- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004

[Senate Hearing 108-241]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

S. Hrg. 108-241, Pt. 5

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2004

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

S. 1050

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES

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PART 5

EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

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MARCH 14, 31; APRIL 9, 2003

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2004--Part 5 EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

S. Hrg. 108-241, Pt. 5

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2004

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

S. 1050

__________

PART 5

EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

__________

MARCH 14, 31; APRIL 9, 2003

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JACK REED, Rhode Island
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BILL NELSON, Florida
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN CORNYN, Texas MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director

Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director

______

Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities

PAT ROBERTS, Kansas Chairman

WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JACK REED, Rhode Island
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina BILL NELSON, Florida
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
JOHN CORNYN, Texas HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York

(ii)
?

C O N T E N T S

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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The Posture of U.S. Joint Forces Command and the Role of Joint
Experimentation in Force Transformation
march 14, 2003

Page
Giambastiani, Adm. Edmund P. Jr., USN, Commander, United States
Joint Forces Command........................................... 5
Cebrowski, Vice Adm. Arthur K., USN (Ret.), Director, Office of
Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense....... 17

Science and Technology Program and the Role of Department of Defense
Laboratories
march 31, 2003

Wynne, Hon. Michael W., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics............. 72
Kern, Gen. Paul J., USA, Commander, Army Materiel Command........ 80
Lyles, Gen. Lester L., USAF, Commander, Air Force Materiel
Command........................................................ 88
Dyer, Vice Adm. Joseph W., USN, Commander, Naval Air Systems
Command........................................................ 99

U.S. Special Operations Command
april 9, 2003

Brown, Lt. Gen. Bryan D., USA, Deputy Commander, U.S. Special
Operations Command; Accompanied by Harry E. Schulte,
Acquisition Executive and Senior Procurement Executive, U.S.
Special Operations Command; and Command Master Chief Richard M.
Rogers, USN, U.S. Special Operations Command, Senior Enlisted
Advisor........................................................ 171

(iii)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2004

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FRIDAY, MARCH 14, 2003

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

THE POSTURE OF U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND AND THE ROLE OF JOINT
EXPERIMENTATION IN FORCE TRANSFORMATION

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Pat
Roberts (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Roberts, Dole, Reed,
and Akaka.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; Carolyn M. Hanna, professional staff
member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; and Joseph
T. Sixeas, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; Maren R. Leed, professional staff
member; and Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Leah C. Brewer and Andrew W.
Florell.
Committee members' assistants present: James Beauchamp,
assistant to Senator Roberts; Henry J. Steenstra, assistant to
Senator Dole; Frederick M. Downey and Aaron Scholer, assistants
to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator
Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka; and
William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAT ROBERTS, CHAIRMAN

Senator Roberts. The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities will come to order. We meet this morning to
receive testimony from the Commander of the U.S. Joint Forces
Command (JFCOM), Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr., United
States Navy and Vice Admiral (Ret.) Arthur K. Cebrowski--who if
he is not the godfather of transformation, certainly is the
god-prince, or maybe Machiavelli, or maybe all three wrapped up
in one individual. Admiral Cebrowski is the Director of the
Office of Force Transformation, in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense. We will discuss the current and future role of
joint experimentation on transforming our Armed Forces to meet
the challenges of an increasingly complex, uncertain, and
threatening future.
Welcome, Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Roberts. I want to welcome our two distinguished
witnesses. We have before us two of America's most able and
willing public servants. Admiral Giambastiani, we congratulate
you on your confirmation to this important position in October.
This is your first appearance before this subcommittee in your
new capacity, but I am sure it will not be your last.
Your leadership role as the joint forces trainer, provider,
integrator, and innovator is critical to the timely and
coordinated transformation of our Armed Forces, and I am sure
we will seek your counsel often, so we welcome you.
Admiral Cebrowski, you served our Nation well as a highly
decorated sailor, and now you have selflessly taken on this
very difficult and challenging chore of guiding the
transformation of our Armed Forces, a concept around which many
opinions abound. Some would say that they are unique and
unprecedented ideas, and some would say brilliant and often
controversial ideas that you have advocated while in the Navy,
show you to be a man of vision and courage. We are fortunate to
have you in this new role. I want to thank you for your past
courtesy calls to me and suggestions to this subcommittee.
You both are aware of the interest of this subcommittee,
for strengthening our joint warfighting ability and our
interest in the timely and meaningful transformation of our
Armed Forces to meet the very different threats of the future.
The testimony in this subcommittee in years past makes it clear
that we have focused on many areas of joint military operations
and capabilities.
As Senator Reed knows, the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols
Act in 1986 did initiate a process that has greatly changed the
way our Armed Forces operate together. It puts into place
processes to assess gaps in our joint capabilities and try to
really identify the requirements to fix these gaps.
Members of this subcommittee have been instrumental in
getting a joint experimentation process initiated. I remember
well my first trip to the Atlantic Command, that is what it was
called in years past, and that was under the command of Admiral
Gehman, and the difficulty staff and all of us had in obtaining
any funding for any joint exercise.
The events of September 11, however, changed a lot of
things, including the urgency with which we need to review the
capability of our Armed Forces to ensure that they are
organized, trained, and equipped to be adaptable and capable of
deterring and, if necessary, defeating known and emerging
threats to our national security.
We have the processes in place that should work, but we
seem to relearn the same lessons in conflict after conflict. We
also hear defense experts in and out of government really
lament the lack of urgency for transformation, and our
inability to rapidly acquire the new capabilities that we need.
We hear a lot about that, but in talking to Admiral Cebrowski,
and I share his opinion, it is not so much that we have the
need for transformation. We are over that hill. It is actually
what we are doing.
I for one, and many of my colleagues, find some of the
criticism troubling. We hear over and over that we have a
unique opportunity to transform our forces to successfully
confront our current and future challenges, but we also must
listen with concern as the observers who are objective, former
defense officials and others, assert that little has really
changed in the requirements, the acquisition, and the budgeting
mechanisms in the Department of Defense.
Three years ago, this subcommittee initiated legislation
that accelerated the joint experiment process and required the
Department of Defense to conduct a major joint field experiment
in 2002. That experiment, called the Millennium Challenge 2002,
concluded in August.
Admiral Giambastiani, we are anxious to hear what was
accomplished, how this was translated into tangible
improvements for our operating forces, and how you view the
future role of joint experimentation, including how you are
leveraging actual military operations to identify the trends,
the gaps, and the new requirements for our joint warfighting
capabilities.
This subcommittee also expressed concern and required the
Department to assess the need for some type of joint national
training capability. I am pleased to learn that our U.S. Joint
Forces Command is now formalizing this concept. We look forward
to your testimony on this capability, and how you feel it will
contribute to the transformation of our Armed Forces.
Admiral Cebrowski, we are especially interested in your
understanding of the role you perceive for your office and how
you feel you have influenced the pace and direction of
transformation. In our conversation earlier, I asked you, are
you pushing a rope, or do you have a lot of help in pulling it.
I think you indicated to me you have a lot of help in pulling
it. Clearly, there should be a close association between your
two organizations. We look forward to your characterization of
this relationship.
Finally, most veterans of the Pentagon would agree that the
momentum for change revolves around resources. Both of you have
rather modest budgets to achieve what seem to be rather
daunting tasks. Some have even suggested that the U.S. Joint
Forces Command should have some ability to rapidly acquire and
field needed capabilities that are identified in the joint
experimentation process. This subcommittee is anxious to hear
both of your assessments about the adequacy of your resources
and existing authorities to successfully accomplish your
important missions for our men and women in uniform.
Gentlemen, we thank you again for being here and what you
do every day for our great Nation. We look forward to your
testimony. I want you to feel free to summarize your testimony
as you deem fit. It is not necessary to read each and every
golden word, which will be made part of the record for sure.
I welcome now the distinguished ranking member and my good
friend Senator Reed, and we also thank Senator Dole for
attending the subcommittee meeting, and thank you, Elizabeth,
for taking time on a Friday morning to attend.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
first say what a privilege it is to serve with you as the
Ranking Member. You and Senator Landrieu have done an
extraordinary job over the past several years. You are the
first and only chairman of this subcommittee, so when we think
of emerging threats, we think of Pat Roberts. [Laughter.]
In fact, even before you were on this subcommittee, I
thought of emerging threats and Pat Roberts. [Laughter.]
Senator Roberts. I had thought I had reached the place in
my life where I was not an emerging threat, I was just a
threat. [Laughter.]
Senator Reed. That will be upon us shortly, Mr. Chairman,
but it is a pleasure to be with you and serve with you. Let me
commend you, with this subcommittee, you did so much to get it
going, not only as the first chairperson, but as the one who
saw the need. I appreciate that and want to thank you for it.
Senator Roberts. Jack, let me just interrupt, and pardon me
for interrupting--if you would yield, I guess that is the
proper way to say it. A lot of credit has to go the chairman of
the full committee, John Warner, who set up this subcommittee,
4 years ago, and a lot of credit has to go to Senator Lieberman
and Senator Coats, whose idea it was in the first place, and so
all we had to do is pick up the plate.
Senator Reed. Well, you deserve a little bit of credit, so
you will get it today, they rightly deserve it also, and thank
you for that point.
Let me also welcome Admiral Giambastiani and Admiral
Cebrowski. I had the privilege of getting to know Admiral
Giambastiani in his submarine days. Admiral Cebrowski was the
distinguished president of the Naval War College at Newport,
Rhode Island, and in that capacity was a visionary, thoughtful,
and articulate, not only a naval theoretician, but also someone
who saw the bigger picture with the whole Defense Department. I
am glad you are in your present position, Admiral Cebrowski.
In fact, I recall last November you were at a conference
and you were reported to have said that a lot of the discussion
at the Pentagon and Congress today about defense is becoming
irrelevant, that we should be talking more about sensors than
about the kind of aircraft we are buying and how many. It is
that provocative and innovative thinking I hope you will follow
through on in your present position, and maybe even this
morning you might amplify those remarks.
I am very concerned today, as we go forward, to look at the
evolution of the roles and responsibilities of transformation
within the Department. I know we have several different
organizations that are involved. There is a forthcoming
transformation planning guidance which I hope will be a road
map for a lot of what we do institutionally in transformation.
We have the Office of Force Transformation, the Joint Forces
Command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the regional combatant
commanders, the military services, all of these have to be not
just integrated, but really energized to provide real
transformation.
One of the issues that is throughout all of this discussion
is just changing cultures, which might be the most difficult
challenge that you gentlemen have. We are very much set in our
ways both here in Congress and in the Pentagon, and to change
the cultures might be the greatest challenge, and you might
also discuss some of your thoughts about that this morning.
One of the key issues that we are going to be looking at is
to ensure that you have adequate resources to do your jobs, and
that there are adequate resources within the overall budget so
that you can reach out and make the transformation not just in
a rhetorical sense, but in a practical sense with new systems,
methods, and approaches to persistent problems.
One of the things that I noted with some dismay was that
the technology, the research and development (R&D) budget in
this year's budget has been decreased. So much of what you are
going to be doing is to identify those appropriate projects and
hopefully accelerate their deployment with the field forces.
R&D is a key part of what I think you are going to be doing and
I would be much more enthusiastic if we could get some
additional dollars into our R&D budgets across the Services.
Let me also just say to Admiral Giambastiani, you have been
in command now for, not the longest period of time, and your
thoughts would be very much appreciated about the roles you see
for JFCOM and also the resources you think you need at JFCOM. I
am extremely pleased to be here, and also delighted that we
have such competent and dedicated patriots who are doing this
important job, and I thank you for that.
Senator Akaka is here, and I thank you for joining us.
Senator Clinton very much wanted to be here, but she is at Fort
Drum, New York this morning. The 10th Mountain Division lost a
helicopter with several soldiers, and I know General Hagenbeck,
the commander, and I know she wanted to be up there with
General Hagenbeck and the troops of the 10th Mountain. She is
not here with us because of that reason.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Roberts. Gentlemen, please proceed, and I think
Admiral Giambastiani will proceed first.

STATEMENT OF ADM. EDMUND P. GIAMBASTIANI, JR., USN, COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND

Admiral Giambastiani. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I
start, I would like to follow on Senator Reed's brief comments
on the Fort Drum incident. I would like to recognize the brave
men and women of our Armed Forces who put their lives on the
line every day at home and abroad to defend our Nation and our
way of life.
Earlier this week, as Senator Reed mentioned, we lost 11 of
our soldiers at Fort Drum, New York and 2 others were injured
while training. This tragic accident serves as a reminder both
of the challenge and the commitment that our service members
willingly face every day to keep our Nation free. We are proud
of their service, and pray for their families and loved ones.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of this subcommittee, I
am honored to testify for the first time before you as the
Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command. Joining me today, and
seated directly behind me, is the Command Sergeant Major of the
United States Joint Forces Command, Sergeant Major Mark Ripka,
United States Army. I am proud to have him with me today.
My message to the subcommittee today is that Joint Forces
Command, following the leadership of President Bush, Secretary
Rumsfeld, and General Myers is focused every day on executing
the top three priorities of the Department of Defense:
successfully pursuing the global war on terrorism,
strengthening joint warfighting capabilities, and transforming
the joint force. We do this, as the chairman mentioned, in our
role as joint force provider, joint force trainer, joint force
integrator, and joint concept development and experimenter.
Joint Forces Command is leaning forward on all of these
areas so that our homeland can be defended, allies assured,
potential adversaries dissuaded and deterred, and those who
would challenge our freedom and peace swiftly and decisively
defeated.
Exercising combatant command of 1.1 million soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines based in the continental United
States, Joint Forces Command is responsible for providing
trained and ready forces to all of our regional combatant
commanders, yet it is not enough merely to manage the
deployment of our joint force, as large and complex a task as
that proves to be. Those forces need training, and they need
capabilities to do their jobs swiftly and effectively. That
ties our contribution to the global war on terrorism directly
to our drive to strengthen joint warfighting capabilities.
In our role as joint trainer, we deploy an average of 100
observer trainers from our command headquarters every day in
support of other combatant commander training requirements. We
have been able to flex significantly in the last 6 months to
support critical mission rehearsals for commanders such as
General Tommy Franks, Commander of the Central Command. In the
same period, we have also helped stand up and train four joint
task forces for employment in Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, the Horn of Africa and, most recently, in Southwest Asia.
This training constitutes one of the United States' most potent
asymmetric advantages--highly trained forces with superb
command and control organizations, equipment, and procedures.
As a final note on strengthening joint warfighting, we have
been rapidly exploiting our joint experimentation results for
use in the field. One example I will give, and I certainly can
talk more about it later, is Combined Joint Task Force 180 in
Afghanistan, which used the training, equipment, and procedures
provided to them in preparation for Millennium Challenge 2002,
to conduct their highly successful campaign in Afghanistan. We
continue to look for opportunities to convert these
experimental results into quick wins.
Having shed the operational burdens, as directed by the
President in the Unified Command Plan, Joint Forces Command has
been liberated to focus its effort on transforming the joint
force. In effect, I have lost a geographic area of
responsibility, but I have gained a more challenging and
exciting area of responsibility: the future. To confront these
transformation challenges posed by an uncertain future that
this subcommittee looks at, populated by asymmetric threats,
weapons of mass destruction, transnational actors, and regional
powers, Joint Forces Command has embarked on a wide-ranging and
robust campaign of joint experimentation, building on the
insights of Millennium Challenge 2002.
We are excited that we are able to provide much-needed
common joint context in the concept and development efforts of
all of our Services, in addition to our combatant commanders.
This forms the basis for multinational cooperation and
transformation with our close allies around the world and as we
stand up NATO's Allied Command.
Finally, in addition to experimentation and concept
development, which produces critical intellectual capital,
Joint Forces Command is taking a larger material role in
filling a critical void in identifying joint interoperability
requirements, especially in the area of joint battle management
command and control. This is an area, Mr. Chairman, that I will
be happy to talk about. You asked about areas, and so did
Senator Reed, we need to concentrate on. This is a very big
one.
Building on our integration and interoperability functions,
we will work with the Services to provide the command and
control solutions, both near and long term, that our combatant
commanders will require.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, since taking
command last October I have worked hard to learn as much as I
can about Joint Forces Command. I have visited every
subordinate command of Joint Forces Command. I have traveled
with Command Sergeant Major Ripka to visit troops deployed
around the world, including Bosnia, Afghanistan, and throughout
the Persian Gulf. I have been impressed by the troops' service,
devotion, and resolve. I have been uplifted by their morale,
confidence, and good cheer, and I can report to you that your
support, as well as that of Congress and the American people,
has borne fruit in the best-trained, best-equipped, and best-
led joint force that I have ever seen in my professional
career. I consider it a privilege to serve with these young men
and women at this critical time in our Nation's history.
Thank you for your patience and attention. I will be
pleased to answer your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Giambastiani follows:]
Prepared Statement by Adm. Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr., USN
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am
honored to testify for the first time as Commander of U.S. Joint Forces
Command on our role in the global war on terrorism and the ongoing
process of transforming our Armed Forces.
Let me open by assuring the subcommittee that U.S. Joint Forces
Command is focused every day on winning the global war on terrorism
(GWOT), including the successful defense of the homeland, and leading
the transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces.
Joint Forces Command is a dynamic command that learns from and
works with our partners throughout the Department of Defense to lead
continuous evolutionary and revolutionary improvements in U.S.
warfighting capabilities to enable continued success, including rapid,
decisive military action. As such, I see U.S. Joint Forces Command
maximizing the Nation's future and present military capabilities by
advancing joint concept development and experimentation, identifying
joint requirements, ensuring interoperability, conducting joint
training, and providing ready forces and capabilities--all in support
of the Combatant Commands.
This focus follows directly from the President's transformation
agenda as outlined in his Unified Command Plan 2002, or ``UCP 02'' that
took effect 1 October 2002, and the Secretary of Defense's top three
priorities:

1. Successfully pursue the global war on terrorism
2. Strengthen Joint Warfare Capabilities
3. Transform the Joint Force

U.S. Joint Forces Command is the primary force provider to our
country's other combatant commanders worldwide. With over 1.1 million
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines--some 83 percent of the Nation's
general-purpose forces--I allocate a significant part of each day
managing the deployment of joint forces from our service components in
support of the global war on terrorism. Forces assigned to Joint Forces
Command comprise some 74 percent of the forces engaged in operations in
Afghanistan, 52 percent of the forces building in the Persian Gulf
Region, and 90 percent of the Nation's forces deployed worldwide in
support of the war on terrorism, including here at home.
Joint Forces Command's role in joint training has been instrumental
in honing the joint command and control architecture now prosecuting
the war on terror. In the last 8 months alone, Joint Forces Command has
trained and deployed four Joint Task Forces, now commanding joint and
multinational forces in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, and Southwest Asia. On any given day, moreover, some 100-
plus observer/trainers and senior mentors from this command are
deployed to support the joint training programs of the combatant
commanders in their areas of responsibility around the globe.
Similarly, every Joint Special Operations Task Force has received
training, and, in some cases, augmentation by the experts from Joint
Forces Command's Special Operations Command.
Our training capabilities have a global reach and our processes
focus on the needs of the joint warfighter. The world class Joint
Warfighting Center in Suffolk, Virginia, for instance, has already
organized and executed two major exercise rehearsals for U.S. Central
Command and a force flow and logistics rehearsal for U.S. European
Command in preparation for potential operations against Iraq. In the
case of Central Command's event, known as Internal Look and conducted
in December 2002, we actually were able to quickly develop a follow-on
exercise only 2 months later at the request of General Franks and his
ground Component Commander, called Lucky Warrior, to specifically
refine operational concerns discovered by Internal Look.
Joint Forces Command's concept development and experimentation
initiatives have had an immediate and positive impact on the global war
on terrorism. Outcomes, systems, procedures, organization and
experience during Millennium Challenge 02 (MC02), last summer's
congressionally-mandated joint field experiment, are making a
difference today. The Services and Regional Combatant Commands are
applying the training, initiatives gained during MC02 and are
exploiting their own, and selected joint concepts and capabilities
validated by the experiment.
The Army's XVIII Airborne Corps is using MC02 lessons, software and
processes today as part of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 180s
operations in Afghanistan; the Air Force's use of software tools and
procedures in Afghanistan and at Prince Sultan Air Base; and the Navy's
use of MC02 concepts, software and processes to improve training for
deploying naval forces.
Command authority over my Service Component Commands has been vital
to understanding and responding quickly to the training and readiness
needs of the warfighter. This command has trained or assisted in
training every JTF deployed overseas, establishing joint standards
across the force. We have also worked closely with the component
commanders to review, update and streamline the force flow procedures
for units deploying from the continental U.S.
U.S. Joint Forces Command has simultaneously launched a
comprehensive concept development and experimentation campaign to
deliver capable joint forces that can operate coherently in a
Knowledge-centric environment, enabled by Network-centric systems and
trained to conduct Effects-based operations. Our campaign plan
specifically aims to achieve these goals through close partnerships
with the Combatant Commands, Services and Defense agencies by
conducting our collective experimentation activities using a ``common
joint context'' that defines the challenges of the future warfight.
Conducting our experiments within a common understanding of the future
warfight allows the joint community to determine future joint
requirements in a collective way--before the acquisition of service
capabilities. This process produces a shared understanding of the
future joint environment that produces coherently joint capabilities
that we describe as ``born joint.''
This spring Joint Forces Command will achieve a significant
milestone in our campaign to expand the experimental ground by co-
sponsoring a U.S. Army/Joint Transformation Wargame called Unified
Quest 2003. Our intention is to embed within the Transformation wargame
a common set of scenarios and a joint context that defines the
operational level of war to determine how well emergent Army
capabilities might actually work within a future joint and
multinational environment. Plans are also underway to establish the
similar partnerships for other upcoming Service wargames later this
year and in follow-on years.
In this important area, Joint Forces Command has matured its
processes and products to the point where the ``joint horse'' is
getting in front of the ``service cart.''
In the near term, we have already begun implementing new
warfighting capabilities and operational methods gained from Millennium
Challenge 2002. Foremost among these is the implementation into the
Regional Combatant Commands (RCC) of the Standing Joint Forces
Headquarters prototype, or ``SJFHQ.'' The SJFHQ is comprised of a small
but powerfully enabled team of planners specifically trained to speed
the operational employment of a larger joint task force headquarters
with real-time, actionable and shared knowledge crucial to the conduct
of rapid and decisive operations. This shared understanding produces
what we call the Collaborative Information Environment, or ``CIE,''
that, in our judgment, may very well change the conduct of future
warfare. This prototype was immediately adopted by Central Command and
is being implemented today in Pacific Command, European Command,
Southern Command, and Northern Command, with the target date of fiscal
year 2005 for the SJFHQ to be fully operational.
Undergirding the implementation of these new operational concepts
is a powerful training environment known as a Joint National Training
Capability, or ``JNTC.'' The JNTC is being designed in part to train
Service units to operate as integrated joint forces anywhere around the
world. Our aim is to turn the existing training and exercise
environment into an integrating environment for new warfighting
capabilities and methods. This will allow the rapid fielding of
prototypes so that operators can test and improve them. We believe that
the JNTC will not only transform the way our armed forces will train in
the future but also speed the implementation of new capabilities and
methods springing from our collective Service Joint Forces Command
experimentation programs. In my view, the Joint National Training
Capability will drive ``jointness'' down to the lowest tactical level.
Here again, the command authority that I maintain over my Service
Component Commands has proven critical to the alignment of our training
and experimentation campaign with the operational requirements of the
force. The command relationship to the Component Commands anchors our
transformation efforts to the joint warfighter--our ultimate customer.
Just as important, this command has formed collaborative
partnerships in the experimentation campaign with other Federal
Departments and Agencies. The Departments of State, Treasury, Justice,
and Transportation, for example, have participated in our experiments
to determine new information sharing processes and techniques included
in the ``Joint Interagency Coordination Group'' concept. The combatant
commanders have all taken this concept aboard and are establishing
similar organizations within their headquarters with the focus of
supporting the global war on terrorism. Though more experimentation and
training is required to standardize and expand the concept to
incorporate processes for theater engagement planning, deliberate and
crisis action planning, and transition (to peace) planning, the
``JIACG'' capability will prove instrumental in leveraging all aspects
of our national power and influence in a more coherent, unified way.
Likewise, we are expanding the experimental agenda with key
multinational partners to focus on concepts that allows for timely
coalition information sharing. Just last month, we conducted a
worldwide, distributed, multinational Limited Objective Experiment
(LOE) that included senior representatives from Australia, Canada, the
United Kingdom and Germany. While the results are still being assessed,
initial insights have identified the policy challenges that must be
overcome to build a coalition equivalent of a Collaborative Information
Environment.
Joint Forces Command is also deeply engaged in the transition plans
of Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) as it becomes a NATO functional
command focused on transformation to be known as Allied Command
Transformation (ACT). Our NATO partners are closely monitoring our
transformation campaign. We will seek to learn together as the
Alliance, as a whole, dedicates itself to military transformation.
In partnership with the combatant commanders, Service Chiefs and
senior Defense officials, this command is helping to promote the
beginnings of a new culture of joint transformation. This culture
rewards intelligent risk taking and supports competition of joint ideas
in open venues. Our culture must reward those who question in order to
make things better; who seek differing perspectives and innovative
approaches and who are not paralyzed by the fear of failure. This
culture understands that combatant commanders do not really care where
a particular capability comes from so long as it is relevant to their
warfighting needs, is interoperable across the force and which works.
In all of my troop visits with our young warriors, I found that they
``get it.'' Innovation and ``jointness'' are important and intuitive
for them. The dynamic of this new culture goes virtually unnoticed and
receives no fanfare and yet is chiefly responsible for providing the
momentum towards joint transformation. In short, the real
transformation is taking root within the minds of those participating
in the change process. This is the culture of transformation that
Congress help put in motion 17 years ago with the watershed Goldwater-
Nichols Defense Act.
Lastly, like the military as a whole, Joint Forces Command has
transformed itself to serve as the Nation's agent for transformation
even as we have been deeply involved in supporting operations around
the world. The divestiture of our geographic area of responsibility has
enabled this command to focus on our new area of responsibility: the
future. With your help, we are receiving the resources and authority to
carry out our new mission and are now helping to deliver:

Trained and ready joint forces to the regional
combatant commanders
Coherently-joint capabilities and operational methods
to the joint warfighter of today
A common joint context to Service experimentation
programs that will lead to new ``born joint'' capabilities of
tomorrow
The first steps in alignment of Joint Battle
Management Command and Control programs across the Department
of Defense
Integration of Interagency and Multinational
capabilities into the change process, and
The beginnings of a new culture of joint
transformation.

What follows is a detailed overview of our successes and additional
requirements to complete our mission.

THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

The attacks of 11 September 2001 put this command on a wartime
footing. Since that day, all elements of this command, including
active, Reserve, National Guard, Civil Service, and contract employees
are involved in this two-front war--at home and abroad. There can be no
more important mission than fighting terrorism overseas and
simultaneously securing the homeland. This Command has directly
supported our Nation's offensive operations overseas while our homeland
security through four major endeavors:

1. Joint Force Provider
2. Joint Force Trainer
3. Joint Force Integrator
4. Joint Force Experimenter
Joint Provider and Trainer
In the last year, Joint Forces Command has supported the war on
terror with an aggressive training program that both improved our joint
readiness of the force while setting the conditions for joint
transformation. Specifically, this command trained and deployed Joint
Task Forces such as: JTF 160 to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; JTF 180 to
Afghanistan and JTF HOA to the Horn of Africa. Additionally we have
recently stood up Task Force IV for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and
trained the Southern European Task Force for U.S. European Command
(EUCOM). Our observer/trainers have helped train the Commander, III
Marine Expeditionary (CDR III MEF) for U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and
Commander, Joint Task Force-Civil Support (CDR JTF-CS) for U.S.
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). In total, some 3,018 individuals from the
Combatant Commands were trained to joint operational standards in the
last year and over 786 manyears were dedicated to the training events
supported by Joint Forces Command.
Overseas, troops from all Joint Forces Command components are
actively involved in support of operations in Afghanistan, preparing
for possible conflict in the Persian Gulf region, and supporting
operations worldwide. Forces from JFCOM comprise some 53 percent of the
forces supporting U.S. Central Command in Southwest and Central Asia.
This force commitment has doubled our normal overseas force rotation
and does not include the substantial obligation of Active and Reserve
Forces to homeland security, force protection and infrastructure
protection.
Additionally, other key elements of Joint Forces Command, such as
the Cruise Missile Support Activity, Joint Personnel Recovery Agency,
the Joint Communication Support Element (JCSE), and the Joint Warfare
Analysis Center are providing critical support to the global war on
terrorism in general and Operation Enduring Freedom in particular.
Joint Integrator
To accelerate the Joint Interoperability and Integration of
Service-provided warfighting capabilities, our Joint Interoperability
and Integration (JI&I) office continues to deliver materiel and non-
materiel solutions to interoperability challenges by working closely
with all combatant commanders, Services, and Agencies to identify and
resolve joint warfighting deficiencies.
Joint Forces Command 's JI&I efforts support current military
operations by fielding:

Interoperable capabilities between U.S. Army and U.S.
Marine Corps ground commander command and control elements
Collaborative planning capabilities for the combatant
commanders
Improvements to Joint Task Force information assurance
and information management
Adaptive mission planning and rehearsal capabilities
for the combatant commanders

Additional efforts that directly support the commanders of
Northern, Central, Pacific and Special Operations Commands in the near
future include fielding capabilities for:

Capabilities for JTF situational awareness, a Common
Operational Picture (COP), and enhanced integration of the
Joint Deployment
Capabilities for integrated joint targeting, and
intelligence analysis
Capabilities for integration of Distributed Common
Ground System multi-intelligence sources
Capabilities for integrated Joint Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
Joint Experimenter
As noted earlier, MC02 concepts are making a difference in the
global war on terrorism as demonstrated by CJTF180 operations in
Afghanistan.
CJTF180's implementation of MC02 concepts and capabilities in
Operation Enduring Freedom illustrates the power of joint
experimentation and joint training in general and MC02 in particular.
XVIII Airborne Corps' exploitation of MC02 concepts and training were
important factors in their success in Afghanistan. USJFCOM-developed
concepts that are being applied in the war on terror listed below
provide a sense not only of their operational utility but also the
impact Joint Experimentation is having on today's force:

Effects-Based Operations (EBO). CJTF180 use of EBO
processes affords operational benefit.
Operational Net Assessment (ONA). To support its
effects-based operations, CJTF180 used an ONA-like process to
view the enemy as an interconnected system of systems.
Collaborative Information Environment. CJTF180
utilizes a CIE based on MC02 processes, within the CJTF
headquarters and their functional components.
Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ). CJTF180 is
exploiting SJFHQ tools and procedures and is implementing
cellular reorganization initiatives to improve coordination and
effectiveness.

Joint experimentation is a proving ground for important
technological capabilities to support combatant command
interoperability needs. Joint initiatives demonstrated in MC02
generated the following Transformation Change Package (TCP)
recommendations:

Adoption of software to support the Joint Fires
Initiative (JFI)
Implementation of the Joint En route Mission Planning
and Rehearsal System-Near Term (JEMPRS-NT)
Fielding the Network Security Management Correlation
and Display System (NSM C&D)
Supporting the identification, certification and
fielding of automated tools to facilitate information transfer
among information systems operating at various levels of
security, e.g. the Joint Automated Single Guard Solution
(JASGS) and Inter-Domain Transfer System (ITS)
Fielding the technologies identified in the Automated
Network Information Flow (ANIF) project
Continuing development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(UAV) Interoperability

Joint concept development and experimentation findings are also
being integrated with Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD)
programs to provide a path to accelerate near-term joint warfighter
solutions. For instance, promising solutions to pressing warfighter
needs sponsored in fiscal year 2002 by the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) included:

Content Based Information Security (CBIS) ACTD--
sharing information across multiple security domains using
cryptographic separation and dynamic access control.
Area Cruise Missile Defense (ACMD) ACTD--improved
detection, identification, and engagement capability against
low altitude targets that may go undetected by the existing
Joint Surveillance System.

Lastly, fundamental to the success of the DOD transformation effort
is collaboration and the partnership with the activities of the wider
transformation communities from joint, interagency and multinational
organizations. MC02 provided a highly successful platform to establish
close partnerships with these communities as well as with industry and
academe.

STRENGTHEN JOINT WARFARE CAPABILITIES

Joint Provider and Trainer
The establishment of a Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) is
perhaps one of the most important transformation programs that the
Department of Defense and Joint Forces Command are developing. The goal
of establishing a JNTC is to improve the ability of U.S. forces to
fight effectively as a joint and combined team. Such improvement
requires new capabilities to augment our existing joint training
capabilities. While Service training centers have excelled at training
Service tactical competencies, joint training requires a more holistic
endeavor at the operational level of war. In its simplest terms, the
JNTC envisions a global system to bring the benefits of live, virtual,
and constructive opportunities to the user. To this end, we must create
a network that is easily accessible, readily available and capable of
supporting the wide spectrum of joint tasks. This network must provide
an integrated, common architecture for ranges, training centers,
experimentation venues, test and evaluation events, simulation centers,
as well as venues for participants located around the globe.
History has taught us that joint warfighting is the way of the
future. The development of a JNTC will support the broader strategic
goal of Department of Defense Training Transformation with the ultimate
goal ``to train like we will fight.''
Establishing an initial operating capability in 2004 will support
four or five JNTC events per year. Near-term milestones will include
the conduct of ``bridging'' events, which are stepping stones towards
full execution of training events. The JNTC will expand over time to
reach full operational capability in fiscal year 2009, when the JNTC
goal will be to support up to 40 events per year. During this time, the
JNTC will continue to move from interoperability training at the
tactical to the operational level, allowing network-centric and mission
rehearsal capabilities that increase the combat power of sensors,
weapon and decision making systems. As directed in the Defense Planning
Guidance 04-09, Joint Forces Command will establish a joint management
office (JMO) to oversee the programs necessary to implement the JNTC.
In the global war on terrorism, our forces are training and
fighting alongside allies and coalition partners in different parts of
the world. In support of this effort, we continue to train and exercise
with multinational partners through existing alliances and programs
such as NATO, NATO/Partnership for Peace (PfP), the American-British-
Canadian-Australian Armies Standardization Program (ABCA) and bilateral
support agreements.
We participated in or supported nine NATO, NATO/PfP, and ``In the
Spirit of'' PfP exercises since March 2002 and are currently planning
15 more such exercises to be executed in the 2003-2004 timeframe. These
exercises included the full spectrum of operations from crisis response
operations and humanitarian relief to Allied/Coalition combat.
As part of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercise
Program, USJFCOM is sponsoring a Combined Joint Task Force training
event in June 2004, which will have a significant multinational
contingent. ABCA has focused on this event as its U.S. hosted major
biennial exercise. Additional multinational naval units have requested
to participate as well. This U.S. joint/coalition exercise will also be
a major event in the ongoing establishment of the Joint National
Training Capability.
We are working closely with NATO's Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT)
in its rapid transition from a strategic operational command to a
strategic functional command focused on Transformation, known
tentatively as Allied Command Transformation (ACT). JFCOM is providing
specific expertise in the NATO effort to revise its exercise program
and establish a European based Joint Warfighting Center using Joint
Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center as a model. The center's
personnel could train NATO elements such as the NATO Reaction Forces,
component headquarters, and PfP nations in joint operations.
Joint Forces Command also has the responsibility to develop the
Regional Security Cooperation Network (RSCN) initiative. The objective
of the program is to assure security cooperation among allies, friends
and potential partners. It will also enhance the ability of United
States and coalition forces to become more interoperable and more
efficient in the conduct of multinational operations. The Swedish-U.S.
Viking series exercise, the Eastern European Defence Ministerial
series, and the South Eastern Europe Simulation Network--02 are
examples of ongoing Regional Security Cooperation Network initiatives.
Critically important to the creation of a joint culture are the
joint education endeavors of our armed forces. Currently, I am working
with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President of the
National Defense University (NDU) to establish closer links between NDU
and Joint Forces Command. We continue to support NDU with our Joint
Operations Module (JOM) as part of the overall CAPSTONE program for
approximately 160 newly selected one star flag and general officers. We
provide guest lecturers and adjunct professors to support portions of
the curriculum at NDU's Joint Forces Staff College. We are also seeking
opportunities for further cooperation and collaboration. A prime
example of the ongoing collaboration is NDU's Military Education
Research Library Network linked to JFCOM's Regional Security
Cooperation Network. We also will be providing the opportunity for both
Joint Forces Staff College student and faculty observation of JFCOM
exercises and experiments.
Joint Integrator
This command continues to receive new authority to ensure
interoperability today and in the future throughout the Joint Force.
Recent DOD Management Initiative Decision 912 signed on 7 January 2003
direct expanded responsibilities for the U.S. Joint Forces Command in
establishing Joint Battle Management Command and Control (JBMC\2\)
requirements, identifying system-of-systems capability requirements and
ensuring the integration and interoperability of JBMC\2\ capabilities.
In this expanded role, JFCOM will lead JBMC\2\ mission and capability
area requirements.
Additionally, we will assume immediate oversight responsibility for
the Deployable Joint Command and Control program and the Single
Integrated Air Picture, with expanded responsibilities in fiscal year
2004 for Family of Interoperable Operational Pictures. This
responsibility will allow Joint Forces Command to synchronize programs
and initiatives within Joint Battle Management Command and Control.
Our Joint National Training Capability will also facilitate the
evolution of JFCOM's role as joint integrator by providing venues for
integration in training.
Joint Experimentation
Joint Forces Command's influence on strengthening our joint warfare
capabilities through experimentation is best understood by viewing how
the services themselves are picking up on the ``joint context'' and
incorporating new capabilities to their organizations.
From MC02 and other smaller experimentation events over the last
year, the Army gained insight into their internal transformation
initiatives with the Interim Force and is exploiting a number of
initiatives and insights in current operations. In the case of XVIII
Airborne Corps' experience as the first ``experimental JTF,'' their
experience in establishing a collaborative information environment
using the suite of MC02 tools enabled that staff's rapid transition and
deployment to the Afghan combat zone with less than 30 days notice. The
Army has incorporated several organizational constructs and
experimental methodologies into Army doctrine and training programs.
This includes new fire control measures and effects-based
methodologies, use of collaborative tools, and co-location of the Army
Air and Missile Defense Command with the Joint Force Air Component
Commander, operating as the Deputy Area Air Defense Commander. The
incorporation of the common joint context in upcoming Army
transformation wargames, like Unified Quest 2003, will help to ensure
that future capabilities are ``born joint.''
The Air Force's Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment initiatives
examined in MC02 are likewise being implemented into their
organizations. Currently, Air Force personnel are using MC02 software
tools that improve the tracking and tasking of intelligence aircraft,
reduce air operations planning time, enable swifter tracking and
targeting of mobile targets, reduce fratricide, and provide real time
tracking of downed aircrews. Planners are using some of these
capabilities at Central Command's Air Operations Center in Afghanistan
and plans are underway for use in other theater Air Operations Centers.
The Marine Corps' Millennium Dragon experiment examined a number of
expeditionary warfare and urban operations challenges. Marine
initiatives under implementation include urban operations tactics,
techniques and procedures, the Dragon Eye backpack UAV, cellular staff
structure standard operating procedures for the Joint Force Land
Component Commander, and Special Operations Mission Planning
Environment-Maritime.
Execution of the Navy's Fleet Battle Experiment-Juliet inside of
MC02 also resulted in the fielding of initiatives and had a positive
impact on personnel and training. Core members from two carrier battle
group staffs, with recent Operation Enduring Freedom experience, were
teamed with Second and Third Fleet staff members to form the Joint
Force Maritime Component Command staff. Each is using the lessons
learned from MC02 to improve training for deploying carrier battle
groups and amphibious ready groups.
Other top concepts coming out of MC02 that an operational Joint
Task Force is applying in the war on terror include the Joint
Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) and the Standing Joint Force
Headquarters (SJFHQ).
Standing Joint Force Headquarters is a key capability examined in
MC02. CJTF180's exploitation of SJFHQ supporting tools and procedures
established the effectiveness of a more cellular organizational
structure such as provided by the SJFHQ concept. CJTF180's organization
is a hybrid of a traditional military staff and cellular structure.
They are exploring reorganization of their headquarters to a cellular
staff to improve coordination and effectiveness. Continued work in
developing a SJFHQ, joint interagency and multinational coordination,
and information sharing and compatibility through joint concept
development and experimentation will assist in Operation Enduring
Freedom as well as prepare for future operations that face the Nation.

TRANSFORMING OUR ARMED FORCES

The most significant event in joint transformation for the
Department last year was the conduct of MC02 in July and August 2002.
Over 13,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines participated in the
event from 8 live training locations across the American Southwest and
Pacific Ocean as well as from 17 simulated locations. As mentioned
above, the insights and lessons gained from MC02 have led to several
new capabilities and operational methods that are being implemented
today.
Joint Forces Command does not have all the ``answers'' to Defense
transformation. In the transformation journey, each answer achieved
raises new questions to answer. This command relies on the collective
wisdom and shared understanding of a common purpose from the joint,
interagency and multinational communities to effect true change over
the entire force and for future coalitions. Our joint experimentation
campaign plan collaboratively links the transformation plans of our
customers, the Combatant Commands; our partners, the services and
Defense agencies; and the interagency and multinational communities.
Additionally, Joint Forces Command has established a collaborative
relationship with the DOD Office of Force Transformation. Joint Forces
Command has included Vice Admiral Art Cebrowski's team in our ongoing
efforts to implement the SJFHQ in the Combatant Commands. His office
provides the necessary bridge between strategy and policy and the
future operational concepts and capabilities of our Armed Forces as
well as assisting with streamlining the acquisition process to
capitalize on rapidly developing 21st century capabilities.
In serving as the Executive Agent for joint concept development and
experimentation, a key aspect of our role in the change process is to
integrate at the operational level the concept development and
experimentation activities of the Services, combatant commands, and
other agencies. Developing innovative joint operational and
organizational concepts that integrate supporting concepts of the
Services, combatant commands and others is the essential first step in
this process.
Millennium Challenge 2002 focused on determining the extent that
the Joint Force could conduct a rapid decisive operation in this decade
without a major re-capitalization of the force. Integrating concepts,
such as SJFHQ, were refined to provide a level of detail that supported
a robust concept of operations.
It is important to understand that joint concept development and
experimentation (JCDE) is an iterative process that takes time to fully
develop and implement a new concept. MC02 was a key step in this
journey, but only one step. The JCDE Campaign Plan continues with
activities in 2003 and 2004 that will define the capabilities and
concept of operations for the future joint force. Through the
competition of joint and service concepts, the best ideas will move to
rapid implementation by embedding them in the exercise programs of the
Combatant Commands and the Joint National Training Capability,
delivering the SJFHQ and supporting concepts to the combatant
commanders in fiscal year 2005.
Key to our understanding of joint transformation was defining the
characteristics of future joint operations. During our joint concept
development work, four key characteristics for future joint operations
were identified:

Effects-based
Knowledge-centric
Coherently joint
Fully networked.

These characteristics provide a simple descriptive framework for
examining concepts and exploring capabilities.
The effects-based characteristic describes the application of the
military instrument of national power across a continuum that ranges
from cooperation through conflict. Effects-based thinking is a
philosophical shift from traditional attrition and maneuver warfare. It
involves the comprehensive, integrated assessment of the adversary and
the application of relevant instruments of national power to achieve a
defined political-military end-state in support of national goals. It
views an adversary from a systems perspective and identifies key links
and nodes to direct engagements.
In conflict, military actions will focus on the precise application
of military capabilities to produce the desired effects needed to
shatter the enemy's operational coherence, preempt his options, break
his will, and destroy his capability to fight, while preserving long-
term U.S. interests. The effects-based approach links to other
supporting characteristics of future joint operations, but it is
important to emphasize that developing a thorough capability to
understand and execute effects-based operations is key to ensuring U.S.
strategic advantage as the global war on terrorism unfolds over the
coming years.
The Knowledge-centric characteristic is a simple yet powerful
characteristic that complements EBO. The more that is known about the
adversary, the operational environment and ourselves, the more
precisely capabilities can be focused to produce the desired effects
with less risk of unintended consequences, and more efficient
expenditure of national resources.
Not surprisingly, knowledge becomes a hedge against risk, allowing
rapid deployment of more precisely tailored capabilities with decisive
effects. Knowledge-centric operations postulate a move beyond
information superiority to decision superiority through a
comprehensive, system-of-systems understanding of the enemy and the
environment, as well as a shared integrated awareness of friends,
allies and neutrals. Decision superiority is the ability of the
commander, based upon information superiority and situational
understanding to make effective decisions more rapidly than the
adversary, thereby allowing a dramatic increase in the pace, coherence
and effectiveness of operations. Advanced decision-support tools,
knowledge-fusion, and horizontal and vertical integration of
situational awareness will improve dissemination to decisionmakers in
an understandable and actionable format.
Coherent jointness is the third characteristic of future joint
operations, which facilitates coordinated, synergistic employment of
the full range of joint capabilities to achieve the desired affects.
The interoperability of joint and Service capabilities further enables,
and amplifies this common joint ethos. To achieve this synergy of
doctrinal, organizational, and human factors, future capabilities must
be ``born joint.'' Interoperability by design in the first instance
will permit true integration. It will solve, by moving beyond, the
current challenge of de-conflicting service systems that do not talk to
each other. Born joint capabilities will require a greater depth of
understanding of joint capabilities, an agreed Joint Operating Concept
and a shared joint warfighting culture. It enables the execution of
seamlessly joint actions at levels appropriate to the mission.
Finally, fully networked forces enable the creation and sharing of
that knowledge needed to plan, decide, and act both collaboratively and
quickly. It will allow the joint force to accomplish many tasks
simultaneously from distributed locations in the battlespace. Networked
forces (based upon systemic, organizational, and personal link) are
necessary to compress and change today's sequential, echeloned way of
planning and conducting operations. Networked forces use shared
situational awareness among all elements of the joint force, to include
interagency and multinational partners. This increases the speed and
precision in planning and application of power. They allow streamlined
joint dynamic processes for the integration of information operations,
fires, and maneuver elements as well as for sustainment and joint
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance management. Fully
networked forces are necessary to employ a coherently joint force to
achieve rapid decisive operations.
We clearly understand that trained and ready forces are the
foundation of Joint Transformation. Transformation is more than just
experimentation, the interoperability of current and future systems or
some new technology.
As the Joint Force Provider, our Service components' forces,
intellectual input and operational experience shape, enable, and assess
transformation activities, particularly concepts and experimentation.
Having direct access and command authority over component forces has
been key and remains essential to establishing the proper foundation
and framework necessary for conducting relevant joint force training
and coordinating constructive joint experimentation and technological
prototyping, which has proportionally increased and enhanced our total
force capability and will continue to be the cornerstone to an
unassailable, transformational joint force.
We are convinced that improved interoperability is crucial, to
ensure near-term fusion of mission capabilities across the joint
services, allied, and inter-agency partners. We have emphasized the
need that operational lessons learned and experimentation must drive
the development of new joint doctrine, concept development, and
integrated architectures, which ensure and enforce the operational
requirements, are properly defined and influence Service and Agency
capabilities in the future.
In support of military operations, I am determining with my fellow
combatant commanders priorities of materiel and non-materiel
capabilities solutions, which provide near-term joint warfighting
capabilities. In response to the Secretary of Defense and Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff concerns over legacy command and control
interoperability and integration, my staff has worked closely with
Services and Defense agencies to develop and implement numerous
transformation change proposals towards improvements in Joint Task
Force command and control, situation awareness, and integration of
intelligence assets. Additionally, we have delivered four interim
capabilities that directly support the global war on terrorism and
ongoing military operations for Central Command, and six other
initiatives that support U.S. Pacific Command and Northern Command for
Homeland Security.
Joint Forces Command is addressing critical interoperability
problems for the warfighter. To ensure new systems are born joint, the
command reviews all requirements documents under development to ensure
sufficiency of interoperability key performance parameters, information
exchange requirements, and operational architecture views. The Joint
Requirement Oversight Council (JROC) has approved four Joint Forces
Command Capstone Requirements Documents--Global Information Grid,
Information Dissemination Management, Combat Identification, and
Theater Air Missile Defense.
Joint Force Integration clearly reaps insights from training and
experimentation and feeds them back into the force. At the same time,
our engagement in joint requirements helps us identify needs and focus
our efforts. This is how we are working to transform the joint force.

CONCLUSION

We must transform even as we conduct worldwide operations across
the range of military operations. We have to get through today to get
to tomorrow. Prudent risk management is necessary. The counsel of
prudence is to strike the right balance between operations, readiness,
transformation and quality of life. This is both a management issue and
a resource issue. Risk can be managed to a point, but resources must
also be committed to secure our dominance for today and the future.
Transformation, modernization, and selected recapitalization cannot
occur without the resources identified in the President's budget.
While I have outlined a number of challenges and priorities for
ensuring we sustain our worldwide military edge, I must note the
criticality of congressional support. Within the constraints of
competing national priorities, even in this time of conflict, the
support of the members of this committee is both critical and
reassuring. The challenge of transforming the joint force ``in stride''
is daunting but doable.
Transformation is underway. Our efforts will accelerate these
trends. I look forward to working with you to provide our troops the
joint capabilities they need today and the transformational
capabilities our Joint Force will require in the future. I am
enthusiastic about our plan for the future and extend to each of you an
invitation to visit Joint Forces Command and our Service components to
see transformation in action.

Senator Roberts. Admiral Cebrowski.

STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. ARTHUR K. CEBROWSKI, USN (RET.),
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FORCE TRANSFORMATION, OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Admiral Cebrowski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, it is
a pleasure to be here, Senator Reed, members of the
subcommittee.
We are in our first full year of operation in the Office of
Force Transformation and I am pleased to report that I am happy
with the results, but I am dissatisfied. I am happy because so
much progress has been made, but dissatisfied because so much
remains to be done in this important area.
Last Thursday evening, the Secretary of Defense approved
the transformation planning guidance. It will be worked into an
unclassified format for general distribution so that not only
yourselves but, indeed, the American people can see what the
main thrust is.
The transformation planning guidance is a precise strategy
for transforming the Department. It clearly identifies the
roles and responsibilities within the Department, and it does
provide the Secretary with some additional levers, bureaucratic
levers within the Department.
As for the role of my office with regard to the
transformation planning guidance, I am tasked with evaluating
the transformation road maps from the Service departments. The
first road maps were produced last year. We have done an
analysis of those and prepared a briefing for that, and I would
be very happy to make those graphics available to the committee
if you would like.
I am also tasked to provide an annual strategic
transformation appraisal to the Secretary. This is meant to be
an independent appraisal quite apart from the prerogatives and
equities of other people in the Department and, of course, I am
tasked with continuing to advise the Secretary and his staff.
One of the questions which I am frequently asked is, what
was the view of our office of the large exercise conducted last
year, Millennium Challenge 2002, and we did have people with
Admiral Giambastiani's people during the experiment. We had
five areas of concern at that time. I will not talk about all
the positives. Admiral Giambastiani can talk about those, I am
sure, at length, because there were many positives. Instead, I
will just touch on the negatives briefly.
We thought that the after-action process, the evaluation
process needed to be more quantitative.
We felt that the linkage between the high level experiment
focused at the headquarters in Norfolk seemed to be somewhat
separated from the lower-level experiments conducted by the
various components out and about the country.
We thought that there needed to be more interaction with
all of the component commanders.
We thought there needed to be better alignment between
training and experimentation, and we thought that we needed
acquisition agility that reflected the agility of the operating
forces themselves. That was one of the things that was pointed
out.
These findings were shared with Admiral Giambastiani's
staff. Immediately, action was taken on every single one of
those issues, and so we feel very confident that we are moving
forward now.
Principal among the actions taken is an increase in the
number of smaller, what we call limited objective
experimentation, done collaboratively with the various
combatant commanders. This is very important, because it
converts the experimentation effort from a large step function
to a continuing process with a greater degree of involvement,
and that is very beneficial to us.
With regard to speed and acquisition, the transformation
planning guidance provides for something called the
transformation initiatives program, which is meant to provide
on very short notice funding for combatant commanders to take
advantage of emerging opportunities, either in actual
operations and contingencies, or opportunities created by
exercises, or the availability of new technology, to conduct an
experiment, and this is new and we hope that it will be funded
appropriately for us.
The office over the last several months has focused on five
areas, we will continue that focus on into the future, and our
business plan reflects this focus. The first is to make
transformation an integral part of the DOD corporate strategy
and national defense strategy supporting all four of the
strategic pillars.
Next, to change the force from the bottom up through
experimentation and the development of experimental articles,
or what one might call operational prototypes, to create new
knowledge.
Third is to implement networkcentric warfare as theory of
war for the information age, and the organizing principles for
joint concepts and capabilities.
Fourth is get the decision rules and metrics right, and
cause them to be applied enterprisewide.
Fifth, and I think most exciting, is to discover and
create, or cause to be created, new military capabilities to
broaden the capabilities base and mitigate risk.
Moving specifically to the area in which we are focusing,
and this is a rather fast-moving area, so what we might have
said we would focus on last year has been broadened somewhat as
we learn more, first, the strategic context. There are falling
barriers to competition with which we are concerned,
principally in the three major commons of the world for which
or over which America has been a marvelous steward, space,
cyberspace, and the sea, and there is potential for
considerable competition in all three of these areas, and we
need to find new ways to compete in these areas.
Next, we have the emergence of a phenomenon which we call
the systems perturbation. By virtue of the movement to the
information age, the density of interconnectivity is such that
it creates a medium for propagation and, indeed, amplification
of large system shocks, which then produce waves which cross
all social, cultural, and economic sector boundaries. September
11 was exactly such a case.
We have been concerned for sometime with the appearance of
the non-State, non-nodal, asymmetric actors who seem to have
more perversity than ever, but now we are finding that we have
to place those threats in the context of this new medium for
propagation of disruption. In other words, they are more
empowered now than we had thought they were, and this is
causing us to step back, make a reassessment of exactly where
we are and where we need to go. We are in the process of doing
that now.
On the technical side of the house, energy weapons are
looming large, not just laser weapons, but also particle beam
weapons, radio frequency weapons, and we have to deal with both
the offensive and defensive side of those, and discern what
their emergence will mean for the character of war in the long
term. That is becoming an area of focus and study for us as
well.
We are concerned about the falling cost of weapons and how
that may change the strategic laydown, and obviously we are
concerned about weapons of mass destruction and the like.
What is emerging from this kind of work is the need for
broadened approach to policy and strategy, one which takes into
account the systems perturbations and which takes into account,
indeed, a redrawn map pointing out the difference between those
societies which are very well-connected, or what we call
globalized, and those which are not, and how that indicates the
kinds of force we will need.
We have identified four major geographic flows, or
geostrategic flows, which will impact the National security
environment, populations, energy, money, and security actions
themselves, and how those four flows interact with each other,
producing a new strategic context for us.
What seems to be indicated is that we need a force which is
less retaliatory and punitive and more preventive. A force
which in addition to being highly networked is more Special
Operations-like, not that we need more Special Operations
Forces, but we need to have more of those key features of the
Special Operations Force, more broadly populating the rest of
the force.
Senator Roberts. Somewhat like the United States Marine
Corps. [Laughter.]
Admiral Cebrowski. I was going to say that it is no
accident that the Marine Corps has a robust communications with
the Special Operations Command for precisely that purpose,
forces which are capable of applying new information techniques
in an urban environment.
We need surveillance-centered forces, particularly counter-
weapons of mass destruction. We need to extend joint concepts
down to the tactical level of war. We are going to need to
figure out how we are going to structure ourselves better for
the back end of conflict, where we have to deal with
constabulary actions, nation-building, civil affairs and
general stability actions, and then we have to, of course, deal
with what this new reality means for the total force, the
relationship between the active component, the Reserve, and the
Guard, which will be up for flex, or it needs to be reviewed.
There are three major movements that we can see are going
to happen, the strategic laydown and the operational laydown,
and what you might call a temporal laydown having to do with
speed, and we are reviewing those, and there is considerable
activity in the Department in all three of those areas already,
and I will be pleased to discuss them with you.
Of course there are other things that we have not begun to
talk about so far at this hearing is the implications for
alliances, where our reliance on alliances seems to be
increasing at the very time when alliances seem to be less
reliable and less durable.
I would be delighted to take your questions and issues.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Cebrowski follows:]

Prepared Statement by Vice Adm. Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN (Ret.)

Chairman Roberts, Senator Reed, members of the subcommittee, I'm
honored to have the opportunity to be back before you, and I am
grateful for the opportunity to continue the dialogue begun last year.
In surveying the course of transformation over the past year, we
see considerable progress throughout the Department. But, of course
many of these are first steps. Our future efforts to transform must not
just sustain the current effort, but must outpace the rate of change
evident in the increasingly interconnected world around us.
When we last spoke, September 11, 2001, had focused considerable
attention on the concept of transformation. Indeed, 1 year ago it was
easy to view our future as a narrow consequence of those events.
However, as we have come to more fully appreciate, transformation is
not simply a response to global terrorism. While the events of
September 11 triggered a ``system perturbation''--a systemic shock to
the stability of the international system--it is clear that profound
change was already occurring in that system. Transforming defense, its
role in national security, its management and the force itself, is a
national, corporate, and risk management strategy that responds to that
change.
While ``change''--uncertainty--is an ever-present part of the
strategic landscape, energy for current change seems to have emerged
from three broadly defined events of the early 1990s. The first was
demise of the bi-polar template that shaped U.S. security strategy; the
second was the aftermath of a great military victory in the Persian
Gulf, which had validated much of our previous military investment
strategies; and the third was the ascendance of information age
warfare. In isolation, each provided a host of relevant issues to
consider as we framed the strategic context within which we would build
a future military. However, taken together they suggested a deeper
assessment of the strategic environment. The trends are there--
escalating ethnic and religious strife, the reshaping of nation-states,
shifting and emerging economic centers, the proliferation of
information technologies in relatively undeveloped societies and
nations, and the emergence of global, transnational terrorism.
September 11 was a violent manifestation of these trends--trends that
continue to reshape our Government, our economy, and even our society.
Understanding how transformation addresses uncertainty is
incredibly important as we move forward. This is a very different way
of thinking for us. For a very long time our focus was at the top--
great power war in a global security environment where our security
concerns were largely viewed through the prism of state-vs-state
conflict. Even as the threat of great power war diminished, we remained
focused largely on state-vs-state conflict--with the threat recast as
the ``rogue.'' Meanwhile, sources of power, conflict and violence
continued to change and spread more broadly within the system. Today,
we find that power is moving to the larger system level--an
international system evolving as a consequence of globalization--while
violence is migrating downward to the level of individuals or
collections of individuals. New threats are emerging from societies and
people who remain disconnected from the larger evolving global system.
These threats have the potential to create severe perturbations to this
system, and the resulting shockwaves cross all economic sectors and
social boundaries as they propagate around the world. On September 11,
we witnessed this phenomenon. We were not attacked by a nation or by an
army; we were attacked by a group of individuals--non-deterables--keen
to die for their cause. As the consequences of this systemic change
become more apparent, we're discovering that our force capabilities are
out of balance with emerging realities.
There is another way of understanding this. In the second half of
the 20th century (prior to 1990), we balanced our global interests and
homeland security on the fulcrum of mutually assured destruction and
containment. It worked well versus the Soviet Union, but what it
yielded was surrogate wars. We lived a useful fiction that depicted all
surrogate wars as lesser-included cases of the larger strategic
problem--which they were not. However, that strategic system ``worked''
given the types of forces we had, and given the era in which we lived--
namely, industrialization. That construct dissolved with the fall of
the Berlin Wall, and we are just now readjusting our security
perspectives in light of this altered system; a strategy that emerges
is transformation.
The need to transform the military as well as the organizations and
processes that control, support and sustain it is compelling. This need
is a by-product of the effects of globalization on the international
security order, as well as the transition from the industrial age to
the information age. While we might point to a beginning of
transformation, we shouldn't foresee the end--the President's mandate
was ``to challenge the status quo and envision a new architecture of
American defense for decades to come.'' Both he and Secretary Rumsfeld
have rightly seen that transformation is a continuing process that not
only anticipates the future, but also seeks to create that future. It
does so, in part, by co-evolving technology, organizations, processes.
However, it begins and ends with culture. Transformation is first and
foremost about changing culture. Culture is about behavior--about
people--their attitudes, their values and their beliefs. What we
believe, what we value, and our attitudes about the future are
ultimately reflected in our actions--in our strategies and processes,
and the decisions that emerge from them. The Department's strategy for
transformation understands this; its actions reflect that
understanding. Consider these Departmental actions in light of the new
security environment discussed above:

Crafted a new defense strategy (with Transformation as
a centerpiece)
Rewrote the Unified Command Plan
Completed a new Nuclear Posture Review
Replaced the two-Major Theater of War force-sizing
construct
Moved from a threat-based to a capabilities based
approach to defense planning focused not on the ``who'' but
rather the ``how'' our national security might be threatened
Reorganized the Department to better focus space
activities
Initiated work with the Allies to develop a new NATO
command structure as well as a NATO Response Force
Expanded the mission of Special Operations Command
Made some tough program decisions

Of course, this last item, the cancellation of programs--or how
many three- and four-star officers were fired--represents the yardstick
by which many would have the Department measure its progress. That
would be a wholly unconstructive approach, and one counter to Secretary
Rumsfeld's stated intent--``we are working to promote a culture in the
Defense Department that rewards unconventional thinking--a climate
where people have the freedom and flexibility to take risks and try new
things.'' Consider these other ``new things'':

Created an Under Secretary position for Intelligence
Created an Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense
Development of Joint Operations Concepts
Reorganization of the JROC
New service-based contributions to Joint Warfare

Army Objective Force
Air Force CONOPs
Navy Expeditionary Strike Groups, TACAIR
Integration

Created a Joint National Training Capability in order
to better train as we intend to fight
Process revisions

New DOD Acquisition Directive and Instruction
Legislative relief proposals

Invested in capabilities to support the warfighter

Joint C\4\ISR
Precision Strike
Adaptive logistics
Mobility enhancements

In the aggregate, these activities represent the beginning of ``the
continuing process'' of transformation as we ``create/anticipate the
future.'' They represent the ``co-evolution of concepts, processes,
organizations, and technology.'' They are consistent with the vision
outlined in the President's remarks, and are representative of progress
toward the goals outlined in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.
As a consequence of this progress, we also see ``new competitive
areas,'' and a ``revaluing of attributes'' consistent with information
age phenomena and the demands of the emerging security environment. One
measure of this revaluing is what is called ``information fraction.''
In other words, what is the measure of a system's ability to access and
contribute to a larger information network? Can it contribute to the
``speed of command'' and ``shared situational awareness'' so necessary
for success in current and future battlefields? The concept of
``information fraction'' provides an important insight into a
``revaluing of attributes'' that characterizes transformation. When we
talk with Sergeants at Ft. Lewis about their Strykers, they're not only
happy about the ride and relative quiet it provides, they're excited
about the situational awareness that can be brought into that vehicle
through its information systems; the Stryker has a high information
fraction. The Army's Land Warrior and Future Combat System (FCS) also
have very high information fractions. Similarly, when Marine pilots
talk about the Joint Strike Fighter, they not only talk about its low
radar cross section and precision weapons--they talk about the
aircraft's sensors and its ability to access and distribute information
as part of a larger naval expeditionary sensor network. The Joint
Strike Fighter has a very high information fraction.
Transformation is yielding new sources of power. Because the global
pace of change is accelerating, new sources of power fuel our ability
to maintain advantage in a competitive landscape where yesterday's
winner is tomorrow's target. Our ability to capitalize on new sources
of power will determine, in part, our success in the future. One such
source is information sharing through robust network structures. We
have a mountain of evidence--from simulation, from experimentation, and
from real world experience--that substantiate the power of network
behavior. Many think of network the noun--in other words, a ``thing.''
They forget that ``network'' is also a verb--a human behavior. So when
we shift from being platform centric to network centric, we shift from
focusing on ``things,'' to focusing on behavior or action. That is
where we find the power. Each of the Department's efforts reflects an
understanding of this phenomenon. Some examples include the Navy's
ForceNet and its creation of the Network Warfare Command, the Army's
Battle Command System for the Legacy and Interim Forces, the Warfighter
Information Network for the Objective Force, and the Early Entry
Command post concept. The Air Force is pursuing Network Centric
Collaborative Targeting and ``predictive battlespace awareness'' under
the Space C\2\ISR Task Force CONOPs, and the Marine Corps intends to
exploit an Expeditionary Sensor Grid through CAC\2\S. These efforts
reflect the ongoing shift from platform-centric to network-centric
thinking that is a key to transformation.
When Secretary Rumsfeld signed the Quadrennial Defense Review in
September 2001, he created the vision for transformation. The six
operational goals and the four pillars of transformation get the most
attention. However, one of the most powerful concepts in that document,
and one that has received the least scrutiny, is ``deter forward.''
``Deter forward'' is profoundly important because it forces us to
change the way we think about force capabilities and disposition.
Consider for a moment the implications of deterring and defeating an
enemy with minimal reinforcements. In peacetime, we assure allies, we
dissuade competition, and we deter hostile acts. If forced to compel
resolution with military force, we bring forces to bear in the
traditional fashion; the relationship between the capabilities we bring
to bear and the forces and the timeline demanded by the circumstances
is a measure of the risk we are willing to accept. This is normal
industrial age thinking. In the Information Age, warfare is
increasingly path dependent--small changes in the initial conditions
result in enormous changes in outcome. Thus, speed becomes a more
valuable characteristic of the entire force because we want to be able
to define or alter the initial conditions on terms favorable to our
interests. The goal is to develop high rates of change that an
adversary cannot outpace, while sharply narrowing that adversary's
strategic options. Only certain kinds of forces are going to be able to
do that--forces oriented around speed. This is not so much speed of
response, as it is speed within the response--speed of deployment,
speed of organization, speed of employment, and speed of sustainment.
In other words, we may choose our punches with great care (strategy),
only to unleash them with blinding speed (operations, tactics).
Networking is the key enabler of the battlespace transparency necessary
for that speed.
The entry fee for the ``deter forward'' force is a network
structure, network centric organizations and an understanding of the
emerging theory of war for the information age--Network Centric Warfare
(NCW). NCW is not about technology per se--it is about behavior. It is
not about the network; rather, it is about how wars are fought, how
power is developed. During the industrial age, power came from mass.
Increasingly, power tends to come from information, access and speed.
Network Centric Warfare will enable the merging of our warfighting
capabilities into a seamless, joint warfighting force. It capitalizes
on the trust we place in our junior and noncommissioned officers. As
information moves down echelon, so does combat power, meaning smaller
joint force packages wield greater combat power. We've seen this most
recently in Afghanistan--very, very small units being very powerful.
NCW enables and leverages new military capabilities while allowing the
United States to use traditional capabilities more discretely and in
new venues. This is allowing the U.S. military to downshift effectively
over time from system-level wars (the Cold War and its World War III
scenarios) to state-on-state wars (Iraq and Korea major theater wars/
scenarios) to the emerging wars fought largely against groups of
individuals (Taliban take-down, rolling up the al Qaeda network).
Network-centric operations capitalize on greater collaboration and
coordination in real-time, the results of which are greater speed of
command, greater self-synchronization, and greater precision of desired
effects. During the past year, we've seen each of the Departments begin
implementation of NCW, primarily at the operational level of war.
However, what we're seeing is essentially ``NCW for the JTF
commander.'' The next step is NCW for the warfighter--reflecting
increased jointness at the tactical level of war.
Pulling together the conceptual threads of transformation and the
emerging international security environment, one is led to the
conclusion that even when homeland security is the principle objective,
the preferred U.S. military method is forward deterrence and the
projection of power. As a matter of effectiveness, cost, and moral
preference, operations will have to shift from being reactive i.e.,
retaliatory and punitive, to being largely preventative. The
implications of ``deter forward'' necessitate a major force posture
review--rebalancing from the current condition where 80 percent-plus of
the force is U.S. based and everyone is competing for the same finite
strategic lift. Accordingly, the emerging American Way of War features:

Highly networked, special operations-like forces whose
extensive local knowledge and easier insertion will give them
greater power and utility than large formations deploying from
remote locations
Forces capable of applying information-age techniques
and technologies to urban warfare, else we will not deny the
enemy his sanctuary
Surveillance-oriented forces to counter weapons of
mass destruction, else unambiguous warning will come too late
Concepts of ``jointness'' that extend down through the
tactical level of war
Interagency capabilities for nation building and
constabulary operations, lest our forces get stuck in one place
when needed in another
Adjustments in force structure and posture in
consideration of the growing homeland security roles of the
Coast Guard, the National Guard, the Air National Guard, and
the Reserves

Adding these new responsibilities to the U.S. military is not only
a natural development but also a positive one. For it is the United
States' continued success in deterring global war and obsolescing
state-on-state war that will allow us to begin tackling the far
thornier issues of transnational threats and sub-national conflicts--
the battlegrounds on which the global war on terrorism will be won.

