[Senate Hearing 108-241]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-241, Pt. 2
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2004
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1050
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
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PART 2
SEAPOWER
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APRIL 1, 2003
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2004--Part 2 SEAPOWER
S. Hrg. 108-241, Pt. 2
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2004
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1050
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 2
SEAPOWER
__________
APRIL 1, 2003
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
87-324 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2004
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JACK REED, Rhode Island
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BILL NELSON, Florida
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN CORNYN, Texas MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Seapower
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina JACK REED, Rhode Island
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Navy and Marine Corps Development Priorities, Procurement Priorities,
and Navy Shipbuilding Programs
april 1, 2003
Page
Clark, Adm. Vernon E., USN, Chief of Naval Operations............ 7
Hagee, Gen. Michael W., USMC, Commandant, United States Marine
Corps.......................................................... 18
Young, Hon. John J., Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, and Acquisition......................... 46
Mullen, Vice Adm. Michael G., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Resources, Requirements, and Assessments........ 59
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2004
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TUESDAY, APRIL 1, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Seapower,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
NAVY AND MARINE CORPS DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES, PROCUREMENT PRIORITIES,
AND NAVY SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m. in
room SR-232, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator James M.
Talent (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Talent, Warner,
Collins, Kennedy, and Reed.
Majority staff member present: Thomas L. MacKenzie,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff
member; and Maren R. Leed, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger and Andrew
Kent.
Committee members' assistants present: James P. Dohoney,
Jr., assistant to Senator Collins; Lindsey R. Neas, assistant
to Senator Talent; and Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator
Kennedy.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. TALENT, CHAIRMAN
Senator Talent. We will convene the hearing. I want to
welcome our distinguished witnesses this afternoon as the
Seapower Subcommittee meets to consider how the fiscal year
2004 budget request and the future years defense program (FYDP)
supports Navy and Marine Corps development and procurement
priorities in our first panel, with the second panel focusing
on current and developmental Navy shipbuilding programs.
I would be remiss, however, if I did not first state my
support for and gratitude to our men and women in uniform, many
of whom are in harm's way as they participate in Operation
Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, the global war on
terrorism, and in other outposts throughout the world. Their
dedication and courage are an inspiration to us all and our
thoughts and prayers are with them and with their families. I
especially want to express our sympathy and support for the
families of those who have lost their lives or been wounded in
the defense of this great Nation.
I also want to thank Senator Kennedy, whose leadership on
this subcommittee has for many years ensured that our Navy and
Marine Corps team has become the most capable and ready
maritime expeditionary team in the world. I look forward to
serving with him in the same bipartisan fashion that this
subcommittee has been known to practice in the past.
For our first panel today, we are pleased to have Admiral
Vernon Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), and General
Michael Hagee, the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Our sailors
and marines whose training and equipment you are responsible
for are performing superbly. It is clear that investments in
force readiness over the last several years have paid off. The
purpose of this panel, though, is to focus on those things that
will enable sailors and marines in the decades ahead to
accomplish their missions equally as well.
The Department's quadrennial defense review (QDR) issued in
fiscal year 2001 established certain force structures as, ``the
baseline from which the Department will develop a transformed
force for the future.'' The capabilities possessed by this
force structure were assessed to present moderate operational
risk, which could be raised to high risk under certain
combinations of warfighting and smaller scale contingency
scenarios.
For the Navy, force structure is 12 aircraft carriers, 12
amphibious ready groups, 55 attack submarines, and 116 surface
combatants. For the Marine Corps, this force structure is four
divisions, four air wings, and four service support groups,
with three active and one Reserve in each case.
It should be noted that the force structure supported by
the fiscal year 2004 budget and the future years defense
program does, in fact, go below these QDR numbers in certain
categories. This follows a number of years during the decade of
the nineties when critical requirements of the QDR were
underfunded.
At the same time, the operational tempo of our force is
extremely high, and world events may require continuing high
operational tempo in the years ahead. I believe it is critical
that our shipbuilding rates are increased in light of this
reality.
The fiscal year 2004 budget request includes funding for
seven new ships. This is an important first step, with two more
ships than were projected last year, but I want to emphasize
that it is only a first step. The ships that are authorized and
appropriated for fiscal year 2004 will not be delivered for
quite a few years. Yet in the near future the Navy is
accelerating the retirement of older ships, with the fleet
scheduled to reach a level of only 291 ships in fiscal year
2006.
I am aware of the increased capabilities of the ships now
being developed and built, but I am concerned about the level
of risk being assumed by decommissioning ships earlier than
originally planned.
CNO, your Seapower 21 vision conveys the vision of a Navy
that will be sea-based, deployed worldwide, operating near
foreign shores, projecting defense for the United States and
allied forces, and prepared to strike and remain engaged
throughout a conflict. This vision is based on the pillars of
Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing. General Hagee, it is
this sea-basing concept that appears to be the linchpin for the
Marines' expeditionary maneuver warfare concept of operations.
You are both to be congratulated on recent examples of how
your Services are complementing one another to gain efficiency.
An example of this is the tactical air integration initiative.
It is important to gain efficiencies wherever possible to
maximize the buying power of each taxpayer dollar. It is
critical, though, to ensure the required increases in readiness
which are necessary if this initiative is to succeed are fully
funded.
Again, Admiral Clark and General Hagee, thank you for
taking time from your busy schedule to be with us this
afternoon. I look forward to your testimony. At this point I
was planning to defer to Senator Kennedy for his opening
statement, as well as Senator Warner, chairman of our
committee.
Senator Warner. Let me state for the record that Senator
Kennedy is the longest-serving member on the committee now on
this subcommittee. He has broke my record because I have had
two terms as chairman and had to pull back from this
subcommittee. So I shall make a statement after he is finished
his opening.
Senator Talent. I recognize the distinguished Senator from
Massachusetts.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much. I look back over that
history. I will never forget, as a young member of this
committee and with my distinguished colleague there, where we
went into an important negotiation between Massachusetts and
the State of Virginia, and out of that negotiation came an
aircraft carrier for John Warner and I got a band up at Fort
Evans, just about a year before it was closed. So I always keep
an eye on that smooth-talking Virginia gentleman who is our
chairman.
Senator Talent. Senator, when Massachusetts and Virginia
get together, there is nothing for the rest of us.
Senator Kennedy. That is right.
I want to thank Senator Talent. As he mentioned, we have
had a good opportunity over a period of years of working very
closely together in this area in terms of force projection and
responsibilities in the building of ships in the Navy and the
Marine Corps. We have worked very closely with the full
committee, both Republican and Democrat alike. I welcome our
new chairman in this. I understand from talking to a number of
our colleagues he has been out working hard in preparation for
this responsibility and I am looking forward to working very
closely with him.
Senator Talent. Thank you.
Senator Kennedy. As always, it is good to be with an old
friend who is a tireless chairperson and who has had an
extraordinary public career. But I do not think there is anyone
that has been more committed to the Armed Forces of our country
and the security of our Nation than John Warner. So it is good
to have him here again with us on this committee.
Senator Warner. I thank my colleague very much. This is
against the background, when I was Secretary, I closed the
Boston Naval Shipyard.
Senator Kennedy. That was nice, too. [Laughter.]
Wondering why I am still around, as I listen.
So in any event, but in a serious way, we want a hearing
that has the spokespersons for the Navy and the Marine Corps
here to again express our enormous appreciation and incredible
thanks to all of those that are under your command and doing so
much for the interests of our Nation. We may have had some
differences in the Senate in terms of how we get to where we
are, but there is absolutely no reservation or hesitancy
whatsoever in giving all and full and complete support and
appreciation for the extraordinary efforts that are
continuously being made and the extraordinary versatility and
pressure they are under, as well as the courage, bravery, and
the challenges. Whether it is sandstorms or the heat today that
is affecting them, we are enormously grateful.
I want to say that we are enormously concerned on this
subcommittee in working with the Department of the Navy to
address some of the very important issues like improvement of
fire support capability. We will come back to that issue in
terms of the building and the construction of ships, including
the organic Marine Corps fire support and Navy shore fire
support. This has been an ongoing and continuing issue. As for
the augmenting of our mine countermeasures capability, both for
sea and on land, we know that there has been some progress
made, but there have been some recent decisions I would like to
get some explanation on.
I want to note for the record that this subcommittee has
taken the lead on ensuring many of the existing capabilities.
The hearing will focus on the vision of the Navy and the
operational concepts for the future and how the budget before
Congress supports that vision. I continue to believe the
fundamental problem we must deal with is achieving the proper
level of modernization to support tomorrow's readiness and with
the sufficient modernization aimed at the proper objectives. We
could be faced with the situation of having forces without
necessary capabilities or we could be in a position of trying
to support theater combatant commanders' requirements with
forces that are too small to meet their requirements.
We all know that our men and women in the Armed Forces will
respond admirably in any crisis, just as they have been doing
in support of the operation in Afghanistan and now Iraq.
However, over the long term, we cannot count on them making up
for the inadequate shipbuilding investments by asking crews to
stay out longer, much longer deployments, and less time at home
with families. This obviously is related to the decisions that
are going to be made in terms of the reductions in the ships,
the guided missile destroyers (DDGs) now, with the idea of
building shipbuilding in the future and the kinds of pressures
that that is going to be putting on the crews.
Everyone can agree that we will continue to need strong
Navy Forces to protect our interests in many sea areas overseas
and within that context there are a number of investment issues
we need to consider today.
So I thank the chairman for calling this hearing and look
forward to the testimony.
Senator Talent. I thank the Senator.
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have no idea
of the importance and the pleasure that you will gain from
service on this committee, and to start out as chairman in your
first year in the Senate is a very special, noteworthy
accomplishment.
Senator Talent. It is a humbling honor and I am grateful
for it.
Senator Warner. I say to my dear friend of so many years,
Senator Kennedy, I know well your love for the Navy, the love
for the sea, that of your family, and the long and
distinguished association with the United States Navy.
I join the chairman and Senator Kennedy in expressing our
profound gratitude to the men and women of the Armed Forces,
particularly those under your respective commands, and how
magnificently they are performing today. With a sense of
humility, this subcommittee looks back on its work in providing
the weapons, the ships, the aircraft, with which they are now
in the most professional and courageous manner discharging
their duties on behalf of the cause of freedom.
But this subcommittee is very proud of our record of a
quarter of a century that I have been on. We have steadfastly
stood with the need to modernize the Services. We are very
proud, certainly, Admiral Clark, of your personal guidance on
this shipbuilding account.
I recall several years ago when we did not have the funds
and you had to make the tough decision to take the equipment
that you had, whether it is on land, sea, or in the air, and
put it in first class shape before new acquisitions. That was a
decision that was received with mixed emotions within the
uniformed ranks and here in Congress. But you were steadfast,
and now this year there is a very clear and decisive upturn in
the procurement accounts for shipbuilding. I think you can take
a lot of personal credit, which is not your style, but you are
deserving of a lot of personal credit.
General Hagee, you follow one of the most distinguished men
ever to serve as Commandant of the Marine Corps and you will
indeed add your chapter to the Corps in maintaining it ready,
well-equipped, and modernized. But throughout history, the
Corps has always done its very best with perhaps less than the
best. Perhaps under your watch you can turn that around and get
just as good equipment as the others.
I must say, General Hagee, I have just been handed a note,
a second marine has lost his life from the State of Virginia,
and you and I have a very special feeling about that.
Admiral, I want to say about the CVN-21 that you fought
steadfastly. You have full funding now for scheduled outyears
2007 and 2008. That, like the predecessor carriers, will be
constructed at Newport News Shipbuilding, a yard with which I
have had 33 years of association. I first came to know that
yard under President at that time Freeman, when I was Under
Secretary of the Navy beginning in 1969. I think it has turned
out extraordinarily high quality products through the years and
will continue to do so under the current administration.
I have not had the opportunity to talk to a certain
individual in the Department of Defense who has expressed some
concerns about the relationship between the Newport News Yard
and the Department of the Navy, but I intend to do so. But in
the mean time, I hope you in your remarks can address the issue
as to whether or not you find any improprieties along those
lines, because it is important that Congress in its oversight
capacity address those situations.
Having said that, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the
ranking member and other members, for indulging my few minutes
here with this distinguished subcommittee.
Senator Talent. We are grateful to you for coming by, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you for those comments.
Senator Reed, do you have an opening statement?
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, just to thank you for convening
this hearing. I wish you well as you take on this important
responsibility. I have a great deal of respect and regard for
both Admiral Clark and General Hagee and I await their
testimony eagerly. Thank you and the forces they lead.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I want to congratulate you on your
chairmanship and admit for the record that I am insanely
jealous they picked you rather than I as the chair of the
Seapower Subcommittee. But I look forward to working very
closely with you to ensure that our Navy has the resources it
needs.
I have enjoyed working with both Admiral Clark and General
Hagee. I very much appreciate the commitment to much needed
shipbuilding that is in this budget. General, I want to tell
you that on Saturday I attended a memorial mass for two marines
from Maine who lost their lives in the helicopter crash the
very first days of this conflict. The presence of the marines
who attended this mass meant so much to the family. When the
marine presented the folded flag to the mother of the
helicopter Captain Aubin who was killed, there was just not a
dry eye in the entire church. It was extremely moving. I know
that the participation of the marines meant a great deal to the
family. So I just wanted to pass that on to you.
Our thoughts are all with the troops in the Persian Gulf
and we support you wholeheartedly. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Collins follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Susan M. Collins
Thank you Mr. Chairman. As we begin today's hearing, it is
appropriate for us to take a moment to recognize the courage and
sacrifice of our forces currently engaged in combat in Iraq. In doing
so, I also believe that it is important for us to remember that the
work of this subcommittee is critically important in ensuring that our
Armed Forces have the resources they need to fight and win our Nation's
wars. The investments we make today in shipbuilding serve to shape the
size and capabilities of our fleet for decades to come. That is why I
have been so troubled in recent years by the dangerously low ship
construction budgets that have been submitted.
The fiscal year 2004 budget submission, however, turns the corner
on shipbuilding. I would like to express my appreciation to all of our
witnesses today for their hard work in producing this budget. It
includes over $12 billion for seven ships, including three DDG-51
destroyers, a Virginia-class submarine, an LPD-17, and three dry cargo
ships. The fiscal year 2004 budget submission also includes substantial
investments in the next generation of vessels. It includes over $1
billion in research and development funding for the DD(X) destroyer,
and $158 million for the Littoral Combat Ship. These funds, combined
with the continuing development of the CVN-21 aircraft carrier, will
help to transform the Navy to deal with threats as they emerge in the
coming decades.
Again, I applaud the Navy for including much needed increases in
the shipbuilding account. However, we must now deal with the legacy
left behind by years of inadequate funding for ship construction. Even
with 7 new ships budgeted for fiscal year 2004, our fleet will still
dip below 300 ships. I have asked our first witness, Admiral Clark, on
a number of occasions for his views on the proper size of our fleet. As
recently as February 25 of this year, Admiral Clark has expressed his
belief that a fleet of 375 ships would adequately meet our national
security requirements. Clearly, we have a great deal of work to do to
meet that goal.
In the coming years, we also face a significant challenge in the
transition from existing ship programs to the full scale production of
next generation vessels. In particular, I have very serious concerns
about the Navy's plan for the procurement of major surface combatants
after fiscal year 2005. As it current stands, the Navy only plans to
procure one DD(X) destroyer in fiscal year 2006, and one in fiscal year
2007. In fiscal year 2008, the Navy would procure two DD(X) destroyers.
Thus, from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2008, there will be
only four major surface combatant ship constructions. As our witnesses
are aware, this is wholly inadequate to sustain our Nation's ship
construction industrial base.
I look forward to working with the witnesses on both of today's
panels on these issues.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Warner. Would the chair yield to me just a moment
to clarify something?
Senator Talent. Sure.
Senator Warner. For the record, this distinguished Senator
from Maine would be in that chair had it not been that her peer
group saw fit to have her be the chairman of a full Senate
committee, the Government Affairs Committee. Under our rules,
quite appropriately, we like to distribute the opportunities
among members. But I did not want you to think that the
chairman passed you over.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that
clarification.
Senator Talent. Mr. Chairman, that is yet another reason I
am grateful for Senator Collins having received that honor.
[Laughter.]
Senator Kennedy. We have not accepted those rules. We still
use old seniority, and I do not want Jack Reed and others to be
hearing about this. [Laughter.]
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, we have a meeting of the
Intelligence Committee at this point in time, presided over by
Senator Roberts, and my attendance is needed there. So I will
not be present for the testimony.
Senator Talent. Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Warner. Thank you for this opportunity.
Senator Talent. I want to welcome Admiral Clark and General
Hagee. Admiral Clark, we do not need any long introductions. We
are waiting to hear your statement and looking forward to it.
STATEMENT OF ADM. VERNON E. CLARK, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS
Admiral Clark. Thank you very much, Chairman Talent,
Chairman Warner, Senator Kennedy, and other distinguished
members of the committee. It is a privilege to be here with you
this afternoon and be able to represent the men and women
serving in the Navy.
I also want to say that I am absolutely delighted to be
able to appear along side the Commandant of the Marine Corps,
my number one joint partner and the leader of a corps that is
performing brilliantly in the theater of operations and the
leader of an organization that is bringing the Navy-Marine
Corps team closer together than we have ever been in our
history.
There are those who have served in times past that
absolutely do not even understand the nature of the
relationship between the United States Marine Corps and the
United States Navy. I want to say that I am absolutely honored
to be able to serve along side an individual like General Mike
Hagee.
Of course, we are here today to discuss the investment
strategy for the future, for fiscal year 2004. Before I do
that, I just want to bring you up to date, as I did in the full
committee, and to tell you that today--this morning's number,
Mr. Chairman--54 percent of our Navy is forward deployed on the
point. Different mixes are deployed in different ways. Seventy
percent of the amphibious structure is deployed taking General
Hagee's marines to the point. Seven of my aircraft carriers are
deployed. Seventy percent of my air wings are deployed. They
are on the tip of the spear and they are carrying out the
President's orders and direction.
Of course, most of those numbers are engaged in Operation
Iraqi Freedom, striking the enemy, conducting close air support
in support of land forces, clearing the sea lanes, bringing in
supplies and logistics, and protecting our joint coalition
forces on land and at sea.
On the day that we commenced hostilities, I sent a note to
Secretary Rumsfeld and I told him that this Navy today is more
ready than I have ever seen it in my career. I have never seen
it this ready. As I indicated before, we have a major piece of
our Navy forward, proving it every day.
I would say that the numbers that I cited for you, in my
experience in previous times that I have served in the Navy our
ability to surge this kind of force forward absolutely would
not have been possible. Our readiness would not have been up to
it.
I want to say that I appreciate Chairman Warner's comments
about the investment that the leaders of America have made in
our readiness. That is the way I phrased it. This body and the
support of the Seapower Subcommittee made the investments
possible so that we could be realizing the incredible readiness
that we are experiencing right now. The result is that we are
capable, we are on the point, and we have a lethal force and a
decisive combat force.
So the challenge for us is, how do we keep it that way? How
do we sustain the gains in current readiness while focusing on
the future and transformation? I believe that is the whole
focus of our time here together.
Last summer, Mr. Chairman, as you indicated, we laid out a
vision for the future called Seapower 21. I will not go into
the details this afternoon, but I have highlighted it in my
written testimony. I will just say it is about projecting
offense, Sea Strike; it is about projecting defense, Sea
Shield; it is about operating from the Sea Base--the largest
maneuver space on the face of the Earth. That is the world's
oceans. It is about having the freedom of maneuver, the freedom
of operations, from the maritime domain.
Let me just talk briefly about what we are doing in Sea
Strike as we speak. The front end of Sea Strike is the United
States Marine Corps and General Hagee will talk about the
specifics of their contribution. But the leading edge of our
ability to project offense starts with the partnership between
the Navy and the Marines, and it could not be more visible than
it is right now.
Of course, it is about long-range precision firepower. We
started this conflict with 1,100 Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles
(TLAMs) in theater, and of course many of those have been
expended.
It is about long-range tactical air (TACAIR). It is about
time-sensitive joint Air Force and Navy strikes on Iraqi
leadership.
It is about Sea Shield. It is about projecting defense.
Missile defense is not a figment of our imagination. The last
year we have had an incredible series of successes, a great
year in test and evaluation and research and development
leading towards missile defense. I would tell you that one of
our research and development (R&D) configured platforms has in
fact been tracking the missiles and has made initial contact on
some of the missiles that have been shot down by the Patriot
missile batteries in theater as we speak.
So it is about output, the joint Army and Navy missile
defense team. Of course it is about sea basing and exploiting
that operational independence that I talked about. These are
just examples.
This year's investment strategy is committed to building
toward the vision of tomorrow. I just want to say very briefly
a few of those platforms that are so important to us. Multi-
mission destroyer (DD(X)) is the heart of our future and our
family of ships that includes next-generation cruiser (CG(X))
and the Littoral Combatant Ship (LCS). It involves incredible
technological advances and development. Admiral Clark's view is
that it will frame the future of the Navy for the next 30
years. It will help determine what our ships are all about.
The LCS, I believe, is critical to Sea Shield, designed
from the keel up to dominate the battle space in the near-land
area--the littorals--built with plug and play technology in
mind from the beginning, conceived with unmanned vehicles in
mind on the surface, in the air, and under the surface.
CVN-21, the first new carrier design in 40 years. I am so
pleased that this ship and this new development is funded in
the fiscal year 2004 submit.
LPD-17, absolutely critical and integral to the Navy-Marine
Corps partnership, and that supports new Marine capabilities
like Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) and MV-22 and
the improved Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC).
The Virginia-class submarine, the most advanced multi-
mission submarine ever built anywhere in the world. I mentioned
missile defense.
So the question is how do we get there? Well, we have to
find the resources. So I will just say, as I did before the
full committee, that I am committed to finding the efficiencies
so that we are part of the process of discovering the resources
to create our future.
I will tell you that I understand that there will be debate
about some of the judgments and the decisions that we have
made. There have been tough choices such as the accelerated
retirement of 11 ships and 70 aircraft and the divestment of
over 50 systems. I will tell you that the decision to do that
was difficult. I believe with all of my heart that those were
the right decisions and I am anxious to discuss them with you.
We are looking at exciting and innovative ways to capture
the future and I hope that we get a chance to talk about some
of them including: innovative manning experiments, Optimum
Manning, and Sea-Swap, led by the commander of our surface
forces. Two of the ships involved in those pilot experiments
have been conducting combat operations in the theater of
operations. They are happening right now. They are not things
that we are talking about we are going to do some day. We are
doing them right now.
So, Mr. Chairman and subcommittee members, in summary, the
Navy of the United States of America is ready and it is
performing. It is forward deployed, it is on scene, it is
carrying out Operation Iraqi Freedom along with the sister
services right now. We are focusing on the future while we are
executing today.
I just want to say that the young men and women in your
Nation's Navy are serving with distinction and I am
extraordinarily proud to be given the opportunity to serve as
the leader of this institution.
I do want to thank you. As Chairman Warner said, this
subcommittee has been involved through the years in significant
work that has led to the kind of Navy that we have today. I
want you to know that the men and women in uniform appreciate
that kind of support and the leadership of this committee.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the chance to be with you
today and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Clark follows:]
Prepared Statement by Adm. Vernon E. Clark, USN
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate this
opportunity to appear before you. I am happy to report to you that the
readiness of today's forces has never been better. The results you've
seen these last few days represent the return on both the investment--
and the wise judgments--of Congress and the American people in
providing for our Navy. I speak for the entire fleet in thanking you
for your exceptional and continuous support.
In my statements to the full committee, I outlined the Navy's
overall strategic rationale for this year's proposed budget. In this
statement, I will focus my comments on issues of particular relevance
to this subcommittee.
YOUR NAVY--TODAY AND TOMORROW
Today, there are 164 ships on deployment, over half of the Navy;
this includes 7 of 12 aircraft carriers, and 9 of our 12 big deck
amphibious ships (LHA/LHD). They are deployed in support of the
Nation's interests in the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean, the Indian
Ocean, and the Western Pacific.
In addition, over 75 percent of the Military Sealift Command's
(MSC) total force is operating in direct support of the war on
terrorism and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Over 130 ships, including
all 19 of our newest large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) ships
and all 8 of our fast sealift ships have been activated; when combined
with other MSC-owned or chartered shipping, MSC has more than 210 ships
committed to the sealift of the joint team, the replenishment of Navy
carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups, and on special
mission assignments around the globe.
All of these forces are around the world, around the clock,
operating with great effect from the vast maneuver area that is the
world's oceans and seas. As the 21st century continues to unfold, it is
clear your Navy will continue to be a vital part of America's defense.
In this age of unpredictability, with transnational terrorists and
regional aggressors pursuing asymmetric strategies, our Navy's ability
to sustain a high level of operations and swiftly respond to a broad
range of scenarios will require naval forces that are widely dispersed,
fully netted, and seamlessly integrated with joint forces.
These are the capabilities that are central to our Sea Power 21
vision--described in my statement before the full committee--and the
capabilities we are pursuing in this year's budget.
OUR FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET REQUEST
Last year, we made plain that current readiness and manpower were
our focus and that we would get after future readiness--the ships,
aircraft, and capabilities needed for tomorrow's Navy--this year.
We have benefited enormously from the $7.1 billion added to our
current readiness accounts in the last 3 years. It has produced the
most ready force in our history, helped us create a surge capability,
and reduced our immediate operational risk. At the same time, we are
enjoying the highest retention in our history; our leaders in the fleet
have helped us dramatically reduce our manning gaps at sea. Without
question, our focus on these efforts has been a key contributor to both
our success in the global war on terrorism and in our effort to disarm
the Iraqi regime.
This budget request sustains these current readiness and manpower
gains. More importantly, it brings our guns to bear on our future
readiness to enhance the Sea Power 21 capabilities that will be core to
our success: agility, precision, reach, persistence, and decisive
power.
Sea Power 21 and the global concept of operations (CONOPs) will
provide our Nation the kind of innovation and force structure that will
enable our Navy to operate more effectively as a netted, distributed,
joint force. Our vision is more than just hardware; it provides the
framework to organize, integrate, and transform our Navy to realize
opportunities and navigate the challenges ahead.
I discussed many of these in my earlier statement to the full
committee; innovations like our Optimal Manning experiment and Sea-Swap
programs are part of the Sea Power 21 process, and they are reaping
benefits already. U.S.S. Milius (DDG-69) for example, achieved a 23-
percent reduction in crew size and focused their combat capability;
Milius was one of the combatants that dispatched Tomahawk cruise
missiles in OIF.
Our Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Aviation Integration plan brings our
Navy and Marine Corps team closer together, enhancing interoperability
and teamwork, and at the same time improves our tactical aviation
affordability for the future. Without question, we will continue these
kinds of innovations, to improve both our effectiveness and our
efficiency.
This year's budget request did involve some tough choices--the
right choices--to balance our current and future risk and to prepare
for both today and tomorrow. Sea Power 21 honed our ability to make
these choices by focusing our investments on both the right
capabilities--Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing--and against the
right capability gaps--the tough, near-land environment where potential
enemies will come after us in the unified battlespace of the future.
Our direction to Navy leadership was to weigh the risks, divest
ourselves of programs and systems that did less to enhance our
warfighting capability, and begin to realize the potential of Sea Power
21. We looked hard at older systems with lesser capabilities, limited
growth potential and high operating and support costs and ultimately
decided to accelerate the retirement of 11 ships and 70 aircraft and
divest more than 50 systems. We found these preferred accelerated cuts
in our least capable type-model series would produce $1.2 billion
across the FYDP for recapitalization, modernization of other platforms,
and investment in Sea Power 21--without compromising our ability to
accomplish our missions.
Accelerating the retirement of the Spruance-class destroyers, the
baseline one Ticonderoga-class cruisers, and selected Oliver Hazard
Perry-class frigates was a difficult decision--but the right decision--
and one based on the capabilities needed for both today's and
tomorrow's threat environment. These ships are significantly less
capable and survivable in the near-land threat environments we'll see
in the future. They require additional manning to operate because they
lack many of the optimal manning technologies of our newer ships. Most
importantly, they provide either redundant or significantly less
effective strike and air defense capabilities than our other platforms.
In every case, continuing to operate these ships for the few years
remaining in their service lives adds little to our aggregate
warfighting posture and hampers our ability to move forward with
critical recapitalization and transformation efforts.
We recognize that the total number of ships in the inventory has a
quality all its own; after all, one ship can only be in one place at a
time. However, as we wargame and analyze the risks inherent in
tomorrow's threat environments, it is already becoming clear that the
type and mix of ships in the future fleet is critically important to
the success of future campaigns--not just for the Navy, but for the
joint force. Accelerating the retirement of these selected ships adds
little risk in the near-term, and helps significantly in facilitating
our transition to the numbers, type, and mix of ships we will require
for the range of missions we anticipate in the 21st century--reducing
our future risk.
INVESTING IN SEA POWER 21--CAPABILITIES TO PROGRAMS
In this year's budget, there is a clear link between the
capabilities our Navy needs and the programs in which we are investing.
Sea Power 21 prescribes a strategy-to-concepts-to-capabilities
continuum by which our forces will exploit the opportunities that
precision, reach, and connectivity give us.
Our fiscal year 2004 submission requests seven new construction
ships--two more than last year--and several conversions. This
fundamentally goes to our Sea Basing vision; after all, the fleet is
the foundation of our ability to project both offensive fires and
defensive protection. Our immediate fiscal year 2004 investment of
$12.2 billion in shipbuilding and conversion includes:
Three Arleigh Burke-class DDGs. These ships, and their
robust strike, undersea warfare and Aegis air defense
capabilities will be a mainstay of our future Carrier Strike
Groups (CSG), Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG), and Missile
Defense Surface Action Groups for many years to come.
One Virginia-class SSN. The best multi-mission
submarine ever built for littoral and regional operations will
be configured to conduct mining and mine reconnaissance,
unmanned vehicle operations, Special Operations Forces (SOF)
insertion/extraction, battle group support, anti-submarine
warfare, intelligence-collection and surveillance missions,
sea-control, and land attack; vastly improving payload
flexibility, connectivity, and joint interoperability for our
undersea forces.
One San Antonio-class LPD for enhanced lift and
survivability in our future Expeditionary Strike Groups.
Two Lewis and Clark-class T-AKEs to sustain our more
widely dispersed operating fleet in the future. These ships
will include upgraded material handling and transfer systems
and multi-purpose convertible cargo holds for dry stores or
ammunition. They will be able to double both delivery load
weight and rates of transfer.
The remaining two of four planned SSBN-to-SSGN
conversions; to more fully distribute our joint, offensive
power with these independent, clandestine strike assets. The
first SSGN is expected to be fully operational in fiscal year
2007.
The first ship in our Cruiser Conversion program.
Service life extension for three Landing Craft Air
Cushioned vehicles.
We are committed to developing the kind of level stream of
investment in our shipbuilding accounts needed to deliver on our Sea
Basing structure and Global CONOPs operating vision. Multiyear
procurement, economic order quantity, and carefully implemented
incremental funding practices help deliver long-lead materials in a
cost-effective manner, stabilize the production path, and in our view,
reduce per unit cost of ships and increase the shipbuilding rate. We
are leveraging these practices in many of our ship and aircraft
procurement programs and support their continued use in the future.
We are also reaching beyond the ships listed above to more fully
achieve our Sea Power 21 vision. From Langley to Halibut, Nautilus to
Ticonderoga, the Navy has a legacy of shipbuilding innovation that has
revolutionized our ships, aircraft, and combat systems--transforming
our capability. We will capitalize on this kind of innovation in this
century as well. While I discussed many of these initiatives in my
earlier testimony to the full committee, there are several key programs
worth mentioning.
At the top of our list is the surface combatant family of ships
centered on the next-generation multi-mission destroyer DD(X), the
next-generation cruiser (CG(X)), and the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).
This powerful combination of ships will provide Joint Force Commanders
with a robust range of transformational capabilities across the
spectrum of warfare.
From the long-range precision strike and volume-fires of DD(X), to
the overland, theater and strategic ballistic and cruise missile
defensive reach of the CG(X), to the ability to clear the way for the
joint force in the tough littoral environment with LCS, the Navy's
future surface warships will be designed from their keels up to operate
as critical elements of our dispersed, networked, joint force.
At the heart of this family is DD(X). As the primary precision
strike fires provider of the ``family,'' DD(X) will be armed with an
array of land-attack weapons, Tactical Tomahawk, and the Advanced Gun
System (AGS) to provide persistent, distributed, long-range, precision
attack needed in support of our joint forces operating deep inland. It
is a critical enabler for our Sea Strike vision, which includes the
Marine Corps' Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, Ship-to-Objective
Maneuver, and Operational Maneuver From the Sea concepts.
DD(X) will take advantage of advanced stealth technologies to be
less detectable and more survivable to enemy attacks than the ships it
will replace and will be a key component of future Expeditionary Strike
Groups. An open architecture, distributed combat system will support a
``plug and play'' environment in which to operate AGS, an advanced
vertical launching system and a Multi-Function Radar/Volume Search
Radar suite. Other features on DD(X) will include an advanced hull
form, integrated electric drive propulsion, optimal manning, and
extensive automation.
Our DD(X) research and development effort is also the baseline that
will enable us to keep pace with today's rapid technological advances;
it will spiral promising technologies to both CG(X) and LCS. It will
also enable us to upgrade in-service Aegis cruisers and destroyers with
selected leading-edge technologies to ensure this vital core of our
legacy, multi-mission fleet will maintain operational effectiveness
throughout their lifetimes and until the DD(X) and CG(X) programs come
to fruition. In fiscal year 2004, we are committing $1.058 billion in
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Navy (RDTEN) for further
development of the electric drive, power grid, and combat system
components and anticipate the lead ship contract award in fiscal year
2005.
