office and if they deploy, the head of that--
or the civil administrator--reports to the combatant commander
who reports, you know, to the President and the Secretary of
Defense.
There will also be the resources of the Department of
Defense, which are enormous, and since it is the Defense
Department's responsibility, they will have access to these
resources. So you may, to some extent, avoid the problem that
Dr. Adams knows very well: when civilian agencies do not have
funds, they turn to the military and the military says, ``It is
not our job.'' Here, clearly, it is their job. So those are the
advantages.
Now the downsides. I mention the downsides not to suggest
we should rethink the structure. But by thinking about the
downsides, you can address the structure to make it better. No.
1, how do you draw in the civilian agencies which do not have
as much stake in the process, especially as the military is not
used to drawing in the civilian agencies. And the fact of the
matter is that we have developed enormous civilian expertise
over the past decade on how to manage these crises. So we have
got to draw them in.
Second, how do you avoid the perception that the post-
conflict exercise is a U.S. military operation and occupation.
General Garner has insisted on not being called General Garner.
That is not enough. And so we need to work hard to avoid that
perception.
And then I think the final question is where is the policy
being made? Is this new Pentagon office an operational office
that is implementing plans or is it a policy formulation body?
And if it is not the latter, where does policy get made below
the principles and deputies? This is not an irrelevant
question. It is an important issue. It is an issue that is
worth asking, not to be a pain in the neck to the
administration but to get them to confront questions that
sometimes are easier to push down the road.
I know, because I was in the same position as the people
who are operating on these issues right now. These are
important coordination questions and I thought of them, Senator
Lugar, when you mentioned that the Pentagon was conducting a
briefing today at 10:30 that you did not know about.
If there was some sort of structure at the sub-deputy
level, below Dr. Steve Hadley, where somebody was sort of in
charge--that is the person who is sort of running the structure
on these post-conflict issues. That is where the buck would
stop, and I do not have a sense that the government is
organized that way right now. And it probably ought to be.
And the problem is going to become greater, as I said
before, when the attention of policymakers turns to other
crises, and this gets managed below the highest level.
Senator Dodd. Yes.
Dr. Adams. To key off the last point that Mr. Schwartz
made, which is that the key is if the military is going to play
this role over the long-term, as keeping their attention on it,
what is unusual about this is that as we have seen for more
than a decade, it has been a very difficult and painful
adjustment for the Department of Defense and the uniformed
services to determine exactly what their role was going to be
in a much messier situation--series of situations in the post-
cold war world than they faced during the cold war.
Those messy situations constantly led to what was called
mission creep for the military and a certain amount of
resistance to the concept that the military ought to be doing
policing and arresting and governance tasks, when they were--
wanted to be restricted to a more clearly defined and sharply
defined military mission.
This is more than mission creep, what we are talking about.
This is really mission spread. This is more like a standard
post-World War II occupation scenario where the occupying force
itself----
Senator Dodd. Well, do you think that is what is going on
here? Do you think that is sort of what we are talking about
here?
Dr. Adams. This is essentially how--I think where this
originated was the sense that the military was going to be an
occupying force; would have, as Mr. Schwartz suggests, a chain
of command, the ability to make decisions, to move pieces
around, to get decisions made, and to have them implemented
very swiftly.
I think they probably were also somewhat educated by the
much more difficult civilian administration scenarios that we
have encountered in places like the Balkans, where simply
organizing the pieces and having one civilian who is seen as
authoritatively in charge was a very, very difficult exercise
for years.
So placing it securely in an organized command structure, I
think, is the preference of the administration. The
difficulty----
Senator Dodd. What do you think about it?
Dr. Adams. Well, the difficulty--I think it is probably
right for the near term. But I agree with Dr. Marr; I think
very swiftly it is going to be in our national interest to
transition this to civilian administration and equally swiftly
to a civilian administration with heavy participation by the
Iraqis, and having the United States step back and take an
indirect role very, very quickly.
I do not rely on the long-term desire of the military to
play this role or to sustained attention to having the military
play this role and need--we need to move, I think, quite
quickly, in this situation.
In order to do that, there is one other point I want to
make, Senator, which is in order to do that on the civilian
side--one of the points that Mr. Schwartz mentioned I wanted to
underline--is the supplemental needs to request adequate
funding. And we need to be prepared to empower the civilian
side of the executive branch of the Federal Government to move
out sharply to take on some of this responsibility quite
quickly.
Senator Dodd. Yes. Just quickly, Ms. Mitchell, do you sort
of agree with the doctor, or would you even disagree with even
the initial point, from the humanitarian relief organization
point of view? And, again, I want to set outside your views
about the war itself, but looking at the management question
what do you--how would you--do you agree with that assessment
or disagree with it?
Ms. Mitchell. I would go a little bit stronger on it. The
Office of Reconstruction, one of their responsibilities is to
handle the humanitarian activities in the event of any type of
action. Because this office is located in the Pentagon, it is
shrouded with confidentiality, classification issues, getting
access. Getting new information out of there has been extremely
difficult.
I have been attending these coordination meetings with
different government officials now since November. And the
meetings have not been very coordinating. They have been very
one-directional. They have been very frustrating for the
humanitarian aid community. We have been asking repeatedly to
get the sanctions lifted, to get our licenses, to get access,
and to have more of a U.N. role.
So, I think we are very, very concerned about how the
Pentagon is going to be able to manage and coordinate a
humanitarian response.
This is chilling the participation of European NGOs and
American NGOs, because of this blurring--further blurring of
the lines with the Pentagon and the civilian control of
humanitarian assistance.
So while an office is, indeed, necessary to fulfill the
nation's four Geneva Convention requirements, to take
responsibility as an occupying power, certainly the
humanitarian tasks need to be carved out and put firmly under
civilian control if we are going to have the type of
multilateral response that is needed.
I cannot stress for you enough that the logistical and
operational framework is not in place to support a humanitarian
response if there is military action in Iraq at this point in
time.
Senator Dodd. OK. Dr. Marr, I think I have heard your
comments, and I have taken a lot of time, so unless you have
anything to add--do you have anything to add to that at all.
Dr. Marr. No, because I have not really been involved in
the policy, except to say that back in the mid-nineties, when
this was discussed in the Pentagon, when I was working at the
National Defense University, civil affairs units were brought
in. And I remember a recent conference in which this was
discussed when civil affairs units and the military seemed
fairly gung-ho about going in and doing the humanitarian job.
So there may be some of that as well, but I do not have
much more to add on this.
Dr. Adams. Senator, could I just add one thought? When we
get past the point of humanitarian assistance and are talking
about the installation of governance, democratic institutions,
running state civil servants, doing construction in oil fields,
things of that kind. It really goes well to the edge of the
competence of the military to administer such an operation.
Having the civilians in is going to be critical very soon.
Senator Dodd. Well, it is a cultural thing too, in a way. I
mean, there is--our military, for a good reason, are used to
doing things their way. And when you start expanding the number
of people that have a shared decisionmaking role, it gets very
difficult if your culture is basically to say it is, you know,
my way or the highway, and you are trying to bring people to
the table; so it gets complicated, to put it mildly. Anyway,
thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for the length.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd.
In recognizing my colleague, Senator Hagel, let me just
pick up on a point you made, Dr. Adams, that the dog does not
bark in the same way in the Balkans; and in part it is because
a lot of constructive things have occurred.
However, in this committee and in the Senate as a whole, we
debated motions regarding Bosnia and then Kosovo made by
distinguished leaders on both sides of the aisle to take the
troops out as of x date, or right away, or what have you.
And I remember one such instance about this point 2 years
ago. My colleague rushed into the room--we were having our
Tuesday luncheons, which we will have today with Republicans
and Democrats--and we were all considering once again the
desire of two distinguished members of both of our parties to
get the troops out. It seemed they had the votes.
Senator Hagel comes in, and brings word that then-candidate
George Bush has indicated that that is not a good idea, thus
confirming what President Clinton was telling the luncheon on
the other side. And, in fact, their words turned around some
votes. By the vote of a fairly small majority our troops
remained.
The success that is evidenced in this anecdote came about
because of a degree of constancy, and it is an important area
of the world that is not out of the woods, but in which some
degree of competency in both the political, military and
humanitarian communities, albeit ad hoc, have been reconciled.
Now, our hope in a larger area today is to be able to do
the same thing, and I call now upon that introduction, Senator
Hagel.
Senator Hagel. I am unworthy of such an introduction, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Not at all.