Senator Roberts. We thank you both, gentlemen. Senator Reed
and I are here for the duration. Senator Dole has a time
situation. Senator Akaka, what is your time situation?
Senator Akaka. I am fine for half an hour.
Senator Roberts. You are fine for a half an hour. Senator
Dole, would you like to start off on any questions you might
have?
Senator Dole. All right. One question I would like to ask,
the Marines at Camp LeJeune provided a significant portion of
the staff for a land component headquarters in Millennium
Challenge 2002. Their participation obviously was valuable,
successful, but it is my understanding that it also came at
some sacrifice in terms of increased personnel tempo and funds
that had to be expended. So I am interested in what level of
participation in experimentation we can expect of the operating
forces, considering that they have other obligations,
obviously, with regard to deployments, training exercises, and
is there a need for a dedicated experimentation force?
Admiral Giambastiani. Senator Dole, let me answer the last
part of your question first, about a dedicated experimentation
force.
This is my third time being associated with a command that
does both, if you will, force-providing, organize-train and
equip-type functions and participating in them with services. I
did one of these back in 1991 and 1993, in the Navy. I also
performed a similar function late in the 1990s similar to this,
and now today at Joint Forces Command.
I am not an advocate of dedicated experimentation forces,
and there is a very good reason for that. If you do not have
your day-to-day business grounded in operations, in providing
forces for regional combatant commanders who go out and use
these forces, it does not make you relevant. You need to have
that connection so that your forces remain relevant, otherwise
they become very specialized, more insular, and they do not
deal with the greater military community.
I could go into a long discussion on this, but I am very
positive on having operational forces doing experimentation
exercises and demonstrations.
To go to the first part, clearly, the Marines performed
very well during the course of Millennium Challenge 2002. As a
matter of fact, we took some of those folks in. They are
currently on Joint Task Force (JTF) Horn of Africa. The Second
Marine Division, as it turns out, has supplied the commander of
that unit. We helped to stand-up and train JTF--Horn of Africa
back in October and November, deployed them in late November on
board the U.S.S. Mount Whitney.
Major General John Satler, Second Marine Division
Commander, is the JTF Commander. We have a Navy one-star rear
admiral named Don Bullard, who is the Deputy, but about two-
thirds of that joint task force staff are, in fact, Marines.
The rest of them, obviously, are Army, Navy, and Air Force,
some coalition members and a few civilians.
What I would tell you is, is that where we see, if you
will, some stress on the force is at the major, lieutenant
commander, commander, lieutenant colonel, captain, and colonel
level who are populating all of these joint task forces and
combatant command staffs as what we call individual augmentees.
The Services provide all of these. They are high quality, top
quality officers. They have done a lot of this work, and we are
looking for those skill sets to populate these major commands,
so that is the place where I do see that we have a problem
across the entire Armed Forces, is at the joint task force and
combatant command staff augmentation level to form these joint
forces.
Senator Dole. Thank you very much, and let me just say that
I am extremely grateful to both of you for your outstanding
service to our country at this critical time. Mr. Chairman, my
husband recently was being interviewed and the interviewer
referred to him as a part of the greatest generation, and his
response was something that I certainly back up and that is
that the greatest generation is these young men and women today
who are being deployed in the defense of our country and our
freedom, so thank you very much for your testimony. I look
forward to working closely with you in the months and years
ahead.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Senator Dole. Senator Akaka, I
know you are pressed for time. Why don't you proceed with any
questions you have.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I commend
you for having this hearing and this discussion. I take this
opportunity to express my appreciation to Admiral Giambastiani
and Vice Admiral Cebrowski for joining us today. What you are
doing is very exciting, because what you two officers are
representing is a whole new twist in what we are trying to do.
After looking at your statement, Admiral Cebrowski, somehow
I came to the conclusion that maybe there might be a need for
an academy of peace instead of training our young people only
for battles. It seems as though we need to focus on culture,
people, quality of life, and we certainly would want global
peace one day, and why not have an academy that trains young
people to bring that about.
But Admiral Giambastiani, I have a question for you. DOD
senior leadership frequently talks about the challenges of
balancing current readiness and transforming to better meet the
future threats. You probably understand this problem better
than almost anyone, as you have to both provide ready forces to
other commands and spearhead DOD's transformation and
experimentation efforts.
My question is about the particularly difficult situation
we find ourselves in now. What impact has our extremely high
tempo of operations (OPTEMPO), higher, I think, than any of us
can remember for quite some time, what impact is this high
OPTEMPO having on our efforts to advance transformation?
Admiral Giambastiani. Senator, two things. One, clearly we
have probably the most ready force I have ever seen, as I said
in my statement, to date. I am very impressed with the
readiness of forces, but with the number of forces we have
deployed right now, can we maintain that high level of
readiness in the long term, with all of these forces forward? I
do not think any military leader would tell you yes, we can
maintain it, if everybody is forward, but what I would say to
you is this. There is a very important balance that you have
pointed out between readiness and the ability to do
transformation.
Back when I was the transition director for Admiral Vern
Clark, when he came in to relieve as the Chief of Naval
Operations, our first two priorities, and I think in explaining
this to you, you will see where I am going with it, we thought
that our people clearly were our number 1 priority, and our
second priority was current readiness. The reason for that is,
we had lots of spare parts problems, and Congress has been
incredibly supportive here over the last couple of years to
increase our operations and maintenance account levels
throughout all the services, but in the Navy I happened to be
focusing on it at that time.
We took a lot of money out of platform programs,
shipbuilding, aircraft, and a number of other things to pour
that money into readiness accounts, because the most important
thing was to keep our forces ready. I think those decisions
have proved today to be very wise, and again the other Services
have done similar things.
For example, we moved $1 billion, as I recall, into
precision weapons 2\1/2\ years ago. Now, we did not have any
idea that we would be going through Afghanistan, Operation
Enduring Freedom, and the rest of it, but one of the reasons
why all this additional money that Congress has put into
helping our readiness with regard to precision weapons is that
we had ramped up the factory level so that they can, in fact,
handle more production today, so these additional funds have
been very useful.
So it is important to maintain readiness in these
operations and maintenance accounts and the personnel accounts
to pay our young men and women properly. At the same time,
though, this is the best time to transform. Everybody is
thinking about how they are warfighting today. Everyone is
thinking about how to do things better, how to make them work
more jointly, make them work in coalitions, and there is great
impetus out there and interest in doing this well.
As a matter of fact, we have created a fairly sizeable
lessons-learned team from Joint Forces Command that is forward-
deployed now, sitting in Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) in
Scott Air Force Base in Illinois, at my headquarters, for
example, looking at the Joint Staff on how we are doing
business, to capture these lessons, and to help us transform
right now. We are working on improving the efficiency and
effectiveness of the joint deployment process, so Congress'
support, and the drive from the administration with the
President, the Secretary, and the Chairman has been absolutely
dead on the mark with regard to transforming.
So you all have put additional resources into the readiness
piece, and you have put additional resources into the
transformational side, and we applaud that, and I would be
happy to talk in more details.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, and that is what I meant when I
said what you are doing is exciting. It is bringing about a
whole new effort in what we are trying to accomplish in the
world.
Admiral, Tom Christie, DOD's Director of Operational Test
and Evaluation (OT&E), gave a speech in April last year about
test and evaluation's role in experimentation. One of his basic
points was that experimentation and testing are essentially the
same thing. He also raised some concerns about changes from a
requirements-driven to a capabilities-driven acquisition
project. Specifically, he pointed out that a capabilities-based
process is not likely to result in measurable requirements
until late in the acquisition process, and that this may
inhibit attempts to measure the operational effectiveness or
suitability of specific systems.
In your mind, do you make a distinction between testing and
experimentation? Do you share Dr. Christie's concerns about a
capabilities-based acquisition process?
Admiral Giambastiani. Simply stated, I do not share his
concern that he has expressed with regard to the connection
between operational test and evaluation and experimentation,
and also the piece about the capabilities force, and let me
explain why very briefly.
When we bring forward a system, a platform, or anything
else to be approved through our DOD system, we have a series of
documents that describe the mission need, first of all, and
then we put out one of two documents that we call an
operational requirements document, or an overarching capstone
requirements document under which are these other requirements.
Now, it is kind of an arcane language, but let me explain
to you why the requirements piece still exists there. I think
that Dr. Christie is changing his definition of requirements in
describing a larger system of how we look for capabilities
within the overall military, whereas we use these requirements
documents to describe the specific systems and the performance
parameters.
For example, we have something called a key performance
parameter. We have very specific things called information
exchange requirements. We also have another arcane term called
an operational architectural view. All of these are very
specific, so that when we produce something, we can measure
against these key performance parameters and, in fact, the
program managers can build the system to that. Now, I have not
seen that changed with the advent of a capabilities-based
force, because we are talking about capabilities at a much
higher level.
With regard to experimentation and test, I find that
generally test programs are, in fact, more set pieces and less
freewheeling and free flow than experimentation is. The other
piece is, when we do a test program, clearly the program
manager that builds a system, a tank, a ship, an aircraft, a
communications system works very hard to have that system be
evaluated successfully so that it can be deployed. When we
experiment, we expect to have failure. We expect things to go
wrong.
That does not mean that in OT&E everything goes correctly,
because it does not, but it is not as freewheeling as an
experimentation event--OT&E is a less risk-averse environment
than doing experimentation. We are supposed to take risks and
push the envelope when we do experimentation.
Art, do you want to add anything to that?
Admiral Cebrowski. Yes. I think in general, when you test,
you test against expectations, and you can do some experiments
like that, but the more exciting experiments, the ones that we
focus on more, are those which are seeking discovery, and that
is a dramatic shift in emphasis.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Chairman, what is happening is so
exciting it will change what we will be doing in this
subcommittee in the future. My time has expired. I have other
questions that I will submit for the record.
Senator Roberts. I thank the Senator, and hopefully the
subcommittee, with the Senator's help and advice and counsel
will be part of that change. We would like to be a leader of
that change posse. That is what we will call it.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you, gentlemen, for your testimony. This is a daunting
challenge, to try to change the operations of the Pentagon and
the Department of Defense. It seems to me that everyone is
looking for the approach, how do you do that, and I do not have
an exhaustive list, but typically you reorganize, or you
reallocate budgets, or you do a combination of both, so let me
take the organizational question first.
The new transformation planning guidance is about to become
public. Admiral Giambastiani and then Admiral Cebrowski, can
you give us a preview of what this new organization will look
like under the guidance? Is it just collaborative between these
agencies? Is there an agency that is responsible for initiating
projects? Is there a hierarchy of approval? Anything along
those lines will help us understand what this new organization,
or at least new arrangement will look like.
Admiral Giambastiani. Let me describe it first from my
perspective. I thought that Admiral Cebrowski very nicely laid
out a couple of the underpinnings of this transformation
planning guidance. Frankly, both he and I had wished we had
signed this out months ago.
As a matter of fact, when both of us were attending what we
call within the Pentagon a senior level review group with the
Secretary, the Deputy, the Chairman, the Vice Chairman, the
Service Secretaries, the Service Chiefs, and the rest--we were
both invited, of course, because of its importance to our
organizations and commands. At the end of the meeting, the
Secretary had asked me a question, and I said the only thing I
wish is that we had gotten this document out sooner, and we
have been working to the tenets of it, but let me describe it
from my perspective.
First of all, my staff at Joint Forces Command has worked
very heavily with those who are crafting this document. I know
that clearly Admiral Cebrowski's staff and he personally have
done the same thing.
Second, I cannot overemphasize a couple of things. This
document codifies in many ways the role of the Office of Force
Transformation and Admiral Cebrowski will speak to that. It
also brings additional responsibilities to Joint Forces Command
in the area of transformation. This all flows from the most
recent unified command plan changes, a series of them.
What I would say to you is Joint Forces Command, through
this document and a number of others, will play much more
heavily in joint battle management command and control, as I
said in my opening statement. We will share milestone decision
authority, for example, with regard to a system that the Navy
is procuring, but it will be called the deployable joint
command and control system. We will share that with the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence (C\3\I). This is
unprecedented, for a combatant command to do this.
In addition, along with the transformation planning
guidance, there is a significant emphasis on our ability to
field things quickly. Admiral Cebrowski mentioned this TIP
fund, this transformational initiatives program, and the fact
that we want money in there.
Now, there is good news and bad news in this. Frankly,
there are some within Congress who do not like to have
initiative funds like this, and there are others who understand
the importance of being able to quickly put capability into the
force. We have tried this in a number of ways. I have gone
through this within the Navy and the R&D community. I am a very
strong supporter of this, very strong supporter of it. It is
important, and there will be money in there.
In addition, there is another fund, for example, that is
talked about in the transformation planning guidance, but it is
supported strongly. We have this within Joint Forces Command.
It is a transition fund for joint integration and
interoperability and, in fact, I request the Senate's support
on this budget submittal, because you will see the transition
funds will jump from about $13 million this year up to about
$43 million in 2004 and on, because we want to be able to get
solutions out into the field.
Now, many of the things the Joint Forces Command is
directed to look at are somewhat more near term. I will tell
you they are in some cases today's problems, some of them are
over the next 5 or 6 years, and of course, Admiral Cebrowski is
looking further out to trends and the rest, but the importance
of this I cannot overestimate, in that your support is
important for these types of funds to allow us to quickly
respond in an area that is important.
Art, why don't you----
Senator Reed. Before you go on, Admiral, let me just put
another set of issues on the table, and you might want to wait
until Admiral Cebrowski comments, or make a comment now.
You have opened up the issue of budget authority, or at
least funding issues, and there is an issue we talked about
previously, whether JFCOM should, in fact, have its own line
with respect to some of these budget issues, an R&D budget of
your own, other types of funds. Do you want to comment now
about that, or do you want to wait?
Admiral Giambastiani. Yes, sir, I would be happy to comment
right now. I would also like to say that, one last part on the
transformation planning guidance, Joint Forces Command is
required to submit a transformation road map annually now as a
result of this, and we will be putting that together, along
with an annual joint experimentation campaign plan, so those
are very important to support this overall view so that it gets
reviewed.
Senator Reed. That will be a product of collaboration with
the uniformed services?
Admiral Giambastiani. It is a product of collaboration with
the Services, combatant commanders, and defense agencies who
play in this, so it is a pretty broad collaboration.
With regard to funding, Joint Forces Command today, if you
looked at all of their combatant commanders, both regional and
functional, the most significant amount of funding for a
combatant command goes to Special Operations Command (SOCOM).
Because of SOCOM's major force program 11 budget, and some of
us describe them as the fifth service, they receive the most
funding and personally I think it was a very smart move to do
this.
Now, when I went to Joint Forces Command, I received
questions along these lines and I was asked, do I need budget
authority at Joint Forces Command? I went down and studied
Special Forces Operations Command with Charlie Holland, looked
through how he did business. One of the things I learned from
that was that General Holland has an acquisition force of about
750 people who are essentially working for Special Operations
Command, and I looked at my mission and charter with regard to
transformation and asked myself how much time we could expend,
if you will, bringing acquisition within Joint Forces Command.
I concluded after a period of time that I did not think I
should sap my energy towards transformation so that I could
have this, if you will, acquisition agency, and thought that a
hybrid between how Special Operations Command does it and how
we currently work today would be the best way to go about
business. So we have asked for and gotten significant resource
changes to come to Joint Forces Command, but we want to work
through agencies that typically do acquisition out there, Army,
Navy, Marines, DISA, Defense Information Services Agency, et
cetera, et cetera, so that we could work through them, fund
them, and also play a kind of cochair role in milestone
decision authority, so that is the approach we have taken.
Just to give you an idea, my staff tells me the budget from
2003 to 2004-2005 time frame goes up by 76 percent, is what the
administration has submitted in the 2004 budget to date, so we
are looking forward to your strong support of the budget
initiatives that Defense has brought forward in the President's
budget, and with those and many of these other authorities
talked about in the transformation planning guidance and
others, I think you will see that our role will change and it
will be stronger without trying to become a separate major
force program like SOCOM.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Admiral Giambastiani.
Admiral Cebrowski, your comments.
Admiral Cebrowski. The transformational planning guidance
creates no new organizations. Rather, it sharpens the roles of
existing organizations. It is really quite American. It is
focused on the concept of checks and balances and seeks to
ensure that, while a particular office is designated for
responsibility, that at least one other office must comment on
it before it goes to the Secretary to ensure that he gets at
least two opinions.
The general offices that fill these roles are the immediate
Office of the Secretary, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
Office of Force Transformation, the Chairman, Joint Forces
Command, and my office, and that is generally the way it works.
You expressed also concern about R&D.
Senator Reed. Let me correct that. That should have been
more directed to science and technology programs and I think
you were going to make that correction, so thank you for that.
That is an important part of your role, the science and
technology business. That is the R&D, 15 years from now, when
the basic research and science comes up with new developments.
You are in the R&D business, and the concern I have, and I
think you would agree with me, is that right now we might be
able to afford it, but if we continually deny science and
technology funding, it is going to in the longer run, in your
world, have an impact.
Admiral Cebrowski. One of the things that was really
debated in the transformation planning guidance was the
creation of the transformation initiatives program and the
joint rapid acceleration or rapid acquisition program, because
those are R&D items, but they occur late in the program, and we
had considerable discussions with Director, Defense Research
and Engineering (DDR&E), Dr. Ron Sega, about ensuring that we
have an appropriate balance between S&T and R&D, and so I know
he is quite sensitized to the issue.
Senator Reed. Let me ask you, Admiral, you indicated, and I
think your description is a very helpful one, about what is the
underlying premise, at least two agencies get to discuss it
before it gets to the Secretary. Who decides which two of those
entities on a given issue get to play?
Admiral Cebrowski. That is in the document. Those issues
were resolved before the document went forward to the
Secretary, and so for example, program appraisal and evaluation
will support my strategic assessment as it goes forward. The
Chairman will produce guidance concerning the experimentation
program broadly, which Admiral Giambastiani and I will comment
on that.
Senator Reed. I think, and I suspect you will be sensitive,
many times who gets to look at the program determines whether
the program survives or fails. If you are sensitive to that
going forward it will be very helpful.
Admiral Giambastiani. I think one of the things I would
add, Senator Reed, and it is important, is the fact that we can
bring up criticism, if you will, critique comments,
recommendations, or voices of dissent during this process,
which is important.
Senator Reed. Absolutely. Sometimes the dissent is more
important than the concurrence.
Mr. Chairman, I am happy to go for a second round if you
would like to take questions, start questioning now, or
whatever.
Senator Roberts. I have quite a show planned. Why don't you
go ahead. [Laughter.]
Senator Reed. All right. Let us turn our attention now to
the Joint Requirements Oversight Coucil (JROC) process. Where
does that fit in terms of this new approach towards joint
requirements, joint doctrine?
I know, Admiral Giambastiani, in a slightly different
context you responded to Senator Akaka about the requirements,
et cetera, et cetera. My understanding is a lot of that is
going to be changed as we move to the capability-based
approach, but just, let's do the question, how do you see JROC
working within now, the context of this new transformational
guidance?
Admiral Giambastiani. Simply stated, I will tell you in my
view the JROC process needs reform, number 1. Number 2, I would
tell you that General Pace is, in fact, working with the
Service vice chiefs and has spent quite a bit of time talking
with the Chairman and the Secretary about reforming the JROC
process as it currently exists to reflect, as you have already
said, the capabilities-based approach.
The JROC cannot play in every requirements issue because
there is not enough time for all of the committees and the Vice
Chairman and the vice chiefs to do that. I think they fully
understand that, which is why they are bringing forward and
have been frankly iterating here over a number of months a
different approach to how the JROC actually operates. In fact,
what studies, what architectures they looked at across the
Defense Department, so in very broad terms, do I think it needs
some reform, answer, yes, and General Pace I think agrees with
that and is, in fact, working with the vice chiefs to bring
about a reform.
Senator Reed. Admiral Cebrowski, your comments.
Admiral Cebrowski. The thrust right now is that the
requirements process and the acquisition process are both in
flux. The guiding documents for both requirements and
acquisitions, the 5,000 series acquisitions have been suspended
and are being rewritten. Of course, I am not your best witness
on those two documents, but the objective is to harmonize those
and streamline them, and one of the critical features is to try
to force management attention to earlier in the process, when
it is easier to make changes and less expensive, rather than
having to fix things after they have been broken for years, so
that is the general thrust of that.
Senator Reed. Let me change the subject just briefly to
Millennium Challenge. There was some criticism, Admiral
Giambastiani, about it being overly scripted. The criticism
raises a more general issue, I think we all would agree
theoretically that you learn more from your mistakes than
sometimes you learn from your successes, but in the real world
we are loath to make mistakes, or at least public mistakes. Can
you comment about the nature of Millennium Challenge, and also
to what extent are you going to design experiments that have a
significant probability of failure to learn from that?
Admiral Giambastiani. First of all, on being able to accept
failure, we have a specific mechanism that we have introduced
into our experimentation plan that actually evaluates whether
we are taking sufficient risk in a certain type of experiment.
In this case red is good. If you use the stop light, red,
yellow, and green, generally green is good and red is bad, but
in the case of experimentation we flip this around and, in
fact, we look at each of our experimental objectives to see if
it is red or if it is orange, if you will, or if it is yellow,
as opposed to being on the lower-risk side. This is important
for us to internally look at it and then ask some external
organizations to look at it, so what I would tell you is, it is
important for us to move in that direction.
Now, with regard to Millennium Challenge, Admiral Cebrowski
early on talked about one of the criticisms is that we had this
huge experiment, exercise and demonstration that it took 2
years to run, and Congress supported this very strongly, and
frankly it was a defining event for Joint Forces Command, and I
think DOD with regard to joint experimentation. Despite any
criticism one way or another, it was, in fact, a defining
event, and an important one.
What we learned out of that is that if you give the
military anything to plan for for 2 years, it is going to work.
[Laughter.]
I mean, if you give us money, you give us time, you give us
resources, we will go make it work. In experimentation you are
looking for the failure, as you have already pointed out, so we
have changed and shifted our program to what we call limited
objective experiments, where we run them more frequently. We
try not to on the scale of preparation go too deeply into them
because once again we will get into this mind set of if I work
long enough on it we are going to make it work, no matter what
the procedure, doctrine, training technology is. We do not want
to do that.
Plus, in these more freewheeling experiments in many cases
you learn insights that you had no clue that you were going to
get in the first place. That is why you experiment. They are
very important insights.
So that is how I would answer your question, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Senator Roberts. Could I ask an add-on?
Senator Reed. Absolutely.
Senator Roberts. I remember talking at length with General
Paul Van Riper, who was the head of the opposing force, and he
indicated in rather meaningful dialogue that every time that
the opposing force won, or was one or two steps ahead of the
operation, that you stopped the exercise. That might be a
little harsh. I am just trying to sum that up. I think his name
was Sun Tzu, as I recall, in the exercise.
Would you comment on that, because one of the questions I
have is, how do you keep the opposing force up to speed with
the rapidly changing environment that we are facing, and it
does not do much good to have an exercise and have the opposing
force really figure out what the answer is and ``win,'' if that
is the proper term, only to stop the exercise, although I do
not know if we are into a credit game where you get a star by
your name in regards to what happens here. Would you care to
comment on that?
Admiral Giambastiani. Yes, sir. First of all I would like
to go back in history for just a moment and talk about opposing
forces. When we were in the early days of developing carrier
aviation in the Navy, in general in our fleet battle
experiments the opposing forces generally won all the time and
we developed a very robust naval aviation capability in this
country as a result of this very extensive fleet battle
experimentation program that occurred during the interwar
years. Almost invariably the opposing forces won, and that is
one lesson I learned out of that.
My own view on this is that the reason why you run a war
game and experiment and exercise is to train and test, to
experiment, and you learn a lot, and part of the failure in
this learning process is the fact that an opposing force would
win.
Now, let me talk about the mechanics of an exercise for
just a second. I did not plan or execute Millennium Challenge.
I am a little bit more of an unbiased observer than I would be
if I had been directly in the middle of it. What I would say to
you is this. When we run one of these experiments and
exercises, you have certain constraints on when airlift is
available, you have certain constraints on when you can use
real forces and when they are available.
Even though the forces provided by the Services are under
Joint Forces Command combatant command, they are also
simultaneously on service training time lines. These are made
available for certain periods of time to help leverage the
experiment--but keep to service timelines so they can do the
rest of their organize, train, and equip functions. We do not
have the luxury of suddenly changing the clock, or allowing
free play to continue in a certain point in the exercise, so
some of this is an exercise constraint. It's just part of the
challenge, it is in existence. Does that mean it is right? No,
but it is a fact of life.
It is easier to do it when you are doing a command post
type of experiment or exercise, where you are moving virtual
forces around. It is much easier to let the free play continue
and the rest of it, but if you have 13,000 Active Forces out
there operating, airlift is available at a certain time,
battalions are available, the range time is available. You have
to allow for those.
I know Paul Van Riper very well. I have dealt with him over
the years, and he is a good man, and he would not have brought
these criticisms up if he did not feel strongly in his gut that
they were important criticisms. I take some of them as very
important criticisms. Some of them, in looking at the
situation, I do not, so I am kind of one of these guys who is
about 50-50 on what he said, and I have been to a couple of
forums with him and discussed this with him.
My own view is that some of his criticisms are valid, some
are not. We learned a lot in this experiment, in this exercise,
in this demonstration. I keep using all those terms because I
hate to call it an experiment if you took 2 years to get it
moving.
So, sir, that may not be the perfect answer, but that is
where I come from.
Senator Roberts. So bottom line, you took the criticism
seriously and on a 50-50 deal, we did come up with some lessons
learned.
Admiral Giambastiani. Absolutely.
Senator Roberts. Jack, go ahead.
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, why don't I just forego. I
might have another question, but why don't you go ahead. Thank
you. Thank you, gentlemen.
Senator Roberts. Gentlemen, I am going to do something a
little unique. I am not too sure you have ever been in a
hearing where you have had the chairman repeat your statement
back to you, but I am going to do that. I think it is important
to emphasize this for the record.
Admiral Giambastiani, you said, ``We must transform even as
we conduct worldwide operations. Everybody knows that the
attention on the world scene today is on the war against
terrorism, Iraq, and North Korea, but we must transform while
we are doing this,'' and you said, ``we have to get through
today to get to tomorrow.'' I think that is a pretty good
quote. If there is any press here today, or if C-SPAN wants to
take notice, I think that would be a good one to take notice
of.
Then you said, ``transformation and modernization and
selected recapitalization cannot occur without the resources
identified in the President's budget.'' That is up to Senator
Reed, myself, and our friendly appropriators to follow suit,
and you note the criticality of congressional support. You have
our support.
You also mentioned the challenge of transforming the joint
force in stride. It was daunting before, to get people's
attention. Now, there is nothing like an exercise called Iraq
to really get people's attention, but it is a daunting task to
continue the mission that you are responsible for.
I would like to move now to the statement of Admiral
Cebrowski and just highlight some things that he said and which
I think are terribly important. On page 10 of his testimony,
and he did not read it, he summarized it like I asked him to
do, but I think this is very important.
``The preferred U.S. military method is forward deterrence
and the projection of power. As a matter of effectiveness,
cost, and moral preference, operations will have to shift from
being reactive, retaliatory, and punitive to largely being
preventative.'' We have heard a lot about preemption, but we
have not heard too much about being preventative. There is a
difference.
The implications of deter forward necessitate a major force
posture review. Rebalancing from the current condition where 80
percent plus of the force is U.S.-based, and everyone is
competing for the same finite strategic lift--which, by the
way, if we do not get the 767 leasing program done, we may not
have any strategic lift. I thought I would toss that in, Jack.
Accordingly, the emerging American way of war features
highly network special operation-like forces, information age
technologies and techniques to urban warfare, deny the enemy
his sanctuary, surveillance-oriented forces to counter weapons
of mass destruction. That is surveillance-oriented forces to
counter the weapons of mass destruction, which is a different
kind of concept, a concept of jointness that extends down
through the tactical level of war. I just came back from Qatar,
Kuwait, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Jordan, Turkey, and London, on
what was called the Chairman Warner Death March I think, or
forced march, at least, by the time we were through. I was
tremendously impressed by the fact that everything is joint.
From the uniforms, to the tactics, to the communications,
everything is joint, not that we are there in terms of being
seamless. I was looking at the intelligence side, but I think
it is a good suggestion.
Then you said, ``interagency capabilities for Nation-
building and constabulary operations.'' We all know that if in
Afghanistan we are doing X, we are going to have to do 100 X in
regards to Iraq.
The adjustments in force structure and posture in
consideration of the growing homeland security roles of the
Coast Guard, National Guard, Air National Guard, and the
Reserves. Senator Akaka brought this up. We have people in the
Reserves who have been in Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Iraq, and in
some cases in the Balkans two or three times. How on earth they
can continue to do that is beyond me, and it is about half our
force over there.
Every time I meet with people, like Jack does, and we ask
to meet with our own people, and I am talking about enlisted,
non-commissioned officers (NCO), all the way up the command
structure, and we pay more attention to the troops in the
field, or at least we both do, and I ask how many are active
duty, and I am always surprised at the number of hands, and
then the number of hands who are Reserve and Guard. I do not
know how we can continue this. The operations tempo is very
severe, especially in the Reserves. You are going to have to
give tax breaks to businesses or something of that nature.
Now, I wanted to thank you for those statements. I wanted
to thank you for the leadership in this. We both have a working
draft of the document that hopefully will be popping out here
real quick. When did you say this might happen in terms of
timing, Admiral?
Admiral Cebrowski. I expect within 2 weeks. It was approved
on Thursday night.
Senator Roberts. Well, here it was Thursday night, and here
we have Friday, and we have a working draft. We can help you
write it right here, if you would like. There is the
Secretary's comment that is not really done yet. Maybe we could
work on that.
But on page 15, and I hope I am not violating any
confidentiality here, you get to pillar 2 in regards to
transformation strategy, and it rests on transformed
intelligence capabilities. I am going to put on my intelligence
cap as Chairman of the Intelligence Committee. You have some
bullets here saying, allow us to warn of emerging crises and
continuously monitor and thwart our adversaries' intentions,
second, to identify critical targets for, measure and monitor
the progress of, and provide the indicators of effectiveness of
U.S. base campaigns.
I asked Secretary Rumsfeld in his confirmation hearing what
kept him up at night. He said, we need better intelligence. Let
me ask you, in exploiting the intelligence advantages, in your
view, what transformation is required of our defense
intelligence capabilities to support the transformation
program, and is investment in intelligence experimentation
keeping pace with the overall experimentation campaign plan?
Are we putting enough money into intelligence experimentation?
Admiral Cebrowski. Yes, considerable work does need to be
done with regard to intelligence, and the problem is
characterized by two things. First, the intelligence officer is
at the center of the intelligence universe instead of the
customer, and second, the provision of intelligence is a
stovepiped operation.
The indication that there is a future for this which
corrects both of those things is to be found at Fort Belvoir,
in Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), under the
command of Major General Keith Alexander.
Senator Roberts. Is that the LIWA Center?
Admiral Giambastiani. It used to be, sir. Now it is the
Army's Intelligence Command.
Senator Roberts. So we have a different acronym. What is
the new acronym?
Admiral Giambastiani. Army Intelligence Command.
Senator Roberts. I sort of liked LIWA. That sort of had a
ring to it.
Admiral Cebrowski. In any case, sir, you might want to
visit that.
Senator Roberts. I have been there twice.
Admiral Cebrowski. Okay, good.
Senator Roberts. And got funding for it, by the way.
Admiral Cebrowski. Great. The key feature of that is the
establishment of what we call a data mediation layer which
allows an analyst to look across all of the various intel
stovepipes to perform his function. The next feature is to move
the customer to the center, that is, the customer's question to
the center of the process.
A possible third step is to take a look at the implications
for the existence of those stovepipes to begin with, and we are
looking at that together with them and the Commander of U.S.
Forces Korea, and that takes me to the second part. We are
hoping to conduct an experiment with him much later, a little
later this year, I think late this summer.
Senator Roberts. Yes. He just testified before the
committee yesterday, as a matter of fact.
Well, knowledge management is the key. When our
congressional delegation (CODEL) was in Pakistan I was
tremendously impressed with the coordination of the military
and our intelligence agencies and the Pakistanis, resulting in
some pretty good news on the war on terrorism. I think we are
being much more robust, much more aggressive, and we are really
collaborating much better.
The Intelligence Committee will be holding a hearing next
week inviting the Director of the FBI to come up and to
strongly assert his position that he would prefer not to have a
Director of National Intelligence to take the place of the FBI.
You mentioned stovepipes. Have you seen real progress, or
some progress, or give it a grade in regards to much better
collaboration and information-sharing, as opposed to the
cultures that existed before September 11.
Admiral Cebrowski. I do not feel qualified to answer the
question, sir.
Admiral Giambastiani. If I could, Mr. Chairman, I would
like to just tail on Admiral Cebrowski's answer here. In
specifically moving the customer toward the center of this
operation, in our experimental work in prototyping at Joint
Forces Command with regard to our standing Joint Force
Headquarters, we have moved the customer to the center of this
operation to perform four functions, knowledge management,
operations, plans, and information superiority for just the
reasons that you have pointed out. We are working very hard on
this to break down what we consider to be the old J or G code
structures to organize ourselves in this way.
In fact, Lieutenant General McNeil, the Commander of Joint
Task Force 180----
Senator Roberts. We have met with him.
Admiral Giambastiani. Yes, sir, and you saw some of his
products out there. He has organized and is organizing himself
in this way. These are part of the products out of Millennium
Challenge 2002, and this is what we are currently prototyping
right now to embed within all of the regional combatant
commanders over the next 2 years.
Senator Roberts. Admiral, you are going to take on the
additional responsibilities as the Supreme Allied Commander for
NATO Transformation? Now, I am not in a position to give you a
Roberts Plan, or the Reed-Roberts Plan, or the Roberts-Reed
Plan for NATO/Jones, or Jones-Roberts-Reed Plan, but at any
rate, it is obvious to me that NATO could come up with a NATO
response force, as opposed to European Security and Defense
Identity (ESDI), that the Europeans keep talking about but will
never fund and do not have the capability to operate, but a
NATO response force is already bought and paid for.
It could be more flexible. We could move east. You could
BRAC (base realignment and closure) certain bases in NATO. We
are going to have to look south to Africa, be more flexible, a
lighter footprint. Tell me what you think about transformation
of NATO, just off the top of your head here. I do not want to
get too far down the road, because these are just my personal
views, and I would just like to have your feeling about it.
Admiral Giambastiani. Yes, sir. Just to let you know how
important this subject is, General Jones, myself, and the
interim Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic met in Norfolk
yesterday for two-thirds of the day on this very subject.
Senator Roberts. We could call it the Jones Plan, except I
do not think he is quite ready to call it the Jones Plan, but
there is a ministerial in NATO in June, and there would be an
opportunity--with all the talk about the coalition of the
unwilling, this would surely be an opportunity to get a
positive message out that made a lot of sense.
Admiral Giambastiani. Yes, sir, and I think we are striving
collectively for a positive message here, and frankly, in
January we, along with Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, my
old NATO staff before I was relieved, hosted a seminar for 2\1/
2\ days called Open Road. Day 1 centered on U.S.
transformation. We had the largest group of NATO officers to
come to Norfolk in anyone's memory, and I am talking about
senior people, coming to listen on how the United States does
transformation. Day 2 included NATO speakers and discussion
seminar topics.
That was a very important event, and a tremendous amount of
interest as a result of last November's ministerials that the
President attended, and the other NATO members said we want to
create allied command transformation, so my staff, frankly, is
doing more with NATO today than in the history of Joint Forces
Command, U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM), whatever it was in the
past over this last 10 years, with regard to working on
transformation. We are currently working on documents inside
the military committee to help them on how we structure
ourselves.
The important points are as follows: 1) we want to make the
organization leaner, if possible; 2) we want to create, as you
have already mentioned, a second Supreme Commander for
Transformation; and 3) to stand up this allied command
transformation, and make that staff joint. Currently, it is a
naval staff, and here I am a Navy officer talking to you, and,
in fact, we are moving joint officers from the allied nations
into it as we speak. The current Chief of Staff, who is a vice
admiral in the Canadian Navy, is leaving. He will be replaced
by an Army lieutenant general. We have a number of other
officers who have reported in already.
We are trying to do, in a space of about 8 months, what
took 4\1/2\ years the last time to make any command structure
changes, and so in itself we are trying to transform the
organization.
The NATO response force in my view and in General Jones'
view, and he and I have talked extensively on this, we think,
as you do, can be the centerpiece for how we transform the way
we do business with NATO, how we get to use it, how we get to
operate it.
I would like to see NATO stand up a joint warfighting
center similar to what we have in Suffolk, Virginia in the U.S.
Joint Warfighting Center so that we can train a combined Joint
Task Force staff. I think you will see that become a reality,
and I think the nations will support this significantly.
So in summary, I would tell you it is an important thing
for us to transform this coalition, make it more useful,
usable, and more easily used.
Senator Roberts. Admiral, if we do not, NATO becomes
irrelevant.
Admiral Giambastiani. Yes, sir.
Senator Roberts. We are on the cusp of that, and I cannot
emphasize enough the importance of your keeping us posted on
your advice and counsel on this. I will not go any further with
it. I think it is in the developing stage. Obviously, each
nation cannot develop the capability we have, that is
impossible, but we can pool it. That is the key word. They call
it pooling, and I think the faster we can get this done post
the conflict in regards to Iraq, the more things may settle
down in regards to the alliances that we must keep, and the
most important thing of all is the transatlantic partnership
that we have had in the past.
Let me ask you how the Services are responding to all of
your efforts, and this could be to both of our witnesses. How
would you characterize the level of cooperation of the military
Services and the joint training, joint concepts development,
and joint experimentation process, more particularly the Army?
Senator Reed. Then the Marine Corps after that. [Laughter.]
Senator Roberts. We have to be joint. We just have baling
wire. [Laughter.]
Admiral Cebrowski. The principal finding of our review of
the service department road maps was that the Secretary is
being well-served by energetic and committed leadership that is
committed to transformation. That is really not the issue. They
are moving forward quite well.
Senator Roberts. So you are optimistic about that?
Admiral Cebrowski. Sir, I am optimistic. I am somewhat less
optimistic, however, about the ability of the institution to
correct some of the fundamentals, such as improvement in
capability cycle time, which is an increasing concern. There is
a lot of talk about it and a lot of energy is being poured into
it. It remains to be seen whether or not it will deliver.
It is not just that we want to have forces and new things
in the field sooner. When you have a capability cycle time of
16 years or 20 years, your learning curve is flat, and in an
age when power accrues to those who can create new knowledge
and innovation, we put ourselves at a considerable
disadvantage.
Senator Roberts. How do you fix that? Other than putting
you in charge, how do you fix that? [Laughter.]
Admiral Cebrowski. Well, Senator Reed talked earlier about
culture change. We have a culture which is based on stability,
the notion that you know what the threat is and the environment
is generally stable, and you can plan things out for a long
time. We also focus on risk management through the lens of
technology, that is, suppressing technical risk.
We also are very efficiency-oriented, which means we spend
the taxpayers' money, we are good stewards of the taxpayers'
money but in the most expensive way possible, because we feel
compelled to study it to death. There are probably things out
there that would be less expensive to do than it would be to
study, and the important thing is to get on with it.
I think about the run-up to World War II, when we did not
know what kind of cruisers to buy, and so we started a chain of
three classes of cruisers. We did not know what kind of
destroyer to buy, so we started to build four of them. That
turned out, those two decisions were margins of victory in the
Solomons, and that is the approach we need to take now, and
that is a completely different culture. It says, we do not have
to have the first ship of the class, for example, be perfect.
It says the important thing is to get the ship in the water
where the forces can experiment with it, learn about it.
Senator Roberts. Do you want to give the catamaran example?
Admiral Cebrowski. Oh, I think that is a great example.
Senator Roberts. You were talking about it 2 years ago in
my office, and you have how many in the theater?
Admiral Cebrowski. We have two, I think, in the theater
right now, and we have another that is going to be delivered, I
believe within a matter of weeks to the Atlantic Command.
Senator Roberts. The value of that particular craft is?
Admiral Cebrowski. The cost?
Senator Roberts. No, the value of it in terms of the
mission in regards to the littoral threat.
Admiral Cebrowski. Oh, the value is difficult to measure
because the metrics we have are all based on older
capabilities. It introduces a new, broadened capability that we
did not have before in terms of speed, numbers of port
facilities which can be accessed, not just speed of the craft,
but also speed with which you offload. These things were built
on ferry technology.
I used to command an amphibious ship and it would take all
day to load it and just as long to unload it. Now we are
talking about craft where we can offload the equipment of a
battalion, the whole battalion landing team plus its command
element in probably 20 minutes or less. This is a degree of
flexibility that we simply have not had before, and we buy it
at about one-tenth the cost of the conventional ships.
My point is not that we should give up the conventional
ships, but that we need to introduce the mix, because it is in
the mix that we have the broadened capabilities.
Senator Roberts. Are you cracking that nut that you are
talking about in terms of the culture, all these points that
you have just made? I mean, do you feel confident that you are
making progress in that regard?
Admiral Cebrowski. Yes, I do feel as though we are making
progress, but you talked about rope-pushing, and that is rope-
pushing, there is no doubt about it.
Senator Roberts. We have already touched on the Millennium
Challenge. I will not go into that, and Jack, don't worry, I
really do not have too many cards left.
Senator Reed. I have just two questions, then.
Senator Roberts. We will let you do that in just a moment.
Admiral Giambastiani. Mr. Chairman, while you are looking
at your next card, I wonder if I might add on cooperation.
Senator Roberts. I have memorized them all, of course.
Admiral Giambastiani. Yes, sir.
Senator Roberts. But go ahead. [Laughter.]
Admiral Giambastiani. I would just like to add, on working
with the Services I think the key thing to look at from the
Service perspective is a 17 September 2002 one-page document
that Secretary Rumsfeld signed that was a result of 2\1/2\
months of senior-level review group. This is the Service
Chiefs, the Chairman, the Secretaries of the Services, the
Under Secretaries, where they came out and gave the top 10
priority list.
It is an unclassified document. I know your people have it,
because it talks about legislative priorities on page 1, and on
the back of it is what is called the draft top 10 priorities
for the Defense Department for the next 6 to 12 months.
In the top three priorities I mentioned in my testimony,
global war on terror, in fact, transforming joint warfighting
capabilities and transforming the joint force, the Service
Chiefs and the Service Secretaries were forward-leading there
in pushing that.
I am optimistic, like Admiral Cebrowski is, that the
Services want to play in this. However, I will put a caveat on
it, as he did, but a different one, and that is, I find on a
routine basis, though, because the Services, like any other
large bureaucracy, are a large bureaucracy, it is tough to get
down sometimes in the middle of this. For example, I will have
staff people who will come back and say, the Navy is not in
agreement with this, the Army does not want to experiment here,
and what we find is, I say to them, okay, well, who is speaking
for the Navy, who is speaking for the Army.
So number 1 is, I will tell you that there is a tremendous
drive at the senior levels to push this. Number 2, one or two
quick examples. The Service Chiefs and the Service Secretaries
all ask for joint concepts of operations on which to base the
building, organize, train, and equip of their programs. That is
really quite remarkable, the fact that they would ask for a
joint context to be able to do their work.
Each of the Service Chiefs is very committed. Just
yesterday I had General Hagee in my office, having a very good
discussion with him. Frankly, he used to make me do pushups,
because he was my squad leader at the Naval Academy many years
ago, but he and I are old friends and we work well together.
Every one of the Service Chiefs has been forward-leaning.
In the case of the Army, I will tell you they are sending
me just the best officers they can give me, general and below,
on my staff. We are, in fact, going to, for the first time
ever, have Joint Forces Command and the United States Army
combine in a joint war game. It used to be the Army's
transformation war game, and we are both equal partners in
this. We have called it Unified Quest, and it is going to start
on 28 April, and it is going to go for about 4 days, right into
early May.
Senator Roberts. Where?
Admiral Giambastiani. It is going to happen, I believe at
Carlisle Barracks, and we are going to participate and, in
fact, not only participate, we are working together with them
to do this, and we are going to take this same common joint
context and bring it to the other Services.
The Navy will probably be next. We are working with the Air
Force and the Marine Corps. The only reason why we did not do
them first is because of the timing of their currently
scheduled games and how we could integrate with them. I think
these are all good messages, and that is what I would leave you
with.
Senator Roberts. I want to bring up one other thing, and
then I am going to yield to Senator Reed and we will close the
hearing.
We have talked a lot about transformation, but I want to
see how this fits into the concept of homeland security and the
role of the Department of Defense in homeland security. What
transformational capabilities and concepts are required to meet
the Defense Department's responsibilities in the area of
homeland security and homeland defense?
Now, I am going to mention something here that perhaps I
should not, but in homeland security we just got a new
coalition support team, by the way, in Topeka, Kansas, which
gives our National Guard units--I cannot remember the number we
are up to now, but I think DOD lagged a little behind in
homeland defense and said, no, we really do not want that
authority, and then the National Guard took a look at it and
said, well, but wait a minute, we are to augment the active
duty folks, but now I think they are welcoming it with open
arms.
But if you get into homeland security and the threats that
could happen, one of the things that fell into my lap when they
could not find anybody else to do it is that I played the
President under an exercise called Crimson Sky with the
Department of Agriculture.
Now, Crimson Sky was the misnomer label of what would
happen if Iraq had launched a hoof and mouth disease infection
in the United States in seven States. That does not sound like
much on the surface of it, but you have an infestation period
of 6 days, and on the 7th day you have to make some decisions,
and we did not do very well. We ended up with 50 million head
of livestock that had to be terminated. How do you do that,
just on the surface of it?
How on earth do you do that, and what do you do with the
carcasses? Obviously, you call the National Guard, and then the
National Guard could not handle it all, so you call in active
duty personnel. Then we found out we did not have enough
ammunition. Then we found out, you do not burn the carcasses
because, as we learned in Great Britain that is not what you
do, so you had to bury them. There was a ditch 25 miles long
and a half a football field wide in Kansas alone, just to
handle the herds there.
Then we had to put a stop order on all shipments, because
you were having States and National Guards being activated by
the Governors to stop other States in transportation of
livestock. All exports stopped, the markets went nuts, and the
people in the cities finally figured out that their food did
come from farms and not supermarkets. [Laughter.]
They rioted in the streets, and it was a mess, and not only
for 1 year, but for several years. Then add in the problem of
food security, that if you put a little anthrax in the milk,
you really have a problem on your hands.
I know at that particular time when different events happen
that DOD will be there. They are going to have to be there,
because they are the only outfit that can do it. I prefer the
National Guard, because people know them, trust them. They are
the home forces, and they are working toward it.
In terms of transformation, I am not sure I see much
progress in that arena. Each State is doing different kinds of
things, each Governor is doing different kinds of things. It is
sort of a hodge-podge kind of arrangement. We are better, but I
do not even think we are close in regards to the progress that
we have made in the intelligence community with the 13 agencies
that comprise that outfit.
Any comments?
Admiral Giambastiani. I would be happy to make a couple of
quick ones. You know previously that Joint Forces Command was
working in this area, homeland security and homeland defense,
and now we are the force provider, if you will, for Northern
Command.
One very important and key indicator that I think General
Eberhardt has brought about in Northern Command is, his chief
of staff is a National Guard officer, so of the top three
within the command, the number 3 guy is a National Guard
officer. That, in my view, is very significant. In fact, the
fine gentleman he just had has been promoted to lieutenant
general and is now becoming the head, as you well know, of the
National Guard Bureau.
Number 2, one of the best ways for us to explore in some of
these areas is to run exercises and experiments and, in fact,
we have a series called Unified Defense that started under
Joint Forces Command and has now been exported to Northern
Command, and we support them in the running of this exercise.
In fact, we wound up having to do a simulated one due to a run-
up here recently because of the high levels.
What I will just tell you is that these Unified Defense--
and we do two of these a year for Ed Eberhardt--are very
important exercises, and our imagination has to run to allow us
to explore the types of things you are talking about in these
exercises.
Senator Roberts. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First,
Admiral Giambastiani, you made reference to a two-page memo.
Could you make sure we get a copy of that?
Admiral Giambastiani. Yes, sir. I will leave it with you
when I leave.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Let me follow up on the issue of rapid acquisition funding.
Admiral Giambastiani, you talked about funding within this
year's JFCOM budget. Admiral Cebrowski, you mentioned both the
TIP and the JRAP programs. There are already, as I understand
it, other programs to achieve similar objectives like advanced
concept technology demonstrations (ACTD), the technology
transition initiative, and the Services' rapid acquisition
programs.
Can you clarify for me how these different funds interact,
and who oversees and coordinates these funds?
Admiral Cebrowski. I am meant to oversee the TIP, and the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition is meant to oversee
the JRAP.
Senator Reed. What about these other funds, the ACTDs, the
technology transition? Is there a coordination or
collaboration?
Admiral Cebrowski. Those are all under the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition. There is, of course, a profound
difference between the JRAP and TIP and the ACTD. The ACTD
process is well-defined, and even though it is rapid compared
to some of the other----
Senator Reed. The normal acquisition.
Admiral Cebrowski. Yes. It is still quite ponderous, and we
need things that can work on the near side of that, and these
other programs are meant to help with that.
Furthermore, they are also meant to focus specifically on
joint constituency, as opposed to service.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
Admiral Giambastiani, I understand that JFCOM is one of the
potential operational users of the Doppler total information
awareness suite of data collection and analysis technology. How
do you propose making use of this total information awareness
(TIA) program at JFCOM, or do you?
Admiral Giambastiani. What we are interested in is the
technology with regard to how it relates to external sources,
if you will, foreign intelligence and the ability to collate,
fuse, network, and use this in that organization I talked to
you before about where we look at knowledge management and also
the information piece, how that is fused for a standing joint
force headquarters, so we are talking about foreign
intelligence external to the United States, but we are very
interested in those technologies, because they have some very
powerful capabilities that we would like to leverage off of.
Senator Reed. Could you give me a hypothetical example?
Admiral Giambastiani. Well, let me give you an example. If,
for example, we have a variety of communications intelligence
sources, electronic intelligence sources, in other words, all
of these different INTS, and how we fuse and put that together
is a very key component in allowing our people to have
situational awareness so that the customer is the guy who is
getting that.
That is why, when Admiral Cebrowski said before, if you,
Senator Reed, have not been down to the Army's Intelligence
Command, for example, and visited General Alexander, I commend
you to do that. He has done a lot of this very well, and he is
interested in it, too.
Admiral Cebrowski. I think a good example is the one that
Senator Roberts pointed out, the hoof and mouth disease
scenario, and what his explanation or his recounting of that,
which was very dramatic, pointed out was the difficulty when
you have zero depth of battle space, and what we need is
intelligence efforts which will create for us depth of battle
space, moving unambiguous warning to the left so that it
happens earlier, so that we can work earlier. We want to start
acting when the problem is on the other side of the globe, and
then start working it in.
Senator Reed. The kinds of intelligence capabilities that
you two gentlemen have been talking about are going to help us
considerably with that.
Admiral Giambastiani. This movement of unambiguous warning
to the left, today you can see as we try to grope with the
variety of little hints and scraps of information that we get
with regard to what is happening and how it applies to homeland
defense, systems like these are very important to try to bring
this information and fuse it in a way that is useful so that
you can tie threads together, if you will, connect the dots and
give you information, because those smoking guns that everybody
is looking for out there are so tough today because people know
how good our systems are and will do everything to try to
combat them.
Senator Reed. You have indicated in your response that you
are only going to use external sources, so that is a very
clear, broad line in your mind about what information you are
going for.
Admiral Giambastiani. Absolutely.
Senator Reed. I know Senator Wyden had an amendment that
put some constraints on the TIA development. Does that impact
your use of this at all?
Admiral Giambastiani. Sir, I will take that for the record.
I just have not looked at what he has written and how it would
apply.
[The information referred to follows:]

We are aware of the Wyden amendment (Public Law 108-7) and its
requirement that the Secretary of Defense, acting jointly with the
Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence, submit a
report to Congress regarding proposed research and development
activities of the Total Information Awareness (TIA) program. We
understand that the Department of Defense intends that that report be
submitted as required. If so, then there should be no impact on U.S.
Joint Forces Command's current participation with the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in research and development efforts on
the TIA program. U.S. Joint Forces Command's interest in the TIA R&D
program is to explore the possibility of using TIA technologies to
establish a collaborative environment for collection and fusion of
foreign intelligence to enhance situational awareness for the
warfighter. Any TIA activities conducted by U.S. Joint Forces Command
will comply with all applicable laws and regulations, including the
Wyden amendment and long-established intelligence oversight guidance.

Senator Roberts. Would you yield?
Senator Reed. I would yield to the Senator.
Senator Roberts. I talked with Senator Wyden at length
about it and he has done his homework. I think we can, I do not
want to say work around, but work through his concerns, which
we all share in terms of civil liberties. I would point out
that yesterday in the Intelligence Committee we were going over
the budget of the National Security Agency (NSA) and the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and I am not going to get
into that, with the exception that we have had to plus-up and
have plussed up a great many analysts, but our collection
assets just knock your socks off, and the amount of information
that comes in is just incredible.
We have to get some kind of an analytical product that
makes sense, and you get into knowledge management again. I
know all these are sort of gobbledy-gook words, but the young
man who quit the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) the day
after the U.S.S. Cole incident thought he saw storm clouds
here, lightning going to strike here, and it was
transformational. They paid attention, but they did not think
that was enough to issue a threat warning.
I am not sure it would have saved the U.S.S. Cole, but now
we have a situation, more especially in the Navy where we
insist, no more U.S.S. Coles, and it is that kind of thing,
that if you had had enough advance information, and I think we
finally tumbled to the fact that terrorism was really
transnational.
Only 6 percent of the information that comes in can be
handled now by the analysts, and so you have to have different
platforms like, what is it, TIA? I think I would have named it
something else, but maybe we can come up with a new acronym
that will not be quite so threatening, I guess, but total
information awareness, but I think it is an excellent question.
We have to do this, or we will not be able to do the job in
the intelligence community that we have to do.
I have one final question. The Joint Personnel Recovery
Agency is an element that means a lot to every service person
and a lot to everybody on this subcommittee and to me
personally, and I am using the case of Michael Scott Speicher,
the Navy pilot who was left behind, and there are other cases.
I hope we will ultimately go to a system where all of our
service men and women get the same advanced training regarding
how to act if captured, and uniform gear that they have on
their persons so that that would aid and abet them should that
happen. I can tell you that on this CODEL that we went on, in
every command that we talked to, when I said no more Speichers,
everybody agreed, because it goes to the heart of what we stand
for and the difference in the cultures where we now have a
conflict, or an impending conflict.
You do not have to respond. That is just an observation on
my part, if we can insist that everybody that could be put in
harm's way get that same kid of training and same kind of gear,
that would prevent another Speicher.
With that, I conclude the hearing. I thank you, gentlemen.
Persevere. We are with you.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

TRANSITION FUNDING

1. Senator Reed. Admiral Giambastiani, in coordination with other
parts of the Department of Defense, please provide a comprehensive list
and description of current and planned programs whose objective is to
more rapidly transition transformational capabilities to the
warfighting force. Please include in each description the year the
program began, the office or individual responsible for allocating the
funding, a funding profile for fiscal years 2002-2009 (including new
starts in the out years), and specific information about the phase or
phases of the development and acquisition process the program is
intended to affect. Please also provide an overarching description of
how these programs will be coordinated to ensure maximum benefit from
the proposed resources. Service-specific initiatives should be
included.
Admiral Giambastiani. I can do no better than cite Secretary
Rumsfeld's analysis of the transformational aspects of the President's
budget for fiscal year 2004. In particular, he cites the programs that
support the Department's six transformation goals:
For programs to help defend the U.S. homeland and bases of
operation overseas--such as missile defense--we are requesting $7.9
billion in the 2004 budget, and $55 billion over the Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP).
For programs to project and sustain forces in distant theaters--
such as new unmanned underwater vehicle program and the Future Combat
Systems--we are requesting $8 billion in 2004, and $96 billion over the
FYDP.
For programs to deny enemies sanctuary--such as unmanned combat
aerial vehicles, and the conversion of SSBN to SSGN submarines--we are
requesting $5.2 billion in 2004 and $49 billion over the FYDP.
For programs to enhance U.S. space capabilities--such as Space
Control Systems--we are requesting $300 million in 2004 and $5 billion
over the FYDP.
For programs to harness our advantages in information technology--
such as laser satellite communications, Joint Tactical Radio, and the
Deployable Joint Command and Control System--we are requesting $2.7
billion in 2004 and $2 billion over the FYDP.
For programs to protect U.S. information networks and attack those
of our adversaries--such as the Air and Space Operations Center--we are
requesting $200 million in 2004 and $6 billion over the FYDP.
Over the next 6 years, we have proposed a 30 percent increase in
procurement funding and a 65 percent increase in funding for research,
development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) above the 2002 baseline
budget--a total investment of around $150 billion annually.
In addition to these increases, RDT&E spending will rise from 36
percent to 42 percent of the overall investment budget. This shift
reflects a decision to accelerate the development of needed next
generation systems and accept some near-term risk.
Among the more important transformational investments we propose is
our request for funds to establish a new Joint National Training
Capability. In the 21st century, we will fight wars jointly. Yet, our
forces still too often train and prepare for war as individual
Services. That needs to change. To ensure that U.S. forces train like
they fight and fight like they train, we have budgeted $1.8 billion
over the next 6 years to fund range improvements and permit more of
both live and virtual joint training--an annual investment of $300
million.
The total investment in transforming military capabilities in the
2004 request is $24.3 billion, and about $240 billion over the FYDP.

JROC PROCESSES

2. Senator Reed. Admiral Giambastiani, last year General Pace
testified that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) was
still in the position of ``grading somebody else's homework'' when it
came to requirements development, and that the JROC was still not being
as proactive as it should be in ensuring capabilities are ``born
joint.'' Can you give an update on your evaluation of the status of the
JROC in this regard--as you put it in your testimony, are we getting
better at putting the ``joint horse'' before the ``service cart'' in
the JROC as well?
Admiral Giambastiani. I believe General Myers gave a good update on
how the JROC is evolving to help all of us produce ``born joint''
requirements. In his posture statement, he noted that ``--the JROC will
implement methodologies to assess both legacy and proposed systems in
the aggregate. As a result, the JROC will define and validate desired
joint capabilities and derive mission area requirements. The JROC shall
consider the full range of doctrine, organizations, training, materiel,
leadership and education, personnel, and facilities solutions to
advance joint warfighting. In this manner, the JROC will further
reorient our force planning to a capabilities-based framework. The
Joint Operations Concept will allow the JROC to adopt a synchronized,
collaborative and integrated systems engineering approach to sizing and
shaping our forces.'' In this case, the ``joint horse'' driving the
``service cart'' is the Joint Operations Concept, derived from our
Joint Vision and the Defense Strategy. That will ensure all the
Services have the proper ``joint context'' with which to develop their
concepts and programs. The JROC is working to adapt its processes to
contribute meaningfully to our collaborative efforts to produce the
best possible capabilities for the joint warfighter. Much work lies
ahead.

3. Senator Reed. Admiral Giambastiani, are you satisfied with your
role in JROC deliberations?
Admiral Giambastiani. To date I am satisfied with my role in JROC
deliberations. In our role as the Joint Integrator, Joint Forces
Command has had good results working with the JROC to ensure that
requirements for new defense systems include key interoperability
performance parameters. We are also working closely with General Pace
and the Service Chiefs on a variety of Transformation Change Packages
that capture the results of our experimentation and integration work.
The proof of the process, however, will be product--the adoption of
joint warfighting programs with adequate resources. Much work remains
to be done, though we have made a good start.

4. Senator Reed. Admiral Giambastiani, you also mentioned in your
testimony that the JROC's requirements process sets out clear criteria
which serve as benchmarks for testing. How will the proposed shift to a
capabilities-based assessment process (and the movement away from clear
requirements definition) affect DOD's ability to evaluate its weapon
systems with tests and experiments?
Admiral Giambastiani. I believe the shift from a requirements based
to capabilities based assessment process is not going to affect
Department of Defense's ability to evaluate its weapons systems with
test and experiments. The difference in the approaches is in the ``up
front'' conceptual work to drive capability development--not in the
detailed elaboration of key performance parameters that form the
foundation of our test and evaluation efforts. The Quadrennial Defense
Review, Defense Planning Guidance, and other strategic documents will
provide guidance for transformation strategy, implementation, and joint
experimentation. The Chairman, using the results of experimentation,
will approve joint operating concepts, supported by born-joint and
Service-led concepts that define how the transformed joint force will
operate. These concepts, assessed against integrated architectures,
will be used to develop or define capabilities based requirements.
With a capabilities based approach, especially within the joint
arena, we can now be more assured that systems are born joint and can
perform their missions within a joint context. U.S. Joint Forces
Command's current involvement in the development of Capstone
Requirements Documents and Key Performance Parameters and future role
in developing integrated architectures helps to ensure the jointness of
Service systems before we ever get to the assessment phase. The rigor
and integrity of that phase will remain intact and indeed essential.

EXAMPLES OF EXPERIMENTATION FAILURES

5. Senator Reed. Admiral Giambastiani, witnesses before this
committee have repeatedly stressed the importance of being able to fail
during experimentation as a critical enabler of the creative process.
With that in mind, can you cite some of our most revealing or
significant failures over the past year or so, including examples from
Millennium Challenge 02, and what you learned from them?
Admiral Giambastiani. Our experimentation efforts are designed to
take risks and accept failure in our concept development process.
Learning from our previous experiments, we have made risk an important
factor that is encouraged in future experiments. It is the only way we
can drive new warfighting concepts to achieve new and improved
operational approaches and capabilities.
For example, during our May 2001 Unified Vision 01 (UV01) precursor
experiment to Millennium Challenge 2002 (MC02), we tested effects-based
warfighting concepts without the benefit of a robust Operational Net
Assessment (ONA) of the enemy or a functional collaborative information
environment (CIE). We found that without a robust ONA, a dynamic and
comprehensive system-of-systems analysis of the enemy, and a functional
CIE, little was different in our approach to warfare. Learning from
these shortcomings, we matured the ONA concept and designed tools and
capabilities to rapidly integrate intelligence and create actionable
knowledge. These improvements better enabled our MC02 experimental
audience to approach warfare differently by leveraging information
technologies and a more comprehensive and robust understanding of the
enemy. However, even after 2 years of experimentation, only CIE was
recommended for immediate implementation. The effects-based operations
and ONA concepts and associated capabilities remain in development.

6. Senator Reed. Admiral Cebrowski, what do you consider to be the
most significant failures in your work and what have you learned from
them?
Admiral Cebrowski. One aspect of force transformation that we have
yet to achieve is to embed a culture of experimentation throughout the
defense establishment. Experimentation is essential for defense
transformation. Only through experimentation will we learn and gain
enough experience to understand what approaches comprise the best paths
for U.S. Armed Forces to extend and broaden their competitive
advantage, and to rapidly adapt to the uncertainties inherent in
information age warfare.
Experimentation should be widespread--planned and executed in a
decentralized manner, guided by principles of competition and
cooperation in the information age. Every organization should adopt a
culture of examining and reexamining its practices and experimenting
with new approaches to extend its capabilities at every opportunity.
Operators, technologists, and systems integrators should work in teams,
rapidly prototyping technology and coevolving organizational and
procedural change to achieve desired capabilities. Spiral
transformation that significantly improves operational capabilities is
possible in months, rather than decades, by transforming current
acquisition approaches and the development of joint mission
capabilities.

STANDING JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS

7. Senator Reed. Admiral Giambastiani, I am encouraged by the
potential for Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) to greatly
improve the process of standing up and operating joint command and
control elements much more efficiently. I am still unclear, however, on
how these organizations relate to more traditional staffs. Can you
clarify how an SJFHQ would interact with the permanent staffs of the
regional combatant commands, with the component commanders in a joint
task force, and with the Joint Staff?
Admiral Giambastiani. We are in the process of maturing and
validating the SJFHQ concept through cooperative efforts with several
combatant commanders. These collaborative efforts will clarify how a
fielded SHFHQ will interact with other elements of a regional combatant
command, the Joint Staff and others. In concept, informed by the
Millennium Challenge 2002 Experiment and preliminary work with
combatant commands, the SJFHQ will be an integral part of the combatant
commander's staff and have routine interaction with the rest of the
staff, component commands, and the Joint Staff. One key difference is
the envisioned method of interaction, which will exploit innovative
information technologies and collaboration tools. Finally, the SJFHQ is
designed to be the full time nucleus of a Joint Task Force (JTF)
headquarters.

8, 9. Senator Reed. Admiral Cebrowski, in response to questions at
our hearing last year, General Pace suggested that we should move away
from dividing the battle area into air, land, and sea sections and
instead conceive of it as joint battle space. I agree with his idea
but wonder if our organizational structures support such a concept.
That is, we continue to have air, land, and maritime force component
commanders. I wonder if it might be fruitful, however, to think about
alternative ways to organize, perhaps around missions or capabilities.
In your view, is the current joint task force organizational framework
still relevant? Does the current joint task force organizational
framework support the kind of integrated view of the battle space we
are trying to encourage? If not, what alternatives have you looked at
or are you considering.
Admiral Cebrowski. A key feature of the JTF framework is that the
commander can change it to suit mission requirements. There are many
models for the division of activities and responsibilities across a
notional battle space. The primary inhibitors in each of these models
are ``interoperability based.'' I am less concerned about how we divide
the battle space than I am about the interoperability that we can
demonstrate across that battle space--both at the operational and
tactical levels of warfare. To the degree that we address
interoperability only at the operational level of war, we inhibit
interoperability at the tactical level of war. Also, we must address
interoperability by eliminating the divisions between the traditional
functional stovepipes--intelligence, operations, and logistics. These
stovepipes exist as a consequence of traditional industrial age warfare
organizational models. It is apparent that the increasing complexity of
the information age battlefield is rendering these organizational
models not just inadequate, but obsolete. In short, our technologies
are outpacing the ability of our organizations to act on the
information those technologies provide. The task now is to put in the
hands of commanders viable alternatives--from experimentation, from war
games, from field exercises, and most importantly, from our most recent
real-world examples. In OFT, we are currently developing a
collaborative demonstration/experimentation program for ``Sense and
Respond'' logistics that addresses new network-centric organizational
models for the information age battlefield.

JFCOM TOUR LENGTH

10. Senator Reed. Admiral Cebrowski, do you know if the Office of
the Secretary of Defense is considering extending the tour length of
key transformational positions such as Commander, Joint Forces
Command?
Admiral Cebrowski. The recently submitted ``Defense Transformation
for the 21st Century'' contains the Department's position on extended
tour lengths for some officers/positions.

11. Senator Reed. Admiral Giambastiani, in your mind what would be
the main pros and cons of such an extended tour?
Admiral Giambastiani. In general, I favor longer tours, however,
transformation depends as much on the power of the idea as the
stability of a single person. Powerful ideas take on a life of their
own as they gain credibility, maturity, and supporting constituencies.
Joint Forces Command's role in transformation is effectively
supported by a work force with the right blend of continuity with fresh
perspectives and operational experience. Joint Forces Command's mix of
stable, professional civilian and rotational military personnel is
about right. Continuity ensures long-term focus and efficiency,
providing the ability to see things through to closure and avoiding
frequent changes of direction. Conversely, fresh ideas and personal
energy are important to the business of transformation. Periodic
leadership changes and infusions of recent operational experience
revitalizes an organization, prevents stagnation, and brings new
perspectives to the mission--vitally important in an organization
charged with being open-minded and inquisitive. Additionally,
transitions expose more officers to transformation and allow them to
carry their new knowledge and enthusiasm back into the force.

IMPLEMENTING CHANGES

12. Senator Reed. Admiral Giambastiani, you have talked in the past
about allowing enough time for experimentation to mature and bear
fruit. On the other hand, you have described some of the transformation
packages that you have prepared for the JROC. As I understand it, some
of those packages were presented within months of the conclusion of
Millennium Challenge, the first major experiment to test them. When you
develop your transformation packages for the JROC, do they represent
all of the anticipated changes across each of the Doctrine,
Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities
(DOTMLPF) areas, or are they sometimes incomplete (e.g., only include
personnel and materiel implications)? If they are not complete, are
JROC members being asked to support initiatives prematurely?
Admiral Giambastiani. U.S. Joint Forces Command is working across a
wide spectrum of concepts and issues to identify immediate combatant
commander needs as well as looking to joint experimentation for new
operational methods and capabilities to support the joint warfighter.
Some joint experimental initiatives like Standing Joint Force
Headquarters and its supporting concepts will take time to mature, yet
have some developed aspects of DOTMLPF that are of immediate value to
joint warfighting, these should be fielded as soon as possible. Not
every capability will require that each part of the DOTMLPF spectrum be
addressed concurrently; this does not mean that capability
recommendation is incomplete or premature, but that portions of each
capability mature at different intervals. Each capability is unique and
some rapidly accelerated near-term capabilities will need follow-on
refinement.

JFCOM EXPERIMENTATION PLAN

13. Senator Reed. Admiral Giambastiani, in your confirmation
hearing last summer, you stated that your priority would be to
``conduct a complete review'' of U.S. Joint Forces Command's
experimentation plan. What is the status of that review? What changes
have you made or do you intend to make, and why?
Admiral Giambastiani. In the wake of Millennium Challenge 02
(MC02), we have evolved our Joint Concept Development and
Experimentation Campaign Plan to build on MC02 results and to support
updated guidance from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff. To help refine our plan, we have held a NATO Concept
Development and Experimentation conference, two-star level conferences
with the combatant commanders and Services, in addition to briefing
commanders, Service Chiefs and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
Our near-term objectives for experimentation now include four
elements: 1) field the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) to
provide the structure and the enabling concepts for developing
transformational joint command and control, 2) pursue rapid prototyping
of capabilities to improve joint warfighting now, 3) provide actionable
recommendations from experimentation results to senior leaders
concerning options for future force investment, and 4) include our
Combatant Commands, Services, defense agencies and multinational
partners and leverage their experimentation activities. A coordination
draft Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign Plan will
be reviewed and endorsed by the JROC, and final draft forwarded to the
Secretary of Defense via the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff by 01
August 2003.
As a result of this review and technical analysis, we are embarking
on a two-path plan of action. The first, which we call the Concept
Path, will focus on developing concepts for the far-term and develop
recommendations for future investment. The immediate objective of our
efforts along the Concept Path is to refine a Joint Operations Concept
for the Armed Forces of the United States. The second, or prototype
path, focuses on the near-term fielding of prototype capabilities to
our warfighters, giving them potentially transformational capabilities
and giving us operational data to help us refine those prototypes.
Through our review, we determined that no one experiment would
answer all the questions--that it requires a body of knowledge linked
by a series of experiments. We have therefore begun a series of
experiments and other events to refine the over arching concept for
joint operations through a series of events known as Pinnacle Impact
2003.

VULNERABILITIES OF NETWORKED FORCE

14. Senator Reed. Admiral Cebrowski, what new vulnerabilities would
a truly networked force need to deal with? For example, would
dependence on commercial communications infrastructure, satellite
communications, and a sensorized battlefield reduce our ability to deal
with asymmetric threats (such as cyber attack) or operate in areas of
the world with very limited infrastructure?
Admiral Cebrowski. The creation of any new capability also creates
new vulnerabilities. Everything of value will potentially be targeted
and its vulnerabilities exploited both before and during hostilities.
Because information processes and technologies are such a great source
of combat power, measures will be taken to provide for defense of that
power.
The capabilities of our sensors and networks, and the information
sharing they enable make us less vulnerable than we would be without
them. A ``truly networked'' force is less vulnerable by virtue of the
very nature of the network--``robustness'' being a key feature. We most
often see problems when we simply overlay new information technologies
on outdated organizational constructs and information architectures and
consider ourselves ``networked.'' When our networks are also
expeditionary, consistent with the character of the entire force, they
are by definition capable of operations without pre-existing
infrastructure.

DISTRIBUTED LEARNING

15. Senator Reed. Admiral Cebrowski, you indicated to the committee
last year that DOD intends to pursue an architecture to allow for
distributed training and education. However, some work the General
Accounting Office (GAO) has conducted for the Readiness and Management
Support Subcommittee indicates that the Services' initial efforts to
take advantage of distributed learning techniques have only been
minimally successful. GAO cited cultural, technological, policy, and
funding challenges to DOD's ability to fully exploit the benefits of
distributed learning. What is the current status of the Department's
efforts to develop a distributed learning architecture?
Admiral Cebrowski. The approach outlined in the Strategic Plan for
Transforming DOD Training (March 1, 2002) emphasizes the mission
requirements of the combatant commanders focused in terms of the
training needed to support the CINCs' requirements, missions, and
capabilities, while preserving the ability of Services to train on
their core competencies. The focus of training transformation is to
better enable joint operations in the future. Joint has a broader
context than the traditional military definition of the term. Joint
training includes training, education, and job-performance.
Strategic goals for training transformation include: comprehensive
and systematic joint training focused on the operational requirements
of the CINCs and linked to readiness assessment robust, networked,
live, virtual, and constructive training and mission rehearsal
environment that enables DOD to build unparalleled military
capabilities; and acquisition and other supporting processes that
identify interfaces and integrates between training systems and
acquisition, logistics, personnel, military education, and command and
control processes.
The Advanced Distributed Learning initiative is a Defense
Department-wide strategy to modernize education and training by
developing standardized e-learning techniques. The goal is to provide
access to the highest quality education and training, tailored to
individual needs, delivered cost-effectively, anywhere and anytime. At
the heart of the program is the sharable content objective reference
model (SCORM), which provides a series of comprehensive guidelines for
developing e-learning systems so Web-based learning content will be
interoperable, accessible, and reusable. SCORM represents one of the
initiative's key accomplishments. ADL work takes place at three co-
laboratories and includes partnerships with the Office of Naval
Research, the Labor Department, and the National Guard Bureau, as well
as work with NATO allies.

16. Senator Reed. Admiral Cebrowski, what steps is your office
taking to help DOD overcome some of the challenges that GAO has
identified?
Admiral Cebrowski. We have participated extensively in the
development of the Department's Training Transformation initiatives.
This plan addresses many of these challenges. Specifically, we have
examined the Army's Broadband Intelligence Training System (BITS) and
believe this methodology may have potential for a much broader
application for the Department's distance learning initiative. We have
collaborated with Dr. Chu's staff on this particular issue and they are
examining its potential. We are continuing a modest research effort on
broadly related education issues.

INTEGRATION OF LEGACY SYSTEMS

17. Senator Reed. Admiral Giambastiani, in the near-term perhaps
one of the biggest challenges to enhancing joint warfighting
capabilities is integrating legacy weapon systems through improved
command and control. However, one of the ``bill payers'' for an
increased emphasis on longer-range transformational programs in this
year's budget request was service modernization programs. In your view,
have any of the reductions in improvements or upgrades to our legacy
forces put near-term joint interoperability at greater risk?
Admiral Giambastiani. I cannot speak with detailed knowledge of all
of the decisions the Services made when putting together their
programs. However, I do know from my experience as the Navy's
programmer, that each Service carefully measures and balances risk
across its entire program. In doing so, they have followed the risk
balancing approach outlined by Secretary Rumsfeld to produce a more
coherent total program. Insofar as resources have flowed to Joint
Forces Command, which has primary responsibility for joint
interoperability, I feel confident that both near-term and long-term
joint interoperability will be enhanced, not jeopardized, by the
President's budget. In fact, the President's budget for fiscal year
2004 triples the dollars coming to U.S. Joint Forces Command for
interoperability.

MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002

18. Senator Reed. Admiral Giambastiani, please provide a chronology
of events during Millennium Challenge that specifies what was planned
during the activity, and what ultimately occurred. Please also provide
a list of programs that resulted from Millennium Challenge that are
included in the fiscal year 2004 budget request.
Admiral Giambastiani. As covered in detail in the 2002 Joint
Experimentation Annual Report to Congress, Joint Forces Command and its
Combatant Command, Service, and Agency partners conducted Millennium
Challenge 2002 (MC02) from 24 July to 14 August. This joint experiment
was the culmination of over 2 years of concept development,
experimentation, and the integration of operational lessons learned
from the global war on terrorism. At its core, MC02 is about thinking
differently with respect to the complex challenges and opportunities of
the 21st century. The joint experiment focused on the value of Effects-
Based Operations (EBO), as employed by a JTF headquarters, built around
the U.S. Army's III Corps staff (with critical Service augmentation),
enabled by a permanently manned Standing Joint Force Headquarters,
informed by an Operational Net Assessment, and executed through
functional components using a robust Collaborative Information
Environment.
MC02 was the largest joint field experiment ever conducted. Over
13,500 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and members of the
interagency community participated in the joint integrated experiment
that employed simulated and live forces nationwide. MC02 was the result
of a deliberate and comprehensive process that comprised numerous
concept development workshops, wargames, and limited objective
experiments involving combatant command, service, defense agency, and
interagency partners. The integration of live and simulated forces, the
incorporation of an adaptive and aggressive ``red team'', the use of a
new federation of 42 simulations, and the use of Service-training
ranges created both a rich experiment and challenging control issues.
Reflecting Combatant Command, Service, defense agency, and interagency
requirements, MC02 facilitated the exploration of 11 concepts, 27 joint
initiatives as well as 46 Service sponsored initiatives, and assessed
22 warfighting challenges.
MC02 execution included several spiral events that developed and
integrated the necessary technical architecture, trained the
experimental audience in the required concepts, tactics, techniques,
procedures, and tools, and enhanced planning for the execution of
military operations against a complex scenario that the U.S. could
realistically confront in the future. MC02 also incorporated Service
experimentation with tactical level, live events. This proved
challenging especially when essential platforms were only available for
very restricted periods due to operational support requirements for
``Enduring Freedom''. Another change occurred when the Army's XVIII
Airborne Corps headquarters was deployed to Afghanistan. However, one
of the experimental organizations, the Standing Joint Force
Headquarters (SJFHQ), enabled III Corps to take mission handoff in
stride and do in days what in our experience tells us normally takes
weeks, providing valuable insight into the utility of the SJFHQ.
Programs initiatives and concepts resulting from Millennium
Challenge 2002 supported by the fiscal year 2004 budget include:

Collaborative Information Environment
Standing Joint Force Headquarters
Joint Interagency Coordination Group
Effects Based Operations
Operational Net Assessment
Force Projection
Information Operations
Joint National Training Center
Joint Fires Initiative

JFCOM'S ROLE IN C2 PROGRAMS

19. Senator Reed. Admiral Giambastiani, a December 2002 article in
Inside the Army reported that the Joint Staff had recommended to the
Chairman that JFCOM should become the head of a new federation to
oversee joint battle management command and control. A key feature of
the proposal would be that JFCOM would control a separate budget line.
What is the status of a Joint Battle Management Command and Control
(JBMC2) federation, headed by JFCOM?
Admiral Giambastiani. JBMC2 is essentially a new management
structure to ensure the joint interoperability of key Service programs,
not a new program element itself. To use a sporting metaphor, I don't
want Joint Forces Command to become an expansion team in the
acquisition league--I want Joint Forces Command to help write the rules
of the game. In January 2003, Management Initiative Decision (MID) 912
assigned U.S. Joint Forces Command to lead the development of joint
doctrine, concepts, requirements, and integrated architectures for
JBMC2 interoperability and connectivity. These efforts will be
coordinated through a JBMC2 board of directors composed of combatant
commander and Service representatives.
In addition, MID 912 directed U.S. Joint Forces Command to take
oversight and directive authority for Single Integrated Air Picture
(SIAP) and Deployable Joint Command and Control (DJC2) in fiscal year
2003 and Family of Interoperable Operational Pictures (FIOP) in fiscal
year 2004. Joint Forces Command is currently negotiating Memorandums of
Understanding with the Army for SIAP, the Navy for DJC2 and the Air
Force for FIOP for execution of the oversight and directive authority.
Finally, MID 912 directed U.S. Joint Forces Command to recommend a
plan to the Deputy Secretary of Defense by July 2003 to take oversight
and directive authority for additional programs. U.S. Joint Forces
Command is currently conducting thorough studies to identify service
programs to manage under the JBMC2 construct.

20. Senator Reed. Admiral Giambastiani, has a new program element
line been created for JBMC2 in fiscal year 2003? If so, what was the
amount and source of the funding?
Admiral Giambastiani. No. JBMC2 is essentially a management
structure to ensure the joint interoperability of key Service programs,
not a new program element itself.

21. Senator Reed. Admiral Giambastiani, what is the JBMC2 funding
profile in the fiscal year 2004 budget request and across the FYDP?
Admiral Giambastiani. Currently one does not exist. JBMC2 is
essentially a management structure to ensure the joint interoperability
of key Service programs, not a new program element itself.

22. Senator Reed. Admiral Giambastiani, in your view, are these
resources sufficient to support JBMC2 requirements?
Admiral Giambastiani. There were no fiscal year 2003 resources
identified in MID 912 to support the JBMC2 management structure.
However, MID 912 did ask U.S. Joint Forces Command to report back to
the Deputy Secretary of Defense on the resources required to administer
and execute JBMC2 oversight as defined within that document. These
resource requirements have been forwarded to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense.

JOINT NATIONAL TRAINING CAPABILITY

23. Senator Reed. Admiral Giambastiani, JFCOM's March 2002 report
on the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) includes a table that
describes funding requirements for fiscal years 2004-2009. Please
provide a description of the current funding programmed for the JNTC,
as compared to the estimates in your report, and explain any
differences.
Admiral Giambastiani. U.S. Joint Forces Command received $10
million in fiscal year 2002. The fiscal year 2003 program of $35.6
million adequately funds the actions necessary to establish an initial
operating capability in October 2004.

NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE

24. Senator Reed. Admiral Cebrowski, how would you assess the
Department's progress to achieve visions of a truly network-centric
force?
Admiral Cebrowski. We are making significant strides but much
remains to be accomplished. As Operation Iraqi Freedom has highlighted,
some parts of the force are more networked than others. For example,
the 4th Infantry Division is the most digitized and networked of all
the Army Divisions, yet it was late to the fight. The 3rd Infantry
Division is not as digitized and networked as the 4th ID, never the
less its commanders were able to operate with higher shared situational
awareness than ground commanders have experienced in the history of
warfare. Similar benefits accrued to the commanders of the 101st Air
Mobile Division, and as well as British Army commanders. Where there is
room for further progress is in our ability to share information at the
tactical level of war across the battle space, and in blue force
tracking and identification.
The benefits of real-time information sharing between air and
ground units have been demonstrated during exercises. Phase I of the
Army's Division Capstone Exercise highlighted the benefits of real-time
information sharing between F-16s, A/OA-10s, and the 4th Infantry
Divisions Brigade Combat Teams. The F-16s and A/OA-10s had
unprecedented situational awareness of the position of the 4th Infantry
Division's ground units, which exceeded that of any combat aircraft
participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom. This awareness enabled the F-
16s and A/OA-10s to engage the OPFOR at night and render them combat
ineffective.
We are pursuing an initiative with John Stenbit's team, to develop
metrics that will help us measure progress in the implementation of
network-centric capabilities in our forces. We call this a conceptual
framework for network-centric operations, and it has already helped
develop some key insights into the power of network-centric warfare.

25. Senator Reed. Admiral Cebrowski, what are the biggest
organizational roadblocks to achieving that vision?
Admiral Cebrowski. I believe that one key measurement of progress
will be in the area of incentives for organizational behavior. For
example, right now, the incentives for interoperability are
insufficient to get us to the vision of a truly network-centric force.
Going back to the answer to the previous question, who owns the air-
ground seam? How should the bill for interoperability required to close
the air-to-ground seam be divided so that we can get to the future
faster rather than we are today? I believe the organizations and
processes that we have inherited from the Industrial Age need to be
reexamined in light of the challenges that we face during this
Information Age transformation. Constructs such as Joint Force Packages
and Agile Mission Groups (A UK Construct) will force these issues and
bring them to the forefront.
Similarly, we need to focus on rewarding organizations in terms of
output measures not input measures. This is particularly important for
disruptive innovations. If constructs such as the Air Force's Network
Centric Collaborative Targeting can enable networked distributed
sensors to outperform a legacy, platform-centric approach, and do so
with significantly reduced resources, then we need to ensure that
organizations are provided with the right kind of incentives to pursue
these kinds of solutions.

NETWORK CENTRIC TECHNOLOGIES

26. Senator Reed. Admiral Cebrowski, what new technologies should
be developed that are critical to achieving the vision of a networked
force?
Admiral Cebrowski. An important area for focus for new technologies
is interoperability. An example of a technology that is currently under
development that will help facilitate interoperability and accelerate
network-centric warfare is the Joint Tactical Radio Program. When all
the JTRS clusters are eventually developed and installed in platforms
across the force, we will observe a dramatic improvement in the ability
of the force to share information at the tactical level.

27. Senator Reed. Admiral Cebrowski, how are you working with the
Services and the defense agencies to ensure that proper investments are
made in research and development to meet those needs?
Admiral Cebrowski. The products of our research and deliberations
are made available to appropriate decision makers through numerous
channels and media. But the principle means is to invite potential
users into the concept development or experimentation from the
beginning.

JOINT ACQUISITION

28. Senator Reed. Admiral Giambastiani, currently the military
departments have the primary responsibility for acquisition of
equipment. There are, however, a few exceptions. For example, the
Chemical and Biological Defense Program is a joint program which has a
joint acquisition program. If we are to improve our joint capabilities
and increase our focus on acquisition of equipment that is intended to
serve joint forces, should we be moving toward more joint acquisition
programs? If so, how would you propose doing so?
Admiral Giambastiani. Acquisition is a complex process requiring
talented people and a disciplined management infrastructure. The
Services have a mature capability here. I believe we can, and should,
leverage that Service capability to acquire joint systems. From my
perspective at Joint Forces Command, the key is to get the joint
requirements right up front and then provide oversight and guidance for
the acquisition community as it produces ``born joint'' systems. To use
a sporting metaphor, I don't want Joint Forces Command to become an
expansion team in the acquisition league--I want Joint Forces Command
to help write the rules of the game.
Presently, we are moving in the right direction to ensure that all
equipment we procure is ``born joint.'' U.S. Joint Forces Command's
role in the development and monitoring of Capstone Requirements
Documents and Key Performance Parameters helps to ensure that the
requirements we provide to the Service acquisition communities will
result in capabilities that can be effectively employed within a joint
context. Beyond that, the Joint Battle Management Command and Control
MID 912 captures a new management structure that allows Joint Forces
Command to help direct funding decisions, prioritize acquisition
actions and participate in milestone decisions for major acquisition
programs. In both of these endeavors, we will be writing the rules of
the ``born joint'' acquisition game.

JOINT ASPECT OF WARGAMES AND EXERCISES

29. Senator Reed. Admiral Giambastiani, Joint Forces Command will
soon cosponsor an Army wargame, and you are planning to work with the
other Services on their wargames in the future. If we want to maximize
our joint warfighting capabilities, should we have a joint component,
if not Joint Forces Command participation, in all major wargames and
exercises? What are you doing to ensure that we are getting the most
``joint value'' out of Service wargames and exercises?
Admiral Giambastiani. U.S. Joint Forces Command has begun working
with all the Services to develop a common ``Joint Context'' for all
their major war games. Our purpose is to improve joint warfighting
capabilities from the birth of each Service's concepts and thereby
ensure their compatibility and complementary nature. We started this
development with the Army's 2003 Title 10 war game, Unified Quest 03.
Our Director of Experimentation has initiated a recurring dialog
with his Two Star Service counterparts in order to improve coordination
among the Service and Joint Forces Command concept development and
experimentation efforts. We will both co-sponsor a major Service game
each year, beginning with the upcoming Unified Quest, as well as
conduct a more moderate level of participation in other games to ensure
continued engagement. Through this approach, we aim to constantly
improve the ``born joint'' development of Service concepts and improve
joint warfighting capability.

COMMON JOINT CONTEXT

30. Senator Reed. Admiral Giambastiani, your prepared statement
included a discussion of the joint experimentation campaign plan that
would achieve its goals by ``conducting our collective experimentation
activities using a `common joint context' that defines the challenges
of the future warfight.'' Please explain the common understanding of
the future challenges of warfare, and whether and how it will be
modified as circumstances change over time.
Admiral Giambastiani. Based on the past 18 months of
experimentation, what we have learned through years of joint
operations, and via coordination with the combatant commanders, the
Armed Services, and the Joint Staff, Joint Forces Command has developed
a draft list of 18 common ``Joint Military Challenges.'' This list of
challenges is the focus of the study and analysis effort behind
application of the ``Joint Context'' in Service and our own wargames.
By addressing these enduring challenges early in the Concept
Development process, we intend to dramatically improve joint
warfighting capabilities and efficiency. Addressing these challenges
will enable our forces to achieve decision superiority, create coherent
effects, and conduct and support distributed operations. This year's
experiments will address these nine challenges:

Achieving info superiority (anticipatory understanding)
Coalition and interagency information sharing
Joint ISR
Joint maneuver and strike
Interagency operations
Multinational operations
Urban operations
Force projection: Deployment, Employment and Sustainability
Counter anti-access and area-denial (includes Forcible Entry
Operations)

CRUISE MISSILE SUPPORT ACTIVITY

31. Senator Reed. Admiral Giambastiani, please describe the Cruise
Missile Support Activity mentioned in your prepared statement. What are
its functions and how is it organized? Is it fully staffed and
operational?
Admiral Giambastiani. The Cruise Missile Support Activities' (CMSA)
mission is to support combatant commander operations by planning
conventional and nuclear Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) missions,
distributing mission and support data to command and control nodes,
planning activities and TLAM firing platforms, integrating TLAM
expertise into the supported commander's force assignment and effects
assessment deliberations, training TLAM planners and evaluating TLAM
mission planning activities. There are two U.S. CMSAs (one each in
Hawaii and Norfolk), and one United Kingdom CMSA located in Northwood.
In Operation Iraqi Freedom, as in Operation Enduring Freedom operations
in Afghanistan, U.S. Joint Forces Command's CMSA is leading the other
two CMSAs, all afloat TLAM Planning detachments, and the TLAM planning
cell at U.S. Naval Forces Central Command in a collaborative effort in
support of U.S. Central Command. U.S. Joint Forces Command CMSA manning
consists of 32 government service civilians, 33 military personnel and
11 contractors (essentially the same as U.S. Pacific Command's CMSA).
This manning level is not sufficient to execute all mission essential
tasks. Additionally, the CMSAs are not fully staffed to meet sustained
round the clock support requirements during crisis or combat operations
and are forced to rely on significant ad-hoc manning augmentation.

AREA CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE ADVANCED CONCEPT TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION

32. Senator Reed. Admiral Giambastiani, your prepared statement
mentioned the Area Cruise Missile Defense (ACMD) Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstration (ACTD). What role is Joint Forces Command
playing with respect to this ACTD, particularly in joint concept
development and joint experimentation?
Admiral Giambastiani. U.S. Joint Forces Command has been the
Operational Sponsor for this ACTD since its inception in fiscal year
2001. The ACMD ACTD has participated in several joint exercises
including NORAD's Exercise Amalgam Virgo 2001 and Amalgam Virgo 2002-
2033, as well as the All Service Combat Identification Evaluation Team
2000, and Joint Combat Identification Evaluation Team evaluation 2002
exercises. These exercises evaluated ACMD concepts of operation and
developed ongoing tactics, techniques and procedures for effective
employment. Currently, this ACTD is supporting real-world operations in
Operation Noble Eagle.
Joint Forces Command is responsible for, and will conduct the
formal ACMD Military Utility Assessment at, the Amalgam Virgo exercise
in August 2003 to determine the operational utility of this potential
capability.
Lastly, the ACMD ACTD has had no direct involvement in joint
concept development and experimentation. After the tragedy of September
11, 2001, the system went operational in its force protection
capability in CONUS. The ACTD will have a Transformation Change Package
prepared and submitted to the JROC before it closes out next year.

THEATER AIR MISSILE DEFENSE CAPSTONE REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT

33. Senator Reed. Admiral Giambastiani, your prepared statement
mentioned that the JROC has approved four JFCOM Capstone Requirements
Documents, including one for ``Theater Air Missile Defense'' (TAMD).
Please describe JFCOM's role in preparing this Capstone Requirements
Document (CRD), and the participation, if any, from: the Missile
Defense Agency; the Joint Staff; and the Joint Theater Air and Missile
Defense Organization. Please provide a copy of this TAMD CRD to the
committee.
Admiral Giambastiani. On 1 March 2001, the JROC approved the
Theater Air and Missile Defense Capstone Requirements Document (TAMD
CRD). The CRD, which is focused on the 2010 timeframe, provides over
arching requirements that apply to the collective TAMD Family of
Systems (TAMD FoS). CRD approval came about as a result of an 18-month
effort by the combatant commanders, the Joint Staff, the Services, and
TAMD related agencies such as the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). The
U.S. Joint Forces Command in coordination with the Joint Theater Air
and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO) led development of the CRD.
The TAMD CRD is a key document in U.S. Joint Forces Command's
transformation effort. Since the CRD approval in March 2001, U.S. Joint
Forces Command has conducted approximately 200 TAMD-related
requirements documents reviews in order to evaluate compliance with
applicable CRD Key Performance Parameters (KPPs), requirements, and
information exchange requirements (IERs) to ensure TAMD systems are
designed to be interoperable at the joint and multinational level.
Additionally, the CRD authors have briefed/coordinated with over 40
Service Program Offices to make sure the materiel developers fully
understand the KPPs and requirements contained in the CRD. Document
reviews and the close coordination with the Services have resulted in a
much improved process that will contribute significantly to
successfully achieving full spectrum dominance as described in Joint
Vision 2020.
The TAMD CRD is currently undergoing a periodic update and is in
formal Flag-level staffing with the combatant commanders, the Joint
Staff, the Services, and other missile defense related organizations.
Per your request, a copy of the current TAMD CRD will be forwarded
to the committee under a separate document.
[Due to the classification of this document, it will be retained in
the committee's executive files and will not be available for public
review.]

TOTAL INFORMATION AWARENESS

34. Senator Reed. Admiral Giambastiani, in testimony before the
House Armed Services Committee on March 13, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Security Paul McHale indicated that the Department
of Defense does not intend to operate the technologies developed by the
Total Information Awareness (TIA) program. This seems to contradict
your testimony on JFCOM's current and future plans for TIA. In light of
Secretary McHale's statements, please clarify JFCOM's plans for testing
and operating the technologies developed by the TIA program.
Admiral Giambastiani. U.S. Joint Forces Command's seeks to exploit
appropriate Total Information Awareness software tools and
methodologies to enhance U.S. Joint Forces Command initiatives aimed at
creating advanced warfighting capabilities. The command is interested
in the capabilities offered by the Total Information Awareness
technologies and collaborative environment to gather and fuse foreign
intelligence information in such a way to improve situational awareness
for the warfighter. Any implemented capabilities will be employed in
accordance with existing intelligence oversight policies.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

WEAPON SYSTEM COSTS

35. Senator Akaka. Admiral Giambastiani, I also serve as the
ranking member on the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support,
which means I must address the rising costs of maintaining our weapon
systems. We are also seeing costs increase as we attempt to boost
training capabilities by more closely tying individual weapon systems
together and increasing instrumentation. At the same time, the General
Accounting Office has done some work that indicates that DOD's
acquisition process does not give sufficient attention to total life
cycle costs particularly the future operation and support (O&S) costs,
early on in weapon development. I suspect the same is also true for
future training costs--that program managers are more interested in
maximizing certain performance parameters that they are in investing
scarce program dollars into future training enablers. Do you agree that
these two problems exist, that both long-term O&S and training costs
are not taken enough into consideration in weapon system development
and if so, do you see a role for yourself in trying to increase
attention toward these issues, especially in the training arena?
Admiral Giambastiani. The Department of Defense has made steady
improvements in capturing life cycle system operating and support
costs. This is particularly true with new systems in final development
or early production such as the Joint Strike Fighter, the Virginia
Class attack submarines, the C-17 transport, et cetera. The Joint
National Training Capability will help us focus on training and support
costs.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

JOINT EXPERIMENTATION AND JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

36. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Giambastiani and Admiral
Cebrowski, the Bush administration articulated concrete transformation
goals in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the specifics of
which you are both very familiar. In addition, the President's 2004
budget and FYDP calls for the acquisition of billions of dollars worth
of programs dubbed ``transformational'' by the Department of Defense,
including F/A-22 fighters, unmanned aerial vehicles, the Army's
Objective Force, and other programs. However, the Department, or more
specifically Joint Forces Command, has yet to produce an overarching
joint warfighting concept into which all of the QDR's goals and the
procurement and research efforts in the FYDP are supposed to fit. The
lack of a joint warfighting concept would seem to make real joint
experimentation difficult. Please discuss this apparent disconnect
between the QDR, the new FYDP, and the lack of an overall joint
warfighting concept.
Admiral Giambastiani. I agree that an overarching joint warfighting
concept is important to transformation and experimentation. Based on
the Secretary's guidance we have been working cooperatively with the
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Services and the defense agencies
to produce a concept. The QDR and other strategic guidance such as the
National Security Strategy, and the National Military Strategy form the
underpinning and shape the strategic environment for this concept.
Connecting this concept and the derived subordinate concepts to future
years defense planning is what we will achieve through subsequent
concept development, experimentation, prototyping and creation of
actionable investment recommendations.
Admiral Cebrowski. The QDR, the National Security Strategy, and the
National Military Strategy form the hierarchy of strategic documents
that currently under gird development of the Joint Operations Concept.
As you've rightly observed, the Joint Operations Concept is a key
document. Thus, it is important that it reflects the altered strategic
context and emerging requirements of warfare in the information age.
With guidance provided by the Secretary, the CJCS, through the Joint
Staff, and in concert with the Services, JFCOM is working at providing
such a document.

37. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Giambastiani and Admiral
Cebrowski, I am aware that there is an ongoing effort to produce such a
concept of operation. Please update me on the status of this effort and
when we may see some concrete results.
Admiral Giambastiani. Since I relieved as Commander, U.S. Joint
Forces Command, we have been working collaboratively within the
Department of Defense to help draft, coordinate and rewrite this
concept. The draft document, currently titled ``Joint Operations
Concept'', has been reviewed by senior members of the Department of
Defense. U.S. Joint Forces Command, in partnership with other elements
of Department of Defense, will examine this concept through two
experiments in April and May 2003. These experiments will use alternate
perspectives, and multiple scenarios to provide a rigorous review of
the current draft version of the concept. After analysis, U.S. Joint
Forces Command will propose improvements to the draft concept.
The approval authority for the concept is the Secretary of Defense
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
Admiral Cebrowski. The original target date for approval of such a
document was 1 May 2003. However, in light of Joint experimentation
scheduled for April and May of 2003, as well the emerging lessons of
Operation Iraqi Freedom, that due date has been suspended indefinitely.

38. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Giambastiani and Admiral
Cebrowski, please explain how the emerging concepts are prepared to
deal with a serious threat to U.S. forces, specifically mobile
ballistic and cruise missile launchers.
Admiral Giambastiani. Based on detailed input from all the
combatant commanders and a review of strategic guidance to U.S. Joint
Forces Command, we have identified force protection and countering
adversary anti-access and area denial capabilities as the broader
operational challenges posed by mobile ballistic and cruise missiles.
Current experimentation is being conducted using scenarios that stress
operating in and overcoming such threats. These scenarios are shared
with our Service experimentation partners, so that we can understand
these issues from multiple perspectives. Additionally, force and base
protection will continue to be a focus in next year's experimentation
events. This experimentation will allow formulation of actionable
investment recommendations to address the operational challenges these
capabilities pose.
Admiral Cebrowski. Experimentation is ongoing and planned using
scenarios that stress operations in the face of such threats. JFCOM
expects that this experimentation will provide actionable investment
recommendations that address the operational challenges posed by these
capabilities. The items mentioned are but two of an array of potential
threats with which the force must deal. Our responses must be similarly
broad.

39. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Giambastiani and Admiral
Cebrowski, Joint Forces Command is making significant progress toward
creating a true joint training capability and improving joint command
and control. Millennium Challenge was a step in the right direction.
What is the next step in joint experimentation?
Admiral Giambastiani. Our near-term objectives for experimentation
now include four elements: 1) field the Standing Joint Force
Headquarters (SJFHQ) to provide the structure and the enabling concepts
for developing transformational joint command and control, 2) pursue
rapid prototyping of capabilities to improve joint warfighting now, 3)
provide actionable recommendations from experimentation results to
senior leaders concerning options for future force investment, and 4)
include our Combatant Commands, Services, defense agencies and
multinational partners in leveraging their experimentation activities.
A coordination draft Joint Concept Development and Experimentation
Campaign Plan will be reviewed and endorsed by the JROC, and final
draft forwarded to the Secretary of Defense via the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff by 01 August 2003.
As a result of this review and technical analysis, we are embarking
on a two-path plan of action. The first, which we call the Concept
Path, will focus on developing concepts for the far term and develop
recommendations for future investment. The immediate objective of our
efforts along the Concept Path is to refine a Joint Operations Concept
for the armed forces of the United States. The second, or prototype
path, focuses on the near-term fielding of prototype capabilities to
our warfighters, giving them potentially transformational capabilities
and giving us operational data to help us refine those prototypes.
Through our review, we determined that no one experiment would
answer all the questions--that it requires a body of knowledge linked
by a series of experiments. We have therefore begun a series of
experiments and other events to refine the overarching concept for
joint operations through a series of events known as Pinnacle Impact
2003.
Admiral Cebrowski. JFCOM's near-term objectives for experimentation
include four elements: 1) fielding the Standing Joint Task Force
Headquarters, 2) rapid prototyping of capabilities to improve joint
warfighting immediately, 3) transition the results of experimentation
to actionable recommendations for investment, and 4) leverage far
ranging experimentation activities throughout the DOD as well as
multinational partners. They are also coordinating for review a draft
Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign Plan for
signature by the Secretary of Defense no later than 1 August 2003. They
have also begun a series of experiments and other events called
Pinnacle Impact 2003, which are intended to refine an overarching Joint
Operations Concept.

40. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Giambastiani and Admiral
Cebrowski, what are the emerging requirements for a Joint Task Force
headquarters?
Admiral Giambastiani. Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters are
increasingly in demand. These headquarters must be joint, responsive,
coherent, and as well trained just as we train our combat forces. We
have seen more Joint Task Force Headquarters established since 11
September 2001 than we saw over the past decade. Given the variety of
missions, we have formed Joint Task Force Headquarters with one-, two-,
and three-star commanders, and in most cases, these commanders and
their headquarters were first trained by Joint Forces Command as a
Joint Task Force Headquarters just before deployment. In fact, Joint
Forces Command has trained all Joint Task Force and Joint Special
Operations Task Force Headquarters pursuing the war on terrorism.
The utility of joint training is clear. In the case of Afghanistan,
the Army's XVIII Airborne Corps formation of combined Joint Task Force
180 was aided by several years of JFCOM JTF training in Unified
Endeavor exercises, participation in Millennium Challenge 02 (MC02),
and exploitation of MC02 concepts and capabilities. During my visit to
Afghanistan, XVIII Airborne Corps cited MC02 concepts and joint
training as important to their success in Afghanistan.
In the near term, we must institutionalize this model for all JTF
capable one-, two-, and three-star Service headquarters. This training
coupled with the fiscal year 2005 fielding of the Standing Joint Force
Headquarters within the regional combatant commands will further
improve JTF formation and responsiveness. As demonstrated in last
summer's Millennium Challenge 02 experiment, the Standing Joint Force
Headquarters enables the rapid establishment of an operationally and
regionally focused JTF headquarters. In that experiment, III Corps was
able to take mission handoff from XVIII Airborne Corps and do in days
what in our experience tells us normally takes weeks.
Admiral Cebrowski. The most compelling requirements for the Joint
Task Force Headquarters are those that emerge from experimentation and
operational prototyping. To the degree that these requirements rapidly
transition from concept or lesson to capability we will be successful
at making transformation an inherent part of Joint Task Forces wherever
they're formed.

SPACE IN NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE

41. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Cebrowski, as the developer of
many of the theories of network-centric operations for our military,
what is the role of space in a networked military force?
Admiral Cebrowski. We envision the potential for our future forces
to increasingly operate in denied areas. We must develop operationally
responsive space capabilities that provide persistent surveillance over
these areas. Space also has the potential to resolve some of our
current communications bandwidth limitations.

42. Senator Bill Nelson. How would you assess the current DOD level
of investment and progress in space systems, training, and concepts of
operation?
Admiral Cebrowski. Space is a critical capability that must be
protected now and in the future. While all areas of space would benefit
from increased funding lines, the areas of greatest concern in the
space program are capability cycle time, work force aging, a narrowing
capabilities base and a misplaced aversion to risk.

MODELING AND SIMULATION IN MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE

43. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Giambastiani, what role did
modeling and simulation play in Millennium Challenge?
Admiral Giambastiani. Modeling and Simulation (M&S) was the only
way we could provide a problem set robust enough to challenge an
experimental audience that included all the Services, several Combatant
Commands and agencies like the Departments of State, Justice, and
Transportation. Costs to establish a similar live capability were
prohibitive. Additionally, M&S allowed us to reset conditions in a
comprehensive way that cannot be done with live troops. Over 13,000
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines operating from eight different
``live'' locations throughout the Southwest United States and Pacific
Ocean were linked virtually to 17 other simulated locations to create a
coherent, integrated battlespace at the operational level of war.
Ultimately, M&S allowed us to experiment with platforms, munitions, and
C\4\I devices unavailable due to operations, funding and range
constraints, still under development, or merely conceptual and apply
those capabilities using new warfighting approaches in a cost effective
and analytically valid environment.

SPACE ASSETS IN MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE

44. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Giambastiani, how were space
assets (which are so critical to current operations) involved in the
exercises and wargames of Millennium Challenge?
Admiral Giambastiani. U.S. Joint Forces Command used current space
assets in the actual planning and conduct of the spirals leading up to
and during Millennium Challenge 02. Space force enhancements such as
satellite communications, space-based ISR, missile warning, and
navigation, were integrated into the event. Space and information
operations organization and C2 was exercised by Strategic Command
(formerly Space Command). The Space and IO element (SIOE) commanded and
managed all space and Information Operations (IO) capabilities in the
area of operations. Much more experimentation is needed in space and
IO.
The second part of the answer appears to support Admiral
Cebrowski's observation during his testimony that the high level
experiment focused on the SJFHQ in Norfolk was . . .``somewhat
separated from the lower-level experiments conducted by the various
components.'' With six notable exceptions, space issues and
experimentation occurred within only the scope of component and Service
events. These exceptions were the Joint Forces Command-sponsored Joint
En-Route Mission Planning and Rehearsal System (JEMPRS) and five small
separate initiatives sponsored by the National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO) which focused on data fusion and product manipulation for the
Standing Joint Forces Headquarters (SJFHQ). In order to coordinate
space issues and experiments conducted by the Services, U.S. Space
Command, and other agencies, we have created the U.S. Joint Forces
Command Space Applications Experimentation Cell as a space conduit and
clearinghouse for future experimentation events.

JOINT SPACE OPERATIONS AND EXPERIMENTATION

45. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Giambastiani, in my opinion, our
space assets are critical enablers of any joint operation. They provide
us the ability to access and distribute information to all parts of the
globe and even down to the individual warfighter in the field. How is
Joint Forces Command working to understand the role of critical space
systems such as GPS satellites, space launch vehicles, and even manned
space missions in future joint operations?
Admiral Giambastiani. In November 2002, U.S. Joint Forces Command,
in partnership with U.S. Space Command (now STRATCOM) established a
Space Applications Experimentation Cell with the mission of
identifying, developing, refining, and experimenting with concepts for
exploiting the medium of space in support of global joint operations.
Until establishment of this cell, concept development and
experimentation in the space arena had been largely left to the
individual Services and agencies responsible for the particular
functions of space. While we have always included current and projected
capabilities in our models and simulations, we had not examined space
as a ``variable'' in the context of future joint warfighting. The small
initial cell is currently focused on conducting a baseline assessment
of the National Security Space Community, identifying potential space
experimentation issues, and beginning to create a strategy for space
experimentation. The scope of that strategy will include examination
and experimentation with the space community's current and future
architectures and systems.

JOINT SIMULATION SYSTEM

46. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Giambastiani and Admiral
Cebrowski, the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) was a high profile,
critical program designed to use advanced computer modeling and
simulation to provide computer-simulated environments that would be
used to train warfighters and commanders, develop doctrine and tactics,
formulate plans and operational requirements, and even assist in the
evaluation of technologies during the acquisition process. This program
was considered DOD's ``flagship'' modeling and simulation program for
warfighters. It was joint, with participation of all the branches of
the Armed Services, as well as a number of defense agencies, including
the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA). It has developed a number of fantastic technologies B
including synthetic environments in which soldiers, sailors, marines,
and airmen could all jointly train in real time. I understand that
Joint Forces Command has taken delivery of some of the first software
delivered by the program and is using it to support joint training
activities (fiscal year 2004 investment: $13.6 million). The JSIMS
program had been scheduled to require an investment of over a $1
billion over the course of the decade to accomplish its ambitious
mission of developing these new joint simulation capabilities and
deliver multiple versions of simulation software for use by the
Services and joint activities. However, the funding for this program
has been severely curtailed--in fact, the core program has been zeroed
out in the fiscal year 2004 budget request. What is the role that
modeling and simulation should play in transforming the military?
Admiral Giambastiani. Modeling and simulation will continue to play
an important role in transforming the U.S. military. Joint Forces
Command seeks a modeling and simulation capability that provides a
single improved replacement for a wide variety of antiquated joint,
Service and Agency legacy simulation systems. The federation of
simulations central to the execution of last summer's Millennium
Challenge experiment demonstrated the utility of such a system, but
also the challenge of creating such a capability from those legacy
simulation systems. The JSIMS was intended to provide next generation
joint and Service training simulation tools; reduce relative
development and life-cycle cost; and substantially improve performance.
However, due to program difficulties the Department of Defense has
discontinued JSIMS development beyond Block I pending an analysis of
alternatives. In the interim, Joint Forces Command received version 1
of JSIMS in December 2002 and began testing, is taking steps to
establish a Software Support Facility (SSF) to maintain JSIMS Block I
software, and will support the analysis of alternatives. The JSIMS
version 1 testing and validation process will take the remainder of the
calendar year and if successful Joint Forces Command intends to use
JSIMS in Unified Endeavor 04-2 (Aug-Sep 04) to support joint training.
If testing is unsuccessful, Joint Forces Command will recommend program
termination and will pursue alternatives to meet Joint training
requirements into the future.
Admiral Cebrowski. Modeling and simulation aids risk reduction in
operational and organizational concept development, as well as systems
development and management decisions concerning cost. However, until
modeling and simulation can divorce itself from dependency on
variations of Lanchestrian equations, it is clear that it cannot
support decision makers in the Information Age any better than was done
in the Industrial Age.

47. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Giambastiani and Admiral
Cebrowski, do you feel that we are investing enough in developing these
capabilities to meet our needs?
Admiral Giambastiani. There is significant investment in modeling
and simulation. Funding has been adequate to meet the original
requirements of JSIMS, but programmatic and developmental difficulties
have denied U.S. Joint Forces Command the benefits of that system.
Joint Forces Command seeks a modeling and simulation capability that
provides an improved replacement for a wide variety of antiquated
Joint, Service and Agency legacy simulation systems. With Joint
National Training Capability (JNTC) requirements established and as
funding comes on line, there is a potential that funds will be
available to support emerging modeling and simulation capability
requirements.
Admiral Cebrowski. The circumstance we find ourselves in today
(described above), calls out modeling and simulation as an important
area for research and development investment. The potential benefits
are significant and far reaching. Some areas worthy of interest are
physics-based modeling, warfare modeling, training simulations, and
value/performance decisions.

48. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Giambastiani and Admiral
Cebrowski, what is your position on the cancellation of this program?
Admiral Giambastiani. The Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) did not
cancel the JSIMS program. Program continuation is dependent upon the
outcome of Joint Forces Command's testing and the Defense Department's
Analysis of Alternatives. If testing is successful, Joint Forces
Command intends to use JSIMS in Unified Endeavor 04-2 (August-September
2004) to support training for a combatant commander, JTF Commander,
Component Commanders, and their staffs. If testing is unsuccessful,
Joint Forces Command will recommend program termination as an input to
the Defense Department's Analysis of Alternatives. U.S. Joint Forces
Command requires JSIMS or JSIMS like capabilities to successfully
perform its mission in the future.
Admiral Cebrowski. Personally, I am delighted that suspension of
this program has occurred since it provides a real opportunity to skip
a generation in our approach to modeling and simulation. Continuation
of the program is contingent upon the outcome of JFCOM testing and a
DOD analysis of alternatives.

49. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Giambastiani and Admiral
Cebrowski, are you satisfied that DOD directed the cancellation with a
clear understanding of the risks and costs associated with closing the
existing program, delaying establishment of a replacement program, and
the potential loss of time and skilled modeling and simulation
development personnel?
Admiral Giambastiani. The PDM did not cancel the program, as
implied in the question. Program continuation or cancellation is
dependent upon the outcomes of the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint
Warfighting Center-conducted Systems Verification and Validation Test
(SVVT) and the OSD-conducted analysis of alternatives (AoA). Although a
JSIMS-like capability is an essential component of JNTC, current plans
provide for using JSIMS in the JNTC only if the system is judged usable
and available.
The Joint Forces Command participated in the review of JSIMS that
led to the PDM decision. U.S. Joint Forces Command made its schedule
and cost concerns known during the review as well as its concerns about
the validity of the joint training requirement that JSIMS was designed
to fulfill. I understand the reasons for the PDM action, support the
decision, and strongly support the SVVT event and AoA that will
determine the best means of meeting joint training requirements in a
timely manner, whether or not those means include JSIMS.
Admiral Cebrowski. It is not my role to evaluate program decisions
in these terms. However, the PDM did not cancel the program--
development was suspended beyond Block I, pending JFCOM testing and an
OSD Analysis of Alternatives.

50. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Giambastiani and Admiral
Cebrowski, are you satisfied that cancellation of the JSIMS program is
necessary to accelerate establishment of a Joint National Training
Capability or does it complicate achieving such an objective?
Admiral Giambastiani. The PDM did not cancel the JSIMS program.
Program continuation is dependent upon the outcome of Joint Forces
Command testing and the Defense Department's Analysis of Alternatives.
The Analysis of Alternatives will account for testing outcomes and
impacts the establishment of a Joint National Training Capability.
Admiral Cebrowski. The PDM did not cancel the program. Program
continuation is contingent upon JFCOM testing and an OSD Analysis of
Alternatives. The Analysis of Alternatives will account for testing
outcomes and impacts on establishment of a Joint National Training
Capability.

51. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Giambastiani and Admiral
Cebrowski, what are your views on the importance of quality modeling
and simulation to joint experimentation, joint training, joint
doctrine, joint requirements development, and joint acquisition?
Admiral Giambastiani. Quality modeling and simulation make
important contributions to joint experimentation, joint training, joint
doctrine, joint requirements development, and joint acquisition, and
will become increasingly important as simulation capabilities improve.
Modeling and simulation plays an important role in training and
transforming the U.S. military. Joint Forces Command seeks a modeling
and simulation capability that provides an improved replacement for a
wide variety of antiquated Joint, Service and Agency legacy simulation
systems. The federation of simulations central in the execution of last
summer's Millennium Challenge experiment demonstrated the utility of
such a system, but also the challenge of creating such a capability
from those legacy simulation systems. Modeling and simulation
capability provides large savings in support costs for joint training
and experimentation right now as compared to field exercises and
experiments. With necessary improvements in simulation flexibility,
interoperability, and fidelity, these savings can be applied to joint
doctrine development, joint acquisition analysis, and joint
requirements development. To maintain the quality simulation
environment required, simulations will have to undergo constant
improvement and expansion of capabilities over time, including
accounting for new approaches to warfare by moving beyond the attrition
based models currently in use.
Admiral Cebrowski. Modeling and simulation provides large savings
in support costs for joint training and experimentation as compared to
live field exercises and experiments. To achieve the quality simulation
environment required, modeling and simulation will have to undergo a
major change that eliminates its current reliance on variations of the
Lanchestrian equations developed during the Industrial Age.

52. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Giambastiani and Admiral
Cebrowski, in your view, what DOD agency should be responsible for the
definition of requirements, research, development, testing, evaluation,
and procurement of a joint simulation system?
Admiral Giambastiani. Unified Command Plan (UCP) 2002 guidance
designates Joint Forces Command as the Joint Force Trainer and Joint
Force Integrator, and as such, Joint Forces Command has an important
role in the development of joint training and experimentation
simulation requirements. Fully unified development, funding, and
procurement of an extremely complex and ambitious simulation system is
a necessity, as has been borne out by past Joint Simulation System
development history. As with Joint Battle Management Command and
Control, Joint Forces Command can take the lead with other joint users
in the evaluation process.
Admiral Cebrowski. I don't believe there should be a single
executive agent for joint simulation.

DECISION RULES AND METRICS

53. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Cebrowski, you mentioned the
importance of decision rules and metrics during the hearing. I
understood you to mean those rules and metrics associated with force
structuring, wargaming and experimentation. What exactly did you mean
by ``decision rules and metrics?'' What makes them so important?
Admiral Cebrowski. ``Decision rules and metrics'' are part of the
incentives and rewards system that compel individual and institutional
behavior. They underwrite our culture by reinforcing or changing our
attitudes and beliefs. Over time they help define the characteristics
and capabilities of our future forces.

54. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Giambastiani and Admiral
Cebrowski, is there a problem with our current system of ``decision
rules and metrics,'' how they are derived or used?
Admiral Giambastiani. The National Security environment is changing
radically and so must our methods for enhancing and measuring military
performance in that environment. Decision rules and metrics that are
applicable to our transformation needs are evolving with our growing
understanding of: first, the role of military power in the future
security environment; second, radical changes in warfighting
facilitated by dramatic technological advances; and, third, the
required changes in doctrine, organization, training, leadership, and
culture necessary to take full advantage of those technological
advances in executing our military's role. Historically, decision rules
and metrics have been derived by the Services to maximize Service
warfighting performance in their respective areas of core competence.
Recently, U.S. Joint Forces Command has begun partnering with the
Services to assist them in ensuring their concepts capabilities and the
decision rules from which they emanate, and the metrics by which they
are assessed, are ``born joint.''
Admiral Cebrowski. The issue is value structure. To the extent our
value structure flows from conventional threats and concepts of
Industrial Age warfare while ignoring the effects of globalization and
the transition to the Information Age, our decision rules metrics are
detrimental.

55. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Giambastiani and Admiral
Cebrowski, the implication is that there will be new ``decision rules
and metrics.'' How will they be decided?
Admiral Giambastiani. U.S. Joint Forces Command's transformation
responsibilities extend across a temporal continuum from developing and
providing to the regional combatant commanders enhanced capabilities
for today's joint forces to developing the capabilities of the future
coherent force, which will be completely networked with total knowledge
of all elements of the battlespace. The latter is unachievable with
current technology, thus remains a vision toward which we are
working. The former responsibility is being executed today. While some
decision rules can be consistent across the continuum irrespective of
the ``art of the possible,'' many rules and most metrics governing
these responsibilities cannot. Those that govern our near term
responsibilities can be the most specific, and derive from policy
documents such as the National Security Strategy, the National Military
Strategy, and the Defense Planning Guidance. Rules and metrics that
govern the mid-term are less specific and derive from the
Transformation Planning Guidance and the Joint Operations Concept.
Least specific are those rules and metrics that govern the far-term,
and are more akin to the scientific process of discovery, which we are
employing in the concept development pathway of our joint concept
development and experimentation process, addressed below. Key to
ensuring that transformation initiatives permeate all aspects of this
continuum is inculcating a culture of transformation throughout the
armed forces. This is partially a function of the Joint Professional
Military Education process, which we are addressing via a new
partnership with National Defense University.
Admiral Cebrowski. New rules and metrics emerge in response to an
understanding of a new strategic context and the domains of competition
in the information age. They should be decided based on output measures
and risk assessment.

56. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Giambastiani and Admiral
Cebrowski, what is the process (over what timeline and cost) and who
will control this process and its ultimate decisions?
Admiral Giambastiani. The Office of Force Transformation is the
agency within the Office of the Secretary of Defense responsible for
establishing policies for DOD-wide transformation efforts. United
States Joint Forces Command is responsible for executing transformation
policy and leading transformation efforts in the Armed Forces.
Therefore, Admiral Cebrowski and I are partners in this effort. We are
working together to derive approaches, rules and metrics across the
temporal continuum of transformation efforts. Within the area of joint
concept development and experimentation, we have been working on a
campaign plan for two experimental pathways, one looking as far ahead
as 20 years into the future, and the other looking at near-term
prototyping of transformational capabilities. This campaign plan is
concept- and capability-driven with rules and metrics derived in
accordance with the specifics of the concept or capability under
examination. The concept pathway is focused on refining our Joint
Concepts of Operations for the mid- and far-terms, and thereby
rationalizing all the individual Services' visions for future
warfighting. The principal focus of our prototyping pathway is on the
enabling concepts for fielding a Standing Joint Force Headquarters
(SJFHQ) capability in each of the regional combatant commanders'
headquarters. These enabling concepts include Operational Net
Assessment and the Collaborative Information Environment, both of which
we are prototyping with U.S. Forces Korea. In Korea, rules and metrics
will be developed specific to evaluating those concepts/capabilities
within that environment. The ultimate assessment will derive from that
of our customer, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea.
Admiral Cebrowski. This process should not be controlled--it is
emergent behavior. As the new strategic context is articulated, new
rules will flow from our understanding of the trends that emerge.

57. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Giambastiani and Admiral
Cebrowski, what role will the Services play in this determination
process?
Admiral Giambastiani. The Services are U.S. Joint Forces Command's
partners in joint concept development and experimentation. We work both
through our component commands--Air Combat Command, the Army's Forces
Command, Atlantic Fleet, and Marine Forces Atlantic--and directly with
Service experimentation agencies for input into our planning and
processes. As part of the planning for every Joint Forces Command--
sponsored event, component and Service representatives contribute their
agencies' perspective and positions, including inputs to definitions of
rules and establishment of metrics. In the training realm, our
components identify the specific joint mission essential tasks to be
performed, which in turn define the metrics for our training exercises.
As we evolve our Joint National Training Capability to address joint
tactical actions, Joint Forces Command collaboration with our
components and their Services will expand even more, especially in the
derivation of joint tactical decision rules and metrics.
Admiral Cebrowski. The Services respond since they are providers.
It's up to them to appropriately sense market dynamics and needs, and
respond accordingly.

58. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Giambastiani and Admiral
Cebrowski, within what research or acquisition program(s) will this
research and development take place?
Admiral Giambastiani. Our current transformation efforts are funded
under three program elements: joint concept development and
experimentation is under PE 0603727N; our Joint C\4\ISR Battle Center
and Joint Integration and Interoperability transformation efforts are
under PE 0305188N; and our joint combat identification efforts are
under 0603857N. Future efforts under our Joint National Training
Capability will be under proposed (not yet validated) PE 0804758N.
Admiral Cebrowski. This is done in many places--the Office of Force
Transformation, the War Colleges, as well as governmental and
commercial think tanks, to name a few.

59. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Giambastiani and Admiral
Cebrowski, how will new ``decision rules and metrics'' be used for
training, experimentation, operational rehearsals, requirements
determination and validation, or acquisition?
Admiral Giambastiani. New decision rules and metrics will reflect
an evolving joint culture across the continuum of our assigned
responsibilities. The general policy established by the Office of Force
Transformation will be translated into the specific rules and metrics
needed to measure performance under the conditions and standards
established for each Joint Forces Command event, whether it's a
training event for joint tactical actions within our Joint National
Training Capability, an experimentation event within our prototyping
pathway, or validation of interoperability within our Joint Integration
and Interoperability cell. For example, a policy-level decision rule
that values increased collaborative planning across all components and
echelons of command impacts the metrics used in all the areas
highlighted in your question: training, experimentation, rehearsals,
requirements determination, and acquisition. It is also reflected in
all our Command's efforts from refining the Collaborative Information
Environment for our Standing Joint Force Headquarters, through training
we provide for all deploying Joint Task Forces; and establishment of
multi-level security capability for collaborative planning with
coalition partners to specific software packages fielded through our
Joint C\4\ISR Battle Center as interim solutions for today's
operational problems.
Admiral Cebrowski. With the dramatic change in warfare being
unleashed by the transition to the information age, future military
capabilities must be judged using new criteria. Pentagon leaders
require a different decision logic to understand which attributes of
future systems are rising in importance, which are falling, and what
overall mix of capabilities to pursue. Yet, the deeper, more profound
debate about changing military ``rule sets'' is about new sources of
power and how they are brought to bear.
In moving to the information age, the Nation is entering an era
where advantages are conferred on the small, the fast and the many.
These capabilities in turn will be paid for by the ponderous and the
massive. Size shrinks because of the ``demassification'' of warfare
that come about by substituting information for tonnage. The Air Force
says that a target once requiring 1,000 bombs to destroy now requires
only one. That magnitude of change is owed almost entirely to
information technology and processes. A second key metric is increased
speed, resulting not just from the decreased mass to be moved, but also
from organizations streamlined to benefit from their superior
information position. The result is a highly responsive, dispersed
force with lower costs per unit of combat power. That is, increased
combat power is vested in yet smaller units. One result of this is the
need for new joint organizations and processes in small units, which
were once considered the exclusive domain of the military services.
The military force must be rebalanced for future operations. The
information component of the force must increase. Our sensor and
networking capabilities must increase at the expense of more industrial
age measures of combat power. Even before Operation Enduring Freedom,
we were finding that we fight first for an information advantage and
maneuver for a superior sensor position. So, an early question that
must be posed regarding any weapon system is whether it is on the
``net.'' If not, then it is not contributing, not benefiting and not
part of the information age. Program managers across all of the
Services must understand that if they fail to achieve joint force
interoperability, they are nominating their programs for cancellation.
In this age of strategic uncertainty, risk is managed by increasing
the breadth of capabilities, no matter the imperfections, even at the
expense of highly effective capabilities bought in quantity. The real
issue is not how much is enough, but do we have the breath of
capabilities necessary to address strategic gaps. New concepts and
capabilities must be favored over quantitative increases in the old. Of
course, even these new capabilities must be prioritized, according to
the new strategic and technical context, and the broadening threat
base.
We must ask if a system is performing at increasing or decreasing
rates of return on investment. That is, is the increased capability
worth the cost? As a result of otherwise laudable Cold War efforts, we
now have programs to produce the ``ultimate'' fighter aircraft, the
``ultimate'' artillery piece, the ``ultimate'' surface combatant and
the ``ultimate'' of everything. Such systems must be candidates for
review because they invariably perform at decreasing returns, not
because these systems are not more efficient than their predecessors,
but because the altered strategic environment has devalued their very
existence. Potential enemies have also had time to prepare asymmetric
counters, and the cost and complexity of the increased capability
frequently outpaces its marginal value. The general rule is that ``the
new'' should perform better, at lower cost, than ``the old.''
Over time the validity or power of a particular type of capability
changes. For example, the reasons normally given for artillery organic
to the maneuver forces are low cost, high volume of fire and very short
response time for the tactical commanders' needs. These are powerful
arguments, but those advantages can now be equaled or exceeded with new
technologies and new military organizations. We have also learned that
reliance on airpower alone carries high risks. What is required is a
mix of capabilities. Programs must be conceived with that mix in mind.
Arguments for a system or capability without consideration of the
emerging joint character of warfare are not uncommon and indicate
additional areas for elimination.

[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2004

----------

MONDAY, MARCH 31, 2003

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM AND THE ROLE OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
LABORATORIES

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m, in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Pat
Roberts (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Roberts, Dole, Cornyn,
Kennedy, and Reed.
Majority staff members present: Carolyn M. Hanna,
professional staff member; Paula J. Philbin, professional staff
member; and Joseph T. Sixeas, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; and Arun A. Seraphin, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Leah C. Brewer, Andrew W.
Florell, and Sara R. Mareno.
Committee members' assistants present: James Beauchamp,
assistant to Senator Roberts; Christine Hill, assistant to
Senator Dole; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator
Cornyn; Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy;
Elizabeth King and Neil D. Campbell, assistants to Senator
Reed; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; and
Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAT ROBERTS, CHAIRMAN

Senator Roberts. The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities will come to order. A special good afternoon.
Thank you all for joining us today. This afternoon the
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities meets to
receive testimony from representatives of the Department of
Defense (DOD) on the Defense science and technology (S&T)
program and the role of Defense laboratories.
Before we begin, I would like to take a moment and extend
my sincere appreciation to the witnesses for their attendance
today. This hearing was rescheduled. We were in the midst of
what we call the vote-a-thon on the budget. I know you have
rearranged your schedules in order to accommodate the
subcommittee, so I truly appreciate your patience and
flexibility, and look forward to your testimony.
These are challenging times for our country. As we watch
events in Iraq unfold and the incredible technology being
deployed, it is apparent just how important and timely this
hearing is. The S&T program is a small slice of the Defense
budget, but it is critical to the success of our Armed Forces.
The investments the Department made decades ago are now paying
off tenfold as of today.
The Defense S&T program relies not only upon the wise
foresight of our leaders, but their faith that has been the
case throughout our history, and that is that the investments
made in intangible and almost unimaginable ideas often
transform into awesome technological advantages. As shepherds
of today's S&T budget, we thank our witnesses for their
foresight, their continued faith, and the innovation of this
country.
Although this hearing was postponed until today, we were
fortunate the other morning to get a first-hand view of the
technologies that the DOD is providing our Armed Forces. These
technologies, many of which are currently being deployed around
the world, not only enable our troops to be more lethal, more
informed, and more aware, but are being employed to combat
terrorism and also defend the homeland.
These technologies are the real game-changers, if I can use
that word, that our country depends upon. They are critical to
our assured success in both winning the war and also keeping
the peace.
This morning's hearing will address several issues
concerning the Defense S&T program. The hearing will provide
oversight for the fiscal year 2004 budget request for Defense
S&T, in particular the role of S&T in transformation, and how
it supports efforts to protect the homeland and combat
terrorism. The witnesses will testify about the challenges they
face transitioning technology out of the lab through the
acquisition process, and to the warfighter. Finally, the
hearing will address issues surrounding the defense labs, in
particular the challenges and initiatives impacting the defense
laboratories' workforce.
I look forward to hearing from each of the witnesses.
Please note that your full written testimony will be included
in the record. To allow plenty of time for questions and
answers, you may summarize your remarks. Again, thank you for
being with us this morning.
I would like to recognize the distinguished ranking member,
Senator Reed.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
also join you in thanking the witnesses for responding among
their busy schedules to this delayed and deferred hearing. I
appreciate that very much.
The subject of the hearing, DOD's S&T programs and the
defense laboratories, may be the furthest thing from our minds
as we watch current military operations all over the world, but
we need to remember that the superior military technology that
we depend upon to fulfill critical missions and protect our
service members grows from these very investments and from the
organizations that we will discuss today.
Every day, we are seeing how advanced technologies like
Global Positioning System (GPS)-guided munitions, unmanned
aerial vehicles, and night vision devices can be used with
great success. All of those systems grew out of defense
research programs and are being used as we speak in military
operations all around the world, but technological innovations
and the military capabilities that they enable only occur if we
faithfully invest relatively small but stable resources in S&T.
They only occur if we have the best technical minds in our labs
and tech centers working on ways to overcome the threats of
today and tomorrow, threats like chemical and biological
weapons, ballistic missiles, and cyber attacks.
I look forward to hearing our witnesses describe their
views on how well we are funding the innovations that will
produce tomorrow's military capabilities, and how well we are
supporting and growing our innovation centers, the defense
labs, and technical centers. In particular, I am anxious to
learn their plans for ensuring that we have the finest quality
workforce in our defense laboratories.
Secretary Rumsfeld, the Quadrennial Defense Review, the
Defense Science Board, and Congress have all endorsed the idea
of investing 3 percent of the defense budget in S&T programs. I
note with concern that this year's request does not achieve
that goal and is projected to fall to 2.4 percent of the budget
by 2009, and that is moving in the wrong direction.
In fact, the S&T request has been cut $1 billion from last
year's appropriated level. This includes reductions to many of
the programs that support the activities of the defense labs,
as well as fundamental research programs conducted by
universities and small high-tech businesses. I look forward to
learning how these budget decisions have been made.
I hope that in this hearing we can also discuss how we can
work together to create a funding process and entrepreneurial
environment that reward innovation and risk-taking among
program managers. This will help us transition the best
technology into the hands of our warfighters as quickly as is
possible.
Our earlier hearing on joint experimentation made it clear
that this transition step is key to transformation. I once
again welcome all of our distinguished witnesses to the
hearing, look forward to the discussion, and again, thank the
chairman.
Senator Roberts. Senator Dole, do you have any opening
comments?
Senator Dole. No, I do not.
Senator Roberts. Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. No, thank you.
Senator Roberts. Then we will move to our witnesses: Hon.
Michael W. Wynne, who is the Principal Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; followed
by General Paul Kern, who is the Commander of the Army Materiel
Command; and General Lester Lyles, of the U.S. Air Force, who
is the Commander of the Air Force Materiel Command; Vice
Admiral Joseph W. Dyer of the United States Navy. He is the
Commander of the Naval Air Systems Command.
Secretary Wynne, would you proceed?

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL W. WYNNE, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS

Secretary Wynne. Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, Senator
Kennedy, Senator Dole, and the members of the subcommittee, it
is my pleasure to be here, and thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today.
It is really a pleasure to have the opportunity to testify
about the S&T program of the Department of Defense, and express
our continued belief that S&T is the engine that will drive the
transformation of the Department. I would like to start with a
thank you to this subcommittee and Congress for your continued
support to the Department of Defense S&T program.
Continued support for S&T, complemented with our
acquisition policy changes, such as the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) part 12, offer stability and forward-planning
opportunity that provides vision and purpose to the
laboratories and the development activities within the
Department, the many colleges, universities, and small
technology houses that many times are the source of our
innovations. This is in addition to our current actions
regarding the 5,000 series to clear away some of the
bureaucratic cobwebs while getting at the fundamentals of good
process management.
The Department has and will be forwarding several
legislative proposals to Congress that seek to retain and
expand flexibility to deploy technology to acquisition programs
of record. For example, the Department has forwarded to
Congress two proposals on the use of other transaction
authority to extend the current authorities of the other
transactions past 2004, and to expand authorities of other
transactions to allow them to be used for existing systems as
well as new systems.
Reflecting back on President Bush's goal to move beyond
marginal improvements to replace existing programs with new
technologies and strategies, he made technology a cornerstone
of the plan to transform and modernize defense. We have taken
on a similar goal within the acquisition technology and
logistics community as one of the highlighted goals. That goal
is to initiate high-level technologies to create warfighting
capabilities, systems, and other strategies for the future.
How are we doing? Let me use this opportunity to review
recent accomplishments and have a look at the future direction
for S&T to provide part of the answer. The Department of
Defense request for S&T in fiscal year 2004 is $10.2 billion,
or 2.69 percent of the overall Department of Defense request.
This administration has increased the budget request for
S&T by nearly 25 percent in just 2 years. However, simply
adding money to S&T accounts will not by itself ensure
transformation, so in comparison to our plan we find that about
80 percent of all the S&T dollars are, in fact, aligned to
enhance capability in one of Secretary Rumsfeld's six critical
operational capabilities as outlined in the Quadrennial Defense
Review. The Services are also investing in other high-profile
transformational projects which I am sure you hear of
separately.
In addition, we have increased our investment in Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the defense agency
charged with conducting high-risk, high-payoff technologies, by
almost $1/2 billion a year. DARPA continues to support the
technologies that have historically been at the center of DOD's
capabilities, materials, microsystems, and informational
technology.
DARPA is the most agile of our components with respect to
changing program direction and entering into agreements with
each of the Services to develop cutting-edge technology and
demonstrations. DARPA is connected and critical to the
transformation road maps of each of the Services. DARPA has
focused on not only developing lab-type technologies, but on
transitioning them to either advanced concept technology
demonstrations (ACTD) or service S&T programs which are more
customer-, i.e., warfighter-focused.
Also, we have increased the investment in demonstrations,
primarily through the ACTDs by almost 50 percent over the past
2 years, from $150 million in fiscal year 2002 to over $213
million in fiscal year 2004, and invested in transformational
technology initiatives as well. One is the National Aerospace
Initiative and the Hypersonic Road Map, developed cooperatively
by DOD and National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), which provides long-term potential for affordable
access to space and a clear military advantage that is gained
from speed.
A second transformational technology thrust is energy and
power technologies. One of the present limiting factors to
military operations is a logistics tail that provides energy to
forces and systems. I want to highlight as well the support
this subcommittee has provided for hybrid electric vehicles,
which the National Automotive Center is using in conjunction
with the automotive and truck manufacturers to jump start a
potential path to manage energy consumption domestically, and
in our Army to truly reduce our logistics footprint in a
meaningful way. I strongly urge you to continue to support this
high-leverage area.
A third is surveillance and knowledge systems. This
initiative is fairly simple. It will develop the technology to
turn information into wisdom.
With regard to technology transition, I was pleased that
the Fiscal Year 2003 Authorization Act supported the Quick-
Reaction Special Projects (QSRP). The objectives for a QSRP is
the speed of rapid technology development. Three programs
structured under QSRP are complementary with the focus of
developing technology at different maturity levels. We seek
continued congressional support for this program, and seek your
help in ensuring there is sufficient flexibility in the program
to allow the Department of Defense to most effectively be able
to move fast to meet the needs of the warfighter.
The decline in scientists and engineers becomes more acute
when considering the production by academia of scientists and
engineers who are American citizens. Simply, one can argue the
U.S. national security advantage over the past half-century was
fueled by the production of science and engineering talent.
America has had the intellectual capital advantage.
At the broader strategic level, the Department is becoming
concerned with the overall production of scientists and
engineers available to work on national security issues. Over
the past decade, the total number of Ph.D-level scientists and
engineers produced by U.S. universities has, in fact, declined.
Recently, I participated in an inaugural workshop using
laboratory scientists and science modules created by
Northwestern University to bring to our Nation's high schools
and colleges more interesting content which will attract young
science and engineering talent.
For several years now, the Department of Defense has been
actively testing many management flexibilities, to wit, pay
banding, pay for performance, and simplified classifications.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense incorporated these best
practices into a legislative proposal for creation of the
National Security Personnel System for Department of Defense
civilians. It adopts many of the features from successful
acquisition demonstration projects and has carefully preserved
the best practices from each of the lab demonstrations dating
back to the China Lake demonstration, all key to attracting and
sustaining an agile civilian force, which is vital to the total
force readiness, not to mention attracting imaginative
laboratory scientists.
Again, I want to thank the subcommittee on behalf of all of
us who serve for your interest in and support of the state of
S&T in defense. I am prepared to answer your questions. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Wynne follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. Michael Wynne

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today. It is a pleasure to have the
opportunity to testify about the S&T program of the Department of
Defense, and express our belief that S&T is the engine that will drive
the transformation of the Department. I'd like to start with a thank
you to this subcommittee, the full committee, and Congress for your
continued support to the Department of Defense S&T program. Your
continued push for a flexible approach to providing operators access to
technology has been met with a corresponding change to the acquisition
policies and regulations to begin to bring about rapid technology
insertion throughout the DOD. Continued support for S&T complemented
acquisition policy changes such as FAR part 12 and our current actions
to revise the 5000 series documents to clear away some of the
bureaucratic cobwebs, while getting at the fundamentals of good process
management. I'd further ask that your support be continued, as it
offers aspects of stability and forward planning that provides vision
and purpose to the laboratories, and development activities within the
Department and the many colleges, universities, and small technology
houses that many times are the source of our innovations. The
Department has forwarded several legislative proposals to Congress that
seek to retain and expand flexibility to deploy technology to
acquisition programs. The Department has forwarded to Congress two
proposals on the use of ``Other Transaction Authority'' to extend the
current authorities of the other transactions past 2004 and to expand
authorities of other transactions to allow them to be used for existing
systems as well as the new systems. The continued use of other
transactions provides an effective mechanism for industry and
government to work together, and enhances technology transition
capability.
Reflecting back on President Bush's goal to ``move beyond marginal
improvements--to replace existing programs with new technologies and
strategies, he made technology a cornerstone in the plan to transform
and modernize defense. We have taken on a similar goal within the
acquisition, technology, and logistics community, as one of our
highlighted goals. That goal is to initiate high leverage technologies
to create the warfighting capabilities, systems and strategies of the
future.''
Well, how are we doing? Let me use this opportunity to review
recent accomplishments and have a look to the future direction for S&T
to provide part of the answer to this question.
I'll start with a look at the S&T program, and then cover the
technology transition areas. I'll address workforce concerns, and
discuss how we are accelerating technology to the warfighters. I'm
often asked if the war on terror has revised our focus, and I respond
that it has expanded our focus, as it added missions, but did not
relieve us of any other missions. Technology will allow us to confront
this expansion of mission in the most expeditious and effective manner.

S&T INVESTMENT

The DOD request for S&T in fiscal year 2004 is $10.232 billion, or
2.69 percent of the overall Department of Defense request. The fiscal
year 2004 President's budget request is a very good budget request for
S&T. First, the budget request achieved greater than 0 percent real
growth for S&T, even compared to the combined fiscal year 2003
President's Budget Request and Disaster Emergency Relief Fund. Perhaps
more significant is the overall growth in S&T investment that has
occurred under the current administration. This administration
inherited a legacy budget request of $7.8 billion in fiscal year 2002.
This administration has increased the budget request for S&T by nearly
25 percent in just 2 years. However, simply adding money to the S&T
accounts will not, by itself, ensure transformation.

S&T AND TRANSFORMATION

In addition to increasing the overall budget request for S&T, we
have focused the budget request on several important technologies that
should enhance transformation and deliver superior military
capabilities for years in the future. About 80 percent of all S&T
dollars are aligned to enhance capability in one of Secretary
Rumsfeld's six critical operational capabilities as outlined in the
Quadrennial Defense Review. The six critical operational capabilities
define the cornerstone of Secretary Rumsfeld's transformation, and are:
protect bases of operations; deny enemy sanctuary; project and sustain
U.S. forces; enhance space operations; assure information operations;
and leverage information technologies. Additionally, under the able
guidance of the Honorable Ronald Sega, Director of Defense Research and
Engineering (DDR&E), three broad, new cross cutting initiatives could
accelerate the development of critical transformational technologies in
areas that the DOD needs to address. The three areas are: the National
Aerospace Initiative; Energy and Power Technologies, and Surveillance
and Knowledge Systems.
The Services are also investing in other high profile
transformational projects. Among the major highlights are the Army
Future Combat System, which is an example of combat and support
vehicles and unmanned air and ground systems which will work together
as an integrated system-of-system, and Objective Force Warrior, which
will decrease the equipment weight of the deployed infantry soldier
from around 100 pounds to 40 pounds. The Air Force is developing
enhanced precision weapons and directed energy weapons that will
provide a battlefield option to deal with a threat with graduated
effects. The Navy is moving rapidly to an electric force, with
propulsion and electric weapons. Taken all together, the fiscal year
2004 President's budget request for S&T represents a budget that
continues to develop the technologies the U.S. military will need to
remain viable well into the 21st century.
In addition, we have increased our investment in Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the defense agency charged with
conducting high-risk, high-payoff technologies, by almost a half
billion dollars a year. This additional DARPA investment is largely
allocated to space technology, but in total, DARPA emphasizes research
in eight strategic thrust areas. These eight areas are:
counterterrorism; assured use of space; networked manned and unmanned
systems; robust, self-forming networks; detect, identify, track, and
destroy elusive surface targets, characterization of underground
structures; bio-revolution; and cognitive computing. DARPA also
continues to support the technologies that have historically been at
the center of DOD's capabilities: materials, microsystems, and
information technology. I would like to highlight a couple of DARPA
projects to give a feel of how DARPA's investment is supporting
transformation of the department. The Organic Air Vehicle (OAV)
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is a small, man-portable UAV that can fly
and hover in a battlefield. The UAV looks very much like a sombrero--
and uses a large horizontal fan for moving and hovering. The UAV has
been tested in 9, 15, and 21 inch version--and each can carry different
payloads--from on-board camera to chemical or bio agent detector. This
``system'' is being developed as a component of the Army's Future
Combat System--which is the acquisition program to transform the Army.
Another DARPA technology that is worth mentioning is the orbital
express space demonstration--which is a demonstration of on-orbit
refueling capability for space systems. The orbital express could usher
in a new era in space, whereby the U.S. uses primarily refuelable,
small satellites to provide a more robust, enduring capability. While I
only mention two DARPA programs, there are many, many more truly
transformational technologies under development at DARPA. Additionally,
DARPA is connected to the Services through several specific
transformational projects--as will be described in the portion that
covers technology transition.
In addition, we have increased the investment in demonstrations,
primarily through Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) by
almost 50 percent over the past 2 years, from $150 million in fiscal
year 2002 to over $213 million in fiscal year 2004. The ACTD program
was instrumental in developing and demonstrating the utility of UAVs
such as the Global Hawk and Predator. The ACTD program harvests the
technology developed in the Defense laboratories and industry, and
integrates these technologies into demonstrations that provide a
glimpse into the future. While there are over 70 ACTD projects
currently underway, I would like to highlight a few. The Homeland
Security ACTD provides a detachable command center to focus responders
in the case of a terrorist or natural disaster. In effect, it brings
the power of the traditional military command post to bear for homeland
security. We all know it is expensive to launch and operate some
reconnaissance satellites. The High-Altitude Airship ACTD will
integrate technologies to determine if the military can also use
survivable very high altitude dirigibles to conduct many reconnaissance
missions. The Active Denial Technology ACTD is demonstrating the
ability of high power microwave systems to potentially control crowds--
in effect, giving the military commander a non-lethal option to protect
an area. I only highlight these three--but suffice it to say we could
hold a hearing on the ACTD program alone. We have increased also our
investment in experimentation, primarily joint experimentation, and are
executing the investment through Joint Forces Command. This new
investment lets the Department conduct large scale ``experiments'' or
war games to effectively ``try technology before it is bought.''
I would like to take a moment to discuss the joint transformational
technologies initiatives. The first is the National Aerospace
Initiative (NAI). The complete initiative consists of hypersonic flight
technology, affordable space launch, and enhanced on-orbit space
technologies. In the fiscal year 2004 budget request, the Department
focused the increased investment into hypersonic technology, investing
over $150 million additional investment in hypersonics. We seek
congressional support for the fiscal year 2004 budget request for
hypersonic technology. We seek this because hypersonic technology could
be truly transformative, in that, when developed, hypersonics provides
the opportunity to conduct tactical strikes from a strategic distance.
The NAI is the right initiative for America as we celebrate the first
century of manned flight. Technology has progressed to the point where
we believe that demonstrations to Mach 12 by 2012 are within reach.
This would more than double any currently demonstrated system. The
development of hypersonic technology could diminish vulnerability of
existing systems, while potentially providing a true capability to
strike so quickly that we could effectively deny enemy sanctuary
anywhere in the world. Additionally, the hypersonic roadmap, developed
cooperatively by DOD and NASA provides long term potential for
affordable access to space. In short, the NAI is one of those
technology opportunities that has the potential to capture American
interest in technology, much like the race to the moon in the 1960s.
A second transformational technology thrust is Energy and Power
Technologies. One of the present limiting factors to military
operations is the logistics tail to provide energy to forces and
systems. The energy and power technologies thrust involves a
coordinated investment by all three Services and DARPA to generate,
store, and use power in systems ranging from microsystems to future
generation electric ships. This initiative is investing in technology
that could develop batteries with over five times the energy density,
fuel cells that are reliable and safe to use in the battlefield;
capacitors that will decrease size needed to store electricity on ships
by a factor of 5-10. In short, this thrust could also truly transform
the military.
The final cross cutting initiative is surveillance and knowledge
systems. This initiative is fairly simple--it will develop the
technologies to turn information into wisdom. Consequently, this
initiative will seek to develop low cost sensors with various
capabilities (such as optical, IR, acoustic, magnetic, and so forth),
connect these information sources to tactical networks, route the data
from tactical to strategic level, and finally, the initiative will
develop technologies that can assist the decision-maker. The initiative
could begin to make the vision of network centric warfare a reality.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION

In October 2002, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz rescinded
several defense acquisition directives and regulations--in effect
throwing approximately 250 pages of bureaucracy out the window. He
directed the Department to revise the 5000 series documents to create
``an acquisition policy environment that fosters efficiency,
flexibility, creativity, and innovation.'' In rescinding the
regulations, Secretary Wolfowitz proposes to replace the 250 pages of
directives with only 40 pages of interim policy and guidance. These 40
pages contain the fundamental elements of acquisition, as it were. Most
significantly here, these 40 pages contain numerous references to the
need to accelerate technology transition or insertion. The Secretary
reaffirmed a streamlined acquisition process built around spiral and
evolutionary acquisition. The key element of spiral acquisition is a
process that allows the Department of Defense to field ever increasing
capabilities brought about by enhanced technology without having to
initiate a new acquisition program. This is a capabilities-based
approach, and is consistent with Secretary Rumsfeld's mandate to
transform the DOD capabilities. The reason I begin the discussion of
what the Department has specifically done to enhance technology
transition is to stress that at the largest scale, the processes are
being revamped and instituted that could allow much more effective
technology transition. This is a cultural change, and will take time
and leadership. This administration is committed to effecting such a
cultural change.
Following the streamlining of the overall DOD acquisition process,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense has taken several additional
steps in the past year to enhance technology transition. At the
organizational level, the Department has brought both technology
transition programs and policy oversight under the Director, Defense
Research and Engineering, who has consolidated the functions under Ms.
Sue Payton, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Advanced Systems
and Concepts. This office executes both the Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration, a program that uses demonstrations to allow the
Department to ``try before buying'' technology and the Foreign
Comparative Test program which overcomes the ``not invented here''
syndrome that occurs. Demonstrations are a cornerstone to spiral or
evolutionary acquisition, and ACTDs are the flagship demonstration
program. As stated previously, ACTD's assemble mature technologies from
the science and technology base and accelerate the flow of technology
to the operator.
Another key step to enhancing technology transition is having a
means to provide incentives to any program that has to accept the new
technology. Changes to programs of record carry risk. Yet the budget
process can be slower than the technology process. By use of
incentives, the Department can reward risk. In Secretary Rumsfeld's
budget hearing this year, he demonstrated that time lag between when
funding is allocated to a capability in the budget process and when the
first dollar is spent is 18-24 months. This in a world where ``Moore's
Law'' states computer capability doubles every 18 months. To break this
cycle, the Department is testing three pilot projects contained in the
``Quick Reaction Special Project'' program. I was pleased that the
fiscal year 2003 Authorization Act supported the Quick Reaction Special
Projects (QRSP). The objective for QRSP is the speed of rapid
technology development. Three programs structured under QRSP are
complementary with the focus of developing technology at different
maturity levels. These three programs are the Defense Acquisition
Challenge Program, the Technology Transition Program, and the Quick
Reaction Fund. All three require vetting by the acquisition,
technology, and warfighting community, but can fund a specific
technology within the execution year. The Quick Reaction Fund,
initiated in fiscal year 2003, is already developing technology that
could be used in current operations and is modeled after the success of
the fiscal year 2002 Quick Reaction Munitions Fund. We believe the
potential payoff from the Quick Reaction Special Program is very
large--and have consequently added $50 million more in the fiscal year
2004 budget request compared to fiscal year 2003. We seek continued
congressional support in the program, and seek your help in ensuring
there is sufficient flexibility in the program to allow the DOD to most
effectively be able to move fast to meet the needs of the Department.
We request the program not be further divided or earmarked, so we can
have the freedom to manage to effect change for the Department and
America.
Why do we seek flexibility? In the fiscal year 2002 appropriations
bill for the Defense Emergency Relief Fund, Congress identified $15
million for the Quick Reaction Munitions Fund. Two successful projects
resulted from the funding. The first was the Thermobaric Hellfire
Enhanced Capability that increased blast lethality in multi-room
structures of the hellfire missile. Within 1 year, the project went
from chemistry to the field at a cost of $12 million. The Low-Cost
Guided Imaging Rocket (LOGIR) was the second project that is enhancing
the accuracy of the unguided 2.75,, ``hydra'' rocket used in close air-
to-ground operations. The type of outcome we achieved from the Quick
Reactions Munitions Fund should occur through use of the Quick Reaction
Special Projects--and should effect technology transition.
Another key facet to enhancing technology transition has also come
to fruition in the past year. Effective technology transition occurs
when the three or four communities involved in developing and
transitioning technology must be in close contact throughout the
process. The communities are the technology, acquisition, operational,
and the logistics community. Effectively, the program manager,
technologist, the end user, and logistician must come together to
provide the best possible supportable technology at the right maturity.
In effect, the acquisition and operations risk is reduced and
technology enhanced.

DARPA'S ROLE WITH THE SERVICES

One concern I have heard since coming to the Department is most
interesting--that concern is that DARPA is disconnected from the rest
of the Department of Defense and supporting acquisition programs.
Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, this administration
has put more money into DARPA because we are trying to change the
technologies being developed within the Department, and DARPA is the
most agile of our components with respect to changing program
direction. But, DARPA has used this agility and entered into agreements
with each of the Services to develop cutting edge technology and
demonstrations. For instance, DARPA and the Army are linked, through
formal agreement, to enable the development of the Army of the future
with networked tactical equipment and vehicles, the Future Combat
System. Additionally, DARPA and the Navy are joined, through
memorandum, to develop the Hy-Fly missile--a supersonic demonstrator
that is on the glide path to be an early NAI hypersonic demonstrator.
Finally, there is the Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV)--a system
demonstration in conjunction with the Air Force. Each of these three
systems--NAI, UCAV, and Hy-fly are at the nexus of critical
capabilities needed by the Services--and a large programmatic change,
so DARPA's agility was instrumental in meeting the need. Instead of the
limited criticism that DARPA is not connected to the Services, I would
turn it around and say DARPA is connected, and critical, to the
transformation road maps of the Services. DARPA is in fact more
critical and connected than ever.

NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH LABORATORIES AND CIVILIAN WORKFORCE

The decline in scientists and engineers becomes more acute when
considering the production by academia of scientists and engineers who
are American citizens. Simply, one can argue the U.S. national security
advantage over the past half century was fueled by the production of
scientists and engineers--America has had the intellectual capital
advantage. There are signs that America's advantage is eroding. It
really does not matter how many of the scientists and engineers
ultimately go to work for the Department of Defense--what matters is
how large is the pool of quality scientists and engineers to select
from. One could argue that the national defense engine of the end of
the 20th century was in part fueled by the increase in scientists and
engineers produced in the U.S. after the launch of Sputnik and the Cold
War. There was an excitement about science that resulted in an ample
supply of scientists and engineers that would work on national security
issues. The United States was able to produce stealth, the global
positioning system, night vision devices, and precision weapons by this
pool of scientists and engineers. The Department of Defense pioneered
the development of the internet through the ``ARPANET''. The large
capacity of scientists produced the capabilities leading to the
superior military capabilities today. We believe it is time to rekindle
the excitement of science and engineering as a national asset.
The Department of Defense has initiated several small programs in
the fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 budget that we hope will
begin the rekindling of imagination. Operational Joint Precision
Educational Strike is a focused pilot initiative sponsored by Dr. John
Hopps, the Deputy Under Secretary for Laboratories and Basic Science,
to increase the interest in high school students in science and
engineering; to reduce the number of college freshmen who leave the
sciences in their freshman or sophomore year; and to increase the
graduate fellowships in science and engineering. The Department has
adopted the Northwestern University's Materials World Module pilot to
develop interesting, challenging modules to capture middle and high
school student's imagination. We are expanding upon the module by
extending the opportunity of middle and high school teachers to train
and intern at DOD laboratories. The kickoff for this effort will occur
at the end of this month at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey.
These initiatives supplement the ongoing Department of Defense
Basic Research program. The fiscal year 2004 President's Budget Request
for Basic Research is $1.3 billion, of which over 50 percent goes
directly to universities. We estimate that every $1 million of
university research supports between 10-15 graduate students, who work
in areas of interest to the Department. Clearly, the DOD is putting
pieces into place to attempt to generate more scientists and engineers.
At the broader strategic level, the Department is becoming
concerned with the overall production of scientists and engineers
available to work on national security issues. This challenge facing
America is greater than an issue just for the Department of Defense. In
December 2002, the National Science Foundation issued a report called
``Science and Engineering Doctorate Awards 2001.'' This report provides
the overall production of scientists and engineers in U.S.
universities. Over the past decade, the total number of Ph.D.-level
scientist and engineers produced by U.S. universities has declined.

COMBATING TERRORISM

Within a week of the terrible attacks of September 11, the
Department had established the ``DOD Combating Terrorism Technology
Task Force''. This task force is still ongoing, and meets as needed to
address specific technology opportunities and or needs. The task force
is comprised of executive level technology members from all DOD
components, flag-level officers from the Joint Staff and selected
Combatant Commanders, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department
of Energy, and now the Department of Homeland Security.
Phase I lasted roughly from September 2001 through winter 2002.
This phase resulted in such capabilities as the GBU-118 ``Thermobaric
Bomb,'' a backscatter gamma ray system to inspect cargo without going
into the container; a small chemical detector, called the nuclear
quadripole resonance system, that can detect small quantities of
explosives remotely. We also used the task force to commission a rapid
study to determine radiation levels needed to kill anthrax spores--
knowledge that helped the Government have an option for dealing with
the anthrax scare of late 2001.
What is significant about phase I of the task force is not the
specific technologies--but the fact that when the Department needed new
capabilities, the continued investment in technology development over
the past decades had put technologies ``in the cupboard'' when needed.
I think this is a very important point for technology and
transformation. Good technology development is largely achieved through
long-term, stable investment in technologies. Not every technology
needs to be transitioned immediately. The technologies can be developed
and stored in a near ready state until needed. But without the
continued stable long-term investment, the ``cupboard could be bare.''
The fiscal year 2004 President's budget does focus on transformation
technologies. But it also maintains long-term technology based
investment in such capability areas as materials and nanotechnology,
electronics, sensors, and so forth. The balance has been, and remains,
important.
The task force met only periodically throughout the spring and
early summer of 2002--but began to accelerate again when the national
focus expanded to weapons of mass destruction. During phase II of the
DOD Combating Terrorism Task Force, the focus has been on technologies
to detect and neutralize chemical and biological agents. The task force
has worked primarily with both the Central Command and Special
Operations Command. Specific details are still classified, but may be
provided in an appropriate forum.