The Littoral Combat Ship is our most transformational effort and
number one budget priority. It will capitalize on emerging unmanned
vehicle technologies and deliver the focused Sea Shield missions of
Mine Warfare (MIW), Surface Warfare (SUW), and Anti-Submarine Warfare
(ASW). It will provide the fast, affordable, focused-mission capability
that will sustain our access and enhance our ability to establish sea
superiority not just for our Carrier Strike Groups and Expeditionary
Strike Groups, but for all the joint logistics, command and control and
pre-positioned ships that must transit the critical littoral threat
area to move and support forces ashore.
Our modeling and wargaming with smaller, fast, highly-maneuverable
ships that simulate LCS capabilities have produced results that show
LCS increases our warfighting effectiveness in the littoral
environment. LCS achieved 70 percent of the ``kills'' during simulated
choke-point transits and reduced the vulnerability--and losses--of our
other carrier and expeditionary strike group ships to submarine torpedo
attack in the littorals. Additionally, LCS ships modeled with mine
warfare capability provided more effective organic mine warfare support
than similarly equipped DDGs--especially during opposed scenarios.
Numerous real-world tests have also been conducted with
experimental craft to gather tangible data to determine the optimal
hull form for the LCS. In fiscal year 2004, we are requesting $79
million for hull form, $66 million for mission module development and
integration, and $13 million for requirements analysis in RDTEN
funding. The Integrated Requirements Document has been completed and we
anticipate beginning construction of the first LCS in 2005.
We are also investing in other platforms to support Sea Basing of
the joint force.
CVN-21 will be the centerpiece of our Carrier Strike Groups in the
future and is scheduled for delivery in fiscal year 2014. It will
combine the most critical technology advancements of the CVN(X)-1 and
CVN(X)-2 programs and deliver them on the CVN(X)-1 schedule we defined
last year. The fiscal year 2004 budget request provides $1.5 billion in
RDTEN and advanced procurement for the first CVN-21 and programs for
split-funded construction beginning in fiscal year 2007.
Our vision for the Maritime Pre-positioning Force Future (MPF(F))
and tomorrow's amphibious force continues to develop into a bright and
exciting future for the Navy-Marine Corps team. The Joint Forcible
Entry Operations study and Defense Science Board Sea Basing study will
help refine our effort and posture us for enhanced sea basing of Navy
and Marine Corps assets.
We expect MPF(F) ships to serve a broader operational function than
current pre-positioned ships, creating greatly expanded operational
flexibility and effectiveness. We envision a force of ships that will
enhance the responsiveness of the joint team by the at-sea assembly of
a Marine Expeditionary Brigade that arrives by high-speed airlift or
sealift from the United States or forward operating locations or bases.
These ships will off-load forces, weapons, and supplies selectively
while remaining far over the horizon, and they will reconstitute ground
maneuver forces aboard ship after completing assaults deep inland.
Other advances in sea basing could enable the flow of Marine and
Army Forces at multiple and probably austere points of entry as a
coherent, integrated combined arms team capable of concentrating lethal
combat power rapidly and engaging an adversary upon arrival. The
ability of the Naval Services to promote the successful transformation
of deployment practices of the other Services will dramatically improve
the overall ability of the Joint Force to counter our adversaries'
strategies of area-denial and/or anti-access.
We will know more about these requirements in the next year and
will consider other joint missions like the need for an afloat forward
staging base, joint command and control ship, and afloat medical
capabilities for the Joint Force for extended periods as well. We are
investing in RDTEN to examine the future MPF and perhaps other
alternative concepts.
We have incrementally funded LHD-8, the last ship in the LHD-1
class. It will be the first big deck amphibious ship powered by gas
turbine propulsion, all-electric auxiliary systems, and a computer-
based Machinery Control System. These changes are expected to realize
significant lifecycle cost savings and serve as the basis for spiral
development into the future LHA replacement (LHA(R)) class of ships.
The near term LHA(R) development effort will be focused on our
joint forcible entry needs and integrating several new capabilities
including the Joint Strike Fighter, MV-22 Osprey, and Advanced
Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV). Our fiscal year 2004 budget request
of nearly $65 million in RDTEN supports design and procurement of the
first ship in the class (LHA(R)1) with a planned ship construction
award in fiscal year 2007. The configuration for remaining ships in the
class will be deferred until the Joint Forcible Entry Operations study
is complete.
Our Sea Shield vision also has particular relevance to this
subcommittee. Sea Shield is about extending our defenses beyond naval
forces, to the Joint Force and allies and providing a defensive
umbrella deep inland. The capabilities needed for Theater Air and
Missile Defense and Sea/Littoral Control--including anti-submarine
warfare (ASW), ship self defense, and mine warfare (MIW)--are part of
our Sea Shield construct. Our budget request and program includes
significant funding for these capabilities.
In Theater Air and Missile Defense, we are pursuing technologies
that will enable us to defeat emerging cruise missile threats and
ballistic missiles in the boost and ascent phase. This difficult
mission requires advanced network-centric operations and high levels of
weapon system technology, seamlessly fused to produce the integrated
air picture and the engagement profile needed for success. This
involves:
Fiscal year 2004 investments include upgrades to the
Aegis weapon system and further development of the DD(X)
destroyer's volume search radar, the E-2C Advanced Hawkeye
(Radar Modernization Program (RMP)) aircraft, and the Extended
Range Active Missile (ERAM). Networks will encompass the
cooperative engagement capability (CEC) and Link-16 systems and
weapons will be the extended range, over-the-horizon, and
ballistic missile defense versions of the standard missile, and
new models of the advanced medium-range air-to-air missile
(AMRAAM).
Our sea-based missile defense programs experienced
tremendous success on the test range during 2002, scoring three
hits and conducting three successful tracking events; proving
in the near term that Aegis BMD has the ability to destroy
ballistic missiles in space and can provide surveillance and
cueing of intercontinental class weapons directed at our
homeland. We are accelerating work with the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) to deploy initial sea-based ballistic missile
defense systems in fiscal year 2004. In partnership with MDA,
we will transfer U.S.S. Lake Erie (CG-70) to MDA to facilitate
a more robust testing program for missile defense. In turn, MDA
is requesting funding to modify a number of Aegis DDGs to
bolster homeland defense surveillance; equip a larger number of
Aegis combatants with a BMD engagement capability; and acquire
a number of SM-3 missile interceptors to provide the capability
at sea to intercept short- and medium-range ballistic missiles
in the boost and ascent phases of flight. We will build on our
successes and develop a vital capability for our Nation by 1
October 2004.
The Ticonderoga-class cruiser conversion program will
extend the Aegis combat system's capabilities against projected
threats well into the 21st century and, with the DDG-51
destroyers, serve as the bridge to the surface combatant family
of ships (DD(X), LCS, and CG(X)). The cruisers will provide
multi-mission offensive and defensive capabilities, and operate
independently or as part of CSG, ESG, and Surface Action Groups
(SAG) well into this century. Core to these conversions is
installation of the Cooperative Engagement Capability, which
enhances and leverages the air defense capability of these
ships, and the 5,,/62-caliber Gun System with Extended Range
Guided Munitions to be used in support of Sea Strike and Marine
warfighting needs. This program is a mid-life upgrade that will
provide selected Aegis cruisers with land attack, force
protection, and Area Air Defense Commander capability while
extending the service life to over 35 years. These converted
cruisers will be viable candidates for a ballistic missile
defense role. The first conversion begins in fiscal year 2004
and our budget requests $194 million.
The Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) will
enable battle group and joint task force ships and aircraft to
act as a single, geographically dispersed combat system. CEC
has demonstrated significantly improved battle force air
defense capabilities by integrating multiple sensors into a
single, real-time, fire-control-quality composite track
picture. In the future, it will integrate airborne radar and
IFF sensors into the battle group composite tracking network
providing long-range detection and tracking with integrated
fire control for improved over-the-horizon battle group air
defense. CEC will provide the fleet with greater defense-in-
depth and the mutual support required to confront the evolving
threat of anti-ship cruise missiles and theater ballistic
missiles. We anticipate the Block 2 Decision Milestone in April
2003 and are requesting $226 million in the fiscal year 2004
budget.
The E-2C Advanced Hawkeye (Radar Modernization
Program) will enable our Navy to deploy an unprecedented
capacity to conduct defensive air warfare deep inland against
cruise missiles and aircraft. The range and overland detection
capabilities achieved with the Advanced Hawkeye, combined with
the networking of CEC, will expand significantly our ability to
defend critical ports, airfields, and Joint Forces ashore--
initially with Aegis Standard Missiles and F/A-18E/Fs Super
Hornets using the Advanced Electronically Scanned Array (AESA)
radar and AMRAAM, and ultimately with the next-generation over-
the-horizon ship-launched ERAM. The fiscal year 2004 budget
invests $352 million for continued development and aircraft
production begins in fiscal year 2008.
The ERAM is the next variant of the family of Standard
Missiles (SM-2 Blocks III, IIIA, IIIB, Block IV). It marries
much of the proven Standard Missile motor with the AMRAAM
missile seeker to enable the extension of naval cruise and
ballistic missile defense overland. We are requesting $34
million in the fiscal year 2004 budget to develop this missile.
Sea/Littoral Control is central to our ability to assure access and
freedom of maneuver for Joint Forces moving from the sea to objectives
inland. We continue to invest in ASW, Ships Self Defense, and MIW
technologies and programs that will counter surface and subsurface
threats, such as modern ultra quiet submarines, small, fast surface
combatants, and an array of floating, moored, and buried mines.
ASW remains a challenging task, not just in the deep ocean, but
also in the shallow littoral regions and against modern quiet
submarines. Programs and technologies that will enhance our warfighting
effectiveness in this environment include:
The new MH-60 helicopters, which will carry
reconfigurable sensors and weapons customized for the littoral
environment, will link their data to the force as they perform
anti-mine, anti-submarine, and anti-surface sea control
missions. The MH-60R helicopter with its Advanced Low Frequency
Sonar will specifically provide improved capability against
submarines in the littorals. In fiscal year 2004, we are
requesting 6 MH-60R and 13 MH-60S.
Recapitalizion of our Maritime Patrol capability--
currently conducted by aging P-3C aircraft--with the
Multimission Maritime Aircraft (MMA). MMA will transform the
Maritime Patrol/Reconnaissance force by fully integrating
manned and unmanned vehicles. In fiscal year 2004, we are
requesting $76.2 million in RDTEN funding and anticipate
initial operational capability (IOC) in the 2012 timeframe.
Initial testing of the Surveillance Towed Array Sonar
System (SURTASS) Low Frequency Active (LFA) in the Western
Pacific has demonstrated detection capability that provides us
added assurance that we can deal with the diesel-electric
threat as it becomes even quieter, and we have accelerated
development of an Advanced Deployable System (ADS) off-board
sensor variant, to start in fiscal year 2005, that will
eliminate the requirement to cable the system to a shore site.
Acquiring the Automatic Radar Periscope Detection and
Discrimination (ARPDD) system will provide further enhancements
to our capability for large area search. Additionally, the
capability for our surface combatants to survive attacks from
threat torpedoes will be enhanced through the Surface Ship
Torpedo Defense effort.
We will fund the Common Undersea Picture (CUP) to
integrate undersea warfare sensors across multiple, dissimilar
ASW platforms and nodes for a shared tactical picture. We will
begin to outfit carrier strike groups in fiscal year 2005. CUP
will greatly enhance our netcentric capability in undersea
warfare mission planning, vulnerability assessment, situational
awareness, and collaboration.
Large area ASW cueing and search is supported via
funding of the USQ-78B acoustic processor for the P-3C AIP
fleet. This enhancement provides the capability for Improved
Extended Echo Ranging (IEER) processing which is a high search-
rate acoustic tool focused on the shallow water, acoustically
harsh environment.
The fiscal year 2004 budget also supports a fiscal
year 2006 IOC of Mk 48 Mod 7 Common Broadband Acoustic Sonar
System (CBASS) heavyweight torpedo specifically designed for
use against advanced diesel submarines employing
countermeasures in the difficult littoral environment. Also
supported is the fiscal year 2004/2005 IOC of the MK-54
Lightweight Torpedo (LWT) for use in shallow waters by
helicopter and patrol ASW aircraft against the diesel threat,
significantly enhancing littoral capabilities.
Finally, the success of the Acoustic Rapid COTS
Insertion (ARCI) program in providing significant improvement
in ASW sensor processing for our submarine force has spawned
similar efforts in submarine combat control, communications,
and upgrades to the surface fleet's SQQ-89 combat suite. These
programs validate the Navy's decision to use commercially
available technology to deliver superior performance at less
cost.
We are investing in Ship Self Defense programs and systems that
will enhance our capability to defeat small and swarming boats. In the
far-term, we are investing in the LCS to enhance this capability
dramatically. This includes:
In the near term, our Navy will continue investment in
the Rolling Air Frame Missile and the NATO Evolved Sea Sparrow
missile as part of our layered defense against anti-ship cruise
missiles.
The Phalanx Close-in-Weapon System (Block 1B) that
will upgrade our current terminal defense capability against
anti-ship cruise missiles and high-speed aircraft penetrating
outer fleet defensive envelopes. In surface mode, the Block 1B
program will defend against small, fast, surface craft and slow
flying aircraft and include better sensor support and lethality
for close-in engagements. The CIWS Block 1B Upgrade Kit
procurement remains a high surface warfare priority.
The Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program
(SEWIP), a spiral development effort initiated to provide a
robust, full spectrum electronic warfare system following
cancellation of the Advanced Integrated Electronic Warfare
System in fiscal year 2002. SEWIP will build on the legacy SLQ-
32 system to field capabilities against next-generation
threats.
Pursuing installation of minor caliber guns on our
deploying ships to improve our ability to counteract a small
boat threat in the 0 to 8,000 yards range. We soon will install
stabilized minor caliber guns on two DDGs. Arming the MH-60R
and MH-60S helicopters mentioned above provides an additional
layer of lethality against small boat attack.
We have increased our investment in our Mine Warfare plan; adding
over $67 million in fiscal year 2004 and $482 million across the FYDP
since last year's budget. Major changes from last year's plan include
additional funding for LCS MIW mission modules, Mine Countermeasures
(MCM) ship diesel engine replacements, MCM ship operations and
maintenance, and acceleration of assault breaching systems R&D.
Our MCM certification plan will assure access to naval and Joint
Forces by defeating the asymmetric mine threat proliferating worldwide.
It supports our commitment to a dedicated MCM force while
simultaneously fielding an organic MCM capability to the CSGs beginning
in 2005. The stealthy and lethal LCS and its MIW module will add new
dimensions to our ability to counter mines and is the future of our
organic battle group capability. Currently:
We are investing in the ship-launched Remote
Minehunting System (RMS) for six DDG-51 Flight 2A ships
beginning in fiscal year 2005. RMS is also a candidate for the
LCS MIW mission module--the future of our organic battle group
capability.
We are also investing in several unmanned undersea
vehicle (UUV) systems. The Long-Term Mine Reconnaissance System
(LMRS) will provide a covert mine-reconnaissance capability
from SSN 688 class submarines and is on track for IOC in fiscal
year 2005. The Mission Reconfigurable UUV, an outgrowth of the
LMRS program scheduled to begin development in fiscal year
2004, will provide ``plug and play'' sensor packages for
potential missions such as ISR, Tactical Oceanography, Remote
ASW tracking, and monitoring for weapons of mass destruction.
The fiscal year 2004 budget invests $82 million in this
program.
We will purchase five organic mine systems to be
integrated in the MH-60S helicopter. Additionally, the Rapid
Airborne Mine Clearance System (RAMICS), a helicopter-borne gun
system, will provide us the capability to neutralize surface
and near-surface mines with a special 30mm supercavitating
projectile. This projectile is specially designed to penetrate
a submerged or surfaced mine casing--causing destruction of the
mine. RAMICS IOC is scheduled for fiscal year 2007.
Sea Strike is about projecting precise, responsive, and persistent
offensive striking power--in the form of weapons, Marines and Special
Operations Forces. Three of its critical capability subsets are Time
Sensitive Strike, Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance and Marine Corps Ship-to-Objective Maneuver; these
capabilities are of particular interest to the subcommittee.
Time Sensitive Strike investments will enable us to link persistent
sensors, emerging knowledge enhancement and decisionmaking systems and
long range precision weapons against an array of targets in ever-
shortening time periods. We are already pursuing investments that will
greatly reduce our target planning timelines and enhance our striking
power. This includes:
The Tactical Tomahawk (TACTOM) Block IV upgrade that
preserves the Tomahawk's long-range precision-characteristics
and adds an in-flight retargeting capability that will enhance
responsiveness and flexibility at a lower total cost than
existing variants. The fiscal year 2004 budget requests full
rate production under a 5-year multiyear procurement (fiscal
year 2004-2008) contract.
Procurement of Precision-Guided Munitions (PGM) that
will continue to be a high priority. Laser Guided Bomb
production is currently at maximum rate, the Joint Direct
Attack Munition is forecast to meet maximum rate by August
2003, and we are increasing our inventory of the Joint Stand
Off Weapon and ramping up production of a new variant. Our
partnership with the Air Force in several of our munitions
programs will continue to help optimize both our inventories
and our research and development investment. In fiscal year
2004, we are requesting over $911 million.
The Joint Fires Network (JFN) that will integrate the
best elements of three existing systems into a converged joint
architecture and automates, coordinates, and correlates the
multiple data streams to provide time critical fire control
solutions for advanced weapon systems. It reduces the sensor-
to-shooter timeline from hours to minutes; provides precision
targeting data for coastal and deep fire support; and uses data
from responsive and persistent ISR assets to improve both the
Common Operational Picture and our intelligence preparation of
the battlespace. The fiscal year 2004 budget includes $159
million for JFN. JFN is at sea in OIF and will continue to
serve as a critical building block for our Sea Strike vision
and enabled by FORCEnet.
Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance will be a
key enabler for both our Sea Strike and Sea Shield capabilities. UUVs,
discussed earlier, and unmanned air vehicles (UAV) are a key component
of our ISR future. We are committed to accelerating development of UAVs
and procuring an operational capability as soon as possible. They will
provide persistent and comprehensive situational awareness; key to
projecting both our offensive and defensive power. This includes:
Two Global Hawk Maritime Demonstration (GHMD) vehicles
that will be procured from the Air Force in fiscal year 2005
for maritime CONOPs development, sensor technology
experimentation, and fleet orientation prior to the
introduction of the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAV
in fiscal year 2009. The BAMS UAV will be a multi-mission ISR
system to support strike, signals intelligence, and
communications relay while operating independently or in direct
collaboration with other assets in the maritime environment. We
are requesting $25 million in the fiscal year 2004 budget
submit and anticipate IOC in fiscal year 2009. We will also
continue our investment in the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle/Navy
(UCAV/N) and have budgeted for two science and technology
demonstrators in this request.
Our renewed interest in the Fire Scout/Naval Vertical
Takeoff and Landing Tactical UAV (VTUAV) and will evaluate its
utility for LCS and potentially other air capable ships. We
will also examine its ability to carry modular mission payloads
and operate using the Tactical Control System, and Tactical
Common Data Link. It will provide real time information,
surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting, communications
relay, and battlefield management.
Ship to Objective Maneuver: Together with our number one joint
partner, the United States Marine Corps, we will provide the capability
to deploy, support, and reconstitute a persistent, operationally
flexible, expeditionary capability across the spectrum of warfare.
Currently:
We are working to ensure that near-, mid-, and long-
term Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) capabilities are met. In
the near-term, we anticipate IOC of the Naval Fires Control
System (NFCS) to connect ships digitally to ground forces
ashore in fiscal year 2004. In the mid-term, the Navy is
developing Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM) and Autonomous
Naval Support Round (ANSR) with both systems headed for a
``shoot off'' in fiscal year 2005 to determine which round will
provide greater range, lethality, and accuracy and ultimately
be incorporated into the Navy's arsenal.
The Commander, Fleet Force Command and the Office of
Naval Research have also taken the lead in experimenting with
the electromagnetic rail gun technologies to determine its
feasibility and perhaps accelerate this enhancement via the Sea
Trial process. We are requesting nearly $35 million in for the
ERGM and NFCS alone in fiscal year 2004.
CONCLUSION: A COMMITMENT TO VICTORY
The President has called upon us to ``be ready to strike at a
moment's notice in any dark corner of the world.'' We are answering
that call in the global war on terrorism and in the opening salvos of
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Your support has been critical to our success.
The fiscal year 2004 budget submission enhances our ability to
answer this challenge in the years ahead. By investing in our Sea Power
21 vision, the fiscal year 2004 request balances near term and future
readiness and risk, charts a course to deliver decisive capabilities,
and enables our most valuable asset--our people--the means to do the
mission to the very best of their ability.
I thank the subcommittee for your continued strong support of our
Navy and our active, Reserve, and civilian sailors. Working together, I
am confident that we will be victorious in the global war on terrorism
and in Operation Iraqi Freedom, leading to a more stable and peaceful
world.
Senator Talent. Thank you Admiral, and we appreciate both
your excellent statement, which will of course go in the
record, and your excellent summary of it. We will hear General
Hagee and then have a chance for questions.
General, thank you for coming and giving us your time this
afternoon, and we look forward to hearing your statement.
STATEMENT OF GEN. MICHAEL W. HAGEE, USMC, COMMANDANT, UNITED
STATES MARINE CORPS
General Hagee. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator Kennedy,
and distinguished members of this subcommittee, it is truly an
honor for me to be here to represent your Marine Corps.
I would like to thank this subcommittee for its strong
support of the issues and programs that are of vital importance
to the readiness of your Marine Corps and the Navy-Marine Corps
team. Along with our sister Services, the Marine Corps
continues to play a key role in the global war on terrorism, in
the establishment of stability and security in many of the
world's trouble spots, and of course in Operation Iraqi
Freedom. The actions of your marines along with the attached
Navy corpsmen and Seabees over the past 2 weeks in Iraq attest
to their morale, their readiness, and warfighting capability
better than any words I could say today.
We have 67 percent of our operating forces forward
deployed. We have almost 80 percent either forward deployed,
forward stationed, or forward based. They are performing
magnificently.
I must add to what the CNO said that we are able to
accomplish this mission today because of the support and
funding Congress has provided us over the last couple of years.
We ask for your continued support and funding in order to
remain ready for the future.
Even as we fight the current war, we, along with the Navy,
are also developing enhanced and, I would say in some cases,
new operational concepts that will make us even more responsive
and effective in the future. I would like to spend a few
minutes discussing one such operational concept, and that is
Sea Basing. Hopefully this discussion will bring together some
of the tenets of Seapower 21 and expeditionary maneuver
warfare.
As you are well aware, the idea of Sea Basing is not new to
the Navy-Marine Corps team. From the island-hopping campaign of
World War II to the more recent non-permissive, non-combatant
evacuation operations in Africa and the Middle East, we have
projected combat power ashore from the sea for many years.
In Operation Enduring Freedom, however, we took this
concept to another level by projecting a composite force from
the sea approximately 400 miles inland, securing the airfields
at Rhino and Kandahar, Afghanistan. The primary command and
control node remained at sea. However, because of platform
limitations, we established an intermediate support base ashore
in a second country.
Recent and projected technological advances in ship and
aircraft design, communications, and distribution systems
provide us the opportunity to move beyond negotiating political
access or seizing an enemy beachhead in order to build
sustainment ashore before moving to the objective. In essence,
we believe we will be able to conduct the initial reception,
staging, onward movement, and integration that you saw over the
past 2 or 3 weeks in Kuwait at sea.
Once ready, the force would maneuver from the sea base to
the objective, with the majority of its command and control,
logistics tail, and supporting fires capabilities remaining at
sea. Such a capability would significantly enhance the Joint
Force Commander's flexibility and speed by providing him
options for employing forward-deployed forces independent of
fixed inland bases, airfields, and ports.
The CNO and I believe such an operational concept will
become more important for the Nation as we face a future
characterized by uncertain and unreliable access to operate
from or through other nations' territorial space as well as the
increasing access to lethal, affordable weapons technology and
sensors that will enable potential adversaries to establish
access denial strategies.
This enhanced sea basing operational concept is within
reach. It rests on four pillars and the CNO has already
mentioned those four pillars: one, an enhanced command and
control network that we call FORCEnet; two, a set of offensive
capabilities we call Sea Strike; three, a set of defensive
capabilities we call Sea Shield; and four, a set of sustainment
capabilities we call the Sea Base.
These capability sets could be expanded or contracted to
meet a range of operations from peacetime exercises to
forceable entry of a brigade-sized force. As a national
capability, Sea Basing would cross service lines and would rely
on the establishment of standardized interfaces for both
logistics and communications, so that each Service can plug and
play with the capabilities it brings to the battlefield.
I would like to stress that sea basing is not a single
thing or a single platform. Rather, it is an aggregation of
capabilities located over the horizon that can support a wide
range of Joint Force Operations. We believe that this sea
basing operational concept will provide the joint commander
freedom of movement by using sea as maneuver space, freedom of
action by not requiring access, a reduced vulnerability to
attack, and an increased agility and speed.
Many programs within the fiscal year 2004 budget proposal
help us move toward an enhanced sea basing capability. They
involve platforms that provide flexibility and survivability in
light of future threats, weapons systems that are lighter or
more lethal, and research, development, and testing in order to
identify leap-ahead technologies. Some examples: the LPD-17,
the LHR replacement development, future maritime pre-
positioning force ships, the Advanced Assault Amphibian
Vehicle, and the Lightweight 155 all support sea basing.
The MV-22, the Joint Strike Fighter short-take-off/
vertical-landing (STOVL), the Cobra-Huey upgrades will move us
closer to an all-vertical air arm where marines take advantage
of operations from the sea base. Several command and control
improvements will bolster our capability for interoperable
joint command and control under the concept of FORCEnet.
The Littoral Combatant Ship that the CNO just mentioned
will provide anti-access capabilities with combat systems for
mine interdiction warfare, anti-sub warfare, and anti-surface
warfare, while the DD(X) Land Attack Destroyer will provide
long-range precision and volume naval surface fires to support
operational maneuver from the sea.
Other organizational enhancements that your marines are
working on include TACAIR integration, expeditionary strike
groups, and Special Operations Command support. These concepts
promise more efficient and effective operations in some
critical areas. TACAIR integration of our strike fighter assets
will build synergy between our Navy and Marine Corps aviation
communities while saving substantial resources now and beyond
the FYDP.
Expeditionary strike groups tie the operations of our
traditional ARG-MEUs to enhanced naval warfighting platforms to
give the entire group more survivability, lethality, and
flexibility with no increase in costs.
The initial integration of Marine capabilities to support
Special Operations Command takes advantage of Marine training
that can relieve some of the burdens on our Special Forces,
freeing them to concentrate on missions that only they can
perform.
As you have seen in Iraq over the past couple of weeks, we
are ready to support the Nation as part of a Joint Force today.
We are on solid ground regarding our mission and our future
direction. We will remain your only sea-based, rotational,
truly expeditionary combined arms force, ready to answer the
call as part of an integrated joint force.
Sir, I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Hagee follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Michael W. Hagee, USMC
Chairman Talent, Senator Kennedy, distinguished members of the
subcommittee; it is my honor to report to you on the state of your
United States Marine Corps. First, on behalf of all marines, I want to
thank the committee for your continued support. Your sustained
commitment to improving the warfighting capabilities of our Nation's
Armed Forces and to improving the quality of life of our service men
and women and their families is vital to the security of our Nation,
especially now, while our Nation is at war.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Navy-Marine Corps team continues to play a key role in the
global war on terrorism and in the establishment of stability and
security in many of the world's trouble spots. Marines, both active and
Reserve, are operating side-by-side in Iraq, as well as in diverse
locations, from Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, Turkey, the Georgian
Republic, Colombia, Guantanamo Bay, and the Philippines. The actions of
your marines--along with Navy Corpsmen and SeaBees--attest to their
morale and readiness better than any words I could say here today.
Marine Corps operations throughout the past year have highlighted
the versatility and expeditionary nature of our forces. Missions in
support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle marked the most
visible accomplishments of our forward-deployed forces. Marine Air
Control Squadrons continue to provide air control, surveillance, and
air traffic control support to Operation Enduring Freedom during their
deployments to the Central Command area of responsibility. Elsewhere,
the Marine Corps continues to support Operation Joint Forge in the
Balkans by sending civil affairs teams to Bosnia.
Even as the Marine Corps saw one of our busiest years in terms of
operational deployments, participation in realistic, worldwide
exercises remained critical to supporting the Combatant Commander's
Theater Security Cooperation Plans and ensuring that we maintained a
ready and capable force. Over the last year, marines participated in
more than 200 service, joint, and combined exercises. These included
live fire, field training, command post, and computer-assisted
exercises. Participants varied in size from small units to Marine
Expeditionary Forces. Overseas, Marine Expeditionary Units (Special
Operations Capable) conducted exercises in Jordan, Italy, Croatia,
Tunisia, the Philippines, Australia, Thailand, and Kuwait.
At home, Marine Reserve units were designated as ``on call'' forces
to support the Federal Emergency Management Agency's role in homeland
security. In addition, the Marine Corps also conducted numerous
training operations and internal exercises. This important training
helps develop individual and unit proficiency and competency. It also
allows the Marine Corps to examine unit operational skills and ensures
that each unit has the capabilities required to execute our full range
of missions.
The Marine Corps continues to contribute to the Nation's
counterdrug effort, participating in numerous counterdrug operations in
support of Joint Task Force Six, Joint Interagency Task Force-East, and
Joint Interagency Task Force-West. These missions are conducted in the
Andean region of South America, along the U.S. Southwest border, and in
several domestic ``hot spots'' that have been designated as High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas. Individual marines and task-organized
units are assigned to these missions in order to provide support for
domestic drug-law enforcement throughout the United States, and to
provide conventional training to military forces in South America that
execute counter-narcotics missions. Marine operational and intelligence
teams also support Colombian military efforts to combat narco-
terrorism. Marines of our Reserve Forces have executed the majority of
these missions.
Our successes in these global operations and exercises have not
been achieved alone. We have worked closely alongside the Navy, our
sister Services, and Federal agencies to realize the true potential of
joint, interoperable forces in the new environment of 21st century
warfare. The operational and personnel readiness levels we have been
able to maintain directly reflect the strong, sustained support of
Congress in last year's National Defense Authorization and
Appropriations Acts. In fiscal year 2004, we seek your continued
support for the President's budget so we can consolidate the gains made
to date, improve those areas where shortfalls remain, and continue
transforming the way the Navy-Marine Corps team will fight in the 21st
century.
II. BUILDING ON SUCCESS
The President's fiscal year 2004 budget, together with your
support, will provide a strong foundation on which we can continue
building on our successes. Our focus is on improving our ability to
operate as an agile, lethal, ready, and effective member of a broader
Joint Force that takes the complementary capabilities provided by each
Service, and blends them into an integrated and effective force for
meeting future challenges.
Increases in our military personnel accounts have a positive effect
on the retention of our most valued assets--our marines. Yet, the
projected trend of personnel costs, especially as they include accruals
for retirement and health care, are increasing faster than the budget
used to pay those costs, resulting in increased pressure on our other
accounts. Given the increasing pressure to modernize and transform the
force, the Marine Corps is constantly working to identify and assess
program tradeoffs to enable the most effectively balanced approach
between competing demands and programs. These tradeoffs occur within a
larger context of the Department's overall program tradeoff decisions,
which is driving the Navy and Marine Corps to work more closely than
ever before in our planning, budgeting, and decisionmaking. An
additional concern that complicates this process is the sizeable
unfunded cost of the ongoing global war on terrorism.
Challenges also arise from the changing realities of our national
security environment. The Marine Corps is committed to the idea that we
will fight as an integral part of a joint team. We continue to place
high priority on interoperability, shared concept development, and
participation in joint exercises with our sister services.
Additionally, the security environment now demands that we pay more
attention to our role in Homeland Defense, our critical infrastructure,
and force protection--even as we deploy more forces overseas. These
challenges demand that we balance competing priorities while remaining
focused on maintaining excellence in warfighting.
Adapting to a Changing, Dynamic World
While we adapt the advantages of technology to meet the changing
face of warfare, we draw strength from the unique culture and core
values that make us marines. We look for innovation in four broad areas
to address future challenges:
Transformational technology
New operational concepts
Refined organizations
Better business practices
Innovative approaches culled from these efforts should provide
insight into new capabilities that we can adapt for future warfighting.
In this regard, we are currently engaged in an immediate and critical
tasking to define how we, along with our partners in the Navy, intend
to project naval power ashore in the 2015-2025 timeframe. This effort
requires the intellectual rigor and participation of all the elements
of our Marine Air-Ground Task Forces and is influencing the entire
Marine Corps--from our structure and training to the way we will fight
on future battlefields as an integral component of a Joint Force.
Technology and Experimentation
The plan for realizing future joint concepts consists of three
closely related processes: (1) Joint Concept Development, (2) Joint
Experimentation and Assessment, and (3) Joint Integration and
Implementation. The overall process is more commonly known as Joint
Concept Development and Experimentation. In order to ensure support and
engagement throughout this process, the Marine Corps reorganized to
establish three Joint Concept Development and Experimentation divisions
under the cognizance of the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat
Development Command. These three organizations are key elements of
Marine Corps Transformation and enable full Marine Corps involvement in
Joint Experimentation and Transformation as well as the Navy's Sea
Trial process for Naval Experimentation and Transformation.
The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory maintains cognizance over
Marine Corps--specific experimentation--with a focus on the tactical
level--to develop enhanced warfighting capabilities for the future.
Technologies and procedures are field tested in experiments conducted
with the operating forces. In addition, the lab coordinates closely
with the Office of Naval Research to identify promising technologies
that support the next generation of warfighting capabilities.