Senator Hagel. Thank you. But I would take note that I am
often the bearer of good news and the administration is very
appreciative of that, starting back in the summer of 2000,
before there was a Bush administration, so thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I, like all our colleagues here today, very
much appreciate not just this hearing but the quality of the
witnesses that you have asked to come share their experience
and thoughts. It has, once again over the last hour--more than
an hour--an hour and--almost 2 hours--become clearer if there
was any need for it to be any clearer of the imperfections and
the complications of what we are dealing with here, as you
noted a few minutes ago.
This is an imperfect business. And I want to say something
about that, because it is my experience--and I have not been
around here near as long as my two esteemed colleagues,
Senators Dodd and Lugar--but this is not an issue about who is
for or against the President. This should not be, nor do I
detect it has been on either side, a political issue.
The President is not the only individual who takes the oath
of office to protect the Constitution in the interest of this
country. The security interests of this country are all of our
responsibilities.
First, the safety of the state. And I think that is
important, at least in my mind, to bring out to all who might
be listening and watching, because this is a very, very
important issue for all the reasons the four of you have laid
out. And we do not have answers. We will never have all the
surety that we need, if we go to war, if we intend to do the
things the President has talked about.
So we are not in disagreement about the security of this
country, and we are not here to hurt the President. But we have
responsibility in the Congress to actually help the President,
and to do what we can do to frame this, to pull out the tough
questions and to ask the tough questions, and then try to find
some solutions.
And I start there, because we tend to drift into these
areas of political litmus tests and get ourselves bogged down
in the underbrush of the superficial and the superfluous and
lose sight of the real focus. And I think one of the things
that the chairman said a few minutes ago about--and you all
have stated it in your own way, in your own focus, the other
combustible parts of the world that will not stop or will not
be put on hold or we cannot defer until we fix Iraq. And the
chairman mentioned some of those areas. You are all well aware
of them.
The cost of what we, it appears, are about to engage in
here are unknown, as you have said. But it is important to put
some framework around this, and that is, again what we are
trying to do today.
Mr. Adams, one of the things that you said--and I happen to
agree with it--and I think the quote was, ``The full burden
cannot rest on the U.S.''--the full burden of fixing Iraq from
start to finish with all the unknowns.
I believe that; I have said that. But I have even taken it
further to say, ``Why should the United States take that burden
on by itself?'' Which gets me to this question that I would
like very much to have the four of you respond to. You all have
referenced the United Nations. You all have referenced allies
in your own ways.
I would be interested in knowing, specifically from each of
you, how important is it to each of you in the areas that you
have focused on in your testimony, that the United States--if
we engage in this military conflict, how important is it to
have the United Nations? To have allies, the consequences of
not having that with us who, in fact, will be called upon as
some of you have stated in your testimony already to actually
do the work or a good part of that work; the infrastructure of
that work; the public diplomacy of that work; aside from the
dollars that you are talking about.
So take that anyway you would like, and I would very much
appreciate each of you responding to it. And, once again, thank
you for a really very, very important and insightful sharing of
your experience and wisdom.
Dr. Adams, thank you.
Dr. Adams. Let me start on that, Senator. Thank you. I
think it is a very critical question, not only who will do
this, but how do we entice them, induce them, encourage them,
negotiate them, deal them in. Because it is my judgment that
without that cooperation, trying to do this on our own is
almost doomed to failure.
We have to have that cooperation, if only for the reason
that an international community is going to be much better
received in-country than a sheer U.S. military occupation
trying to accomplish these tasks.
More than that, we do not have the resources to do this. We
could not find those resources--Senator Lugar has already
mentioned some of the budgetary considerations that will enter
in, in trying simply to corral the resources that we think we
can ask for. So the numbers I offered to you are, I think,
beyond our capacity to do all alone.
More than that, we are going to need the expertise to do
these things in the humanitarian arena just to start there. We
are going to need the expertise of organizations like Ms.
Mitchell has been talking about.
We do not have in-house, in the government, the capacity to
deliver this assistance. And there are a lot of international
organizations and non-governmental organizations, which I would
add to your question, who have now years of tradition and
practice in delivering the humanitarian assistance and have
been helping with the Oil for Food Program, have been doing the
job. And we are going to need their full wholehearted
collaboration to do it.
In the area of governance, we are going to need other
countries to participate in trying to work with the civil
service, to work with democratization, to work with local
groups. We will not have the resources to do it alone and,
frankly, we will not have the full confidence, as Dr. Marr has
suggested, of parts of the country to do it alone.
You are much better off with a community, a blanket that
cushions the U.S. presence and any reaction to its presence in
achieving that goal.
In economic reconstruction, we are far from having the
investment capability to deal with principal task No. 1, the
oil resources, the reconstruction if war has damaged it, of the
oil fields, the upgrading of the electricity grid, the
upgrading of the export possibilities of that oil field, the
potential exploitation of the probable reserves. I mean, they
have only exploited 15 percent--15 out of 74 potential and
probable reserve fields in Iraq. We will not do that as a
government. We are going to rely on substantial private sector
and international financial institution cooperation to
accomplish this goal.
Debt--well, it is not debt even owed to us for the most
part. It is going to have to be handled, however; or the
Iraqis, who already face a debt-to-GDP ratio that is one of the
highest in the world, will find that they are burdened by that
debt and cannot do the economic reconstruction.
That is going to require Paris Club reschedulings, London
Club reschedulings, negotiations that involve the international
community in trying to relieve the burden of debt on the Iraqi
people.
So my judgment is we cannot do it alone. We will not be
trusted to do it alone by the international community or the
Iraqis. We will need those organizations because of their
competence and their resources. So it simply is of urgent
necessity to create that coalition of support.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the indulgence of
the chairman to ask the others to respond?
The Chairman. Yes. Please proceed.
Mr. Schwartz. Thank you, Senator Hagel. I think your
question is about one of the most important ones that needs to
be looked at. And I should also say that there is a vigorous
debate and discussion on this issue within the administration,
so I think it is critical that Members of the Senate be part of
that discussion. This is because decisions are, in fact, being
made on the very question that you raised.
I am also a little less pessimistic than most that the
difficulty that we are having in New York now, at the United
Nations, will preclude post-conflict cooperation. I think we
have a tremendous capacity to persuade other governments, to
encourage other governments to come on board. And of course,
the more successful the U.S. action in Iraq, the greater that
possibility will be. So I certainly would not rule it out based
on the discord in New York now.
I can just echo Gordon's statements. There are so many
areas where international involvement will be essential and
also will be required. We have no alternative.
I will highlight a few areas. First, to reiterate Gordon's
point and to anticipate my humanitarian colleague's point, the
WFP or another international humanitarian organization should
clearly be playing the lead over time on humanitarian
assistance. You know, they coordinate the tens of thousands of
food agents in Iraq who deliver food under the Oil for Food
Program.
We do not want U.S. soldiers to be doing that. It is a bad
use of our resources and it is probably not a very effective
way to do the job.
We have a very strong interest in the involvement of
others. Even if the United States maintains responsibility for
civilian administration, we have a strong interest in
indicating that the United Nations or an international body
will take responsibility in organizing the consultative process
that leads toward a political transition.
If we do not do that, if we are not prepared to do that, we
will really have very significant legitimacy problems about a
hand-picked--a future government hand-picked by the United
States. And I would say a model--not a perfect model--but a
model for this is the Bonn process where the United States had
enormous influence, but it was a U.N. process. So that is a
second area.
A third is the issue of oil. Some suggest that the United
States could go in and take over the oil fields. First of all,
that is not true. The United States has no intention of doing
that. But as a matter of law, we could not.
Right now, the Iraqi oil industry is governed by a U.N.
resolution, essentially; and any changes would have to go
through the Security Council, as well.
So there is not really a unilateral option on oil for us,
unless we wanted to break out of the U.N. Security Council
resolution, which don't believe the administration has any
intention of doing.
The continuation of the Oil for Food Program, modified in
some way, will have to take place through an international
effort. And to echo Gordon's points, the establishment of a
consortium of donors, with the World Bank and the IMF, to deal
with assistance and debt relief will also be an international
effort.
So I think there are so many clear areas that we should not
let the heat of ideological debate on this question prevent us
from shedding light--practical light--on the issue.
International involvement is inevitable, so we ought to engage
and get on with it.
Ms. Mitchell. I think in looking at the role of the United
Nations, there is time to discuss what role the U.N. can be
playing, actually, in a reconstruction period. There is not a
whole lot of time left for the role of the U.N. in the
humanitarian activities, because that crisis is upon us.
If we have military interventions in the weeks to come, the
operational framework to get the assistance out simply is not
there. There is not enough non-governmental organizations and
U.N. operational capacity in the region at right--at this point
in time. So, again, I would stress there is a need to de-link
the humanitarian activities and there a very clear mandate
needs to be given to the United Nations, authority to lead the
humanitarian response for the reasons that Eric said.