CONCLUSION

In closing, the S&T program and the objective of Secretary Rumsfeld
to provide transformational capabilities to the DOD are absolutely
intertwined. I am pleased to be able to detail just a few successes of
the DOD S&T program. But, throughout the technology program of the
Department, and the priorities of the DDR&E, a theme emerges I believe
the successes being built by the DOD in technology, technology
transition and transformation are very significant, and I appreciate
the opportunity to come before you today to tell you about them. Thank
you.

Senator Roberts. We thank you.
General Kern.

STATEMENT OF GEN. PAUL J. KERN, USA, COMMANDER, ARMY MATERIEL
COMMAND

General Kern. Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, members of the
subcommittee, thank you for permitting me to testify today
before your subcommittee on the investments you have made and
will continue to make in our S&T. They are truly paying off for
us today.
If you will permit me, Senator Reed, I have a picture which
I will leave with you from Specialist Ashline which was taken
at our demonstration here, where we have demonstrated the
protective gear which he was wearing, which you and this
subcommittee have helped develop, in fact, saved his life in
Afghanistan. It is emblematic of the work that science can do
in supporting our soldiers.
Army transformation has many parts to it today, and the S&T
is working in collaboration with academia, industry, and with
the other service laboratories and with DARPA. Our priority is
getting technology to our soldiers faster. We have a series of
university-affiliated research centers, which began with a
University of Texas in Austin center, and we have then
continued with the University of Southern California in
establishing a center focused on bringing the best of training
technology through what capability universities and
entertainment can bring. That is paying dividends today, as we
learn how to train in more realistic environments.
We will open early in May a third center, a university-
affiliated research center with the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) in the nanosciences, a new area which we are
beginning to explore. I met at lunch today with Dr. Covington,
who is running that facility for us, and have some very
exciting ideas of what nanosciences can bring to the Army to
reduce the weight and burden on our individual soldiers. We
have one other, which we will award this year, in the
bioengineering area to complete a center of excellence in the
new areas as well as the more fundamental areas of training and
ballistics.
I would like to focus on three areas: transformation
infrastructure, people, and organizations. In transformation,
we are focusing on new threats. We are looking at the agility,
sustainability, reliability, lethality, survivability, and
maintainability necessary for the future. A critical piece of
this is the development of the future combat system. We will go
to a review with the Office of the Secretary of Defense in May
for the next steps in that. Today, 98 percent of our S&T is
focused on the Objective Force, including the Future Combat
Systems (FCS). The priority of that work is going to our
laboratories.
We are seeing successes in some of our new initiatives,
soldier systems of protection, chemical and biological
detection and defense, reducing our footprint for logistics,
sensor technologies, unmanned ground vehicles and unmanned
aerial vehicles. An example of the ground vehicle is a PacBot,
a project which was started with DARPA and which we have taken
into the caves of Afghanistan, where robotics systems are now
going down into the caves, as opposed to soldiers having to go
in harm's way.
In medical technologies, we are looking at current
operations as well as our objective force to improve our
ability to respond in that first magical hour to save soldiers'
lives.
We have begun a revitalization of the Army laboratories in
1999, and we are increasing our support to the program
executive officers and program managers. That was an area that
you wanted to explore further on how rapidly we could
transition to our program offices through the acquisition
process. We have world-class laboratories in sensors; robotics;
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) that combination of
C\4\ISR which is providing us vital battlefield information.
We are concerned about the people. The Engineering and
Science Career Development Program has a great deal of focus
for us on revitalizing our workforce. We have increased our
hiring by 1,100 people between 1999 and 2002, and we have an
increase in Ph.D and masters' degree holders. Recruitment and
retention continues, however, to be a major focus on what we
must do to keep our S&T alive.
We are also looking at outreach programs at the
historically black colleges and universities (HBCU) and with
our high-performance computing centers. We have started a
program for seventh- and eighth-graders called E-Cyber Mission
to reach out to young children to bring them into the area of
S&T, and this year we have developed a Research, Development,
and Engineering Command to integrate all of our S&T, not by
commodity or specific areas, but across all of the sciences,
much as our universities are today. Major General John
Doesburg, who is joining me here, is the transition director
for that and bringing those areas into fruition.
I would be remiss if I did not mention some critical people
that we have. Army scientist, Richard Fong, who has been with
us for many years at Picatinny Arsenal is absolutely the
world's greatest scientist in warhead technology. He knows how
to make our systems smaller and lighter for all of our
Services.
Dr. Melissa Holland, an engineer psychologist who has
developed the Falcon language translator, has taken the work
that was done previously in DARPA and again put it into
commercial off-the-shelf components and we are using it today
in Bosnia and Afghanistan.
Chuck Vessels, an engineer at our Army Missile and Research
Development Center, which has helped to develop the warhead in
use by both the force and the Army on our Hellfire missiles,
and done that very quickly and very effectively.
It has been a very ambitious journey this past year. It
will be even more ambitious in the future, as we bring on the
S&T needed for the future combat systems and leading to the
Objective Force.
I look forward to your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Kern follows:]

Prepared Statement by Gen. Paul J. Kern, USA

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Army's laboratories and
S&T efforts. I want to thank the members of this subcommittee for your
valuable role in making our Army the preeminent land combat force in
the world. Your support of our Transformation goals has been vital to
our progress. We welcome your continued advice and support.
Army Transformation is multi-faceted. Comprising many of those
facets are the numerous S&T efforts being pursued across our Army, in
collaboration with academia and industry. Those efforts do not stop at
our shores. We are working closely with our allies on projects for
mutual benefit. From sensors to simulators, from bullets to batteries,
from ammo to armor, Army Transformation is being accelerated through
integrated efforts, creating invaluable synergy to ensure we provide
our Nation a dominant land force capability as well as support our
homeland defense.
Out of the lab and into the hands of our soldiers is the number one
priority of our S&T work. Faster is better. We are reaching out and
connecting with experts in fields that a few years ago might not have
been associated with the United States Army. For example, we approached
Hollywood, the game and entertainment industry a few years ago, to
create a center where simulation would really be ``outside the box.''
Another great example is the Institute for Soldier Nanotechnology at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where we are researching a
wide range of possibilities, from climate control clothing to
biomedical monitoring.
It would take several books to cover all we are doing in S&T and
expect to do in the future. Therefore, it becomes practical to focus on
three areas for discussion at this time--Efforts, Infrastructure, and
People. First, we will define some of the critical efforts that are key
to Army Transformation--to the Objective Force, and within that, the
Future Combat System (FCS). Second, we will lay out the extraordinary
capabilities that reside in our S&T infrastructure, which includes our
in-house laboratories and our research, development, and engineering
centers. The third area that significantly impacts all areas is the
people arena, as well as how we organize our people.

EFFORTS SUPPORTING ARMY TRANSFORMATION

The Army is fundamentally changing the way we fight and is creating
a force that is more responsive to the strategic requirements facing
our Nation. We are building a joint precision maneuver capability that
can enter a theater at the time and place of our choosing, maneuver at
will to gain positional advantage, deliver precise joint fires and, if
necessary, to close with and destroy the enemy.
The Objective Force is an army designed from the bottom up around a
single, networked, integrated command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR)
architecture that will enable us to link with joint, interagency, and
multi-national forces. It will be a rapidly deployable, mounted
formation, seamlessly integrated into the joint force and capable of
delivering decisive victory across the broad spectrum of military
operations.
The Objective Force will leverage and deliver with precision the
combat power of joint and strategic assets. It is a capabilities-based
force that rapidly responds to the requirements of the strategic
environment, no matter what the mission, the threats, or the risks. The
Objective Force will be responsive, deployable, agile, versatile,
lethal, survivable, and sustainable.
A critical piece of the Objective Force is the FCS which is on
track to be fielded by the end of this decade. There will be a
Milestone B decision in May 2003. FCS is being developed in partnership
with the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency (DARPA). In addition,
the Army has selected and employed an industry team to serve in the
role of Lead System Integrator (LSI), which will ensure that all the
best and most innovative sources of technology are leveraged and
exploited. The FCS is a synergistic mix of manned and unmanned systems
being developed and fielded as a complete family to achieve the
warfighting capabilities the Nation requires to defeat adaptive,
asymmetric, conventional, and unconventional adversaries.
The Army is placing similar emphasis on the soldier of the
Objective Force. The Objective Force Warrior program is the Army's
flagship S&T soldier system effort led by the Army Material Command
(AMC) to provide revolutionary improvements in warfighting capabilities
for the soldier and small team. The program takes advantage of ongoing
Army S&T integrated with the technological expertise of the private
sector to provide our soldiers with overwhelming advantages, both with
respect to soldier safety and survivability as well as lethality
capability.
S&T is the enabler of the Objective Force. The S&T community inside
the Army consists of laboratories belonging to AMC, the Medical
Research and Material Command, the Corps of Engineers, and the Space
and Missile Defense Command. The total Army S&T funding for fiscal year
2004 is over $1.8 billion, of which 98 percent is focused on the
Objective Force, including FCS. The work of Army laboratories is highly
leveraged with activities in industry, academia, other government
agencies, and foreign countries. The scope of efforts spans the
spectrum from vehicle platforms and munitions to drinking water and
food.
Priorities in the Army labs in support of the Objective Force
include protection of the soldier; reduction of the logistics
footprint; improvements in network centric command, control and
communications; development of unmanned capabilities; and increasing
the lethality and survivability of the overall force. In addition to
support to the Objective Force, the Army S&T community has contributed
significantly to Homeland Defense initiatives.
Soldier protection is always a major concern. Efforts in improved
body armor, lightweight vehicle armor, active protection systems, and
signature management ensure that soldiers are hard to find and even
harder to defeat. A significant transition success story is the
Interceptor Body Armor and Small Arms Protective Insert developed by
the Natick Soldier Center (NSC) for the U.S. Marine Corps and leveraged
by the Army. Through advancement of new, lightweight ceramic composite
materials, the NSC was successful in achieving a 13-percent weight
reduction in the ballistic vest and over a 40-percent weight reduction
in the ballistic insert, without performance degradation and while
addressing a new blunt trauma requirement. NSC also successfully
executed a Manufacturing Technology Program that evaluated the
different ballistic plate materials and manufacturing processes. The
end result is a technology that is not only mass producible, but
reduces the cost by 25 percent. Another recent transfer from S&T was a
crack arrestor technology that improves the multiple hit capability of
the ceramic composites used in SAPI. Undoubtedly the most meaningful
result is the soldiers' lives saved by this technology advancement. As
the Honorable Pete Aldridge, USDAT&L, noted, ``Every bullet deflected
by advanced body armor, represents a visit not paid to a spouse or
parent by a military chaplain.''
The Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC) is well known for
its contributions to CB agent detection equipment, such as the Joint
Biological Point Detection System, which is currently in its third
generation in 10 years. Each new version has been smaller, lighter,
more durable and more capable--in a word, better. ECBC is now hard at
work on the fourth generation of this biotechnology application.
Recently, ECBC design and technology development supported full-scale
development transition of the Joint Service General Purpose Mask
(JSGPM) program. The JSGPM satisfies all joint service chemical/
biological mask field and combat vehicle applications for the next
generation soldier and is significantly influencing future civilian
respiratory protection systems.
Transformation in logistics requires a reduction in the logistical
footprint. A fighting force expends large amounts of materiel, from
food to ammunition to batteries. All of this needs to be brought into
theater and maintained if the force is to be effective. The S&T
community continues to invest in smaller, more reliable ammunition and
armament, more nutritious and long lasting foods, and more efficient
energy sources. There are several efforts underway to reduce the amount
of water that needs to be transported. Current efforts include recovery
of usable water from vehicle exhaust and finding efficient ways of
drawing water from the atmosphere, even in desert climates.
See First, Understand First, Finish Decisively! Sensor technology
and information fusion is critical to situational understanding. Modern
warfare depends highly on accurate timely transfer of information to
the warfighter. The highly mobile, lighter force envisioned in the Army
Transformation will depend on this ability more than ever. Investments
in self-healing networks, remote and robotic sensors, data fusion
techniques, and leader development help ensure that up-to-date
information is always available and decisions can be made quickly and
accurately. Many of the technologies developed by the Communications
Electronics Research Development and Engineering Center to support the
Army's warfighting capabilities will, it is believed, be adapted for
homeland security needs. Sensors, including infrared, acoustic, and
radar--used singly or in combination--can provide intrusion detection
and perimeter security. Multi-spectral x-ray technology can facilitate
real time inspection of baggage and small crates at security
checkpoints. Hyper-spectral infrared imaging can detect chemical and
biological agents, while Armaments Research Development and Engineering
Center improved non-lethal munitions can increase security perimeters
by stopping threats at a greater range and incapacitating antagonists
if required. High value targets can be protected by layered defenses
incorporating acoustic cannons and hypersonic sound devices, while
smart audio and video surveillance systems can more effectively control
crowds and yield intelligence about hostile threats.
A recent major technical accomplishment is the integration of a
Hellfire laser-guided missile with an Air Force Predator UAV and its
improvements/modifications to give the Predator the capability not only
to identify targets of opportunity on the battlefield but also to
engage and destroy these targets in real-time. The Aviation and Missile
Research Development and Engineering Center (AMRDEC) quickly developed
critical technologies for the Hellfire MOD-K to meet an urgent
operational need to provide fragmentation lethality against a broad
range of targets. The primary urgency was related to Global Military
Operations involving the U.S. The MOD-K is an excellent example of
AMRDEC transitioning advanced technology to deployment in a very short
time at minimal cost. The MOD-K effort, including simulation, design,
fabrication, test, and deployment, provided a joint service capability
in less than 8 weeks. In addition, the RDEC supported urgent
requirements for deployed forces, designing, producing, and modifying
satellite communications (SATCOM) radios in country in support of OEF.
This included the design and test of Army aviation Blue Force Tracking
capabilities which supported the modification of 200 Army aviation
assets in Southwest Asia and the current designing and testing of
improvements for AH-64A/D instrument flight rules (IFR) capabilities
which will provide significant operational improvements. AMRDEC's
Prototype Integration Facility (PIF) is a Government Owned, Government
Operated (GOGO) facility/concept concentrated on meeting the rapid
response needs of Army, Department of Defense (DOD), and ultimately the
warfighter. Customers buy solutions, not technology; therefore, the
GOGO PIF concept focuses on assembling and integrating the necessary
Government and Industry expertise to render a true rapid response.
The Army Research Laboratory (ARL) has been working with DARPA for
over 5 years on the development of the PacBot robot. We have provided
two PacBot platforms (Hermes and Professor) and an infrared imager to
the forces in Afghanistan that was used in the caves and closed
environment. An improved platform with a fully articulated sensor head
under complete remote control of the operator is ready for troop
evaluation and may be available for the deployed troops.
The U.S. Army Tank Automotive Research Development and Engineering
Center (TARDEC), in partnership with industry and ARL, is currently
developing semi-autonomous and follower capability for unmanned ground
vehicles under its' Crew-integration and Automation Testbed (CAT) and
Robotic Follower programs. At the request of the FCS LSI, TARDEC
adapted their program to form the basis of the FCS program's Unmanned
Combat Demo (UCD). The CAT operates as a surrogate FCS Command and
Control Vehicle and the Robotic Follower together with ARL's
Experimental Unmanned Vehicle operates as two surrogate FCS Armed
Reconnaissance Vehicles (ARV). The goals were to demonstrate one to one
soldier to ARV robotic control, conduct a remote fire engagement, and
to generate much needed experimental data in support of the FCS
Milestone B decision. The UCD field experiments culminated with the
first ever successful remote firing from a ground robot under semi-
autonomous control. This effort went from first discussion to
successful field experimentation in less than 18 months and involved
multiple Army agencies and industry partners. We continue to do field
experimentation at Ft. Bliss to generate data in support of the FCS
Milestone B decision.
The Medical Research and Materiel Command (MRMC) is playing a key
role in inserting new medical technologies into both future acquisition
programs such as the Objective Force Warrior, and directly into
operational forces. Recent technology successes include:
Battlefield Medical Information System--Telemedicine (BMIS-T),
which captures longitudinal patient information (predeployment,
deployed, postdeployment) and epidemiological data. The system provides
first-responder and forward deployed and home-station physician access
to critical information, knowledge bases, and medical consultation that
will greatly improve the quality of medical data acquisition,
processing, and storage, regardless of the point of care. BMIS-T is
currently being deployed as part of the U.S. Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM) Health Surveillance System and is a component of the DOD
Theater Medical Information Program, as well as current Army medical
surveillance architecture (BMIS-T/Composite Health Care System II--
Theater).
Chitosan Dressing (CD) is expected to provide a marked improvement
in the ability of front-line medics to control severe life-threatening
external bleeding on the battlefield. Developed under Army contract,
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the CD on 4 November
2002 for temporary control of severely bleeding wounds. Research has
shown that the CD is also effective in reducing internal bleeding after
severe liver injury, and work is continuing to allow FDA approval for
internal use of the dressing. Through a combination of fiscal year 2002
and fiscal year 2003 funding, a total of 27,000 dressings are being
procured. Delivery of these dressings is under way, and production will
continue through the summer of 2003, with the initial dressings
designated for delivery to the USSOCOM and the remaining dressings to
be distributed in Army channels.
Combined Camouflage Face Paint is a U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency-approved blend of face paint with DEET insect repellent to
provide a minimum of 8 hours of protection against biting insects.
Inclusion of insect repellent protection will reduce nuisance factors
by repelling insects near the face and help reduce diseases, such as
malaria and dengue fever, transmitted by biting insects. DEET has been
previously used as a separate product, but caused existing face paint
formulations to run. Its integration into face paint is intended to
simultaneously improve ease of use and compliance, optimizing
protection.
In keeping with the Army's Executive Agent responsibilities for the
use of INDs (investgational new drugs) for force health protection,
USAMRMC has currently deployed two Special Medical Augmentation
Response Teams to the Middle East to oversee the operational use of IND
products. The IND products are not yet approved by the FDA for every
day use. These products must be administered by a physician under an
approved human use protocol and require consent forms. Regulatory
requirements warrant maintenance of complete and accurate records by
the principal investigator(s). IND products being used are a new
hemostatic dressing for medic use in the control of severe external
bleeding, and botulinum toxoid vaccine, human botulism immune globulin,
and botulinum antitoxin to prevent and treat illness caused by use of
botulinum toxin as a biological warfare agent. These teams will oversee
the use of the products, and provide training to field medical
personnel in their use, the collection of informed consent, and
required record keeping. The team devoted to botulinum toxin prevention
and treatment is also overseeing compliance with FDA requirements for
storage and transfer of products to ensure their effectiveness.
These technologies, as well as many others, will provide
capabilities which will be introduced into the Objective Force. This
Force, with the FCS as its centerpiece, will be a leap ahead for the
Army and its ability to defend the Nation.

INFRASTRUCTURE

The FCS program has had a significant impact in revitalizing Army
laboratories. Dr. Michael Andrews, the Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology--Research and Technology,
initiated this effort. Beginning in 1999, Dr. Andrews refocused,
reshaped, and reinforced Army S&T efforts to speed the development of
those critical technologies essential to transform the Army into the
Objective Force. Continued revitalization of the Army laboratories is
key to the success of this reshaping effort.
In-house laboratories provide the Army with a critical source of
objective expertise, corporate memory, niche-area technologies of
little interest outside the Army, an understanding of the user's
problems, and innovative technology breakthroughs. The Army laboratory
facilities are located throughout the world. Currently the Army has
seven major laboratories located within the United States. This
represents almost 8 million square feet of laboratory space. We also
maintain facilities in other parts of the world, such as Africa, to
study disease where it occurs. These facilities represent our ability
to develop technologies for tomorrow's weapons and our ability to
develop defensive technologies for the future.
The Army laboratories provide Subject Matter Experts in support of
the Army acquisition community throughout the entire system lifecycle
from concept exploration to disposal. Army laboratories provide
engineering support to the Program Executive Officers/Program Managers,
materiel managers, and other customers. Army laboratories played a
vital role in the development of the FCS requirement documents and
request for proposal to industry, and are active participants in the
source selection process.
Our Army laboratories have developed an in depth capability to
conduct research in a variety of specialized areas. Many are world
class. Most Army laboratories have a very strong modeling and
simulation capability within their facilities for virtual design,
development, and testing as part of our efforts to decrease the time
between laboratory research and fielding. For example, the Tank-
Automotive Research Development and Engineering Center (RDEC) operates
a 360-degree immersive collaborative virtual environment (CAVE) for
design, development, and testing of automotive systems. In conjunction
with the CAVE, the RDEC developed the Power Wall, a single screen 3-D,
one to one scale analysis tool. Both tools can be linked across
multiple sites and have generated interest from major contractors
associated with FCS. The Army Research Laboratory has the Zahl Physical
Sciences Laboratory. This laboratory contains a 6,400 square foot clean
room used for chip development and small-scale manufacturing as well as
facilities for nanotechnology, Infrared, and Wide Bandgap Technology
research. At the Engineering Research and Development Center (ERDC) in
Vicksburg, MS, the Army Corps of Engineers operates the Survey and
Global Positioning System Laboratory. This facility is used to develop
and test survey techniques and equipment for use in positioning and
navigation, and, in conjunction with other systems, for obtaining high-
accuracy terrain and navigation channel elevation data. The Army also
maintains one of its two DOD High Performance Computing Major Shared
Resource Centers at ERDC. This 55,000 square foot facility includes
multiple, state-of-the-art High Performance Computing Systems, which
provide some of the most powerful scientific and engineering computing
capability in DOD. The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for
Chemical Defense is the DOD lead laboratory for development of medical
countermeasures against chemical warfare agents and for training
personnel in the medical management of chemical casualties. The
institute's facilities support chemical casualty care training,
physiology, drug assessment, pathophysiology, pharmacology, analytical
chemistry, neurotoxicology, veterinary surgery, chemical safety/surety,
medical maintenance, information and resource management, logistics
support, and quality assurance. The Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases maintains containment laboratories that are a
unique national and international resource for the safe study of high-
hazard disease agents. This lab was instrumental in the recent anthrax
investigation.

PEOPLE AND ORGANIZATIONS

Army laboratories are staffed with some of our country's most
talented and dedicated civilian and military scientists and engineers.
The Engineering and Scientist Career Program is extremely important for
the Army because it establishes career development programs for its
many scientists and engineers that maintain the highest levels of
technical and managerial competency. The career development program
reflects current and future needs for education, training and
developmental assignments so that Army engineers and scientists bring
state-of-the-art skills and knowledge to their jobs. In large part,
because of the Army's focus on FCS and the Objective Force, and the
enabling laboratory personnel demonstration authority championed by
this subcommittee, we show an upward trend in the numbers of engineers
and scientists. Between 1999 and 2002, AMC hired over 1,100 engineers
and scientists. The technical expertise of the workforce at ARL has
shown significant improvement with an increase in the number of
engineers and scientists holding doctoral degrees increasing from 22
percent in 1992 to 32 percent in 2002 and individuals with master's
degrees rising from 34 to 47 percent. However, recruiting top talent in
specific emerging technology areas remains a challenge. One way we are
addressing this challenge is by Army laboratories maintaining an active
recruiting presence on major university campuses to attract the best
and brightest talent. Another way we are responding is through the
unique hiring, compensation, and performance management authorities
Congress has provided the DOD laboratories over the last 8 years. The
importance and excitement of the work within the Army labs is
attractive to many college graduates. We are also aggressively pursuing
opportunities to revitalize the S&T workforce through participation in
the DOD Laboratory Quality Improvement Program which will shape the new
National Security Personnel System development. We are working with the
Office of the Secretary of Defense through the Director, Defense
Research and Engineering (DDR&E) to include critical flexibilities.
The Army has a number of initiatives to reach outside our
laboratories to leverage talent, ideas, and technologies. Typically our
labs and RDECs attempt to achieve a ratio of 35 percent for in-house
research to 65 for outsourcing research. These figures vary from lab to
lab from a low of approximately 8 percent in-house to a maximum of
approximately 72 percent in-house. The variance in these percentages
results from specific missions of the organizations. The weapon system
commodity based organizations typically have higher industry interest
in solicitations due to quantity or profit potential. Some of our
organizations deal with very specific low volume solutions that are
service unique thereby necessitating an in-house capability to address
Army or DOD unique problem.
The Army is committed to a significant outreach program toward
institutions of higher learning and, in particular, to an outreach
program towards Historically Black Colleges and Universities/Minority
Institutions (HBCU/MI). These institutions of higher learning form the
nucleus of the next generation of scientists and engineers for our
country and for the Army. In fiscal year 2002, the Army sent over $296
million in funding to colleges and universities. Of the $296 million,
the Army awarded over $35 million to HBCU/MI in fiscal year 2002.
The Army is taking extensive advantage of the research capabilities
associated with our universities. One of the ways we do this is through
University Affiliated Research Centers (UARC). UARCs provide or
maintain essential engineering, research, and/or development
capabilities through DOD contracts awarded under the authority of 10
U.S.C. 2304(c)(3)(B). Currently, the Army maintains three UARCs. They
are: the Institute for Advanced Technology at the University of Texas
at Austin, the Institute for Creative Technology at the University of
Southern California, and the Institute for Soldier Nanotechnology at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. We are currently in the
process of soliciting for a fourth UARC to be known as the Institute
for Collaborative Biotechnology.
There are several notable examples of partnerships that the Army
has with both institutions of higher education and HBCU/MIs, one of
which is the Army High Performance Computing Research Center (AHPCRC)
located at the University of Minnesota. University researchers use
state-of-the-art computers to solve real world problems for the Army.
Specific examples include work in computational solid mechanics to
model ballistic armor perforation of a layered ceramic target and
computational aerodynamics dealing with the airflow past advanced
parachute designs. As part of its contract, the University of Minnesota
partners with six HBCU/MIs to investigate phenomena of interest to the
Army. Recently the AHPCRC concluded a computational fluid dynamics
model of aerosol dispersion in downtown Atlanta. This model
demonstrated the effective radius of a chemical or biological attack
based on specific weather conditions and is relevant to Homeland
Defense planning.
eCYBERMISSION is a national science competition for seventh and
eighth grade students initiated by the Army. It is a web-based science,
math, and technology competition for teams at U.S. based public or
private schools, Department of Defense schools abroad or U.S. based
home schools. Teams consist of three or four students in the same grade
and region with a team advisor. Each team selects a challenge in any
one of four areas: Sports and recreation, arts and entertainment,
environment and health & safety. The Army hopes to stimulate interest
in the sciences and technology through this program. This program
represents one way in which the U.S. Army can demonstrate it's
gratitude to the citizens of this Nation for giving their sons and
daughters to military service in defense of freedom.
Uniformed Army Scientists and Engineers provide a vital link
between the work in the laboratories and the operating forces. The
expertise derived from military training and experience is a key
success factor contributing to the design, conduct, and interpretation
of operationally relevant studies of technologies in actual deployment
or under field conditions.
The need for uniformed Army scientists and engineers is
particularly great in the medical area, as the medical R&D laboratories
provide the personnel necessary to perform significant operational
support roles, in addition to and separate from their research mission.
These roles include management and oversight of the use of
Investigative New Drug products in theaters of operation, operational
laboratory support for contingencies (e.g., anthrax attack response),
and performance of specialized in-theater assessments and consultations
to operational commanders on matters affecting health and performance.
Medical R&D personnel also augment deployable Combat Health Support by
providing professional fillers (PROFIS) to Table of Organization and
Equipment medical units and by serving as members of deployable Special
Medical Augmentation Response Teams.
Today, our needs are changing as we face new threats. We must get
technology out of the lab and into the field faster. It is vital that
we optimize the benefits of technology by sharing across the old
commodity oriented stovepipes. We must organize to do so.
In October 2002, AMC established the Research, Development, and
Engineering Command (Provisional). It has three major objectives. The
first is to integrate research, development, and engineering across all
areas of the Army, the other services, universities and all other
sources. The second is to get emerging technology to the soldier
faster. The third is to demonstrate the agility to rapidly take
advantage of opportunities no matter where they may arise. To achieve
these objectives requires new and innovative approaches to all aspects
of the development of technology for the soldier.
The first organizations assigned to the new command were the Army
Research Laboratory, the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, the
International Cooperative Programs Activity, the International Research
and Development Standardization Groups, and the Field Assistance in
Science and Technology Activity, the S&T portion of HQ AMC and the S&T
portion of the former Simulation Training and Instrumentation Command.
We intend to formally stand up the full organization, including the
RDECs, October 2003.
The Command is establishing a formal relationship with the Army
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Army Test and Evaluation
Command (ATEC). The relationship with TRADOC will include the full
integration of Doctrine, Training, Leadership, Organization, and
Soldier considerations into the technology development and transition
process. Similarly, with ATEC the relationship will include the
comprehensive testing considerations into the integration of technology
and technology programs to facilitate the rapid and effective
development and transition of technology to the soldier and maximum
verification with modeling and simulation. No longer will technology be
developed or acquired without a very close link to these two Commands.
The RDE Command will look at the capabilities the Army needs from a
systems of systems perspective. For example we will focus on
supportability and lethality capabilities instead of commodities such
as helicopters or missiles, which will enable the scientists and
engineers to integrate those technologies across multiple disciplines.
We will use modeling and simulation (M&S) to reach across all the labs
so that they can operate in a virtual environment from any location.
The M&S that the RDE Command is developing and integrating will
feed into the Advanced Collaborative Environment. This virtual,
distributed environment will tie together M&S, life cycle cost,
requirements, testing, and training. We are using it now in the Future
Combat System acquisition process. It will continue to grow and become
the means by which all of the Army shares concepts and breaks down
organizational walls. The days of single, independent platforms are
coming to a close. The future will require each platform to be linked
to all the others. The only way we can learn to operate that way is to
first build the modeling and simulation capabilities. We will start at
the beginning with the simulation and carry that all the way through in
a way that ensures the training devices and the systems are fielded
together.
I see the RDE Command as a key part of the process the Army is
using to transform itself. We are breaking down our old barriers.
Transforming the way we acquire and develop technology for our soldiers
is a step further down that road.

CONCLUSION

We have only touched the surface of some of the facets of Army
Transformation, but it is apparent that the S&T facets are essential to
success. The Army has embarked on an ambitious transformation journey.
We must provide technology solutions essential to current and future
warfighter needs across the full spectrum of Army operations. A diverse
S&T portfolio will enable the Army to support evolving and emerging
capabilities. Innovative initiatives will revitalize our workforce and
laboratories and ensure our world-class labs continue to be equipped
with modernized equipment and staffed with a dedicated and highly
skilled workforce. Effective partnerships and collaborations will speed
the transition of technology solutions to the soldier. The Army S&T
community remains committed and focused to support Army Transformation
and provide the warfighter with ``Technology to Win''. Our Army and a
team of people from industry, academia, and other nations are committed
and focused on enabling a faster transformation. At the end of the day,
our soldiers, our civilians, our contractors, and our allies--our world
benefits from the power of S&T applied across a remarkable spectrum.

Senator Roberts. Thank you, General Kern.
General Lyles.

STATEMENT OF GEN. LESTER L. LYLES, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE
MATERIEL COMMAND

General Lyles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Roberts,
Senator Reed, Senator Kennedy, Senator Dole, Senator Cornyn, I
appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony on the fiscal
year 2004 Air Force Science and Technology Programs. As noted,
I have submitted my prepared testimony for the record, and I
would like to summarize just a few key points here, then I look
forward to responding to your questions.
First, let me say that the United States Air Force is fully
dedicated to a robust S&T program that enables us to maintain
our vision of being an integrated Air and Space Force capable
of rapid and decisive global engagement. By continuing our
investment in transformational technologies and our commitment
to reduce cycle time in our acquisition process, the Air Force
will retain the dominance of air and space in future conflicts
against both traditional and asymmetrical threats.
Mr. Chairman, we have all been faced with the reality of
fiscally constrained budgets and an operationally demanding
environment, but in spite of this, we have increased our S&T
funding while maintaining a balanced S&T portfolio.
The Air Force fiscal year 2004 President's budget request
for S&T is $2.2 billion, an increase of more than $535 million
from the fiscal year 2003 President's budget. The most
significant change in that S&T request is the devolvement of
$350 million from several OSD-sponsored programs to the United
States Air Force. This includes high-performance computer
modernization, the University Research Initiative Program, and
high-energy laser programs.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to summarize quickly our three
strategies and principles for S&T in the United States Air
Force. First, to pursue integrated technology solutions that
support our warfighters' highest needs. Second, to pursue
fundamental enabling technologies that will improve both
today's Air Force and the Air Force of tomorrow. Last, and
certainly not least, to attract and nurture our most valuable
S&T asset, the outstanding scientists and engineers whose
intellectual capital provide us with the cutting-edge
capabilities we enjoy today and we will certainly need for
tomorrow.
Let me briefly make a comment about each one of them, then
I will close and look forward to your questions.
In the era of integrated technology solutions, we are
focusing our S&T talents to support our warfighters' need. That
is an imperative for our United States Air Force. One relevant
example of today, in today's environment, concern about
terrorist threat, is something called exterior explosive blast-
coating polymer.
This was developed by the United States Air Force to
protect buildings and installations from close-proximity
explosions or from air-dropped weapons or truck bombs. This
easy-to-apply spray coating provides greater structural
integrity of exterior walls and prevents dispersion of debris,
as well as separation of wall elements. This coating is
currently being used in many different applications, and is
actually being applied to the outer walls of the Pentagon.
Also, Mr. Chairman, as you are aware, both in Operation
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, during our war on terrorism,
and today in our war in Iraq, Air Force Special Tactics Combat
Controllers have literally changed the very nature of warfare.
By performing operations deep in enemy territory, they helped
determine who the adversaries are, where their weapons are
located, and who the innocent civilians might be so that we can
precisely direct air power to confront and to kill a threat if
one warrants it. These Special Tactics Combat Controllers are
also there to provide instant battle damage assessment.
We call these deep engagements battlefield air operations
(BAO), and as a result of integrated efforts between our S&T
laboratories, our developers, and these special tactics
warriors, we will soon have, literally within the next few
days, a new capability we are providing to them to help provide
integrated solutions to solving their needs on the battlefield.
This includes digital machine-to-machine capability that
helps quickly connect the right aircraft with the right
weapons, the right munitions, precisely to the right target, on
time, at the right time, and they do this very decisively. This
automated process was started literally about 2 months ago, led
by one of our Special Tactics Controllers, working with our
laboratories, and working with our scientists to give this kind
of rapid capability and to field it very quickly.
In the second strategy, enabling technologies to improve
tomorrow's Air Force, our S&T strategy is to pursue enabling
technologies that will continuously provide improvements to our
capabilities. Amongst the many transformational technologies
that we are rapidly developing is directed energy in various
forms, including laser and high-powered microwave technology.
One such transformational directed energy effort is the
vehicular-mounted active denial system (VMADS). VMADS is being
developed by Air Force laboratories primarily today for use by
the United States Marine Corps, but as you will soon see, it
will have applications in a wide variety of different ways.
This defensive millimeter wave system is used for perimeter
defense applications today. It is a directed energy weapon that
emits a nonlethal, nondamaging beam which heats up the skin of
a potential enemy when in close proximity to the system. The
resulting temporary pain causes the person to flee or disperse.
The pain stops when the person is no longer in the path of that
particular energy, and Mr. Chairman, I think you, Senator Reed,
and Senator Cornyn saw a demonstration of that with the little
finger test device at the demos a couple of weeks ago.
We are looking to expanding this program very quickly,
again both for the Marine Corps and for many applications,
including commercial applications for crime-fighting.
One other new technology area that I think is really on the
cutting edge and will actually dramatically change lots of
things that we do in the future is one mentioned by General
Kern. It is the future application of nanotechnology. It will
provide the greatest change in how man operates, since we will
be operating at the atomic and molecular level to create
structures, materials, and devices never thought of before. We
are looking at putting monies into nanotechnology and
technology programs working closely with the other services and
other agencies because of the tremendous benefits we will get
from nanotechnology.
As an example, an order of magnitude increase in the
strength of materials, a twofold improvement in material
thermal properties, a threefold reduction in power consumption,
and an order of magnitude increase in the energy in munitions
and propellants. Nanotechnology is going to revolutionize the
way we do everything in our activities in S&T.
The last strategy of our three-prong strategy is the one I
consider to be the most important and the most severe, and that
is to attract and nurture a world-class S&T workforce. We are
working diligently in many ways to ensure that we have the
scientists and engineering workforce to meet our needs for the
Air Force today and for the future.
Both Secretary Roche and General Jumper are deeply involved
with me, with Major General Paul Nielson, sitting behind me,
the Director of our laboratories, to ensure that we shape the
workforce, our future sciences and engineering workforce. Air
Force civilians and military scientists and engineers are
highly motivated and productive today. We cannot lose that.
The Air Force is unique in that 20 percent of our
laboratory scientists and engineers are actually Government
personnel, active duty military. This gives us, we think, a
better direct link to the warfighter. We are committed to
making sure we maintain that excellence and relevance in our
S&T programs.
There are a wide variety of initiatives that we have
undertaken to make sure that stays the case, the Airman
Education Commissioning Program, the Technical Degree
Sponsorship Program, our own current Air Force Laboratory Demo
Project, which has been ongoing since 1997 to today, the future
National Security Personnel System, and budgets that we are
applying to ensure we can recruit and retain the scientists and
engineers we need for the United States Air Force.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the Air Force is fully
committed to providing this Nation with the advanced air and
space technologies required to meet America's national security
interests. We are an integral part of the DOD S&T team, and we
look forward to working with Congress to ensure a strong Air
Force S&T program tailored to achieve our visions and the
visions needed for the future.
Mr. Chairman, I will close right there, and I will look
forward to questions from you or the subcommittee.
[The prepared statement of General Lyles follows:]

Prepared Statement by Gen. Lester L. Lyles, USAF

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, and staff, I very much
appreciate the opportunity to provide written testimony on the Fiscal
Year 2004 Air Force S&T program. The United States Air Force is
transforming to a capabilities-focused Expeditionary Air and Space
Force. We are doing this through the development of the Concept of
Operations for each of the seven major tasks the Air Force must be
capable of accomplishing. Our goal is to make the warfighting effects
and the capabilities we need to achieve them the drivers for everything
we do. This is especially true in our S&T program. We have taken the
effects and capabilities required by the seven Concepts of Operations
and mapped them to the Long-Term Challenges and Short-Term Objectives
identified in the congressionally-directed S&T Planning Review
completed in February 2002. Not surprisingly, we have a high
correlation between our S&T programs and the capabilities required by
these Concepts of Operations. This is because the Air Force Research
Laboratory (AFRL) closely links the technologies reflected in its S&T
plan to warfighter capability needs.
The United States Air Force is committed to a robust S&T program
that enables us to achieve our vision of becoming an integrated air and
space force capable of rapid and decisive global engagement. By
continuing our investment in transformational technologies that support
a reduced cycle-time, spiral development acquisition process, the Air
Force will retain its dominance of air and space in future conflicts,
against both traditional and asymmetrical threats.
Innovation is a vital part of our heritage and is key to ensuring
the Air Force will meet the challenges of tomorrow. Transforming our
warfighting capabilities towards this end will involve continued
innovations in how we think about employing our forces to defend our
Nation, as well as quantum leaps in our technology. We must be prepared
to counter regional instabilities, the worldwide availability of
advanced weapons, and other emerging and less predictable asymmetrical
threats. We are developing transformational technologies that permit
flexible forces to operate far from home, on short notice, and for
extended time periods. However, we must also be able to afford these
innovations once we develop them in order to re-capitalize the Air
Force to fulfill our vision. To meet these objectives, we search out
the most promising and affordable technologies in order to win
decisively, protect our forces, and minimize collateral damage.

S&T BUDGET/SENIOR LEADERSHIP INVOLVEMENT

We have been faced with the reality of a fiscally-constrained, but
operationally-demanding environment. The high operations tempo the Air
Force has sustained in support of peacekeeping operations and
conflicts, such as Afghanistan, has placed a great burden on our people
and system.
In spite of these requirements, the Air Force is working to
increase S&T funding, while maintaining a balanced S&T portfolio. The
Air Force fiscal year 2004 President's budget (PB) request for S&T is
$2.2 billion, an increase of more than $535 million from the fiscal
year 2003 PB. The most significant change in the S&T PB request results
from the devolvement of $350 million for several Office of the
Secretary of Defense efforts to the Air Force S&T program. This
includes the High Performance Computing Modernization program, the
University Research Initiative program, and the High Energy Laser
program. Another significant addition to S&T in fiscal year 2004 is
over $150 million for the National Aerospace Initiative.
The Air Force understands the concerns of Congress regarding the
level of support for these devolved programs and is working hard to
ensure execution of the programs transferred to the Air Force continues
to support the diverse multiple military objectives inherent in each of
these programs. Further, the Office of the Secretary of Defense will
continue to provide policy guidance and oversight for these efforts.
In a separate action, the Seismic Research Program for detection of
nuclear explosions has been transferred back to the Air Force from the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The Air Force is working to
reclaim the knowledge and experience it possessed before transfer of
the program to DTRA in 1997.
One area in which the Air Force has increased its investment is in
space communications technology with initiation of the transformational
communications technology development program. This program will
identify, develop, and demonstrate the wideband technologies needed to
build a space-based laser communications network that could provide
higher data throughput and higher frequencies, thus transforming our
military satellite communications infrastructure.
In conjunction with the increase in S&T funding, there has also
been a significant increase in the involvement of the warfighting
commands and senior Air Force leadership in the planning, programming,
and prioritizing of Air Force S&T. For example, we have conducted S&T
summits where the Secretary of the Air Force, the Air Force Chief of
Staff, and the Air Force four-stars and other senior leaders review the
S&T portfolio. The latest S&T summit focused on transformational
technologies that can be developed to assist in combating terrorism and
other asymmetrical threats.

WORKFORCE

The Air Force scientist and engineer (S&E) workforce is another
area where senior Air Force leadership involvement plays a pivotal
role. Both Secretary Roche and General Jumper are deeply involved in
shaping our future S&E workforce. Air Force civilian and military S&Es
are highly motivated and productive. The Air Force is unique in that 20
percent of its laboratory S&E government workforce is active duty
military. This gives us a direct link to the warfighter. Some of these
military S&Es come directly from operational commands, while others
will serve in operational commands later in their careers.
The Air Force is committed to shaping its S&E workforce with the
vision to enhance excellence and relevance of S&T into the 21st century
and appreciates the support Congress has already provided. This
challenge requires the Air Force to maintain a dominant edge in
technology and also requires us to provide clear direction and growth
for our S&E workforce. However, we, as do others, find it is difficult
to recruit and retain S&Es. The Air Force has several initiatives, both
civilian and military, that address recruitment and retention issues.
AFRL was the first laboratory in the DOD to take advantage of
legislation allowing us to experiment with alternative personnel
management systems for our civilian S&Es. The simplified classification
system, broadband pay levels, and contribution-based compensation that
form the cornerstone of the Air Force Laboratory Demonstration Project
have provided AFRL with some key flexibilities needed to compete with
private industry for critical S&E talent and properly compensate our
high contributors. We will need to consider these flexibilities as we
develop the National Security Personnel System (NSPS).
We have found that our centers have the greatest difficulty in
recruiting high quality minority member scientific and engineering
candidates. We have implemented a command-wide recruitment program
targeting this group of highly sought after candidates. The following
is a list of national career fairs that we have attended or plan to
attend this year: Black Engineer of the Year Award Conference; Society
of Hispanic Professional Engineers Conference; National Society of
Black Engineers Conference; and Hispanic Engineering National
Achievement Awards Conference. We provide the resumes that we obtain
from these conferences to our center civilian personnel offices as a
ready source of high quality applicants. This targeted recruitment, in
conjunction with the hiring flexibilities of the Federal Career Intern
Program, is enabling us to make more timely offers to highly sought
after S&E graduates. To ease the confusion that applicants for the Air
Force Material Command (AFMC) positions can experience, we developed a
public web page, which explains what we have to offer and how to apply
for specific vacancies. The page links to each center's public web page
for more detailed center explanations.
Other civilian initiatives include the recruitment of college
students with critical S&E skills via recruiting incentives, a robust
marketing effort, and a co-op central funding program that hires
college students while still in school. Central funding for recruiting
bonus and retention allowances for journeyman level S&Es also promises
to provide much needed assistance with civilian recruitment and
retention.
On the military side, we're employing the Airman Education and
Commissioning Program and the Technical Degree Sponsorship Program to
recruit additional S&Es into the military workforce. Bonus programs
such as the Critical Skills Retention Bonus are essential to shrinking
the current shortfall of military S&Es within the Air Force and the Air
Force is currently exploring additional bonus programs.
The Air Force is committed to its S&Es and recently published a
``Concept of Operations for Scientists and Engineers in the United
States Air Force.'' We also baselined the requirement for the Air Force
S&E workforce and, upon analyzing this baseline requirement, found that
while our military and civilian authorizations were about right, our
actual demographics were seriously short in some key areas. As such, we
are shifting our focus to retaining the workforce we have and infusing
it with the vitality of new S&Es to meet tomorrow's need. During the
next 7 years, we are investing nearly a third of a billion dollars to
support the retention and reshaping of our technological workforce. As
we replenish our S&E workforce, we are providing career guidance and
mentoring that will enable us to meet our 21st century challenge.
Initiatives, such as the special hiring legislation authorized by
Congress in PL 106-398, which provides ``DARPA-like'' hiring authority
to the military departments, should also produce positive results in
shaping our S&E workforce. This authority has only recently been
delegated to the Air Force, but we are optimistic about its potential.
Again, we express our thanks to Congress for your continued support.

MAXIMIZING OUR S&T DOLLARS

We will continue to leverage technology to achieve new levels of
combat effectiveness. Our strategy is to pursue integrated technology
capabilities that support our warfighter's highest priority needs. We
must also pursue the fundamental enabling technologies that will
improve tomorrow's Air Force. As technological superiority is
increasingly a perishable commodity, we work hard to optimize our S&T
funding, by not only ``inventing the future'' ourselves, but also by
speeding the introduction of new technologies to our warfighters.
One way we are doing this is through our Applied Technology
Councils and the Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDs). The
councils are composed of two- and three-star representatives from AFRL,
our acquisition product centers, and our major user commands who
formally prioritize ATD programs. We hold an Applied Technology Council
meeting with each Major Command twice every year and have commissioned
34 ATDs that have transition funding in the fiscal year 2003 budget.
The Applied Technology Council process is extremely important in
linking the S&T program to both the system developers and the
operational user. This process facilitates technology transition to
operational use and secures user commitment for resources to do systems
design and development and fielding of the technology. Currently about
50 percent of our Advanced Technology Development (6.3) budget is
committed to these programs.
Since deployed technology may remain in use for decades, the Air
Force S&T program not only focuses on enhancing performance, but also
on sustaining our fielded warfighter capabilities. Emphasizing
affordability from the very beginning through training of our
management, and science and engineering staff, as well as through an
in-depth review of technology development efforts, increases our
potential to reduce the costs of technology early in the system
development process and throughout a product's life cycle.
We maintain an excellent balance of military, civilian, and
contractor expertise, which allows us to be very selective about
investing in high payoff technological opportunities. We constantly
seek opportunities to integrate Air Force planning and leverage our S&T
funds by cooperating with other Services, Agencies, the private sector,
and international partners. For example, we rely on the Army as the
lead Service for defensive chemical-biological technology development.
The Air Force also has strong inter-Agency efforts, such as our program
in aging aircraft, which is focused on detection and management of
corrosion and fatigue in aging structures. It is closely coordinated
with the civilian aging aircraft research programs at the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA). Our partnership with the industrial and
university research base is very strong. In fact, we outsource over 70
percent of our S&T funding. Finally, the Air Force is involved in
international cooperative technology development efforts for S&T, such
as the software defined radio development, insensitive high explosives,
and aircraft battle damage repair efforts conducted with France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom. Another example of international
cooperation is the multi-domain network management program with
Australia and Canada. This program is developing the concepts and tools
for creating and managing secure computer networks with our coalition
partners.

WORLD CLASS RESEARCH

The quality of our program is assessed by the Air Force Scientific
Advisory Board (SAB) through yearly reviews. The SAB conducts an in-
depth review of half of the S&T program each year, covering the entire
program over a 2-year period. Twelve technical areas have been
identified as world class research during the last cycle of reviews--
let me highlight a few of these areas that were identified as world
class.
The Directed Energy Directorate's Starfire Optical Range at
Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, is leading the adaptive optics
research for use in large ground-based telescopes to image satellites
and propagate laser beams through the atmosphere. This will enable
high-quality, ground-based observations of space objects and
propagation of laser beams through a turbulent atmosphere. Astronomical
images using this technology can rival those obtained with the Hubble
Space Telescope.
Our Propulsion Directorate's Hypersonics Technology (HyTech) work
at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, is acknowledged by the SAB as
world class and a cornerstone of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense's Director of Defense Research and Engineering's (DDR&Es)
National Aerospace Initiative. Our HyTech program has continued to
advance the state of the art in scramjet engines and conducted the
first ever ground test demonstration of a scramjet producing positive
net thrust back in 2001. In February 2003, HyTech tested a flight
weight scramjet Ground Demonstration Engine operating at Mach 4.5.
While the 2001 Performance Test Engine used copper heat-sink hardware
and weighed 1,500 pounds, the 2003 Ground Demonstration Engine used JP-
7 fuel to cool the scramjet engine walls and weighed less than 150
pounds. This marked another first for the HyTech program--demonstrating
the structural durability of a hydrocarbon fueled, actively cooled
scramjet. Testing at Mach 6.5 will start in March 2003 and should be
completed in April 2003. Pratt & Whitney developed this particular
engine in collaboration with Air Force scientists and engineers.
Another SAB-rated world-class research program is the Warfighter
Skill Development and Training efforts worked by our Human
Effectiveness Directorate at Brooks City-Base, TX. Specific research
areas include Integrated Panoramic Night Vision Goggle (PNVG) and
Distributed Mission Training. The Integrated PNVG will improve
situational awareness and terrain avoidance at night through its wider
field of vision and improved resolution. It will also provide
protection from laser target designators, laser rangers, and laser
threats through compatibility with existing laser eye protection
technologies. Distributed mission training will provide an integrated
set of training, simulation, and mission rehearsal technologies that
will improve warfighter capabilities and mission readiness by enhancing
operator and team performance skills. Technologies will increase
operational readiness by providing more effective methods and
approaches to train and assess personnel. These technologies will
contribute to a more highly trained and flexible cadre of personnel at
a reduced cost.
Working closely with operational users, AFRL researchers in the
Materials Directorate at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio,
continue to develop and transition new filter technologies that provide
improved eye protection for aircrews from varied levels of laser
threats. The Laser Eye Protection program is enabling aircrews to
conduct day and night air operations without visual jamming or personal
injury.
Our research in Electro-Optic Warfare at Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base, Ohio, will allow future laser-based sensor systems to penetrate
moderate cloud cover, obscurants, and camouflage. This will provide
improved target detection and identification for our weapons systems.
``See and Avoid'' sensors will ease restrictions on unmanned air
vehicle operations in civilian airspace and allow autonomous operation
in conjunction with manned aircraft. These technologies may also be
applied as low-cost missile warning sensors to affordably protect
military and commercial aircraft from surface-to-air missiles. Also,
experimental research in infrared countermeasures is developing threat
adaptive techniques for robust defeat of current and future infrared
weapons and sensors.
Space weather research at Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts, is
another SAB-rated world class operation. We have a strong modeling
capability that specifies and forecasts space weather from the sun to
the ionosphere. Assessment capability of space environment and its
effects using compact sensors will be incorporated into a high energy
particles sensor that is under development.
At Edwards Air Force Base, California, the Propulsion Directorate
is working on world class research in polynitrogen propellants. The
goal is to enable high performance monopropellant rocket propulsion
systems with revolutionary performance. By improving the specific
impulse of the propellant, we will have environmentally benign exhaust
and reduced signatures. This could potentially improve storage,
manufacturing, and rocket engine size.

COMBATING TERRORISM

While the traditional focus of S&T has been on developing long-term
capabilities, the Air Force S&T program also contributes to the current
needs of the Nation and our troops deployed in hostile areas. One
example of an Air Force project receiving a great deal of attention
since September 11 is the Exterior Explosive Blast Coating polymer,
which was developed by the Air Force to protect key buildings and
installations from close proximity explosions, such as air dropped
weapons or truck bombs. This easy-to-apply spray coating provides
greater structural integrity of exterior walls and prevents dispersion
of debris as well as separation of wall elements. This coating is
currently being applied to the interior of the outer walls of the
Pentagon.
Another transformational effort is the Vehicular Mounted Active
Denial System (VMADS). The VMADS is being jointly developed with the
U.S. Marine Corps and is a defensive millimeter wave system used for
perimeter defense applications. It is a directed energy weapon that
emits a non-lethal, non-damaging beam, which heats up the skin of a
potential enemy when in close proximity to the system. The resulting
temporary pain causes the person to flee.
In the war on terror, Air Force Special Tactics Combat Controllers
are changing the very nature of warfare. By performing operations deep
in enemy territory, they help determine who the terrorists are, where
their weapons are located, and who the innocent civilians are. Then,
they precisely control the elements of airpower to defeat the terrorist
threat, while taking care to spare innocent civilian casualties and
minimize collateral damage. Then, these same Special Tactics Combat
Controllers are there to provide instant battle damage assessment. We
call these deep engagements, ``Battlefield Air Operations (BAO).''
AFMC is providing needed help for these brave Special Tactics
Warriors. The Air Force Research Laboratory is accelerating new
technology to these Special Tactics Warriors in the form of significant
improvements to their BAO kit of equipment. The Aeronautical Systems
Center is providing a Special Tactics System Program Office to assist
in rapid procurement of these new BAO kit items. The Electronic Systems
Center is helping to ensure these new digital machine-to-machine data
communications are interoperable with the rest of our Global Grid of
military command and control communications systems. As a result of
this AFMC-wide enterprise, our Special Tactics Warriors will soon have
a digital machine-to-machine capability that helps to quickly connect
the right aircraft, with the right munitions, guided precisely to the
right target, at just the right time, to achieve the desired effect.
This new automated process helps to reduce the time it takes to target
the terrorist threat, while at the same time reducing human error in
the targeting process.
Working collaboratively with the Special Tactics Warriors, this
AFMC ``BAO Tiger Team'' has also partnered with a national team of
industry to field significant enhancements of increased capability,
while reducing the weight and size of the individual BAO kit equipment.
They are performing these improvements by developing, prototyping,
testing, building, and fielding these BAO kit improvements in very
rapid spirals. These new BAO capabilities will help to save American
lives, and the lives of innocent civilians. BAO provides a
revolutionary and highly effective way to combat the terrorist threat.
One of the premier munitions almost ready to transition from the
munitions lab at Eglin Air Force Base into acquisition is Crash PAD
(Prompt Agent Defeat). The objective of the Crash PAD program is to
demonstrate a blast/frag multi-purpose warhead that can be used to
damage fixed biological and chemical targets while producing an
environment that will mitigate bio agent collateral damage. The range
of applicable targets includes soft to moderately hardened. Sled track
testing occurred in late January and flight test occurred in late
February. This program has the potential to be a significant resource
for the warfighter in destroying chemical and biological weapons with
minimal effects to civilians.

TRANSFORMATIONAL TECHNOLOGIES

There are many other Air Force technology areas that deserve
special mention. Let me highlight just a few examples. As mentioned
earlier, there's our transformational communications technology
development program, whose laser communications technology efforts
promise to increase data transfer rates at least ten-fold compared to
current radio frequency communications systems. Additionally, laser
communications uses a narrow beam, which decreases the likelihood of
intercept and increases resistance to jamming. While laser
communications have a high potential to revolutionize satellite
communications, there are technical challenges to overcome such as
precision pointing and tracking, weather constraints, and adapting the
equipment for use in space. We continue to work on the technology
challenges and are also conducting a study to determine the best
architecture for implementing laser communications technologies to
complement and integrate with radio frequency-based systems.
To increase aircraft survivability and operational efficiencies,
the Air Force is developing both manned (F/A-22 and Joint Strike
Fighter) and unmanned flight vehicles that can carry and employ weapons
from both external and internal weapons bays. To increase the number of
weapons the flight vehicle can fit into their internal weapons bays,
part of our investment strategy focuses S&T funding on developing and
demonstrating smaller precision weapons.
One of the small munitions currently being flight demonstrated at
Eglin Air Force Base is the Low Cost Autonomous Attack System (LOCAAS).
The LOCAAS is a 100-pound class powered munition of which the primary
target set is moving and relocatable targets. This Advanced Technology
Demonstration (ATD) program will demonstrate the effectiveness and
military utility of this type of munition for the Lethal Suppression of
Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD), Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Attack
Operations, and Armor/Interdiction mission areas. LOCAAS will integrate
a laser radar precision terminal seeker with autonomous target
recognition algorithms, a multi-modal warhead, Global Positioning
System (GPS)/Inertial Navigation System (INS) mid-course guidance, and
a miniature turbine engine with a fly-out range of 100 miles. This ATD
program will complete five flight tests by the end of fiscal year 2003,
culminating in a planned autonomous flight with active seeker and
warhead against a real target. The first flight test was successfully
completed on February 4, 2002, and demonstrated the powered flight
envelope, GPS waypoint navigation, and simulated attack of a SEAD
target. The second flight test, successfully completed on November 4,
2002, was a guided LOCAAS that demonstrated real-time autonomous
search, and automatic target acquisition algorithms that could detect,
identify, and simulate attack against a TMD target.
Plans are also being made in fiscal year 2004 to conduct a
cooperative program with the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) using
the LOCAAS vehicle. A test program on the RAAF F-111 aircraft in
Australia is scheduled for the first quarter of the fiscal year. This
will be an important test for both nations--the U.S. is able to test
munitions release at supersonic speeds and Australia benefits from the
test results. These results could enable maturation of the
computational simulation codes for separation of symmetric and
asymmetric miniature weapons, providing for a reduction in the risk and
cost of weapons certification efforts for aircraft with internal
weapons bays such as the F/A-22, Joint Strike Fighter, and UCAVs.
To continue the trend of miniaturization of space platforms, the
Air Force and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) have
provided funding to 10 universities to explore the military utility of
innovative, low-cost nanosatellites. These nanosatellites, weighing 2
to 10 kilograms, could demonstrate efforts such as differential Global
Positioning System navigation, miniaturized sensors, and
micropropulsion technologies. In December 2002, two ``pico satellites''
weighing slightly more than two pounds each, were successfully released
from a specialized spring-loaded launcher assembly mounted on the
sidewall of the Space Shuttle Endeavor. This was the joint Air Force/
DARPA-developed PICOSAT Inspector experiment to demonstrate a
significant step forward in the development of an onboard autonomous
inspection capability.
The Air Force is also conducting the Experimental Satellite System
(XSS) series to demonstrate increasing levels of microsatellite
technology maturity. The XSS-10, the first microsatellite in the series
launched on schedule during fiscal year 2003. It demonstrated semi-
autonomous operations and visual inspection in close proximity of an
object in space--in this case a Delta II upper stage. In fiscal year
2004, we plan to launch XSS-11, which will demonstrate autonomous
operations and provide experience with command and control in proximity
operations to another space object.
One of the most transformational and quickly deployable
technologies available today is command, control, and communications
technology, also known as information technology. This technology is at
the heart of our Moving Target Indicator Exploitation program, which is
developing web-enabled automated tools to exploit data from current and
future sensor systems such as the Joint Surface Target Attack Radar
System, better known as JSTARS. The effort is focused on four
technology areas: ground moving target tracking; motion pattern
analysis; behavioral pattern analysis; and sensor resource allocation
and scheduling, which provide the capability to track moving targets
and get the information to the operations center. This system is in
southwest Asia today.

BREAKTHROUGH TECHNOLOGIES

In recent years, we have all come to appreciate the success of
unmanned vehicles. We hear over and over again the tremendous
operational advantages that systems such as Predator and Global Hawk
are bringing to warfighters from all Services. Over the first two
decades of the 21st century, advances in micro unmanned air vehicles
will provide significant additional capabilities to our Armed Forces.
Micro air vehicles utilize advances in microscale aerodynamics,
electronic miniaturization, munitions, and propulsion to package
sensory and weapons payloads into highly reliable, on-demand systems.
These systems will provide unprecedented levels of situational
awareness in the most severe threat environments. Whether we are
operating in urban environments, sensing bio-chemical dispersion
through the atmosphere, or looking over the next hill, our troops will
have the awareness needed to fight and survive. These systems will
provide the persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
in high threat environments needed by our troops on the ground and our
airmen in the air. When called for, swarms of these vehicles will
cooperate together to generate both lethal and nonlethal effects.
In the next 50 years, advancements in nanotechnology will provide
the greatest change in how man operates since the invention of powered
flight itself. Nanotechnology is a science and a series of disciplines
that works at the atomic and molecular level to create structures,
materials, and devices through improved molecular organization. By
working with elements at the level of nanometer scale, we have access
to the building blocks of nature. This will fundamentally change the
way materials and devices will be produced in the future. The ability
to synthesize nanoscale building blocks with precisely controlled size
and composition and to then assemble them into larger structures with
unique properties and functions will revolutionize segments of the
materials and device industry. The benefits that nanostructuring can
bring include lighter, stronger, and programmable materials; reductions
in life cycle costs through lower failure rates; innovative devices
based on new principles and architectures; nanosensors and
nanoprocessors; and use of molecular/cluster manufacturing, which takes
advantage of assembly at the nanoscale level for a given purpose.
Another significant breakthrough technology that will change the
way we develop systems is our work in biotechnology. Biology has
developed unique materials and processes that may be exploited in non-
biological systems. We are studying the fundamental science necessary
to incorporate biological components and organisms into Air Force
systems. For example, in biomemetics, we research the adaptation of
natural biological sensor in reptiles. The natural infrared sensors in
reptiles do not need to be cooled. We hope to adapt this biological
process to Air Force sensor applications that normally require
cryogenic cooling.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION

The majority of Air Force S&T is contracted with industry and
universities. This promotes relationships between the scientists and
engineers conducting the research and lays the foundation for
technology transition. Strong connections between the technology
supplier and the end user help speed transition of technology to the
warfighter. In addition, the various transition programs in which the
Air Force participates further cement this foundation. Air Force
technology transition efforts include Advanced Technology Demonstration
projects, Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) contracts, and
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) among others.
The Applied Technology Councils discussed earlier were initiated in
fiscal year 1999 to foster top-level user involvement in the transition
of technology from the laboratory to the system developer to the
operational user. As noted, these Councils review and approve Air Force
Advanced Technology Demonstration projects and ensure that the Major
Commands plan for the transition of successful technology by tying
approved Advanced Technology Demonstration projects to planned Major
Command Future Years Defense Program funding.
Another Air Force technology transition tool is the SBIR program,
which funds early-stage efforts at small technology companies. These
programs serve a defense need, but also have the potential for private
sector and/or military market commercialization. A similar program, the
Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program, funds cooperative
efforts involving a small business and a research institution (i.e., a
university), a Federally-funded research and development center, or a
non-profit research institution. A CRADA is an agreement between a
government laboratory and a non-Federal party under which the
laboratory provides personnel, facilities, equipment, or other
resources (but not funds) with or without reimbursement and the non-
Federal party provides funds, people, services, facilities, equipment,
or other resources to conduct specific research and development efforts
that are consistent with the agency's mission.
These efforts along with many other programs, such as Dual-Use S&T,
Independent Research and Development, Mentor-Protege, Personnel
Exchanges, etc., are mutually beneficial to the Air Force and the
contractors and universities with whom we collaborate. Technology
transition is a key component of the Air Force S&T program and is vital
to our pursuit of national security requirements.

SECTION 253 STUDY

Section 253 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2002, Public Law 107-107, directed the Air Force, in cooperation
with the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences,
to carry out a study to determine the effect of S&T program changes of
the past 2 years. The Air Force Science and Technology Board (AFSTB) of
the National Research Council will prepare a written report for the
Secretary of the Air Force to forward to Congress by the May 1, 2003,
deadline. While we do not have any insight into the AFSTB study
results, we expect this study will reflect the positive impact of
changes instituted by the Air Force in its S&T planning process.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Air Force is fully committed to providing this
Nation with the advanced air and space technologies required to meet
America's national security interests around the world and to ensure we
remain on the cutting edge of system performance, flexibility, and
affordability. The technological advantage we enjoy today is a legacy
of decades of investment in S&T. Likewise, our future warfighting
capabilities will be substantially determined by today's investment in
S&T. As we face the new millennium, our challenge is to advance
technologies for an Expeditionary Aerospace Force as we continue to
move aggressively into the realm of space activities. The Air Force is
confident that we can lead the discovery, development, and timely
transition of affordable, transformational technologies that keep our
Air Force the best in the world. As an integral part of the Department
of Defense's S&T team, we look forward to working with Congress to
ensure a strong Air Force S&T program tailored to achieve our vision of
an integrated air and space force.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to present
written testimony, and thank you for your continuing support of the Air
Force S&T program.

Senator Roberts. General, thank you very much, and thank
you for your emphasis on stressing the importance of
nanotechnology, particularly in regard to consequence
management. I know there are several nanotechnology solutions
around all of the services that they can utilize. We do just
happen to have a very fine organization in Kansas called
Nanoscale Materials, Inc. in Manhattan, Kansas.
Now, I want everybody to know that I did not write your
speech, and you are not writing mine, but we may want to work
on that. At any rate, the Marine Corps is working on specific
reactive nanoparticles to neutralize any anthrax stimulants,
and we look forward to that technology, and I could not pass
that up. You gave me a softball so I decided to respond.
General Lyles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Roberts. Senator Reed. I am sorry, Admiral Dyer. We
do not want to leave the Navy out.

STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. JOSEPH W. DYER, USN, COMMANDER, NAVAL
AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND

Admiral Dyer. Sir, thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, distinguished members, it is a
pleasure to be here with you today.
Moving technology quickly from the scientist's bench to the
sailors and marines that fight our wars and support our country
is a most important undertaking, and I would offer up the
sensor resolution and the weapons delivery accuracy that you
are seeing played out real time, right now and over this last
year or so, as an example of our success.
I am the Commander of the Naval Air Systems Command, the
senior flag officer in the Navy materiel community, and I
represent today the Naval Sea Systems Command, the Navy Office
of Research, and others. We recognize that a long-term stable
and sustained investment is necessary to transition S&T to
research and development (R&D). We are committed to
accelerating and validating that investment via
experimentation.
The thermobaric weapon much in the news over the last few
years, and capable of taking out inhabitants deep within caves
or bunkers, is an example of a technology that has been in
development for over 30 years. Quickly displayed to the
battlefield, it nevertheless represents work that started 30
years ago on synthetic organic chemistry, and reflects that
many times when you step out in R&D you do not know what path
it is going to lead, but contributing to the body of knowledge,
and especially to defense knowledge, is important to us.
The Navy's S&T investment has increased via the fiscal year
2004 budget submission some $1.45 billion over the Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP), and includes such things as the Navy
UCAV, our unmanned combat aerial vehicle, supersonic cruise
missiles, down through things like the Coast Guard vessel
tracking system, which helps to protect and monitor our
harbors.
We are also gratified by the subcommittee's interest in
test and evaluation, and the Navy is a strong supporter of the
Defense Test Resource Management Center, and we are working
with the Under Secretary Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
(AT&L) to establish that office.
I will shorten my remarks on transformation because you
have heard a lot about medical, nanotechnology, materiels, and
autonomous vehicles from my fellow briefers this morning, but
these are exciting technologies, and it is an exciting time. We
view S&T within two contexts. One is a time line, and the other
is a philosophical organization piece.
Time lines, we look at today in quick technology to the
work place and to the battlefield. We look at the next Navy,
looking out 5 to 15 years, and then we look at the Navy after
next, some 15 to 30 years in the future. Our Sea Power 21
construct, where we look at Sea Strike, our ability to deliver
striking power to the enemy; Sea Shield, our ability to protect
our fleet, our people, and our friends; Sea Basing, faster
logistics and a smaller footprint, both standing atop a
foundation of improved efficiencies relating to Sea Enterprise;
and to Sea Warrior, where we look to take better advantage of
our human capital and our human assets.
Our S&T investment is guided by three pillars: rapid
response, feedback from our operational forces via the
experiment and now via actual combat; national naval
responsibilities, where we have unique defense interests such
as naval engineering and acoustics that are not necessarily
shared by the other services; and what we call, Grand
Challenge, those things that while 15 to 30 years out,
questions that have answers, and solutions if found, represent
breakthrough technology to serve our future needs.
The Navy's future Navy capabilities is an important
program, and one that we believe is serving us very well, where
we work in partnership among scientists, industry, requirements
folks, acquisition, and warfighters. Two-thirds of the Navy's
6.3, or advanced technology funding, is in the FMCs and 40
percent of our 6.2, or applied research money, is reflected in
the future Navy's capabilities as well.
I would share what you have heard I think from all three of
the other folks this morning, sir, that it is the demographics
and the shaping of the workforce that we believe is the must-
solve challenge for going into the future. We are able to
recruit young folks with great talents. We use the excitement
of our business and a reemerging sense of service. It is the
necessity to keep those folks as they become journeymen
scientists and engineers and reach the peak contribution years
of their careers that is of most concern to us.
We look forward to taking your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Dyer follows:]

Prepared Statement by Vice Adm. Joseph W. Dyer, USN

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you
for this opportunity to discuss Naval Science and Technology. You and
the other members of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities have been leaders in calling attention, both
nationally and in the Department of Defense, to the importance of
moving new technology quickly from the scientist's bench to our sailors
and marines.
As Commander, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), I oversee the
operation of two Naval Air Warfare Centers. My counterparts at Naval
Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), Space & Naval Warfare Systems Command
(SPAWAR), and the Office of Naval Research (ONR), operate an additional
six Naval Surface Warfare Centers, three Naval Undersea Warfare
Centers, three Space and Naval Warfare Systems Centers, one Naval
Research Laboratory and numerous other field activities. Among us we
cover the wide range of technologies the Navy and Marine Corps use. We
report to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Development, and Acquisition. I think this division of labor has proven
valuable in allowing the separate Systems Commands to better focus
their resources on their applicable technologies.
As the senior Naval officer directly responsible for many of the
issues being covered today, I have been asked to represent all of the
Navy Systems Commands and the Office of Naval Research. We collaborate
closely, and we face similar challenges, particularly with respect to
attracting and retaining technical talent. I will address some of those
challenges later in my statement.
Let me begin with an overview of our scientific and technological
portfolio. The return on the Nation's investment in naval S&T is
measured in capabilities. This is particularly important in a time when
we must not only fight and win a global war, but also transform the
Navy and Marine Corps. We hear a great deal about al Qaeda and others
posing an ``asymmetric threat'' to us. But our scientific and
technological edge gives us a tremendous asymmetric advantage over our
enemies. We've already seen some of that advantage at work in Operation
Enduring Freedom, and naval transformation will depend on our ability
to sustain and exploit our lead in S&T. To do that you need a long-
term, stable, and sustained investment in S&T transitioning to research
and development, validated through ongoing experimentation, with
transition to the fleet and force in a continuous cycle of progress.
It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of sustained
scientific effort: investment in research is always a long proposition.
We have seen some very quick delivery of new, advanced capabilities
already in this war. These can seem like overnight successes. Take the
thermobaric bombs our forces dropped on al Qaeda and Taliban positions
last year in Gardez, Afghanistan. That thermobaric fill--developed at
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Indian Head, and weaponized by the Navy
in collaboration with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Air
Force--was more than 30 years in preparation. This particular Naval
investment in basic, synthetic organic chemistry (for that's what
produced thermobarics) began in the late 1960s after the disastrous
accident and fire aboard U.S.S. Forrestal. So basic science answered a
Naval need, and the necessary work had been done to produce an
effective, new class of weapons. You might consider it an overnight
success that depended on 30 years of work.
With this in mind, I am pleased to report that the Department of
the Navy's S&T funding has shown real growth from fiscal year 2003 to
fiscal year 2004 (based on comparison of the President's budget
requests for those years). This is our positive response to the Defense
guidance and congressional mandates that have called for more Defense
S&T funding. During fiscal year 2004 budget development, the Department
of the Navy's S&T Future Years Defense Plan (Fiscal Year 2004-2009) was
increased by a net $1.45 billion.
The significant increases in fiscal year 2004 include programs that
are both transformational and bear directly on the current war:

Naval Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle +$98 million
National Aerospace Initiative--Supersonic Cruise
Missile +$22 million
Strategic Systems Infrastructure +$20 million
Joint Project Office--Special Technology
Countermeasures +$14 million
U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Tracking +$10 million

The Department of the Navy is gratified by consistent congressional
support of our S&T program. We trust that we are managing that support
effectively to achieve the objectives of our program.
We are particularly gratified by congressional interest in testing
and evaluation--we owe sailors and marines the assurance that the
systems we put in their hands work as advertised, especially when
they're delivered under wartime exigencies. Regarding, for example, the
Defense Test Resource Management Center Congress has recently mandated,
the Department of the Navy certainly supports the concept. We are
working with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics to support the establishment of this new
field activity, and we look forward to supporting its mission.
Let me return to my earlier theme of transformation in a time of
war. To keep perspective, recall that transformation occurs over the
near-term, mid-term, and long-term. Naval S&T is a sustained journey
from discovery to deployment in which innovation (invention) and
experimentation (validation) transform the operating forces. Because
this is a continuous cycle, we find technological advance in ``Today's
Navy and Marine Corps,'' the ``Next Navy and Marine Corps'' (roughly
the forces that will emerge over the next 5 to 15 years), and the
``Navy and Marine Corps After Next''--which we will see in 15 to 30
years.
How do we choose where we invest? We are guided by:

Programs for Rapid Response--immediate feedback from
the operating forces. We get this through participation in
experimentation with those forces, in exercises like Millennium
Challenge, through the Naval Research Science Advisors posted
to the staffs of each major Navy and Marine Corps Command, and
through our Tech Solutions initiative. When an immediate
challenge, problem, or opportunity lends itself to scientific
resolution, we are able to shift a relatively small but
nonetheless crucial investment to a decisive area.
National Naval Responsibilities--fields in which the
Department of the Navy is the only significant U.S. sponsor.
These include fields like Naval Engineering, Ocean Acoustics,
and Underwater Weaponry. If the Department of the Navy didn't
invest in them, it's unlikely that anyone would. It's vital to
keep such fields healthy, not only for the sake of our own
capabilities, but to avoid technological surprise as well.
Naval Science and Technology Grand Challenges--big,
difficult, challenges that, if met, could give us decisive
capabilities 15 to 30 years in the future. We encourage the
Nation's scientific community to achieve breakthroughs in
difficult but achievable scientific challenges like Naval
Battlespace Awareness, Advanced Electrical Power Sources for
the Navy and Marine Corps, Naval Materials by Design, and
Multifunctional Electronics for Intelligent Naval Sensors.
Future Naval Capabilities (FNCs)--programs to shape
the next Navy and Marine Corps. Developed and managed by
integrated product teams with members of the acquisition,
requirements, science and technology, resource, and above all
warfighter communities, the FNCs fill the gap that all too
often opens between S&T on the one hand and acquisition on the
other.

