    [Senate Hearing 108-241]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                     S. Hrg. 108-241, Pt. 7

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2004

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 1050

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
    PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
                                 OTHER PURPOSES

                                   ----------

                                     PART 7

                                STRATEGIC FORCES

                                   ----------

                           MARCH 12; APRIL 2, 8, 2003

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                         2004--Part 7  STRATEGIC FORCES

                                                     S. Hrg. 108-241, Pt. 7

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2004

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 1050

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
    PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
                                 OTHER PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 7

                                STRATEGIC FORCES

                                   __________

                           MARCH 12; APRIL 2, 8, 2003

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
    JOHN McCAIN, Arizona                 CARL LEVIN, Michigan
    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma            EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
    PAT ROBERTS, Kansas                  ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
    WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado               JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
    JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama               JACK REED, Rhode Island
    SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine              DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
    JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada                  BILL NELSON, Florida
    JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri            E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
    SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia             MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
    LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina    EVAN BAYH, Indiana
    ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina       HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
    JOHN CORNYN, Texas                   MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
                        Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director
                 Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
                                     ------

                        Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

                        WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado, Chairman
    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma            BILL NELSON, Florida
    JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama               ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
    JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada                  JACK REED, Rhode Island
    LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina    E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
    JOHN CORNYN, Texas                   MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                        CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
                National Security Space Programs and Management
                                 march 12, 2003

                                                                       Page
    Teets, Hon. Peter B., Under Secretary of the Air Force and
      Director, National Reconnaissance Office.......................     4
    Ellis, Adm. James O., Jr., USN, Commander, United States
      Strategic Command..............................................    11
    Lord, Gen. Lance W., USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command....    34
    Cosumano, Lt. Gen. Joseph M., Jr., USA, Commanding General, U.S.
      Army Space and Missile Defense Command and U.S. Army Space
      Command........................................................    37
    Mayo, Vice Adm. Richard W., USN, Commander, Naval Network Warfare
      Command........................................................    42

    Department of Energy's Office of Environmental Management and Office of
                               Legacy Management
                                 april 2, 2003

    Roberson, Hon. Jessie Hill, Assistant Secretary of Environmental
      Management, Department of Energy...............................    77
    Owen, Michael W., Director, Office of Worker and Community
      Transition, Department of Energy...............................    87

                          Strategic Forces and Policy
                                 april 8, 2003

    Brooks, Hon. Linton F., Acting Administrator, National Nuclear
      Security Administration........................................   114
    Ellis, Adm. James O., Jr., USN, Commander, United States
      Strategic Command..............................................   130
    Beckner, Hon. Everet H., Deputy Administrator, Defense Programs,
      National Nuclear Security Administration.......................   150
    Smolen, Brig. Gen. Robert L., USAF, Director, Nuclear and
      Counterproliferation, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
      Air and Space Operations.......................................   155
    Young, Rear Adm. Charles B., USN, Director, Strategic Systems
      Programs, Department of the Navy...............................   159

                                     (iii)

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2004

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 2003

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS AND MANAGEMENT

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Wayne Allard
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Inhofe, Allard,
    Sessions, Reed, Bill Nelson, and E. Benjamin Nelson.
        Majority staff members present: L. David Cherington,
    counsel; Brian R. Green, professional staff member; Mary Alice
    A. Hayward, professional staff member; and Gregory T. Kiley,
    professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
    minority counsel; and Kenneth M. Crosswait, professional staff
    member.
        Staff assistants present: Leah C. Brewer, Andrew W.
    Florell, Jennifer Key, and Sara R. Mareno.
        Committee members assistants present: Jayson Roehl,
    assistant to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II, assistant to
    Senator Sessions; D'Arcy Grisier, assistant to Senator Ensign;
    Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Elizabeth
    King, assistant to Senator Reed; William K. Sutey and Douglas
    Bush, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant
    to Senator E. Benjamin Nelson; and Todd Rosenblum, assistant to
    Senator Bayh.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Allard. The Strategic Forces Subcommittee will come
    to order. This is the first subcommittee meeting for this year
    in this process; therefore, I just want to keep everything in
    the proper frame of mind and start on time. Bill Nelson is
    going to be a little bit late. We are going to make provisions
    for him to make his opening statement when he shows up. Senator
    Ben Nelson--we have two Nelsons on this committee; we will have
    to be careful--is here and ready to go on time. Thank you, Ben.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
        Senator Allard. Then I will make my opening comments. I
    know that the witnesses on the panels we have before us are
    extremely busy individuals. I think we do ourselves, and we do
    them all, a favor if we can stay on schedule, so I am going to
    try and move things along.
        The hearing will come to order. We meet today to receive
    testimony on the space programs of the Department of Defense. I
    want to note that this is the first hearing that I will chair
    with Senator Bill Nelson as the ranking member. Senator
    Nelson--I will welcome him when he shows up--I know you share
    my keen interest in space issues. I look forward to working
    with you and your staff.
        I am also pleased to welcome the witnesses on our first
    panel--the Honorable Peter Teets, Under Secretary of the Air
    Force, and Admiral James Ellis, Commander, United States
    Strategic Command. Thank you both for taking time out of your
    very busy schedules to join us here today.
        These are extraordinary times. Our Nation faces
    extraordinary threats. The importance of this hearing rests on
    the fact that the capabilities embodied in our space systems
    are absolutely essential in facing and, if necessary, defeating
    those threats. Space systems are critical to our military for
    intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, early warning,
    navigation, communications, weather prediction, and,
    increasingly, to force application.
        When our military was called upon to engage al Qaeda and
    Taliban forces in Afghanistan, our forces acted swiftly and
    with maximum efficiency and effectiveness. Our forces were
    engaged in October 2001, and, by November, most of the combat
    was over, the enemy was routed, and Afghanistan was liberated.
    We could not have done this without precision munitions, and
    many of these munitions now rely on signals from the Global
    Positioning System (GPS) to help guide them to their targets.
    For example, a special operations soldier would provide
    coordinates of a target provided by GPS to a pilot in a nearby
    aircraft. The pilot, whose own location is precisely known
    because of GPS, would download those target coordinates to its
    precision weapon. After the pilot released his weapon, the
    weapon would receive GPS updates to prevent any drift away from
    the target, the target would be destroyed, and special
    operations forces and the Northern Alliance fighters would then
    move on to the next objective.
        None of that sequence would have been possible without the
    capabilities of our space assets and the support of the young
    men and women who build, launch, and operate these systems.
    Precisely because they are so valuable, the military services
    and we, in Congress, have a special obligation to assure that
    the systems, operations, people, and management processes that
    undergird these capabilities are healthy and sound. It is a
    long and complex road to provide these capabilities. We must
    develop, acquire, launch, operate, and sustain these systems,
    and train our young men and women to do so. We face challenges
    in all of these areas.
        We are all aware that space programs have not had an
    unblemished record of successful development. Indeed, last
    year, one of the witnesses on our second panel, General Lord,
    contended that all of his major space-development programs were
    broken. These problems arose over a long period of time and had
    multiple causes. The inherently difficult challenges of the
    harsh and unforgiving space environment, the complexity of the
    technology, the atrophy of space expertise in the Department of
    Defense and the military services, and a set of
    counterproductive incentives imposed by the Pentagon's
    acquisition system--many of these causes have been recognized
    for some time. For example, the 2001 Report of the Commission
    to Assess United States National Security Space Management and
    Organization stated, ``The Department of Defense is not yet on
    course to develop the space cadre the Nation needs.'' Many of
    my friends in the space community believe that this problem had
    its roots in decisions taken over a decade ago.
        To address these challenges, I know that Under Secretary of
    Defense Aldridge and Under Secretary Teets have instituted a
    number of changes to improve program coordination, management,
    and oversight. I will be interested in exploring how these new
    processes are working.
        To address personnel inadequacies, Congress mandated in the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 that
    the Secretary of the Air Force establish a space career field
    to enhance the service's ability to develop space doctrine,
    concepts of operation, space systems, and operations-based
    systems. I know all the services have been addressing space
    personnel needs. Again, I will be looking forward to
    determining how much progress has been made and what further
    congressional steps might be necessary to encourage a more
    rapid reconstitution of these vital skills.
        Finally, I am very much interested, given the problems many
    of our space efforts have faced in the past, in exploring the
    fiscal year 2004 budget request. I note, with some concern,
    that several advanced efforts appear to be delayed compared to
    schedules we saw last year, including the next-generation
    global positioning satellite and the space-based infrared
    system. I know we will certainly discuss these issues today.
        Once again, I want to welcome our witnesses. When Senator
    Nelson arrives, I will recognize him. In the meantime, I will
    recognize Senator Ben Nelson, if he has any questions or
    comments.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First of all, I appreciate your scheduling this hearing
    today. Obviously, the issues that are before this subcommittee
    are extremely important to the national defense. I welcome, of
    course, my good friend, Admiral Ellis, here today. I think he
    is a brave man, leaving the banana belt of weather--[Laughter.]
        --to come back to Washington, DC, where the weather roles
    have been reversed with Nebraska. I escape, too, on weekends,
    because it has been rather mild there compared to here.
        I appreciate very much, Admiral Ellis, your willingness to
    come on this occasion, and, I think, a couple of more occasions
    over the next several weeks, to talk about the role that
    Strategic Command plays in the national defense of our country.
        Secretary Teets, it is nice to have you back and have this
    opportunity to learn more about what is happening within DOD in
    dealing with the threats that we deal with in space.
        Mr. Chairman, that is my opening statement, and I suspect
    that you have some questions you would like to ask, and, at the
    appropriate time, I will be happy to entertain mine.
        Senator Allard. Okay, Senator Ben Nelson, I will go ahead
    and call on the panel to make some remarks. When the ranking
    member shows up, we will stop your testimony and ask him to
    give a few opening remarks.
        Secretary Teets and Admiral Ellis, we will let you proceed,
    and we will start with Secretary Teets. I appreciate your
    joining us. I appreciate your service to the country, both of
    you. I would like to compliment you both on what I feel is a
    good job. We look forward to continuing to work with you in a
    positive way.
        Secretary Teets.

     STATEMENT OF HON. PETER B. TEETS, UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR
           FORCE AND DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

        Secretary Teets. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
    thank you for the opportunity to come before your subcommittee
    today.
        I would also like to say I am honored to sit on a panel
    with Admiral Ellis. I have gotten to know Admiral Ellis over
    the course of this last year reasonably well. He is a person of
    the highest integrity and capability, and it is an honor for me
    to be present with him.
        As you said in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, never
    has there been a time, really, when our national security space
    systems have been as important or critical to our warfighting
    efforts and also our ability to collect intelligence from
    space. I feel that in this kind of an environment, it is
    terribly important that we properly resource space systems,
    operations, and acquisitions, as well, and that we properly
    develop a future that will allow us to continue to take
    advantage of our asymmetric advantage that we have with our
    space assets.
        I am pleased to say that if we look at the President's 2004
    budget and if we look at it from a virtual major-force-program
    point of view, there is something on the order of an 18-percent
    growth in the President's 2004 budget request from that which
    was appropriated in fiscal year 2003. I think that is a very
    appropriate increase.
        We have spent the course of this last year working hard to
    focus on leadership and focus on joint organization, if you
    will, across national-security space, an organization that
    would allow us to have insight and knowledge of what is going
    on in the space world in not only the Air Force, but also in
    the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps. Frankly, it is also
    important for us to bridge across the intelligence community
    because the lines of distinction between military warfighting
    space systems and intelligence gathering systems are certainly
    becoming blurred.
        As a result, I think we have made some good progress, but
    there is much left to be done. I have established, for this
    coming year, a list of some eight priorities, and I have
    submitted a written statement to the subcommittee, which I hope
    to have entered into the record.
        Senator Allard. Without objection, so ordered.
        Secretary Teets. I thought I would just take a couple of
    minutes here to just quickly tick through those eight items
    that we are focusing effort on and which I do believe that the
    President's 2004 budget supports.
        The first item on the list is to ensure success in our
    mission operations because of the criticality of it. This year
    represents an extremely important year for space operation. We
    have scheduled some 14 space launches this year, and they need
    to be conducted with great success. I am pleased to report to
    you that this year we have already had three successful space
    launch missions. The most recent launch was earlier this week,
    when a Delta 4 Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)
    successfully launched our DSCS satellite, and that is going
    well.
        The second priority is to fully integrate space operations
    into warfighting and national intelligence collection
    capabilities, and that is an ongoing effort. We are better
    integrated today than we have ever been, but we have more
    progress to make on that score.
        Third, I do have a focus on getting our space acquisition
    programs back on track. I know you mentioned that we have had
    some difficulty in space acquisitions, and that is true. We
    have made some significant progress, I think, in changing the
    way we are acquiring space systems, and we are making progress
    there. We need to continue to focus on that effort.
        Next is a drive, on my part, frankly, to pursue
    operationally responsive assured access to space. Assured
    access to space is critical for these systems that we are
    talking about, and I am fully supportive of the concept that we
    have for two independent-as-possible, expendable launch
    vehicles. At the same time, I would recognize that those EELVs,
    while more operationally responsive than any before them, are
    still not operationally responsive enough to really support
    ongoing future warfighting kinds of operations.
        You mentioned, in your remarks, the desire to develop this
    team of space professionals. I share that belief and have
    placed a strong focus on that. General Lord, whom you will hear
    from a little bit later, is putting the final touches right now
    on a professional space strategy, which will allocate
    resources, which will define precisely how the space cadre will
    be developed within the Air Force. But this development of the
    space cadre goes beyond Air Force channels; it also goes to
    Navy, Army, Marine Corps, and, frankly, intelligence-community
    capabilities, as well, and I think we have a wonderful
    opportunity to build a very professional team of space
    professionals.
        The next priority is to pursue innovative capabilities. We
    will spend significant amounts of money on research and
    development in the search for breakthrough technologies, which
    can continue to build our asymmetric advantage.
        Because of the value of these space assets, I do believe
    the time has come for us to also put some focus on enhancing
    our space control capabilities. When I say ``space control,'' I
    really mean, first of all, space situational awareness, an
    awareness of whether or not our space assets are under attack.
    I also mean defensive countermeasures, and, yes, I think it is
    time to start thinking about offensive countermeasures, as
    well.
        Last, I would conclude with my eighth priority, which is, I
    think, a strong need to focus our space, science, and
    technology resources and programs. It turns out that there is a
    lot of activity going on in space research and technology in a
    lot of different organizations. AFRL, Air Force Research
    Laboratory, has a strong program. Out at the NRO, we have an
    advanced systems and technology directorate that is doing some
    wonderful research in technology. The Defense Advanced Research
    Projects Agency (DARPA) has more activity going now in the
    space arena than they have had in years, and we need to embrace
    that. Of course, the Naval Research Laboratory does some great
    work.
        In addition, we are finding ways to build partnerships with
    NASA. NASA does some wonderful, innovative, and creative work
    in the space/science arena that we need to also make ourselves
    aware of. So that last item, as I say, is to focus space
    science and technology resources in the program.
        With that, sir, I will conclude. I thank you, again, for
    the opportunity to be here, and I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Teets follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Hon. Peter B. Teets

                                  INTRODUCTION

        It is my distinct honor to appear before the subommittee today
    representing the world's greatest air and space force, and to join my
    operational counterpart regarding space activities, Admiral James
    Ellis, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command. You have previously heard
    from the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff about the
    state of affairs of the Air Force as a whole. The ``Top 4'' of the Air
    Force--the Secretary, the Chief of Staff, the Vice Chief and I--are of
    one mind regarding our collective vision of a total air and space force
    providing global reconnaissance and strike across the full spectrum of
    operations in the service of this great nation. Given the focus of this
    committee, and my role in overseeing National Security Space activities
    as Under Secretary of the Air Force and Director of the National
    Reconnaissance Office (NRO), I will concentrate my remarks today on the
    eight priorities I have set for our National Security Space efforts for
    2003. These priorities serve to shape the fiscal year 2004 budget for
    our space programs, and--as they are all important to our space
    efforts--they do not have any particular ranked order. They are: (1)
    ensure mission success in space operations, (2) fully integrate space
    capabilities for warfighting and national intelligence, (3) get space
    acquisition programs on track, (4) pursue operationally responsive
    assured access to space, (5) develop a team of space professionals, (6)
    pursue innovative capabilities for national intelligence and defense
    priorities, (7) enhance space control capabilities, and (8) focus space
    science and technology resources and programs.

             SECTION 1--ENSURE MISSION SUCCESS IN SPACE OPERATIONS

        Our space assets now are more important to warfighters, more
    important to the intelligence community, and more important to our
    ability to win current and future conflicts, than they ever have been
    before. Space capabilities are integral to modern warfighting forces.
    They provide critical surveillance and reconnaissance information,
    especially over areas of high risk or denied access for airborne
    platforms. They provide weather and other space and earth-observation
    data, global communications, missile warning, precision navigation, and
    guidance to troops on the ground, ships at sea, aircraft in flight, and
    weapons en route to targets. All of these space capabilities enable the
    tremendous success our joint warfighters achieve during combat
    operations.
        To support these critical national security activities, ensuring
    mission success in space operations is of vital importance--and we
    anticipate a very busy year for national security space operations. We
    have 12 national security space launches scheduled for 2003, compared
    to only 1 conducted in 2002. In addition to activities at launch bases,
    this increased launch rate leads to a heightened state of readiness at
    our ground stations, additional initial on-orbit checkout and
    housekeeping functions, and greater challenges to integrate those 12
    new spacecraft into existing constellations. These launch operations
    include actions to sustain military satellite communications with one
    Milstar and two Defense Satellite Communications Systems (DSCS)
    launches this year. The first of the two DSCS satellites was just
    launched this past Monday evening on board a Delta 4 EELV. We conducted
    a successful launch of a GPS IIR in January. We have two more IIR
    launches scheduled in 2003, and summer 2004 we will launch the first
    modernized GPS IIR-M. This new IIR-M will add new civil and military
    capabilities and is the first step towards improving GPS services to
    both the military and civil users. We also have a projected launch for
    the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) this summer as well
    as a Defense Support Program (DSP) satellite early next year, and, in
    addition to these launch activities, we continue to actively modernize
    and upgrade our launch and test ranges on both coasts. Concurrent with
    all of these activities is the critical need to keep on-orbit
    capabilities at peak performance. All of these events are vital to
    national security, and we will make every effort to ensure their
    success.

       SECTION 2--FULLY INTEGRATE SPACE CAPABILITIES FOR WARFIGHTING AND
                             NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

        There is a commonality between our intelligence collection
    activities and our warfighting needs. A good example is the Air Force's
    Space-Based Infrared System-High (SBIRS-High) satellite in development,
    which will replace the veteran DSP platform. It will perform the
    missile early warning mission, and also provide extremely valuable
    additional capabilities. SBIRS-High will have two very highly capable
    infrared sensors capable of collecting large amounts of information
    useful to the intelligence community. In addition, it will
    significantly contribute to the Theater Ballistic Missile warning
    mission.
        There is also a significant amount of information our
    constellations of NRO satellites collect on a daily basis that is
    crucial to warfighting operations. We have made great progress over the
    decades in expanding the range of those exploiting these space
    capabilities from a small set of strategic users to multiple Government
    agencies and virtually the entire warfighting force. But we need to do
    more. Our goals for improved integration include providing
    communications, environmental sensing, and precise position and timing
    information to support a ``common operational picture'' of the
    battlespace, and facilitating cross-platform command, control, and
    communications. One way we will accomplish this is through programs
    like the Combatant Commanders Integrated Command and Control (CCIC2S)
    Target System Architecture in Cheyenne Mountain, which will provide an
    integrated battle management system delivering a fused battlespace
    picture to strategic and theater decision-makers.

               SECTION 3--GET SPACE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS ON TRACK

        Our goal is to create an acquisition process that is both credible
    and agile. We have made progress in this direction with our new 03-01
    space acquisition policy, which I signed into interim guidance this
    month. This new process recognizes the inherent differences of space
    systems. It allows us to reduce our timeline, while maintaining the
    required depth of review. It enables us to manage risk by looking for
    challenges early on. It eliminates program management bureaucracy,
    giving our program managers the responsibility and the resources to
    manage their programs. We expect there will be some continuing risk in
    our programs. Our job is to manage those risks by giving our people the
    necessary tools and ability to do so.
        One tool we can give them is a world-class independent cost
    estimation capability. Our vision is to form a National Security Space
    Cost Assessment Team to provide a useful, accurate and timely
    independent cost estimate with common methodology in support of space
    acquisition. The team would consist of experts knowledgeable on the
    unique challenges facing space programs. The Director of the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG)
    and I are working together to accomplish this task. He has also agreed
    to lead the National Security Space Cost Estimating Team.
        Another valuable resource to reduce program risk is management
    reserve. We want to give our program managers the flexibility to meet
    the unknown challenges that arise in virtually every program. Such
    resources are not intended to meet unforeseen requirements, but to
    address technical challenges. This will enable us to provide greater
    stability in our programs, reducing risk and increasing our ability to
    deliver on time and on budget. Further, a dedicated, fenced reserve
    does not just help one program--it helps our entire portfolio of
    programs. Currently, we pull money from a stable program to solve
    problems in an unstable program, and then we ask for more money to fix
    the initially stable program. In other words, we will break one program
    just to fix another. This is not how a good business runs; we must make
    these changes or we will continue to experience delays, overruns, and
    instability in our acquisition programs.
        We have been successful in getting our major space programs back on
    track. The SBIRS-High program successfully completed its rebaselining
    in January 2003. In that program, stronger government oversight has
    replaced Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR), and Earned
    Value Management System (EVMS) enhancements have combined industry best
    practices with increased program office supervision. I personally chair
    a quarterly meeting with General Lance Lord (AFSPC/CC) and company
    presidents, ensuring consistent leadership involvement in the program.
    We have introduced contract improvements to more effectively reward
    positive performance, and added numerous new incentives for effective
    management, systems engineering, timely delivery of capabilities, and
    cost performance. While challenges still remain, I have much more
    confidence in SBIRS-High than I did a year ago.

       SECTION 4--PURSUE OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE ASSURED ACCESS TO SPACE

        Last year was a pivotal year for space launch--both of our new
    Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELV), the Atlas family and the
    Delta family, had their first successful launches in 2002. While I am
    encouraged by their success, each of our launch providers is suffering
    due to the current weakness in the commercial launch marketplace. Since
    maintaining two launch providers is critical to assuring access to
    space for our national security programs, we will continue to grow our
    EELV capability for near-term assured access. The Government has four
    EELV launches scheduled for calendar year 2003. We have budgeted $163.9
    million for assured access initiatives in fiscal year 2004, $538.8
    million across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), including: (1)
    infrastructure sustainment, which covers facilities, critical skills,
    maintenance, leases and supplier readiness; (2) critical component
    engineering, which improves reliability of critical components from
    common suppliers or components that have been historically problem or
    risk areas, (3) pre-post mission engineering, which provides new
    capabilities tools or resources to increase effectiveness of EELV
    practices and processes, and (4) RL-10 engine producibility, which
    involves investment to increase the producibility and reliability of
    the RL-10 engine, common to both the Atlas V and Delta IV vehicles.
        Our EELVs are the best expendable launch vehicles the world has
    ever seen, but they still lack the responsiveness necessary to ensure
    our ability to rapidly replenish critical on-orbit capabilities. Today
    we still talk about time on the launch pad in terms of weeks, perhaps
    months, to prepare a satellite for launch. If we intend to have
    operationally responsive assured access to space, we need to find ways
    to bring that cycle time from weeks and months down to hours and days.
    One way is to pursue simpler, lower-cost small expendable launch
    systems. Accordingly, we are pursuing $24.4 million for Operationally
    Responsive Spacelift in fiscal year 2004, $233.8 million across the
    FYDP, and are planning a lower-cost responsive spacelift technology
    demonstrator in fiscal year 2007.
        The other aspect of operationally responsive assured access to
    space comes in the form of reusable spacecraft, or reusable launch
    systems. I believe the Nation needs to embark on a course to an
    eventual fully reusable Single-Stage-to-Orbit launch capability. The
    capability may be a long way off, and there will certainly be
    intermediate steps, but we need to begin to chart the path now. I plan
    to engage NASA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, other
    DOD laboratories, and the broader space community in developing a
    technology roadmap to do just that. This roadmap will guide investing
    in a portfolio of research projects and technology demonstrations in
    propulsion, materials and structures, with increased funding beginning
    in fiscal year 2005.

                SECTION 5--DEVELOP A TEAM OF SPACE PROFESSIONALS

        I know that General Lance Lord considers developing the space
    workforce a high priority item at Air Force Space Command, and he is
    putting the finishing touches right now on his space professional
    strategy. I am confident we will see some excellent ideas, plans, and
    resources brought to bear on this issue.
        In the meantime, we have taken a number of steps within the Air
    Force to attract and retain top talent. We introduced a Critical Skills
    Retention Bonus for scientists and engineers, similar to the bonuses we
    offer pilots, to increase retention in those career fields. We are
    establishing new requirements for advanced education, including courses
    for all space professionals and advanced space training for specific
    mission areas. We are also using the Naval Postgraduate School and the
    Air Force Institute of Technology to build a joint program using the
    particular strengths of each school to allow space professionals to
    receive a graduate education spanning a broad spectrum of space
    activities.
        I also recognize these efforts are not and must not be limited to
    just Air Force personnel. We will need space professionals in all
    services and agencies--and in our civilian and industry workforce--to
    exploit space effectively in the interests of national security. I will
    encourage the other services and agencies to join us as we begin to
    build this initial ``space cadre.'' In doing so, we will actively
    engage with all the services to meet their mission and development
    needs.

    SECTION 6--PURSUE INNOVATIVE CAPABILITIES FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND
                               DEFENSE PRIORITIES

        One focus of this priority is on the development of breakthrough
    technologies that would produce new sources and methods for collecting
    intelligence. Our goal is transparency--we want the ability to see
    everything and know everything, while simultaneously denying our
    adversaries both the ability to do the same, and the knowledge that
    such capabilities are being used against them. We want to always be one
    step, or more, ahead of our adversaries--to be first to see, first to
    understand, and first to act. To achieve this ambitious goal, we look
    to technological advances to preserve our asymmetric advantage in
    information superiority against the full spectrum of threats and
    adversaries.
        In addition to the push for new sources and methods, we have two
    other very innovative, creative, technology-pushing initiatives
    underway. The first is the Transformational Communications Architecture
    (TCA). TCA will combine upcoming spaceborne communications systems
    (Advanced EHF, Wideband Gapfiller Satellite) with future systems
    (Transformational Satellite, or T-SAT) that will leverage new
    technologies such as laser communications and internet-based protocols
    to dynamically distribute communications amongst users. The ultimate
    goal is to remove SATCOM bandwidth and access as constraints on the
    warfighter. We anticipate this new architecture will increase available
    bandwidth from 10 to 100 times existing capacity--all of which will be
    essential to persistent ISR such as Space-Based Radar (SBR) and
    advanced Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). The President's budget
    includes $439 million for TCA in fiscal year 2004, $12.5 billion across
    the FYDP, with a T-SAT first launch targeted for calendar year 2009/
    fiscal year 2010.
        The second initiative is the SBR program, which will give
    warfighters the ability to surveil as well as reconnoiter deep into
    denied areas, day or night. SBR will be part of a larger mix of air,
    space, and ground ISR assets, all of which together have the potential
    to revolutionize warfighter command and control. In the budget, the
    $274.1 million for SBR in fiscal year 2004 continues technology risk
    reduction activities while completing concept definition, with $4.4
    billion across the FYDP in pursuit of a fiscal year 2012 first launch.

                 SECTION 7--ENHANCE SPACE CONTROL CAPABILITIES

        I described earlier how our space systems give our warfighters and
    intelligence analysts a very significant capability advantage. There is
    little doubt in my mind that our potential adversaries have taken note
    of this, and that, in the future, our space capabilities may be
    threatened by them. We must prepare to protect our advantage in space
    by developing space control capabilities.
        The first ingredient for successful control of space is awareness
    of the space environment: natural phenomena, spacecraft ``traffic,''
    and potential threats (whether natural or manmade) to our space
    systems. We have taken steps to increase our space situation awareness
    capabilities, including the standup of a Space Situation Awareness
    Integration Office in Air Force Space Command, and significant funding
    for space surveillance assets over the next 5 years. An example is our
    Space-Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) satellite program, which will
    augment ground-based space surveillance capabilities. The first launch
    of SBSS is planned for fiscal year 2006, accelerated 4 years earlier
    than in the fiscal year 2003 PB. We have also budgeted $134.8 million
    for the Air Force Spacetrack modernization program in fiscal year 2004,
    with $1.5 billion over the FYDP.
        Effective space control also requires protection of our space
    capabilities, a mission area we call Defensive Counterspace (DCS). An
    example of our efforts in this area is the Rapid Attack,
    Identification, Detection, and Reporting System (RAIDRS), planned for
    initial operational capability (IOC) in fiscal year 2008. RAIDRS will
    enable detection, reporting, identification, location, and
    classification of attacks against valuable space assets.
        Achieving effective space control also requires us to think about
    denying the high ground to our adversaries through Offensive
    Counterspace (OCS). With the integration of space capabilities across
    the spectrum of our own warfighting operations, we have been paving the
    road of 21st century warfare, and others, cognizant of the asymmetric
    advantages our space systems give us, will soon follow. We currently
    have two OCS projects underway. The first is the Counter Communication
    System (CCS), a capability intended to disrupt satellite-based
    communications used by an enemy for military C3, and scheduled for
    first delivery in fiscal year 2004. The second is the Counter
    Surveillance Reconnaissance System (CSRS), intended to impair an
    enemy's ability to obtain targeting, battle damage assessment, and
    information by denying their use of satellite imagery with reversible,
    non-damaging effects. CSRS is currently in the initial design phase,
    with operational units scheduled by fiscal year 2007. Our commitment to
    DCS and OCS is $91.4 million in fiscal year 2004, and approximately
    $635 million over the FYDP.

      SECTION 8--FOCUS SPACE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY RESOURCES AND PROGRAMS

        If we are to truly transform our warfighting and intelligence
    operations, we must continue to invest in and focus our space science
    and technology (S&T) efforts. Much of what we have accomplished in
    National Security Space to date stems from past S&T investment and
    development. Sometimes apportioning resources to S&T development can be
    difficult--such development requires stable long-term investment and
    typically does not provide immediate benefits to current programs. But
    we remain committed to investing today for our future capabilities--we
    must push the technology envelope.
        Investment alone will not ensure that the United States military
    and intelligence community has preeminent future space capabilities. We
    must improve our S&T planning to ensure we: (1) encourage an
    operational pull that conveys to the S&T community a clear vision of
    the capabilities we need for the future; (2) address the full spectrum
    of future needs in a balanced and well-thought out manner; and (3)
    determine ways to demonstrate and spin-off promising technologies to
    programs.
        Another ingredient critical to effective S&T development is
    collaboration. We have a number of outstanding organizations
    contributing to space science and technology development, including the
    Air Force Research Laboratory, the Naval Research Laboratory, and the
    NRO's Advanced Science and Technology directorate. By bringing these
    organizations together, and working with other agencies such as DARPA
    and NASA, we can move forward faster without duplicating effort.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Space capabilities are vital to the current and future warfighting
    force structure and to our national intelligence collection efforts.
    They are inherently global and uniquely capable of supporting our
    global interests and responsibilities. Likewise, as the world changes,
    our ability to understand events, to shape security relationships, to
    project power, and to deter and/or compel adversaries will increasingly
    depend on space. These circumstances collectively present us all with a
    tremendous responsibility--a responsibility to do the right thing for
    the future of space, and to ensure those critical capabilities are
    there, and on-time. It is our commitment to effectively and decisively
    deliver these capabilities for the good of the Nation.

        Senator Allard. Thank you for your testimony.
        Now I will call on the ranking member of the Strategic
    Forces Subcommittee on Armed Services. In matter of
    introduction, this is our first meeting, Senator Nelson.
    Welcome, and I look forward to working with you in a
    partnership on this particular subcommittee.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON

        Senator Bill Nelson. Congratulations, Mr. Chairman, on your
    chairmanship of this most important subcommittee on a subject
    area that is extremely important to the interest and the
    defense of the United States.
        I would just summarize by saying that a few of the issues
    that I want to look at are, as the Secretary has just
    mentioned, assured access to space, space surveillance, and
    situational awareness, the overall approach to the acquisition
    of space systems, and then the challenges for the future, which
    would be transformational communications, space-based radar,
    satellites, the role of space in the future, and the future of
    manned spaceflight. So I am really looking forward to digging
    into this with you.
        Thank you for your offer of partnership. Years ago, I
    chaired a similar committee in the House. My ranking member and
    I both agreed that space is not a partisan issue. Space is
    something that you approach from the interest of the country.
    So I am looking forward to that with you.
        Senator Allard. I appreciate your comments, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Inhofe just joined us. Do you have any brief
    comments?
        Senator Inhofe. No, let us get on with it.
        Senator Allard. Okay. I like this guy. He says, ``Get on
    with it.'' [Laughter.]
        Admiral Ellis, we will now start with your testimony, if
    you would, please.

     STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES O. ELLIS, JR., USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
                        STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

        Admiral Ellis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Nelson,
    distinguished members of the committee.
        It is an honor to appear before you again today
    representing the outstanding members of the United States
    Strategic Command and our components, men, women, and civilian
    alike.
        I, too, have a prepared statement that I would ask to be
    submitted for the record.
        Senator Allard. Without objection, so ordered.
        Admiral Ellis. Thank you, sir.
        As my presence here indicates, and as you know well, it is
    a new United States Strategic Command since I last appeared
    before this subcommittee. The new command is a reflection of
    the clear guidance the President gave the Department to
    challenge the status quo and envision a new architecture of
    American defense. It is a reflection of the recommendations of
    the Space Commission, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and the
    Nuclear Posture Review, and it is also a reflection of the new
    international security environment we must all work to
    effectively address together.
        The new United States Strategic Command was created, first
    and foremost, to provide responsive, integrated, and
    synchronized combat capability and support across geographic
    boundaries. Our very success will, in many ways, be reliant
    upon our ability to operate to, from, in, and through space.
        I am convinced that the alignment of responsibility for our
    Nation's on-orbit capabilities under the same unified command
    that now has global responsibilities in the areas of missile
    defense integration, communications, intelligence, and global
    strike, holds great promise for the continuing and accelerating
    operationalization of space.
        Thanks to the leadership and efforts of this committee and
    a host of talented Americans, including Under Secretary Teets,
    sitting beside me, we are the world's preeminent space-faring
    nation, and I am committed to ensuring that we retain and
    advance that position and the technological advantages it
    affords us.
        It has been an extraordinary 5\1/2\ months since the new
    United States Strategic Command was established. We have been
    working closely, on the one hand, with the broad space
    community, spanning Government and industry, to ensure we
    continue the growth in both the economic benefits and the
    warfighting capabilities that our space assets provide. On the
    other hand, we have also been working closely with the regional
    combatant commanders engaged in the war on terrorism or
    planning and conducting forward operations around the globe.
        Specifically, over the last few months, I have traveled to
    each of the launch complexes, our critical gateways to space. I
    have walked the ground and better understood the infrastructure
    and operational challenges associated with those facilities. I
    have met with industry, NASA, and military space leadership and
    joined the Partnership Council, including Secretary Teets,
    Administrator O'Keefe, General Lord, and Dr. Sega, to build on
    those relationships. I have participated in the Nation's most
    innovative space war-gaming efforts to date.
        The Command has also deployed space, intelligence,
    planning, and information operations expertise to the regional
    combatant commanders. We have optimized communications
    bandwidth and GPS performance in support of ongoing operations,
    and we continue to provide missile warning for the Nation and
    our forces in the field. Importantly, we are also engaged in
    the demanding work of charting the course for meeting our
    future warfighting needs.
        There are many opportunities ahead, and I am committed to
    working with our strong and growing team of partners to address
    each one. We will assist in crafting not only a vision, but a
    clear and detailed course of action in each area.
        Opportunities to move our Nation forward that we will
    address together include assured, responsive, and affordable
    access to space; safe and effective launch ranges; persistent
    space surveillance and space control capabilities; physical
    protection of our on-orbit assets and their accompanying global
    network of ground stations and communication links; and
    development and maintaining, as you have noted, a cadre of
    highly trained space professionals.
        As we meet the challenges in these areas, we will then be
    able to more effectively address warfighting needs, which
    include robust communications architecture, persistent
    intelligence collection, precision navigation and weapons
    guidance, and missile warning and missile defense.
        Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to represent the men and women
    of the United States Strategic Command and its components
    represented in the following panel, all of whom are working
    diligently today to ensure the most effective space
    capabilities for tomorrow.
        It is also a privilege to join Secretary Teets in this
    hearing. We are partnering through formal councils and, more
    importantly, on a regular and growing basis at all levels
    through our organizations. We will continue to work with all
    those other space professionals who play an integral role in
    the defense of our Nation and prove the combat effectiveness of
    our modern joint warfighting forces.
        Thank you very much for your attention, and I welcome your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Ellis follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Adm. James O. Ellis, USN

        Mr. Chairman, Senator Nelson, and distinguished members of the
    subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you representing the
    outstanding men and women of United States Strategic Command. The
    President has given all of us in the Department of Defense clear
    guidance to ``challenge the status quo and envision a new architecture
    of American defense for decades to come.'' The new U.S. Strategic
    Command is a clear product of that revolutionary and continuing effort.
    Today, the finest soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines--representing
    active duty, Guard, and Reserves--joined by a cadre of talented
    civilians, are building an entirely new command, instrumental in
    fighting the war on terrorism and focused on reshaping the Nation's
    military capabilities for the demands of the 21st century.
        Capitalizing on the historic work of our predecessors, we have made
    tremendous strides in the short time since the key elements of U.S.
    Space Command and U.S. Strategic Command were reshaped into the new
    U.S. Strategic Command. Specifically, we:

             Created an entirely new unified command, while
            streamlining headquarters management and supporting the
            establishment of the vitally important U.S. Northern Command.
             Provided world-class deployed and reach-back space,
            intelligence, planning, and information operations expertise to
            the regional combatant commanders either engaged in the war on
            terrorism or planning for potential operations around the
            globe.
             Successfully supported the initial launches of both
            the Atlas V and Delta IV, a major step in sustaining assured
            access to space for the next decade.
             In accordance with Presidential direction in Unified
            Command Plan Change Two, assumed four global missions
            previously unassigned to any combatant commander. These
            missions capitalize fully on our space systems and will give us
            a powerful role in shaping our future capabilities in support
            of the joint warfighter.
             Developed new partnerships with NASA, the National
            Security Agency, the Missile Defense Agency, and the
            Intelligence Community in order to better satisfy the Nation's
            defense needs in the 21st century.

        Each of these ongoing efforts is important to our future, but
    represent only the first steps. They are a foundation for aggressively
    pursuing, with our strong and growing team of defense and agency
    partners, our next set of challenges and opportunities. I welcome the
    opportunity to address the subcommittee on the policies and programs
    supporting our command's efforts, and particularly, our important
    space-related missions and responsibilities.
          the connection between space operations and strategic forces
        Our success in developing strategic space-based capabilities such
    as missile warning and survivable communication links, coupled with a
    strong nuclear deterrent, contributed in many ways to a peaceful end to
    the Cold War. From 1985 to 2002, U.S. Space Command made tremendous
    progress in enhancing on-orbit capabilities, while simultaneously
    expanding their application from the purely strategic arena to the
    tactical battle space. The warning of Scud launches during Operation
    Desert Storm and the broad application of the GPS to navigation and
    weapons guidance are but two examples of how the space community
    transformed our on-orbit capabilities into combat tools employed by
    commanders at all levels, increasing their warfighting effectiveness.
    The combat power, networked systems, and global reach of our military
    today are a tribute to the contributions of America's space program and
    U.S. Space Command's diligent work over the course of 17 years.
        In 2002, following a series of high-level studies that included the
    Space (Rumsfeld) Commission, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and the
    Nuclear Posture Review, the President and Secretary of Defense directed
    the creation of a new unified command to effectively and efficiently
    anticipate and counter the diverse and increasingly complex global
    threats our Nation will face for the foreseeable future. These threats
    to our homeland, our allies, and our interests abroad range from
    conventional military capabilities to the asymmetric and indirect
    dangers of cyber attack, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and
    terrorism--each designed to circumvent U.S. strengths and exploit any
    vulnerabilities on the ground, in the air, at sea, and in space. These
    threats are global in scale and often transcend geographic or regional
    boundaries.
        The new U.S. Strategic Command was established October 1, 2002, to
    address these very threats. The command is chartered to pursue an
    integrated, trans-regional approach to both deterrence and warfighting,
    and to further strengthen our complementary and supporting
    relationships with the regional combatant commanders, each of whom
    retain the full responsibility for the regional challenges within their
    respective area of responsibility (AOR). Initially assigned
    responsibility for space and computer network operations and nuclear
    deterrence, on January 10, 2003, the President expanded the command's
    role to include four additional missions previously unassigned to a
    unified command. These include global strike planning and execution;
    integration of Department of Defense information operations (IO);
    global missile defense integration; and oversight of command, control,
    communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) in support of strategic and global operations.
    These newly assigned missions will broaden our global supporting role,
    further strengthen our Nation's deterrent posture and bring focused
    responsibility and authority to our space and information operations
    missions.
        The vision for U.S. Strategic Command is exciting. It requires re-
    thinking, operationalizing, and, in some cases, building from the
    ground up, every mission in our portfolio. Fortunately, the experience
    gained from carrying out our space operations and our nuclear deterrent
    roles will facilitate development of our newly assigned missions. The
    warfighting focus and cutting edge technology of our space and
    information operations missions, the rigor and exactness of nuclear
    planning, and the robust command and control for our operational
    forces, translates directly to the missions now assigned to the
    command. I am convinced the alignment of our new missions under the
    same command with responsibility for the Nation's on-orbit capabilities
    holds great promise for the continuing operationalization of space, and
    will serve as the foundation we will build upon to achieve success in
    all our mission areas.

                          OUR OPERATIONAL SPACE FOCUS

        The United States is the preeminent space-faring Nation in the
    world. Space operations have evolved to far more than an American
    military center of gravity. It is now an economic force, intricately
    woven into almost every facet of our lives--farming, weather
    prediction, resource management, communications, finance,
    transportation and recreation. Entire new industries have been created
    around space applications, and approximately $100 billion U.S. are
    invested in space assets today. While the U.S. has spent over half a
    trillion dollars on space programs since 1958, current projections
    indicate that same amount will be invested globally in just the next 5
    years. The message is clear: the U.S., and in many ways all nations,
    increasingly rely on platforms operating in the medium of space; that
    reliance will continue to increase dramatically in the years ahead.
        As the Nation's designated space warfighter, U.S. Strategic Command
    is committed to bringing a focused operational perspective to our on-
    orbit capabilities. From a special operations soldier on horseback
    navigating by GPS to our global communications architecture providing
    intelligence and command and control around the world, never again will
    this Nation fight without significant contributions from space. Our
    satellite systems are essential, not just enabling, to each of our
    disparate missions, and they underpin many of the distinct
    technological advantages we have over our potential adversaries. U.S.
    Strategic Command will work diligently to ensure the extraordinary
    global communication, navigation, surveillance, weather, and missile
    warning capabilities we have and are pursuing for the future, will
    provide dominant, war-winning contributions to the Nation.

                        SPACE SUPPORT TO THE WARFIGHTER

        Winning the war on terrorism remains the Department's top priority,
    and space operations continue to play an integral role in our global
    efforts. Since the moment the President arrived at Offutt AFB on
    September 11, 2001, the men and women of U.S. Strategic Command and its
    predecessors have provided support in all areas of our expertise--
    space, IO, intelligence, planning, and communications. Specifically,
    we:

             Provided a continuous Space and Information Operations
            Element presence at U.S. Central Command, enabling immediate
            access to space-related and IO capabilities.
             Optimized bandwidth allocation in support of
            operational deployments, working with the regional combatant
            commanders and making recommendations to the Joint Staff to
            better maximize the communications capabilities available to
            forces in the field.
             Assured peak GPS performance for precision strikes
            through our GPS Enhanced Theater Support program, reducing the
            number of sorties required and minimizing collateral damage.
             Provided federated intelligence support to multiple
            regional combatant commands, using space systems to conduct
            battle damage assessment and intelligence analysis, and lead
            the intelligence community-wide effort to find and characterize
            underground facilities in Afghanistan.

        Although successful in each of these endeavors, U.S. Strategic
    Command is striving to even further refine our support to the
    warfighters. We are developing a single team of professionals that
    bring the full suite of our global capabilities--space, missile
    defense, planning, communications, IO, strike, and intelligence--to the
    joint warfighter in an even more integrated fashion. We are also taking
    concrete steps forward in developing our newly assigned missions that
    will be integral to global warfighting, to ensure we continue to stay
    one step ahead of our adversaries.

    Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C\4\)
        In the fast-paced and complex international security environment of
    the 21st century, U.S. warfighters must have access to superior
    information to conduct decisive operations. U.S. Strategic Command
    provides oversight and authority for many of the systems and missions
    that serve as the enablers for the Nation's defense, including
    responsibilities in the command and control, communications, computers,
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) arena.
    Although C\4\ISR represents several related and essential capabilities,
    we are deliberately parsing out the acronym into its key elements to
    better address the very different challenges in each area. Under the
    Unified Command Plan, the command is assigned the role of tasking and
    coordinating C\4\ in support of strategic force employment. Our
    objective is to provide the means to integrate, synchronize,
    coordinate, and convey information to support superior decision-making
    and tasking at any level from the President to the front-line
    warfighter.
        The events of September 11, 2001, illustrate the need to improve
    our national command and control architecture. We are working with our
    partners at U.S. Joint Forces Command, the Defense Information Systems
    Agency (DISA) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,
    Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD/C\3\I) to craft a new
    national-level C\4\ system that provides improved information flow,
    rapid decision making, and dramatic improvements in our current
    bandwidth capability. While this is important for all missions, it is
    imperative for the global strike and particularly, the integrated
    missile defense missions, where data gathering, decision-making, and
    execution must occur within minutes. Your continuing support of the
    communications initiatives such as the Transformational Communications
    Architecture will enable the Department to dramatically improve our
    critical national level and joint warfighting capabilities.

    Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)
        U.S. Strategic Command is also tasked under the Unified Command
    Plan to plan, coordinate, and integrate intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance (ISR) for the Department of Defense in support of global
    and strategic operations. We are working closely with our partners in
    the National Intelligence Community to move away from Cold War military
    force collection strategies and toward the creation of the processes
    and systems necessary for comprehensive, synergistic, and flexible
    contingency ISR operations. We see great value in assisting the
    warfighter in determining the optimum use of scarce collection assets
    by focusing on ISR information requirements versus specific platforms.
    This will enable us to better maximize and prioritize the capabilities
    of our collection systems, whether space-based, air breathing, at sea,
    or on the ground, and integrate their collection with critical human
    intelligence and technical data to meet the needs of both the
    warfighter and the national decision-maker. It will also enable us to
    better assemble integrated, synchronized strategies and architectures
    that provide persistent, actionable, predictive intelligence and
    streamlined dissemination. We look forward to working closely with the
    Intelligence Community as they develop systems such as the Future
    Imagery Architecture (FIA) and SBR that will play a large part in our
    intelligence collection capabilities of the future.

    Missile Defense
        The danger posed by weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
    systems is clearly one of our Nation's top concerns, and U.S. Strategic
    Command is actively partnering with the Missile Defense Agency to
    provide an additional level of protection for our homeland, our allies,
    and our forces in the field. As General Myers noted recently before
    this committee, missile defense is inherently a multi-command and
    multi-regional task, and, as the Missile Defense Agency acquires our
    missile defense systems, U.S. Strategic Command will bring a
    warfighter's focus to most effectively and efficiently integrate and
    operationalize the system on a global scale. We are currently
    developing a global missile defense concept of operations and battle
    management architecture to provide the full support needed by the
    regional combatant commanders to defend their theaters, including the
    ballistic missile defense of the continental United States by U.S.
    Northern Command.
        Ballistic missile defense has evolved from an effort focused on
    mid-course intercept of ballistic missiles to an integrated, multi-
    layered, cross-AOR approach to achieve an Initial Defensive Operations
    (IDO) capability by late 2004. A critical element of our Nation's
    global missile defense capability will be detailed and effective
    tactical warning, which we will continue to provide to national
    leadership and regional combatant commanders. U.S. Strategic Command
    currently supplies sensor information for the missile warning component
    of integrated tactical warning and attack assessment, and we appreciate
    your support of the systems that will improve our warning capabilities
    in response to changing threats and expanded intelligence requirements.
    The Space-Based Infra Red System (SBIRS), appropriately funded in the
    President's budget, is a prime example.

                            ASSURED ACCESS TO SPACE

        Assured access to space is the precursor to all our on-orbit
    capabilities, and is clearly vital to our national interests. It
    ensures freedom of access to, through and from space, and the ability
    to deny interference with these actions and capabilities. As the
    heritage systems Titan II and IV, Atlas II, and Delta II near the end
    of their lives, the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program
    remains the Department's chosen option for ensuring the ability to
    safely and responsively launch orbital assets. Although the contraction
    in the commercial launch market has changed the business case for EELV,
    it remains a promising avenue, as demonstrated by the recent successful
    launches of both vehicles.
        As we have seen in our Nation's ongoing war on terrorism, we may
    not always know when or where around the globe our next operations will
    occur. Surprise will continue to be a part of the international
    security environment, and it is prudent to have the flexibility
    designed into not only our weapons systems, but also our communications
    and intelligence architectures. Uninterrupted, responsive access to
    space is critical to ensuring the responsiveness necessary to replenish
    or augment our critical capabilities on-orbit.
        Inextricably linked to assured access is maintaining viable
    gateways to space. Our east and west coast ranges continue to provide
    safe and effective spacelift and test and evaluation services to
    military, civil, and commercial users, and we must work with our
    partners in Government and industry to continue to search for the most
    effective and fiscally responsible strategies to ensure they remain
    adequate for the long-term. I am personally committed to the health of
    these vital facilities, and look forward to being a part of the
    discussions on the long-range vision for our launch complexes.

                            ENHANCING SPACE CONTROL

        Space will continue to be a realm we share with industry, our
    allies, and increasingly, our adversaries. While access to space is
    clearly a vital national interest, space control is the means by which
    to assure it. Importantly, the same flexibility and freedom of action
    the U.S. currently maintains in the terrestrial, maritime, and aerial
    environments, consistent with international law and customs, is the
    goal of U.S. Strategic Command's space control efforts. While the U.S.
    enjoys significant military and economic benefits from our current lead
    in space communications, navigation, and remote sensing, threats may
    well emerge to challenge these interests.
        From the coalition victory in Operation Desert Storm through the
    recent conflicts in Kosovo and Afghanistan, the United States enjoyed
    space dominance because it controlled the ``higher ground,'' because it
    possessed superior technologies or strategies, and in all honesty,
    because its adversaries simply did not exploit space, or act to negate
    U.S. space systems. The U.S. cannot rely on adversaries to cede this
    same advantage in the future.
        Future adversaries may threaten any component of space systems--the
    satellite, the ground segment, or the link between the two. Even the
    less technically advanced nations and non-state actors may employ
    techniques such as electronic jamming or attacks against ground
    facilities. U.S. Strategic Command's role is to ensure the U.S. fully
    meets these challenges, providing uninterrupted access to space and on-
    orbit capabilities. One avenue we will use to accomplish this is
    through our active role in U.S. military, commercial, and scientific
    launches, and through military representation to U.S. national
    agencies, commercial endeavors, and international organizations for
    matters related to military space operations. Another avenue to ensure
    our satellites, communications links, and ground stations remain
    operational, is maintaining and enhancing our physical protection of
    these vital assets. U.S. Strategic Command is identifying critical
    components and defining the most effective ways to safeguard our
    capabilities on-orbit and on the ground.
        A crucial aspect of our on-orbit security is ensuring space
    situational awareness through enhanced surveillance capability and
    improvements to our global sensor network. The security of our Nation's
    space systems is of utmost importance; success in this top priority
    will ensure a comprehensive and responsive ability to monitor our on-
    orbit systems.

                         DEVELOPING SPACE PROFESSIONALS

        Success in any of our missions depends on our number one asset--our
    people. Maintaining the culture of excellence in highly technical space
    operations depends on recruiting, training, and retaining the best and
    the brightest. We will also need to develop an entirely new set of
    skills, leveraging our air defenders and space operators, to build a
    cadre of missile defense experts. I fully support General Lord's
    efforts at Air Force Space Command to chart a course for space
    professional development, as recommended by the Space Commission. I
    also applaud Lieutenant General Cosumano's personal management of the
    Army's dedicated space operations officer career field, as well as Vice
    Admiral Mayo's Space Cadre Initiative within the Navy.
        Additionally, I appreciate the continued emphasis Congress places
    on raising the overall quality of life for the men and women in uniform
    and their families, which contributes in innumerable, very tangible
    ways to the defense of our Nation.

                          ADDITIONAL ASSIGNED MISSIONS

        In addition to these important missions, U.S. Strategic Command is
    already taking steps to mature the nascent global strike and
    information operations missions assigned just 2 months ago. As we build
    to these new taskings, the interrelationships and interdependencies
    among all our missions are increasingly apparent, and we will leverage
    the capabilities we have on-orbit to maximize our joint warfighting
    effectiveness in each area.
    Global Strike
        Space capabilities will dramatically enhance U.S. Strategic
    Command's newly assigned global strike mission, which extends our long-
    standing and globally focused deterrent capabilities to the broader
    spectrum of conflict. The incorporation of advanced conventional, non-
    kinetic, and special operations capabilities into a full-spectrum
    contingency arsenal will enable the command to deliberately and
    adaptively plan for and deliver rapid, limited-duration, extended-range
    combat power anywhere in the world. This innovative approach to global
    strike will provide a wider range of options to the President and the
    regional combatant commanders in responding to time-critical global
    challenges, and I encourage your support of innovative programs such as
    the Common Aero Vehicle (CAV).
    Information Operations
        Delivering on the promise of information operations is one of U.S.
    Strategic Command's top priorities. This newly assigned mission area
    promises to dramatically improve our offensive and defensive
    capabilities, which could very well reduce the number of weapons
    required in our arsenal and the force size required in future
    conflicts. Quite simply, I believe that effective, integrated IO
    comprises the next revolution in warfighting, and U.S. Strategic
    Command's objective in our new role as the integrator of DOD
    information operations is to bring a joint perspective to improvements
    in the capabilities provided to our national leaders and warfighters in
    the field.

                          OPTIMIZING OUR ORGANIZATION

        Serving as robust stewards of our space and nuclear missions while
    simultaneously developing our newly assigned missions and capabilities
    is a demanding task. We are flattening and shrinking the overall
    organizational structure of our headquarters to work more effectively
    and efficiently. Additionally, with the help of the services, we are
    developing new relationships to fully use DOD-wide capabilities and
    expertise, while not duplicating in our headquarters what other
    professionals already do so well.
        As we design concepts of operations for the globally-focused and
    increasingly operational U.S. Strategic Command, we are pursuing
    innovative concepts for new service relationships that employ the
    capabilities resident in other organizations that U.S. Strategic
    Command can tap for unique skills and capabilities. U.S. Strategic
    Command is fortunate to have strong relationships with many national
    agencies, and as we move forward in each of our new mission areas we
    will need even stronger ties to both our current and new agency
    partners.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Combat readiness and combat support remain the top priorities for
    U.S. Strategic Command, and the capabilities we have on-orbit are an
    integral part in achieving mission success. While 2002 was a year of
    new thinking and new concepts, 2003 and 2004 will be years of
    execution. Under the umbrella of our revised mission set, we are taking
    the first steps in the evolution of our strategic capabilities, and we
    embrace the challenge of delivering on the promise of better meeting
    the Nation's global warfighting needs.
        Never before has such a broad array of missions been combined under
    one combatant command, and we are aggressively building the right
    teams, the right organizational structure, and the right plan to move
    confidently from concept to tangible combat capability. We will
    leverage our space, information operations, strategic planning, and
    regional support heritage to become a more globally focused operational
    headquarters, better able to provide the combat capabilities required
    by warfighters and our national leaders. All of our challenges and
    opportunities will require a team effort, inside and outside the
    command, and we look forward to working with you and our many partners
    to adequately meet the challenges that lie ahead.
        I appreciate your continued support of the men and women of U.S.
    Strategic Command and the unique and essential contributions they
    continue to make to our Nation's security. I look forward to reporting
    our progress to you in the future as we continue to build our Nation's
    space capabilities under the new United States Strategic Command.
        Thank you, and I welcome your questions.

        Senator Allard. Thank you both for your testimony.
        Now we will proceed to two rounds of questions for this
    panel, and then we will just follow the same procedures that we
    have in the Armed Services Committee. You will get a notice on
    your 5 minutes, and we will just move on. Then we will get the
    second panel up and proceed to ask them questions.
        Let me start off with you, Admiral Ellis. You are commander
    of Strategic Command, and, ultimately, you are the consumer of
    the space expertise developed by the services in their own
    space career fields. The question is, have you been consulted
    on and have your views been solicited on the appropriate
    requirements or elements of a space career field?
        Admiral Ellis. Mr. Chairman, that is an excellent question.
    The answer is yes. I am personally involved with each of the
    service components. As they, in their own individual and very
    service-specific ways, address the way ahead, my role is to
    bring a joint character and a joint flavor to their
    optimization of our space cadre. This is to ensure that the
    billet structures, the organizational alignment that is
    increasingly a part of our joint warfighting approach, reflect
    the skills and the capabilities that are imbedded in our space
    cadres so that they are better equipped, the components are
    better equipped, to tailor those programs very specifically to
    support both their service and our joint requirements.
        I have met with General Lord on this issue, and we have
    discussed it. General Cosumano is very personally involved in
    overseeing and expanding the FA40 Space Cadre Program that the
    Army has put together. Admiral Mayo has a cadre initiative of
    his own that he is beginning as we focus on these essential
    requirements. Obviously, under the Navy piece, we also continue
    to grow our partnership with our Marine components. For the
    first time, as you may be aware, the Marine Corps now has an
    established component in support of MARFOR space physically in
    residence at U.S. Strategic Command. The services are getting a
    great deal of encouragement from me to press ahead, and I am
    offering my joint warfighting perspective on these efforts as
    they pursue them in their individual ways.
        Senator Allard. Thank you.
        Secretary Teets, you referred to this issue of assured-
    access funding in the President's budget, and I do believe that
    you agree with me that we do not, at this point at least, just
    want to rely on one launch provider.
        Secretary Teets. Right.
        Senator Allard. We are looking at the budget, and there is
    only funding provided for 2 years. After that, we do not have
    any funding noted in the budget. I wonder if you would comment
    on that.
        Secretary Teets. Yes, sir. I have worked closely with
    Secretary Aldridge to identify resources that would be used
    going forward to ensure that we can continue to maintain two
    separate, independent families of launch vehicles. As you say,
    relative to the infrastructure sustainment item, the
    President's budget in 2004 contains money for it. Our plan in
    2005 also contains money for it. As we move forward and see the
    EELV program developing, see the commercial marketplace
    evolving, my plan would be to continue that as long as
    necessary. That would mean outyear funding would be flowing
    into that up until the point in time when a viable commercial
    marketplace exists that can sustain their operations as they
    had originally planned them.
        Senator Allard. You are right, we had planned on a stronger
    commercial market at this particular point in time.
        Secretary Teets. Correct.
        Senator Allard. There has been a small wedge of funding put
    in there to help companies sustain the program. Could you
    elaborate any further on how you expect that wedge to work? I
    know they are saying that they may need more money than was
    provided in that wedge funding. I wonder if you would respond
    to those concerns.
        Secretary Teets. Yes, we will be keeping a close eye on it.
    In addition to the infrastructure sustainment, we have
    allocated some funds, actually across all future years, for
    critical component engineering and pre- and post-mission
    engineering. In addition, we are looking at meaningful ways
    that we can even improve on the assured access characteristics
    of the two families. For example, one of the critical
    components on both Atlas and Delta are the fact that they both
    use the RL-10 engine developed by Pratt Whitney. That is flown
    on the Centaur. It also flies on the Delta.
        If we can move in a direction to make some prudent
    investments that will allow us to be resilient from that
    single-point failure in a more meaningful way than we are
    today, I think it would be worthy. Similarly, we will be
    looking at other technology investment activities which can
    enhance the assured-access nature of these two vehicle
    families.
        Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, do you want to comment on
    this issue of assured access from your operator's perspective?
        Admiral Ellis. Mr. Chairman, obviously, from an operational
    perspective, this is critical to our future and to the
    enhancement of our capabilities in space. We have pursued a
    launch-on-schedule approach rather than a launch-on-demand
    capability. As we are increasingly reliant on space systems and
    perhaps, in a more responsive way, need to be able to replenish
    constellations and employ new concepts, some blending of those
    capabilities will likely better serve the needs of the Nation.
    That is where Secretary Teets is taking us, addressing how we
    can reduce from months to days, if not hours, in terms of our
    responsive capability. All of those enhancements are critical
    to the way ahead, and we fully support that effort.
        Senator Allard. Let me call on ranking minority, Senator
    Bill Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        When we get down to the point of just using the Delta 4 and
    the Atlas 5, suppose you were denied the use of those two pads.
    How are we getting to space?
        Secretary Teets. Sir, we do have capability at Vandenberg
    for those missions that could be launched from Vandenberg, but
    I would say if we were denied two pads on the east coast, we
    would be severely hampered in our space operations.
        You will notice that in the President's 2004 budget, there
    is an initiative to start moving in the direction of a truly
    operationally responsive launch system, and the first thrust of
    that effort will be for a small launch system, pressure fed,
    LOX-kerosene kind of technology, low cost. It would be capable
    of launching satellites in the 500- to 1,000-pound class weight
    capacity and would do it in a truly operationally responsive
    way by allowing us to take this small vehicle to essentially a
    concrete launch pad, erect with it a mobile crane, attach the
    necessary spacecraft and load it with mobile propellent tanks--
    tanker trucks, so to speak--and launch and achieve what Admiral
    Ellis just referred to as being able to decide on a launch and
    actually achieve a launch in hours and days, rather than weeks
    and months.
        Senator Bill Nelson. That system would be ready when?
        Secretary Teets. We would like to test fly it in 2007, and
    we intend, even this year, to initiate a competition for a
    system. I have been briefed by several people on several
    competing kinds of systems that would achieve the kind of
    characteristics that I described earlier, and so what we would
    like to do this year is run a competition, select the most
    promising of these endeavors, and then fund it in a way that
    development could be demonstrated in 2007.
        I should tell you that also not only will it be
    operationally responsive, but it will be low recurring cost.
    There are some of the systems that people are trying to design
    with a target in mind of $3-4 million per launch. If we could
    achieve anything like that, it would be a real boost for our
    Nation's space program, because all of a sudden we could have
    demonstration satellites of lightweight, advanced-technology
    systems and do it on a wide basis and a frequent basis.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Test fly in 2007, so it would not be
    operational until 2009 or 2010.
        Secretary Teets. Probably correct.
        Senator Bill Nelson. For payloads that are 500 to 1,000
    pounds.
        Secretary Teets. Yes, to start.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay, between now, 2003, and 2010,
    until you have that capability, your only backup access to
    space then would be the space shuttle if you were denied the
    pads after you get down to just the Delta 4 and the Atlas 5. Is
    that correct?
        Secretary Teets. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So what do you plan with regard to
    making sure that you have assured access to space vis-a-vis the
    shuttle as the backup?
        Secretary Teets. As it relates to the shuttle, we plan to
    engage NASA, in a meaningful way, to understand their plans
    going forward in light of the Space Shuttle Columbia tragedy.
    We will be staying in lockstep with Sean O'Keefe and with the
    NASA people to understand what the recovery plans for space
    shuttle operations are. As Admiral Ellis also mentioned in his
    earlier remarks, we do participate with NASA in a partnership
    council, and we have meaningful interchanges on how we can
    share technology and leverage each other's capabilities.
        To date, there have not been plans for DOD to make use of
    shuttle operations. The question asked is a valid one. If both
    Atlas and Delta launch pads were down, shuttle would provide
    our only access. That is true.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral, your comments?
        Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir. I would echo what Secretary Teets
    has noted. The thrust of your question, I think is, ``How do we
    conduct an analysis of our space access and systems, writ
    large, that examines carefully, as noted on the issue of the
    RL-10, potential single-point failures?'' Included in that has
    to be the infrastructure that is essential to guaranteeing that
    access.
        I have begun a fairly detailed study that addresses our
    systems and how they can best be sustained and protected.
    Clearly the infrastructure that you described needs to be a
    part of that.
        Senator Allard. Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me ask a short question to Admiral Ellis and then a
    longer one for both of you to respond to. There is a lot of
    discussion, not on this subcommittee, but on our full
    committee, about problems we are having right now with our lift
    capabilities, our refueling, and our tanker capabilities. We
    are looking at now a lease of perhaps the first 100 767s, but
    we never talk about bombers. Right now, our B-1s are going to
    be reduced from 92 to 60. Our B-52s are over 40 years old. We
    only have 20 to 21 B-2s. What kind of future plans do you think
    of, Admiral Ellis, in terms of replacing some of these bombers?
        Admiral Ellis. Sir, we have shifted gears here in the
    direction of the strategic side, in the classic sense, and I am
    very much aware and follow closely the Air Force's bomber road
    map, as I know you do, to look to the way ahead. We are
    interested in all three of the elements of the active bomber
    force, because with the new mission for global strike, the B-1
    is introduced back into the equation from our perspective, in
    its conventional role. We are following closely all of the
    upgrades associated with each of those platforms--the avionics,
    the navigation capabilities, the weapons carriage capabilities,
    and the like that are essential to sustain that--while we begin
    to focus on what the next generation of air-breather platforms
    ought to look like.
        Clearly, that is in the conceptual phase. It is not a near-
    term deliverable, but it is one that we intend to participate
    in shaping the requirements for, both from the classic former
    United States Strategic Command mission and the new missions
    that have been assigned to us with global support on the
    conventional side.
        Senator Inhofe. After the tragic loss that we sustained not
    long ago, I think I would particularly compliment our colleague
    and former astronaut, Bill Nelson, on the way he handled these
    things. I think one of the things that we need to renew is
    something we talked about way back when I was in the House. I
    am talking about back 10 years ago or so in the House Armed
    Services Committee. Future wars are going to be fought in space
    on the control of space. You asked the access question. It is
    very significant, very important. But we have kind of been
    lacking in that discussion here recently, and I think we need
    to get back to that.
        In 1998, I was critical of the President when he vetoed,
    line-item vetoed, three space programs. They were the
    Clementine II program, the Air Force space plane program, and
    then the kinetic kill antisatellite interceptor. Can you give
    us a status on these programs, how significant you think they
    are, and how they fit into this discussion?
        Secretary Teets. If the question is directed to me, I would
    be pleased to provide an answer. We have no plans to restart
    Clementine II. With respect to the Air Force space plane, we
    have an interest in looking at that kind of an initiative and
    perhaps in a future year will restart it. As it relates to the
    kinetic kill ASAP vehicle, I really do not know of any plans
    that we currently have underway for it.
        Senator Inhofe. At the time that took place, in 1998, there
    was a lot of discussion. What I would like to ask you to do is
    be as specific as you can in answering that for the record,
    something that you could submit to us.
        Secretary Teets. Yes, sir, I would be happy to take it for
    the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Teets. The Clementine II program was restructured into
    the XSS-10 program following the overturn of the fiscal year 1998 line-
    item veto. The original Clementine II asteroid rendezvous mission
    required a unique set of operational capabilities that were not
    applicable to most military space applications. With the restructure,
    the focus of the microsatellite technology development program shifted
    to satellite servicing, including proximity operations and resident
    object inspection. The XSS-10 program was funded with the fiscal year
    1998 line-item veto funds plus congressional add funds appropriated
    from fiscal year 1999 to fiscal year 2001. The Fiscal Year 2001
    Authorization Bill directed the Secretary of the Air Force to
    reallocate funds from within Program Elements 0602601F and 0603401F to
    fund completion of the XSS-10 satellite and provide support for launch
    and operations. XSS-10 was launched on January 29, 2003, on the Global
    Positioning System Mission IIR-8; the planned 24-hour mission was
    executed on January 30, 2003. Mission results were outstanding with all
    primary objectives achieved. Lessons learned are being transitioned to
    other micro satellite programs, such as the follow-on XSS-11 program.
        The Air Force space plane, officially known as the Military Space
    Plane (MSP), is a concept for a reusable launch vehicle system
    comprising four major components: the Space Operations Vehicle (SOV)--a
    fully reusable launch vehicle; the Space Maneuver Vehicle (SMV)--a
    reusable upper stage and satellite bus; the Modular Insertion Stage
    (MIS)--a low-cost expendable upper stage; and the Common Aero Vehicle
    (CAV)--a gliding maneuverable reentry shroud. Program funding provided
    prior to the fiscal year 1998 line-item veto was primarily used to
    develop this system concept and to support the flight test of the X-40
    demonstrator system. The successful flight test of the X-40 at Holloman
    Air Force Base led to a partnership agreement with the National
    Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Marshall Space Flight
    Center's Future X Program Office to modify NASA's SMV-like X-37
    demonstrator to address military utility requirements. A portion of the
    fiscal year 1998 line-item veto funds was applied to the X-37
    cooperative effort when released in fiscal year 1999; the Air Force
    applied core science and technology funds in fiscal years 2000-2002 to
    meet this commitment and also provides a deputy program manager for the
    X-37, co-located at NASA Marshall.
        The remaining fiscal year 1998 line-item veto funds were applied to
    the SMV and MIS preliminary development efforts and systems concept
    studies. Congressional funds targeted for the SMV and MIS (as the
    ``Upper Stage Flight Experiment (USFE)'') were subsequently received in
    fiscal years 2000 and 2001. The earlier systems concept studies
    identified critical rocket propulsion technology needs, resulting in
    the application of fiscal years 2000 and 2001 SMV funding to the
    development of the high performance Advanced Reusable Rocket Engine
    (ARRE) required for a militarized system. ARRE preliminary design was
    completed in fiscal year 2002, and component fabrication and testing of
    the developmental engine is nearly complete. Hot fire testing of the
    injector and combustion chamber is scheduled for the summer of 2003,
    completing the funded effort. The USFE funding was applied to the
    development of a MIS demonstrator, including the demonstrator design,
    fabrication, and captive fire ground test. The assembly of the USFE
    composite structure was completed in March 2003 and the captive fire
    test is scheduled for June 2003 at Stennis Space Center.
        In addition, the Air Force has continued low-level investment in
    SOV technologies over the last few years. The fiscal year 2004
    President's budget request provides for a significant increase in
    funding for the advancement of SOV technology. Technologies include
    thermal protection systems, flight structures, tanks, avionics,
    operability, and mission planning issues. Early in 2002, the Air Force
    and NASA concluded their joint Reusable Launch Vehicle 120 Day Study.
    Following this, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated the
    Operationally Responsive-Spacelift (ORS) Mission Needs Statement. With
    the full support of NASA, Air Force Space Command in its ongoing ORS
    Analysis of Alternatives is currently exploring the requirements
    related to the Air Force space plane. We expect results early next
    year, leading to a demonstration effort to explore key technologies.
    Additionally, the fiscal year 2004 President's budget includes funding
    for the development and launch of a small launch vehicle in fiscal year
    2007 to demonstrate capabilities to meet ORS requirements.
        Finally, the Army's Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite (KE-ASAT) program
    last received Department of Defense funding in fiscal year 2001. Funded
    efforts will result in construction and testing of three flight-
    qualified interceptors that upon completion will be stored. At this
    time, there is no current or planned funding for this program in the
    Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).
        I recently had the opportunity to visit with executives of Davidson
    Technologies in Huntsville, Alabama, to discuss their work on the KE-
    ASAT program, and I was impressed with their progress to date. Although
    our current emphasis in the area of space control is on reversible
    effects, I intend to discuss this program's capabilities with Admiral
    Ellis and General Lord, and we will continue to review our requirements
    for this and similar systems.