The U.N. Oil for Food Program is the largest humanitarian
operation anywhere in the world. It is huge. We have to have
the U.N. involved in this. They can assure greater access for
non-governmental organizations; not only inside Iraq, which may
be under U.S. military control at the time, but also in the
border countries.
The U.N. will have more independence, more impartiality to
meet the humanitarian needs that we are simply not able to meet
right now for a variety of reasons. The U.N. will also provide
a critical interface with military forces, both the Iraqi side
and the coalition's side, to deliver assistance and to include
more donors.
We are getting--donors are chilling. There is a perception
that the United States is going to go it alone and that there
is a unilateral flavor to this, and it is chilling our
traditional--humanitarian communities' traditional donors, not
just in the United States, but around the world.
And we need European humanitarian NGOs to respond to a
crisis in Iraq. It is a very difficult situation. If weapons of
mass destruction are used, we have never experienced this
before as a community. We will need everybody's help.
The United Nations gives us a better chance of securing
that participation on humanitarian issues, so if we can de-link
those from the political processes, that day has arrived.
Dr. Marr. Let me just say that I have no idea what the size
of the humanitarian crisis is going to be after the war, no one
does. It is not clear how much damage, how much repair and
reconstruction is going to be needed, so it seems very clear to
me we need international support on the humanitarian crisis and
rebuilding from the destruction of the war.
I take that as a given, to share the burden, to make it
more legitimate. I am looking ahead past this humanitarian
period and reconstruction of war damage to politically
reconstructing Iraq. I keep hearing all this, and it rings a
little bit wrong in my ear as I think how Iraqis would respond
to this. We say: ``we are going to help,'' ``we are going to do
this,'' ``we are going to do that.'' We are imposing this on a
people who frankly consider themselves quite competent to do
this. That is going to be the real political problem that we
have when we start in the nation-building and the political
process.
In my view, they are not competent to build a democracy
overnight. I understand that, but they think they are. So there
is going to have to be a tradeoff here.
Iraq is now pretty close to 26 million. It is a very large
country. I do not have exact figures for the exiles. It could
be as high as 3 million but there are at least 2 million
exiles. They include the best engineers, the best architects,
the best writers; they are very, very competent people.
I do not think they are going to be looking for all sorts
of people from the rest of the world to come in and do
reconstruction for them. They are going to be looking to
themselves and to this exile community before they look
elsewhere.
We do need to keep in mind that this is a big country with
a lot of qualified people, some of them inside, some of them
out. It is their oil, and oil has been a very important
flashpoint. We must not get ourselves into the mind-set that we
are going to have to keep doing things for the Iraqi people. We
are going to have to put the Iraqi people back in charge. They
are going to tell us this very shortly.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, this has
just been an excellent panel. I thank the chairman and the
committee for having the hearing.
I would like to make a couple of remarks and then ask some
questions. I would like to first note how strongly I agree with
the chairman when he points out the security of the American
people really depends upon fostering what you described in
effect as functioning successful states rather than chaotic and
failing ones. And some members of the committee know that I
spent a good part of the last couple of years trying to make
this point with regard to Africa. We held four different
hearings about countries that are in that posture.
And it is especially important to keep this in mind now as
we are on the cusp of disordering a state, in effect, and then
committing to the awesome task of trying to reorder it. And I
think this committee is really--these witnesses have really
helped us think about some of those issues.
Let me also say that, judging from the administration's
statements and Iraq's behavior with each passing day, it
obviously becomes more and more likely that the United States
will engage in a major military operation in Iraq. And while I
have no doubt in my mind that our admirable men and women in
uniform will be successful in any military engagement, I do
have doubts about whether or not the American people truly
understand or have been given the chance to understand the
magnitude of the tasks that the country is setting for itself,
not only with regard to the military engagement itself but with
regard to occupation and reconstruction.
I do not believe Americans have been told much about what
the future holds beyond the most optimistic of scenarios. And
frankly, I do not believe that Congress has heard much about
the full range of potential scenarios either.
We really started trying to think about these things way
back in late July and early August when, under Chairman Biden,
a couple of hearings were held and some of these questions were
raised then and have not been adequately answered over these
many months.
I think that we were wrong to authorize the use of force
without demanding this information and weighing it carefully,
to assess the costs of this endeavor in economic terms,
diplomatic terms, and, of course, in terms of human life, and
to assess whether or not this will make America more secure in
the end. The fundamental issue is whether this really will make
America more secure in the end.
Unfortunately, and I will just reiterate what I appreciate
the chairman and, I believe, Senator Dodd saying at the
beginning, there is no one here from the administration to
clarify these points or to reassure us that plans have
progressed beyond where they stood a month ago, when it seemed
that very capable representatives from the State and Defense
Departments were simply unable to answer questions for this
committee. So, again, I thank the witnesses for trying and I
would like to ask a question.
At a staff briefing last week, administration officials
indicated that they hoped our troops and reconstruction teams
would be able to get out of Iraq within one year of a military
intervention, leaving behind a country with a democratic
political system and a transformed economy.
Can any of you think of any examples from recent history to
give us confidence that such a timetable is feasible?
Dr. Adams. A clear and direct answer to that, no. I find
it, frankly, implausible that the United States could leave
within 12 months and leave a standing democracy and a healthy
economy behind in Iraq. It is simply not plausible.
And I cannot give you another example where it has
happened. The chairman mentioned earlier--I believe it was the
chairman or maybe it was Senator Dodd mentioned South Korea,
where a healthy democracy has emerged.
But I hasten to point out that the healthy democracy began
to emerge, I think, some 30 or 40 years after the initial
Korean war. Now, that is a very long time. And the United
States has maintained a troop presence in that country
throughout that entire period, not governing the country, to be
sure. But the country was clearly under a very authoritarian
government.
It took a long time to come around. It will be a long time
before a fully healthy, functioning democracy exists in the
Balkans in Serbia, for example, where we have been engaged now
for a period of more than 10 years. These do not happen
overnight.
And while Iraq--and I certainly share Dr. Marr's view of
this, Iraq is not Afghanistan. It has substantial resources,
which Afghanistan does not have and more greater coherence in
terms of bureaucracy and governance than Afghanistan has ever
had. It is also not Germany or Japan, in terms of its ability
to establish a functioning regime and generate the resources
that would support it.
Unless there were a very clear and well funded hand-off to
some international administration of the Iraqi governance
process and the reconstruction process at the end of one year,
I just cannot foresee leaving in that timeframe.
Senator Feingold. I appreciate that answer, and the
reference to Bosnia, and certainly good things can be said
about what has happened in Bosnia. But I was at this table, I
believe, in 1995, and we were strongly assured that within one
year before the next Christmas, our troops would be out of
Bosnia, and the cost of the whole operation would be less than
$2 billion.
So there is this unfortunately tendency to tell the
American people that something cannot happen within one year
will happen, and I just wonder why such statements are made
with such confidence. And it really does undercut people's
confidence in what their government is telling them.
Yes; would you like to answer?
Mr. Schwartz. Well, first of all, I certainly agree with
Gordon's point. It would be great if the United States could
get out--if the military could withdraw completely from Iraq in
a year. I do not see it happening and certainly we should not
plan to leave in a year--you have to plan for what you think is
going to be necessary or might plausibly be necessary rather
than for what you are hoping for.
But I want to raise another issue in terms of the extent of
the U.S. presence. We have to realize that downsizing the Iraqi
military, which will be an objective presumably of the American
intervention, will create a security issue, because any future
army that is powerful enough to defend Iraq against Iran, for
example, will also be strong enough to threaten Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait.
And so there are going to be regional security issues. And
this will raise the question of regional security guarantees,
with implications for issues like the nature and duration of
our presence. So, it is not simply the case that when we fix
everything up domestically in Iraq, the job is done.
There is the broader regional context. We go in, we occupy
a place. We downsize the military. That has implications for
the rest of the region, and it may have implications for the
nature and duration of our presence.
Senator Feingold. Ms. Mitchell.
Ms. Mitchell. I see no way how the United States can be out
of Iraq in one year, and I say that because we have seen no
plans for how they are going to secure Iraq within the first
year.
Population movements will occur after the regime falls.
There are populations at risk. There has been 30 years of a
brutal regime, 30 years of populations being moved around and
manipulated and engineered--Marsh Arabs from the south, Kurds
from the north, et cetera.
We know the stories. I just do not see how it can happen.