A great deal of our transformational effort is lodged in the FNCs.
S&T enable Navy transformation by achieving the FNCs' goals. The key to
successful transformation is the strong business partnership among
scientists, industry, requirements, acquisition, and warfighters.
The FNC process delivers maturing technology to acquisition program
managers for timely incorporation into platforms, weapons, sensors, and
process improvements. With a total investment of $577.6 million in
fiscal year 2002 and over $640 million in fiscal year 2003 and $500
million planned for fiscal year 2004, FNCs support the Secretary of the
Navy's goals to: (1) increase combat capability, (2) enhance personnel
performance, (3) introduce advanced technology, and (4) improve
business practices.
The Office of Naval Research devotes approximately two-thirds of
its 6.3 (advanced technology development) funds and about two-fifths of
its 6.2 (applied research) funds to FNCs. We currently have 12 approved
FNCs. I'll describe each one briefly, and provide the basics as to
where it fits into the Department of the Navy's concept of Sea Power
21:

Autonomous Operations--This program is pursuing a
dramatic increase in the performance and affordability of Naval
air, surface, ground, and underwater autonomous vehicles--
unmanned systems able to operate with a minimum of human
intervention and oversight. The Autonomous Operations FNC gives
us a great potential to operate effectively in what would
otherwise be denied areas. It contributes to Sea Shield and Sea
Strike. In fiscal year 2004, for example, we will transition
the Gladiator Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicle to the Marine
Corps. Gladiator is intended to support dismounted infantry
across the spectrum of conflict and throughout the range of
military operations. It will enhance tactical commanders'
ability to detect, identify, locate, or neutralize a broad
range of threats.
Capable Manpower--The focus here on affordable human-
centered systems that give our sailors and marines the ability
to operate effectively under conditions an enemy can barely
survive. The primary goal of this program is to get the right
person in the right job with the right training at the right
time in order to meet the needs of the Navy and Marine Corps. A
great deal of progress has been made in this last area. In
particular, two products have already transitioned: Models of
Navy Compensation and Personnel Behavior (MODCOMP)--a tool for
manpower analysts to rapidly develop retention forecasting
models through ready-access to relevant data sources, intuitive
linkage to highly sophisticated statistical tools, and export
capability to populate existing decision support tools, and
Comprehensive Officer Force Management Environment (CHROME)--a
tool for monitoring actual officer inventory behavior and a 12-
month loss-forecasting model to predict officer losses for each
primary category. Capable Manpower is most directly aligned
with Sea Warrior.
Electric Warships and Combat Vehicles--The future of
naval warfare is electric. Warships will have revolutionary
power plants that permit new hullforms and propulsors, reduce
manning, streamline logistics, power advanced sensors, and
enable future high energy and speed-of-light weapons. We have
already successfully demonstrated the essential elements of a
high temperature superconducting motor for the next generation
of warship, and a hybrid diesel-electric reconnaissance vehicle
for the Marines. This FNC is aligned most closely with Sea
Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing.
Fleet/Force Protection--We have very capable ships,
aircraft, and ground combat vehicles. It's our business to
ensure that they don't fall to the sorts of asymmetric threats
our enemies pose. This FNC, aligned with Sea Shield, is working
to develop effective organic means of protection: weapons,
sensors, countermeasures, stealth and damage control. It has
already transitioned Real Time Damage Detection, Assessment,
and Response to acquisition. As well, the President's budget
for fiscal year 2004 supports the execution of full-scale
development of an Integrated Torpedo Defense System for
protection of heavy combatants and amphibious forces operating
in the challenging littoral environment. This effort is the
culmination of support, from Congress, for torpedo defense R&D
activity over the past several years, and is focused on the
ability to rapidly deliver threat-sensitive capabilities to the
Navy's high value forward deployed assets.
Knowledge Superiority and Assurance--Information
technology is as crucial to Naval superiority as it is to any
other aspect of contemporary life. This program is developing
our ability to distribute integrated information in a dynamic
network with high connectivity and interoperability. It will
ensure knowledge superiority, common situational understanding,
and increased speed of command. Knowledge Web technology from
this program has been deployed with the U.S.S. Carl Vinson
Battle Group, engaging the enemy in Operation Enduring Freedom.
This FNC is a key enabler of FORCEnet.
Littoral Antisubmarine Warfare--This program is part
of our shift of emphasis to littoral, expeditionary operations.
The antisubmarine warfare challenge in coastal waters is a
tough one, so we focus scientific effort on enhancing our
ability to detect, track, classify, and engage enemy submarines
in a near-the-shore environment before they are close enough to
harm our forces. A number of products have already entered
acquisition from this program: the Environmentally Adaptive A/N
SQQ-89 sonar instrumented tow cable fibers and signal
processing, for example. Sea Shield will benefit from the
products of this FNC.
Littoral Combat and Power Projection--This FNC has two
major thrusts: Expeditionary Logistics (an important step
toward Sea-Basing) and Littoral Combat (essential to Sea
Strike). It focuses on deploying uniquely capable combat and
logistics systems necessary to deploy and sustain the Fleet and
the Force without building up a large logistical infrastructure
ashore. The program has already transitioned a baseline
logistics command and control system for expeditionary warfare.
Missile Defense--This program is directed at the
threat expeditionary forces face from cruise missiles. In
particular, it's working toward the ability to track and
destroy overland cruise missiles that threaten both ships at
sea and marines ashore. It will also contribute to our general
air defense capability through a single integrated air picture,
composite combat identification, distributed weapons control,
and overland intercept capability. This new capability will
greatly mitigate the likeliest and most dangerous air threat to
our forces. The Missile Defense FNC is nearing transition in
several of its product lines, including, for example, the
Reactive Materials Warhead and Affordable Ground-Based Radar.
Missile Defense forms an important part of Sea Shield, but this
shield is extended to cover forces ashore, as well.
Organic Mine Countermeasures--Mines are a cheap,
deniable, and able to infest the battlespace with a menace far
out of proportion to their numbers, mines have been and will
continue to be deployed against us by terrorists and their
state sponsors. We're working to give our forces an organic--
that is to say, an inherent--ability to detect, characterize,
and neutralize mines wherever they may be encountered. Closely
aligned with Sea Shield, this FNC has transitioned several
important products. One of them, the REMUS autonomous
underwater vehicle, is now in the hands of our operating
forces. It was pressed into service in the weeks immediately
following September 11 to help secure ports on both of our
coasts. REMUS emerged from a basic oceanographic research
program--another piece of evidence that overnight successes are
long in preparation.
Time Critical Strike--Here we are substantially
reducing the amount of time it takes to hit critical mobile
targets, like theater ballistic missiles, command centers, and
weapons of mass destruction. One of this FNC's products, the
Affordable Weapon (a loitering cruise-missile-like system that
can carry a variety of payloads) is being deployed to the
CENTCOM area of responsibility soon. Time Critical Strike is
aligned with Sea Strike.
Total Ownership Cost Reduction--This FNC is using
advanced design and manufacturing processes to decrease
significantly the cost of buying, operating, and maintaining
our systems. We are working to reduce total lifecycle costs,
and that includes obvious work in design and manufacturing as
well as less obvious savings realized from reduced manning,
better environmental compliance, and more sophisticated cost-
estimating tools. Aligned most especially with Sea Enterprise,
this FNC has transitioned a number of products to industry. One
example includes advanced coating techniques for hot-running
turbine engines.
Warfighter Protection--Improved casualty prevention,
care, and management are the goals of this FNC. Aligned with
Sea Shield and Sea Warrior, this program has already
transitioned a life-saving clot-inducing bandage to our forces
in Afghanistan.

Our investment portfolios are not built in isolation. The Defense
Reliance process integrates the Services' S&T programs while preserving
the healthy diversity of vision and approach that has given us the
technical agility we enjoy today. Our relations with the DARPA are
excellent and productive. Much of the Office of Naval Research's basic
and applied research investment is designed with a view to handing
scientific advances over to DARPA for further development and
exploitation. The Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle-Naval (UCAV-N) program is
an excellent example of this kind of collaboration.
I will now address some of our challenges concerning the health of
the Navy's Laboratories and Warfare Centers. The Naval Research and
Development Centers, which include the SYSCOM Warfare Centers, the
Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) and the Medical and Health Research
Centers, employ world-class technical experts who execute much of the
Navy's S&T portfolio, developing innovative solutions and
transformational capabilities for the Navy and Marine Corps. These
centers, spread throughout the United States, currently employ around
40,000 civilians, about half of who are scientists and engineers. They
perform cutting edge work upon which we depend to preserve its military
superiority. The effectiveness of the warfighting systems employed by
the Navy and Marine Corps of the future depends as much on investment
in these dedicated, capable civil servants as it does on the size of
the S&T budget itself.
The past decade's frequent downsizings, coupled with the declining
number of American students--particularly women and minorities pursuing
mathematics, engineering, and physical science degrees--has left us
with a dwindling pool of scientists and engineers available to become
the next generation of researchers. This situation jeopardizes our
ability to perform essential research in support of, ultimately,
sailors and marines.
Recent warnings about the decline of the Navy's S&T workforce come
from a variety of sources. In the Naval Institute's Proceedings, Dr.
James E. Colvard, former director of civilian personnel policy for the
Department of the Navy and chair of the panel that developed the
report, ``Civilian Workforce 2020, Strategies for Modernizing Human
Resources Management in the DoN'' notes the Navy has ``put its
institutional capability in science and engineering at peril.'' Colvard
also comments, ``The Navy has lowered its level of intellectual
involvement in research and development and weakened its entire
infrastructure, which at the end of WWII was the strongest in the
world.''
The DoN's ``Civilian Workforce 2020'' study pinpointed workforce
modernization as the defining issue pushing S&T revitalization. The
study concluded: ``It is not possible to achieve a functional workforce
that is prepared to meet the management, technical, and political
challenges of the future without investing financial resources and
leadership attention.''
Recently, a tri-Service laboratory study chartered by the Director,
Defense Research and Engineering, and carried out under the auspices of
the Naval Research Advisory Committee produced a report: Science and
Technology Community in Crisis. In the report, the panel commented that
all of the laboratories they visited reported that ``maintaining a
quality scientific and engineering staff is growing more difficult.''
The report continued: ``The real issue is not whether the laboratories
can muddle through under the current system and fill science and
engineering vacancies with entry-level personnel. It is whether they
can compete effectively for, and retain, the best and brightest
technical talent, e.g. the top 10 percent.''
A total commitment to improving our ability to attract and retain a
cadre of world-class scientists and engineers will be necessary to meet
the simultaneous challenges of performing transformational research
while replenishing the aging talent base. Simple demographics show that
over the next 10 years we will lose most of our current workforce.
Although some organizations are holding their own in recruitment, many
indicators are going negative, and managers report greater difficulty
in hiring quality scientific personnel. If we cannot invest at an
appropriate level in promising research scientists and engineers today,
we believe that the options and opportunities the Naval R&D labs and
center have provided our fighting forces for more than the past 60
years or more will begin a decline that will be difficult to reverse.
The Navy has launched an initiative called ``N-STAR''--Naval
Science and Technology for Advancing Revitalization. This program is
addressing the personnel issues associated with: refreshing our
technical workforce with the small pool of recruits available to fill
positions vacated by retiring scientist and engineers, and with the
professional and technical enhancement of the current workforce as they
move into senior positions at the Naval Research and Development
Centers. N-STAR is a collaborative effort, concentrating on integrated
relationships with partners within the university community and other
Federal agencies interested in the future of the Nation's scientific
and engineering workforce.
In fiscal year 1995, Congress provided the Department of Defense
labs with the opportunity to test a variety of new personnel tools.
Section 342 of the Fiscal Year 1995 National Defense Authorization Act
permitted some of our labs and centers to implement a number of
personnel reforms not previously available. The personnel initiatives
being tested under this program have broad acceptance and are achieving
very positive results.
For several years now, the Department of Defense has been actively
testing many management flexibilities, i.e. pay banding, pay for
performance and simplified classification. Acknowledging the success of
the demonstration projects and alternate personnel systems, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness began a review of the
personnel management flexibilities already in use within the Federal
Government. Multi-component, multi-functional work teams and senior
functional executives completed this yearlong review that identified
``best practices''--those with the highest rate of success. The Office
of the Secretary of Defense is considering many of these best practices
for inclusion in a legislative proposal on human resource management.
In conclusion, the return on the Nation's investment is clear.
Naval transformation depends on a long-term, stable, and sustained
investment in S&T, validated through ongoing experimentation and
transition to the warfighter in a continuing cycle.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to share with the
subcommittee some of the good things the Navy is doing in the S&T
world.

Senator Roberts. It is the chair's intention to have 6-
minute rounds, and as many of those as members would like. In
the order of recognition, it will be Senator Reed, Senator
Dole, Senator Kennedy, Senator Cornyn, and then I will bat
clean-up.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen, for your testimony today, and let me start off by
asking each of you if you agree with--and this is not a trick
question--the Secretary of Defense that the goal for S&T should
be 3 percent of the DOD budget.
Secretary Wynne?
Secretary Wynne. Sir, I think we need a benchmark. Against
that benchmark you measure yourself for progress, and 3 percent
is an appropriate benchmark.
Senator Reed. General Kern?
General Kern. Senator, I think the 3 percent is a good goal
for us all to meet each year. It has its challenges as we try
to reach those levels, but I think as Secretary Wynne has
suggested it is a very good benchmark.
Senator Reed. General Lyles?
General Lyles. Senator, I also agree. I think it is a great
benchmark. Personally I hope we can exceed it one day in the
future, but it is a great benchmark for us to try to achieve
right now.
Senator Reed. Admiral Dyer?
Admiral Dyer. Short answer, yes, but with a comment, if I
may.
Senator Reed. Yes, sir.
Admiral Dyer. We are blessed in the Navy right now with the
products of S&T that are supporting us in programs like Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF) and into the E-2 program and to emergence
in networkcentric warfare, so in a sense our success in S&T in
previous years is presenting us with opportunities to
transition and actually procure those technologies today, such
that there is an ebbing and flowing of S&T and the product of
it.
We are challenged with the affordability of doing
everything all the time, but we are enjoying today the previous
investment of S&T.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Admiral Dyer.
Let me begin, Admiral Dyer, with a follow-up question for
each of the panel. Projections suggest that the S&T funding
will go down by 2009 to about 2.4 percent, and the question I
have, what are the risks that we are going to run if this level
of funding is projected over the next several years?
I think you suggested, everyone suggested, we have a
problem retaining scientists. That is one risk. We might have a
potential risk that other countries that are developing high-
tech sectors like China or India, just for example, can begin
to match our efforts and begin to erode our advantages. I do
not know if you want to comment on those points. There might be
other risks, too. But Admiral Dyer, and then everyone else.
Admiral Dyer. We have great discussions in my organization
across the Navy that says, how much S&T is required. The answer
is enough, and a benchmark is required, but it is hard to know
exactly what that is. You draw an important nexus, I think, and
that is this relationship between S&T funding and people,
because to keep scientists and engineers, we have to give them
exciting work to do. They have to be a part of it, and they
have to feel their effect in the future. That is the thing that
can hire people away, and we think that it is critically
important.
Senator Reed. General Lyles.
General Lyles. Senator Reed, I agree with Joe Dyer in terms
of how we define what is enough or what is not enough.
Certainly we think we need to maintain a robust program, and
the way I see it, because of the balance that we have to look
across the board to other investments, we need to put
priorities on where we allocate the dollars.
Certainly taking care of the critical S&T workforce is
number 1, making sure we maintain emphasis on cutting-edge
technologies like nanotechnology and biotechnology, which have
tremendous opportunities to leverage significant things in the
future. We should not let that melt away, but because it is
going to be very tough for all of us to just get to 3 percent
right away, what I would like to see, and what we are trying to
do in the Air Force, is make sure we are doing a better job of
leveraging the similar activities that go on in the Services,
other agencies in DOD, or even other agencies outside of DOD.
I think for instance, nanotechnology is an obvious one.
Each one of us mentioned that, but I dare say all of our
nanotechnology programs are harmonized. If we cannot meet the 3
percent, at the very least we need to make sure where we have
common goals, common technologies, that we bring those things
together and leverage the dollars that we have so we do not
fall back.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Kern.
General Kern. I would agree with all of the previous
comments. There are two areas in particular I think that we are
at risk of falling behind. Clearly the one is the nanosciences,
which we see emerging as a very bright potential right now for
many of the problems that we face in weight reduction, reducing
our footprint and increasing survivability. The second is in
the area of quantum computing, which we are beginning to see
some demonstrations of its applicability, but we clearly have a
long way to go before it becomes practical.
The third point I would make is that there are other
countries, two in particular, that have a billion people each,
India and China, which have many brilliant people. Their
investments in those areas and their studying in this country
will bring many of those ideas outside of the continental
United States to worldwide access, and so we will be challenged
to keep up with them both economically and from a security
standpoint if we allow ourselves to fall behind.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Wynne. There is really a two-part answer that I
think is necessary here. Part one is that the things that we
can see out into the outyears, we can cost, and what is
happening is, the things that we can see in S&T are percentage-
wise less than the things we can see in procurement, operation
and maintenance (O&M), health costs, things that make up the
top line.
One of the unique features about S&T is that you know what
you know today. You cannot see very clearly beyond 24 months,
so one of the things that happens to us is, our ideas begin to
shrink, if you will, relative to the pressing needs and the
must-pay bills of health care, people, and the procurement
accounts. But as time nears, what we find that we do is, we
have postulated, for example, real growth. We have improved our
accounts over 25 percent the last 2 years, and we can see very
clearly the benefits of that coming out.
That does not mean that in 2007 or 2008 when we get there
the numbers will actually be 2.4. It is what we can see today.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. My time has
expired.
Senator Roberts. Senator Dole.
Senator Dole. First of all, as has been mentioned
previously, transitioning technology into warfighter capability
continues to be a real challenge. Some Special Forces programs
have been able to transition technology from the concept to
capability at much faster pace, primarily due to Major Force
Program-11 (MFP-11) funding. I am wondering if, as acquisitions
chiefs, you have had an opportunity to explore the possibility
of transition-type funding, nonprogram-specific, that would be
a way to more rapidly field some of the most promising
technology.
General Lyles. Senator Dole, just speaking for the Air
Force, I think we have looked at ways that we could get the
benefits of MFP-11, as Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has
it, without necessarily coming up with a new appropriations
cycle just the way they have today.
We are trying to ensure that, as we look at all of our
technology programs, we work closer with our warfighters, the
operational users, because in the Air Force, they are the ones
that actually fund the transition dollars. By setting up some
established programs and processes that we call the applied
technology council, we actually have their vote and their say
and input into the technology programs and their commitment to
put transition dollars in the budget so we can quickly get a
mature technology into their hands.
That is similar to, in some respects, some of the benefits
of MFP-11, but it allows us to attain that without again going
through a whole different appropriations process like that, so
we are trying to get the benefits without necessarily changing
the way we do things.
Senator Dole. Would others like to comment on that?
Secretary Wynne. Senator Dole, I would like to just add
that we have an ACTD process, each of the Services has an
advanced technology demonstration process. Each of those, the
problem is transitioning into the actual fielding and
warfighting. I think one of the things that SOCOM has done
pretty well is, they have followed up with funding promising
technologies in the outyears. But I will tell you also that
under the advanced concept technology development we have all
the warfighters show up at what is called a breakfast club, and
they do quite a bit of feedback into the system. We have, in
fact, fielded quite a few things that have come through that,
and are currently fielding, or being requested to field, other
things.
It has to do a lot with laying in the logistics and
training, and the compactness of the SOCOM is something that we
could all learn.
Senator Dole. Thank you. Please, go ahead, General.
General Kern. I was just going to add, Senator, that we do
work across those boundaries today. We have memorandums of
agreement and research centers that we share with the Special
Operations community. We are taking advantage of the work, but
more importantly the processes, I think, which they have used
to expedite technology to the field, and that has allowed us to
copy some of the things that they have done both in a process
and the technologies themselves, and bring them into the rest
of the force.
Senator Dole. Thank you.
Secretary Wynne, let me ask you about the Medical Free
Electron Program. I understand this is a merit-based research
program, currently involves five academic centers, including
Duke University. It is peer-reviewed, competitively awarded,
and the application of this research ranges across the board
from surgical advances to improvements in wound-healing, burn
technology, burn recovery especially. Last year the funding was
moved from the DOD to National Institutes of Health (NIH), and
then Congress moved the funding from NIH back to DOD with a
reduction in the funding, and that continues this year.
I know that many programs are able to adapt through
adjusted levels of effort, but then there are others where it
is a necessity to cut personnel, and where delays ensue because
of this uncertainty in terms of the funding. I wonder if you
could tell us more about your efforts to identify programs with
tangible potential and what you are doing to stabilize the
year-to-year funding for these programs, and I just mentioned,
you referred to the ACTDs.
In this same vein, a lot of small technology niche
companies often shy away from DOD projects, I understand,
because of the uncertainty of the year-to-year funding. How can
reduced cycle times and a greater use of the ACTDs encourage
more private industry participation in the DOD approach?
Secretary Wynne. The application of FAR part 12 has, in
fact, induced many companies to come on board, even small ones.
One of the transformational proposals we are making to you is
to try to extend that to production. One of the things that FAR
part 12 does is, it allows, if you will, the forgiveness
against all of the FAR regulations, which are fairly dense and
are, in fact, an inhibit to a small businessman because he
immediately needs a lawyer.
Now, after we get through the development program, we are
now faced with fronting the first production contract that we
would award if we want to really move out and field a finding,
and now we do not have the authority to award under FAR part
12. We would like to get that. It results in the fact that you
get a small business, they develop a really good thing, and
then at the end of the day we confront them with a production
contract that is three times as thick as the one they signed
before, and it contains several civil penalties for various
nefarious crimes, like not reading the document. They tend to
drop out at that point, and that is really a problem that we
are faced with.
I would tell you that your support of the Quick Reaction
funding is really a big benefit, whether it be through the ACTD
process, the ATD process, or, in fact, several of the grant
monies that you give to DARPA. All of this is a tremendous
benefit to us in stabilizing the funding.
As opposed to the Medical Free Electron Program, we do feel
like it was a better fit over in the NIH, frankly, but it may
have been needed to follow up with a direction to them as to
how to proceed. I know that many of you all see the benefits of
using the Department of Defense is that we do, in fact, follow
through on things, and we appreciate that, but in that
particular instance I still would tell you that it probably is
better over in the NIH, because it has a lot more application
here domestically.
Senator Dole. Thank you. My time has expired. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Roberts. Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much. All of us want to
thank all of our witnesses here and those that are behind them
as representatives of our fighting men and women abroad. You
may get tired of hearing of it, but we are deeply grateful to
you, and we are also enormously grateful to you for the
technology that has been developed.
This is a lot of hard work. You have enormous competition
within the various services for a lot of different kinds of
issues, but I think if we have the best technology with the
best-trained and the most highly motivated and skilled service
men and women, the technology is really as a result of the work
that has been done by all of you and your predecessors. This is
an incredibly important issue and an incredibly important
hearing.
I will come back, just generally, to the labs generally in
my second or third question if I have the time. I would like to
get to the issue of the command and control in intelligence.
One of the great tragedies that we have seen in the engagement
in Iraq in these past weeks is the fact that so many
servicemen, particularly the British, have lost lives because
of the information or identification, whether it was the
incidents in the helicopters, or whether it is the Patriot, or
whether it is friendly fire incidents which we have had
recently.
The importance of this kind of command and control in
intelligence even seems to be much more important today than
ever before because of the sophistication of these kinds of
weapons or weapons systems and their complexities. I am
interested if you could comment about whether we are doing
enough in this area. I would ask General Lyles whether this has
enough support or should we be doing more? Are you satisfied
that we are doing enough?
General Lyles. Senator Kennedy, I think you hit it right on
the head. This is increasingly a force multiplier in everything
that we do in our military applications today. We realize that,
and we are putting more emphasis on and more resources into
command and control, intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance, and ensuring that all of the programs that we
are working on are networkcentric, that they are all linked
together, that we have an opportunity to achieve what our Chief
of Staff, General John Jumper likes to refer to, machine-to-
machine movement of data, movement of knowledge to allow us to
better command and better control our forces.
Senator Kennedy. I know you could go on. I just want to
hear both in terms of the Army and the Navy, too, you have your
own kind of centers of command and control. What is your own
kind of evaluation of the progress that you are making? How do
you all work together? How does that sort of integrate
together? What are the areas that you think need to be
strengthened, or did you find out that important progress has
been made recently? What can you tell us just quickly, and then
I want to come to one last question.
General Kern. Senator, I will go first and then let Admiral
Dyer continue.
One of the improvements we have made in recent years is a
system today we call blue force tracking, which we fielded to
the members of the Armed Forces in Southwest Asia right now. If
you can remember the studies that were done in the last gulf
war, there are two parts to understanding where people are on
the battlefield so that you can identify them correctly. One is
a direct interrogation system and the other is a sense of the
battlefield, situational awareness, as we have called it.
The blue force tracking allows us to develop that sense of
awareness, or a situational understanding of where forces are
on the battlefield so that you can identify friend from foe by
their position location and not engage on the friendly forces.
That has helped, but it is not as pervasive, clearly, as we
would like it to be because we do not have 100 percent of the
battlefield today, so it is clearly an area where we could use
more.
I would tell you from my own personal experiences, and
there is no such thing as friendly fire, wherever you get fires
from it becomes hostile, and we need to continue to put
investments in both sides of that equation so that you have
interrogation as well as complete, 100 percent situational
understanding.
Senator Kennedy. Admiral Dyer.
Admiral Dyer. The Department of the Navy, and especially
the Marine Corps, participate in blue force tracking as well,
so I absolutely agree with the comments made by the other
witnesses.
However, I think it is constructive to think about the
construct a bit broader. As we in the Naval Service think so
much and rally around networkcentric warfare, that is a piece
and part of it.
General Kern, if I could quote an Army general officer
friend of mine, I was told the other day that in the Naval
Service we make networkcentric warfare way too complicated. He
said that it is really the answer to the Army's two oldest
questions, which is, where are the bad guys and oh, by the way,
where are we? [Laughter.]
General Kern. Communicating that information on a network
is the solution to this problem. It does require some
rewickering of priorities, however. For years and years, I
think, within the Army at least, we have looked at platforms,
weapons, sensors, and links in that priority. To solve this
problem and to really leverage networkcentric warfare, you have
to take that construct and turn it over, and we have to look
early on in our investment strategies to links, the
communication between folks on the ground, in the air, on the
surface, and beneath the surface, and then the capability to
sense where they are and communicate it.
Senator Kennedy. I would just say that this is enormously
important and obvious. We have been on the Armed Services
Committee long enough to know the lessons we learned from
Grenada and others just in this very area. I am interested in
how we are going to continue to make all this progress when you
also have sort of this base realignment and closure (BRAC)
holding over your head in terms of what is going to happen in
terms of the laboratories.
This will be my final question. Secretary Wynne, your
memoranda for the Director of Defense Research and Engineering,
and Deputy Under Secretary (Laboratories and Basic Sciences),
from October of last year, and you mentioned, ``the conclusion
that I drew is that labs are out of favor and no longer have a
constituency within parent organizations, their budgets are
cut, people are discouraged, overall, utility is in question.''
Then you make a suggestion about organizing a commission to
identify the laboratories, imperative for the defense to retain
the structure on this.
I would be interested whether that commission has been set
up. No one can listen to the reports here and not understand
the importance and significance over the long-term--
particularly in the areas of education, and you are talking
about workforce, which is another whole kind of area, if you
could comment, Secretary Wynne. Was this commission set up?
We do not want to discourage at a time when we want to keep
these laboratories performing at top speed, and the need, given
our new challenges is so significant. What can you tell us
about whether this commission has been set up and also what the
impact of these laboratories is going to be in terms of looking
out after, running through a whole process in terms of the
whole BRAC process?
Secretary Wynne. Senator, let me put a little bit of
perspective. I received a briefing from a group called ENRAC
who, in fact, postulated many of the same issues that you
stipulated in my note, and I felt an absolute responsibility to
alert the remainder of the services if they had not been aware
that this was the course of at least the feelings from their
ranks. In fact, I did that, and the response from my three
coconspirators here as well as the Director of Laboratories and
the Director of Research and Engineering was remarkable. They
are putting together a group that has really professed to
improve the quality of the laboratories. The intent of the memo
was to spark, if you will, a renewed management intention to
the laboratories and the situation that the laboratories were
reflecting. I think the response, like I say, has been
fantastic in that each of the laboratories will now tell you
that their connection to the service has grown stronger ever
since.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much. My time is up.
Senator Roberts. So you were not being a critic, you were
being a Dutch uncle and a Jiminy Cricket.
Secretary Wynne. Yes, sir.
Senator Roberts. I see. The conclusion that I drew is that
the labs are out of favor and no longer have a constituency
with parent organizations. Their budgets are cut, people are
discouraged, and their overall utility is in question. This, of
course, then alerted them that there might be a problem.
Secretary Wynne. I think the response was exactly that,
sir.
Senator Roberts. I would guess that would be a response.
Never mind what they would say, but they have said it to you,
in other words.
Secretary Wynne. It was excellent, yes, sir. I heard it
from several sources. [Laughter.]
Senator Roberts. You had meaningful dialogue and you got a
response.
Secretary Wynne. Yes, sir.
Senator Roberts. Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to each
of you for appearing today before the subcommittee. There is
obviously little doubt that strong S&T programs are critical to
the true transformation of the armed services. I enjoyed coming
by the demonstration the other day and experiencing the pain, I
guess, that victims of directed energy weapons can feel,
although fortunately it was on a small scale.
But my State plays an important role in research and
development in this area, and so I have really just three quick
areas I want to just cover. One involves small business
innovation research programs. This program is critical to
supporting much cutting-edge research currently being conducted
by small businesses throughout the country.
I understand that while phase 1 and phase 2 funding appear
to be working relatively well, that there are some problems
when it comes to phase 3 funding, which I guess requires
private sector or other than Department of Defense funding. I
wondered if each of you might take the opportunity, if you have
something to add on this, to comment about what you are doing
to improve opportunities for small businesses to receive phase
3 funding.
General Kern. We held a conference this past year with all
of our small businesses specifically looking at Small Business
Innovative Research (SBIR) programs. We have one small business
in Massachusetts who has managed to break the code, I guess I
would say, on phase 3 funding, and has continuously been able
to implement that. We have asked them to put together some
lessons learned for all of the other small businesses which we
are sharing this year and we will continue to hold conferences.
In addition, we hold an annual conference with small
businesses in which we invite large business in as well so that
they can see what work is being done and get promises so that
the two then can match up capabilities with some of their
funding opportunities. We have found that that has been a very
positive influence, because most of the larger corporations are
coming to look for the good ideas that are being generated in
the start-ups that we have had in phase 1 and phase 2.
The last area in many of our conferences that we hold now,
we have also, in the past, had the small businesses somewhat
separated, and we find that now, by including them in the
center of our efforts, that they are getting a lot more
attention, and in the area of where new technologies are
emerging today, the business is beginning to flow their way.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
General Lyles. Senator, we have some similar initiatives to
what Paul Kern mentioned for the United States Army. I find
that we put a lot of emphasis on small businesses in general,
and we work that very hard. To be honest with you, I am not
quite sure if we work the Small Business Innovative Research
program in the same manner, and this is one area where I think
we can put a lot more efforts towards it.
I came back to this particular command from having
commanded or directed the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization, and there I found that almost everything that we
are doing in missile defense has some roots to some small
business-innovated research somewhere downstream, somewhere in
the past, and I came back to it with the commitment that we are
going to try to revitalize that effort within the Air Force. I
cannot tell you that we have succeeded yet, but at last there
is a model that we can follow from another agency that I think
can apply to what we are doing in the United States Air Force.
Admiral Dyer. In the Naval Service, we have been spying on
the CIA. [Laughter.]
By that, I mean their approach to venture capital. While we
would apply it differently and use a different model of
spinning out technology to the commercial sector, then spinning
it back in for defense-related efforts we think is a very
productive one.
We had a wonderful occasion just a few months ago where we
took some two dozen venture capitalists from all over the
country, hand-selected, out aboard a carrier to see us work in
our environment. We think we have them excited, we are excited
about filling just this gap, of bringing commercial funding to
bear to further S&T efforts and to transition them.
Senator Cornyn. That is very encouraging.
My second question has to do with the decrease in 6.1
funding for primary research, and I noticed in looking at the
various charts reflecting the direction of this research,
everybody seems to be heading south. Could you explain your
reasons for cutting back on 6.1 funding, and do you think this
is going to impact our current transformation efforts, cutting
back on expenditures for primary research?
Secretary Wynne.
Secretary Wynne. Thank you very much, Senator. I would
first say that this is a cyclic enterprise. Many of the ideas
that we funded in 6.1 are being realized in 6.2 and 6.3, so it
kind of looks a little bit like a porpoise or a sign wave in
the sense of. I think right now we are benefitting from some of
the research that was done in 6.1, whether it be hybrid fuel
cells and/or whether it be the nanosciences or some of the
other stuff.
My sense is now we are about to increase that again in the
biologic sciences, which, by the way, has been the largest
creator of patents over the course of the last 18 months. We
have actually not funded at the rate at which the patents have
been developed.
My take on that, sir, is that I think you will find that in
a given year it could be a little bit down, but in a given year
it could be way up.
Senator Cornyn. If any of you have anything you would like
to supplement that with, please go ahead.
General Kern. I would add three things. First, there has
been a reduction in the cycle time, particularly as we have
seen in the communications electronics area, so that what had
been a process of transitioning from 6.1, 6.2, into the
production, today can go very fast, and cycle times are
measured in 18 months in many of these S&Ts, so they do not
necessarily fit the pattern of funding which we have
established over the past few years.
Second, we have been a procurement holiday literally for
the last 12 years. We have not purchased new systems, and so in
the years ahead, we must take the technology developments and
cycle them back into product and get them into the hands of our
soldiers to replace those existing systems that are out there
today. That is challenging us on the level of funding which we
are able to maintain and sustain in the basic research area.
Finally, I think it asks for a little bit more flexibility
to take advantage of what is emerging. As I mentioned earlier,
we are starting these university-affiliated research centers,
and we are looking for the mechanisms there to support the 6.1
research at the university level, and, at the same time,
rapidly transition it into development efforts.
General Lyles. Senator, just one similar comment to
Secretary Wynne. It does seem to be cyclic. Fiscal year 2004
and fiscal year 2005 are transition times for us in our 6.1
program. We are actually increasing, as we look at it in 2005.
The objective is to try to keep the 6.1 up as much as we can
because of the obvious benefits.
Admiral Dyer. The Navy has historically been very
aggressive in this area. Our funding of the universities
throughout the Nation reflects it. It is always difficult, and
takes tremendous discipline in times of affordability, but we
are dedicated to sustain it.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. Chairman, my time is up. Thank you.
Senator Roberts. We thank you, Senator. I have an
observation in regards to Senator Kennedy's very timely
question in reference to the command and control in the
intelligence community and the warfighter in the field. Having
the privilege of being the chairman of the Intelligence
Committee, which by the way is not an oxymoron----[Laughter.]
--let me say that Senator Levin, Senator Rockefeller,
Senator Warner, and I went on a congressional delegation, a
forced march, six countries in 5 days, but we spent a great
deal of time in Doha and in Kuwait, and we were very impressed
with the way the stovepipes are coming down. As a matter of
fact, holding numerous hearings in this subcommittee and being
a member of the Intelligence Committee for 6 years, why, I
never thought I would see the changes rapidly develop as they
have. Nothing like an exercise called Iraq to make that happen,
but in terms of the big picture, that commander in the field, I
would tell the Senator that Headquarters Doha in real-time
intelligence is delivering that to the lance corporal or the
private first class or, for that matter, the lieutenant or the
staff sergeant. It is very impressive.
Of course, at the same time we got hit with the mother of
all sand storms, and a threat that gives terrorism a new name
in terms of conduct, recognized by everybody with the exception
of Peter Arnett.
At any rate, I was impressed with the jointness, but I am
troubled. In the millennium exercise, it has been well-
publicized in the press, and we asked this question during the
last hearing. I think I asked the question a year ago where the
red team defeated the blue team, and as soon as they did, they
said, okay, stop, take a lock, take a lock, we are going to
continue the exercise, and he was using--he meaning General van
Ryper--the same kind of asymmetrical tactics that are being
used today in Iraq. Every time he won, he won three straight
times, we stopped the exercise and we started over. I asked the
question of Larry Myers, what is going on here, and of course
the answer we got back, it said there is about a 50-50
proposition. You have to finish the exercise, but these lessons
are lessons learned.
Would any of you have any comment on that in terms of the
exercise and more especially the van Ryper suggestions? I could
call them complaints, but I will label them suggestions.
Secretary Wynne. I would say that I know General van Ryper,
and he is one of the most imaginative combatants that we could
have picked as the red team commander, and actually a really
fun guy to be around in that regard, very imaginative.
One of the things I wanted to advise you is that we are, in
fact, causing interoperability to be more and more of a watch
phrase in our forces. We are finding out that is a real plus to
situational awareness, when they can actually use the same
symbology, use the same, if you will, signals to advise, be
they Air Force, Army, or Navy, or the Marines for that matter,
and getting the coalition forces on that same interoperable
standard has been a real plus during this engagement, and I
think there is yet more to come.
I think part of the situation that you are faced with there
in Millennium Challenge 2002, and there may be some of my
colleagues who are more familiar with it than I was, but when I
went down to get my briefing on it, it is true that they were a
force with an opening gambit, almost like in a chess game, that
it was checkmate before they got their pawns released, and I
think there is no better thing to do than to reboot the system
and sort of replace the warriors and say, hey, can we play that
game again.
I think the lessons learned from the first couple, in fact,
have been fed forward into the Services, and I think that is
probably one of the reasons we can be as flexible as we are
when faced with these--I think the word perfidy was used, but
very pernicious attacks that have been made upon our troops.
Senator Roberts. When you look out 20 years in the future,
this is for all of you gentlemen, what technological challenge
in future threat concerns you the most? Pick one. What
challenge? What threat? What are you worried about the most?
What keeps you up at night?
General Kern. I will tell you that from my perspective on
the ground force, I worry about two things, both of which are
objectives of our S&T. The first is our footprint, and what
that does in terms of restricting our agility and flexibility
on the battlefield. So one of our objectives of our future
combat systems and all of our work is to reduce the burden on
the field commanders through S&T.
That gets at some of the earlier discussions of hybrid
electrics, lighter-weight materials, much better active
protection systems, and armor protection that will allow us to
have a series of systems that are less demanding of fuel and
maintenance on our future battlefields.
The second area that I worry about are the asymmetric-type
threats that we are seeing today, to be able to identify
essentially the terrorist wearing a bomb, and to be able to
detect them from any other person who might be in the area that
we see, and so that is a threat which is both here in the
homeland and on the battlefields, as we are seeing today.
General Lyles. Mr. Chairman, I share the second concern
that General Kern mentioned. The asymmetric threat is the one
that concerns me, and we are trying to put a lot of
intellectual capital to figure out how can either today's
technologies, or the technologies we are working on in the
laboratory, can that help us to counter that particular threat.
We are still looking at different ways.
The second area is space.
Senator Roberts. Give me an example. Give me a specific
example of what kind of technological superiority, other than
the thing that burned into my finger in your demonstration--
actually, it did not burn it. It just heated up.
General Lyles. Well, that is exactly the one that we have
been talking about recently. If we had this directed energy
millimeter wave technology that would allow us to repel forces
without killing them, we can then give an opportunity for our
forces to sort out who is bad and who is not.
Senator Roberts. Okay, and that had a range of 750 yards,
as I recall, or something of that nature.
General Lyles. Yes, sir.
Senator Roberts. Okay. I am sorry. We will continue the
question. My time has expired and I will go right to Senator
Reed, but first Admiral Dyer.
Admiral Dyer. Very quickly, 20 years, if you look forward
20 years, the specialty software is closing our leadership gap,
so the ability to leapfrog or to transform into the future is
the one that I would give you, sir.
As we go to speed-of-light weapons and their associated
intensity, it is power generation on the large scale, power
storage, and the ability to attend to electromagnetic
interference to our own systems, and to be able to operate it
with stealth, are the technologies that I would give you, sir.
Secretary Wynne. I would just like to add information
assurance. We are so becoming focused on C\4\ISR, and we are
using it to the hilt, and it is great, but it takes a matter of
trust. The individual soldier, when he hears over his earpiece,
or looks on his screen, he must trust that that information is
accurate and complete, and the day it becomes inaccurate or
incomplete, we have to start over, so information assurance is
the thing that concerns me the most 20 years away.
General Lyles. Mr. Chairman, if I could add one other thing
that I was going to bring up, and that is space, space
technology and space capabilities. The phrase, we own the
night, is certainly appropriate today. You could also say that
for space, we own space. We cannot allow anything to ever
jeopardize the tremendous advantage we have from our space
systems, and we have to make sure that they are always
protected also.
Senator Roberts. I thank you for that.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
During the first round, several comments were made about
the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) and also about
the laboratory workforce demonstration program. These
demonstration programs I find to be very popular. The Naval
Undersea Warfare Center at Newport has such a demonstration
program they find extremely useful in retaining scientists,
having the flexibility to run a lab, which is much different
from any other military organizations.
The fear I think I have heard expressed is that this NSPS
will be one size fits all and will really leave the labs out in
terms of the flexibility, the creativity, the uniqueness that
they have, so Mr. Secretary and then gentlemen, can you comment
upon these issues?
Secretary Wynne. Right now I would tell you that when the
NSPS arrives here in Congress, which we hope is in short order,
I think you will see that it has tremendous flexibility beyond
the expected. That having been said, the Office of Personnel
Management has in their hands the DOD-released best practices,
where we have assembled the best practice from each of the
laboratory demos and intend to turn that back to them so that
they could cherry-pick the one that they felt was most
applicable to their particular laboratory situation.
We expect that will be published in the National Register
and cleared within 30 days, so we are really excited about
that.
The accommodation that you have given all of the
laboratories over the years has been very well used, all the
way back to, as I mentioned, the China Lake demonstration, but
yet the laboratories are, in fact, special purpose areas, and
we intend to see that they do have their continued flexibility,
sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General Kern.
General Kern. Thank you, Senator. The laboratory demo
programs have been extremely beneficial to us over the years,
and we have learned lots of new ways of managing personnel and
providing the right incentives. That has been a very positive
incentive that you have given us.
On the other hand, we ended up with such a proliferation of
them that it inhibited some migration between laboratories of
people who were afraid to leave one personnel system to move to
another, and so that was one of the challenges that we were all
trying to find what was the best solution amongst all of those
demo programs.
I think the solution that is being proposed has some of the
attributes that we are looking for out of the best practices of
all of those lab demo programs. I was also surprised to some
extent to find some of the negative feedback I was getting from
many of our research centers on the lack of flexibility they
thought it presented. I, as a result, had a fairly detailed
discussion with Dr. Chu on where we are going on that, and he
was listening. So I think many of the concerns are being taken
in and, as Secretary Wynne has suggested, when the program
comes forward, they will be addressed in the proposals that
will be made.
I also believe that it is something that we will not
probably solve the first time around. It is going to take some
iteration to find the right combination, but we all agree that
we need some new personnel systems both in science and
engineering as well as across the Department of Defense.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General.
General Lyles.
General Lyles. Senator Reed, we also have been very pleased
with our lab demo project since 1997. The flexibility it
provides us and the way it has allowed us to do something I
think is very significant, to change the culture of our
scientist and engineering workforce, and to improve overall
performance to make sure that we are paying people and
rewarding people as a result of contributions or results, not
just because they are sitting at the job.
They have broad band pay levels and simplified
classification system. Those three attributes are the things we
passed through to Dr. Chu and to others. We think they are
being listened to, as the NSPS proposed, but those kinds of
flexibilities, we think, are paramount to continue that
success.
Senator Reed. Thank you. Admiral.
Admiral Dyer. Senator Reed, I was at China Lake during the
genesis of that demonstration program. I believed then and I
continue to believe that the attributes of the marketplace
reflecting in Government personnel pay for performance, a
simplified classification system, and perhaps surprisingly most
of all I would give you speed. If we are to hire and retain a
creditable technical workforce in the future, we have to be at
parity with regard to the answers we can give people with
regard to their hiring, with regard to their pay, and with
regard to their classification.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Mr. Secretary, the Total Information Awareness (TIA)
Program started off with some rather grandiose goals, ``all-
encompassing megadata base,'' which presumptively would be
manipulated to do interesting things.
Since that time, there has been some discussion about what
those goals might be. Secretary Aldridge was before the
committee, and he talked about there is just some connections
between airline tickets and other publicly commercial data
bases. What are the goals right now, from your perspective?
Secretary Wynne. Right now, sir, it is the creation of
advanced analysis tools. The models that are being talked of
are what drive the analysis tools. There are translation
programs which would assist people when the data base they are
being permissively searched is in a foreign language, and the
tools are being developed using synthetic data bases for the
most part, so that there is no aspect of privacy possibilities.
We have put lots of policies in place to scale back any
potential aspirations that were mentioned, but it is our
intention to provide these tools to people who are, in fact,
empowered or legally advised that have databases that can
therefore use them in the absence of DARPA support.
DARPA is a builder of tools for warfighters, be they
information warfighters or physical warfighters. We do not, at
DARPA, fight wars. We provide those tools to warfighters. We
will not, at DARPA, investigate data bases so much as to
provide people who have the legal authority to investigate data
bases.
It has been used, for example, in the instance of on
Guantanamo, when they had a whole series of interviews with the
prisoners. They used that very model, to find out what the
difference between dirt farmers and potential terrorists were,
and I think it really helped in the recent release program.
Senator Reed. Can I just follow up, Mr. Secretary? Mr.
Aldridge has created an oversight board, and also there is a
report required by the Wyden amendment. Can you update us on
the status of these aspects?
Secretary Wynne. The oversight board has been published.
Mr. Minow is the chairman of that board. We have candidates who
are undergoing the standards-of-conduct interviews and the
financial transaction disclosures that all of us have to go
through. We hope that does not cause any fallout, but I do not
think it will. These are pretty dedicated Americans who are
very concerned with civil liberties. I think that will be good.
The secondary board is an internal board that consists of
Secretary Aldridge as the chair and Secretary Feith and
Secretary Zakheim as cochairs to try to go through and make
sure that they have the policies of record done.
Senator Reed. With the permission of the chairman, one
follow-up question. You pointed out that DARPA builds the
tools, but who in DOD, and maybe I am just asking you to repeat
what you have said, is responsible for the deployment of these
tools and the actual use of them?
For example, I understand that both Joint Forces Command
(JFCOM) and Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) are
using something like this, both testing it and using it.
Secretary Wynne. It is really INSCOM for the Army. There
is, if you are deployed overseas and you have freedom and
permission on a foreign data base, but I would have to take for
the record, sir, the issue about JFCOM.
[The information referred to follows:]

A number of agencies and commands of the intelligence,
counterintelligence, and military operational communities have agreed
to participate in the TIA experimental network: U.S. Army Intelligence
and Security Command, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence
Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, DOD's Counterintelligence Field
Activity, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Special Operations Command,
Joint Forces Command, and Joint Warfare--Analysis Center.
These organizations, working with the TIA program, have established
a collaborative environment in which the participants can form ad hoc
groups across the organizations, discover new experts and ideas, and
begin to work operational problems in the global war on terrorism, such
as:

Analyzing data from detainees from Afghanistan and
finding relationships among entities in that data and with
additional relationships from all-source foreign intelligence
information.
Assessing various aspects including weapons of mass
destruction in the Iraqi situation.
Aggregating very large quantities of information based
on patterns into a visual representation of very complex
relationships, which enabled rapid discovery of previously
unknown relationships of operational significance.

The organizations participating in the experiments are potential
transition partners if experiments are successful. Any agency
contemplating deploying TIA tools for use in particular contexts will
be required to conduct a pre-deployment legal review of whether the
contemplated deployment is consistent with all applicable laws,
regulations, and policies. The DOD General Counsel has directed each
operational component within DOD that hosts TIA tools or technologies
to prepare a substantive legal review that examines the relationship
between that component and TIA and analyzes the legal issues raised by
the underlying program to which the TIA tools will be applied. The
General Counsel also has advised that all such relationships should be
documented in a memorandum of agreement between TIA and the component
to ensure that the relationship is clearly understood by all parties.

Senator Reed. I do not want to belabor this, because
Senator Kennedy needs a round, but I would feel more
comfortable if I not only knew what DARPA is doing, which is
essentially building the tool, but what is the overall DOD
policy about how this tool is going to be used?
Secretary Wynne. In each case where it is being used, we
are putting a memorandum of agreement in place between DARPA
and the using agencies, so we will have several chartered
agencies, and they will equally agree to use these in a lawful
sense in protecting the privacy of American citizens wherever
possible.
The fact is that I think that policy or the lack of a
policy led to some misunderstandings and potentially
disagreements, but the fact is, those policies are now in
place, and each agency that takes it on, be it INSCOM or JFCOM,
has to sign an agreement with DARPA as to how to use it written
by both of the general counsels.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Roberts. Senator Cornyn. We are going back and
forth.
Senator Kennedy. Fine. I just found that out.
Senator Roberts. This is in the tradition of the bipartisan
nature of the former Chairman of the Health, Education, and
Labor and Pensions Committee.
Senator Cornyn. I have just been so inculcated with the
seniority system, Mr. Chairman, and I just automatically----
Senator Kennedy. Don't forget it, either. [Laughter.]
Senator Cornyn. I thought I would be the last, regardless
of party affiliation.
Senator Roberts. Just count your blessings and ask your
questions. [Laughter.]
Senator Cornyn. Gentlemen, I was just curious about
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons. I know one of the
challenges we have in the current conflict in Iraq is to
degrade the regime's ability to communicate with the people on
television and radio and otherwise to try to maintain at least
some hope on the regime's part that Saddam would remain in
control. I would like for you to respond to what is the
potential of electromagnetic pulse weapons in modern warfare,
and what are we doing for our part to make sure that as
dependent as we are upon computers and electronic devices, that
we are protected from those threats by our adversaries?
Secretary Wynne. I will just start quickly that we have
several hardening programs underway. We invent them, then we
try to prevent at the same time. I think one of the lessons
that we are learning is number 1, the effect of such a weapon,
and how does it actually, as different from maybe what it was
purported to do in the laboratory effect things. As we find
things from the laboratory, we are moving towards hardening
programs.
Senator Cornyn. Paul.
General Kern. I would say two aspects. First, we have moved
very clearly and quickly into the electronic era of information
processing. So many of those products are commercial off-the-
shelf, and we have done a tremendous amount of testing and
evaluation of those systems against EMP, and so we have a very
good understanding of where our vulnerabilities are and where
we need to do further work on hardening, so without going into
a lot of details, we do understand that.
The second piece of it, though, is that we have been
pleasantly surprised that many of the commercial off-the-shelf
products demonstrate a great deal of resiliency that we did not
expect. It is not all bad news and we have found some real
successes in that area. I would not underestimate that we still
need to do a great deal of work for the future systems as we
see more and more of our weapons platforms moving to
electronics information systems and exposing war vulnerability
to EMP. We will continue to work the hardening of all of our
future systems a great deal.
General Lyles. I will concur with what Paul mentioned. As
we better understand exactly how the programs that we are
working on provide effects, how they couple them to
capabilities in computer systems or even in buildings, it then
gives us an opportunity to figure out how do we counter that to
make sure that something like that does not happen to us.
We are still relatively in our infancy, regardless of what
you read in the newspaper, with some of these weapons systems,
almost all of whom are in the special access category, but we
are still in our infancy, and we are looking on both sides of
the equation, both how do we use them effectively, but also how
do we make sure that somebody does not use technology like that
against us.
Senator Cornyn. Admiral.
Admiral Dyer. I would just add that we are somewhat blessed
in the Naval Service with the challenging electromagnetic
environment that we face on board the carrier today. With the
aircraft in close proximity and associated weapons systems of
the ships we have had to be very focused on shielding for
years. That will continue to serve us as a form of departure
and, as Secretary Wynne indicated, we are all looking at the
ways to improve shielding in future systems.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, gentlemen. I yield back the
remainder of my time, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Roberts. Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, I have here the
table of the 2005 BRAC time line, and the first item on it is
April 15, 2003, the infrastructure Steering Group recommends
initial categories for analysis. Then the next one is December
31, 2003, Secretary of Defense sends initial selection criteria
to Defense Committees and publishes the same in the Federal
Register.
Have you been working now, since it is 2 weeks away, and
have these other representatives of the labs been working on
the initial categories for the analysis?
Secretary Wynne. Sir, we have barely started. A report, in
fact, is due at 5:00 this afternoon.
Senator Kennedy. You have about an hour and 15 minutes.
Secretary Wynne. I recognize that. My boss does, too.
Unfortunately, but we have barely begun the how-are-we-going-
to-do-the-process. Our criteria is fairly broad, but does start
with no military value, and I think frankly it is going to
got----
Senator Kennedy. Well, we could assume, if I could move on,
that this will probably slip a bit, the April 15? Will the
other members of the panel have an opportunity? Will they be
asked to have an input in this?
General Lyles. Senator Kennedy, the answer is yes. As a
matter of fact, I have identified one of my key scientists,
mature scientists with a lot of experience to be part of this
to ensure the right infrastructure equities are being accounted
for in this process.
General Kern. I would add yes for the Army as well.
Senator Kennedy. You will be involved in the process, good,
and I assume the Navy.
Admiral Dyer. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. This has been an enormously valuable
hearing, Mr. Chairman. If I could ask Admiral Dyer, I was
interested in how do the marines work with you in terms of
their priorities. The one particular priority that I have been
interested in over a long period of time is the countermine
warfare at sea priority. This has been something in which,
quite frankly, the marines have been interested and the Navy
has not, and former Secretary Cohen and I have worked with the
Navy on the program.
I was just wondering, on the kinds of issues that they
might have, how does that work with you. I guess we will not
hear from the Marine Corps today, but we will be interested at
least to hear from you how you work with them in order to get
their kind of input in terms of their priorities.
Admiral Dyer. Yes sir, Senator Kennedy. Perhaps the best
answer to that question is right behind me. The Chief of Naval
Research is Admiral Cohen, and right beside him is the Deputy
Chief of Naval Research, who is a marine one-star, so we are
joined at the hip at the very top of organizing S&T and
research and development in our Naval Service.
I would add that to look in my own area of naval aviation,
it is very much naval. The Naval Air Systems Command attends to
those systems for both Navy and Marine Corps aviation, and it
is well-coordinated, no better example playing out in real time
than the integration of Marine Corps aviation aboard carrier
and the progress that we have made in the last couple of years,
so I think it is a good news story, sir. I think you would be
proud of it.
Senator Kennedy. I will submit some later questions just
with regard to the mine research, which I have been
particularly interested in.
On the issue of researchers, foreign researchers, and the
dependency that we have on the foreign researchers, are you
working, Secretary Wynne, with immigration? With all of the
problems, the challenges that we are having now and the
restrictions in terms of permitting visas for a number of the
countries which had provided us with researchers. Are you
beginning to work with them on this, and are you satisfied that
you are getting the grants to the visas, for the ones that are
necessary now to work on these programs?
Secretary Wynne. Sir, I have not personally been involved
in that aspect.
Senator Kennedy. It has not been brought to your attention
as a problem yet?
Secretary Wynne. No, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Well, that is helpful, because I am on
that Immigration Committee, and the numbers have gone down
dramatically. A follow-on question, how are we going to react
to these foreign students who are coming in terms of the
security issues which now are an increasing kind of concern?
How is that going to be the protocol, how is that going to be
working through? I would be glad to have you get back to me on
it, because this is rather technical.
Secretary Wynne. I do know that it is affecting university
research, because the professors there were somewhat dependent
on that labor.
Senator Kennedy. All right. I will submit those.
Finally, on the whole area of getting scientists and
research, there have been a number of comments about the
workforce, and this is something that I happen to be enormously
interested in. I just mention one minor point and use up my
last minute here.
We in Massachusetts are the first State now that is going
to have an engineering course Kindergarten (K) through grade
12. It is principally sponsored now out of the Museum of
Science in Boston. They have worked it out with the State, and
they are going to include that in their curriculum now in terms
of reaching the very goals in terms of proficiency, even under
the No Child Left Behind Act. They are working on some
enormously interesting research, and have had some very
important success in terms of both minorities and with regards
to young girls and women in this area.
This has been an area which has been, for far too long,
limited for a variety of different reasons, but this is
something that they are working on. So we welcome any of the
kinds of programs that you are working on, and I will write to
all of you on it, that you are being successful, because we
want to try and, in other areas of public policy, give those
encouragement. We need to do that in a great number of areas of
public policy, and we would certainly benefit from what you
have found to be helpful and successful in reaching your goals.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Roberts. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
Wynne, last year Congress enacted legislation creating a
Defense Test Resource Management Center in order to help
coordinate, plan, rationalize the use, the joint use of test
facilities and evaluation facilities, to be headed by a three-
star general officer. Can you tell us when we can expect that
nomination to come before the Senate?
Secretary Wynne. Sir, we are on track to construct such a
directorate. The problem is that the solicitation of a three-
star general, which is a flag officer, which is the
stipulation, is somewhat difficult these days, with the
Services all engaged in an active engagement. We are hoping, as
everyone else is, for a relatively quick end and intend to
resubmit that nomination to the Joint Chiefs when we feel like
there could be a little bit more fertile ground for the three-
star nomination.
We recognize that the committee might be kind to give us
relief and perhaps substitute a Senior Executive Service member
or something along those lines. We have not yet given up on the
initial direction.
Senator Reed. If there were some relief, then that civilian
would be of equal rank to an 010, or 09, rather, a three-star?
Secretary Wynne. Sir, I would have to go look at what we
have available in that regard, and sometimes the capabilities
far outnumber the rank, but I do not know what we have
available, sir.
Senator Reed. But your intention is to still try to find a
military officer?
Secretary Wynne. Yes, sir, right now it is.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Admiral Dyer, if I could ask one final question. I noted
that the Navy's S&T budget request includes a number of
programs transferred to it by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD), others that pass through to JFCOM, and I
understand without those programs, the DOD-interested program
and the JFCOM programs, that the S&T request this year is down
by $50 million from last year's request, down nearly 25
percent, or $400 million from last year's appropriated levels.
What specific areas of investment do you have to cut back
because the money that the Navy actually has, the Navy-
initiated programs has been decreased?
Admiral Dyer. Sir, to get the detail of what was cut back I
would like to take that for the record.
Senator Reed. Absolutely fair. Absolutely fair.
[The information referred to follows:]

While Basic Research (6.1) has benefited from the development of a
portion of the University Research Initiative program to Navy, there
remain difficult choices in Applied Research (6.2) and Advanced
Technology Development (6.3) funding to maintain the best possible
portfolio in the face of the significantly constrained budgetary
environment.
In the face of the significantly constrained budgetary environment,
we made difficult choices in Applied Research (6.2) and Advanced
Technology Development (6.3) funding to maintain a viable portfolio to
fund transformational S&T at a rate we can afford.
We cut the FNCs designed to deliver new capabilities to the
warfighter in order to focus only on the highest priority projects
within the 6.2 and 6.3 portfolios.
The following shows some of the primary FNCs' products that were
reduced or not pursued in the fiscal year 2004 President's budget
request:

- Low Observable Integrated Deckhouse
- Advanced Estimate of Sensor Performance
- Mission Responsive Ordnance
- Limits of Passive Sonar
- Underwater Surveillance Data Link Network

Senator Reed. Just let me add for the record, too, that I
have a very keen interest in the unmanned underwater vehicles,
and those are issues which I hope are top priority and not on
that list of things that had to be forgone.
Thank you, Admiral, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Roberts. I just have a couple of wrap-up questions
here. I remember 2 years ago, I asked Secretary Aldridge about
whether the hiring authorities authorized by Congress would be
implemented by the Department. He assured me that they would, 2
years have gone by and we really have not seen too much
progress. The thought occurred to me if the NSPS has not
submitted to Congress, or if it does not pass, will the
authorities that were previously authorized then be implemented
by the Department? For example, I am talking about the direct
hire by lab directors.
That would be to you, Secretary Wynne.
Secretary Wynne. We have submitted that as a best practice,
and it would be in the Federal Register. Which means it would
have the force of policy, which would implement the laws as it
was passed. I think we were looking to the NSPS, if it is here
and if you take kindly to it and pass it as well, would
actually supplement the best practices until it was rejoined in
the Federal Register, because each law has to be formulated in
implementing instructions and then released in the Federal
Register.
Senator Roberts. Oh, it would be commensurate, not an
either/or thing.
Secretary Wynne. Yes, sir.
Senator Roberts. Right. I want to follow up on Senator
Reed's question in regards to our adversaries and even our
allies who are investing in a specific technology which could
provide them a technological advantage in the future. I would
like to know what mechanism do you currently utilize to make an
informed investment decision to identify the cooperative
research opportunities and track, and this is the real nub of
the question, and track foreign research efforts in emerging
technologies so it is not only what we think we need, but what
others are doing, and what we need to do to make sure that they
do not gain an unfair advantage. What mechanism do we use,
other than damned good intelligence?
Admiral Dyer. Well, in the Navy's case, sir, we have field
representation in Europe, emerging in Russia, and in areas in
the Pacific that represent the eyes and ears of the technical
community to ensure that we do not suffer technological
surprise.
Senator Roberts. General Lyles.
General Lyles. We have a similar situation, Mr. Chairman.
We have a European Office of Aerospace Research and Development
and a Japanese Office of Aerospace Research and Development
both to look at their specific theaters and continents and work
with both our friends and potentially understand what the
adversaries are doing in research and development so that we
can track them very closely.
Senator Roberts. Good.
General Kern.
General Kern. We have similar offices located in Europe and
in Japan which were, many of them, co-located with the other
services. In addition, we have foreign science internships
where we work in the universities with some of our scientists
to learn what they are doing. The third area that we are
working right now is to expand what had been our historical
locations into Eastern Europe, into the new nations of NATO,
and to look at some of the other areas, and we use those other
bases to move out from that.
I have organized all of that in the Army under our Research
and Development Engineering Command, which had been spread out
in the past under a number of different organizations, so that
we can better coordinate it. I have even gone so far as to
coordinate with the Foreign Service, the U.S. Navy, and I met
with Admiral Cohen----[Laughter.]
--and we discussed how we could better coordinate our
efforts together, as well as with Les Lyles.
Senator Roberts. What about a searchable data base, sort of
a central repository, and it could be classified or
unclassified? Would that be helpful, to know what it had?
Secretary Wynne. Sir, we are doing two things. We do
maintain the military critical technology list as far as
outbound technology, and then we are, in fact, reinserting the
intel community into the R&D planning and S&T planning so that
we get first hand access to whatever data screening devices
they might have relative to foreign science journals and such.
Senator Roberts. One final question. It would be helpful to
request an unfunded priority list from you all from the
Services for S&T. This would allow us to put more good
Government into good zip codes, if you get the drift, so if you
would do that for the committee staff, that would be most
appropriate.
I thank you all for coming. Thank you for your time and
patience, and more especially, thank you for what you are doing
for this country.
Secretary Wynne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Lyles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Pat Roberts

BANDWIDTH FOR UNMANNED SYSTEMS

1. Senator Roberts. General Kern, General Lyles, and Admiral Dyer,
as was apparent at the technology demonstration, many of today's
innovative technologies are unmanned systems. These systems will be
responsible for sending tremendous amounts of information around the
battlefield and to the warfighter. What efforts do you have underway to
enable the bandwidth necessary for these unmanned systems to be truly
effective?
General Kern. Bandwidth is a concern for all of our systems to
include the emerging unmanned systems. We are making positive strides
to address bandwidth concerns but still have more work to do. The
emergence of the software radio, specifically the Joint Tactical Radio
System (JTRS) provides the capability to implement in software the
communications waveforms that will better address these bandwidth
concerns. We have come a long way from the primarily voice and fax
networks that were the standards only a decade or so ago. DOD is
developing KA band terminal for high bandwidth communication to future
DOD wideband SATCOM systems (i.e., Wideband Gapfiller System). This
enables UAVs to access significant bandwidth, beyond line of sight to
control ground systems.
We do have some efforts currently underway and are in the process
of putting others in place to address unmanned networking. The S&T
community is addressing the bandwidth issue for all systems with the
following three-prong attack to address the bandwidth issue.
Specifically those areas are:

1) Focus on improving the communication systems themselves to
increase their throughput capacity.
2) Develop (e.g., Multi-function On-The-Move Secure Adaptive
Integrated Communications (MOSAIC)) bandwidth management mechanism that
will allow the network to function more efficiently.
3) Engineering the applications/systems to more efficiently utilize
the network.

The combination of these three thrust areas will lead to a system
of system network that will optimize bandwidth usage and assure that
critical information gets to its destination in the appropriate time.
Communication System Improvements: S&T efforts in this area are
focused on transitioning technologies and supporting programs for PM
Tactical Radio Communications Systems (TRCS) (JTRS), Warfighter
Information Network--Tactical (WIN-T) and FCSs. Present programs
include: more efficient, low profile and directional antennas; co-site
and interference mitigation capabilities; new frequency radios (for
example: Ka, Laser, and Ultra-wideband); frequency agile radios and
more efficient waveforms such as Turbo coding. In the past, the
flexibility of even our best tactical communications systems was
greatly limited by their inherent hardware constraints, which in turn
were limited by their original anticipated missions, their
``stovepipe'' approaches, and their rapidly obsolete technologies and
designs. Consequently, deployed systems were not only years or decades
old, but they were often unable to fully satisfy the continually
changing needs of our military, regardless of the cost. The JTRS
program will soon provide the critically needed flexibility to upgrade
many of our tactical communications systems to the latest available
technologies and waveforms, in addition to greatly improving
interoperability, performance, capacity, and economy of production. It
will also incorporate imbedded GPS location, automatic ``gateway''
functions between networks, and the new robust and flexible Wideband
Networking Waveform (WNW). Due to the unique requirements associated
with unmanned systems and the over-allocation of the JTRS wideband
waveform the Army is pursuing the development of an additional JTRS
compliant waveform under the Soldier-Level Integrated Communications
Environment (SLICE) program. In addition the Army will leverage the
emerging Transformational Communications Satellite (TCS) effort that
will significantly enhance our ability to use satellite communications
on the tactical battlefield with high data rate communications.
Bandwidth Management mechanisms: Primarily this area refers to the
protocols that will seamlessly bind the sub-networks such as Satellite,
JTRS, and WIN-T into a coherent overall network. These protocols
include an overall Quality of Service (QoS) set of protocols that will
assure the network Reserves sufficient bandwidth to support the
individual task (such as voice calls or video) and the ability to
prioritize them such that the higher priority tasks go through the
network in a timely quality manner. Also included are protocols that
allow the warfighter to join and leave sub-networks in an efficient
timely manner, and ones that provide the ability to select the best
route/network to utilize when more than one sub-network is accessible
(note: FCS envisions a multi-tier network: satellite, airborne,
terrestrial, and wired). Presently commercial protocols don't support a
dynamic multi-hop, multi-tiered, wireless network or the seamless
interface between the different networks (for example JTRS, WIN-T, and
Satellite) that are required for FCS. S&T programs are addressing these
requirements as well as providing the commander's management tools to
change and optimize the network to the tempo of the battle such as
shifting priority from Video in the planning stage to Data in the
execution phase to support call for fire.
Application/System Bandwidth design: This area is focused on how to
design each application/system to more efficiently utilize the network
and what can be done to reduce the load placed on the network. Areas to
be considered include: frequency of updates; data compression; on-board
processing; header information that identifies priority and traffic
type such as video, voice, and data so the bandwidth management
mechanisms can act upon them; packet size to match the packet size of
the network; and various others. With regards to unmanned system
several design approaches can have a tremendous impact on the bandwidth
required. It should be noted that the bandwidth requirement associated
with unmanned systems can be broken down into two major categories, the
bandwidth necessary to control the system and the bandwidth required to
transmit what is received from the unmanned system (sensor data).
Control bandwidth is greatly affected by the amount of autonomous
operation the unmanned system can achieve. Very limited bandwidth is
needed for sensor (Unmanned Ground Sensor) fields and mines, UAVs
require some control but their operations are getting more autonomous
while unattended ground vehicles (UGVs) still have some challenges and
require the most bandwidth. The sensor bandwidth can be greatly
affected by the amount of on-board-processing (ability to locally
interpret the information) and the frequency with which you send
updates.
General Lyles. The challenge to our S&T program is to provide
needed additional bandwidth, while reducing the load on the available
radio frequency, or RF spectrum. The S&T program addresses this
challenge in three ways: better use of existing RF spectrum, making
advances in data compression techniques, and using our networks of RF
links more effectively.
First, the existing RF spectrum can support more users by putting
systems in the field that use more efficient RF waveforms. New advances
in modulation and coding technology can transmit up to gigabit transfer
rates in a limited amount of spectrum. Recent breakthroughs in the
removal of interference will also allow more users to operate
successfully in a limited frequency band. We are developing
technologies to make better use of lower frequency bands that have been
underutilized. Software-defined radios, such as the Joint Tactical
Radio System, could let us implement these and future technologies.
Improvements in antenna technology can support more users by covering
broader ranges of frequencies and could support the reuse of
frequencies by better controlling the direction of transmitted and
received signals.
The second area, data compression, will allow more data to be
passed within the same bandwidth. We are developing superior data
compression techniques by examining both commercial and military unique
procedures.
Finally, demands on frequency allocations can be reduced by smarter
networking technology. Technology solutions in this area include the
development of new techniques that are designed specifically for
wireless links. We are developing new compression techniques to pack
greater amounts of image and video date into fewer and fewer bits.
Laboratory programs are developing prototypes that use multiple RF
links at a time and can route information intelligently to reduce the
need for bandwidth in congested portions of the RF spectrum.
The combination of these three approaches could reduce the demand
on the bandwidth for unmanned systems.
Admiral Dyer. The Navy S&T is looking at several approaches to
increase information throughput. Increasing bandwidth is only one way
to increase throughput. We have many programs aimed at this. We are
looking at advanced protocols which would enable us to pack more
information in the same bandwidth or to transmit information in a more
efficient manner. Some of these have already transitioned to the Navy
and non-Navy communities.
We are examining technologies to develop apertures that support
high frequency communications which enable denser information packing.
We are supporting intelligent compression techniques which enable us to
transmit less bits of data, but the same amount of information. Again
some of these techniques are already transitioning. We are supporting
multi-function, multi-beam apertures so that effectively one has more
communication capacity from a given aperture. Also, we are supporting
Autonomous Decision Aides and Target Cueing technologies that will
allow the UAV mission systems to filter the information, onboard the
UAV, prior to transmission. Finally we are supporting high density
memory technology. This would enable one to carry more information
since much of the information in images and video are not changing.
Thus one only needs bandwidth to transmit changes to information, not
the full information.

NUCLEAR DETECTION CAPABILITIES FOR FORCE PROTECTION

2. Senator Roberts. General Kern, General Lyles, and Admiral Dyer,
what nuclear and radiological detection capabilities do the Services
currently employ for force protection and what areas require
improvement to meet force protection needs?
General Kern. The Services currently employ the following nuclear/
radiological detection capabilities for force protection. The AN/PDR-75
Radiac Set provides the capability to monitor and record the exposure
of individual personnel to gamma and neutron radiation. The AN/PDR-77
detects and measures alpha and x-ray radiation. The AN/UDR-13
``Pocket'' Radiac Set is a compact hand-held or pocket-carried tactical
device capable of measuring prompt gamma/neutron dose from a nuclear
event plus gamma dose and dose-rate from nuclear fallout. The AN/VDR-2
which is used to perform ground radiological surveys in vehicles or in
the dismounted mode by individual soldiers as a hand-held instrument.
Future needs/improvements focus on automated, low cost dosimeter
capabilities to enhance individual warfighter survivability. A Joint
Standoff Radioactivity (RADIAC) System and an Advanced Airborne RADIAC
System remain on the Joint Future Operational Capabilities (JFOC) list
as required radiological Early Warning capabilities. Standoff
radiological detectors provide the commander with a capability to
identify the content of a detected radiological hazard by specific type
(source of radioactive hazard) before it impacts operational forces.
Also required is Radiological Confirmation and Validation. This
capability provides a rapid, valid, and reliable in-theater
confirmatory laboratory analysis of a suspected radiological hazard
presence in environmental samples and clinical specimens. This
capability enables commanders with a mobile, versatile, and tailorable
ability that can address all radiological threat hazards. Finally,
while point detection for radiation exists, the age of several fielded
dosimeters (AN/PDR-75 & AN/PDR-77) averages 20 years. Radiological
detectors provide the commander with the ability to detect and identify
the presence of radiological hazards in the immediate area of
operations, on personnel within the area of operations, and provide
information necessary to conduct immediate planning in support of
timely medical and restoration decision-making activities.
General Lyles. Currently, all Air Force installations (including
Active, Guard, and Reserve) are required to maintain a major accident
response capability that includes ADM-300 radiological detection kits
and Staplex Air Samplers. In addition to this home-station response
capability, many bases also maintain a deployable detection capability
(ADM-300). The Air Force also maintains three Response Task Forces that
serve as DOD's primary response elements for command and control at the
scene of a nuclear weapon/material accident. Each of these teams
possesses organic radiological detection equipment (ADM-300). Finally,
the Air Force Radiological Assessment Team has a suite of advanced
equipment that permits detailed assessment of any radiological
incident. Any or all of these assets could be used, as needed, to
support force protection issues at fixed CONUS and OCONUS Air Force
installations as well as at deployed locations.
All of our current systems are point detectors; they must be within
meters of the radiological hazard to detect it. They are not linked to
an automated monitoring system to facilitate remote operations. This
limits their utility for early warning. Additionally, there are not
standoff radiological detection systems currently available.
Admiral Dyer. Navy has radiation detection devices available for
force protection both at sea and ashore for the detection of low (and
higher) levels of radiation associated with various nuclear and
radiological events. Current capabilities are considered to be adequate
in support of operational forces and installations.

DEFENSE LABORATORIES

3. Senator Roberts. General Kern, General Lyles, and Admiral Dyer,
could you describe the coordination process your organization
participated in during the formation of the National Security Personnel
System (NSPS)?
General Kern. Army personnel from Headquarters, Department of the
Army, and the Army Materiel Command participated in a series of OSD
sponsored work groups to study best personnel practices from
demonstration projects operating within DOD and across the Federal
service in four key areas of human resources management. Each of these
groups made recommendations to the members of the OSD Civilian
Personnel Policy Council on what they considered to be ``best
practices''. The Army Assistant G1 (Civilian Personnel Policy) served
as the Department of Army representative on the Council. He
participated in the development of the initial legislative language and
reviewed and approved subsequent drafts. The Army and I strongly
support the NSPS because it will unify into one simplified DOD system
the multiple personnel systems under which we currently operate.
General Lyles. Air Force Materiel Command was represented by the
Air Force Research Laboratory Project Office and Headquarters Air
Force, Directorate of Personnel Policy, on the Department of Defense
``Best Practices Task Force.'' However, neither the Command nor
Headquarters Air Force was formally asked to comment on the enabling
legislation for the NSPS.
Admiral Dyer. The Navy laboratories and warfare/systems centers
that are designated as S&T Reinvention Demonstration Project
Laboratories were consulted by the staff of the Office of the Director,
Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) through the Personnel Sub-
panel of the Laboratory Quality Enhancement Panel (LQEP) regarding a
DOD Best Practices Personnel Demonstration Project, which may form the
basis for the NSPS. More specifically, the LQEP Personnel Sub-panel was
invited to send one representative to each of the four DOD best
practices working groups. There was a LQEP representative on the
Performance Management, Classification, and Staffing Working Groups.
Through this process, the reinvention lab participants were able to
provide feedback on some of the proposals of the Performance Management
and Classification Working Groups. In addition, the staff of DDR&E
requested the S&T Reinvention Demonstration Project Laboratories to
provide information on the various personnel innovations, delegations,
and flexibilities they needed to assist the laboratories in meeting
their mission. This information was made available to the Senior
Steering Group member from DDR&E representing the S&T Reinvention
Demonstration Project Laboratories in the development of the best
practices proposal.