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Ben Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Ellis, as I have stated previously, I consider you
    the right person to be leading Strategic Command at this point
    in time, and I want to ask you today a question I asked you
    last fall. In October 2002, with the new Strategic Command
    stood up, you felt that the merger of the two commands was
    going smoothly. Now that this transition has had several more
    months associated with it, it probably is not complete--
    transitions are never fully complete--has it been successful?
    Is there anything that this subcommittee could do to help in
    that transition?
        Admiral Ellis. Thank you, Senator, for your compliments and
    for the question. The answer, of course, is that it has been
    very successful, and, indeed, is going faster in some areas
    than we originally anticipated. We have been able to bring
    together very quickly organizational concepts that draw on the
    tremendous skills and talents of elements of both former
    commands and bring them together in ways that offer a great
    potential and opportunity to address problems in a global
    context rather than historic stovepipes, for example.
        The involvement in very specific responsibilities
    associated with the space area that I detailed in my opening
    oral statement are just examples of the issues in which we have
    already been actively involved and have had some influence. The
    list is, of course, much broader than that. We are now a part
    of many of the fora in which Secretary Teets and I share
    oversight of next-generation space-based platforms, the
    missile-defense integration effort, as we move forward towards
    operationalizing that in the next 20 months, and many other
    operationally focused areas. One area is ISR, which the
    chairman mentioned in his opening statement, the intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance concepts for the future. So we
    are in with both feet.
        The good news is that, as is always the case, people rise
    magnificently to the challenge. When we brought the
    organizations together and we were able to offer the new
    opportunities to areas to make contributions, people responded
    enthusiastically on both sides of the former commands. As we
    complete the process of bringing the command together here in
    the spring, I anticipate that that is only going to increase.
        In terms of specific support, I think you have all given
    that. You have understood the objective and have been
    supportive of the goals that were a part of the merger and
    understand the potential value on which the command is already
    delivering, and we thank you for that.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
        Now, turning attention just a little bit, in addition to
    being the combatant commander for U.S. Strategic Command, you
    are also the DOD manager for manned space flight support. Your
    responsibilities include astronaut rescue and recovery,
    contingency landing sight support, payload security, medical
    support coordination of airlift and sealift for contingency
    operations, as well as other support services required in the
    event of a shuttle emergency. Also, under normal conditions for
    a shuttle, where you do not have an emergency, it is my
    understanding you receive and validate NASA requests for
    support and elect the proper DOD support for specific missions.
        Obviously, following the unfortunate Space Shuttle Columbia
    tragedy, could you discuss for the record the role that
    STRATCOM, Strategic Command, played in the immediate aftermath
    of the Space Shuttle Columbia tragedy and also what the role is
    through the course of the ongoing investigation?
        You will have to submit something for the record. Our time
    does not permit you to go into full detail at this point.
        Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir, I would be delighted to do that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        You can be proud of the contributions that Brigadier General
    Pavlovich, my deputy at DOD Manned Space Flight (DDMS) support
    operations, and his team, were able to accomplish almost immediately
    after the tragedy, and the follow-on support to Admiral Gehman, who
    leads the continuing mishap investigation.
        DDMS members at the Support Operations Center at Patrick Air Force
    Base, Florida, quickly implemented the Catastrophic Event Checklist,
    immediately activated national search and rescue teams, coordinated
    military aircraft, and provided personnel at three recovery sites
    located in Texas and Louisiana. It was a truly fine performance by a
    group of highly trained professionals.
        U.S. Strategic Command established the DOD Columbia Investigation
    Support Team (DCIST) to collect, analyze and preserve data from a
    variety of assets to support the investigation. In parallel, STRATCOM
    was authorized direct liaison authority with the National Imaging and
    Mapping Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and other agencies for
    the collection and preservation of data relating to the loss of the
    shuttle.
        We have reviewed our early actions after this tragedy both
    internally, within the STRATCOM Headquarters, as well as externally. We
    plan to advance the lessons we have learned to strengthen our support
    to NASA. We will work this through all the means available including
    the Partnership Council, where together with Mr. Teets and General
    Lord, we can expand DOD support, as appropriate, to NASA as they strive
    to return to flight.

        Senator Ben Nelson. I appreciate that, and I know my
    colleague from Florida has been deeply concerned on a personal
    level as well as on a professional level and, as part of this
    committee, would be, I am sure, equally interested in that
    information, as well.
        Secretary Teets--my time is expired. Thank you. [Laughter.]
        Senator Allard. Time flies when you are having fun, does it
    not?
        Senator Ben Nelson. It sure does. [Laughter.]
        Senator Allard. We will proceed now with a second round.
        I would like to start my second round of questioning with
    the SBIRS program. We have had some problems in the past with
    the SBIRS program, getting it put in place. I will address my
    first question to Admiral Ellis. Things were going well, and
    now we are seeing that there is a break between the second and
    third satellites on SBIRS, and these are geosynchronous
    satellites. I am concerned about this 2-year break that we have
    in there. I just would like to ask you, Admiral Ellis, if you
    are satisfied you had appropriate input prior to the Air
    Force's decision to defer the launch of those satellites three,
    four, and five.
        Admiral Ellis. Thank you for the question, sir. Obviously
    there was a great deal of consultation associated with a
    decision of that magnitude, both with the Air Force and other
    elements within the senior department leadership. SBIRS is
    absolutely critical to our way ahead. It is far more than a
    replacement for DSP. It offers us opportunities that we have
    never had before, in terms of support for the warfighter and
    ISR and technical intelligence and battlefield
    characterization, that are truly unique. While I always avoid
    the use of the word ``transformational,'' if anything has the
    potential to merit that term, it is the SBIRS constellation.
        But the short answer to your question is, we are satisfied
    that this is a plan that is executable, that will satisfy our
    immediate needs to continue to modernize that constellation,
    and that will give us the ability to assess the performance of
    the first two systems and then to modify and deploy the follow-
    on vehicles, and we are supportive of that plan, as structured.
        Senator Allard. If, by some unfortunate circumstance, one
    of those first two launches would fail, that puts us really on
    the edge. It does not give us much margin. We have 2 years, and
    it seems to me that it leaves ourselves kind of short supply
    there. That would concern me. Secretary Teets, maybe you want
    to respond to that.
        Secretary Teets. I would be pleased to. Because of the very
    concern you are expressing, Senator Allard, we are looking
    right now at whether we can work with our supplier base to get
    long-lead material and parts--I will say ``spares''--for the
    first two vehicles, which, if they are successfully built and
    deployed, those same parts then could be applied to vehicles
    three, four, and five in order to ameliorate the effect of a
    gap in production.
        Now, Admiral Ellis mentioned the upside of causing this
    break, where we can have an opportunity to evaluate performance
    on orbit for the first two satellites and then make
    adjustments, as necessary, for the buying of satellites three,
    four, and five. If we can find the right way to buy long-lead
    parts and protect ourselves from a potential for a gap in this
    production, we would be wise to do so, and so we are in the
    process of looking at that right now with our prime contractor,
    Lockheed-Martin.
        Senator Allard. Good.
        On space-based radar, Secretary Teets, we have--as I
    understand--a space-based radar program manager's office in Los
    Angeles, and then the deputy's office in Virginia. Do you think
    this is a sound or practical arrangement? People keep
    mentioning to me that they think this is a recipe for failure
    when you separate the office out that way. I would like to have
    you address that concern.
        Secretary Teets. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy
    to address that.
        We are very much in the process right now of formulating
    our strategy for how the space-based radar program will be put
    into place. This is a program that is going to be enormously
    important to the national security community. It will be
    important to both the warfighting element, all services, of
    course, but also the intelligence community.
        The fact is that a space-based radar that we are
    envisioning will provide persistent looks at ground mobile
    targets. It will also provide that same persistent look in
    terms of the capability to image the surface with synthetic
    aperture radar.
        Clearly, in my view, space-based radar is a very
    transformational program. Again, forgive the use of the word
    ``transformational.'' But this is a system that will bridge the
    intelligence community and our warfighters and serve the needs
    of both. We would be remiss if we did not take advantage of the
    capability and the expertise that has built up over the years
    in all of that community in order to properly acquire, design,
    develop, field, and operate our space-based radar system.
        This system we are describing is a multi-billion-dollar
    kind of system, and we need to get it right. There is expertise
    and experience in Northern Virginia that can be brought to
    bear. I am working very hard right now with General Arnold, in
    El Segundo, as well as with the National Reconnaissance Office
    in Northern Virginia to try and craft the right way to bring
    the skills and the talents of people to bear that will maximize
    the probability of success for this system as we architect it
    and then acquire it and then operate it.
        Senator Allard. Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I want to go back to the SBIRS program
    because part of the problem there is software, is it not?
        Secretary Teets. Software has been a problem. A year ago,
    we found ourselves in a situation where the SBIRS-High program
    needed to declare a Nunn-McCurdy breach. Part of that
    difficulty that we were experiencing did have to do with
    development of the ground software system.
        We have put in place a restructure of that program with our
    prime contractor, Lockheed-Martin, and progress on ground
    software development has been excellent. We are currently
    experiencing a bit of a problem with electromagnetic
    interference in the first highly elliptic orbit vehicle payload
    that is being delivered, and we have experienced a couple of
    month's slip. But I will say that the SBIRS-High program has
    done an excellent job of restructuring and focusing on the
    difficult tasks at hand.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Aside from the electromagnetic
    problem, what is the problem? Is it not enough people? Is it
    poor management? Is it unclear requirements, too much reuse of
    software? What is it?
        Secretary Teets. In terms of the current state of that
    program, in roughly the spring of last year, we did restructure
    that program. Up to that point in time, yes, we were having
    problems with systems engineering and we were having problems
    with management control. We had an intensive effort underway to
    change and restructure the SBIRS-High contract. Lockheed-Martin
    stood up, as the prime contractor, and we changed some of the
    clauses in the contract, we changed some of the total system
    performance responsibility activities, and we restructured the
    program office in Los Angeles under Colonel Mark Borkowski,
    reporting directly to General Brian Arnold. All of that
    activity resulted in the need to add resources to the program
    and define a new schedule that could be implemented. Progress
    over the course of this last year has been excellent, with the
    one exception that I mentioned, which is this electromagnetic
    compatibility problem that we are experiencing on the first EO
    payload delivery.
        But software development milestones are moving ahead as
    planned in the restructured contract, and we are making
    excellent progress on the program, as a whole.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Is it according to those milestones
    that you are going to know if the program is not going well in
    the future?
        Secretary Teets. Yes, that is clearly the intent of the
    restructured program--to identify milestones along the way that
    will give us an early warning signal that things are amiss.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral?
        Admiral Ellis. I want to add my support to the program
    concept--one of the other ways in which we can monitor not just
    the milestones, of course, but the technological issues that
    you describe, as well. One of the goals that I have set for my
    organization is to ensure that while we oversee the joint
    requirements perspective, we also be technologically
    knowledgeable enough in certain critical developmental systems
    so that we understand the implications of their successes, or
    lack thereof, as they meet or proceed along their milestone
    chart.
        We are committed to understanding the technical pieces that
    have to come together at the right time in order to achieve
    success at the milestone; so, at the earliest time, we can
    identify areas in which additional focus may be required. We
    view that as one of our oversight functions.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral, earlier, the chairman had
    asked about space-based radar. I want to ask you about the
    Navy's space surveillance system and part of our space
    surveillance network. It is being transferred to the Air Force
    in 2004. I am curious, are you involved in this review? When is
    it going to be finished?
        Admiral Ellis. I am not involved directly in the transfer.
    That is a service-to-service effort, as you are well aware,
    sir. We are aware of the criticality of the so-called
    ``fence,'' as it is known in the space business, the Navy space
    surveillance sensor, and its essential contribution to our
    ability to know what is going on on-orbit. It is essential to
    our situational awareness. Its modernization and upgrade are
    necessary to further enhance that so that we know
    fundamentally, first, what is going on on-orbit so we have a
    better ability to deal with those eventualities when they
    occur. There was a modernization plan associated with that that
    the Navy has been pursuing for a number of years.
        My understanding is that the transfer is taking place, but
    the funding issues associated beyond the normal operations and
    maintenance, the sustaining the upgrade piece of that, are
    still under review. We view the upgrade of that capability as
    essential to give us the situational awareness that is so
    important to our ability to review and to react to what is and
    to anticipate, actually, what is going on on-orbit.
        Senator Allard. Senator Nelson, you and I are the ones
    remaining. I have two or three questions more I would like to
    ask, and I thought we would wrap it up with this panel.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I have a few more questions, sir.
        Senator Allard. Very good.
        Senator Bill Nelson. You go ahead and just take as much
    time as you want.
        Senator Allard. We do want to leave enough time for the
    second panel, so I thought maybe a couple or three more
    questions from both of us.
        On space and science technology, Secretary Teets, in your
    written testimony and here orally, also, you mentioned the need
    to improve our science and technology planning. One of the
    questions we were asked, that was posed at one time, was, ``Who
    is coordinating all this?'' At one time, the response was, ``A
    lot of people are coordinating it,'' which indicated to me
    there may not be anybody that is coordinating it. What outcomes
    do you see in the current planning and coordination process?
        Secretary Teets. We are just in the process, Mr. Chairman,
    of setting up that kind of a coordinating activity, and we are
    electing to set it up under the cognizance of the National
    Security Space Integration Office under General Bob Kehler. It
    is a natural point of focus because General Kehler's office
    does have representation from the intelligence community as
    well as from each of the services; so it is a truly joint kind
    of an organization looking across bridging items across these
    various stove-pipes, if you will.
        What we are planning on doing is giving General Kehler the
    necessary resource so that he can look across AFRL, DARPA, the
    NRO's Advanced Systems and Technology Directorate, and the
    Naval Research Laboratory, and see where are there
    duplications, where are there leverages where we can take
    advantage of the resources and apply them in a way that will
    maximize our return from space science and technology
    development.
        Senator Allard. One other question I have here, and the
    other two questions, actually, are on space management
    organization. In last year's authorization, Secretary Teets,
    the act required a report on a plan by the Secretary of Defense
    to provide oversight of defense space programs by appropriate
    offices in the office of the Secretary of Defense. What is the
    status of that report? Do you know when it will be in?
        Secretary Teets. Mr. Chairman, I need to take that one for
    the record. I do not know the exact status of that report, but
    I would be happy to do so and get the answer to you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The report was delivered to Congress on 27 March 2003 by the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense.

        Senator Allard. One other question I had here, as Under
    Secretary of the Air Force and Director of NRO, you have the
    overarching responsibility of coordinating classified and
    unclassified space efforts. This is a challenge, and I would
    like to know how you are addressing that and what kind of
    progress you are making in that regard.
        Secretary Teets. Yes, sir. The answer to the question also
    applies, in large part, to this organization I just mentioned,
    National Security Space Integration Office, headed up by
    General Bob Kehler. In this case, there is another organization
    involved, as well, and that is the National Security Space
    Architects Office, headed up by Army Brigadier General Steve
    Ferrell. Both of those organizations are joint organizations in
    the sense that they have multi-service participation and
    intelligence community participation, as well. Both
    organizations are looking across the entire spectrum of
    activity there. I rely upon those two organizations to help me
    in doing the proper integration.
        Senator Allard. Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I want to return to the
    Navy space surveillance sensor. We were talking, when we last
    talked about this, about modernizing defense by replacing the
    current system with an X-band radar. Do either of you think
    that terminating the proven system is going to be counter to
    the recommendation of the Space Commission that our country
    needs to improve space situational awareness? Is the
    termination going to diminish space situational awareness?
        Secretary Teets. I would be pleased to take that one on
    first. The answer is, we need to find the right way ahead with
    space situational awareness, where we increase it and improve
    it. As it relates to the Navy fence, it is true that activity
    has been shifted over to the Air Force. It came over with the
    necessary O&M funding to continue it. There is, however, a
    strong desire to upgrade it to S-band capability. As Admiral
    Ellis indicated earlier, the issue of funding for that upgrade
    is under review and consideration right at the present time.
        But I can tell you that I do believe it is absolutely
    necessary that we maintain the fence and that we upgrade the
    fence. We need to augment our space situational awareness
    capability in major ways.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Secretary, does this mean, by
    shifting it to the Air Force, that the Navy's not going to be
    involved?
        Secretary Teets. I think that fundamentally is the case,
    yes. I think the Navy has decided, in this case, to not
    continue to operate and maintain the fence. The Navy will
    certainly continue to be interested in the results of space
    situational awareness, and they will be provided. The Air Force
    will pick up the ball.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral, how do you feel about that?
        Admiral Ellis. Sir, as I said earlier, the space
    situational awareness is absolutely essential to our way ahead.
    While there are studies and reviews that are attempting to
    characterize how best to proceed--I think the Secretary has
    said it as well as I have heard it said--this is absolutely
    essential for the future. We must have an enhanced and
    increased capability on-orbit. If defense is going to be part
    of that, it will have to be suitably upgraded or modernized.
        As the joint customer, I am going to just evaluate the
    organizational alignment on the basis of performance. It is
    possible that by bringing it under a single service, all of our
    surveillance capabilities may allow for some efficiencies and
    synergies along the way, but the metric, from a joint
    warfighting perspective, is going to be how well they
    accomplish the mission once the transfer is done and the
    realignment is complete.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you about
    GPS. Why is there no funding for GPS 3 in the fiscal year 2004
    budget?
        Secretary Teets. Senator Nelson, we have, in development
    for subsequent production right now, GPS 2R modifieds--that is
    to say GPS 2RM--and GPS 2F, which have improved anti-jam
    capability over and above our currently fielded system. As we
    look through the projected lifetimes of those satellites, we
    found that if we bridged 2003 money across 2004, as well--I
    think there is about $60 million of 2003 money that was
    appropriated for GPS 3--we could defer spending until 2005 and
    still achieve a 2012 first-launch capability. That 2012 first-
    launch capability for GPS 3 does, indeed, provide for a
    reasonably conservative continuum of replacement launches.
        Now, having said that, I want to also say that we are in
    the process right now of doing a study to look at what it would
    take to accelerate that 2012 first-launch date in order to get
    the even more improved anti-jam resistant GPS in place earlier.
    We are in the process of doing that study right now, and I
    would hope within 60 days to have a crisper answer to your
    question.
        Senator Allard. I would like to follow up on that last
    question of GPS. The French are putting out a GPS also, and I
    understand it is on the same wavelength. I think that creates
    some special problems for us, and maybe you want to comment on
    that.
        Secretary Teets. It does. We are in intense discussions
    now. As a matter of fact, my Deputy for Military Space, Bob
    Dickman, is in Brussels today at a GPS/Galileo conference
    discussing the very item that you are mentioning. It is
    important for us to work with the European space community to
    make certain that the Galileo system that they have under
    development does not interfere with our GPS capability. We are
    in the process of doing that.
        Senator Allard. Thank you. We have just had two members
    join us, Senator Sessions and Senator Reed.
        Senator Sessions, do you have any comments you want to put
    on the record and any questions before we wrap up on this
    panel? We have a second panel coming up.
        Senator Sessions. I do not, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
    these leaders for their work. Secretary Teets and Admiral
    Ellis, you have both done an excellent job. I know, Admiral
    Ellis, you have been doing some real reorganizational efforts
    while we are trying to fight a war and doing some changes, and
    I salute you for that.
        There is just no doubt whatsoever that the ability of our
    forces to be successful on the battlefield is dependent upon
    dominance in space, and I think we need to be looking at that
    constantly. If there is anything that threatens that, we ought
    to meet that threat and maintain that dominance.
        Senator Allard. Senator Reed?
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is an
    opportunity to ask questions?
        Senator Allard. Yes, we have pretty well finished the
    questioning round. Obviously, if you want to ask questions or
    make a statement for the record, you have an opportunity to do
    so.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Secretary
    Teets and Admiral Ellis.
        Let me ask just a few questions. First, last year, Mr.
    Secretary, when you were questioned with respect to space and
    weapons, you stated that, ``I believe that weapons will go into
    space; it is a question of time. We need to be at the forefront
    of that.'' Can you just elaborate on the current policy of the
    United States with respect to weaponization of space? Have
    there been any significant changes in the last few years?
        Secretary Teets. I think there have not been changes yet
    implemented in terms of that policy, but I think policy is
    under review at the current time and could conceivably change.
        In the statement that I made earlier today, I think the
    time has come for us to push hard on the issue of space
    control. That will involve some things that are currently
    within our capability, like space surveillance, attack warning
    systems, and even some defensive counterspace kinds of measures
    that we can take. But I, for one, believe that the time has
    come for us to consider a change in policy which would allow us
    to have some offensive capability, as well.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, the Space Commission
    unanimously concluded, ``The U.S. has an urgent interest in
    promoting and protecting the peaceful use of space.'' Is that
    inconsistent with your introducing offensive weapons into
    space?
        Secretary Teets. I think not, because I am not advocating
    the use of those weapons unless our forces are threatened or
    put under attack by an adversary's system in space. What I do
    not want to do is be the victim of a space Pearl Harbor and
    find that at some point in the future, when we are as dependent
    on our space systems as we are for effective warfighting
    capability, we lose them because of an enemy action and find
    ourselves having no capability to preclude an enemy's use of
    space assets.
        Senator Reed. I think, in listening to your comments--and I
    appreciate it is a very serious topic and you address it in a
    serious and substantial way--that at this juncture in history,
    we are one of the few powers that really has the capability of
    effectively weaponizing space, just as we were once one of the
    few powers that had the capability of deploying atomic weapons
    and nuclear weapons. There is a logic that it might be
    attractive to us now, but if others copy that, then we could be
    in a worse situation. I know you are considering that, also.
        Secretary Teets. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. Admiral Ellis, as the head of STRATCOM, you
    have the responsibility for the global command and control of
    U.S. strategic forces, including integrated missile defense.
    You have an important stake in decisions that are involved in
    that with respect to missile defense, the global capabilities.
    The President has made a decision, apparently, to deploy. I
    think prior to his deployment decision, your recommendation was
    not for deployment in 2004. Is that correct?
        Admiral Ellis. I do not recall the conversation or the
    context, sir. We set a goal for deployment of the initial
    operational capability in October of next year, and the
    President has characterized the limited scope of that effort as
    part of a continuing developmental process, led by the Missile
    Defense Agency, that will extend, of course, well beyond that.
        Our role in that is to assist in the operationalization of
    what has up to now been a development program, and that
    includes concepts of operations, that includes command and
    control structure, and that includes the details that certainly
    would be essential to making that a completely effective system
    once the development is complete.
        Senator Reed. One of the issues here is at what point would
    the operational test-bed become deployment. I would think,
    though, that if it is a deployed system, then your role would
    be critical, then it would be within your responsibility. Is
    that fair?
        Admiral Ellis. The concept, as I mentioned, for its
    employment is under development--the operational concept, if
    you will. But clearly there will be an interest, since it is
    now global missile defense and not just regional or national
    missile defense, on each of the combatant commanders who have a
    statutory responsibility for the defense of their area of
    responsibility. Northern Command, certainly that is the United
    States of American and North America, and the regional
    combatant commanders are also interested in how we blend
    together all of the layers or levels of systems that could
    contribute to that.
        That is our role, to make that architecture common, to have
    common concepts of operations, to have interoperability across
    theaters to ensure that there are no seams in what you rightly
    characterized as essentially a global capability, and then
    provide that to regional combatant commanders as it is
    currently structured for their use, if required.
        Senator Reed. Thank you. Just one quick thought. In 2004,
    do you anticipate that you will have an operational system that
    you will be integrating globally, even if it is declared a
    deployment?
        Admiral Ellis. The system goals, ambitious as they are,
    indicate that there will be a limited operational capability in
    this developmental system when it is in place by the fall of
    next year. Clearly as we move beyond that, there will be
    additional refinements and elements that will contribute as
    follow-on concepts that could contribute to this layered
    defense delivered. But initially, yes, sir, it is our intent to
    have in place the operational elements that could use this
    development capability should the need arise in defense of the
    Nation.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Allard. I would like to thank Senator Nelson--Bill?
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I have a bunch of
    questions that I will submit for the record.
        Senator Allard. Yes.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I have one or two that I need to ask.
        Senator Allard. Go ahead.
        Senator Bill Nelson. We were talking about assured access
    to space, Mr. Secretary, and we talked about that new vehicle
    that you were developing to operationally test in 2007. What we
    did not talk about are exploring with NASA future alternatives
    to the space shuttle and what DOD funding might be allocated to
    that.
        Secretary Teets. Yes, sir. I do believe we are very
    interested in discussing that entire situation with NASA.
    Again, as NASA builds its plans going forward, following the
    Space Shuttle Columbia tragedy, we are anxious to work with
    NASA to understand what their plans are and how we can work
    together to further mutual objectives having to do with assured
    access to space.
        Senator Bill Nelson. You and I have had private
    conversations on this, and I think it is getting to the point
    of decision-making from the standpoint of assured access to
    space. Exactly how much is DOD going to participate in the
    development of new technologies for a follow-on vehicle that
    would be a vehicle that DOD could use, including perhaps other
    agencies as well as NASA? We are going to need to have some
    further discussions.
        Admiral Ellis, in your position as the Commander of
    Strategic Command, you have the operational responsibility for
    the deployed missile defense system. How have you coordinated
    with the MDA and how will you coordinate in the future to
    ensure that your operational considerations are included in
    those missile defense systems?
        Admiral Ellis. That is a great question, sir. Obviously, as
    General Kadish and his team at the Missile Defense Agency
    continue to work the developmental efforts of this, we are very
    closely linked with them through a longstanding relationship
    that we had in former U.S. Space Command that is now part of
    the United States Strategic Command. I speak at his
    conferences. We work in each of the major policy groups that
    oversee developmental decisions, and we, together, are crafting
    milestones that will support fully his need for the command and
    control architecture, the organizational alignment, and the
    training and location of key operational nodes. All of those
    decisions which have to be in place, as I said in my colloquy
    with Senator Reed, have to be in place by the fall of next
    year. We are very mindful of the aggressive timeline that we
    are on and are moving equally aggressively to meet it.
        Senator Bill Nelson. The full committee, Mr. Chairman, is
    having a hearing on missile defense system in about a week, and
    that might be something that we might explore further at that
    point, on the operations.
        Finally, Mr. Secretary, we have read in the papers about
    utilizing some of the ICBMs and putting a conventional warhead
    on the top of it as a means of having additional punch instead
    of a nuclear warhead. What discussions have you had or would be
    needed with other countries about these non-nuclear ICBM
    programs?
        Secretary Teets. I have not had any discussions with anyone
    on that subject, really. I do know that, of course, there are
    certain ICBM assets that are being retired now, and, as far as
    I know, the plan there is to put them into storage for the
    indefinite future.
        Senator Allard. Yes, the Peacekeeper.
        The President announced that they are going to discontinue
    the Peacekeeper and then just go with the Minuteman.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Right.
        Senator Allard. I want to thank the panel for your time and
    for your willingness to share your thoughts with this
    subcommittee. We wish you well. You are both doing a good job,
    and keep it up.
        Now we would like to call on the second panel. It consists
    of Gen. Lance Lord, Commander of Air Force Space Command; Lt.
    Gen. Joseph M. Cosumano, Jr., Commanding General, U.S. Army
    Space and Missile Defense Command and U.S. Army Space Command;
    and I would also like to welcome Vice Adm. Richard Mayo, United
    States Navy Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command.
        Gentlemen, thank you for joining us. When you are all set
    and ready, we will proceed in the order in which I introduced
    you. General Lord and then we will go to Lieutenant General
    Cosumano and then Admiral Mayo.
        Whenever you are ready, General Lord.

      STATEMENT OF GEN. LANCE W. LORD, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE
                             SPACE COMMAND

        General Lord. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor, on
    the part of all the members of Air Force Space Command, to have
    the opportunity to appear and testify.
        I have also submitted a written statement, and I
    respectfully request that it be entered into the record.
        Senator Allard. We will make that a part of the record.
        General Lord. Sir, thank you and the whole committee for
    your support.
        In my brief comments here, I would like to outline our
    three important roles at Air Force Space Command as the major
    command. First off, it is my job to help oversee the almost
    40,000 men and women officers, enlisted, professionals, plus a
    great group of civilians and contractors who help train,
    organize, and equip our space and ICBM forces. That is really
    my major command role. Then we present those forces and their
    capabilities, and that is our component role. We do that
    through Admiral Ellis and his support as the combatant
    commander and, in turn, his support for the other combatant
    commanders. Lastly, we support Secretary Teets in his role as
    the DOD and the executive agent for space in serving as our
    under secretary.
        Recently, our Air Force has refined its core competencies
    in three things that really strike to the things that we are
    doing in space. One is really developing airmen. We think our
    space professional strategy and our cadre development is really
    a significant aspect of that and certainly has harmonized well
    with the Air Force program. I certainly would, if you wish,
    talk a little more about that later on. I think one of the keys
    to integration across black and white space is really
    developing the right cadres to think about those issues. That
    would help, as well.
        Second, the Air Force has gotten better with transitioning
    technology to the warfighter, the tools of combat capability
    that you have recognized and the subcommittee has so expertly
    talked about how important it is to protect those assets, not
    only in supporting Operation Enduring Freedom today, but
    developing the systems of space and ICBMs for the future.
        I had an opportunity to visit Southwest Asia the week of
    Thanksgiving, and in my history in this business where we have
    seen space capabilities be pushed where we developed, now they
    are in a pull mechanism from theater. People want as much space
    capability as we can possibly deliver and to help integrate
    across all theaters. We have shifted gears from space-
    capability push to space-capability pull, and they are
    certainly integrated with the users, certainly in Southwest
    Asia and I know across all the combatant commanders.
        The integration of the Space and Missile Systems Center
    into Air Force Command--thus now the procurement arm of our Air
    Force space acquisition resides in our command--has been a
    major step forward. It is certainly a recommendation of the
    committee that was acted on in October 2001, and I am proud to
    report that that is maturing in big ways.
        Lastly, as we integrate operations, we are experts in ICBM
    and space, but really we want to be skilled in the airline and
    sea business because we see space as key to joint employment as
    we work together here with our colleagues in the Army and the
    Navy and the Marine Corps, as well.
        We are convinced, as you pointed out, that our environment
    is changing and our missions continue to grow in their
    importance, and we want to build the foundation with our space
    priority to make sure that we can fully exploit that. We feel
    that the space and ICBM capabilities are key to our asymmetric
    advantage, and we want to keep them that way.
        Sir, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear, and
    I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Lord follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Gen. Lance W. Lord, USAF

        Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: On behalf of the
    outstanding men and women of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), thank you
    for this opportunity to appear before you today. Our airmen and
    civilians are a key part of the world's greatest integrated air and
    space force, and we are proud to be a part of our Nation's defense.
    From the missile fields in the Great Plains to remote locations around
    the globe, in-place or deployed as part of an Air and Space
    Expeditionary Force, the commitment of our men and women to the
    Nation's security has been exceptional. I would also like to thank all
    of you for your continuing support.
        Our command has three important roles. The first is to organize,
    train, and equip our space and intercontinental ballistic missile
    (ICBM) forces--our role as an Air Force Major Command. The second is to
    present those ready forces and their capabilities in our role as a
    component to U.S. Strategic Command. Finally, we support the Air Force
    in its role as DOD Executive Agent for Space. I appreciate this
    opportunity to tell you about the things our Command is doing in these
    areas, and I would like to frame my remarks in terms of the Air Force's
    recently refined core competencies: developing airmen, bringing
    technology to warfighting, and integrating operations.

               DEVELOPING AIRMEN: THE HEART OF COMBAT CAPABILITY

        Our highest priority is our people. In-place or deployed, people
    are our most important asset and the key to mission success. Because of
    this, we have a continuing need to recruit, retain, equip and train our
    entire force.
        We appreciate the role the members of this committee have played to
    improve their quality of life. The Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense
    Authorization Act reflects the country's confidence in and concern for
    the men and women who serve in our Armed Forces. We are grateful for
    the many important quality of life improvements such as pay raises,
    health benefits and greater educational opportunities this year's Act
    provides. All of these are key to helping us retain and recruit the
    quality force our Nation needs.
        As our Nation's dependence on space continues to grow, the Air
    Force must meet the challenge of developing the right people to
    acquire, operate, and employ military space capabilities. A strong,
    proactive space professional development program is essential to
    safeguarding our Nation's leadership position in space and our way of
    developing airmen. The Space Commission's recommendations and
    subsequent Secretary of Defense direction provided an opportunity to
    more deliberately focus our space professional development, and we have
    done just that.
        We have developed the Air Force's Space Professional Strategy that
    describes a structured approach for developing space professionals. Our
    strategy is comprehensive and provides a blueprint for better
    addressing the training, education, and experience needs of our space
    professionals. At the same time, it recognizes the unique roles these
    officers, enlisted members and DOD civilian employees play in the
    national security space arena. Additionally, this strategy addresses
    the varied disciplines required of the space professional team--a team
    that accomplishes the complex functions required to take ICBM and space
    systems from concept to employment.
        We have been actively refining this strategy since I took command.
    In fiscal year 2003, we have begun the harder task of implementing the
    initiatives identified in the strategy--initiatives that center on the
    force's education, training and experience needs. Given the importance
    and complexity of professional development, we recognize this is a
    long-term commitment but it's the right thing to do--for our mission
    and for our country. We have the best space and missile operators and
    acquirers in the world and we will continue to improve on that standard
    of excellence.

           TECHNOLOGY-TO-WARFIGHTING: THE TOOLS OF COMBAT CAPABILITY

        Today, our space systems engaged in current operations are
    excellent examples of bringing technology to the warfighter--our second
    core competency. For instance, AFSPC communications experts deployed in
    support of Operation Enduring Freedom to establish satellite data links
    for the Air Force Predator system that reduced the ``sensor to
    shooter'' time to single-digit minutes. Today, we have over 1,000
    personnel deployed, and our people, in-place or deployed, work to
    deliver combat effects. Our missile and space capabilities are global
    in their reach and provide the asymmetric advantage we enjoy today.
        One result of implementing the Space Commission recommendations is
    the integration of the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) in Los
    Angeles into AFSPC. This has had profound effects on the way our
    command brings technology to warfighting. We are now responsible for
    both the acquisition and operation of our space and missile
    capabilities. For example, we recently set up the Space Superiority
    Program Office at SMC to acquire the counterspace systems that Under
    Secretary Teets mentioned. With acquirers and operators in a single
    command, we have identified a mission need, generated requirements,
    begun the acquisition process and will eventually deploy, operate, and
    sustain these systems.
        Secretary Teets has talked about our priority programs. AFSPC will
    work to ensure that these acquisition programs stay on track, that our
    requirements for new systems are stable and that we look hard at new
    ways to put technology to use. In addition to the Global Positioning
    System, Space-Based Infrared System-High, SBR, Transformational
    Communications Architecture, assured access and space control programs,
    we will ensure that this Nation maintains a credible force of safe,
    secure and ready ICBMs. Our ICBMs underpin our deterrent posture, and
    we thank you for your continuing support in our efforts to modernize
    them. While the Nuclear Posture Review requires us to maintain the
    current fleet of Minuteman IIIs until 2020 it also directs the Air
    Force to plan for a follow-on system. This fall we will start an
    analysis of alternatives to determine the best course for that effort.
    This is even more important as we begin the second year of our 3-year
    program to deactivate the Peacekeeper system this October.
        Technology is advancing rapidly, and it is clear that we must
    continue to develop and field the systems that provide our warfighters
    the combat capabilities they need.

             INTEGRATING OPERATIONS: MAXIMIZING COMBAT CAPABILITIES

        Our space capabilities are an integral part of all our combat and
    humanitarian operations, and they are essential for success in the
    fast-paced environment of the 21st century. Today, we operate as a
    Joint force and, in addition to our expertise in space and missiles, we
    must be well versed in air, land and sea operations. That way, we can
    ensure we provide forces and capabilities combatant commanders need in
    an integrated manner to generate effects when and where they need them.
        There were significant changes to the Unified Command Plan last
    fall. With missions additional to those of U.S. Space Command
    (USSPACECOM) and the previous U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM),
    USSTRATCOM is a new command with global focus and strategic reach. They
    are now responsible for military space operations, computer network
    operations, information operations, strategic warning and intelligence
    assessments as well as global strategic planning. The space
    capabilities AFSPC provided to USSPACECOM 24/7/365 remain the same; the
    componency relationship is different. Today, we are their Air Force
    component for both space and ICBM operations. To that end, we have
    recently activated a command center in our headquarters to manage the
    flow of orders from STRATCOM to our Numbered Air Forces. Through this
    componency relationship, we provide our capabilities to joint
    warfighters from all commands, around the globe.

                                   CONCLUSION

        We believe AFSPC missions will continue to grow in importance as
    the Nation responds to current and emerging threats. Through our core
    competencies, AFSPC will help build the foundation necessary to fulfill
    our National Security Strategy goals of assuring our allies and
    friends, dissuading future military competition, deterring threats
    against our interests, allies and friends, and decisively defeating any
    adversary if deterrence fails. We will serve a central role as the
    space capabilities that are both an economic and military center of
    gravity to our Nation become ever more important.
        We continue finding new ways to improve our unique capabilities and
    integrate them into our military missions. As we develop more advanced
    systems, we must invest the necessary resources, energy and
    intellectual capital to protect our vital interests and sustain the
    asymmetric advantage that allows us the freedom to operate in the
    medium of space. We appreciate Congress' continued support of our
    people as well as your support to maintain our high state of readiness.
    With your help, we will ensure our space and ICBM forces continue to
    play a key role in our Nation's defense.
        Again, I am honored to appear before you and look forward to your
    questions.

        Senator Allard. Thank you.
        General Cosumano.

    STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JOSEPH M. COSUMANO, JR., USA, COMMANDING
     GENERAL, U.S. ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND AND U.S.
                           ARMY SPACE COMMAND

        General Cosumano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        It is an honor for me to represent the men and women of the
    United States Army Space Command and United States Army Space
    and Missile Defense Command here this morning before the
    subcommittee.
        I will make a few brief opening remarks, and I have a
    prepared statement for the record, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Allard. Without objection, your prepared remarks
    will be a part of the record.
        General Cosumano. Thank you, sir.
        General Cosumano. Members of our command are employed
    worldwide and also in the United States in Operations Noble
    Eagle and Enduring Freedom, and there are three main points I
    would like to emphasize this morning for the subcommittee.
        Today, the Army is at war and transforming at the same
    time. We are transforming to an objective force, a more
    deployable and flexible force, and the key enabler for that
    force is space. We believe that we must have space if we are to
    see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively.
        Second, Mr. Chairman, integration of space activities and
    programs into our Army is very important, and we have done a
    lot of work in the last 2 years. We developed a space cadre of
    operational officers who are deployed at each one of our major
    commands. We have looked at our space organizations and we have
    revamped those space organizations so that they can better
    sustain combat operations.
        We have deployed Army space support teams. These are people
    who bring space down to the warfighter in each one of our major
    combat formations. We continue to structure Space and Missile
    Defense Command and Army Space Command to meet the demands of
    the four new missions that you heard Admiral Ellis talk about,
    as we are the Army service component to the new Strategic
    Command.
        Finally, our command is a cradle-to-grave organization
    composed of elements that perform combat development, material
    development, as well as operations, allowing us to move
    products quickly to the warfighter.
        While our friends in the Air Force and Navy focus on space
    constellations and providing those types of services, we, in
    the Army, leverage their investments and focus on ground
    stations such as the Grenadier Brat, Blue Force Tracking System
    used in Afghanistan, the Tactical Exploitation System,
    Intelligence Processing Ground Station, and the Joint Tactical
    Ground Stations, a ballistic missile early-warning system.
    These are but a few examples of the technologies and products
    of this command.
        Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude by saying that our
    soldiers are our most treasured assets, and we are making great
    strides in the development and fielding of the space
    capabilities that will help them accomplish their missions. We
    are proud to be a full partner in the national security space
    community.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you and your subcommittee for your
    support. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Cosumano follows:]

          Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Joseph M. Cosumano, Jr., USA

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the
    soldiers and civilians of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense
    Command (SMDC), thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
    today. I also consider it a privilege to be counted in the ranks with
    Secretary Teets, Admiral Ellis, General Lord, and Admiral Mayo. I
    appear before this subcommittee as the Army proponent for space and as
    the Army Service Component Commander to U.S. Strategic Command. In our
    Title 10 role, we lead the Army in the effort to man, train, and equip
    Space Forces. We develop space concepts, doctrine, organizations,
    material, training programs and personnel, and integrate space
    capabilities into nearly everything the Army does.
        Mr. Chairman, as we speak, men and women of SMDC are deployed
    within the U.S. and around the world in the global war on terrorism.
    Their mission is to ensure the Department of Defense, the Army and the
    Combatant Commanders have access to all the benefits of space. I am
    proud to represent them. They are our highest priority.
        The last 2 years have been very busy for our space mission, due to
    increased demands for our capabilities and working to implement the
    Space Commission's findings as directed by the Secretary of Defense. My
    remarks today will cover efforts in the transformation of the Army,
    integration endeavors, development of a space cadre and finally, some
    key technologies, which enhance the Army's space capabilities in
    support of our Nation's warfighters.

                              ARMY TRANSFORMATION

        Army Transformation represents the transition from a threat-based
    cold war design to a more strategically responsive, capability-based
    force to meet threats in an uncertain future. Today, we are
    simultaneously engaged in the war on terrorism, Operations Enduring
    Freedom and Noble Eagle and in Southwest Asia. Make no mistake,
    however, we simultaneously continue the transformation process. Space
    is critical to our success. The ultimate result will yield an Army that
    is dominant and strategically responsive.
        Space is our ``High Ground'' for conducting global operations, and
    often our first sensors and communications supporting rapidly deploying
    joint military forces. The Transformed Army must have this critical
    space-based support if we are to ``See First, Understand First, Act
    First and Finish Decisively.'' The Army, as part of a Joint Space
    Force, will do its part to ensure we have assured access for U.S. and
    coalition forces, and when directed, to deny space to our enemies.
        As the Army Service Component for USSTRATCOM, SMDC is the single
    point of contact for employment of Army Space Forces that directly
    support warfighting commanders with space-based imagery, intelligence,
    weather, missile warning, communications and other products. We have
    Army Space Support Teams providing space products and expert advice on
    the capabilities and use of space systems to Army, Corps, and Division
    staffs. From all over the globe, they ``reach back'' through classified
    communication systems to our home station operations center at Army
    Space Command. They also pull advanced imagery products from Spectral
    Operations Resource Center, also in Army Space Command. Our Mission
    Management Center, which oversees the use of thousands of Blue Force
    Tracking Systems, is providing significant command and control to our
    joint warfighters. All our early warning systems are deployed or are
    standing by.
        It's hard to imagine, but ``a day without space'' for our military
    forces as well as our commercial and civil sectors, would emphasize our
    total reliance on space. We would be limited in the areas of
    intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. We would also be reduced
    to primitive missile attack warning. Global positioning and long-range
    communications would be non-existent. The affect on our economy and
    National Security would be devastating. Our focus over the past year in
    developing the concept for space operations in support of the Objective
    Force has been to ensure that the Army, from Legacy to Objective Force,
    will never experience ``a day without space.'' We have leveraged to the
    maximum extent possible--high payoff areas, which are focused on
    assuring access to space and space products.

                                  INTEGRATION

        The Army recently formalized its doctrinal concepts for Space
    Operations in support of the Objective Force, which outlines our
    essential tasks for Space Operations and how space support is provided
    to the Objective Force. The Army, with SMDC as the proponent, has
    established the Space Operations Officer Corps to address interim and
    Objective Force Space Cadre requirements. To that end, SMDC is
    developing a number of initiatives that will bring space literacy
    training to all members of the Army, including the Officer Education
    System. The system has undergone structural changes resulting in an
    expansion of the education process for Army space officers and the
    development of joint space training opportunities with the Air Force.
    SMDC has taken the initial steps for developing the officer corps and
    is working on processes to identify, educate and train enlisted and
    civilian personnel. Work remains to be done as future systems are
    derived and the soldiers required to man them are identified. The
    ability to perform these tasks is enabled by SMDC's unique structure.
        SMDC's organizational construct is designed to create unity of
    effort, synergy, and integration across the mission areas for the Army.
    The Command is composed of research, development and acquisition,
    combat development and operational organizations. This ``cradle to
    grave'' approach links the Combatant Commander's desired capabilities
    to the development of requirements and fielding of these capabilities.
    We can take transitional operational concepts to the fielding of
    solutions more responsively, more efficiently and at less cost. We
    achieve this by leveraging resources from outside the command and
    through established relationships with other Army, Joint and non-DOD
    agencies. In this case, ``the whole is indeed greater than the sum of
    its parts.''
        The Army has five military tasks that must be met by Joint Space
    Forces if the Army's Objective Force is to truly meet its full
    Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Capabilities. These tasks are
    especially critical during the early phases of a military operation
    from home station to entry into a theater of operations. They become
    just as significant later when the fight is over and we are conducting
    Stability and Support Operations and transitioning to civilian
    authorities.
        First we must ``Support increased deployability and reduced in
    theater footprint'' of Army Forces. We accomplish this by deploying
    only the combat forces and logistics forces that must be in theater to
    conduct operations. We leave back in our Home Station Operations
    Centers, the planners and thinkers that can do their job out of
    theater, and we ``reach back'' to them through the Global Information
    Grid and particularly Global Satellite Communications or SATCOM. The
    Advanced Wideband System, Advanced EHF System and the Transformation
    Communication Systems represent the pathway to full Objective Force
    communications, connected by the Joint Tactical Radio System.
        Next is to ``Enable situational understanding off the ramp.'' The
    Army of today needs time once they arrive in theater to gain
    understanding of the environment and enemy actions that we will
    encounter. The Objective Force is built to deploy and employ directly
    into operations with little to no pause from leaving the ship or
    aircraft that brings us into theater. This requires that situational
    awareness and understanding begins the instant we are alerted at home
    station, builds continuously through deployment and as we conduct entry
    operations either in a hostile or permissive environment. Space-based
    environmental monitoring for weather, mapping, and terrain analysis is
    provided today by the Defense Meteorological Support Program (DMSP).
    Other space-based weather systems, such as the National Polar-orbiting
    Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) will contribute to
    those missions in the future. LANDSAT and other commercial systems
    provide us terrain data. Together they supply the initial information
    required to understand climate and terrain in a distant land. Next,
    support from the NRO's National Systems, augmented by imagery from
    commercial satellites, gives us even greater detail and information on
    enemy activities and conducting intelligence preparation of the
    battlespace. The SBR is the next critical step forward in enhancing our
    force by giving tactical forces persistent views of the battlefield, to
    include the most accurate levels of terrain information needed for
    mapping. The Army strongly supports the development and fielding of
    SBR, and will continue to be the Air Force's closest partner in its
    development.
        GPS and its integration into our systems is the key to the next
    essential task, ``Support precision maneuver, fires, sustainment, and
    information.'' It is GPS that gives us the common grid that all systems
    must use to achieve networked and precision operations. Knowing exactly
    where forces are around the world will allow us to save lives through
    blue-force tracking, destroying the enemy faster with precision
    maneuver and engagement, and supporting our forces more efficiently
    through knowing exactly where sustaining items need to be and when they
    are needed by the customer. GPS, as it is doing to our commercial
    activities, is the critical underpinning of precision operation, to
    include its timing signal, which is critical to networked
    communications. Today's GPS is good, but GPS block III will give us the
    1-meter accuracy our Future Combat System requires, and from a more
    jam-resistant and reliable GPS signal.
        ``Enable information and decision superiority'' simply means we
    have more and better information than our enemy, and can make the right
    decision faster. Certainly being able to collect and move information
    is a part of this equation, but we must also ensure the enemy ``sees
    last, understands last, acts last, and loses'' by attacking his
    information systems, making him ``deaf, mute, blind, and confused.''
        The joint nature of space requires that the Army become a more
    active partner in the development of space requirements that enable
    units of action and units of employment to achieve information
    superiority. In the same manner, the Army can no longer assume that the
    U.S. will maintain space superiority. Space control capabilities are
    essential to ensure that an adversary's use of space is denied at the
    appropriate time and place when required. We must never allow U.S.
    Forces to have ``a day without space.'' The Army is developing ground-
    based space control negation systems that will be synchronized with
    efforts by the Air Force and Navy in a traditional role as we have in
    air defense, missile defense, and now space defense.
        Protect force during all phases of the operation. Only space
    systems can provide the early warning of theater ballistic missile
    attack that will allow our forces to take cover, and cue Army missile
    defense systems to engage in-bound enemy missiles. The Space-Based
    Infrared System (SBIRS) will give us significantly more accurate launch
    points of enemy missiles, and more accurate and timely impact points of
    these missiles saving lives and allowing efficient use of missile
    defense systems. The Army strongly supports the continued development
    and fielding of SBIRS. Protection also means defeating the enemy's use
    of space systems for communications and intelligence, surveillance and
    reconnaissance. As mentioned in the previous essential task, defeating
    our adversaries' use of sensors and communications is a mission the
    Army knows well. In the past, we have done that against ground threats,
    then against air threats, and now against threats in space. This is not
    a new mission for the Army, just a new medium from which to operate.
        Our space forces integrate with land, sea, air, and even cyber-
    based capabilities to provide the information demanded by our
    warfighters. What is important is that these capabilities are brought
    together as part of a robust system that enables information and
    decision superiority--which allows us to dominate across the full
    spectrum of military operations.

                            TECHNOLOGIES TO SUCCEED

        We are conducting the research, development, and acquisition
    functions that are developing and bringing to the warfighters new
    space-based technologies, much faster and more efficiently than is
    possible using normal procurement procedures. The Army conceived the
    Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program (TENCAP). Our
    Army Space Program Office (ASPO), using TENCAP acquisition procedures,
    has rapidly developed and fielded to Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force, and
    Special Operations Forces the Grenadier Brat Blue Force Tracking
    system. This equipment allows us to know precisely where our military
    units are on the battlefield, right down to the individual person or
    platform. ASPO also, within a few years, developed and fielded the
    Tactical Exploitation System, which is one of the most advanced
    intelligence, and information integration systems currently supporting
    our forces. This system will become the ``heart'' of the Distributed
    Common Ground Station--Army.
        Our role in the Ground-based Midcourse Defense System (GMD)
    strongly links us with the efforts of the Missile Defense Agency. The
    Army supports the Defense Department's Ballistic Missile Defense System
    (BMDS) efforts to develop, test, and deploy ballistic missile defense
    programs designed to protect America, its deployed forces, and its
    friends and allies. As the lead service, the Army has been preparing
    for GMD deployment for some time. We are prepared to deploy and operate
    the GMD component in September 2004 in support of National Security
    Presidential Directive-23 (NSPD-23).
        With regard to our Army Space Control efforts, we provide enabling
    technologies to support the Objective Force and Future Combat System.
    As the largest user of space products, the Army requires timely and
    assured access to space systems and subsequent denial for our
    adversaries. From providing continuous surveillance to the integration
    of space sensor data into battlefield operating systems to the negation
    of our adversary's space capabilities, Space Control initiatives are a
    key component of our overall strategy.
        Our strategy also includes the Army Space Exploitation
    Demonstration Program formed to exploit space-related capabilities by
    closely linking technology to the warfighter. This program reacts to
    expedited requests for emerging technology through rapid prototyping.
    Some recent examples have been the Low Earth Orbit Position and
    Reporting Device (LEOPARD), the Space Operating System (SOS), and the
    Space Support Element Toolset (SSET). Recently, a number of the SSETs
    have been deployed and more are being built to fulfill requirements.
        Our space partners in the Air Force take the lead on the design,
    acquisition, launch, and operations of satellites, while Army Space
    Forces focus on the user ground-segment, and how to best use these
    capabilities. The Defense Support Program satellites and the Joint
    Tactical Ground Station are an existing example of this Army, Air Force
    and Navy partnership that will continue into the future with the
    fielding of the SBIRS, and our Multi-mission Mobile Processor. The
    Space-Based Radar, another example, will use the Distributed Common
    Ground Station--Army as its downlink to the user community. The Army's
    development of Ground-Based Space Control negation systems will protect
    joint forces from the enemy's use of space.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Mr. Chairman, the Army is on point for the Nation, fighting the war
    on terrorism, preparing for operations in Southwest Asia, and deterring
    aggression throughout the world while transforming to meet future
    threats. We are making great strides in the development of our
    Objective Force Space cadre to carry their missions. Soldiers are our
    most treasured asset.
        The Army is proud to be a full partner in the national security
    space community as we continue to protect our forces, our American
    citizens, and our allies. Mr. Chairman and distinguished subcommittee
    members, thank you for your steadfast support. I look forward to your
    questions. Thank you.

        Senator Allard. Admiral Mayo.

     STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. RICHARD W. MAYO, USN, COMMANDER, NAVAL
                        NETWORK WARFARE COMMAND

        Admiral Mayo. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator Nelson,
    distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am Vice Admiral
    Dick Mayo. I am Commander of the Naval Network Warfare Command.
    I have submitted a statement for the record, which I hope you
    will accept.
        Senator Allard. We will make that part of the record, sir.
        Admiral Mayo. I am glad for this opportunity to address the
    subcommittee, and I look forward to your questions.
        Space has long been and remains a critical enabler for
    naval warfighting. The Navy has been in the forefront of
    operationalizing space from the Global Positioning System
    through the earliest tactical satellite communications to the
    Classic Wizard System and to bringing realtime targeting to the
    cockpit and in-flight weapons.
        Some people say that the Navy is disengaging from space,
    and that is absolutely wrong. The Navy needs space-based
    capabilities today more than ever. To realize our vision of Sea
    Power 21 and its three pillars of Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and
    Sea Basing, the Navy needs space for increased situational
    awareness, speed, precision, and lethality. The Navy/Marine
    Corps Team wants to operationalize space and bring it to every
    level of operations. Our transformation to a capabilities-based
    Navy, which is represented by Sea Power 21 and what we call
    FORCEnet, is critically dependent upon the joint capabilities
    we get from space. The Navy's contribution to space has been
    reflected and is reflected in such major programs as the Mobile
    User Objective System satellites, various DOD satellite
    terminal systems, and innovate space-smart people.
        A guiding principle of the Rumsfeld Commission Report was
    to formalize what our Chief of Naval Operations then called
    ``an operationally and technically savvy space cadre,'' experts
    you could call who could advocate Navy requirements in the
    joint community and the joint program offices and to continue
    to advance the operationalization of Navy for the fleet. We
    have moved to identify those people, certify their expertise,
    and strengthen their identification as a valuable group of
    professionals.
        The establishment of Naval Network Warfare Command is
    Navy's response to recognize the importance of space to
    operational capability. We have aligned NETWARCOM under the
    fleet in clear recognition of the need to concentrate network
    and space operations at that level. NETWARCOM also serves as
    the functional component to U.S. Strategic Command for network
    space operations and information operations.
        Our dependence upon space is absolutely critical. To that
    end, space control is an arena and an area which we think needs
    much further attention. The Navy offers unique capabilities in
    that regard, and we have already offered a capability to U.S.
    Strategic Command in support of space control.
        I would like to introduce Major General Kevin Kuklok, the
    Assistant Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and
    Operations. Both of us stand ready to answer any questions you
    have about space and the Navy/Marine Corps team. Thank you very
    much.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Mayo follows:]

              Prepared Statement by Vice Adm. Richard W. Mayo, USN

        Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: Good morning, I am
    VADM Dick Mayo, the Commander of Naval Network Warfare Command located
    in Norfolk, Virginia. NETWARCOM is the newest Navy ``type commander''
    working for Admiral Bob Natter, Commander, Fleet Forces Command,
    responsible for organizing, training and equipping forces that operate
    the Navy network. Additionally, I am the Navy functional component
    commander to the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command for space,
    information operations, and network operations.
        The Navy supports the changes that were recommended and have been
    implemented by the Rumsfeld Commission report. Based on the Rumsfeld
    report, Navy has conducted our own internal review that was led by Adm.
    (Ret.) Smith. Space-based sensors and platforms have never been more
    important to the success of naval operations and our future success is
    dependent upon them. I will comment on the importance of space to naval
    operations, what we are doing to implement the changes that were
    addressed in the Rumsfeld and Smith reports and the importance that
    space will play in achieving the U.S. Navy's Sea Power 21 vision.

                               NAVY ROLE IN SPACE

        Space can no longer be viewed as a separate entity, or even a
    separate medium. It must be a fully integrated part of our warfighting
    capability. Space is the backbone of naval network centric warfare,
    providing communications, precise timing, positioning, and battlefield
    characterization. Space also provides critical real time intelligence,
    and surveillance information for naval combat operations. The stand up
    of NETWARCOM has combined space operations with networks and
    information operations, and resulted in a coherent end-to-end
    architecture that allows us to fully optimize the use of space-based
    capabilities today and in the future. Navy is fully in step with the
    joint community here. NETWARCOM also serves as the Navy functional
    component to USSTRATCOM for information operations and network
    operations.
        Navy's priorities and direction in space are quite clear. Our job
    is to integrate the essential enabling capabilities provided by space
    systems across and throughout our naval forces, at every appropriate
    level. Because space is truly joint, we intend to lead where
    appropriate, fully participate in, and influence the outcome of joint
    deliberations on space capabilities to solve our toughest problems,
    enable naval transformation, and better serve the combatant commanders.

                                  SPACE CADRE

        Key to Navy's continued engagement with the newly aligned DOD space
    organization, and to ensure that Navy space equities continue to be
    represented, we are developing a core of space experts, the Space
    Cadre. This is a group of innovative military (both Active and Reserve)
    and civilians that have expertise in space system requirements,
    acquisition, S&T, and operations.
        As the Air Force executes its Executive Agent responsibilities for
    space, the Navy will stay engaged by ensuring that qualified Navy space
    experts are in leadership roles, where appropriate, under the guidance
    of Secretary Teets, the Under Secretary of the Air Force. This
    ``cadre'' of naval space experts will help shape joint space policies,
    strategies, requirements, S&T development, acquisitions, and
    operations.
        Navy's current involvement includes: our leadership of the joint
    Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) development and acquisition, which
    is the new system that will replenish our narrow-band communications
    satellite system and provide critical communications to mobile forces;
    our support of the development of future acquisitions, such as the
    Space-Based Radar for ground moving target indication and leadership at
    the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Communications Directorate and
    the Transformational Communications Office by Rear Admiral Rand Fisher.
    Additionally, we are committed to aligning our terminal procurement
    with the development and procurement of DOD Satellite Communications
    resources.