And there is no plan in place for policing, for filling
security vacuums for arresting hardliners, spoilers, radicals,
others that will fill security vacuums once the regime falls.
It will be the responsibility of the allied forces to do
that. Who else is there?
And unless we are able to fill those voids in the first 100
days after the regime, that will determine how long the United
States will stay inside Iraq--is how quickly security and
protection can be provided to the Iraqi people.
And right now I see no plans from the administration on
that.
Senator Feingold. Dr. Marr.
Dr. Marr. There is one other thing that is going to
determine how long we stay and that is the attitude of the
region toward a continued occupation of Iraq.
I keep raising this unfortunate public opinion issue,
because it is there. We have two sides of the sword to
consider. Of course, you cannot leave in a year and have a
functioning democracy, maybe even a functioning economy--that
is out of the question.
But the tradeoff here is going to be how visible is the
presence, how large is the presence, and how well we are moving
to accomplish some of the goals that we want.
And I quite agree that an outside presence, particularly
with respect to security and getting help in reconstruction is
good for Iraq. But it is going to cause a backlash, not only in
some areas of Iraq itself but in the region.
I do not need to tell you all what the atmosphere in the
region is today. The impetus for terrorism--Bin Laden's main
focus in 9/11--was the presence of our forces in the gulf.
Other issues like the Arab/Israel issue, really did not play
much of a role, in my view, in getting him started on
terrorism.
So there are going to be a lot of pressures focused on how
long the presence is there and how visible the presence is. I
can well imagine political pressures of forcing us to draw
down, move out, turn over to others. This is exactly what the
rest of the region is afraid of.
They fear we are not going to be able to stay long enough
to really create a fairly functional state. We are going to
leave too early and leave a mess. So I just remind everyone
that there are going to be political pressures. It is not just
how long we have to stay to do a good job. There are going to
be political pressures, which I can well imagine will make us
think about drawing down--moving out well before the job is
done.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I just want
to comment that the comments of Mr. Schwartz and Dr. Marr
really do highlight this interesting point. I have been on this
committee and watched our involvement in Haiti and Bosnia and
Kosovo and East Timor. And although everyone of those
situations obviously has regional implications, it just does
not compare in magnitude to what this entails in terms of the
region and in terms of the implications. There really is a
difference in substance, not just a matter of degree.
Senator Dodd. If my colleague would allow me--I think the
political pressures are not going to just be regional. They are
going to occur here at home as well.
The chairman has pointed out the tremendous budget issues
that are going to be confronting us very quickly; and I can
see, despite all of the intentions today, even with the
situation going well militarily, the pressures domestically to
sustain the budgetary requirements, to maintain the kind of
level of participation we are going to require are going to be
profound here at home.
Dr. Adams. Senator, in my judgment, that is precisely why
it is useful to have a much more broad discussion of this today
than we have had to date. It is precisely because it has those
implications.
The Chairman. Well, we thank each one of you for the
historical perspective. I am going to introduce Senator Chafee,
but I interject one more minute of editorial comment, because
mention has been made of South Korea, and of how long it took
to move toward democratic institutions--a little more than
three decades.
One reason, however, we were not resented in that case was
that the Koreans felt we were a security for them. That is a
point about Iraq we have not gotten into today. Namely, there
may be predators from outside that do not have the same respect
for the boundaries of Iraq as we do.
So there may be some interesting by-play there; but
nevertheless, it was the Philippines election, at least in my
judgment, that bumped along democracy in the South Korea case.
And I would just say, historically, that Mr. Armitage and Mr.
Wolfowitz were around in those days. They played a very
important part in testimony for this committee in 1985 and
1986, along with Secretary Schultz and-then President Reagan,
who became involved in this.
So optimistically, these things do work out historically if
you have patience and if, in fact, the chemistry between the
countries in question, in this case the United States and those
who are our friends in South Korea, works for a long period of
time.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Senator
Feingold mentioned a number of countries where we have been
active but we have not mentioned Afghanistan yet, and President
Karzai, was here last week saying, ``If you do not strengthen
your commitment to us--or lose your commitment to us, we will
fall like a house of cards.'' And so as we look at
reconstruction of Iraq and the question of who might help us,
in looking at the dynamics that are happening every hour, what
countries, might after the dust settles, really be there for us
to help us in this reconstruction?
I guess I will start with the other end, Dr. Marr. Why do
you think after everything is said and done----
Dr. Marr. As I am sitting here trying to----
Senator Chafee. Because we have the help in Afghanistan.
Are they also--many of these countries--going to ante up and
come help us in Iraq? And which ones in particular can you see?
Dr. Marr. Well, first of all, I would have to think on
that. However, oil comes to mind. How is the oil industry going
to develop? There are a lot of people, a lot of companies, and
a lot of countries who are interested in getting some profit
from the oil industry. So there is a carrot on the stick out
there, to entice people into getting involved in Iraq. Some
will want to go in and acquire a stake in this society.
The answer is whoever is interested in oil and markets.
That would be a lot of people--certainly, I think the
Europeans.
The Russians and the French have, as you know, long-
standing interests there. It is interesting to see how this
issue is playing in the United Nations. If there is a new
regime, they certainly must be asking themselves whether their
stake in oil will remain. So certainly, I think European
countries would be interested. Possibly east Asia--oil flows to
east Asia these days.
So my answer would be to just keep the oil in mind and
countries that would be interested in getting a stake in it. I
do not know whether it is going to be difficult to find people
to help eventually.
Senator Chafee. So when you refer to regions, European,
East Asia, does that mean what countries in Europe--can you see
the Germans, the French, the Spaniards, all these countries
helping us--the Dutch, the--and then to go to East Asia, coming
in and helping us? Is that what you are saying?
Specifically what countries, I guess, is what I am asking.
Dr. Marr. The other people on the panel may be able to
address that. If you mean financial help, I really cannot
answer that question, because I do not have the expertise.
I am thinking not so much in terms of the early
reconstruction and sort of ponying-up on the budget--but
countries interested in long-term involvement in Iraq,
particularly the political involvement--of countries willing to
come in and make some kind of an investment in time and energy.
Certainly the people who are going to want to get involved in
this are people who see a stake in oil.
Iraq has reserves second only to Saudi Arabia. The
potential for oil production and exploitation is incredible.
And people are interested in that and would like to get into
Iraq and have a stake there for that reason. That will be a
help.
Senator Chafee. Yes, a very good point.
Ms. Mitchell. I think about 30 to 40 percent of the U.N.'s
plea for humanitarian contingency funding has been met at this
point. That is all. And I think that the donors that have
contributed to that--and I am going by memory, certainly the
United States has contributed, has made pledges, the United
Kingdom.
There are no more than five or six countries; I think
Canada, Switzerland. We are seeing no funding being released at
this time to the humanitarian NGOs from the British Governor,
from the European Union, or from other traditional donors in
Europe. That may change in the event that an action begins, but
we are very far behind right now in preparations.
The way to speed this up is, again, is to give the clear
authority and clear mandate to the United Nations. Several
embassies here in town have told me that they would consider
contributing to the humanitarian activities if they were de-
linked from the process that is going on in the Security
Council right now. So I think we could get much broader funding
with the U.N. handling the humanitarian situation.
And that is going to be, you know, the big costs aside from
the military in any type of campaign that is going on,
depending on how it unfolds. We simply do not know.
And certainly if there are population movements during a
campaign, they may spontaneously return very quickly, as we saw
in Kosovo, once you have ground forces going in, and the costs
can be very, very high. If this Oil for Food Program collapses,
there are 16 million people that the United States will have to
somehow coordinate funding and feeding of, which again is
another reason to get the U.N. involved, get them involved
today, give them clear authority, let them lead the
humanitarian response.
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much. I assume you are
saying that despite all their opposition to the direction we
are going, when the dust settles, they will be there for
humanitarian assistance to help the needy people in Iraq to get
on their feet?
Ms. Mitchell. If they have a clear authority. The U.N. only
operates on clear mandates and clear authority, and right now
they do not have it. So something does have to be done in New
York to give them that authority, and I do think that they can
be de-linked from the political process.
It is not inconsistent for the United Nations to be
preparing for a humanitarian response while still advocating
and working toward a peaceful resolution.
Senator Chafee. Mr. Schwartz, you said that--earlier that
despite what is happening in New York--and I think were your
words--you expect to have a broad international help here.
Do you think that the popular opposition will affect the
decisions of these leaders to send help, or is it back to Dr.
Marr's--the oil is there, and that is what is going to be
important once the war is over? And we are assuming that in
this questioning.
Mr. Schwartz. Right. I do not want to appear too
optimistic, but I am not quite as pessimistic as others on this
question.