New Concepts and Organizations
The Marine Corps is streamlining force development from concept to
acquisition under the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development. Our
Expeditionary Force Development System is a single system of dynamic
functions integrated into a process that produces and sustains
capabilities to meet the needs of the Marine Corps and the combatant
commanders. The Marine Corps advocates for ground combat, aviation
combat, command and control, and combat service support, as well as the
Marine Requirements Oversight Council, are key participants in the
process. The Expeditionary Force Development System continuously
examines and evaluates current and emerging concepts and capabilities
to improve and sustain a modern Marine Corps. The system is compatible
with and supports naval and joint transformation efforts and integrates
transformational, modernization, and legacy capabilities and processes.
This integrated, concept-based driver for transformation is currently
working on several ideas that will influence the future Marine Corps.
Expeditionary Strike Groups
The Marine Corps and Navy are engaged in a series of experiments
that will explore the Expeditionary Strike Group concept. This concept
will combine the capabilities of surface action groups, submarines, and
maritime patrol aircraft with those of Amphibious Ready Groups and
Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable), to provide
greater combat capabilities to regional combatant commanders. In the
near future, the Navy-Marine Corps team will conduct a pilot deployment
on the west coast to test the Expeditionary Strike Group concept. Navy
combatants have already been incorporated within the existing training
and deployment cycle of the Amphibious Ready Group. This experiment
will also allow us to test command-and-control arrangements for the
Expeditionary Strike Group. It will provide critical information to
support the future implementation of the concept and highlight any
needed changes in service doctrine, organization, training, materiel,
leadership and education, personnel, and facilities.
Tactical Aviation Integration
The Navy and Marine Corps team has embarked on a Tactical Aircraft
(Strike-fighter) Integration plan that will enhance core combat
capabilities and provide a more potent, cohesive, and affordable
fighting force. This integration is the culmination of a long-term
effort to generate greater combat capability from naval fixed-wing
strike and fighter aircraft, and represents a shared commitment to
employ the Department of the Navy's resources as judiciously as
possible. This integration has been ongoing for several years, with
four Marine Corps F/A-18 Hornet squadrons operating as part of embarked
carrier air wings. This Navy-Marine Corps effort will guarantee that
naval aviation will be integrated as never before, and will effectively
support the Marine Air-Ground Task Force and the joint warfighter.
Specifically, the integration plan:
Reinforces our expeditionary ethos;
Provides a smaller, more capable, more affordable
force for the Department of the Navy;
Integrates Marine strike fighters in 10 Navy Carriers
Air Wings;
Integrates three Navy strike fighter squadrons into
the Marine Unit Deployment Program;
Includes the global sourcing of all DoN strike fighter
assets and ensures their support to Marine Air-Ground Task
Forces and regional combatant commanders;
Provides increased combat capability forward; and
Complements the enhanced seabasing concept.
A cornerstone of this plan is Department of the Navy funding for
essential modifications as well as the flight hours and maintenance of
legacy aircraft to keep them at the highest levels of readiness until
the Joint Strike Fighter and F/A-18E/F are fully fielded. This requires
an unwavering commitment to level funding of strike fighter readiness
across the Department of the Navy. These integration-driven readiness
levels will allow the Navy-Marine Corps team to surge more aircraft
than what is possible today.
Enhanced Networked Seabasing
Fully networked, forward-deployed naval forces and platforms that
are integrated into our seabasing capability will provide naval power
projection for Joint Force Commanders. These forces will use the sea as
a means of maneuver, enabling a broad range of joint campaign
operations. Sea-based operations incorporate, integrate, protect, and
sustain all aspects of naval power projection, from space to the ocean
floor, from blue water to the littorals and inland--without dependence
on land bases within the Joint Operating Area. Seabasing will provide
enhanced capabilities to the naval force, such as rapid force closure,
phased arrival and assembly at sea, selective offload of equipment
tailored for individual missions, and force reconstitution for follow-
on employment. The traditional naval qualities of persistence and
sustainment--enhanced by advanced force-wide networks--underpin the
staying power and flexibility of the sea base. Naval platforms can stay
on-station, where they are needed, for extended periods of time. The
at-sea maneuverability of the seabase, coupled with advanced underway
replenishment technologies and techniques, will ensure force readiness
over time.
Integrated Logistics Capabilities
The Integrated Logistics Capabilities effort began as a unique
collection of military, industry, and academic organizations
collaborating to develop a future vision of Marine Corps logistics
processes. The product is a set of transformational initiatives that
will provide better support to the warfighter. The purpose of the
Integrated Logistics Capabilities concept and process is to implement a
transformation strategy, based on best practices, that provides the
framework for the execution of agile, effective logistics support to
the Marine Air-Ground Task Force, with the focus of streamlining the
logistics chain.
Capabilities are being conceptually refined and incrementally
validated in the Operating Forces as they are identified and
recommended. An assessment of the Proof-of-Concept, published in
November 2002 by the Center for Naval Analysis, reflected improved
supply response time (68 percent reduction in time) and overall repair
cycle time (33 percent reduction).
Over both the mid- and long-term, improved combat effectiveness and
efficiencies in the logistics chain are expected. However, efficiencies
cannot be fully realized until the people, process, and technology
changes are applied across the entire operating force. The logistics
transformation and process modernization, together with the cutting
edge suite of technologies provided by the Global Combat Support
System, will greatly enhance the combat capabilities of Marine Forces.
Reestablishment of Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies
We have validated the requirement to reestablish our Air-Naval
Gunfire Liaison Companies (ANGLICO). These companies will provide our
commanders a liaison capability with foreign area expertise to plan,
coordinate, and employ terminal control of fires in support of joint,
allied, and coalition forces. ANGLICO will be reestablished with a
company on each coast, and a separate brigade platoon in Okinawa. Each
company will have a habitual relationship with the Reserves. Full
operational capability is expected by late summer 2004.
Marine Corps--U.S. Special Operations Command Initiatives
Today, 105 marines are filling Special Forces billets around the
world. In addition to providing the current Chief of Staff to U.S.
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), the Marine Corps provides support
to and ensures interoperability with Special Forces through the actions
of the SOCOM-Marine Corps Board. That board met twice in 2002 and
developed initiatives in the areas of Operations, Training and
Education, Communications/C\4\, Information Operations, Psychological
Operations, Civil Affairs, Intelligence, Aviation, Future Concepts, and
Equipment and Technology. One of the initiatives, pursued in
coordination with the Naval Special Warfare Command, is the Marine
Corps' first sizeable contribution of forces to the Special Operations
Command. Consisting of 81 marines and 5 sailors, a detachment has been
organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special reconnaissance,
direct action, coalition support, foreign internal defense, and other
special operations missions, and will begin training at Camp Pendleton,
California, in June 2003. They will subsequently transfer to the
operational control of USSOCOM during October 2003, and deploy in April
2004 as augmentation to a Naval Special Warfare Squadron supporting
both U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Central Command.
Better Business Practices
We continue to seek out and use better business practices to
achieve greater cost-effectiveness, improve performance, and sharpen
our focus on our warfighting core competencies. In line with the
competitive sourcing initiatives in the President's Management Agenda,
we are increasing emphasis across our Supporting Establishment on
competing our commercial activities with the private sector. We are
complementing this initiative with continued development of an
effective Activity-Based Costing and Management initiative across our
installations. This allows us to focus on the true cost of various
functions and services and to develop benchmarks that enable us to
improve performance and to focus analyses on cost-saving initiatives.
This will occur both in commercial areas that we compete, and in non-
commercial areas that cannot be competed. Competitions completed to
date have resulted in saving millions of dollars annually and returning
almost 900 marines to the operating forces. We will continue to seek
additional competition candidates. Activity-Based Costing and
Management initiatives provided our installation commanders with cost
and performance information that enabled them to save over $37 million
last year. As we refine our databases, we expect continuing increases
both in performance and cost effectiveness.
Through all of the efforts outlined above, the Marine Corps is
building on today's success. As we build on our current capabilities,
embrace innovation, and transform to meet the conventional and
asymmetric threats to U.S. security in the 21st century, we will
continue to be the Nation's Total Force in Readiness, fielding warriors
whose unique seabased expeditionary and combined-arms capabilities will
be critical to success in crisis and conflict. In the process of
balancing our programs to meet these goals, we will focus on two
primary objectives: (1) our main effort, maintaining excellence in
warfighting, and (2) taking care of our marines and families.
III. TAKING CARE OF OUR OWN
Providing for the needs of our marines, their families, and our
civilian marines remain among our top priorities. The most advanced
aircraft, ship, or weapons system is of no value without highly-
motivated and well-trained people. People and leadership remain the
real foundations of the Corps' capabilities. It is important to note
that the Marine Corps operates as a Total Force, including elements of
both active and Reserve components. We continue to strengthen the
exceptional bonds within our Total Force by further integrating the
Marine Corps Reserve into ongoing operations and training.
Human Resources
End Strength
The congressionally authorized increase in Marine Corps end
strength to 175,000 in response to the global war on terrorism is very
much appreciated. This increase of 2,400 marines allows us to sustain
the increased missions associated with the activation of the 4th Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (Anti-Terrorism), enabling us to replace marines
in the active units that we ``borrowed'' in standing up the brigade,
and continue to provide the Nation with a robust, scalable force option
specifically dedicated to anti-terrorism.
Recruiting
Sustaining our ranks with the highest quality young men and women
is the mission of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command. Recruiting
Command has consistently accomplished this mission for more than the
past 7 years for enlisted recruiting and 12 years for officer
recruiting. These achievements provide the momentum fueling the
continuous pursuit to improve the recruiting process and enhance the
quality of life for our recruiters. To continue to attract America's
finest youth, Recruiting Command has provided recruiters with the best
tools available to accomplish their mission. The Marine Corps supports
the National Call to Service Act and continues to work closely with DOD
in developing an implementation policy. We expect to commence enlisting
individuals under this program commencing October 1, 2003. The Marine
Corps Reserve achieved its fiscal year 2002 recruiting goals, accessing
5,904 non-prior service marines and 4,213 prior service marines. With
regard to our Reserve component, our most challenging recruiting and
retention issue is the ability to fill out our Selected Marine Corps
Reserve units with qualified officers. The Marine Corps recruits
Reserve officers almost exclusively from the ranks of those who have
first served a tour as an active duty marine officer.
While this practice ensures our Selected Marine Corps Reserve unit
officers have the proven experience, knowledge, and leadership
abilities when we need it the most--during mobilization--it limits the
recruiting pool that we can draw from to staff our units. As a result,
the Selected Reserve currently has a shortage of company grade (Second
Lieutenant to Captain) officers. We are exploring methods to increase
the Reserve participation of company grade officers through increased
recruiting efforts, increased command focus on emphasizing Reserve
participation upon leaving active duty, and Reserve officer programs
for qualified enlisted marines. We are also pursuing the legislative
authority to provide an affiliation bonus to Reserve officers as an
additional incentive for participation in the Selected Marine Corps
Reserve.
Retention
Retaining the best and the brightest marines has always been a
major goal of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps is by design a
youthful service, however, it is of paramount importance to retain the
highest quality marines to lead our young force. History has proven
that leadership in the Staff Noncommissioned Officer ranks has been the
major contributor to the combat effectiveness of the Marine Corps. The
Marine Corps has two retention standards. Our First Term Alignment Plan
has consistently achieved its reenlistment requirements over the past 8
years. With one-third of the current fiscal year completed, we have
achieved 87 percent of our first-term retention goal. A look at our
Subsequent Term Alignment Plan (second tour and beyond) demonstrates
that we have already retained 51 percent of our goal for this fiscal
year. Both of these trends indicate healthy continuation rates in our
career force.
Current officer retention is at an 18-year high, continuing the
strong performance of the last 2 years. Despite this positive trend, we
cannot become complacent. As a Corps, we will continue to target
specific qualifications and skills through continuation pay. Military
compensation that is competitive with the private sector provides the
flexibility required to meet the challenge of maintaining stability in
manpower planning.
Marine Corps Reserve--Partners in the Total Force
It is important to note that the Marine Corps operates as a Total
Force, including elements of both active and Reserve components. We
continue to strengthen the exceptional bonds within our Total Force by
further integrating the Marine Corps Reserve into ongoing training and
operations. Concurrent with the various initiatives underway to improve
integration and update capabilities, the Marine Corps Reserve continues
to support its primary mission of augmentation and reinforcement.
Reserve units and marines provided over 1.8 million man-days in fiscal
year 2002. Reserves provided support at all levels within the Marine
Corps and at Combatant Commands and High-Level Staffs.
As we enter the 21st century, the overall structure of Marine
Forces Reserve will retain the current basic structure. However, Marine
Forces Reserve is currently working to create new capabilities
identified as part of its comprehensive review. Both as a structural
and an operational change, Marine Forces Reserve is increasing its
operational ties with the warfighting commanders by improving lines of
communication with our operating forces. These increased operational
ties will improve interoperability, increase training opportunities,
and enhance the warfighting capabilities of the Total Force.
Mobilization
Since the events of September 11, the Marine Corps judiciously
activated Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) marines in response to both
internal and joint operational requirements. The Marine Corps has
maximized the use of individual volunteers to meet these requirements
primarily in the areas of staff augmentation and force protection. In
addition, selected Marine Corps units were activated for force
protection requirements in support of homeland security. Because of
emerging requirements associated with war on terrorism, we began
involuntary recall of some of our IRRs on January 17, 2003.
Stop Loss
On January 15, 2003, the Marine Corps instituted Stop Loss across
the Marine Corps to meet the emerging requirements associated with the
expanding war on terrorism. Stop Loss was initiated to provide unit
stability/cohesion, maintain unit readiness, meet expanded force
protection requirements, and to reduce the requirement to active IRR
personnel. We will continue to make judicious use of this authority and
continue to discharge marines for humanitarian, physical disability,
administrative, and disciplinary reasons. We have instructed our
general officers to continue to use a common sense approach and have
authorized them to release marines from active duty if it is in the
best interest of the Marine Corps and the marine.
Education
Our leaders--especially our noncommissioned officers--throughout
the entire chain of command have kept the Corps successful and
victorious. Their sense of responsibility is the cornerstone of our
hard-earned successes. We will continue to develop leaders who can
think on their feet, act independently, and succeed. In the future, as
today, leaders will continue to instill stamina and toughness in each
individual while simultaneously reinforcing character that values
honor, integrity, and taking care of our fellow marines--including
treating each other with dignity and respect. Aggressive and informed
leadership demands education, training, and mentoring. The importance
of these key elements cannot be over-emphasized, and we must attend to
each at every opportunity.
Marine Corps University has responsibility and authority for the
planning, coordinating, and overseeing all education for our marines.
The university is accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges
and Schools to confer masters' degrees and currently offers a Masters
of Strategic Studies at the Marine Corps War College, and a Masters of
Military Studies at the Command and Staff College. The Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff currently accredits the War College, Command and
Staff College, and the College of Continuing Education for Phase I
Joint Education. The president of the university also exercises command
authority over the Expeditionary Warfare School and the Staff
Noncommissioned Officer Academies worldwide. Notable accomplishments
include Department of Education approval of a Masters of Operational
Studies at the School of Advanced Warfighting, which is the first step
toward our third master's degree program.
Plans for the future include providing coordination and continuity
through a coherent education plan for all marines. Our goal is to
develop better warfighting leaders at all levels through an increased
emphasis on relevant, structured education--at the graduate and
undergraduate level--through both resident programs and distance
education. Our intent is to greatly expand beyond the current emphasis
on field-grade officers to support leadership development throughout
the training and education continuum from private through general
officer, and to specifically bring senior non-commissioned officers
further along the education continuum.
Our lifelong learning mission is to establish an integrated
approach to learning; providing marines with one destination for
enrollment in a college program; access to research tools such as
books, periodicals, and the Internet; basic skills enhancement; and
nonresident courses. In the face of a requirement to increase tuition
assistance from 75 percent to 100 percent of tuition costs, and the
rate from $187.50 per semester hour to $250 per semester hour, the
Marine Corps added the necessary funds to expand the tuition assistance
program in the fiscal year 2004 POM, which provides sustainment until
fiscal year 2009.
Quality of Life/Quality of Service
Congressional support for increases in the Basic Allowance for
Housing, as well as the aggressive Marine Corps use of the Public
Private Venture (PPV) authority provided by Congress 5 years ago, are
resulting in dramatic improvements to the housing of our marines and
their families. Your continued support of our budget to help us achieve
zero out-of-pocket expenses by fiscal year 2005 is greatly appreciated.
The condition of other infrastructure, such as our barracks,
workspaces, and training ranges, are also key factors in overall
quality of life. While our infrastructure budgets reflect only the
minimal essential military construction and recapitalization necessary,
they will allow us to achieve a recapitalization rate of 67 years
within the FYDP (down from 100 years in fiscal year 1999) and an
improvement of our facilities readiness by fiscal year 2013.
We have been aggressively working to reduce the number of marines
and civilian marines in non-core business areas, reapplying the marines
to other operational requirements, and looking to optimize the use of
civil service/contractor support where appropriate. Our track record is
good. For example, we have reapplied marines in the garrison food
service and mobile equipment areas back to the operating forces and
competed a significant number of civilian positions. We will continue
this process in line with the President's Management Agenda to review
50 percent of our positions by fiscal year 2008. By ensuring that
quality of service remains high, we will help maintain our successful
record of recruitment and retention.
Families
The Marine Corps is an expeditionary force prepared to deploy on
short notice to accomplish assigned missions. While we may recruit
marines, we almost always retain families--it becomes a family decision
for a marine to stay for an entire career. Because of our expeditionary
culture, deployment support is provided to marines and their families
as part of our normal operations, largely through the efforts of Marine
Corps Community Services. In addition to concerted efforts to improve
housing and family services, security and support is offered during
pre-deployment, deployment, and post-deployment phases of our
operations. The Marine Corps also offers numerous programs focused on
new parent support and the prevention of domestic violence, as well as
services and programs for infants, toddlers, children, and teens. The
Exceptional Family Member Program focuses on assistance to service
personnel who have a family member with special needs before, during,
and after Permanent Change of Station Orders.
Safety
Ensuring a safe command climate and working environment remains a
critical concern for the Marine Corps. Often, the settings and the work
our marines do are dangerous, but effective command climates
continually mitigate those dangers through planning and leadership. Our
safety programs are integral to force protection and operational
readiness. Leadership and programming in safety awareness and standards
are vital to providing marines and their families with a meaningful
quality of life and service. On the heels of a very successful year
prior, fiscal year 2002 was a disappointing year for safety in the
Corps, as we lost more marines to mishaps in fiscal year 2002 than we
had in any single year for the preceding decade. Our aviation mishap
rate increased as well (from 1.4 to 3.9 class A mishaps per 100,000
flight hours).
These results do not indicate a lack of desire to safeguard
marines. Rather, several factors were involved that made it
particularly difficult to prevent mishaps through normal operational
risk management efforts. Demographically, the Marine Corps is a younger
force than the other Services (by an average 6 to 8 years), with
maturity being a contributing factor in many mishaps; however, none of
these factors are excuses for any failure to avoid preventable mishaps.
Our leadership at all levels is deeply concerned about the negative
trend and we are actively involved in multiple efforts to improve
readiness and save our most precious marines and valuable equipment.
IV. OUR MAIN EFFORT--EXCELLENCE IN WARFIGHTING
Marines have a vision for the future, and we are moving forward
with the modernization and transformation efforts needed to make this
vision a reality. We fully understand that our vision cannot be
achieved independent of our sister Services. Each of the Services has
its own critical role to play in providing for our Nation's collective
security; however, it is important that each of our contributions be,
simultaneously, both unique and complementary. In particular, the Corps
stresses the importance of our key partnership with the Navy. The Navy-
Marine Corps team has never been stronger, nor more necessary for our
Nation.
We have stated that our first concern is with the care and
stewardship of our people. This philosophy extends to the rest of our
programming in that we focus on procuring the programs and equipment
that will maximize the abilities of our marines to perform effectively
in combat. With the foundation of requirements drawn from our emerging
concepts, the Marine Corps is transforming its warfighting systems and
assets throughout the elements of our Marine Forces. The following
examples reflect but a few of our transformation and modernization
efforts. A more comprehensive description of the Marine Corps' entire
acquisition program can be found in the publication entitled Marine
Corps Concepts and Programs 2003.
Training
We believe the enduring wisdom, ``you train the way you fight.''
Because of this, our training exercises are becoming ever more joint
and combined to provide our marines with the experience they will need
when called upon to respond to crises--because there is no doubt that
we will work alongside our sister Services and coalition partners from
other nations in such circumstances. The Marine Corps Combat Training
Center at Twentynine Palms, California, focuses on integrated live fire
and maneuver, as well as combined arms training, and will continue to
play a central role as our foremost training and testing site for
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. Ongoing initiatives will expand the
role of the Combat Training Center and transform it into a ``Center of
Excellence'' that will focus the training efforts across our operating
forces. The Combat Training Center facilitates and supports the
development of new concepts and capabilities, thereby reinforcing our
combat effectiveness, enhancing joint interoperability, and supporting
DOD transformation efforts.
The future role of the Combat Training Center will grow beyond its
current emphasis on battalion-level integrated live fire, combined arms
training to support expanded training opportunities for all elements
(ground, air, combat service support, and command) of Marine Air-Ground
Task Forces up to and including a Marine Expeditionary Brigade. This
will include: enabling multi-site, distributed training evolutions that
tie together units from various bases; and investing in technology that
simultaneously links live, virtual, and constructive training.
Additionally, improvements to the existing Expeditionary Air Field and
construction of a large-scale urban training facility are being studied
as possible ways to enhance training opportunities at Twentynine Palms.
All of these efforts have the potential to increase the capability of
our training center to support evolving training requirements, enabling
the Corps to maintain its focus on uniquely Marine training skills,
while providing a vehicle to further integrate Marine Corps
capabilities into those of the Joint Force.
Infrastructure
Marine Corps infrastructure consists of 15 major bases and stations
and 185 Reserve facilities in the United States and Japan. In keeping
with the Corps' expeditionary nature, these installations are
strategically located near air and seaports of embarkation, and are
serviced by major truck routes and railheads to allow for the rapid and
efficient movement of marines and materiel. Recognized as the ``fifth
element'' of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force because of the close link
to the operating forces and their operational readiness, the condition
of the Corps' bases and stations is of vital importance. With the
ability to train as an integrated force being a fundamental requirement
of the Corps, infrastructure development planning is designed to
provide the facilities, training areas, and ranges (both air and
ground) to accomplish this requirement while minimizing excess and
redundant capacities. With increasing encroachment pressures and
constrained fiscal resources, the Marine Corps faces significant
challenges to provide and maintain a lean and efficient infrastructure
that fully meets changing mission demands.
Blount Island Acquisition
We are committed to undertake the wisest possible course to
conserve our real property and, when necessary, to acquire any
additional property that is mission critical. The Blount Island
facility in Jacksonville, Florida, is a national asset that must be
acquired to ensure its availability for long-term use. Blount Island's
peacetime mission of supporting the Maritime Pre-positioning Force is
vitally important, while its wartime capability of supporting large-
scale logistics sustainment from the continental United States gives it
strategic significance. The facility will play a vital role in the
national military strategy as the site for maintenance operations of
the Maritime Pre-positioning Force for years to come. The Marine Corps
plans to acquire the Blount Island facility in two phases. Phase 1,
funded in fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 2001, is currently in
progress and will acquire interests in approximately 311 acres of land
for the primary purpose of ensuring public safety on parcels adjacent
to the leased central management operational area. Phase 2, planned for
fiscal year 2004, involves acquisition of the central maintenance
operational area, consisting of over 1,000 acres.
Training at Eglin Air Force Base
With cessation of training at Vieques, Puerto Rico, the established
training ranges, quality of training support, and proximity to the
ocean available at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, can provide Naval
Expeditionary Forces with an alternative training capability. Eglin's
capabilities, location, and tenant commands provide the opportunity to
facilitate joint training between Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Army,
and Special Operations Forces. Development of an expeditionary force
training capability at Eglin can support the Secretary of Defense's
vision and direction for training transformation and the development of
a Joint National Training Capability. This type of training will be
critical to naval expeditionary combat-readiness.
The Marine Corps proposes to execute two 10-day training exercises
with a Marine Expeditionary Unit at Eglin each year. These exercises
include a variety of scenarios such as amphibious landings, raids,
mechanized operations, helicopter operations, and live fire and
maneuver exercises. No final decision on training activities will be
made until an environmental assessment currently underway is completed.
The Navy and Marine Corps are actively working to develop and sustain
cooperative relationships with the local community and the State of
Florida.
Encroachment and Environmental Issues
Encroachment--defined as any deliberative action that can cause the
loss of, or restrict, the use of land, airspace, frequency, or sea
maneuver areas--is a serious threat to the operational readiness of the
Corps. Urban and residential areas now surround many Marine
installations that were originally remotely situated. This growth is
often accompanied by pressure for access to Marine Corps resources, or
demands to curtail Marine Corps operations to make them more compatible
with surrounding land uses. The Corps' training lands often provide
excellent habitat for threatened and endangered species, serving as
islands of biodiversity amid the crush of densely populated urban areas
that surround many of our installations. The Marine Corps is
proactively engaged with Federal, State, and local agencies and
governments, as well as nongovernmental organizations, to provide win-
win solutions to these encroachment pressures, and ensure compatible
land usage and environmental security without degrading training and
mission readiness. Unimpeded access to our installations and ranges is
critical to the Marine Corps remaining America's ``Force in
Readiness.''
Our Nation has crafted a strong environmental code of conduct
structured on a wide range of Federal, State, and local laws and
regulations. Vague or inflexible environmental requirements, however,
can present significant challenges for marines performing their primary
mission. We support ongoing efforts to seek clarity and limited
flexibility in certain environmental laws, so that we may more
effectively balance our training requirements with our long-term
environmental stewardship responsibilities. Our ultimate goal is to
``fight the way we train,'' while preserving the natural environment.
Today, marines at all levels perform their jobs with an increased
awareness of potential environmental impacts. All of our bases and
stations, for example, have implemented Integrated Natural Resource
Management Plans and aggressive pollution prevention programs. The hard
work does not end with these initiatives. The impact of encroachment on
the Corps' ability to fully utilize its installations are varied and
require constant vigilance and attention to ensure that operational
readiness is not diminished.
Command and Control
Interoperability is the key to improving naval expeditionary
command and control effectiveness, especially as we begin to integrate
battlespace sensors residing in our manned and unmanned aerial, space,
and ground vehicles. This is particularly true as the Marine Corps
continues to work routinely with a range of government, non-government,
and international agencies. The command, control, communication, and
computer (C\4\) end-to-end interoperability of the Global Information
Grid will serve to enhance our ability to conduct joint, multi-
department, and multi-agency operations through the use of technology,
standards, architectures, and tools.
The Marine Corps works closely with the Joint Staff, combatant
commanders, operating forces, and other Services to ensure that, where
possible, joint concepts of operations are developed for common
capabilities. An example of this process is occurring with the
development of the Joint Tactical Radio System, which combines numerous
single function programs of current inventories into a single,
interoperable, joint radio program that will provide secure digital
communications while enhancing wideband tactical networking.
Intelligence
Our fiscal year 1996 through fiscal year 2003 enhancements to
Marine Intelligence Support are paying off during Operation Enduring
Freedom and the global war on terrorism. Intelligence support organic
to Marine Forces combined with capabilities from our Marine Corps
Intelligence Activity in Quantico, Virginia, to provide federated
production (reachback) support has been validated through current
operations. Marine Expeditionary Unit's forward deployed with organic
all-source intelligence collection and production capabilities provide
current intelligence support to Marine and Special Operations units.
Our deployed signals intelligence, human intelligence, ground sensor,
and reconnaissance teams provide the commander current situational
awareness. All-source intelligence marines have the systems and
training to integrate organic collection, network with the joint force
on the ground, and effectively reach back to the Marine Corps
Intelligence Activity and joint centers at secure locations.
Mobility
While the global war on terrorism has demonstrated the current
capabilities of the Navy-Marine Corps team, our continuous
transformation and modernization efforts hold even greater potential
for increasing naval power projection capabilities in the future. Many
of these efforts focus on increased speed, range, payload, and
flexibility of maneuver units--mobility. This concept includes a vision
of an all-vertical lift Air Combat Element, with the introduction of
tiltrotor and short-take-off/vertical-landing (STOVL) aircraft. The
following initiatives are some of the keys to the achievement of Marine
Corps operational mobility objectives:
MV-22 Osprey
The MV-22 remains the Marine Corps' number one aviation acquisition
priority. While fulfilling the critical Marine Corps medium lift
requirement, the MV-22's increased capabilities of range, speed,
payload, and survivability will generate truly transformational
tactical and operational opportunities. With the Osprey, Marine Forces
operating from the sea base will be able to take the best of long-range
maneuver and strategic surprise, and join it with the best of the
sustainable forcible-entry capability. Ospreys will replace our aging
fleets of CH-46E Sea Knight and CH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters.
KC-130J
The KC-130J will bring increased capability and mission flexibility
to the planning table with its satellite communications system,
survivability, and enhancements in aircraft systems, night systems, and
rapid ground refueling. The KC-130J is procured as a commercial off-
the-shelf aircraft that is currently in production. We are pursuing a
multiyear program for purchase with the U.S. Air Force.
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle
The Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) is the Marine Corps'
only Acquisition Category 1D program and will be one of the principal
enablers of the Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare concept. AAAV will
provide never before realized high-speed land and water maneuver, a
highly lethal day/night fighting ability, and advanced armor and
Nuclear-Biological-Chemical protection. This--coupled with a systematic
integration into emerging service and Joint Command and Control
networked information, communications, and intelligence architectures--
will provide the Marine Corps with increased operational tempo,
survivability, and lethality across the spectrum of operations.
Maritime Pre-positioning Force
The Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future) will be the true
enabler of primarily sea-based operations. When it becomes operational,
the future Maritime Pre-positioning Force role will expand beyond that
of today, and will provide a true seabasing capability. In this regard,
it will serve four functions that the current capability cannot: (1)
phased at-sea arrival and assembly of units; (2) selective offload of
equipment and cargo; (3) long-term, sea-based sustainment of the
landing force; and (4) at-sea reconstitution and redeployment of the
force. The naval services are exploring several new technology areas
during the development of Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future).
Currently, the Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future) Program is
conducting an analysis of alternatives to inform an acquisition
decision by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
High-Speed Vessel (HSV)
High-speed vessels will enhance the Marine Corps' capability to
perform a wide range of missions, from providing support to a theater
security cooperation plan to sustaining long-term operations ashore.
High-speed vessels can enhance our ability to conduct sea-based
operations and use the sea as maneuver space. HSVs do not have the
loitering and forcible entry capabilities of amphibious ships or the
pre-positioning capacity of our Maritime Pre-positioned Force
Squadrons. However, their shallow draft, high speed, maneuverability,
and open architecture make them a valuable link in a seamless logistics
system that extends from source of supply to the Sea Base and the Joint
Force, enabling a faster, more responsive, and capable deployment of a
range of force modules from forward-based ``hubs'' such as Okinawa, or
from the United States. The Marine Corps is currently testing and
validating these concepts by employing a high-speed vessel in the
Pacific theater as a form of strategic lift.
Power Projection Platforms
Combined with embarked marines, naval expeditionary warships
provide the Nation with forward-presence and flexible crisis response
forces. They also provide a truly unparalleled expeditionary forcible-
entry capability. As part of a joint effort, the Marine Corps will
remain capable of getting to the fight rapidly in order to decisively
deter or defeat adversaries who try to impose their will on our country
or its allies. A fiscally constrained programmatic goal of 12
Amphibious Ready Groups--one that deliberately accepts increased
operational risk by attempting to balance force structure with
available resources--does not change the warfighting requirement to
lift the Assault Echelons of three Marine Expeditionary Brigades via
future platforms for amphibious shipping. The Marine Corps supports the
LPD-17 and a modified LHD-8 (``Plug Plus'') ship design in fiscal year
2007 and will evaluate the adequacy of the R&D and shipbuilding and
conversion (SCN) funding for the development of future LHA(R) ships for
the remainder of the class.
Mine Countermeasure Capabilities
Naval expeditionary forces require an effective counter-mine
warfare capability to open and maintain sea lines of communication and
to operate within the littoral battle space. This is probably our
greatest concern when it comes to projecting power in an anti-access
environment. With respect to mine countermeasures, we require a family
of capabilities that encompasses mine detection, location,
neutralization, marking, and data dissemination. Designed to provide an
organic mine counter-measures capability within operationally
acceptable timelines and with acceptable levels of operational risk,
this next generation of systems includes the Advanced Mine Detector,
the Assault Breacher Vehicle, the Remote Minehunting System, and the
Long-term Mine Reconnaissance System. Our most critical mine
countermeasures deficiencies exist in the area near the shoreline
through the high water mark and beyond, where detection and
neutralization capabilities are extremely limited. Given the broad
proliferation of known and unknown mined areas throughout the world, we
must improve our ability to operate in this exceptionally lethal
environment. Our intent is to leverage America's strength in technology
to dramatically improve our ability to locate and avoid or neutralize
mines and obstacles as necessary, and eventually remove the man from
the minefield.
Fires and Effects
With the increased range and speed of expeditionary mobility
assets, the landward area of influence of naval forces has increased by
an order of magnitude. Consequently, the Nation requires weapon systems
with correspondingly greater range, lethality, flexibility, and
tactical mobility. A range of lethal and non-lethal fire-support
programs is moving the Corps in that direction. The development and
acquisition of non-lethal weapons systems will expand the number of
options available to commanders confronted with situations in which the
use of deadly force is inappropriate. The Marine Corps is developing a
robust non-lethal capability that will address the non-lethal core
requirements of clearing facilities, crowd control, and area denial.
Additionally, we are enhancing the capabilities with which we can
affect our adversaries that defy the traditional concept of weapons and
fire-support means. Technical advances in directed-energy weapons hold
much promise for future capabilities in this area.