                                SPACE OPERATIONS

        The earliest Navy role in space operations was surveillance of
    potential enemy reconnaissance satellites. Surveillance of and from
    space over the years has successfully become a Joint and a Strategic
    capability of which the Navy is a proud participant. We continue, for
    the time being, to operate the Navy Space Surveillance Sensor (the
    ``fence'') and are awaiting the Air Force recommendation on whether it
    should be continued as a part of the space surveillance network.
        While over the years Navy's role in space has become predominantly
    satellite communications, we are continuing to explore new operational
    applications where Navy combines the capabilities of space with our
    advantage of at sea mobility. Navy developed WINDSAT (launched on 6
    January) that will provide sea surface wind speed and direction
    directly to ships at sea. We will continue management of vital UHF
    satellite communications and look forward to flying the Mobile User
    Objective System in the 2008 timeframe. The real challenge in front of
    us is how to continue to integrate space capabilities into naval combat
    capability to support Fleet and Joint forces.

                              SERVICE INTEGRATION

        In addition, NETWARCOM has taken a leadership role to strengthen
    the relationship with the Air Force across all information technology,
    information operations, and space domains, with the goal of sharpening
    interoperability. The location of NETWARCOM in Norfolk, VA, was chosen
    because of its proximity to the Fleet and the numerous joint commands
    in the area. In concert with the Air Force Command and Control and
    Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Center located at Langley,
    AFB, we are collaborating on Air Force/Navy ISR architectures;
    Distributed Common Ground Station interoperability; and supporting each
    other in establishing the operational requirements for Transformational
    Communications, Space-Based Radar, and Space-Based Infrared systems.
    Additionally, we have met with the Army and Air Force to support Joint
    Forces Command in establishing and experimenting with Joint Command and
    Control systems for the evolving Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters
    concepts.

                             SEA POWER 21 AND SPACE

        Space-based capabilities are vital to the success of the Chief of
    Naval Operations' Sea Power 21 Vision. It calls for a fully netted
    force, capable of working in a joint and coalition environment, and
    going it alone when necessary. Sea Power 21 will enable the Navy to
    become a capabilities based Navy. My part in Sea Power 21, in
    partnership with Rear Admiral Zelibor, is making FORCEnet a reality.
    FORCEnet will enable all of Navy's combat capabilities--Sea Strike, Sea
    Shield, and Sea Basing. FORCEnet will link our weapons, platforms,
    sensors, C2 systems, and our people, into a netted force capable of
    responding with unprecedented precision, speed and lethality. The
    products we get from space are absolutely critical to achieving this
    capability. The capabilities of space are fundamental to FORCEnet and
    to Sea Power 21.

                                   CONCLUSION

        My highest priority is to transform naval organizational processes
    and culture to fully integrate the warfighting capabilities that space
    systems present to our warfighters.
        Space-based products must be integrated into the development of new
    operational concepts, such as the Global Information Grid, network
    centric warfare, and Sea Power 21. NETWARCOM's ability to operate and
    develop future space needs, and my execution of FORCEnet must be
    synchronized with Fleet warfighting requirements and the emerging
    global needs of combatant commanders. This is my challenge, as the
    commander of NETWARCOM. I appreciate your continuing support as the
    Navy presses forward to make Sea Power 21 reality.
        Once again I thank you for this opportunity, and will be happy to
    answer any questions.

        Senator Allard. Thank you all for being willing to testify
    before the subcommittee, and thank you for your testimony.
        I just want to make sure that we have all the coordinated
    effort going on between the various branches of our defense, as
    far as space is concerned, so I will start out with you,
    General Lord. Would you outline to me what career path you are
    developing for the Army and Navy, as well for the Air Force? I
    know the Air Force is doing a lot. I want to see what you are
    doing as far as the Army and Navy are concerned.
        Then, the next follow-up question I would like to have you
    answer also is, are there some common schools and some common
    resources to develop this space cadre from all the branches?
    Also, how are we going to rate space officers when they serve
    in this joint space billet?
        General Lord. Yes, sir, I am delighted to answer your
    question. I think it is a very appropriate one with respect to
    the space cadre. It is important to note that I think we are
    often, with a good strategy here, coordinating with Brigadier
    General Rick Geraci, who is the Army Space Command guy in
    Colorado Springs. We are also working with our Navy
    counterparts as we put our Air Force space cadre program
    together because we do not want to just do something that
    solves the Air Force issue. It ought to be able to be mapped
    over to the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps, and also to
    our friends in NASA and certainly reach out and grab the folks
    in the National Reconnaissance Office and space people wherever
    they serve in the military department. We will do that both for
    officers and enlisted.
        What we have done is put together a program that looks in
    three different areas--operations, acquisition, and the mission
    support areas we have talked about. The President's budget in
    fiscal year 2004, at $10 million, supports the beginning of our
    initial development for courses and initial places for people
    to serve as we develop not only job experiences but the courses
    and the training that will help people form their intellectual,
    if you will, bona fides in the space business when we are
    working them up through the system.
        We have offered opportunities, and people in the Army and
    the Navy are taking advantage of now attending courses at our
    schools. An inherent part of what we are doing is going to also
    harmonize with the Air Force efforts under the Chief and the
    Secretary, Secretary Roche, and General Jumper, as well, to re-
    look and re-energize systems engineering and the excellent
    initiatives under my old command, Air University. We will be
    working with the folks at Air Education and Training Command,
    along with the Air Force Institute of Technology and also the
    Naval Postgraduate School to put together an integrated program
    with great support so that not only do we work the Air Force
    and the space part of this and the other services, but we also
    have the critical engineering skills and systems engineering
    that will help us work the problems that Dick Mayo and Joe have
    talked about, as well as Admiral Ellis and Secretary Teets.
    That is living and prospering and being able to handle and
    develop in this space situation awareness defensive and
    offensive counterspace missions of space control. We will need
    the systems engineering talent. We will need people developed
    in that program.
        What we want to do is start the path. This is going to take
    us throughout the 5-year defense program, I think, to really
    get it fully entrenched. Our first steps are in fiscal year
    2004. With your continued support, we will be able to do that.
        Our formal announcement of the strategy, once approved by
    the Secretary of Defense, should be within the next days, I
    would hope, as we get the full strategy laid out for everybody
    to see.
        Senator Allard. Did you respond to the part of the question
    of how we are going to rate the space officers?
        General Lord. I am not sure in a rating, per se. I consider
    myself a space officer, and those who serve will go through our
    initial schools and get rated, if you will. They will become
    space professionals as they develop their capabilities.
        We looked at--as you had asked us to do in the past--
    different models for doing that. One is the nuclear Navy model.
    I think we have taken some of the best kinds of attributes of
    their program as well as we have looked at the folks in the
    Army and the Navy, and we are going to put those together and
    get the best of all those systems to do that.
        But we will get initial skills. We will get certified and
    continue to work our bona fides as they work their way through
    not only job experiences, but actual training that goes with
    that.
        Senator Allard. Admiral Mayo, how do you track space
    expertise in the Navy? Are space subspecialties adequately
    linked with the Navy's areas of functional expertise?
        Admiral Mayo. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman.
        We have done quite a bit to really power up our
    identification of the naval space cadre in the aftermath of the
    Rumsfeld Commission. We have formalized it. We have put a flag
    officer at the Navy staff in charge of it. We have identified
    those officers in the Navy who have the critical operations and
    skills, space operations and engineering skills, to be part of
    our cadre. We have identified the number of billets. There are
    775 officers in the Navy with the skill and talent, 250
    billets. We have added precept language for selection boards to
    select people with these skills so that we can continue to
    advance our Navy professional work in the area of space.
        As General Lord mentioned and alluded to, we have initiated
    a program with the Air Force Institute of Technology and with
    the Naval Postgraduate School to exchange officers so both
    services can better understand each other's efforts and learn
    and prosper together.
        Lastly, in the Navy, we have integrated the Reserve and
    active space expertise with about 250 enlisted and officer
    experts in our Reserve community. We have fully integrated them
    with our active-duty space cadre so that we can gain the
    maximum expertise and leverage from all of our naval assets.
        Senator Allard. General Cosumano, I note that your space
    career field functional area 40 is a subset of the Army's
    information operations career fields. Space and information are
    rather obviously different. What are the advantages and
    disadvantages of this arrangement?
        General Cosumano. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman.
    We have several functional areas as a part of this information
    operations career field. As it turns out, space is an enabler
    for all those functional areas that are part of that career
    field. In fact, without space, you really do not have a global
    context when you are prosecuting warfare.
        It gives us a great advantage in that we share information
    across those functional areas as a part of this one career
    field. We developed this career field over 2 years ago, and we
    have been proceeding with this Functional Area 40 for over 2
    years. We worked closely with the Air Force in designing the
    curriculum, the syllabus for training our space operations
    officers. All our space operations officers are certified and
    wear the Air Force Space Operations badge. We have been working
    very closely with our friends in the joint community to do
    this.
        In summary, I think if we did not include space as a part
    of the information operations career field, we would not be
    able to leverage this area called space control, one of the
    components of Space Information Operations.
        Senator Allard. Thank you.
        General Cosumano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Allard. Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit some
    questions for the record. I have another appointment I have to
    go to and would like to congratulate General Lord, General
    Cosumano, and Admiral Mayo for the work that they have done. I
    know well just how critical space dominance has been to us in
    the last few years, and will be if conflict breaks out in Iraq.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Allard. Thank you very much. On the panels, we have
    had several members express that they wanted to submit
    questions. If we could just ask the panel members to get back
    with us in 10 days, we would appreciate it.
        General Lord. Yes, sir.
        General Cosumano. Yes, sir.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        General Lord, I think two of the most important assets for
    the country are the western and the eastern test ranges, and
    yet the funding for the launch ranges has decreased
    significantly. I want to know why. I also want to know why the
    Air Force has walked away from the range modernization--not
    little, but big time--in 2004, for RDT&E, lessening spending by
    $43 million and, in other procurement, lessening spending by
    $72 million. Share with us what is the thinking of the Air
    Force.
        General Lord. Yes, sir. Thanks, Senator Nelson.
        I had a chance Saturday night to go down and sit on the
    launch console with General Pavlovich and the folks at the
    45th. My background is that I was a launch range commander of
    the 30th, so I can pledge to you that we do not want to make
    our space-lift ranges a limiting factor in our access to the
    space equation, I guarantee you that. I had a chance to sit
    down with those folks and go through a countdown. We did not
    launch on Saturday night. We did launch just last night, if you
    know--or the night before last--the Delta 4.
        What we did is, we reshaped the Range Standardization
    Automation program. We also have taken away what we used to
    call RSA and have replaced it with a recapitalization and an
    improvement program that I think takes a look at what we need
    to do and what we need to deploy on the range. We bumped up--by
    the way, in 2004 we have an increase in the O&M funding for the
    ranges, both the west and east coasts. We have tried to reshape
    our program and make the critical things be available when they
    need to be to put on the range to continue to launch in a safe
    and effective manner.
        I have looked at the range safety part of that. I mean, I
    am familiar with the missile flight control business. I have
    looked at what they have done. I have looked at the interim
    steps we have with our first, what we call, FOV, the flight
    operations verification, work that will replace the existing
    missile flight safety strings. Then regarding our plan for the
    next step, I have looked at the plans and scheduling folks and
    the things that we have added. I think we are on a prudent
    course. We will continue to watch this very closely.
        I need to tell you, sir, that we had bought things before,
    and we let them sit on the dock. We did not put them on the
    range. Therefore, I am committed, along with the folks on the
    west and east coasts, to install the equipment, get it on the
    range, and make sure that we continue to improve and upgrade.
    We are following through on that, sir, and we are committed to
    making the launch ranges be everything they need to be to
    complement our assured-access-to-space strategy.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I know you are committed, and I just
    want to help you because I think that one of the easiest places
    to cut when you start looking for money to cut is the ranges. I
    do not think that these cuts are prudent, just like I do not
    think some of the cuts on the modernization in the launch
    procedures for NASA are prudent. They cut out a system--albeit,
    it had gotten way too expensive--called CLCS in the launch
    process. But it seems like we always do that in trying to fund,
    when budgets are tight. I am going to be on this as we get on
    into the process of authorization.
        Senator Allard. Senator Nelson, I share your concerns on
    this and want to try and be helpful with you on this particular
    issue because I know it is important to you, and we want to
    make sure that we are doing the right thing in that regard.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, these are huge hits. In
    2003, for example, the RDT&E funding was $106 million, and they
    are whacking that by $43 million. The OPAF, which is
    procurement, in 2003 was $153 million, and they are whacking
    that by $80 million. You are talking about some rather
    substantial whacks.
        Senator Allard. Some real dollars here, that is right.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Like half. In the case of RDT&E, they
    were whacking that by $43 million. So you are talking about
    whacking it by almost half, RDT&E and OPAF.
        General Lord, let me ask you, is the deferral of the GPS 3
    going to impact your ability to provide GPS service to the
    troops and civilians who rely on it every day?
        General Lord. Sir, we are going to make that initial launch
    capability in fiscal year 2012. We are committed to that, as
    the Under Secretary spoke to you about that. We are looking at
    bridging from 2003 to 2004, and then, as he said, we may even
    be able to shoot for an earlier capability with GPS 3. Now, we
    are committed to the modernization, and we are going to step up
    to that in both the 2R and the 2RM; the next launch will be
    29th of March, scheduled this month. We just launched one
    earlier this year, and we will continue to populate that
    constellation.
        I will tell you, we have that constellation screwed down
    pretty well, we are certainly supporting our warfighters over
    there right now, and we will continue to do that. My view is
    that we will continue to modernize the constellation and push
    hard on GPS 3, maybe do it earlier. I hope we can.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I
    need to step out and make a quick telephone call, and I will be
    right back.
        Senator Allard. Sounds great, Senator.
        I have a number of questions. I want to follow up a little
    bit on the SBIRS questions and will address this one to you,
    General Lord. We talked a little bit on the previous panel
    about this break in production that we have on the satellites,
    on SBIRS, just after we have had all these programs and gotten
    them straightened around. Frankly, I am concerned about what
    that is going to do to program risk, how it is going to affect
    costs, and what it is going to affect with continuity in the
    manufacturing process. I would like to hear what the Air
    Force's assessment of the operational risk of this delay would
    be.
        General Lord. Excellent question, sir. I think, as
    Secretary Teets said earlier, a year ago was a different story.
    I am convinced, having sat in several different senior level
    reviews, also with the Under Secretary and with our contractor,
    that we have the A-team on board in all aspects, from the
    Government as well as from the contractor, Lockheed-Martin. Our
    program manager, Mark Borkowski, and Miles Crandall of the
    Lockheed-Martin team, are working very well together. We have
    intentionally reviewed this, and we will continue to do that.
        If we can continue that approach and work the mitigation
    strategy that the Under Secretary outlined with procuring spare
    pieces, et cetera, I think we will be able to bridge from GEO 2
    to 3, 4, and 5.
        I will tell you, on the operational side, sir, we have sat
    down and we have laid out for the next 10 years the capability
    that will be derived from the constellation plus the ground
    processing that we have, and we are delivering on specific
    blocks of capability. We validated that with Admiral Ellis, and
    that is the warfighting application we are going to get. We are
    meeting those requirements, as well. This is a full-court press
    to deliver that, and it is not going to stop until we get the
    final operational capability.
        Senator Allard. I am just really concerned we do not set
    this program back because we worked hard to debate on this
    side. It was not easy to get it back on track.
        I am looking at it from a manufacturing standpoint. How is
    this company going to keep this expertise on their payroll for
    2 years? I do not think they can. It looks to me like you are
    putting us in the position where they move on to other projects
    and then you have to bring in a whole new bunch of workers and
    people in charge of the program--you have to reeducate and
    retool them back up again after a 2-year lapse. It seems to me
    that it is rather inadvisable.
        General Lord. Yes, sir. I know exactly what you are saying
    and how you feel about that, and, as I said, we are working out
    the mitigation strategy. I would be happy, as we work that, to
    provide it for the record if you like and keep you informed as
    we go on how we are doing on the mitigation efforts so that we
    do not have a break that substantially affects the program.
        Senator Allard. I would very much appreciate that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

    AFSPC Mitigation Strategy for Minimizing the Impacts of 2-Year Delay in
              Start of GEO 3-5 and the Associated Production Break

        The decision to slip GEO 3-5 2 years to the right was a very
    difficult decision to make. The slip was based on an assessment that we
    would not need the additional satellites until later in the decade.
    From an experience perspective, OSD also believed it was prudent to
    have more familiarity with producing and testing the first two GEO
    satellites before we made commitments to buy the following three. Later
    procurement of those three offers opportunity to include ``lessons
    learned'' from the earlier satellites into the later ones.
        Nonetheless, from an acquisition risk perspective, the delay has
    two potential impacts. First, it may induce production breaks at many
    of the vendors who produce the satellites. Those production breaks can
    result in additional costs to restart the production line. We have
    accounted for that risk in our long-term budgetary planning. In
    addition, we are working to identify other critical vendors and assess
    their risks. In many cases, these vendors may have other work, which
    will provide reasonable continuity. We are also maintaining options--as
    yet unfunded--to procure additional Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO)
    payloads--any such procurement would also serve to mitigate production
    gaps.
        Second, delay in procurement of GEO 3-5 creates a risk in the event
    we need spare parts for GEOs 1 or 2. If GEO 3 were available sooner
    rather than later, its production could provide critical spares for one
    of the earlier satellites, if needed. But with production delayed, we
    would not have access to GEO 3 hardware to cover contingency sparing.
    The mitigation for this is to identify and procure critical spares. We
    are in the process of making that identification. Depending on the
    extent of the requirement, we may need out year budget adjustments to
    cover the new spares--but I believe we have time to make the decision
    beyond fiscal year 2004.

        Senator Allard. General Lord, Secretary Teets stated that
    the possibility of accelerating GPS 3 is being studied. What is
    the status of this study, and when will it be completed? Then
    what are the advantages and disadvantages of such acceleration?
        General Lord. We took a meeting with Secretary Teets 2 days
    ago. We owed him the information. I talked to our folks. Within
    a week, we are going to come back with what we think would be
    the impact of that. It is going to cost money to accelerate,
    and we will look at some preliminary estimates on what it might
    cost. I am not ready to announce those until we take a harder
    look. We have Al Ballinger, our program manager, plus General
    Arnold with SMC. We will work that, and we should know within
    the next week to 10 days.
        Senator Allard. Now, in space science and technology,
    General, the Air Force Research Lab reports to Air Force
    Materiel Command. Are you comfortable that you have sufficient
    input on the Air Force Research Lab space science and
    technology efforts?
        General Lord. Yes, sir, I am comfortable. We met earlier,
    within the last week, with General Les Lyles, the Commander of
    Air Force Materiel Command, and then Major General Paul
    Nielsen, the Commander of the Air Force Research Lab, and went
    through about 5 hours of briefings and every dollar in the Air
    Force space S&T program and our linkage with, in the most part,
    Kirtland Air Force Base and the labs there as they relate to
    our process.
        What we have done in Air Force Space Command in our
    integrated planning process is, we have identified where we
    need basic and applied research. We can trace that back from
    our needs and our deficiencies in our integrated planning
    process right to the dollars that are being spent in basic
    research. We have a good connectivity there, as well as with
    Dr. Tony Tether and DARPA and also working under Secretary
    Teets, as he said, putting together the whole team to look at
    S&T across not only the intelligence communities, but also what
    we are doing in the Air Force Research Lab and also with DARPA.
    Periodic meetings with Tony Tether and what they are doing in
    DARPA is going to pay off for us, as well.
        I think we have our arms around the overall program, and it
    will become more and more focused as particular areas get
    emphasized.
        Senator Allard. Admiral Mayo, in regard to space science
    and technology, are you satisfied with the role that the Naval
    Research Lab plays in science and technology efforts?
        Admiral Mayo. Senator, thanks very much. Most definitely.
    They have been a leader for a long time in innovation, bringing
    innovation and transformation to space. As I alluded to in my
    opening verbal testimony, such things include bringing realtime
    data to the cockpit, in-flight weapons, initial satellite
    communications systems, and initial efforts to help in Global
    Positioning System.
        I think the S&T effort that Naval Research Lab is involved
    in is very significant, and we have focused the effort for this
    upcoming year in an agreement with the Air Force and DARPA to
    work in the area of microsats. We look forward to that very
    innovative, hopefully creative work.
        Senator Allard. We still have some time here, and I want to
    talk about space management organization. General Cosumano, I
    do not want you to feel left out here. [Laughter.]
        General Cosumano. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. I will
    be glad to respond to those other questions, too, if you want
    to ask me.
        Senator Allard. If you have a response to those other two
    questions, please step in.
        General Cosumano. I do.
        In terms of the last series of questions on science and
    technology, the Army Research Lab, the Space and Missile
    Defense Technical Center, as well as the Army Space Program
    Office are really three key organizations that the Army
    leverages as we work with our partners both in the Air Force
    and the Navy to get those products to the warfighter. As I
    said, we have really focused on technologies that have to do
    with providing those capabilities to the warfighters. We focus
    on ground stations many times. In coordination with NASA, we
    are also involved in other technologies such as hypervelocity
    technologies in our Space and Missile Defense Technology
    Center. We are a partner in this S&T arena, too, and we are a
    full player.
        Senator Allard. Let me get to the question now on space
    management organization. Are you satisfied, General Cosumano,
    with what the new acquisition oversight processes related to
    space systems provide? Do they provide your services adequate
    input and insight into space programs?
        General Cosumano. Mr. Chairman, we are at this point, we
    certainly are. We have worked very well with our friends in the
    Air Force as the executive agent.
        We, as I said, do not have the resources that the Air Force
    has, in terms of space, and so we leverage their capabilities.
    I think my wife said it best when we were watching TV one night
    and I was trying to explain it to her. She says, ``Oh, I get
    it. The Air Force is the cable company, and the Army buys
    television sets.'' In many cases, that is true. They fly and
    maintain the constellations and have a huge investment in
    space. We leverage those capabilities, we ask for premium cable
    service at the point on the ground where we want it, and we get
    it.
        Senator Allard. Very good. My time has expired.
        Senator Nelson. I am sorry.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Go ahead and let Senator Reed and then
    I will follow up.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator
    Nelson.
        General Lord, Secretary Teets suggested that there is a
    growing momentum to weaponize space. Do you think it is
    inevitable that it will happen and happen within a short period
    of time?
        General Lord. Thank you, Senator Reed, an excellent
    question. I think we all realize that there is a difference
    between weaponization and militarization in space. Space has
    certainly been militarized as an economic as well as a military
    center of gravity for our country, and we are critically
    dependent upon that.
        I agree with what Secretary Teets said. I think that we
    need to maintain a balanced approach to that. I think offensive
    kinds of capabilities in space are important to enforce our
    ability to use ours and act as a deterrent against others to
    interfere with our capabilities. I think we will have to think
    carefully about how we proceed in that area. But I think a
    balance should be maintained among the space-control area,
    space situational awareness, which is critical, defensive
    counterspace measures to protect ourselves against the
    vulnerabilities, and then offensive counterspace capabilities
    when we need it to not only dissuade others from trying to do
    something, but be able to protect our assets.
        Senator Reed. You have identified one line of demarcation,
    which is those defensive measures that you put up to protect
    satellites, even self-contained defensive measures, which I
    think probably roughly falls into what most people assume is
    this militarization of space, if not weaponization. When,
    however, you cross the line to offensive weapons, I think it
    raises concerns. Do you think that we will inevitably have to
    put offensive weapons into space?
        General Lord. I think that that day may come. I think it is
    not a matter of if; it is when somebody is going to try to
    perturb our asymmetric advantage in space, if you will, or try
    to interfere with that, and then I think we have to be able to
    enforce that and use the capabilities.
        Now, in all our war games and all the things we look at as
    we do simulations, et cetera, the high value of those assets
    certainly is recognized as a premium, and we will take prudent
    steps as we go there.
        Senator Reed. General Cosumano, do you have any thoughts on
    this, since the Army has a significant role?
        General Cosumano. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
    Yes, sir, we do. We lump this under the mission area called
    space control. Many times you can control your access to space
    and deny the adversary's access to space with airborne systems
    or ground systems. Oftentimes we can accomplish that mission of
    space control and really do not need to get into that business
    in outer space itself. The Army, thus, is pursuing, with the
    Air Force as the lead, a series of programs to do just that.
        Senator Reed. Thank you. Admiral Mayo, any thoughts you
    might have?
        Admiral Mayo. Definitely, sir. Space for the Navy, being
    forward deployed almost all the time, provides us our
    connection. Space provides us our content of absolutely
    critical key combat information for the battle space. Space,
    therefore, is absolutely critical. It is going to become even
    more critical in the future as we try to become a capabilities-
    based Navy, capable of dealing with any kind of an emergent
    threat for the President. That kind of reliance and critical
    dependence upon space makes space control that much more
    important to us. As I said, we have contributed to this
    capability for STRATCOM, and I would be happy to go into this
    any further in a closed or classified session. It is absolutely
    critical.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        One final follow-up question. It strikes me that the
    technology to get into space is getting such that many people
    who could not compete years ago can compete now. In a
    simpleminded way, if you can access the computer and you can
    get into a network, you might even be able to influence our
    satellites in space, et cetera. As we go forward--and I think
    this has to be borne in mind when we start thinking about what
    we can do in space--the threshold for other people to do things
    in space has been lowered dramatically, which should have some
    influence on your decisions about weaponization,
    militarization, and what you put up there. Is that a point that
    you are considering, General Lord?
        General Lord. Absolutely. We want to maintain the
    asymmetric advantage that we have and continue to protect that
    and deny somebody using that against us. That is a key to our
    continued success in being able to support both economic and
    military operations. We want to maintain that advantage. But
    living and deterring in an asymmetric environment requires a
    different set of rules, I think, and different theology, if you
    will, about how you think about that. We certainly want to
    maintain our advantage of that and work all aspects of that.
        I do not want to be redundant, but I think that the three
    pillars of space control are important to space situation
    awareness: understanding what is in the environment, the
    defensive measures to protect yourself against that, and then,
    lastly, offensive counterspace to protect your assets and deny
    somebody using those against you. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much. General Cosumano,
    Admiral Mayo, thank you.
        General Cosumano. Mr. Chairman, may I comment on that point
    Senator Reed made?
        I think it is important to realize the emergence of gray
    space, the commercialization of space. As a panel, we certainly
    work through our wargames and under the leadership of the Air
    Force.
        Just as scale, just 20 or so years ago, there were about
    250 satellites in orbit; and of those 250, about a quarter of
    those were commercial types of satellites, primarily
    communications satellites. Now there is over a thousand
    satellites, and about half of those are commercial satellites
    that not only have communications capabilities, but imaging
    capabilities. The ability, therefore, to do a left-hook, so to
    speak, in Operation Desert Storm today is very problematic. I
    just want to emphasize that there is another dimension in space
    control that we have to worry about.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, General. It is an important point.
    Thank you very much.
        Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Allard. Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral, does the transferring of the Navy space
    surveillance fence to the Air Force signify a policy change for
    the Navy?
        Admiral Mayo. Sir, after the Rumsfeld Report, we huddled a
    lot in the Navy about what is the Navy's future role in space.
    Our decision, with leadership, was to concentrate on the
    operationalization of space, to do those things that we thought
    were core, and to continue to do those things which were core.
        We felt that space surveillance and our previous operation
    of a fence could best be rationalized with the Air Force as
    executive agent and the number of sensors that they have. We
    also felt that a study should be done of the queued and
    unqueued sensors to see how it could all come together most
    efficiently. We did that work. We made that dialogue. Then the
    program decision memorandum came out last year. We feel that
    this is in the best interests of DOD. We are committed to
    making it work.
        I would say that we have 59 highly experienced civilians
    who run the fence today. Pending the outcome of Secretary
    Teets' decision based on the Air Force input, those people can
    be used as best as possible. They are very well qualified.
        Senator Bill Nelson. General Lord, perhaps in another
    setting, I wish that you would share with us your ideas, your
    plans, for the protection of the ground systems on the GPS.
        General Lord. Yes, sir. I would be delighted to do that. I
    have just taken a look at that, and I will be happy to share
    those with you in a separate meeting.
        [The information referred to follows:]

             High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP)

        Senator Bill Nelson and his staff will be briefed in the near
    future on the protection of the Global Positioning System ground
    stations.
        The briefing contains details regarding the current level of
    protection afforded the ground-based portion of the Global Positioning
    System as determined through an end-to-end review of space security
    systems. It further addresses the impact to the warfighter and the U.S.
    in general if the Global Positioning System is lost. It details the
    current security and provides a way ahead to enhance ground station
    security and overall Global Positioning System sustainment.

        Senator Bill Nelson. General Cosumano, with regard to the
    Air Force's decision to eliminate funding for the GPS 3 in the
    2004 budget, were you consulted?
        General Cosumano. Thank you for the question, Senator. Yes,
    sir, we were consulted, and we agree with the acquisition
    strategy that has been laid down. Based upon the technical
    issues in the program, we think that the current strategy that
    has been laid before the committee and before the Department
    minimizes the risk.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I would like all three of you to
    address a concern that all of us should have about the ability
    to train and retain space professionals. What are each of your
    services doing, and what are your obstacles?
        General Lord. I will go ahead and start. Thank you,
    Senator. Excellent question.
        I look at this as a space career manager for all of the Air
    Force across both our officers as well as our enlisted and our
    civilian professionals. We have worked hard on all aspects. I
    would say, within a couple of percentage points on our officers
    and enlisted, we are in pretty good shape across the averages
    with respect to space professionals in our enlisted corps as
    well as our officers. The only place we really have significant
    problem is in our mid-level engineering expertise in our
    program offices. I have lots of lieutenants, but not captains,
    majors, and lieutenant colonels, who are the heart of it. We
    are working hard to build new engineers and attract and retain
    those that are leaving us or have chosen to do that. I think we
    may have turned the corner on that, as well.
        I will tell you that your interest and the committee's
    interest and certainly any interest in the business speaks
    volumes to them about how important it is to be committed to
    the business.
        General Cosumano. Senator, in the Army, we began this space
    operations career field just 2 years ago, so it is really early
    on to see the impact. We have had some promotion boards, and we
    are consistent with the Army average in promoting those space
    operational officers.
        Where we do need work, though, is in our enlisted career
    field as we try to pull together intelligence specialists, the
    communicators, and other military occupational specialists into
    a skill identifier that identifies each of them as a space-
    smart enlisted person. We have not done that yet. That is on
    our books to do this year, and we are working that very
    closely.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Remember that it was the Army that got
    us into space in the first place with the Redstone missile,
    after the Vanguard would never get off the pad.
        General Cosumano. Yes, sir, I had that in my script, but I,
    in deference to my friends up here, took it out.
        General Lord. It is burned into our memory, sir.
    [Laughter.]
        General Cosumano. Thank you for that comment, Senator.
        Admiral Mayo. Senator, if I may add--and thank you to the
    Army--but with respect to the cadre, as I have said about the
    Navy's efforts to formalize, as you have indicated, we have
    appointed a flag lead on the Navy staff to address this need to
    retain and keep these kinds of folks. We have identified the
    billets, the people. We have put precept language in being for
    selection on boards so that these kinds of folks can be
    selected.
        The Navy emphasis on the operationalization of space is
    clearly reflected in our Sea Power 21 vision, where we
    absolutely need all of the capabilities that we can get from
    space.
        I see, in the years ahead, the integrated theater missile
    defense, the importance of networks, the importance of
    information operations, and the big mission area of global
    strike. I think U.S. Strategic Command will become more and
    more of a magnet for our best and brightest of all services,
    and I think that that is really going to help us keep the kinds
    of folks that you referred to.
        General Lord. Sir, if I might, I would like to add just a
    little bit more to that. One of the things that we have done,
    and I know this is something the Army and the Navy have thought
    about, as well, is that we have a healthy component of Guard
    and Reserve folks involved in the space business that really
    complements the total force and is a way to capture and retain
    that talent. Down in Florida, on the console in the range
    flight there in the 45th wing, we have Guard folks who have
    worked hard. We have the 310 Space Group and the Reserve that
    is involved in all of our missions in space. We have a good
    balance of not only active, but total force capability, as
    well, across the states and the mission areas. We have not only
    on the active side, but also in the Guard and Reserve, the
    capability to keep and retain those talents that are critical
    to our capability.
        Senator Allard. I think that is a great approach, to also
    include the Guard and Reserve on those. I think those are
    important parts of the program.
        General Cosumano. Mr. Chairman, may I comment on that, just
    for a moment? We activated, this past year, the 193rd Space
    Support Battalion as a part of Army Space Command Colorado
    National Guard. In fact, the space support team that went to
    Afghanistan to support Task Force 180 on the ground was a
    National Guard space support team.
        Senator Bill Nelson. By the way, speaking of that, I may as
    well get on my soapbox. A policy question, Mr. Chairman, that
    we are going to have to answer is, how much can the Guard and
    the Reserve do what the active-duty military is supposed to do,
    particularly if we are ending up in long-term stabilization of
    countries as we obviously are going to be in Afghanistan, as we
    will likely be in Iraq, just as we have been now for 7 years in
    Bosnia. As you all are making your plans on your high-tech
    folks, it is not fair to say that we are going to expect the
    Guard to do this, because the Guard is the Guard, and it is
    expecting that it is called up in times of emergency for short
    durations, not for the long-term duration that we are going to
    be looking at in the future. I just add that little comment for
    policy consideration.
        Senator Allard. I agree. Our Guard and Reserve people are
    being utilized more than I think most of us ever visualized,
    and it is creating some hardship on families, employers, and
    educational efforts with all that is going on there. But I know
    one thing that is happening in Colorado is, we have, as I
    understand it, an Air Space Reserve. The Reserve is dedicated
    just to space. I visualize that more at home, but obviously
    there might be times when they might have to be deployed.
        A couple of questions, again, on space management and
    organization. I am just going to give you all an open-ended
    question. Are there any improvements to the acquisition or
    oversight of space systems that would more fully assure that
    your service's space equities are adequately addressed?
        General Lord?
        General Lord. In my particular case and certainly the Air
    Force and certainly relating to the Under Secretary and our
    maturing process with the Space and Missile Systems Center as
    part of Air Force Space Command, the Program Executive Office
    authority, from the Secretary of the Air Force, is delegated to
    Secretary Teets and out to Los Angeles. I think we have a
    structure that is maturing, and it is getting better as we work
    those. Then as we put it in the virtual program with Secretary
    Teets and the other Army/Navy program together, we are getting
    a good review, along with the space architects' look at the
    overall architecture. I think things are being done quite well
    right now, but that does not mean we cannot improve, and maybe
    we ought to watch it for a while and see if we are delighted or
    pleased with the outcome.
        Senator Allard. General Cosumano.
        General Cosumano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the
    question. I would like to think that the Air Force copied Army
    Space Command. As I mentioned earlier, we have been organized
    for some period of time. We have all our materiel development,
    combat development, and operators all in the same unit bringing
    products quickly to the warfighter.
        Specifically, we see the framework that Secretary Teets has
    set up with the national security integration, national
    security space architect, and that whole review process, as a
    welcome improvement over the old process. It does give us a
    voice in the acquisition world. We are part of that process. We
    are part of the Major Force Program (MFP) 12, the virtual space
    program, and we participate, in terms of priority, for those
    assets.
        On the requirements side and capabilities side, the Joint
    Requirements Oversight Council that all our vice chiefs sit on
    has been more than adequate to review the status and resourcing
    of those programs.
        At this point in time, I think we are fine, sir, and we
    think we have made some good improvements over the last year.
        Senator Allard. Admiral?
        Admiral Mayo. Mr. Chairman, the processes are still
    continuing to evolve, but I think they are headed in the right
    direction. The virtual major force program gives everybody in
    DOD great situational awareness now on the resources that are
    being spent in space across the services and the agencies.
        Our major system acquisition on behalf of the DOD and
    executive agent, the Mobile Use Objective System, is doing
    well. We benefitted from the interaction with Secretary Teets
    and the staff, and it is on schedule.
        Secretary Teets has been very inclusive, has reached out,
    embraced, really brought us in to the integration and the
    architecture office. He has really gone out of his way to try
    to make this work, and we are very supportive of that.
        I would say if there is one challenge that I would like to
    tell you about, though, it is that this requires a lot of work
    to make this work. We are trying to make the Rumsfeld
    Commission come together. There are a lot of meetings. There
    are a lot of places to go. Earlier today, we heard about
    program office, west coast/east coast. We only have a finite
    number of people. We send them to the best meetings that we
    think they should attend. We work closely with the Marine
    Corps, in fact, the Navy/Marine Corps team, trying to attend
    all the meetings.
        I think a challenge to be recognized, at least for the Navy
    or Marine Corps team, is that we have a finite number of
    people. There are a lot of meetings to go to, so we are working
    that issue.
        General Lord. Sir, if I might add, too?
        Senator Allard. Yes, General?
        General Lord. I think that our work with the requirements
    process to be almost unrelenting, if you will, to make sure
    that only urgent and compelling needs are reintroduced into the
    program. The biggest threat to our program acquisitions has
    been an unstable baseline in our major programs. To stabilize
    the baseline, have a process where we would review
    requirements, and then if we need to change, do it with the
    full understanding of what the price and what the cost and what
    the impact is to the program, certainly supports the needs of
    the acquisitors as well as those who are going to get the
    operational capability. That is something that, as General
    Cosumano said, has worked for them, and we are pushing hard on
    that.
        I think that has been one of the successes in the SBIRS-
    High program, and I would say, although Dick did not say this,
    that is certainly the way that MUOS has worked, as well.
        Senator Allard. General Lord, I want to go back to our
    educating and training our space professionals. I understand
    that space comprises only one-half of 1 lesson out of 37
    lessons in the full professional military education curriculum
    and only 1 lesson in squadron officers school. Do you think
    that is the right level of emphasis for space?
        General Lord. No, sir. We are working to improve that. As I
    said, part of our initial look is to give everybody 20 courses,
    20 basic lesson plans, in astro engineering. We are going to
    make people's heads hurt, but they need to understand that. We
    are going to harmonize that with Secretary Roche and General
    Jumper's push on force development so that our professional
    military education fully uses and employs the space part of the
    curriculum so people understand the importance of what we are
    doing. I started that as a commander of Air University. I was
    responsible for that curricula you talked about. We started to
    improve that, and they will continue to follow through on it.
        Senator Allard. Admiral Mayo, you made reference to the
    importance of space control to the Navy. Would you elaborate on
    the Navy's interest in space control, and what capabilities
    does the Navy bring to bear in this area?
        Admiral Mayo. Sir, in open session, Mr. Chairman, all I can
    say is that we view this as critical because we are absolutely
    dependent upon the product we get from space to define our
    battle space and to be able to bring precision and speed to our
    combat capability. The Navy, the naval forces, because of the
    geometry that we can use on the open ocean, brings unique
    attributes and capabilities to the idea of space control.
    Otherwise, sir, I would have to ask if we could go into closed
    session.
        Senator Allard. We are going to have a closed session later
    on--not today, but in another hearing--just dedicated to those
    kind of issues. I would ask the staff to keep that question in
    mind, and we will bring that up to whomever we have there from
    the Navy at the time.
        Admiral Mayo. Yes, sir.
        Senator Allard. Thank you.
        Also, Admiral Mayo, there was discussion in the first panel
    related to the transfer of the fence to the Air Force. Does the
    transfer of this space surveillance system represent any
    retreat from involvement in space activities by the Navy? To
    further elaborate on that, why did not the Navy transfer any
    outyear funds to the Air Force for operation of upgrade of this
    asset, which both Secretary Teets and Admiral Ellis described
    as very important to the space surveillance mission?
        Admiral Mayo. Sir, we have done the naval space
    surveillance system, so-called ``the fence,'' for years. But as
    we look to the future and how to implement the Rumsfeld
    Commission Report, we felt we would best be served in the Navy
    and within DOD if we concentrated on what we consider to be
    core competency. Because of the large efforts that the Air
    Force does also in space surveillance, we thought it best to
    see if our efforts could be integrated and rationalized with
    their efforts. That is the course that we are embarked upon,
    and that has been directed by PDM1 from last year.
        The funds for outyear, as I understand it--and I would be
    glad to supply more information for the record--were gathered
    up by the Department of Defense. I think what is going on is
    that the Department of Defense is awaiting the ultimate
    recommendation from Secretary Teets as to what the future of
    this naval space surveillance fence should be.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Senator Allard. Thank you.
        I want to thank you, gentlemen, for showing up before the
    subcommittee, and thank the subcommittee members for being here
    today and for their questions. You are all doing a good job.
    Stay in touch, good to have you here before us, and good luck.
        Admiral Mayo. Thank you, Senator, and thanks to the
    subcommittee. Thank you.
        Senator Allard. I adjourn the subcommittee.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions

                      IMPACT OF MOSCOW TREATY RATIFICATION

        1. Senator Sessions. Admiral Ellis, now that the Senate has
    ratified the Moscow Treaty, please share your assessment of the
    implications that this new strategic relationship between the United
    States and Russia will have for the structure of the strategic forces
    of the United States?
        Admiral Ellis. This treaty reflects our new relationship with
    Russia that moves beyond the adversarial framework of the Cold War to
    one of mutual confidence and cooperation. More important than the
    actual reductions, however, is the affirmation by our two Presidents
    that our nations have entered into a new relationship based upon trust,
    with the goal of developing a genuine partnership, strengthened through
    cooperation and friendship.
        Under this treaty, both sides can make reductions in their own way,
    according to what serves their own best interests. Each side will
    reduce forces according to its own plan and will determine for itself
    the composition of its strategic forces, subject to agreed overall
    limits. Both countries will retain the flexibility required to ensure
    their future security.

                           MISSILE DEFENSE DEPLOYMENT

        2. Senator Sessions. Admiral Ellis, from your vantage point as the
    Commander responsible for system employment, are there potential
    advantages to be gained by deploying the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
    (GMD) and the Sea-Based Midcourse Defense System (SMD) segments of our
    missile defense system prior to completion of all required operational
    tests?
        Admiral Ellis. The ballistic missile threat is expanding, and
    fielding viable defensive capabilities as they become available is the
    prudent choice to more effectively increase the security of our Nation,
    our forces, our allies, and our friends. Ballistic missile defense is
    inherently a multi-command and multi-regional task, and, as the Missile
    Defense Agency acquires systems, U.S. Strategic Command will bring a
    warfighter's focus to most effectively and efficiently integrate and
    operationalize the system on a global scale.
        The systems will be tested in an operationally representative mode.
    By testing in this manner, initial defensive capability can be provided
    to the Regional Combatant Commanders without having to wait for all
    operational testing or even initial operational capability. This is a
    very positive plan, initial defensive capability is available to the
    Nation and the technical experts designing and acquiring the systems
    can see how the operators use them, thereby having the opportunity to
    refine systems in the early stages of development.

             FUNCTIONING OF THE REORGANIZED U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

        3. Senator Sessions. Admiral Ellis, as combination of the functions
    previously resident in the former U.S. Space Command and the U.S.
    Strategic Command mature within the reorganized U.S. Strategic Command,
    are you aware of any additional legislative assistance necessary to
    ensure the continued smooth functioning of your command given your new
    responsibilities?
        Admiral Ellis. As you are well aware, Unified Command Plan Change 1
    brought the functions of the former U.S. Space Command and  Strategic
    Command together on October 1, 2002. Change 2 signed by the President
    on January 10, 2003, assigned the command new responsibilities in
    missile defense integration, global strike, DOD information operations,
    and C\4\ISR. As we develop organizational structures, processes, and
    concepts of operations for these newly assigned missions, we will
    review the need for any legislative assistance. Although we currently
    have no legislative issues, I look forward to working with Congress if
    requirements are identified.

                           ARMY SPACE TRANSFORMATION

        4. Senator Sessions. General Cosumano, this budget is the
    Department of Defense's most concerted attempt at transformation. Would
    you outline the vision for Army Space transformation, and why it is
    important?
        General Cosumano. Senator, the vision for Army Space transformation
    directly supports the advanced full-spectrum decisive operations
    described in the Army's Objective Force concept.
        Army space operations will focus on five essential tasks to ensure
    that the Objective Force will successfully achieve decisive victory.
    These five essential space operations tasks are to support increased
    deployability and reduced theater footprint; achieve situational
    understanding ``Off the Ramp'' during entry operations; support
    precision maneuver, fires, sustainment, and information; enable
    continuous information and decision superiority and protect the force
    during all phases of the operation.
        The Army has already transformed a large portion of the Command,
    Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and
    Reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) aspects of these tasks for Army and Joint
    Services. This occurred through fielding of the Tactical Exploitation
    System (TES) and its Joint variants (the Navy TES-N as part of the
    Joint Fires Network, the Marine Corps Tactical Exploitation Group, and
    the Air Force ISR Manager), all of which is playing a critical role in
    Operation Enduring Freedom and will again if we go into conflict.
        Transformation of the Army's space operations is critical to
    maintaining a technological edge of superiority over our adversaries.
    Space support will be reliable and timely, and operational friction
    with the warfighter will be minimized. The central thrust of Army space
    operations is to reduce technical and procedural seams in the system of
    systems. Army space operations will be consistent with the Army's
    responsibility to conduct prompt and sustained land combat and win the
    Nation's wars.

     U.S. ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND SUPPORT FOR U.S. CENTRAL
                                    COMMAND

        5. Senator Sessions. General Cosumano, much has been made in both
    the press and in committee hearings about the importance of space-based
    capabilities in the Afghanistan campaign. The current build-up in the
    Central Command area of responsibility also places a heavy demand on
    our spaced-based assets. Can you comment on the Army's role in space in
    the current operations, and on your assessment of the adequacy of our
    capabilities?
        General Cosumano. Yes, sir. The U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense
    Command (USASMDC) continues to provide space support across a multitude
    of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) elements. Satellite communications is
    the most obvious single space-based capability used by deployed forces
    of all services. As your question implies, there is an ongoing concern
    that the capability of these systems is not adequate to support the
    kind of information intensive operations that we are currently
    conducting in the Middle East, and in which we envision the Objective
    Force will be involved. The Air Force is working on providing new
    satellites to address future bandwidth requirements. Recent launches of
    new MILSTAR and DSCS satellites are a great example of continuing
    improvements to our space architecture. In the meantime, the Army
    performs the critical function of allocating these limited resources to
    the highest priority users.
        The Army has FA40 Space operations officers working closely with
    Joint Task Force (JTF)-180, the Combined Forces Land Component
    Commander (CFLCC), V Corps and with various Special Forces staffs. In
    addition, our Army Space Support Teams are deployed in theater to
    provide space force enhancement products to both Army and Marine Corps
    ground forces. The Space and Missile Defense Battle Lab in Huntsville
    developed and fielded the Space Support Element Toolset--Light, in
    short order. The toolset is an independent, high capacity, secure
    communications capability for our deployed space forces. It provides a
    significant increase in our ability to push high resolution, commercial
    imagery forward to deployed commanders. As an example, the U.S. Army
    Space Command's Spectral Operations Resource Center (SORC) recently
    delivered unclassified commercial imagery for CENTCOM press briefings.
    With regard to missile defense, the Nation's in-theater Joint Tactical
    Ground Station (JTAGS), manned by both Army and Navy personnel, is
    providing continuous 24/7 tactical ballistic missile (TBMs) early
    warning to our forces. This system, deployed shortly after September
    11, is now a permanent part of the theater missile early warning
    architecture which is vital in providing our warfighters protection
    from enemy TBMs.
        One of the Army's biggest uses of space is to derive intelligence.
    The Army's Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) such
    as the Tactical Exploitation System (TES) and its joint variants play a
    crucial role in tasking, downloading, processing, and disseminating
    that information in the theater. As far as adequacy is concerned, the
    Army and the rest of DOD are working on a number of programs to improve
    the detail and responsiveness of national systems for today and
    tomorrow. I think we are on the right path to ensure that the Objective
    Force has a greatly improved capability to request and receive the
    right information quickly, and in a usable form.
        The Army's Space-Based Blue Force Tracking Mission Management
    Center provides near real time location and status of elements equipped
    with tracking devices into the theater common operating picture (COP).
    This capability became operational following the events of September
    11, 2001, and has supported the CENTCOM area of responsibility.
        Finally sir, the USASMDC Technical Center has been able to
    accelerate a number of test and evaluation assets, which we deployed
    and made operational well ahead of schedule in order to support the war
    effort.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

            INCREASED DEMAND FOR BANDWIDTH AND BANDWIDTH MANAGEMENT

        6. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, the Department of Defense
    is rightly concerned with increasing the available communications
    capacity, or bandwidth, available to the warfighter. New, more capable
    communications satellites will be critical to this effort. Equally
    critical, perhaps, will be the less visible efforts to make better use
    of the available bandwidth, using innovative software programs, for
    example. What sort of bandwidth management and control programs do you
    have in place to ensure that the space systems you are developing make
    maximum use of communications bandwidth now available?
        Secretary Teets. Making more efficient use of existing bandwidth is
    an ongoing effort in several areas:
        a. In the satellite area, we have upgraded our last four Defense
    Satellite Communications System (DSCS) satellites as part of the
    Service Life Enhancement Program to include higher power transmitters
    and better receivers that result in higher throughputs within the same
    frequency band. Similar efforts are being taken in the designs of both
    the Wideband Gapfiller and Advanced Extremely High Frequency (EHF)
    satellites. We also use multi-beam antennas and are moving to phased
    arrays in order to implement ``frequency reuse'' techniques--i.e., use
    the same frequency in multiple areas within the satellite field of
    view.
        b. In the terminal area, we have upgraded many of our existing
    Super High Frequency (SHF) terminals to use more efficient modulation
    schemes. In addition, both the Ground Multi-Band Terminal (GMT) and the
    Family of Advanced Beyond Line of Sight Terminal (FAB-T) programs are
    being designed with bandwidth efficient modulation as a key
    requirement. Use of more efficient modulation schemes allows us to
    transmit more bits of data in each hertz of frequency spectrum. In the
    UHF area, we are continuing to implement Demand Assigned Multiple
    Access (DAMA) terminals at our ground locations and on our airborne
    platforms. We have increased capacity 35 percent in 2002 by
    aggressively implementing DAMA capability. We are using an
    unprecedented amount of DAMA to execute Operations Enduring Freedom and
    Iraqi Freedom. In fiscal year 2005, DAMA will be fully operational and
    is expected to increase capacity another 25 percent. Approaching the
    bandwidth shortage from another angle, USSTRATCOM is leading an effort
    to identify and reduce interference, which robs us of useable capacity.
    Each channel we recover would cost $83,000 per year to replace from a
    commercial source. So far, the effort has resulted in the recovery of
    six channels in CONUS and we are targeting long-term sources of
    interference emanating from foreign countries via the State Department.
    Attempting to resolve interference issues has highlighted a dramatic
    need for DOD owned and operated geo-location capabilities to assist
    operators in quickly rectifying interference that occurs regularly
    throughout the SATCOM spectrum. We continue to pursue any available
    capability that can assist with this effort.
        c. We are implementing the Global Broadcast System (GBS) in order
    to more efficiently transmit broadcast type of information to multiple
    users simultaneously, instead of sending the same information on
    multiple channels. In addition, we will be migrating GBS to an Internet
    Protocol architecture, which will allow for even more dynamic and
    efficient bandwidth use within GBS.
        d. In addition to these technical means of increasing bandwidth
    efficiency, we also use management processes. Access to all military
    satellite resources is controlled by USSTRATCOM. They look at all
    requirements across all services and agencies and allocate satellite
    resources to individual users, depending on the specific requirement
    and its priority. They also monitor satellite usage to ensure that
    individual users are remaining within their allocation. When a specific
    requirement has been satisfied, the satellite resources used to meet
    that requirement are then reallocated to another user. In order to
    accomplish this allocation process, USSTRATCOM makes use of
    communications planning tools. These tools permit USSTRATCOM to satisfy
    the maximum possible number of users within a given satellite
    bandwidth.
        As an example, in the Milstar system, apportionment is the process
    used to allocate bandwidth to the user community. Communications
    planning tools are used to allocate these slots and monitor the user
    community to ensure compliance. For Milstar, the Milstar Communications
    Planning Tool-Integrated is the current comm-planning tool being used.
    This year, we are fielding the Automated Comm Management System (ACMS),
    which provides additional automated capability to allocate and monitor
    bandwidth efficiency. Similarly, our SHF control systems are in the
    process of being updated with the latest technology with the
    introduction of Wideband Gapfiller Satellites. Existing control systems
    will be replaced by the Common Network Planning System and the
    Integrated Monitoring and Control System. These upgrades will provide
    increased flexibility in planning the satellite communications
    requirements and bring on line new technologies to monitor and control
    the satellite networks.

                        SPACE SYSTEMS SOFTWARE PROBLEMS

        7. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, space programs rely
    heavily on computer software. Both NASA and the Department of Defense
    have had problems in recent years with software. NASA has lost a Mars
    probe because of a software problem, and the Department of Defense
    almost canceled the SBIRS-High program in part because of software
    problems and delays. Last year's National Defense Authorization Act
    required all of the military services to establish programs, by April
    1, to improve software acquisition and establish metrics to monitor
    software performance. What metrics do you use to monitor the progress
    of software development for space programs and how do you know when a
    program's software development is not going well?
        Secretary Teets. On 21 March, OSD issued a memo providing
    Department-wide guidance on Section 804, requiring each service to
    define and develop a software acquisition process improvement program
    and to report the status within 90 days (13 June). SAF/US is a senior
    member of the Air Force Software Steering Group (AFSSG), the Air Force
    lead in addressing the OSD memo and Section 804. The AFSSG Working
    Group has been working this issue since February, briefing and
    receiving feedback from the AFSSG Principals at the March AFSSG
    meeting. Currently the Working Group is developing the framework and
    identifying the already existing resources for a centralized AF
    program.
        In addition to the coordinated AFSSG efforts, the Space and Missile
    Systems Center (SMC) is in the midst of reinvigorating the Air Force's
    approach to space program software acquisition in concert with the
    Aeronautical System Center's Air Force-wide software acquisition reform
    initiative. SMC is working with Carnegie Mellon University's Software
    Engineering Institute to modify the widely-used Capability Maturity
    Model Integration industry standard for evaluation of the maturity of
    software systems engineering development efforts at each of its program
    offices and contractors. Associated metrics are being designed to
    identify incompatible or optimistic performance, cost, and schedule
    baselines; software engineering staff issues such as instability,
    shortages, or lack of training and experience; and inadequate software
    risk identification and management. Use of more applicable metrics that
    better address cost, schedule, and quality in conjunction with rigorous
    standards, peer reviews, independent evaluations, and thresholds whose
    breach will trigger corrective action will enable early warning of
    potential problems for mitigation while minimizing the risk of
    duplicating past software engineering problems.

        8. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, what in your view is the
    primary reason for the many software problems; is it not enough people,
    poor management, unclear requirements, too much reuse of software, or
    something else?
        Secretary Teets. There is no single primary cause of space program
    software problems. In our experience, multiple contributing factors
    collectively plague software development:

             Lack of experienced software engineering personnel.
            Shortages of qualified people across the spectrum of software
            development, from design to testing, result in consistent
            understaffing of these efforts. Contractors often attempt to
            compensate by requiring overtime, but fatigue burns out skilled
            personnel and causes more mistakes that require additional
            downstream rework, with attendant cost and schedule impacts.
             Lack of proper contractor emphasis on software
            development. Contractor management often streamlines software
            development efforts when under cost and schedule pressure,
            decreasing the scope and/or frequency of peer reviews,
            combining or eliminating levels of software testing, postponing
            integration until the latter stages of software development, or
            scheduling more software tasks in parallel. The end result:
            discovery of substantial software defects late in development
            efforts, when they are much more expensive and time consuming
            to fix.
             Government inattention to contractor software efforts.
            By strongly emphasizing cost and schedule targets while poorly
            enforcing disciplined contractor software development
            processes, the Government fails to display concern about
            software engineering or hold companies accountable for poor
            software development practices.
             Overly optimistic bids. The Government has gotten away
            from emphasizing low bids over best value; however, the
            tendency remains for contractors to bid low on ambitious
            projects. The result is often an underestimate of the required
            lines of code, overestimate of the amount of usable commercial
            and reuse software, and overestimate of attainable software
            development  productivity in order to achieve these impossibly
            low bids.
             The increasing complexity of space systems. As systems
            become more complicated, ever more complex software packages
            are required to link and control their various elements. Growth
            of system software development technical, cost, and schedule
            risks is commensurate with software's increasing centrality to
            space systems.

        The Air Force is working to improve its software engineering
    metrics, increase use of independent cost estimates, hire additional
    software engineering technical support, and include software in source
    selection criteria. These and other measures will help prevent the
    recurrence of recent software engineering problems in future
    acquisition efforts.

                 DOD/NASA COORDINATION AND SHUTTLE REPLACEMENT

        9. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, late last year, both NASA
    and Air Force officials announced that they planned to increase their
    cooperation in aerospace technology development to achieve efficiencies
    and share expertise. You were quoted as saying that this cooperation
    was likely to occur in the Space-based Radar program as well as the
    follow-on program to the EELV launch vehicle. A memorandum of agreement
    signed October 8 stated that ``additional cooperative efforts are
    possible and desirable, including across utilization of facilit[ies] .
    . . sharing of support services, and leveraging of science and
    technology investments.''
        Increased cooperation was to manifest itself in the 2004 budget
    request. In the wake of the Space Shuttle Columbia tragedy, the need
    for cooperation is even more urgent. Specifically, what is the DOD
    doing to explore manned space alternatives, help NASA explore future
    alternatives to the space shuttle, institute joint research and
    development programs, and otherwise examine the future military
    requirements for manned space flight?
        Secretary Teets. The Air Force and NASA are cooperating in many
    areas from space technology to launch infrastructure. This cooperation
    is being managed at the very highest levels through the Air Force,
    NASA, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, United States
    Strategic Command, and National Reconnaissance Office Partnership
    Council. This Council is chaired by Mr. O'Keefe; General Lord, the
    Space Command Commander; Admiral Ellis, the Strategic Command
    Commander; Dr. Sega, Director of Defense Research and Engineering; and
    me, and meets semi-annually to ensure cross talk at all levels of our
    organizations.
        Several successful examples of our mutual sharing occur in the area
    of space technology. We have been sharing technology with NASA from our
    X-43 liquid hydrogen scramjet demonstration program, and our
    Experimental Spacecraft System (XSS)-11 for use in NASA's Mars Sample
    Return Mission. Also, NASA has been providing technology for DOD
    satellite efforts, including the National Polar-Orbiting Operational
    Environmental Satellite System's risk reduction effort, and SBR's
    Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). We are also transforming our
    communication architecture by integrating communications among DOD, the
    intelligence community, and NASA.
        In the area of launch infrastructure and support, we are providing
    mutual benefit through such efforts as our joint Delta II procurement
    strategy and review teams. We are also exploring strategies for the
    future including new spacelift architecture, both reusable and
    expendable, and Operationally Responsive Spacelift (ORS).
        The ORS effort is to provide rapid, economic access to space, and
    is being explored through an AoA, with full NASA involvement. The AoA
    will define comprehensive solutions to satisfy requirements for
    responsive launch and on-orbit operations. This will lead to the
    demonstration of a small launch vehicle, one of our fiscal year 2004
    new starts. Ultimately, we expect the ORS effort to lead to a reusable
    launch vehicle.
        Concerning specific manned space flight requirements, at this time
    the Air Force has no initiatives addressing them, as those are unique
    NASA requirements.

        10. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, how much DOD funding is
    associated with this effort?
        Secretary Teets. The Air Force is requesting $24.4 million in
    fiscal year 2004 to begin the ORS program.

                         GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM III

        11. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Ellis, the ability to jam Global
    Positioning Systems (GPS) has grown in recent years. From your
    perspective as a warfighter, can you share your thoughts for the need
    for GPS III and when this might be needed?
        Admiral Ellis. In my role as the combatant commander responsible
    for providing navigation and timing signals to users worldwide, I fully
    support the expeditious improvement of the GPS constellation. While the
    acquisition of GPS jammers by our potential adversaries increases, the
    performance of today's GPS constellation is bound by the original
    design. It is imperative we field a new generation of GPS satellites
    that possess robust resistance to countermeasures, improved signal
    integrity, global availability, and spectrally separate military and
    civilian signals.

        12. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Ellis, can you also give a sense
    of the anticipated improved capabilities for GPS II-F and II-R and if
    these capabilities are sufficient to allow a 2-4 year delay in the GPS
    III program?
        Admiral Ellis. Planned GPS modernization includes 12 GPS IIF, 8
    Block IIR, and 5 IIR-M satellites. These upgraded satellites will
    improve the warfighter's ability to control power output, commonly
    referred to as ``flex power,'' partially mitigating the effects of
    jamming. Additionally, the five IIR-M satellites will introduce a
    second civil frequency and a new military signal that provides the user
    with direct access to an encrypted, precise navigation signal, reducing
    vulnerabilities to intentional and unintentional interference.
        Additionally, over the last year the Air Force conducted a review
    of the GPS III program and developed a more efficient acquisition
    strategy to meet warfighter needs. This new strategy reduces
    development and fielding time by more than 2 years, allowing a later
    program start while maintaining the first launch in fiscal year 2012.
    The Air Force will also change from a ``launch on need'' strategy,
    which adds a new satellite as one ages out, to a ``launch on
    capability'' strategy, which launches each GPS III satellite as it is
    developed.

                             WEAPONIZATION OF SPACE

        13. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, the Space Commission
    believed unanimously and concluded that the ``U.S. has an urgent
    interest in promoting and protecting the peaceful use of space.'' Is
    current policy consistent with this recommendation?
        Secretary Teets. The recommendations of the Space Commission are
    consistent with current national space policy. According to this
    policy, ``The United States is committed to the exploration and use of
    outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of
    all humanity.'' ``Peaceful purposes'' allow defense and intelligence-
    related activities in pursuit of national security and other goals. The
    Department of Defense is directed by national policy to ``maintain the
    capability to execute the mission areas of space support, force
    enhancement, space control and force application. Consistent with
    treaty obligations, the United States will develop, operate and
    maintain space control capabilities to ensure freedom of action in
    space, and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries.
    These capabilities may also be enhanced by diplomatic, legal and
    military measures to preclude an adversary's hostile use of space
    systems and services.

        14. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, when will the revisions
    to U.S. national security space policy be completed, will it urge
    weaponization of space, and does the administration plan to consult
    with Congress before the new space policy is completed?
        Secretary Teets. In June 2002, the President directed the National
    Security Council (NSC) to initiate a phased approach to updating
    various aspects of the national space policy, and this process is still
    underway. The NSC sets the timetable for this review. The remote
    sensing national policy is nearing completion, and the space
    transportation policy is on hold pending results from the Space Shuttle
    Columbia accident investigation board. I understand additional space
    policy reviews are planned. Current national space policy promotes the
    ``use of outer space for peaceful purposes.'' We will work to ensure
    that all future policies support this goal, while preserving our right
    to protect and defend our critically important defense and intelligence
    space systems.

                                  EELV FUNDING

        15. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, is there any active
    consideration to modifying the EELV program to make it ``man-rated''
    for use by either NASA or any future manned military space flight?
        Secretary Teets. Currently, the Air Force does not foresee a
    requirement for manned military space flight. Therefore, there are no
    plans on the part of the Air Force to modify the Evolved Expendable
    Launch Vehicle (EELV) program to certify either the Atlas V or Delta IV
    for human flight. Based on their requirements, NASA has been working
    directly with Lockheed Martin and Boeing on the possibility of human-
    rating the EELV boosters.

                     SPACE LAUNCH RANGE FUNDING REDUCTIONS

        16. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets and Admiral Ellis, the
    fiscal year 2003 budget request for space launch range modernization
    was $82 million and anticipated that the fiscal year 2004 budget
    request would be $106 million. The actual fiscal year 2004 budget
    request is only $63 million, a reduction of $43 million. With the
    reduction is a program shift away from modernization to stabilization.
    This is a significant decrease in funding and a significant program
    shift. The goal to modernize the ranges to achieve a 20 percent
    reduction in operations and maintenance costs has been abandoned, as
    well. Why has the funding for launch ranges been decreased so
    significantly and why has the Air Force walked away from the laudable
    goal of a 20 percent reduction in operations and maintenance costs for
    the ranges?
        Secretary Teets. The Air Force has shifted its focus away from the
    increasingly costly and time-consuming modernization program to
    completely standardize and automate the ranges, with the theoretical
    possibility of follow-on operations and maintenance (O&M) cost savings.
    In its place is a less costly and more incremental recapitalization and
    sustainment approach to replace or upgrade existing, obsolete range
    systems, without compromising necessary support for the Nation's launch
    and test mission requirements through the foreseeable future.
        There are two primary reasons for this change: 1) launch rates have
    not increased as dramatically as projected when the range modernization
    efforts began, diminishing the need to reduce range reconfiguration
    times and increase range flexibility through full-scale standardization
    and automation; and 2) the Air Force needed to reallocate investment
    dollars earmarked for range modernization to other higher priority
    space modernization needs.
        At the same time, the Air Force determined the 20 percent O&M
    savings goal established nearly 10 years ago is no longer realistic,
    given the significant changes in program direction and the emergence of
    other O&M cost drivers not directly influenced by range modernization.
    Accordingly, the Air Force decided to abandon this goal and more
    realistically seek to offset fact-of-life range O&M cost increases by
    replacing older, more costly systems and implementing more cost
    effective sustainment efforts.
        Admiral Ellis. Our position at U.S. Strategic Command is that
    uninterrupted, on demand access to space is fundamental to ensuring the
    responsiveness necessary to replenish or augment our critical on-orbit
    capabilities. Inextricably linked to assured access is maintaining
    viable gateways to space. We must work with our partners in Government
    and industry to search for the most effective and fiscally responsible
    strategies to ensure a responsive, bicoastal launch capability for the
    long term. I look forward to being a part of the discussions on the
    long-range vision for our launch complexes.