First let me address Phebe's point. I think she is right. I
think any post-conflict regime, legal regime, a modified Oil
for Food Program is probably going to have some sort of
provision that gives a future Iraqi government a great deal of
freedom to make judgments about how it is going to develop its
own oil industry, and maybe free it of some of these executory
contracts and other shackles that really might otherwise
restrict its ability to make independent decisions.
And that independence will be potential leverage--or if not
leverage, will create incentives on the part of other
governments to get involved in Iraq. So I think Phebe's point
is correct.
I also think that in a post-war environment, the
governments will be more inclined to come on board. But I have
to caveat that by saying I think the big players on big
reconstruction in Iraq are probably going to be the
international development institutions more than individual
governments.
Senator Chafee. Let me just--my clock rang, but----
The Chairman. A quick couple of points, yes.
Senator Chafee. On the last comment, can you refer also
back to Afghanistan, and how do you think our resources are
going to handle all of what we are getting on our plate now?
Dr. Adams. Afghanistan is a good point of comparison. The
first point I wanted to make is that unlike the--on the war end
of this, unlike the first gulf war, we are not going to be
reimbursed substantially by the Germans, the Japanese, the
Saudis, or the Kuwaitis for the military exercise; so there is
a big difference that we will incur up front.
That point is really relevant, though, with respect to the
occupation issue that I raised in my testimony. I think it is
the expectation of the administration that at some point rather
like the Balkans, where the Europeans provide 80 percent of the
forces occupying the theater, or in Afghanistan where a
substantial augmentation of European participation has happened
in the force presence in the theater, it is not my impression
that the European countries who are in the position to provide
such forces for these purposes are likely to step in and fill
the void militarily after the war is over.
And if you count on a substantial occupation being
required, building a set of expectations that say the Germans
and the French and the British, in particular, will step in and
pick up the American military occupation role, I think is a
totally unreliable expectation. And that is for two reasons. I
do think, there, New York makes a difference. There is going to
be an uneasiness about that.
A second reason, those countries have, in some cases,
colonial history in this country, which makes them reluctant to
engage forces in that theater.
And third, all of those countries, but especially the
British, are going to be stretched. Their conventional force--
Army capability to become an occupying force over a long time
is already significantly stretched by the Balkans and
Afghanistan. So expecting them to then provide a very large
force to occupy Iraq is, I think, an expectation well beyond
what we can actually see happen in the region.
The other question that I wanted to raise has to do with
international organizations; and I endorse what Eric Schwartz
was saying about the large water-bearing will be done here by
the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, not by bilateral
donors to the reconstruction piece of the task in Iraq.
We will have a harder time with governance support. That
may be on our hook, most of it, if not all of it. And the
other--in reconstruction, the other point just to make is that
I do expect something, though, I do not know how much out of
the European Union. The European Union has been a participant
in other exercises in Gaza and the West Bank, for example. They
have been willing to come in and provide substantial resources.
And the Europeans, because of the colonial history, will
probably find it preferable to divert their activity through
the EU than to come in on a bilateral basis.
So the oil fields, I think Dr. Marr is correct, there is
substantial, already defined, and probable reserves in this
country. However, the $30 billion or $40 billion that the Baker
Institute estimates it would take to actually go in, explore
and develop those fields, build the infrastructure to pump it,
build the infrastructure to move it down pipelines, build the
infrastructure to refine it and prepare it for export, all of
that is going to take 5 to 10 years minimal. So, it is not a
source of revenue that is going to come on stream quickly.
Senator Chafee. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
Senator Brownback.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
thank the panel members for being here and their presentation.
I want to make two notes, if I could. One is that I agree
with a couple of the panel members and their comments about
that we need to move toward civilian control as quickly as
possible, and I think we have--the chairman has held hearings
about this point previously. We have had a number of hearings
in the past Congress about various opposition groups, the Iraqi
National Congress and others that are working--as a matter of
fact are in northern Iraq today--have convened meetings in
northern Iraq.
The northern Iraq is operated now by a civilian authority.
The Kurds are operating in northern Iraq. And so I think there
is a good basis to build off of that I would hope we would
build and gauge quickly in the process of moving to Iraqi
control that Dr. Marr was talking about, that you have a
mixture some of military and civilian for a period of time, but
you quickly move to that civilian Iraqi control.
There are very, very qualified people and this is going to
be able to make a move that I think will be very well received,
and I do not think a military oversight will be particularly
well-received over a long period of time or we have a capacity
to do that. I would hope that the State Department would help
in the funding of these opposition groups and get those funds
out now, in building them up to be able to get that done.
The second point is, is that I want to take us a little bit
back to the big picture that President Bush addressed at the
AEI speech that he gave about 10 days ago. And I appreciate
your thoughts--I do not agree with all of them. I appreciate
the thoughts and spirit it is put forward with and your
analysis that you have created with it, but when he gave that
speech, he was talking about the big picture that he actually
had addressed not this State of the Union, but the State of the
Union before, when he talked about the ``axis of evil,'' which
was the statement everybody latched on to.
He also talked about pushing for democracy, human rights,
religious freedom everywhere in the world, and that would
include within this region of the world where Iraq is located.
You have a number of countries in that region who are not
democracies, do not respect human rights, do not respect
religious freedom or tolerance. Indeed, they all go the exact
opposite of that.
And we have been supporting a number of countries in this
region that have not, and their populations have generally been
very restive underneath them. I think there are a fair number
of experts that believe that--that is a big part of the problem
in the region is we have not stood by our basic principles. We
stand for liberty. We stand for human rights. We stand for
these principles and we have not pushed them in this region as
we have in other regions before.
And I think what President Bush was saying in that AEI
speech was, ``Let us look at the big principles of what we
stand for and what could happen down the road if this effort is
successful in Iraq.'' And that Iraq is a very likely place for
this to succeed.
Undoubtedly, it takes a long period of time. Undoubtedly,
it is also costing us a great deal that in this region there is
a dearth of democracy and human rights and religious freedom.
And undoubtedly, that is also contributing to our costs of
beefing up our interior defenses against terrorism, because
that is not the rule of order within that region.
So while I think there are clear costs associated with
this, and they are clearly going to be expensive costs, I would
hope that a fair amount of resources there, locally, could pay
for this--and there may be a question about over a period of
time whether that can take place or not, but I think there--we
are paying a huge cost for the destabilizing nature of what is
taking place in this region today.
And I hope as you appraise these issues, you would also
look at the current costs that we are going--and not just the
operation, the ``no-fly zones,'' the areas that we are
currently going, but also what all we are doing to fight.
I have had experts that I have hosted that have said the
way you are going to have to deal with this is this way, to
work within the region and to sow those seeds of this type of
opportunity--democracy, human rights, religious freedom--into
the future.
I would hope you would use that in your appraisals as well,
as you look at the costs of this operation--that it is already
costing us a great deal of what is being done in some regions,
or this region of the world.
Would anyone care to respond?
Dr. Adams. I would be happy to respond to the Senator. I
think you make an excellent point.
Let me just touch on two aspects of it. One, I am not sure
that you were in the room when I talked about the cost of not
going in, of the costs of not dealing with Saddam Hussein, and
they are costs obviously of not dealing with Saddam Hussein
that we would have to think about as well. Whether it is
maintaining the force in the region or it is the costs of the
inspection process itself, of enforcing the inspection process
without going to war, costs of the war on terrorism, costs of
homeland security defense. All of those are very real.
And we are going to incur them and they--we may incur them
in greater amounts if we do not deal with Saddam Hussein and
his weapons of mass destruction.
The other question I want to raise, just to springboard off
what you said, which I think is critical, the touchstone in the
President's speech--and I think in what has been discussed in
the State Department is the wider regional issue, and how we
intend as a government to deal with not just Iraq, but what
will happen in the rest of the region, while we are there and
how we deal with that.
And I--let me just touch on three points. One is whether we
are well-received or poorly received, I suspect there is room
for a substantially enhanced program of public diplomacy in the
region, beyond what we have now committed to the region, either
to deal with backlash or with frontlash, to actually encourage
the kinds of changes that you are proposing.
Second, I gather there is some planning or thinking about a
region-wide Islamic world democratic initiative. That is an
additional resource consideration. It will cost more to do that
but I anticipate that may be the outgrowth of dealing with
Saddam Hussein and the weapons of mass destruction.
And the third question that we have generally stayed away
from, but is considered a touchstone of American policy in the
region, which is how we deal with the second intifada and the
issues between Israel and Palestine.