Joint Strike Fighter
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is the next-generation strikefighter
for the Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy and will replace the Marine
Corps' AV-8B and F/A-18A/C/Ds. The JSF family of aircraft will include
a STOVL variant, a conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) variant,
and an aircraft carrier-capable variant. Commonality between the
variants will reduce both development and life cycle costs and will
result in significant savings when compared to the development of three
separate aircraft. The Marine Corps requires that its STOVL variant be
able to operate from large-deck amphibious ships, austere sites, and
forward operating bases. The STOVL Joint Strike Fighter version can use
from three to five times more airfields around the world than our
existing conventional take-off and landing aircraft. Moreover, because
the STOVL variant can operate from both conventional carriers and
amphibious assault ship decks, it thereby effectively doubles the
number of platforms available for seabased operations. The advantages
of a stealthy STOVL strike fighter--capable of taking off from an
expeditionary base on land or at sea, flying at supersonic cruise,
accomplishing its mission with advanced sensors and weapons, and then
returning to its expeditionary site--are dramatic. The STOVL Joint
Strike Fighter will provide the reliability, survivability, and
lethality that marines will need in the years ahead, and transform the
very foundations of naval tactical air power for the 21st century.
Naval Surface Fire Support
Our ability to provide fires in support of expeditionary forces
operations beyond the beach has not kept pace with the dramatic
increases in mobility. Critical deficiencies currently exist in the
capability of the Navy to provide all-weather, accurate, lethal, and
responsive fire support throughout the depth of the littoral in support
of expeditionary operations. The Marine Corps supports the Navy's near-
term efforts to develop an enhanced naval surface fire support
capability with the fielding of the 5,,/62-caliber naval gun and the
development of extended-range munitions. In the far-term, the Marine
Corps supports the development and fielding of the Advanced Destroyer
(DD(X)), armed with 155mm Advanced Gun Systems and Land Attack
Missiles, to fully meet our naval surface fire support requirements.
Our Nation's expeditionary forces ashore will remain at considerable
risk for want of suitable sea-based fire support until DD(X) joins the
fleet in significant numbers.
Indirect Fire-Support
A triad of indirect fire-support programs will provide needed
firepower enhancements for marines in the near- to mid-term. The first
element of the triad is the Lightweight-155mm (LW-155) towed howitzer
needed to replace our current M-198 howitzer, which is at the end of
its service life. The LW-155 is a joint Marine Corps-Army effort that
will meet or exceed all the requirements of the current system while
significantly reducing its weight.
The second element, the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
(HIMARS), will deliver very high volumes of rocket artillery in support
of the ground scheme of maneuver. The HIMARS will provide accurate,
responsive general support, and general support, reinforcing indirect
fires at long range, under all weather conditions, and throughout all
phases of combat operations ashore. It will fire both precision and
area munitions to a maximum range of 36 miles.
The Expeditionary Fire Support System, the third system of the
land-based fire support triad, will accompany marines in any
expeditionary mode of operation. It will be the primary indirect fire-
support system for the vertical assault element of the ship-to-
objective maneuver force. The Expeditionary Fire Support System, as a
system, will be internally transportable by helicopter or tiltrotor
aircraft to allow the greatest range and flexibility of employment for
our future operations.
Information Operations
Defense planners are engaged in studies exploring Information
Operations as a core military competency, fully integrated into both
deliberate and crisis action planning. The Marine Corps intends to
enhance our operational capability in both offensive and defensive
Information Operations. Marine Corps doctrine and warfighting
publications are being reviewed and revised to acknowledge Information
Operations as a core warfighting capability fundamental to all
operations spanning the spectrum of conflict with equal significance
during non-combatant and humanitarian operations. We recognize a
requirement to develop and train an Information Operations career force
of trained professionals from the ground up in support of joint and
interagency efforts.
New Weapons Technologies
The Corps is particularly interested in adapting truly
transformational weapon technologies. We have forged partnerships
throughout the Department of Defense, other agencies, and with industry
over the past several years in an effort to develop and adapt the most
hopeful areas of science and technology. Several notable programs with
promising technologies include: (1) advanced tactical lasers, (2) high-
power microwave, non-lethal active denial systems, (3) free electron
lasers, (4) electromagnetic guns (rail guns), and (5) common modular
missiles for aircraft.
Logistics and Combat Service Support
The Marine Corps logistics' vision is to significantly enhance the
expeditionary and joint warfighting capabilities of our Operating
Forces. Key warfighting capabilities encompassed in our future
concepts--Enhanced Networked Seabasing and Ship-To-Objective-Maneuver--
will be defined by our logistic capabilities and limitations. Hence, we
are committed to exploring and implementing actions to increase combat
power, operational versatility, and deployability. The concept of
focused logistics in Joint Vision 2020 is guiding the Marine Corps as
we strive to increase the sustained forward-deployed capability of our
forces. Future force combat service support--and the Marine Corps
logistics that enables it--will be changing as we shift more of our
operations to the sea base. At the forefront of this effort is the
Marine Corps Logistics Campaign Plan that outlines essential objectives
and tasks based upon overarching Marine Corps, naval, joint, and DOD
concepts and guidance. Our strategy encompasses four pillars:
Logistics Information Fusion and C2
A key to current and emerging warfighting capabilities is a robust
and responsive logistics information technology capability--one that is
integrated with our command-and-control architecture and interoperable
with naval and joint systems. The Global Combat Support System--Marine
Corps (GCSS-MC) and shared data environment, along with the Common
Logistics Command and Control System, provide logisticians across the
Marine Corps with a set of common logistics assessment, planning, and
execution tools that are interoperable with the common operating
picture.
Seamless Distribution
The single capability that defines Marine Forces in a joint
environment is its ability to sustain itself over an extended period of
time. The principal goal is to move from defining sustainment in terms
of deployable ``days of supply'' to a continuous uninterrupted
sustainment capability for the force. A key element in achieving this
is integrating current distribution processes and systems into broader
naval and joint distribution processes. Achieving this capability will
not only greatly enhance naval operations, but will be transferable to
the task of sustaining joint forces and operations.
Enhanced Equipment Readiness
The bulk of our logistics effort and associated ``footprint'' is
driven by its equipment-support activities. The Marine Corps seeks to
reduce the required level of support for equipment by greatly improving
the reliability, availability, and maintainability of ground tactical
equipment.
Enterprise Integration
Achieving the emerging warfighting capabilities envisioned by
future concepts require dynamic shifts in our logistics processes and
organizations. Leading this effort toward logistics modernization is
true enterprise integration consisting of GCSS-MC, process
reengineering, and organizational reform.
V. CONCLUSION
The major challenges confronting the Marine Corps today center on
organizing, training, and equipping our force to better support Joint
Force Commanders, now and in the future. The modernization programs and
the transformational systems that we are pursuing are key to our
ability to meet the Nation's wartime, crisis, and peacetime
requirements. We have put into place well-conceived programs addressing
the needs of our marines and their families, the requirement to enhance
the current readiness of legacy systems, the critical role
infrastructure plays in present and future readiness, and the balance
between modernization and transformation.
We are focusing on the development of integrated capabilities that,
when combined with those of our sister Services and Special Operations
Forces, will effectively meet the challenges of an increasingly varied
and threatening national security landscape. You can remain justifiably
proud of what your Marine Corps contributes as America's forward
engagement and expeditionary combined-arms force. We are grateful for
the unwavering support you provide in this vitally important work.
Senator Talent. Thank you, General.
We have a vote at 3:45, and I want to make sure the
subcommittee members have a chance to ask questions. I am only
going to ask one right up front and then defer to Senator
Kennedy.
Admiral, I want to thank you for your personal kindnesses
to me in giving me that really good brief, which took me by the
hand a little bit, not only a new chairman but a new Senator.
Your vision is intriguing and powerful. As you mentioned, it
depends a lot on the Littoral Combat Ships, which as I
understand there are two parts to that. One is the ship or the
frame, and then the focus on mission modules. As I look at the
requirements documents that the Navy has developed so far, it
seems to me that you are pretty far along in defining what you
want with the ship and its frame.
I am concerned about whether you are equally as far along
in defining the requirements for the modules. I think we know
what we want them to do and it makes a lot of sense with anti-
submarine warfare and littoral combat. Do you share that
concern? Are you where you want to be in terms of developing
the requirements for that module, and are you where you want to
be in terms of the technical sophistication of it at this
point?
Admiral Clark. Mr. Chairman, where I would like to be is
that I would like to be at the end of a 3-year or a 4-year
development process, but I am only a year or less into it.
Senator Talent. Are you where you hoped to be at this
point? Put it that way.
Admiral Clark. So what I would say is that I am very
pleased with the fact that I am sitting here and we are
discussing a program that we did not submit in the fiscal year
2003 request. It was clear to me that in dealing with the world
that we were living in, the LCS platform and its family of
ships has a capability we need tomorrow.
I will tell you that I am extraordinarily pleased with the
progress that we have made. If I had known what I know today
when we worked on this budget and developed it, I would have
put it together differently. But I did not know enough yet.
When Secretary Young comes in panel two to talk to you about
the things that we have done to bring, to move LCS along, I
want to say that LCS represents a reform in the acquisition
process, the spiral development process.
Here is where I am with LCS. We envision Block Zero
fundamentally the modules being off-the-shelf existing
capabilities that we have today. If I had known what I know
today when I was building this budget and submitted it, I would
have had more money in the R&D side of this, but I could not
justify it as we were making the submissions. I did not have
enough knowledge.
I do believe that we are absolutely going at this in the
correct way.
Senator Talent. Is that the reason the $35 million in
production money is part of your unfunded priorities?
Admiral Clark. That is correct. Fundamentally, I need these
ships to deal with what I believe to be the threat that we face
in the world where we are operating today and the kind of
threat that is going to come after us in the first decade or
two decades of the 21st century, where no navy is going to go
toe-to-toe with the Navy of the United States of America. They
are going to come after us asymmetrically, and we have to be
able to deal with these threats in the near-land arena.
What I am excited about, though, is the issue you raised.
This is a sea frame. We are going after the design of this in a
revolutionary way. I and my successors will not have to come to
Congress years from now for a mid-life upgrade because this
approach to ship ownership is going to allow continuous
upgrades.
It is the way to develop and create the combat capability.
I am excited about it.
Senator Talent. You are saying the whole concept here is
that the nature of the modules would be such that even if you
develop the frame ahead of where you develop the module, the
frame should be able to accommodate whatever you decide to do
with the module?
Admiral Clark. That is absolutely correct, and I believe
that the basic frame has to have fundamental capabilities. It
must have self-defense capabilities. We ought to be able to
shoot down missiles, and we have to be able to deal with the
surface threat. But fundamentally, we have defined what the
mission is for this ship. General Hagee mentioned them. They
are areas that this subcommittee is very interested in.
I believe this is the most significant advance we have seen
in years is the wet end of mine warfare. I believe that by
enabling us to go and create the design from the keel up, the
ability to go after unmanned vehicles in mine warfare and the
whole undersea warfare area, anti-submarine warfare, in the
near-land arena, the future is going to absolutely
revolutionize the way this whole area of warfare is conducted.
The first step is we have to have the frame as rapidly as
possible because we have real world threats in the terrorist
environment that we live in today. We need these capabilities
with things that we can put on them today, existing off-the-
shelf capability. We need that as rapidly as we can turn the
product.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Admiral.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Just continuing along on the LCS modules,
I understand that the Navy had planned to install the remote
mine hunting systems on 17 DDG-51 destroyers. Now they are
focused on the LCS. They have cut the number to six systems for
the DDGs. The previous plan would give mine countermeasures
capability to the fleet sooner.
I am looking at that against the background of what we have
seen with the HMS Galahad coming on into port over there with
the presence of mines. It seems to me that we are going to be
needing this capability. You have the capability. It was all
set to sort of go. Now we are going to be delayed for a period
of time, and we are just illustrated in these littoral
situations in the past days about the importance of that
capability.
Admiral Clark. Senator, here is the way we go at this.
Frankly, the recommendation was made to me said: Boss, we are
going to do this in LCS; should we proceed with the organic
commitment that we had made before? I said, ``Absolutely, we
are going to continue with the commitment for organic mine
warfare, because we have more development to do here.''
But, Senator, what I believe is this: an LCS ought to have
four or five of the RMSs on it. That is what I think it should
have. So as we put together the program for the next year, this
will have more definition next year. But one RMS is not enough.
I envision we will be tailoring these individual platforms, and
I will tell you that I absolutely see the RMS program growing.
Senator Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, we are going to be voting at
3:45 and there are three of us here. So if we get 7 or 8
minutes, is that okay?
Senator Talent. Whatever we need.
Senator Kennedy. We want to be fair. We will try and get it
within 8 minutes.
Let me ask you this. Why did it take as long--I do not know
if the general can tell--for the HMS Galahad to get into port?
It seemed that it was coming into port and it was outside and
coming into port, and it seemed to take about 3 days to get on
into that area with all of the relief. I know what the problems
are once it got there, but what was that problem and the
problems with unloading. But what was really the problem? Was
it removing the mines?
General Hagee. Actually, it was not removing the mines. In
fact, I would like to say a couple of words about the mines.
Senator Kennedy. Good.
General Hagee. There is a complementary way to attack mines
and that is what we did in Kuwait.
Senator Kennedy. This is not when you were using the
choppers and the chains? I saw them doing that clearing the
Gulf before out there.
General Hagee. No, sir.
Senator Kennedy. One of the great sights, seeing these
helicopters carrying those chains and the American fleet going
after.
General Hagee. This goes back to the idea of Sea Basing and
speed, sir. When it looked like the Iraqis were going to ignite
some of the air fields, we launched the attack. Not only did we
take down the southern oil fields, we also took down the Al Faw
Peninsula and Umm Qasr. Because it was so fast, what our forces
did is we actually captured three barges with mines on the
barges that they were getting ready to lay--that they never
laid.
Therefore, we actually got the HMS Galahad in much faster
than otherwise. Now, the day that she was supposed to leave, we
actually found a mine, and so we wanted to ensure that the
harbor was completely clear of mines and that is why there was
that slight delay.
Senator Kennedy. Okay. That is helpful, but that capability
and capacity, if they had not gotten the three barges of mines
out there, it might have been different.
Let me come back to the fleet size. We talked--Admiral
Clark, I appreciated the chance to visit with you--about the
retiring of the DD-963 destroyers early. We know that they have
been providing the Tomahawk missiles for the strike missions
and I think you mentioned that there were alternative ways of
providing that capability.
So I looked into that, and of course you mentioned, I
think, the Aegis cruisers and the destroyers, which have 120
cells for the cruisers and 90 cells for the destroyers. But
most of those are the surface to air rather than the Tomahawk
missiles that were being used into this. So let me come back
again to this question. Given the need for this capability,
should we not be holding onto those?
Then second, given the fact of the overall reduction in
terms of the number of ships is going to mean more people on
the ships, I guess, the additional OPTEMPO in terms of people
going out because you have smaller numbers of ships and so they
will have to be on base for a longer period of time. You have
obviously worked that through or thought about that. How much
pressure is that going to present to the Navy? Obviously, the
personnel will be willing to do it, but what is your assessment
over a period of time?
Admiral Clark. My assessment is, Senator, that I have
reviewed very carefully the inherent warfighting capability and
the risks associated with the retirement of this platform. My
view is, and I think the numbers show, we have significant
capacity in the vertical launch system (VLS) and we are also,
part of this budget is the creation of SSGNs, which handle over
150 Tomahawks apiece. So we do not have a shortage of potential
missile tubes.
When I evaluated this whole laydown, it became clear to me
that it was time to cut this asset loose so we could use those
resources to reinvest in the future. It is a tough choice, but
in an open hearing I do not want to get into the specifics of
why, but I would be glad to submit those for the record if you
would like.
But I want to assure you that I have assessed this and I
believe that the risk is absolutely acceptable.
With regard to tempo, it becomes a driver for force
structure. Again, it gets into a classified discussion very
quickly to talk about each platform and the piece that they
bring to the challenge.
But Senator, here is the issue with the legislation that
was passed last year. The limitation on 116 combatants and then
the requirement for me to maintain those ships ready to be
recommissioned and remanned is an expense that I do not believe
the taxpayers' money needs to be spent on. I believe that
unless there is a decision made not to allow us to proceed with
these decommissionings, we need to alter the legislation and I
need your support. If we are going to take this step, we need
to take the entire step.
Senator Kennedy. Let us come back to that and talk with you
about it. Just in the last bit of time that I have, looking at
the tradeoffs in firepower on the DD(X), my understanding of
the effort leading to the point on the DD(X) schedule,
including all of the analysis done supporting the DDG,
indicated there were certain threshold capabilities for the two
parameters. One, the question about the first design being too
big. Evidently 15,000 tons was too big. The question is whether
the next platform is going to be too small to be able to
provide the fire support that is going to be necessary, given
the fact of the deficiencies we have today and given the fact
that that extended range, the ERGM, has also been delayed.
What are we getting ourselves into?
Admiral Clark. Senator, those decisions will be made by the
acquisition executive, not by the CNO, and he is going to be in
panel two. Having said that, I will tell you that the
breakthrough in DD(X) is the development of the AGS, a system
that has the potential to fire out to 100 miles. I mean, it is
unbelievable when I think about it, the way it was when I
started my career with a 16,000 yard weapon.
You look at Tomahawk, which will be on that platform. You
look at the potential for ERGM and ANSR, those two systems that
are competing with one another. The real breakthrough here is
going to be volume of fire and precision of fire from a surface
platform in support of the United States Marine Corps.
A science and technology (S&T) project on the affordable
missile has potential for future use. Because this is going to
be an all-electric ship, it has all the potentials that come
with the potential of rail gun technology. I believe that what
we see is an extraordinary bright future here. All of these
things involve research and development, but all of these are
well within our grasp and the programs are progressing nicely
here and the Secretary for Research, Development, and
Acquisition will be able to address more specifics if you would
like.
Senator Kennedy. My time is up. Thank you.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Collins is next.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Clark, I want to again reiterate my thanks to you
for your good work in putting together the budget request for
this year, and in particular for funding shipbuilding at a
level that will help to remedy some of the deficiencies of the
past and put the Navy on the road to recapitalization. There
are, however, still challenges that face us.
In particular, I have concerns about the procurement of the
major surface combatants in the coming years. As I understand
it, the Navy will cease construction of the DDG-51 destroyers
after 2005 and only fund four DD(X) destroyers during the 2006
to 2008 time frame. As you are well aware, to sustain the
industrial base four vessels over a 3-year period just does not
make it. It really is totally inadequate.
At the same time, I think a lesson that we have learned
from the last couple of years is the Navy is going to continue
to face increased mission requirements. The problem is still a
few years off and I realize that, but I think it is critical
that we start talking about it now. What are your thoughts on
addressing that gap to make sure that we are sustaining the
industrial base as we transition from the DDG to the DD(X)?
Admiral Clark. I believe Secretary Young has done a
magnificent job of working the industrial base issues and the
partnerships that have occurred with the ship swap concept and
has made it a reality, and the support of Congress made those
moves possible. I think these are all things that are out in
front of us.
There are some unknowns, Senator. The first unknown is with
the advent of missile defense do we have our numbers right? How
quickly will CG(X) come on line? What will be the impact on
this for the DDG, the whole numbers of DDGs, and the cruisers
that we have?
I will tell you that some of those are unknown at the
present time and we are going to have to continue to review
those. I feel good about where we are in the 2004 line. There
is no doubt about the fact that we are going to have to
continue to work that, and a major focus as we are working the
2005 submit now as we are up here talking about 2004. These are
important issues that we are having to address as we put
together the next cycle.
Having said that, it is my conviction that clearly the
industrial base is a critical issue for the United States Navy.
What makes our future possible is the industrial base. So these
numbers in the transition between DDGs and DD(X) have to be
managed very carefully. So the best answer I can give you is a
pledge that that will be done from a standpoint of where my
role in the process in stating the requirements, as opposed to
the acquisition executive, making the case for a healthy
industrial base.
With regard to the outyears, this is the third year that I
have come and talked to you about the issue of the importance
of an investment stream that is leveled so that we create
better partnerships with industry. One of the things that I am
very proud of in this submission is that you can see that the
leadership in the Navy Department reaching toward and for the
goals that we have talked about now. For the third year, we
need to reach the point where we have at least $12 billion in
new ship construction so that we can have the kind of Navy that
we are dreaming about.
What I am really pleased with is that you see a progression
and a growth. The growth in this year is not hypothetical. It
is real. It is not where I want to be yet. We have not reached
the objective, but we are reaching toward that objective in a
constructive way. When we have that level investment stream, we
will be able to partner more effectively with industry so that
sizing and maintaining the industrial base is going to be a
much more productive effort.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Admiral.
We have talked often that, given the rapidly declining size
of the fleet, that it is critical that the Navy take every
opportunity to maximize the life of vessels that can still
provide useful service. Your unfunded priority list includes
funds to or requests for funds that would provide for the
refueling of the SSN-699, the U.S.S. Jacksonville. In the past,
some people have suggested that the Navy perhaps has been too
quick to decommission submarines and that has contributed to
the decreased force structure that we have today.
What value would the U.S.S. Jacksonville bring to the Navy
should funding be made available by this subcommittee so that
it could be refueled as opposed to decommissioned?
Admiral Clark. This falls, Senator, in the category of
talking about the tough decisions that a person has to make.
There are several categories where I had to make judgments like
this. The recommendation to decommission the Baseline 1
cruisers was totally and completely an affordability issue. The
decision to not refuel all of the submarines was an
affordability issue.
But this issue and this decision was driven in part by the
decision also to invest $4 billion in the reconfiguration of
the Trident submarines and creating SSGNs. So if you go back
and look at this over time, when I got this job there were five
submarines that were not in the program to be refueled. So we
have reached out and we have pulled some of those into the
category that they are now in program for engineering-refueling
overhauls.
So we have made the point about total numbers. I have
stated often, and before the whole committee you asked me if I
still believed in 375, and I do believe that that is the right
objective to reach toward. I am a great believer that
capability in individual platforms is even more important than
numbers, but numbers has this quality all of its own. It
defines the places that you are going to be able to be.
So Senator, the bottom line is those decisions were made
because of affordability reasons. I do not have the resources
to retain those ships or to refuel those submarines.
Senator Collins. Finally, Admiral Clark, I am going to ask
you for the record--since I know we want to give our colleague
from Rhode Island a chance to get his questions in before the
vote--information on the increasing role of the Navy in missile
defense. I am very interested in the comments you have made
both orally and in your written testimony and I would like to
explore that with you in a written exchange.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to follows:]
We are working cooperatively with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
to evolve Navy's participation in ballistic missile defense (BMD). The
plan to install surveillance and track capability in several DDGs by
October 1, 2004, is the first operational effort toward this
cooperation. We are working with MDA to improve on these capabilities
through a spiral development plan culminating in a capability to
provide anti-air warfare and BMD capability in Aegis-equipped ships in
the 2010+ timeframe. Currently, that effort is aimed at in-service
ships, but we are also looking at options that have the potential for
applications in new construction ships in the future.
Senator Talent. I thank the Senator from Maine.
The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony and for your
service to the Nation. We appreciate both.
Both the fleet and the Corps is stretched awfully thin at
the moment and I just wonder, can you let me and the
subcommittee know in terms of equipment, because I think the
personnel will do whatever they are told to do, what is the
constraining items that you are finding in this deployment and
this operation? Is the constraint in numbers or design,
technology, and obsolescence? Admiral Clark?
Admiral Clark. At the top of the list comes precision
ordnance. Of course, the issue with Tomahawk is documented. We
look toward going to full-scale production in 2004, the
acquisition executive, Secretary Young, perhaps would want to
address this, but I would just say this about it. The goal,
especially given now what has gone on in the last couple of
weeks--and without getting into specific numbers, which you
would not want me to do because we get into classified issues
right away--to get more Tomahawks.
The way the program is designed today, we do not get to
full capacity until fiscal year 2005, and I do believe there
are things that could be done to remedy that situation and that
they ought to be looked at very carefully. So that even though
we are not at full-scale and we have not gone to production
yet, we could make the investment that when we are ready to go
to production we get to capacity much earlier in the period.
I would say with regard to the rest of the precision
munitions issues, fundamentally the Nation has made the
investments as part of the DERF last year and we are in pretty
good shape. We are reaching toward capacity.
I will tell you there is one area that I have learned in
Afghanistan and I have learned here. Boy, I want the Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF) as fast as I can get it. I am so pleased
with the way F/A-18E/F is going. This is the first deployment
for the F/A-18E/F. The combat range of this airplane, 40 to 50
percent more combat range, major issue; and the ability to get
to the target area and the drain on the refueling resources,
because when you have a big operation and large refueling
requirements. If I had JSF, I could get to the target area
without ever bothering them.
What I have learned from this is the investment that we
have in JSF in this budget is, boy, an incredibly wise thing to
do. What I have said before, I desperately want the operational
availability that is present in this aircraft.
What else I have learned is how desperately I want the
combat range that is in this aircraft.
Senator Reed. Can you comment here on the decision to
suspend launches over Saudi Arabia and other countries of the
Tomahawk?
Admiral Clark. I certainly could.
Senator Reed. What is the problem there? Let me put it that
way, if you can comment.
Admiral Clark. Let me just tell you that no combat system
in the world is a 100-percent system. I will tell you that this
system is operating, with the data that I have today, better
than our historic averages.
With regard to the capability that it has, I can say this:
that if this system gets lost, it will set down. We had a
failure in a component in a couple of these systems where that
happened. That is about what I can say about it. But the
performance has been improved over previous operations and
previous numbers.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Hagee, from the perspective of the Corps?
General Hagee. Sir, I would like to associate myself with
Admiral Clark's comments on legacy systems. I, too, would like
to see the Joint Strike Fighter here. We are flying our assault
helicopter, the CH-46. I am ashamed to say that some of those
helicopters that are flying in Iraq I flew in Vietnam, and that
was a long time ago. So, we need the Osprey.
But if you set those legacy systems aside, because of the
funding that both Admiral Clark and I talked about in our
opening statement that Congress has given us over the past
couple of years, we are ready to fight today, as you are seeing
on television. My short-term concern is when this war is over,
we have to reconstitute, and we have been using our equipment
and some of the legacy equipment. We have been using it hard
and it is going to have to be maintained; some of it is going
to have to be replaced.
So that is really a larger concern to me than the current
fight.
Senator Reed. In effect what you are saying is that you
will have the perennial tradeoff between reconstituting your
legacy systems and modernization, and it will be even worse
after it has been used so aggressively; is that fair?
General Hagee. That is correct, sir. But facing reality, we
know that we are going to have to maintain some of these legacy
systems until the new ones come on.
Admiral Clark. May I just comment further? I believe that
that shows the importance of some of the investments that are
in this budget. For example, the EA-18G, a new program to
replace EA-6B, is I think vital because of the point you just
made.
Can I also add something about Tomahawk?
Senator Reed. Yes, sir.
Admiral Clark. The Tomahawk question you raised has been
said, but let me reiterate. Precision is of utmost importance,
and we are doing everything we can in the way we conduct this
operation to make sure that we minimize the potential for
collateral damage. I would like to say with this system, that
does not involve just the end point. We have meticulously
planned these routes so that we could do everything that we
know how to do to ensure that if there was a problem with the
system as it was conducting its path in to the target, that it
would minimize any collateral damage, and so far that has been
very successful.
Senator Reed. Just a follow-up question. Does this budget
reflect those refurbishment costs that you already anticipate?
General Hagee. No, sir, it does not.
Admiral Clark. There was no way for us to know about that
in that submission. Frankly, I do not know how to even
calculate it right now, to tell you the truth.
Senator Reed. But I suspect, given the pace of activities
and the extent of activities, that is going to be a sizable
number.
Admiral Clark. I have several teams working the whole issue
of reconstitution and I am working various options, because I
do not know when I will be able to start.
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, I think we have a vote coming
up. Thank you.
Gentlemen, again thank you. Your forces are performing, as
we expect, magnificently and we are all very proud of the
sailors and the marines that are doing the job. My father was a
sailor and my brother was a marine. I was a soldier. But two
out of three ain't bad.
Admiral Clark. We love our United States Army.
General Hagee. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Talent. Your family had it pretty well covered.
Thank you. Thank you, Senator.
I would just add something to what the Senator from Rhode
Island said. Really we are all trying to make up for years when
we never hit the bogie for procurement that you were saying we
needed in the nineties, and at the same time fight a war, and
at the same time transform. It is hard. Even with these
additional investments, it is hard. I admire you two for the
work that you are doing, and particularly for the vision that
you have showed, Admiral, with Seapower 21.
General, let me ask you a couple of questions. I want to
just get your opinion on how a couple of your programs are
going. First, AAAV, which is so important to Seapower 21. A
couple years ago you added a Milestone C, I think, to the
procurement process, and then last year additional testing
time, and then this year the budget moves the milestone C back
a year.
While on the one hand it does seem that you are actively
managing, the program has been actively managed to make certain
that it does not get into any trouble. That is good, but on the
other hand you have to have questions about whether we are
going to be able to make operational readiness dates. What is
your opinion of the technical maturity of the program now? Are
we going to be ready by fiscal year 2008? When are we supposed
to be ready?
General Hagee. The short answer is yes, sir, I am confident
in it. The longer answer is that there was a number of things.
One, the development testing was taking longer than we
originally thought. The actual training of the crew was taking
longer than we thought. Then the operational testing is a new
system and we are still in the system development phase; we
wanted to be sure that we got it right. So we extended the
testing phase by a year in order to do good development testing
and robust operational testing.
I am confident in the system, sir.
Senator Talent. Are you still confident in the fiscal year
2008, or is it 2008 for your initial operational capability
(IOC)?
General Hagee. That is the correct IOC. Yes, sir, I am
confident in that.
Senator Talent. For the record, tell me what is happening
in your judgment with V-22? Have we resolved the problems? Is
it moving along the way you would like it to move along?
General Hagee. Yes, sir, it is. It is really doing
extremely well. We are about 80 to 85 percent finished with the
high rate of descent testing and it is performing exactly as
the model said it would. In fact, the envelope for this
particular phenomenon is larger than for a normal helicopter.
In other words, it is safer than a normal helicopter, and it is
easier to come out of the phenomenon. All you do is you rotate
the nacelles forward and you fly horizontally and you come out
of it. It is not quite as easy to come out of the phenomenon if
you are in a normal helicopter.
The maintenance and reliability problems that we had back
around 2000, because of the redesign of the system, the number
of hours between inspections continues to grow because we see
no rubbing, no chafing at all. We have conducted operations on
board the amphibs that went very well, and we are about 80 to
85 percent complete with the low-speed maneuverability testing
and that is also coming out very well.
Senator Talent. So far all systems go?
General Hagee. All systems go, sir.
Senator Talent. That is great. That is great news.
Admiral, let me ask you a question. I have a confidence
level actually that we are okay. Yet I want to ask you, just
because there are several things, when you put them together
you say to yourself, well, maybe I should not have this
confidence level.
The QDR force structure is the number of ships. You have
commented you think that is a moderate risk type scenario. We
are now below the QDR force structure level and we are also at
war. You did retire these ships and I think I agree with it. I
think it was a tough decision, but you have to make those
decisions.
But in your judgment, still an acceptable risk level?
Please comment on why that does not move up the risk level in
your judgment?
Admiral Clark. Let me say it like this. The sonar system,
designed for the deep water, not the near-land area. A towed
array sonar system in the same, fundamentally the same way. So
a ship not optimized for the near-land arena. A gun system, a
conventional gun system that is relatively short-range, 18,000
yards, 9 miles, does not provide you the reach that you are
looking for in the future, that we have laid out in the
investments for the future. A self-defense air defense system,
but not a defense system that can protect anybody else.
So when I weigh all of those things, I have plenty of TLAM
holes. There is not going to be canister and positions to fire
TLAM, that is not an issue. A much more difficult issue for me
is the Baseline 1 cruisers, which has an air defense
capability. That decision was very difficult. But it is not
mid-life because they are past the mid-life. This one, the
Baseline 1s, do not have vertical launch in them, and so for
them to play effectively in the game that we have from the
future in either the missile defense arena or against the
threats that we are dealing with for future, we have to put
significant resources against them and the life expectancy. We
are not at mid-life, but it is shorter than mid-life.
That is why I made those judgments. So the Baseline 1 is
much more difficult than the 963 class. I want to say that I am
personally wedded to the 963. I commanded the class leader.
This is hard for me.
Senator Talent. You are not dumping on these ships. It is
not like they do not have value, but when you do not have all
the money you want you have to make these tough decisions.
Admiral Clark. I have to make those decisions. I could keep
some of them, but I could not keep them in good conscience and
look you in the eye and say: This is the best way to spend our
resources. I want to assure you that I got zero pressure from
anybody above me in the chain of command for this. This is the
recommendation of Admiral Clark and the team in the United
States Navy. This is what we believe collectively is the best
thing to do.
Senator Talent. Let me close, unless Senator Collins has
any additional questions, and I will certainly recognize her
for any she may have, on a real up beat note. I know you think
the Sea-Swap program has worked well.
Admiral Clark. It has worked phenomenally well.
Senator Talent. Talk about some of the benefits of it and
tell us how that compares in your judgment with forward home
porting and the synergy that you see in the future. I mean, I
do not imagine it is going to be all or nothing at all.
Admiral Clark. First of all, it was a pilot. In our
discussions, I told you my view of this, and this is the
environment I have tried to create in the Navy, is let us
encourage innovation. The fleet came forward with a proposal on
how we could fly the Sea-Swap concept. I want to tell you, it
is their plan, it is their approach. Admiral LaFleur, who is
the commander of surface forces in the Navy, told me they have
executed the first swap.