        17. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets and Admiral Ellis, could
    you provide an optimized schedule for achieving this goal, the annual
    cost of the modernization, and the savings on an annual basis?
        Secretary Teets. As indicated before, the goal of achieving a 20-
    percent cost savings is no longer justifiable. Therefore, the Air Force
    has not developed an optimized schedule to achieve 20 percent O&M cost
    savings, nor has it determined the associated annual costs of
    modernization and savings on an annual basis. Instead the Air Force is
    focused on modernizing, recapitalizing and sustaining the ranges to the
    degree necessary to reliably and responsively support launches for the
    foreseeable future, with O&M cost containment as an important, but not
    overriding factor.
        Admiral Ellis. STRATCOM's role is to identify operational
    requirements, and we will also exercise our oversight responsibilities
    for space launch ranges. I am personally committed to helping determine
    the most effective, streamlined methods of modernizing space launch
    ranges to ensure responsive, bicoastal launch capabilities. Our vision
    is that as we modernize the complexes, we must explore and analyze
    opportunities to find new ways to provide not only replacement, but
    improved capability with less infrastructure where possible.

        18. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets and Admiral Ellis, do you
    believe the current state of the space lift ranges is adequate to meet
    space launch requirements for the future?
        Secretary Teets. Yes, our shift in emphasis from modernization to
    recapitalization and sustainment will allow us to meet the space launch
    requirements for the foreseeable future. However, if we look out to
    2020 and beyond, the need for a global launch and test range capability
    (exceeding the current Eastern and Western Ranges' capabilities) to
    support operationally responsive spacelift makes a compelling argument
    for renewed investments in range modernization beyond the FYDP. Then
    the likely emphasis will be on space-based launch and test range
    assets.
        Admiral Ellis. In the near term, yes. As we move past the near
    term, we must develop a range capability that supports flexible,
    operationally responsive spacelift to remain the preeminent space-
    faring nation. This effort will require renewed, dedicated investments
    in range modernization, and we must strive to find effective and
    fiscally efficient methods of supporting these requirements.
        Also important, we will address potential issues such as the
    vulnerability of our launch pads as we analyze the full range of
    diverse and increasingly complex global threats our Nation faces. We
    will identify possible single point failures within our space launch
    complexes and other data essential to ensuring the long-term security
    and viability of our spacelift program.

                        EUROPEAN GPS INTERFERENCE ISSUES

        19. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, the European Union plans
    to launch their own version of the GPS, called Galileo, in 2008.
    Despite U.S. protests, I understand they may decide to use the same
    frequency band that the U.S. GPS uses. This could potentially result in
    interference to the U.S. GPS signal. If Galileo uses the same frequency
    as the U.S. GPS, how much of a problem would that be and what action is
    the U.S. taking to persuade the Europeans not to use the same
    frequency?
        Secretary Teets. The United States firmly opposes the European
    Commission's (EC) proposal to overlay Galileo signals on the GPS
    Military code (M-code). Overlay is in direct conflict with U.S. and
    NATO security interests. Specifically, it complicates our ability to
    deny our enemies access to the GPS signal while preserving U.S. and
    allied use of the system. Any overlay of the GPS M-code is unacceptable
    to the United States and should be to the European Union (EU) Member
    States as well.
        The United States Government (through a Department of State-led
    team) has been engaged in discussions with the EU for the past several
    years regarding cooperation between GPS and the proposed Galileo
    system. Part of that discussion has been focused on alternative
    signals, which we believe provide equivalent performance capabilities
    for Galileo users. Our GPS experts are participating in Technical
    Working Groups with the EC experts to discuss these alternatives. Our
    goal is to help facilitate a successful Galileo program, without
    eroding U.S. and NATO security interests.

                               SPACE-BASED RADAR

        20. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, the Air Force has
    requested substantial funding in fiscal year 2004 to develop a space-
    based radar system which would be capable of global detection and
    tracking and possibly imaging of various ground targets. Such a system,
    once fielded, also could possibly be used to provide global tracking of
    ballistic missiles. Would the space-based radar system, as currently
    envisioned, be capable of providing ballistic missile tracking data?
        Secretary Teets. The space-based radar (SBR) would be capable of
    tracking mobile ballistic missiles and their launchers as they traverse
    the earth's surface prior to launch. Also, Synthetic Aperture Radar
    (SAR) imaging is a baseline requirement for space-based radar. These
    missiles and launchers can be imaged by the space-based radar.
        Some information on tracking the missiles in flight may be received
    and the complete phase history data will be transmitted to ground
    processing. However, airborne targets tend to have lower radar cross-
    sections (radar signatures), operate at higher speeds, and have
    significantly greater agility than surface targets. This requires radar
    to have a faster scan and range gating capability and from space,
    targets need to be detected against a complicated surface clutter
    background. This provides a greater challenge in terms of radar antenna
    size, power required, and demands advancements in processing
    techniques. A cost effective space Airborne Moving Target Indication
    (AMTI) solution is a problem of technology readiness. The likely time
    frame of availability is well beyond the schedule of the first
    increment of SBR.

        21. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, as you look at the long
    range future of the space-based radar do you see it becoming the
    primary ground moving target locator or that it will be used in
    conjunction with other platforms such as J-STARS?
        Secretary Teets. Even in the long term, SBR will be used in
    conjunction with other platforms. Persistent surveillance isn't
    envisioned to be accomplished by one system, but a system of systems.
    Radar from either space or air brings day/night, all-weather target
    identification, and tracking capability. SBR adds global access with
    multi-theater support, theater-wide dynamic surface picture, and near-
    continuous, non-provocative intelligence preparation of the
    battlefield. There are no overflight restrictions or political
    sensitivities. Space basing offers reduced terrain masking constraints,
    operational risk, and theater footprint. Nevertheless, aircraft
    platforms bring the benefits of higher transmit power and closer
    ranges, which provide capabilities that are not achievable from space.
    Each platform has its own strengths and weaknesses. A mix of platforms
    is the best approach to maximizing ground moving target indications
    coverage.

                         CONVENTIONAL WARHEADS ON ICBMS

        22. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, the Air Force is
    beginning a program to look at developing a non-nuclear warhead to be
    launched on an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Launching an
    ICBM at a target is a potentially provocative move, because ICBMs have
    nuclear warheads on them and if launched from a silo how would anyone
    be certain if the warhead were nuclear or conventional. Such a launch
    could easily be interpreted as a nuclear strike, greatly increasing the
    chance that any potential adversary would overreact. From a policy
    perspective, what is the justification for such a weapons system?
        Secretary Teets. The Air Force has studied use of an ICBM in a
    conventional role in the past. This concept has reemerged within the
    Air Force in a limited fashion. From a policy perspective, it is only
    one of various possible alternatives being examined to meet the Nuclear
    Posture Review (NPR) goal of enhancing our deterrent posture with a mix
    of advanced concepts, to provide the widest possible range of options
    for our Nation's leaders. The Air Force acknowledges there are
    sensitive issues associated with this type of system, in terms of
    international security and stability, and we will address these
    concerns as this capability is reviewed. These internal discussions
    simply allow us to weigh alternatives and in no way represent a
    decision to design, produce or deploy a conventional ballistic missile
    (CBM). In short, there is no developmental CBM effort underway, nor is
    one programmed in the current FYDP.

        23. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, what discussions has the
    U.S. had or would be needed with other countries about these non-
    nuclear ICBM programs?
        Secretary Teets. To our knowledge, there have been no discussions
    with other countries on this topic. If this capability evolves beyond
    the current conceptual stage, some dialogue may be necessary to address
    treaty implications, international law concerns, and similar issues.

        24. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, what are the plans to
    deploy and use such weapons?
        Secretary Teets. As stated above, this is simply an ongoing
    conceptual discussion based on new mission requirements. There are no
    current plans to deploy and use such a weapon.

        25. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, would such a program
    signal an abandonment of the land-based leg of the nuclear triad?
        Secretary Teets. A concept such as CBM would not signal abandonment
    of the land-based leg of the nuclear triad. The ``nuclear triad'' has
    evolved from the limited focus of the Cold War paradigm. Nuclear forces
    are now just one part of the ``new triad'' defined in the 2001 NPR. It
    includes: (1) both nuclear and non-nuclear strike forces, to provide a
    more robust deterrent; (2) active and passive defenses, including
    ballistic missile and air defenses; and (3) a responsive defense
    infrastructure for developing, building and sustaining required
    systems. This concept is underpinned by enhanced Command and Control,
    Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (C\2\ISR), and planning--all
    designed to ensure comprehensive, accurate and actionable information
    on an adversary's capabilities of military consequence.
        In short, the NPR validated the continued need for nuclear ICBMs,
    stating, ``ICBMs are a critical component of the New Triad. The focus
    of the Department's efforts are to extend the life of the Minuteman III
    weapon system until 2020 while beginning the requirements process for
    the next-generation ICBM.'' The NPR also embraces new concepts, similar
    to the CBM, as a way to enhance our deterrent force/strategic strike
    capabilities with a mix of advanced concepts, to provide the widest
    possible range of options for our Nation's leaders.

             HIGH FREQUENCY ACTIVE AURORAL RESEARCH PROGRAM (HAARP)

        26. Senator Bill Nelson. General Lord and Admiral Mayo, DARPA, the
    Navy, and the Air Force signed a Memorandum of Agreement to jointly
    invest $118.5 million over 4 years to attempt to develop a high power,
    radio frequency, ground- or space-based transmitter that could
    potentially clear charged particles out of radiation belts and
    remediate a portion of the space environment to support space
    operations. Is this an example of a program that had been previously
    funded through congressional adds that is now considered an important
    portion of the defense science and technology budget request?
        General Lord. Yes, congressional adds and funding for HAARP have
    definitely advanced space technology. This important program exploits
    extremely-low-frequency/very-low-frequency wave generated in the
    ionosphere for subsurface communications, detecting and characterizing
    underground structures, and for reducing charged particle populations
    in the radiation belts, which disrupt satellite systems and operations.
        Admiral Mayo. Yes, the previous congressional funding of HAARP has
    provided an important contribution towards the potential capability for
    clearing charged particles and remediating a portion of the space
    environment. Development of this pioneering concept would exploit
    emerging ionosphere/high-power radiowave technology. The Air Force,
    Navy, and DARPA have embraced this technology through a coordinated MOA
    for addressing this remediation along with other potential applications
    such as imaging subsurface structures and enhancing submarine
    communications.

        27. Senator Bill Nelson. General Lord and Admiral Mayo, given
    limited resources, how high a priority is this effort relative to other
    technology development efforts to support your service's space
    missions?
        General Lord. A calm space environment is one important aspect to
    ensuring reliable, accurate space operations. HAARP is an exploratory
    effort to research innovative ways to stabilize the ionosphere. As a
    result, we believe this investment is very important to future space
    operations.
        Admiral Mayo. Space protection is very important to maintaining
    space systems operations and is a critical capability. HAARP is an
    exploratory effort to research innovative ways to protect the
    environment in which these critical space assets operate. We believe
    this investment is important to future space operations.

                         NATIONAL AEROSPACE INITIATIVE

        28. Senator Bill Nelson. General Lord, Admiral Mayo, and General
    Cosumano, the fiscal year 2004 budget request proposes $363 million
    science and technology funding for the National Aerospace Initiative
    (NAI), a multi-service program to develop space-related technologies
    and improve our hypersonic flight and space access capabilities. This
    program is slated to be funded at nearly $2 billion over the next 6
    years. What are the goals of this major initiative?
        General Lord. The Director of Defense Research and Engineering's
    (DDR&E) National Aerospace Initiative is to accelerate service
    development of technologies in the areas of high speed/hypersonic
    flight, space access, and space technology. The stated mission of NAI
    is to ensure America's continued aerospace leadership. The NAI goal is
    to do this by using an integrated, capability-focused, national
    approach that enables high speed/hypersonic flight; affordable,
    responsive, safe, reliable access to and from space; and in-space
    operation by developing, maturing, demonstrating, and transitioning
    transformational aerospace technologies.
        Admiral Mayo. The overall vision of NAI is to ensure America's
    leadership in space. The three defined goals that support this vision
    are:

            - Development and demonstration of technologies that enable
            air-breathing hypersonic flight;
            - Development and demonstration of technologies that enable
            responsive, safe, reliable and affordable access to space; and
            - Development and demonstration of technologies that enable
            transformational and responsive capabilities in space.

        Further, the NAI objectives include science and engineering
    education for all Americans. This is truly a cross-cutting initiative
    that will have implications far beyond space.
        General Cosumano. Senator, there are three goals for the NAI. The
    first goal is to demonstrate sustained hypersonic flight to Mach 12 by
    2012 and beyond--develop and demonstrate technologies to enable
    militarily responsive, low-cost, reusable access to space. In the
    nearer term, this effort offers the potential to reduce the time and
    cost of space access by 50 percent--consistent with goals put forth by
    the ``Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace
    Industry.'' In the longer term, order-of-magnitude improvements are
    possible through the use of air-breathing propulsion concepts that do
    not require carrying an oxidizer during the boost phase--thus
    significantly reducing system mass. The second goal is to maintain U.S.
    technological superiority in four areas--space control, responsive
    payloads, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and
    flexible communications. Space control means providing space
    situational awareness and the ability to defend space systems.
    Responsive payloads provide quick response deployment and employment of
    space capabilities. Third, there is ISR which provides for persistent,
    global ISR for the warfighter. There is also flexible communications,
    which ensure delivery of the right information to the warfighter
    anywhere at anytime.

        29. Senator Bill Nelson. General Lord, Admiral Mayo, and General
    Cosumano, were those goals developed in coordination with the services?
        General Lord. Technical experts from all the services participated
    in the development of the NAI goals.
        Admiral Mayo. Yes, these goals and objectives were developed within
    the past year by a panel that included representatives from OSD and all
    the services. All services will also be represented on the NAI Board of
    Directors.
        General Cosumano. Yes, sir. In addition to the Army, national
    experts from the Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, NASA, industry, and
    academia worked together over the past year to generate a comprehensive
    state-of-technology assessment and identify technical opportunities,
    such as flight demonstrations of supersonic and hypersonic cruise
    missiles, high-speed unmanned vehicles, long-range aircraft, and
    reusable, affordable access to space vehicles. Following this, four
    Synergy Group meetings were held from September 2002 through February
    2003 to develop coordinated collaboration and implementation plans for
    the three NAI pillars. These meetings were jointly chaired by the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and NASA Headquarters. Senior-
    level representatives from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force,
    Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), NASA Glenn Research
    Center, NASA Langley Research Center, NASA Marshall Space Flight
    Center, NASA Dryden Flight Research Center, Air Force Space Command,
    Headquarters Space and Missile Command, Air Force Air Combat Command,
    National Security and Space Integration (NSSI) office, and other
    appropriate organizations and agencies participated in the meetings.
    The result was consensus agreement on the NAI mission, goals,
    objectives, organizational structure, and roles and responsibilities.

        30. Senator Bill Nelson. General Lord, Admiral Mayo, and General
    Cosumano, how are these efforts being coordinated with acquisition
    strategies and operational organizations?
        General Lord. Air Force Space Command has been involved in the
    development of NAI strategy and planning. The NAI space technology area
    is well funded by current DOD S&T efforts, which are closely
    coordinated with the service's acquisition strategies and operational
    plans. As an example, the near- to mid-term NAI space access technology
    plans are being coordinated with the ongoing Air Force Operationally
    Responsive Spacelift (ORS) Analysis of Alternative (AoA) being
    conducted by Air Force Space Command. As concepts are defined, refined,
    and selected through the ORS AoA process, these will be used to further
    refine the NAI space access technology development goals.
        Admiral Mayo. Navy's lead for NAI is ASN(RDA), who also has
    responsibility for oversight of all naval acquisition strategies. I
    believe this gives us reasonable assurance that NAI and our acquisition
    strategies will be coordinated and synchronized to the degree
    necessary.
        Top level management issues and objectives for NAI are just now
    being finalized, so it may be premature to judge how well coordinated
    all is, or will be, with operations. I can assure you that I will work
    closely with ASN(RDA) to make certain that my operational needs and
    objectives will be met as appropriate by NAI.
        General Cosumano. In addition to a number of other operational
    commands (including U.S. Strategic Command, Air Force Space Command,
    and Air Force Air Combat Command), the U.S. Army Space and Missile
    Defense Command actively participated in the NAI planning process. As
    NAI moves forward, operational commands will also be represented in the
    NAI management organization to coordinate linkage of NAI technology
    activities with current and future acquisition strategies.

        31. Senator Bill Nelson. General Lord, Admiral Mayo, and General
    Cosumano, how are the programs within the NAI consistent with the
    space-related missions of the individual services?
        General Lord. The NAI space technology efforts are very consistent
    with the DOD space mission. For example, the NAI space access
    technology developments are directly applicable to the DOD space lift
    mission and will converge with specific service goals as we progress
    through our Operationally Responsive Spacelift Analysis of
    Alternatives. In addition, the NAI high speed/hypersonic programs do
    have potential applicability to the space lift mission as well as
    potential hypersonic missile applications.
        Admiral Mayo. The emerging NAI management plan allows the services
    to participate to the level and degree as they see relevant to their
    needs. This level of flexibility allows the services to leverage NAI in
    a way that is fully consistent with their needs. Also, all NAI
    technology roadmaps will be developed with transition as a goal. This
    further ensures NAI will be responsive to our needs.
        General Cosumano. The NAI will develop and demonstrate technologies
    that will enable capabilities never before available to our warfighters
    such as long-range supersonic cruise missiles, hypersonic strike/
    interceptor missiles, a family of long-range hypersonic strike/
    reconnaissance aircraft, air-breathing space access, rapid insertion of
    surveillance satellites to expand remote area coverage, rapid
    dispensing of long range weapons during early stages of a conflict, and
    on-orbit space control. This breadth of capabilities supports the
    Army's mission.

                    SPACE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PRIORITIES

        32. Senator Bill Nelson. General Lord, Admiral Mayo, and General
    Cosumano, what are the highest space S&T priorities for your service?
        General Lord. The Air Force's highest space mission capability need
    in the mid- to far-term (fiscal year 2010-2030) is responsive
    spacelift. The Air Force is pursuing the following S&T efforts to
    enable responsive spacelift: Advanced Organic Matrix Composite (OMC)
    Material Concepts, Materials Supportability, Metallic Materials and
    Processes for Space Applications, OMC Materials and Processes for
    Space, Boost, Scramjet (Hypersonics), System Simulation and Flight
    Control, Advanced Spacecraft Mechanisms, Integrated Structural Systems,
    Advanced Control for Space Systems, and Adaptive Guidance and Control.
        Admiral Mayo. In the area of space science, our current highest
    priorities include improved sensing of ocean, atmosphere and space
    environments for a number of applications including improved ISR and
    targeting, reduced navigation and communication outages and improved
    GPS and precision geolocation. Nearly every aspect of maritime
    operations, from safety of navigation to weapon selection and
    deployment, is dependent upon a clear meteorology and oceanographic
    picture. While nearly all the services and agencies deal with weather
    over land, only the naval services are so heavily dependent on timely
    and frequent forecasts of weather over water and sea conditions.
        In the area of space technology, priorities include revolutionary
    optics for ISR, hyperspectral sensing, new techniques for optical
    communication and improved time keeping technologies.
        General Cosumano. There are two emphases in Army space S&T
    priorities. One is force enhancement technologies such as ISR, and
    position, navigation, and timing to extend and improve the operational
    capabilities of the Future Combat System (FCS) and the Objective Force;
    second is space control technologies to protect and secure our Nation's
    space assets while denying our adversaries the use of space. The focus
    of these technology efforts is to enhance our force's operations in
    theater, to augment space capabilities and protect them from the enemy.
        Current funding allows the Army to develop and demonstrate advanced
    space technology applications for the Army's Objective Force. Advanced
    space force enhancement technologies include electro-optical, synthetic
    aperture radar, advanced data collection, processing and real time
    dissemination. The Army is currently pursuing efforts to process space
    data in real time to ultimately support a single integrated operational
    picture for the Objective Force. We are also pursuing development of
    advanced space control technology risk reduction efforts for ground-to-
    space surveillance and negation systems like the Space Surveillance
    Science and Technology Objective.

        33. Senator Bill Nelson. General Lord, Admiral Mayo, and General
    Cosumano, what is your current investment in that area?
        General Lord. The Air Force fiscal year 2004 President's budget
    requested amount for space-unique S&T is $0.3 billion, which is 14
    percent of the total Air Force fiscal year 2004 S&T request.
        Admiral Mayo. The naval space S&T investment is approximately $22
    million per year.
        General Cosumano. Army space S&T funding is reflected in the Army
    Space Application Technology Program that funds force enhancement
    initiatives and space control programs. Space control technologies
    including sensor-to-shooter efforts are currently programmed for
    funding by the Army. Force enhancement technologies for ISR radars and
    radio frequency-based counter fire systems are also funded. These
    technologies support Objective Force operations as well as deny the
    adversaries the ability to use space against our forces.
        The Army has programmed more than $70 million from fiscal year 2004
    through fiscal year 2009 for space control and force enhancement
    technology efforts. Space control efforts include space surveillance
    and negation technologies. Force enhancement technologies include
    distributed radar imaging, radio frequency early warning, and upper
    tier airship augmentation of space capabilities.

        34. Senator Bill Nelson. General Lord, Admiral Mayo, and General
    Cosumano, what are your highest priority unfunded space S&T
    requirements?
        General Lord. We manage the Air Force space S&T portfolio to
    minimize risk and maximize impact for the entire group of important
    long-term projects. Therefore, we tend to focus on ``underfunded''
    rather than ``unfunded'' priorities. Our underfunded S&T priorities
    include the following areas: access to space, space control (space
    capability protection) and space force application.
        Admiral Mayo. I currently cannot identify what I would call a high
    priority unfunded in the space S&T area. As we proceed with the
    development of our FORCEnet capabilities, we will be identifying
    specific capabilities and associated S&T needs. Some of the types of
    issues I will be examining include naval needs for increased
    communications bandwidth and improved ISR to provide quick and tailored
    response to conflicts. A candidate technology here may include small,
    low cost, tactical microsatellites and payloads to test new
    technologies for networking, SIGINT, communications and imaging. When
    those are identified, I will prioritize and forward them through the
    appropriate Navy channels.
        General Cosumano. Senator, for the Army, the immediate priority is
    to fund space control technologies supporting Joint programs and
    protecting the Objective Force. These technologies are terrestrial-
    based and support deployed joints forces, to include our FCS. The
    Army's long term priority is to fund space technologies that enhance
    the Objective Force by leveraging both Army and Joint investments. This
    will provide tactical in-theater exploitation of space resources and
    associated enabling capabilities.

        [Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2004

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 2003

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

    DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND OFFICE OF
                               LEGACY MANAGEMENT

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
    room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Wayne
    Allard (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Allard and Bill Nelson.
        Majority staff members present: L. David Cherington,
    counsel; Brian R. Green, professional staff member; and Scott
    W. Stucky, general counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Andrew Kent and Sara R. Mareno.
        Committee members' assistants present: Douglas Flanders,
    assistant to Senator Allard; Aleix Jarvis, assistant to Senator
    Graham; and Peter A. Contostavlos, assistant to Senator Bill
    Nelson.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Allard. I call to order the Strategic Forces
    Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. This is a
    very busy time for Congress, considering the conflict in Iraq
    and considering the fact that we have a very compressed
    schedule in getting the Defense authorization bill out of the
    Senate and moving. As a result of that, we all have very tight
    schedules, and so I want to get started on time. I have a
    reputation for getting started on time. Other members, I think,
    will show up as we proceed forward with the hearing. We will
    give them an opportunity to make opening statements and then to
    ask questions, and we will call on them in the order of
    arrival, which is the way we do business around here.
        The committee meets this morning to receive testimony from
    Ms. Jessie Roberson, the Assistant Secretary of Energy for
    Environmental Management, and Mr. Mike Owen, Director of the
    Department of Energy's Office of Worker and Community
    Transition. I would like to thank our witnesses for appearing
    before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee today and providing
    testimony about the Department of Energy's vision for cleanup
    and closing all of the environmental sites and facilities and
    the subsequent challenges of handing over the long-term
    stewardship and personnel responsibilities to the soon-to-be-
    created Office of Legacy Management. I look forward to hearing
    your testimony.
        In 1996, the vision of cleanup and closing Rocky Flats,
    Mound, and Fernald in 10 years was revolutionary. The original
    plan for these former defense nuclear weapons facilities was to
    complete cleanup in 2065. To many naysayers in 1996, a 10-year
    closure plan was impossible. Now it is not only seen as
    possible, but probable, and it has provided the manuscript for
    completing cleanup and closing the remaining Environmental
    Management (EM) sites much sooner and at much less expense than
    originally envisioned.
        Hindsight is 20/20, but as it turns out the methods used by
    the EM program to accelerate cleanup also make the most sense
    environmentally. Reducing the largest risk first provides
    enormous benefits to the workers, to the environment, and to
    the surrounding communities, and also allows the sites to save
    resources formerly used merely to meet compliance requirements,
    which did nothing to further cleanup or reduce environmental
    risks.
        Now the freed-up resources can be plowed back into the
    cleanup, greatly reducing the duration of the cleanup and
    thereby saving tens of billions of dollars across the EM
    complex.
        It is important to note that none of the success of the EM
    program could have been done without the cooperation and
    commitment by the workforce. As an example, the workers at the
    2006 closure sites have exhibited the highest level of
    professionalism even when knowing the better their performance,
    the quicker they will find their job has come to an end.
        At Rocky Flats, where I have gotten to know the workers the
    best, I want to express my deepest appreciation for the pride
    they take in their work and the success that they will deliver
    to Colorado and to the Nation as other sites will now have a
    great cleanup and closure model to follow.
        While I celebrate EM's successes, I also know there are
    still many challenges ahead. Maintaining the closure model that
    has proven to be successful at Rocky Flats, Mound, and Fernald
    does not mean it will necessarily be successful at the
    remaining four major EM sites. Moving to an acceleration
    cleanup and closure are not a simple plan you put in place and
    just implement.
        The struggle to move Rocky Flats, Mound, and Fernald
    towards closure required a lot of cooperation by the States and
    local communities, respectively. It required and still does
    require a lot of cooperation by the other EM sites who stood by
    as only some of the sites were accelerated with increased
    funding. The EM sites further exhibited their cooperation when
    they took on missions to help coordinate waste treatment and
    final disposition responsibilities. As I already mentioned, it
    takes a lot of cooperation between management and the workers
    who will actually do the cleanup.
        If there is one message I want to send the remaining EM
    sites, it is that cooperation is the key. This will require
    flexibility and compromise, but it also can deliver compelling
    results.
        One example of how the post-2006 closure sites are about to
    be repaid is with increased resources. By accepting waste for
    processing from other sites which will allow Rocky Flats,
    Fernald, and Mound to close by 2006, there will be over $1
    billion of annual EM budget freed up to help accelerate closure
    for the remaining EM sites.
        Additionally, there have been important lessons learned and
    new innovative cleanup processes adopted at the 2006 closure
    sites.
        Last year, the EM program worked with the remaining EM
    sites and the States to work out initial agreements to
    accelerate their cleanup and closure as well. Although many of
    the details still need to be worked out--and I do not mean to
    steal Jessie Roberson's thunder on this--DOE has now
    redesignated all of the EM sites as closure sites, with the
    last of the cleanup to be completed by 2035 or sooner.
        One of the biggest challenges that lies ahead for all of
    the EM sites is how they will be transitioned to assume their
    long-term stewardship and post-closure personnel
    responsibilities. The plan to create the Office of Legacy
    Management (LM) is a good first step in that it establishes the
    office which will assume these responsibilities. How the
    closure sites will be seamlessly transferred from EM to LM
    remains to be seen.
        On the environmental side, the States and local communities
    need to be sure the stewardship responsibilities will be taken
    care of by Legacy Management both with short-term and long-term
    concerns. Additionally, the workers who made the cleanup and
    closure of these sites possible want to make sure that they
    have an entity to take care of their pension, health care, and
    any other needs as is appropriate.
        The current DOE entity that addresses these concerns is the
    Office of Worker and Community Transition. I am interested to
    know how this office will work with EM and Legacy Management to
    make sure our dedicated workforce receives a smooth transition
    as they close their current workplace, whether they transfer to
    another Environmental Management site or leave the Department
    of Energy for other opportunities.
        Secretary Roberson and Mr. Owen, thank you for your service
    to our Nation. We look forward to your testimony and then when
    my ranking member shows up, I will turn to him for an opening
    statement. So why do we not proceed with you, Madam Secretary.
    We look forward to your testimony.

    STATEMENT OF HON. JESSIE HILL ROBERSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
             ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Secretary Roberson. Good morning and thank you, Chairman
    Allard. As usual, it is always a pleasure to sit before you and
    communicate what our progress has been. I am pleased to be here
    today to discuss President Bush's fiscal year 2004 budget
    request for the Department of Energy's environmental cleanup
    program.
        Eighteen months ago, Secretary Abraham directed me to
    review from top to bottom the EM program and uncover those
    obstacles hindering the efficient and effective cleanup of our
    sites. As you are aware, the Top-to-Bottom Review was published
    last February and it concluded that EM had lost focus of its
    core mission, which was to remedy the legacy of the Cold War's
    impact on the environment.
        We had to take immediate action. With the Top-to-Bottom
    Review as the blueprint for our transformation, we have
    realigned EM's focus from risk management to risk reduction and
    accelerated cleanup and closure, the intended mission for the
    Environmental Management program from the start. We have made
    remarkable progress this year toward our goal of saving at
    least $50 billion over the life of this program and completing
    the program by at least 35 years sooner.
        But we must not succumb to the idea that all problems are
    solved. The momentum we have gained must not be compromised or
    allowed to weaken. We must stay the course. The actions and
    strategies we have implemented while producing key results must
    be given the chance to further evolve, bringing even greater
    gains in risk reduction and cleanup sooner.
        Underpinning these strategies are several groundbreaking
    reforms that will propel us forward in our thinking and in our
    actions. We are implementing a new acquisition strategy. We are
    aggressively using and managing the acquisition process as a
    key tool to drive contract performance and risk reduction
    results. We have established 10 special project teams to carve
    new innovative paths for accelerated cleanup and risk
    reduction. Each team is formulating corporate-level initiatives
    and activity-specific actions to accelerate risk reduction in a
    much improved, more cost-effective manner.
        We have implemented a strict configuration control system
    that baselines a number of key critical program elements.
    Robust change control and monitoring of these key elements will
    facilitate a high confidence level that the direction of the
    accelerated cleanup initiative is on course and that our
    objectives are being accomplished.
        The budget request before you is one of our most crucial
    reforms. This request, a cornerstone of our transformation, is
    a major step toward aligning performance with the resources
    needed to expedite risk reduction and cleanup. This budget
    request sets the foundation for budget planning and execution
    of the accelerated risk reduction and closure initiative.
        Today the EM program is still very much a defense
    environmental liability, responsible for the disposition of
    many tons of special nuclear material, 88 million gallons of
    radioactive liquid waste, 2,500 metric tons of spent nuclear
    fuel, 135,000 cubic meters of transuranic waste, and well over
    a million cubic meters of low level waste.
        I ask the committee to stay with us as we continue our
    quest to eliminate risk posed by these materials at a pace few
    of us could have imagined 2 years ago. For example, just within
    the last week at Savannah River, the defense waste processing
    facility was restarted on March 29 and completed its first
    canister pour with waste and a new glass frit. The melter
    change out of this facility occurred more efficiently and
    expeditiously than thought.
        At Rocky Flats, the plutonium packaging facility has
    produced 425 containers in the first 3 months of this year and
    is producing at a rate of 140 3013 containers per month. At
    Richland, we are packaging six spent-fuel multicanister
    overpacks per week versus one. At the River Protection Project,
    waste retrieval from Tank C-106 commenced on March 31. At
    Fernald, contract modification was executed on March 28, making
    closure in 2006 an actual contractual requirement. This is the
    first time this has actually occurred.
        At Idaho, the advanced mixed waste treatment facility sent
    its first TRUPACT-II to WIPP on March 31. Yesterday, Savannah
    River packaged its first 3013 plutonium canister. Yesterday,
    Oak Ridge removed its first converter from Building K-29. At
    the Office of River Protection, we have pumped over 1.5 million
    gallons of radioactive liquid waste from older single-shell
    tanks. Less than 300,000 gallons of waste remains in single-
    shell tanks.
        These are examples of work that was completed in the last
    week, and skeptics did not believe that we would accomplish
    these goals at this point in time. We know that our job is not
    to let skeptics convince us that we cannot do this job, but to
    demonstrate by our actions that we can and are doing this job.
        New ideas and breakthroughs have grown from looking beyond
    the paradigm of risk management to the new focus of accelerated
    risk reduction and cleanup. We are experiencing the realization
    that for the first time the goal of completing the current
    cleanup is within our grasp. We are at a turning point for this
    program.
        In spite of the challenges ahead, and there are challenges
    ahead, these challenges, however, existed from the beginning of
    this program. We did not create them in the accelerated cleanup
    program. They have simply been lying in wait. However, we are
    taking these challenges on and our momentum is building.
        I ask for your support of our fiscal year 2004 budget
    request of $7.24 billion to assure our impetus does not
    diminish. The administration considers this program vitally
    important. We stand at an important crossroads in the cleanup
    program today. I believe the cleanup of the former nuclear
    weapons complex is far too important a matter to be left to
    chance. With your past assistance, we have laid a solid
    foundation that is already showing signs of early success.
    Moving forward, we need your continued support to achieve
    success more broadly across the complex.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Roberson follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Hon. Jessie H. Roberson

        Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be
    here today to discuss the reform of the Department of Energy's
    Environmental Management (EM) program, our progress in implementing
    cleanup reform, and the importance of sustaining the momentum for the
    benefit of the many generations to come. I appreciate the opportunity
    to sit before you and share our actions of this past year and the
    opportunities that lie before us.
        In 1996, Congress took a bold step that fundamentally altered the
    course of the cleanup program in the Department of Energy when it
    supported the accelerated closure of Rocky Flats. This was at a time
    when there was little reason and no demonstrated track record to
    believe that the Department could deliver on a challenge of this
    magnitude. Congress took further steps in 1999 when it created the
    Defense Facilities Closure Projects account and challenged the
    Department of Energy to close three of its nuclear sites by 2006. While
    it has taken significant effort and dedication, today all three of
    those sites, Rocky Flats, Mound, and Fernald, will close on or ahead of
    schedule. The vision and support that Congress provided planted the
    seeds of success in the cleanup program and we have already begun
    harvesting those fruits.
        Nonetheless, success at other sites in the EM program remained
    elusive. Year after year, it continued to take longer and cost more to
    complete the cleanup and we slowly devolved into a program that
    promised little and delivered even less. By the end of fiscal year
    2001, the environmental cleanup program stood as one of the largest
    liabilities of the Federal Government.
        Last year, as ordered by Secretary Abraham, the Department
    completed a Top-to-Bottom Review of its cleanup program and concluded
    that significant change was required in how the Department attacked
    risk reduction and cleanup for the rest of its sites. Two years ago, as
    costs continued to increase, we estimated that it could take over $300
    billion and nearly 70 more years to complete cleanup--20 years longer
    than the actual operations of our oldest facilities and 25 times longer
    than the actual construction of our most complex facilities. We
    concluded that a fundamental change to how we approached, managed, and
    performed the entire cleanup program was required. Last year I started
    the effort to reform this massive program, and while our most daunting
    challenges still lie in front of us, we are now focused, moving in the
    right direction. The accelerated cleanup program has started to build
    momentum.
        Today the EM program is still very much a defense liability,
    responsible for many tons of special nuclear material in the form of
    plutonium and enriched uranium, which would make it one of the world's
    largest nuclear super-powers. In addition, the EM program is
    responsible for safely disposing of 88 million gallons of radioactive
    liquid waste, 2,500 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel, 135,000 cubic
    meters of transuranic waste, and well over 1 million cubic meters of
    low level waste. I ask the committee to stay with us as we continue our
    quest to eliminate risks posed by these materials at a pace few of us
    could have ever imagined.
        Since the completion of Secretary Abraham's Review, the estimated
    cost to complete the cleanup program has decreased by over $30 billion
    and the time to complete will be shortened by 35 years. This means that
    the risks to our workers, our communities, and the environment will be
    eliminated a generation earlier than the previous plan. But I am not
    satisfied and neither should you. My goal is to accelerate risk
    reduction and cleanup and shorten this program even further while
    decreasing costs by more than $50 billion.
        In fiscal year 2004, President Bush is requesting a record $7.24
    billion for the accelerated cleanup program. The administration's
    funding request continues the great progress we made last year with our
    regulators and communities. The administration believes that this
    investment, which we expect to peak in fiscal year 2005, is crucial to
    the success of accelerated risk reduction and cleanup completion. We
    anticipate funding will then decline significantly to about $5 billion
    in 2008.
        The EM portion of the fiscal year 2004 congressional budget
    contains some creative and innovative changes that are greatly needed
    to support our accelerated risk reduction and closure initiative. The
    first of these is a new budget and project baseline summary structure
    that focuses on completion, accountability, and visibility;
    institutionalizes our values; and integrates performance and budget.
    Requested funding can clearly be associated with direct cleanup
    activities versus other indirect EM activities. Second, where
    appropriate, we have limited the inclusion of line-item construction
    projects as activities for separate authorization and funding controls
    to facilitate timely and sensible tradeoff decisions that otherwise may
    not be possible. We solicit your support for this flexibility as we
    implement our accelerated cleanup strategies, with the understanding
    that improving project management remains a significant challenge for
    the Department. Third, this budget reflects the transfer of multiple
    activities that are not core to the accelerated cleanup mission to
    other Department elements. They include the transfer of Idaho National
    Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) landlord
    responsibilities to the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and
    Technology, transfer of the long-term stewardship program to the new
    Office of Legacy Management, and several others.
        The administration considers this program vitally important. We
    stand at an important crossroads in the cleanup program today--success
    is clearly within our reach, but so is failure. I believe the cleanup
    of the former nuclear weapons complex is far too important a matter to
    be left to chance. With your past assistance, we laid a solid
    foundation that is already showing signs of early success. Moving
    forward, we need your continued support to achieve success.

                            A YEAR OF TRANSFORMATION

        Last year at this time, the Top-to-Bottom Review had been recently
    released, citing recommendations to quickly improve performance. I wish
    to take a moment to recap the recommendations and update you on our
    progress in remedying these weaknesses.
        Improve DOE's Acquisition Strategy and Contract Management. A key
    conclusion of the Top-to-Bottom Review was that EM's contracting
    approach was not focused on accelerating risk reduction and applying
    innovative cleanup approaches. Processes for contract acquisition,
    establishment of performance goals, funding allocation, and government
    oversight were managed as separate, informally related activities
    rather than as an integrated corporate business process. Contracting
    strategies and practices made poor use of performance-based contracts
    to carry out EM's cleanup mission. The Top-to-Bottom Review team
    recommended that all current performance-based contracting activities
    be reviewed and, where necessary, restructured to provide for focused,
    streamlined, and unambiguous pursuit of risk reduction.
        Move EM to an Accelerated, Risk-Based Cleanup Strategy. EM's
    cleanup strategy was not based on comprehensive, coherent, technically
    supported risk prioritization--another important observation cited by
    the Review team. The program was implementing waste management
    practices and disposition strategies costing millions without providing
    a proportional reduction in risk to human health and the environment.
    Cleanup work was not prioritized to achieve the greatest risk reduction
    at an accelerated rate. Interpretation of DOE Orders and requirements,
    environmental laws, regulations, and agreements had created obstacles
    to achieving real cleanup benefiting neither human health nor the
    environment. Resources were diverted to lower-risk activities. Process,
    not risk reduction, had become the driving force. The Review
    recommended that DOE initiate an effort to review DOE Orders and
    requirements as well as regulatory agreements, and commence discussions
    with states and other regulators with the goal of accelerating risk
    reduction.
        Align DOE's Internal Processes to Support an Accelerated, Risk-
    Based Cleanup Approach. The Review found DOE's own internal processes
    inconsistent with a risk-based cleanup approach. The hazards at the DOE
    sites and the liability associated with them did not appear to dictate
    the need for urgency in the cleanup decisions. The Review team
    emphasized that the EM mission cannot be accomplished by continuing
    business as usual. Immediate actions in all elements of the EM program
    would need to be taken to transform DOE's processes and operations to
    reflect the new accelerated risk-based cleanup paradigm.
        Realign the EM program so its scope is consistent with an
    accelerated, risk-based cleanup and closure mission. The Review team
    underscored the necessity that EM should redirect, streamline, or cease
    activities not appropriate for accelerated cleanup and closure. A
    laser-like focus on the core mission was needed to realize the cleanup
    of the Cold War legacy in our lifetime. Though many of these non-core
    activities may be worthy of DOE or Federal Government support, a
    reassessment of the relevance of non-related or supporting missions was
    warranted to focus the EM program. The financial and administrative
    resources required for EM implementation and oversight of these
    activities represent a major commitment for EM.
        In response to the Review's recommendations we have:
        Developed and are implementing a new acquisition strategy. In the
    area of acquisition strategy and contract management, we have not been
    idle. We are aggressively using and managing the acquisition process as
    one tool to drive contract performance. We are evaluating both the
    performance and design of every contract in this program and as
    opportunities become clear we are making corrective action. One example
    of our progress is the December 2002 award of a new contract for the
    cleanup and closure of the Mound site. The whole process, which
    required changes in DOE's internal business practices, was accomplished
    in just 6 months from time of the issuance of the Request for Proposals
    (RFP) to the awarding of the contract. Another example is at Oak Ridge,
    where we are transforming the cleanup contract into a closure contract
    with a 1-year demonstration period to further our overall cleanup
    goals. Changing this contract arrangement will accelerate cleanup work
    by 5 years and save $1 billion over the life of the program at the
    site.
        But that is just the tip of the iceberg. I envision a broader
    overhaul of EM's entire acquisition process, including our methodology
    for formulating acquisition strategy, developing RFPs, identifying
    performance-based incentives, and providing oversight of contractor
    performance. We are pursuing a path to both increase competition by
    enlarging the pool of potential contractors competing for our work and
    increase the accountability of our contractors to deliver real,
    meaningful cleanup. Our acquisition strategy focuses on five areas.
    First, we are ``unbundling'' work into smaller packages where it makes
    sense. Second, we are driving innovation and improved cost performance
    through the use of small and smaller businesses, complementing the
    unbundling strategy. Third, we are actively promoting innovation in our
    cleanup work through the competitive process where improved performance
    is required. Fourth, we are extending or modifying contracts where
    excellent performance has been clearly demonstrated. Fifth, we are
    modifying and changing our acquisition processes to support these
    strategies in order to allow them to be successfully implemented.
        To complement these steps, we have launched a Contract Management
    Review Board to review our contracts from a more corporate perspective.
    Our goal is to ensure that the lessons learned, both good and bad, from
    all our endeavors are institutionalized into our contracts and business
    practices and that we suspend those contract philosophies that do not
    support accelerated risk reduction and cleanup of our sites.
        Established 10 special project teams to carve new innovative paths
    for accelerated cleanup and risk reduction. The Top-to-Bottom Review
    identified unfocused and inconsistent work planning processes as the
    principal contributors to EM's uncontrolled cost and schedule growth.
    To address this failing, I formed 10 special corporate projects, each
    assigned a specific strategic objective. Each team is formulating
    corporate level initiatives to accelerate risk reduction in a much
    improved, more cost-effective manner. Objectives include contracting,
    high-level waste, and consolidation of special nuclear material. Each
    of the special projects has a dedicated project manager, supported by
    an integrated project team, to identify, plan, and execute needed
    changes in the EM program. These project teams, using project
    management principles, are key to correcting our work planning
    processes and instilling rigor into our internal management decisions.
        Meaningful, lasting reform must be the result of leadership and
    commitment but it must find its way into the very core of the
    organization to be sustained. Building a high-performing culture
    requires attracting and retaining talented people who deliver
    excellence in performance. Improving management efficiencies requires
    that organizations challenge, hold accountable, and reward top-
    performing employees. This corporate initiative does just that. These
    10 teams will herald a new standard of performance, innovation, and
    greater results for the EM program. Our goal is not just to establish
    performance-based contracts but to solidify a performance-based program
    for all who choose to have a role.
        Implemented a strict configuration management system. Another
    reform we have implemented is a strict configuration management system
    that baselines a number of key, critical program elements. Examples of
    some of the key elements include the Performance Management Plans, EM
    corporate performance metrics, contract performance measures/
    incentives, and life-cycle costs. Strict change control and monitoring
    of these key elements will facilitate a high confidence level that the
    goals and direction of the accelerated cleanup initiative are being
    met.
        In October 2002, EM established several new corporate performance
    measures for the program. EM will continue to track corporate measures
    such as the number of geographic sites completed, the amount of
    transuranic waste disposed, and the number of plutonium metal/oxides
    packaged. However, new corporate measures such as the volume of liquid
    waste in inventory eliminated, number of liquid waste tanks closed,
    number of enriched uranium containers packaged, and amount of depleted
    and other uranium packaged are a key part to the successful execution
    of EM's accelerated cleanup strategies. In addition, EM is establishing
    site resource-loaded baselines that will enable the program to
    comprehensively track progress against its accelerated risk reduction,
    cost, and schedule objectives. The establishment of these new
    performance measures and a rigorous configuration management system are
    resulting in clear lines of accountability for what is expected. With
    this critical tool, EM is now able to make crucial corporate decisions
    that will keep the program on track, control cost increases, and
    minimize schedule growth.
        Identified work activities that directly support accelerated
    cleanup from those that do not. A key finding of the Top-to-Bottom
    Review was that EM was supporting and managing several types of
    activities that may not be appropriate for an accelerated risk-
    reduction and cleanup program. In that light, I took a hard look at
    those activities and, while they may be of importance to the Department
    and the Federal Government, they may not be best aligned in the EM
    program. Based on that assessment, for fiscal year 2004, the following
    identified program elements were not included in the EM budget but,
    because of their importance to the Department, have been transferred to
    other DOE organizations with which they are more appropriately aligned.
    They represent activities that are not part of the core accelerated
    risk reduction and closure mission.

             Environmental Management staff at the National Energy
            Technology Laboratory transferred to the new Office of Legacy
            Management.
             The Analytical Services Program transferred to the
            Office of Environment, Safety and Health.
             The Radiological and Environmental Sciences Laboratory
            transferred to the Office of Environment, Safety and Health.
             Pre-existing liabilities and long-term contractor
            liabilities transferred to the Office of Legacy Management.
             The Long-term Stewardship Program transferred to the
            Office of Legacy Management.

        In addition, landlord responsibilities for the Idaho National
    Engineering and Environmental Laboratory were transferred to the Office
    of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology to reflect the site's major
    mission realignment.
        Revitalized our human capital strategy. Another key management
    reform is the human capital revitalization that strongly supports the
    President's Management Agenda. This reform focuses on building a high-
    performing culture that attracts and retains talented managers and
    staff to deliver sustained performance excellence. We have built a more
    robust performance accountability system that holds each manager and
    employee accountable for actions and results and rewards them
    accordingly. Individual performance management is being fully
    integrated into EM organizational goals; executives are being held
    accountable for achieving strategic program objectives, fostering
    innovation, and supporting continuous improvement.
        We are implementing an executive mentoring program with our senior
    executives with the objective of having a cadre of executives who are
    well-rounded and are prepared to effectively lead irrespective of the
    position to which they might accrue. We are becoming a flatter and more
    effective organization with a goal to have an organizational structure
    that is clearly aligned to deliver on our accelerated risk reduction
    and closure initiative.
        Aligned tangible, consequential results to resources with this
    budget request structure. Given all these changes and advances, the
    budget request before you is one of the most crucial. This budget
    request structure is the foundation for budget planning and execution
    of the accelerated risk reduction and closure initiative. This new
    structure clearly identifies scope and resources that directly support
    the core accelerated cleanup and risk reduction mission from those that
    do not. The new structure consolidates risk reduction and completion
    activities into only two appropriations (defense and non-defense) in
    addition to the existing Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and
    Decommissioning Fund. This structure removes barriers to facilitate
    better resource utilization and segments accelerated completion into
    three distinct accounts to highlight accountability.
        In addition, implementation of this new structure will complement
    other management reform initiatives by focusing on completion or
    endpoint, clearly delineating how resources will be utilized (i.e., for
    direct cleanup activities or for other activities in the program that
    only indirectly relate to on-the-ground cleanup activities), and
    communicating the goals and objectives that we value. Last, but not any
    less important, this new structure will support integration of
    performance and budget for the EM program.

                      THE FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET REQUEST

        The fiscal year 2003 budget was a transitional budget in which
    management reforms were developed and significant efforts were put
    forth to improve performance, accelerate cleanup, and reduce risk. The
    strategic groundwork has been laid, and the EM program is moving
    forward with its risk reduction and cleanup strategies. The investment
    we have requested in our fiscal year 2004 budget will keep EM's new
    accelerated risk reduction and cleanup strategies on track.
        The EM fiscal year 2004 budget request has been tailored to meeting
    our mission of accelerated risk reduction and completion. This budget
    fully reflects each site's new accelerated risk reduction and cleanup
    strategies. The fiscal year 2004 budget request is a major step toward
    aligning performance with the resources needed to expedite risk
    reduction and cleanup.
        The 2004 budget request for EM activities totals $7.24 billion to
    accelerate risk reduction and closure. The request includes five
    appropriations, three of which fund on-the-ground, core mission work,
    and two of which serve as support. The five appropriations and
    associated requested funding are:

             Defense Site Acceleration Completion ($5.8 billion)
             Defense Environmental Services ($995 million)
             Non-Defense Site Acceleration ($171 million)
             Non-Defense Environmental Services ($292 million)
             Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning
            Fund ($418 million)

        Through the implementation of accelerated cleanup strategies, the
    EM program anticipates that cleanup will be completed by 2035, at least
    35 years earlier than originally anticipated, with the potential of
    life-cycle savings of greater than $50 billion.
        In building the request, the Department applied the following
    principles and priorities:
        Protect workers, public, and the environment: The budget request
    continues to place the highest priority on protecting workers, the
    public, and the environment. The implementation of new cleanup
    strategies will allow for an overall improvement in safety and
    reduction in risk because cleanup will be completed sooner, reducing
    the extent to which workers, the public, and the environment have the
    potential to be exposed.
        Ensure the appropriate levels of safeguards and security: Due to
    heightened security levels throughout the Nation, it is crucial that we
    maintain vigilance in our domestic security to protect our citizens.
    The EM program is responsible for many tons of surplus nuclear
    material. This budget request reflects our increased safeguards and
    security needs. In particular, the sites with the largest funding needs
    are Savannah River and Hanford. Savannah River's increase in funding
    supports protective force staffing for the HB Line Category 1 Process
    and plutonium stabilization activities, perimeter improvements,
    maintenance on security systems, vulnerability assessments, and Capital
    and General Plant Project upgrades. Hanford's increase in funding
    supports updates to the Critical Facility Vulnerability Assessment,
    additional security employees for Waste Treatment and Immobilization
    Plant construction, security clearance processing, drug testing, and
    accelerated movement of special nuclear material to Savannah River and/
    or the Grout Facility.
        Reduce risk methodically: Accelerated risk reduction requires a
    pragmatic approach to cleanup based on real risk reduction. Risk
    reduction occurs in various stages, which involve the elimination,
    prevention, or mitigation of risk. Because safe disposal of many
    materials will take a number of years to complete, our major focus of
    risk reduction is stabilization of high-risk materials.
        The following categories of materials are considered to pose the
    highest risk:

             High-curie, long-lived isotope liquid waste
             Special nuclear materials
             Liquid transuranic (TRU) waste in tanks
             Sodium bearing liquid waste in high-level waste tanks
             Defective spent nuclear fuel in water basins
             Spent nuclear fuel in leaky or poor water chemistry
            basins
             High TRU waste content (greater than 100 nanocuries/
            gram)
             TRU waste stored on the surface
             Remote-handled (RH) TRU waste
             Decontamination and Decommissioning of highly
            contaminated facilities

        Although all of these items are to be considered when setting
    priorities, their relative ranking may vary from site to site. For
    example, the following sites have planned activities/milestones for
    fiscal year 2004 that correspond to their site-specific risk
    categories.

    Hanford
             Close six single-shell tanks; the first tanks closed
            at the site.
             Complete interim stabilization of Hanford single-shell
            tanks, which completes removing all pumpable liquids from
            single-shell tanks.
             Complete 30 percent of the Hanford Waste Treatment and
            Immobilization Plant.
             Complete stabilization of plutonium metals, oxides,
            and residues.
             Complete removal of all spent fuel from the K Basins
            and place in dry storage in the Canister Storage Building.

    Idaho
             Complete the transfer of spent nuclear fuel in the
            Power Burst Facility canal from wet storage to dry storage at
            the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center.
             Ship off-site a total of 1,819 kg total uranium
            (leaving a remainder of 825 kg).
             Begin the transfer of EBR-II spent nuclear fuel from
            the Chemical Processing Plant to the Argonne National
            Laboratory-West for treatment and disposition as an interim
            step to removing all EM spent nuclear fuel from wet storage.
             Support treatment of sodium-bearing waste: complete
            conceptual design activities for the sodium bearing waste
            treatment project, initiate preliminary design on primary
            technology, and complete Sodium Bearing Waste Treatment
            Facility Critical Decision 1 documentation; and complete
            characterization of remaining liquids and solids in the 11
            underground tanks.

    Rocky Flats
             Remove and ship remaining plutonium metals, oxides,
            and residue.
             Begin stabilization and hazard removal in two TRU
            waste buildings.

    Savannah River
             Permanently close tanks 18 and 19, completing the
            closure of the first tank grouping.
             De-inventory spent nuclear fuel from the Receiving
            Basin for Off-site Fuels.
             Complete treatment of the aqueous portion of the
            plutonium-uranium extraction (PUREX) waste at the Saltstone
            Facility.
             Produce 250 canisters of vitrified high-level waste.

        Accelerate cleanup results: To accelerate cleanup, 18 sites have
    developed Performance Management Plans (PMPs), which identify
    strategies, end states, end dates, key milestones, and commitments that
    facilitate accelerated cleanup and site closure. These PMPs were
    developed in collaboration with our State and Federal regulators.
        For fiscal year 2004, several examples of sites' milestones for
    accelerated cleanup are:

    Brookhaven National Laboratory
             Submit Brookhaven Graphite Research Reactor Draft
            Record of Decision to our regulators to determine the final
            end-state for Brookhaven Graphite Research Reactor.
             Complete construction of the Airport/Long Island Power
            Authority Groundwater Treatment System.

    Hanford
             Complete cocooning of the H Reactor.
             Complete excavation/removal of 100 B/C Process
            Effluent Pipeline.
             Dispose of 500,000 tons of remediation waste from
            waste sites and burial remediations in the Environmental
            Restoration Disposal Facility.

    Idaho
             Begin shipment of RH TRU waste offsite (6-year
            acceleration) supporting completion of shipments by 2012.
             Complete cleaning and grouting of second pillar and
            panel vaulted tank, supporting acceleration of tank farm
            facility closure by 4 years to 2012.

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-Livermore Site
             Construct, install, and operate a new treatment system
            to address groundwater contamination.

    Los Alamos National Laboratory
             Permanently dispose of over 600 cubic meters of legacy
            TRU waste through an integrated strategy of segregating,
            decontaminating, and shipping to the Waste Isolation Pilot
            Plant (WIPP).
             Complete shipment of 2,000 drums and initiate
            retrieval of legacy TRU waste stored below grade.

    Nevada Test Site
             Complete remediation of 55 release sites.
             Continue to dispose of low-level waste from complex-
            wide generators in support of closure of other EM sites.
             Continue characterization and shipments of TRU waste
            to WIPP.

    Oak Ridge
             Complete East Tennessee Technology Park K 29/31/33
            decommissioning for re-use (1-year acceleration), supporting
            closure of the site 8 years earlier than planned.
             Complete Molten Salt Reactor Experiment flush salt
            removal, and complete fuel salt removal from the first of two
            drain tanks.

    Pantex
             Continue pump and treatment of the perched groundwater
            and evaluation of more efficient cleanup technologies to
            mitigate the contaminated plume.
             Complete demolition of Zone 10 ruins and initiate
            actions for the demolition of Building 12-24 Complex.

    Savannah River
             Eliminate low-level waste legacy inventory.
             Complete major remediation projects in the testing and
            experimental areas.

    WIPP
             Increase carrier capacity from 25 to 34 shipments of
            TRU waste per week.
             Procure 11 RH trailers for a total of 14.
             Complete TRUPACT-II (a transportation container to
            safely transport either TRU waste or standard waste boxes)
            fabrication to obtain fleet of 84 TRUPACTs.

        Maintain closure schedules: Three major sites, Rocky Flats,
    Fernald, and Mound, have accelerated closure schedules. In addition,
    two smaller sites, Ashtabula and Battelle-Columbus, are scheduled to
    close in 2006. Funding in the fiscal year 2004 budget will allow these
    sites to remain on track toward project completion and site closure.
        At Rocky Flats, fiscal year 2004 funding provides for:

             Disposing of more than 109,000 cubic meters of low and
            mixed low level waste.
             Disposing of more than 8,600 cubic meters of TRU waste
            (70 percent complete).
             Completing the decontamination and decommissioning of
            72 work sets in Buildings 371, 717, 771, and 776.
             Cleaning 194 environmental release sites (81 percent
            complete).

        At Fernald, fiscal year 2004 funding provides for:

             Treatment and shipment offsite of 150,000 tons of
            waste pit material, which cumulatively represents approximately
            80 percent of the total.
             Construction completion of Silos 1, 2, and 3 retrieval
            facilities.
             Completion of D&D of Plant 1 Complex Phase II, Liquid
            Storage Complex Phase II, and Pilot Plant Complex.

        At Mound, fiscal year 2004 funding provides for:

             Continued removal of high concentrations of tritium
            from Tritium Effluent Reduction Facility to allow for early
            shutdown.
             Completion of soil excavation phase of Potential
            Release Site 66 and completion of the total remediation of
            Potential Release Sites 68 and 267. These three Potential
            Release Sites represent 38 percent of the total soil
            remediation remaining.

        At Ashtabula, fiscal year 2004 funding provides for:

             Complete disposal of 100 percent of building
            remediation debris generated in fiscal year 2003.
             Initiation of excavation and shipment of remaining
            estimated known scope (i.e., 38,000 tons) of contaminated soil
            to a licensed disposal site.

        At Battelle-Columbus, fiscal year 2004 funding provides for:

             Demolition of buildings JN-2 and JN-3.

        Integrate technology development and deployment: An integrated
    technology development and deployment program is an essential element
    for successful completion of the EM cleanup effort and for fulfilling
    post-closure requirements. The EM Technology Development and Deployment
    (TDD) program provides technical solutions and alternative technologies
    to assist with accelerated cleanup of the DOE complex.
        Through the fiscal year 2004 budget, EM technology development and
    deployment investments are focused on high-payoff site closure and
    remediation problems through a two pronged approach: Closure Projects
    and Alternative Projects.
        Closure Projects: Principal near-term closure sites (such as Rocky
    Flats, Fernald, and Mound) will be provided with technical support and
    quick response, highly focused technology development and deployment
    projects. The goal is to ensure that accelerated site closure schedules
    are achieved.

             At Rocky Flats and the Ohio closure sites, technical
            assistance teams will assess critical technical issues and
            provide technology alternatives including the treatment and
            disposition of orphaned waste streams.
             At Mound, innovative technologies will be developed to
            determine and enable treatment of radioactive contaminated soil
            beneath buildings.
             At Fernald, the vacuum thermal desorption
            demonstration will be completed to provide a technical solution
            for an orphaned waste stream.

        Alternative Projects: Alternative approaches and step improvements
    to current high-risk/high cost baseline remediation projects are our
    second focus. The goal is to enable cleanup to be accomplished safely,
    at less cost, and on an accelerated schedule. EM is focusing funds for
    fiscal year 2004 on:

             Alternatives for tank waste immobilization;
             Alternatives for carbon tetrachloride source term
            location;
             Alternatives for remediation of leaked high-level
            waste below tanks;
             Alternatives for disposition of high-level salt waste;
             Alternatives for immobilization of high-level sludge
            waste;
             Alternatives for remediation of chlorinated ethenes
            using monitored natural attenuation;
             Alternatives for deposit removal at gaseous diffusion
            plants;
             Alternatives for cleanup of trichloroethylene under
            buildings (Paducah); and
             Alternatives for expedited processing of scrap metal/
            equipment.

                                   CONCLUSION

        We planted the seedlings of transformation 1 year ago. We have
    fostered and guided the reforms. New ideas and breakthroughs have grown
    from looking beyond the paradigm of risk management to the new focus of
    accelerated risk reduction and cleanup. New strategies and plans are
    thriving.
        We are experiencing the realization that for the first time, the
    goal of completing EM's mission is within our grasp. We have set into
    motion a reformed cleanup program--one designed and managed to achieve
    risk reduction not just risk management; to shift focus from process to
    product; and to instill the kind of urgency necessary to clean up and
    close down the nuclear legacy of the Cold War and to protect human
    health and the environment.
        We are at a turning point for this program. We must not lessen our
    resolve. I ask for your support to continue this important work. We
    must avoid passing this intolerable inheritance to our children.
    Accelerating cleanup by at least 35 years and saving over $50 billion
    is a wise investment for our children's future.
        I look forward to working with Congress and others to achieve this
    goal. I will be happy to answer questions.

        Senator Allard. That is a good news report. I want to thank
    you for all your effort, and I know you have been involved in
    it from the very start.
        Mr. Owen, go ahead.

     STATEMENT OF MICHAEL W. OWEN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKER AND
               COMMUNITY TRANSITION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Mr. Owen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning. My
    name is Michael Owen, and I am the Director of the Office of
    Worker and Community Transition at the Department of Energy. I
    have also been directed by Secretary Abraham to lead the
    planning for and standup of the new Office of Legacy
    Management.
        To ensure our success, the Department must complete
    preparation for the orderly transition of long-term
    surveillance and maintenance activities to the Office of Legacy
    Management. Additionally, retirement benefits administration
    will transition to the Office of Legacy Management. This will
    be required after the completion of cleanup and closeout
    activities at Rocky Flats, Mound, and Fernald.
        As proposed in the Department's budget, the Office of
    Legacy Management would be a stand-alone program secretarial
    office with a separate budget line reporting directly to the
    Under Secretary of Energy. The Department, in the fiscal year
    2004 budget request, is proposing to establish this new office,
    to be funded at approximately $48 million.
        The environmental surveillance and maintenance efforts
    require approximately $26 million, slightly more than half of
    the proposed budget. Of the balance, about $12 million would be
    used to meet the requirements for pension and other benefits
    for former contractor personnel at four sites. The remaining
    approximately $10 million would be for program direction
    expenses to include personnel at offices in Washington, DC,
    Grand Junction, Colorado, the National Energy Technology Lab in
    Morgantown, West Virginia, and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
        The Secretary with his budget proposes creating the new
    Office of Legacy Management, which would be put together from
    the personnel currently working at sites that I have mentioned.
    The Secretary with his budget proposes creating the new Office
    of Legacy Management to focus on the environmental surveillance
    and maintenance of sites whose missions have ended and the
    continuity of worker benefits at those closure sites. Because
    these functions have historically been included among the
    activities of the Office of Environmental Management, Secretary
    Roberson's office, the net budgetary effect of establishing the
    new office is neutral.
        Upon standup, the Office of Legacy Management would be
    responsible for such activities at more than 60 sites where
    active environmental remediation has been completed. The
    majority of these sites are Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation
    Control Act (UMTRCA) sites. Other sites transferring to Legacy
    Management also include sites associated with Formerly Utilized
    Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP), the Weldon Spring site
    in St. Charles County, Missouri, the Monticello site in Utah,
    and the Young-Rainey Science, Technology, and Research (STAR)
    Center in Largo, Florida, better known as the Pinellas plant.
    Over the next 5 years, the number of sites to be managed by
    Legacy Management is projected to grow to approximately 80.
        The completion of the Department's missions also has an
    impact on the former contractor personnel at their respective
    sites. When the site contractor's cleanup functions are
    complete, pensions and other long-term benefits due to former
    contractor personnel still need to be administered.
        At this time the Department's oversight of post-closure
    benefits involves two programs at four sites. The office will
    administer selected post-retirement, post-closure benefits for
    the former contractor personnel at the Pinellas facility. The
    other program, involving three sites, administers certain pre-
    existing liabilities and long-term contractor liabilities at
    the former gaseous diffusion facilities at Oak Ridge,
    Tennessee, Paducah, Kentucky, and Portsmouth, Ohio, where
    Environmental Management is still conducting site remediation.
        The Office of Legacy Management will oversee a program to
    continue the benefit payments that the Department, through its
    contracts, is committed to provide for the contractor employees
    at Rocky Flats as well as Mound and Fernald. We recognize that
    the Department has responsibilities to the communities
    following the completed remediation and closure of sites.
    Establishing the Office of Legacy Management will ensure that
    community concerns are represented by a dedicated office
    measured only by its success in meeting the defined needs of
    those communities.
        We believe the Office of Legacy Management will be better
    able to address these long-term issues in one office, while the
    Office of Environmental Management continues to focus on the
    environmental cleanup mission.
        That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I would be glad
    to answer any questions on the Office of Legacy Management
    proposal, as well as my existing office, the Office of Worker
    and Community Transition, and the relationship between the two.
    Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Owen follows:]

                       Prepared Statement by Michael Owen

        Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the
    committee. My name is Michael Owen and I am the Director of the Office
    of Worker and Community Transition at the Department of Energy. I have
    also been directed by the Secretary to lead the planning and stand-up
    of the new Office of Legacy Management.
        The Department is making significant progress in addressing the
    consequences of our science, nuclear energy and national security
    missions. This is an important moment, and an opportunity to focus DOE
    programs and personnel on achieving the diverse missions of the
    Department. As you have heard (or will hear) from Assistant Secretary
    Roberson, the successful completion of the Office of Environmental
    Management's responsibilities requires a re-focusing of that program's
    efforts and a Department-wide approach to securing the continued
    protection of the environment and communities. To ensure our success
    the Department must complete preparation for the orderly transition of
    long-term surveillance and maintenance activities and retirement
    benefits administration to the Office of Legacy Management that will be
    required after the completion of cleanup and closeout activities at
    Rocky Flats, Mound, and Fernald.
        The Department, in the fiscal year 2004 budget request, is
    proposing to establish an Office of Legacy Management to be funded at
    approximately $48 million. The environmental surveillance and
    maintenance efforts require approximately $26 million, slightly more
    than half of the total. Of the balance, about $12 million would be used
    to meet the requirements for pension and other benefits for former
    contractor personnel at four sites. The remaining approximately $10
    million would be for program direction expenses of the personnel at
    Washington, DC, Grand Junction, Colorado, and at the National Energy
    Technology Laboratory in Morgantown, West Virginia, and Pittsburgh,
    Pennsylvania.

       CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO THE ENVIRONMENT, AND OUR COMMUNITIES AND
                                    WORKERS

        The new office will be responsible for ensuring that the
    Department's post closure responsibility including the administration
    of long-term pension and medical benefits for former contractor
    personnel and environmental surveillance and maintenance are fulfilled.
    The Secretary, with his budget, proposes creating the new Office of
    Legacy Management to focus on the environmental surveillance and
    maintenance of sites whose missions have ended and the continuity of
    worker benefits after site closure. Because these functions have
    historically been included among the activities of the Office of
    Environmental Management (EM), the net budgetary effect of establishing
    the new office is neutral. As proposed in the Department's budget, the
    Office of Legacy Management would be a stand-alone program secretarial
    office with a separate, discrete, free-standing budget and reporting
    directly to the Under Secretary of Energy.
        Placing these functions in a new office will allow EM to better
    focus its efforts on remediation, as well as permit the Office of
    Legacy Management to achieve significant efficiencies by consolidating
    programs of a similar nature and concentrating the long-term functions
    in one office dedicated to legacy issues.

     PROTECTING THE NATION'S INVESTMENT IN CLEANUP THROUGH EFFECTIVE LONG-
                       TERM SURVEILLANCE AND MAINTENANCE

        The Department's environmental legacy responsibilities stem
    primarily from the activities of the Department and predecessor
    agencies, particularly during World War II and the Cold War. These
    activities left behind a variety of radioactive chemical waste,
    environmental contamination, and hazardous materials at over 100 sites
    across the country, including such large sites as Rocky Flats in
    Colorado and the Mound and Fernald sites in Ohio which are scheduled to
    close.
        While the remediation activities conducted by EM will continue, the
    administration's focus on accelerating cleanup in order to achieve risk
    reduction and closure will mean that the EM mission will be completed
    at many sites earlier than previously predicted. However, certain
    aspects of the Department's environmental responsibility remain. These
    environmental surveillance and maintenance requirements differ
    according to the nature of the individual site, but generally include:
    groundwater monitoring and treatment, record keeping, radiological
    surveys, repairs to waste disposal caps and covers, erosion control and
    periodic inspections and the preparation and submission of post-closure
    regulatory documentation.
        Upon standup, the Office of Legacy Management will be responsible
    for such activities at more than 60 sites where active environmental
    remediation has been completed. The majority of these sites are Uranium
    Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) sites, and also include
    sites associated with the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action
    Program (FUSRAP), the Weldon Spring Site in St. Charles County,
    Missouri, the Monticello site in Utah, and the Young-Rainey Science,
    Technology, and Research (STAR) Center in Largo, Florida (Pinellas
    Plant).
        Over the next 5 years the number of sites to be managed by the
    office is projected to grow to approximately 80.

       ENSURING THE EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL MEDICAL
                             BENEFITS AND PENSIONS

        The completion of the Department's missions also has an impact on
    the former contractor personnel at the respective sites. When the site
    contractor's cleanup functions are complete, pensions and other long-
    term benefits due to former contractor personnel still need to be
    administered.
        At this time, the Department's oversight of post-closure benefits
    involves two programs at four sites. The office will administer
    selected post-retirement/post-closure benefits for the former
    contractor personnel at the Pinellas facility. The other program,
    involving three sites, administers certain pre-existing liabilities and
    long-term contractor liabilities at the former gaseous diffusion
    facilities at Oak Ridge, Paducah, and Portsmouth where Environmental
    Management is still conducting site remediation. The latter includes
    activities and expenses associated with post-retirement life and
    medical benefits for contractor employees at the gaseous diffusion
    plants who served there prior to the 1993 creation of the United States
    Enrichment Corporation and for the retirees of the Ohio Valley Electric
    Company (OVEC) associated with the Portsmouth contract.
        Additionally, a significant increase in pension and long-term
    benefit administration will occur in the near future. In the past, the
    administration of pensions and benefits at closed sites were passed
    over to other DOE contracts. For example, the administration of
    Pinellas' pensions and benefits was transferred to an Albuquerque
    contractor. With the planned closure of Rocky Flats, this practice
    would no longer be a viable option given the magnitude of the Rocky
    Flats pension and benefit plans. Rocky Flats is scheduled to close in
    fiscal year 2006. The Office of Legacy Management will oversee a
    program to continue the benefit payments that the Department, through
    its contractors, is committed to provide for former contractor
    employees from Rocky Flats as well as from Mound and Fernald.

     ACTIONS TAKEN/NEEDED TO PLAN FOR AND CONDUCT THE STANDUP OF NEW OFFICE

        As part of my responsibilities to manage the standup of the new
    office I have formed interdisciplinary teams (legal, regulatory,
    logistics, personnel, communication) to ensure the transition of
    functions to the office is completed in an orderly fashion and that we
    seamlessly continue to serve our customers and stakeholders.
        The personnel involved in managing the activities of the Office of
    Legacy Management would come from three organizations. Generally,
    Washington, DC, personnel would provide overall oversight and
    coordination as well as establish policy. Program implementation at the
    sites would be performed by personnel located at our Grand Junction,
    Colorado, location and by personnel at the National Energy Technology
    Laboratory in Morgantown, West Virginia, and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
        We are planning the standup of this office to consolidate multiple
    functions and provide affected communities, stakeholders, government
    regulators, and former contractor personnel a single point of contact
    for information, communication and expertise regarding legacy
    management issues. Furthermore, such consolidation will integrate
    functions for cross-cutting departmental policy issues and facilitate
    intergovernmental coordination. Most importantly, concentrating
    functions in an office dedicated to legacy management will heighten its
    visibility and, consequently, program accountability to the Secretary,
    Congress, and affected communities and organizations for successful
    performance.

                                   CONCLUSION

        We recognize that the Department has responsibilities to the
    communities following the completed remediation and closure of sites.
    The continued involvement of stakeholders including state, tribal, and
    local governments, is critical to meeting these responsibilities.
    Establishing an Office of Legacy Management will ensure that community
    concerns are represented by a dedicated office, measured only by its
    success in meeting the defined needs of those communities and their
    constituents.
        In closing, the Secretary is dedicated to ensuring the Department's
    commitment to the environment, our communities and our workers. We
    believe the Office of Legacy Management will be better able to address
    these long-term issues in one office, while the Office of Environmental
    Management continues to focus on its environmental cleanup mission.
        Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, that concludes my
    statement. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today,
    and I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

        Senator Allard. Thank you very much for your report, Mr.
    Owen. You are just starting a new Office of Legacy Management,
    and I know there are a lot of challenges. I want to be helpful
    to both of you as you move forward in the future.
        It is not going to surprise you, Madam Secretary, when my
    first question is on Rocky Flats. It has been reported this
    week that as many as 33 workers at Rocky Flats may have been
    exposed to plutonium this past week. Can you give us an update
    on this incident? Also, were any of the workers found to have
    been exposed to plutonium, and what is being done to mitigate
    further exposure?
        Secretary Roberson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The event that
    you are referring to involved 33 workers during decontamination
    activities in Buildings 776 and 777. The initial investigation
    revealed that a ventilation damper was closed, which impacted
    the ability of ductwork to move upstream air into an air
    plenum. The mechanical linkage inside the duct that controls
    the damper movement via a control arm was defective and that
    arm would turn, indicating a different position than was
    actually occurring inside the ductwork.
        All 33 workers received initial sampling. The results
    indicated that three of these workers were above the site-
    operating decision level. Two of those employees that were
    above the decision level have undergone additional testing, and
    we are awaiting the results of those results. Those workers
    have been removed from the building area for that work while we
    await those results.
        Area monitoring in this work area has indicated that the
    exposure in the area is below background, and we expect the
    additional testing results to be in within 21 days. We will
    keep those workers from that workplace until we validate that
    there was no exceedances.
        The site itself is conducting an investigation even today,
    and tomorrow my chief operating officer, Paul Golan, is being
    deployed to the site to make sure that we understand the
    circumstances and to make it clear how important it is to
    ensure that these kind of occurrences do not happen in the
    future.
        Senator Allard. Thank you.
        Now, the State of Idaho won a lawsuit against the
    Department of Energy on transuranic waste, and I know that
    because you are going through the legal aspects of it there are
    probably some limited comments that you could make at this
    particular hearing.
        Secretary Roberson. Right.
        Senator Allard. Without getting into the middle of ongoing
    litigation and since DOE may choose to appeal this decision,
    can you please quantify the potential increased cost created by
    the court decision where an additional 62,000 cubic meters of
    TRU waste may have to be removed from the INEEL site?
        Secretary Roberson. Well, Mr. Chairman, I can probably
    provide some bounding numbers for the record. I do not know off
    the top of my head what the range of impact would be. I would
    like to clarify that the court agreement that is at issue is a
    Batt agreement that has been in place for a number of years and
    the State of Idaho approached the legal system to request an
    interpretation as to whether buried waste was intended to be
    included in that order. This is the result of their request for
    an interpretation of that.
        I cannot say more because we simply just yesterday
    understood the results of that and I think our legal staffs are
    trying to decide what is an appropriate path forward.
        Senator Allard. What this committee would be interested in
    would be your giving us some kind of range on costs if you
    could. I know that we are very premature and we understand they
    are nothing more than just estimates, but do the best you can.
        Secretary Roberson. Okay.
        Senator Allard. Also, please estimate how long it might
    take. I know again this is a subjective approach and there are
    a lot of factors, but just do the best you can for this
    committee. We would appreciate it.
        [The information referred to follows:]

               Potential Increased Cost Created by Court Decision

        The Department is in the process of determining the appropriate
    remediation for the buried waste through the Comprehensive
    Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act process. Our
    current estimate for retrieval, characterization, packaging, disposal,
    and long-term monitoring and maintenance of this buried waste is at
    least $10 billion. The current schedule estimate indicates that the
    work could not be completed before 2018.

        Secretary Roberson. We will. One other thing I would like
    to add, Mr. Chairman, is we have not exempted cleanup in this
    area from our accelerated cleanup plan for INEEL. But there is
    a CERCLA process that determines what removal needs to take
    place or not. So we have not predetermined action while this
    process proceeds.
        Senator Allard. Thank you.
        Senator Nelson, welcome. I know that you are battling a
    full schedule like all the rest of us around here. It is a very
    busy time.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I have not figured out how to clone
    myself.
        Senator Allard. I had two very important hearings going on
    today that affected Colorado, this one and another one in the
    Environment and Public Works Committee. I know how these things
    happen.
        When you showed up, we wanted to give you an opportunity to
    make an opening statement and then ask some questions if you
    like, and we will just switch back and forth.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you very much. I will just get
    right into the questions.
        Mr. Owen, one of your duties is to ensure that the workers'
    pensions and health insurance are protected when the various
    sites and facilities are cleaned up and then when they are
    closed. It is going to extend to billions of dollars of pension
    funds and thousands of workers. What is your plan for
    protecting the workers and their benefits when their current
    employers are no longer DOE contractors and their jobs are
    gone?
        Mr. Owen. Yes, sir. This is exactly one of the reasons that
    Secretary Abraham directed that the new office be stood up and
    established. In addition to land legacies that the Department
    has to tend to, there is the people legacy. For the first time
    ever, we do have some fairly large sites closed or about to
    close. In Florida we have the Pinellas site. Workers are
    involved there. Just around the corner, Rocky Flats, Mound, and
    Fernald will close.
        For the first time ever, a site contractor or an M&O
    contractor will not be on site to tend to the traditional human
    resource needs of former contractor workers. We have recognized
    this, and we are working with the establishment of the new
    Office of Legacy Management to create a mechanism to allow for
    the administration of pension and medical benefits. We
    recognize the financial responsibility that we have for those
    workers. We are not trying to shirk that, and we are going to
    work to establish a system that will allow for a smooth,
    seamless administration of pensions and all issues associated
    with that, as well as these former workers' health benefits.
        Exactly the shape that that is going to be in, the form it
    will take, we are still working that out and we will share that
    with committee staff as we go forward. We have already been
    talking to them some about that. We are still planning for this
    new mechanism. It has to be in place ideally by mid-2005 so it
    is ready to accept Rocky Flats.
        As for the Pinellas folks we currently have their benefits
    funded for now, and they will be part of the new system. We
    were fortunate in that when the Pinellas plant closed, the M&O
    contractor was Lockheed Martin. They also had another site
    within the DOE complex, and they agreed just to transfer the
    administration of those benefits over to that site. But as we
    bring the new organization on board, we would anticipate that
    the Pinellas folks would be one of the first participants in
    the new mechanism.
        Senator Bill Nelson. What was the Pinellas plant?
        Mr. Owen. It was a facility that I believe worked on
    electrical component parts of some of our weapons systems. I
    would be hesitant to be held to that 100 percent, but I believe
    that was their primary mission. It is a well-contained, modern
    plant type of facility a little south of Tampa. We probably
    employed over a thousand people there.
        It is a success story for my office in how we were able to
    work with the local community for follow-on reuse and how the
    facility is now being reused by the local economic development
    authority. I believe there are actually more private sector
    workers in that facility today than DOE ever had. There is a
    small environmental remediation effort underway, a groundwater
    monitoring situation that we are monitoring and will continue
    to monitor.
        But it is a typical, fairly modern industrial plant. It is
    not a sprawling, hundreds of thousands of acres type of
    facility. It is very defined, and it is located in a very
    populated area.
        Senator Bill Nelson. When you go about closing down one of
    these facilities and cleaning it up, do you have in your
    process a way that the public comes in and has participation?
        Secretary Roberson. Senator, we absolutely do. All of our
    cleanups are conducted in accordance with some regulatory
    process which in and of itself requires public involvement.
    There are obviously different processes, whether it is RCRA,
    CERCLA, or a DOE-regulated process under AEA or NEPA. They all
    involve and mandate public involvement in those decisions.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Now, do you contract out to an
    insurance or financial company to ensure the benefits are there
    for the employees? If the vendor has financial difficulties,
    does DOE have any guarantee of those benefits?
        Mr. Owen. Yes, sir. As the situation is today, there are a
    large variety of pension plans and health benefit plans being
    used by our various contractors for our contractor workforce
    scattered across the country. If one of those plans were to be
    in the red at any given hour and there were a need to cash it
    out, the Department of Energy recognizes its responsibility to
    make that plan whole. Of course, many pension plans--and there
    are numerous ones throughout the Department--are contingent
    upon equity markets, and we all know that they have been
    heading south for the last couple of years. There are indeed
    plans currently across the complex nationwide that are in the
    red. If they had to be cashed out today, all the funds would
    not be available to do it and the Department of Energy would
    have to step in and cover that shortfall.
        On the medical benefits, there are no means to establish
    trust funds under the Internal Revenue Code to cover medical
    benefits in the out years. That has been historically and will
    continue to be a pay-as-you-go, 1 year-at-a-time securing of
    appropriations to support the medical benefits of our
    contractor employees currently working or already in retirement
    and their families who are entitled to those benefits.
        The new office that we are establishing is to better manage
    and administer all of those things, to allow us to get a better
    handle on it, especially as we start to lose contractors
    because of closures.
        Senator Bill Nelson. When you close a site, what is done to
    see that the employees have the same bargaining rights that
    they had previously?
        Mr. Owen. Maybe we can both try and chime in, kind of a tag
    team.
        If a site is closing, the workforce in most instances would
    no longer work for us. They would come to the end of their
    employment and, if they are eligible, go into retirement or
    wait for a deferred retirement, or find other alternative
    employment, which our office works to help them do through
    career transitioning.
        I do not know if, at this hour, we have an issue where a
    whole block of unionized workers are moving from one site to
    another and it is an issue concerning their collective
    bargaining agreement. I cannot cite one right now, Senator.
        Secretary Roberson. There are two points to be made. One,
    we certainly have sites where as work is done, the size of the
    workforce is reducing. Those workers, retirees for instance,
    are still a part of the bargaining unit, so as the active
    workforce negotiates benefits and other elements, the retirees
    are considered a part of that. But once the complete suite of
    work is done, there is no negotiation of a bargaining agreement
    at that point because there is no work to bargain around.
        Mr. Owen. Our policies concerning a site closure and the
    layoff of, say, people at Rocky Flats and, if there is an
    opportunity and the right skill mix requirements, say at Idaho
    or Pantex or wherever require that those employees have
    preferential hiring or right of first refusal type of
    guarantees. We work with them to make the rest of the complex
    nationwide aware that they are available to highly qualified
    radioactive welders at Rocky, five of them are going to come to
    the end of their employment there and do you need them at
    Pantex? Then they would have some preference if they wanted to
    relocate, and we would help them relocate with some financial
    assistance if need be or maybe even help with some retraining
    dollars if they need some retraining. They would receive some
    preferential consideration at another DOE site if an
    opportunity exists for them.
        Secretary Roberson. But upon that move, then they would be
    covered by the existing bargaining unit agreement at that site.
    It does not transport.
        Mr. Owen. The new site.
        Secretary Roberson. Right.
        Senator Allard. Very good. Thank you.
        We both have a number of questions to ask this morning.
    Several concerns have been raised in my office that the Energy
    Employee Occupational Illness Compensation Program (EEOICP),
    which is managed by the Department of Labor, is processing the
    workers' claims much too slowly. This is for you, Mr. Owen, as
    the Director of Worker and Community Transition and the future
    head of the Office of Legacy Management. What can be done to
    make sure workers at DOE facilities have an effective remedy
    through the EEOICP and by the Department of Labor, and what are
    you doing to help expedite the process?
        Mr. Owen. At this hour, I am not responsible for the
    administration of that specific program.
        Senator Allard. I see.
        Mr. Owen. It is a relatively new program. It is still being
    stood up, I believe, and there is always some hiccups
    associated with that. But that is not my responsibility. The
    oversight of that is by Assistant Secretary Beverly Cook, our
    Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety, and Health.
        Senator Allard. Go ahead, Madam Secretary.
        Secretary Roberson. Mr. Chairman, I think I can contribute
    a bit because, as you are well aware, there are several
    elements of this program and I believe the concerns surround
    the processing of claims through State workers' compensation.
        Senator Allard. So it is the State compensation program
    that is slowing down the processing?
        Secretary Roberson. Well, it is the processing of claims
    through the State workers' compensation.
        Senator Allard. I see.
        Secretary Roberson. In each State we have, quite frankly, a
    different set of laws at the State level that govern. I am
    personally familiar with those claims that are in the system at
    each of our sites. I work very closely with our site manager in
    Kaiser-Hill on the ones that are specific to Rocky. I am
    familiar with those claims since the payment is directed
    through our contracts.
        There are two elements that we are working on. One is
    records retrieval and management; as you can imagine, when it
    comes to historical claims, it does indeed take some time to
    retrieve records. Then also it takes time working through the
    process.
        I know one of the concerns is once there has been a
    physician's positive finding of a physicians panel, we direct
    our contractor to make payments. Those claims are sent to State
    workers' compensation, and then the State also has a process to
    work through to determine the range of disability or impact. We
    are working aggressively--hopefully, you can tell by my
    statement that I am personally informed on those complaints
    that have positive findings that are to be paid by the
    Environmental Management program--and we are working very hard.
    As Mike said, it is a new program and so with every step we are
    learning and finding a way to improve it. We are working on
    shortening that cycle. But there certainly are two elements
    that are different from site to site.
        Mr. Owen. If I might add, Senator, Assistant Secretary
    Roberson in her comments mentioned the retrieval of records. As
    part of the Office of Legacy Management, we have recognized
    that a very large, new, evolving problem is records management.
    Legacy Management will be working on and addressing these
    records issues. The records required for environmental
    remediation have to be left open to the public and revised
    periodically, with periodic investigations and inspections, as
    well as the record of all those many employees who have worked
    there.
        As part of the new office we hope we will be able to come
    up with a good management system that will help everything move
    along better when it comes to records management and retrieval
    of what is turning out to be a very large amount of records
    that we are going to have to keep.
        Senator Allard. Now, can the workers go to one place and
    get all this managed in one place, or do they have to keep
    going to a number of different offices throughout this process?
        Secretary Roberson. For the workers' compensation program,
    I would venture to say the program was not designed to do that.
    That is why there are satellite offices set up across the
    country. We bear the burden of records retrieval and providing
    those records, but it is still a different task. I mean, we are
    dealing with records decades old, so the quality of the records
    and the ability to retrieve those and the contract history
    involved in retrieving those certainly proves to be a challenge
    in this venue.
        Senator Allard. I guess the question is, when a site
    closes, won't workers need one organization to interface with?
        Mr. Owen. On that type of thing, sir, they would interface
    with the Office of Legacy Management or outposts that we
    establish to deal with them. I would anticipate that at a large
    site, such as Rocky Flats, we will probably require that the
    contractor of the pensions and health benefits system set up by
    us maintain what I call kind of a downtown storefront office
    with benefits claims processors and experts that the people can
    come in and learn about the new system, especially the first
    couple of years after a site is closed. After that, they will
    get used to the new system and recognize that it is seamless.
        As we manage through all of these problems and the many
    problems of standing up the new office and some of the new
    things that come with closure and no M&O contractor any longer,
    the ability for workers to access their records and interface
    with us and maintain liaison with us is very important. It will
    be high on our checklist of things to do to make sure that that
    is as smooth and seamless as possible--these are anxious times
    for a lot of the workers. For some 70 years, Rocky has been out
    there and it is going to go away. There is not going to be a
    building; there is not going to be a little Human Resources
    office for them to go into. We have to make sure that they feel
    comfortable with that.
        Senator Allard. Will the DOE workers go to Legacy
    Management or will they have to go to other DOE organizations
    to seek remedies, Mr. Owen?
        Mr. Owen. Right now, if they have a specific remedy that
    they are seeking under the EEOICP, they would probably come
    into our same network and system to file that claim. But that
    is a very specific claim, a very specific program, a very
    specific statutory authority, working with State unemployment
    compensation folks.
        But ideally the public face that we put on as far as basic
    information and records retrieval and things like that are
    concerned, they would be working through the mechanisms that my
    new office will establish out in the field. We certainly, when
    we go back, will work with Assistant Secretary Cook. I have
    already met with her. As I look at the new records management
    requirements in my office, I have gone to Assistant Secretary
    Cook and said, ``Let's get our people together and determine
    what your requirements are so that we don't build the right
    thing without the other's knowledge.'' We will work for a
    smooth transition on that front and be fully coordinated with
    the very specific requirements of the EEOICP.
        Senator Allard. Thank you.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Is this Office of Legacy Management
    going to be responsible for additional cleanup required after a
    site is closed and the cleanup is completed?
        Mr. Owen. No, sir. The remediation, the cleanup, will have
    been completed. If, for example, that cleanup results in a tail
    being left there or say it is a groundwater contamination
    problem such as at the Pinellas plant and there is some pump
    and treat equipment, Legacy Management will oversee and make
    certain that those remedies are being properly maintained. We
    will conduct surveillance to see that they are doing their
    job--doing sampling and whatever else is necessary.
        But will we as such actually do the remediation? No.
    Secretary Roberson's office will do the remediation. When they
    are finished, they will pass it to me.
        Senator Bill Nelson. But once the facility is closed, who
    has the responsibility for any additional cleanup that might
    occur down the road?
        Secretary Roberson. May I? Thank you.
        Mr. Owen. You are talking about additional, new, unfound
    cleanup?
        Senator Bill Nelson. That is correct.
        Secretary Roberson. Well, I would say in general terms, the
    Department of Energy remains responsible for that cleanup. This
    does not remove that liability. The tool or organizational
    instrument that would be used 40 years down the road when we
    complete the current scope of this program is something that
    the Secretary has a team evaluating now and would be a long-
    term instrument to ensure that the Department maintains the
    capability for remediation in the future, beyond where we are
    right now.
        Senator Bill Nelson. How do you go about budgeting for
    that?
        Secretary Roberson. The first thing that you do is you
    identify what is likely to be there, just as we budget today.
    Problem identification is a precursor to estimating what the
    cost would be. What the Secretary is committed to doing is
    maintaining the capability and the vehicle for doing so, but
    the specific problems obviously have to surface themselves
    before we could estimate the remedy.
        Senator Allard. I want to get back to some of our
    discussion on the accelerated cleanup with the three sites. We
    appropriated extra dollars to get that accomplished. I remember
    making a commitment to other cleanup sites that as these sites
    were completed, those freed-up dollars would be available to
    them to accelerate their cleanup. How does DOE plan to use the
    annual savings utilized by the closure of the three sites? Are
    they going to be used to accelerate cleanup on the remaining EM
    sites?
        Secretary Roberson. Mr. Chairman, the current application
    to cleanup in this program is a result of the Top-to-Bottom.
    You are absolutely correct; about 5 or 6 years ago the approach
    was to accelerate those sites and reinvest the savings from
    those in the cleanup of other sites. As a result of the Top-to-
    Bottom, the Department made the determination that the cost to
    accelerate the cleanup of those sites based upon the strategies
    that resulted from that review with some minimal increase today
    would actually allow us to make a broader life cycle savings in
    the overall program.
        What you have before you in the 2004 budget request and
    what you saw in the 2003 budget request and congressional
    appropriation was an increase over what had been planned as a
    flat funding program. That peak over the next 2 to 3 years
    actually allows us to pull forward the cleanup at those sites
    so that those communities actually benefit in a more timely
    manner from a cleaner environment.
        Senator Allard. Thank you for your comments.
        As Environmental Management attempts to define the scope of
    the remaining cleanup responsibilities, NNSA continues to
    create additional waste streams and need for structures to be
    decontaminated and decommissioned. As far as you know, is there
    a plan for NNSA to mitigate their waste in a facility D&D scope
    that will not be added to the environmental management scope?
        Secretary Roberson. There are two things at work right now.
    One is, with the opportunity for accelerating this scope of
    work, it has provided the impetus to really look 20 years out
    at what environmental remediation work scope would avail itself
    and to actually plan structurally for that right now.
        The Secretary has established, I would say, an interagency
    team, since NNSA is a semi-autonomous agency, over the next 4
    months to actually dissect this issue and provide options for a
    decision as to how to go forward in the future. Taking into
    consideration the acceleration of this program, it brings
    issues like that to the forefront.
        It has been one of the clear benefits of the acceleration
    of this program. It is one of those challenges that was lying
    in wait and has come to the forefront that we must deal with
    now. The Secretary has set forth an effort to do that and to do
    that within this fiscal year.
        Senator Allard. Well, if NNSA is semi-autonomous, don't
    they maybe have a responsibility to do their own cleanup?
        Secretary Roberson. I think all options are available. I am
    not aware that there is a lean one way or the other, but I
    think all options are available, and the Secretary has been
    very clear that while they decide what the future may look
    like, my job is to demonstrate we are taking care of the
    present.
        Senator Allard. As a follow-up question--in your vision for
    Environmental Management, do you see it going out of business
    or should it continue to take on cleanup and waste business at
    some point in time?
        Secretary Roberson. I believe we have been very consistent
    in that there is a tremendous amount of work in this program
    that needs to get done, and continuing to expand it without a
    demonstration of doing, actually fulfilling, actually remedying
    issues that have been left in the environment, will not improve
    our ability to deal with future work scope. The Secretary has
    been very clear. Our job is to bound the scope that we have and
    demonstrate that we can do it and fulfill it; the leadership of
    the Department will identify options for completing future
    environmental cleanup.
        Senator Allard. Are there some advantages in your view to
    having the NNSA do their own cleanup?
        Secretary Roberson. Well, I would liken it to industry. In
    industry, the view is normally that if a generator has to make
    cost-benefit decisions, then they are likely to generate less--
    to be more aggressive about pollution prevention. In the past,
    EM and NNSA have been very intertwined at these sites. But I
    believe that there is a benefit to tying pollution prevention
    principles to generation of materials directly.
        Did I answer your question, sir?
        Senator Allard. I believe you did.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. As a follow-up to that, take, for
    example, when you close Rocky Flats in 2006, are you going to
    be able to, in your budget plan, redistribute the funds that
    were made available by the Rocky Flats closure? Are you going
    to be able to redistribute that to other sites?
        Secretary Roberson. The strategy we have laid out and we
    have been implementing for the last 18 months involves
    accelerating the cleanup of those sites. Five years ago the
    strategy was to accelerate Rocky Flats, Mound, Fernald, and a
    few smaller projects, reinvest that savings, and then pull
    forward the cleanup at those other sites.
        Through the Top-to-Bottom Review, we actually developed
    strategies with minimal investment to accelerate the cleanup of
    those other sites as well. Our longer term plan does not
    necessarily include reinvesting those fundings into the current
    cleanup. It may be available for cleanups that are now not a
    part of the Environmental Management program. But our strategy
    funds the accelerated cleanup of all of our sites today.
        It is, thus, a different strategy. Five years ago, the plan
    was level funding and pull as many sites as you could when you
    could underneath that level funding. In the last 2 years we
    have actually asked for a minimal increase to pull all of our
    sites forward in schedule. That is what allows us to take 35
    years off the overall schedule for the program.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Can you provide the committee with a
    funding plan for each of those things down the road?
        Secretary Roberson. Yes, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

                                 Future Funding

        The administration is in the process of budget formulation for
    fiscal year 2005. With the conclusion of this process, the fiscal year
    2005 budget request will provide you our funding plan to achieve the
    new ``minimal investment'' acceleration strategy and its associated
    risk reduction and cleanup goals.

        Senator Bill Nelson. May I ask some other questions?
        Senator Allard. Yes, go ahead, Senator.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Does your 2004 budget request fully
    fund the DOE's obligations in the various agreements?
        Secretary Roberson. I believe it does.
        Senator Bill Nelson. All right. You initiated an effort to
    renegotiate the cleanup agreements with States and EPA to focus
    on risk reduction. Can you explain what this means from a
    practical perspective?
        Secretary Roberson. What it means from a practical
    perspective, as with any project, whether it is in industry or
    in government, we drew conclusions 10 years into this program--
    and obviously it was validated not just by the Department's
    Top-to-Bottom Review, but reviews by GAO, IG, and many others.
        At the 10-year mark in this program, it was time to
    reevaluate both the strategy and approach to cleanup. In doing
    that reevaluation, we were able to apply lessons learned,
    technology developments, and, quite frankly, a more capable
    pool of resources to designing the logic for cleanup. The
    problems are there. We are not changing the problems. But our
    approach in the sequencing of addressing those is really the
    result of the Top-to-Bottom Review that impacts our cleanup
    approaches and our agreements at some of our sites.
        The way our cleanup agreements are structured is unchanged.
    They include processes defined that includes regulatory
    collaboration and decisionmaking, and public collaboration and
    decisionmaking. Those were processes used during development of
    the Performance Management Plan (PMP). Then there is a section
    that involves regulatory milestones.
        Within the process of applying our cleanups, they all
    include steps to go through to change milestones. With or
    without the accelerated cleanup, that is the case and that has
    always been the case, and milestones do evolve as we learn and
    we experience. We view this as learning and experience and the
    evolution of it does have some limited impact on the sequencing
    and scope of milestones.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Well, in that budget do you get the
    same level of cleanup or does that cleanup start to change?
        Secretary Roberson. I believe in many cases we get a better
    cleanup sooner. The approach to cleanup and the end result I do
    not believe are necessarily disconnected. Am I answering your
    question?
        Senator Bill Nelson. Well, what about fines for
    noncompliance for the EPA and the States?
        Secretary Roberson. Are funds for fines included? Is that
    your question?
        Senator Bill Nelson. No. The various agreements that you
    have include what are known as these enforceable milestones
    that you just talked about.
        Secretary Roberson. Right.
        Senator Bill Nelson. They allow the States and the EPA to
    assess those penalties or fines for noncompliance. Are there
    any States at the moment that are contemplating assessing such
    fines or penalties, do you know?
        Secretary Roberson. None that I am aware of directly
    related to our accelerated cleanup initiative. At the Hanford
    site, I believe they are assessing a fine because we were late
    on meeting a milestone of sludge removal from spent-fuel
    basins. At Idaho I believe there was a fine recently assessed
    for missing a milestone.
        Our going-in assumption has to always be that the
    regulators have the same goal in accomplishing the cleanup that
    we do. Actually, the steps we went through in this program were
    to revalidate that was the case, that the goals that we sought
    are the same. We may indeed have disagreements on the steps to
    achieving that along the way.
        But our agreements have processes through which we work,
    and that is not new. Two years ago I could have probably listed
    out two or three fines that were in debate between ourselves
    and the regulators. We have not created any new structure with
    this program.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Is it your experience in dealing with
    EPA that they are doing their job or are they dragging their
    feet?
        Secretary Roberson. Well, that is a hot question. To be
    honest, I tend to be more self-critical. I think if they are
    dragging their feet, it is because we are not leading. I tend
    to focus more on are we dragging our feet, are we stepping out,
    because we are responsible for actually doing this work. We do
    not have to be dragged along the way to do it.
        My goal is for us to be out front in demonstrating we
    understand it, we are committed to it, and we know how to do
    it. This way I do not need EPA or the States to drag us along.
    That is the way we should be doing our work.
        Senator Bill Nelson. We appreciate your commitment. What if
    you were not so committed? Would EPA be there cracking the
    whip?
        Secretary Roberson. If the Department were not so
    committed, I think history shows that they would be there
    cracking the whip.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I hope you are right, but I do not
    have faith.
        Thank you.
        Senator Allard. I think I have about four questions left on
    my side. On that response, I think Colorado has been cracking
    the whip if I recall correctly and keeping the pressure on.
        Secretary Roberson. May I, Mr. Chairman, just add one
    comment?
        Senator Allard. Yes.
        Secretary Roberson. I think the States, EPA, and DOE have
    to be focused on the same set of goals because we are all there
    to produce a better environment for the people in the
    communities and in the States that we work in. We have to be
    careful not to relate cracking the whip to just more
    milestones. One of the changes that we are trying to make in
    this program is to ensure that we are all focused on the
    accomplishment of physical results--problems solved, material
    gone. We do not just contain and maintain compliance, but we
    reduce those risks because they get no easier in the future.
        Sometimes we confuse more milestones with risk reduction
    and remediation, and they are not the same. That is a challenge
    in this program.
        Senator Allard. Let me address this to Mr. Owen, and I will
    just ask you a direct question here. Would there be value in
    folding the Worker and Community Transition Office into the
    Office of Legacy Management so there is one office which is
    responsible for all legacy issues?
        Mr. Owen. Yes, sir. Our budget submission shows the offices
    as separate and freestanding. We debated that long and hard
    prior to sending the budget to Congress. We decided to take the
    course we did because we felt it added emphasis to the
    importance of the new Office of Legacy Management.
        Clearly, because of many of the things that the Worker and
    Community Transition Office is doing, it is a very natural
    glove-fit to have it run by the same Office of Legacy
    Management. They are out there dealing with local communities,
    which will be a big responsibility of Legacy Management. They
    take the worker up to that last split second when he goes off
    the payroll and Legacy Management picks him up and carries him
    on through retirement. It seems very logical that the two
    offices be merged together. We would support that, and, as
    either the manager of both of the offices or the merged office,
    I would personally find it an easier management process if they
    were merged together.
        Senator Allard. In creating the Office of Legacy
    Management, why didn't the administration just go ahead and put
    the Worker and Community Transition right in the Legacy
    Management at the start?
        Mr. Owen. Well, again, we seriously debated that and we
    really wanted to lead with the new emphasis on Legacy
    Management to show its importance. We did not want to appear as
    though maybe it was being diluted in another office because it
    is certainly not going to be. It was a decision we debated. We
    could have gone either way. We decided to send it separately
    because we did not want it to be diluted. But the marriage of
    the two just begs of common sense.
        Senator Allard. How soon do you think that will happen?
        Mr. Owen. Well, we plan to stand up the new office on
    October 1, 2003, and we could on October 1 have the merger
    accomplished as well if there is support for that on Capitol
    Hill, if the appropriations come back aligned accordingly. Now
    there are two budget lines, but with some language coming back
    from here, we could do it October 1.
        Senator Allard. We would like to work with you on that. I
    think we could combine that, and I think it would help if we
    could.
        Mr. Owen. Thank you.
        Senator Allard. On security and safeguards, does the fiscal
    year 2003 appropriation for safeguards and security provide
    enough funding for the Environmental Management program to
    provide adequate security while maintaining the cleanup and
    closure schedules, Madam Secretary?
        Secretary Roberson. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I would
    like to express our gratitude to Congress. In the omnibus
    budget there was an inclusion of a reprogramming that actually
    did indeed put the Environmental Management program in a solid
    position for this fiscal year based upon a security level 3.
        Obviously, we are at an enhanced security level, and we are
    pretty close within the Department to understanding the impacts
    of that if we have to maintain it for the balance of the fiscal
    year. I am sure we will be communicating very soon. There
    clearly will be some impacts because that changed security
    posture results in some additional costs, although we think
    minimal. But the Department is evaluating all of its programs
    at this time.
        Senator Allard. What kind of plans do you have for closure
    on the final details? Have you come up with some final details
    for closure and how those details can be verified in the three
    sites that we have accelerated plans?
        Secretary Roberson. The three specific sites? At Mound,
    Fernald, and Rocky Flats, as you well know, once you have
    agreement among the public and the regulators as to what the
    bounding scenario is--for instance, at the Rocky Flats wildlife
    refuge; at Fernald, county park and wetlands; and at Mound,
    transition to the city of Miamisburg for industrial use--then
    the regulatory process aims to lay out the details of how you
    get there to accomplish that.
        I would say I think we are in pretty good shape on those
    three. We will continue to have details to work out, both with
    the regulators among ourselves and with the community. But I
    think we are in a pretty solid path, better than we have ever
    been before on any site.
        Senator Allard. Now I have a number of questions that I
    want to ask on the Savannah River Site and then I will pretty
    well be able to wrap mine up. On Savannah River, are there any
    waste streams which are planned to go through the F Canyon now
    or in the future?
        Secretary Roberson. No, sir, none that I am aware of.
        Senator Allard. Are there any materials held by
    Environmental Management or the National Nuclear Security
    Administration which need to be disposed of and which must be
    or should be processed through F Canyon to reach a safe
    disposition?
        Secretary Roberson. No, sir. We believe H Canyon can meet
    the Environmental Management needs and the future needs of the
    National Nuclear Security Administration.
        Senator Allard. There are not any materials being held by
    Environmental Management or NNSA?
        Secretary Roberson. There are no materials being held by
    Environmental Management. The question with NNSA is future
    release of materials, things that are not before us right now,
    and ensuring that the capability is maintained to process any
    future materials. We believe that H Canyon still provides that
    capability. Obviously, that is a result of the size of the
    stockpile and modernization at some of the different sites. But
    we believe H Canyon can provide that long-term capability and F
    Canyon is not needed.
        Senator Allard. As far as you know, are there any reasons
    now or in the foreseeable future why we would need F Canyon to
    meet the national security mission?
        Secretary Roberson. No, we believe that F Canyon is
    available--is no longer needed for the future mission of any of
    our programs.
        Senator Allard. Any reason why F Canyon should not be
    dismantled?
        Secretary Roberson. Well, we do have a congressional hold
    point that we are attempting to resolve between ourselves and
    the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and committee
    staff, but there is no work-off to be done. We have completed
    processing all the necessary material in that canyon.
        Senator Allard. What is your plan for the H Canyon there at
    Savannah River?
        Secretary Roberson. Currently, in the Environmental
    Management program, our processing needs for H Canyon that are
    within the scope of this program would be completed in about
    2008. Right now the National Nuclear Security Administration is
    evaluating its needs beyond that period of time and could very
    well result in H Canyon needing to be available to process
    materials that come out of NNSA in the future. I do not know
    what those material streams would be. They are in the process
    of determining that right now.
        Senator Allard. Is Environmental Management going to make
    sure that all materials which need to be processed through H
    Canyon will be processed before any decommissioning of H
    Canyon?
        Secretary Roberson. Absolutely, and I think the Secretary
    has made that commitment.
        Senator Allard. Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I am asking you, under current law,
    DOE is required to specifically request funds in a line item,
    as is DOD, for anything that is over $5 million. Can you
    explain how your 2004 budget request would propose to modify
    the current law?
        Secretary Roberson. I do not think that we do propose the
    current law. Is this an issue of the proposed structure, the
    reduction of the number of construction line items?
        Senator Bill Nelson. I am asking you, under current law,
    construction projects over $5 million have to have a line item.
    Is there any in your budget that does not obey current law?
        Secretary Roberson. I do not believe it does because the
    bulk of this program is not construction line item and was not
    before the 2004 budget request.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Do you propose to change that current
    law?
        Secretary Roberson. I do not propose to change that current
    law, sir. What the administration has proposed and I obviously
    support is the elimination of certain interim activities as
    construction line items. We clearly proposed a new budget
    structure for this new program in the 2004 budget request. That
    budget structure is a result of lessons learned from the
    closure initiatives of the past year. We did not invent this
    for the rest of the complex. We are simply taking the lessons
    learned from Rocky, Fernald, and Mound and applying them to the
    remediation activities at all of our operations across the
    complex.
        What it entails is it does, indeed, provide greater
    accountability in that by providing to Congress visibility of a
    subset of the billions of dollars spent in this program,
    somewhere around 20 percent of the funds, we would report on
    the totality of the funds, almost 80 percent of the funds that
    come in this program. Our goal is to structure the entire
    program applying our project management order, not just to the
    construction line items, but the entire project. The entire
    program is a set of projects from site to site that have some
    defined end point to be accomplished.
        That is the way the reporting and the budgeting would
    occur. We call them project baseline sheets that are provided
    to Congress to define the scope of work at each site. Major
    pieces of work, including life cycle costs, would be handled as
    a project, even though it isn't a construction project.
        Let me just give you an example of why this is important.
    Savannah River, Hanford--the major drivers of funds utilization
    in this program are remediating our tank farms where we have
    liquid radioactive waste below ground. This year we have
    construction line item projects for constructing waste removal
    systems on top of tanks, and we have hundreds of these tanks.
    The removal system above each tank is a construction line item.
        What we are attempting to do is to create more mobility and
    flexibility on a real-time basis to remove waste because that
    is the result. What should be important is not the increment
    that is spent on constructing a system on top, because we would
    like for them to learn from each other in real time, but how
    much waste is actually removed in a reasonable time frame.
        We have proposed substituting construction line item
    projects that are increments of accomplishing work for
    visibility of the actual accomplishment of the work that makes
    the environmental difference in what we spend dollars on.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. But let me tell you, you could
    get into some touchy territory here because this whole process
    is about the constructive and healthy tension between the
    executive branch and the legislative branch, which funds the
    executive branch. The idea of being in there is that the
    requirement of $5 million plus for a construction project the
    legislative branch has the oversight and the spending
    authority.
        This is the way the constitutional fathers created this
    remarkable experiment that we have been engaging in for over 2
    centuries. I want to make sure that we are not suddenly
    creating a category that is skirting for future administrations
    this requirement of our appropriations oversight.
        Secretary Roberson. Well, Senator, that is certainly not
    our intent. Clear and simple, our intent is just as I
    explained. I would be more than happy to work with Congress to
    make sure that we address any concerns in a way that will be
    satisfying. I also would continue to like to have the
    opportunity to explain why I think it is so critical to this
    program.
        Senator Allard. Senator Nelson, if I can step in here. We
    have a good model at Rocky Flats, and Madam Secretary was
    involved with that. It is when you put these certain goals that
    become inflexible in the process that it does not make sense.
    What we found at Rocky Flats is that sometimes you run into a
    problem and you can do work over here. While you are doing work
    over here, you resolve this problem, and then you can come back
    to it.
        Secretary Roberson. Exactly.
        Senator Allard. It keeps you moving during the process.
    That is how the committee has looked at this in the past, and
    we have decided that you need to put some confidence in what is
    happening on the ground so that you do not cause delay of
    cleanup. The purpose of the committee has been to see rapid
    cleanup--at least see it accelerated past what it was and that
    was one of the key milestones in getting rapid cleanup to
    occur--to ensure that we did not make it so fragmented that we
    run into these milestones that created problems.
        Go ahead.
        Secretary Roberson. I was just going to say, Mr. Chairman,
    you are absolutely right, and it is the same approach that we
    applied to ourselves, we applied to our contracts, and that
    many of our regulatory agreements are coming around to. We are
    going to run into challenges and problems that are going to
    slow work down. What we have looked at is any wall that would
    prevent us from applying resources, human and financial, to
    ensure that we continue to move forward on other activities
    while we address whatever issues may arise on a specific
    activity, which is critical to being able to accomplish the
    work before us.
        Senator Bill Nelson. If at the end of the day what you are
    trying to do is to close a site and to get it done as quickly
    as possible and as efficiently as possible, what about
    considering the advantages of budgeting by site closure instead
    of by closure year? Do you understand what I am saying?
        If I understand your proposal, each of the sites is
    allocated a portion of your account based on when they
    anticipate they would close or the cleanup would be complete.
    Would it make more sense to budget that by site?
        Secretary Roberson. Well, this is the balance we attempted
    to strike, and I think it is critical to maintain this balance.
    What we are proposing to do in the 2004 budget structure is to
    budget by fulfillment of activity--spent fuel removed from wet
    storage and nuclear material packaged and in storage. There may
    be five specific activities at a site. But we believe the
    offset is to demonstrate progress. With budgeting by site, what
    we think is critical is to hold ourselves accountable for
    accomplishing results, not just funding the site, but making
    visible what is to be accomplished by major activity.
        I think we have proposed to go one level down for the
    reason that we want accountability. We are asking for
    flexibility in being able to accomplish it, but we also know
    that one of the things that is going to get this job done is to
    maintain accountability for fulfilling the specific physical
    results that we have committed to do.
        Senator Bill Nelson. In the past there was a distinction
    between the waste management and the treatment accounts and the
    accounts devoted to the cleanup of soil and water. Is this
    distinction no longer important?
        Secretary Roberson. In our project baseline summaries,
    which are what is provided as the basis for our budget request
    in this program, I think we have identified somewhere between
    seven and nine distinct accounts that cross every site.
    Savannah River would have an account for soil and water
    remediation, with a life cycle cost and a schedule for
    completing that. Hanford would have the same. Rocky would have
    the same. Savannah River would have a tank farm closure summary
    as well, as a subproject to the cleanup of that site. Hanford
    would have the same.
        It would be a consistent set of subprojects across the
    whole complex that you would see repeated with a schedule and a
    life cycle cost for that specific site.
        Senator Allard. I do not have any more questions. Senator
    Nelson, have you wrapped it up?
        Senator Bill Nelson. Let me just check here.
        Senator Allard. While he is checking to see if he has any
    more questions, there may be a few questions for the record
    that we will want to submit to both of you. I just ask that if
    we have those questions that you could respond back to us
    within the 10-day period.
        Mr. Owen. Yes.
        Secretary Roberson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Allard. If for some reason you cannot make that, if
    you would let us know and the reason why. Most of these
    questions probably will be in regard to Rocky Flats closure on
    some of the specific concerns that we hear there from time to
    time.
        Mr. Owen. Yes, sir.
        Secretary Roberson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I am fine.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        I want to thank the panel. I think this has been a good
    hearing. Thank you very much.
        Secretary Roberson. Thank you.
        Mr. Owen. Thank you.
        Secretary Roberson. Thank you both.
        Senator Allard. The committee is adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard

    RESPECTIVE ROLES REGARDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF STEWARDSHIP POLICIES FOR
                                 CLOSURE SITES

        1. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson and Mr. Owen, the successful
    closure of a site necessitates incorporating long-term stewardship
    requirements into remedy selection. What are the respective roles of
    Environmental Management (EM) and Legacy Management (LM) regarding the
    development of stewardship policies for closure sites?
        Secretary Roberson and Mr. Owen. The Department of Energy is
    addressing long-term stewardship with a Department-wide, corporate
    strategy. The Office of LM will lead the coordination and development
    of policy for the Department. The Office of EM will participate in the
    LM-led development of policy to provide perspectives on cleanup and
    remediation plans and strategies.

        2. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson and Mr. Owen, if LM is
    charged with developing such long-term stewardship policies, what
    measures will be put in place to ensure the closure sites do not
    receive conflicting policy direction regarding remedy selection and
    related post-closure long-term stewardship needs and commitments from
    EM and LM?
        Secretary Roberson and Mr. Owen. Remedy selection and remedy
    maintenance, which includes long-term environmental surveillance and
    maintenance, are clearly interrelated activities. Therefore, EM and LM
    will work closely to ensure that EM's remedy decision policies and LM's
    post-closure policies are consistent. Thus, as part of the remediation
    process, EM will consider and make policies regarding active
    remediation, taking into account the long-term protectiveness and life-
    cycle cost of implementing a chosen environmental remedy, as required
    by applicable law and regulation. LM will consider and make post-
    closure policies regarding the long-term surveillance and maintenance.

        3. Senator Allard. Mr. Owen, LM will be charged with ensuring the
    long-term effectiveness of remedies and will house the long-term
    stewardship subject matter experts. Given that the Comprehensive
    Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)
    explicitly provides that the long-term effectiveness of remedies be
    considered when selecting remedies, does LM intend to be involved in
    the selection of remedies? If so, how?
        Mr. Owen. As part of long-term surveillance and maintenance
    activities, LM will evaluate the effectiveness of remedies for sites
    under its authority. Additionally, LM will work with and provide data
    to EM for its consideration in future remediation decisionmaking.

        4. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson, if LM does not intend to be
    involved in the selection of remedies, how will EM continue to
    integrate long-term stewardship into remedy selection and coordinate
    with LM?
        Secretary Roberson. EM is charged with putting environmental
    remedies in place that comply with applicable laws and regulations,
    such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
    Liability Act. Thus, long-term stewardship considerations are
    integrated into remedy selection as part of the regulatory process.

        5. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson and Mr. Owen, given the
    aforementioned integration of remedy selection and long-term
    stewardship planning, when Rocky Flats personnel call the Department of
    Energy Headquarters with stewardship planning questions, who answers
    the phone, EM or LM?
        Secretary Roberson and Mr. Owen. During closure and environmental
    remediation operations at the site, EM site personnel will continue to
    report and consult with EM personnel at headquarters. However, EM and
    LM will work together in a consolidated effort to ensure that sound
    stewardship decisions are made during and after closure.

        6. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson and Mr. Owen, similarly, will
    a long-term stewardship subject matter expert remain with EM, or will
    all responsibilities be transferred to LM?
        Secretary Roberson and Mr. Owen. LM will have personnel with long-
    term stewardship and long-term surveillance and maintenance expertise.
    EM's Office of Long-term Stewardship personnel will transition to LM.
    The offices of EM and LM will work closely together.

                         ROCKY FLATS CLEANUP AGREEMENT

        7. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson and Mr. Owen, at Rocky Flats,
    DOE and the regulators have committed that the long-term stewardship
    plan will be adopted as part of the final closure documents. Further,
    under the Rocky Flats Cleanup Agreement, the Environmental Protection
    Agency (EPA) and Colorado Department of Public Health and the
    Environment (CDPHE) must, as a regulatory matter, approve the
    stewardship plan. Which program office (EM or LM) will be responsible
    for developing, finalizing, and seeking the approval of the plan by the
    EPA and CDPHE?
        Secretary Roberson and Mr. Owen. EM is and will continue to be
    responsible for conducting all necessary cleanup and remediation
    activities, including developing required plans and finalizing
    regulatory documentation. However, LM and EM will work together to
    coordinate the development of Rocky Flats' long-term stewardship plan
    and other documents, as necessary, associated with the long-term care.

        8. Senator Allard. Mr. Owen, currently all DOE-Rocky Flats staff
    work for EM, including site staff that focus on long-term stewardship.
    Will LM staff be assigned to Rocky Flats prior to closure so that they
    can be involved in developing the stewardship plan?
        Mr. Owen. Not at this time. However, on-site EM staff will
    coordinate with LM staff to develop any required documents.

                  CRITERIA FOR TRANSFERAL OF SITE JURISDICTION

        9. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson and Mr. Owen, what criteria
    will EM and LM use for determining when site jurisdiction should be
    transferred from one program office to another? What criteria will EM
    use to determine a site can be designated as closed?
        Secretary Roberson and Mr. Owen. The Department will use the draft
    revised Life-Cycle Asset Management process for transferring site
    responsibility between programs. This process is a detailed management
    tool for ensuring clear lines of accountability and authority for sites
    before, during, and after transfer. EM and LM personnel are familiar
    with this process as they assisted with its development and revision.
    The Department will determine a site's readiness to close pursuant to
    all applicable laws, regulations, and agreements.

        10. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson and Mr. Owen, will LM have
    veto authority over the transfer of a site to its jurisdiction?
        Secretary Roberson and Mr. Owen. There is no ``veto authority''
    between departmental programs. Any issues that may arise regarding the
    transfer of sites from EM to LM will be discussed and resolved by the
    Department's senior management.

        11. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson and Mr. Owen, how will
    disputes be resolved?
        Secretary Roberson and Mr. Owen. Issues or disputes between EM and
    LM will be resolved by the Department's senior management.

          COST-ESTIMATES FOR POST-CLOSURE LONG-TERM STEWARDSHIP PLANS

        12. Senator Allard. Mr. Owen, currently, DOE field offices,
    including Rocky Flats, are required to develop cost estimates for
    implementing post-closure long-term stewardship plans. Presumably,
    these costs estimates will be updated annually. Assuming EM continues
    to develop the cost estimates, what will be LM's role in this process?
        Mr. Owen. LM will review and analyze cost estimates to ensure they
    are adequate to meet requirements.

        13. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson, conversely, if LM assumes
    responsibility for developing these cost estimates, what will be EM's
    role in that process?
        Secretary Roberson. EM's role is, and will continue to be,
    development and selection of remedies, taking into consideration the
    long-term effectiveness and cost of the selected remedy.

        14. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson and Mr. Owen, likewise, what
    steps will LM and EM take to ensure the cost estimates are factored
    into remedy selection analyses? This question is extremely important
    because CERCLA mandates that both cost and long-term effectiveness be
    factored into remedy decisionmaking.
        Secretary Roberson and Mr. Owen. The Comprehensive Environmental
    Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, as well as the Resource
    Conservation and Recovery Act, require the Department to develop and
    analyze remedial options while considering the long-term implications
    and cost. EM takes into account and considers the long-term
    effectiveness and cost of all remediation decisions. In addition, LM
    will review and analyze cost estimates to ensure they are adequate to
    meet requirements.

                        LM TOOLS AND STAFFING RESOURCES

        15. Senator Allard. Mr. Owen, once a site has been closed and
    responsibility has been transferred to LM, what tools and staffing
    resources will LM have to maintain and repair remedies and implement
    response actions?
        Mr. Owen. LM will request the financial resources and be staffed
    with personnel who have the knowledge and experience needed to conduct
    an effective and efficient long-term surveillance and maintenance
    program. LM will be staffed with existing personnel from DOE
    Headquarters and a number of DOE sites, including personnel from DOE
    sites located in Morgantown, West Virginia; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania;
    and Grand Junction, Colorado. Much of that staff has long-term
    surveillance and maintenance experience as they perform these
    responsibilities at numerous sites today. LM's core staff will adjust
    accordingly to perform complex long-term surveillance and maintenance
    requirements at an increasing number of closure sites. Additionally, LM
    is currently factoring the estimated increase in site responsibility
    into future program budget, planning, and staffing profiles to ensure
    the office has access to the resources needed to properly manage legacy
    responsibilities.

        16. Senator Allard. Mr. Owen, is DOE's assumption that in shifting
    the Grand Junction Office to LM that Grand Junction will be charged
    with these critical responsibilities?
        Mr. Owen. The Grand Junction staff has been responsible for long-
    term surveillance and maintenance activities at numerous sites since
    1988. This management and long-term surveillance and maintenance
    expertise will be drawn upon as LM goes about its responsibilities.

        17. Senator Allard. Mr. Owen, what tools and staffing resources
    will LM have to research and develop new technologies that could be
    applied to remedies to either improve the remedies or replace the
    remedies?
        Mr. Owen. LM will actively coordinate and integrate Federal
    research and development (specifically the work of the Department's
    Office of Science) into our program. Additionally, LM will use the
    draft Long-term Stewardship Science and Technology Roadmap as a
    framework for identifying research and development opportunities and
    for leveraging existing investments in long-term stewardship related
    science and technology.

                          MAINTAINING PHYSICAL RECORDS

        18. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson and Mr. Owen, which office
    (EM or LM) will maintain physical records regarding mission work,
    cleanup activities, and long-term stewardship?
        Secretary Roberson and Mr. Owen. In general, LM will be responsible
    for and receive custody of all departmental closure site records as
    sites are transferred to LM for long-term surveillance and maintenance.
    Currently, LM and EM are coordinating these record management efforts
    with the Department's Chief Information Officer, the Office of
    Environment, Safety and Health, and other affected responsible
    entities.

                ROCKY FLATS NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE ACT OF 2001

        19. Senator Allard. Secretary Roberson and Mr. Owen, under the
    proposal, LM, not EM, will be charged with managing Rocky Flats once
    the site is closed and delisted from the CERCLA National Priorities
    List. Per the Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge Act of 2001, DOE
    will be charged with implementing the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
    that is now being negotiated between EM and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
    Service. Should LM, the agency that will be charged with implementing
    the MOU, be involved in the development of the MOU?
        Secretary Roberson and Mr. Owen. The EM's Office of Long-term
    Stewardship staff, which will be transitioning to LM, has participated
    in the past, and will continue to actively participate, in the
    development of the MOU. LM will continue to work with EM staff on the
    MOU and will coordinate with EM on any agreements that provide for or
    affect the management of sites after closure.

        [Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2004

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 2003

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                          STRATEGIC FORCES AND POLICY

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m. in
    room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Wayne
    Allard (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Allard, Reed, and Bill
    Nelson.
        Majority staff members present: L. David Cherington,
    counsel; Brian R. Green, professional staff member; and Mary
    Alice A. Hayward, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
    Democratic staff director; and Madelyn R. Creedon, minority
    counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Andrew Kent and Sara R. Mareno.
        Committee members' assistants present: Douglas Flanders and
    Jayson Roehl, assistants to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II,
    assistant to Senator Sessions; Elizabeth King, assistant to
    Senator Reed; and William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill
    Nelson.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Allard. I am going to call to order the Strategic
    Forces Subcommittee on the Armed Services Committee. First of
    all, I would just like to welcome our panels here today. I am
    looking forward to your testimony. Just a little bit of
    business. We are going to go ahead and conduct the first part
    of this hearing here in open session, then we are going to go
    to Top Secret level and the staff will lead us over to the room
    where we will be set up for Top Secret. Unfortunately, we did
    not get cleared for some of the real technical nuclear
    discussion aspect of it, so we will have to avoid that in our
    discussion once we are at Top Secret, if you will help me
    remember that while we are there.
        We will start out this morning and Senator Nelson was going
    to join us, but apparently he is not here, so I will go ahead
    and proceed.
        I want to start by introducing the witnesses on our first
    panel: Acting Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA) and Under Secretary of Energy Linton F.
    Brooks; and Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr., Commander, U.S.
    Strategic Command. Since both of you have appeared before this
    committee, I want to welcome you again. In fact, Admiral Ellis,
    we heard from you earlier this morning.
        Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir.
        Senator Allard. We are here to receive testimony on U.S.
    strategic forces. There is no more important task for this
    subcommittee than to exercise its oversight functions with
    respect to U.S. nuclear forces. Nuclear weapons remain the most
    awesome in our arsenal, and we cannot foresee any circumstances
    in which nuclear weapons would cease to play a central role in
    our nuclear posture.
        The security, safety, reliability, and effectiveness of
    these weapons remain paramount. But there can also be no doubt
    that the role of nuclear weapons in our overall military
    posture and the very notion of having to think about strategic
    forces is changing. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), issued in
    December 2001, was truly a watershed document. It recognized
    that the Cold War paradigm of two hostile nations balanced in a
    nuclear standoff was no longer relevant and could not dominate
    our strategic future.
        Uncertainty about the nature and direction of current and
    future threats is now more prominent. Rogue nation and non-
    state threats are key. The psychological underpinnings of
    deterrence are more poorly understood with respect to future
    adversaries than they were when we faced off with the Soviet
    Union.
        These considerations led the Department of Defense to
    conclude that a new, more flexible, more adaptive strategic
    triad is needed. Rather than rely exclusively on a nuclear
    triad of land and sea-based intercontinental missiles and long-
    range bombers, the Nuclear Posture Review outlined a new triad
    consisting of offensive strike forces, both nuclear and non-
    nuclear, defensive systems, both active and passive, and an
    infrastructure capable of supporting these systems, all
    supported by robust command, control, intelligence
    capabilities.
        I know some of my colleagues are uncomfortable with the
    notion that this is an era of inevitable change in which we
    must rethink and reshape our strategic forces. There are
    concerns, none of which I mean to belittle, that these changes
    are not for the better and in adapting our nuclear and non-
    nuclear forces to the new strategic environment they somehow
    lower the threshold for nuclear use, or that active defenses
    against missile attack may somehow be destabilizing.
        But from my perspective one of the major goals of the NPR
    was to reduce reliance on aging nuclear weapons. The merit of
    missile defense, advanced conventional weapons, and new
    delivery systems is that they have the potential to provide a
    more complete tool kit to our political and military leaders
    and a more relevant set of capabilities to assure our allies,
    dissuade our adversaries, deter, and, if necessary, defeat our
    enemies.
        In laying the groundwork to provide a more complete set of
    alternatives, the Nuclear Posture Review holds the promise of
    raising, not lowering, the nuclear threshold.
        None of this is to say that defenses and advances in
    conventional munitions and delivery systems can deter or defeat
    the entire range of threats. Our legacy nuclear weapons and
    delivery systems will remain important to hold certain targets
    at risk and, if for no other reason than their enormous
    destructive power, remain a powerful deterrent. But as Cold War
    threats have diminished after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
    a new set of security challenges has emerged to which our Cold
    War nuclear force may not be well adapted. Thus I believe it is
    time to begin considering how advanced nuclear concepts may
    contribute to our ability to hold at risk emerging threats.
        By providing for research in advanced nuclear concepts, our
    weapon designers will have the opportunity to sharpen their
    skills, innovate, and conceptualize new designs which may be
    required in the future. Research on such concepts does not in
    my view presuppose that Congress will finally authorize
    advanced development or production, but it would provide a
    common set of facts and a common understanding of a range of
    alternatives that might meet the legitimate U.S. national
    security needs on which Congress might base an intelligent
    debate.
        I am very interested in engaging with our witnesses and
    with my colleagues in a broad discussion on the future of our
    strategic forces and of deterrence. How do we understand the
    notion of strategic forces? How important is the mix of offense
    and defense? Are we making sufficient progress in the
    development of advanced conventional munitions to provide a
    more complete tool kit in a timely fashion?
        Do we have the right set of nuclear capabilities to address
    the very different target set that concerns our military today
    and in the future? Do we have the right set of delivery
    vehicles for the conventional and nuclear capability we believe
    we will need in the future? Have we retained the right
    infrastructure and expertise to sustain and modernize our
    forces? How should we use them in the future?
        There is another set of questions more distinctly focused
    on the legacy of the past. These questions are related to our
    current nuclear force, how we are going to reduce those forces
    to the level required by the Moscow Treaty and the disposition
    of those warheads. These are important questions as well, but
    they comprise, I think, only a portion of our concerns today.
        Many of these questions tend to be controversial. I believe
    that above all what has kept our military the best in the world
    is the ability to vet new ideas, to think creatively, to bring
    the American ability to innovate to the forefront. We will
    inevitably have to deal with serious policy issues in this era
    of change.
        I also believe that the members of the Strategic Forces
    Subcommittee have the opportunity to establish a serious open-
    minded tenor to these deliberations.
        First let me recognize Senator Reed from Rhode Island for
    some remarks and then when Senator Nelson comes in, if he shows
    up, we will give him an opportunity.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, I assume that Senator Nelson
    has a prepared statement and I would simply yield back my time.
        Senator Allard. Thank you very much.
        Again, I would like to thank both our witnesses for being
    here with us today, and we will move forward. We will start
    with Ambassador Brooks and then Admiral Ellis.