DEVOLVEMENT

4. Senator Roberts. Secretary Wynne, this year your office devolved
(transferred) several programs to the Services. Many of these programs
reside in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) because of the
inherent jointness of the program. What was the objective of moving
these programs?
Secretary Wynne. I expect no diminution of the jointness of these
programs, and there are already many joint programs in the Service and
Defense Agency budgets. We transferred budgetary responsibility, not
oversight responsibility, by shifting the funding for the programs from
OSD to the Services. The Services were already executing the programs
and performing the day-to-day operations in any case, and certainly
have the necessary expertise to manage programs efficiently and
effectively.
OSD is a headquarters organization whose primary responsibilities
and organizational structure are inconsistent with executing a number
of programs. I also saw no reason to retain an extra layer of
management for program execution within a headquarters organization.
With this in mind, we shifted our emphasis into new ``business areas''
more attuned to those of Under Secretary Aldridge, and Secretary
Rumsfeld's transformation agenda. We divested the organization of
functions and workload. We returned to oversight and policy development
responsibilities, and divested line management responsibilities to the
Military Departments.
The OSD will continue program oversight responsibilities by
establishing a set of output-oriented metrics to ensure the Military
Departments meet the ``core/joint service'' objectives of the programs.
In addition, the OSD will review execution plans and metrics prior to
the start of each fiscal year, and at mid-year to determine future
allocations. Programs also have senior review groups that will remain
in place to provide monitoring from the OSD.

5. Senator Roberts. Secretary Wynne, for those programs that fund
work in multiple Services, how does OSD intend to keep these joint in
nature if they are devolved to a particular Service?
Secretary Wynne. Senior review groups with members from the OSD
will remain in place to ensure particular military departments meet the
``core/joint service'' objectives and metrics of the programs. The
senior review groups will review execution plans and metrics prior to
the start of each fiscal year, and at mid-year to make recommendations
concerning future funding allocations.
The Physical Security Equipment, Unexploded Ordnance Detection and
Clearance, and High Performance Computing Modernization programs are
good examples.
Physical Security Equipment. Monitoring will continue to be
provided by the Physical Security Equipment Action Group. The action
group is composed of staff from the OSD and the military departments
responsible for research, development, test, and evaluation to develop
solutions for military department operational requirements.
Representatives from other Federal agencies also attend meeting.
Unexploded Ordnance Detection and Clearance. An Executive
Committee, Joint Board of Directors, and Joint Unexploded Ordnance
Coordination Office will continue to complement each other to ensure a
joint perspective for this mission area.
High Performance Computing Modernization. The High Performance
Computing Advisory Panel will continue the oversight function. The High
Performance Computing Advisory Panel members include the S&T and test
and evaluation communities from the Military Departments and Defense
Agencies.

FUNDING FOR DARPA

6. Senator Roberts. General Kern, General Lyles, and Admiral Dyer,
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has a critical
mission of performing high-risk, high-payoff research and its budget
has been increasing over the past several years. Currently DARPA's
budget is about 28 percent of the defense S&T budget. How are you
coordinating with DARPA and leveraging their resources?
General Kern. DARPA is an essential partner in transforming the
Army. As such, the Army is coordinating with DARPA on many levels to
ensure success. At the Department of the Army-level, memorandum of
agreements are negotiated with the DARPA to leverage capabilities of
both organizations and to combine resources. Prominent examples of this
cooperation are the FCS and Unmanned Combat Armed Rotorcraft programs.
Typical management arrangements are where DARPA has the program
management lead until the Milestone B and the Army has program
management lead after Milestone B--these programs transition directly
into Army Acquisition Programs.
At the Army Materiel Command's (AMC) Research, Development, and
Engineering Center-level, for programs that do not transition directly
into an Army Acquisition Program, DARPA program managers coordinate
with AMC's Science and Technology Objective Managers. An example of
this is the A-160 Hummingbird program.
In addition to the three above, examples of other DARPA programs
that the Army leverages are Organic Air Vehicle, Unmanned Ground Combat
Vehicle, NetFires, Self-Healing Minefield, Airborne Communications
Node, Small Unit Operations: Situational Awareness System, Lithium Ion
Batteries, High Rotorcraft Radar, and Tactical Sensors--Unattended
Ground Sensors.
The Army plans to continue partnering with DARPA on its path to
Transformation.
General Lyles. The Air Force and the DARPA enjoy an excellent
symbiotic relationship. In fact, last year, the Air Force Research
Laboratory (AFRL) received approximately $450 million in customer
funding from DARPA and expects about the same amount in fiscal year
2003. This funding is connected with over 300 different efforts and
AFRL's Information Directorate acts as DARPA's largest agent executing
over 200 of these efforts. More importantly, the Air Force ensures that
the research we do with DARPA is leveraged to support Air Force
technology requirements. Examples of programs leveraging DARPA funding
include:

Control of Agent-Based Systems--$7.4 million
Intrusion Tolerant Networks--$8.7 million
DARPA Markup Language (DAML)--$9.9 million
Bio-Computation--$10.0 million
Basic Research--$20.2 million

Admiral Dyer. Our investment portfolios are not built in isolation.
The Defense Reliance process integrates the Services' S&T programs
while preserving the healthy diversity of vision and approach that has
given us the technical agility we enjoy today. Our relations with the
DARPA are excellent and productive. Much of the Office of Naval
Research's basic and applied research investment is designed with a
view to handing scientific advances over to DARPA for further
development and exploitation. The Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle program
is an excellent example of this kind of collaboration. We are working
closely with DARPA on wide band gap semiconductors to support the
radar, communications, and electronic warfare systems of the future,
including the advanced multifunction radio frequency concept.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

MARINE MAMMAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

7. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne and Admiral Dyer, I know that the
Navy has been facing a difficult issue in trying to balance operational
and training requirements for active sonar tracking of submarines with
concerns over the effects of these technologies on marine mammals. Are
there any technologies being developed in the Navy or DARPA S&T
programs that may be able to replace active sonars as we search for
enemy submarines?
Secretary Wynne. DARPA has a development effort entitled Robust
Passive Sonar (RPS) that is in its fourth year of a 5-year program. The
goal of the RPS program is to significantly increase the performance of
tactical towed sonar systems operating in littoral environments. This
will be accomplished by canceling out the primary cause of
interference, surface shipping noise and extending target detection and
capability. The RPS program accomplishes surface shipping noise
cancellation by innovative processing techniques coupled with multi-
dimensional receive arrays and other external information. In addition,
the program will extend target detection and tracking: (1) while the
receive array is maneuvering by compensating for the acoustic array
shape; and (2) in the forward direction by suppressing noise from the
receiver tow platform. Net system performance gains against surface
shipping noise are expected to be 10 decibels or greater, thereby
providing an increased ability to detect quieter targets such as
submarines. It is expected that this system will affect future array
and acoustic sensor field designs. By extending the range of scenarios
for which passive acoustic techniques are effective, RPS may reduce the
range of scenarios for which active sonar is applied. The program plans
to take the prototype RPS system to sea as part of a U.S. Navy exercise
in fiscal year 2004. The exercise will be used to evaluate the
technical performance and operational utility of the RPS processing
system.
Admiral Dyer. There is no ``silver bullet'' for Anti-Submarine
Warfare (ASW). Effective ASW requires a mix of technologies, including
active acoustics. One reason is that the marine environment very
strongly affects any given technology. A particular technology may work
well in one place at one time of the year and not in the same place
another time of the year or in a different place the same time of the
year. Another reason is that the way submarines operate affects any
given technology. Fortunately, the mix of possible technologies
complements each other to some degree. For example, acoustic
technologies work well many places in the winter while non-acoustic
technologies work well many of the same places in the summer. Active
acoustic technology often works well against submarines operating
deeply submerged while non-acoustic technology often works well against
submarines operating near the surface. The Navy has not yet developed a
full complement of technologies to effectively implement ASW in all
places through out the year and under all operating conditions. Active
acoustics is and will remain a necessary part of that complement.

8. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne and Admiral Dyer, how much are we
investing in these efforts?
Secretary Wynne. In fiscal year 2000 through 2004, DARPA is
investing $64 million for the RPS program.
Admiral Dyer. The Office of Naval Research (ONR) is investigating
more effective active sonar technology that the Navy hopes will reduce
adverse effects on marine life through reduced source levels,
alterations in signal characteristics, and focusing of emitted sonar
beams. ONR research into the interactions of marine life and sonar
sounds will help guide our search for reduced environmental impact from
active sonar, while preserving and enhancing the effectiveness of this
vital fleet protection asset. ONR is also exploring the development of
non-acoustic capabilities, including magnetic and optical sensors, to
complement existing active and passive sonar capabilities, with the
goal of reducing reliance on active acoustics as a means of anti-
submarine force protection. Annual investments in these two scientific
program areas [sonar effects on marine mammals and new technologies
(magnetic and optical sensors) to replace active sonar] are
approximately $3 million and $10.5 million, respectively. Taken
together, these programs should enable the U.S. Navy to keep up with
the challenges posed by advancing foreign submarine technology while
simultaneously reducing the potential risks to marine life from the
active sonars.

9. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne and Admiral Dyer, what are the
technical barriers to the eventual deployment of these systems?
Secretary Wynne. The innovative processing techniques employed by
the RPS program are computationally intensive. When these techniques
are coupled with the use of multi-dimension receive arrays, the
computational requirements exceed the sonar processing capability
currently installed on submarines and surveillance vessels. During the
life of this program, computer industry advances in processor speed and
the increased availability of field-programmable gate arrays as
commercial off-the-shelf hardware improve the likelihood that a real-
time RPS system will be successfully deployed. Additionally, the RPS
processing techniques are dependent on knowledge of the environmental
characteristics of the area of interest. Currently, we can only make
direct measurements in the immediate vicinity of our own platforms, and
estimate the environment in the vicinity of the target. Consequently,
the RPS system relies on historical data bases to fill in those
measurements which are not made directly. More complete environmental
data bases will result in better RPS system performance and will
facilitate widespread system deployment.
Admiral Dyer. The current environmental technical challenge for
active tracking of submarines centers on the interaction of sound from
submarine tracking (ASW) sonars with marine life, particularly marine
mammals (whales, dolphins, and seals). While no harmful reactions have
been observed in connection with the Navy's SURTASS Low Frequency
Active Sonar, there is some evidence that existing mid-frequency (2.5-
10kHz) ASW sonars such as the AN/SQS-53C and AN/SQS-56 have the
potential to cause beaked whales to beach and subsequently die as a
result of the beaching. Minor physiological injuries found in the
stranded whales have not been life threatening. The connection of these
injuries to the sonar sound and the beaching behavior of the whales is
not fully understood at this time.
The Navy has begun an investigative program on this topic.
Investment totals over $10 million annually, with approximately $1-$2
million specifically focused on beaked whales and the effects of ASW
sonars on them. These programs have generated a compilation of beaked
whale occurrence data worldwide, in an attempt to provide information
about potential sites where sonar use may pose a greater than usual
risk of interaction with beaked whales. The Navy is also investigating
a number of technical solutions for improved detection of beaked whales
and other marine animals in the vicinity of sonar operations, including
radar, drone aircraft, and special whale detection sonars. These
emerging capabilities should enable the Navy to operate both existing
mid-frequency sonars and new low frequency sonars in a manner that is
environmentally safe while also preserving the tactical effectiveness
of the systems.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

10. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, I understand that the Department
reduced the fiscal year 2004 budget for the Strategic Environmental
Research and Development Program by $13.0 million, or more than 20
percent, below the fiscal year 2003 requested level to fund other
research and development priorities. This reduction means that the
program has no money for new starts for significant new environmental
research initiatives, including alternatives for ammonium perchlorate
in DOD missile propulsion applications, advanced approaches to
unexploded ordnance detection and discrimination, and marine mammal
behavioral ecology and predictive modeling. What steps are you prepared
to take to demonstrate the Department's commitment to these vital
environmental research and development programs and to ensure that
these cuts are not repeated in future years?
Secretary Wynne. The Strategic Environmental Research and
Development Program (SERDP) was reduced in fiscal year 2004. Budgetary
constraints and competing priorities led to this one time reduction in
the program. The Department continues to be strongly committed to the
SERDP program. This technology program is critical to meeting our
environmental obligations, preserving access to DOD ranges, and
lowering the environmental costs across the Department. The Department
is aware of the potentially large financial liability associated with
unexploded ordnance and the continued use of ammonium perchlorate in
weapons systems, as well as the fact that SERDP represents between 75
percent and 100 percent of the funding for research and development
addressing these issues. Similarly, the Department is acutely aware of
the potential impact of the presence of marine mammals in the vicinity
of forces involved in at-sea operations. As stated in the President's
budget, the Department is committed to SERDP in the future.

TOTAL INFORMATION AWARENESS

11. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, please clarify for the record
the organizations that are currently operating or testing technologies
associated with the Total Information Awareness (TIA) program. What are
future plans for operation or testing of these technologies?
Secretary Wynne. A number of organizations in the counterterrorism
community have shown great interest in working with the TIA program to
test and evaluate technologies. The organizations already participating
or planning to participate in the near future in TIA's spiral
development and experiments include:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Currently Participating Planning to Participate
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security National Security Agency
Command (INSCOM). (NSA)
Defense Intelligence Agency Joint U.S. Strategic Command
Intelligence Task Force--Counter- (STRATCOM)
Terrorism (DIA JITF-CT).
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)......... Special Operations Command
(SOCOM)
DOD's Counter-Intelligence Field Activity
(CIFA).
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)..............
Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC)......
------------------------------------------------------------------------

DARPA is providing these agencies and commands with a system/
network infrastructure and concepts; software analytical tools;
software installation; training; software performance evaluation; and
integration and evaluation of user comments on modifications and
additions to the software. The operational agencies and commands are
providing facilities and personnel to conduct these experiments,
scheduled to occur on a continuous basis at 3 to 4 month intervals over
the duration of the TIA program, which concludes in 2007. They are
using data currently available to them in accordance with existing
laws, regulations, and policies applicable to each agency and command.
DARPA is not providing any real data or providing any technical or
other means to collect real data.

12. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, what organizations will be
involved?
Secretary Wynne. Organizations already participating or planning to
participate in the near future in TIA's spiral development and
experiments include:

U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM)
National Security Agency (NSA)
Defense Intelligence Agency Joint Intelligence Task
Force--Counter-Terrorism (DIA JITF-CT)
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
DOD's Counter-Intelligence Field Activity (CIFA)
U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)
Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC)

13. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, who is responsible for
monitoring the use of these technologies during their development and
testing by contractors?
Secretary Wynne. These technologies are being developed and tested
along two distinct paths. One path involves the development of
analytical tools using synthetic unclassified data to ensure full
compliance with privacy or data source policies. These activities take
place in a pure research setting. Subject to the higher level
monitoring described below, these efforts are monitored by DARPA
program managers. The other development path is at the network level,
within the framework of a series of experiments to test and evaluate
components and their integration using real world data as permitted by
existing laws and policies. These activities take place in the
operational agencies and commands that are providing facilities and
personnel to conduct these experiments. The user agency is responsible
for monitoring the use of TIA technology in this setting; DARPA only
provides the analytical tools and training to support user agency
testing and experimentation. The agency is responsible for providing
data that the agency determines may be used for this purpose.
Both development paths are subject to higher level monitoring in
the form of two bodies created by the OSD, one internal to OSD and one
external. The internal oversight board, chaired by the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics will monitor how
terrorist-tracking tools are transitioned for real-world use. It also
will establish policies and procedures for internal DOD use of TIA-
developed tools. The external board has been established as a Federal
advisory committee to advise the Secretary of Defense on the policy and
legal issues that are raised by the TIA program. Newton Minow, Director
of the Annenberg Washington Program and the Annenberg Professor of
Communications Law and Policy at Northwestern University, is chairman
of the external board.

14. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, what investments are being made
towards the development of privacy protection technologies?
Secretary Wynne. DARPA is spending $3.9 million in the current
fiscal year to develop privacy protection technologies. There is $4.0
million and $5.9 million budgeted in fiscal years 2004 and 2005
respectively.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM

15. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, the Department has a joint
Chemical and Biological Defense Program that is intended to provide our
military forces with needed capabilities to defend and protect against
chemical and biological weapons and agents, including the development
and production of vaccines. Since the September 11 terrorist attacks
and the anthrax attacks of October 2001, other Federal agencies have
taken a keen interest in many of these same (or similar) technologies,
capabilities, and vaccines. This could lead to lower emphasis or
resources for the defense requirements and programs and significant
duplication of effort by the other agencies. What is the Department
doing to ensure that its needs for chemical and biological defense are
being met while coordinating its programs and efforts with those of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the NIH to avoid duplication
or wasted resources?
Secretary Wynne. The DOD continues to place a high emphasis on
research, development, and acquisition of chemical and biological
defense products. The Fiscal Year 2003 Supplemental Defense
appropriation allocated additional funding to acquire chemical
biological defense equipment. The Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense (Chemical and Biological Defense) is working closely with the
Joint Staff to address urgent operational requirements and ensure that
the needs of the warfighter are addressed. The fiscal year 2004
President's budget outlines a significant program to provide chemical/
biological (C/B) protection for 200 DOD installations, beginning with
15 in fiscal year 2004. This follows a pilot project initiated in
fiscal year 2003 to provide C/B protection at nine installations in
fiscal year 2003 and represents the Department's commitment to ensure
that DOD installations are adequately protected from C/B threats.
The DHS will also sponsor research and development for countering
chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. The DOD's
Chemical/Biological Defense Program (CBDP) has already begun the
process of coordination with DHS by including a representative from DHS
in the DOD CBDP's annual Technology Area Review and Assessment for the
CBDP Science and Technology programs. As the programs within the
Department of Homeland Security develop, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Homeland Defense), in conjunction with the Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense
Programs) will work to expand that level of cooperation. DOD has been
working with DHS on the BioWatch Program, a DHS effort to provide
biological monitoring systems in America's cities, and to date has
provided detectors for 10 U.S. cities.
In the case of vaccines, there was little interest in biodefense
vaccine efforts outside the DOD prior to the anthrax attacks of fall
2001, but this has changed. Both the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) now have
active programs to address national needs for biological defense
vaccines. The DOD is currently working with both the NIH and DHHS on
vaccine or therapeutic efforts of joint interest. These include a next
generation anthrax vaccine, a next generation smallpox vaccine, a
tularemia vaccine, and botulinum antitoxin. In addition, the DOD is
reexamining its vaccine efforts to identify which programs can be
worked jointly in cooperation with the DHHS/NIH and which are DOD
unique or which may not be part of the national program. It is possible
that there may be some realignment of resources within the overall DOD
CBDP as a result of this analysis. Wherever possible, the DOD will seek
to prevent duplication of effort but still assure unique DOD vaccine
and therapeutic needs are met.

COUNTERPROLIFERATION SUPPORT PROGRAM

16. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, the Department participates in
an interagency Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC) to
determine the areas where counterproliferation capabilities most need
to be improved. But there is not an overarching program within the
Department to lead and support the efforts to research, develop, and
field needed counterproliferation capabilities, and this appears to be
a weakness in our counterproliferation efforts. Prior to 1998 the
Department had a Counterproliferation Support Program (CPSP) that was
very effective in leveraging relatively small sums of funding to
develop and produce needed capabilities. Would you investigate whether
reinstating the CPSP within OSD would improve the effectiveness of the
Department's counterproliferation research and development programs and
tell the committee of your views on this idea?
Secretary Wynne. I have recently reviewed the past activities of
the Counterproliferation Support Program and have asked the Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
Defense Programs to provide me with a recommendation as to whether
reinstating such a program within OSD would improve our abilities to
lead, support, and coordinate research and develop efforts, and to
expedite the fielding of needed counterproliferation capabilities to
the warfighters.

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS INDEPENDENT REVIEW

17. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne and General Kern, I understand
that Secretary Rumsfeld has requested that retired Air Force General
Larry Welch chair a review and assessment panel on the Army's Objective
Force and the FCS initiatives, and provide that assessment to the Under
Secretary of the Army. What is the status of that review?
Secretary Wynne. General Welch will complete the review in early
May and will brief the Under Secretary of the Army in mid-May on his
findings and recommendations.
General Kern. The study panel chaired by retired Air Force General
Larry Welch is ongoing. Senior Army leaders met with the panel 10-15
April 2003 to address topics related to FCS and Objective Force. The
panel met with Army leaders again on 22 April 2003 to provide
preliminary findings. A follow up session will be held before the
report is provided to the Secretary of Defense in early May. Although
the panel seems to have gone well, it is too early to say what the
findings are and its impact to technology or other program decisions.

18. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne and General Kern, how will the
outcome of this review affect the upcoming Milestone B decision on FCS
technologies?
Secretary Wynne. One of the Terms of Reference of the Independent
Review required a review of the existing assessment of the critical
technologies in FCS Increment #1 and a determination of the adequacy of
these assessments to guide the program.
The Department will seriously consider the results of this
determination in the reviews leading to the Milestone B decision.
General Kern. A Technology Readiness assessment was completed for
the FCS Milestone B decision. Two members of the review and assessment
panel chaired by retired Air Force General Larry Welch were on the FCS
Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) Independent Review Team (IRT).
The FCS TRA IRT concluded the Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs)
supported entry into System Development and Demonstration (SDD).

LABORATORY INFRASTRUCTURE

19. Senator Reed. General Kern, General Lyles, and Admiral Dyer,
the OSD-sponsored Naval Research Advisory Committee noted that DOD's
lab infrastructure is in serious decline. This is partially due to
underfunding of labs and test centers in Military Construction (MILCON)
accounts. How are you planning to ensure that the lab facilities in DOD
remain world class in terms of their equipment and infrastructure?
General Kern. In order to maintain our world-class facilities, we
continually pursue opportunities to obtain the capital investments
required to provide our researchers with the scientific and
experimental infrastructure vital to the development and transition of
the technologies required for Army Transformation. An example of our
commitment is the significant laboratory MILCON put in place at
Aberdeen Proving Ground (the Rodman Materials Research Laboratory) and
Adelphi, MD (the Zahl Physical Science Laboratory) as a result of the
last BRAC and the ongoing MILCON major facility upgrades at the Soldier
and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM) and the Armaments Research,
Development, and Engineering Center. We also compete for Major
Construction, Army (MCA) projects. As a result of this competition, we
were recently notified of an approval of $4.1 million for a Food
Engineering Lab expansion at the Natick Soldier Center. Additionally,
the laboratories use special programs like Pollution Prevention in
Facilities (P\2\IF) program when the upgrade involves an environmental
issue.
Through our close association with the U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC), we are identifying future core competencies
needed in our laboratories. We have identified a future vision where
products are modeled, designed, manufactured, and tested in virtual
environments that are physics based, secure, and networked. To further
enhance our capabilities, we have identified external partnerships to
support core competencies along the lines of our University Affiliated
Research Centers (UARCs) with MIT, USC, and UT-Austin with an
additional chemical/biological UARC planned at a yet to be determined
university. We have formal partnership agreements and CRADAs that share
both Federal and State government, industry, and academic facilities
and core competencies in a networked environment. We are collaborating
with customers to support investments in RDE infrastructure as an
enterprise initiative focused on future customer requirements aligned
to core competencies. We have developed a long-term vision and
dedicated full time support to the MILCON process. We are participating
in OSD initiatives such as Business Initiative Council (BIC) that
enable legislation and rule changes that foster an environment where
world-class lab and test facilities can be achieved at least possible
taxpayer cost. In addition, we invest annually in laboratory equipment
purchases from the Technical Director's central overhead funds and we
compete for traditional and non-traditional sources of funds for
upgrades.
General Lyles. The AFRL Infrastructure Planning process was
established to identify those key facilities that should be world
class. We have identified niche research areas that are essential for
the warfighter but are not available in either universities or within
defense industries. The Air Force has been able to maintain world-class
research facilities in those identified high-priority research areas.
Examples include the Sandia Optical Range, Dynamic Inferred Missile
Evaluation facilities, Maui Space Surveillance System, and high power
microwave effects facilities. In addition to maintaining world-class
research facilities, there must also be world-class scientists and
engineers to conduct the research. The Air Force has been successful in
recruiting world-class scientists and engineers in those research areas
that are of the highest priority to enable future warfighting
capabilities.
Admiral Dyer. As the Naval Research Advisory Committee panel noted
in its report, ``Science and Technology Community in Crisis,'' some
headway has been made on this issue over the past decade thanks to
congressional action. Section 2892 of the Fiscal Year 1996 National
Defense Authorization Act raised the dollar limits for both Major
MILCON and Unspecified Minor MILCON projects at the DOD laboratories
and centers for fiscal years 1996 through 1998. This authority was
extended through fiscal year 2003 by Section 2871 of the fiscal year
1999 National Defense Authorization Act, and we are hopeful that a
further 5-year extension will be approved.
Our plan is to continue to use current authorities to ensure
appropriate funding for equipment and infrastructure. Nevertheless,
this is a difficult issue given DOD/DON priorities and fiscal
constraints. Laboratory facilities generally cost significantly more
per square foot to construct than more typical military structures. In
addition, laboratory facilities often do not compete well for MILCON
funds against other critical needs, such as piers, runways, and
barracks. Finally, as has been noted numerous times in the past, MILCON
funding levels have not been adequate to maintain much of the DOD
infrastructure at an appropriate materiel condition. As needed, DON
will consider and pursue other alternative solutions such as
authorizing the construction and modification of laboratory facilities
through some funding mechanism other than MILCON. Ultimately, new
legislation may be requested.

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS VALUE

20. Senator Reed. General Kern, in your testimony you highlight the
development of FCSs to give the Army a lighter, more lethal, and
networked force. Can you give me a few examples of how FCSs
technologies might change the way our ground forces are operating in
Iraq today?
General Kern. There are several ways in which our ground forces
would be operating differently in Iraq today using the FCS
technologies: 1) The FCS family of systems and the Unit of Action (UA)
organization would have enhanced the interoperability and connectivity
to joint capabilities, significantly improving an already impressive
choreographed joint operation; 2) The FCS family of systems would have
required less fuel and less refueling, as well a significantly reduced
logistical footprint; 3) The UGVs and UAVs in the FCS family of systems
would have provided a greatly increased capability for brigades,
battalions, and small units (company and below) to see first, in
adverse weather conditions increasing situational awareness and
situational understanding; and 4) The FCS network would have improved
the ability of leaders throughout the joint environment at all UA
echelons to integrate and synchronize combat power, both organic and
supporting.

21. Senator Reed. General Kern, would we see significant
enhancements of combat results?
General Kern. Although it is difficult to significantly improve on
the combat results of our forces in Iraq, I believe that our increased
connectivity, mobility, and surveillance capabilities would result in
fewer coalition casualties, faster and more effective penetration into
Iraqi positions, and significantly less cost associated with the entire
operational effort.

seismic research program to support nuclear test monitoring
22. Senator Reed. General Lyles, your prepared statement notes that
``the Seismic Research Program for detection of nuclear explosions has
been transferred back to the Air Force from the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency.'' The Air Force managed this research program before
1997 and now has it again. This important program supports a national-
level nuclear test monitoring requirement, and it deserves adequate
resources and attention. Congress has repeatedly concluded that the
Department had not provided adequate funding for this research program
in the last 6 years, and added funds. Do you agree on the importance of
this research program, and can you assure this subcommittee that the
Air Force, through the Air Force Research Laboratory, will do its best
to support this important mission adequately?
General Lyles. Yes, the Seismic Research Program is very important
to the Air Force and we will do our best to adequately support this
important mission within available resources. In this era of rogue
nations, terrorism, and homeland defense, the importance of this
national mission has grown, as has the supporting research program
needed to advance the monitoring capability to meet the expanding
requirements arising from today's and tomorrow's threats.

23. Senator Reed. General Lyles, if additional resources were
available for this research program, would it improve our ability to
meet the national requirement for monitoring foreign nuclear tests and,
if so, can you quantify an additional level of support?
General Lyles. Yes, additional funds could contribute to additional
Seismic Research Program capabilities. However, current program funding
of approximately $6.5 million per year is sufficient to meet minimum
seismic research monitoring needs. If additional funding became
available, it could be used to accelerate the enhancement of nuclear
monitoring analysis capabilities and to expand in geographical areas of
interest around the world.
Like many areas in the Air Force, we could wisely invest additional
funds in the Seismic Research Program, however, funding for this
program must be considered within the context of the entire Air Force
portfolio. The Air Force is currently reviewing the level of funding
for seismic research in support of more stringent regional monitoring
requirements.

24. Senator Reed. General Lyles, will you keep the subcommittee
informed on your progress in managing and resourcing this research
program, and in its effectiveness in supporting the national monitoring
requirement?
General Lyles. Yes, we will be happy to keep the subcommittee
informed of our efforts in this area. In the past, Congress has
directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on its management
of and resources for nuclear explosion monitoring; the Air Force
provided inputs to the most recent report submitted in March 2003 and
will continue to do so as required in the future.

BEST PRACTICES DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM

25. Senator Reed. Admiral Dyer, Secretary Wynne mentioned the
development of a ``Best Practices'' approach to modifying the existing
lab demonstration programs. I understand the description of this system
has been published in the Federal Register. How will the implementation
of this system as proposed change the ongoing demonstration at the
Naval Warfare Center in Newport?
Admiral Dyer. Final publication of the ``Best Practices'' (BP)
demonstration will supersede the existing Federal Register postings
that authorized prior DOD demonstration programs. The notice in the
Federal Register says that although the amendment may be implemented as
early as the date of the final notice, implementation strategies will
be developed over time as appropriate. At this time, it is unclear what
the implementation schedule will be. In addition, although the Naval
Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) has not completed a full assessment of
the changes, it is felt that if they are required to transition to the
new BP system, the current Newport demonstration project will be
affected.
The current Demonstration at NUWC Newport is authorized as part of
the Science and Technology Reinvention Laboratory Personnel
Demonstration Project at the Naval Sea Systems Command Warfare Centers
as published in the Federal Register on December 3, 1997. A key feature
of the NAVSEA Warfare Center Demonstration project is that it provides
maximum opportunity for local ``tailoring'' to meet the variety of
requirements characteristic of the NAVSEA organization. NUWC Newport
used this flexibility to establish a local system that satisfied many
of the concerns of the union, which represents the majority of the
workforce (Federal Union of Scientists and Engineers, NAGE R1-144). It
is unlikely that the 1,700 employees represented by the union would
have been enrolled in the demonstration without that flexibility. Based
on our initial review, the BP demonstration does not appear to provide
for local flexibility.
One feature of the BP demonstration project which provides some
concern is the inclusion of the annual comparability increase in the BP
pay-for-performance system. The current NAVSEA demonstrations do not
include the annual comparability pay increase in pay-for-performance,
and it is doubtful that the union would agree to participate in the BP
demonstration with that modification. If the union were to elect to
convert back to the General Schedule (GS) system rather than adopt the
BP demonstration, NUWC Newport would lose at least 80 percent of its
demonstration employees, leaving only managers and supervisors in the
BP demonstration.

26. Senator Reed. Admiral Dyer, will changes to the system require
the approval of the local management and unions?
Admiral Dyer. At NUWC Newport, participating organizations must
fulfill any collective bargaining obligations and enter into an
agreement before converting existing represented employees into the BP
demonstration. The union could choose to ``opt-out'' of the
demonstration and go back to the GS system if we cannot reach agreement
on the BP demonstration. We are not aware that local management
approval is required to transition to the BP demonstration, however
changes to the currently implemented Demo system would require
agreement by the unions.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy

MINE COUNTERMEASURES

27. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Dyer, how is the Navy coordinating
with the Marine Corps to develop mine countermeasures?
Admiral Dyer. The Navy and Marine Corps Mine Countermeasures (MCM)
Requirements Offices (Expeditionary Warfare Division (OPNAV N75) and
Marine Corps Combat Development Command (FWD)) and Headquarters, Marine
Corps, are in daily contact for defining and resourcing MCM
requirements. The result of this well-established working relationship
is to provide the Navy/Marine Corps team with a requisite capability to
defeat mines and obstacles in the littorals. Flag/General Officers,
senior field grade officers, and representatives from those MCM
Requirements Offices as well as applicable Service Acquisition Offices
are members of numerous MCM-specific boards and chartered working
groups.
An example of the close interaction between the Services is the
inclusion of Navy and Marine Corps MCM representatives in the Mission
Area Analysis (MAA) for Amphibious Operations in a Mined Environment.
The mission of this MAA is to define operational capabilities required
to perform amphibious MCM in the 2015 time frame; participation
includes both Services at the 0-6 Oversight Board and Integrated
Process Team (IPT) levels.
The recent approval of the Marine Corps Mine Countermeasures
Working Group Charter by the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps
is another example of the close coordination between the Services. A
primary task of this particular working group is to examine the Marine
Corps' interface with the Navy, particularly with respect to assuring
the effective transition of MCM responsibilities and leveraging Navy
MCM systems with Marine Corps ground MCM applicability. Accordingly,
the Expeditionary Warfare Division (OPNAV N75) is a permanent member of
this Marine Corps working group.
Through the continuous dialog and coordination, this mutually
supporting association has significantly increased visibility of the
overall littoral MCM requirement. Through coordinated efforts such as
these and many others, the Navy/Marine Corps team will assuredly
provide the capability required by naval amphibious forces to readily
project essential combat power ashore.

28. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Dyer, what programs is the Office of
Naval Research pursuing to provide mine countermeasures to the
operators?
Admiral Dyer. Mine warfare S&T develops and transitions
technologies that address critical gaps in the ability of naval forces
to conduct successful operations in anti-access (mined) environments.
The focus of these efforts is on: (1) enabling and developing the
fielding of first generation organic MCM systems; (2) stand-off mine
countermeasures from very shallow water through the beach to support
Ship To Objective Maneuver (STOM); and (3) the development of
cooperating, unmanned MCM systems (UUVs, USVs, UAVs).
The goal of S&T efforts is to reduce tactical timelines and
eliminate the need for manned operations in minefields. The development
of unmanned MCM systems emphasizes networked, cooperating systems which
can be scaled, are easily deployed, and can be tailored to counter
specific threats and within distinctive local environments.
The planned acquisition of a chartered High Speed Vessel (HSV) for
MCM experimentation provides a significant opportunity to examine and
accelerate development of unmanned systems for mine countermeasures.
S&T investments are developing containerized mission packages
(inexpensive AUVs for minehunting, USV minesweeping) for demonstration
on HSV-X2. This builds on the rapid advance of AUV technologies and
capabilities demonstrated on HSV-2 SWIFT during Fleet Battle
Experiment-Juliet and during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The ONR is
working with CNO, PEO LMW, COMINEWARCOM and NWDC on an experimentation
schedule. ONR intends to have the first AUV mission package ready when
HSV-2 SWIFT becomes operational.
Additional AUV mission packages and the USV mine sweeping mission
package will follow. Lessons learned from experimentation would be
applied to the littoral combat ship and reduce risk to the definition
of MCM mission package composition. Additionally, these AUV mission
packages provide a contingency capability for operating forces and
provide a readily deployable underwater search and survey capability
that could be used for homeland defense.
Additionally, S&T investments provide technologies for stand-off
mine countermeasures from very shallow water through the beach to
support Ship To Objective Maneuver (STOM). Examples of S&T products are
described below:
Very Shallow Water MCM: S&T investments in the development of a
small, diver portable AUV system (REMUS) have transitioned to USSOCOM
(Initial Operational Capability (IOC) fiscal year 2003). Additionally,
two units have been acquired by the Naval Special Clearance Team ONE
for use in current operations. This provides an initial stand-off
capability for divers working in very shallow water and has been
demonstrated in FBE-Hotel, Kernal Blitz 2001, FBE-Juliet, and Operation
Iraqi Freedom to greatly reduce tactical timelines.
Littoral Remote Sensing: S&T investments have focused on the
development of algorithms to exploit NTM for environmental products
(e.g. near shore bathymetry in denied areas), detection of mine like
objects and beach defenses. Algorithms for bathymetry have transitioned
to the Warfighter Support Center (WSC) at NAVO and will first be
exercised as an operational system in fiscal year 2003.
Assault Breaching: S&T investments in assault breaching are focused
on the development of mine and obstacle defeat warheads that can be
employed from existing precision-guided munitions. In the near term,
S&T efforts are directed at characterizing the lethality and
effectiveness of existing precision-guided bombs (JDAM) for assault
breaching. Fielding of near term capability is expected by 2006.
Computer Aided Detection/Classification: S&T investments in
computer aided detection/classification (CAD/CAC) are transitioning to
both the AQS-20 and Remote Minehunting System (RMS) program. The
approach taken uses at least three different classification algorithms
which are fused to greatly reduce the number of false alarms.
Synthetic Aperture Sonar: This technology was recently demonstrated
to produce very high resolution imagery at long ranges (approx. 400
meters) and has transitioned to the Long Term Mine Reconnaissance
System (LMRS). This will greatly improve the ability of LMRS to manage
clutter by providing it with near identification acoustic imagery.
Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System (RAMICS). S&T transitioned
this technology in fiscal year 2001 after a successful RAMICS ATD
demonstration of a full up system from a Cobra gunship.
Mine Sweeping/Jamming: Minesweeping is perhaps the most significant
challenge posed by porting airborne MCM capabilities from dedicated MH-
53s to the organic MH-60 airframe. S&T investments in minesweeping are
directed at the development and demonstration of magnetic/acoustic mine
sweeping from unmanned surface vehicles. Additionally, S&T efforts have
demonstrated technical feasibility of using own ship degaussing coils
for mine jamming during a fiscal year 2002 NATO exercise. Current S&T
efforts are directed at applying these techniques to steel hull
combatants.
Mine Identification: Laser line scan technology and streak tube
imaging LIDAR technology have transitioned from S&T to the AQS-14 and
AQS-20 programs, respectively. This technology provides fleet systems
with the capability to rapidly identify mine like contacts. S&T
investments continue to support these acquisition programs through the
development of computer-aided identification and the development of
mine identification tactical decision aids.
Airborne Laser Mine Detection: Streak tube imaging LIDAR technology
has transitioned from S&T to the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System
(ALMDS) acquisition program. S&T investments focus on the development
of compact, high rep rate lasers and the development of a 3D camera.
The latter technology is a P3I to ALMDS. These investments enable the
development of a UAV based LIDAR mine detection system.
Mine warfare near-term S&T investments are focused on enabling an
organic mine countermeasures capability, will provide mission packages
for experimentation on HSV-X2, and provide technologies for stand-off
mine countermeasures from very shallow water through the beach to
support STOM. Longer term S&T investments focus on the development of
networked, cooperating, autonomous systems which can be scaled, are
easily deployed, and can be tailored to counter specific threats and
within distinctive local environments. Fleet involvement is a critical
part of the mine warfare S&T program.

29. Senator Kennedy. General Kern, what programs is the Army
research lab pursuing to provide mine countermeasures to the soldiers
in the field?
General Kern. Senator Kennedy, the Army's leadership has focused
current and future countermine science and technology investments to
address the most pressing needs of Army transformation. We are pursuing
programs to solve critical capability shortfalls for our dismounted and
mounted forces.
For our dismounted warfighter, we have initiated a program
investigating multiple sensor technologies mounted on robotic platforms
to provide safer standoff distances when detection of individual anti-
tank and anti-personnel mines is necessary. Such capabilities are
critical when operating in close terrain, when stealthy operations are
planned, and when other specialized equipment is not available.
Lightweight, high performance technology from this dismounted
warfighter initiative will augment current capabilities afforded by the
recent procurement and limited fielding of 210 new Handheld Standoff
Mine Detection Systems (HSTAMIDS) being produced by Cyterra, Inc. of
Waltham, MA. Full rate production is scheduled for fiscal year 2004.
HSTAMIDS is a state-of-the-art mine detector that combines ground
penetrating radar with sophisticated metal detection and advanced
signal processing to reliably detect low metal content as well as high
metal content anti-tank and anti-personnel lines.
Remote detection of minefields is essential for mission planning
and execution. The timely knowledge of minefield locations is critical
to the commander's decision to breach, avoid, or bypass the mine
obstacle. Knowing minefield locations generally supports rapid rates of
advance which is a key transformation imperative and is necessary to
preclude blundering into mined areas unknowingly and suffering
avoidable losses. In the near term, a minefield detection system based
on electro-optic and infrared sensor technology is planned for use with
tactical level unmanned aerial vehicles. In the longer term, we are
investing in airborne ground penetrating radar and hyperspectral
infrared sensor technologies to provide more rapid and broader search
capabilities operating at higher, more survivable altitudes on larger
unmanned or manned aircraft. To further increase the rates of advance
along routes and provide usable capability for the transformation, we
are exploiting advances in unmanned ground and small air vehicles as
well as technical breakthroughs in mine detection sensors. We have
initiated a program to digitally link a small UAV with an UGV. Both the
UAV and UGV have integrated on-board mine detection sensors. The small
UAV with on-board mine detection sensor proceeds first along a route
and nominates regions of interest where anti-tank mines are likely
buried. The UGV based system will follow and thoroughly analyze each
region. By reducing the search area of the UGV based mine detection
sensor system, this concept increases mine detection rates of advance
to approximately 13 kilometers per hour and provides a significant
increase in speed when compared to the UGV performing alone. The mine
detection sensor on the small UAV uses lightweight, uncooled infrared
operating at discrete frequencies in the long wave region that, when
combined with minimal signal processing, can identify recent mining
activity in roads. The mine detection sensor for the UGV is a close-in,
ultra-wideband ground penetrating radar that reliably detects plastic
and metallic cased anti-tank mines without excessive false alarms.
Recent technical breakthroughs have produced this new ground
penetrating radar that for the first time has the potential to provide
the warfighter with a high confidence tool for tactical on-road mine
detection. In addition to these technologies and concepts of operation
to detect traditional mines buried in a roadway, we are aggressively
pursuing a program to protect vehicles against the effects of side
attack mines and improvised explosive devices that are not deployed in
the roadway.
For a longer-term solution, we have begun to research forward
looking mine detection technologies that can be integrated directly
with the manned vehicles envisioned for the transformation. Forward
looking technologies have the potential to replace the linked UAV and
UGV concept described above with a less complex solution for on-route
mine detection. Initial analyses and component experiments indicate
that multi-sensor approaches will be required to ``see'' far enough
ahead of the vehicle to permit stopping or swerving to avoid
encountering the suspect area and to meet other performance goals.
Forward looking, ground penetrating, synthetic aperture radar, advanced
infrared, and acoustic technologies are currently under investigation.
Finally, we will be starting a new research initiative during
fiscal year 2004 directed toward mine detection sensor technologies
with potential of detecting buried mines that are deployed along
unimproved avenues of approach, i.e., cross country. While the sensor
technology is the critical component to any mine or minefield detection
system, state-of-the-art sensors alone are not sufficient to enable the
Army transformation. Imbedded within each of the mine or minefield
detection systems outlined previously is sophisticated signal
processing and target detection algorithms that automate the detection
process and permit the warfighter to concentrate on other tasks.
University researchers and small businesses from across the country
have contributed their intellectual capital to take advantage of the
mine detection sensor breakthroughs with new mathematical routines and
data analysis processes.
While a majority of the countermine investment has focused on mine
and minefield detection, the Army is keenly aware of the need to
enhance our neutralization and breaching capabilities. To meet the
needs of the transformation, we have shifted focus in the S&T arena
from breaching lanes through minefields to point neutralization of
individual mines. A key benefit of this shift in focus is reduced
logistical demand. We are moving from the paradigm of large, heavy
explosive or mechanical breaching systems to smaller, more compact
individual mine neutralization capabilities. S&T initiatives are
underway in point neutralization to exploit mine detection advances
that produces fewer false targets and provides smaller location error
associated with individual mine locations. The Army has initiated S&T
investments in close-in techniques to kill individual mines. We are
currently monitoring U.S. Navy investments in techniques to neutralize
minefields using remotely delivered, precision-guided weapons.
The progress in countermine science and technology is and has been
closely monitored by all affected parties within the U.S. Army. We have
more than doubled the 6.2 investments starting in fiscal year 2004 with
funding levels of approximately $18 million through the Future Year
Defense Program (FYDP). The Training and Doctrine Command has
established a countermine General Officer Steering Committee that meets
semi-annually. I personally review countermine material status
quarterly. Every effort is being made to address this difficult and
technically challenging area.

30. Senator Kennedy. General Kern, what types of programs are you
pursuing to uncover mines and unexploded ordnance?
General Kern. While the Army's leadership has focused a substantial
percentage of its countermine science and technology resources to
addressing its transformation needs, we do recognize that mine
clearance is an important requirement. Mine clearance is defined as the
removal of mines or unexploded ordnance from an area of operation post
combat. In fiscal year 2000, we proposed a new Joint Area Clearance
(JAC) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) to the Office of
the Secretary of Defense to evaluate the military utility of equipment
developed by the Department of State's Humanitarian Demining Research
and Development Program. Approved the following fiscal year, we are
currently executing the third year of this 4 year Joint Forces Command
(JFCOM) sponsored program jointly with the U.S. Air Force and U.S.
Marine Corps.
The JAC ACTD is focused on two mine clearance missions. The first
mission is administrative clearance of small areas for military needs
such as establishment of logistics bases or field hospitals. The second
mission is maintaining clear logistics routes once the fighting force
has moved forward. For both missions, we are keenly interested in
removing all mines and unexploded ordnance and preventing remining of
cleared areas.
For area clearance, we are evaluating the military utility of four
different systems. The four systems are a floating mine blade, a mine
clearing cultivator, a mine sifter, and a full width mine flail. All of
these systems are large, requiring a D-7 class bulldozer as the prime
mover, and generally modify the top layer of soil to remove the mines
or unexploded ordnance. The first three systems have been assessed and
used by the international humanitarian demining community.
Additionally, the floating mine blade was used to proof the cleared
U.S. minefields at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
For route clearance, we are evaluating full width mine rollers to
rapidly traverse and clear a route. A prototype full width roller
system has been designed for the M113 and is currently under
evaluation. A version of this roller system is in the design phase for
the U.S. Marine Corps Lightweight Armored Vehicle (LAV) 25.

VISA DELAYS

31. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Wynne, General Kern, General Lyles,
and Admiral Dyer, the State Department's Visa Mantas program requires
that foreign scientists and students participating in sensitive
research undergo careful screening before they are admitted to the U.S.
The areas covered by this program are numerous, including nuclear
technology, rocket systems technology, chemical, biotechnology, and
biomedical engineering, remote sensing, imaging and reconnaissance, and
laser and directed energy systems technology. Last year universities,
defense labs, and research institutions employing these foreign
scientists experienced extensive delays--of 8-10 months--in obtaining
the security clearances and visas needed before the scientists could
travel the U.S. These delays adversely impacted the universities and
defense labs, which had to put critical programs on hold. I understand
that universities remain concerned that similar delays could ensue
again this year. Are we seeing the delays this year that we saw last
year?
Secretary Wynne. The delays are getting shorter. In 2000, I
understand that about 1,000 visa cases were reviewed by the State
Department and other agencies under the Mantis program. In 2002 the
number was closer to 14,000. That increase, along with other new visa
clearance requirements instituted after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, overwhelmed the resources of the agencies reviewing
the cases. The result was the long delays observed last year. Since
then, the agencies have decreased the time required for processing a
majority of cases through better use of automation and additional
staff. Now, at anyone time, there are approximately 1,000 Mantis cases
in the review process. The delays are not nearly as long as they were
last year.
General Kern. The Directors of the Army Laboratories (LABs) and
Research Development and Engineering Centers (RDECs) were surveyed in
April 2003 with regard to the visa delay question. All Directors except
the Director of the Aviation and Missile RDEC (AMRDEC) reported they
were not experiencing visa delay problems that had impact on either
sensitive or non-sensitive research programs. The Director AMRDEC
identified one instance that required 4-6 months to complete. The
Director did not consider this processing time excessive. AMRDEC
Director also reported that the center had started a process to query
their contractors on this issue and report back to the Army Materiel
Command (AMC) in 2 weeks. Approximately half of AMRDEC work is
accomplished under contract.
General Lyles. The Air Force S&T program has not been affected by
visa and security delays in any measurable way with respect to foreign
scientists or students. Increased national security has sometimes
resulted in increased processing times for visas and security
clearances, but we anticipate long lead-times and plan accordingly.
Many times, we are aware of upcoming visits in advance and can begin
the required scheduling and paperwork prior to the actual visits. As
for security clearances, delays are fairly common even for U.S.
citizens.
While the Air Force is primarily involved with foreign scientists
in conjunction with the Air Force Research Laboratory, there are also
many foreign students working on Air Force funded research programs
within the university community. The baseline document that the Air
Force uses to provide policy and direction for foreign scientists and
students in funded research programs is the National Security Decision
Directive (NSDD)-189, entitled ``National Policy on the Transfer of
Scientific, Technical, and Engineering Information.''
This directive establishes national policy for controlling the flow
of science, technology, and engineering information produced in
conjunction with Federally-funded fundamental research at colleges,
universities, and laboratories. Basically, the NSDD-189 policy, to the
maximum extent possible, is that the products of fundamental research
remain unrestricted. If it is determined prior to conducting the
research that there will likely be national security issues involved,
the mechanism to control information will be by classification.
Fundamentally, no restrictions may be placed upon the conduct or
reporting of Federally-funded fundamental research that has not
received national security classification, except as provided in
applicable U.S. statutes. To ensure this guidance is implemented
consistently across the laboratory, the Air Force relies on the
Scientific and Technical Information Program and on its classification
program managers to determine if Federally-funded work is sensitive and
should be appropriately controlled by national security guidelines.
Admiral Dyer. We have not experienced systemic problems with
obtaining visas for the placement of foreign scientists in our Navy
facilities.

32. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Wynne, General Kern, General Lyles,
and Admiral Dyer, how are you addressing these delays?
Secretary Wynne. We are cooperating with the Department of State so
that officials can more quickly identify sensitive courses of study and
identify problematic applicants. An example of our cooperation is our
consistent participation in deliberations concerning the proposed
Interagency Panel on Advanced Science and Security (IPASS).
General Kern. The April 2003 survey of Army LABs and RDECs revealed
that they were not experiencing any visa delay problems. The AMRDEC
reported they used management attention to facilitate the one
identified situation. The Deputy Director of the Weapon Sciences
Directorate facilitated the clearance process with the Aviation and
Missile Command's (AMCOM) Intelligence and Security Directorate to
ensure that all applicable policies and procedures were followed.
General Lyles. The Air Force recognizes that increased national
security sometimes results in increased processing times for visas and
security clearances. In fact, in the case of security clearances,
delays are fairly common even for U.S. citizens. The Air Force
addresses these possible delays by planning accordingly for anticipated
long lead-times. When notified of upcoming visits, we begin the
required scheduling and paperwork prior to the actual visits.
Admiral Dyer. We have not experienced systemic problems with
obtaining visas for the placement of foreign scientists in our Navy
facilities.

33. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Wynne, General Kern, General Lyles,
and Admiral Dyer, are these delays causing any disruptions in programs?
Secretary Wynne. I am not aware of disruptions to our research
programs. Given the need for a different kind of homeland security that
was thrust upon us in 2001, a small number of transient disruptions
would be acceptable.
General Kern. The Directors of Army LABs and RDECs reported, in the
April 2003 survey, that no programs have experienced any known
disruptions due to delays in the processing of security clearances or
visas for foreign scientists or engineers.
General Lyles. The Air Force S&T program has not seen an adverse
impact of security delays in any measurable way with respect to foreign
scientists and students.
Admiral Dyer. There was one isolated event that involved a Russian
Gromov delegation (Russian Research Institute), which resulted in a 6-
month delay. This was an unclassified visit to the Patuxent River Naval
Air Station to continue an ongoing NAVAIR/Gromov flight research
institute technical exchange.

NATICK SOLDIER CENTER

34. Senator Kennedy. General Kern, I understand that the Army has
established a nanotechnology research institute at MIT to develop new
technologies for the soldier. How does that new institute work with the
Natick Soldier Center, the Army's premier center for the development of
soldier technologies?
General Kern. The Natick Soldier Center (NSC) works with the
Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies (ISN) in several ways. First,
the Director, NSC, is a member of the Executive Steering Board of the
ISN and, as such, is involved in determining the overall direction of
the ISN and in assessing its performance for the soldier. In addition,
the NSC Director also stays in regular communication with Professor
E.L. (Ned) Thomas, Director of the ISN.
There are also a number of subject matter experts from NSC who are
assigned to participate in reviewing the ISN program as part of the
Army's Capability Area Review Teams (CART) technical oversight process.
The objective here is to make sure that the Army's technical community
is represented, and that the accumulated knowledge residing in that
community is used as input to decisions made on the ISN program.
To maintain regular communication as the work is performed,
technical staff members from the NSC and the ISN meet as needed
informally to exchange information on Army research directions, soldier
needs, and ISN research. Recently, scientists at the NSC and the ISN
co-organized a highly successful meeting of the Fiber Society,
including a well-attended session on electrospinning and nanofibers. In
addition, the Army is instituting an annual technical review of the ISN
program at which NSC personnel will be present.
To ensure that we remain focused on the Institute's primary purpose
of developing nanotechnology to meet needs of the individual soldier,
we have also assigned a military member of the NSC staff to work at the
ISN. This individual is an 0-5 (Lieutenant Colonel) on active duty, a
graduate of both West Point and MIT, and a career infantryman. His role
is to assure that the lines of communication between the NSC, the Army
Research Laboratory (ARL), and the ISN are open and clear, and his
focus is on assuring that ISN science is directed toward the needs of
the future soldier.
In addition, MIT faculty members who participate in the ISN are
already initiating collaborations with Natick subject matter experts in
various areas. To date these have not been under the umbrella of the
ISN. This is the first year of the ISN effort and its facility will not
open until late May. We are getting to know each other better in
anticipation of additional collaboration in the future.

35. Senator Kennedy. General Kern, what role will Natick play in
ensuring that the new nanotechnologies are quickly turned into real
warfighting capabilities?
General Kern. The role of NSC in ensuring that new nanotechnologies
can be turned into real warfighting capabilities is multi-fold. In
addition to working with the ISN to transition its technology, NSC has
an active in-house research program augmented by external contracts and
collaborations with individuals in academia, industry, and other
Government laboratories.
The focus of the ISN is on basic research in nanotechnology that
can lead to revolutionary advances and very significant payoff to the
Army. Because this is basic research, it is likely that most of these
payoffs, even if they are major, will be realized in the longer-term.
Nevertheless, some of these may be ready for transition to the field
sooner. Natick will be carefully following progress at the ISN in order
to identify technology that is rapidly maturing. As they are
identified, we may need to provide the NSC with additional resources to
help mature the technology so that it can transition from the ISN and
its partners to our Program Managers for further development and
fielding. The spiral development approach, in which technology is
inserted as it becomes available, is expected to facilitate this
process.
The NSC has maintained an active program in the area of
nanotechnology for the soldier involving several thrusts. For example,
NSC scientists have been active in research on flexible photovoltaic
materials involving the use of nanoscale materials and processing for
generating power from sunlight, with the potential to supply much of
the power requirements of the warfighter. Technology that has been
jointly developed with the University of Massachusetts at Lowell has
now been licensed to Konarka, a venture-capital funded firm that is
working to producing flexible solar cells in a roll-to-roll process. If
successful, these may provide an early implementation of nanotechnology
for the warrior.
The NSC has been working on combining the technology of
electrospinning, in which nonwoven mats of fibers having diameters of
approximately 100 nm can be produced using a variety of polymers, with
nanoparticles, and other materials having the potential to
decontaminate chemical or biological agents. This work could lead to
clothing having a layer that is both an agent barrier and is self-
decontaminating, thereby providing enhanced protection for tomorrow's
warfighter against these threats. Physical Sciences, Inc. has worked
with NSC on developing nanofiber protective liners for future chemical
protective clothing systems.
Working in-house and with industrial firms such as Triton Systems,
NSC has also been examining the potential of nanocomposites that employ
natural clay materials in conjunction with polymers for various
applications. One example is in packaging for DOD combat rations, where
polymer films made from these materials offer the potential to protect
foods over longer periods, thereby increasing shelf life and reducing
spoilage.
NSC has also been working with scientists from Boston College to
examine the interaction of electromagnetic radiation with ordered
arrays of carbon nanotubes. These materials share many things in common
with photonic band gap materials and offer promise as filters,
waveguides, and other components for optical modulation and switching
in soldier-borne equipment. NSC, Boston College, and UMass-Boston are
also working together to combine the carbon nanotube arrays with dyes
for agile laser eye protection and vision devices.
NSC has also been working with the Army Research Laboratory in
directly supporting my initiative to meet with academia and industry to
identify ``low-hanging fruit'' in nanotechnology that could be
harvested and moved forward into Army applications sooner rather than
later.
Finally, while there is significant potential for nanotechnology to
enhance the soldier's real warfighting capabilities, there are many
existing demands on the Army budget. One challenge is to meet the needs
we have already identified as necessary for transforming the Army even
as we accelerate progress in nanotechnology and ready it for insertion.
To speed the transition of nanotechnology and realize its benefits, we
may need to provide NSC with the resources to accelerate technology
development so it can be moved forward into Army systems more rapidly.

BRAC PROCESS

36. Senator Kennedy. General Kern, General Lyles, and Admiral Dyer,
in your roles as heads of the Services' systems commands, you play an
important role in protecting and promoting the tech-base and ensuring
military transformation. As we face the 2005 BRAC round, what role will
you play in developing the criteria and conducting the analysis?
General Kern. The Army Materiel Command will be thoroughly involved
with both the Army and Joint Cross Service Groups in a collaborative
effort to develop recommendations for consideration that enhance Army
and DOD Transformation and the capability of our labs and research,
development, and engineering centers to deliver technology to the
soldier.
General Lyles. Both Congress and DOD recognize military value must
be the primary consideration in reducing or restructuring U.S. military
bases. All military installations will be reviewed equally, and all
recommendations will be based on approved, published selection
criteria, infrastructure inventory, and a future force structure plan.
The criteria to be used by all Services are being developed by the
OSD's Infrastructure Executive Group and Infrastructure Steering Group.
I have input to both of these groups through the Secretary of the Air
Force and Air Force Chief of Staff. These two groups will also conduct
the analysis of the data collected by the appropriate cross-service
working groups. I will ensure that the data collected within my command
is true and accurate as required by the internal control plan.
Admiral Dyer. I am not directly involved in development of the
selection criteria or conducting the analysis, however my understanding
is the Department of Defense, with all of its components, will work as
a team to develop the BRAC 2005 selection criteria. Military value will
be the primary consideration. Through this process DOD will not only
eliminate excess physical capacity; the operation, sustainment, and
recapitalization of which diverts scarce physical resources from
defense capability, but also hopes to reconfigure current
infrastructure into one in which operational capacity maximizes both
warfighting capability and efficiency.

37. Senator Kennedy. General Kern, General Lyles, and Admiral Dyer,
do you know if the Services will recommend the same criteria as in the
1995 BRAC round?
General Kern. The Secretary of Defense has not yet proposed the
criteria he will use in making closure and realignment recommendations
for the 2005 BRAC round, but will do so not later than December 31,
2003, as required by the BRAC Statute. Therefore, I cannot provide a
definitive response to your question. However, my understanding is
that, unlike prior BRAC rounds, for the 2005 BRAC round Congress has
specified a number of issues that, at a minimum, the 2005 criteria must
address. For that reason I don't anticipate that the 2005 criteria will
be identical to those utilized by the Department in 1995. I expect the
Department and Services to work together to develop the BRAC 2005
selection criteria over the summer and fall of 2003, and the Army
Materiel Command will participate in that effort.
General Lyles. Both Congress and DOD recognize military value must
be the primary consideration in reducing or restructuring U.S. military
bases. The criteria, which will be used by all Services, are being
developed by the OSD's Infrastructure Executive Group and
Infrastructure Steering Group. A draft of the criteria will be provided
for a 30-day comment period not later than 31 December 2003. Final
section criteria will be published by 16 February 2004.
Admiral Dyer. My understanding is the Department along with the
Services will ensure that the proposed selection criteria meet all of
the requirements of the enabling legislation, retain the best of what
has worked in the past, and incorporate changes that might be needed to
accommodate changing military missions in the future. DOD intends to
meet all legislatively mandated deadlines regarding selection criteria,
e.g., publishing the proposed selection criteria in the Federal
Register not later than 31 December 2003.

38. Senator Kennedy. General Kern, General Lyles, and Admiral Dyer,
if you are not involved in the development of the criteria or the
analysis, how will you ensure that the senior leadership of your
Services know the importance of the systems commands, the defense labs,
and product centers in the 2005 BRAC round?
General Kern. I believe that the senior leadership of the Army is
well aware of the importance of the systems commands in both the near
term readiness of the service and delivery of technology to the
soldier, and in Army Transformation. The Army Materiel Command will be
thoroughly involved in BRAC 2005 with both the Army and Joint Cross
Service Groups in a collaborative effort to develop recommendations for
consideration that enhance Army and DOD Transformation.
General Lyles. Through the BRAC process, we will ensure that the
United States continues to field the best prepared and be equipped
military in the world. I have continual contact with the Air Force
headquarters members of the OSD Infrastructure Executive Group and
Infrastructure Steering Group. I have nominated several of most
knowledgeable senior leaders as members and functional experts to the
technical, industrial, and supply and storage joint cross-service
working groups.
Admiral Dyer. In my normal course of business, I ensure that the
senior leadership is well aware of and recognizes the importance of the
systems commands, the defense labs, and product centers. As mentioned
before, the Department of Defense, with all of its components, will
work as one team on BRAC 2005. Each Service will provide experienced
people to all levels of the cross-service BRAC working groups. The law
requires that the published selection criteria, ensures that military
value is the primary consideration. I anticipate that both current and
future aspects of those functions and missions will be identified and
considered as a part of the installation military value assessments
during the BRAC 2005 process.

39. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Wynne, what role will you play in
developing criteria and conducting the analysis for the 2005 BRAC
round?
Secretary Wynne. Secretary Rumsfeld released a memo on November 15,
2002 which summarized the procedures the Department will use for the
2005 BRAC. He established two senior groups. The Infrastructure
Executive Council (IEC) will make policy and oversee the entire
process. The IEC is chaired by the Deputy Secretary; the Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)
(USD(AT&L)) is a member.
The subordinate Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) will be chaired
by USD(AT&L). The ISG will oversee joint cross-service analysis of
common business functions and ensure integration of the process with
the military departments and defense agencies. USD(AT&L) will issue the
policies and direction to conduct BRAC 2005 analysis. Towards those
ends I will carry out the policies and follow the directions issued by
the USD(AT&L).
The ISG established six joint cross-service groups (JCSG) to
conduct the analysis of common business oriented support functions:
Industrial, Supply and Storage, Technical, Education and Training,
Administration, and Medical. I chair the Industrial JCSG that will be
responsible for developing closure and realignment recommendations
regarding the Department's industrial functions. The Industrial JCSG
has as its members senior Service and Joint Staff experts in the
Industrial field.

COMMISSION TO REVIEW LAB FUNCTIONS

40. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Wynne, last October you signed a
memo recommending the establishment of a commission to review
laboratory functions. You stated that your conclusion is that ``. . .
labs are out of favor and no longer have a constituency within parent
organizations. Their budgets are cut, people are discouraged, and their
overall utility is in question.'' Do you agree with this statement?
Secretary Wynne. My opinions since that 29 October memo have been
altered significantly. Updates from the Services, and from the Deputy
Director, Defense Research and Engineering, who also serves as the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Laboratories and Basic Sciences,
have been most encouraging. My suggestion to organize a commission is
no longer valid. I have learned that the defense labs are, in fact, not
out of favor. I am pleased to report that they have been successfully
working toward a stronger constituency within their parent
organizations. As Senator Roberts implied, the memo was intended as a
wake-up call. Its intent was to spur action. As I stated in my
testimony, their response in working to improve the laboratories'
connection to the Services has been fantastic.

41. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Wynne, how are you working to
improve that constituency within parent organizations?
Secretary Wynne. DOD laboratories have a solid constituency within
parent organizations that is being strengthened through numerous DOD
initiatives.
In the Army, a new two-star command was created to centralize S&T
development and enhance research and development oversight and
direction.
In the Air Force, the Chief Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) and the
Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) have taken personal action. Within
the past 3 years, the Air Force held three four-star S&T summits,
hosted by the CSAF and SECAF, which reviewed the quality and relevancy
of the Air Force S&T program. The AFRL earned positive feedback, from
the highest levels of the Air Force.
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy reorganized his staff in the
fall of 2002. As part of that reorganization he established and
recently filled a new Senior Executive Service level position to
coordinate with the Office of Naval Research, the Warfare Centers, and
Program Managers to facilitate moving highly sophisticated and complex
technological systems into the fleet.
At the DOD level, we have increased the budget request for S&T by
nearly 25 percent in just 2 years. In addition, we have increased the
investment in demonstrations, primarily through the ACTDs, by almost 50
percent over the last 2 years.
Personally, I am supporting the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Laboratories and Basic Sciences (DUSD(LABS)), who is working very
closely with the labs through the Laboratory Quality Enhancement
Program (LQEP) to develop compendia of exemplary practices that the
labs themselves can use as tools for further enhancement of laboratory
quality.

42. Senator Kennedy. General Kern, General Lyles, and Admiral Dyer,
as sponsors of the parent organizations, could you address the current
utility of the labs?
General Kern. The U.S. Army depends heavily on its labs to provide
the needed stimulus for the next generation of Army weapon systems. In
areas where there is little or no outside interest for investing in
research and development, such as munitions, missiles, certain areas of
medicine, and certain areas of building construction, among others, a
very dedicated Army investment is required. To take more complete
advantage of the Army's investment in R&D, the Army Materiel Command
has reorganized is lab functions into a new command.
The U.S. Army Research, Development, and Engineering Command
(RDECOM), within the AMC, represents a major shift in the organization
of Army labs within the AMC. There are three main objectives for the
RDECOM:

1. Integrate Research, Development, and Engineering across all areas
of the Army
2. Get the products of technology to the soldier faster
3. Demonstrate the agility to take advantage of opportunities no
matter where they may arise.

Achieving these objectives will require new and innovative
approaches to all aspects of development of technology for the soldier.
The Commander of the RDE is empowered to test and experiment with new
processes to achieve these objectives. The creation of the RDE Command
will help the Army further enhance it's ability to sustain peace and
wage war when directed.
There are several examples of how the Army labs have been involved
in projects that have resulted in our ability to fulfill our mission.
The food our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines eat, the Meals
Ready to Eat (MRE), are a product of the NSC, an Army lab. In
conjunction with the food industry, we have developed and fielded an
entire menu of food stuffs that represent dramatic improvements over
just 20 years ago. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, a number of Abrams
tanks were disabled as a result of being shot in the engine grill doors
by rocket-propelled grenades. As a result of these incidents, the Army
Research laboratory undertook a project to quickly develop a defeat
mechanism. The results were welded grills that bolt on over the
existing Abrams grill doors. These welded grills are crew installable
with initial sets already in theater. The fact that the Army ``owns the
night'' is a direct result of the R&D done by the Army Night Vision and
Electronic Sensors Directorate at Ft. Belvoir. Here, Army scientists
and engineers continue to develop and improve the Army's ability to see
and operate in darkness. Many of these items have commercial
applications as well, such as the MRE and night vision goggles that
have found there way into the market place.
The Army labs are a vital part of our ability to sustain the peace
and wage war. They represent a very talented and diverse portfolio of
scientists and engineers that help the nation maintain its preeminent
position throughout the world.
General Lyles. The AFRL provides the foundation for the Air Force
S&T program, which contains the technology development essential for
the Air Force vision of an Expeditionary Air and Space Force. Our S&T
programs focus of providing cutting edge performance, flexible, and
affordable technologies to the warfighter. Years of continued
technology investments have resulted in unequivocal returns as
evidenced by our superior military capabilities, as recently
demonstrated in Operation Iraqi Freedom. These technologies, many of
which are currently being deployed around the world, enable our troops
to be more lethal, more informed, and more aware. The S&T program
relies not only upon the wise foresight of our leaders, but upon their
faith as well. AFRL is where tangible and unimaginable ideas transform
into superior technological innovations. It takes imagination,
innovation, and persistence to foresee today what defenses to prepare
for the possibilities of tomorrow. Air Force S&T is the key to
addressing tomorrow's emerging threats--both traditional and
asymmetrical.
Admiral Dyer. Navy centers and laboratories are best able to
translate between technological opportunities and the warfighters'
needs, integrate technologies across life cycles and generations of
equipment, respond rapidly to DOD needs, provide special facilities,
and offer the necessary technical support to the services to make them
smart buyers and users of technology. For example, Navy centers and
laboratories:

Infuse the art of the possible into military planning.
Act as principal agents in maintaining the technology
base.
Avoid technological surprise and ensure technological
innovation.
Support the acquisition process.
Provide special-purpose facilities not practical for
the private sector.
Respond rapidly in time of urgent need or national
crisis.
Be a constructive adviser for Department directions
and programs based on technical expertise.
Support the user in the application of emerging
technology and introduction of new systems.
Translate user needs into technology requirements for
industry.
Serve as a S&T training ground for civilian and
military acquisition personnel.

43. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Wynne, what can we do to ensure that
the labs and product centers remain a vibrant incubator for
transformational technologies?
Secretary Wynne. As you are aware, our laboratories and product
centers are world-class institutions. Besides an increase in our S&T
budget, we also plan higher investment in technology demonstration
efforts. These actions provide the resources required to sustain our
technological advantage and accelerate transition of critical
technologies to our warfighters.
Additionally, we must begin now to incorporate long term strategies
and guide investments that reshape the scientists and engineers (S&E)
supply chain, assuring a quality pipeline of personnel resources. Also
through LQEP, the DUSD(LABS) is working to ensure that the defense
laboratories, in a collective sense, are appropriately aligned for the
long term with respect to the major S&T-based transformation
initiatives identified within DDR&E and within the Services.

44. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Wynne, has the commission provided
any recommendations?
Secretary Wynne. No. My suggestion to organize a commission is no
longer valid. (see supporting Answer to Question #40)
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman

LAB WORKFORCE

45. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Wynne, in recent years, the
Department of Defense has been given numerous authorities by Congress
for personnel demonstration projects to encourage employment and
retention of top scientific talent, such as Section 342 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Section 246 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 and Section 245
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. A
preliminary study by GAO has found that very few of the requests by the
labs for personnel demonstration projects and flexible hiring authority
have been implemented by the Department. How many requests have been
made to the Department for personnel demonstration projects and
flexible hiring authority under the sections listed above, and how many
of these requests have been implemented by the Department?
Secretary Wynne.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authority Requests Implemented
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 342.................................... 11 8 \1\
Section 246.................................... 10 0 \2\
Section 245.................................... 7 0 \2\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Of the three new proposed projects not implemented, one was
withdrawn by the sponsor and the other two were deferred pending the
outcome of the Best Practices Initiative.
\2\ These requests could not be approved because sections 245 and 246
did not provide the Secretary of Defense with any additional civilian
personnel authorities. Nonetheless, in June 2001, DOD waived certain
hiring policies, procedures, and regulations for the laboratories and
centers participating in the section 245 and 246 pilot programs, in
order to remove any existing DOD policies that impeded the exercise of
expedited hiring authority. Further, the Secretaries of the Military
Departments were requested to identify and waive those policies,
procedures, practices, and regulations within the Departments not
specifically required by law that restrict or otherwise impede the
ability of those laboratories and centers to exercise expedited hiring
authority for personnel within their organizations.

46. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Wynne, how does the Department
intend to use the provision for personnel demonstration projects and
flexible hiring authority, and why have so few of the laboratory
requests been implemented thus far?
Secretary Wynne. Section 342 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for fiscal year 1995, as amended, has been widely used. Eight
personnel demonstration projects were created under this authority,
which resulted in many positive personnel related benefits for the
participating laboratories and centers. Examples of such innovations
include:

Relaxed rules for details and temporary hires and
promotion
Increased new hire probationary period to 3 years
Used performance focused reductions-in-force
Implemented pay banding
Implemented pay-for-performance system

The Department recently proposed legislation for expanding these
and other flexibilities to all Defense laboratories.

NATIONAL SECURITY PERSONNEL SYSTEM

47. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Wynne, it is my understanding that
Congress will be reviewing a National Security Personnel System (NSPS).
Before this system is implemented, there is the concern for the present
difficulties in attracting and retaining top scientific and engineering
talent in the DOD labs. What steps is the Department currently taking
to assure that top scientific and engineering talent are retained,
before the NSPS is implemented?
Secretary Wynne. Working within the framework of merit principles
and veterans' preference, DOD has developed two innovative hiring
flexibilities that, when combined, will greatly expand the hiring
authorities of laboratory commanders. The first flexibility, on-the-
spot hiring, effectively gives laboratory commanders direct-appointment
authority for shortage categories. The second flexibility, scholastic
achievement appointment authority, will provide direct-appointment
authority to laboratory commanders for college graduates. Candidates
must meet an overall grade point average (GPA) of 3.0 or better on a
4.0 scale (or the equivalent on a different scale); or either: (1) a
3.5 or better cumulative GPA on a 4.0 scale (or the equivalent on a
different scale) in the field of study qualifying for the occupation or
(2) a ranking in the upper 10 percent of a student's class of the major
college or subdivision attended. We believe that these features, used
in combination, will provide laboratory commanders with greater hiring
flexibility. These hiring flexibilities are included in the Best
Practices Personnel Demonstration Project and will be available to the
laboratory commanders as soon as this demonstration project clears the
final Federal Register process.
In addition to enhancing the science and engineering (S&E) human
resource system, we are implementing key programs that will help
attract top talent. These programs are focused on transforming the
defense laboratory system; improving the overall basic research
programs; and reshaping the S&E supply chain.

48. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Wynne, how will the implementation
of the NSPS affect the hiring and retention of top scientific and
engineering workforce?
Secretary Wynne. The NSPS proposed by the administration includes a
provision that would allow DOD to hire professionals, including
scientists and engineers, and to prescribe the appropriate compensation
program. It is based on the authority currently available to DARPA and
the military departments. This proposal provides for increased salaries
and bonuses. Professionals hired under this authority may be paid at
least 120 percent of the minimum rate of basic pay for GS-15, up to the
rate of basic pay for Executive Schedule (EX) level IV, with basic pay
and locality pay not to exceed EX-III (currently, $142,500 annually).
In addition, these employees would be eligible each year for additional
payments of up to $50,000 of one-half of their rate of basic pay,
whichever is less.
We anticipate that it will greatly assist in recruiting and
retaining key scientists and engineers. The NSPS, as proposed by the
administration, would also enable increased flexibility in hiring and
pay for performance.