What it does for us is, I did not have to have the transit
all the way from San Diego all the way out to the theater of
operations. It saved us the transit two ways by flying the crew
out there. So I just multiplied the effective utilization of
the ship, in effect increased the numbers of ships that I have
with on-station combat capability.
The first experience is complete. We are going to learn
some things from it. But his report to me through the chain of
command, through Admiral Natter, is that it has worked
remarkably well.
Optimum manning is another concept. How are ways that we
can thin down the manning in our ships by giving them
technology and other things that will make them more effective?
The U.S.S. Milius and the Mobile Bay have both been out there.
I was on Milius in January. What a bright-eyed group of
innovators. They have cut the manning in that ship by 23
percent.
We did not tell them to go do this. We said, where can you
see areas that we could do this better? But here is one thing I
want: I want every sailor to have a job full of rewarding job
content in positions where they can make a difference, and they
are doing that. It is working well.
Senator Talent. I thank you both again for your service and
for your time. I know you are certainly busy and I appreciate
working with you, and we will continue to do it as we get the
bill ready.
Admiral Clark. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity
to appear before you today.
Senator Talent. We appreciate it very much. Thank you.
I think we will go ahead and recess and I will run and vote
and come on back, so we do not keep the second panel waiting.
Thank you all very much. [Recess from 3:50 p.m. to 4:05 p.m.]
All right, I thank the two distinguished members of the
second panel for waiting. I was going to try and get your
statements in anyway while the roll call was pending, but I am
not sure we could have done it.
Our guests on the second panel, who we have reshuffled
because we had to reschedule this--and I appreciate your
flexibility--are John Young, the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy, a figure well known to Congress and this committee; and
Vice Admiral Mike Mullen, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
for Resources, Requirements, and Assessments and thank you both
for being here.
I am looking forward to your testimony. Secretary Young,
please let us have your statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN J. YOUNG, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION
Secretary Young. Mr. Chairman, it is a great honor actually
to come and talk to you. I think we have a good story to tell,
so I appreciate your kindness in rescheduling the hearing. I
have a written statement that I hope will be part of the
record.
I recently visited our sailors and marines in the Persian
Gulf area and I am proud to report to you that the commitment
that we made and Congress supported in fiscal year 2003 to
focus our taxpayers' dollars towards improving current
readiness has yielded strong dividends. Today we have 6 carrier
battle groups, over 70 ships, and more than 60,000 marines in
theater who are trained, equipped, and carrying out the
Nation's will, and our prayers are with them.
In my testimony to Congress last year, I emphasized that we
were focused on building a foundation of solid, stable funding
for our shipbuilding programs while working hard to control
costs and take a more businesslike approach to these programs.
While we still have work to do, I am pleased to tell you this
year that we have made significant progress in all of these
areas.
In June, the Navy and two of our principal shipbuilders
successfully negotiated an unprecedented workload swap
arrangement in which General Dynamics transferred its four-ship
LPD-17 construction program to Northrop Grumman Ship Systems in
exchange for additional DDG-51 work transferred from Northrop
Grumman. This swap avoided a second lead ship challenge for the
LPD program, improved the production learning curve, and
provided production efficiency for the LPD-17 class.
We estimate the swap will provide savings and cost
avoidance of at least $473 million for the LPD-17 program. The
agreement also allows General Dynamics to focus on DDG
construction, looking ahead to DD(X) opportunities. This deal
made good business sense for everyone and I must recognize the
courage and willingness to explore innovative ideas
demonstrated by General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, the Navy,
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) leadership
that were key in making this happen, particularly the essential
support of Congress in seeing a deal like this through.
The swap, in conjunction with the DDG multiyear contract,
has stabilized both DDG and LPD production.
The fiscal year 2004 budget requests authority to enter
into a multiyear procurement on the Virginia-class submarine.
The combination of the DDG-LPD swap, the DDG multiyear, the
Virginia-class multiyear, plus the funding in the budget for
CVN-21, T-AKE, and LHD-8 provide a stable, low-rate, new ship
construction program. The Navy and the Nation can build upon
this stable foundation in the future.
We have also worked hard to control costs and avoid prior
year completion bills. Our focused efforts to reduce change
orders, to strictly manage ship configuration, and to properly
fund to realistic cost estimates is paying dividends. The
fiscal year 2004 to 2009 budget recognizes new prior year
completion bills of approximately $225 million as compared to
over $800 million from the fiscal year 2001 budget, $487
million in fiscal year 2003, and $2.2 billion in fiscal year
2002.
A perfect example of our resolve in this area was the
decision to install the current and very capable combat system
suite on CVN-77 within the budget, rather than the
developmental system which was clearly going to generate
additional prior year costs and likely force late delivery of
CVN-77. Instead, we will install the new radars when they are
ready in a spiral modernization effort.
We are also using new tools, such as broken or stepped
share lines and incentive fee, to prevent cost growth on future
contracts.
In the next 5 years, we will deliver or design the lead
ship of eight new classes. This clearly shows our commitment to
providing the most modern and capable warships to our fleet,
sailors, and marines. Along with improved warfighting
capability, these new designs allow us to implement fundamental
changes in the way we man, operate, and maintain our ships.
DD(X) is the centerpiece of this leap forward. DD(X) is
being designed to provide our sailors the survivability and
flexibility of stealth, automation, and electric propulsion. In
addition to its land attack capability, DD(X)'s dual helo spots
and stern boat launch will provide new mission response
options.
I am pleased to report the DD(X) program is well under way.
The Navy has worked with our industry partners to forge a
national team of our country's most capable ship designers and
combat systems experts dedicated to its success. The DD(X) hull
and combat systems will also provide a path to the CG(X)
cruiser, which must be capable against the air, surface, and
theater ballistic missile defense threats out into the 2050
timeframe.
We have also embarked on an exciting initiative to build
the LCS in an entirely new way, exactly as you heard the CNO
speak about. With your help last year, we were able to get a
full 1-year jump on our original schedule. We are currently
evaluating potential hull forms to use as our ``sea frame.''
The LCS sea frame will be designed to accommodate different
mission modules, allowing us to tailor the capability to the
fleet's task.
We plan to develop and purchase the mission modules for LCS
on a time line that ensures the most current technology is
installed. Your support of this very innovative approach to
shipbuilding has been instrumental in our ability to move
forward so quickly with this ship.
We have combined many of the advances in our CVNX-1 and
CVNX-2 programs into the new CVN-21 program, while maintaining
the CVNX-1 development schedule. This is the first new carrier
design since 1967 and will introduce such new capabilities as
the electromagnetic aircraft launching system (EMALS), the pit
stop concept for improved sortie generation, and enhanced
survivability, while again reducing manning and maintenance
requirements.
We also continue to advance the current and future combat
value of our existing ships and future ships as we shift to
open architecture designs, which serve as powerful tools for
reducing software sustainment costs and increasing commonality.
Our commitment to develop and field networkcentric systems,
such as the Cooperative Engagement Capability Block II and the
Joint Fires Network, further empower our forces by providing
real-time awareness of the combat situation for our
warfighters.
Finally, building on the success of our Standard Missile 3
(SM-3) tests, we have worked closely with the Missile Defense
Agency to bring an initial missile defense capability to sea by
2004 and a more significant capability of up to 20 of our Aegis
equipped destroyers by 2006. We have provided the dedicated use
of one of our cruisers as a missile defense test ship and we
are using the funds originally intended for an MDA test ship to
develop and implement the SM-3 capability at sea earlier than
originally planned.
To enhance our ability to deliver these systems, we have
reorganized our Program Executive Officer (PEO) structure to
bring all integrated warfare systems across all surface
combatants, submarines, aircraft carriers, and amphibious ships
under a single PEO. We have done the same thing for all our
C\4\I systems throughout the Navy. Finally, we have
consolidated all non-nuclear shipbuilding and modernization
programs under a single PEO for ships to ensure that we take
maximum advantage of scale with all of our shipbuilders and the
lessons learned from one program are quickly transfered to
other programs.
The fiscal year 2004 budget sustains the enormous strides
made in personnel and readiness accounts while requesting $11.4
billion for shipbuilding and modernization. We have increased
the number of ships from the 5 indicated in the 2003 request to
7 in the 2004 budget request, resulting in 34 ships under
contract.
The fiscal year 2004 budget also includes funds for the
first Ticonderoga-class cruiser conversion, incremental funding
for LHD-8, service life extension for three LCACs, and two SSBN
to SSGN conversions. It requests, as the CNO mentioned, the
$1.5 billion R&D funds necessary to move forward with CVN-21,
DD(X), and the LCS programs.
I believe we have crafted a balanced and properly focused
budget request that ensures our Nation will have a stable and
healthy shipbuilding industrial base as well as an efficient
and appropriately sized infrastructure to support an optional
force structure. Our Navy-Marine Corps team is the most
professional and capable naval force in the world. With your
assistance, we will continue to provide maximum capability for
our sailors and marines and maximum security for America.
I thank you again for the opportunity to tell this story to
you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Young follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. John J. Young, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you
for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Department of
the Navy's fiscal year 2004 budget request. I recently visited our
sailors and marines in the Persian Gulf area, including Kuwait and
Bahrain, and we can rest assured that our sailors and marines guard our
freedom with a dedication born from a voluntary commitment to defend
the ideals of our founding fathers. I am proud to come before you today
and outline the contribution that we in the Navy and Marine Corps
acquisition community are making to enable the Department of the Navy
to field the most capable, mobile, and lethal force since its inception
over 225 years ago.
The global war on terrorism has fundamentally changed the national
debate on defense. To meet this challenge, difficult decisions were
required to find the optimal mix within the portfolio of naval
responsibilities, and within that, the shipbuilding acquisition
objectives of the Department. We have been good stewards for the
taxpayer by demonstrating creative thinking such as shipbuilding
workload swaps, R&D funding for lead ships, and split funding for CVN
21; making sound fiscal decisions including stopping the growth in
prior year shipbuilding costs; reviewing the need for some of our
legacy systems; and leveraging these actions to increase the number of
ships being requested in the fiscal year 2004 budget. By addressing key
issues such as the cultivation of promising shipbuilding technologies,
cost effective acquisition of mature platforms and systems, and
improved maintenance of existing systems we have been able to increase
the number of ships from the five indicated in last year's budget
request to seven in the fiscal year 2004 budget request.
In striving to provide the warfighter with the latest capabilities,
we have adopted the tenets of Naval Vision 21 and Naval Transformation
Roadmap 21. In doing this, we have engaged in a full assessment of
Naval Science and Technology funding to ensure we have addressed all
technology needs to support these transformation mandates. To this end,
technology demonstrations are planned using future years defense
program (FYDP) funds that aim to meet the needs of our forces--
stretching from the ocean floor to the edge of space, and from
facilities in the United States to the tip of the spear throughout the
world.
We are working extensively with industry to make each defense
dollar go further. For example, the DD(X) team is cultivating the best
minds in industry to ensure the DD(X) will provide the best ship design
and ship systems possible. Our efforts however aren't limited to the
early stages of a program's life cycle. We have recently brokered a
swap with Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics to align our LPD and
DDG shipbuilding programs more effectively. The result is a more robust
and competitive shipbuilding industry with a lowered cost to the
taxpayer. A true win-win situation. Additionally, we completed a
disinvestments effort to identify and eliminate those items we carry
and maintain in inventory that have limited function or application or
are becoming obsolete and unaffordable. We plan to continue this effort
to eliminate older systems with limited capabilities that have an
inordinately high infrastructure cost to supply, train for, and
support. Finally, we will continue to use multiyear procurements (MYP),
for example, the proposed Virginia-class submarine MYP, and cost
effective procurement quantities to help drive down the cost to the
taxpayer but drive up the support to our sailors and marines.
Our actions to get the best value reach beyond the Department of
the Navy. For example, we recently arranged a deal with the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) that assigns to them the U.S.S. Lake Erie to test
sea-based ballistic missile defense. In return MDA will pay for, and
upgrade, up to 20 Aegis equipped ships with as many as 90 Standard
Missile 3 (SM 3) weapons to be installed for missile defense. This
provides a limited sea-based missile defense capability by 2004 and
greater capability by 2006, well in advance of the plans presented to
you last year. It is this type of creative thinking that marks the new
mindset that we are instilling within the Navy's acquisition community.
In a similar initiative, the Navy has worked in partnership with
the Air Force to define a joint strategy for developing an unmanned
combat air vehicle (UCAV). The Air Force and Navy have been able to
define a common set of requirements while also recognizing the unique
needs of each Service. This work has allowed definition of a
competitive acquisition strategy for UCAV and patterned after the
successful Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) competition. UCAV is a critical
tool for providing persistent surveillance and combat capability for
sea based Navy platforms.
ENHANCING WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES
We are changing and initiating programs to improve the warfighting
capability of current and future forces. We are seeking joint
opportunities and options wherever possible in taking these steps.
One critical initiative is known as Open Architecture. This effort
will allow all Navy ships to eventually share common computers and
computer operating systems. Key functions, such as tracking, fire
control, and navigation, can be software applications that are shared
among all ships and easily upgraded as discrete software modules.
Unique software functions can easily be added for ships that need
special capabilities. We can enhance our competition opportunities by
allowing all qualified industry partners to offer proposals for writing
software modules. The DD(X) engineering development modules and planned
Aegis Combat System and Ship Self Defense System upgrades will be
combined to achieve the greater goal of an open architecture for all
Navy ships.
In addition to moving the Navy into the future of combat systems,
the DD(X) also moves naval surface combatants to the future of electric
powered, stealthy, and automated destroyers and cruisers. DD(X) will
essentially take the next step towards efficiency in the destroyer
construction process by implementing the design-build process
successfully applied to Virginia-class and LPD-17 class. Further, the
Total Ship Computing Environment developed for DD(X) will automate many
ship systems and damage control functions, allowing the Navy to reduce
the crew and thus the life cycle operating cost. The DD(X) hull and
technologies will lead directly to CGX, the cruiser for the air and
missile defense threat of the future.
Through the support of Congress, we have gotten an accelerated
start on the other surface combatant family member, the LCS. LCS will
allow the Navy to more affordably and effectively conduct mine
countermeasure, maritime interdiction and anti-surface warfare
operations, and enhance our capabilities against asymmetric threats.
LCS also represents a new approach to building ships--where the hull
will be a flexible ``sea frame''. The sea frame's common computer
architecture, the ``backbone,'' will enable the sea frame to
accommodate a variety of mission modules and will provide a path for
future spiral upgrades to LCS's capabilities. This family of ships will
be the heart of the Navy's Sea Strike capability until 2050 and beyond.
With the leadership of Secretary Rumsfeld, the Navy team defined a
strategy to accelerate and integrate the technologies of CVNX-1 and
CVNX-2 to yield the CVN-21 design. This ship will provide greater
sortie generation capability through improved flight deck operational
concepts. Further, the ship will use automation and survivability
enhancements to accelerate the manpower reduction goals, providing
lower operating costs for the fleet.
Ships alone cannot accomplish missions. First and foremost, we must
have the unmatched sailors and marines of today's force who turn our
weapon systems into true warfighting capability. They need the tools
that expand their reach and improve their effectiveness. The Department
has taken several truly dramatic steps that will change combat
capability in this area.
First, the Extended Range Active Missile (ERAM) provides an active
missile allowing Navy ships to fire and forget and do so 200 miles
over-the-horizon using surveillance systems such as the E-2C Advanced
Hawkeye. ERAM will leverage the significant investment made by the
Defense Department in the AMRAAM seeker, achieving the goals of
maintaining jointness and of leveraging past investments wherever
possible.
The UCAV will achieve the Chief of Naval Operation's goal of
persistent airborne surveillance capability combined with effective
strike capability. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Air
Force, and the Navy have worked together to harmonize requirements for
UCAV. This partnership will accelerate the delivery of UCAVs for the
Navy, providing competition and the potential for jointness.
The Army, Navy, and Air Force are working to join our requirements
for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) systems. Navy
ships are relying to a greater degree than ever on real-time delivery
of ISR products and the commanders increasingly have the command and
control tools to act on this information. Achieving a joint strategy in
this area will accelerate delivery of these systems to our sailors and
marines while assuring interoperability among the Services for joint
operations.
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) systems allow one Navy ship
to fire on a threat based on the better quality tracking information
provided from another Navy ship. CEC inherently improves the picture of
the battlefield for all naval assets. The acquisition team has defined
a strategy that will more efficiently use limited bandwidth and provide
CEC-quality situational awareness to all participants in the theater of
operations.
These and other tools will ensure that our sailors and marines have
unmatched capability and technology for the battlefield of the future.
CHANGING OUR BUSINESS PRACTICES
The Department of the Navy remains committed to simplifying the
acquisition system, streamlining the bureaucratic decisionmaking
process, and promoting innovation. We are streamlining our regulations
and instructions to remove unnecessary impediments and provide the
maximum flexibility to our acquisition workforce consistent with law
and higher regulation. We are also continuing to take advantage of
numerous acquisition initiatives to shorten cycle times, leverage
commercial products and capabilities, and improve the quality of
equipment being provided to our warfighters. For example, we used
direct dialogue with industry to accelerate by several months the
process of defining and selecting the ERAM missile design.
In an environment where competition is limited, the structure of
contracts is critical to providing tools for the program manager to use
in delivering ships and weapons on schedule and within the budget. The
Department is applying new contract strategies in an effort to focus
greater attention on cost and schedule. We are implementing broken or
stepped profit share lines to ensure that the Navy and industry are
very focused on the cost target and that industry is rewarded for
beating the target and penalized for exceeding the cost target.
Further, we are shifting greater portions of fee to be awarded on an
incentive basis upon accomplishment of critical path tasks. Finally, we
are weighting fee towards the critical events at the end of a program
that result in the desired goal--delivery of ships and weapons.
Evolutionary acquisition techniques show promise in programs such
as DD(X) and LCS. We are seeking to strictly control requirements at
each evolution or spiral in order to avoid program churn and associated
cost growth. Program risk, and cost, can be most effectively managed by
properly timing the development and introduction of new technologies at
specific points in the development and production process. The
extension of this step to production programs means carefully limiting
changes during the carefully planned production process. We have
imposed a strict discipline on ourselves that limits change during the
critical phases of our major shipbuilding programs to stop the growth
in prior year completion bills. By controlling the scope and timing of
change in a planned manner, we know what changes will cost and how we
will install them in the most economical manner.
The Department is working with industry as a partner across the
full breadth of our shipbuilding programs. Industry can help us
identify the best technologies and business practices for Department of
the Navy programs. Such partnerships have been critical to negotiation
of the new DDG multiyear contract, to completion of the DDG/LPD swap,
and to formation of the DD(X) team. For example, the tri-partite
agreement between Navy, General Dynamics, and Northrop Grumman
stabilized both our DDG-51 and LPD-17 programs, avoided a ``second lead
ship'' challenge for the LPD program, dramatically reduced risk and
provided cost savings on the LPD program, and enhanced stability and
competitiveness in destroyer construction. Furthermore, the swap
agreement created a rare opportunity to build LPD-18 and LPD-19 as twin
ships, providing the additional benefits of near-term cost savings and
the longer-term benefit of having two ships with one configuration.
This idea was adapted and applied to the carrier program by taking
steps to share planning efforts and combine purchasing power on the
CVN-70 complex overhaul and the CVN-77 new construction.
The Department also is actively improving its internal business
practices, including integrating commercial best practices where
feasible. By improving these practices, we expect to be able to shift
more dollars into combat capability and quality of service. We believe
that better information makes for better decisionmaking, both on the
battlefield and at the budget table. We have four pilot programs in
place utilizing enterprise resource planning (ERP) which aim to improve
the quality of information available to our decisionmakers. These pilot
projects will eliminate dozens of incompatible computer databases and
the business processes that once supported those databases. ERP should
produce financial and managerial information that is more complete,
accurate, and timely. ERP will allow greater efficiency in our ship
maintenance processes that should in turn deliver more ship
availability for training or deployment. Our recent focus has been on
converging the pilot programs to achieve even greater synergy of
management information across a broader spectrum of the Department, and
working with the DOD Comptroller to ensure these efforts are advancing
the uniform business management architecture under development.
In addition to better information, we need flexible and innovative
tools to help manage the Department. Some of these tools, such as
strategic sourcing, are being used already. Furthermore, competition
helps achieve the best quality support to the sailor and marine at the
lowest possible cost by introducing the discipline of the marketplace.
Another approach we are taking to improve logistics support to the
warfighter and reduce total life cycle system costs is through
Performance Based Logistics (PBL). This year, all ACAT I & II fielded
programs and all new programs submitted PBL implementation plans with
milestones. PBL has been successfully implemented on numerous weapon
system components (improving capability and lowering costs) and the
intention is to expand these successes to major weapon systems and
subsystems. We are also continuing to pursue Depot Maintenance
Partnerships between the private and public sector. These partnerships
provide increased capability to our depots while simultaneously
reducing cost and improving warfighter capability.
We are working hard to ensure that our sailors and marines get
needed technology in their hands today, not tomorrow. In areas ranging
from Forward Looking Infrared upgrades for Marine Corps tanks, to ISR
tools, to active anti-air warfare missiles, we are seeking greater
jointness and taking advantage of prior DOD investments in order to
reduce risk, lower cost, accelerate delivery, and provide greater
interoperability.
FOCUSING ON OUR PEOPLE AND ORGANIZATION
To enable development of new capabilities and facilitate the
adoption of new business practices, a number of organizational changes
have been made. Because of the importance of opening the computing
architectures and sharing combat system development across all ship
platforms, we established a Deputy Assistant Secretary and a Program
Executive Officer for Integrated Warfare Systems.
We also reorganized our business process owners by combining the
Director of Acquisition and Business Management with the Acquisition
Reform Office into a single Deputy for Acquisition Management. This new
office focuses on business policy and implementation and infuses it
with the innovative thinking and ideas of the office dedicated to
reforming the way we do business. One of the primary goals of this
reorganization is to shorten the time it takes new ideas to find their
way into our acquisition business practices. The Deputy for Acquisition
Management is directly supporting the DOD effort to streamline the OSD
policy and processes for major weapon systems embodied in the new DOD
5000 series directives.
In order to improve logistics support to the warfighter, we
established a Deputy for Logistics. The logistics office will
coordinate efforts to insert logistics considerations early in the
acquisition process where over 60 percent of the total life cycle costs
are determined. Equally important, logistical support of our current
systems is a costly and complex part of today's acquisition management
task. Finally, the Deputy for Logistics will play an important role in
guiding the implementation of ERP across the Department.
In today's environment, many technologies and systems cut across
program, platform, and systems command boundaries. To leverage the
expertise within our systems commands and ensure consideration and
coordination of concepts that cross program boundaries, we created a
virtual systems command. The systems command commanders will now work
together to avoid duplication of capability and ensure that we achieve
integration and interoperability benefits wherever possible within the
Navy and Marine Corps.
Equally important, we are reshaping the acquisition workforce to
concentrate on mission critical functions. These human resource plans
call for an analysis of key characteristics of the acquisition
workforce, an assessment and projection of changes in the workforce
into 2008, and the identification of human resource process shortfalls
that inhibit the ability to effectively manage this workforce. With the
advent of civilian personnel ``demonstration'' programs with pay
banding and the increase in outsourcing of commercial functions, we are
seeing an emerging workforce that will be compensated based on their
level of responsibility and contribution. Through enhancements to our
career development program, which include continuous learning
activities that augment minimum education, training, and experience
requirements, we are developing our acquisition professionals to be
better managers and leaders.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Cooperation with our allies remains a continued objective from
which we can leverage our Navy funds and accrue interoperability and
coalition warfighting capability. Programs such as Evolved Seasparrow
Missile, which is being developed in cooperation with nine of our
partners, is proof that cooperation works as demonstrated by recent
successful firings. The Rolling Airframe Missile program is a further
testament that cooperation has substantive benefits. We have also
continued to cooperate with Japan on technology to enhance our SM-3
missile and reduce development risk and cost. We are continuing our
strong ties with the U.K. in a number of areas. Efforts are also
underway to expand our cooperation into area and theater missile
defense through the eight Navy Maritime Theater Missile Defense Forums.
Each of these cooperative initiatives is aimed at reducing our costs,
increasing interoperability, and achieving enhanced coalition
warfighting capability.
SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMS
Our fiscal year 2004 budget request calls for construction of 7
ships in fiscal year 2004: 3 DDG-51 class destroyers; 1 Virginia-class
submarine; 1 San Antonio (LPD-17) class Amphibious Transport Dock ship;
2 Lewis and Clark (T-AKE) auxiliary cargo and ammunition ships; and
incremental funding for the fiscal year 2002 LHD 8, resulting in 34
ships under contract. The fiscal year 2004 budget request represents an
increase of two ships over the five ships indicated in last year's
budget request. In addition, we have requested funding for advance
procurement of the seventh and eighth Virginia-class submarines, for
advance procurement of CVN-21 and the CVN-70 refueling complex overhaul
(RCOH), the first Ticonderoga class cruiser conversion and for service
life extension modifications of three Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC)
craft. The budget request fully commits the Navy to the conversion of
four Ohio class SSBNs into SSGNs.
Completion of Prior Year Shipbuilding Contracts
Growth on ship construction contracts has eroded the confidence of
the DOD and Congress in our estimating, budgeting, and execution
process for current and future procurements. The Navy is committed to
restoring the confidence of Congress and building stable programs to
ensure force structure requirements are sustained.
Congress provided over $700 million in fiscal year 2002 and almost
$1.3 billion in fiscal year 2003 to address cost growth for ships
contracted in 1996-2001. The fiscal year 2004 budget request reflects
$636 million to address similar shortfalls in order to deliver ships
authorized and appropriated in 1996-2001. Also visible in the Navy's
budget request are the known requirements through the FYDP to address
similar issues for ships appropriated through 2002.
The Department has taken a number of management actions to mitigate
the existing condition and to prevent a reoccurrence of the situation
for ships requested in fiscal year 2004 and future budget submissions.
To prevent further increases to the Prior Year Cost to Complete funding
shortfall, the Navy has instituted the following corrective actions:
In fiscal year 2003 and beyond, shipbuilding programs
have been budgeted to independent cost estimates prepared by
the Cost Analysis Improvement Group or independent Navy
estimate.
Change order budgeting levels have been established to
reflect maturity of respective programs.
Shipbuilding and Government Furnished Equipment
program managers have been directed to limit changes to
critical safety issues.
The Department has reestablished a senior level ship
configuration panel to ensure required changes are validated
and fully funded.
We motivated industry cost performance through
incentives in fiscal year 2002 and 2003 contracts.
Prior decisions regarding workload splits among
multiple yards have been reevaluated in light of the increased
cost of having multiple ``lead'' ships.
We are implementing more aggressive share lines and
positive incentive strategies in new ship construction
contracts in a further effort to establish realistic targets
and to motivate industry management and performance.
The swap of DDG-51 and LPD-17 between General Dynamics and Northrop
Grumman will also alleviate the potential for significant new prior
year bills and allow the construction of the individual ship classes in
the most efficient manner. We will continue to pursue innovative
business approaches like this to reduce the risk of future Prior Year
Cost to Complete bills.
Surface Combatants
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Destroyer
The fiscal year 2004 budget request includes $3.198 billion for the
procurement of 3 Arleigh Burke class (DDG-51) destroyers of a 10 ship
MYP. The additional DDGs in fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005
facilitate the innovative DDG/LPD swap agreement and increase force
structure capability. The new 4 year, 10 ship, fiscal year 2002 through
2005, MYP contract awarded last year has cemented the DDG procurement
profile and sustains our industry partners as we work toward the
transition to DD(X) production.
DD(X) Destroyer
The Navy competitively awarded the DD(X) design agent and
technology development contract in April 2002. The winning contractor
has organized a national team of industry experts to achieve the most
innovative and cost-effective solutions for development of the DD(X)
through spiral development of technology and engineering, with
promising systems being employed on existing platforms and other future
ship classes. The Department will link the development of the DD(X)
combat system to the opening of computer architectures in our DDGs,
CGs, LPDs, and CVNs. This is a critical step for the Department and
represents an effort to leverage every dollar Congress provides.
Applying new design--build concepts to DD(X) is critical to improving
the construction process for destroyers. The DD(X) design will reduce
manpower requirements. The ship will capitalize on electric drive and
electrical distribution systems to simplify ship operations, reduce
maintenance, and enable future upgrades including directed energy
weapons. The ship will be designed with reduced signature to provide
the survivability necessary in the future combat environment. These and
other features will provide more affordable future ship classes in
terms of both construction and operation.
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
The LCS will be a networked, agile, stealthy surface combatant
designed to counter asymmetric littoral threats such as diesel
submarines, shallow water mines, and small boats through organic manned
and unmanned vehicles and as part of a network centric battle force.
The LCS was granted new start authority in the fiscal year 2003
authorization act and initial program funds were appropriated by
Congress. The fiscal year 2004 budget request includes $158 million for
LCS platform and mission system development. The LCS spiral development
acquisition strategy will support construction of multiple flights of
focused mission ships with progressive capability improvements. Flight
0 is comprised of one ship planned for authorization in fiscal year
2005 (currently budgeted in RDT&E) and one ship planned for
authorization in fiscal year 2006 (currently budgeted in SCN). Flight 0
will develop and demonstrate a modular hull design with performance
attributes needed for new operational concepts in the littoral. The
solicitation for preliminary design of LCS Flight 0 was released in
February 2003.
Ticonderoga (CG-47) Cruiser Conversion Plan
The fiscal year 2004 budget request includes $194 million for
systems that will add new mission capabilities and extend the combat
system service life of the Ticonderoga (CG-47) class. The upgrade of
these ships will add new, and enhance existing, combat system
capabilities for land attack, CEC, and Area Air Defense Commander
missions to improve compatibility in joint and coalition warfare
environments.
Aircraft Carriers
Nimitz Class
In May 2003, we will commission U.S.S. Ronald Reagan (CVN-76), the
ninth of the Nimitz class of aircraft carriers. Also in 2003, we will
lay the keel of the tenth, and last, ship in the Nimitz class. That
ship, recently named the George H.W. Bush (CVN-77), is scheduled for
delivery in 2008.
CVN-21 Class
CVN-21, previously known as CVNX-1, is a fiscal year 2007 ship that
incorporates many advanced technologies and design changes originally
slated for CVNX-2. Acceleration of these technologies into the lead
ship of the class increases warfighting capabilities and reduces life
cycle costs. CVN-21 now includes: a new propulsion plant; new and
improved electric plant that provides three times the electrical
generation capacity of a Nimitz class carrier; Electromagnetic Aircraft
Launching System; advanced arresting gear; a new integrated warfare
system; enhanced flight deck; improved weapons handling and aircraft
servicing efficiency; increased sortie generation rate; improved
survivability; and allowance for future technologies and additional
manpower reductions. We are working with our industry partners to
improve the design-build effort for CVN-21 to allow efficient
production, earlier delivery, and future technology insertion.
Amphibious Ships and Craft
LPD-17
The LPD-17 San Antonio class of amphibious transport dock ships
represents a critical element of the Navy and Marine Corps future in
expeditionary warfare. The 12 ships of the San Antonio class will
functionally replace four classes of amphibious ships. The fiscal year
2004 budget request includes $1.2 billion to fully fund the
construction of the sixth ship of the class. Five additional LPD-17s
are included in the FYDP, with the final ship of the 12 ship class
planned beyond the FYDP. Current metrics indicate the LPD-17 program
team is now performing in a predictable and disciplined manner. Detail
design of the lead ship is completing and fabrication has started on
over two-thirds of the lead ship construction units. LPD 18
construction began in February 2002 and LPD-19 construction commenced
last summer. We plan to award the contract for LPD-21 (U.S.S. New York)
later this year to honor the victims of the World Trade Center attack.
LHD-8
In accordance with congressional direction to incrementally fund
LHD-8, the fiscal year 2004 budget requests $355 million for continued
detailed design and construction. LHD-8 will be the first big deck
amphibious ship that will be powered by gas turbine propulsion and all
of its auxiliary systems will rely on electricity, rather than steam.
This change is expected to realize significant lifecycle cost savings.
LHA(R)
The fiscal year 2004 budget requests $65 million in R&D for LHA(R),
a spiral development variant of the LHD-8 known as the Plug Plus, which
provides a longer and wider platform capable of increased vehicle lift,
better survivability, and a suitable weight margin. This funding
supports ship design development, live-fire testing activities, and
other risk mitigation efforts leading to a planned ship construction
award in fiscal year 2007.
Auxiliary Dry Cargo Ammunition Ship (T-AKE)
The fiscal year 2004 budget request includes $722 million for the
fifth and sixth ships of this 12 ship T-AKE class. Last summer the
initial critical design review was conducted for the class design, and
construction of the lead ship is expected to commence this fall. Lead
ship delivery is scheduled in fiscal year 2005.
Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC)
Our fleet LCACs saw dramatically increased operational tempo
supporting worldwide operations during the past year, underscoring the
need for the LCAC Service Life Extension Program (SLEP). The program,
designed to extend the service life of LCACs to 30 years, had several
notable accomplishments during the past year including:
``On schedule-on budget'' delivery of LCAC 44, the
first SLEP craft;
Excellent production progress on the fiscal year 2000
and 2001 SLEP craft with delivery scheduled before the end of
2003; and
Contract award for the fiscal year 2002 and 2003 SLEP
craft.
The fiscal year 2004 budget requests $73 million SCN for three
additional LCAC SLEPs.
Submarine Programs
Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarines
With current construction progressing as scheduled, the fiscal year
2004 budget request includes $2.5 billion for the sixth ship and
advance procurement for the seventh and eighth ships of the Virginia
class. Further, the budget requests permission to enter into a
multiyear contract to provide program stability and enable substantial
cost savings. Approximately $400 million in fiscal year 2004 for
Economic Order Quantity advance procurement in support of a seven-ship,
fiscal year 2004-2008 MYP is included in the budget request. The
Virginia class detailed design is complete. The lead ship, the U.S.S.