       STATEMENT OF HON. LINTON F. BROOKS, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR,
                NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

        Ambassador Brooks. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
    appreciate the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee,
    and I also want to thank all of the members for their strong
    support of the National Nuclear Security Administration's
    critical national security activities. I have prepared detailed
    written testimony which I would like to submit for the record.
        Senator Allard. Without objection.
        Ambassador Brooks. While that written statement covers the
    entire NNSA request, I would like to focus my oral remarks on
    the administration's views on the technical and policy issues
    relating to U.S. nuclear forces and to the Nuclear Posture
    Review and, in particular, to the prospects of advanced
    concepts.
        Before I start, I want to say how pleased I am to be
    sitting here today with a longstanding friend and colleague,
    Admiral Jim Ellis. I am pleased for two reasons. One is
    obviously personal, but I am also pleased because it symbolizes
    the fact that we traditionally must work very closely with the
    military and with the Department of Defense to make sure that
    they understand our capabilities and we understand our needs.
        As this committee knows, the National Nuclear Security
    Administration has several complementary missions. We are
    supposed to provide a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear
    deterrent; implement the decisions the President made in acting
    on the Nuclear Posture Review; reduce the threat posed by the
    proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; support the war
    on terrorism through aggressive nuclear nonproliferation
    programs; maintain security at our own facilities and reinvest
    in those facilities; and support the President's management
    agenda.
        Our budget request to do all this for this year is $8.8
    billion, the bulk of it, $6.4 billion, for Defense Programs and
    Stockpile Stewardship that are the primary subjects of this
    hearing. The budget represents a top line growth of about 11
    percent over the enacted fiscal year 2003 budget and it is
    consistent with the planned program funding levels that we
    provided to Congress in our future years national security
    program.
        The budget supports the Stockpile Stewardship Program. For
    the 7th year, that program has enabled us to certify to the
    President that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and
    reliable and has enabled us to do so without having to consider
    returning to nuclear testing. The budget includes funds to
    revitalize the facilities and infrastructure that is the
    bedrock of our nuclear weapons enterprise, and I will say a bit
    more about the policy implications of that in a moment.
        It supports efforts to push the outer limits of scientific
    modeling and computing, which, when we couple it to new
    experimental capabilities, are helping us to understand the
    complex physical processes associated with nuclear weapons. The
    budget supports our efforts to produce tritium, to restore full
    uranium processing operations, and to manufacture certifiable
    pits for our nuclear weapons.
        The budget also helps attack the global nuclear danger in
    other ways. It supports the President's emphasis on reducing
    proliferation threats, improves physical security of nuclear
    materials in the Russian Federation, and helps us to slow
    illicit trafficking of nuclear material.
        My written testimony today highlights our accomplishments
    as well as the milestones we expect to achieve this year.
    Because Dr. Beckner, who is on the next panel, will focus on
    the technical details of stockpile stewardship, I would like to
    focus on the foreign policy issues. I am very pleased that the
    Stockpile Stewardship Program has continued to demonstrate the
    ability to certify safety and reliability. We are charged, the
    Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, to assess
    each year the safety and reliability of the stockpile, and
    whether there is a need to resume underground testing. I cannot
    tell you how importantly Secretary Abraham takes that
    responsibility and how importantly we take our responsibility
    to support him in that determination.
        As the Nuclear Posture Review articulated, the 21st century
    presents the prospect of a national security environment in
    which threats may evolve more quickly, be more variable, and be
    less predictable than in the past. In this environment, nuclear
    weapons will play an important, although reduced, role in the
    United States' security posture. At the same time, the Nuclear
    Posture Review reaffirmed that nuclear forces linked with
    advanced conventional strike capability and integrated with
    other capabilities will continue to be essential elements of
    national security.
        Our nuclear capability will strengthen our overall ability
    to reassure allies, to dissuade arms competition from potential
    adversaries, and to deter threats to the United States. The
    Nuclear Posture Review offered a basic reassessment of the role
    of nuclear forces and of their contribution toward meeting
    these policy goals and established a need for a capabilities-
    based force, a dramatic departure from the threat-based
    approach to nuclear forces in the past.
        This change, in combination with the judgment that we no
    longer need to plan as though Russia presented an immediate
    threat to the United States, was the basis for the dramatic
    reductions codified in the Treaty of Moscow in the level of
    operationally deployed strategic nuclear forces. Over the next
    decade, operationally deployed warheads will be cut by about
    two-thirds from today's level.
        At the same time, to meet the challenges of an uncertain
    and unpredictable threat environment, the nuclear weapons
    enterprise has to be ready to respond rapidly and decisively,
    and that is the idea behind designating a responsive
    infrastructure along with strike capabilities and defenses as a
    separate leg of the new triad. We have to provide the means to
    respond to new, unexpected emerging threats in a timely manner.
    Therefore, we need a research and development (R&D) base and
    the industrial infrastructure to develop, build, and maintain
    nuclear offensive forces.
        With regard to future nuclear forces, the Nuclear Posture
    Review reaffirmed the stockpile refurbishment plan agreed to
    previously between the Department of Defense and the National
    Nuclear Security Administration. The plan calls for three
    warhead refurbishment programs, the W80, the W76 SLBM warhead,
    and the B61 bomb, to begin life extensions later this decade.
    We are working with the Department of Defense to develop the
    right life extension programs for each warhead type well before
    we commit production funds.
        To support these refurbishments, we have to press ahead
    with efforts to reverse the deterioration of the nuclear
    weapons infrastructure, restore lost production capabilities,
    and modernize other capabilities.
        I appreciate the past support of this committee for these
    efforts and hope that support will continue in the future.
        Now, a responsive infrastructure has to be more than just a
    slogan. There are three specific initiatives endorsed by the
    Nuclear Posture Review. They involve efforts to enhance nuclear
    test readiness, to revitalize nuclear warhead advanced concepts
    at the national laboratories, and to accelerate planning and
    design for a modern pit facility to produce key plutonium parts
    for nuclear weapons, something, as the committee knows, we have
    not been able to do for 14 years.
        Each of these initiatives is intended to provide the
    nuclear weapons enterprise with the flexibility to provide a
    timely response to surprise or to changes in the threat
    environment. Regarding these initiatives, there are four items
    in the budget request that are noteworthy because they are
    subject to misinterpretation, and I would like to discuss each
    of them.
        First, the budget proposes an allocation of $25 million to
    begin the process begun in fiscal year 2003 of improving the
    underground nuclear test readiness at the Nevada Test Site from
    the current 36 months to 18 months. Second, the budget proposes
    an allocation of $15 million to continue a study that will
    begin in the next few weeks assessing the feasibility and cost
    of adapting an existing weapon to serve as a so-called Robust
    Nuclear Earth Penetrator. Third, the budget allocates $6
    million to begin other advanced concepts work. Finally, the
    administration has separately recommended that existing
    legislation prohibiting research and development that could
    lead--important words--to new low-yield weapons be repealed.
        In looking at this issue, it is very important for the
    committee to understand what we are not doing. We are not
    planning to resume nuclear testing. The President has made it
    clear that we have no interim need, no requirement, for such
    testing. We are not proposing to improve readiness at the
    Nevada Test Site in order to develop new weapons. Given the
    time it would take to develop fundamentally new weapons, the
    current test readiness would be more than adequate. We are not
    planning to develop any new nuclear weapons at all. The
    Department of Defense has not identified any requirements for
    such weapons.
        Above all, we are not signaling through these programs any
    intention to lower the nuclear threshold or to blur the
    distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. The fact
    remains that only the President can authorize the use of
    nuclear weapons. That will not change in the future, and I do
    not believe anything we are proposing will make any President
    any more likely to take such an awesome decision.
        That is what we are not doing. What are we doing? We are
    hedging against the possibility that we may some day need to
    conduct a test to confirm a problem or to verify that a problem
    has been solved in a stockpiled weapon that is crucial to the
    Nation's deterrent. Indeed, we chose 18 months as a test
    readiness figure because that is a typical value that it would
    take once a problem is identified to assess the problem,
    develop and implement a solution, and then plan and execute a
    test that would let us certify a fix.
        We are conducting a study on whether an existing warhead
    could be adapted without testing to improve our ability to hold
    at risk hardened, deeply buried targets that may be important
    to a future adversary. We are seeking to explore in conjunction
    with the Department of Defense advanced concepts that might
    some day be needed for a future President or this President or
    a future Congress or this Congress to implement.
        Finally, we are examining these concepts, seeking to free
    ourselves from intellectual prohibitions against exploring the
    full range of technical options. We do not want to be limited
    in our thinking just because some options might imply a
    hypothetical weapon with a yield below an arbitrary value.
        Let me be clear on these last two points. Repeal of the
    prohibition on low-yield nuclear weapons development falls far
    short from committing the United States to developing,
    producing, or deploying new weapons. As Secretary Abraham made
    clear before the full committee--in fact, I believe, Mr.
    Chairman, it was in response to a question from you--such
    warhead concepts could not proceed to full-scale development,
    much less production, still less deployment, without Congress
    authorizing and appropriating the necessary funds.
        The repeal of this legislation does not authorize anybody
    to develop anything. What it does is it removes the chilling
    effect on scientific inquiry that could hamper our ability to
    maintain and exercise our intellectual capabilities to respond
    to needs that one day might be articulated by the President.
        I believe the steps on nuclear test readiness are a prudent
    response to hedge against the possibility of future problems in
    the stockpile. As a completely separate matter, the examination
    of new concepts unconstrained by artificial limitations is
    another prudent hedge. It is a hedge against the possibility
    that the President and the Department of Defense may some day
    need to consider capabilities we do not now have.
        I urge the committee to support both of these prudent
    steps. But I stress again, they do not represent any intention
    to return to nuclear testing or any requirement to develop new
    nuclear weapons.
        Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement, and I look
    forward to your questions after Admiral Ellis has had an
    opportunity to present his.
        [The prepared statement of Ambassador Brooks follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by Hon. Linton F. Brooks

        Thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the fiscal
    year 2004 President's budget request for the National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA). This is my first appearance before this
    subcommittee as the Acting Administrator of NNSA, and I want to thank
    all of the members for their strong support of our important national
    security responsibilities. I would like to begin my testimony here
    today by providing an overview of the NNSA mission requirements
    followed by the highlights of our budget request.

                                    OVERVIEW

        The NNSA, comprised of Defense Programs, the Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation Program, and the Naval Reactors Program, has several
    complementary mission requirements:

             Provide a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent
            and implement the President's decisions on the Nuclear Posture
            Review (NPR) recommendations.
             Reduce the threat posed by the proliferation of
            weapons of mass destruction and continue to support the global
            war on terrorism through aggressive nuclear nonproliferation
            programs.
             Maintain a robust security posture at NNSA facilities.
             Revitalize the nuclear weapons complex infrastructure.
             Support the nuclear propulsion needs of the U.S. Navy.
             Support the President's Management Agenda for more
            effective government.

        The fiscal year 2004 budget request totals $8.8 billion, an
    increase of $878 million, about 11 percent, over the enacted fiscal
    year 2003 budget. The request is consistent with the planned program
    levels in the Future-Years Nuclear Security Program recently submitted
    to Congress. This substantial increase reflects the administration's
    commitment to sustain a stable and effective long term national
    security program through the NNSA, as well as our obligation to our
    citizens to conduct this program safely, securely, and in an
    environmentally acceptable manner.
        We are building on recent accomplishments. Although there is a
    large increase in this year's budget request, there is no single new
    initiative driving this growth. Rather, we are continuing plans and
    programs already set in motion, and adjusting to the guidance in the
    Nuclear Posture Review. We are moving beyond the talking and planning
    phase of many programs conceived in the 1990s.
        This budget supports the Stockpile Stewardship Program, which
    continues to successfully certify to the President the safety and
    reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile without underground
    nuclear testing. It includes funds to begin a modest Advanced Concepts
    initiative to provide nuclear deterrence options, begin the transition
    to a 18-month test readiness posture, continue to revitalize the
    facilities and infrastructure that are the bedrock of the weapons
    complex, and push the outer limits of scientific, modeling, and
    computing ability to apply new experimental capabilities to the
    processes of maintaining and certifying the stockpile. It supports our
    efforts to manufacture certifiable pits and to produce tritium.
        In the area of reducing global nuclear danger, this budget request
    for the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program reflects the
    President's and Secretary Abraham's emphasis on reducing proliferation
    threats, including the Global Partnership formed at the Kananaskis
    Summit in June 2002. The fiscal year 2004 request contains funds to
    support attacking the problem globally, to improve the physical
    security of nuclear material, to consolidate and reduce that material,
    and to end its production. It also continues efforts to prevent illicit
    trafficking of nuclear materials, to improve our ability to detect
    proliferation, and to stem the ``Brain Drain'' of weapons experienced
    scientists from Russia.
        Under this budget, the Naval Reactors Program will initiate the
    design and development of a new reactor that will utilize advanced
    materials to achieve a substantial increase in core energy. The result
    will be greater ship operational ability and flexibility to meet
    increasing national security demands.

                             BUDGET SUMMARY TABLES

        The fiscal year 2003 estimates in the fiscal year 2004 budget
    documents transmitted to Congress reflect the President's fiscal year
    2003 budget request because final fiscal year 2003 appropriations were
    not enacted until February 20, 2003. The Future-Years National Security
    Program tables tie to the President's budget request. The table below
    summarizes the enacted funding levels by appropriation. The fiscal year
    2003 appropriations estimates are made comparable to the fiscal year
    2004 President's budget request by eliminating fiscal year 2003
    appropriations being transferred to the Department of Homeland Security
    and to the Department of Energy's Office of Security (for COOP/COG
    activities). The fiscal year 2003 totals detailed in the table below
    also reflect applications of the general reductions and the government-
    wide, across the board reduction of 0.65 percent enacted in the final
    fiscal year 2003 appropriations.
        The outyear budget estimates and associated programmatic
    information for NNSA programs are contained in the Future-Years Nuclear
    Security Program document I forwarded to Congress in February.

        Before going into Weapons Activities Stockpile Stewardship Program,
    I will discuss the NNSA's response to the broader policy framework set
    out in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and its implementation.
        As the NPR has articulated, the 21st century presents the prospect
    of a national security environment in which threats may evolve more
    quickly, be more variable in nature, and be less predictable than in
    the past. In this broad threat environment, nuclear weapons will play a
    reduced role in the overall United States security posture a point
    reinforced in the NPR. At the same time, the NPR reaffirmed that, for
    the foreseeable future, nuclear forces linked with an advanced
    conventional strike and integrated with the capabilities offered by the
    other two legs of the New Triad will continue to be an essential
    element of national security by strengthening our overall abilities to
    reassure allies of U.S. commitments, dissuade arms competition from
    potential adversaries, and deter threats to the U.S., its overseas
    forces, allies, and friends.
        The NPR offered a basic reassessment of the role of nuclear forces
    and their contribution toward meeting these defense policy goals. It
    established the need for a capabilities-based force, a dramatic
    departure from the threat-based rationale for the nuclear force of the
    past. This change, in combination with the judgment to no longer plan
    our forces as if Russia presented an immediate threat to the U.S., was
    the basis for dramatic reductions codified in the Moscow Treaty in the
    level of operationally-deployed strategic nuclear forces. Over the next
    decade, the number of deployed warheads will be cut by approximately
    two-thirds from today's level.
        To meet the challenges of an uncertain and unpredictable threat
    environment, and in seeking to mitigate any dangers associated with
    dramatically reduced nuclear forces, the nuclear weapons enterprise
    must be able to respond rapidly and decisively. This is the idea behind
    the third leg of the New Triad. That is, by providing means to respond
    to new, unexpected, or emerging threats in a timely manner, the R&D and
    industrial infrastructure needed to develop, build, and maintain
    nuclear offensive forces and defensive systems (of which the nuclear
    enterprise is a key component) is itself a principal tool for achieving
    our overall defense strategy. This concept, and its endorsement by the
    NPR, has had enormous implications for NNSA in helping to gain strong
    support for its programs from DOD and others.
        We are pressing ahead with efforts to reverse the deterioration of
    the nuclear weapons infrastructure, restore lost production
    capabilities and modernize others in order to meet the stockpile
    refurbishment plan. We are actively assessing the NPR's implications in
    a number of other related areas. Finally, we are pursuing initiatives
    endorsed by the NPR which are intended to provide the nuclear weapons
    enterprise with the flexibility to provide a timely response to
    ``surprise,'' or to changes in the threat environment.

                   WEAPONS ACTIVITIES--STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP

        The President's fiscal year 2004 request for Stockpile Stewardship
    continues to build and expand on the scientific and engineering
    successes that are the hallmarks of this program. This request totals
    $6.378 billion, an increase of 8.2 percent. It will also allow us to
    meet our requirements under the terms of the Nuclear Posture Review
    including enhancing test readiness, reinvigorating the advanced
    concepts work in the weapons laboratories, and restoring the weapons
    complex to meet the national security requirements of the 21st century.
    There are a number of significant milestones we expect to achieve this
    year.

             Manufacture the first certifiable W88 pit.
             Begin irradiation of the first Tritium Producing
            Burnable Absorber Rods in the TVA's Watts Bar Reactor.
             Continue delivery of W87 Life Extended warheads to the
            Air Force.
             Complete environmental documentation in support of the
            Modern Pit Facility.
             Deliver four ultraviolet beams of National Ignition
            Facility (NIF) laser light to the target chamber.
             Initiate Stockpile Stewardship experiments in NIF.
             Perform two and three-dimensional simulations of aging
            stockpile weapons focused on Life Extension Program activities.
             Ship nuclear weapons, weapons components, and nuclear
            materials safely through the Secure Transportation Asset.
             Conduct subcritical experiments at the Nevada Test
            Site to better understand plutonium aging.
             Begin work on the Advanced Concepts initiative and, in
            particular, on the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) Phase
            6.2 studies with the Air Force.

        These major milestones will be accomplished by the weapons complex
    in addition to the manufacture of thousands of components needed to
    maintain the stockpile. The complex will also carry out hundreds of
    smaller scale experiments, perform surveillance activities, address
    Significant Finding Investigations to ensure weapons safety and
    operability, conduct flight tests with the support of the DOD, deploy
    new manufacturing tools and processes at the production plants, and
    safely dismantle weapons excess to national security requirements.
        These and other activities are dependent on retaining today's
    highly skilled workforce and recruiting the next generation of
    stockpile stewards. Over the last several years, NNSA has made a
    significant headway on this all-important front. Critical skill
    vacancies across the complex have been reduced to 8 percent.
    Inextricably linked to recruitment and retention is providing the
    quality workspace and fully functioning tools and technologies needed
    by our scientists and engineers to carry out their work. We are working
    diligently to reinvest in the weapons complex infrastructure.
        I would now like to highlight several activities under the
    Stockpile Stewardship Program that I believe are of particular interest
    to this committee.

    Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign
        Restoring the Nation's ability to manufacture plutonium pits in
    support of the stockpile has been a central challenge for the
    stewardship program since the closure of the Rocky Flats plant in 1989.
    The United States has never before manufactured and certified pits
    without nuclear testing. I am very pleased to report that late this
    spring, Los Alamos will manufacture the first certifiable W88 pit. The
    Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) also remains on-track to
    manufacture a war reserve W88 pit by 2007. To achieve this critical
    milestone, LANL has produced a number of development pits and has
    performed a series of engineering tests and physics experiments to
    confirm pit performance.
        While the TA-55 facilities at LANL are adequate to support the W88
    pit campaign, they do not appear to be capable of supporting the
    manufacturing need for long-term stockpile support. NNSA has begun
    planning for a Modern Pit Facility (MPF) consistent with the Record of
    Decision for Stockpile Stewardship and Management and the NPR. In May
    2002, the Secretary of Energy formally approved Critical Decision ``0''
    (CD-0) for the MPF. The NNSA is now examining five candidate sites--
    Pantex, Carlsbad, the Nevada Test Site, Savannah River and Los Alamos--
    as possible locations for the MPF. We expect to issue a Draft
    Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) later this spring. Following a
    series of public meetings, a final EIS and associated Record of
    Decision (ROD) will be issued. The program will prepare site specific
    environmental documentation if the ROD supports a decision to construct
    and operate an MPF. The fiscal year 2004 request will allow conceptual
    design and other planning activities, National Environmental Policy Act
    (NEPA) work, and technology development activities to proceed on a
    schedule that will support a CD-1 decision in fiscal year 2006.

    Test Readiness
        While I continue to have confidence in the ability of the Stockpile
    Stewardship Program to continue to ensure the safety, security, and
    reliability of this Nation's nuclear deterrent, we must maintain our
    ability to carry out nuclear weapons tests. Our current readiness
    posture to conduct such a test is 24 to 36 months, as established in a
    1993 Presidential Decision Directive. Last year's NPR stated that this
    period should be reduced in order to provide options to deal with
    defense policy goals, including resolving unanticipated problems in the
    stockpile. A study completed in July 2002 confirmed that additional
    work was required to maintain the present posture, but it also led us
    to conclude that the right posture is to be ready for a test within
    approximately 18 months. With fiscal year 2003 funding now in place, we
    intend to begin the transition to a 18-month posture. The Nuclear
    Weapons Council has concurred that our intended action is appropriate.
    The transition to this new readiness posture is expected to take
    approximately 3 years.
        Although there have been discussions about a transition to shorter
    times, there is concern that an unnecessarily expedited time frame may
    cause adverse effects on critical personnel resources and require
    significantly more funding. It is not likely that we will be able to
    match the short lead times when the weapons complex conducted multiple
    underground tests annually, nor do I think it is prudent to tie-up
    important resources to indefinitely maintain an extremely short test
    readiness posture. Since device and diagnostics preparations are driven
    by the particular weapon to be tested and the questions to be answered
    by the test, such a posture might not be responsive to a surprise in
    the stockpile. The NNSA is studying this matter and I will soon be
    reporting to Congress on these subjects as directed in the fiscal year
    2003 Defense Authorization Bill.

    Advanced Concepts/Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator
        The NPR also highlighted the importance of pursuing Advanced
    Concepts work to ensure that the weapons complex can provide nuclear
    deterrence options well into the next century. To that end, the fiscal
    year 2004 budget includes $21 million for Advanced Concepts work. About
    $15 million will be allocated to the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator
    (RNEP), with the balance of the funding divided between the weapons
    laboratories for concept and feasibility studies of possible nuclear
    weapon modifications, or new designs to meet possible new requirements.
        The Department of Defense submitted the report on RNEP to Congress
    on March 19, 2003, as required by the Bob Stump National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. The NNSA will begin an in-depth
    study once the 30 day waiting period has elapsed. As members know, this
    study will examine whether or not two existing warheads in the
    stockpile--the B61 and the B83--can be sufficiently hardened through
    case modifications and other work to allow the weapons to survive
    penetration into various geologies before detonating. This would
    enhance the Nation's ability to hold hard and deeply buried targets at
    risk. The RNEP feasibility and cost study is currently scheduled for
    completion in 2006; however, we are looking at opportunities to reduce
    study time.
        For other advanced concepts, we will work with the DOD to assess
    evolving military requirements. We will carry out theoretical and
    engineering design work. I should stress that we have no requirement to
    actually develop any new weapons at this time.

    Physical Infrastructure
        Since its inception, the NNSA has been committed to a disciplined
    corporate facilities management approach to improve the facility
    conditions of the nuclear weapons complex. We made this corporate
    commitment clearly recognizing the drivers and practices of the past
    decade had ultimately resulted in a complex with significant
    deterioration in our physical infrastructure and an excessive backlog
    of deferred maintenance. The NNSA complex is part of our Nation's
    strategic nuclear infrastructure and the third leg of the New Triad as
    defined in the Nuclear Posture Review. The Nuclear Posture Review gave
    a responsive infrastructure equal priority with offensive and defensive
    weapons. Through our focused and disciplined efforts, we now have
    underway an effective and integrated program to restore, revitalize,
    and rebuild our nuclear weapons program infrastructure.
        Two complementary accounts in the budget, Readiness in Technical
    Base and Facilities (RTBF) and the Facilities and Infrastructure
    Recapitalization Program (FIRP), are essential to the operation,
    maintenance, and renewal of a physical infrastructure. Funding for
    RTBF, Operations of Facilities, increases by 4 percent in the fiscal
    year 2004 request. The RTBF provides the funding needed to operate and
    maintain the facilities required for certification, thus ensuring the
    vitality of the NNSA national security complex and its goal of a
    consistent readiness level. FIRP is a capital renewal and
    sustainability program designed to eliminate maintenance backlogs. The
    FIRP addresses an integrated, prioritized list of maintenance and
    infrastructure projects, separate from the maintenance and
    infrastructure efforts of RTBF, which will significantly increase the
    operational efficiency and effectiveness of the NNSA sites.
        Importantly, beyond the application of the new and much needed
    funding, FIRP also brings a series of new facility management processes
    and best business practices which are improving our corporate facility
    management. One of the most important practices is the NNSA commitment
    to deferred maintenance reduction: stabilizing our backlog by fiscal
    year 2005 and returning it, for our mission essential facilities and
    infrastructure, to industry standards by fiscal year 2009. To meet this
    goal, the fiscal year 2004 budget request targets 45 percent of the
    FIRP Recapitalization subprogram to facilities and infrastructure
    specific deferred maintenance projects.
        Integral to our corporate approach to RTBF and FIRP are the
    linkages and discipline provided by the PPBE process, and specifically
    the Ten-Year Comprehensive Site Plans (TYCSP) and associated facilities
    and infrastructure planning processes. We are now in the third year
    that the NNSA has approved the TYCSPs, incorporating technical
    requirements and performance measures within the financial bounds of
    the FYNSP resource levels. From the field perspective, these plans
    provide Federal and M&O managers at each site with the tools and
    processes to propose, prioritize and obtain approval of the work needed
    to effectively manage their facilities and infrastructure. From the
    Headquarters perspective, the TYCSP provides the NNSA with a
    standardization that allows comparisons and planning to be effected
    complex-wide.
        In recent years, the combined and measurable efforts of FIRP and
    RTBF have worked to assure that we restore, revitalize, and rebuild the
    weapons complex infrastructure for today and tomorrow's missions.
    Across the weapons complex both programs are fixing the backlog of
    maintenance, keeping up with operational needs, and planning for the
    future to make a clear and visible difference. These combined efforts
    are crucial, and I urge the committee to support them.

    Stockpile Life Extension
        While preparing for the future, the labs and plants are working
    very hard to extend the life of several elements of the existing
    nuclear weapons stockpile through the Life Extension Program (LEP). The
    NPR reaffirmed the decision as reached by the Nuclear Weapons Council
    on the timing, pace, scope, and technical aspects of the LEPs for the
    W76, W80, B61-7/11, and ongoing W87 work. Through this program new
    subsystems and components are designed, built, tested and installed,
    thereby extending the operational service life for these warheads for
    some 30 additional years.
        For the last several years, we have been extending the life of the
    W87 warhead for the Air Force. This work is ongoing at Y-12 National
    Security Complex, Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories,
    and the Pantex Plant. We are more than half way through this effort and
    expect to wrap up the work by early 2004.
        Life extension for the W76 involves a comprehensive overhaul of the
    warhead, including replacement or refurbishment of the Arming, Firing
    and Fuzing set, high explosives, gas transfer system and other
    components. We will also be requalifying the weapon primary. For the
    W80, we will be replacing the Trajectory Sensing Signal and Neutron
    Generators, the tritium bottles and incorporating surety upgrades. For
    the B61, we will be refurbishing the secondary. The First Production
    Units for these systems are scheduled for delivery to the Navy and Air
    Force in: fiscal year 2007, fiscal year 2006, and fiscal year 2006,
    respectively.

    Tritium
        In addition to restoring plutonium manufacturing capabilities, NNSA
    will begin tritium production later this year when several hundred
    Tritium Producing Burnable Absorber Rods (TPBARs) are inserted into
    TVA's Watts Bar Reactor. However, because of significant changes in
    stockpile size in the outyears as a result of the NPR and the Moscow
    Treaty, the NNSA has, in concert with the DOD, adjusted the tritium
    production requirements to reflect these changes. We remain fully
    committed to exercise all elements of the system for producing,
    extracting, and purifying new tritium, including initial operation of
    the Tritium Extraction Facility (TEF) being constructed at the Savannah
    River Site.
        Timing of tritium production, extraction, and purification has also
    been delayed by approximately 17 months for two reasons: (1) a
    reduction in the stockpile requirements by the NPR and (2) a delay in
    completion of the TEF project. This program delay can be accomplished
    without impacting nuclear weapons readiness. A revised baseline has
    been approved increasing the Total Project Cost from $401 million to
    $506 million and delaying project completion from mid-fiscal year 2006
    to late-fiscal year 2007.
        Since the tritium decays by natural radioactivity at a rate of
    about 5 percent per year, and since irradiation service costs are the
    dominant operating costs in supplying tritium to the stockpile, it is
    prudent not to produce tritium beyond the stated national requirements.
    Since the program intends to complete and exercise all elements of the
    tritium production and purification system (including TVA's reactor(s)
    and the TEF) on a schedule that fully protects the stockpile
    requirements, irradiation services are being deferred in order to use
    funds planned for these activities to complete TEF.

    National Ignition Facility
        I am pleased to report that tremendous technical progress has been
    achieved over the last year at the National Ignition Facility (NIF).
    Its mission is to obtain fusion ignition in a laboratory setting by
    imploding a BB-sized capsule containing a mixture of the hydrogen
    isotopes, deuterium and tritium. The NIF will provide the capability to
    conduct laboratory experiments to address the high-energy density and
    fusion aspects that are important to both primaries and secondaries in
    the nuclear stockpile.
        In December 2002, the first four NIF laser beams were activated to
    generate a total of 43 kilojoules of infrared laser light in a single
    pulse. In March 2003, NIF delivered its first 4 beam of ultraviolet
    laser light focused onto a target at the center of the 30 foot-diameter
    target chamber. With this accomplishment, all elements of each of the
    NIF critical subsystems have been successfully activated and operated.
    Stewardship experiments will begin in fiscal year 2004.

    Advanced Simulation and Computing
        The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASCI) Campaign is creating
    simulation capabilities that incorporate modern physics and engineering
    models to improve our ability to predict with confidence the behavior
    of the nuclear weapons in the stockpile. These models, validated
    against experimental data from past above ground and underground
    nuclear tests, are the repositories of expert designer judgment as well
    as the best scientific representations of our current knowledge of the
    performance of the nuclear weapons. The ASCI Campaign is driving the
    integration of the theoretical and experimental efforts within the
    Stockpile Stewardship Program.
        At the same time that ASCI continues the development of the most
    powerful computer capabilities needed for the future, the modern
    simulation tools previously developed by ASCI--the Blue Pacific and
    White Machines at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), the
    Red Machine at Sandia National Laboratory (SNL), and the Blue Mountain
    and Q machines at LANL--are being applied day-to-day to address
    immediate stockpile concerns. The ASCI codes are being used to close
    Significant Finding Investigations as well as to support Life Extension
    Programs for the W76, W80, W87, and B61. These activities are enabled
    by the ongoing supercomputing infrastructures at the national
    laboratories, encompassing both continuing operations as well as
    research in new techniques for storage, visualization, networking, and
    all aspects of the infrastructure required by modern computing.
        By fiscal year 2008, ASCI will deliver a high fidelity, full-system
    physics characterization of a nuclear weapon. At that time, the
    campaign will deliver a suite of validated codes, running on
    supercomputer platforms, acquired through open procurement, with user-
    friendly environments, advanced visualization tools for analysis, and
    the entire support structure to integrate the components together.
    Other program deliverables include high-performance storage and high-
    bandwidth networks. In support of a true integrated Strategic Systems
    Programs effort, the ASCI Campaign continues to push the envelope in
    distance computing as well as in advanced encryption techniques and
    other approaches to ensure secure, classified networking.

                             SECURE TRANSPORTATION

        The Office of Secure Transportation is responsible for safely and
    securely moving nuclear weapons, special nuclear materials, select non-
    nuclear components, and Limited Life Components for the DOE and the
    DOD. This work is carried out by 225 Federal agents stationed at three
    sites--Pantex, Oak Ridge, and Albuquerque. These highly dedicated and
    skilled agents are authorized to use deadly force in the performance of
    their duties. Employing highly modified tractor trailers and escort
    vehicles, and secure and redundant communications they have amassed an
    impressive safety record of more than 100 million accident free miles
    without cargo compromise. I would note that this office also provides
    support to other elements of the DOE, including the Offices of
    Environmental Management and Nuclear Energy.

              NONPROLIFERATION--REDUCING THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR DANGER

        The NNSA's nonproliferation activities are central to the Bush
    administration's National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
    Destruction of December 2002, which lists ``Strengthened
    Nonproliferation'' as a pillar of its approach to reducing
    proliferation threats. Secretary Abraham and the NNSA are committed to
    this critical mission. This commitment is reflected in the diversity of
    our programs to address nonproliferation concerns in Russia, other
    former Soviet States, and, increasingly, throughout the world. The NNSA
    uniquely integrates technical and policy expertise to guide and
    implement the full range of U.S. nonproliferation priorities. The
    fiscal year 2004 request for this program is $1.34 billion, an increase
    of about 31 percent.
        The NNSA addresses concerns that arise from the two requisites of
    nuclear weapons proliferation: materials and expertise. Whether
    ensuring that former Russian weapons experts are able to put their
    skills to use on peaceful and commercial initiatives, reducing the
    footprint of Russia's ``closed'' nuclear cities, or leading on-the-
    ground programs to secure at-risk nuclear materials in Russia or
    elsewhere, NNSA is at the forefront of U.S. efforts to halt the
    proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advance U.S. nuclear
    security interests.
        The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials
    of Mass Destruction, formed at the Kananaskis Summit in June 2002, has
    recommitted the G8 nations to increase greatly assistance to
    nonproliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism, and nuclear safety.
    The partnership pledges to provide $20 billion over the next 10 years
    for nonproliferation and threat reduction initially focused in Russia.
    The United States is committed to provide half that total. The effort
    of our G-8 partners will complement U.S. programs and meets past
    congressional concerns that we not carry a disproportionate burden.
        I am also pleased to inform you of the substantial progress of the
    Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production Program (EWGPP). The
    EWGPP is using best project management practices by applying the
    Department's established directives on project management. On December
    20, 2002, the projects received Critical Decision Zero (CD-O), mission-
    need justification, and we have started the process to procure U.S.
    contractors.
        These contractors will be responsible for oversight, verification,
    and payment to the Russian Federation Integrating Contractor for work
    completed. The U.S. contracts will be performance-based with the award
    fee provisions focusing on successful completion and the ability of the
    U.S. contractor to incentivize the Russian Federation Integrating
    Contractor's performance in meeting or exceeding cost, schedule and
    quality objectives. The U.S. contractor is being selected from a group
    of contractors that have extensive experience in both fossil fueled
    power plants and in Russia. Although the projects will be executed in
    the Russian Federation, using Russian equipment and personnel, we are
    implementing a rigorous oversight plan to monitor the progress through
    a formal project management system.
        With three exceptions, our fiscal year 2004 request is essentially
    the same as last year. Last year, at the President's request, Secretary
    Abraham sought Russian agreement to dispose of additional Russian
    highly enriched uranium. We are nearing agreement on the purchase of
    Russian highly enriched uranium for U.S. research reactors and on
    purchasing downblended uranium from Russian weapons for a strategic
    uranium reserve. We have requested $30 million for this program.
        Second, there has been a $19.7 million increase in the request for
    programs to secure radiological sources that could be used in
    radiological dispersal devices, also known as ``dirty bombs.''
        The largest fiscal year 2004 budget increase, about $272 million,
    supports our plutonium disposition efforts. The United States and
    Russia will each dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons grade plutonium
    by irradiating it as mixed oxide, MOX fuel, in existing nuclear
    reactors. This program is on track. Over 75 percent of the detailed
    design of the U.S. MOX facility will be done this year. Russia has told
    us that it will use the U.S. design for the MOX Fuel Fabrication
    Facility, thus ensuring the programs remain on roughly the same
    schedule. Construction of both the U.S. and Russian MOX Fuel
    Fabrication Facilities will begin in fiscal year 2004.
        I would also like to comment on NNSA's efforts to ensure that
    funding is focused on the highest nonproliferation concerns. Given that
    adverse impacts of terrorists or rogue nations obtaining nuclear
    weapons is intangible, we cannot easily assess risks using quantifiable
    risk analysis methods. However, we have and will continue to conduct
    qualitative risk analyses to determine that we are applying the most
    cost-effective approaches to meet the greatest nonproliferation needs.
        The NNSA recognizes that proliferation is a multifaceted problem,
    and reduces the threat in a multitude of ways.
        We're attacking the problem globally. The Global Partnership is
    only the most recent example of U.S. cooperation with the international
    community on nonproliferation. International cooperation supports our
    national nonproliferation objectives, and we pursue such cooperation in
    new ways. The suite of NNSA programs promotes greater international
    understanding and adherence to export controls, the application of
    safeguards to secure nuclear materials, and measures to maintain
    regional security in the world's most volatile regions.
        NNSA is improving the physical security of nuclear material. The
    United States does this primarily through its Materials Protection,
    Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program in Russia, as well as the Newly
    Independent States/Baltics. In fiscal year 2004, this will include
    security upgrades on 24 metric tons of Russian nuclear material and
    1200 Russian Navy nuclear warheads. We will also continue our work to
    ensure the adequate physical protection of nuclear material located in
    40 countries around the world.
        We are improving our work to secure radiological sources and
    prevent their use in ``dirty bombs.'' The International Conference on
    Security of Radioactive Sources delivered a concrete set of findings to
    guide international efforts to gain better control of high-risk
    radioactive sources worldwide. Secretary Abraham's announcement of a $3
    million ``Radiological Security Partnership'' will set in motion a new
    initiative to address potential threats from under-secured, high-risk
    radioactive sources.
        NNSA is helping to consolidate nuclear material. By reducing the
    number of locations where this material is stored, the United States is
    greatly reducing its vulnerability to theft or sabotage. By the end of
    2003, we will have removed all weapons-usable material from 23
    buildings into fewer locations, thus improving security.
        Nuclear material can be reduced. Fissile Materials Disposition
    conducts activities to dispose of surplus highly enriched uranium and
    weapon-grade plutonium. By disposing of 68 metric tons of plutonium in
    the U.S. and Russia, the plutonium disposition program will reduce the
    threat that this material could pose if acquired by hostile nations or
    terrorist groups. The plutonium will be irradiated as mixed-oxide (MOX)
    fuel in nuclear reactors, making the material no longer readily usable
    for nuclear weapons.
        The production of nuclear material for weapons can be ended. The
    value of reducing nuclear materials increases greatly if no new
    material is being produced at the same time. The EWGPP discussed above
    aims to accomplish just that by replacing Russia's remaining plutonium
    production reactors with fossil fuel energy plants to meet the energy
    needs of local communities.
        The illicit trafficking of nuclear materials can be slowed. The
    Second Line of Defense Program and International Nuclear Export Control
    programs focus on cooperative efforts to minimize the risk of illicit
    trafficking of special nuclear material, radiological materials, and
    dual-use technologies across international borders such as land
    crossings, airports, and seaports. Under the fiscal year 2004 budget
    request, the program will continue to target strategic border points
    and transshipment countries around the world for deployment of
    radiation detection equipment while maintaining existing equipment in
    more than 20 countries.
        The threat of the ``Brain Drain'' can be alleviated. To prevent
    adverse mitigation of WMD expertise, the Russian Transition Initiatives
    (RTI) program commercializes technology and downsizes Russia's weapons
    complex. This approach transforms the former weapons infrastructure
    expertise into commercially viable, peaceful business ventures, and
    shrinks the complex by moving fence lines, closing buildings, and
    providing alternative employment opportunities to weapons experts.
        We can continually improve our ability to detect proliferation.
    Research and development in proliferation detection provides the United
    States timely detection of potential threats. These technologies are
    key to identifying threats at borders or other critical thoroughfares,
    detecting clandestine proliferation activities, and verifying treaty
    adherence.
        In sum, the United States, with NNSA leading the way, has developed
    programs to address the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass
    destruction in all its dimensions.

                                 NAVAL REACTORS

        Naval Reactors (NR) continues the success it has had for more than
    50 years and is a prime example of how to manage unforgiving and
    complex technology. Our Naval Reactors program, which supports the
    nuclear-powered submarines and carriers on station around the world,
    remains a vital part of the national security mission and the global
    war on terrorism. In fiscal year 2004, NR will support 103 reactors in
    82 nuclear-powered warships, including the first-of-a-class reactor
    when the U.S.S. Virginia goes to sea. In addition, NR will continue to
    design and develop the reactor for the new transformational carrier
    CVN-21. The NR budget request for fiscal year 2004 is $768 million,
    about a 7 percent increase above inflation over fiscal year 2003. The
    increase will allow NR to begin the development of the Transformational
    Technology Core (TTC) utilizing advanced materials to achieve a
    substantial increase in core energy. TTC will be forward-fitted into
    the Virginia class submarines, and will result in greater ship
    operational ability and flexibility to meet increasing national
    security demands. This budget increase will also allow maintenance and
    replacement of some of the program's 50-plus year-old infrastructure as
    well as remediation at sites no longer in use, allowing NR to continue
    its ``clean-as-you-go'' policy.

                 SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY THROUGHOUT THE COMPLEX

        Security continues to be one of the NNSA's highest priorities. The
    NNSA's Safeguards and Security program focuses on the protection of our
    people, classified and sensitive information, nuclear and non-nuclear
    materials, and the vital infrastructure of our laboratory and
    industrial production complex. Overall, we have a very effective
    safeguards and security program as validated by internal and external
    independent reviews across our sites and operations. We then use the
    results of these reviews to assess and confirm our security postures
    and areas for improvement. Our fiscal year 2004 budget request
    maintains a robust safeguards and security posture throughout the
    weapons complex to protect our facilities, materials, information, and
    people.
        The request also supports evaluation and assessment of options to
    use cost-effective measures to meet future security requirements. The
    NNSA sites conduct Vulnerability Assessments that include a review of
    potential targets and the identification of the variety of methods that
    an adversary could or might attempt to use against the targets.
    Tabletop exercises, computer simulations, and actual force-on-force
    exercises, conducted both internally and through external independent
    offices, are used to evaluate various scenarios and related options for
    protection.
        In our efforts to assure we have a robust, responsive and adaptable
    security architecture, we have recently been conducting detailed, site
    specific reviews, known as Iterative Site Analyses (ISA). The ISAs are
    analytical, tabletop exercises which address a spectrum of potential
    threats, both within and beyond the Design Basis Threat. The ISA is
    conducted by independent and highly skilled security professionals from
    across the government and private sector. These analytical efforts are
    designed to give decision makers at each site and NNSA Headquarters a
    better understanding of how potential changes in threat and protective
    measures can be factored into actions that improve our system
    responsiveness and overall security posture. The results are then used
    in our risk identification and management efforts that assist in
    determining the safeguards and security program structure and most
    cost-effective investments at each site.
        Immediately following the events of September 11, 2001, NNSA
    initiated a series of efforts to increase our security posture. As a
    result, I am very comfortable with the level of our security complex-
    wide. Most of the increases in our security posture, however, were the
    result of increases in the level of physical protection, mainly guard
    forces. As NNSA looks to the future, it is clear that the threat and
    protection challenges will continue to become more complicated and
    costly. More effort is needed to identify and deploy technologies and
    work procedures that can maintain or improve our security
    responsiveness while reducing physical security force staffing and
    overtime requirements.
        In fiscal year 2004, the NNSA will initiate a modest research and
    development effort to pursue emerging technologies. In addition to our
    historic rate of physical protection upgrades, the modest research and
    development effort will focus on applied technology to define a more
    robust, flexible, and cost-effective security architecture across all
    aspects of our work in the coming decade. These areas include earlier
    detection of adversaries, automated response capabilities, better
    coordinated communications, more efficient efforts to delay
    adversaries, better detection of contraband at site perimeters and
    enhanced cyber-security. This relates to both the current
    infrastructure and operations as well as our up-front planning for new
    construction and operations. Early in 2003, we completed an initial
    review of our technology needs and applications. In fiscal year 2004,
    we will complete the gap analysis of needed security efforts, review
    various technologies for near-term application, and target areas that
    have the potential for significant long-term contributions. Throughout
    this effort, we will engage with the ongoing efforts and experiences of
    the Department of Energy's other program areas and National
    Laboratories as well as other Federal agencies such as Departments of
    Defense and Homeland Security, to help assure sharing of best practices
    and maximum leveraging of our resources.

                RELATIONSHIP TO DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        The standup of the NNSA has been shaped by the Nation's response
    over the past 18 months to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.
    Because the NNSA is the steward of the facilities and assets for the
    Nation's nuclear weapons complex, we placed the highest priority on
    addressing urgent, emergent concerns about the safeguards and security
    posture of our nationwide complex of facilities and transportation
    systems. We also upgraded our emergency response assets, which are
    available to be deployed in emergencies around the world. We have
    accelerated research and development on chemical and biological agents,
    and have shared the expertise resident in our laboratories and other
    facilities with other agencies and municipalities as part of the
    expanded focus on homeland security across the government. NNSA has
    contributed research and development and Federal support programs to
    the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and provided expertise
    and administrative support for startup of the new department. These
    programs, totaling about $88 million, include research and development
    to counter the chemical and biological threats; nuclear smuggling
    research and development; nuclear assessments program, from MPC&A; and
    Federal program direction funding in support of these programs.
        The legislation establishing the new Department specified that the
    Nation's radiological response capabilities will remain under the
    direction of the Secretary of Energy and NNSA Administrator. Funding
    for the radiological assets will remain within NNSA's Nuclear Weapons
    Incident Response programs ($90 million in fiscal year 2004). The
    assets will continue to respond to radiological accidents at
    Departmental facilities and will support Federal law enforcement
    activities where nuclear materials may be involved. NNSA's Office of
    Emergency Operations will work cooperatively with the DHS, and, when
    deployed in formally designated situations, the radiological assets
    will take direction from the Secretary of Homeland Security as the Lead
    Federal Agency. A Memorandum of Agreement establishing a framework for
    DHS to access the capabilities of these assets was finalized between
    the two Departments last month.

                          OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

        Finally, I will summarize the fiscal year 2004 budget request for
    the NNSA Federal workforce, both Headquarters and field. The Office of
    the Administrator account provides the corporate direction and
    oversight of NNSA operations consistent with the principles of
    protecting the environment and safeguarding the safety and health of
    the public and workforce of the NNSA. This account now represents the
    consolidated program direction funds from the former Weapons Activities
    and Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation accounts; the Naval Reactors and
    Secure Transportation Asset activities retain separately funded program
    direction accounts. Our fiscal year 2004 budget request of $348 million
    reflects declining staffing levels and includes about $16 million for
    re-engineering incentives and relocation costs necessary to bring about
    the new NNSA organizational model.

                               MANAGEMENT ISSUES

        I would like to conclude by discussing some of the management
    challenges and successes NNSA has faced. The most obvious challenge has
    been the ongoing problems at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. There
    are three specific areas of concern at Los Alamos: improper use of
    government-issued credit cards; potentially fraudulent use of purchase
    orders; and poor accountability of government property. These problems
    taken together reveal significant weaknesses in business practices at
    the Laboratory.
        As soon as we learned about the extent of these problems this past
    fall, Secretary Abraham and I insisted that the University of
    California, which manages the laboratory for the Department, take
    corrective action. Subsequently, the University has replaced the Los
    Alamos Director and Deputy Director, and demoted or replaced 15 other
    officials. The University also has subordinated business services and
    auditing at the laboratory directly to the University, brought in
    outside firms to conduct detailed audits, and made numerous changes in
    the internal procedures. Generally, we are satisfied with the
    corrective action taken to date. The Secretary has directed the Deputy
    Secretary and me to conduct a review of the future relationship between
    the University of California and the Department. This review will be
    complete by the end of April. In addition, we are compiling a
    comprehensive set of ``lessons learned'' from the Los Alamos problems
    to share with all DOE sites.
        On a more optimistic note, good progress has been made in
    implementing the intent of Congress in creating the NNSA. The National
    Nuclear Security Administration is in its third year of operation,
    focusing the management of the Nation's nuclear security programs
    through a single organization. The new organization brought together
    the Department of Energy's Defense Programs, Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation, and Naval Reactors organizations in a separately
    organized and managed agency within the DOE. The standup of the
    organization has been a complex undertaking, and I am pleased to report
    that NNSA is now fully operational. As a result of our strategic
    planning exercises last year, and the resulting re-engineering of
    program responsibilities and organizations, we are getting a better
    handle on the many diverse components of the NNSA programs. Through an
    emphasis on our new Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation
    (PPBE) process, we are planning programs with a long-term view,
    budgeting within a firm 5-year resource envelope, and managing program
    and budget execution with more discipline, all leading to better
    results for the citizens of the United States.
        On December 20, 2002, the NNSA began a fundamental restructuring of
    its management structure designed to implement the President's
    Management Agenda to create a more effective NNSA. The NNSA of the
    future will build upon the successes of the past by giving outstanding
    people the tools needed for strong and effective management of our
    vital national security mission. This reorganization eliminated a layer
    of Federal management oversight in the field by disestablishing NNSA's
    three Operations Offices at Albuquerque, Nevada, and Oakland; shifting
    the focus of Federal management oversight to eight Site Offices, closer
    to where the actual work is performed; and consolidating all business
    and administrative support functions into a Service Center to be
    located in Albuquerque to increase overall efficiency. These changes
    were the culmination of 9 months of functional and business process re-
    engineering, as first described in the Administrator's February 2002
    ``Report to Congress on the Organization and Operations of the National
    Nuclear Security Administration.'' These management and organizational
    reforms are expected to permit NNSA to achieve significant Federal
    staff reductions of about 20 percent in the nuclear weapons enterprise
    by the end of fiscal year 2004.
        As we continue to implement the NNSA Act, we are particularly
    mindful of the President's Management Agenda to which we are firmly
    committed. We have invested much time and energy over the past year to
    carrying out its five major initiatives. Implementation of a PPBE
    process as NNSA's core business practice is designed to improve budget
    and performance integration throughout the organization. During the
    past 12 months, NNSA has been involved in an intensive effort to design
    and implement a PPBE framework simultaneously with the standup of the
    new NNSA organization. The processes have been designed in-house, along
    the lines of the DOD's PPBS system but tailored to our needs. We are
    adapting processes to address NNSA's emerging organization and unique
    business operations, and working within limited administrative staffing
    levels.
        Budgeting structures are being updated and aligned with management
    structures. We are making excellent progress in finalizing the cascade
    of performance metrics linked from the NNSA Strategic Plan to the
    individual budget and reporting (accounting) codes and contractor work
    authorizations. There is a very significant improvement in the
    Performance Measures across all programs for fiscal year 2004.
    Evaluation is becoming formalized through linkage with the budget, and
    improved by the realignment of roles and responsibilities for program
    managers and financial managers across the complex.
        We are pleased with the early progress of PPBE in becoming the core
    operating philosophy for NNSA. The first year was spent on process
    design, integration of the NNSA programs primarily at Headquarters, and
    in consultations and coordination of our efforts with the DOE Office of
    Management, Budget and Evaluation/Chief Financial Officer and the
    administration. The DOE Inspector General is currently auditing the
    first year's implementation, with a report expected in late spring
    2003. Our near term goal is to extend more formalized PPBE roles and
    missions from our Headquarters organizations to the new NNSA Federal
    field structure and the M&O contractors as the NNSA re-engineering
    proceeds during the next 12-18 months. It will take several budget
    cycles and lessons learned to complete the culture change, and to
    properly staff the organization to fully realize the benefits of PPBE.
    The NNSA remains committed to this goal.
        The NNSA also participated in the Administration's Performance
    Assessment Rating Tool (PART) analyses, evaluating four programs that
    encompass about 20 percent of NNSA's annual funding. The PART
    assessment noted that the NNSA programs were well managed and that NNSA
    management was proactively working to make additional improvements to
    program effectiveness and efficiency. Two of the NNSA programs,
    Advanced Simulation and Computing and International Nuclear Materials
    Protection and Cooperation, were rated in the top 5 percent of programs
    government-wide and received the highest PART ratings of ``Effective''
    from the Office of Management and Budget. The PART analysis tool
    embodies and reinforces the PPBE processes and discipline we are
    implementing throughout NNSA. We plan to incorporate the PART
    assessment for all of NNSA's programs as part of our annual Evaluation
    cycle, starting with the fiscal year 2005 budget this summer.

                                   CONCLUSION

        In conclusion, I remain confident that we are headed in the right
    direction. Our budget request will support continuing our progress in
    protecting and certifying our nuclear deterrent, reducing the global
    nuclear danger from proliferation and weapons of mass destruction, and
    enhancing the force projection capabilities of the U.S. nuclear Navy.
    It will enable us to continue to maintain the safety and security of
    our people, information, materials, and infrastructure. Above all, it
    will meet the national security needs of the United Stated in the 21st
    century.
        Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. Now, I would be
    pleased to answer any questions that you and members of the
    subcommittee may have.

        Senator Allard. Before I call on Admiral Ellis, I want to
    check with my colleague, Senator Nelson from Florida, and see
    if he has any opening statement?

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON

        Senator Bill Nelson. I want to thank you for being
    persistent that we get this hearing before us, and I will save
    my comments for questions.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Bill Nelson follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Senator Bill Nelson

        Thank you, Senator Allard. Good afternoon. I want to join Senator
    Allard in welcoming all of you to the Strategic Forces Subcommittee
    hearing this afternoon. I am glad we were able to reschedule this
    hearing, particularly on rather short notice. Senator Allard, thank you
    for being persistent in making sure we could get this very important
    hearing in before the subcommittee markup.
        In the two panels we have present today we will be able to cover
    almost all aspects of the U.S. strategic programs. At the outset,
    however, I would note the success of the bomber fleet in Iraq. The B-
    52, the B-1 and the B-2 are once again demonstrating how very important
    they are to any military activity. Bombers are essential to gaining and
    maintaining control of the skies at the outset of any campaign and in
    ensuring the success of our forces on the ground.
        The U.S. bomber fleet is old, particularly the B-52s, and we are
    planning on keeping them in the air for a very long time, many until
    2040. As such, it is essential that we devote the time and attention
    needed to modernize and maintain these aircraft and make sure that they
    are there when we need them.
        The primary focus of this hearing today, however, is the nuclear
    deterrent. Maintaining a reliable nuclear deterrent has been a key to
    U.S. national security strategy for many years. Nuclear weapons will no
    doubt continue to play an important role in U.S. national security for
    the foreseeable future. I look forward to discussing today the nuclear
    forces from all perspectives including the future for nuclear weapons
    and nuclear weapons policy.
        On the National Nuclear Security Administration side, the stockpile
    stewardship program has made considerable progress. I believe it is a
    fair statement that the scientists and engineers in the NNSA nuclear
    weapons complex understand the stockpile better today than ever before.
    The various experimental tools that are coming on line are developing a
    record of success in identifying and resolving a variety of issues.
        On the military service side the news is also good. The D5 backfit
    is progressing on schedule, the Minuteman III upgrade program has
    successfully resolved most of its issues and the drawdown of the
    Peacekeeper is on track.
        It is no secret, however, that several elements of the
    administration's budget and legislative request are controversial. In
    particular, the proposal to repeal the decade old ban on the
    development of new low-yield nuclear weapons appears to be a
    significant new step in U.S. nuclear weapons policy.
        Nuclear weapons policy is a serious issue. Congress has an
    obligation to ensure that there is a serious, full, and frank
    discussion of the policy and changes to that policy. The U.S. is
    currently engaged in a war in Iraq due in large part to concerns over
    efforts to develop nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.
        I look forward to continuing this most important discussion today
    with our witnesses.
        Thank you.

        Senator Allard. Thank you.
        Admiral Ellis, you are up.

     STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES O. ELLIS, JR., USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
                        STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

        Admiral Ellis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Nelson,
    distinguished members of the subcommittee. I, too, have a
    prepared statement that I would like to submit for the record,
    sir.
        Senator Allard. Without objection.
        Admiral Ellis. As always, it is an honor to once again
    appear before you representing the outstanding professionals of
    the United States Strategic Command. Following our discussions
    last month on space operations, I look forward to focusing
    today on our strategic deterrent mission and the opportunities
    we now have to shape a dramatically different strategic future
    for the command and for the Nation.
        The forces that underpin our deterrence mission and the men
    and women who design, plan, sustain, exercise, and operate them
    have not only helped bring a peaceful end to the Cold War, but
    also remain an important part of our Nation's future security
    structure. I commit to you that a robust and disciplined
    nuclear planning and oversight, conducted for the Nation for
    more than half a century, will remain a primary focus for the
    new United States Strategic Command.
        It has been an extraordinary 15 months since the Nuclear
    Posture Review began movement towards the new triad and
    dramatic reductions in our nuclear arsenal. In that short time,
    we completed the most sweeping revision of our Nation's
    strategic planning in a generation, updating our deterrent
    posture for the realities of the new international environment.
    We created an entirely new unified command to better address
    the Nation's global warfighting and deterrent needs. We assumed
    new responsibilities under Change-2 to the Unified Command Plan
    which will bring into even sharper focus our deterrent mission
    as we blend our now broadened portfolio together in innovative
    ways to enhance the Nation's security.
        We have provided intelligence and planning capabilities to
    the Regional Combatant Commanders, leveraging our historic
    expertise and unique tools to assist warfighters faced with the
    challenge of countering weapons of mass destruction and the
    systems that could be used to deliver them.
        We began reductions to the Nation's deployed nuclear
    arsenal by initiating the retirement of the Peacekeeper ICBM
    and removing two and soon to be four ballistic missile
    submarines from strategic nuclear service.
        Finally, we continue to provide missile warning for the
    Nation and for our forces in the field.
        Importantly, as you have alluded to, we are also engaged in
    the demanding work of charting the course of meeting our future
    needs. We have recognized that there are many opportunities
    ahead, and I am committed to working with our strong and
    growing team of partners to address each one. Opportunities to
    move our Nation forward that we will address together include
    the following:

             Implementing the recommendations of the
            Nuclear Posture Review, to include advocating the
            development of advanced offensive and defensive
            capabilities along with their supporting systems and
            infrastructures;
             Delivering quickly on the promise of
            information operations;
             Bringing to fruition the same concept of
            planning non-kinetic efforts with known weapons systems
            reliabilities and analytically-based consequences of
            execution that have been done for our nuclear
            stockpile;
             Integrating global missile defense across
            regional boundaries, among disparate land and sea-based
            systems, with our offensive forces to better protect
            our Nation and our forces in the field;
             Working with those who will provide
            communications architecture and persistent intelligence
            capabilities so robust that it not only provides
            adequate C\4\ISR, but also takes on a substantial
            deterrent character all its own;
             Ensuring safe, secure, reliable, and credible
            nuclear systems as they continue to age well beyond the
            original life expectancy; and,
             Finally, improving anti-terrorism and first
            protection measures for both our critical deterrent
            forces and the tremendous capabilities we have on
            orbit.

        We will assist not only in crafting a vision, but also a
    clear and detailed course of action in each area. We will
    pursue the dispassionate analysis of advanced weapons concepts,
    to provide a shared set of analytically derived data on which
    to base the policy discussion and decisions appropriate at
    senior levels of government. We will also pursue and
    participate in discussions of future deterrence concepts beyond
    2012.
        Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to represent the men and women
    of the United States Strategic Command and its components who
    are working harder than ever today to ensure the most effective
    deterrent force for tomorrow. It is also a privilege to join
    Ambassador Linton Brooks in this hearing. The NNSA is a strong
    and vital partner of STRATCOM and the Department of Defense.
    With their unparalleled expertise, we are together pursuing the
    life extension and Stockpile Stewardship Programs that will
    sustain and modernize our forces for the demands of a new and
    unpredictable security environment in the months and years
    ahead.
        Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Ellis follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Adm. James O. Ellis, USN

        Mr. Chairman, Senator Nelson, and distinguished members of the
    subcommittee, it is an honor to again appear before you, representing
    the outstanding men and women of United States Strategic Command, to
    address the strategic issues that remain so vital to the Nation. As you
    recall, during our last hearing we discussed space operations, allowing
    us to focus today on strategic deterrence and the actions underway to
    shape a dramatically different strategic future.
        U.S. Strategic Command, our components, and our task forces are
    crafting an entirely new command, instrumental in fighting the war on
    terrorism, deterring a wider array of potential adversaries, and
    focused on recasting the Nation's global military capabilities for the
    demands of the 21st century.
        We are drawing on the best elements of both U.S. Space Command and
    U.S. Strategic Command in order to eliminate seams, broaden oversight
    and streamline responsibilities. Significant reductions in the level of
    operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons have begun in
    compliance with Presidential direction, the Nuclear Posture Review
    (NPR) and the Moscow Treaty while continuing to meet our obligations
    under START. Associated deactivation or modification of strategic
    delivery platforms is also well underway.
        STRATCOM continues to deploy or provide intelligence, planning,
    targeting, space, and information operations expertise to operations in
    U.S. Central Command and around the world. We have reshaped and
    streamlined the command's component and organizational structure to
    enable an integrated and trans-regional approach to matching global
    capabilities to global challenges. Importantly, we also completed a
    comprehensive update to our deterrent force plans to reflect the needs
    of the new international security environment.
        While these efforts are critical, they represent only the first
    steps toward a much broader vision of our strategic future. On January
    10, 2003, the President signed Change Two to the Unified Command Plan
    and tasked us specifically with four previously unassigned
    responsibilities. These are: global strike, missile defense
    integration, Department of Defense information operations, and command,
    control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance (C\4\ISR). This unique combination of roles,
    capabilities, and authorities under a single unified command will bring
    new opportunities in the strategic arena, in addition to further
    refining the global opportunities to support the regional combatant
    commanders.
        We are quickly integrating the efforts of our strong and growing
    team of service, agency, national laboratory, and Intelligence
    Community partners to define specific goals, identify milestones and
    quantify the progress of our collective efforts. Today, the new U.S.
    Strategic Command is improving our Nation's joint combat effectiveness
    by modernizing systems, streamlining processes, and providing a broader
    range of fully integrated mission capabilities to the warfighter and to
    our Nation's leaders.

                   THE FUTURE OF OUR NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE

        I am proud to again report that our Nation's nuclear deterrent
    forces remain fully ready. They are manned by a cadre of true
    professionals who, around the world and around the clock, effectively
    support the nuclear pillar of our national security strategy. For more
    than 56 years, Strategic Air Command and the former U.S. Strategic
    Command stood at the ready, supporting deterrence through rigorous and
    disciplined planning, effective training, and robust command and
    control of our Nation's strategic nuclear forces. The professionals of
    the new U.S. Strategic Command still willingly shoulder that enormous
    responsibility. We remain fully confident that STRATCOM's readiness,
    and that of our service components, is the most effective guarantee
    that the use of these weapons will never be required. As we reshape our
    organization and assume broader responsibilities, we remain committed
    to rigorously ensuring the continued safety and surety of our nuclear
    arsenal and delivery systems. Zero defects remain our standard.
        We are making prudent and measurable progress in achieving the
    President's goal, codified in the Moscow Treaty, of between 1,700 to
    2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by the year
    2012. Air Force Space Command, our Air Force component, began
    deactivation of Peacekeeper ICBMs on 1 October 2002. This effort
    remains on schedule and will be complete by 2005. The Navy removed two
    Trident submarines, U.S.S. Ohio and U.S.S. Florida, from strategic
    service in fiscal year 2003, to be followed in fiscal year 2004 by
    U.S.S. Michigan and U.S.S. Georgia. All four of these capable vessels
    will be modified into Tomahawk cruise missile carriers, designated
    SSGN, by the end of 2007. They will also provide a tremendous increase
    in the size and sustainability of support to our special operations
    forces. With the 1996 re-role of the B-1 to a non-nuclear role, we are
    moving to retire several hundred gravity weapons in fiscal year 2003,
    and are finalizing plans to remove many of the oldest ICBM warheads
    from the Nation's active nuclear stockpile.

                         SUSTAINMENT AND MODERNIZATION

        With no new nuclear systems under development, the important task
    of sustaining and modernizing our Nation's aging weapons and delivery
    platforms must be carefully managed and appropriately resourced. These
    forces must remain a ready, reliable, and credible element of our
    Nation's security posture. Other than the Navy's submarine launched D5
    missile, still in low-rate production, we are no longer building any of
    the weapons or platforms that comprise our strategic forces. We
    appreciate your continued strong support, through service and agency
    programs, of our key weapon, delivery platform, and communications life
    extension and upgrade programs. These include:

             Minuteman III Guidance Replacement Program (GRP),
            which replaces aging electronic components and updates software
            to preserve reliability, maintain accuracy, and ensure
            supportability through 2020. The GRP is the foundation of MMIII
            modernization and is being completed at the rate of 80 per
            year, with 140 deployed to date.
             Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP),
            which corrects age-related degrades by repouring the propellant
            in stages I and II, and remanufactures stage III. PRP requires
            GRP software for fielding, and must be sequenced appropriately.
            It is programmed at the rate of 96 per year, with 49 boosters
            deployed to date.
             B-52 Avionics Mid-life Improvement, one of STRATCOM's
            highest priorities, and AEHF upgrade, which ensure mission
            capability and assured connectivity as this aircraft continues
            to establish new benchmarks in service longevity.
             D5 SLBM Life Extension and Backfit Programs, which
            will provide a standardized fleet of 14 SSBNs for the full hull
            life of the Trident II. Two of four SSBNs have completed
            backfit with the remaining two scheduled for completion in
            fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2007. D5 life extension
            requires replacement of guidance and missile electronics on
            fielded D5 missiles, and procurement of 115 additional missiles
            to meet reliability testing needs over the 14-year life
            extension of the hull. The D5 Life Extension Program is
            adequately funded and on schedule for initial operational
            capability (IOC) in fiscal year 2013.
             B-2 communications upgrade, which may require
            acceleration in future years to ensure secure and survivable
            connectivity as AEHF replaces MILSTAR.
             Strategic War Planning System (SWPS), which recently
            completed an initial upgrade and is now entering a new phase.
            This new modernization effort will incorporate the flexibility
            and responsiveness envisioned by the Nuclear Posture Review and
            broadened to support our newly assigned non-nuclear strategic
            and regional support missions.
             Combatant Commanders Integrated Command and Control
            System (C2IC2S), which will replace aging and unsustainable
            NORAD/U.S. Strategic Command mission-unique battle management
            systems with a single, open architecture. CCIC2S is on track to
            incrementally deliver warfighting C2 capability for NORAD in
            late fiscal year 2004, strategic missile warning in early
            fiscal year 2006, with space surveillance and control
            capabilities being delivered from fiscal year 2003 through
            fiscal year 2008.