And if we get into a serious peace-making effort in--
between Israel and Palestine, which the rest of the region is
going to watch whether we do that or not; that, too, could,
from my perspective, have downstream resource implications in
terms of assistance programs, maybe even military presence that
we need to start thinking about as we look to long-term policy
region wide.
Mr. Schwartz. I want to talk first about the cost issue. I
have tried to be very, very clear that if there is a post-war
Iraq, our interests are vital, and we should spend whatever it
takes. And my only plea is that the administration start to
speak in greater detail and make the case so that we can get
the buy-in of the American people in what is going to be an
enormous commitment.
But it is a commitment we have to make. And my discription
of the numbers is not designed to scare. It is designed to make
clear that they are very high, which is all the more reason why
the American people need to be a part of the exercise at the
outset; so 4 or 5 years from now, we are still spending, as we
should be spending, large amounts of money, so we still have
support to do that.
Second, in terms of promoting democracy in the region, as
the former head of the White House office that dealt with
democracy and human rights, Senator, I am very well aware of
your efforts on these issues, which I think are exemplary. For
the advocates for human rights and democracy within the former
administration, you were very helpful in ways that you probably
do not even know, in terms of internal administration debates.
Promoting democracy and human rights has to be an important
objective of U.S. foreign policy, not only in the Middle East,
but everywhere in the world. Good governance helps us--we deal
better with governments that are democratic and the threats
that we face are far less severe.
I would just make three caveats. Without making any
judgments, the first thing I would say is that concerns have
been expressed by those who support our position at the U.N.
that making the democratic argument, the argument that we need
to go in because we need to change this regime, has hurt our
diplomacy at the U.N. Because at the U.N., we are arguing
international law, that Saddam is not complying with U.N.
resolutions on weapons of mass destruction, and that is the
reason why we need to go to war.
And other governments question whether upholding U.N.
resolutions is the reason we are planning for war. They say
that is not really what we are about. They claim that is a
pretext for other objectives. So I am just raising the point
that this has created a complication in our diplomacy. And it
raises a question with which our diplomats have been grappling.
Second, I think there is the basic question of when do you
use force to impose democracy. And I am one who believes there
are times when you have to use force to promote human rights,
even in circumstances where your legal authority is uncertain.
But I think one has to have a clear idea of when the use of
force for that purpose is and is not appropriate, because it is
certainly not appropriate everywhere, but there are places
where it is. And I think Iraq raises that question.
And the third question, I think Phebe can talk much more
smartly about this, is just--to use the President's words--how
humble we need to be when we are trying to impose these sorts
of reforms elsewhere. That is not an argument for not trying,
but it is an argument for being careful about how one directs
one's efforts.
And I think those are factors which are important to
consider. And before I give up the mike, if I can just say one
word on the Afghanistan point, because I did not address it,
that I think it is important. I do think there is an issue of
declining U.S. interest in Afghanistan. It is clear--and I
think we need to be very careful about it--that there is
sentiment in the administration that Afghanistan does not
matter the way Iraq matters. And as a result, we may see
implications for future funding.
And I think that is something that should be of great
concern to members of this committee and to the Senate.
Ms. Mitchell. I would just echo that last point by Eric. It
is very difficult these days for humanitarian organizations to
get the attention of the administration on Afghanistan, where
there continues to be serious security concerns in the
distribution of aid--so more attention for sure.
On the issue of human rights, I mean, clearly there are few
regimes in the world most unworthy of ruling than Saddam
Hussein. The 30 years of brutal, brutal human rights and
humanitarian law violations that have been bestowed on the
population over time have left tremendous effects.
And these human rights violations will not stop the day the
regime falls. We have to deal with the past crimes. Again,
where is the plan for that? Where is the plan for dealing with
these past violations?
And we also need to work very hard in order to promote the
human rights of the Iraqi civilians. The American Government if
it goes into Iraq again will be bound by the fourth Geneva
Convention, which sets forth those responsibilities. They are
to protect the civilians and include the protection of their
rights.
We have not seen a lot about how that is going to be done.
It is going to have to be a very proactive strategy. You have
to buildup confidence very quickly as an incoming force to
protect the civilians.
Presumably, hopefully, they will all embrace American
soldiers. We do not want any casualties, for sure. But that
means getting out of the Humvees and talking to the local
leaders and engaging them and having a proactive strategy. This
is not something the American military is traditionally great
at doing.
They are trained in a different manner. This is why the
humanitarian community has such an important role in these
areas. We work with these local communities. We can assist in
rebuilding those bridges and rebuilding their confidence, but
we have to do so that is seen as being independent and
impartial from military forces.
On the issue of protecting human rights, and I think it is
something that is important for you all to know, which is that
if the United States intervenes in Iraq, there will be areas of
Iraq that will be more stable than others. In areas where it is
a very destable environment--unstable, where the risks of
civilians are at greatest risk, there may be a need for strong
military control in those areas.
We should not be shy of that. Sometimes the only way to
protect civilians is with some sort of military rule for a very
short defined transparent period of time. And here I am
thinking of Kirkuk in particular, which could be a very
volatile situation.
Again, we have been asking the administration for months
now what are the plans for these volatile areas? How are you
going to protect communities, individuals, specific groupings
of people that today are in power that tomorrow will be victims
and will be very vulnerable? They will be perceived to have
been collaborators and perpetrators of 30 years of abuses.
They need special protection plans. This is not--general
incarceration is not an option. I am talking about general
protection plans, working with the local community, instilling
trust.
USAID, the DART teams--the Disaster Assistance Response
Teams--the Office for Transition Initiatives, these parts of
the government should be coming up with ideas and plans for
this. This cannot fall on the military. It really is not fully
their role on some of these things.
They should be providing security, but reaching out and
building the confidence of the population will require much
more than what a military commander is going to be able to do,
given all of the other demands that will be put on that
person's shoulder, most particularly finding weapons of mass
destruction, which again I must reaffirm to you, we have no
plan.
There is no plan for what to do if weapons of mass
destruction are used in Iraq against the Iraqi population.
Thank you.
Senator Dodd. Can I just----
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Dodd. I wanted to ask you quickly about something.
What about protecting humanitarian workers, really? Has that
been thought about at all?
Ms. Mitchell. Well, the military has--you know, they have
this embedded procedure going on with journalists. It was
discussed many months ago with the humanitarian community, but
it is just not acceptable. I mean, we cannot go in and work
hand-in-glove with the military. We are not perceived as being
impartial and our security is too greatly at risk.
Presumably, the U.S. military, if it provides security to
areas, then we can operate. We do not need any additional
security measures, as long as we have ambient security in the
area.
Senator Dodd. But if you did not have that, you would not
be able to perform your functions?
Ms. Mitchell. It would be very much--Senator, it would be
very much a day-to-day type of calling. We work in some parts
of the world where there is no military and we are in a
conflict situation. It really is a call that is made on the
ground day-to-day.
Dr. Marr. Just a quick response on the democracy issue, I
do not remember whether you were here earlier when I said that
I, too, have a concern about leaving the current situation the
way it is, I consider Iraq a failing state. We all know about
Saddam and what he has done on the humanitarian side, but the
state itself is failing.
And, therefore, I, too, see that it is necessary to go in
and do something about this. There are costs also to letting
the current situation drag on.
I certainly agree with you on democracy and restructuring
and better governance in Iraq. I guess my fear here is that
this is going to require staying the course, but I am not sure
this requires years of a military presence, especially an
American military presence. What staying the course really
means is personnel and political involvement and pushing and
shoving this process when necessary.
I am concerned about two things on this. I am concerned
about the governance issue. I am also concerned about human
rights, but my colleague has already addressed that. The
retribution issue is numero uno on the day after. We have got
to be very careful about that.
It seems to me that before we select or favor any Iraqi
leaders, whether it is the INC or the outsiders or the insiders
or whatever, we really ought to be directed to creating a
process. The most important thing in Iraq is to a
constitutional process and the rule of law started.
Second, let us not forget that an important part of this
democracy process is political culture. It is not going to be
simply a matter of a vote and putting people in office, but
until you have tolerance and an ability to conduct yourself in
a democratic way, democracy is not going to come. That will
take a very long-term effort.
Incidentally, I feel very strongly about this in the rest
of the area as well. I want to come back to the textbooks and
education, with which I have a lot of familiarity. This area
needs improvement all over the region.
What you really need to work on is more openness, and a
change in the political culture. That simply is going to take a
long period of time. And I hope we will have the persistence to
stick with it.
Senator Brownback. I appreciate your comments and, Mr.
Chairman, your indulgence. What I have seen, though, is that we
have paid for a lack of being bold--humble, but bold in this
region for some period of time. And I think we are paying for
that, and no attention to textbooks may be within the region
that we are seeing in several places that are teaching in some
cases very hateful items.