Virginia, is over 80 percent complete and early construction has
validated the effectiveness of the design--build concept. Negotiations
are underway on the fiscal year 2003 Block Buy contract and the Navy is
reviewing strategies to optimize the planned MYP.
SSGN
The fiscal year 2004 budget request includes over $1.2 billion in
procurement and R&D for the conversion efforts of the first two Ohio
class submarines, funding for the Engineered Refueling Overhaul (ERO)
of the third submarine, and advanced planning for the fourth and final
ERO and conversion planned to begin in fiscal year 2005. When
completed, these submarines will provide transformational warfighting
capability carrying up to 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles, support
sustained deployed special operating forces, and sustain our submarine
force structure. The fiscal year 2004 budget request also funds attack
weapons system procurement. Recently U.S.S. Florida successfully
launched two Tomahawk missiles from a Multiple All-Up-Round Canister in
a demonstration and validation (DEMVAL) test. The DEMVAL test confirmed
that the conversion of SSBNs to SSGNs will work as envisioned with the
ability to carry Tomahawk cruise missiles and support deployed special
operating forces. Lastly, we are exploring opportunities for public-
private partnering in this program. The U.S.S. Ohio recently entered
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and began its refueling overhaul, the first
step towards SSGN capability. The acquisition team has developed a
creative plan to accelerate delivery of SSGNs while working to stagger
the conversions to allow key workers and managers to apply lessons
learned to each sequential submarine. The assistance of Congress was
critical to the signing of the SSGN design contract in September 2002.
PRECISION MUNITIONS
Tactical Tomahawk
Tactical Tomahawk missile begins full rate production in fiscal
year 2004. Tactical Tomahawk significantly improves performance through
an improved warhead, fuzing, and navigation improvements. This is
accomplished at almost half the cost by using innovative manufacturing
and production techniques. The Tactical Tomahawk completed successful
developmental test shots from a simulated ground launcher in August
2002 and an underwater launcher in December 2002. The program
subsequently awarded a Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) contract in
October 2002, and exercised an option for additional missiles in
January 2003, for a total of 192 missiles. The fiscal year 2004 budget
requests authority for a fiscal year 2004-fiscal year 2008 MYP.
MINE WARFARE PROGRAMS
Organic Airborne Mine Countermeasures
The fiscal year 2004 President's budget requests funding for a
variety of airborne mine countermeasure systems that will be employed
by the MH-60S helicopter as an organic capability. Specific systems
are:
AN/AQS-20A Advanced Minehunting Sonar and the Airborne
Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) are being developed to
counter deeper moored mines and visible bottom mines. The
Department is requesting $17.2 million for the AN/AQS-20A to
continue system developmental testing and $14.5 million to
continue development through critical design reviews on the
AMNS.
The Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (AN/AES-1)
and the Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System (AN/AWS-2) are
being developed to counter near surface and floating mines. The
Department is requesting $21.9 million to complete
developmental testing and award two AN/AES-1 LRIP units. The
budget also requests $31.2 million to complete critical design
review and begin developmental testing of AN/AWS-2.
The Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep
(OASIS) will counter influence mines not found using hunting
systems. The Navy is requesting $14.8 million for completion of
critical design review and commencement of development testing.
Long-term Mine Reconnaissance System (LMRS)
The budget request of $56.5 million will continue LMRS baseline
development through developmental test and preparation for operational
testing. The LMRS program also incorporates development of a Mission
Reconfigurable Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (MRUUV).
Remote Minehunting System
The Remote Minehunting System (RMS) is being developed as an
unmanned semi-submersible vehicle to deploy from surface combatants and
operate remotely over-the-horizon. This new organic minehunting
capability is to be integrated into DDG-51 Flight IIA (Hull 91-96)
ships and is being considered for LCS. The Department requested $55.5
million to complete critical design and continue fabrication of
Engineering Development Models and to conduct technical evaluation in
preparation for operational evaluation in fiscal year 2005.
INTEGRATED WARFARE SYSTEMS PROGRAMS
Open Architecture Concepts
The Navy intends to implement open architecture concepts into its
future ships and current and future combat systems using commercially
available, widely accepted interface standards to bring commercial
products from multiple vendors to bear on mission-critical systems. The
Navy efforts will include leveraging the Hiper-D open architecture
effort into the DD(X) total ship computing environment and into all
future ship and submarine system developments. The Navy is integrating
the command and control and combat systems information flow using open
specifications and standards and open architecture constructs, in order
to participate in FORCEnet and other global information networks.
FORCEnet
Through the FORCEnet concept, the Navy is transforming future and
existing assets to a joint, netted, distributed, and forward stationed
force. It will bring an expanded ``toolbox'' of capabilities to the
joint warfare commander as the Navy participates more and more in
integrated joint operations. Network centric operations will be the
foundation of our transformation to the force of the future and the key
enabler in network centric operations will be the FORCEnet concept.
FORCEnet is not a system; rather it is the architecture by which we
will integrate our sensors, networks, decision aids, weapons, and
warfighters into an adaptive human centered maritime system. FORCEnet
will allow the Navy, as a part of an integral joint force, to leverage
legacy and developing capabilities to achieve dominance across the full
spectrum of warfare missions.
Ship Self-Defense (SSD)
Ship self-defense is provided by weapon systems and equipment
related to multiple primary warfare areas; Anti Ship Cruise Missile
Defense, Surface Warfare, Undersea Warfare, Electronic Warfare, Anti
Terrorism/Force Protection, Mine Warfare and Command and Control.
Currently fielded systems allow ships to defend against today's
threats, while new systems and improvements to existing systems are
being developed and procured to meet the future stressing threats. The
Ship Self Defense System (SSDS) forms the centerpiece of future combat
systems for aircraft carriers and amphibious ships, enabling them to
pace the increasingly lethal threat. SSDS is the integrator for the
individual detection and engagement elements of the combat system. An
open architecture system with automated weapons control doctrine, SSDS
also integrates with the CEC and the Tactical Data Links. Last year,
the Navy conducted rigorous land based testing on SSDS Mk 2 Mod 0 at
the Surface Combat System Center, Wallops Island, in preparation for
the U.S.S. Nimtz battle group. In May 2002, land based testing was
transitioned to at sea testing for the Nimitz and the Wallops Island
facility started to focus on SSDS Mk 2 Mod 1 testing for the U.S.S.
Ronald Reagan. After Reagan, Wallops will focus on SSDS Mk 2 Mod 2 for
``first of class'' testing for LPD-17 bringing a revolutionary combat
capability to the amphibious fleet. The fiscal year 2004 budget
includes $94 million for the SSDS.
In addition, we continue to invest in upgrading the detect and
engage portions of Ship Self Defense programs. The Surface Electronic
Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) is a spiral development effort
initiated to provide a robust, full spectrum electronic warfare system
following cancellation of the Advanced Integrated Electronic Warfare
System. SEWIP will build on the legacy SLQ-32 system to field
capabilities against next-generation threats. Fiscal year 2004 budget
includes $53 million for the development of Block 1 electronic warfare
improvement. The fiscal year 2004 President's budget request includes
$41 million WPN for the Close-In Weapons System (CIWS) that funds
procurement, engineering support and installation of Block 1B for eight
ordnance alteration (ORDALT) kits and upgrades. The eight ORDALT kits
and upgrades will be combined with kits already onhand for installation
on 13 ships. Fiscal year 2004 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) funding is
$48 million WPN for Block 1 ORDALT kits, Block 1 Guidance and Control
section procurements, and 90 missiles. Fiscal year 2004 RAM
installations will be on five ships. Finally the Evolved Sea Sparrow
Missile has just completed successful developmental testing on the Self
Defense Test Ship and remains on schedule for OPEVAL in April aboard
the U.S.S. Shoup. The fiscal year 2004 budget includes $113 million WPN
for procurement of 105 missiles, production engineering, and
performance characterization.
Extended Range Active Missile (ERAM)
Despite the cancellation of the Standard Missile 2 (SM 2) Block IVA
in December 2001, the Navy has an existing extended range (ER) AAW
mission requirement as defined in the 2002 Navy Transformational
Roadmap. A robust ER AAW missile with engage-on-remote capability
against overland cruise missiles is key to achieving this requirement,
providing flexible firepower throughout the battle space utilizing a
variety of targeting platforms. The Navy's approach to this mission is
the ERAM, which uses a SM 2 Block IV propulsion stack with an active
AMRAAM seeker to provide enhanced capabilities. The ERAM approach is a
low risk, non-developmental item approach and supports an fiscal year
2010 Initial Operational Capability. The fiscal year 2004 budget
includes $35 million for ERAM development.
Sea-based Terminal Missile Defense
The Navy sees a unique requirement for sea-based, terminal
ballistic missile defense capabilities. The Department of Defense has
tasked the Navy in conjunction with Missile Defense Agency (MDA), to
study the requirement of a sea-based, terminal missile defense. The
Navy acquisition team has identified at least two options for providing
a Sea-Based Terminal Missile Defense:
Spirally evolve the ERAM missile to incorporate TBM
fuzing and lethality improvements; or
Evaluate the potential for the extended range PAC-3,
known as Pegasus, to integrate with Navy ship systems.
The recommended approach will depend on the specific threat and
performance requirements defined, operational need date, and funding
environment.
Midcourse Missile Defense
The Navy-MDA team executed three consecutive successful missile
intercepts utilizing the Aegis Element of the Ballistic Missile Defense
System culminating in the groundbreaking milestone of a ship-launched
missile intercepting a target missile during its ascent phase. The
Aegis BMD element also successfully met all objectives in two ground
based missile defense tests in late 2002.
Standard Missile
The fiscal year 2004 budget request for $148.3 million will procure
75 SM 2 Block IIIB missiles. The budget request will extend missile
procurement of the remaining 942 missiles through fiscal year 2013 vice
fiscal year 2008.
Joint Fires Network (JFN)
A further step forward in Network-Centric Warfare and one of the
Navy's transformational initiatives is the Joint Fires Network (JFN).
The fiscal year 2004 budget includes $159 million for JFN. It is the
interface of the intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance, target, and
command and control capabilities of three existing stand-alone systems:
Joint Services Imagery Processing System--Navy; Global Command and
Control System--Maritime; and Tactical Exploitation System--Navy. The
JFN is not a traditional program. The virtual program office works to
eliminate duplication and retain complementary elements each has to
offer. In addition, the team that validated the JFN analysis of
alternatives has continued to support the JFN engineering team in its
spiral development efforts to interface and converge the various
functions of the three programs. JFN will serve as a building block for
the Navy's more extensive FORCEnet concept and is being fielded as part
of the Department's emergency wartime response to get critical
capability to the warfighter quickly.
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)
The fiscal year 2004 budget request includes $160 million for CEC.
CEC provides a significant step forward in transforming our situational
awareness of the battle space. CEC's successful completion of OPEVAL
allows implementation of this capability within the fleet and is a
major step in developing a network-centric force. This transformational
program allows one ship to shoot a weapon at a generated target based
on another ship's firing solution for the first time in naval history.
CEC is being integrated into our E-2C aircraft and follow-on test and
evaluation of this added capability is ongoing. CEC is moving forward
with a solicitation this summer to compete a next generation design
that will be smaller, more affordable, and more bandwidth efficient
while providing significantly higher performance and potentially
supporting joint service use.
SUMMARY
The Navy acquisition team has taken many positive steps during the
past year. From moving forward with the SSGN design contract to
initiating the LCS program, the support and direction of Congress has
been essential to our progress. I am most grateful for the assistance
of this committee for all of the Department of the Navy's efforts.
I would report to you today that the shipbuilding program and
associated industrial base is on the verge of being stabilized, a key
remaining facet of this is the proposed Virginia-class submarine
multiyear. The Department will have a chance to manage these programs
and control cost going forward. This core shipbuilding program can be
built upon in the future to continue the recapitalization of the Navy
fleet. Through the use of innovative acquisition initiatives, our
Nation will have a healthy shipbuilding industrial base and an
efficient and an appropriately sized infrastructure to support an
optimal force structure.
In the end, the ship fleet is a tool of our sailors and marines.
Today, the Navy and Marine Corps have used all of the ships in that
fleet to the fullest degree possible, putting combat capability exactly
where the Nation needs it as part of the Joint Force. Naval forces are
also forward deployed, providing clear presence and protecting the
United States' strategic interests. We have the finest naval force in
the world. With your assistance, we will continue to improve every
aspect of our business to provide the maximum capability for our
sailors and marines and the maximum security for America.
Senator Talent. Thank you. It is a good story.
Admiral Mullen.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR RESOURCES, REQUIREMENTS, AND ASSESSMENTS
Admiral Mullen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee today to
discuss our United States Navy as a proud member of the Navy
and Marine Corps team.
While not asked to testify today, sitting in back of me
today is Lieutenant General Bob Magnus, who probably knows as
much about our program as anybody. He is my counterpart in the
Marine Corps and he worked hard along with us to bring this
program forward, and I am grateful for that support.
I would like to express my great appreciation for your
outstanding and longstanding support, which continues to be
vital and is at the foundation of our ability to project our
naval forces to the four corners of the globe.
Since last year we have been very busy. Your Navy has been
a continuing participant in the global war on terrorism and
Operation Enduring Freedom, where we deployed 9 of our 12
aircraft carriers and 6 of our 12 amphibious ready groups, and
in recent weeks and months in the buildup and execution of
Operation Iraqi Freedom, in which 7 of our carriers and 9 of
our 12 big amphibious ships are also deployed along with, as
the CNO said, 70 percent of our air wings. Many of our naval
forces deployed to fight in Operation Enduring Freedom are now
redeployed to fight in Operation Iraqi Freedom, less than 18
months later.
Your Navy now and in the future is a joint, sea-based,
interoperable, networkcentric, power projection force and
continues to provide a terrific return on the taxpayers'
investment. In the last few years, as you have heard and, our
CNO, Admiral Clark, has made improving our readiness accounts a
top priority and, with your support, we have achieved the
highest level of readiness I have seen during my almost 35-year
career.
I believe the President's 2004 budget is also transforming
our Navy. Admiral Clark's comprehensive vision of Seapower 21
provides a strong framework upon which to build for the future.
We have had healthy debates in the Pentagon on major issues
which have centered on the urgency of moving forward and the
requirement to be able to fight today as well as transform for
the future.
I believe Secretary Rumsfeld has created a positive
atmosphere in which these debates take place and the result has
been a better program for the Navy and for our Nation. We are
transforming much more than the equipment we buy. This budget
supports our ability to continue to transform our most
important resource, our people. We have adopted a
transformational new global concept of operations and we are
looking to reorganize our operational structure from the old
way of 19 independent striking groups to a new way of 37
independent striking groups, including carrier striking groups,
expeditionary strike groups, surface strike, TBMD groups, and
SSGNs.
In conjunction with the Missile Defense Agency, we expect
to field a sea-based missile defense capability in fiscal year
2004. These changes are exciting and meet head-on the
challenges of the 21st century in which widely dispersed and
netted forces with combat capability will become the norm.
At the heart of this change is the sea base and the concept
of sea basing, which notionally is a scalable collection of
joint warfighting capabilities distributed across interoperable
platforms netted together and sustained from the sea without
reliance on shore facilities within the joint operations area.
I also believe we are currently at an important inflexion
point and decisions this year and in the near years to come
will determine the capabilities we will have in our Navy and
our Marine Corps for the next 3 or 4 decades. Our current
program has eight new classes of ships, as Secretary Young has
said. They include our future carrier, CVN-21, our
transformational land attack destroyer, DD(X), which is also
our R&D centerpiece for the future of surface ships and a
member of our family of ships, along with our Littoral
Combatant Ship, the LCS, the LPD-17, and our SSGNs, to just
name a few.
We have changed the trend on our recapitalization of our
Navy and we are compelled to do so to get to the future of
about 375 ships. To get to that goal, we need to sustain a
shipbuilding account of 10 to 12 ships a year and about $12 to
$14 billion a year in constant fiscal year 2003 dollars. We are
also asking for funds to buy the EA-18 Golf, which the CNO
mentioned in his testimony, to replace our aging EA-6Bs, funds
for Joint Strike Fighter, and for the Advanced E-2, all of
which are critical parts as we move forward.
In order to recapitalize, we took some near-term risks the
garner resources for future investment in both ships and
airplanes. These were particularly tough decisions, but on
balance calculated to take low to moderate risks now in order
to avoid high risk in the future.
In both ships and airplanes, we rely heavily on the private
sector, especially the national treasures of our industrial
base. I truly believe we have turned the corner in
recapitalization and we must continue the trend in future
budgets.
In particular, I would like to thank this subcommittee for
its strong longstanding support in shipbuilding. Without ships,
we are not much of a Navy. Our priorities continue to be to
sustain the readiness necessary to fight the global war on
terrorism, to recapitalize and transform our Navy, to invest in
our sailors, to improve our networks both in a operational
sense and in a business sense, and to provide quality training
both individually and on our training ranges.
Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for your continued support
and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Nathman and
Admiral Mullen follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Vice Adm. John Nathman, USN, and Vice Adm.
Michael Mullen, USN
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we appreciate the
opportunity to appear today. The investment you've made in America's
Navy has been vital to the Nation's security and your Navy's ability to
project more power, more protection, and more freedom to the far
corners of the Earth. Thank you for your exceptional and continuous
support.
I. YOUR NAVY TODAY
This is a time of tremendous challenge and accomplishment for our
Navy. Our men and women operating in the air, on and under the sea, and
on the ground are at the leading edge of the global war on terrorism.
Today, there are 168 ships deployed, more than half of the Navy,
providing persistent combat power forward; this includes 7 of 12
aircraft carriers, and 9 of our 12 big deck amphibious ships (LHA/
LHDs). They are deployed in support of the Nation's interests in the
Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the Western
Pacific. Still others are preparing for deployment or continuing
operations like strategic deterrent and counterdrug patrols in support
of other national imperatives.
II. YOUR FUTURE NAVY
The 21st century sets the stage for tremendous increases in
precision, reach, and connectivity, ushering in a new era of joint
operational effectiveness. We clearly will be able to integrate sea,
land, air, and space through enhanced network technology to a greater
extent than ever before. In this new, unified battlespace, the sea will
provide the vast maneuver area from which to project direct and
decisive power.
To navigate the challenges ahead and realize the opportunities, we
developed this past year a clear, concise vision--Sea Power 21--for
projecting decisive joint capabilities from the sea. The Chief of Naval
Operations has already described this vision to you, so we will not
repeat that description here. But we want to emphasize to you that the
Sea Power 21 vision will be put into practice through a new global
concept of operations (CONOPs) to distribute our combat striking power
to a dispersed, networked fleet. This will optimize our flexible force
structure and create additional, scaleable, independent operating
groups capable of responding simultaneously around the world. This
distribution of assets will take us from 19 independent strike capable
groups to 37 independent strike capable groups with the full
implementation of the global CONOPs. Sea Power 21, put into practice
through the global CONOPs, will provide increased power-projection.
Integral to Sea Power 21 and to ensuring access to critical corners
of the globe through operational independence is the Sea Base. The Navy
and Marine Corps team is working closely to determine the best mix of
expeditionary ships that will make up the future Sea Base. In addition
to naval requirements, we will also consider other joint missions that
may arise such as the need for a joint command ship, hospital ships,
and an Afloat Forward Staging Base. We will know more about these
requirements over the next year as we complete ongoing efforts such as
the Joint Forcible Entry Study and the Defense Science Board Seabasing
Study. As we begin procurement of MPF(F), LHA(R), DD(X), LCS, MV-22,
and JSF, we have a unique opportunity to design an entire package of
capability to support Sea Basing and Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. We
are facing a rare inflection point in history with several new ship
classes coming on line within the next few years. What we decide to
build today will impact the Navy for the next 30 to 40 years.
III. CONTEXT FOR OUR FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET REQUEST
In recent years the Navy improved its readiness by properly funding
our current readiness accounts, deepening the growth and development of
our people, and developing innovative operational concepts and
capabilities.
We also sharpened our focus on future force structure--to buy the
ships, aircraft, and the capabilities needed for tomorrow's Navy. At
the same time, we did not overlook the important gains our focus on
current readiness made these last few years; it produced the more
responsive force on deployment today. As a result, we looked hard at
ways we could balance these priorities and our discretionary
investments to both satisfy the near-term operational risks and prepare
for the long-term risks of an uncertain future. This year we made hard
choices across the fleet to do more to mitigate our future risk while
sustaining our current readiness gains.
Our fiscal year 2004 budget request includes an initiative to
accelerate the retirement of our oldest, least capable, and most
maintenance-intensive ships, and to apply the savings this decision
produces toward higher recapitalization priorities. Our preferred
inactivation timeline would produce $1.2 billion across the FYDP for
this purpose.
Accelerating the retirement of the Spruance class destroyers, the
baseline 1 Aegis cruisers, and selected Oliver Hazard Perry class
frigates was one of the most difficult decisions we made in building
this year's budget. Although difficult, we firmly believe it is the
right decision, one we made only after carefully considering the risks,
both in the near-term and in the long-term. Current Navy warfighting
analysis of likely combat scenarios over the next 10 years indicates
that the warfare missions for surface combatants are not well met by
Spruance class destroyers, baseline 1 Aegis cruisers and older Perry
class frigates. In the long term, we need the next generation
destroyer, DD(X), the next generation cruiser, CG(X) and the Littoral
Combat Ship to address these missions.
Fundamentally, we believe aggregate warfighting capability based on
the type and mix of key weapon systems in the fleet is a better metric
than the total number of ships when analyzing the risk attendant to
various force structure options. While it is true that one ship can
only be one place at a time, and that below a certain threshold the
total number of ships does matter, our judgment is that the near-term
retirements we propose do not cross the threshold of unacceptable risk.
Instead, accelerating the retirement of these selected ships adds
little risk in the near-term, but helps significantly in facilitating
our transition to the numbers, type, and mix of ships we will require
to execute the range of missions we anticipate in the 21st century.
In assessing the risk of reducing our legacy surface combatant
inventory, we examined three criteria by which our aggregate
warfighting capability should be measured: capacity for strike
missions, performance against submarine and surface ship threats, and
contribution to air defense.
Strike warfare capabilities affected by the decommissioning of
Spruance destroyers are met by the simultaneous commissioning of
Arleigh Burke class destroyers; the number of Vertical Launch System
(VLS) cells available in the fleet for Tomahawk by fiscal year 2004 is
greater than in fiscal year 2001 despite the decommissionings, and it
rises steadily thereafter. Perry class frigates and baseline 1 Aegis
cruisers, the oldest in the inventory, have no VLS or Tomahawk
capability.
The most effective surface combatant weapon system for anti-
submarine and anti-surface warfare (ASW/ASUW) is the combination of a
Lamps Mk III helicopter and an Aegis warship. The net result of the
planned ship decommissionings and Burke class destroyer commissionings
is to temporarily reduce the total fleet capacity for helicopter
embarkation, but the number of deck spots for helicopters available
still exceeds the number of helicopters in the inventory to fill them.
The ability to maintain a shipboard protective anti-air warfare
shield over a broad area is best delivered by the Aegis Weapon System
and the SM-2 Block IIIB VLS missile. Neither the Spruance nor Perry
class ships are Aegis equipped, and the baseline 1 Aegis cruisers have
Mark 26 rail launchers which can only shoot older, less capable
missiles. We are focusing our Cruiser Conversion efforts on upgrading
the 22 cruisers with VLS for future mission requirements, including
ballistic missile defense (BMD). The cost of doing this for the
baseline 1 cruisers is prohibitive.
In every case, continuing to operate these ships for the few years
remaining in their useful lives adds little to our aggregate
warfighting capability while hampering our ability to move forward with
critical recapitalization efforts.
We will continue to pursue efficiencies that improve our
warfighting capability. We are committed to producing the level
investment stream that will help implement our bold new Navy vision and
produce the number of future ships, aircraft, and systems we need to
counter the 21st century threat. Harvesting savings for reinvestment is
an important part of that effort, and we will continue to examine the
potential efficiencies while weighing the operational risks, both now
and in the future.
This year, we intend to:
Sustain our current readiness gains to support the
global war on terror;
Deepen the growth and development of our people into
the 21st century, high-technology personnel force that is our
future; and
Invest in our bold new Navy vision--Sea Power 21--to
recapitalize and transform our force and improve its ability to
operate as an agile, lethal, and effective member of our joint,
networked warfighting team.
IV. INVESTING IN SEA POWER 21
Our 21st century Navy will be a joint, netted, dispersed power
projection force and Sea Power 21 is the framework around which our
Navy will organize, integrate, and transform. It prescribes a strategy-
to-concepts-to-capabilities continuum by which current and future naval
forces will exploit the opportunity that information dominance and
rapid, highly accurate, and lethal power projection and defensive
protection capabilities bring to us.
We have started to ``turn the corner'' in our ship and aircraft
recapitalization program. The fiscal year 2004 budget request provides
funding for seven new construction ships, the final two of four planned
SSBN-to-SSGN conversions, and the first ship in our Cruiser Conversion
program. In all, our shipbuilding program includes $12.2 billion, a
significant increase above last year. The seven new ships include three
Arleigh Burke class (DDG-51) destroyers, one Virginia class (SSN 774)
fast attack submarine, one San Antonio class (LPD-17) amphibious
transport dock, and two Lewis and Clark class (T-AKE) dry cargo and
ammunition ships.
Additionally, we invest more than $1.5 billion for R&D in
transformational shipbuilding programs such as CVN-21, DD(X), LCS, and
SSGN, discussed later in this statement. Each of these platforms will
bring to the force unique capabilities focused on distinctly different
mission sets. They will complement each other, and each will enhance
the others' ability to accomplish its primary mission. Pressing ahead
with all of these programs is essential to recapitalizing the fleet
with the right mix of future capabilities.
Demonstrating Navy's commitment to stabilizing the shipbuilding
program and industrial base, the fiscal year 2004 budget presents a
plan for multiyear procurement for Virginia class SSN. In addition to
the MYP strategies in place for DDG-51 and requested for Virginia
class, we plan on funding the lead DD(X) and LCS in RDTEN funds
beginning in fiscal year 2005 and split funding CVN-21 over 2 years
beginning in fiscal year 2007. We are committed to the continued
pursuit of alternative funding strategies to both stabilize the
shipbuilding accounts and increase the shipbuilding rate while
maintaining fiscal responsibility and doing things that make sense.
The following describes the core capabilities, and our investments
in our highest priority programs supporting our vision of a 21st
century Navy.
Surface Combatants
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report stated the importance of
projecting and sustaining U.S. forces in ``distant anti-access''
environments. Accomplishing this critical operational goal requires a
broad range of capabilities, and the naval capabilities required are
best provided by a ``family of ships.'' Although warships are multi-
mission by necessity, each member of the family of ships is optimized
to perform a key function: DD(X) for delivery of precision strike and
volume fires to support assured access and maneuver warfare; CG(X) to
create and maintain air superiority over the joint force at sea and on
land; and LCS to operate closer to shore to deny the enemy the use of
anti-access weapons such as mines and submarines against our forces.
The fiscal year 2004 budget request includes funding for DD(X) and
LCS. CG(X) development will begin in the future, and, as a descendant
of the DD(X) program, it will share with DD(X) a common, more stealthy
hull form and propulsion architecture. That architecture includes an
integrated all-electric power system that is more efficient and
survivable than today's ships', and provides more power capacity for
future weapons. DD(X) and CG(X) will also use many of the same
transformational technologies to reduce crew size and operating and
support costs.
DD(X). The DD(X) advanced multi-mission destroyer is the
centerpiece of our future surface combatant ``family of ships.'' It
will bring revolutionary improvements to precision strike and joint
fires. The fiscal year 2004 budget request includes R&D funding of more
than $1 billion for design, development, and testing leading to
procurement of the lead ship in fiscal year 2005. This investment is
vital and it is the most critical component for the shipbuilding
technology base of the future. Transformational and leap ahead
technologies include an integrated power system and electric drive; the
Advanced Gun System with high rate of fire and magazine capability; the
new Multi-Function Radar/Volume Search Radar suite; optimal manning
through advanced system automation, stealth through reduced acoustic,
magnetic, IR, and radar cross-section signature; and enhanced
survivability through automated damage control and fire protection
systems. Unless we systematically reduce the crew size of our future
ships, we can't get to the future. DD(X) leads the way. Armed with an
array of land attack weapons it will provide persistent, distributed
offensive fires in support of joint forces ashore, including our number
one joint partner, the United States Marine Corps. The capacity in both
hull form and integrated electric power system will allow us to spiral
its development to CG(X), a critical future component of sea based
missile defense.
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). The Chief of Naval Operation's
number one budget priority, the LCS is the next member of our surface
combatant ``family of ships.'' The fiscal year 2004 budget includes
$158 million to accelerate development and construction of nine LCS in
the FYDP, key to ramping surface force structure to global CONOPs
levels outside the FYDP. It will be the first Navy ship to separate
capability from hull form and provide a robust, affordable, focused-
mission warship to enhance our ability to establish sea superiority. A
networked, lethal, small, fast, stealthy, and highly maneuverable ship,
LCS will be designed from the keel up as a focused mission ship capable
of employing manned and unmanned mission modules to counter some of the
most challenging anti-access threats our naval forces may encounter
close to shore--mines, quiet diesel submarines and small, fast, armed
boats.
Mission module development will focus on identifying and
integrating systems with technical maturity that will provide proven
warfighting capability for the first flight LCS. These potentially
include off board systems that will increase LCS sensor and weapons
reach such as Vertical Takeoff UAV, Remote Minehunting System, Spartan
Scout ACTD, Long-term Mine Reconnaissance System and Advanced
Deployable System. Integration of these systems, in addition to the
installed core systems, will provide LCS combat capability in the
focused mission areas of Mine Warfare, Anti-Submarine Warfare, and
Anti-Surface Warfare. Through the spiral development process, we will
combine improved legacy systems and next generation systems to provide
ever-increasing capability for follow on LCS flights.
Last year, we continued experimenting with a range of innovative
hull forms, and Congress supported us so we could get the program
moving this year, avoiding a critical 1-year delay. The fiscal year
2004 effort will be aimed at defining requirements, improving our
knowledge base for selecting an LCS design, and beginning mission
module development. We will capitalize on DOD initiatives, spiral
development, and new acquisition methods to streamline the acquisition
process, and begin construction of the first LCS by 2005.
CG Conversion. The fiscal year 2004 budget includes $194
million for the first Cruiser Conversion. The Cruiser Conversion
Program is a mid-life upgrade for our existing AEGIS cruisers that will
ensure modern, relevant combat capability well into this century and
against evolving threats. These warships will provide enhanced land
attack and area air defense to the Joint Force Commander. Core to these
conversions is installation of the Cooperative Engagement Capability,
which enhances and leverages the air defense capability of these ships,
and the 5,,/62 Gun System with Extended Range Guided Munitions to be
used in support of the Marine Corps Ship-to-Objective-Maneuver
doctrine. These converted cruisers will also be available for
integration into ballistic missile defense missions as that capability
matures.
DDG-51. Three Arleigh Burke class (DDG-51) destroyers are
being procured in fiscal year 2004 with the $3.2 billion requested as
part of the MYP of 10 DDG-51 ships over the period fiscal year 2002
through fiscal year 2005. The Navy and its two principal DDG builders
successfully negotiated a workload swap arrangement in June 2002 in
which General Dynamics' Bath Iron Works will transfer LPD-17 ship
construction work to Northrup Grumman Ship Systems in exchange for
additional DDG-51 work. This arrangement will optimize production
efficiencies and stabilize workload at all shipyards building DDG-51
and LPD-17 class ships.
Amphibious Ships
LPD-17. The fiscal year 2004 budget provides full funding
of $1.2 billion to procure the sixth ship of this planned 12-ship
class. LPD-17 functionally replaces LPD 4, LSD 36, LKA 113, and LST
1179 classes of amphibious ships for embarking, transporting, and
landing elements of a Marine landing force in an assault by
helicopters, MV-22s, landing craft, and amphibious vehicles. This
program is on track and represents a critical contribution to the
Marine Corps' amphibious lift requirements.
LHD-8. The fiscal year 2004 budget requests $355 million
additional incremental funding for LHD-8, a modified repeat of previous
LHDs. LHD-8, with introduction of gas turbine propulsion, all-electric
auxiliaries, and a new electrical distribution and computer based
Machinery Control System will replace one of the aging Tarawa (LHA)
class ships in 2007.
LHA Replacement (LHA(R)). LHA(R) is a spiral development
ship construction program designed to field a far more capable
replacement (in conjunction with LHD 8) for the five Tarawa class ships
that begin reaching end of service life in 2011. LHA(R) will provide a
longer and wider platform capable of increased vehicle lift, and will
have better survivability and weight margin. The fiscal year 2004
budget request of $65 million provides funds for R&D supporting fiscal
year 2007 procurement of the lead ship.
While we are building LPD-17 and replacements for the Tarawa class
ships, it is important that we have a robust sustainment program for
the amphibious ships currently in the fleet. The LPD-4 Class Extended
Sustainment program, started in fiscal year 2003, will be completed on
6 of the 11 aging ships by fiscal year 2006 and addresses maintenance
and operational readiness concerns. It is not designed to provide
additional capabilities or combat systems enhancements. Average cost is
$73 million per hull based on existing configurations. These ships will
ultimately be relieved by the last six LPD-17s by 2015 at an average
age of 41.5 years. The LHA-1 Midlife program completes in fiscal year
2008 and will ensure that maintenance and readiness concerns are
addressed. The LHAs do not have future growth for JSF or significant
weight additions as the limiting draft at full load has been reached.
The first LHA is scheduled to be replaced by LHD-8 in fiscal year 2007
and the last hull will be relieved in fiscal year 2022 by the LHA(R)s
with an average class age of about 40 years.