        In addition to our vital life extension and modernization programs,
    we are working closely with our partners in the Departments of Defense
    and Energy, and Congress to ensure our nuclear stockpile remains safe,
    reliable, and credible. As the Nation's nuclear stockpile continues to
    age, we must carefully monitor its condition. Through the National
    Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) science-based Stockpile
    Stewardship Program, we continue to improve our surveillance, modeling,
    simulation tools and processes in order to provide the critical data on
    aging effects, component reliability and physics phenomena we require
    in the absence of nuclear weapon testing. Past drawdowns in nuclear
    weapon infrastructure require that the essential warhead life extension
    programs be carefully sequenced with scheduled warhead dismantlement so
    as to provide just-in-time delivery to meet operational deterrent force
    requirements. We are working closely with the NNSA, the national labs
    and plants to shape their support to our future stockpile. With the
    production complex operating near its peak capacity, we will need to
    optimize the balance between essential life extension programs and
    dismantlement work.
        Annually, at the direction of the President, I provide a nuclear
    weapon stockpile assessment to the Secretary of Defense. In my last
    assessment, based on the information provided by my staff and
    independent advice from our expert Strategic Advisory Group, I outlined
    my confidence in the safety and reliability of the stockpile. This is
    the first time since the program began in 1996 that a STRATCOM
    assessment did not indicate a decline in confidence in the reliability
    of the stockpile. I attribute this directly to the continued
    improvements in and funding for the Stockpile Stewardship Program, to
    the steps taken by NNSA and the services to diligently address
    previously reported technical issues, and to the progress of the
    ongoing life extension programs. I agree with the rigorous technical
    analysis conducted, and confirmed to the Secretary there is currently
    no need to consider resumption of nuclear testing. I appreciate your
    strong support for funding of the NNSA, enabling continuation of their
    important work.
        As we continue to sustain and modernize our forces, we are also
    working closely with the services and the Department of Energy to
    address the critical anti-terrorism and force protection requirements
    associated with safeguarding the Nation's nuclear systems. The ongoing
    Mighty Guardian exercise series and the Nuclear Command and Control
    System Federal Advisory Committee End-to-End Review have helped the
    services and the Department of Energy better focus their security
    efforts. While the changing character of the postulated threats
    requires continuous evaluation, I believe the services are making
    concrete improvements in physical security, though much remains to be
    done. We will continue to encourage this effort through the STRATCOM
    Integrated Priority List and will remain an active participant in the
    creation of implementation guidance that will flow from completed
    Office of the Secretary of Defense policy studies such as the NPR and
    the End-to-End Review.

                          FUTURE ENHANCED CAPABILITIES

        It is well known that much of our current military capability was
    designed or procured for a dramatically different international
    security environment. This is especially true of our Nation's deterrent
    forces. Though sustainment and modernization of these systems remains
    essential, equally important is the examination of future concepts and
    the contribution they could make to our deterrent posture. A
    fundamental assumption of the Nuclear Posture Review is that a mix of
    advanced capabilities, some yet to be designed, that include
    conventional, non-kinetic, special operations and nuclear, is needed in
    order to offer the broadest range of options to our Nation's leaders.
    Such a spectrum of capabilities will both enable the planned NPR draw
    down in operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons and form part
    of a New Triad of deterrence in support of the President's goal of
    reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. While there are certainly
    significant policy issues associated with this transformational effort,
    it is also true that much laboratory research and development, detailed
    analytical study and advanced simulation efforts are an essential
    underpinning to such a fact-based dialogue. A number of organizations,
    including the Department of Defense and the Defense Science Board have
    nascent reviews underway. As the Secretary of Defense has noted, these
    studies are intended to consider and weigh alternatives and in no way
    presuppose decisions as to detailed design, production or deployment.

    Advanced Conventional Capabilities and Global Strike
        U.S. Strategic Command's newly assigned global strike mission
    extends our long-standing and globally focused deterrent capabilities
    to the broader spectrum of conflict. We will incorporate conventional,
    non-kinetic, and special operations capabilities into a full-spectrum
    contingency arsenal and into the Nation's strategic war plan to further
    reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons. This innovative approach will
    enable the command to deliberately and adaptively plan and rapidly
    deliver limited-duration, non-nuclear combat power anywhere in the
    world. Our intent is to provide a wide range of advanced options to the
    President in responding to time-critical, high-threat, global
    challenges and, thereby, raise even higher the nuclear threshold.
        As envisioned, global strike could be decisively conducted at the
    direction of our most senior civilian leaders. It also represents a
    powerful tool in support of the regional combatant commander,
    essentially increasing the forces and options he has available to deter
    and engage an adversary. In either case, global strike will provide the
    Nation the ability to engage priority targets by moving rapidly from
    actionable intelligence, through adaptive planning, to senior-level
    decisionmaking and the delivery of kinetic or non-kinetic effects
    across thousands of miles. It can provide what may be the most critical
    element early in the fight--time. As a regional combatant commander
    assembles and moves forces into position or needs to strike into
    temporarily denied areas, U.S. Strategic Command can provide early
    planning and tangible, long-range combat capability. We are initially
    building this capability around the bomber force, and are bringing the
    B-1 back into our force structure in its purely conventional role. This
    committee's continued support of advanced conventional weapons
    initiatives such as the SSGN will assist in our immediate efforts to
    improve joint warfighting effectiveness. We continue to study concepts
    such as conventional ballistic missiles, Common Aerospace Vehicles,
    hypersonic aircraft, and unmanned combat aerial vehicles that could
    play a significant role in improving our global strike capabilities in
    the mid- to long-term.

    Information Operations (IO)
        Delivering on the promise of information operations is one of U.S.
    Strategic Command's top priorities. Incorporating computer network
    attack and defense, electronic warfare, psychological operations,
    strategic deception and operational security, this nascent mission area
    promises to dramatically improve our offensive and defensive
    capabilities, and may play a large role in shaping the size and
    character of future force structures. Quite simply, I believe that
    integrated IO comprise the next revolution in warfighting, and our new
    role as the integrator of DOD information operations will bring a joint
    perspective to improvements in capabilities, ensure ready access to IO
    planning, reduce stovepipes, test and validate new capabilities, and
    provide a responsive command and control system to the Nation's
    civilian leaders and combatant commanders.
        Our current vision has U.S. Strategic Command serving as the
    central IO armory. While we need not own service and agency IO
    programs, or execute all IO missions, we must have full insight and
    access to all DOD IO capabilities as well as execution capability for
    strategic efforts. We will capitalize on our proven expertise in
    detailed intelligence collection, rigorous nuclear planning and
    consequence analysis to bring a fully integrated, deliberate planning
    process to the IO realm. We envision providing weapons or capabilities
    with documented system reliability and analytically based estimates of
    consequences and effectiveness, just as we have done for decades with
    the Nation's nuclear forces. We will support an expeditious national-
    level approval process for conducting IO, and we will work to ensure
    national leaders and warfighters have what they need at their disposal,
    not only during crisis but also during the critical planning, training,
    exercise, and deployment phases. In this vein, we have conducted a
    number of advanced information operations exercises, spanning the
    entire planning, approval, execution, and battle damage assessment
    phases, and have identified valuable lessons for inclusion in our
    future planning and development processes.

    Missile Defense
        The danger posed by weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
    systems is clearly one of our Nation's top concerns. As we discussed
    during my last appearance, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is actively
    developing an array of land, air, and sea-based missile defense systems
    to provide an additional level of protection for our homeland, our
    allies, and our forces in the field. Although still in the early stages
    of development, global missile defense will become an important third
    leg of the Nation's New Triad beginning next year.
        While the MDA develops and acquires our missile defense systems,
    U.S. Strategic Command is charged with efficiently integrating and
    operationalizing global missile defense, enabling an initial defensive
    operations capability in less than 18 months from today. As General
    Myers noted recently before the full committee, missile defense is
    inherently a multi-command and multi-regional task, and we are
    developing the global concept of operations and command and control
    architecture to provide the full support needed by the regional
    combatant commanders to defend their theaters, including the ballistic
    missile defense of the continental United States by U.S. Northern
    Command. With the unique combination of missions now assigned to our
    command, we are also working to integrate the emerging defensive
    capabilities with our full-spectrum of offensive capabilities, to
    support rapid and fully informed decisionmaking at the appropriate
    tactical level. This effort will be aided by the long-existing
    relationships we have crafted as the historic provider of ballistic
    missile integrated threat warning.

    Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C\4\)
        In the fast-paced and complex national security environment of the
    21st century, U.S. decisionmakers and warfighters must have seamless
    access to superior information to conduct decisive operations. Under
    the Unified Command Plan, STRATCOM now is assigned the role of tasking
    and coordinating C4 in support of strategic force employment. Our
    objective is to provide a more capable and flexible means to integrate,
    synchronize, coordinate, and convey information at any level from the
    President to the front-line combatant. We will partner closely with
    U.S. Joint Forces Command and the Defense Information Systems Agency in
    this critical effort.
        The events of September 11, 2001, illustrate the need to improve
    our national command and control architecture, and we are working with
    the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, and
    Communications (ASD/C3) and a host of others to craft a new national-
    level C4 system. This system must allow increased access to a broader
    array of Federal agencies, provide improved information flow, enable
    rapid decisionmaking, and support the requirements of our network-
    centric forces in the Information Age. While this is important for the
    Nation and all of the Department's missions, it is imperative for the
    strategic deterrent, integrated missile defense, and global strike
    missions, where data collection, analysis, decisionmaking, and
    execution must occur within dramatically compressed timelines. We will
    leverage our experience with nuclear command and control to create a
    robust, hardened component to the national C4 system to preserve and
    strengthen the deterrent effect that assured communications, rapid
    decisionmaking and certain action provide. We appreciate your
    continuing support of the innovative communications initiatives such as
    the Transformational Communications Architecture and the important
    delivery platform connectivity upgrades vital to robust command and
    control.

    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
        U.S. Strategic Command is also tasked under the Unified Command
    Plan to plan, coordinate, and integrate ISR for the Department of
    Defense in support of global and strategic operations. While ISR has
    always provided intelligence insight and targeting data, recent world
    events have demonstrated the critical role comprehensive ISR operations
    can play in senior-level decisionmaking, tactical planning and even
    deterrence.
        We will work closely with Department of Defense and Intelligence
    Community partners to develop and institutionalize the processes and
    systems necessary to maximize the capabilities of existing systems and
    assess intelligence collection priorities. New concepts such as
    intrusive ISR, incorporating space-based, air-breathing, terrestrial
    and maritime elements, could take us beyond passive collection
    benefits, especially when integrated with critical human intelligence
    and technical data. Our objective is to not only better provide
    persistent, actionable, predictive intelligence, but also to deter the
    threatening actions that a robust, global, persistent ISR capability
    could bring into full view. Systems such as the Space Based Infrared
    System (SBIRS), Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) and Space Based Radar
    (SBR) represent the high end of a spectrum that must also bring
    advanced air-breathing, terrestrial and maritime elements into a global
    architecture. Our ISR needs and regional focus in time of crisis are
    well known. In the future, global challenges will require an ISR
    capability that is broad and deep enough to simultaneously meet all
    national and regional needs across the continuum of peace, crisis, and
    conflict.

                          OPTIMIZING THE ORGANIZATION

        As you recall from my previous statements, U.S. Strategic Command
    is realigning our overall headquarters organizational structure in
    order to effectively and efficiently address a wider range of
    responsibilities. We will organize along functional and operational
    lines, rather than administrative in an effort to focus on our primary
    mission areas. As we move to our new organizational alignment this
    month, we will expand the use of enhanced planning and analysis tools
    into our newly assigned mission areas. While we will draw heavily on
    their tools and skills, we will retain the core nuclear planning staff
    as a distinct element in our headquarters, organizationally aligned and
    consolidated to ensure focused and dedicated nuclear planning and
    expertise continues in the future as it has for more than half a
    century.
        As we design concepts of operations for the new command, we are
    pursuing innovative new service relationships that will enable the
    command to efficiently tap into the unique skills and expertise
    resident in an array of other organizations, without requiring full-
    time STRATCOM ownership of their forces. We are strengthening our
    partnerships with the national agencies in order to collaboratively
    approach our new mission areas, particularly in the highly technical
    and focused realm of intelligence, information operations, and
    communications. We have forged new relationships with the National
    Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Defense
    Information Systems Agency. Each has incredibly talented professionals
    and dedicated systems, processes, and procedures that are important to
    our shared success but which need not be duplicated in our
    headquarters. We are also excited about the opportunity to leverage our
    strong relationships with the national laboratories as we expand and
    develop new capabilities applicable to our recently assigned missions.
        As we discussed previously, success in any of our missions depends
    on our number one asset--our people. Creating a culture of excellence
    in a broader and deeper range of missions while sustaining the
    standards still reflected in our nuclear and space communities will
    depend on recruiting, training, and retaining the best and the
    brightest, in our military, in public service, in industry, and at the
    national labs. We will fully support and participate in efforts to
    create and sustain cadres of space, nuclear, and information operations
    professionals in both the Department of Defense and the Department of
    Energy. They are absolutely essential to our future.

                          CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

        As we work to achieve the goals, carry out the responsibilities and
    deliver the capabilities needed for the global challenges of the 21st
    century, we will encounter many difficulties and find many more
    opportunities. It will not be quick or easy; few truly important
    efforts are. We will need to keep in mind our broader objectives, even
    as we wrestle with the daily technical, operational or policy details.
    Though the list will doubtless change over time, our specific strategic
    goals are:

             Fully implementing the guidance of the Nuclear Posture
            Review, to include advocating the development of advanced
            offensive and integration of defensive capabilities in order to
            meet the President's goal of reducing our reliance on
            operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons.
             Delivering on the promise of information operations to
            the warfighter.
             Integrating global missile defenses across regional
            boundaries, combining land, air, and sea-based systems with
            capable offensive forces to better protect the Nation and our
            forces in the field.
              Providing adequate bandwidth and a robust
            communications architecture for rapid decisionmaking and global
            combat operations at the strategic and operational level.
             Supporting technical and process enhancements in
            intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance so as to provide
            comprehensive, persistent, predictive, and actionable strategic
            capabilities.
             Redefining the STRATCOM organizational structure and
            crafting new relationships with the services and national
            agencies to effectively and efficiently support our broadened
            responsibilities.
             Supporting the services' and the Department of
            Energy's efforts to enhance anti-terrorism and force protection
            measures for our critical space and nuclear facilities.
             Addressing concepts of deterrence and the associated
            force structure appropriate for the new international security
            environment of this decade and beyond.

        Each of these challenges will require a team effort, inside and
    outside the command. As we move forward, we look forward to working
    with you and the many others who are privileged to share the humbling
    responsibilities for our Nation's defense.

                                   CONCLUSION

        It is a time of great enthusiasm, excitement, and opportunity at
    U.S. Strategic Command. While 2002 was a year of new concepts, 2003 and
    2004 must clearly be years of execution. Driven by new tasking and new
    responsibilities, in a real sense we at STRATCOM have reclaimed the
    classic definition of strategic, as articulated by Sun Tzu, Clauswitz,
    Washington, or Webster. We no longer live in a world where strategic is
    synonymous with nuclear, and we are integrating and interlinking the
    command's broad portfolio of missions to better and more flexibly meet
    the deterrent needs of the Nation. We have taken the first important
    steps in the evolution of our full-spectrum ``new'' strategic
    capabilities, even as we have taken the historic first steps in drawing
    down our Nation's deployed nuclear arsenal.
        I appreciate your continued support of the men and women of
    STRATCOM and the unique and essential contributions they continue to
    make to our Nation's security. I look forward to reporting our
    continuing progress to you in the future, as we take the next important
    steps in building the new United States Strategic Command.
        Thank you, and I welcome your questions.

        Senator Allard. I thank you both for your testimony.
        I will start off with some questions and will direct the
    first one to Admiral Ellis. It used to be that when we referred
    to strategic basically we were referring to long-range nuclear.
    Now with the posture review, when we talk about offensive and
    defensive weapons, I guess the question comes to mind--I am so
    much confused myself--as to what is a strategic target. In
    connection with that, how would you define a strategic weapon?
    My understanding is that these definitions have changed over
    time.
        Admiral Ellis. They certainly have, sir. You have
    highlighted a theme that I have been sounding since the 1st of
    October last year, when the new United States Strategic Command
    was established. Many people believe that we kept the name the
    same and slid a new organization under it. But I remind
    audiences that in reality we have done just what you have
    described. We have redefined and recharacterized the term
    ``strategic.'' We have recaptured in a sense the classic
    definition of what ``strategic'' means.
        In other words, for many years, as you rightly noted, Mr.
    Chairman, we have equated ``strategic'' with ``nuclear.'' But
    if you go to the dictionary, if you go to Webster's, nowhere in
    there does the definition of ``strategic'' mention the word
    ``nuclear.'' Rather, it states, ``essential to the success of
    large-scale global operations.'' It talks about ``essential to
    the prosperity of a nation, but available in small quantities
    domestically.''
        There are a number of definitions ascribed to
    ``strategic,'' but none of them are ``nuclear.'' That indeed is
    what we are about. ``Strategic'' in my view encompasses a
    broader range of capabilities, all the capabilities that the
    Nation's military can bring to bear in its defense and its
    protection. It really refers to operations and capabilities
    conducted on a global scale, in support of Regional Combatant
    Commanders, if necessary, but in response to specific tasking
    of our own forces, if appropriate.
        I hope that helps put things back in context, sir. But you
    are exactly right, we have recaptured the classic definition of
    ``strategic'' at the new United States Strategic Command.
        Senator Allard. I thank you for that response.
        I wish you would go over a little bit for the subcommittee
    the significance of developing the advanced conventional
    munitions, particularly in light of the reductions of nuclear
    arms envisioned by the Nuclear Posture Review as well as the
    Moscow Treaty.
        Admiral Ellis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As you
    rightly allude, one of the fundamental assumptions or
    underpinnings of the Nuclear Posture Review was that as we draw
    down the Nation's operationally deployed strategic nuclear
    stockpile we would generate over time an enhancement in a
    number of areas. You have alluded to them in referencing the
    new triad.
        They include the infrastructure to which Ambassador Brooks
    alluded. They include robust command and control, adaptive
    planning capabilities. Most importantly, they also include new
    strategic capabilities, advanced concepts that are non-nuclear
    in context, and that includes advanced conventional as well as
    non-kinetic or information operations capabilities.
        As I said earlier, we have broadened the term ``strategic''
    and our goal is to provide a full range of options to the
    Nation's senior leadership, and the development of those
    capabilities at a pace that is appropriate for the drawdown in
    our nuclear forces is what was envisioned in the Nuclear
    Posture Review and is a capability or direction that I fully
    support.
        Senator Allard. How important would you say conventional
    munitions are today in carrying out your STRATCOM mission? How
    important do you think they might be 20 years from now?
        Admiral Ellis. Sir, as we have established ourselves on the
    1st of October and begun the creation of a nascent global
    strike capability--that is one of the four previously
    unassigned mission areas that have come to the United States
    Strategic Command--that capability obviously involves
    conventional weapons, as does the capabilities that are
    embedded in what is called Department of Defense information
    operations.
        As to the future, we see a need, an opportunity indeed, to
    pursue advanced conventional capabilities across that full
    spectrum, kinetic and non-kinetic. We believe that by
    partnering closely with the Services, the agencies, Defense
    Threat Reduction Agency, DARPA, the advanced development
    organizations and laboratories, as well as the National
    Aerospace Initiative and other capabilities that are beginning
    to take form, these advanced conventional capabilities will be
    an increasingly significant part of the planning capabilities
    that fall under our purview.
        They are absolutely essential to our future. They were a
    part of the assumptions that were implicit in the Nuclear
    Posture Review, and we certainly appreciate your support of
    these efforts to develop such capabilities.
        Senator Allard. That gets us down to the issue of delivery
    systems. Do we have the right mix of delivery systems to put
    those conventional advanced munitions on target?
        Admiral Ellis. My view is that for the near term I believe
    we do. We are working through the Services to address issues
    regarding sustaining our bomber forces, for example. Two weeks
    from today we celebrate the 51st birthday of the first flight
    of the B-52. Fifty-one years ago next week, that airplane first
    flew, and the projection is that it will continue to fly until
    2037.
        Clearly, we need to pay attention to these aging platforms
    and continue to examine how to modernize them and how to
    upgrade them to capably carry the current and future
    generations of weapons. We also need to explore new
    capabilities, some of which you are familiar with from your
    interest in space. Common Aerospace Vehicles and advanced
    delivery concepts of that type offer some promise for advanced
    conventional capabilities that would allow us to deal with
    time-critical targets half a world away in short order.
        As these types of things mature, we get more clarity on the
    capabilities that they do, in fact, deliver, and we are able to
    fold into the budget the tradeoffs that inevitably are part of
    this process in which we are all involved, I think it is going
    to be an important approach that we take for the future.
        Senator Allard. My time has expired.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I am going to let Senator Reed go. I
    have plenty of questions, so I will just take the time.
        Senator Allard. Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony. Ambassador
    Brooks, I have been listening closely as you talked about the
    request to repeal the ban on low-yield nuclear weapons. Your
    rationale seems to be wanting to sweep away the artificial
    intellectual constraints, but it strikes me that if that were
    the only thing that was at issue here you would request
    modification to the statutory language, not an outright ban.
    For example, the language could simply say: ``It shall be the
    policy of the United States not to produce a low-yield nuclear
    weapon, including a precision low-yield nuclear weapon.'' Is
    that accurate?
        Ambassador Brooks. It is accurate that that would eliminate
    one of the concerns that I have with the language, though the
    language now does have, we fear, a potentially chilling effect
    on R&D and as you have described a possible modification it
    might not. Speaking narrowly for the prospect of trying to get
    a robust advanced concept program working, language like that
    might be entirely suitable.
        My view, the administration's view, is that the ban on a
    particular class of weapons is a mistake because it substitutes
    sort of a mechanical limitation for a broad examination. We
    have low-yield weapons now. Is there a logic to saying that we
    can have older low-yield weapons, but that we know now that we
    are not going to ever want to produce new low-yield weapons?
        Now, to some extent I admit we are talking about an
    important signal, since I am not going to develop or produce
    anything without the permission of Congress and if Congress
    decides to give me permission it could modify the ban you talk
    about in the future. To some extent we are talking about an
    important signal, but I believe that it is wrong as a matter of
    principle to set forth arbitrary restrictions on even the
    development of weapons. But I freely concede the point that I
    would be much better off in terms of my immediate concern for
    intellectual development with a modification like you said.
        Senator Reed. I think, Mr. Ambassador, you are right. This
    is a very important conversation. It sends off very strong
    signals, and the signal that you tried or are communicating, at
    least I thought, was that this is just a technical issue about
    the breadth of research. But yet, this repeal goes far beyond
    that. It would signal to many people that we are not only
    researching, but we have the legislative authority--at least
    not the legislative prohibition--to produce new weapons, new
    low-yield weapons. That would be an interesting signal around
    the globe in terms of many issues, other countries looking at
    what we do, or the proliferation issues, not discouraging
    disarmament efforts that we are trying to encourage.
        I find it puzzling that if it is simply a narrow, research
    base, intellectual inquiry base, that such a ban would be urged
    by the administration. As for the arbitrary nature of setting
    one class of weapons aside, I think that goes to an issue about
    this weapon, a low-yield weapon, might be less of a threshold
    to use than a larger weapon. That may be common sense; it may
    be wrong, but I think that is what most people think.
        Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir, and I understand that. Here
    you have a paradox we have faced in this country for the last
    60 years. On the one hand the more that you can see that a
    weapon is directly relevant to something you might want to do,
    the more effective a deterrent it is, and on the other hand the
    more the argument that you make comes into play.
        I think that is an inherent part of the dilemma of nuclear
    weapons: What signal will we be sending? One signal we may be
    sending is that we are no longer going to constrain ourselves
    by a reliance on a type of retaliation that was appropriate for
    the Soviet Union, that, in fact, since deterrence depends on
    what the adversary values, we are going to hold open the
    possibility of a deterrent that is adapted to a future
    adversary.
        In my view, that does not lower the nuclear threshold. The
    nuclear threshold is awesomely high, but we know we are engaged
    today in an exercise in Iraq which demonstrates that the
    overwhelming power of the United States is not always enough to
    ensure rational behavior on the part of other countries. There
    is a possibility that in the future one may need to have
    capabilities that we do not have now.
        Senator Reed. Excuse me, Mr. Ambassador. Are you suggesting
    that in the Iraq situation if we had a low-yield nuclear
    device----
        Ambassador Brooks. No, I am not, and thank you for the
    opportunity to avoid misunderstandings. I am not suggesting
    that. I am suggesting that it is important to realize that
    people we try to deter, by and large, do not think like us, and
    therefore we may need a variety of capabilities to deter them.
    That is the point that we had in the time of the Soviet Union
    and that is the point that we have now. I was not meaning to
    suggest that nuclear weapons have any particular relevance to
    the Iraqi situation because I do not think they do.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. I might
    not be able to stay and perhaps Senator Nelson might follow up
    on this. As we look around, where would we use these types of
    weapons? We are currently engaged in a conflict with Iraq, and
    I think you, Mr. Ambassador, quite rightly said that we
    probably would not even contemplate using such a weapon, a low-
    yield weapon, in Iraq. I just wonder, why are we making the
    effort to take away all the restrictions, not just research and
    development leading up to, but all the restrictions with
    respect to low-yield nuclear weapons? My time has expired.
    Thank you.
        Senator Allard. If you want some extra time, your colleague
    is willing here.
        Senator Reed. No, I will yield back.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I will follow up for you. Why do you
    not just jump in if you would like to.
        Senator Reed. We cannot tag team. That is WWF. [Laughter]
        Senator Allard. Excuse me. Before you leave, I do want to
    make an announcement. I announced earlier that we would not be
    able to have as high a level of security in the closed session
    as we were counting on. I have now been informed that we have a
    reporter we will be able to use at that session, so we can go
    into however much detail or whatever clearance level. That will
    not be a restricted matter when we go into closed session.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Ambassador, I might agree with you
    on the policy, but on the issue of what is law and obeying the
    law, sitting right here looking at that nameplate right there
    causes me to remind the executive branch that this is a
    government of shared powers and the law-making process is here,
    with the President signing legislation into law, and that we
    are a Nation of laws, not of men.
        Section 3136 is a prohibition on research and development
    of low-yield nuclear weapons, and until that law is changed, no
    matter how you interpret it, the law is the law.
        Ambassador Brooks. Senator, if anything I said suggested
    anything else, then I apologize. In fact, my point is your
    point, because I believe, Senator, that you left out the words
    ``that could lead to,'' and it is precisely the fact that we
    tried to be scrupulous in our following the law that leads us
    to the situation in which, in addition to physicists and
    engineers, we have to have lawyers in thinking about technical
    development. It is not because we wish to thwart the law, but
    because we know we are obligated to scrupulously comply with
    the law, that we are advising the Senate that we think the law
    should be changed.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Well, for the record I think the law
    is pretty clear. Subsection [b]: ``The Secretary of Energy may
    not conduct, or provide for the conduct of, research and
    development which could lead to the production by the United
    States of a low-yield nuclear weapon which, as of the date of
    the enactment of this Act, has not entered production.''
        Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir, that is absolutely correct. I
    believe that that law is clear. The words ``which could lead
    to,'' however, raise issues in terms of, can you do something
    for a high-yield weapon because what you learn could lead to.
    That is the point I was trying to make.
        In the nuclear area above all, we are pretty meticulous
    about following the law.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Is there a requirement in your opinion
    for a new low-yield?
        Ambassador Brooks. No.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Is there a requirement for such a
    weapon under consideration or being developed?
        Ambassador Brooks. There is no requirement being developed.
    To the best of my knowledge, there is no requirement under
    consideration. There are continued discussions among
    specialists about what capabilities might be suitable or might
    be required in the long term. But anything that rises to the
    level of formal consideration by the Department of Defense of a
    specific requirement for a specific weapon, I am not aware of.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Over at DOD you hear talk that there
    is justification for the repeal of this law so as not to
    foreclose the exploration of technical options that could
    strengthen our ability to deter or to respond. What sort of new
    emerging threat would a low-yield nuclear weapon be used to
    deter or to respond to?
        Ambassador Brooks. I am not sure, but let me give you some
    of the kinds of examples that people have looked at for
    advanced concepts more generally. For advanced concepts one
    might look at what is sometimes called Agent Defeat, the idea
    that a particular biological agent, set of biological agents,
    might require a large burst of radiation to in essence kill the
    biological agents. For example, one might want to look at an
    enhanced cruise missile which has different safety and surety
    features. For example, one might conclude at the end of the
    study of the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator that I cannot do
    what I am asking you to let me do and see if I can adapt an
    additional weapon, and then one might be forced to say the only
    way you can get a nuclear earth penetrator is to do something
    fundamentally new.
        Now, in all of those cases I do not know whether the most
    efficient and effective design would be a low-yield design or a
    high-yield design because, as I tried to make clear in my
    statement, I am not asking to produce something, I am not
    asking to develop something. But those are things where our
    existing capabilities might need to be improved. Those are the
    kinds of things that we will be looking at under advanced
    concepts, and in doing that I do not want to set out at the
    beginning of the exploration a boundary that says I must look
    at them with higher yields.
        I have a bias in favor of the lowest usable yield because I
    have the bias in favor of something that is the minimum
    destruction. I accept Senator Reed's point that that means I
    have a bias in favor of things that might be usable. I think
    that is just an inherent part of deterrence.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I would assume, and you tell me if
    this is correct, that bunker busters are a function not only of
    the explosive blast, but would also be a function of the
    hardening of the case?
        Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir, that is exactly right.
        Senator Bill Nelson. In order to penetrate deeper.
        Ambassador Brooks. That is exactly right, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. The latter would not get into the
    question.
        Ambassador Brooks. It does not. What we hope to do on a
    nuclear earth penetrator is to look at both the B61 and the
    B83, both of them gravity-delivered bombs, and take a look at
    whether, without getting into the redesign of the nuclear
    package, we can so strengthen--it is not just that you have to
    be able to penetrate. I mean, we know how to make things that
    will penetrate. You have to be able to penetrate and still have
    nuclear weapons, which are actually quite intricate machines to
    work right, survive the penetration long enough so it will
    still work with the reliability that we demand. Whether that
    can be done by adapting an existing weapon is what we are
    asking Congress to let us spend a fair amount of money to find
    out.
        Senator Bill Nelson. If you can penetrate, you can take
    care of business with a conventional explosive, can you not?
        Ambassador Brooks. It depends a little bit. I defer to
    others who are experts in conventional explosives, but, in
    general, a conventional explosive demands a precision that a
    nuclear explosive does not. In general, knowing exactly the
    outline of an underground bunker is not something you can
    guarantee. For example, if I knew that I was trying to
    penetrate this room and the conventional explosive ended up
    three rooms over, that would not be very effective. If a low-
    yield nuclear weapon ended up three rooms over, that would in
    fact make this room unusable under any conceivable
    circumstance.
        I do not mean to minimize the importance of conventional
    penetrators. Everybody would like to be able to do everything
    with conventional weapons for a whole bunch of reasons, and it
    may well be that the country will decide that the benefits of a
    Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator are not worth having. What we
    are trying to do is find out what those benefits are and what
    it would cost to actually have them.
        Senator Allard. Okay, I think Ambassador Brooks has had a
    pretty good workout. Admiral, you are next.
        Admiral Ellis. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Allard. You appreciate that opportunity.
        Ambassador Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Allard. We just heard Senator Reed suggest that
    nuclear weapons could lower the nuclear threshold, and I heard
    Ambassador Brooks testify that we had lower yield nuclear
    weapons in our arsenal in the past. Do you know why we did not
    use those weapons in the past?
        Admiral Ellis. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the decisions
    that would confront the President on the use of nuclear weapons
    are the most demanding and challenging decisions that he will
    likely ever face. It is not clear to me that there is a direct
    linkage between the size of the weapon and the awesome
    responsibilities embodying that decision.
        You rightly point out, as the Ambassador has already noted,
    that we have low-yield weapons in the inventory. Quite frankly,
    we have had many more low-yield weapons in the inventory in the
    past through the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. But now they are
    removed from the inventory. Each of those periods saw their own
    challenging, demanding conflicts and, as we all are well aware,
    thankfully, none of those challenges in any way got close to
    the threat level that would require their use.
        My view is that the decision is an extremely difficult and
    demanding one. The survival of the Nation, our allies, and
    friends in significant measure has to be at stake, and I
    suspect that is why those issues have not come to the fore
    prior to this.
        Senator Allard. In your view, can conventional munitions
    hold at risk the full range of targets you think you need to
    address today and in the future?
        Admiral Ellis. No, sir. In a word, there are clearly
    hardened, deeply buried targets, as we are well aware, that
    even our most capable advanced conventional capabilities cannot
    touch. Even some of the developmental capabilities that we are
    now beginning to see and have addressed--the massive ordnance
    air blast weapon that has been demonstrated and the like, a
    21,000-pound weapon there--cannot deal with all of those
    facilities.
        Senator Allard. It looks to me like our potential enemies
    are at least beginning to address this vulnerability aspect. I
    guess in the last night or so we had, if you looked on TV, the
    bunker that was blown up there; the thing that struck me was
    the size of those walls that I saw laying around that room. It
    looked to me like some of them were 6 feet thick.
        So you are telling me that our enemies or potential enemies
    are perhaps looking at going deeper, with--I do not know if I
    saw a lot of rebar in them, but--an even stronger wall and even
    deeper, which our current conventional weapons could not get
    to, is that correct?
        Admiral Ellis. That is correct, sir. It is even more
    challenging than that, because many of them are taking
    advantage of the rock formations and the type of structure that
    they dig the tunnel into, that to a large degree cannot be
    easily penetrated by any of our conventional weapons. If you
    consider that, it makes the challenge even more demanding.
        It is not just the depth, it is the character of the matter
    en route to the target of interest that is of importance as
    well. If it is a solid rock, granite formation, mountain type
    structure, as we are seeing proliferating around the world,
    those are even more challenging to any weapons capability, much
    less conventional.
        Senator Allard. Now, my understanding of maybe some of
    these low-yield weapons that will penetrate down through the
    earth is that actually contamination on the surface would be
    much less than our more conventional nuclear weapons that we
    have now. Is that right?
        Admiral Ellis. Well, again, we have not been able to do the
    depth of analysis that could give us that type of information.
        Senator Allard. But that is what it appears?
        Admiral Ellis. There are many experts who believe that as
    you tunnel down many feet that, particularly with the lower
    yield weapons, there would be much less probability that the
    blast would emerge from the hole and contaminate the
    environment. Conceptually that is a theory. But, again, it
    needs to be validated by the rigorous and precise engineering
    analysis that the Ambassador is talking about so that we are
    all dealing with the same set of facts here as we discuss this
    very important issue.
        Senator Allard. I guess the one thing that a nuclear weapon
    might carry with it on a conventional weapon is a lot more
    heat. It would have a lot more heat in that blast. If you had,
    for example, a bacteriological lab, say anthrax, which is very
    resistant to most disinfectants, a very strong heat source
    could be helpful. Is that right?
        Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir, heat could be an element in the
    agent defeat scenario that the Ambassador described, as well as
    the larger energy that could couple to rock formations and
    propagate shock waves through much greater depth and ensure
    destruction that could not be done by conventional munitions as
    we know them.
        Senator Allard. Now, as I understand it, both the
    administration and you are interpreting the current law, which
    was just read to us here by Senator Nelson, as saying that you
    could not do any research at all that somehow or other could be
    construed to leading toward the development of a particular
    weapon. There are a lot of lawyers out there that want to carry
    that language to the ultimate. Does this law preempt us from
    doing some research out there that we ought to be doing when we
    look at the full range of possibilities of defending this
    country?
        Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir.
        Senator Allard. Is that the way you are looking at that
    interpretation?
        Admiral Ellis. Certainly the language has been subject to
    as much scrutiny as anything that has gone into law on the
    nuclear side in many years. As Ambassador Brooks has properly
    noted, we have taken a very conservative interpretation to
    ensure that we carry out fully the----
        Senator Allard. That nobody would ever question what you
    were doing.
        Admiral Ellis. The intent--I think the term ``possibly''
    and a number of other generalities associated with that have
    really engendered a real reluctance to begin to address any of
    these issues. It really is what you spoke about earlier. I was
    privileged to be here last month for a hearing and happened to
    be watching some of the debate going on on the floor with your
    colleagues. There was a wonderful quotation that one of them
    used in a different debate, that said: ``We are all entitled to
    our own opinion, but we are not entitled to our own facts.''
        That is what this is all about--let us find the facts
    associated with this and let us understand that there are very
    important policy issues that need to be addressed. We certainly
    are very mindful of that, but it is important that we have a
    dispassionate analytical fact-based discussion on just the
    issues that you have been questioning me about, and that is the
    reason that relaxation of this language is so important.
        Senator Allard. In my own mind I think I can conjure up
    where this definition could be extended to the point where it
    could actually interfere with just basic research. For example,
    just hypothetically, maybe if you run across an element that
    all of a sudden comes to light and somebody says, ``Well, that
    has the potential of being an element that would be used in a
    nuclear weapon,'' that that could keep you from doing some very
    basic research as far as chemicals are concerned. Could it be
    carried that far?
        Admiral Ellis. I would not speak for Ambassador Brooks
    here, but since I am covering for him in this session, I think
    that that is what he is alluding to in his discussion of the
    chilling effect. It is important.
        Senator Allard. So it can be interpreted to the point where
    it interferes with basic physical research, basic chemical
    research--is that correct? Is that what you are trying to say?
        Admiral Ellis. Our interpretation is all research and
    development, which could lead to the development of precision
    low-yield weapons, is precluded by that language, and that is
    the issue at hand.
        Senator Allard. My time has expired.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I am reminded of debates
    on other matters that we have as to whether you are a strict
    constructionist or a judicial activist, and all of a sudden it
    sounds like you want to be a judicial activist.
        Senator Allard. Well, no. The problem is we have judicial
    activists out there.
        Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Let me ask you, Admiral.
    Let us talk about the bomber fleet. The B-1 defensive system
    upgrade program was cancelled as a result of significant
    technical troubles and cost overruns. The funding picture is
    improved for the B-52, but there is still no funding for the
    Link 16. It is also not clear whether the B-2 radar program
    will be completed as soon as required, and there is no money
    for EHF satellite communications in 2004. Are you comfortable
    with all this?
        Admiral Ellis. In a short answer, no, sir. There are clear
    issues associated with the B-1 that are important to us
    because, even though it has now been re-roled out of its
    nuclear mission, it now is of great interest to me because of
    its global strike capabilities and the conventional
    capabilities that are a part of that capable platform.
        It is clearly a defensive countermeasures suite that is
    appropriate to the challenges that that airplane might
    confront--and it was a workhorse for me in Kosovo in 1999 and
    continues to serve us well in the ongoing conflict. It is an
    ability that we continue to upgrade, as we do all of the
    systems for the stresses they are going to face in the future.
        Senator Bill Nelson. How about schedule change?
        Admiral Ellis. The specifics of schedule will have to be
    taken in context. I am certainly not waffling here. I need to
    understand why the schedule has slipped, and I will look into
    that, sir. If it is to resolve technical issues, then there may
    be some legitimacy in that if it leads to ultimate success in
    the overall procurement process. You have rightly identified
    the issues that are a part of the B-52 piece: the avionics
    upgrades, the kind of things that are going to keep that
    airplane flying until it is beyond 80 years old are very
    important to us.
        The B-2 piece, the radar is having to be changed out
    because the frequency spectrum in which it operates is no
    longer available after fiscal year 2007 as a result of
    commercial encroachment issues. It is important that that
    capability come on line as quickly as possible.
        We are working with the Services to address the importance
    of the reachback capability associated with the communications
    because it is important to us, but not just in the strategic
    mission in the classic context of recallable aircraft, with
    which you are very familiar. Also, the global strike command
    and control, the ability to get retargeting information to the
    platforms in the air, has proven to be very critical to us, as
    we have seen in the successes we have enjoyed in recent
    operations.
        The bomber road map continues to be an important part of my
    focus. In fact, it is more important now than it has ever been
    because it serves me well in at least two, if not more, of my
    missions.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Have you flown B-52s?
        Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir, once.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Have you flown the B-1 or B-2?
        Admiral Ellis. No, sir. We are scheduled to do that this
    spring. They invited me up to Minot, where I am going to have
    the opportunity to fly both of those aircraft, and I look
    forward to that.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Do they handle a lot easier than a B-
    52?
        Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir, they do. I have to admit my
    experience in the B-52 was many years ago when I was a
    lieutenant in test pilot school, and I thought I was a pretty
    hot pilot as a fighter guy. That is a pretty humiliating effort
    when you get in there and crank that yoke over and nothing
    happens. About that time you say, well, nothing is going to
    happen, and you try and add more, and you find out it happens
    and then some. It is a completely different set of intellectual
    control laws and time delay associated with that aircraft.
        I admire and have the deepest respect for the folks that
    have flown that for a generation. We used to joke that it was
    older than the pilots that flew it. Now we are going to be able
    to say that it is older than the grandparents of the pilots.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I will address to both of you. Is our
    nuclear stockpile safe and reliable, even though we are not
    testing weapons?
        Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir.
        Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Do both of you think that we do not
    need for the safety of the country to conduct a nuclear test?
        Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir, at this time that is true.
        Ambassador Brooks. Yes.
        Admiral Ellis. I have certified that to the Secretary of
    Defense on an annual basis.
        Ambassador Brooks. Not at this time, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. This treaty that we have just passed
    over the course of a number of years takes weapons off of
    ICBMs, but it does not destroy them. I would like your comment
    to make me feel a little better about the safety of those
    weapons in the hands of the Russians when they stick them into
    a warehouse. Give us some of your thoughts there.
        Ambassador Brooks. Let me talk both about safety and
    security. With regard to safety--and we should both be in a
    different venue and perhaps with a different group of people
    here to get the full intelligence assessment on safety--I have
    no reason to believe that there are safety problems with stored
    Russian nuclear weapons.
        With regard to the security of those weapons, it has been
    part of U.S. policy for a number of years to try and improve
    that security. The security of Russian Navy nuclear weapons is
    done by the National Nuclear Security Administration. We are
    upgrading security for about 4,200 weapons, and we will finish
    that process in 2006. The security of the rest of the arsenal
    is primarily the responsibility of the Defense Threat Reduction
    Agency under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, although
    recently I have also picked up some responsibility for
    Strategic Rocket Forces for a bunch of basically Russian
    bureaucratic reasons.
        I have been impressed with the attitude toward security on
    the part of the Russians. The Russians have no more interest
    than you and I in having a nuclear weapon get out of their
    hands. But this is a glass that is half full, but it is also
    therefore half empty. There is still a fair amount to do in
    improving the security of nuclear weapons.
        Regarding the safety of nuclear weapons, my analysis
    suggests that that is not a huge problem. The Russians have
    always been quite concerned with that, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Yet, I hasten to add, I have heard
    Senator Lugar, who has been a leader in this area, talk about
    the only security on some of those buildings that he has seen
    is a little padlock.
        Ambassador Brooks. Oh, yes, sir. There is no question at
    all, and, in fact, I think the Senator is also referring to
    nuclear materials as well, which we also do for the Ministry of
    Atomic Energy in Russia. If you look back to where we started,
    security was appalling. It is less appalling at some places and
    actually pretty good in others now. We have not gotten into the
    large serial production facilities. That is probably where they
    have their best security.
        But I guess I am trying to convey an image of a real
    problem, which we are chipping away at as fast as we know how.
    I do not want to minimize the magnitude of the problem, but I
    will say we have gotten huge cooperation from Congress and we
    are getting huge cooperation from the Russian Federation in
    improving security over there. But they did have a long way to
    go. All those horror stories are true.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral, is there a need for a
    conventional ICBM?
        Admiral Ellis. Senator, I think there is a need to look at
    the full range of advanced conventional concepts, as I said
    earlier. That is one that has been articulated. There are
    others. It is important that we look, as we will over this next
    year, at concepts of deterrence for the future and provide the
    Nation's leadership with that full range of options I discussed
    earlier. Obviously, there will be a piece of that that will
    remain in the nuclear stockpile, but there will be much broader
    opportunities in advanced conventional capabilities when the
    technologies we spoke of earlier begin to deliver. That is one
    that I think needs to be considered for the future.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Could it be a bunker buster?
        Admiral Ellis. It could be that. It certainly could be
    responsive and precise, given emerging technologies. If we can
    get those types of things together with the speed associated
    with the reentry of an IC or SLBM, it would certainly have
    tremendous penetration capabilities as a result of that.
        Senator Bill Nelson. To the other guy on the other side of
    the globe, how would you distinguish between a conventional and
    a nuclear incoming ICBM?
        Admiral Ellis. In another session, another venue, we can
    perhaps talk in more detail about those capabilities, and I
    would be delighted to address that, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Let us do that.
        Go ahead, you ask some questions.
        Senator Allard. Senator Nelson, here is our situation. We
    need to get out of here I think by 4:30 in order to get to the
    closed session, and we still have another panel we need to give
    time to testify.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Are we going to have a closed session?
        Senator Allard. We are going to have a closed session.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Here?
        Senator Allard. We are going to move to a different room
    where it is secure. We are going to have a different reporter
    who has that security clearance.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.
        Senator Allard. I will go ahead and move forward with the
    other panel. I would like to thank both of you for coming to
    testify.
        I want to welcome the next panel. On the next panel we have
    Rear Admiral Charles B. Young, United States Navy, Director of
    Strategic Systems Programs, Department of the Navy; Brigadier
    General Robert L. Smolen, United States Air Force, Director of
    Nuclear and Counterproliferation, Office of the Deputy Chief of
    Staff for Air and Space Operations; and the Honorable Everet H.
    Beckner, Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, National
    Nuclear Security Administration. [Pause.]
        Whenever you are ready, we will start with Dr. Beckner. Or
    if the panel decides they want to go in a different order, it
    is okay with me. Dr. Beckner, go ahead.

      STATEMENT OF HON. EVERET H. BECKNER, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
       DEFENSE PROGRAMS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

        Dr. Beckner. Yes. I think under the circumstances I will
    abbreviate my oral comments. Much of the material that I would
    normally cover has already been covered by Ambassador Brooks. I
    think, therefore, I can save us some time here and merely go
    through several areas quickly, which he did not spend too much
    time on, on the assumption that they could be of additional
    interest.
        We have several activities in the research arena, which are
    very important to us and are a substantial part of our budget,
    and we have had good success here in the past year. I am
    thinking particularly of the work with the NIF laser facility
    at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, and we are in a position to
    report good success there. That project is on schedule and on
    budget.
        We have had good success with the DARHT hydrodynamics
    facility at Los Alamos. It has recently been signed off as
    completed and is operational. Of course, we have had several of
    our large computing facilities under the ASCI program, which
    has come on-line this year, and are producing results there.
    Some of these relate obviously to the discussions we were
    having earlier here today about understanding weapons design
    and weapon design limitations, much of which we now have to
    gain from our computing programs. Those three areas in
    particular I think have been quite successful this year, and
    more material is contained in my written statement on those as
    well.
        Another area that was not covered was on our secure
    transportation assets. They have been very busy this year. They
    have continued to operate, with some limitations during these
    high security alerts, but for the most part they have continued
    to operate. They are required for all the weapon moves and all
    the material moves that occur during the year, and things have
    gone well there. We have not had any problems. That is a
    separate budget item, which can be found also in the prepared
    testimony.
        Beyond that, I think what I would say would tend to be
    redundant to what Ambassador Brooks has already said, and I
    would yield at this point to the other gentlemen.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Beckner follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by Dr. Everet H. Beckner

        Thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the fiscal
    year 2004 President's budget request for the NNSA, specifically the
    Stockpile Stewardship activities carried out by the Office of Defense
    Programs. The budget request for this vital national security program
    totals $6.3 billion, an increase of $533 million, about 9.1 percent,
    over the comparable fiscal year 2003 budget request. This request
    supports the requirements of the Stockpile Stewardship program as
    defined by Presidential Directives, Department of Defense requirements
    and the Nuclear Posture Review.

                                BUDGET OVERVIEW

        The budget for Stockpile Stewardship is allocated among three major
    program lines--Directed Stockpile Work (DSW), Campaigns, and Readiness
    in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF). Directed Stockpile Work (DSW)
    is focused on the maintenance and evaluation of the nuclear weapons
    stockpile and the refurbishments needed to maintain the stockpile well
    into the future. The budget request for DSW totals $1.3 billion, an
    increase of $63 million, about 4.9 percent, over the comparable fiscal
    year 2003 budget request. Campaigns allow the NNSA to move to
    ``science-based'' judgments for stewardship, utilizing experiments,
    simulations, and surveillance data in place of nuclear testing.
    Campaigns contribute technology needed to carry out the DSW, as well as
    foster new ideas and concepts that will provide opportunities for
    cutting-edge improvements to sustain, and, if necessary, enhance the
    effectiveness of the stockpile over the long term. The budget request
    for Campaigns totals $2.4 billion, an increase of $229 million, about
    10.6 percent over the comparable fiscal year 2003 budget request. RTBF
    funding is devoted to operating key defense facilities activities
    across the weapons complex. The budget request for RTBF totals $1.6
    billion, an increase of $111.2 million, about 7.4 percent over the
    comparable fiscal year 2003 budget request. The remainder of the
    Weapons Activities budget request is composed of Facilities and
    Infrastructure Recapitalization Program (FIRP), Secure Transportation
    Asset (STA), and Safeguards and Security (S&S). The budget request for
    these activities total $1.0 billion, an increase of $127 million, about
    14.6 percent over the comparable fiscal year 2003 budget request. FIRP
    is revitalizing the physical infrastructure of the nuclear weapons
    complex. STA and S&S protect our assets.

                             STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP

        The President's fiscal year 2004 request for Stockpile Stewardship
    continues to build and expand on the scientific and engineering
    successes that are the hallmarks of this program. It will also allow us
    to meet our requirements under the terms of the Nuclear Posture Review
    including enhancing test readiness, reinvigorating the advanced
    concepts work in the weapons laboratories, and restoring the weapons
    complex to meet the national security requirements of the 21st century.
    Significant milestones we expect to achieve this year include:

             Manufacture the first certifiable W88 pit;
             Begin irradiation of the first Tritium Producing
            Burnable Absorber Rods in the TVAs Watts Bar Reactor;
             Continued delivery of W87 Life Extended warheads to
            the Air Force;
             Complete environmental documentation in support of the
            Modern Pit Facility;
             Delivery of four ultraviolet beams of NIF laser light
            to the target chamber;
             Initiate Stockpile Stewardship experiments in NIF;
             Perform 2 and 3 dimensional simulations of aging
            stockpile weapons focused on LEP activities;
             Safely ship nuclear weapons, weapons components, and
            nuclear materials through the STA;
             Conduct subcritical experiments at the Nevada Test
            Site to better understand plutonium aging;
             Begin work on the Advanced Concepts and in particular,
            on the RNEP Phase 6.2 activities with the Air Force.

        These major milestones will be accomplished by a weapons complex
    that will also manufacture the thousands of components needed to
    maintain the stockpile. The complex will also carry out hundreds of
    smaller scale experiments, perform surveillance activities, address
    Significant Finding Investigations, conduct flight tests with the
    support of the DOD, deploy new manufacturing tools and processes at the
    production plants, and safely dismantle weapons excess to national
    security requirements.
        These and other activities are dependent on retaining today's
    highly skilled workforce and recruiting the next generation of
    stockpile stewards. Over the last several years, NNSA has made
    significant headway on this all-important front. Critical skill
    vacancies across the complex have been reduced to 8 percent.
    Inextricably linked to recruitment and retention is providing the
    quality workspace and fully functioning tools and technologies needed
    by our scientists and engineers to carry out their work. Two accounts
    in the budget, RTBF and FIRP, are essential to the operation,
    maintenance, and renewal of physical infrastructure. RTBF provides the
    funding needed to operate and maintain the facilities required for
    certification, thus ensuring the vitality of the NNSA national security
    complex and its goal of a consistent readiness level. FIRP is a capital
    renewal and sustainability program designed to eliminate maintenance
    backlogs and restore, rebuild, and revitalize the physical
    infrastructure of the nuclear weapons complex. FIRP addresses an
    integrated, prioritized list of maintenance and infrastructure
    projects, separate from the maintenance and infrastructure efforts of
    RTBF, which will significantly increase the operational efficiency and
    effectiveness of the NNSA sites.
        I would now like to highlight several activities under the
    Stockpile Stewardship Program that I believe are of particular interest
    to this committee.

                                 TEST READINESS

        While I continue to have complete confidence in the ability of the
    Stockpile Stewardship Program to continue to ensure the safety,
    security, and reliability of this Nation's nuclear deterrent, we must
    maintain our ability to carry out nuclear weapons tests. Our current
    readiness posture to conduct such a test is 24 to 36 months, as
    established in a 1993 Presidential Decision Directive. Last year's
    Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) stated that this period should be reduced
    in order to provide options to deal with defense policy requirements,
    including the possibility of unanticipated problems in the stockpile. A
    study completed in July 2002 confirmed that additional work was
    required to maintain the present posture, but it also led us to
    conclude that the right posture is to be ready for a test within
    approximately 18 months. With fiscal year 2003 funding now in place, we
    intend to begin the transition to an 18-month posture. The Nuclear
    Weapons Council has concurred that our intended action is appropriate.
    The transition to this new readiness posture is expected to take
    approximately 3 years.
        Although there have been discussions about a transition to shorter
    times, there is concern that an unnecessarily expedited time frame may
    cause adverse effects on critical personnel resources and require
    significantly more funding. It is not likely that we will want to be
    able to match the short lead times when the weapons complex conducted
    multiple underground tests annually, nor is it prudent to tie-up
    important resources to indefinitely maintain an extremely short test
    readiness posture. Since device and diagnostics preparations are driven
    by the particular weapon to be tested and the questions to be answered
    by the test, such a posture might not be responsive to a surprise in
    the stockpile. The NNSA is studying this matter, and I will soon be
    reporting to Congress on these subjects as directed in the Fiscal Year
    2003 Defense Authorization Bill.

               ADVANCED CONCEPTS/ROBUST NUCLEAR EARTH PENETRATOR

        The NPR also highlighted the importance of pursuing Advanced
    Concepts work to ensure that the weapons complex can provide nuclear
    deterrence options for decades to come. To that end, the fiscal year
    2004 budget includes $21 million for Advanced Concepts work. $15
    million will be allocated to the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator
    (RNEP). The remainder of the funding will be divided between the
    weapons laboratories for Advanced Concepts work. The vision is for
    small teams in coordination with DOD to assess evolving military
    requirements, investigate options, and ensure that DOD understands what
    is and is not possible. The teams will carry out theoretical and
    engineering design work on one or more concepts. These activities might
    proceed beyond the ``paper'' stage and include a combination of
    component and subassembly tests and simulations to introduce an
    appropriate level of rigor to challenge our designers. These activities
    might also culminate in an integral flight or laboratory test, or a
    subsequent decision to proceed with further development activities.
        On March 19, the Department of Defense submitted its report on the
    RNEP as required by the Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense Authorization
    Act. Once the 30 days has lapsed, NNSA and the Air Force will begin the
    required feasibility and cost studies. As members know, this program
    will examine whether or not two existing warheads in the stockpile--the
    B61 and the B83--can be sufficiently hardened through case
    modifications and other work to allow the weapons to survive
    penetration into various geologies before detonating. This would
    enhance the Nation's ability to hold hard and deeply buried targets at
    risk. The RNEP feasibility and cost study is currently scheduled for
    completion in 2006; however, we are looking at opportunities to reduce
    study time.

                            STOCKPILE LIFE EXTENSION

        While preparing for the future, the labs and plants are working
    very hard to extend the life of several elements of the existing
    nuclear weapons stockpile through the Stockpile Life Extension Program
    (SLEP). The NPR reaffirmed the decision as reached by the Nuclear
    Weapons Council on the timing, pace, scope, and technical aspects of
    the LEPs for the W76, W80, B61-7/11, and ongoing W87 work. Through this
    program, new subsystems and components are designed, built, tested and
    installed, thereby extending the operational service life for these
    warheads for some 30 additional years.
        For the last several years, we have been performing the work to
    extend the life of the W87 warhead for the Air Force. This work is
    ongoing at Y-12, Lawrence Livermore, Sandia and Pantex. We are more
    than three quarters of the way through this effort and expect to wrap
    up the work by early 2004.
        Life extension for the W76 involves a comprehensive overhaul of the
    warhead, including replacement or refurbishment of the Arming, Firing
    and Fuzing set, high explosives, gas transfer system and other
    components. We will also be requalifying the weapon primary. For the
    W80, we will be replacing the Trajectory Sensing Signal and Neutron
    Generators, the tritium bottles and incorporating surety upgrades. For
    the B61 we will be refurbishing the secondary. The First Production
    Units for these systems are presently scheduled for delivery to the
    Navy and Air Force in: fiscal year 2007, fiscal year 2006 and fiscal
    year 2006, respectively.

                           NATIONAL IGNITION FACILITY

        I am pleased to report that tremendous technical progress has been
    achieved over the last year at the National Ignition Facility (NIF).
    Its mission is to obtain fusion ignition in a laboratory setting by
    imploding a BB-sized capsule containing a mixture of the hydrogen
    isotopes, deuterium and tritium. The NIF will provide the capability to
    conduct laboratory experiments to address the high-energy density and
    fusion aspects that are important to both primaries and secondaries in
    the nuclear stockpile.
        In December 2002, the first four NIF laser beams were activated to
    generate a total of 43 kilojoules of infrared laser light in a single
    pulse. This equates to about 10 times more power than the entire U.S.
    electrical generation capacity, but only lasting 5 billionths of a
    second. In January 2003, NIF delivered its first beam of ultraviolet
    laser light focused onto a target at the center of the 30 foot-diameter
    target chamber. With this accomplishment, all elements of each of the
    NIF critical subsystems has been successfully activated and operated.
        On March 6, 2003, the NIF delivered four ultraviolet beams of laser
    light to the target chamber, 15 months ahead of schedule. Stewardship
    experiments are slated to begin in fiscal year 2004.

                       ADVANCED SIMULATION AND COMPUTING

        The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASCI) Campaign is creating
    simulation capabilities that incorporate modern physics and engineering
    models to improve our ability to predict with confidence the behavior
    of the nuclear weapons in the stockpile. These models, validated
    against experimental data from past above-ground and underground
    nuclear tests, are the repositories of expert designer judgment as well
    as the best scientific representations of our current knowledge of the
    performance of the nuclear weapons. The ASCI Campaign is driving the
    integration of the theoretical and experimental efforts within the
    Stockpile Stewardship Program.
        At the same time that ASCI continues the development of the most
    powerful computer capabilities needed for the future, the modern
    simulation tools previously developed by ASCI--the Blue Pacific and
    White Machines at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), the
    Red Machine at Sandia National Laboratory (SNL), and the Blue Mountain
    and Q machines at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)--are being
    applied day-to-day to address immediate stockpile concerns. ASCI codes
    are being used to close Significant Finding Investigations as well as
    to support Life Extension Programs (LEPs) for the W76, W80, W87, and
    B61. These activities are enabled by the ongoing supercomputing
    infrastructures at the national laboratories, encompassing both
    continuing operations as well as research in new techniques for
    storage, visualization, networking, and all aspects of the
    infrastructure required by modern computing.
        By fiscal year 2008, ASCI will deliver a high fidelity, full-system
    physics characterization of the functioning events of a stockpile
    nuclear weapon. At that time, the campaign will deliver a suite of
    validated codes, running on supercomputer platforms, acquired though
    open procurement, with user-friendly environments, advanced
    visualization tools for analysis, and the entire support structure to
    integrate the components together. Other program deliverables include
    high-performance storage and high-bandwidth networks. In support of a
    true integrated Strategic Systems Programs effort, the ASCI Campaign
    continues to push the envelope in distance computing as well as in
    advanced encryption techniques and other approaches to ensure secure,
    classified networking.

                        OFFICE OF SECURE TRANSPORTATION

        The Office of Secure Transportation is responsible for safely and
    securely moving nuclear weapons, special nuclear materials, select non-
    nuclear components, and Limited Life Components for the DOE and the
    DOD. This work is carried out by 225 Federal agents stationed at three
    sites--Pantex, Oak Ridge, and Albuquerque. These highly dedicated and
    skilled agents are authorized to use deadly force in the performance of
    their duties. Employing highly modified tractor trailors and escorts
    vehicles, and secure and redundant communications they have amassed an
    impressive safety record of over 100 million accident free miles
    without cargo compromise. I would note that this office also provides
    support to other elements of the DOE, including the Offices of
    Environmental Management and Nuclear Energy.

                   PIT MANUFACTURING & CERTIFICATION CAMPAIGN

        Restoring the Nation's ability to manufacture plutonium pits in
    support of the stockpile has been a central challenge for the
    stewardship program since the closure of the Rocky Flats plant in 1989.
    Never before has the weapons complex been asked to manufacture and
    certify pits without nuclear testing. I am very pleased to report that
    late this spring, Los Alamos is scheduled to manufacture the first
    certifiable W88 pit. LANL also remains on-track to manufacture a war
    reserve pit by 2007. To achieve this critical milestone, LANL has
    produced a number of development pits and has performed a series of
    engineering tests and physics experiments to confirm pit performance.
        While the TA-55 facilities at LANL are adequate to support the W88
    pit campaign, they do not appear to be capable of supporting the
    manufacturing need for long-term stockpile support. NNSA has begun
    planning for a Modern Pit Facility (MPF) consistent with the Record of
    Decision for Stockpile Stewardship and Management and the NPR. In May
    2002, the Secretary of Energy formally approved Critical Decision ``0''
    (CD-0) for the MPF. NNSA is now examining 5 candidate sites--Pantex,
    Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, the Nevada Test Site, Savannah River and
    Los Alamos--as possible locations for the MPF. We expect to issue a
    Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) later this spring. Following
    a series of public meetings, a final EIS and associated Record of
    Decision will be issued. The program will prepare site specific
    environmental documentation if the ROD supports a decision to construct
    and operate a MPF. The fiscal year 2004 request will allow conceptual
    design and other planning activities, NEPA work, and technology
    development activities to proceed on a schedule that will support a CD-
    1 decision in fiscal year 2006.

                                    TRITIUM

        In addition to restoring plutonium manufacturing capabilities, NNSA
    will begin tritium production later this year when several hundred
    Tritium Producing Burnable Absorber Rods (TPBARs) are inserted into
    Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) Watts Bar Reactor. However because
    of significant changes in stockpile size in the out-years as a result
    of the NPR and the Moscow Treaty, NNSA has, in concert with the DOD,
    adjusted the tritium production requirements to reflect these changes.
    NNSA remains fully committed to exercise all elements of its system for
    producing, extracting, and purifying new tritium, including initial
    operation of the Tritium Extraction Facility (TEF) being constructed at
    the Savannah River Site (SRS).
        Timing of tritium production, extraction, and purification has also
    been delayed by approximately 17 months for two reasons: (1) under the
    NPR, stockpile requirements are reduced, and (2) to accommodate delays
    in completion of the TEF project. This program delay can be
    accomplished without impacting nuclear weapons readiness. A revised
    baseline has been approved increasing the Total Project Cost from $401
    million to $506 million and delaying project completion from mid-fiscal
    year 2006 to late-fiscal year 2007.
        Since tritium decays by natural radioactivity at a rate of about 5
    percent per year, and since irradiation service costs are the dominant
    operating costs in supplying tritium to the stockpile, it is prudent
    not to produce tritium beyond the stated national requirements. Since
    the program intends to complete and exercise all elements of the
    tritium production and purification system (including TVA's reactor(s)
    and the TEF) on a schedule that fully protects the stockpile
    requirements, irradiation services are being deferred in order to use
    funds planned for these activities to complete TEF.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Mr. Chairman, let me thank this committee for its strong and
    enduring support of the Stockpile Stewardship Program for the last 10
    years. Your support has allowed us to deploy cutting edge technologies
    to help ensure that the Nation's nuclear deterrent remains safe,
    secure, and reliable. Because of these tools and technologies we have a
    much better understanding of the health of the stockpile and have
    solved technical issues that in the past would have required
    underground testing. While we are very pleased with the technical
    progress we have made, we cannot rest on our success. The men and women
    of the weapon complex will continue to pursue the advanced technologies
    we will need to answer the scientific and engineering challenges that
    will confront us in the years ahead.