BROADBAND/SPECTRUM

49. Senator Lieberman. General Kern, General Lyles, and Admiral
Dyer, as the Armed Services transform to a ``network-centric'' force,
access to high-speed data communications will be vital to the military.
Crucial technologies will need to be developed and subsequently
deployed into the field to resolve the problem of high-speed
communication to the warfighter in remote locations, to bridge the
``last-mile to the soldier'' gap using wireless communications. What
areas of research and development are currently underway in the
Department to overcome the problems of the ``last-mile''
communications?
General Kern. The Army fully understands the need to provide high-
speed connectivity to bridge the ``last mile to the soldier.'' To
address this we are working several different technology areas: mobile
networking, waveforms, airborne communication, and antenna
technologies. Allow me to expand on each of these areas.
Mobile Networking: Our challenge is to provide an assured, wireless
network that works in diverse, complex terrain. With wireless
technologies, we can allow the warfighter steady, uninterrupted
wireless on the move communications. Currently it takes hours to set up
and initialize a large wireless network. Our MOSAIC program is
developing solutions for a mobile communications infrastructure through
the development of Ad-hoc networking protocols (software) that will
allow the network to self-configure and self-heal within a matter of
minutes. In addition Internet Protocol (IP) QoS that will dynamically
allocate bandwidth based on precedence, priority, and/or reservation in
this mobile ad-hoc environment is being pursued. QoS is a key component
to making wireless networks work for the military. Even as we are
adding wideband networking waveforms we must be able to dynamically set
priorities to allow the critical traffic to get through the network.
This will happen at the expense of low priority traffic but will ensure
that the network supports the critical battlefield information.
Waveform: Current mobile radio communications networking technology
uses narrowband waveforms. Narrowband waveforms limit the amount of
data we can transfer in a timely manner. We are working on developing
wideband waveforms in two specific areas which will provide the
capability of high data rate connectivity between a large number of
ground and air, mounted and dismounted, and manned and unmanned mobile
assets. First, the JTRS is one of the core technologies that will
change communications in the tactical environment. It will provide
increased capacity and, more importantly, network services that will
tie all our forces together into an inter-network allowing
communications from and between all Service deployed elements, to
include people, platforms, and command centers. Key to this development
is the Wideband Networking Waveform (WNW) being developed under the
JTRS program for which the Army is the lead service. Second, we are
working on the Soldier-Level Integrated Communications Environment
(SLICE) project, for example, focuses on maturing the DARPA Small Unit
of Operation (SUO) Situational Awareness (SAS) waveform and making it
compliant with the JTRS software communication architecture. It will
leverage the many technology ``pieces'' from several Government and
Industry R&D efforts and combine them into one advanced highly power
efficient wideband waveform geared towards the soldier for the use of
transferring large amounts of data in a timely manner. Power efficiency
is the key to allow for battery operation.
Airborne Communication: We have found that in order to support high
speed wireless data in dispersed environments in all terrain it is
essential that airborne communications nodes as well as satellite
communications be part of that architecture. We demonstrated this need
at the Communications-Electronics Command Research, Development and
Engineering Center's Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) testbed. In a
relatively flat terrain with some terrain features, along with foliage,
we showed that an airborne relay is critical for battlefield
connectivity. To address this we have partnered with DARPA and the Air
Force on the Adaptive Joint C\4\ISR Node Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration (AJCN ACTD). This program is addressing multi-mission
airborne technologies both for communications as well as Signals
Intelligence (SIGINT) and Information Operations.
Antenna Technologies: We are conducting research in many areas of
antenna technologies with emphasis on high efficiency and practicality
(affordability, reduced visual signature, safety, etc.). Our mission is
to develop antennas that can sustain robust, high data rate
communications, offer greater agility for on-the-move operations, have
low profiles for reduced platform visual signatures, can be integrated
within soldiers' clothing for improved mobility and survivability, and
are functional with the JTRS multi-band radio. Our Advanced Antenna
program, for example, is developing various antenna technologies for
applications including ground vehicle reconfigurable band switching
antennas, multi-band on-the-move vehicular antennas, soldier/body borne
antennas, low profile ground/rotary wing aviation antennas, and phased
array antennas. In addition, DOD Teleports provide last mile extension
of terrestrial DOD IF, voice, and video services via satellite
communication to deployed tactical warfighters. At any of six global
Teleport locations, the users can access high speed communications
networks via UHF, L-band, C, X, KU, and KA frequencies. Mobile SATCOM
terminals are required and become the ``hub'', in theater, for soldier
radio access to global DOD networks.
General Lyles. The ``last mile'' of the Global Information Grid
(GIG) is critical because it can operate under some of the most severe
and adversarial conditions that exist. Information assurance, security,
electronic protection, and covertness are of paramount concern when new
systems are developed or applied in this portion of the GIG. At the
same time, there is a need to leverage low-cost, yet highly capable
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technology--not only because of its
lower acquisition cost, but because it is interoperable with the rest
of the developing GIG, which is also largely COTS-based. Thus, our main
technology development mission is to find ways which commercial
technology can be leveraged without erasing cost benefits.
Admiral Dyer. The Department of the Navy is pursuing the
development of numerous technologies to bridge the last mile of the
soldier gap using wireless communications. These efforts include basic
research and development programs funded by the ONR, programs funded to
industry, and a set of experiments and/or planned experiments to
validate the effectiveness of these efforts and highlight shortcomings
to allow continued development. One example includes the Joint Task
Force Wide Area Relay NETwork (JTF WARNET) program that is currently
deploying an Operational Prototype in WESTPAC. This system includes a
network radio that is being used as a surrogate for the JTRS Wideband
Networking Waveform (WNW). The 41 radios will be used between Services,
as well as within Services, to augment existing Single Channel Ground
and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) and Enhanced Position Location and
Reporting System (EPLRS) radios. The experiment will validate the
effectiveness of the proposed WNW. JTF WARNET is an Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program. Transition targets are the
U.S. Army and the JTRS Program Office.
In addition, a number of ONR S&T efforts are addressing this issue:
1. Highly Mobile Tactical Communications: This project will
integrate the existing Iridium satellite communication system as an
Iridium Tactical Communication Overlay (ITCO) to the current Marine
Corps tactical communication architecture (SINCGARS/EPLRS radios) in
order to provide over-the-horizon (OTH) communications. This will
enable a Marine Corps Expeditionary Maneuvering Warfare (EMW)
capability using current, available, secure communications technology
at reasonable cost without imposing the constraint of fixed sites with
directional antennas that impede mobile forces.
2. Dragon Warrior Communications Relay: This project is developing
an unmanned airborne communications relay capability for the Dragon
Warrior small vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) UAV that will provide
a high data rate network radio relay for expeditionary warfare wireless
networks. The Communication Relay uses the existing commercial AN/VRC-
99(A) network radio, which serves as the near-term stand-in for the
JTRS Wideband Networking Waveform. The DW Communication Relay will give
deployed marines an enhanced capability to transmit and receive data,
voice, and video throughout the battlespace network. Integration and
testing of the communication payload and platform are scheduled for 4Q
fiscal year 2003.
3. Submarine SATCOM Medium Access Protocol: This effort is
conducting modeling and simulation to address the Medium Access Control
(MAC) problem for submarine satellite communications in order to allow
multiple submarines in a single Area of Operation to efficiently share
a single satellite communications channel. With limited bandwidth
available to submarines, and with increasing traffic requirements, it
is critical that submarines make the most efficient use of their
bandwidth.
4. Tactical Phased Array Networking: This project is developing a
network control system (protocols) for a mobile, ad-hoc, wireless
tactical network that employs agile-beam directional antennas, such as
phased arrays. The use of highly-directional antennas requires
coordination across the network of when and where to point each
antenna. This technology could be used for either mobile user
battlefield communications at high data rates or an airborne UAV
network that would provide the internet in the sky and OTH capability
to reach the last-mile users and provide high capacity via directional
antennas.
5. Mobility Management for Heterogeneous Networks: This project is
developing dynamic routing protocols for mobile users and includes the
design and implementation of an enhanced 802.11 subnet in which the
access points are entirely mobile and interconnected using multi-hop,
wireless routes. Modeling and simulation of this protocol has been done
and a 10-node field demonstration using WLAN 802.11 radios was also
completed. The technology being developed could be used to provide
highly mobile, automated, wireless communication for: (a) Marine Corps
Expeditionary Maneuvering Warfare; and (b) Navy, Marine Corps, and
Allied Coalition littoral operations.
6. Asymmetric Secure Network Access for Vulnerable Assets: This
project is developing an asymmetric secure link to provide network
access to vulnerable assets (last-mile user) such as reconnaissance
teams, special operations users, submarines and sensors. This
bidirectional link will have low data rate and long range on the uplink
(from the vulnerable asset to the airborne network node) and high data
rate and long range on the downlink (from the airborne node to the
vulnerable asset). This technology will be most useful to the Marine
Corps in terms of disadvantaged user access and providing LPI/D links
for deep reconnaissance missions.

50. Senator Lieberman. General Kern, General Lyles, and Admiral
Dyer, how does the Department plan on leveraging off of civilian
technologies to maximize cost-efficient wireless communications
systems?
General Kern. The Army will continue to leverage commercial
technologies to the maximum extent possible across the board and this
is especially true in the area of communications, including wireless
communications. The commercial marketplace has made significant
investments in communications technologies and it is a key part of the
Army's strategy to leverage these investments. It is also important to
point out that often these technologies need some adaptation before
they can be applied to the tactical battlefield environment, which
involves more than ruggedization. The basic philosophy we employ in
regards to communications technologies is an approach we refer to as
adopt, adapt, develop. Our goal is to adopt commercial technologies as
is, whenever we can, that is use as is. More often the case exists that
we will adapt these technologies to work in the tactical environment.
Finally we develop technologies on our own when commercial technologies
do not meet our needs.
There are key differences between the commercial and military
tactical environment. The largest of these is the use of a fixed
infrastructure. Commercial wireless technologies rely on a fixed
infrastructure whether it be cell towers for phone connectivity or
wired backbone for wireless Personal Data Assistants (PDAs), Wireless
Local Area Networks (WLANs), etc. Commercial systems provide end user
mobility. The warfighter on the battlefield requires complete network
mobility. In other words, there is no fixed ground infrastructure,
everything is mobile. Even with that difference we have had significant
advances in adapting these technologies and leveraging these
technologies.
For example, to achieve this totally mobile network that is
dynamic, ad-hoc, self-forming, self-healing while providing QoS
features to ensure critical information gets through the network we are
using commercial standards from the Internet Protocol (IP) and build
upon them to address our needs. We have a S&T program called MOSAIC
that is maturing these technologies and is resulting in a commercially
interoperable solution that both meets our needs and is cost effective.
We have partnered with both military and non-military industry on many
of these programs where industry is also making an investment (or cost
share) on these efforts. Finally in order to make this S&T investment
worthwhile we are transitioning these technologies to the JTRS and
Warfighter Information Network--Tactical (WIN-T) programs and working
standards bodies with the goal to make such features mainstream in
commercial products.
There are many other examples of leveraging commercial technologies
from Personal Communications Systems, the use of commercial WLAN, to
antenna technologies that are becoming integral to our Network Centric
concept for the future.
General Lyles. Civilian technology provides the Air Force with the
opportunity to acquire advanced technology at affordable prices.
Civilian wireless communication systems or technologies are evaluated
for adoption, where possible, and adaptation or modification to meet
specific requirements when necessary. Development of new items is done
only as a last resort. For instance, we are already leveraging the
commercial market for wireless local area network technology and
supplementing this with military-unique features that the civilian
marketplace has not yet demanded and, therefore, have not been
provided. This has resulted in the availability of robust information
techniques such as Type-1 security. In the area of tactical radio,
software-defined radio technology will facilitate the inclusion of
commercial products that meet government needs. Leveraging commercial
technology and adding a military edge can be more effective than simply
paying for the use of proposed civilian assets. The Air Force is
assisting commercial developers in understanding the growing need for
military-like robustness in the wireless area. The Air Force is also
supporting advances in the commercial community through programs such
as Small Business Innovation Research and Dual-Use Science and
Technology.
Admiral Dyer. The Navy and DOD have placed a significant emphasis
on leveraging commercial technology where applicable. All of the DOD IP
networking is based on the open standards developed and approved by the
consensus of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Navy
representatives participate in the IETF as working members with
industry and academia to develop future standards that meet both
commercial and military needs. In the area of Multicast Dissemination,
Navy engineers recognized a shortcoming in the existing IETF Requests
for Comments (RFCs) and worked as the leaders to develop a new RFC that
has been placed before the IETF as a recognized extension to the
standards. In those areas where military needs may be significantly
different than the private sectors, focused research and development is
being, or has been, performed to augment the commercial standards to
meet those unique needs. In addition the ONR S&T program is addressing
the issue through the following projects:
1. Highly Mobile Tactical Communications: This project will
integrate the existing Iridium satellite communication system as an
Iridium Tactical Communication Overlay (ITCO) to the current Marine
Corps tactical communication architecture (SINCGARS/EPLRS radios) in
order to provide OTH communications. This will enable a Marine Corps
Expeditionary Maneuvering Warfare (EMW) capability using current,
available, secure communications technology at reasonable cost without
imposing the constraint of fixed sites with directional antennas that
impede mobile forces.
2. Dragon Warrior Communications Relay: This project is developing
an unmanned airborne communications relay capability for the Dragon
Warrior VTOL UAV that will provide a high data rate network radio relay
for expeditionary warfare wireless networks. The Communication Relay
uses the existing commercial AN/VRC-99(A) network radio, which serves
as the near-term stand-in for the JTRS Wideband Networking Waveform.
The DW Communication Relay will give deployed marines an enhanced
capability to transmit and receive data, voice, and video throughout
the battlespace network. Integration and testing of the communication
payload and platform are scheduled for 4Q fiscal year 2003.
3. Bandwidth Efficient Advanced Modulation Line-of-Sight Technology
(BLT): This project is developing a UHF Line Of Sight (LOS) waveform
that provides both bandwidth efficiency (100 Kbps in a 25 KHz channel)
and power efficiency. Industry is developing a joint iterative
demodulation and decoding scheme for achieving this 4:1 bandwidth
efficiency over a LOS channel. In addition, they will develop an
equalizer to mitigate LOS multipath and the latencies associated with
joint iterative demodulation and decoding. This project leverages off
the past commercial industry work on turbo coding. The impact of this
technology development will be to serve as a combat system multiplier
for the warfighter by increasing data rates (within an existing 25 KHz
channel bandwidth) four-fold over current LOS technology. The targeted
product line for transition is the AN/ARC-210 radio and the waveform
will also be considered for the JTRS radio program.
4. Multicast Dissemination Protocol: This project developed a
Multicast Dissemination Protocol (MDP), which provides an IP compliant
reliable group data dissemination capability. Previous network
technologies for group communications were unreliable and the design of
MDP provided reliable group delivery for a broad set of applications
and scenarios. Significant research gains were made in the areas of
protocol scalability, robustness, and information theoretic repairing
mechanisms. This technology was fed into the IETF, the primary Internet
standards body, for civilian use and widespread application. MDP is
being used, integrated, and leveraged into numerous Navy, DOD, and
industry organizations including: U.S. Navy Information Screening and
Delivery System (ISDS) to provide efficient and reliable dissemination
to the submarine community; U.S. Army's first digitized brigade is
equipped with MDP which includes the 4th Infantry Division; joint
coalition network experiments are using MDP-based applications for
improved situational awareness data dissemination, e-mail, and other
data traffic; U.S. Postal Service (USPS) has adopted MDP for daily
large scale network operations (thousands of sites) with resulting
large performance gains in satellite data dissemination; NASA is using
MDP in experiments for improved spaceborne network communications; and
the IETF is transitioning related MDP work into a new specification for
NACK-oriented reliable multicast (NORM).
5. 802.11 WLAN Technology: This low-cost, short range, commercial
radio technology has been adopted in several projects in order to test
and demonstrate adaptive routing and beam scheduling protocols in
mobile environments. This technology could be used for either mobile
user battlefield communications at high data rates or an airborne UAV
network that would provide an internet in the sky and OTH
communications capability. These commercial WLAN radios typically cost
about 1-2 percent of what one would have to pay for a militarized
radio, which has substantially more communications range capability.
Hence, many projects have leveraged this civilian WLAN technology to
test cost-effective wireless communication and networking capabilities.

51. Senator Lieberman. General Kern, General Lyles, and Admiral
Dyer, as the military forces are under increasing pressure to share
spectrum with industry and government, how is the Department developing
technologies that can tolerate interference?
General Kern. The DOD has undertaken quite a few programs that
address the need to increase the communication reliability by reducing
interference and developing new spectrum efficient technologies. The
Army is also investing in this area as well as leveraging DARPA and the
other Services.
In the Army we have a S&T Objective for Advanced Antennas with one
of the focuses being on antenna co-site interference. This program is
developing multi-band, re-configurable and band switched antenna
technologies that will substantially reduce susceptibility to co-site
interference (e.g., indiscriminately receiving and coupling unwanted
interference energy from a nearby transmitter into the radio receiver)
by increasing the antenna's ability to reject non-desired, out-of -band
interference signals. These technologies will also provide greater
antenna gain and efficiency resulting in more robust communication
links and extended ranges. These technologies will not only increase
the reliability of the communication but will also increase spectrum
efficiency by providing broadband transmission.
The Army is leveraging the DARPA Next Generation (XG) program
investment in spectrum efficient technology. Under this program DARPA
is developing a protocol where radios can transmit suitable frequency
(over a wide frequency range) by sensing the local environment and on a
non-interfering basis share the spectrum much more efficiently. This
technology will not only use spectrum more efficiently, but will also
be able to tolerate higher level noise threshold, thus increasing the
communication efficiency by a factor of 10 to 20 times. This
revolutionary concept challenges the spectrum scarcity in the
communication world; instead it avails the opportunity of utilizing the
unused spectrum on a real time and space basis.
The Army will also leverage the DARPA Future Combat Systems--
Communications (FCS-C) program. This effort uses directional antennas
and networking programs to allow frequency reuse to include power
management such that you only use the amount of power to close the
link. This utilizes the available spectrum more efficiently and with
the directionality, less interference. The Army is now building a
program to mature this DARPA effort to transition these technologies to
the field.
General Lyles. The increase in pressure to share spectrum may mean
the military owns less and we realize that new emphasis must be given
to treating the Electromagnetic Spectrum as a precious limited
resource. Although Air Force requirements for spectrum access must
continue to be carefully planned and retained, new advances in
modulation and coding technology enable us to transmit more digital
information in the limited amount of spectrum. We continue to research
and field better methods of interference excision. Recent breakthroughs
will allow more users to operate successfully in a limited frequency
band. We are also developing techniques for better use of the lower-
frequency (tactical) bands that have been underutilized until now.
Software-defined radios, such as the JTRS will let us implement these
and future techniques much more easily.
We continue to research, develop, demonstrate, and field advanced
technologies. Improvements in antenna technology can support more users
by covering broader ranges of frequencies and can support the reuse of
frequencies by better controlling the direction of transmitted and
received signals. Other specific areas that will mitigate potential
interference excision techniques, higher-order modulation, advanced
coding methods, enhanced networking, new or modified network (mobile ad
hoc) protocols, QoS techniques, diversity (in time, frequency, space,
polarization, and coding), improved radio frequency and receiver
components, and signaling agility .
Admiral Dyer. The increasing pressure to share spectrum, coupled
with an increased need for bandwidth by the military, is forcing the
development of techniques that can tolerate or mitigate interference.
These programs will allow the Department of Defense to more effectively
utilize the available spectrum through the use of a wide variety of
techniques, such as adaptive routing, directional or narrow beam
antennas, better filtering, and improved spectrum spreading and
correlation techniques. ONR funded S&T programs to attack interference
mitigation and to more efficiently use the spectrum that is available
include the following:
1. Adaptive Routing: Interference in networks can be mitigated by
having multiple communication paths to get to an end user. The Mobility
Management for Heterogeneous Networks project is developing dynamic
routing protocols for mobile users that are interconnected using multi-
hop, wireless routes. Such an approach provides for very robust
operation and tends to mitigate interference via multiple paths for
transmission.
2. Narrow Beam Antennas: The use of highly directional antennas
provides for interference reduction or elimination in some cases
because of the narrow antenna beamwidth. ONR research in this area
includes extensive development of phased array antennas as well as
methods of forming networks using directional antennas across the
spectrum from UHF (100s of MHz) to Q-band (on the order of 40 GHz).
However, the use of highly directional antennas introduces another
problem for networks and particularly for mobile networks in that one
must keep track of the positions of all the platforms and the
directions of all of the antennas. Thus the Tactical Phased Array
Networking project is developing the network protocols to allow such a
mobile, ad-hoc, wireless tactical network to operate with agile-beam
directional antennas. The use of highly-directional antennas requires
coordination across the network of when and where to point each
antenna. This technology could be used for either mobile user
battlefield communications at high data rates or an airborne UAV
network that would provide the internet in the sky and OTH capability
to reach the last-mile users and provide high capacity via directional
antennas.
3. Optical Domain Tunable Microwave Filtering For Multifunction
Antennas: This effort is investigating and developing novel photonic
link based microwave filtering techniques suitable for mitigating
detrimental electrical isolation and co-site interference effects
associated with broadband multifunction antenna apertures. Optical
domain microwave filtering potentially offers larger operating
bandwidth and more practical filter reconfiguration capabilities than
presently available using conventional electronic filtering approaches.
In this project, photonic links with embedded broadband tunable
microwave filters for adaptively improving out-of-band signal rejection
will be demonstrated.
4. Multi-function Digital Receiver Demonstration for JTRS-Compliant
Communication System: This effort will demonstrate that superconducting
digital electronics can strongly reduce the problem of co-site
interference among co-located RF systems. It will also define a
development path toward fully software reconfigurable, multi-
simultaneous signal hardware that offers much better utilization of
bandwidth than is possible today. The proposed approach involves using
the highly inherent sample speed and superior accuracy and sensitivity
of superconducting analog to digital converters to produce
programmable, digital matched filters (cross-correlators) operating on
raw RF signals. Up to an additional 40 dB of signal correlation gain is
expected prior to decoding of the signal. The receiver front end to be
constructed will focus on communications signals in the UHF band (225-
400 MHz), but its design concept is generic to all RF signals.
5. Studies of Spread Spectrum Communication Systems with Very High
Interference Immunity: This 6.1 research effort investigates multiple
access interference (MAI) suppression techniques for direct sequence
(DS) code division multiple access (CDMA) systems for ship-to-ship and
ship-to-shore links using satellite communications. Signal processing
techniques such as multi-user detection and interference cancellation
will be applied to suppress the MAI. Multiple access interference
suppression techniques will be designed to combat the near-far
interference problem associated with DS CDMA.
6. Communications and Sensor Networks: Interference Mitigation and
Cross-Layer Design: This 6.1 research project will develop and analyze
interference mitigation techniques for multi-user communication
systems. Techniques such as channel estimation, channel decoding,
equalization and synchronization will be investigated in order to
provide an iterative, interference mitigation technique. It is
anticipated that the techniques developed will have applicability to
both military and commercial wireless communication systems. The effort
will also examine methods for generating side information about the
interference environment in order to assist the more conventional
methods of combined narrow band interference suppression and multi-user
detection.
7. Maximal Exploitation of Space-Time Dimensions for Communication
in Highly Dynamic Scenarios: This 6.1 research project addresses
maximal exploitation of space-time dimensions for communication in
highly dynamic scenarios. The emphasis is on reliable and seamless
wireless connectivity in a variety of environments exhibiting harsh
characteristics such as multipath fading, interference and rapid
temporal variations. Space-time processing will be useful with antenna
arrays to maximize the capacity of the wireless channel.
8. Nonlinear Adaptive Equalizer Applied to UHF Submarine
Communications for Minimizing Effects of Multipath Interference: This
planned 6.2 new start in fiscal year 2004 will develop a nonlinear
adaptive equalizer for improved UHF communications. Currently,
submarine UHF communications are degraded by multipath distortion and
other interference. One of the least invasive methods to improve UHF
communications would be the adoption of a software filter that could
significantly reduce the bit error rate and thus improve the data
throughput. To date, the use of an equalizer for improved UHF submarine
communications has not been explored. This research would develop a
nonlinear adaptive equalizer to improve data rates by reducing the
effects of multi-path interference. The equalizer will be adaptive to
compensate for the non-stationary communications channel, and will be
nonlinear for improved filtering performance through dynamic filter
weight behavior.
9. JTRS Maritime Spectrum Awareness and Spectrum Adaptive Waveform:
This planned 6.2 new start in fiscal year 2004 will focus on Spectrum
Awareness (SA) and spectrum adaptive technology for Navy communication
platforms, including the JTRS Maritime radio systems. Two major
elements of this development include: Spectrum Adaptive Waveforms,
including Discontiguous Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) Waveform
for Maritime JTRS, and a Maritime Spectrum Awareness and Interference
Decomposition on future Software Defined Radios tuned to frequency
bands currently above the JTRS frequency band. The resulting spectrum
awareness when combined with tunable filtering technology should enable
interference mitigation.
10. Bandwidth Efficient Advanced Modulation LOS Technology (BLT):
This project is developing a UHF LOS waveform that provides both
bandwidth efficiency (100 Kbps in a 25 KHz channel) and power
efficiency. Industry is developing a joint iterative demodulation and
decoding scheme for achieving this 4:1 bandwidth efficiency over a LOS
channel. In addition, they will develop an equalizer to mitigate LOS
multipath and the latencies associated with joint iterative
demodulation and decoding. This project leverages off the past
commercial industry work on turbo coding. The impact of this technology
development will be to serve as a combat system multiplier for the
warfighter by increasing data rates (within an existing 25 KHz channel
bandwidth) four-fold over current LOS technology. The targeted product
line for transition is the AN/ARC-210 radio and the waveform will also
be considered for the JTRS radio program.
11. Tactical Phased Array Networking: This project is developing a
network control system (protocols) for a mobile, ad-hoc, wireless
tactical network that employs agile-beam directional antennas, such as
phased arrays. The use of highly-directional antennas requires
coordination across the network of when and where to point each
antenna. This technology could be used for either mobile user
battlefield communications at high data rates or an airborne UAV
network that would provide the internet in the sky and OTH capability
to reach the last-mile users and provide high capacity via directional
antennas.

SEMICONDUCTOR CAPABILITIES

52. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Wynne, there is currently a
serious concern about the loss to the U.S. economy of the high-end
semiconductor chip-manufacturing sector to East Asian countries, the
likely subsequent loss of the semiconductor research and design
sectors, and the grave national security implications that this would
entail. What does the Department plan to do to ensure the retention of
domestic semiconductor chip manufacturing capabilities, as well as
research and design capability?
Secretary Wynne. The Department recognizes this as a critical
problem. We are continuing to assess the impact of this trend on
important Defense systems. As capabilities move offshore, the U.S. can
lose access to the most advanced technologies (i.e., commercial and
foreign host security needs will be met first), reliability for
delivery and performance is arbitrarily compromised, and the
vulnerability for malicious engineering is greatly increased. We have
already identified the most critical Defense elements that are being
threatened by the migration of foundries to offshore locales and have
moved to mitigate the impact. For information assurance and
intelligence missions, the Department (including elements of OSD,
ASD(C\3\I), and AT&L) is working with the National Security Agency and
U.S. semiconductor firms to explore arrangements that would maintain
trusted domestic capabilities in a manner mutually beneficial to all
parties. We believe the Department will be able to address adequately
its most pressing microelectronics needs through such arrangements.
However, should economic conditions continue to force moves offshore,
the Department will be faced with a more severe problem in the future.
Note that we are currently addressing only those critical programs for
which requirements have been identified. More broadly, the Department
and the entire USG must continue to deepen its partnership with the
industry in investing in the next generation of U.S. microelectronic
components (i.e., photonic, superconductors, etc.) as the U.S. industry
cannot fulfill this task on their own.

53. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Wynne, does the Department feel
that it may be possible to address some of these issues by exploring
such avenues as increasing funds for research and development,
supporting cooperative government-industry research programs, adjusting
U.S. trade policies, or developing joint production agreements and
other innovative partnership arrangements with the semiconductor
industry?
Secretary Wynne. The ensuring answer is ``all of the above''. Trade
policy needs to be explored with the objective of level playing field,
world-wide. Simply increasing the cost of DOD parts is not a long term
solution for ensuring a robust capability in the U.S. In areas where
there is weak commercial S&T investment, Federal research funding
should be increased. Other innovative arrangements with semiconductor
firms should be explored on a functional basis. The arrangements
between DOD (to include DARPA), NSA, and commercial semiconductor
vendors for the most critical integrated circuits is one such example
of a transformational and innovative arrangement where all parties come
away with increased capabilities while simultaneously lowering costs.
Nonetheless, a comprehensive, longer-term solution involving economic,
technological, and political components may be needed.

54. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Wynne, does the Department have
plans to maintain the critical semiconductor equipment industry (i.e.
lithography, photomasks) in the U.S., either through a government-
industry consortium or through more direct intervention?
Secretary Wynne. The design and fabrication of semiconductor
equipment is highly specialized and requires a very expensive and
lengthy product development cycle. Given the offshore relocation of
semiconductor foundries, domestic equipment manufacturers have become
less willing to make the U.S. based investment required to fabricate
new tools. The purchase of foreign process tools could, indeed,
threaten domestic chip foundries, trusted or otherwise. The fact that
foreign suppliers would be in a position to impose export restrictions
and at least temporarily make the few U.S. based fabrication lines
technically substandard is a very real threat. Addressing this threat
would come at some considerable expense. Basically, we would need to
develop U.S. process tools as an ``insurance policy''. If we instead
focus on developing economic mechanisms that would keep the
semiconductor industry on-shore, the equipment manufacturers would
likely maintain both their presence and leadership role. Consequently,
if we can solve the offshore migration issue, we also solve the
semiconductor equipment issue. However, DOD's needs are out of
synchronization with the commercial sources. To address the problem,
DOD is also looking at alternative and transformational strategies and
technologies. Such approaches include exploring advanced techniques
such as ``maskless lithography'' to allow the production of the most
advanced microelectronic features in a small scale production situation
to address critical needs. In this area, the needs of the DOD and the
commercial semiconductor industry may become divergent.

DARPA STRATEGIC PLAN

55. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Wynne, DARPA recently released
their strategic plan in February 2003, and although it is an excellent
description of DARPA's major focus areas, including what the agency has
done for the Department in the past and what the current programs are,
it does not appear to be a proper strategic plan. A strategic plan
would have elements such as a list of goal statements, a series of
objectives that support each of the goal statements, and a series of
strategies and tactics required to achieve each objective. Finally, a
comprehensive plan must be developed to describe how and when the
strategies and tactics would achieve the objectives, and thus the
overall goals. Does DARPA intend to develop a true strategic plan in
accordance with the items listed above?
Secretary Wynne. DARPA has an excellent strategy to promote radical
innovation for our national security; its strategic plan clearly states
that strategy. The plan describes DARPA's role and mission, how it
operates, its major strategic thrusts, and how they have been shaped by
our national security environment, and other research DARPA supports
because of its proven value to the DOD. What is more, the plan is
concise and readable--just what is needed to communicate DARPA's
strategy. In addition to the strategic plan, DARPA makes an enormous
amount of detailed information on its program plans available through
its web site, the ``DARPA Fact File,'' and, most importantly, the 400+
pages of its budget request. (The Fact File will be updated and
restructured this spring to correspond to the elements of the strategic
plan.) DARPA's strategy is well aligned with DOD's transformation and
well managed, and detailed information on DARPA's programs is widely
available, so I think the current strategic plan is very appropriate.

56. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Wynne, as a good strategic plan
would also be a ``rolling plan'' (i.e. one that is often reviewed and
changed as individual strategies and tactics succeed and fail), does
the Department intend to periodically review DARPA's strategic plan so
as to assess the level of accomplishment in terms of the goals,
objectives, and strategies?
Secretary Wynne. You're quite right that strategy needs to be
reviewed and adjusted periodically in light of new developments. That's
what makes it strategy. DARPA's strategy is reviewed every year as part
of the budget formulation process, and, given the interest in
transformation, DARPA receives a great deal of attention. In reality,
with all the high profile things DARPA is involved in, its strategy
gets attention more often than that. I believe that the eight strategic
thrusts DARPA has at the moment are well chosen and are proceeding
apace.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

JOINT SIMULATION SYSTEM

57. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Wynne and General Kern, the
budget request for fiscal year 2004 cancels the Joint Simulation System
(JSIMS) program in fiscal year 2004 and through the FYDP. My
understanding is that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness has protested the decision as ``premature.'' I also
understand that Admiral Giambastiani, Commander Joint Forces Command,
shares my concerns over the elimination of this program. In previous
years, JSIMS was described as the flagship modeling and simulation
program for the Department, and highlighted as a shining example of
joint technology development that addressed a critical warfighter need.
What analysis (program management, operational requirements, etc.)
informs and justifies this cancellation decision?
Secretary Wynne and General Kern. The Department added significant
resources on three occasions to provide full funding for the JSIMS
program and keep it on schedule. In August 1999, $7.9 million was
reprogrammed to ensure an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of April
2001. In August 2000, an additional $265.5 million was allocated for
fiscal year 2002-2007 to support an IOC of March 2002. Several months
later, during the budget review, a further $7.4 million increase was
approved for fiscal year 2001-2002, to address shortfalls identified
late in the process by the program office.
Several changes also were made to the management structure in an
attempt to improve program performance and keep development on track.
In December 1999, the program was given an Acquisition Category-1D
(ACAT-1D) designation to increase management oversight. In January
2000, the Army was directed to appoint a full-time program manager. At
the same time, the program office was instructed to produce a cost
estimate, split JSIMS development into blocks, and develop appropriate
acquisition documents. Although some of these measures were adopted,
problems persisted. By December 2002, the official IOC date had slid to
March 2005.
In addition to standard ACAT-1D oversight, there were at least four
other reviews to assist program management, two of which were led by
former Directors of Defense Research and Engineering. In December 1999,
the Senior Review Board directed the program office to reconfigure its
development plan around the Department's High-Level Architecture
standard. Then, in 2001, an independent panel led by Dr. Anita Jones
concluded that JSIMS needed to establish sound performance-prediction
capabilities and improve its integration with its major partners, like
the Army's Warfighter Simulation program. That same year, an audit
conducted by the Army Material Command concluded that current
engineering practices would not resolve performance issues within cost
and schedule constraints. Finally, in December 2002, another
independent review team, this time headed by Dr. Dolores Etter,
recommended looking externally for commercial technologies and
strategies that support scalability in order to facilitate spiral
development for future JSIMS blocks. Dr. Etter's team also recommended
an independent outside assessment of the JSIMS architecture. All of
these reviews, in addition to numerous ACAT-1D assessments, highlighted
serious concerns about the technical and performance standards for
JSIMS. The decision to conduct an analysis of alternatives (AoA) before
proceeding with further development is consistent with the results of
these reviews.

58. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Wynne, General Kern, General
Lyles, and Admiral Dyer, Congress appropriated significant resources
for JSIMS and its related Service programs in fiscal year 2003. How
will that funding be used now that the JSIMS program has been
terminated in the fiscal year 2004 request and FYDP?
Secretary Wynne and General Kern. All fiscal year 2003 funds
remained with the program to ensure delivery of Block I software in
accordance with program office estimates. The JSIMS Software Support
Facility was funded at $14 million in fiscal year 2004, using monies
originally planned for the JSIMS Program Office. The remaining $168.6
million in fiscal year 2004 funding proposed in the fiscal year 2003
President's budget was allocated to other priorities.
General Lyles. Consistent with OSD direction, all remaining Air
Force fiscal year 2003 research and development funds supporting the
JSIMS program will be expended in the direct support of completing the
JSIMS Block 1 System Verification and Validation Test currently in
progress by the JSIMS Alliance under HQ Joint Forces Command authority.
Admiral Dyer. For the Navy, the resources allocated for JSIMS will
be spent on existing model and simulation (M&S) programs in order to
ensure they continue meeting Navy's training requirements. These
systems include, but are not limited to, the Virtual At-Sea Training/
Deployable Prototype Integrated Maritime Portable Acoustic Scoring and
Simulator (VAST-DP IMPASS), the Battle Force Tactical Trainer (BFTT),
the Enhanced Naval Wargaming System (ENWGS), the Battle Group Inport
Exercises (BGIE), the JSAF (Joint Semi-Automated Forces), and the Fleet
Aviation Simulator Training (FAST) Plan.

59. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Wynne, the termination of the
JSIMS program unhinges a valuable `center of gravity' in modeling and
simulation research, development, and acquisition based upon the
synergy of a tightly organized and interdependent network of industry,
academia, and military services and agencies that has existed and
excelled over a number of years. How will DOD ensure that this network
is sustained, energized, and leveraged in fiscal year 2003 and fiscal
year 2004 while alternatives to JSIMS and its related programs are
evaluated for the outyears?
Secretary Wynne. The intent is to take delivery of Block I software
at the Joint Warfighting Center, where a software support facility will
be established to maintain JSIMS products. This action, in conjunction
with moving the hardware and cataloging documentation, will preserve
our software investment for future use, should a decision be made to
resume the program. JSIMS is only one of many modeling and simulation
programs being conducted in Orlando, Florida. While many engineers will
no longer work directly on JSIMS, their expertise will transfer readily
to these other programs, thereby keeping their modeling and simulation
skills current. Should the analysis of alternatives recommend a
continuation of the program, we would seek to reassemble the best of
the team and restart the program, using the Block I software maintained
at the Software Support Facility.

60. Senator Bill Nelson. General Kern, General Lyles, and Admiral
Dyer, given the termination of the JSIMS program, please highlight your
current investments in modeling and simulation and how they support
your Service missions.
General Kern. The Army continues to work with Office of the
Secretary of Defense and Joint Forces Command to support joint
training. A new joint simulation is not funded in the fiscal year 2004
budget. An AoA has been initiated and is scheduled for completion in
fiscal year 2004 which will identify the most cost-effective approach
for meeting joint and service training requirements. Until the AoA is
complete, we cannot say whether a new program ultimately might be
needed.
The President's budget for fiscal year 2004 has funding to continue
limited development of constructive simulation in support of the Army
Title 10 training mission.
General Lyles. With the termination of Air Force funding associated
with the JSIMS program, the Air Force Modeling and Simulation Support
Program will require funding adjustments to maintain and improve legacy
systems currently used for service and joint readiness training,
wargaming, and experimentation. We are working with the Air Staff to
reallocate funds to critical efforts, and where necessary, increase
outyear funding to compensate for the JSIMS program decision. Our
investment strategy seeks to incorporate critical models and
simulations into the C\4\ISR systems architecture, in a fully
integrated battlespace environment. Within this architecture, modeling
and simulation will directly support Air Force and Joint commanders
conducting distributed mission operations worldwide and provide the
inherent capability to conduct distributed mission training and
rehearsal from home base, minimizing the stress of family separation
and disruption. This strategy remains consistent with current and
previous work in the JSIMS program and we will continue to work with
OSD and other services/agencies to achieve cost-effective solutions to
meet these critical operational requirements.
Admiral Dyer. The Navy currently uses the following M&S programs:

Virtual At-Sea Training/Deployable Prototype
Integrated Maritime Portable Acoustic Sensor and Simulator
(VAST-DP/IMPASS) is a portable, deployable buoy array for Naval
gunfire training.
Battle Force Tactical Trainer (BFTT) is a shipboard
combat system capability providing realistic team training in
all warfare areas. BFTT stimulates shipboard sensors via
onboard trainers to provide simulation of non-shipboard forces
such as friendly, neutral, and enemy aircraft and submarines.
BFTT also links systems on board ships located in different
homeports for coordinated training using distributed
interactive simulation protocols.
Battle Group Inport Exercise (BGIE) is a graduated
proficiency exercise series conducted throughout the
interdeployment training cycle maximizing use of shore-based
trainers and ship imbedded M&S systems built on a BFTT
architecture. BGIE provides tactical training at the Battle
Group/Amphibious Ready Group Staff level from a single warfare
area to more complex multi-warfare exercises.
Enhanced Naval Wargaming System (ENWGS) is a computer
gaming engine to support real-time tactical training to Battle
Group staffs. ENWGS is a computer-based model that provides
man-in-the-loop interaction and graphic depiction of friendly,
neutral and enemy forces.
Joint Semi Automated Forces (JSAF) is a computer
simulation system that generates entity level platforms such as
infantrymen, tanks, ships, airplanes, munitions, buildings, and
sensors, that interact at the individual level in a robust
synthetic natural environment. The individual entities are task
organized into appropriate units for a given mission and can be
controlled as units or single entities. The environment is a
representation of real world terrain, oceans, and weather
conditions that affect the behaviors and capabilities of the
synthetic force.
Fleet Aviation Simulator Training (FAST) plan is a
program currently under development intended to replace aging
aviation simulators with high fidelity versions to support
training at a variety of aviation concentration areas. High
fidelity aviation simulators have the potential to enhance a
range of skill sets necessary to successfully employ an
aircraft in combat. Individual simulators can be used to assist
in developing and maintaining air-to-air and air-to-ground
engagement skills, and several integrated simulators can
develop team skills.

JOINT NATIONAL TRAINING CAPABILITY

61. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Wynne, what is the current state
of analysis and planning leading to creation of a Joint National
Training Capability (JNTC)?
Secretary Wynne. The Department is making significant progress in
creating the JNTC. The JNTC program has an approved budget. JFCOM is
setting up the JNTC Joint Management Office, which is now staffing its
implementation plan to define JNTC certification and accreditation.
Fiscal year 2003 activities include establishing and testing technical
support requirements, determining opposing force capabilities,
developing and testing data collection methods, and establishing and
testing the exercise-control architecture. JFCOM is also leading the
planning for JNTC events in fiscal year 2004 and beyond with resources
programmed in the President's fiscal year 2004 budget now before
Congress.

62. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Wynne, how does cancellation of
the JSIMS and related Service simulation programs contribute to the
challenge or facilitate the creation of a JNTC?
Secretary Wynne. As the Secretary has said to this committee, the
Department has not cancelled the program as implied in the question.
Current systems and the JNTC, when it is available, will meet the
Department's immediate training needs. JSIMS and JNTC are independent
of each other, although JSIMS could be used by JNTC if it met JNTC
requirements. Without JSIMS, JNTC will use legacy systems, complemented
if necessary by new systems, to meet its objectives. The overarching
challenge is to create a solution with a high-level architecture that
provides for the rapid implementation of live, virtual, and
constructive components so that trainees are immersed in a seamless,
combat-like environment without realizing that some aspects are virtual
or constructive.

ARMY INSTITUTE FOR COLLABORATIVE BIOTECHNOLOGIES

63. Senator Bill Nelson. General Kern, I am concerned that the
Army's effort to establish an Institute of Collaborative
Biotechnologies has been undermined by the appearance of an unfair and
closed competition designed and executed to advantage pre-selected
universities. This concern has been raised to Congress by some
universities and other members of the academic community. What actions
are you taking to reestablish the confidence of the many biotechnology
research universities across the nation that this will be a free, fair,
and open competition?
General Kern. The Army has identified a critical need for this R&D
effort and only a university has the diversity of basic research
capabilities and programs that can provide the breakthrough
technologies that will satisfy the Army's requirements. A number of
research universities have strong programs in biotechnology applicable
to Army systems that could host this University Affiliated Research
Center (UARC). Research universities by their nature are
multidisciplinary and capable of providing the range of research
required. Therefore, the Army has proposed a limited competition
amongst these research universities from which a single research
university will be selected to host the UARC. The host university will
enlist the support of other research universities through subcontract
to complement the host and to ensure all aspects of the Army's
biotechnology program can be addressed.
The authority that will be used in the establishment of the UARC is
10 USC 2304(c)(3)(B) as implemented by Federal Acquisition Regulation
6.302-3(ii). This is an authority that is used for this type of
competitive process. Since the Army decided to hold a competition, it
publicized notices of proposed contract actions through the Government-
wide point of entry for such public notices, the Federal Acquisition
Computer Network.
The ICB had three such postings on January 3, 2003, the
announcement of the Army's intent and the anticipation of informational
meetings one on the east coast and one on the west coast. On January
31, 2003, the Army again announced the intent to create an Institute
for Collaborative Biotechnologies, announced the dates and locations
for the informational meetings, and identified to the public the web
site for registration of the informational meetings. On February 21,
2003, the Army announced to the public the Final Broad Agency
Announcement (BAA). This announcement stated to the public that the
final BAA takes precedence over previously posted draft BAAs and
contains the most current and accurate information regarding the
Government's requirements and stated the proposal due date of 4:00 pm
local time, on April 7, 2003.
The Army is using a competition limited to Research Universities
for this UARC award as a means to identify a single university that
could host the UARC.

64. Senator Bill Nelson. General Kern, why not design a system that
continually taps into the many universities doing this research rather
than limit the Army to just one, two, or three universities?
General Kern. The intent of the ICB is to develop and maintain a
critical mass of researchers and to provide them with the necessary
resources to conduct research in a highly focused area of biotechnology
(sensors, electronics, and information processing). The ICB will form
long term collaborative relationships with Army laboratory scientists
and engineers and industrial partners to continuously transition the
ICB research products to application as rapidly as possible.
The plan is for other universities to collaborate with the ICB.
Section 3.2.3, UARC Research Management of the Broad Agency
Announcement states ``It is likely that no single university has the
internal expertise to adequately fulfill the Army's expectations for
the ICB in its entirety. An individual university offeror, serving as
the lead university, will enlist through subcontract the complementary
research expertise of other universities, and that lead university will
be designated as the UARC host for the Institute. The lead university
will provide a fully networked mechanism whereby 40 percent of the Army
ICB funded amount will be available for subcontracting purposes.

65. Senator Bill Nelson. General Kern, please provide examples of
collaboration between your existing UARC and outside universities,
including the amount of research funds that have been made available to
those outside universities through the UARCs.
General Kern. The Army Materiel Command currently supports three
UARCs, the Institute for Advanced Technology (IAT) at the University of
Texas-Austin, the Institute for Creative Technologies at the University
of Southern California (USC), and the Institute for Soldier
Nanotechnologies (ISN) at the MIT. The contract to establish the ISN
was awarded last year. ISN has begun its outreach efforts and has
attracted additional industry partners, but to date no outside
universities have established collaborative relationships with that
UARC.
The following universities collaborate with IAT-Texas Tech
University ($489,250), Cameron University ($10,000), four different
University of Texas at Austin departments and centers, University of
Texas-Southwest Medical Center at Dallas, University of Texas-Medical
Branch at Galveston, and the University of Texas at San Antonio. The
total funding provided to the University of Texas system-wide (not
including IAT) was $2,508,000. The combined total amount provided to
universities collaborating with IAT over the past 5 years is $3.0
million.
The following universities collaborate with ICT-University of
Michigan ($179,000), University of Pennsylvania ($73,000), University
of California-Los Angeles (collaboration only), MIT (under discussion,
no funding to date). The total funding provided to other University of
Southern California departments (not including ICT) was $9.6 million.
The combined total amount provided to universities collaborating with
ICT is $9.9 million.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton

WATERVLIET ARSENAL

66. Senator Clinton. General Kern, I understand that you recently
visited Watervliet Arsenal and Benet Laboratories in New York. Since
1813, Watervliet Arsenal has played a vital role in arming our military
and supporting our Nation and is our Nation's only manufacturing
facility for large caliber cannon in volume. Benet Labs performs
scientific and engineering activities that range from basic research
through design for production, and engineering support for the
production of its design items. The co-location of the Arsenal and
Benet Labs allows for complete lifecycle management from idea through
research and engineering, into prototyping and testing, and finally,
into full-scale production. The labs are located in several buildings
on the Watervliet property. No other arsenal in the United States can
boast of this type of resource.
As I have said before, I believe that maintaining Watervliet's
manufacturing ability is critical for our Nation's national security.
Last month, I visited Watervliet Arsenal and Benet Labs and was greatly
impressed by the leadership and the workforce that I met.
I was also greatly impressed by the vision of the future that I saw
at the Watervliet Arsenal and Benet Labs which could greatly benefit
the U.S. Army and the Nation. Research institutions and the private
sector in the capital region of New York State are engaged in
innovative research regarding cutting-edge technologies including
nanotechnology. By partnering with these institutions, Benet Labs could
become a designer of a wide variety of products built around the
critical skills embedded in the region. Watervliet Arsenal would then
be a flexible manufacturer of these innovative new products to the
Army's and the Nation's benefit. What is your vision for the future of
Watervliet Arsenal?
General Kern. The Army recognizes and appreciates the significance
of Watervliet Arsenal's role in supporting the warfighter and its
historic role as the Nation's provider of large caliber systems.
Watervliet is included in our Ground Systems Industrial Enterprise
initiative, a major step in the transformation of the Army's industrial
base.
We will continue to enhance partnerships with the private sector as
well as aggressively institutionalize lean manufacturing processes and
other initiatives to improve efficiencies in the arsenal's core
capabilities to meet current and future requirements.

AIR FORCE RESEARCH LABORATORIES

67. Senator Clinton. General Lyles, the Information Directorate of
the AFRL develops systems, concepts, and technologies to enhance the
Air Force's capability to successfully meet the challenges of the
information age. I was disappointed that your testimony did not include
a discussion of your vision for the AFRL in Rome, New York. Can you
give a description of the role that Rome Labs will play in the AFRL's
future?
General Lyles. The laboratory facilities and personnel at Rome, New
York, have been prime contributors to the Air Force's Command, Control,
Communications, Computing, and Intelligence (C\4\I) technology
development for many years. The Rome Research Site is a recognized
leader in the development and fielding of information technology and
executes almost $100 million of core Air Force S&T funding and an
additional $500 million of customer funding annually. The Air Force has
focused this funding to ensure it has produced increased capability for
our Nation's warfighter's as shown by the C\4\I technology used in
Kosovo, Operation Desert Storm, Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi
Freedom. The importance of C\4\I cannot be underestimated--the enemy's
C\4\I is our first target during any conflict. In this high technology
military world where information technology is increasingly being
recognized as the force multiplier that it is, the Rome Research Site
plays a crucial role in the future of the Air Force.

LABS WORKFORCE ISSUES

68. Senator Clinton. General Lyles, how will the best practices
system described by Secretary Wynne and the NSPS being proposed by DOD
affect the ongoing lab workforce demonstration programs at Rome Labs?
General Lyles. The Air Force is still assessing the effect of the
proposed NSPS and the related best practices demonstration project at
the Rome Research Site. For the Air Force to move forward in the coming
century, we need the ability to use all the flexibilities proposed in
the best practices demonstration project, not only for the laboratory
workforce, but across all Air Force functions.

69. Senator Clinton. General Lyles, will they improve the labs'
ability to accomplish its mission?
General Lyles. The Air Force is still assessing the effect of the
proposed NSPS and the related best practices demonstration project on
ongoing personnel demonstration projects. It is too early to tell if
changes implemented will improve the Air Force Research Laboratory's
ability to accomplish its mission.

70. Senator Clinton. General Lyles, will they reduce or modify any
of the personnel authorities currently delegated to the lab director?
General Lyles. The Air Force is still assessing the effect of the
proposed NSPS and the related best practices demonstration project on
ongoing personnel demonstration projects. It is too early to tell if
changes implemented will reduce or modify any of the personnel
authorities currently delegated to the laboratory director.

71. Senator Clinton. General Lyles, will the modifications of this
system save the Air Force money?
General Lyles. The Air Force is still assessing the effect of the
proposed NSPS and the related best practices demonstration project on
ongoing personnel demonstration projects. It is too early to tell if
changes implemented will save the Air Force money.

SMALL BUSINESS INNOVATIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM

72. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne, recently the Small Business
Innovative Research (SBIR) program had great difficulty handling
electronic submissions to a recent Broad Agency Announcement. In the
fiscal year 2004 budget request, how much money is being invested in
new technologies and procedures to ensure that these problems do not
reoccur?
Secretary Wynne. DOD is taking two complimentary steps to avoid
future problems. First, additional computing processing power is being
applied to address the additional volume of electronic traffic. It is
anticipated that this additional hardware will cost no more than
$100,000 in fiscal year 2004. Second, DOD is considering adjusting its
procedures for the entire DOD SBIR solicitation process and is
exploring several options to increase the efficiency of its existing
framework. It is anticipated that new procedures will be in place
beginning in fiscal year 2005.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

HYBRID ENGINE TECHNOLOGY

73. Senator Levin. Secretary Wynne and General Kern, the
subcommittee has strongly supported efforts by DOD to develop hybrid
engine vehicle technologies and fuel cells to reduce fuel costs and
support defense missions. What advantages do you see hybrid vehicles
having for the military?
Secretary Wynne. Hybrid electric propulsion for future vehicles has
the potential to reduce fuel consumption of ground vehicles--this will
vary depending on the weight class, specific application, and driving
cycle. Providing diesel fuel to operate our fleet of tactical and
combat vehicles comprises the largest portion of the logistics burden,
especially for the Army. Even if the reduction in fuel consumption
proves to be more modest than current indications, we should be able to
reduce significantly the costs associated with the logistics and
sustainment tail associated with fuel on the battlefield. However, this
is an emerging technology and we still have much to learn before
implementing it and making a long-term commitment--especially in terms
of reliability, maintenance, and lifecycle costs. In addition, we must
continue to work toward making the component technologies smaller,
lighter, and more affordable, if we are to realize the full potential
of hybrid electric power systems as an on-board source of power for
mobile radars, electric weapons, missiles, communications, computers
and complex survivability systems.
General Kern. The main advantage of hybrid electric vehicles is the
reduction of the logistical footprint. This is accomplished by using
the onboard power generation rather than towing external power
generators, increasing fuel economy, silent watch, stealth mode,
improved acceleration, modular design and creating a more reliable
propulsion system. For combat vehicles the propulsion system can be
packaged to maximize the useable under armor volume, and the propulsion
system can be tailored to the individual variant.

74. Senator Levin. Secretary Wynne and General Kern, what are your
plans for the development, procurement, and deployment of these hybrid
vehicles?
Secretary Wynne. For the non-tactical fleet, Public Law 107-107,
section 318, establishes a requirement concerning the acquisition of
hybrid light duty trucks for the Department starting in fiscal year
2005. We are updating our motor vehicle directive and regulation to
address this requirement. However, the limited availability of
commercial hybrid vehicles will inhibit the Department's acquisition of
Original Equipment Manufacturer hybrid vehicles in the near term.
Currently, Toyota and Honda have only commercial hybrid sedans. Ford
expects to offer the hybrid Escape Sports Utility Vehicle to fleets
this fall. Other manufacturers have also indicated they will offer
hybrids at some point in the future.
The General Services Administration (GSA) is a key player in the
Department's ability to acquire hybrid vehicles as we lease/purchase
the majority of our non-tactical vehicles through GSA. We have
discussed our needs with the GSA Fleet Acquisition Division and they
plan to offer hybrid light duty trucks next year. We also requested GSA
to provide hybrids through their lease programs to help mitigate the
higher unit cost for these vehicles. As the appropriate vehicles become
available through the GSA purchase and lease programs, they will be
acquired for DOD.
General Kern. The Army has been working with the our Defense
vehicle suppliers as well as the U.S. automotive industry and component
manufacturers to mature the technology needed within the Army for more
fuel efficient and cleaner power trains.
The Japanese auto industry's hybrid propulsion technology is
sufficiently matured to be offered to the general public for light
passenger use. The U.S. auto industry will have matured its hybrid
technology sufficiently this year to be able to offer it up for light
passenger cars in 2004. Hundreds of thousands of these light passenger
vehicles will be on the roads within the next few years. The fuel
economy gains have been substantial in the currently available
vehicles.
The Army currently has several R&D programs to hybridize several
types of our military vehicles. These vehicles are currently being
evaluated by our testing community and by our soldiers in the field.
Our emerging test results are promising, but an operational assessment
needs to occur before the Army commits to any specific technology and/
or solution. Passenger cars don't have to operate in the severe
climatic and environmental extremes as do our troop's vehicles. The
emerging technologies for use in the military will have to be hardened
significantly to survive our deployments.
We are confident the Army will be able to move into a procurement
phase for vehicles that will incorporate much of this technology. Our
current HMMWV program is projected to incorporate hybrid electric
technology into some of its production platforms in 2006.

POST-U.S.S. COLE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT

75. Senator Levin. Admiral Dyer, since the attack on the U.S.S.
Cole, what technologies has the Navy developed or is the Navy trying to
develop in order to prevent this type of tragedy from being repeated?
Admiral Dyer. The Office of Naval Research has developed several
technologies to help provide force protection to U.S. ships including:

- Flare launcher on a 50-caliber machine gun mount to send
warning shots at small boats.
- Running Gear Entanglement System to provide a 100m perimeter
around a ship at anchor.
- Rapidly developed empirically validated models demonstrate
new solutions for ship survivability. Model shows that use of
stainless steel for hull material helps to reduce blast
penetration.
- 360-degree periscope and related software.
- Microwave powered warning system which deters intruders by
heating their skin.
- Nuclear Quadrapole Resonance System for the detection of bulk
explosives (RDX, PETN) in packages, mail pouches, or on
personnel (manual scanning).

In addition, NAVSEA has initiated a program called Integrated Radar
Optical Surveillance and Sighting System (IROS\3\) to address
asymmetric surface threats. IROS\3\ will integrate sensor information
and communications for ship forces to maintain 24 hour situational
awareness at pier side, at anchorage, and in restricted waterways.
IROS\3\ will also provide semi-automated engagement of small close-in
surface threats.

76. Senator Levin. Admiral Dyer, what technology advances are being
made to allow us to detect conventional explosives (like the ones used
in this attack) at standoff ranges? For example, what technologies are
being developed to detect conventional explosives in vehicles (boats
and trucks) at standoff ranges?
Admiral Dyer. This is a challenging problem for which no good
technical solution has yet been identified. ONR hosted a conference on
standoff detection of conventional explosives that concluded that no
stand-off (defined as >1Km) off-the-shelf detection technologies could
be exploited within the next 18 months.
Planning for technology investment in this area is underway. ONR is
collaborating with Air Force, Army, Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal
and NAVSEA Indian Head experts (both government and contractor) to
identify and exploit emerging technologies that may potentially be
stand-off quality detectors. Additional proposals are being continually
received and reviewed for merit. Much work is underway in detectors
suitable for shorter range, including joint Navy/DARPA work in the
nuclear quadrupole resonance technology especially in combination with
other standard techniques.

[Whereupon, at 3:51 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2004

----------

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, 2003

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Pat
Roberts (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Roberts, Kennedy, and
Reed.
Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; and Carolyn M. Hanna, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Evelyn N. Farkas,
professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional
staff member; and Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Leah C. Brewer and Nicholas W.
West.
Committee members' assistants present: James Beauchamp,
assistant to Senator Roberts; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to
Senator Chambliss; Henry J. Steenstra and Christine O. Hill,
assistants to Senator Dole; Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to
Senator Kennedy; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Todd
Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; and Andrew Shapiro,
assistant to Senator Clinton.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAT ROBERTS, CHAIRMAN

Senator Roberts. The subcommittee meets today to receive
testimony on the posture and readiness of the U.S. Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM) in review of the fiscal year 2004
defense authorization request and future years defense program.
I welcome our witness, Lieutenant General Doug Brown, who is
the Deputy Commander of USSOCOM. I see that you have two very
distinguished gentlemen accompanying you. Please introduce them
to the subcommittee if you will.
General Brown. Okay, sir. To my left is Harry Schulte, the
Command's Acquisition Executive and the man responsible for all
Special Operations research, development, acquisition, and
procurement; and to my right is Command Master Chief Rick
Rogers, a Navy Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) and the senior
enlisted adviser to the commander.
Senator Roberts. We certainly want to welcome you,
gentlemen, and thank you for what you do for our country.
I do want to take a moment to recognize the extraordinary
bravery and professionalism that we have witnessed by the
United States and our Coalition Forces. They are conducting
this campaign with precision and remarkable discipline.
Regrettably, there have been casualties. Our thoughts and
prayers go out to the families and loved ones of those killed,
missing, and of those who we know are captive. We share their
pain and we will not forget. As always, our forces are
committed to leaving no one behind.
War is never a pleasant thing. That is why it should be the
last resort.
Our Special Operations Forces (SOF), active and Reserve
component, have also sacrificed. It was four Rangers who were
killed in Iraq when a plain-looking civilian car with a
pregnant female passenger pulled up to their checkpoint
guarding a dam and exploded. Our Army Special Forces, Navy
SEALs, and Air Force special operators led the initial efforts
in Afghanistan, and they have lost over 20 fallen comrades. Ten
of our special operators died tragically in the Philippines
supporting our ally in their effort to free themselves from the
terror of the al Qaeda-linked Abu Sayyaf Group. Countless
others do essential things to defend our Nation that are seldom
well known or recognized.
We are fortunate as a Nation to have these remarkable
special operators. We are deeply saddened by these losses.
We have all been thankful for the success of our armed
forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world in this
global war against terrorism. While much will be debated for
sure in the months and years ahead about the relative value of
air power, sea power, and ground operations in Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), one thing
is clear. The quiet warriors of Special Operations air, sea,
and ground were trained, ready, and have performed
magnificently. General Brown, you and your colleagues deserve a
lot of credit for this high level of readiness.
Fifteen years ago, Members of Congress recognized that our
capabilities in the area of unconventional warfare, low-
intensity conflict, and special operations were not where they
should be and convinced our colleagues to create a new Special
Operations Command as part of a larger Department of Defense
organization. The increasingly successful and sophisticated
joint operations our armed forces are able to conduct,
including the seamless inclusion of special operations, is a
tribute to the joint warfighting concepts that were envisioned
by the architects of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.
The world has been amazed at pictures and stories of the
special operators directing the 21st century weapons with
devastating precision, leading and advising the forces of
freedom, and silhouettes of parachutes descending on distant
airfields. This is the face of special operations. This is our
first line of defense that has been quietly fighting terrorism
around the world for years. These are the forces on which we
will increasingly depend to confront the emerging unexpected
and unconventional threats of the future.
Speaking for myself, I have been amazed at the pace our
Special Operations Forces have maintained. While operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan have been most visible, SOCOM has also
continued to perform very critical missions all around the
world, including in Colombia, the Philippines, and the Balkans,
and military training missions elsewhere. Commando Solo, a
flying broadcast studio manned by the Pennsylvania Air National
Guard, has been beaming messages of freedom all over the world.
Elements of the 20th Special Forces Group have been an integral
part of operations in several active areas of operation. The
same is true for Reserve components of our air and naval SOF
components.
Most of our civil affairs capabilities, much of our
psychological operations (PSYOP) are in the Reserve components.
They are all doing extraordinary essential things, but often at
great personal sacrifice. General Brown, your thoughts on the
effect of these very demanding operations on the total SOF
would be appreciated.
The nature of warfare may be fundamentally changing.
Actually, it is fundamentally changing. Asymmetric,
unconventional warfare seems to be coming the norm. If that is
the case, our conventional forces have to be transformed to
confront these increasingly conventional threats. What then is
the face of future unconventional warfare? What skills and
capabilities will our future Special Operations Forces need?
How do we ensure our Special Operations Forces remain special,
focused on the most unconventional emerging threats?
The decision by the Secretary of Defense to give USSOCOM an
expanded role as a supported combatant command, in addition to
your traditional role as a supporting command to other
combatant commanders with your special capabilities, is a
decision I support. We must be able to respond to these global
emerging threats in a timely and a unified manner.
I do want to make sure, however, that we work closely
together to ensure USSOCOM evolves in a manner that preserves
your real agility, your uniqueness, invests in the right
capabilities, and keeps you on the tip of the spear. We look
forward to working with you, General Brown and USSOCOM, to
ensure that our Special Operations Forces continue to be the
very best in the world.
I thank you again for being here today and for what you and
your command do every day in defending our National security
and our friends at home and abroad.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me welcome General Brown and Master Chief Rogers and
Mr. Schulte here and echo the chairman's comments with respect
to not only the extraordinary success of our special operators,
but also the fact that in the course of these battles we have
lost special operators, and we send out condolences to their
families and we join everyone in expression of our great
respect for what they do and what their comrades continue to
do.
I was speaking with General Brown just before the hearing
and one of my colleagues, General Del Dailey, is deeply
involved in special operations in the theater of war today. He
is an extraordinary soldier and representative of all the
special operators I have had the pleasure to know in my career
and my professional life.
We understand also that as the battle is concluded the
special operators will be key in the next phase, which is the
stabilization operation, which offers different challenges,
maybe even more daunting challenges. I think that is something
that we should be very much aware of. As we understand, today
in Afghanistan special operators remain some of the key
elements of our policy, just as they will remain in Iraq after
cessation of the conventional hostilities has taken place.
As we go forward, too, I think we also want to recognize
and understand the needs for the Special Operations Command to
revitalize and restore its equipment, its personnel, to bring
back its soldiers and sailors and airmen, retrain them, re-
equip them. That is going to be a significant cost and I think
we would like to begin at this hearing to understand the
dimensions of that cost as we go forward and whether those
costs have been recognized in your budget going forward,
General Brown.
We are all here today to say to you: Well done; an
extraordinary act of courage and professional skill on behalf
of the Nation and the world. I thank you for that.
Mr. Chairman, I have a more formal statement which I would
like to include in the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Reed follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Jack Reed

I join Senator Roberts in welcoming our witness, General Doug
Brown, Commander of the Special Operations Command, as well as Command
Master Chief Richard Rogers, and Harry Schulte, SOCOM's Acquisition
Executive.
I would like to highlight some recent SOF accomplishments just in
the war on Iraq: securing Iraq's SCUD sites to prevent the launching of
missile against Israel; securing airfields, and a dam on the Euphrates
River; searching for weapons of mass destruction; seizing Saddam's
palaces--and seizing our imaginations--by rescuing Private First Class
Jessica Lynch from Iraqi captivity.
Meanwhile, special operators are heavily engaged in the global war
on terrorism. Army Special Forces are training the nucleus of a new
Afghan military, and civil affairs units are working on projects in
Afghanistan and the Philippines. Special Operations Forces including
Navy SEALs and Air Force aviators, are on assignment in places like
Colombia, Yemen, and Central Asia. For all their successes Special
Operations Forces have also paid a price. Since September 11, 2001, 42
special operators have been killed in action or in support of Operation
Enduring Freedom, and 150 have been wounded.
General Brown let me also express the condolences of this committee
for the losses that your men and their families have suffered, and
please accept our thanks for their continued outstanding work.
This committee has a long tradition of interest in special
operations. In 1986, the Nunn-Cohen amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols
Defense Reorganization Act established the Special Operations Command
and, within the Department of Defense, the position of Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.
Unfortunately, the position of Assistant Secretary for Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict has remained vacant for 2 years.
I join those members, including the Chairman, who have urged Secretary
Rumsfeld to fill this critical position. I hope, General Brown, that
you take our concerns back to the Department.
The purpose of today's hearing is to examine special operations
missions, operational requirements, and the command's 2004 fiscal year
budget request.
Unlike conventional military forces, who are charged with
countering a wide range of military threats, Special Operations Forces
are organized, trained and equipped for narrowly focused military
operations. We have seen how Special Operations Forces have utilized
their special capabilities, and how their successes have spawned new
missions all over the world. Indeed, the Special Operations Command,
has been directed by Secretary Rumsfeld to take the lead in planning
and prosecuting the global war on terrorism as a fully-supported
command.
Today's hearing will focus on SOCOM's roadmap for the future. I
look forward to learning more about how SOCOM will organize to conduct
the priority missions of combating terrorism and preventing
proliferation, as well as critical traditional missions including
training foreign militaries.
In addition, I hope to learn about ongoing and new research
programs to support the special operator. With small, but significant
investments in research and development in the past SOCOM is now able
to provide its operators with more precise weapons, better night vision
gear, and lighter and more capable radio and communications equipment.
Indeed, in some cases the services have later procured this same
equipment. I note that the budget request for research and development
is $440.4 million, as compared to the $1.97 billion procurement
request, and am interested in hearing from the command regarding the
rationale for the level of funding for research and development for
2004 and beyond.
Finally, I also hope that we will hear about the SOF requirements
for the next fiscal year and beyond, should operations in Iraq and
elsewhere continue at the current level for your forces. My
understanding is that the cost of replenishing stocks for 1 year is at
least $300 million; I'd be interested to hear more about what you might
need in future supplementals.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Roberts. Without objection, and thank you, Jack,
for a very fine statement.
General Brown.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. BRYAN D. BROWN, USA, DEPUTY COMMANDER,
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND; ACCOMPANIED BY HARRY E.
SCHULTE, ACQUISITION EXECUTIVE AND SENIOR PROCUREMENT
EXECUTIVE, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND; AND COMMAND MASTER
CHIEF RICHARD M. ROGERS, USN, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND,
SENIOR ENLISTED ADVISOR

General Brown. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed:
It is a privilege to come before you this morning to speak
about the United States Special Operations Command, or SOCOM,
and the men and women that make up our command. I have a few
points I would like to highlight at this time, but with your
permission I would ask to enter my longer prepared statement
into the record.
Senator Roberts. Without objection.
General Brown. Sir, you have already met Mr. Schulte and
Command Master Chief Rick Rogers to my left and my right here,
and with the subcommittee's permission I would like to invite
these gentlemen to contribute in the forthcoming discussion as
applicable.
Senator Roberts. Certainly.
General Brown. Mr. Chairman, your United States military is
on the offensive against terrorism around the globe. The
Special Operations Forces are the tip of the spear. Last year
over 7,000 special operators were deployed to more than 150
countries, providing regional commanders with a force
unsurpassed in both agility and lethality. Today, in what is
undoubtedly the most robust use of Special Operations Forces in
the history of our military, we have significantly more than
that number deployed in support of operations in Iraq.
The recent successes achieved by our men and women during
Operation Enduring Freedom and now during Operation Iraqi
Freedom have given the world a much clearer insight into the
skills and the dedication of American Special Operations
Forces. Through your support, we continue to get even better.
The United States Special Operations Command will now
transform from being primarily a force provider to geographic
commands to become a warfighting command with the additional
mission of planning and execution of combat operations against
terrorist organizations. I would stress, Mr. Chairman, that
this expanded role as a supported commander is not meant to
replace or otherwise marginalize the special operations
organizations assigned to the regional combatant commanders. In
fact, it is designed to dramatically increase the efficiencies
of our operations by ensuring that we are totally synchronized
and focused on the global war on terror wherever it breeds.
With this additional added responsibility, comes additional
resource requirements that will allow us to be better
positioned around the world, have more responsive forces,
ensure collaboration with our regional combatant commanders and
the intelligence agencies, increase the needed planners at the
theater Special Operations Commands (SOC) and at our own
headquarters in Tampa, alleviate some of the high demand, low
density issues, and overall give us more agility and
flexibility around the world.
At the Special Operations Command, we have built a Special
Operations Joint Inter-Agency Collaboration Center to ensure
there is no seam between our intelligence agencies and our
planning and execution efforts. We have built a world-class
Joint Operations Center. While in a temporary facility, it
provides the needed connectivity to our forces currently around
the world.
Mr. Chairman, I am happy to report that the Department of
Defense has worked very hard to ensure Special Operations
Forces at every level have what they need to get the job done.
While we have focused on the war on terror, we have not lost
any momentum in our extremely important ability to rapidly
design, build, acquire, and field the best equipment possible
for our operators on the ground, in the air, and at sea.
Congress empowered the command to develop and acquire
special operations-peculiar equipment, material, and services.
We have implemented streamlined and cost-effective processes to
provide our SOF soldiers, sailors, and airmen with the
technology and equipment they need to execute their myriad of
warfighting and peacetime missions.
Our fundamental philosophy within the command is to
expedite an 80 percent solution to our troops while working
with the warfighters and industry to address the remaining 20
percent of the requirement. We leverage the Services, other
agencies, and their development programs to look for technology
to apply to our special operations needs. At the end of the
day, the warfighter has the tools necessary to fight the most
committed enemy across the spectrum of conflict.
The President's new budget will increase the command's
annual funding approximately $1.5 billion to a total of $6.7
billion in fiscal year 2004. This additional funding will allow
us to increase procurement and research, development, test, and
evaluation (RDT&E) in the programs vital for the success of our
force. These include CV-22, the MH-47G, the AC-130U gunships,
and a myriad of command, control, communications, computers,
and intelligence (C\4\I) initiatives and operator equipment.
Mr. Chairman, the current state of SOF capabilities is
strong, but to meet the evolving capabilities of potential
adversaries we must invest now to ensure reliable support for
the defense strategy. Our people are certainly our most
important asset. We will not forget that. But maintaining and
improving materiel capabilities remains one of the command's
most difficult challenges. Special Operations Forces must keep
its equipment up-to-date while keeping the costs for sustaining
its warfighting systems under control.
We depend on leading edge technologies to provide critical
advantage and to support participation in the growing number of
technologically complex missions and operations. On the
horizon, we see promising technology maturing that will help to
keep our forces on the cutting edge. SOCOM is working closely
with industry, the national labs, with academia, to insert
these technology thrust areas for the future. These thrust
areas address the gaps we see in technology and offer the
command the greatest opportunity for technological payback.
They will include signature reduction, high bandwidth
reachback communications, underwater communications, unmanned
systems, battery and fuel cells, remote sensing, advanced
training systems, bioengineering, and directed energy weapons.
Additionally, the command will be able to meet its critical
force structure requirements that will support the increased
effort to defeat terrorism around the globe.
The Department's recognition and support for our manpower
requirements will result in an end strength increase of almost
4,000 people over the next 5 years. I believe it is worthy of
mentioning that SOCOM has also worked closely with the
Department of Defense to find funding for the much-needed
state-of-the-art warfighting center to be located at our
headquarters in Tampa, Florida, a facility that will afford us
the highest level of efficiency and integration as we plan the
war on terrorism.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to mention the special
operators who have made the ultimate sacrifice since September
11th, 2001. Daily the press reports just a small sample of the
amazing missions being done in OEF and OIF. Our people are
engaged on the battlefield nightly performing the full spectrum
of missions that mark special operations. They are working at a
level of intensity, sophistication, and commitment never before
seen in the history of special operations and, quite frankly,
they are amazing.
These men and women, several who have been wounded, and all
the special operators who put their lives on the line around
the world are some of America's truest heroes. I would
therefore like to close by acknowledging the great support that
you and the other committee members have given our soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, and our civilians, and thank you for
the opportunity to be here today. I look forward to addressing
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Brown follows:]

Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Bryan D. Brown, USA

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is
an honor and privilege to report to you on the state of the United
States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and Special Operations
Forces (SOF). I am pleased to report that SOF remain the most capable
and ready force in the world today.
We have seen great change in our Nation as America takes action
against terrorism. USSOCOM has been a key player in that response. I
will report to you on how we are facing two critical challenges and
provide an overview of our fiscal year 2004 budget request. The two
challenges addressed are fighting terrorism on a global scale and
transformation.
Let me first address the war against terrorism on a global scale.
USSOCOM has been at the forefront of this fight since initiation of
combat operations following the September 11 attacks. Given the
character of this war and the stakes involved, SOF is on the offensive.
The aspect of today's international terrorist is far different than in
the past, as terrorists now have global reach, infrastructure, and
significant resources. The attacks on our Nation on September 11, 2001,
clearly demonstrated that determined terrorists will go to any lengths
to inflict catastrophic losses on Americans, regardless whether they
are civilians or military personnel. Of greater importance is the fact
that these terrorists have chemical, biological, nuclear, and high-
yield explosive weapons and the desire to kill as many Americans as
possible and undermine our Nation's interests and influence around the
world.
SOF play a vital role in combating and defeating global terrorism,
by disrupting terrorist organizations and bringing their members and
supporters to justice . . . or by taking justice directly to them. The
mission of USSOCOM is expanding to planning direct combat missions
against terrorist organizations around the world and executing those
missions as the supported command, while maintaining the role of force
provider and supporter to the geographic combatant commanders. To meet
this challenge, USSOCOM must establish command and control
infrastructures which complement the geographic combatant commanders
and invest in programs and systems improving SOF's speed, agility,
precision, lethality, stealth, survivability, and sustainability.
USSOCOM must also be forward-deployed for rapid response. The
requirement to plan, synchronize, and execute operations on a global
scale necessitate a globally capable SOF ready for full spectrum
integrated operations.
Full spectrum integrated SOF are the refinements that must occur to
tailor SOF capabilities for the war on terrorism. These SOF
capabilities will ensure greater operational agility, flexibility and
mobility, sufficient global command and control, focused intelligence,
signature reduction, and a collaborative planning environment that
facilitates simultaneous multi-echelon planning. Additionally, SOF
capabilities must continue to address other national and military
strategies, including homeland defense and forward deterrence, swiftly
defeating the efforts of adversaries and decisively winning lesser
contingencies.
All personnel of USSOCOM--active duty, Reserve component, and
civilians, are engaged in this multi-front global war on terrorism
(GWOT). The battlefield successes in this campaign have proven again
and again the foresight of Congress in the creation of USSOCOM. Our
organizational flexibility and streamlined acquisition and resourcing
authorities continue to allow unequaled response to the needs of our
operators. The capability of conducting joint operations is enhanced by
synchronizing SOF, which include Army Special Operations Aviation,
Special Forces, Rangers, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations
forces; Air Force Special Operations Aviators and Special Tactics
Squadrons; and Navy Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL), SEAL Delivery Vehicle
Teams, and Special Boat Teams.
The continuing action in Afghanistan is a great example of how
joint warfighting has evolved from the Goldwater-Nichols legislation as
a powerful and precise tool to support our Nation's vital interests.
Daily Civil Affairs teams and other SOF continue to play an active role
in Afghanistan to ensure we win the peace. Our activities in Operation
Enduring Freedom have given the world a much clearer insight into the
skills, dedication, and power across the spectrum of America's SOF,
specifically as part of a larger joint and interagency team--each
bringing their specific skills and capabilities to the team. The
ability to win across the spectrum of military operations requires
seamless joint teamwork and USSOCOM is privileged to team with the
Services to create the best warfighting capability the world has seen.
Our other opportunity is transformation. The hallmark of SOF is
that they are always open to change and ``out of the box'' thinking.
Transformation embodies our SOF core values . . . integrity, courage,
competence, and creativity. The success of change and transformation is
the ability to maintain the goodness of the past, while taking
calculated risks that promise competitive advantages on the battlefield
for our future forces. We must change to ensure that we have maximized
the ability of the human to think and problem solve, while taking
advantage of the rapid pace of technology. Transformation is not about
equipment, it is about a holistic approach producing sweeping advances
for the individual, to the organization structure, to the appropriate
application of technology to build the right capability at the right
time to defeat any threat ensuring the safety of our Nation now and
into the future. Transformation of SOF is a journey, not a destination
and there is no mark on the wall that will indicate we are finished
transforming.
While SOF activities remain constant, the context of how and the
manner in which they are executed has changed significantly.
Traditionally, SOF were employed as a force multiplier to wage war
against other nation states. Traditional warfare focused on the
destruction of large massed armies, navies and air forces. Supporting
intelligence communities developed capabilities to locate and track
these large enemy combat elements. In traditional conflicts, the main
effort was expended on the physical destruction of the enemy's military
capability during large battles. USSOCOM is transforming intelligence
and interagency capabilities not to locate and destroy large enemy
combat elements, but to locate and track individual terrorists across
the globe and conduct small surgical operations with minimal risk to
the employed force.
In addition to the war on terrorism, our forces are still committed
to the geographic combatant commander's theater security cooperation
plans. These include the European Command (EUCOM)-led campaign in
Bosnia and Kosovo, the Pacific Command's (PACOM) support to combating
terrorism in the Philippines and exercises with our allies in the
Republic of Korea, Southern Command's (SOUTHCOM) narco-terrorism
programs, providing crucial SOF for Central Command's (CENTCOM) combat
operations including Operation Enduring Freedom, as well as cooperative
efforts with Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and the newly established
Northern Command (NORTHCOM).