Aircraft Carriers
CVN-21. We are fulfilling the President's stated goal to
``skip a generation'' of technology and have accelerated
transformational technologies from the CVNX development plan into CVN-
21. The fiscal year 2004 budget request provides $1.5 billion in RDT&E
and advanced procurement for the first CVN-21 and programs for split-
funded construction beginning in fiscal year 2007. The transformational
technologies include a new electrical generation and distribution
system providing a 300-percent increase in available electrical power,
improved flight deck design with Electro-Magnetic Aircraft Launching
System and Advanced Arresting Gear, improved sortie generation,
enhanced survivability, reduced manning, and incorporation of a
flexible infrastructure that will allow the insertion of new
capabilities as they evolve. CVN-21 will be the centerpiece of our
future carrier strike capability when it enters active service in 2014.
Submarines
Virginia-class submarine (SSN 774). The first ship of this
class will deliver in June 2004. This class will supplement Los
Angeles-class (SSN 688) attack submarines and improve submarine force
capability for multi-mission littoral operations including ISR, special
operations, mine warfare, conventional strike anti-submarine, and anti-
surface missions. The Virginia class is designed to accommodate new
technologies, including an array of unmanned vehicles and will be an
integral part of our joint, networked, dispersed fleet of the 21st
century. The fiscal year 2004 budget request of $2.5 billion includes
funding for Economic Order Quantity supporting plans for a MYP
contract.
SSGN Conversions. We have requested two additional
conversions in fiscal year 2004; these ships will be configured to
carry more than 150 Tomahawk missiles, enabling covert, large-volume
strike. The SSGN will also have the capability to support Special
Operations Forces for an extended period, providing clandestine
insertion and retrieval by lockout chamber, dry deck shelters or the
Advanced Seal Delivery System, and they will be arrayed with a variety
of unmanned systems to enhance the Joint Force Commander's knowledge of
the battlespace. We will leverage the existing Trident submarine
infrastructure to optimize their on-station time. The first two ships,
the U.S.S. Ohio and U.S.S. Florida, begin refueling overhaul this year,
Ohio in Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Florida in Norfolk Naval
Shipyard. U.S.S. Michigan and U.S.S. Georgia will begin their
conversion in fiscal year 2004, and we expect this capability to be
operational for the first SSGN in fiscal year 2007. But we are already
experimenting with the capabilities this new ship will offer.
The recent Sea Trial experiment, ``Giant Shadow,'' explored how a
network of forces, including special warfare forces, and various
unmanned aerial, underwater and ground vehicles and sensors could be
used to provide surveillance, collect real-time intelligence, and
develop and launch a time critical strike in support of the Joint Force
Commander. This included the first vertical launch of a UUV, testing of
nuclear-biological-chemical sensors, and the insertion of SEALs from
one of the submarines we will convert to an SSGN.
In conjunction with Giant Shadow, the U.S.S. Florida successfully
launched two Tomahawk missiles, confirming the ability to launch a
Tomahawk from a configuration similar to the tightly packed cluster of
Tomahawk All-Up-Rounds (AUR) we will use in the SSGN.
Maritime Pre-positioning Forces
Maritime Pre-positioning Force Future (MPF(F)). The fiscal
year 2004 budget request includes $4 million in preliminary R&D funding
for MPF(F) leading to procurement of the first ship in fiscal year
2008. MPF(F) ships will serve a broader operational function than
current pre-positioned ships, creating greatly expanded operational
flexibility and effectiveness. We envision a force of ships that will
enhance the responsiveness of the joint team by the phased at-sea
assembly of the sea-based echelon of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade.
These ships will off-load forces, weapons, and supplies selectively
while remaining far over the horizon, and they will reconstitute ground
maneuver forces aboard ship after completing assaults deep inland. They
will sustain in-theater logistics, command and control, and medical
capabilities for the joint force for extended periods as well.
Combat Logistics Force Ships
Lewis and Clark Class Auxiliary Dry Cargo Ammunition Ship
(T-AKE). The widely dispersed nature of future operations and the
growing emphasis on sea-basing of joint capabilities will be supported
by newer, more capable additional combat logistics force ships such as
the T-AKE Cargo and Ammunition Combat Support supply ships. The fiscal
year 2004 funding of $722 million procures the fifth and sixth ships of
the class to continue recapitalization of our support fleet. Delivery
of the lead ship is expected in 2005. These ships will be crewed by
Military Sealift Command (MSC) civilian mariners and constructed to
meet ABS class/USCG certification. Enhanced capabilities in these ships
will include greater capacities and upgraded material handling and
transfer systems over the aging T-AFS and T-AE class ships being phased
out. The T-AKE class will be built with multipurpose convertible cargo
holds for dry stores and/or ammunition that will provide greater
flexibility to tailor loads to meet changing operational requirements.
A 12,000-pound Heavy UNREP system will double both delivery load weight
and throughput rates of transfer, as well as increase the safe
operating separation of the ships conducting replenishment. An
innovative electric drive propulsion system will provide increased
electric power for auxiliary power needs.
Science and Technology
Our science and technology (S&T) investment of $1.6 billion in
fiscal year 2004 continues to focus on maintaining a broad S&T base.
The S&T program seeks to inspire and guide innovation that will provide
technology-based options for future Navy and Marine Corps capabilities.
It addresses areas from oceanography, advanced materials, sensors, and
robotics; from biomedical science and technology; from electronics,
surveillance, and neurotechnology and information science; from
advanced combat systems to other technologies for ships, submarines,
aircraft, and ground vehicles; and from concept-based experimentation
conducted to enhance warfighting excellence. Our S&T drawing board
includes projects related to next generation surface ships; unmanned
aerial vehicles; underwater weapons; and, combat casualty treatment.
Approximately 10 percent of the DoN S&T investment is budgeted for U.S.
Joint Forces Command experimentation requirements.
The fiscal year 2004 budget request devotes a significant amount of
resources toward four critical areas: Anti-submarine Warfare, Mine
Warfare, Ship Self Defense, and Air and Missile Defense; to assure
access in the future.
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)
The fiscal year 2004 budget request supports improvements in ASW.
The Improved Extended Echo-Ranging is incorporated into the USQ-78B
Acoustic Processor, which will improve large area acoustic search
capability on our Maritime Patrol Aircraft. Initial testing of the
SURTASS Low Frequency Active (LFA) in the Western Pacific has
demonstrated detection capability that provides us added assurance that
we can deal with the diesel-electric threat as it becomes even quieter,
and we have accelerated development of an Advanced Deployable System
(ADS) off-board sensor variant, to start in fiscal year 2005, that will
eliminate the requirement to cable the system to a shore site. The
fiscal year 2004 budget also supports a fiscal year 2006 IOC of Mk 48
Mod 7 Common Broadband Acoustic Sonar System (CBASS) Heavyweight
Torpedo specifically designed for use against advanced diesel
submarines employing countermeasures in the difficult littoral
environment. The MH-60R helicopter with its Advanced Low Frequency
Sonar will provide an improved capability against submarines in the
littorals. Acquiring the airborne Automatic Periscope Detection and
Discrimination system will provide further enhancements to our
capability for large area search. Additionally, the capability for our
surface combatants to survive attacks from threat torpedoes will be
enhanced through the Surface Ship Torpedo Defense system. The success
of the truly open architecture Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (A-RCI)
program in providing significant improvement in ASW sensor processing
for our submarine force has spawned similar efforts in submarine combat
control, communications, and upgrades to the surface fleet's SQQ-89
combat suite. These programs validate the Navy's decision to use
commercially available technology to deliver superior performance at
less cost.
Mine Warfare (MIW)
The fiscal year 2004 budget continues the development and
acquisition of the Long-Term Mine Reconnaissance System (LMRS), which
is on track for a fiscal year 2005 IOC on the Los Angeles class and
will be incorporated on the Virginia class as it delivers. LMRS will
provide a clandestine reconnaissance capability for mines and mine-like
objects. The fiscal year 2004 budget also includes funding for the
development and acquisition of the Remote Mine-hunting System (RMS), a
surface ship--launched and recovered semi-submersible vehicle. RMS has
a fiscal year 2005 IOC with near-term fielding planned for DDGs 91-96.
RMS also is a strong candidate for future deployment on the LCS. To
meet the Department's goal of an organic mine warfare capability by
fiscal year 2005, the fiscal year 2004 budget continues the development
and integration of five Organic Mine Subsystems into the MH-60S
platform.
The MH-60S ``Knighthawk'', the Navy's newest Multi-Mission Combat
Helicopter, has been identified as one of the two platforms that enable
the Naval Helicopter Concept of Operations for the 21st century.
Partnered with the MH-60R, the MH-60S will enable maximum combat
efficiency across a spectrum of warfighting tasks centered on the Armed
Helicopter and Airborne Mine Countermeasures configurations. These
missions place great reliance on the lethality of weapons systems
brought to bear on a threat to our Nation's access to littoral waters.
Through enhanced lethality of helicopter borne weapons systems, an
asymmetric disruption of naval operations can be thwarted without the
use of fixed wing based aircraft or the air combat element of the
Marine Expeditionary Unit. In addition to operating from today's
current inventory of combatant ships, the MH-60S will interface with
the Maritime Pre-positioning ship of the future (MPF), the LCS, and the
High Speed Vessel (HSV). As we develop these platforms and concepts,
the MH-60S will be tailored, through spiral acquisition, to meet the
capabilities required of the Joint Theater Commander. The fiscal year
2004 budget includes $431 million for 13 helicopters and other
equipment required to transition to the new airframe.
Ship Self-Defense
We continue to invest in upgrading our Ship Self-Defense programs.
Fiscal year 2004 funding covers the spectrum from electronic
countermeasures to missiles to guns. The SEWIP is a spiral development
effort initiated to provide a robust, full spectrum electronic warfare
system following cancellation of the Advanced Integrated Electronic
Warfare System in fiscal year 2002. SEWIP will build on the legacy SLQ-
32 system to field capabilities against next-generation threats. The
current budget expands procurement of the Close-in Weapons System,
Block 1B. The internationally procured Rolling Air Frame Missile and
the NATO Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile will provide ship self-defense
against anti-ship cruise missiles as part of a layered defense.
Additionally, we are pursuing installation of minor caliber guns on our
deploying ships to improve our ability to counteract a small boat
threat in the 0 to 8,000 yards range. We soon will install stabilized
minor caliber guns on two DDGs. Additionally, arming MH-60R and MH-60S
helicopters that deploy on surface combatants provides an addition
layer of lethality against a small boat attack.
Air and Missile Defense
Our Navy is poised to contribute significantly in fielding initial
sea-based missile defense capabilities to meet the near-term ballistic
missile threat to our homeland, our deployed forces, and our friends
and allies and we are working closely with the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) to that end. U.S.S. Lake Erie will be transferred to MDA to
facilitate a more robust testing program for missile defense. In turn,
MDA is requesting funds to upgrade three AEGIS guided missile
destroyers (DDG) for ICBM surveillance and tracking duties and
procurement of up to 20 standard missile interceptors to help us
provide a limited at sea capability to intercept short- and medium-
range ballistic missiles in the boost and ascent phases of flight. Our
sea-based missile defense programs experienced tremendous success on
the test range during 2002, and we look forward to building on these
successes and developing a vital capability for our Nation.
The fiscal year 2004 budget requests $35 million to develop the
Extended Range Active Missile (ERAM). ERAM will enable over-the-horizon
engagements against the most advanced anti-ship and land attack cruise
missiles, and represents an important step in projecting area defense
landward from the sea.
The fiscal year 2004 budget also includes $29.7 million to begin in
earnest the conversion of the Aegis combat systems to an open
architecture (OA) design. In fiscal year 2004, we will begin the
development of standards and functional architecture, building the
Engineering Design Model of the computing environment, and validation
and testing of common applications with the eventual goal of migrating
legacy and new systems to OA condition. Based on mainstream commercial
off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies and systems, converting to OA can
avoid the high cost of maintaining and upgrading multiple legacy
computing systems that quickly become obsolete and are not responsive
to changes in warfighting requirements. Legacy computing systems have
reached the upper bounds of processing capability and will be unable to
accomplish the processing required for near-term and future complex
missions, including BMD. With a COTS-based architecture, there will be
minimal system changes as either warfare requirements or underlying
commercial computing technologies change over the life of a platform.
Precision-Guided Munitions
Precision-guided munitions receive continued investment in our
fiscal year 2004 request with emphasis on increasing our inventory
levels. Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) production rate has been
tripled with $277 million requested for procurement of 12,300 Navy JDAM
kits in fiscal year 2004 and $139 million was requested for 429 Joint
Stand-Off Weapons. Laser Guided Bomb (LGB) kit procurement will
continue with 5,000 to 6,000 LGB kits planned each year from fiscal
year 2004 to 2006. We are also commencing full rate production under a
proposed multiyear procurement for the Tactical Tomahawk (TACTOM)
missile with 267 missiles requested in fiscal year 2004. Our
partnership with the Air Force in several of our munitions programs
will continue to help us optimize both our inventories and our research
and development investment.
Employment of PGMs from aircraft requires precision targeting
information, and the budget request includes funding for two noteworthy
systems in this regard. First, the Multifunctional Information
Distribution System (MIDS) provides secure, jam-resistant, high-
throughput digital data link for voice and data to F/A-18 aircraft. It
supports positive identification, precise location, situational
awareness, sensor-to-shooter coordination, and reduction of fratricide
between U.S. and allied aircraft, maritime and ground forces. This
system is included in F/A-18E/Fs and a retrofit item for F/A-18C/D
aircraft. The MIDS system is currently deployed with two Super Hornet
squadrons aboard U.S.S. Nimitz.
Second, the active Electronically Scanned Array Radar system to be
installed on naval tactical aircraft dramatically improves lethality in
both air-to-air and air-to-ground scenarios. It has three times greater
air-to-air target detection capability and optimized air-to-ground
modes for multi-target identification. The fiscal year 2004 budget
request of $117 million supports a system IOC in fiscal year 2006.
FORCEnet is the enabler of the foregoing capabilities, and the
operational construct and architectural framework for naval warfare in
the joint, information age. It will allow systems, functions, and
missions to be aligned to transform situational awareness, enable rapid
mission planning, accelerate speed of decisions, and allow naval forces
to greatly distribute its combat power in the unified, joint
battlespace. It puts the theory of network centric warfare into
practice. Programs that will enable the future force to be more
networked, highly adaptive, human-centric, integrated, and enhance
speed of command include:
Cooperative Engagement Capability. The fiscal year 2004
budget request includes $160 million for Cooperative Engagement
Capability (CEC). CEC provides a significant step forward in
transforming our situational awareness of the battle space. This
transformational program allows one ship to shoot a weapon at a
generated target based on another ship's firing solution for the first
time in naval history. The first squadron of CEC equipped E-2C Hawkeyes
is currently deployed with the Nimitz Battle Group. The new variant of
CEC that will be competed this summer is a next generation design that
will be smaller, more affordable, and more bandwidth efficient while
providing significantly higher performance and potentially supporting
joint service use.
E-2C Advanced Hawkeye Radar Modernization Program. E-2
Advanced Hawkeye (AHE) program will modernize the E-2 weapons system by
replacing the current radar and other aircraft system components to
improve nearly every facet of tactical air operations. The modernized
weapons system will be designed to maintain open ocean capability while
adding transformational surveillance and Theater Air and Missile
Defense capabilities against emerging air threats in the high clutter
and jamming environment. The advanced Hawkeye will be a critical
contributor to Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air, and to Sea
Strike and Shield. The fiscal year 2004 budgets over $350 million for
continued development with first production planned for fiscal year
2008.
Combining the capabilities of CEC on Aegis ships and E-2C Advanced
Hawkeye aircraft with the ERAM described earlier creates a capability
package called Navy Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA). The
over-the-horizon air directed surface-to-air missile capability against
challenging targets that NIFC-CA will provide will dramatically improve
the joint air defense capability.
Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV). We increased our commitment
to a focused array of unmanned air vehicles that will support and
enhance all missions with persistent, distributed, netted sensors. We
are initiating the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAV this
year to develop a persistent, multi-mission platform capable of
surveillance and reconnaissance of maritime and land targets,
communications relay and some intelligence collection. Additionally, we
have requested funding for development, testing, and experimentation of
Fire Scout, a Global Hawk Maritime demonstration, and an Unmanned
Combat Aerial Vehicle--Navy (UCAV-N) demonstration vehicle.
Joint Fires Network. A further step forward in Network-
Centric Warfare and one of the Navy's transformational initiatives is
the Joint Fires Network (JFN). The JFN integrates the best elements of
three existing systems, Global Command and Control System-Maritime
(GCCS-M); Joint Service Imagery Processing System-Navy (JSIPS-N); and
Tactical Exploitation System-Navy (TES-N), into a converged joint
architecture. JFN automates, coordinates, and correlates the processing
of multiple tactical data streams from various intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) sources to provide time critical
fire control solutions for advanced weapon systems. JFN provides the
maritime and joint tactical commander the ability to quickly target and
re-target precision weapons, enhancing their overall effectiveness and
lethality. JFN supports Sea Strike and Sea Basing by reducing the
sensor to shooter timeline from hours to minutes; providing precision
targeting data for coastal and deep fire support; and the use of ISR
data from responsive and persistent ISR assets to improve both the
Common Operational Picture and Intelligence Preparation of the
battlespace. The fiscal year 2004 budget includes $159 million for JFN.
JFN will serve as a critical building block for the FORCEnet concept.
V. CONCLUSION
With your help, we are significantly improving our Navy. We will
continue our culture of readiness and our commitment to developing our
people while we recapitalize and transform our force. Your future Navy
will be joint, dispersed, and netted, and we will accomplish this
improvement in warfighting capability while still pursuing those
efficiencies that make us good stewards of the public's funds. The
Chief of Naval Operations has made it plain that mission accomplishment
means both warfighting effectiveness and resourcefulness
The fiscal year 2004 budget request reflects these priorities. It
focuses on the right thing--ensuring future naval combat readiness. To
recapitalize, we need to sustain the MYP of DDG-51 class destroyers and
initiate MYP for Virginia class submarines. To transform to meet future
threats, we need to keep DD(X) on track, move ahead on LCS and LCS
mission modules, execute the CVN-21 acquisition strategy and complete
the development of SSGN. Also, we must define the right mix of
Expeditionary Warfare ships. We thank the committee for your continued
strong support of our Navy, our sailors, and our civilian shipmates.
Working together, we are confident we will make our great Navy even
better.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Admiral Mullen.
I see the Senator from Rhode Island has returned and I
think that kind of faithfulness justifies immediate
recognition, so I am going to recognize Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Am I being punished for being prompt, Mr.
Chairman? No? Thank you very much for your courtesy.
Mr. Secretary and Admiral, thank you again for your
testimony. Let me first begin by asking whether you can give me
and the committee an update on the conversion program, the SSGN
conversion program.
Secretary Young. The SSGN conversion? The Ohio was inducted
into Puget Sound Naval Shipyard on schedule and so the work on
it is progressing in the very early phases, but going very
well. The fiscal year 2004 budget requests the funds needed to
execute the four-ship program less an amount we need to try to
work, and we are working through, on a reprogramming right now.
We have built a program structure that puts about 6 months
stagger between each conversion and a strategy that uses
Electric Boat as the overall conversion manager. This will
allow them to gain some learning advantage by moving key people
between those conversions.
So we have a very aggressive, as you well know, and fast-
paced program, but we have been allowed to build a structure
that tries to seek some learning curve benefit and opportunity
for efficiency. So I am optimistic and we are off to a good
start.
Senator Reed. Great.
With respect to the amphibious forces, I understand that
the model is a 12-ship amphibious ready group able to lift
simultaneously 2\1/2\ MPDs?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. I think it is a very important
question and important to reiterate the overall requirement. I
talked about the 19 independent strike groups and the new
global concept moving to 37. That is based on 12 carrier strike
groups, 12 expeditionary strike groups, which would include the
kind of amphibious capability we have today in our ARGs, in
addition to additional surface combatants and submarines in
order to give them some more punch and some more striking
power, and that the requirement in particular for LPD-17 of 12
is still one we very strongly support.
Secretary Young. That is, if I could?
Senator Reed. Yes, sir.
Secretary Young. The program that is laid in place. Albeit
there is some slippage in the budget, and that is an issue we
will take a look at. Building out those 12 LPDs efficiently is
important both from an acquisition point of view and from the
strike group point of view. This is because they replace ships
that will be easily approaching or exceeding 40 years old by
the time we get the LPDs out there.
Senator Reed. Let me understand it, since I am more
comfortable with tanks than ships. But we are building the
eighth Wasp-class LHD, is that correct?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Then we have five Tarawa-class ships to
comprise the ARG at the moment, is that correct?
Admiral Mullen. Yes.
Senator Reed. The five Tarawa-class ships are rather old,
about 35 years or so, and there is an issue about how do we
continue this transition, particularly with the introduction of
some of the Osprey aircraft, stability of the ships? Are those
questions that you are considering?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. As I understand it, there is a study going
under way to try to determine how best to deal with this whole
issue of reaching that 12-ship ARG. Can you talk about some of
the options and your thinking at the moment about what should
be done, building additional Wasp-class ships, designing a new
ship, etcetera? Where are we in that process, Admiral?
Admiral Mullen. I will certainly let Secretary Young talk
about the acquisition side of this, but from the overall
program standpoint and as we approach it, as LHD-8 comes in the
first Tarawa will be retired, the intent is not to go above 12
in that regard.
In the 2007 column of the budget, we have a ship called
LHAR, which is essentially put in there to start to address
some of the issues you raise, in particular the flight deck
space. So it is not an LHD-8. It will be LHD-8-like, except it
will be both longer and it will have a plug in it which will
allow us to accommodate that additional deck space, if you
will.
We essentially started to put these ships out in 4- or 5-
year increments to replace the first five as they reach their
full service life. The next one to come after that is not in
the budget right now. It is in the fiscal year 2010 timeframe.
A lot of the both internal study and also the study to which I
think you are referring, is this joint forcible entry study, in
which we are participating to look at creating options. We have
not gotten to the point, Senator Reed, where we have created
the options yet. We are really at the point where we have
blessed the scenarios because we have good data on four
different scenarios.
The idea of that, though, is to run those scenarios from a
warfighting standpoint and see what the needs are and see where
those studies point us with respect to options in the future.
That gets us to the warfighting capability that is going to be
existent in the future expeditionary strike group when that
fiscal year 2010 ship starts to take more form.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. Secretary, can you talk about the Virginia-class
submarine program? You are asking, I think, this year for a
multiyear procurement and frankly in order, from our
perspective, to maintain the recommended number of submarines
in the fleet we have to begin to be more aggressive in our
procurement. That is the point I begin with.
But can you talk about the multiyear in terms of the cost
profiles you are seeing right now in the multiyear?
Secretary Young. I would say a couple things. The Virginia-
class program, for one, has gone very well. I am sure you have
monitored it very closely. The design is basically complete.
The first submarine is 82 percent built, the second submarine,
the SSN 775, is 71 percent done, and down the line. We have
made excellent progress with the program.
In years past there was a decision both from an efficient
way to build the submarine which allocated the work between the
two yards and from an industrial base point of view to allocate
the work between the two shipyards. So it has been a very thin
production base, but they have done a reasonable job.
I make that point to say a couple of things. One, I would
tell you, going back several years when the program was set up,
it was set up to leverage the SSN-21 Seawolf class. The design-
build tools have come together very well and the schedules that
were laid out as many as 10 years ago have been met to within
months. The reactor core was within a month, the pressure hull
was within 3 months. We have operated the turbine generators
and the main engines 3 years prior to going to sea, and there
is a land-based test site to test the combat system, which has
been under way since 1996.
We have a lot of confidence to come to you with a
multiyear. Then I would approach that from another side and say
from an industrial base point of view and from a requirements
point of view, we really need to build at least one submarine a
year. Once you know you have to do that, the most efficient way
to do that and the tool we need to try to get control of the
annual escalation in material prices and labor prices is a
multiyear. So we can lock in some stable agreements with our
vendor base.
I really believe we need that multiyear tool. I think there
is adequate progress to justify it. It is not the traditional
scheme. You would probably like to have a delivered submarine,
but the industrial base situation we live with and the need to
stabilize that base and stabilize the prices, I think very much
the two together, justify taking the risk and taking the step
forward and executing a multiyear procurement.
Senator Reed. So you see it from the standpoint of not only
requirements, but efficiency?
Secretary Young. Yes, sir, absolutely.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Admiral Mullen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, thanks.
Senator Talent. I thank the Senator from Rhode Island. I am
certainly also a supporter of multiyear funding and greatly
admired the CNO's emphasis on stability in funding, and
multiyear procurement is obviously one of the ways to achieve
that.
I do not think, at the same time, that we can ignore some
of the cost problems that we have had with the Virginia-class
submarine. In view of that and the fact we do not have a
submarine in the water yet, are you telling me you have
confidence that the Title 10 criteria have been met for a
multiyear?
Secretary Young. I believe we have excellent design
stability in the program. I believe we know what the program
costs are and we are submitting a new acquisition program
baseline that recognizes those costs. I think critical to
controlling those costs and not having further growth is the
multiyear procurement tool. So I believe the criteria can be
met to justify authorization of the multiyear contract or
authorization.
Senator Talent. I am not saying you are wrong with that. I
am just saying that, given the problems that we have had from a
cost profile standpoint, it is going to require I think very
active management, careful watching, because we do not want to
be in a situation where we discredit this important tool,
multiyear funding, by not getting the costs under control.
I say this as a supporter of the program.
Secretary Young. I think that is exactly true. Sir, to that
point, we have also recently set up an executive committee
almost like V-22 to go and implement some of those management
discipline tools, maintain control of the configuration, ensure
that progress is being made. Program decisions are elevated to
the highest levels, so that you can indeed deliver to schedule
and cost.
We are working to put in place those tools, because I could
not agree more strongly with your comment. Multiyears have been
a successful tool in building people's confidence in schedule
and cost, and we need to preserve that.
Senator Talent. To be fair, some of this cost overrun, as
we all know, is not the shipbuilder's fault. There are
mitigating factors here. It reminds me a little bit of when
Bill Perry took the C-17 in hand and ended up with a great
aircraft.
I wanted to make that point and I appreciate your comment
on it. Admiral, if you have anything you want to say, feel free
to jump in on that.
Admiral Mullen. I just have to reinforce the comment you
made about what the CNO has discussed. Stabilizing these two
accounts, both the aircraft account and the shipbuilding
account, is a very high priority for us. There are lots--over
the years that has been a very difficult challenge because they
are such big accounts and we have, many of us, myself included,
have over the years had a habit of reaching in there to make
other things balance and trying to figure it out later on.
We are working hard to turn that corner so that we leave
those accounts alone. I have watched Secretary Young for the
last year and a half and the senior Navy leadership really work
hard to try to stabilize it, and in the long run I think that
is really what is going to give us a healthy Navy in the
future.
Senator Talent. Yes, and I think we all have to just agree
that we are going to forfeit that unbridled discretion to reach
in those pots of money every year as the whim moves us. I am
certainly willing to stand up for that here on the Hill. We
just have to have active management of programs that have had
some concerns.
I want to follow up on a question Senator Kennedy asked
regarding the Advanced Gun System for the DD(X). The CNO said
he was confident it would meet the Marine Corps' requirements
for both rate and volume of fire, and I was pleased to hear
that. Mr. Secretary, there is a reevaluation of the performance
parameters for DD(X) under way now. Is that Advanced Gun System
part of that reevaluation? Is it being considered for
downsizing and, if so, how would that affect the Marine Corps'
requirements that Senator Kennedy asked the CNO about?
Secretary Young. I think to best answer the question, I
would take a step back and say, that as we move forward this
ship is very important to the Navy. It will be both the land
attack destroyer fighting for the Navy out to the 2050
timeframe and then it is the platform that hopefully will
enable CG(X), without significant additional investment other
than the radars and sensors for it.
It is worth taking some time to look at the requirements
and make sure we have them right. The Advanced Gun System you
mentioned is a significant driver in the size of that ship. As
you are even more familiar than I with airplanes, size, weight
and cost tend to have a correlation. So it is worth taking some
time and making sure we have the requirements right, because
the fire support requirement is substantial.
Do we need to execute all of that requirement by having a
very large magazine on the ship, because that and the guns
drive the size of the ship. Or do we need a better resupply
concept for that ship, so that we resupply it with rounds and
there are two ships firing? So we are sitting down and looking
at the operational doctrine, which brings the operational Navy
to the table--looking at the acquisition side in terms of what
we can do with the size and volume we have--and trying to make
sure we also build a ship that is not exceedingly dense,
because I think it is one of the cost factors in DDGs today,
which is a smaller, but a very dense ship, which drives an
intensity, if you will, into increased labor and the cost of
the ship.
Therefore, we are taking another look at both the
requirements side and then what the acquisition side can
deliver to make sure we have it right as we get ready to move
to the next important step of designing and locking the ship.
Senator Talent. Is it fair to say then that in this
reevaluation you are looking at the Advanced Gun System, being
open-minded about it, if you will, in no way retreating,
though, from the need to meet the Marines' requirement for
naval gun support?
Secretary Young. I believe that is exactly true, the right
way to say it. In fact, I hesitate to elaborate, but we want to
make sure we have the rate of fire right as well as the weight
of the projectile right. So it is a full-spectrum look. Are we
going to put enough warhead on the target? It is clear that
ERGM and the 5-inch 62 caliber gun take a step in that
direction. That step--we are revalidating--is still not quite
enough and people are growingly convinced that you have to have
the Advanced Gun System and proceed with that.
We need this work also to inform us about what we would
expect from a rail gun, because that may be a future tool to
get even more range and a higher rate of fire. I believe it is
worthwhile. We owe it to you to make sure we have relooked all
the system choices and we feel confident about the path that is
going to be both the path to AGS and then an element of this
will be the path to the future in terms of rail gun and what
technology investments we make in S&T.
Senator Talent. Admiral, Tomahawk missile inventory. I know
the inventory is low and needs to be resupplied. You seem to be
committed to doing that through block 4 procurement rather than
conversion of the older variants. Do I have that right and do
you want to comment on that?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. I have said, and I have been
involved in the Tomahawk business for a few years, that the
inventory, while it has recently increased because of in great
part tremendous support here on the Hill is fragile.
We are in the second big remanufacture effort right now to
remanufacture older missiles into what we call block 3 missiles
as we speak. Where the CNO is on this, and Secretary Young and
I have discussed this at reasonable length and the CNO talked
about it in his testimony, is we really believe we need to move
forward, do the block 4 Tactical Tomahawk, bring that to bear.
One of the great success stories in my view of Tomahawk has
been over the years a pretty rigorous testing system. We have
rung that missile out with a very healthy test program, so we
need to honor the law and the needs of the acquisition system
to bring the new missile through that.
The remaining missiles that we have to remanufacture are
exorbitantly expensive to do so, at the estimate is $1.6-$1.7
million a missile. So it is our conviction we need to move
forward, not go back to that last group of missiles, which are
very old and basically just shells that we would have to make
new missiles out of.
We would like to ramp up--and I think Secretary Young can
speak to the details of this--as early as we can, as quickly as
we can, from a capacity of on the order of about 38 a month to
50 a month and make the acquisition strategy work. Once we have
reached, as the CNO said, full rate production, buy as many as
we can.
Secretary Young. If I could, Mr. Chairman, I believe
Admiral Mullen said it exactly right. Because of the condition
of the missiles that remain to be remanufactured and because to
do the remanufactures that have been done to date efficiently
we bought out some of the parts, therefore we would have to go
back and requalify sources and do some re-engineering on pieces
of it. So the best you do is get additional remanufactured
missiles out of this group at a fairly high price and 24 months
from now you can, for significantly less money, over the same
time frame of getting about 300 more remanufactured missiles,
get 300 Tactical Tomahawk on close to the same schedule, maybe
not quite as fast, but close, or even closer if we are willing
to take some risk in this area. This is an area where, because
of the war, we may want to take some risk and buy Tactical
Tomahawks.
The three tests have gone almost flawlessly to date and all
the basic parameters have been demonstrated. This is not a
brand new system where we are re-inventing the wheel. This is a
system where we are re-engineering the parts to bring the cost
down and doing so very well. The new Tactical Tomahawks are
going to be on the order of $569,000 a copy. That is the
promise.
So we would like to work aggressively to step up that
production rate faster and to a higher level as soon as
possible as the most efficient way to get more missiles and
replace the fact that we have burned through the inventory
here.
Senator Talent. You have mentioned several times, this
constant emphasis, which I really appreciate, on rolling up
your sleeves and getting involved in the details of these
programs, discovering efficiencies, making dollars go further,
and making the tough choices. I appreciate what you have done
working with our partners in the shipyards to begin revising
those manufacturing processes so they can get the same
efficiencies.
I know that we have made progress in that area and I know
that that is a result of a partnership, but a lot of it is the
initiative that has come from your offices, and I want to
compliment you on that.
Do you want to comment on how that is going? I mean, you
have referred to it a little bit, but do you have any comments
you want to make?
Secretary Young. I appreciate the opportunity to say a
couple of brief things. Again, some of it is because of my
awareness of your background and what you have seen. The
shipyards have been very aggressive in embracing lean
manufacturing. You can go to Avondale and see what used to be a
very messy workspace now efficiently lined up so the distance
traveled by the workforce is minimized, and the tools are there
for them to do the job. You see the same thing at Ingalls, and
you see the same thing at Bath when you visit the shipyards.
Newport News has implemented an Enterprise Resource
Program, which the Navy on its own is also trying to implement
across our enterprise. So you manage your supply chain, you
know when the parts are there, and they are properly scheduled
for use. So I think your point is well taken.