        Senator Allard. Thank you. Who wants to go next? Okay,
    General Smolen.

       STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. ROBERT L. SMOLEN, USAF, DIRECTOR,
    NUCLEAR AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF
                   STAFF FOR AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS

        General Smolen. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity
    to appear today. I too have some written remarks, and I would
    be honored if you would allow me to just submit those.
        Senator Allard. We will put those in the record without
    objection.
        General Smolen. Yes, sir, thank you.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to appear today
    representing the men and women of the Nuclear and
    Counterproliferation Directorate. Our team is part of the
    world's best nuclear force, and I have the highest confidence
    that our strategic warfighting capabilities will continue to
    contribute to the Nation's security.
        Our directorate establishes Air Force policy and strategy
    for nuclear weapons systems, has oversight of nuclear
    operations and requirements, and manages Air Force arms control
    activities ranging from treaty negotiation support to
    implementation and compliance. We are also the Air Force lead
    for activities to counter proliferation of chemical,
    biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.
        I certainly appreciate this opportunity to discuss those
    events along with the Nuclear Posture Review, the status of the
    Air Force strategic forces, and our current efforts as stewards
    of nuclear expertise. The Nuclear Posture Review, sir, has been
    discussed in detail, and I would only add that within the Air
    Force we are working actively towards being a participant in
    determining the requirements and the status for the reduction
    from 2,200 to 1,700 by 2012.
        In support of Strategic Command, we are working jointly
    with that office and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to
    define what the future nuclear force structure might best be.
    We will continue to ensure that our part of that nuclear force
    maintains the capability to meet current and emerging threats.
        In accordance with the NPR, we are downsizing our ICBM
    force to 500 Minuteman IIIs by fully deactivating the
    Peacekeeper system by 2005. This already began in 2002, and it
    is progressing on schedule. We are not only reducing the
    warheads, but we are also reducing the infrastructure,
    communications, and many of the other aspects that will save us
    in the long term that are associated with that system.
        While we are working to implement the NPR transition to the
    future, it remains essential that we sustain and modernize and
    enhance the existing systems that we have. As we reduce the
    number of operationally deployed forces, it is important to
    highlight the fact that the strategic systems that we do deploy
    are the best, most reliable, and most secure.
        The ICBM missile and cruise missile programs are critical
    components of the triad. As we examine options for the land-
    based follow-on system to Minuteman III and the next generation
    cruise missile, we must also continue to execute a
    comprehensive sustainment program. The ICBM force must continue
    to be capable, reliable, and fully supportable. Life extension
    programs for the ICBM force are under way to sustain it through
    2020. These life extension programs include propulsion and
    guidance replacement, as well as various other sustainment
    efforts. All of these sustainment programs are important in
    making the new triad a reality that cannot be neglected.
        Since we plan on our bomber fleet remaining operational for
    another 35 to 45 years, as was mentioned previously, our air-
    launched cruise missile and advanced cruise missile programs
    are undergoing life extension programs in support of the B-52
    lifespan. Both of these cruise missile systems are implementing
    life extension programs that include test instrumentation kit
    modification, subsystem simulator modification, and W80 Warhead
    Life Extension Program integration. Supporting these programs
    will sustain them to 2030.
        September 11 drove home the importance of homeland
    security, and in that context a secure strategic force is not
    debatable. We have taken aggressive steps to ensure that our
    nuclear force remains secure from known and postulated threats.
        For example, we are implementing advanced delay-denial
    features and updating detection-assessment technology and data
    transmission systems from the geographically separated launch
    facilities to the responsible missile alert facility. This in
    part deals a little with the question that Admiral Ellis
    discussed in terms of security.
        We also ensure that our helicopters that transport our
    security response forces to the field to provide nuclear convoy
    security are properly equipped to protect our resources, and we
    are providing a forward-looking infrared capability and night
    vision cockpit capability. We are very serious about the safety
    and security of the nuclear system and the deterrence that it
    provides.
        I would like to address for just a second the nuclear
    expertise question. As General Lord stated in his testimony
    before this subcommittee, the success of all of our missions
    depends on our number one asset, our people, and our
    warfighting edge depends on dedication, professionalism, and
    sacrifice by all of us. Without our people, even our most
    effective weapons systems are of little value.
        As always, we will continue to place the utmost emphasis on
    recruiting, retaining, equipping, and training our entire
    nuclear force. However, our cadre of experienced nuclear
    engineers, scientists, and even military leaders is declining.
    As they retire, they take years of experience with them. But
    one of the programs that we sponsored in the Air Force, the
    Nuclear Technologies Fellowship Program, is a step we have
    taken in the Air Force as an initiative to solving some of the
    shortfall in nuclear expertise. The program has a 21-month long
    educational course in two phases, both academics and applying
    factual knowledge in a national lab environment. Graduates from
    this program are being provided to the Air Force and other
    agencies to provide that new basis of a generation of nuclear
    experts.
        In conclusion, sir, the strategic forces are not a Cold War
    relic and will continue to remain a vital aspect of our
    Nation's defense as we respond to current and emerging threats.
    As we transition into the future, it is essential that we
    continue to sustain, to modernize, and to enhance our nuclear
    systems. Today's efforts will help build the foundation
    required to fulfill our goals, the transformational goals, to
    protect the United States and homeland and critical bases of
    operation, and to also deny sanctuaries to the enemy, as well
    as project and sustain overwhelming combat power in defense of
    national security.
        I appreciate your continued support, sir, and I look
    forward to the opportunity to answer your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Smolen follows:]

            Prepared Statement by Brig. Gen. Robert L. Smolen, USAF

        Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: Thank you for this
    opportunity to appear before you today representing the outstanding men
    and women of the Nuclear and Counterproliferation Directorate (XON).
    Our team is a key part of the world's best nuclear force and I have the
    highest confidence that our strategic warfighting capabilities will
    continue to contribute to our Nation's security.
        Our directorate establishes Air Force policy and strategy for
    nuclear weapon systems, has oversight of nuclear operations and
    requirements, and manages Air Force arms control activities ranging
    from treaty negotiation support to implementation and compliance. We
    also are the Air Force lead for activities to counter the proliferation
    of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. I
    appreciate this opportunity to discuss events regarding the Nuclear
    Posture Review, status of Air Force strategic forces, and our current
    efforts as stewards of nuclear expertise.

                             NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

        On November 13, 2001, President Bush announced that operationally
    deployed strategic nuclear warheads would be reduced to a range between
    2,200 to 1,700 by 2012. In support of this, we are actively working
    with United States Strategic Command, the Joint Staff, and the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense to define the future nuclear force
    structure. With the nuclear force structure defined, we will continue
    to ensure the nuclear force maintains the capability to meet current
    and emerging threats. In accordance with the Nuclear Posture Review
    (NPR), we are downsizing the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
    force to 500 Minuteman IIIs, by fully deactivating the Peacekeeper ICBM
    system by 2005. Peacekeeper deactivation began in October 2002 and is
    progressing on schedule. The Air Force is not only reducing warheads,
    we are also working to ensure that the infrastructure, communications,
    intelligence and planning resources that integrate our strategic strike
    force are responsive, robust, and all linked within the construct of
    the New Triad. While we are working to implement the NPR and transition
    into the future, it is essential to sustain, modernize and enhance
    these existing strategic systems.

                                STRATEGIC FORCES

        As we reduce the number of operationally deployed strategic forces
    to a range between 2,200 to 1,700 warheads, it is important to
    highlight the fact that the strategic systems we deploy are the best,
    most reliable, and most secure systems available. Our ICBM and cruise
    missile programs are critical components of the New Triad. As we
    examine options for the future, such as the land-based follow-on system
    to Minuteman III and next-generation cruise missiles, we must also
    continue to execute comprehensive sustainment programs.
        Our ICBM force must continue to be capable, reliable and fully
    supportable. Life extension programs for the ICBM force are underway to
    sustain it through 2020. These life extension programs include
    propulsion and guidance replacement, as well as various other
    sustainment efforts. All of these sustainment programs are important in
    making the New Triad a reality and cannot be neglected.
        Since we plan on our bomber fleet to remain operational for another
    35 to 45 years, our Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM) and Advance
    Cruise Missile (ACM) programs are undergoing life extension programs to
    support the B-52 life span. Both of these cruise missile systems are
    implementing life extension programs that include Test Instrumentation
    Kit modification, Subsystem Simulator modification, and W-80 Life
    Extension Program integration. Supporting these programs will sustain
    the ALCM and ACM to 2030.
        September 11, 2001, drove home the importance of homeland security.
    In that context, a secure strategic force is not debatable, so we have
    taken aggressive steps to ensure our nuclear force remains secure from
    known and postulated threats. For example, we are implementing advanced
    delay/denial features, and updating detection/assessment technology and
    date transmission systems from the geographically separated launch
    facilities to responsible Missile Alert Facility to counter emerging
    threat technologies and methods. We will ensure the helicopters that
    transport our security response forces in the ICBM field and provide
    nuclear convoy security are properly equipped to protect national
    resources by adding a Forward Looking Infrared capability and night
    vision cockpit capability. We are very serious about the safety and
    security of the nuclear weapon systems that provide us the deterrent
    force for our Nation.

                               NUCLEAR EXPERTISE

        As General Lord stated in his testimony before this subcommittee,
    the success of the mission depends on our number one asset--our people.
    The warfighting edge depends on the dedication, professionalism, and
    sacrifice of the men and women in our Air Force. Without our people,
    even our most effective weapon systems are of little value. As always,
    we will continue to place the utmost emphasis on recruiting, retaining,
    equipping, and training our entire nuclear force. However, our cadre of
    experienced nuclear engineers, scientists, and even military leaders is
    declining. As they retire, they take years of experience away with
    them. One of the programs we sponsor on behalf of the Air Force is the
    Nuclear Technologies Fellowship Program (NTFP). NTFP is a key
    initiative in solving the shortfall in nuclear expertise by serving as
    a sustainment program. The NTFP uses a 21-month long educational course
    in two phases. Phase One focuses on academics in a classroom
    environment, and Phase Two applies classroom knowledge in a national
    lab environment. Graduates from this program are providing the Air
    Force with a new generation of nuclear force experts. These graduates
    are placed in nuclear-related positions across the Department of
    Defense and as they grow in experience and assume leadership roles,
    they will contribute greatly to our nuclear foundation.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Strategic forces are not a Cold War relic and will continue to
    remain a vital aspect of our Nation's defense as we respond to current
    and emerging threats. As we transition into the future, it is essential
    that we continue to sustain, modernize and enhance our strategic
    systems. Today's efforts will help build the foundation required to
    fulfill DOD's transformational goals, protect the U.S. homeland and
    critical bases of operation, deny sanctuaries to our enemies, as well
    as project and sustain overwhelming combat power in defense of national
    security.
        I appreciate your continued support, and again thank you for the
    opportunity to appear and discuss our contributions to national
    defense.

        Senator Allard. Thank you, General.
        Admiral Young, you are next.

        STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. CHARLES B. YOUNG, USN, DIRECTOR,
           STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

        Admiral Young. Mr. Chairman, Senator Nelson, I really thank
    you for inviting me to have this opportunity to testify before
    the subcommittee on the status of my programs. I do have a
    written statement, and I request that it be submitted for the
    record.
        Senator Allard. We will make it a part of the record
    without objection.
        Admiral Young. Last year, sir, the Strategic Systems
    Programs office was extremely busy and also very successful.
    The Nation now has D5 capability on both coasts. The U.S.S.
    Nevada SSBN-733 launched the 100th successful Trident II test
    missile, and the Nevada was also the second Ohio-class
    submarine to complete backfit conversion to Trident II D5 from
    her previous status as a Trident I C4 strategic weapon system.
    That ship is currently undergoing final certification and
    testing.
        Through our direct support, we also have been busy in the
    SSGN program. The U.S.S. Florida SSBN-728 successfully launched
    two Tomahawk missiles during an SSGN demonstration and
    validation test off the southern coast of Florida.
        To achieve these accomplishments, it took our people an
    enormous amount of planning and hard work to execute the
    programs during these challenging fiscal and geopolitical
    times. In spite of the significant challenges, the Navy can say
    with confidence that the strategic submarine force continues to
    cost-effectively provide a survivable, reliable, and flexible
    strategic deterrent.
        The Navy has been aggressively modernizing our deployed
    strategic weapons systems, shifting to commercial off-the-shelf
    equipment where practical, developing plans to effectively and
    economically provide payload flexibility with increased
    effectiveness against hardened targets, incorporating strategic
    retargeting capability, and providing hardware and software
    updates to prevent the obsolescence of our weapons systems.
        Strategic Systems Programs is working diligently towards
    the new strategic framework as outlined in the Nuclear Posture
    Review that was forwarded to Congress in December 2001. In
    addition to initiating the D5 life extension program that
    increases the life of the Trident II strategic weapons system
    to match the 45-year life of the Trident hull, Strategic
    Systems Programs is working with the Department of Defense to
    develop the planned reduction of deployed nuclear warheads to
    support the NPR objectives.
        Strategic Systems Programs is also developing and acquiring
    an Attack Weapon System that will be deployed on the four
    Trident submarines being converted to SSGNs. The success of
    this important transformational program is a major priority at
    Strategic Systems Programs.
        Our role in nuclear weapons security has expanded recently.
    The Navy's goal is to have an integrated security approach at
    our Atlantic and Pacific Trident submarine bases, providing an
    appropriate level of security to the submarines coincident with
    their status as critical strategic assets. It is imperative to
    provide the highest level of protection for our strategic
    facilities and submarines against the postulated threats.
        In summary, we are pleased to report that the Trident II D5
    Strategic Weapon System continues to meet or exceed all design
    objectives. Also, in spite of significant challenges ahead, we
    are confident that the SSGN Attack Weapon Systems will meet and
    exceed design objectives to support the SSGN program, and we
    will be able to achieve a commensurate level of protection for
    our strategic submarines as we have for our strategic weapons
    facilities.
        On behalf of the Strategic Systems Programs family, I want
    to thank you for your support for our strategic weapons and the
    submarine force and I would like to invite you to visit our
    facilities and submarines so that you can witness first-hand
    the esprit de corps of our people. I am looking forward to
    answering your questions, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Young follows:]

             Prepared Statement by Rear Adm. Charles B. Young, USN

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I am Rear Admiral
    Charles B. Young, Director, Strategic Systems Programs. Thank you for
    inviting me to brief the subcommittee on the status of my programs.
    Strategic Systems Programs is the Program Manager for the Trident I
    (C4) and Trident II (D5) Strategic Weapon Systems; the Navy's Executive
    Agent for all arms control treaties and agreements; the Executive Agent
    for the US/UK Polaris Sales Agreement, which was amended to encompass
    the UK procurement of the Trident II system; and the Navy's Technical
    Program Manager for Nuclear Weapons Security. Strategic Systems
    Programs is also responsible for the integration of the Nuclear Powered
    Guided Missile Submarine (SSGN) Attack Weapons System in the four
    Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN) being converted to
    SSGNs.
        Before giving you an overview of the Trident II (D5) Acquisition
    Program, there are several recent significant events and achievements
    of the program that are noteworthy. In June 2002, the Strategic Weapons
    Facility, Pacific in Bangor, Washington, achieved Initial Operational
    Capability (IOC) to support the Trident II Strategic Weapon System in
    the Pacific. The Navy now has Trident II capability on both coasts. In
    August 2002, U.S.S. Nevada (SSBN 733) completed her engineered overhaul
    and backfit conversion to the Trident II Strategic Weapon System at the
    Puget Sound Naval Shipyard--she was the second ship to complete the
    Trident II backfit and overhaul ahead of schedule and under budget. In
    October 2002, U.S.S. Ohio (SSBN 726) and U.S.S. Florida (SSBN 728)
    completed their final strategic offloads of Trident I (C4) missiles in
    preparation for their refueling overhauls and conversions to SSGNs. In
    December 2002, U.S.S. Nevada successfully launched the 100th Trident II
    (D5) flight test missile. Finally, in January 2003, U.S.S. Florida
    (SSBN 728) successfully launched two Tomahawk missiles during an SSGN
    Demonstration and Validation test--demonstrating Tomahawk missiles can
    be launched vertically from a modified Ohio class submarine.

                                    OVERVIEW

        The Trident II (D5) program achieved IOC on 23 March 1990, when the
    U.S.S. Tennessee (SSBN 734) was deployed with 24 tactical D5 missiles.
    The Trident II Strategic Weapon System (SWS) represents the sixth
    generation of the Navy's Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) Systems, which
    have served as significant deterrents to aggression and major war since
    Polaris (A1) achieved IOC in 1960. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR),
    which was forwarded to Congress in December 2001, outlined the
    Strategic Submarine Force structure: 14 SSBNs outfitted with the
    Trident II (D5) Strategic Weapon System in 2 oceans. In accordance with
    the NPR, the remaining 4 of the original 18 Trident SSBNs will be
    converted to SSGNs.
        To achieve an all D5 SSBN force, backfit of four of the submarines
    to the D5 Strategic Weapon System from the Trident I (C4) Strategic
    Weapon System has been initiated. The C4 SWS will be retired in fiscal
    year 2005. The Trident SWS and support facilities were designed from
    the beginning to handle the newer and larger missile system with
    minimal impact and cost. To date, two of the four SSBNs have completed
    backfit; one is fully operational and making deployments in the
    Pacific, and the other is finishing its final certification and
    testing. The second submarine will also be homeported in the Pacific.
    The last two SSBNs are scheduled to start their backfit in fiscal year
    2005 and fiscal year 2006. The contracts have been awarded and much of
    the required hardware has been procured.
        The four oldest of the Ohio class submarines were selected for
    conversion to SSGNs because of their age and scheduled maintenance
    periods. As mentioned previously, two of the four submarines have
    already completed their final strategic offload. The first two SSBN
    engineered refueling overhauls (EROs) are scheduled to start in fiscal
    year 2003, followed by conversion to SSGN starting in fiscal year 2004.
    The third and fourth SSBN EROs are scheduled to start in fiscal year
    2004 and fiscal year 2005, respectively, followed by conversion to SSGN
    starting in fiscal year 2005.
        Both backfit and SSGN conversion operations are examples of
    transformational programs that provide an improved capability for the
    Navy and the Nation, extend the life of the submarines beyond their
    planned life, and represent the return on investment the American
    people have made in our Navy.
        The Navy can say with confidence that the Strategic Submarine Force
    continues to cost-effectively provide a survivable, reliable, and
    flexible strategic deterrent. We've been aggressively modernizing our
    deployed Strategic Weapon Systems, shifting to commercial off-the-shelf
    equipment where practical, developing plans to effectively and
    economically provide payload flexibility with increased effectiveness
    against hardened targets, incorporating strategic retargeting
    capability, and providing hardware and software updates to prevent the
    obsolescence of our weapon systems. These efforts are a part of the
    Navy's strategic vision of Sea Power 21.

                                    PROGRAM

        Strategic Systems Programs is focused on three primary areas: D5
    life extension (D5LE), nuclear weapons security (NWS), and NPR
    objectives.

    Trident II (D5) Life Extension
        The Trident II D5 life extension (LE) program is required due to
    the Ohio class Ballistic Missile Nuclear Submarine (SSBN) service life
    increasing from 30 years to 45 years. The impact of the SSBN hull life
    extension is significant in two ways. First, it delays the replacement
    of these platforms by 15 years, effectively delaying the expenditure of
    up to $25 billion in current year dollars for follow-on strategic
    submarine platforms. Second, it requires the service life of the
    Trident II D5 Strategic Weapons System (SWS) carried by these ships to
    also be extended by 15 years.
        The extended service life requirement affects flight hardware
    (missile, guidance and reentry) and shipboard hardware (launcher, fire
    control, navigation and test instrumentation).
        With respect to flight hardware, D5 life extension requires
    procurement of an additional 115 Trident II D5 missiles, revising the
    total D5 procurement objective from 425 to 540. In addition, the
    guidance system and missile electronics must be replaced due to aging
    and obsolescence issues.
        The service life extension for flight hardware requires a strategy
    that effectively addresses two key issues: (1) supporting the existing
    systems, recognizing that some parts will fail due to age or become
    obsolete, and (2) producing the additional flight test missiles
    required to assure credibility and safety of the deterrent. These
    flight test missiles support qualification of new or modified
    components, as well as the additional annual reliability tests required
    due to extended program life.
        With the SSBN service life extended to 45 years, a missile
    inventory shortfall will occur starting in approximately fiscal year
    2014 when the oldest Ohio class submarine would have originally been
    decommissioned. The 30-year service life procurement objective of 425
    Trident II D5 missiles does not support the additional flight tests
    necessary to extend the Trident II D5 SWS to 45 years.
        The Navy is currently executing a low rate production continuity
    procurement strategy for critical components of Trident II D5 missiles.
    Several missile components are designated as critical, the most
    important being the rocket motor sets. These critical components are
    being procured at their minimum rate in advance of when they would be
    required for full missile assembly to sustain component quality and
    maintain the supplier base. The production continuity procurement
    strategy has been extensively reviewed and approved by the Department
    of Defense (DOD) and Congress and has been in execution for nearly 15
    years. This procurement strategy has proven successful, based on the
    demonstrated superb performance of the Trident II D5 Strategic Weapon
    System. The fiscal year 2004 Trident II WPN budget request includes the
    continued production of rocket motors and other critical components.
    The current program fully funds the additional 115 Trident II D5 LE
    missiles in fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2013, supporting lead-
    time away from need requirements. Rocket motor sets and other critical
    components in support of the 115 missile requirement are currently
    being procured as described above. Rocket motor procurements in support
    of the additional missiles for life extension began in fiscal year
    2002.
        The current Trident II D5 Mk-6 Guidance System improved accuracy by
    a factor of four over the previous Trident I C4 Mk-5 Guidance
    Subsystem. As successful and reliable as the Mk6 Guidance Subsystem has
    been to date, there are significant technology limitations that make
    this design impractical to maintain throughout the extended life
    period. The Mk-6 design is based on early 1980s technology. Production
    ended with the fiscal year 2001 procurement. Restarting production
    would be cost prohibitive, and attempting to integrate today's
    electronics technology into a 20-year old design would be inefficient
    and high risk. The Mk-6 guidance subsystem, in its current form, will
    not support the life extension requirements. The Navy program includes
    the most affordable and lowest risk approach to meet Trident II D5 LE
    requirements by the pursuit of a system to replace the Mk-6, designated
    the Next Generation Guidance (NGG). Due to the advancements made in
    technology, both in components (solid state sensors and electronics)
    and in modeling and simulation, stringent cost targets have been
    established for NGG with the requirement to meet current Mk-6
    performance. The ability to develop precision instruments, sensors, and
    radiation hardened architectures for NGG requires investment in
    underlying commercially supported technologies to adapt them for the
    unique strategic requirements. The redesign approach leverages off of
    current Air Force/Navy cooperative strategic-unique technology efforts
    and will result in a Navy Trident II D5 LE solution and government
    owned design package that can be used by other services to leverage off
    the Navy investment.
        Similarly, missile electronics packages must also be redesigned for
    the same aging and obsolescence issues described above for guidance.
    The technology used for D5 electronics is obsolete and for most
    components there is no longer an industrial base. Thus, the Trident II
    D5 electronics subsystem will require new package designs for the
    additional missile procurements and for backfit into existing missiles,
    since legacy electronic components are no longer available. The Navy's
    fiscal year 2004 WPN request continues the missile electronics and
    guidance system redesign efforts begun in fiscal year 2003.
        The D5 missile is capable of carrying both the W76/MK4 and the W88/
    MK5 reentry bodies. While the W88/MK5 was designed specifically for the
    D5 during the early 1980s and will not need to be immediately
    refurbished, the W76/MK4 warhead and fuze carried on the MK4 reentry
    body was designed in the early 1970s and began deployment in 1979 on
    the Trident I (C4) missile with a design life of 20 years. The W76/MK4
    program was based on the older W68/MK3 design and some of the
    components were carried over from that program. There are technical and
    programmatic issues that require both a refurbished warhead and a
    refurbished fuze for the W76/MK4. The Department of Energy and the Navy
    are executing a refurbishment program for the W76/MK4 reentry body. The
    Navy's refurbishment of the W76/MK4 fuze is supported in the Navy's
    fiscal year 2004 WPN budget request.
        With respect to shipboard hardware, life extension is taking place
    on a somewhat continuous "refreshment" basis, with the computing and
    electronic component parts of these systems moving rapidly towards the
    integration of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products. Because of the
    low cost of COTS hardware components, it is more cost-effective to
    adopt a shorter refresh cycle than possible with previous generations
    of custom hardware/software. This strategy reduces support costs while
    maintaining high reliability and safety. All shipboard SWS Subsystems
    have life extension programs planned or in place to support the SSBN 45
    year life. In addition to the COTS components, there is specialized
    equipment required to support the mission, such as the highly precise
    strategic submarine inertial navigation equipment. Prudent investment
    in these equipments is also contained in the Navy's fiscal year 2004
    OPN request. The goal for each subsystem will be to mitigate known
    obsolescence and supportability problems, providing both cost avoidance
    and reduced life cycle costs. The Navy's fiscal year 2004 OPN budget
    request supports these shipboard subsystem life extension efforts.
        Trident II (D5) life extension efforts ensure a credible,
    survivable and affordable strategic deterrent capability well into the
    21st century.

    Nuclear Weapons Security
        The Navy continues to meet all current DOD policy regarding nuclear
    weapons security. There was a significant investment during the design
    and construction of both Strategic Weapons Facilities in Bangor,
    Washington, and Kings Bay, Georgia, primarily in the weapons storage
    areas (WSA) and the assignment of sizable dedicated security forces to
    protect nuclear weapons within the WSA. However, the attack on the
    U.S.S. Cole and the events of September 11 caused the DOD and Navy to
    re-evaluate the security posture of all our nuclear weapon storage
    facilities around the globe from all three axes of threat--land, sea,
    and air. In regard to nuclear weapons security, the Navy has determined
    a security posture similar to what is currently established in the WSA
    should be extended to the waterfront and during transit to and from the
    dive point at which point the submarine can submerge and protect
    itself. Therefore, we have initiated an integrated nuclear weapons
    security program. This program will provide a layered defense under a
    command structure with centralized command, control, communication,
    monitoring and surveillance. Utilizing a balanced mixture of technology
    and manpower, the Navy will have the capability to ensure this security
    posture is sustainable over the long term. This integrated program will
    be implemented, provided resources are available, in a phased approach
    with initial investments beginning in fiscal year 2003, and taking
    approximately 6 years to reach full operational capability. The lengthy
    implementation time is driven primarily by the lead-time for military
    construction project design, construction and outfitting. Interim
    measures are being undertaken to mitigate risk with initial investments
    focused on our highest vulnerability areas.

                    NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW (NPR) OBJECTIVES

    Research and Development (RDT&E,N)
        The most significant change in the Navy strategic programs budget
    is in research and development. Strategic Systems Programs' RDT&E,N
    budget increases from about $34 million in fiscal year 2003 to about
    $102 million in fiscal year 2004. This arises from the need to enable
    the dramatic changes articulated in the new Strategic Framework
    outlined by the December 2001 NPR. The inherent flexibility in warhead
    loading of the Trident submarine launched ballistic missile force
    enables the Department of Defense to execute the reduction of deployed
    nuclear warheads to achieve the Moscow Treaty and congruent NPR
    objectives in force structure. The NPR goes beyond a mere changing of
    force levels to describe the changes in the framework for, and nature
    of the Nation's strategic forces needed in the future. Navy efforts in
    contributing a Sea Shield element of missile defense are implemented in
    other programs, while the Trident program makes significant Sea Strike
    contributions to the offensive and infrastructure legs of the new Triad
    described in the NPR. These contributions are achieved by
    ``Applications'' programs in specific technology areas and in focused
    development programs for specific capabilities. Applications programs
    develop and evaluate new technologies for potential use in existing and
    future strategic systems. The strategic guidance and reentry body
    applications programs have existed for about 8 years. This effort is
    increased in fiscal year 2004. New applications programs in strategic
    propulsion and radiation hardened electronics are contained in the
    fiscal year 2004 budget. Separate from the applications programs, a
    specific technology solution, Enhanced Effectiveness (E2), has been
    identified and included in the fiscal year 2004 budget. E2 is a
    technology development effort fully supported by the Commander, U.S.
    Strategic Command, for achieving improved missile accuracy. It aims at
    enhancing the accuracy of an existing weapon system, the W76/MK4
    reentry body used on the Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile
    (SLBM).
        Applications programs have the major goal of sustaining unique
    strategic technology, design talents and infrastructure needed by the
    Nation to maintain dominant strategic forces. In essence, these
    applications programs are the Nation's ``seed corn'' in strategic
    offensive missile systems. This is needed to both develop future
    replacement systems and to fix any performance issues within existing
    systems. Since the Navy and Air Force have a common need for this
    talent in strategic missile (ICBM and SLBM) technologies, the
    Department of Defense has a strategy of executing coordinated,
    complementary programs in each service. The Navy and Air Force
    carefully coordinate technology areas and critical skills to obtain
    maximum synergy in meeting the Nation's need in this critical area.
        The Navy has four major applications program efforts included in
    the fiscal year 2004 budget request: Reentry System Applications
    Program (RSAP), Strategic Guidance Applications Program (GAP),
    Strategic Propulsion Applications Program (SPAP), and Radiation
    Hardened Applications Program (RHAP). Each of these is briefly
    described.
        Reentry Systems Applications Program (RSAP). Unique strategic
    reentry environments require technologies in materials needed to
    provide long service life while being able to survive the extreme
    atmospheric reentry and possible radiation environment. Critical and
    unique attributes necessary for the design, development and testing of
    ICBM and SLBM reentry systems have been defined and will be maintained.
    Critical technologies are heat shield and nose-tip material and fuze
    electronics. Navy requirements have been integrated with Air Force
    requirements into a comprehensive program that maintains close
    coordination with the DOD Science and Technology (S&T) community to
    leverage S&T programs and avoid unintended duplication of effort. To
    ensure these efforts are focused on real solutions, RSAP demonstrates
    appropriate emerging technologies through actual reentry flight test
    evaluations.
        Strategic Guidance Applications Program (GAP). Unique strategic
    guidance requires technologies that provide extreme accuracy over long
    ranges while potentially operating in a hostile radiation environment.
    The GAP provides a strategic guidance core technology development
    capability consistent with the Strategic Advisory Group (SAG)
    recommendation to COMSTRATCOM. System accuracy and functionality
    depends upon key technologies, which provide radiation hardened
    accelerometer, gyroscopes and stellar sensing capabilities. A critical
    skill is the ability to integrate these elements together in a
    extremely high performing and reliable system. As the underlying
    technologies that currently provide these capabilities age and are no
    longer technically supportable, modern alternatives must be made
    available to allow for orderly replacement. There is no commercial
    market for these technologies and their viability depends on the
    strategic community.
        RSAP and GAP have increased their combined funding of $34 million
    in fiscal year 2003 to $44 million in fiscal year 2004 to better meet
    these unique strategic needs.
        Strategic Propulsion Applications Program (SPAP). Strategic
    propulsion requires technologies to provide large high performance
    solid rocket motor systems that have a long shelf life, high
    reliability and safe handling and storage. The SPAP, commencing in
    fiscal year 2004, will be a coordinated Navy and Air Force effort to
    exercise these unique design talents and infrastructure needs. Key
    elements of SPAP are investment in propellant technologies, nozzle and
    case materials and integrating these into an effective solution. Boost
    propulsion (missile stages), post boost propulsion (missile payload
    delivery vehicle) and ordnance (separation events and flight
    termination events) are all integral parts of missile propulsion
    application efforts.
        To focus on developing real system solutions, an annual large-scale
    rocket motor test firing of developed technology is planned. A sound
    base of demonstrated technologies suitable for Strategic Missile
    applications will be maintained and will provide the Nation a talent
    base and source of technologies suitable for current and follow-on
    development programs. The Navy SPAP starts at $8 million in fiscal year
    2004 and increases in future years.
        Radiation Hardened Applications Program (RHAP). Radiation hardening
    electronics for potential strategic radiation environment results in
    technology challenges as well as industrial base issues. The Radiation
    Hardened Oversight Council (RHOC), chaired by the Director, Defense
    Research and Engineering (DDR&E), coordinates these efforts. The RHAP
    will focus on a coordinated productization and qualification effort,
    which provides a transition between ongoing science and technology
    (S&T) efforts and production for actual use. The RHOC has developed a
    technology road map that coordinates these efforts into the Department
    of Defense investment strategy. In addition, the RHAP will sustain
    critical skills in radiation hardened electronics design and simulation
    techniques to support the ability to design radiation hardened
    strategic missile, guidance and reentry systems. These efforts become
    of greater importance because of the shrinking industrial base for
    radiation hardened electronics, the fast-moving commercial electronics
    market, the unavailability of underground testing resources and the
    loss of radiation hardened expertise. The RHAP will compliment RSAP and
    GAP efforts by specifically focusing on those tasks required to ensure
    producibility of radiation hardened parts. The fiscal year 2004 budget
    requests $20 million for the radiation hardened applications program.
        Enhanced Effectiveness Program (E2). Enhanced Effectiveness
    provides increased capabilities articulated in the NPR, such as prompt
    accurate strike, defeat of critical targets and selective nuclear
    options. This program is a 3-year effort culminating in a flight test
    demonstration of a Trident reentry body with dramatically improved
    accuracy. The approach is to integrate existing technologies into a
    reentry body extension. The extension would attach to the existing W76/
    MK4 warhead, giving it the size and weight of the larger W88/MK5
    warhead. Since the current D5 missile is capable of carrying either the
    MK4 or MK5 warhead, the changes to the missile are minimal.
        The fiscal year 2004 budget contains about $30 million for the
    Enhanced Effectiveness effort. The E2 program is an R&D effort; it
    includes no funding for procurement. Any procurement program that
    employs this technology will be presented to Congress for authorization
    in future budget requests.

    SSGN
        Strategic Systems Programs is playing a major role in support of
    one of the Navy's initiatives in Sea Power 21. The SSBN-to-SSGN
    conversion will provide a near-term transformational capability to the
    Nation, removing four Ohio class submarines from strategic service,
    refueling their reactors to permit an additional 20 years of operation,
    and converting them into conventional strike platforms.
        Strategic Systems Programs, in support of the SSGN program manager,
    is providing the Attack Weapons System for the SSGNs. As part of the
    development of that system, a demonstration and validation was
    conducted in January. U.S.S. Florida (SSBN 728), an Ohio class
    submarine, successfully launched two Tomahawk cruise missiles,
    confirming the ability to launch a Tomahawk from a configuration
    similar to the tightly packed cluster of Tomahawk All-Up-Rounds (AUR)
    we will use in the SSGN. In addition to this demonstration and
    validation supporting the multiple all-up-round canister development
    and design, the firings supported the Navy's Sea Trial experiment,
    Giant Shadow, which also explored how a network of forces, including
    special warfare forces, and various unmanned aerial, underwater and
    ground vehicles and sensors could be used to provide surveillance,
    collect real-time intelligence, and develop and launch a time critical
    strike in support of the joint force commander. This included the first
    vertical launch of an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV), testing of
    nuclear-biological-chemical sensors, and the insertion of Navy SEALs
    from one of the submarines the Navy will convert to an SSGN.
        For the Attack Weapons System for SSGN, Strategic Systems Programs
    is leveraging existing strategic weapons systems technology and
    expertise including the use of commercial off-the-shelf technology in
    shipboard systems to minimize the life cycle cost. The fiscal year 2004
    budget request supports the continued design, development, and
    procurement of the Attack Weapons System.
        Our future SSGN forces will provide large volume clandestine strike
    with cruise missiles and the capability to support and insert Special
    Operations Forces. The flexibility provided by missile tube volume
    supports payload adaptability to meet emerging mission requirements.
        The Navy will leverage the existing Trident submarine
    infrastructure to optimize their on-station time. The first two ships,
    the U.S.S. Ohio and U.S.S. Florida, enter the shipyard in fiscal year
    2003 to begin their engineered refueling overhauls (EROs) and
    conversions. U.S.S. Michigan and U.S.S. Georgia will begin their EROs
    and conversions in fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005, respectively.
    We expect the first SSGN to be operational in fiscal year 2007.

                                    SUMMARY

        In summary, I am pleased to report the Trident II (D5) Strategic
    Weapon System continues to meet or exceed all design objectives. The
    fiscal year 2004 President's budget supports the NPR-directed force
    structure requirement of 14 D5 SSBNs; fully funds D5 Life Extension
    requirements; provides funding to ensure an integrated approach to
    nuclear weapons security; and includes R&D investments and funding for
    SSGN conversion that meets the NPR objectives. In spite of significant
    challenges, I reiterate with confidence that the Navy's Strategic
    Submarine Force continues to cost-effectively provide a survivable,
    reliable, and flexible strategic deterrent.
        Thank you.

        Senator Allard. Thank you very much, Admiral. We appreciate
    your testimony.
        Dr. Beckner, the first question I have for you relates to
    Savannah River. Section 2137 of the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 prohibited the
    decommissioning of F Canyon until both the Secretary of Energy
    and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board certified that
    all materials present in F Canyon were safely stabilized and
    all future fissile materials disposition can be met by H Canyon
    or other facilities. Do any of the programs within NNSA plan to
    use F Canyon now or in the future?
        Dr. Beckner. They do not. Our plans are consistent with
    utilizing H Canyon for the future.
        Senator Allard. Is there any reason now or in the
    foreseeable future in which the NNSA would need F Canyon to
    meet their national security mission?
        Dr. Beckner. No, there is none.
        Senator Allard. Are there any materials held by NNSA which
    need to be disposed of and which must be or should be processed
    through F Canyon to reach a safe disposition?
        Dr. Beckner. There are none.
        Senator Allard. Does NNSA have any reason why F Canyon
    should not be decommissioned?
        Dr. Beckner. We do not.
        Senator Allard. One of the responsibilities of Readiness in
    Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) is the current and future
    maintenance of facilities across the NNSA. What specific
    criteria and methods of discipline are being used to make sure
    that RTBF meets all current and future maintenance and repair
    needs?
        Dr. Beckner. That is a fairly complicated question to
    answer because of our interface with the other elements of NNSA
    programs that is devoted to the condition of our facilities,
    that being the facility and infrastructure section of the
    budget. Our activities are such that we plan together between
    RTBF, which is the part of the budget that I manage, and the
    Facilities and Infrastructure (F&I), the part of the budget
    that Mr. Greg Rudy manages, both for Ambassador Brooks. We work
    the problems jointly so that we understand the way they are
    spending money to assure that our facilities are maintained
    properly and brought back up to conditions which are better for
    future utilization. Then the RTBF budget will be in a position
    to carry them forward as necessary until we can shut them down
    if that is appropriate.
        There is a very elaborate planning activity there which we
    use to be sure that we can go forward with the facilities. I
    guess the best thing I can offer there would be to spend more
    time with your staff or with committee staff showing you the
    way we schedule that work and the way we budget it, because
    there is never an excess of money for this sort of thing.
        Senator Allard. We would like to hear what you have to say
    on how you are working the two programs together and
    coordinating it.
        Dr. Beckner. We would be happy to do that.
        Senator Allard. General Smolen, I know some of the
    Peacekeepers have been removed from their silos and the rest
    will be removed over the next couple of years. What does the
    Air Force intend to do with the Peacekeeper silos once these
    missiles are removed?
        General Smolen. Sir, for now the silos will be maintained
    in caretaker status. There has not, to the best of my
    knowledge, been any decision on what the silos may be used for
    in the future. However, in the analysis of alternatives that
    Space Command may be considering, that can certainly be a
    possible option for some future consideration.
        Senator Allard. Admiral Young, the Navy's current plan is
    to extend the life of the D5--you mentioned this in your
    testimony--ballistic missile from 30 to 45 years. Do we have
    any experience with trying to sustain rockets that old, and do
    you have that kind of confidence in the rocket motors? If they
    need to be refurbished, for example, do you reach a point there
    where what you used originally in the motors are not available
    in our high-tech, rapid turnover society 10, 15, 20 years down
    the road? Can you comment on that?
        Admiral Young. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. That certainly is a
    concern.
        To answer your first question, we have limited experience
    in very old rocket motors. We flew the C4 for about 21 years,
    so we have that type of experience, but not out to 45 years.
    For our current D5 rocket motors, our oldest one is about 13\1/
    2\ years old right now.
        We have seen nothing in any of our surveillance programs
    that indicates any aging problems at this point, but we have a
    specific milestone to look at as we go forward. We believe that
    in the POM 2008 time frame we will have to make a decision
    whether or not we will need to maintain those rocket motor
    manufacturing facilities because, as we continue building the
    D5 life extension rockets, that is when we think that decision
    will be coming up. Right now, we have no indication that we are
    going to have any aging problems. However, we are continuing to
    look at the aging of rocket motors very closely, with the
    understanding that it could impact the industrial base.
        Senator Allard. Dr. Beckner, the secure transportation
    assets of the National Nuclear Security Administration are
    responsible for securely and safely transporting nuclear
    weapons, nuclear weapons components, and special nuclear
    materials. With the closure of Rocky Flats and other
    environmental management sites, there is an increased demand on
    the STAs. This has placed stress apparently on some of the
    assets.
        Has NNSA put together a plan to replace the aging assets
    within the secure transportation assets and hire enough
    security guards to keep up with increasing demand for shipments
    over the next several years?
        Dr. Beckner. We believe we have. This is a part of the
    system that is obviously impacted by the security status in the
    country generally. When we move to Security Condition-2 (SECON-
    2), for instance, that forces us to make some changes in the
    way we operate those assets. We have done that this year
    largely with more overtime.
        We have a program to replace equipment. We are completing
    the Rocky Flats shipments this year, and so that part of the
    program will no longer be on our schedule book. We are
    uncertain at this time as to the Department's plans for moving
    material out of Hanford, which is again a substantial amount of
    surplus material that is at the Hanford site. So for now we
    have to view that as work that we probably will have to
    conduct, but is at this time uncertain.
        Our priority continues to be the weapon program and then to
    work other areas, other program areas, as available to do so.
    Based on that, we have the 5-year plan that takes care of new
    equipment as required.
        Senator Allard. Thank you.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. General and Admiral, if there were a
    new low-yield nuclear weapon developed, what platform would be
    used to deliver it?
        Admiral Young. For the Navy, sir, our D5 missile has a very
    capable and adaptable, flexible payload system on it. It can
    carry both the W76 Mark IV payload as well as the W88 Mark V.
    If a low-yield were developed and were required, we could fly
    that on that missile. We have some limitations about how many
    RVs you would have to put on the missile bus. Essentially,
    there is a limited number just because of the balance of how
    you would fly the warheads. That would be our delivery plan.
        Senator Bill Nelson. General?
        General Smolen. Sir, I think any of the systems, both the
    intercontinental missile as well as bomber delivery, could
    possibly be used. I think part of the discussion goes to the
    heart of the nature of the type of weapon, the kind of target
    that might be held at risk, and the desired weapon effects that
    you would want to achieve. With the balance of that, I think
    any one of the platforms could conceivably field that weapon.
        Senator Bill Nelson. For any new nuclear weapon, not
    necessarily low-yield, plus existing nuclear weapons, does
    either the Air Force or the Navy have a requirement for a new
    delivery platform?
        Admiral Young. The Navy as far as I am aware, Senator, does
    not have a requirement for a new delivery platform.
        General Smolen. Senator, the Air Force would, I believe,
    have the same position.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Beckner, what work will NNSA carry
    out using the advanced concepts funding in 2004?
        Dr. Beckner. It will be a broad assessment, largely to
    explore ideas that could lead to systems which would, as they
    say, potentially be of interest for future targets. This is
    mostly sitting and attempting to answer the question, ``What
    will be the threats that this country will be confronted with,
    and, based on those threats, what would be an appropriate
    weapon to put against those threats?'' Mostly paper studies,
    conceivably a bit of hardware work just to prove out some
    ideas, but invariably, whenever you do advanced thinking--
    whatever term you want to give to it--it is driven very much by
    the target that is put to you as something that would be a
    threat to this country, and then you work backwards from that.
    Given such a threat, what would be the best way to attack that
    threat?
        Sometimes you will see applications for instance, for
    specialized outputs, one target might need a higher percentage
    of X-rays or gamma rays, or another one might be one where you
    want to enhance the neutron output. All those things would have
    to be done within the context of what the package would need to
    look like so that it could fit on a certain delivery system.
        That is all those things that you work for the most part on
    paper.
        Senator Bill Nelson. This week's edition of Aviation Week
    has an article titled ``Rapid Response.''
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Senator Bill Nelson. The idea is a rotational conventional
    reentry vehicle for the Minuteman III. The article acknowledges
    that conventional ICBMs present policymakers with difficult
    political problems.
        What do you think about that? Could you explain, any of
    you, the activity each of your Services has undertaken in
    support of or related to conventional ICBMs, either sea or
    land-based?
        Admiral Young. Senator, the Navy has no specific programs
    at all that are developing a conventional submarine-launched
    ballistic missile. Now, having said that, as I mentioned
    earlier, the D5 is a very capable, flexible platform. If you
    wanted to develop and fly a conventional warhead on that
    platform, you could do that.
        As a matter of fact, we do a series of flight tests each
    year and we obviously fly inert heads on them, which could
    essentially, at the velocity at which they come down, be
    considered a weapon that could be used. We obviously fly those
    into the ocean at points. But we have no specific programs
    developing a conventional capability. Again, that capability to
    fly those types of weapons is available if we wanted to develop
    that for the country.
        General Smolen. Sir, from the Air Force perspective,
    certainly, with the advancements in technology, a conventional
    ICBM could be a possibility. Certainly, overflight issues would
    be a consideration, as well as where the booster might be
    placed should they be launched from an existing current
    facility somewhere in the United States. There are technical
    issues that might be associated with determining whether or not
    that could be a feasible option.
        But in the Air Force Space Command's charter to look at an
    analysis of alternatives for the future, I am certain that they
    will be adapting some of their thinking toward looking at what
    possibilities may exist. But technologies might make some of
    that feasible which might not necessarily be feasible today.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, the reason I am asking
    is, as we confront the problem of terrorists and we need to
    knock out terrorists before they suddenly activate a weapon of
    mass destruction, can we do it better by using an ICBM as
    opposed to a cruise missile?
        General Smolen. Quite possibly, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Why? Because you would have a bigger
    payload, conventional payload, on an ICBM, on a reentry
    vehicle?
        Admiral Young. I think that is one factor, sir. I think the
    other factor is time. A ballistic missile, be it coming from
    the sea or from land, flies fairly quickly. If, therefore, you
    have a target that is only there for some short period of time,
    then you can get there quicker with one of these weapons, as
    opposed to a cruise missile that takes a lot longer to get from
    its launching platform to the target.
        General Smolen. Yes, sir. With the retargeting capability,
    I think the timeliness of an ICBM type of weapon would
    certainly pose an advantage.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
        Senator Allard. Gentlemen, it is about 4:22. It is going to
    take us about 7 or 8 minutes to go over for the closed hearing,
    so I just want to bring this to a close. Dr. Beckner, I want to
    thank you for your efforts in setting up the tour during Easter
    here. I am going to be visiting labs, visiting with you, and
    also going out to Pantex, so I am looking forward to that
    during Easter break.
        Dr. Beckner. Thank you.
        Senator Allard. We are going to SR-222. If you just follow
    the staff, they can get you over there. We are adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Question Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard

                               ADVANCED CONCEPTS

        1. Senator Allard. Ambassador Brooks, to help clarify the record on
    the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Advanced Concepts
    initiative, please list examples of the types of activities you
    envision Advanced Concepts will be working on in fiscal year 2004 or
    beyond.
        Ambassador Brooks. We see a large number of potentially valuable
    projects in the next few years, more than our resources will allow us
    to pursue. NNSA will work with the Joint NNSA-DOD Advanced Concepts
    Steering Group and the Nuclear Weapons Council to prioritize the most
    significant efforts. We anticipate that the Air Force will initiate a
    concept study of an Enhanced Cruise Missile in late 2003 that will
    extend into 2004. Air Force Space Command has begun looking at
    alternate yield options for a small quantity of Minuteman ICBM
    warheads. The Navy has expressed interest in examining the utility of
    alternate yields for the W76 sometime in the future. The Foster Panel
    urged us to investigate warhead designs with reduced fission yield and
    the military could ask us to study those concepts. In addition, the DOD
    NPR Implementation Plan calls for a number of other concept studies in
    the future. Some of the studies are classified, but among the
    unclassified studies are an Air Force Analysis of Alternatives for a
    follow on ICBM with an Initial Operational Capability in 2018, and USD
    (AT&L) is directed to study long term (at least 20 years out) strategic
    strike capabilities for the New Triad as well as non-strategic nuclear
    strike capabilities. I expect that NNSA advanced concepts studies will
    be a part of these DOD led studies.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

                                 PLUTONIUM PITS

        2. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Ellis, is there a validated annual
    requirement for pit production? If the answer is yes, what is the
    requirement? Is the requirement general or is it specific as to the
    number and type per year and when must production start? What is the
    size of the nuclear weapons stockpile on which the requirement is
    based? If the answer is no, what is the process for establishing a
    validated requirement?
        Admiral Ellis. There are two aspects to plutonium pit production
    requirements, each under the purview of NNSA. The first is replacing
    plutonium pits consumed by the Stockpile Stewardship Program, which is
    essential for stockpile safety and reliability. As an example, the
    short-notice termination of W88 warhead production in 1989 did not
    allow the production of extra pits to replace those consumed during the
    warhead's service life. Therefore, we are now at the point of deferring
    for up to 2 years the destructive tests of the warhead to preclude
    decreasing the active stockpile. This requirement can be satisfied by
    small facilities capable of producing 10-20 pits per year of all types.
        The second aspect is providing pit replacements, in quantity, at a
    time in the future before the plutonium pits in the current stockpile
    reach the end of their service life. With few exceptions these
    plutonium pits were produced over a short period of time, and it is
    reasonable to expect they will reach the end of their service life in a
    similarly short timeframe. NNSA initiated and Congress funded a program
    to begin work on a Modern Pit Facility to address this future need.
        Regarding the size of the stockpile on which requirements are
    based, work is currently underway on the fiscal year 2003-2007 Nuclear
    Weapons Stockpile Plan, which will incorporate the tenets of the 2001
    Nuclear Posture Review.

        3. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, NNSA is currently in the
    process of designing a new pit facility and conducting an environmental
    impact statement to support construction of such a facility. What is
    the requirement to which the facility is being designed?
        Ambassador Brooks. The NNSA has the requirement to support the
    Nation's nuclear stockpile. The NNSA must be in a position to respond
    to future stockpile requirements as well as address any issues that may
    arise impacting the performance of pits. It is anticipated that all
    pits have a functional lifetime (currently estimated at 40 to 60 years)
    and will need to be replaced to maintain a reliable stockpile. The
    basic design strategy is modular so final sizing can be made when we
    have a better assessment of the impact of the NPR and our efforts to
    restore and modernize other production capabilities on the size of the
    future nuclear stockpile.

        4. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, is there an estimate of
    the total project cost for the facility, and, if so, what is the
    estimate?
        Ambassador Brooks. Since the project has just initiated conceptual
    design, only a pre-conceptual estimate of $2 to $4 billion has been
    developed. This range of estimated cost covers both design and
    construction and will depend upon the initial capacity, among other
    factors, approved for design and construction. More detailed baseline
    costs will be available at the conclusion of preliminary design
    (Critical Decision 2) in fiscal year 2008.

        5. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, is there an estimate of
    the annual operating cost of the facility?
        Ambassador Brooks. A pre-conceptual design estimate for operation
    of the facility beginning in fiscal year 2019 is $200 to $300 million
    annually.

        6. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, when will a site
    selection decision be made for the pit facility?
        Ambassador Brooks. Activities under the National Environmental
    Policy Act were initiated at the beginning of fiscal year 2003 for a
    Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement on Stockpile
    Stewardship and Management for a Modern Pit Facility. Should the
    Secretary of Energy decide to continue with the Modern Pit Facility
    project, a Record of Decision (ROD) can be issued as soon as April 2004
    that announces a site location. After that, the Department will prepare
    a site specific Environmental Impact Statement.

                    MANAGEMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY LABS

        7. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, the Los Alamos National
    Laboratory has had a series of well-publicized financial management
    problems. These problems resulted in your request for the resignation
    of the laboratory director. You are now, I understand, in the process
    of reviewing the University of California contract for Los Alamos to
    determine if it should be cancelled, competed, or extended. Could you
    explain the full nature of the ongoing review, who is conducting it,
    when it will be done, and the criteria that will be used to base any
    recommendations?
        Ambassador Brooks. At the direction of Secretary Abraham, Deputy
    Secretary McSlarrow and I conducted a review of the relationship
    between the University of California, the responsible contractor, and
    Los Alamos National Laboratory. We also explored the relationship among
    the University of California, Los Alamos and the NNSA of the Department
    of Energy. We completed our review and reported the results to
    Secretary Abraham on April 26, 2003. Our review included the history of
    the contract since it was revised and extended in 2001 including the
    Appendix 0 process which was focused on improving security practices
    and other operations; examinations of relevant Inspector General and
    DOE Office of Independent Assessment and Oversight reports; and
    interviews and meetings with senior University, laboratory, and NNSA
    individuals. Our report to Secretary Abraham recommended that he
    announce a decision now to compete the University's contract for Los
    Alamos which expires at the end of September 2005. Secretary Abraham
    accepted our recommendation and announced his decision to compete on
    April 30, 2003. The main criteria for our recommendation were that the
    University bears responsibility for what Secretary Abraham termed the
    systematic management failures in business systems that came to light
    in 2002, and the Department's policy is to compete contracts unless
    there is compelling reasons not to compete. We are currently developing
    the criteria we will use for evaluating competing proposals for the
    contract. We announced this decision about a year ahead of the normal
    schedule to ensure adequate time for developing those criteria, and we
    chartered a Blue Ribbon Commission to advise the Secretary on the
    Department's competition policy and asked them to provide input on
    suggested criteria for the competition.

        8. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, in addition, could you
    explain how the review impacts the University of California contract to
    run the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory?
        Ambassador Brooks. Our review did not explicitly cover Lawrence
    Livermore National Laboratory. That decision can await the
    recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission and also address other
    issues that we may want to consider.

                    NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW AND OTHER STUDIES

        9. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks and Admiral Ellis, has
    the Nuclear Posture Review implementation document been signed, and, if
    so, can we get a copy of that document?
        Ambassador Brooks. The NNSA Nuclear Posture Implementation Plan was
    signed out in April 2002. We can provide you with a copy of that
    document. The DOD NPR Implementation Plan was signed out in March of
    this year; you will need to request a copy from DOD directly.
        Admiral Ellis. The Nuclear Posture Review Implementer is complete
    and signed. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) is
    the releasing authority for all requests for copies of the document.

        10. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks and Admiral Ellis, when
    do each of you anticipate the annual stockpile memo will be signed and
    submitted to the President?
        Ambassador Brooks. This year's Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum
    (NWSM) will be approved by the Nuclear Weapons Council Standing and
    Safety Committee in the near future and put out for vote by the Nuclear
    Weapons Council (NWC). After approval by the NWC, the NWSM will be
    signed by the Secretaries of Energy and Defense and submitted to the
    President.
        Admiral Ellis. The Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of
    Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs is
    responsible for coordination of the annual NWSM and is best qualified
    to provide an estimated completion date.

        11. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks and Admiral Ellis, what
    is the status of the End-to-End Review and when can we get a briefing
    on that document?
        Ambassador Brooks. The End-to-End Review of the Nuclear Command and
    Control System was completed last year under the chairmanship of Brent
    Scowcroft. The Department of Defense and the Department of Energy's
    National Nuclear Security Administration are working together on a plan
    for implementation of the End-to-End Review. A request for a briefing
    on the conclusions of the Review should be addressed to the Department
    of Defense.
        Admiral Ellis. The United States Nuclear Command and Control System
    Federal Advisory Committee End-to-End Review is complete and the
    implementer is in the very early stages of development. The Office of
    Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) will
    serve as the releasing authority for the report.

        12. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks and Admiral Ellis, what
    is the status of the nuclear mission management plan and the NNSA Green
    Book?
        Ambassador Brooks. The Green Book will be signed shortly by the
    Secretary of Energy and copies will be delivered to Congress.
        Admiral Ellis. Defense Research and Engineering distributed the
    most recent Nuclear Mission Management Plan in October 2001. I
    respectfully defer to Ambassador Brooks on the status of the NNSA Green
    Book.

          REPEAL OF THE BAN ON PRODUCTION OF LOW-YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS

        13. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Ellis, the Department of Defense
    has asked for a repeal of the ban on production of low-yield nuclear
    weapons from 1993. The current law prohibits the Secretary of Energy
    from conducting research that could lead to production of a new low-
    yield nuclear weapon. Is there a requirement for a new low-yield
    nuclear weapon?
        Admiral Ellis. To date, the Department of Defense has not
    identified a specific requirement for a new low-yield nuclear weapon.

        14. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Ellis, is a requirement for such a
    weapon under consideration or being developed?
        Admiral Ellis. The Nuclear Posture Review put in motion a major
    change in our approach to the role of nuclear forces in our deterrent
    strategy. As we investigate the full range of possibilities in
    defending our Nation, it is incumbent upon the Department of Defense to
    not only reevaluate the overall capabilities of our nuclear arsenal,
    but to thoroughly analyze the potential of advanced concepts that could
    enhance our overall deterrent posture. Repeal of Section 3136 of the
    Fiscal Year 1994 National Defense Authorization Act will allow rigorous
    and precise engineering analyses necessary to validate facts related to
    nascent advanced concepts. In turn, the results of the research will
    enable dispassionate, fact-based discussions on very important defense
    and policy issues.

        15. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Ellis, why does the United States
    need a new low-yield nuclear weapon?
        Admiral Ellis. At present there are no established requirements for
    a new low-yield nuclear weapon. Responding to the realities of a new
    international security environment, U.S. Strategic Command recently
    completed the most comprehensive revision of our Nation's strategic war
    plan to date. It is focused on crafting the framework to integrate a
    full range of capabilities, old and new, regaining the classic
    definition of strategic deterrence.
        U.S. Strategic Command sees great value in investigating a
    deterrent strategy that is global in nature and includes the most
    effective mix of capabilities available, including nuclear, advanced
    conventional, non-kinetic, and special operations forces. We are
    interested in conducting rigorous studies of all new technologies, and
    examining the merits of precision, increased penetration, and reduced
    yields for our nuclear weapons that will provide the overall
    capabilities that we will need in the new international security
    environment.

        16. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Ellis, the DOD justification for
    the repeal is ``not to foreclose exploration of technical options that
    could strengthen our ability to deter, or respond to new or emerging
    threats.'' What sort of new or emerging threat would a low-yield
    nuclear weapon be used to deter or respond to?
        Admiral Ellis. We are very interested in advanced concepts that may
    prove effective against new or emerging threats. Examples of these
    advanced concepts include earth penetrators, increased accuracy, and
    lower nuclear yields that, separately or together, may better hold at
    risk or defeat weapons of mass destruction and hard and deeply buried
    facilities--two target sets that are growing in both number and
    importance for our adversaries due to their perceived asymmetric
    counter to U.S. capabilities.

        17. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Ellis, is a low-yield nuclear
    device effective against hard and deeply buried targets that cannot be
    held at risk by a conventional weapon?
        Admiral Ellis. When combined with increased penetration and
    precision, many experts anticipate a low-yield nuclear device will hold
    a large number of hard and deeply buried targets at risk that cannot be
    destroyed by conventional warheads, while also dramatically lowering
    expected collateral damage from those levels that would result from
    today's higher-yield nuclear weapons. Detailed analyses will be
    required to validate the effectiveness of the full range of technical
    options.

                          W-80 LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM

        18. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Beckner, in the NNSA fiscal year
    budget request, what is the assumption for the first production in the
    W-80 Life Extension Program?
        Dr. Beckner. The NNSA fiscal year budget request supports a Nuclear
    Weapons Council approved First Production Unit (FPU) date of February
    2006 for a Block 1 quantity of refurbished Air Force W80-1 warheads.
    Although this date is somewhat earlier than the Air Force requirement,
    it appears, at present, to work better in our production plants,
    considering other workload schedules that also have to be met.

        19. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Beckner, can the Air Force support
    this date?
        Dr. Beckner. The Air Force cannot support this date. The W-80 Life
    Extension Program is being rebaselined to establish a joint W-80
    refurbishment program with the Air Force based upon the availability of
    Air Force Fiscal Year 2003-2009 Program Decision Memorandum (PDM)
    funding. The rebaselined program will be presented to the Nuclear
    Weapons Council for approval later this year.

        20. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Beckner, are there any plans to do
    life extension on the Navy W-80s?
        Dr. Beckner. There are currently no plans to refurbish the Navy W-
    80 warheads. The DOD and NNSA have agreed through the Nuclear Weapons
    Council to refurbish a Block 1 quantity of Air Force W80-1 warheads by
    the end of 2010. The NNSA and DOD will work together to adjust the
    Post-Block 1 refurbishment plans and quantities to reflect the total
    quantity of W-80 warheads that will need to be refurbished, if
    refurbishment of the Navy W-80s should be required.

        21. Senator Bill Nelson. General Smolen, when does the Air Force
    need the first production unit of a refurbished W-80?
        General Smolen. Current Air Force funding supports an Air Force
    desired W-80 Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of fiscal year 2008.

        22. Senator Bill Nelson. General Smolen, what is the life extension
    program, including providing test assets, that can be supported by the
    Air Force?
        General Smolen. The W-80 Life Extension Program (LEP) Integration
    is funded for both Advanced Cruise Missiles (ACM) and Air-Launched
    Cruise Missiles (ALCM) over the FYDP. The funding supports:

             Interface Control Document Evaluation
             Flight Testing

                     4 Free Flight, 4 Captive Carries, and 8 REST
                    Tests
                     Missile Interface Compatibility Tests
                     Range and Flight Test Support
                     Test Instrumentation Kits (TIKs) procured in
                    the current ALCM and ACM programs

             Transportation and shipping costs
             ALCM and ACM cable and hoist beam modifications
             ALCM, ACM, and B-52 Tech Orders

        23. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Young, has there been a decision
    to retire the nuclear Tomahawk missile?
        Admiral Young. No.

        24. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Young, can and will the nuclear
    Tomahawk missiles be converted to conventional Tomahawks?
        Admiral Young. No action would be taken until a retirement decision
    is made. Although they can be converted, it would not be recommended
    because conversion costs would average $1.53 million per converted
    missile plus a one-time nonrecurring cost of $32.4 million, compared to
    $612,000 per TACTOM missile (fiscal year 1999 dollars).

        25. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Young, if the TLAM-Ns will be
    retired or converted, will this obviate the need to extend the life of
    the Navy W-80s?
        Admiral Young. Nuclear warheads are managed, as directed by
    National Security Presidential Directive, via the Nuclear Weapons
    Stockpile Plan. The requirements for W-80s would depend on the
    retirement plan for TLAM-N and other potential future weapon system
    options.

                              NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS

        26. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Young and General Smolen, do
    either the Air Force or the Navy have a requirement for a new nuclear
    weapon or are either developing such a requirement?
        Admiral Young. Navy has no requirement for a new nuclear weapon and
    is not currently developing such a requirement.
        General Smolen. The Air Force does not have a requirement for a new
    nuclear weapon and currently is not developing such a requirement. The
    Air Force is leading a joint DOD-NNSA ``Phase 6.2/6.2A'' (Feasibility,
    Downselect, and Cost Estimate) study for a Robust Nuclear Earth
    Penetrator (RNEP) version of an existing nuclear weapon. This study
    will examine modifications of current stockpile weapons to improve our
    capability to meet a longstanding requirement for defeating hard and
    deeply buried targets.

                               ADVANCED CONCEPTS

        27. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Beckner, what work will NNSA carry out
    using the advanced concepts funding for fiscal year 2004?
        Dr. Beckner. Right now, the most likely candidate besides RNEP is a
    concept study for an Enhanced Cruise Missile with the Air Force, which
    could also lead to the start of a feasibility study in fiscal year
    2004. Air Force Space Command may also request a feasibility study of
    alternate yields for a small number of Minuteman III warheads.

        28. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Beckner, is there any advanced concept
    work ongoing in fiscal year 2003, other than the RNEP, and, if so, what
    is it?
        Dr. Beckner. The only activity is programmatic planning and related
    activity.

        29. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Beckner, is NNSA planning on doing
    advanced concepts work that will support modifications to existing
    nuclear weapons to meet new military requirements?
        Dr. Beckner. NNSA is restoring the capability to design, develop
    and field new or modified warheads to meet future military
    requirements. There are no current military requirements for new or
    modified warheads.

        30. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Beckner, the structure of the NNSA
    budget request for fiscal year 2004 does not comply with the statutory
    requirement to request advanced concept funding in a single line item
    set out in section 3143 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2003. Will NNSA submit an amended budget request that will
    comply with the statutory direction? When will the amended budget
    request be submitted?
        Dr. Beckner. We have assembled the necessary information and are
    working through the DOE CFO office and OMB to determine the best method
    and timeline for submitting that change.

        [Whereupon, at 4:22 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]