I mean, people have to be taught peace as they are taught
war--or not necessarily taught, but they need to be encouraged
toward peace, as they are encouraged toward war. And I think we
have paid, and we continue to pay a huge price. And now the
President is trying to put upon a tack to actually solve the
problem, rather than some form of containment or continued
expansion of it. And it is going to be difficult, and it is
going to be expensive, but I think we are much better off to
solve it rather than to continue on with Band-Aids that do not
particularly work.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Brownback. I thank you
likewise for your patience as we have proceeded to ask our
witnesses ad seriatim to answer these questions. And they have
responded.
I just want to pick up one point, Dr. Marr. In describing
the geography of Iraq earlier on and the different types of
governance situations you might anticipate, you mentioned a
degree of self-government now going on by the Kurds.
This committee had a behind-closed-doors briefing on Turkey
last week, following the decision of the Turkish Parliament but
preceding the elections of this weekend. And first of all, I
just make the point that, despite all of our planning and our
timetables and what have you, other people in the world make
decisions in different ways.
Political parties, movements are formed, that are totally
beyond our control--sometimes beyond our comprehension. Because
the committee is trying to comprehend this better, we went to
school on Turkey last week. And that was helpful, because we
were not totally surprised by the events, nor I suspect were
you, of the three bielections over the weekend that came about
because of a flawed democratic system, one that is perceived by
the Turks as flawed. So they had re-runs in three situations,
which gave the presumptive leader, Mr. Erdogan, an opportunity
to enter the parliament, which he is going to do apparently,
and likewise, maybe to regroup the parliament but not
immediately. And he has indicated to a congressional visitor
and now to others, some of the thoughts that he has with regard
to the relationship.
Whatever they may be, they certainly impact upon the
northern part of the country. And that is why we are all
planning for Iraq; as you pointed out, as and each one of you
have reiterated, Iraq is a complex country. It is a big
country, with different kinds of governance situations, and
very different in the case of the north.
So I do not ask you for a comment today upon what is
speculative, because we all are watching that. But it is
something that we do need in our own planning, whether it be
over at the Pentagon or here or in our conversations back and
forth to consider. Because Turkey is a special situation, I
believe, given the north, the history of the Kurds, and the
interest of Turks perhaps in being in northern Iraq during this
reconstruction process, and whether we will be there along with
them, with a combination of Kurds, Turks, Americans, plus
whoever else comes in from the United Nations and the NGOs.
Does anyone have any thought that they want to express on
that issue? I am not really wanting to interrogate you, but
having raised it, you may be stimulated to answer. Dr. Marr.
Dr. Marr. Well, I do think it is extremely important and
very sensitive. There are two places where I think we really
might get flash points aside from removing Saddam in the
center, of course. One of them is the shi'a holy cities; the
other one is the Kurdish area.
My own proclivity is, to the greatest extent possible, to
keep the Turks and the neighbors out of Iraq. That may not be
possible because Turkey has such an intense interest there, but
we all know what the reaction will be with the Kurds; Turkey
exploiting the Turkomen minority is not very good.
The Turkomen minority is very well integrated in Iraq. They
do not have any particular separatist tendencies. They are
usually an educated class.
And as soon as the Turks come in, the Iranians and the Badr
Brigade, composed of exiled Iraqis are going to want to come
in. And frankly this is going to be very tough for us to
handle, because we are going to have to talk to the Turks. We
are going to have to talk to the Kurds--our friends the Kurds
as well. And maybe they will not get everything they want
either. But it is a very sensitive issue and we really do need
to address that.
If Turks go into Iraq, it is just going to set a very bad
precedent for keeping the territorial integrity of Iraq and
keeping other neighbors out, keeping them from interfering.
That has been one of the historic problems in Iraq. Every
neighbor has a group inside of Iraq that it can use to
manipulate its interests, and to the extent that we can exclude
that, it would be better.
The Chairman. Yes, Ms. Mitchell.
Ms. Mitchell. The Kurdish authorities since 1991--or the
Kurdish authorities in the north, have done a pretty good job
of rebuilding villages and putting administrative systems in
place. Certainly from a humanitarian perspective, there is more
capacity in the north to absorb population movements now than
there was then.
Our concern continues to be, though, that adequate security
measures be put in place for Kirkuk, which is potentially the
second largest oil reserves inside Iraq. Years and years of
forced population movements--Arabs living in there now that had
been put there by Saddam. They all left in 1991. They may leave
again. There may be a race then on Kirkuk, and how that
security situation can unfold can quickly start moving
populations around.
But I think that the Kurdish authorities, at least in our
meetings with them, have indicated that because they have more
of a system now in place, that they would be looking forward to
a role in a new national government and not an independent one.
The Chairman. Well, I thank you very much, and I
appreciate, again, the detail in which you have addressed these
problems. Senator Dodd may have had a similar experience, but
in Indiana this weekend on Saturday and Sunday, I addressed
almost continuously meetings of several thousands of people.
They were not there either to applaud or to protest; they
wanted information.
There is a yearning for information. That is what this
committee is trying to go to provide. What is Iraq? Who are the
people that are there? We are considering the impact of the
history of this situation, even as we now become tremendously
involved, and are likely to be for some time.
So all of the things that you are saying illuminate for my
constituents--for all of our constituents--the facts that they
want to have. And they are going to be a part of the argument
for a long time.
And this is what I have tried to stress today. This is not
the first time we will ever take up a supplemental
appropriation bill, if we take up one with regard to Iraq. It
is likely to go on and on, as those of you have been in the
budget business understand.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Well, Mr. Chairman, I thank you and I thank
our witnesses. I will sort of end where we began. This has been
tremendously instructive.
I thank you immensely for your preparation and for the work
that many of you have done for so many years in the related
areas that we talked about here today.
And I cannot help but express my sincere disappointment
that the administration saw fit not to participate this
morning. I do not know what the motivations may be, even from
people who are part of this committee who may have been against
the resolution the last fall. I was not one. I voted for it,
and I believe they made the right decision at the time.
But even for those who have been critics of the decision on
that resolution, I think there is a strong desire that once
this occurs, that we do it right in terms of the follow-on,
winning the peace as has been described the situation.
And to miss an opportunity here today to start to build the
kind of level of support and understanding of what this
involves, is a tremendously missed opportunity--we will have
more hearings but I do not know how many more we are going to
have once the actions starts in a sense. And then we are sort
of playing catch-up.
And I am just terribly disappointed that they decided not
to be--there may have been tough questions, maybe some awkward
questions, but that is the nature of democracy. At times, we
are going to be trying to instruct a part of the world that has
very little of it. And it seems to me on the very issue of
whether or not there is going to be support here under
democratic institutions for the level of backing and support
necessary to give Iraq a chance in the post-Saddam period to
survive is not terribly instructive of how democracy may work.
So I thank the chairman for these very, very helpful
hearings. I learned a lot here this morning. And I thank all of
you. And I suspect we are going to be calling on you, again, to
give us your insights and observations as we move forward here.
I just hope that maybe there are some people within the
administration who listened carefully to what you had to say
today. Certainly, it has been helpful to us here on this side
of the dais. It could have been tremendously helpful as well
for people inside the administration to hear your pleas to get
going. We are losing time here. You have got to start now. You
have got to get involved in this. You need to involve the
international community.
Whatever differences may have existed over wordings or
resolution at the United Nations, there ought to be a second
track ongoing to know how we are going to work together, to see
to it that the people of Iraq deserve far better than they have
had for the last 30 years.
So, I thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, likewise. I hope our colleague,
Senator Biden, has an opportunity to listen to all of this too,
because he will have enjoyed it.
And with that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee adjourned, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
----------
Additional Statements Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Senator Jon S. Corzine
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the distinguished panelists for
sharing their wisdom with us on a topic that promises to be one of the
most important that this committee will face this year.
Victory in Iraq, we all acknowledge, cannot be defined as simply
overthrowing Saddam Hussein. We will not have won the war in Iraq until
we successfully put the pieces of the country back together when the
fighting is over.
And by some measures, beating Saddam will be the easy part. It
would be a colossal mistake to underestimate the far-reaching national
security implications of an ineffective, haphazard, or poorly
considered reconstruction effort.
I regret that the administration is not here today to discuss some
of the many concerns that this committee has relating to the
reconstruction of Iraq. Up until now, for example, the administration
has been unwilling to suggest how much post-conflict reconstruction
might cost. Clearly, many difficult to predict variables factor into
the ultimate costs, but getting a range of estimates should not be
nearly as much trouble as it has been to date.