The key step that we are enforcing is discipline in the
design and manufacturing process. We have a fund. We are
strictly controlling the design changes we want to implement in
the ship, and letting the yard plan to build that ship in
accordance with an approved configuration, and not create
churn, because our accounting systems and budgeting process are
not amenable to the delay and disruption that you inevitably
put in when you decide to change something on the waterfront.
Those are the steps we have taken to stop generating prior
year completion bills as well as be more efficient in our new
build program. The shipyards are taking a lot of initiative on
their own.
Senator Talent. I ought to visit because it is exciting to
watch as manufacturers do that. You are right, I do have some
history of that with TACAIR, and I am certain that they are and
I hope that they are inculcating that concept all the way
through the workforce. In other words, a lot of this comes from
the guys and gals on the line who are doing this work. Once
they get that sense that the top leadership is committed to the
updating and this lean manufacturing, it is amazing what they
will come up with. It might be a good opportunity or a good
subject for me to visit.
Let me close with how I started to get your comments on how
LCS is doing and particularly the modules. You were here when I
asked the CNO about this. I really support this idea and I have
caught his vision, and your vision for this. First of all, the
whole concept is ambitious. You have a frame of a ship and then
you are going to put modules in it and pull them out as you
change the mission for that particular ship. Mr. Secretary, and
then maybe Admiral Mullen, if you would comment on if you have
had any estimate of costs or range of costs for the modules
that you have available at this time?
Secretary Young. I think that last discussion is important.
When we make decisions to change a combat system or other
equipment, a lot of times you have to go into the ship and the
yard or on the waterfront and change the foundations and other
things to land it. So to give credit, I think Secretary England
and I talked through some of this in the beginning with the CNO
and he brought his vision to bear.
But I hope that sea frame is something like this room,
where there are throughout the room regular drops for power,
communications, cooling, and the things you need, so that you
see this in today's ships. You go on a DDG, you will see a lot
of laptops that have been brought on board. I believe we can,
in the future, bring the combat system aboard as laptops and
test it at a land-based site and implement it on that.
So we need most importantly to have a sea frame that has
space and it has ride qualities so that in this littoral
environment the sailors are comfortable performing their
mission. We need to focus on getting a ship that is about the
right size. Given we know, as the CNO said, we want RMS on
board and a certain amount of air defense capability. We can
roughly allocate those budgets, if you will, to the ship, focus
on getting the hull right so we can get the speed and the
stability we need, and then make sure the combat systems going
forward try to conform to that space, hopefully to have more
than enough margin so we have some growth margin.
The same thing was done in F/A-18E/F. You built a big
enough airframe to have margin space to bring additional combat
systems on board. We will try to put some margin in that sea
frame so we do not find ourselves constrained in that regard.
Admiral Mullen. Sir, a couple of recent data points that I
think are really important. This is a warship and we talk about
it in a lot of terms. But the CNO first and foremost reminds us
that this is a warship we are fielding to be able to get in the
ring and stay in the ring, win while we are there, and do some
missions that are very challenging for us right now such as in
the mine warfare area, the diesel submarine area, as well as
the surface ship defense or both attack and defense, if you
will, where other ships cannot go because we do not have them
in numbers or we are restricted to get them in that close in
certain environments.
The issue of modularity has come up and what does that
mean. I think this is a part of the CNO's vision as well as how
both Secretary England and Secretary Young talk about this. The
CNO was overseas in a European country not too long ago that
has a small navy and he watched inside 15 minutes a 76-
millimeter gun, which is the same size gun we have on our
Guided-Missile Frigates (FFGs), essentially from the time the
clock started until it was doing firing checks was about 15
minutes, from being on the pier to putting it on the ship.
Now, to me that concept or that modularity with a very
capable gun, if you will, or whatever we are going to bring in
these modules is really what we are after, to be able to hook
up into the capability, water, air, heat, power, those things,
cooling, that Secretary Young mentioned a second ago.
So we are excited about it. It is moving quickly and
certainly what he said is true. A year ago, we did not know
enough to properly budget for the modules. The way we answer
that is to take some of the off-the-shelf stuff--he used the
example of several RMSs in the mine warfare area on an LCS, for
example. There are other off-the-shelf technologies that would
go to the first two.
Not unlike moving it quickly with the money we have in it
this year, which we got great help over here for, we need to do
the same thing in the modules, which is why we have asked for
it in the unfunded program list. It really is risk reduction
money to get us to what it is going to be in the 2007-2008 time
frame.
Senator Talent. That $35 million is really pretty important
to you?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, it is in that regard.
Senator Talent. That is part of the record; I see this
really as the crossroads of the whole Seapower 21 vision. One
of the reasons I am asking so many questions about it is I have
a feeling if I can understand it better then I am going to see
the direction that you all are trying to go with this thing and
we are going to make a lot of progress on this in the 2 years
that I am chairing this subcommittee. So I want to really
partner with you on it.
I interrupted you.
Admiral Mullen. No, sir. That was essentially what I had to
say.
Back to the land attack destroyer, one of the initiatives
there, while it is the technology center for our R&D base for
surface ships, which 3 or 4 years ago was virtually
nonexistent, that is why that money that is over here right now
in R&D on DD(X) is so important to us, because clearly it is
going to develop the DD(X) technologies. But it will spin to
LCS and CG(X). In my view, if we do it right, it will spin to
just about any seagoing vessel, submarine, or aircraft carrier
that we build. That is one piece, the volume of fires and
precision that the CNO talked about, which is critical. In the
armored world, the 155-round is what does it. The 5-inch round
that we have right now as we explore this over time is not the
one that was able to answer the mail, even with the increased
precision that clearly the technology brings now.
The other piece of that is DD(X) is going to be manned with
a very small number, a third of the crew typically that we have
had on a destroyer, and that has forced a major investment in
technology, if you will, to support that. That will spin off to
LCS so it will be properly manned at a very small number, we
think. We do not know what that number is yet.
The whole idea is we want the cost of both the modules and
the ship to be absolute minimum. It cannot approach the billion
dollars a year we are talking about right now in DDGs, for
instance. It has to be well below half of that in my view.
Senator Talent. Well, that is because this is how you are
going to meet the need for surface combatant vessels, is it
not?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, clearly.
Senator Talent. I mean, I am really intrigued and attracted
by the ambition of this and I do intend to follow it carefully
with you and to be supportive of your efforts in it. You are
right, a few years ago we would have said you are trying to
square the circle, build a ship with multi-mission capabilities
that you can easily and quickly modify to perform a number of
different functions, fitting in with a Sea-Basing concept that
you are also still developing, and doing all that at a rock
bottom price. A few years ago I would have said you cannot do
it, but I think you guys probably can do it.
Maybe that is a good note on which to end the hearing. Let
me just make certain that I have not neglected to ask anything
that people are panting to have me ask.
Thank you all for coming and we will adjourn the hearing.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Talent
BENEFITS OF ``SEA-SWAP'' EXPERIMENT
1. Senator Talent. Admiral Clark, in your written statement, you
note the Navy's Sea-Swap program and that benefits are being realized
from this program. What are examples of these benefits?
Admiral Clark. The intent of the Sea-Swap program is to improve the
Navy's forward presence and employability without a corresponding
increase in force structure. The Navy has two ships, U.S.S. Fletcher
and U.S.S. Higgins, operating forward as part of the Sea-Swap
initiative. By rotating crews to the ship rather than changing ships,
Fletcher and Higgins are providing longer on-station times while
maintaining our personnel tempo goals.
2. Senator Talent. Admiral Clark, how do the benefits of the Sea-
Swap program compare with the benefits of forward homeporting of Navy
ships in foreign ports, such as Yokuska, Japan?
Admiral Clark. Our forward deployed naval forces homeported in the
Western Pacific, the Persian Gulf, and in the Mediterranean, allow us
to respond rapidly to crises and provide theater security cooperation
in that theater of operations. Strategic cooperation, particularly with
the host nation, forward maintenance capability, and shortened lines of
supply are all benefits of forward homeporting. Similarly, Sea-Swap
attempts to improve our forward engagement, but without permanent
basing in the forward theaters. The Sea-Swap initiative is starting out
with two ships as a pilot program to measure and evaluate the benefits
versus the costs of the program.
3. Senator Talent. Admiral Clark, are Sea-Swap and forward
homeporting programs mutually exclusive or is there a synergy between
the two programs that realizes a larger benefit for the Navy? Please
cite examples.
Admiral Clark. Sea-Swap and forward homeporting are not mutually
exclusive. Through both programs we are attempting to get a greater
percentage of immediately employable, flexible naval forces forward.
Our forward based ships operate predominately in the Western Pacific,
while Sea-Swap ships are currently employed in the U.S. Central Command
theater of operation. The benefits of forward homeporting ships are
routinely demonstrated through operations and exercises with nations of
the Western Pacific region and in their rapid response to the Persian
Gulf during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. The Sea-Swap
program is still in its infancy and we are in the process of evaluating
its effectiveness.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan M. Collins
MISSILE DEFENSE
4. Senator Collins. Admiral Clark, in your testimony, you mention
the increasing role of the Navy in missile defense. You highlight the
recent success that the Navy has had in testing, which included scoring
three hits and conducting three successful tracking events. Certainly,
that track record stands out among the family of missile defense
systems being developed across the Department of Defense. I believe
that the Navy will become an even larger player in missile defense in
the coming years. Already, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is
requesting funding to equip a number of DDGs for surveillance purposes.
As more of the DDG-51 vessels are integrated into missile defense, it
will add to the already considerable requirements we place on our
destroyers. How do you envision the role of the surface fleet
developing in missile defense and what are the possible implications
for shipbuilding?
Admiral Clark. We are working cooperatively with the MDA to evolve
Navy's participation in ballistic missile defense (BMD). The plan to
install surveillance and track capability in several DDGs by October 1,
2004 is the first operational effort toward this cooperation. We are
working with MDA to improve on these capabilities through a spiral
development plan culminating in a capability to provide Anti-Air
Warfare and BMD capability in Aegis-equipped ships in the 2010+
timeframe. Currently, that effort is aimed at in-service ships, but we
are also looking at options that have the potential for applications in
new construction ships in the future.
DDG-51
5. Senator Collins. Admiral Clark, I want to thank you personally
for your good work in putting together the fiscal year 2004 budget
submission. In the past, you have made commitments to me that
shipbuilding funds would be restored to a level that would help to put
the Navy on the road to recapitalization. You have kept that
commitment. However, there are still challenges ahead. In particular, I
have concerns about the procurement of major surface combatants in the
coming years. As it currently stands, the Navy will cease construction
of DDG-51 destroyers after 2005, and only fund four DD(X) destroyers
during the 2006 to 2008 timeframe. To sustain the industrial base, four
vessels over a 3-year period is wholly inadequate. At the same time,
the Navy will continued to be faced with increasing missions. In
particular, it is becoming evident that major surface combatants will
be playing a significant, and growing, role in missile defense. While
this problem is still a few years off, it is critical that we begin to
deal with it. Are you committed to addressing this issue?
Admiral Clark. The Navy is committed to restoring shipbuilding
funds to a level that will put us on the road to recapitalization as
reflected in the fiscal year 2004 President's budget request. The
Navy's ship recapitalization program and corresponding budget for
fiscal year 2004 is ``turning the corner'' on previous budgets and will
continue to increase across the Future Years Defense Program, ramping
to levels needed to recapitalize the fleet to meet future warfighting
requirements. In the near term, the recently awarded 10 ship DDG-51
multiyear contract and workload exchange agreement between Bath Iron
Works and Northrop Grumman will optimize production efficiencies and
help stabilize workload at both shipyards. To meet the needs of our
future Navy, including missile defense, we must rapidly transition from
legacy programs such as DDG-51 to transformational programs such as
DD(X), Littoral Combat Ship, and CG(X).
6. Senator Collins. Admiral Clark, do you have any initial thoughts
about major surface combatant construction in the coming years?
Admiral Clark. In addition to completing procurement of 62 Arleigh
Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers in fiscal year 2005, Navy is investing
significant resources over the next several years to develop, design,
and construct the LCS and DD(X), two of the three members of the
surface combatant family of ships. Both the lead LCS and DD(X) are
funded in RDT&E recognizing the managed risk associated with key
systems included in these new start transformational shipbuilding
programs.
In line with recent DOD initiatives to streamline the acquisition
process, the Navy has placed LCS on a fast track to begin construction
no later than fiscal year 2005. Starting the LCS program in fiscal year
2003 affords an opportunity to employ innovative spiral development and
acquisition methods from the keel up. Collaboration between the Navy
and the U.S. Coast Guard Deepwater program and with allied nations with
experience in littoral operations will facilitate cost effective
development and procurement of the LCS and its associated mission
capability modules. The Cruiser Conversion Program will bring critical
mid-life capability improvements to our first class of Aegis equipped
ships.
The DD(X) research and development effort will enable the Navy to
keep pace with today's rapid technological advances, spiraling
promising technologies to both CG(X)--the third member of the family of
ships--and LCS. It will also enable the Navy to upgrade in-service
Aegis equipped cruisers and destroyers with selected leading edge
technologies to maintain operational effectiveness of the legacy,
multi-mission fleet.
U.S.S. JACKSONVILLE
7. Senator Collins. Admiral Clark, with a rapidly declining fleet,
it is critical that the Navy take every opportunity to maximize the
life of vessels that still can provide useful service. The Navy has
recently provided Congress with its Fiscal Year 2004 Unfunded Priority
List. On that list is funding that would provide for the refueling of
SSN-699, the U.S.S. Jacksonville. This refueling would take place at
Kittery-Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. In the past, I believe that the Navy
has perhaps been too quick to decommission submarines, which has in
part led to the decreased force structure we have today. What value
would the U.S.S. Jacksonville bring to the Navy should funding be made
available to refuel it, as opposed to decommissioning the vessel?
Admiral Clark. The expected warfighting benefit to be derived from
the U.S.S. Jacksonville ERO in fiscal year 2004 is the availability of
an additional SSN 688 class submarine raising SSN force level from 54
to 55 to meet minimum warfighting requirements.
The 2001 QDR sets the moderate risk SSN force level at 55.
Similarly, the 1999 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Study reached the
conclusion that below 55 SSNs leaves the Department with insufficient
capability to respond to urgent critical demands without gapping other
requirements of high national interest. Navy studies since 1999 have
identified the warfighting requirement of SSNs as 55. Current SSN force
level is 54 ships.
The investment in Jacksonville's refueling will add 10 years of
life and force structure to the force.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
EFFECT OF DECLINING FLEET SIZE
8. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Clark, this budget includes cutting the
Navy fleet size below 300 ships in fiscal year 2004. At a time when we
are deploying the fleet more and asking our people to spend greater
periods of time away from home, this would appear to be moving in the
wrong direction. More specifically, the plan involves retiring the rest
of the DD-963 destroyers early. What will be the effect on operating
tempo for the remaining ships and crews in the surface combatant fleet?
Admiral Clark. The Navy maintains a 2-year surface combatant
deployment schedule. The current schedule keeps the surface combatant
fleet within the CNO's operating tempo guidelines while allowing these
reductions in fleet size. The Navy is committed to keeping deploying
units within operating tempo guidelines.
9. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Clark, aren't you, by the actions in
this budget, asking Navy personnel to make even greater sacrifices?
Admiral Clark. We constantly evaluate our manpower needs to ensure
we have the right number of people, with the right training and the
right experience levels, to man our ships, squadrons, and shore
stations within established fiscal constraints.
The high-tech, inherently more capable, platforms we continue to
integrate into the fleet in the 21st century present opportunities to
accomplish more, without placing undue or unacceptable burdens on our
men and women. The retirement of the DD-963 class will allow the
recapitalization necessary to integrate less manpower intensive
platforms that will have even greater warfighting capabilities. We are
ever mindful of the effects on our sailors of excessive operational and
personnel tempo. Accordingly, we continue in our efforts to ensure the
pace of operations and time spent away from home are not adversely
impacting their morale or their ability to perform in the same
outstanding fashion we've observed since the onset of the global war on
terrorism.
To be sure, a smaller Navy cannot be in as many places as a larger
Navy. The Department must effectively manage operational tempo issues.
Considering all the issues, I believe retirement of the DD-963
destroyers is the correct course of action.
dd(x) capability alternatives and effects on fire support capability
10. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Young, you mentioned during the
hearing that the Navy is analyzing alternatives for the level of
capabilities in the DD(X) program. I fear that this may be related to
some arbitrary goal for the displacement of the ship. You also
mentioned that you are considering alternatives involving rate-of-fire
and the magazine volumes. The analytical efforts leading to this point
in the DD(X) schedule, including all of the analysis done to support
the original DD-21 program, determined that there were certain
threshold capabilities for these two parameters.
Certainly, the Navy might be able to compensate for smaller
magazine sizes by conducting more frequent underway replenishment
operations, but this could include adding requirements for additional
auxiliary ships. It would appear that the only way to compensate for a
smaller rate-of-fire would be to increase the number of DD(X)
destroyers or other vessels in the force supporting the same set of
fire missions. Requiring more ships for the set of fire support
missions could be a lot more expensive than letting the analysis
determine the size of the ship. Is someone setting some arbitrary goal
for displacement of DD(X)?
Secretary Young. No. The Navy is in the process of analyzing
alternatives to meet requirements for: Marine Corps fire support, DD(X)
multi-mission capapility, and the projected CG(X). The analysis spans a
range of threshold and objective values for various systems including
trading requirements such as the number of guns, magazine volume, and
number of VLS cells, against ship design features, including
displacement. Considerations in this review include current and
proposed operational concepts and employment options for DD(X) under
Sea Power 21. The Navy would like to spiral CG(X) from the same hull
built for DD(X). This would reduce nonrecurring engineering cost, life
cycle cost, technical documentation, and provide a common hull for 40-
50 ships of the DD(X) and CG(X) class.
11. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Young, will any Navy review of
alternatives to the previously-derived threshold requirements include
assessing fully-ascribed costs such as: (1) needing to provide
additional or different auxiliary ships; or (2) buying a larger number
of DD(X) destroyers or other vessels to satisfy the set of required
missions?
Secratary Young. Although not specifically addressed in the ongoing
review of alternatives for DD(X), the Navy is studying various force
architectures including additional or different auxiliary ships and
platforms to support the future logistics needs and Sea Basing concept
of operations for the Navy and Joint Forces. Other studies, such as the
recently completed Secretary of Defense Shipbuilding study and ongoing
Joint Forcible Entry Operations Study, are examining various force
architectures which include notional organic capabilities of DD(X) and
the means to sustain DD(X) and other surface combatants to support
future forcible entry concepts. Although a final decision on the
configuration and size of DD(X) has not been made, it will ultimately
be balanced against operational concepts and force structure
considerations, including other platforms, necessary to meet the
Department's warfighting requirements.
LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP
12. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Young, I understand the concept of
the LCS, the Navy intends to employ this vessel in contested waters
close to shore. By certain accounts, the Navy's acquisition strategy is
to rely on contractors to provide ship designs that are to be built to
standards established by the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS). As I
understand it, ABS publishes standards for commercial vessels, but does
not encompass all of the survivability considerations that we normally
expect from a Navy combatant. Will these vessels be built to the
regular Navy damage control standards?
Secretary Young. LCS will be built to the Navy damage control
standards. The February 28, 2003, Preliminary Design Interim
Requirements Document specifies that LCS will meet the requirements of
OPNAVINST 9070.1, Survivability Policy for Surface Ships of the U.S.
Navy.
13. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Clark, if these ships were not to be
built to normal combatant damage control standards, why would you find
it acceptable to place these crews at greater risk with less built-in
survivability?
Admiral Clark. As specified in the LCS Flight Zero Preliminary
Design Interim Requirements Document, the ship will be built to normal
combatant damage control standards in accordance with OPNAVINST 9070.1,
Survivability Policy for Surface Ships of the U.S. Navy.
STUDIES INSTEAD OF INVESTMENT
14. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Clark, I notice that the Navy's
shipbuilding plan does not include the 12th and last planned ship of
the LPD-17 class. I understand that the Defense Department is
conducting a so-called ``Forcible Entry Capability Study'' that might
have some bearing on the make-up of amphibious fleet. I also understand
that the Defense Department is conducting an ``Undersea Superiority
Study'' that may change objectives for attack submarine force levels. I
note that the rate of submarine construction increases to two boats per
year in fiscal year 2007, consistent with plans to meet requirements
established in the previous JCS review of submarine requirements. Why
does the Navy's budget drop the last LPD-17 out of the shipbuilding
plan, perhaps anticipating some different guidance from one study, when
the attack submarine plan does not appear to presume the outcome of the
other study process?
Admiral Clark. The Navy has not changed its requirement for 12 LPD-
17 class ships. Relative to the 2003 plan, the fiscal year 2004
President's budget request procures the same number of ships through
fiscal year 2007 and continues the 2003 plan by procuring one ship per
year in fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009. The 12th and last
planned ship of the class can be expected to be procured beyond the
current future years defense program. While studies such as the
Forcible Entry Study will explore various force structure alternatives
including Naval Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG) and Expeditionary
Strike Forces (ESF), and Amphibious and Maritime Pre-positioning Force
ships, at this time there is no plan to alter the program of record to
acquire 12 ships.
EFFECTS OF PERTURBATIONS IN THE LPD-17 SCHEDULE
15. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Clark, the shipbuilding profile in the
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) shows a gap in LPD-17 production in
fiscal 2005. Has the Navy assessed the effect of this projected gap in
production on procurement costs for these ships?
Admiral Clark. Yes. The Navy and Northrop Grumman Ship Systems
estimate of known LPD-17 program cost increases are expected to be
approximately $80-$100 million due to the impact of the fiscal year
2005 procurement gap. There could be additional risks to the program's
cost, schedule, and vendor base depending on how the industry addresses
this procurement gap.
16. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Clark, delays in producing LPD-17
vessels will probably mean that the Navy will have to keep ships with
higher operating costs for longer than planned. For example, the 12
LPD-17 ships are supposed to replace a larger number of older ships,
and in the process, reduce demands for personnel by roughly two-thirds.
How is delaying introduction of the LPD-17 program consistent with the
Navy's efforts to get operating and support costs under control?
Admiral Clark. A number of the ships that the LPD-17 class replaces
have already been retired. Keeping the remaining older ships around
does increase our operating and support costs. Compared to the
President's fiscal year 2003 budget, the President's fiscal year 2004
budget delays the LPD-17 class deliveries by only three ship years.
Although undesirable, this delay was necessary in order to balance all
Navy programs in the FYDP.
DDG-51 AND LPD-17 SWAP
17. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Clark, based on the latest information
on the agreement to transfer workload for DDG-51 destroyers and LPD-17
amphibious transport docks between Bath Iron Works and Avondale/
Ingalls, what effects on total costs of the two programs have you
experienced?
Admiral Clark. The workload transfer was expected to save the Navy
funding on the LPD-17 program by consolidating all LPD-17 work at
Northrup Grumman Ship Systems, Inc. (Avondale/Ingalls). However, near
term DDG-51 costs were expected to increase due to higher labor costs
at Bath Iron Works. The net effect was estimated as a $200 million cost
savings to the Navy, plus intangible cost avoidances across both
programs. The projected savings are reflected as part of the fiscal
year 2004 President's budget request. The work associated with the
initial ships (DDG 102 and LPD 19) has been transferred. Actual costs
to date on the DDG-51 and LPD-17 programs are supporting the initial
swap savings estimates.
ADDING DEMANDS TO UNDERFUNDED SHIPBUILDING PLAN
18. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Clark, this subcommittee has taken a
prominent role in pointing out that the Navy has not been buying a
sufficient number of ships to recapitalize the current fleet. The
shipbuilding plan in this budget has finally begun to address this
situation, but the quantities are increased in the outyears by plans to
build nine relatively cheaper LCSs. As I understand your Sea Power 21
vision, the Navy's view is that: (1) LCS would be additive to the 316
ship fleet supported by the Quadrennial Defense Review; and (2) LCSs
are not designed to replace any current vessels. Can we afford to start
a new class of ships that really does not modernize any current part of
the fleet when we are not buying enough ships to recapitalize the
current fleet?
Admiral Clark. Currently, no ships in the fleet can be modernized
at any cost to deliver LCS like capabilities. To meet the requirements
of the new Defense Strategy, Global Concept of Operations, and future
global threats, Navy must invest now in the LCS. A new, focused-mission
ship, LCS will provide the fast, affordable, and reconfigurable
capability that will sustain access and enhance the Navy's ability to
establish sea superiority for our Carrier Strike Groups, Expeditionary
Strike Groups, and joint logistics, command and control and pre-
positioned ships that must transit the critical littoral threat area to
move and support forces ashore. Funding LCS is not at the expense of
other equally important plans to recapitalize the current fleet. In
addition to 9 LCS, Navy plans to procure 43 ships through fiscal year
2009 including an aircraft carrier, 9 fast attack submarines, 14 multi-
mission destroyers, 7 amphibious assault ships including 1 large deck
ship replacement, 9 logistics ships, and 3 pre-positioning ships.
Additionally, Navy is funding various nuclear refueling overhauls,
conversions, and small craft replacement or service life extensions.
19. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Clark, in that context, I would note
that maintaining the current fleet of roughly 300 ships requires that
the Navy build 8-10 ships per year over the long-term, while
maintaining a fleet of 375 ships would require building roughly 9-12
ships per year. Expanding the fleet to 375 in 10 years would require
building roughly 16-18 ships per year. Given the recent shipbuilding
procurement experience (5-7 ships per year), it hardly seems likely
that the Navy can afford to achieve these production rates without
making major reductions elsewhere. These actions could include having
to retire existing combatant ships early and substitute the smaller,
less capable LCS ships for them. Are there major portions of the
current fleet that the Navy will not need under the Navy's new
operating concepts?
Admiral Clark. A fleet of approximately 375 ships is required to
fully implement the new Defense Strategy and Global Concept of
Operations. This force will consist of a combination of current fleet
assets as well as future ship classes. To achieve a fleet of this size
and capability requires both near- and long-term commitments. In the
near-term, Navy is committed to funding transformational shipbuilding
programs. To do so, Navy is decommissioning some older, less capable
and more maintenance intensive ships such as Spruance (DD-963) class
destroyers and Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG 7) class frigates and applying
those savings to help finance the transition to the numbers, type, and
mix of ships required to execute the range of missions anticipated in
the 21st century.
20. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Clark, isn't the addition of the LCS
program going to be at the expense of modernizing some part of the
existing fleet when the Navy has not been able to allocate sufficient
funding to recapitalize the fleet?
Admiral Clark. The LCS program is not funded at the expense of
other essential plans to recapitalize and modernize the current fleet.
The Navy's ship recapitalization program and corresponding budget for
fiscal year 2004 is ``turning the corner'' on previous budgets and will
continue to increase across the FYDP, ramping to levels needed to
recapitalize the fleet to meet current and future warfighting
requirements. In addition to 9 LCSs, Navy plans to procure 43 ships
through fiscal year 2009. In addition to new ship construction, the
Cruiser Conversion, SSGN Conversion, and other funded fleet improvement
programs such as nuclear ship refueling overhauls represent parallel
efforts to upgrade our current capabilities, while investing in
transformational initiatives like LCS, which will provide capability
into the future.
21. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Clark, when would you expect that the
Navy would be able to achieve the transformation of the fleet as
envisioned in Sea Power 21?
Admiral Clark. In order for Sea Power 21 to meet the key goals as
outlined by the Quadrennial Defense Review and National Security
Strategy, and as operationalized by the Navy's Global Concept of
Operations, shipbuilding procurement rates must reach a rate of
approximately 12 ships per year through the next 20 years to meet the
375 battle force ship requirement.
SEA-BASED MISSILE DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS
22. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Young, the administration's draft
plans for expanded intercontinental-range ballistic missile defense
include looking to sea-based defenses. Your prepared statement
indicates that the Navy and MDA have signed an agreement relating to
the Navy's contributing ships to cover MDA missions. The Navy seems
split over this matter, with some advocating a greater Navy role in
missile defenses, other than the Navy theater defense programs, and
others who are concerned over the impact this new mission could have on
the number of ships available to the fleet for conventional missions.
What are the details of the MDA-Navy agreement on contributing ships to
cover MDA missions?
Secretary Young. The Navy is in process of assigning U.S.S. Lake
Erie (CG-70) to the MDA as a dedicated ballistic missile defense
testing platform. This action allows the MDA testing program to proceed
unabated by the delay and expense that would be involved in modifying
an older Aegis-equipped cruiser to accomplish the testing mission, and
demonstrates the Navy's firm commitment to missile defense as a core
mission. In January 2003, OSD directed that the assignment of Lake Erie
to the MDA should occur. OSD also directed MDA to procure Standard
Missile-3 missiles and Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) upgrade ship
sets to facilitate an early deployment of Navy missile defense
capability. A Memorandum of Understanding is currently in staffing
which will stipulate the Lake Erie cost sharing arrangement,
administrative actions and other operational details between Navy and
the MDA. We expect the actual ship transfer to occur summer 2003.
Regarding other ships that may be allocated to BMD, the Navy is
working closely with MDA and the appropriate combatant commanders to
develop an efficient operational concept for Navy participation in the
BMD system. This work began last fall and accelerated with the issuance
of National Security Presidential Directive 23, which stated the
President's intent to deploy ballistic missile defenses in 2004 and
2005. The concept of operations for the Navy's role in the initial
defensive operations capability has not been finalized by the U.S.
Strategic Command. The details of ship availabilities, impact upon
other Navy deployments, and the opportunity costs of this new mission
have yet to be fully determined.
23. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Mullen, what are your views of the
effect that using Navy ships for testing intercontinental-range
ballistic missile defenses or deploying them for MDA missions would
have on the availability of ships for covering existing missions?
Admiral Mullen. The Navy is supportive of MDA in their efforts to
rapidly field effective ballistic missile defenses for the homeland.
Effective testing is key to that goal and we are in process of
assigning U.S.S. Lake Erie (CG70) to MDA as a dedicated ballistic
missile defense testing platform. As Admiral Clark testified to the
SASC in February, this action allows the MDA testing program to proceed
unabated by the delay and expense that would be involved in modifying
an older Aegis-equipped cruiser to accomplish the testing mission and
demonstrates the Navy's firm commitment to missile defense as a core
mission. Although the concept of operations for missile defense has not
yet been completed by the U.S. Strategic Command, it's clear that the
number of ships involved in the ballistic missile defense mission will
have some opportunity cost vis-a-vis existing Navy missions. It's our
sense at this early juncture that the multi-mission character of our
Aegis ships will enable us to support this new mission assignment
without an undue impact on the Navy missions that are currently extant.
24. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Mullen, in the near-term, how would
the Navy propose to meet forward deployment commitments and assume any
additional such duties without breaking operational tempo guidelines?
Admiral Mullen. The Navy uses a process called Global Naval Force
Presence Policy (GNFPP) to balance the deployment requirements for our
Carrier Strike Groups and Expeditionary Strike Groups. Through the
GNFPP process the Navy, in coordination with the Joint Staff and
combatant commanders, develops a schedule to meet the forward deployed
requirements and keep the deploying units within operational tempo
guidelines.
Theater security and deterrence posture is currently under review
by the Joint Staff and it is unclear what the requirement will be for
the Navy, but we fully expect to maintain rotational presence in the
four strategic hubs described by the Defense Strategy. The requirement
to provide surface combatants in support of missile defense is an
emerging requirement that the Navy is prepared to support. Future
schedules developed within the GNFPP process account for additional
surface combatant requirements to support missile defense and will
continue to be adjusted to support this evolving requirement.
At the same time we plan to preserve a global surge capability to
meet critical warfighting and engagement requirements for the combatant
commanders. In order to fulfill those commitments, the Navy is rapidly
transitioning to a global concept of operations--supported by the fleet
response plan--that fundamentally changes how we will provide combat
capability forward. Analysis of potential adversary capabilities allows
us to modify the way we provide deterrence--moving from a Carrier
Battle Groups (CVBG) centric construct to one where we make more
efficient use of our expeditionary forces. By providing broader
capability with the same force structure, we will minimize the impact
on personnel and operational tempo, while still maintaining the ability
to surge sufficient combat power in the event of major conflict.
Maintenance and training schedules for returning Carrier and
Expeditionary Strike Groups are being adjusted to maximize operational
availability, and deployment schedules are being adjusted to provide
rotational presence and quality of life.
TOMAHAWK MISSILES
25. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Young, you and Admiral Mullen
referred to the higher costs of refurbishing the remaining Tomahawk
missiles that have not already been slated for Block III conversion.
One of the issues you raised was that many of these missiles had
already been cannibalized for parts to support converting other
missiles to the Block III configuration. Presumably, this would not
have been the case for missiles with nuclear warheads (TLAM-N) that had
been reserved for Strategic Command requirements. Has the Department
identified a planned retirement date for the TLAM-N?
Secretary Young. The Navy was directed in 1991 to remove all
surface-launched nuclear Tomahawk missiles from active inventory. These
surface nuclear Tomahawk missiles were released in 2002 for use in the
Remanufacture II program. Submarine torpedo-tube-launched nuclear
Tomahawk missiles remain in the active inventory due to strategic
requirements. These missiles have not been cannibalized or included in
any remanufacture program. During the FYDP, there is no planned
retirement date for submarine TLAM-Ns.
26. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Young, if these TLAM-N missiles were
released to the Navy for other uses, how much would converting them to
Block III configuration cost?
Secretary Young. If the TLAM-N missiles were released to the Navy
for remanufacture, the estimated cost to convert 183 TLAM-N missiles to
Block III configuration would be $312 million, which would include
$1.53 million per missile and a one-time non-recurring cost of $32.4
million. However, as Tactical Tomahawk (Block IV) missiles began low
rate initial production in fiscal year 2002, and will be in full rate
production in fiscal year 2004, it would be more cost effective to
increase procurement quantities of the more capable Block IV missile
than to pay significantly more to convert the older TLAM-N missiles to
Block III configuration.
[Whereupon, at 4:53 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]