STRATEGY

Our broad, yet unique, mission areas and capabilities allow us to
make a number of important contributions to the National Security
Strategy, especially in the war on terrorism. Although SOF cannot
address every crisis, we provide policymakers an expanded set of
options for rapidly resolving strategic crises with relatively limited
resources, fanfare, and risk. Our ubiquitous presence as ``Global
Scouts'' serves to assure our allies and friends of the United States'
resolve. SOF's selective and integrated participation in support of
Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP) to include: Joint Combined
Exchange Training (JCET), Humanitarian Demining (HD), Humanitarian
Assistance (HA), Narco-Terrorism (NT), and Foreign Internal Defense
(FID) programs which provide tangible benefits in support of war on
terrorism objectives and geographic combatant command strategies while
building rapport with our friends and allies.
The global presence of SOF and our unique capabilities dissuade
potential adversaries by disrupting their planning, while providing the
President and Secretary of Defense a wider array of options for dealing
with potential adversaries. Forces organized, trained, and equipped to
execute the SOF principal missions of combating terrorism and
counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction also provide
critical deterrence against adversaries that might contemplate
producing or employing these weapons against the homeland or our
friends and allies. SOF can deter threats and counter coercion through
the deployment and employment of forces specially tailored to counter
adversaries' capabilities through direct and surrogate means.
By operating ``in the seam'' between peace and war, SOF can address
transnational and asymmetric threats through direct military means or
concerted action with conventional military forces or other government
agencies. SOF help shape the pre-conflict environment, setting the
conditions so they are favorable to U.S. objectives and provide a
strategic economy of force in areas of the world left uncovered by the
commitment of conventional forces to other priorities.

EXPANDED ROLE OF USSOCOM

While our Nation is at war, we realize this war is unlike any other
ever fought. It is a war without formal declaration, concrete
resolution, nation state boundaries, and against adversaries willing
and able to strike directly against our homeland or our citizens
abroad. It is a potentially interminable war in which our adversaries
are likely to use weapons designed to cause catastrophic injury to our
citizens and our way of life.
The nexus of the Department of Defense's counterterrorism global
war on terrorism effort is at USSOCOM. Our strategy encompasses the
entire spectrum of special operations missions, capabilities and
methods; then incorporates conventional capabilities, as necessary, for
mission success. USSOCOM's nine legislated activities remain relevant
in determining our missions and activities in the fight against
terrorism. Our overarching strategy is focused initially on disrupting,
defeating, and destroying al Qaida. The main effort is directed against
the al Qaida operational center of gravity, their senior leadership. To
accomplish this strategy, USSOCOM is employing SOF simultaneously
worldwide through focused deployments to priority regions in order to
prepare the battlespace, both physically and psychologically, and set
the conditions for global war on terrorism operations. As the situation
develops and terrorist targets are located, operations are conducted to
further identify and acquire the target, followed by combat operations.
The overall intent is to seize and maintain the initiative through
constant pressure against known or suspected terrorist organizations
and infrastructure.
As USSOCOM's role expands, this will generate changes in our
manpower, organizational structure, facilities, equipment, and special
programs relating to the expanded responsibilities. As we assess the
specific changes needed to meet these expanded operational
requirements, we will continue to collaborate with the other combatant
commands and interagency partners that have key information operations
(IO) supporting responsibilities in order to accomplish our changing
mission in a responsible, coordinated manner.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

Our headquarters organization and activities are changing
dramatically to fight the war on terrorism. As the lead supported
commander for planning the Department's global war against terrorist
organizations, USSOCOM will plan and selectively execute combat
missions against terrorists and terrorist organizations around the
world. In order to most effectively enhance our ability to respond as
both a supported and supporting command, we are formulating the
integration of our intelligence, operations and planning, and analysis
divisions into a single facility. The effect will be a synergy of
talent into a single entity which will significantly enhance and focus
our unique warfighting capabilities.
Our planning efforts will focus on the development of recommended
courses of action to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Our focus is campaign planning, prioritization of
targets and missions, development and tasking intelligence collection
planning, and employment of SOF and conventional forces. As the
supported command for planning and possibly execution, we conduct
planning and determine forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and
communications for employment. We are also developing the processes and
organizations required to collaboratively draft, coordinate, and
globally synchronize plans and operations. These forces could include
any of our Special Operations Forces or part of the Theater Special
Operations Command (TSOC), but may also include conventional forces, as
necessary.
During the execution phase, USSOCOM will conduct detailed planning
and execute the approved courses of action using the TSOC or a Joint
Task Force or Joint Special Operations Task Force as our operational
and tactical coordinator. This is a significant and transformational
change in strategic military command and control and will require a
major adaptation of USSOCOM headquarters and the geographic combatant
commanders' TSOCs.
The geographic combatant commander's area of responsibility in
which the operation is to be executed supports our request for forces
by providing operational control of the forward deployed forces
necessary to execute the approved courses of action, in accordance with
the Department's deployment order. USSOCOM will be prepared to conduct
follow-on operations based upon exploitable intelligence and
operational opportunity.
We have formed a collaborative planning environment through the
geographic combatant commands' staff and interagency liaisons. The
collaborative planning identifies interagency requirements, issues
planning guidance as appropriate, reviews, validates, and submits plans
with recommended delegation of command relationships for execution for
Departmental approval. This command relationship recommendation may not
always recommend USSOCOM as the supported command, but may in fact,
recommend the geographic combatant commander as the supported command
and USSOCOM will remain in its traditional role as supporting command.
In that instance, during planning, the geographic combatant commands'
staff (designated as the supported command for execution) determines
the forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and communications for
employment. During execution, the geographic combatant command's staff
executes the approved courses of action, collaborates with USSOCOM, and
provides post-operation assessments. The geographic combatant command
will be prepared to conduct follow-on operations based upon exploitable
actionable intelligence and operational opportunity.
USSOCOM's traditional role of a ``supporting'' command; responsible
for providing trained and equipped SOF to the geographic combatant
commanders is thus a ``supported command for planning'' and, when
necessary, ``supported command for execution'' within the geographic
combatant commands' areas of responsibility. Under these
circumstances--supporting or supported for execution--a flexible
command relationship structure that exploits the command and control
capabilities already present in the geographic combatant commanders'
staff. This will enable us to prosecute missions supporting the war on
terrorism will allow USSOCOM to focus our energies toward the execution
of only the most critical counterterrorist operations as the supported
commander for execution.

TRANSITION AND SHARING OF SOF EMPLOYMENT TASKINGS

SOF are traditionally small, highly trained, specifically
organized, and uniquely equipped to perform missions conventional
forces are not trained, organized, or equipped to perform. To better
focus our efforts in the war on terrorism, the Department and USSOCOM
are conducting reviews of the SOF principal missions and collateral
activities in order to identify the mission employment taskings
currently performed by SOF that could be transitioned or shared with
our conventional force partners or other governmental agencies. Our
measuring stick is those missions, tasks, and activities as they
pertain to access, intelligence development, and operational
preparation to prosecute combat operations in the war on terrorism. SOF
routinely consider leveraging conventional forces and interagency
partners to perform certain missions. However, if a mission task does
not align directly or indirectly with the war on terrorism, or provide
access to a significant area or objective, SOF have the ability to
transition or load-share these tasks with conventional forces. Examples
of this load-sharing are the Georgia Train and Equip missions and
personal security detail for Afghanistan's President Karzai, which were
transitioned to conventional forces or other government agencies--
seamlessly. Future SOF deployments should identify at the time of
deployment a conventional force to be prepared to assume the mission
taskings as they are identified and when the unique capabilities of SOF
are no longer required, both operational and support. The transition of
SOF employment taskings to a conventional force, while prioritizing and
focusing all SOF deployments, in coordination with geographic combatant
commanders, is essential to our continued success in planning and
executing the war on terrorism.

STRATEGIC CHALLENGES AND RISK

We know that current terrorist networks are linked with non-state
actors with very different local strategies but mutually self-
supporting goals. These nodes operate across international boundaries,
spanning and circumventing current geographic constructs. The imprecise
nature of terrorist goals and the ambiguous international environment
have nullified traditional responses. This dangerous mix catapults the
need for an extremely sophisticated joint, interagency, combined and
coalition strategy to unparalleled levels, which currently challenge
our Nation to unprecedented levels.
Global access is vital to the preservation of U.S. national
security and SOF must have the ability to access and operate anywhere
in the world, in any mission environment, from benign to hostile. SOF
maintain access and an understanding of local issues through geographic
orientation, cultural acuity, and continued forward presence and
security cooperation. Although theater security cooperation events
provide SOF access to most parts of the world, SOF must retain the
ability to operate where U.S. forces may be unwelcomed or opposed
through unconventional warfare methods. Potential adversaries are
acquiring weapons and developing asymmetric capabilities to deny United
States forces access to critical theaters of operations in a crisis. As
first responders--global scouts, pathfinders, and door openers--SOF set
the stage for follow on forces.
The risks facing USSOCOM include Operational Risk during
preparation of the battlespace encompassing Force Management Risk, and
Future Challenges Risk. Operational Risk is the ability of a force to
achieve military objectives in a near-term conflict or other
contingency. Force Management Risk is the ability to recruit, train,
retain, and equip sufficient numbers of quality personnel and sustain
the readiness of the force while accomplishing its many operational
tasks. Lastly, Future Challenges Risk, refers to the ability to invest
in new capabilities and develop new operational concepts needed to
dissuade or defeat mid- to long-term military challenges.
Like the Services, SOF have reduced operational risk by
reallocating resources from its modernization and recapitalization
accounts to fund current readiness. Nevertheless, SOF will require
significant enhancements in capability, capacity and speed of response
enhancements to meet all priorities. SOF may have to accept operational
risk in some areas in order to build new operational capabilities. Some
key issues associated with operational risk include: sizing the force
to conduct effective operations, optimizing basing to support strategic
objectives, and improving SOF strike and mobility capabilities.
In many respects force management risk is the most critical problem
facing SOF. The special operations community must retain its
experienced and seasoned personnel to gain the significant return on
investments made in the areas of assessment, selection, training, and
education. For example, today's Green Beret is the only operational
specialty that requires a foreign language for qualification--a
critical skill that must be retained as we posture for future
operations. Some key issues associated with force management risk
include: retention of mid- and senior-grade personnel and growing the
force to meet current as well as emerging operational requirements.
Dealing with future challenges will require force transformation--
where these challenges can be overcome by using fundamentally different
organizations, tactics, techniques and procedures than those used by
today's forces. Some key issues associated with Future Challenge Risk
include improving trans-regional information capabilities to support
global operations; building a linguistically, culturally and ethnically
diverse force; improving capabilities to operate for extended periods
in anti-access environments; providing force protection in adverse
environments; improving ground-directed fire support; and improving
capabilities to operate in urban environments.

TRANSFORMATION AND REORGANIZATION

SOF must continue to operate effectively in joint, combined, and
interagency environments while also fusing capabilities that reflect
U.S. political, military, economic, intellectual, technical, and
cultural strengths into a comprehensive approach to future challenges.
USSOCOM, therefore, embraces the process of transformation in a
disciplined manner that allows the command to move towards its goal of
full-spectrum, integrated SOF. Our use of full-spectrum, integrated SOF
will allow us to tap into diverse areas, such as commercial information
technologies, utilization of space, biomedicine, environmental science,
organizational design and commercial research and development. All
aspects of SOF--the organization, force structure, platforms,
equipment, doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and missions--
must continuously transform to meet the needs of the Nation and seize
the opportunities manifested by change.
As we develop the tools to conduct our expanded mission in the
fight against terrorism, we must transform our headquarters into one
that includes the traditional train, organize, and equip mission with
the capability to plan and execute the warfight against terrorism. Our
component commands face this same challenge. Some areas already being
addressed include the growth in our warfighting staff to build an
organization oriented on the expanded mission of an operational
headquarters without degrading the necessary work of our resourcing and
acquisition headquarters. We have also developed a 24-hour joint
operations center with the connectivity to work with the geographic
combatant commanders and the TSOCs and a Campaign Support Group from a
myriad of commands and interagency partners. In the near future we will
see these activities consolidated into a ``state of the art''
warfighting center.
The 21st century SOF warrior--selectively recruited and assessed,
mature, superbly trained and led--will remain the key to success in
special operations. These warriors must be capable of conducting
strategic operations in all tactical environments--combining a warrior
ethos with language proficiency, cultural awareness, political
sensitivity, and the ability to maximize information age technology. We
must also have the intellectual agility to conceptualize creative, yet
useful, solutions to ambiguous problems, and provide a coherent set of
choices to the combatant commands or Joint Force Commander.
People will always remain the most important component of SOF
capability. However, future SOF will use technological advances more
effectively. Technology improvements will allow commanders to track and
communicate discretely with SOF in the field. Improvements in unmanned
vehicle technologies will provide better precision fire, force
protection, personnel recovery, and logistics support. SOF must develop
new competencies and enhance existing ones in support of critical
national requirements, including the ability to locate, tag, and track
mobile targets and support trans-regional information operations.
USSOCOM is focused on providing the most accurate and complete
intelligence support to our tactical commanders and deployed forces. We
do this by leveraging national, theater, and Service intelligence
resources with our SOF-peculiar systems and intelligence professionals.
USSOCOM's commitment to transformation is demonstrated by the Special
Operations Joint Interagency Collaboration Center (SOJICC) in the
Special Operations Joint Intelligence Center. Established in 2001 to
assure consistent and cohesive collaboration with national efforts, our
SOJICC is a dynamic interagency, collaborative, network-centric
environment that uses advanced computing capabilities and nodal
analysis to rapidly process, fuse, and visualize all-source
intelligence to support decisionmaking. USSOCOM is committed to
discovering other ways to exploit and build upon our country's
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance advantages and to
utilize the latest technologies to provide enhanced intelligence
support to our deployed SOF in our expanded strategic role.
USSOCOM continues to transform our PSYOP force structure and
capabilities to improve our support to geographic combatant commander's
influence initiatives, and ongoing military operations. Lessons learned
from multiple contingency operations, including Operation Enduring
Freedom, identified a requirement to increase our PSYOP force structure
to meet the demands of the geographic combatant commanders. The
Department of the Army agreed to crosswalk the necessary manpower in
order to activate two additional active duty and four Reserve
Geographic PSYOP Companies. To modernize our PSYOP force we are
proposing an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) that will
explore emerging technologies to increase the dissemination range of
our PSYOP products into denied areas and develop state of the art PSYOP
analytical planning tools. We are also modernizing our PSYOP EC-130E
Commando Solo television and radio broadcast aircraft by cross-decking
the EC-130E into the newer EC-130J model.
We have also developed a new construct in joint warfighting with
the fusion of a Marine Corps USSOCOM Detachment into one of our Naval
Special Warfare Squadrons. Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC)
continues to pioneer U.S. Navy warfighting capabilities to support
special operations in the war on terrorism. NSWC is the lead agent on
the establishment of the SOF module on the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
and evaluating SOF modifications for U.S. Navy rotary wing programs. In
addition, NSWC's transformation efforts include unprecedented
experimentation in the new SSGN conversion effort. Our Naval Special
Warfare component is also collaborating with the Department of the Navy
to pursue technologies and concepts in unmanned undersea and air
reconnaissance vehicles and sensors for persistent intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and courses of action required
for enhancing asymmetric operations to find, fix, and finish non-state
threats such as the global war on terrorism.
USSOCOM and the Marines have signed an agreement to establish the
initial Marine Corps force contribution to SOF, which will jointly
train and deploy with naval special warfare in the spring of 2004.
Finally, and most important, the improvement of SOF training,
education, and experience contributes to the development of SOF's
capability. Doctrine, organization, and materiel factors have additive
value to the force; leadership and personnel factors, however,
exponentially multiply investments in doctrine, organization, and
materiel. As training, education, and experience influence the quality
and effectiveness of leadership, these variables have the greatest
long-term effect on SOF capabilities. In order to maintain strategic
flexibility and maximize the likelihood of operational success, SOF
will increase their commitment to ``train for certainty, educate for
uncertainty.''
USSOCOM's expanded mission and organizational changes constitute a
new vector that will require a continual effort to refine our
Transformation Roadmap based on this new azimuth. USSOCOM will be a
hybrid of the geographic combatant commanders and a specified command
for Special Operations support. More than ever, our transformation is
truly a process, not a destination.

BUDGET AND ACQUISITION

One of the strengths of the command, thanks to the wisdom of
Congress, was the establishment of a separate Major Force Program
(MFP), MFP-11, for SOF along with the requisite acquisition and
research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) authority. It is a
powerful tool that allows us to quickly meet the soldier, sailor, or
airman's equipment needs. This is accomplished by a world class
acquisition center at Tampa, made up of folks who live by some very
specific and exacting acquisition principles. Our fundamental
acquisition strategy is to rapidly field the 80 percent solution while
working with the warfighters and industry to continue to address the
last 20 percent.
Our expanded role in the war on terrorism has resulted in expanded
resources as the Department recognized the challenges confronting SOF
and the Nation. Our fiscal year 2004 budget request is $6,735 million,
1.8 percent of the Department of Defense budget. A summary and some
highlights of SOF's fiscal year 2004 request is provided below.
Military Personnel
Today, the relative health of the special operations community
remains strong. The long-term stabilization of our health depends upon
continued efforts to ensure our people experience a quality of life
commensurate with their hard work and their dedication to duty.
Increased pay and allowances and special pays are crucial to the
continued health of our community. It is imperative that we continue to
improve military pay and allowances and fund the Reserve component
military pay for additional schools as well as training days necessary
for Reserve component SOF Military Personnel (MILPERS) requirements.
Congressional support is a powerful signal to our deserving men and
women and will have a tremendous impact on our future health and
readiness.
The total SOF end strength for fiscal year 2004 will grow to 49,848
manpower resources with about one-third of our military manpower in
Reserve component units. Thanks to the Department's recognition of a
need for more SOF, and the Services' cross-walking end strength to SOF,
we will see an end strength increase of 3,869 over the next 5 years.
This end strength growth primarily supports the manning
requirements to wage the global war on terrorism. The increases are
focused on fixed and rotary-wing aviation, SEAL teams, Civil Affairs
(CA), PSYOP, TSOCs, and support to USSOCOM as the supported combatant
commander in the war on terrorism. While USSOCOM budgets for SOF
personnel, the Services execute the funds. For fiscal year 2004 our
MILPAY request totals $2,210.8 million.
Operation and Maintenance (O&M)
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) is the heart of maintaining SOF
operational readiness. O&M includes the day-to-day costs of SOF unit
mission activities, such as civilian pay, travel, airlift, special
operations-peculiar equipment, equipment maintenance, minor
construction, fuel, consumable supplies, spares and repair parts for
weapons and equipment, as well as the headquarters functions of USSOCOM
and its Service components. Our fiscal year 2004 O&M request is
$1,994.1 million. An additional $12 million supports SOF from MFP-3
(command, control, communications, and intelligence [C\4\I]) O&M funds.
Operating forces include the necessary resources for SOF tactical
units and organizations, including costs directly associated with unit
training, deployments, and participation in contingency operations.
Resources support civilian and military manpower, SOF peculiar and
support equipment, fielding of SOF equipment, routine operating
expenses, and necessary facilities.
Procurement
Along with the authority to budget and program for SOF activities,
USSOCOM also has the authority to develop and acquire Special
Operations peculiar equipment to prepare SOF to carry out their
assigned missions. This provides the warfighter with the tools
necessary to fight not only the most committed industrial age power,
but also the means to fight entities that would and could wield
influence through terror by any means. USSOCOM's fiscal year 2004
procurement request is $1,978.3 million, an increase of over $1 billion
over the amount appropriated in fiscal year 2003. Speaking of fiscal
year 2003, we would like to thank Congress for the procurement
increases received--over $137 million--including the transfer of funds
from the Defense Emergency Response Fund.
The current state of SOF capabilities is strong, but to meet the
evolving capabilities of potential adversaries, we must invest now to
ensure reliable support for the Defense Strategy. USSOCOM's aim in
pursuing technological transformation is to guarantee our forces remain
relevant to any fight, and ensure we minimize risk to our Nation's
vital interests.
To enhance our force projection capabilities, we must continue to
invest in programs to improve strategic mobility, force protection,
research and development, and information dominance.
Our Air Force Special Operations rotary-wing capabilities must
remain safe, sustainable and relevant. We are working to ensure the
airworthiness and defensive system capabilities of our MH-53
helicopters to allow them to fly in the threat environments they face
on the battlefield.
The heart of our future rotary wing capability as we transform Air
Force special operations to the CV-22 is the rotary-wing upgrades and
sustainment funding provided for critical improvements to our Army
special operations aircraft. These aircraft must be capable of
operating at extended ranges under adverse weather conditions to
infiltrate, reinforce, and extract SOF. The fiscal year 2004 budget
provides ongoing survivability, reliability, maintainability, and
operational upgrades as well as procurement and sustainment costs for
fielded rotary wing aircraft and subsystems to include forward-basing
of MH-47 helicopters. In fiscal year 2004, the Department made a
concerted effort to mitigate our most pressing problems associated with
SOF low density/high demand rotary wing assets. In particular, the MH-
47 inventory was increased by 16 aircraft in fiscal year 2004 by
diverting CH-47D aircraft from the Army's service life extension
program (SLEP) production line to the SOF MH-47G production line to
help alleviate USSOCOM's critical vertical lift shortfall due to battle
damages. We are grateful to the Army for their support. The MH-60 fleet
begins a major program in fiscal year 2004 to extend its useful life,
which will significantly upgrade our MH-60 fleet. Improvements to both
fleets will enhance SOF's ability to conduct both medium and long range
penetration into denied or sensitive areas. These programs will keep
our Army rotary wing relevant well past 2020.
The command is committed to the CV-22 aircraft and its unique
capabilities. We will continue to assure the CV-22 is safe, reliable,
and maintainable for SOF. The long-range, high speed, vertical lift CV-
22 fills a long-standing SOF mission requirement not met by any other
existing fixed or rotary wing platform. The Navy is the lead Service
for the joint V-22 program and is responsible for managing and funding
the development of the baseline V-22, Osprey. The Air Force will
procure and provide the fielding of 50 CV-22 aircraft and purchase
service common support equipment for USSOCOM. Initial Operational Test
and Evaluation will be conducted as soon as practical, after
Developmental Test is complete. The support we have received from the
Department for an additional test aircraft will significantly reduce
the technical and schedule risk for this ``flagship'' program. USSOCOM
will continue to fund the procurement of SOF peculiar systems for the
CV-22 such as the terrain following/terrain avoidance radar, and
electronic and infrared warfare suites.
The fiscal year 2004 AC-130U Gunship program continues modification
of four additional C-130Hs into the gunship inventory. C-130
modification programs provide for numerous survivability and capability
modifications to our C-130 fleet. The Department accelerated the MC-
130H Combat Talon II aerial refueling modifications to fiscal year 2004
because this capability is crucial to the war on terrorism. In
addition, the Air Force is providing USSOCOM 10 additional C-130Hs to
convert to MC-130Hs. This increased capability will make up for
attrition losses, enable SOF to forward-station additional rapid
mobility assets, and allow us to assure our allies through increased
forward presence. In fiscal year 2004, we will continue programs
including the Directed Infrared Counter Measure (DIRCM) Laser and
several modifications to our Commando Solo fleet.
The Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) is a specially designed
combatant submarine that will provide clandestine undersea mobility for
SOF personnel and their mission support equipment. The ASDS is capable
of operating in a wide range of threat environments and environmental
extremes, providing increased range, payload, communications, loiter
capability and protection of SOF personnel from the elements during
transit. The ASDS provides a quantum leap in our undersea mobility
capability. ASDS boat #1's Initial Operational Capability is planned
for third-quarter, fiscal year 2003. In fiscal year 2004, program
activities for the ASDS will continue to focus on procurement of long
lead material items to support ASDS boat #2 fabrications and the
development of technology improvements in the areas of sensors, cameras
and communications. The ASDS is the only capability of its kind in the
world.
In addition to the ASDS, USSOCOM remains committed to the Navy's
SSGN program, converting four Ohio Class Ballistic Missile Submarines
into dual role Strike/SOF platforms that will provide SOF with
unprecedented worldwide access for both the ASDS and the SEAL Delivery
Vehicle. The transformational changes incorporated into the SSGN will
allow SOF to deploy a larger and more flexible force package than has
ever been possible. Additionally, the command, control and
communications capabilities designed into these platforms will permit
SOF to operate independent from, or in conjunction with, any land or
sea-based Joint Task Force.
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)
We must continue to invest in making our SOF more capable in all
environments. Our Research and Development (R&D) activities focus on
exploiting technologies to improve SOF Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C\4\I), mobility, weapons,
and survivability. Our R&D program, while modest, is producing great
capability enhancement products. USSOCOM's fiscal year 2004 RDT&E
request is $440.4 million, as compared to $512.5 million in fiscal year
2003.
Two examples of capability enhancement products are our National
Systems Support to SOF and our Advanced Tactical Laser (ATL) Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstration programs.
The National Systems Support to SOF project is successfully
integrating national intelligence systems capabilities into the SOF
structure. For example, the project is rapidly transitioning Blue Force
Tracking equipment from development to operational use by SOF deployed
in Operation Enduring Freedom. These systems enable command and control
elements, as well as combat search and rescue elements, to identify and
track friendly forces. They also significantly increase our capability
to execute surgical strike missions in the proximity of friendly forces
by providing an effective means to distinguish between friendly and
enemy forces.
The Advanced Tactical Laser (ATL) ACTD evaluates the military
utility of a tactical directed energy weapon on the battlefield to
provide support to the warfighter. A directed energy weapon has
inherent performance capabilities that can support extremely precise
and selectable strikes, effects and lethality, and multi-axis
engagements. These capabilities have the potential to greatly enhance
the effectiveness of our SOF operators. The ATL ACTD will develop and
employ a modular, high-energy laser weapon system on a C-130 platform,
capable of conducting ultra-precision strike engagements to enhance
mission accomplishment. In fiscal year 2004 program activities will
focus on design completion of an objective ATL system, procurement of
long lead material items, and begin the Military Utility Assessment
(MUA) using ATL simulations and component hardware testing in
conjunction with military exercises.
We are working on an array of improvements across our mission
areas, including: improved body armor and chemical protection, advances
in gunship armaments, developing and leveraging Information Operations
(IO) tools. USSOCOM's primary success has always been ensuring we
select the right people and train them for innovation: we equip the
warrior, not man the equipment. We clearly recognize that the modern
battlefield is comprised of land, air, sea, space and the virtual
domains. IO has the potential to help SOF operators remain undetectable
in hostile area--a critical element in most SOF missions. We intend to
actively pursue IO capabilities and develop standing authority to
employ these capabilities when needed. This will improve SOF
effectiveness and access to previously denied environments, and
dissuade potential competitors from engaging even if they perceive
quantitative advantage.
Some of our most successful development programs have or will make
a real difference in the fight against terrorism. The Multi-Band Intra-
Team Radio (MBITR) provides a small, lightweight, software
reprogrammable handheld radio capable of providing both secure and
clear voice and data communications over 100 selectable channels.
Thanks to support from the Department and Congress, USSOCOM has been
able to accelerate fielding of these radios to our forces.
Another program worthy of mention is the hemostatic bandage. The
development and rapid fielding of the hemostatic dressing embodies the
first of our SOF truths--that humans are more important than hardware.
The family of hemostatic dressings, which include the fibrin and
chitosen dressings, were not due for fielding until 2007, but with the
heroic actions and ultimate sacrifices of SOF in Afghanistan, USSOCOM
focused on accelerated fielding of these dressings. Thanks to the
combined efforts of the Department, the Services, and other combatant
commands, this revolutionary medical technology was catapulted from the
research laboratory to the field 5 years ahead of schedule. These
dressings stop the bleeding almost effectively as surgical closure of a
wound. We aim to put this technology into the hands of every soldier,
hoping to end preventable hemorrhage on the battlefield.
Military Construction
USSOCOM's military construction efforts ensure our highly
specialized SOF personnel and equipment are provided a modern array of
SOF training, maintenance, operational, and command and control
facilities to successfully execute SOF missions. USSOCOM relies on the
Services to provide community support facilities and programs
construction only for facilities directly contributing to SOF training,
readiness and operational capabilities. USSOCOM's fiscal year 2004
MILCON request is $99.4 million for 12 projects.

CONCLUSION

Now and in the future, SOF continue to improve their ability to
execute the war on terrorism, while remaining ready to deal equally
with demands of both our warfighting and peacetime roles. SOF will be
deliberate in its transformation to ensure continued support to
critical national requirements.
But let us never forget those who have paid the last full measure.
We want to acknowledge the 36 men and women killed in direct support of
our Nation's response to terrorists since October 2001 and others lost
or wounded in combat operations to ensure their skills were honed and
ready for the next fight. We face adversaries who would destroy our way
of life. In response, SOF will not rest until we have achieved victory
in the war on terrorism.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide the state of SOF and for
your continued support of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
civilians; the men and women of the United States Special Operations
Command.

Senator Roberts. Thank you, General Brown. Do either one of
our special guests have any opening statements?
Mr. Schulte. No, sir.
Chief Rogers. No, sir.
Senator Roberts. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Brown, for your statement. Well done. In
your testimony you state: ``SOCOM must establish command and
control infrastructures that complement the geographic
combatant commanders.'' With your new role and your mandate to
operate anywhere in the world, I think this is one of the key
issues that you have to face organizationally. Can you give us
an idea of what you are doing and what steps you are taking to
make it less hypothetical? For example, coordinating with
SOUTHCOM with respect to Colombia, coordinating with Pacific
Command (PACOM) with respect to the Philippines?
General Brown. Yes, sir. What we are doing is, as we take
on this new role as the supported commander, we are ensuring
that we have the connectivity with all of the regional
combatant commanders and Theater Special Operations Commands,
we call the TSOCs. Those are Special Operations Forces that are
a component of all of the regional combatant commanders.
We believe that they will be key in assisting us as we go
on with the war on terror to help us identify targets, deploy
folks, and command and control the battlefield. With that in
mind, we have added additional people to the TSOCs, about 84 in
some and about 74 in others based on the requirement, so that
they can help us do this command and control when we are in the
supported commander role.
Additionally, we have stood up the Joint Operations Center
down at Tampa, Florida, that gives us connectivity to all these
people and a Collaboration Center so that we cannot just be
sharing information, but actually collaborating as we go
through our planning process. We have built a campaign support
group that actually has members of all of the regional
combatant commanders and the inter-agencies located right with
us at Tampa, Florida, in a temporary facility that we will
eventually put in a world-class warfighting center.
So part of the vision is that we have tremendous
connectivity out through our theater SOCs and right there from
Tampa, Florida, for our planning.
Senator Reed. Let me follow up if I could, General. Are
there budgetary issues involved in this coordination? I mean,
before you came on board with this mission the commanders in
chief (CINC) had essentially this mission in their individual
geographic zone with budget authority that were planning to do
this mission. They were the ones who were going to operate. Now
you come in and say, no, no, it is our responsibility.
Can you elaborate just briefly on whether there are budget
issues here?
General Brown. Well, the first thing I would say is that we
work in very close coordination and cooperation with the
regional combatant commanders. I think one of the great things
about this entire plan, that it is not an either/or. We are all
in this thing together and we will coordinate very closely with
the regional combatant commanders on a day-to-day basis as we
take on these type of missions.
We plussed up those SOCs so that we could help not only the
regional combatant commanders as we placed this additional
burden on them, but additionally to help us make sure that we
are informed with everything that is going on in their theater,
and the regional combatant commanders have been extremely
supportive of this plan.
In addition to the plus-up of personnel for resources that
I already spoke about, and the building of our facilities down
at Tampa, Florida, that will help us do this, we also have
asked for additional force structure so that we can forward-
position to increase our ability to be agile and flexible as we
get these type missions and to reduce our reaction time. That
is part of the plus-up, the $1.7 billion in 2004, that we have.
A lot of that money will go to help us forward-position,
increase our connectivity, increase our national mission
posture, and to plus-up our TSOCs. We will actually have
forward-based capability where we can react much more quickly.
Senator Reed. One of the other consequences of your new
mission is a refocusing of roles, giving up some traditional
roles that the Special Operations community perform, like
liaisons to other countries and training. Certainly we have
seen that in Colombia for example, the Philippines, and
elsewhere. Can you comment about how this is going? Not only
are you gaining some more flexibility, but you lose something
in terms of exposure to foreign militaries, language, training,
and those aspects which come with the training mission for one.
General Brown. That is a great point, Senator. That is one
of the things that we want to make sure that we maintain the
value of, our interaction with all of these foreign services
that we work with and train with on a regular basis, because
that is one of the keys to our cultural awareness, for our
ability to be out around the world working.
We are already turning over some of the missions that we
started to conventional forces, missions that they could pick
up. I think the best example is the Georgia Train and Equip
Program (GTEP), where we went in, got it started, set it up,
and then brought a Marine Corps company in behind us. They
spent a couple of weeks to make sure that they understood the
same program of instruction (POI) so that we did not start all
over again, and then they just continued on, and that Special
Operations company was then allowed to redeploy to prepare for
other missions.
We are also looking at other tasks, such as personal
security detachments, and we are studying this very hard. For
every potential area that we could turn over to a conventional
force, we intend to do that.
Senator Reed. To get back to the point that I raised in my
opening comments, I understand that for your operations at the
2003 level of tempo of operations (OPTEMPO) the cost of
replenishing your stocks is on the order of about $300 million.
That is on top of operations, maintenance costs for current
operations. The long and the short of it, can you give us an
idea of the impact that you see going forward on the operations
in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and the potential
situation in North Korea, in terms of additional moneys you
might need?
General Brown. It would be very difficult for me to give
out a figure to say this is exactly the amount we need. We know
that after this, Operation Iraqi Freedom, is done and we have
redeployed, we will have to refurbish a lot of our helicopters
and our C-130s. Just about every C-130 that we own right now is
deployed except for keeping the schoolhouse open. Our MH-47E
are all we have left in the States keeping the schoolhouse
open, all those. So they are going to need refurbishment and we
have some plans to do that.
Our forces are going to have to come back and we are going
to have to pay for the attrition of all of our equipment that
we have lost or has worn out or been damaged over there. We
will have to ensure, and we have been working very hard to
ensure, that our schools are operating again at a maximum
capacity so that we can continue to ensure we have the force in
the field that we need.
We will have to restock all of the shelves in our SOSAs,
what we call our Special Operations Support Activity, that
maintains our stock of parts for us. There is a myriad of
things we are going to have to do.
For me to put on a specific price tag on it, it would be
very difficult.
Senator Reed. It sounds like it is a significant number. It
is not a rounding error we are talking about here.
General Brown. No, I think it is a significant number,
Senator.
Senator Reed. Is that anywhere in the budget that we are
seeing before us, General, that number?
General Brown. We have some plans. We have money for the
MH-60 service life extension program (SLEP) that we will do in
concert with the big Army. We have money for the MH-47 SLEP
program that will convert them to the G models from the current
E models. Those aircraft will just naturally go through that
line and be refurbished and come out the other end. So some of
those costs have already been paid.
Then additionally, of course, we are looking forward to the
potential of a supplemental, which for us is about--the 2003
supplemental I am talking about--$1.7 billion, about $531
million that we have already, and that leaves us about $1.2
billion. From that we will pay deployment costs, flying hour
costs, but some of that will be to continue to field equipment
in small numbers that we need to continue fighting the global
war on terrorism.
So it is very difficult to see without knowing exactly
where the end date is and when we will be able to come home and
when we will be able to start rotating our forces around to
know exactly what this bill will be.
Senator Reed. I think we all understand there will be a
bill, and I think you would be pleased the sooner you knew,
because then you could start planning.
The chairman has been very kind. I can stop now, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Roberts. Oh, no, please proceed. Just, General,
understand: We are authorizers. We promise everything. It is
the appropriators that are tough.
Senator Reed. You have talked about the new mission of the
special operators and we have seen the great skill and
progress. One area of Special Operations, civil affairs and
psychological operations, going forward the civil affairs
function is going to move from the back rank to the front rank.
Psychological operations are ongoing today and will continue.
In the new orientation, do we have sufficient resources
committed to these two areas, civil affairs and psychological
operations? Do we have enough forces? Most of these forces I
believe are in the Reserves. Can we continue to count upon the
Reserves to again and again be taken from communities and
called up and then sent back and then taken again? Can you
comment?
General Brown. First of all, let me talk real quick about
our Reserve Forces. I think in Special Operations Command we do
a tremendous job of training and working with our Reserve
component. As you have already mentioned, Senator, most of our
civil affairs forces are in the Reserves. We only have one
active civil affairs battalion and that is at Fort Bragg, North
Carolina, the 96th Civil Affairs. That active component will
grow. Of the 2,500 or so spaces that we will get here in the
2004 time line, that active component will grow about 184
people. That will help them with some of their tasks.
Additionally, we will grow four more civil affairs
battalions in the Reserve component, because of the amount of
demands that we place on these civil affairs folks.
We work with our civil affairs folks on a regular basis.
They have been deployed to Kosovo, they have been deployed to
Bosnia. We routinely use them around the world. They have done
tremendous work for us in OEF, and of course, as you mentioned,
during the final phases of OIF they will be extremely important
to get out in those areas and design and figure out what the
infrastructure is going to have to be to help put Iraq back
together again and make sure that all those services are there.
Civil affairs forces in our Reserve component are extremely
important to us and that is why we are going to grow four
battalions. I think we are also growing 9 CAT-As, which are the
four-man teams that go out, and about 184 in the active
component.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General.
A final question----
General Brown. Sir, could I interrupt you?
Senator Reed. I am sorry. Excuse me.
General Brown. I failed to mention our great PSYOP forces
and I did not want to leave them out. You are correct, about a
third of our PSYOP forces are in the active component, but we
are also going to grow in our PSYOP forces so that we can
continue the great work that they are doing. We will actually
grow two active component companies in our psychological
operations, four companies additionally in the Reserve
component, and then we are standing up a joint PSYOP support
element of about 70 folks that will be located at Tampa,
Florida.
So both of those issues, we are getting involved with
making sure that they have the force structure that they need.
Senator Reed. Do these PSYOP companies have a geographic
orientation or are they generic?
General Brown. Some of them, but they are all different
kinds. The truth is that some of them will be oriented on
specific areas and some of them will be what we call general
purpose battalions, and those have two different kinds of
missions as we stand them up.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General.
A final question, the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS).
It has been in development since 1994. It is 6 years behind the
original schedule. Costs have more than tripled. Last year we
authorized the General Accounting Office (GAO) report. One of
the recommendations the GAO made was to have the DOD Cost
Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) conduct an independent
estimate and this recommendation was apparently rejected by the
Department of Defense, indicating that they had not yet
determined the level of CAIG involvement necessary.
When can we expect DOD to make at least a determination of
whether the CAIG will be involved and when they will be
involved? A more general question: When can we expect the cost
to stabilize, the schedule to firm up, and the system to be
coming on line?
I believe there is one vehicle now, a prototype in Hawaii?
General Brown. Yes, sir. I will say something about ASDS
and then I would ask Mr. Schulte to get involved with this
answer.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Brown. Our ASDS, you are right, sir, we have one.
It is a prototype. It is out in Hawaii right now. It has made
115 dives and it has spent over 1,000 hours under water at this
time. It took part in Millennium Challenge 2002 and actually
ran a sample scenario during Millennium Challenge, which it
performed very well.
Senator Roberts. Now, were they on the blue team or the red
team?
General Brown. They were on the blue team in that.
Its operational evaluation (OPEVAL) starts next month and
we hope to have it IOC'd (initial operational capability) this
summer. So for the details on the budget pieces of it, I would
ask Mr. Schulte to weigh in.
Mr. Schulte. Senator, you are exactly right, we have been
at this a long time on ASDS. But we have hung in there and what
we have ended up with in Boat No. 1 is actually a pretty
formidable weapon system, we think. As General Brown said, it
is going to its OPEVAL--actually it starts late this month and
it goes into May. So we will have a robust test and we are very
hopeful that this is going to do well.
It was taken through a vehicle integrated systems test
several months ago, which is a little bit like an OPEVAL, a
dress rehearsal for an OPEVAL, and it did very well. So we are
very hopeful on that.
As far as the CAIG involvement in the program, as a result
of the GAO report Mr. Aldridge did make the decision to move
the program up to an ACAT-1 (acquisition category). He is going
to make it an ACAT-1C. The milestone decision authority will
remain with Mr. Young in the Navy. I do not think it has been
determined yet whether the DOD CAIG will do an estimate or not.
The program office has done an independent estimate and the
Navy Cost Analysis Group has done another analysis. They were a
little bit different. They have reconciled those differences
now. So basically we have what we think is a pretty solid
program estimate for what these boats are going to cost for
Boat No. 2 through No. 6.
Whether Mr. Young will determine that he wants the DOD CAIG
to do yet another estimate, whether it may be required is still
unknown. We will be coming up for a full rate production
decision probably this fall. So OPEVAL will be over in May,
take a couple of months to get the final report, there will be
a milestone decision taken to Mr. Young probably in September
or October, something like that, and he will have to decide
after the OPEVAL report, whether we need yet another
independent cost estimate or not.
If he decides he does, from what I am told, it will take
the CAIG about 6 months to do one. So if we do a DOD CAIG
estimate, it might delay the milestone decision back later in
the year or early next year. I think that is where the
discussion is: Do we want to delay the procurement of the long
lead material in 2004 until January or something like that in
order to get a CAIG estimate? Really, that is Mr. Young's
decision.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
A final point. Command Master Chief, have you had a chance
to ride in the delivery vehicle yet? Or within the SEAL
community, what is the word, not from the cost perspective but
from the warfighter perspective?
Chief Rogers. You are talking about the ASDS, correct, sir?
Senator Reed. Yes.
Chief Rogers. I have had a chance to talk to the SEALs who
have been involved in the testing. The last time we went to
Hawaii I had a chance to talk to the group that did a couple of
exercises out of it, and they had very positive things to say
about it. It is accomplishing what we intended it to do, which
is it is putting the operator in a dry, relatively
comfortable--notice I say ``relatively''--if you have seen one
of these, you know that the inside of this thing is not what
you call spacious. But it is adequate for getting our folks
inside and keeping them dry and comfortable to where they get
to where they are actually going to do their insertion and then
continue on with the rest of the mission.
So it has been positive so far, sir.
Senator Reed. Right. Well, if they were of normal size like
myself it would be comfortable, it would be spacious.
[Laughter.]
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Roberts. Well, do not sell yourself short.
[Laughter.]
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you. Be brief, do not be short. [Laughter.]
Senator Roberts. General, unlike operations in Afghanistan,
most of the media focus in Iraq has been on conventional
forces, a lot of talk, a lot of talking head generals, experts,
gurus, and media. I would like for you to give the subcommittee
a short overview of the scope and level of participation of
your forces, U.S. and coalition, in the current military
operations in Iraq. As a matter of fact, most of the questions
that I got from the press were, are you there, and obviously
what are you doing. Obviously you cannot say that, or you say
no comment.
While I think you were in the glare of the center ring and
the spotlight in Afghanistan, I am not too sure that was the
case with regards to Iraq. But yet I think your contributions
were just as important, if not more so.
Would you care just to give a very brief overview of how
you see that?
General Brown. Sir, I think you are exactly right. We have
been--our forces have been--extremely important in Operation
Iraqi Freedom. We have stood up a Combined Joint Special
Operations Task Force and put all of the SOF, or I should say
most of the SOF, under this Combined Special Operations Joint
Task Force.
Quite frankly, the press has already reported about the
SEALs hitting the gas and oil platforms down off Al Faw Island
and also the switching stations and there have been some
reports. Especially the rescue of Jessica Lynch got a lot of
press. Special Operations Forces are over there, and we have
pretty well done all of the things that you would expect
Special Operations Forces to do and all of our core missions.
Without thinking through it in detail, we have probably done
all of those, and we are decisively engaged all over the
battlefield in Iraq.
Senator Roberts. General Jim Jones, now the Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe (SACEUR), then the Commandant of the Marine
Corps, indicated to the subcommittee and to all interested that
he had signed agreements with SOCOM that would greatly expand
the cooperation and the interaction between the Marines and the
Special Operations Forces. A year later, what is the status of
this cooperation, and how do you envision this relationship
evolving, knowing that you are talking to a former marine?
There are no ex-marines. Will there be a Marine component of
SOCOM?
General Brown. Sir, I think whether there is going to be a
Marine component of SOCOM is yet to be seen. This October we
will start with an 85-man detachment that will report to our
Naval Special Warfare Command and become part of our maritime
component. They will train from October to April. They will
sail in April. About this time next year we will start having
some real good definition on how these two forces have worked
together.
But that is only a proof of concept and, quite frankly,
that is only part of the success stories I think we are having
in getting these forces together. Now, all the Marine
Expeditionary Units, Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC), when
they come into country, link up with our theater Special
Operations Command headquarters and they exchange liaison
officers (LNO) to make sure each know one another and what the
capabilities of each one has.
We have now got a Marine Corps Brigadier General Chief of
Staff. General Denny Hejlik has been assigned down at Special
Operations Command and sits in the office right next to mine,
and he is very much engaged in everything that is going on, and
specifically helping with this Marine Corps initiative.
As you mentioned, General Jones and General Holland signed
a memorandum of understanding. I have signed a memorandum of
agreement with General Bedard of the Marine Corps to get this
proof of concept going with the force recon platoon--or
company--sailing with our guys.
I think the key to this thing is how to maximize the
capability of both forces and ensure that we know where we can
best go on the battlefield together and how to make sure that
we are getting the essence out of the skills of each one.
I would go back to the story of Jessica Lynch. I think that
is a great story. That was planned in conjunction between
Marines and Special Operating Forces. The Marines provided the
security cordon while the SEALs went in and did the actual
room-clearing operation and rescued Private Lynch. So that was
a great example of how we can get together and maximize the
effects of both of those great forces.
Additionally, we just had the material development folks
down for the Marine Corps. They looked at all of our programs.
We have seen all of their programs. I will soon go on a Special
Operations Capable Exercise, certification exercise, with one
of the MEUSOCs. General Hejlik and I will go look at how that
best works and where we might fit into that.
We share all of our technology with them. One of the great
success stories in Operation Enduring Freedom was a small
radio--I think we have brought it up and showed it to the
subcommittee before--called the multiband inter-team radio, a
very small, handheld, inter-team radio that was a tremendous
success story for the Special Forces A teams on the ground. I
think what most people do not know, is that the first load of
those went to the United States Marine Corps even though they
were developed in Special Operations Command jointly with the
Marines.
So we have a lot of interaction with the Marines and we are
continuing to find areas that we can work together.
Senator Roberts. You answered about three questions there,
which is right on the money.
I mentioned in my opening comments, and Senator Reed also
commented about this, about a significant portion of SOCOM
resides in the Reserve components. If there is one thing I am
concerned about, when we were--``we'' meaning Senator Levin,
Senator Warner, Senator Rockefeller, myself--the first time the
Intelligence Committee and the Armed Services Committee went on
a joint congressional delegation (CODEL) to the war zone.
I was talking to a lot of reservists who had been in the
Balkans, Kosovo, Bosnia, and now Iraq, and I do not know how
they do it. They do it at great personal sacrifice. We were
able to pass some legislation that should be of help to them in
terms of the monetary situation.
But this high OPTEMPO, I know it affects your Reserve
components. Do you have any suggestions in terms of adjustments
on the active-Reserve component mix of SOCOM to relieve this
problem?
General Brown. Sir, we are doing a little bit of that. The
additional people that we are putting in the 96th Civil
Affairs, the additional PSYOP active duty companies, will
relieve some of those problems. I think that is about the
extent of any change in the Active and Reserve Forces.
But I will tell you that we are looking at that. We see the
problem. We are having to very closely manage our Reserve
components and their commitment. It is a great personal
sacrifice to them and it is a lot of understanding employers
that are very generous to let these people constantly come to
work for us.
We are looking at that very carefully to see if there is
some change in the mix that we need. Those that we have
immediately in front of us where we know we can change the mix
a little bit, we are doing that in the civil affairs (CA) and
PSYOP.
While I am on the Reserve component, sir, I would like to
mention our great 19th and 20th Special Forces Group out of the
Army National Guard. I failed to mention earlier in the PSYOP
portion our folks from the 193rd Commando Solo at Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania. Commando Solo which is doing such a phenomenal
job for us and continues to in all of the things we get
involved in.
The 19th and 20th Special Forces Group are two Special
Forces, SF, groups that have taken part in OEF and some of
their teams are in OIF. The 20th Group commander, Colonel Greg
Champion, was our Joint Special Operations Task Force commander
of all SOF in Afghanistan for the last 6 months. We have taken
a Reserve component headquarters and put them over there
controlling all of the active and Reserve SOF. Sir, they have
performed tremendously.
So I go back to what I said in the original question, I
think that Special Operations Command uses its Reserve
components probably at a rate much higher than other folks do.
Senator Roberts. The MH-47 Chinook, that is a real work
horse for you in Afghanistan. They suffered significant losses,
eight, as staff has informed me here, and you hoped to obtain
funding to replace these eight in the 2003 supplemental. It was
not included in that request. They are not going to be replaced
until fiscal year 2005 or 2006 if we do not do something.
What is your recommendation on how best to minimize this
operational impact?
General Brown. Sir, the CH or MH-47 Echo (47E) has been, as
you said, our work horse on the battlefield, with its Special
Operations-unique equipment, terrain-following terrain
avoidance (TF-TA). It can work at those altitudes that a lot of
aircraft cannot get to, and it continues to be the only
aircraft on the battlefield that can internally load a high
mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), and that is a
key part to why we need the 47 Echoes.
The basic vehicle for a Special Forces team is a HMMWV. The
only helicopter that can load it internally and then fly the
legs using its aerial refueling capability and, especially in
marginal weather, using its TF-TA, the 47E has really come to
the forefront during Afghanistan as a critical piece of
equipment for our infils and exfils, and today they are
employed all over Iraq and Afghanistan.
We did lose two of them. We lost one in the Philippines, we
lost one in Operation Anaconda, totally lost. Then we had 11 of
them that were badly damaged in either landings in brownout
conditions or to enemy fire, which we had several of them shot
up.
We have in Program Decision Memorandum (PDM-1) a
replacement for 16 aircraft. Our initial plan back even before
all this started was to grow a new Chinook battalion to meet
our requirements. That is 24 aircraft. We have the first 16,
and what we are trying to do is find funding and work with the
Army and the Department to get the other 8.
Senator Roberts. Senator Reed asked you about the combatant
commands, so I think we will pass on that subject. I think you
got into that, and also the budget considerations. The SOCOM
budget request increased significantly this year, $4.5 to $6
billion, but most of this increase is for the helicopters and
other aviation systems, and the spending on research and
development (R&D) actually goes down. I know we should be
replacing lost equipment one for one perhaps.
But on this subcommittee, if you look at the title of it,
``Emerging Threats and Capabilities,'' we should be developing
new capabilities. Are you satisfied you are investing
sufficient resources to develop these future capabilities?
Should we be investing more in R&D and science and technology
(S&T) to develop the capabilities we need for future unexpected
threats?
General Brown. Sir, I would ask Mr. Schulte, our
Acquisition Executive, to talk a little bit about R&D funding
and where we are going with that area.
Senator Roberts. I mean, if there is any outfit that cannot
stand still it is your outfit.
General Brown. Yes, sir, I think you are exactly right.
Mr. Schulte. Sir, you are right that about a billion
dollars of the increase in our budget for fiscal year 2004 is
in procurement. That is basically to get these extra
helicopters that General Brown talked about, to start the SLEP
program for the MH-60, to finish the plus-4 buy for the four
new gunships. There was one gunship, a new gunship, put into
2003 and there are three gunships in 2004. There is an
acceleration of the air refueling mod for the Talon 2 aircraft.
There is some money in there to get the CV-22 production
started and there is a new simulator for the Chinook.
So all of that is over about a billion dollars, those are
the kinds of things where the procurement is now. In the R&D,
the actual change in the R&D was up a little bit. The request
from the President's budget in 2003 was $420 million. Congress
was most generous last year and plussed us up a net of $92
million, which is how we got up to $512 million.
What we have asked for this year is $440 million. So
compared to our request last year, we have actually gone from
$420 million to $440 million in R&D. We actually got $512
million last year because Congress had some plus-ups. I think
that level of R&D is adequate for what we are trying to do
right now. It is more important for us to get the additional
helicopters and modify the aircraft that we have right now to
get the capability into the hands of the warfighter as soon as
possible. That is where the priorities of the command are right
now, sir.
Senator Roberts. That makes sense.
Senator Kennedy, I have just two more questions, but in the
interest of your time would you like to proceed?
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to welcome our witnesses here. I just left Chief
Finnegan, who is the Police Chief in Hyannis, Massachusetts.
His son is a Special Forces operator in Nasiriyah now. So we
are all, I think, very much aware of what you are doing, your
leadership, and all of those that you lead, and we commend you.
I would like to ask about the issue that we have seen on
the television and even this morning taking place in these
major cities and what your own reaction is. That is the growth
of the sort of the lawlessness that is taking place. I am
primarily interested in the stories that we saw this morning.
One from Thomas Freedman of the New York Times, who has been
pretty objective and supported the administration, talks about
the fact of Umm Qasr, 20 days into the war, is without running
water, security, and adequate food supplies. He went in with a
Kuwaiti relief team, taking pity on the Iraqis, ``tossed food
from a bus window as we left; townsfolk scrambled after the
food like pigeons jostling for bread crumbs. It is a scene of
humiliation, not a liberation,'' and it goes on.
Then in The Washington Post this morning they have
``Fighting in Baghdad, Other Areas, Stalls.''
Senator Roberts. Are you sure that is not classified? It is
from the Post. [Laughter.]
Senator Kennedy. I will just read one line: ``No one is
more impatient than the relief workers who are poised to
deliver electric generators, water, jobs to Iraq. They say the
Iraqis will benefit after hostilities end. The frustration
level is going up. We feel like a bunch of pigeons perched on
the boundaries. One U.S. relief staffer said: `We are ready to
do stuff, but we need a secure environment in which to do it.'
''
My question has two parts: What is your assessment of the
secure environment, how far are we away from it in these areas
where the humanitarian need is the greatest? Also, what is the
policy with regards to the, whether it is Baghdad or Nasiriyah
or these other communities, in terms of the growth of
lawlessness where we have some presence?
[The information referred to follows:]

General Brown. Senator, it is hard for me to tell exactly
what the situation is over there in all of these cities. This
war is being fought by CENTCOM. We are providing the forces to
it and we are certainly involved with what is going on over
there. But for me to know the exact environment that is taking
place in all these towns, I would just tell you that I get
briefings and I see it, but the exact state and when we are
actually going to have a secure environment, that would be
difficult for me to say. I think that CENTCOM and General
Franks would probably come a lot closer to that.
I can tell you that we have deployed our civil affairs
folks and that is what they do for a living, to get out there
and assess those kinds----
Senator Kennedy. Could you elaborate on that? How has that
worked? That is a key element? What is the dimension? When have
they been going in? Can you tell us where and what success they
have been having?
General Brown. Sir, right from the beginning we will put
civil affairs teams in any conflict. We will put civil affairs
teams with the combatant commander's forces when they go in. He
will have planners. They will stand up a civil-military
operations center to coordinate these kind of activities that
you are talking about at his headquarters.
Then our civil affairs teams will go in with the combatant
troops when they go in. The civil affairs teams will do
analysis of each one of these cities and they will look for
those infrastructure pieces and they will look for the food and
running water and electricity. They will then design plans to
solve any problems that they have, that they will take back to
the regional combatant, General Franks in this case, his
headquarters, and they will try and implement those plans.
So that is how the system works with our civil affairs
guys.
Senator Kennedy. What are the funds available in the budget
supplemental for civil affairs?
General Brown. I do not have that figure right off the top
of my head. I did talk about a little earlier, sir, that we are
growing our civil affairs force. You know it is predominantly a
Reserve component force in Special Operations Command. We only
have one active battalion. We will grow that battalion, the
Active Force portion of it, by about 190 people to give us a
little more flexibility in the active component.
At the same time, we will grow four additional civil
affairs battalions. We use our civil affairs. They are all very
well trained. We have deployed them to Afghanistan in numbers.
We have deployed them to Kosovo. We have deployed them to
Bosnia. So we are intending to grow our civil affairs force and
that is part of our plus-up.
Senator Kennedy. Maybe you could provide what they have
requested on that. You would probably indicate that that was
enough to do it, but I would be interested in what is in the
budget in the supplemental, what they are planning to do in
terms of the budget as well.
General Brown. I would be glad to, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]

The importance of Civil Affairs is evidenced by the ongoing actions
in Afghanistan and as the United States transitions towards the process
of rebuilding Iraq. Civil Affairs units are made up mostly of Reserve
soldiers with occupations varying from city managers and judges to
school administrators and public works engineers. In their civilian
jobs, the soldiers hone the skills they need in their military
specialty. Civil Affairs tactical teams accompany Special Forces and
conventional forces to provide humanitarian assistance to the local
population by providing food and medical care for refugees in a war
zone and rebuild schools and hospitals when the fighting is over. The
fiscal year 2003 supplemental request for USSOCOM includes $22.6
million for costs associated with the deployment of Civil Affairs
forces and $12.2 million to procure the necessary equipment to carry
out their assigned missions. Not included in the USSOCOM portion of the
supplemental are funds that are required by the Department and Services
to provide the common support equipment, logistics support and special
pays, etc. required by Civil Affairs units.

Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Roberts. Yes, sir.
Mr. Schulte.
Mr. Schulte. Sir.
Senator Roberts. The capabilities developed by SOCOM
sometimes have migrated to the other services. I am astounded
that the new radio went to the Marines first. That works at
cross-purposes with the Corps. Did they actually accept them?
Mr. Schulte. Yes, sir. The reason it went to them first is
they put a little money up front to help us develop it. So we
were co-developers of this radio and when the first production
units came out they took theirs first.
Senator Roberts. Can you give us some other examples where
you have provided some significant benefit to other military
services as a result of your R&D?
Mr. Schulte. There has been a number of places where, for
instance in soldier kinds of equipment, the new helmet that we
developed, the Modular Integrated Communications Helmet
(MICH)----
Senator Roberts. Yes, but you cannot sit on it and you
cannot cook in it, so it is not worth a damn. [Laughter.]
Mr. Schulte. No, but it actually does stop bullets, which,
they kind of like that part. [Laughter.]
Senator Roberts. Right, okay.
Mr. Schulte. So they do like that.
We have done some uniform kinds of things, some night
vision goggles kinds of things. In fact, the Special Operations
Peculiar Modification kit which we put all the different--when
we missionize an M-4 carbine with night scopes and other things
like that, a lot of those kind of night vision devices and
scopes and things like that eventually the Army will pick up.
Probably several years after we first introduce it into the
SOF, they will pick those kind of things up, too.
So there has been a number of things where we have been
able to move out. Sometimes what happens in our development is
we will work a very special item for a classified unit, it will
be adopted in that classified unit, and eventually the non-
classified units will get a chance to see that and say: I think
this has application in the kinds of missions that we do also.
That would migrate then into our Special Forces groups and even
the Rangers, and then the Army will look at some of these
things and once in a while adopt some of them as best practice
and go ahead and buy it for the Army forces.
So we have had some luck migrating things that way. Of
course, when the Army buys it and it becomes Army standard,
then they provide it back to us at that point, which is good
for them and is good for us.
General Brown. I realize you did not ask me, but I will get
in here real quick, just some of the ones I jotted down here.
Night vision equipment, especially for the ground soldier, SOF
has been the leading guys in all of that. You will notice as
you see everybody in Iraq in the press reports, they are all
wearing that little night vision goggle thing on their helmet.
All of that started or got really moving down at Special
Operations Command.
The M-4 carbine that everybody is carrying. Our ballistic
body armor; we spent a lot of time working the best body armor
possible. Those are migrating over to the Services. Our MICH
which Harry mentioned, everybody you see out there has a MICH
that was built by our folks down in the Special Operations
Acquisition and Logistics (SDAL) center.
I would tell you a tremendous part of our R&D that is moved
over to the Services is in the helicopter world: 1,553 data
buses, flat panel screens, forward-looking infrared sensors,
forward-looking infrared balls on aircraft, we are the first
ones to do that really in the Services and now you see that on
a lot of other Services' aircraft. Fuel tanks on the inside,
fast rope bars, miniguns, weapons systems. So we have a very
robust plan for migrating stuff over to the Services.
Senator Roberts. Your mission focus, when the Secretary
changed that there was discussion that SOCOM would divest
itself of certain missions that could be done by conventional
forces. Did you recommend any missions that you would divest?
The second part of that: What decisions have been made with
regard to moving any missions away from SOCOM to other Services
or other agencies?
General Brown. Right now, sir, that is an ongoing Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) study that is a very large study that is
reporting out probably in the next 30 to 45 days, to take a
look at all of that. The Department is looking at that.
We immediately took a very hard look at tasks and started
seeing which one of those--we were going to be training the
Afghan National Army. We will now train battalion 8 and
battalion 9 of the Afghan National Army and then someone else
will come in and take that over for us. The GTEP I already
mentioned; some personal security detachments that we do around
the world, we are giving those over to other forces.
So we are looking at every opportunity. I would not call
those mission sets as much as I would call those specific tasks
that will just unencumber our forces to bring them back and let
them take other tasks.
Senator Roberts. You are doing a good job over in
Afghanistan. Senator Warner, Senator Levin, Senator
Rockefeller, and I were there, watched that training, met the
first company, ``enjoyed'' some real Afghan food for lunch. So
you are doing a good job.
I want to just touch on one other thing and then I am
through with the questions. Senator Kennedy, do you see a need
for a closed session?
Senator Kennedy. No, no.
Senator Roberts. Jack?
Senator Reed. No, I do not, sir.
Senator Roberts. I think we are going to bid you, not fond
farewell, but a job well done.
Are your forces being given the right authority and
flexibility and support to go after al Qaeda in Afghanistan or,
for that matter, go after anybody? I am talking primarily about
the southeastern border and General McNeil, and whether there
remains within the civilian DOD leadership any culture of risk
aversion when it comes to employing your forces.
General Brown. Sir, I see no culture of risk aversion when
we take on al Qaeda. I think that we are given pretty much all
the authority that we need and would like to have in going
after these guys.
Senator Roberts. That concludes the questions I have.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. One question, General Brown. I understand
that you have a number one unfunded priority for military
construction for your new operations center in Tampa and this
is about a $27 million project. Is this money in the
supplemental?
General Brown. Sir, I am happy to report that the
Department has found a way to fund our operations center and
that will be built at Tampa. It will integrate all of these
little organizations that I spoke about earlier: our Inter-
Agency Collaboration Center; our CSG, which is our Campaign
Support Group; our Joint Operations Center that right now we
have built in trailers and other places. The Department has
said that they will help us build that, and so we are thrilled
about that and we are about to get on with it.
Senator Reed. We can presume you will revise your unfunded
list?
General Brown. Yes, sir, we will.
Senator Reed. Great.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Roberts. Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. I just want to again commend you. Did you
talk a little bit about the situation of the Special Forces in
Afghanistan, the kinds of increased threats that they are
under? Did you talk about that?
Senator Roberts. General Brown was asked a rather generic
question in regards to all the media attention on his force in
Afghanistan and yet the media attention on conventional forces
in Iraq and could he give a review of the Special Operating
Forces in Iraq, and he has done that.
Senator Kennedy. In Afghanistan, has he talked about that?
Senator Roberts. Not so much Afghanistan as in the Iraq
situation, because of the difference in the media focus. They
were on the front page in regards to Afghanistan and then of
course the operations in Iraq were equally important, if not
more so. So I asked him to summarize that and he did.
Senator Kennedy. Just finally, General, could you go into
the numbers that they have. To the extent that you can give us
an idea without getting into the classifications, what you
expect the numbers are going to continue to be there in
Afghanistan? What could we expect?
General Brown. Sir, I think for the near term it will be
about what it is right now. I prefer not to say the exact troop
level.
Senator Kennedy. Okay, all right.
General Brown. I think the forces, type of forces, and the
amount will probably stay about where they are right now. As
far as threats go, we did look down the road and see if in fact
we were to go into Iraq that it might raise the threat level
over in Afghanistan against our forces that are pretty much out
there operating in small units by themselves. So we thought a
little bit ahead of that and got the guys prepared for those
kind of potentialities.
Senator Kennedy. Your threat assessment in terms of the
Special Forces in Afghanistan for the next 6 months is what?
General Brown. Sir, I think right now we take force
protection very seriously, so all of our guys that are over
there are pretty much in the areas that they have been working
and have built up pretty good force protection postures, have
built relationships with the local Afghans, and are doing a
pretty good job.
While we are out hunting folks down and on patrol, there
will still be firefights. It will be a very dangerous time over
there. We had some people ambushed last week coming back from a
patrol and lost a couple special operators last week in
Afghanistan that were ambushed. So it is still a very dangerous
area.
As far as our posture, I think that we have a pretty good
force protection posture over there and I think every person
over there understands how dangerous the environment is right
now.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Roberts. Let me just say, Senator, on the Warner
CODEL, which we dubbed the forced march, we found a great deal
of progress in Pakistan with our intelligence community and the
Pakistanis without our military.
Then with General McNeil and the snake-eaters--that is what
I call you--but there are 550 less of the al Qaeda than there
were a year ago. I think that figure is probably higher today.
A very dangerous situation, but they actually thwarted in my
view the spring offensive of the al Qaeda. Rest assured, force
protection is absolutely primary.
If you take in Afghanistan and Iraq, killed in action in
regards to this particular force were 22 wounded in action, 103
died of wounds, 1 non-hostile, 47 injured, and 19 captured. It
is in their memory, those who paid the ultimate sacrifice, that
we recommit to what you are all about in terms of our national
security, and we thank you for coming.
General Brown. Thank you very much, sir, and thanks for the
continued support up here. We appreciate it.
Senator Roberts. We are adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Dole

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES SUPPORT

1. Senator Dole. General Brown, since September 11, much has been
asked of Special Operations Forces' personnel. There have been repeated
and lengthy deployments to Afghanistan and other fronts in the war on
terrorism. Now we are in the midst of a very substantial deployment of
Special Forces in Iraq. While the successes have been many, I am very
concerned about how long the Special Forces personnel and their
families can sustain this pace. What plans are there for the continuing
presence of Special Forces units in post-Saddam Iraq and in
Afghanistan?
General Brown. [Deleted.] SOF will continue to support Central
Command as required and will maintain a continuous presence which can
be sustained for the long term. This presence would be a little more
than our pre-September 11 levels, which we have maintained since 1991.

2. Senator Dole. General Brown, what concerns do you have about the
continuing readiness of the people who have been through repeated and
lengthy deployments, and the morale of those forces and their families?
General Brown. One of the SOF truths is that people are our most
important assets. We place great emphasis on and resources toward these
highly motivated professionals because they cannot be built or rebuilt
overnight. SOF stay motivated by doing the work they are trained to do.
They are doing that work and for the most part report high
satisfaction. In coordination with the Services, we closely and
continuously monitor the impact of operations tempo to ensure we adjust
as we see tempo-related problems at the onset (training, maintenance,
quality of life, retention, etc.). Top-down emphasis and family
assistance programs have and will continue to have an overall positive
effect on the services and programs offered to families before, during,
and after deployments.

3. Senator Dole. General Brown, how are the families holding up
under this strain?
General Brown. SOF families are a tight-knit, close community that
offer family support programs of the highest caliber. Due to the nature
of SOF operating tempo, these family support structures are thriving
and responsive. Just as the SOF warrior is satisfied when ``doing his
job,'' the families are wholly supportive of the units and missions.
Our family members are accustomed to deployments. They understand
from the beginning that the military member will be frequently
deployed. Because of this understanding, they become strong and
independent.
Programs offered through our Family Support Centers and Chaplain's
offices have been very successful in helping our military members and
their families adjust before, during, and after deployments.

4. Senator Dole. General Brown, do you have in place both good
support networks and ready availability of counseling services?
General Brown. Special Operations Forces' Service component
commands benefit from programs offered by their Services and home-base
installations. Training and outreach programs are available and
chaplains and counseling programs are in place. Additionally, the
Department of Defense sponsored Lifeworks system has been implemented
at Fort Bragg to assist families with a myriad of issues.
The Family Readiness Office at Fort Bragg has established a toll
free phone number that is available to SOF families 24 hours per day, 7
days per week (24/7). This office is staffed with people who are
trained to provide information and referrals to anyone requesting help.
All three Services provide excellent Family Support Programs and
websites that supply information to assist our families. The remainder
of the United States Special Operations Command has recently been added
to the Department of Defense ``Lifeworks'' contract. This program will
also provide assistance through a website and a toll free phone number
24/7.
Our chaplains are very supportive and provide many counseling
programs to our service members and their families. A new program
titled ``Building Strong and Ready Families'' has begun at Fort Bragg,
North Carolina, with a goal of reaching families before there are
problems.
All returning military members and their families are offered
counseling and leave to enable a readjustment period.

5. Senator Dole. General Brown, does Special Operations Command or
your component Service units need additional resources to help the
Service members and their families deal with the stress and burdens of
these constant deployments?
General Brown. There are no Major Force Program-11 (MFP-11) funding
requirements for family support issues. Those are Service
responsibilities.

6. Senator Dole. General Brown, is the issue of family readiness a
matter you oversee from SOCOM or do you leave it up to each Service
component command?
General Brown. The Services and home-base installations provide
family support programs for their respective service members. The
leadership of SOCOM also monitors and provides guidance and support as
needed. More importantly, we ensure training and outreach for family
members prior to, during, and after the deployment is provided. Our SOF
leaders ensure contact between families and rear detachment commanders
is ongoing and ensures all returnees are treated equally.

SOCOM BUDGET INCREASE

7. Senator Dole. General Brown, as part of the budget increase for
fiscal year 2004, I understand that SOCOM will have an increase of over
2,500 spaces and that over the next 5 years there is a planned increase
of over 4,000 spaces. Where will these additional personnel be
assigned?
General Brown. The budget increase for fiscal year 2004 did indeed
add a significant amount of spaces to the U.S. Special Operations
Command. The placement of these additional personnel is identified
below:

[Fiscal Year]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adds
Location -----------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bahrain................................. 3 3 3 3 3 3
Birmingham, AL.......................... 12 12 12 12 12 12
Camp Smith, HI.......................... 79 79 79 79 79 79
Coronado, CA............................ 17 17 17 17 153 153
Ft. Benning, GA......................... 14 14 14 14 14 14
Ft. Bragg, NC........................... 439 1,369 1,369 1,369 1,369 1,369
Ft. Campbell, KY........................ 845 845 845 845 845 845
Ft. Carson, CO.......................... 12 12 12 12 12 12
Ft. Lewis, WA........................... 25 25 25 25 25 25
Hunter AAF, GA.......................... 13 13 13 13 13 13
Hurlburt Field, FL...................... 27 37 56 349 533 579
Little Creek, VA........................ 10 10 146 146 146 146
MacDill AFB, FL......................... 265 293 320 320 320 320
Nagshead, VA............................ 198 198 198 198 198 198
Salt Lake City, UT...................... 12 12 12 12 12 12
Stuttgart, GE........................... 79 89 89 89 89 89
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Grand total........................... 2,050 3,028 3,210 3,503 3,823 3,869
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

8. Senator Dole. General Brown, what resources will you need to
support these increases?
General Brown. The Department has already resourced our personnel
shortfalls during the Fiscal Year Defense Program build.

9. Senator Dole. General Brown, does your budget include what you
need for this purpose?
General Brown. Yes, it has been included in our submission to
Congress.

[Whereupon, at 11:11 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]