Providing cost estimates is not a trifling matter. The Congress
must assure that sufficient resources are being earmarked for
reconstruction activities because the risks of failure in post-conflict
Iraq are tremendous. And unless the American people are cognizant of
the costs we expect to encounter, it will be much more difficult to
maintain support for this important, but expensive effort in the
future.
Substantial sums will need to be provided to support peacekeeping
efforts and attempts to restore civil society. Without these
initiatives, Iraq could splinter into warring factions and plunge the
region into further turmoil. This in turn could lead to military
intervention by neighboring countries, including Turkey and Iran, and
upset the regional balance of power. To avoid an ad hoc or ill-
conceived approach to reconstruction later, it's important now--before
the fighting starts--to consider the costs that we are likely to face.
Ultimately, America's success in reconstructing Iraqi society will
be directly related to the quality of life enjoyed by the Iraqi people,
economically and politically.
Ideally, by creating a strong, democratic Iraq, we will help
overcome one of the main difficulties the United States faces in the
Middle East: its image problem. A Gallup poll conducted between
December 2001 and January 2002 in Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, found that 53% of
people polled had an unfavorable opinion of the United States.
America's future in the Middle East presents a forked road. If we
are unwilling or unable to provide the level of humanitarian assistance
and other support that Iraq desperately needs, the United States could
undermine its credibility in the region for generations to come,
bolstering efforts by foreign terrorist organizations to gain further
strength and making meaningful relations in that part of the world
unattainable. However, if a prosperous, democratic Iraq flourishes, it
will pay dividends to American security for our children and beyond.
______
Prepared Statement of Bernice Romero, Deputy Director of Policy and
External Affairs, Oxfam America
Following please find analysis in response to recent Administration
announcements around its humanitarian planning for Iraq.
Oxfam continues to believe that war in Iraq should be avoided due
to the humanitarian consequences that may result. The best way to avoid
humanitarian consequences is to find a diplomatic alternative to the
current crisis.
However, if military action does take place, the international
community must be prepared to meet humanitarian needs and protect the
rights of civilians. Any warring party in conflict has obligations to
protect civilians under international humanitarian law and the Geneva
Conventions. This obligation will apply to the U.S. and coalition
forces in the event of military action against Iraq.
The White House has outlined 6 principles that will frame its
relief efforts in Iraq: minimizing civilian displacement and damage to
civilian infrastructure; relying on civilian relief agencies;
committing to effective civil-military coordination; facilitating the
operations of international organizations and NGOs; pre-positioning
relief supplies, and supporting the resumption of the ration
distribution system.
Drawing on recent analysis by Refugees International (``U.S.
Announces Intention to Rely on Civilian Relief Agencies for
Humanitarian Response in Iraq,'' February 27, 2003) and our own
experience, Oxfam America raises the following concerns about the
ability to live up to these principles:
Minimizing civilian displacement and damage to civilian
infrastructure: Because Iraq is an urbanized country with concentrated
population centers an effective military strike is likely to produce
significant damage to civilians. For example, Iraq's electrical grid
supports water treatment and sewage facilities for the majority of the
population. Any disruption of power could leave half of Iraq's
population without access to clean water, making them vulnerable to
diseases such as diarrhea, cholera and respiratory infections. In fact,
this was the cause of the greatest number of deaths in the last Gulf
War. Millions of Iraqi civilians already lack access to safe water and
sanitation. Oxfam has called on the U.S. to avoid targeting civilian
infrastructure and using indiscriminate weapons such as landmines and
cluster bombs.
Reliance on civilian relief agencies: U.S. policy in the run-up to
the war will make this commitment difficult to realize. The fact is:
the U.S. government has not facilitated the conditions that would allow
U.S. humanitarian agencies to prepare an adequate response to a
humanitarian crisis in Iraq.
U.S. sanctions law requires humanitarian agencies to have U.S.
government licenses that permit them to operate in Iraq and some
surrounding areas. Although many U.S. humanitarian groups have been
trying to obtain licenses since last year, significant delays in the
licensing process have prevented them from conducting the humanitarian
assessments and pre-positioning that would allow them to prepare for a
significant humanitarian response. Even those humanitarian agencies
that received grants from the U.S. government to work in Iraq were
delayed for months by the licensing process. In response to NGO
pressure, new expedited processes were announced recently. They are
welcome but it is still too early to tell whether they will be
effective or whether they have come in time to allow adequate
preparedness before military action.
The U.S. has also weakened the possibility of a civilian-led relief
effort by placing the office for the reconstruction of Iraq within the
Department of Defense. While the Administration argues that this is
simply to facilitate civil-military planning and communications, doing
so sends the message to NGOs and others that the Pentagon--not
civilians--will be in control of post-conflict Iraq.
The U.S. is staffing the largest Disaster Assistance Response Team
(DART) in U.S. history for deployment to Iraq. DARTS work closely with
NGOs and UN agencies to implement humanitarian assistance programs. In
the case of Iraq, few international NGOs are present and UN personnel
are largely limited to overseeing the oil for food program. Given this
vacuum and the licensing problems described above, it is difficult to
imagine how a relief effort will be civilian led.
Under these conditions, the military may have the only real
capacity to meet humanitarian needs. Problems may emerge around the
effectiveness and appropriateness of the aid provided, and the blurred
lines between military actors and civilian humanitarian actors may
affect humanitarian principles of impartiality, endangering NGO staff.
Oxfam continues to insist that as soon as security allows, relief and
reconstruction efforts must fall under U.N. leadership that is not
subordinate to U.S. government or military bodies.
Effective civil-military coordination: The U.S. is supporting
offices and positions in the region that will serve to facilitate
information exchange and planning between civilian and military
institutions. U.S. officials have pointed to USAID as an appropriate
interface between the military and U.S. NGOs. However, the fact that
AID is part of the U.S. government--a belligerent force in the
potential conflict--is unacceptable to some NGOs concerned that their
efforts be perceived as impartial. Oxfam and other humanitarian
agencies have been calling for the U.N. to serve as the interface to
ensure impartiality and needs-based relief efforts.
While Pentagon officials have met with the U.S. NGO community, they
have failed to share details of U.S. humanitarian planning. In fact,
promises to declassify plans and share them with U.S. NGOs have not
been met. Meetings with both the USAID and military apparatus have
provided forums for limited information exchange and have not met
planning or coordination purposes.
Facilitating the operations of international organizations and
NGOs: Due to their opposition to the war, U.S. allies have failed to
fund U.N. agencies' humanitarian preparedness. As of February, the U.N.
had received only $40 million of the $123 million it said was needed to
run a three-month relief operation in Iraq. In addition, few U.S. NGOs
have received U.S. government grants at present for humanitarian
preparedness and relief in Iraq. Until only recently, U.S. NGOs were
told that funds were unavailable.
Pre-positioning supplies: The U.S. has stockpiled emergency
supplies for one million people. The pre-positioning pales in
comparison to the level of need. To put the number in perspective:
nearly 16 million people rely on the oil for food distribution system.
The U.S. is also stockpiling nearly 3 million Humanitarian Daily
Rations, meal packets like those dropped by air in Afghanistan. In the
case of Afghanistan, the U.S. spent $40 million on food airdrops that
weighed 6,000 tons--equivalent to $7.50 per kilo. The parcels were the
same color as cluster bombs, and their contents were not tailored to an
Afghan diet. Not surprisingly, they met the needs of only a fraction of
the civilian population. By comparison, the average cost per kilo of
food provided by the World Food Program was 20 cents, and its provision
of wheat, oil, and sugar was designed to meet the long-term, everyday
cooking needs of the local population. Humanitarian Daily Rations are
not the most appropriate or effective way to ensure relief.
Supporting the resumption of the food ration system: Because of the
significant dependence on this system, its preservation is essential.
The U.N. reports that household reserves in Iraq are expected to last
no more than six weeks and that 460,000 tons of food will be needed per
month--4 times the amount that was delivered during the crisis in
Afghanistan. Oxfam notes the U.S. commitment to supporting its quick
resumption of the program should it be disrupted by military action.
However, doing so will be a challenge; as outlined above, Iraq's
infrastructure is vulnerable and the system is run by local officials
who may flee during a military attack. Failure to resume the program
may put lives at risk.
Oxfam is encouraged that the U.S. government recognizes is
obligations to protect and assist civilians caught in any conflict in
Iraq. It is important that the discussion of the humanitarian costs of
war, and how to avoid them, is finally taking place. We remain
concerned, however, about the potential human costs of military action.
It is unclear that the necessary preparation and conditions are in
place to mitigate the worst effects on Iraqi civilians.